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LAND REFORM AND PEASANT DIFFERENTIATION
IN TWO SOUTHERN DISTRICTS OF PERU

by

Christiane Paponnet-Cantat
B.A., University of British Columbia
M.A., Simon Fraser University

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department of
Sociology and Anthropology

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Simon Fraser University
August 1989

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NAME: Christiane Paponnet-Cantat
DEGREE: Ph.D. (Anthropology)
TITLE OF THESIS: Land Reform and Peasant Differentiation in Two Southern Districts of Peru
EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
CHAIR: Karl Peter

Marilyn Gates
Senior Supervisor

Mary Lee Stearns

Michael Kenny

Benjamin Orlove
External Examiner
Division of Environmental Studies
University of California at Davis

DATE APPROVED: August 23, 1989
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Land Reform and Peasant Differentiation in Two Southern Districts of Peru

____________________________________
Author: Christiane Paponnet-Cantat

____________________________________
August 25, 1989
Abstract

Macro-level research on state efforts to nationalize and internationalize the agriculture of developing nations tends to indicate that an overall process of growing peasant differentiation ensues. However, micro-level study of the dynamics of such transformations, such as this investigation of the impact of the 1969 Peruvian land reform on two Andean smallholding districts, shows that state interventionism can lead to re-peasantization instead of differentiation, depending on the specific historical and contemporary context.

Ethnographic and archival research was conducted in the districts of Marangani and Ccapacmarca in the department of Cusco between 1983 and 1986. Pre-reform information was obtained from village records, archival documents and published manuscripts. Post-reform data come from surveys, participant-observation and interviews with peasants, landlords and cooperative workers.

Results indicate that the creation of a collective Sociedad Agrícola de Interés Social (SAIS) in Marangani for alpaca wool export has led to complex peasant differentiation. In this region where herding predominates over agriculture, high plateau shepherds have become low paid wage labourers for the collective. Members of SAIS cropping communities are tied to their land but increasingly impoverished, requiring supplementary cash employment for subsistence. However, herding settlements exhibit growing intra-community differentiation, as alpaca raising permits some capital accumulation. Meanwhile, in the domestic food producing sector of Ccapacmarca, the state has re-peasantized the district by augmenting individual holdings. In this district, indigenous landlords and state agents such as teachers and
rural police have been able to continue their exploitation of the peasantry. *Ccapacmarca* are increasingly marginalized as the elite resort to rustling to dispossess smallholders and perpetuate the pre-reform ideological order through control of education.

Conclusions indicate that Andean peasant marginalization is not caused primarily by landlessness but by power structures inhibiting productivity. Initially, Peru’s military seemed genuinely committed to social reform. However, political will for radical change has gradually disappeared as evidenced by both President Belaúnde’s and President García’s counter-insurgency responses to recent rural unrest. Escalating violence since 1983 underscores the gap between the government’s promises and actual performance. The Andean peasants’ long-standing call for greater autonomy and recognition in the Peruvian nation-state continues to be thwarted.
A Jacques et Odette, mes parents et à Christopher, mon compagnon.
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Table of Contents

Chapters

Approval ii
Abstract iii
Dedication v
Acknowledgements vi
List of Tables x
List of Figures xii

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
1. The Scope of the Project 1
2. Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions 6
3. Documentation 9
   a. Ministry of Agriculture 9
   b. Departmental Archives - Cusco 10
   c. Newspapers 10
   d. Unpublished Documents 11
   e. Published Documents 11
4. Fieldwork Data Collection 12
   a. Introduction to the Field and Fieldwork Problems 13
   b. Participant-Observation 17
   c. Survey Questionnaires 17
   d. Interviews 20
5. Organization of the Thesis 20

Chapter 2: Review of the Literature
1. Development of Concepts and Methods in Andean Research 22
   a. Indigenismo and the Creation of an Andean Discipline 24
   b. Ethnohistory: The destruction of the Andean Myth 29
   c. Critical Theoretic Approaches 38
2. Peasant: a Redifinition 39
   a. Modernization and Peasant Society 39
   b. Dependency and Marxism 44
   c. Towards a Historical Materialist View: Mode of Production 50
   d. Challenges Within Marxism 58
3. Summary 67

Chapter 3: The Economic History of The Provincias Altas
1. Introduction to the Region 69
   a. Physical Characteristics 69
   b. Socio-Economic Setting of Canchis and Chumbivilcas 75
## Chapter 4: Land Reform: The Aggrandizement of the State

1. **State Interventionism in Agriculture**
2. **Process of Land Reform Implementation**
   - a. Expropriation
   - b. Compensation
   - c. Judicial Reform
   - d. Eligibility
3. **The New Role of the State**
   - a. Price Control Policies
   - b. New Forms of State Control Over the Rural Sector
   - c. The State and Peasant Communities
   - d. *Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Mobilización Social*
4. **Achievements of the Reform**
   - a. Effects on Production
   - b. Deepening Political Crisis: The Rise of Popular Movements
   - c. APRA and the Rural Sector
5. **Enforceability of the Reform in Chumbivilcas and Canchis**
   - a. Pattern of Land Ownership Prior to Reform
   - b. The New Land Tenure Structure
   - c. Adjudication
   - d. Impact of reform
   - e. Landlords' Counter-Reform Measures
6. **Summary**

## Chapter 5: Changing Land Tenure, Unchanging Social Relations in Ccapacmarca

1. **Location and Setting of the District of Ccapacmarca**
2. **Case Study: The Community of Ccapacmarca**
   - a. Annual Farming Calendar
   - b. Labour and Animal Exchange Systems Amongst Peasants
3. **Effects of Land Reform on the Tenurial System**
   - a. Expropriation
   - b. Post-Reform Household Land Tenure
   - c. Crop Production
   - d. Livestock Production
4. **Elite's Counter-Offensives**
   - a. Rustling
   - b. Outside Employment: An Unpromising Economic Alternative
   - c. Education and *Gamonalismo*
5. **Summary**
# Chapter 6: Livestock Collectives as Agribusiness: The Case of Marangani

1. General Setting of Marangani 206
2. The Creation of SAIS Marangani 211
   a. Organization of the SAIS 213
   b. Economic Performance 217
   c. Production Constraints 225
3. Crop Farming Communities: The Case of Llallahui 232
   a. Tenancy and Petty Proprietorship 238
   b. Peasant Production Constraints 240
   c. Diversification of Household Incomes and Strategies 250
4. Herding Communities: The Case of Quisini 254
5. Inequality Within the SAIS: Potential for Conflict 261
   a. Splits Among the Peasantry 261
   b. Sex Relations 264
6. Summary 267

# Chapter 7: Conclusions

1. Observations on the SAIS Model 269
2. Observations Derived From Capacmarca's Case Study 274
3. Implications of the Reform for Peru 276
4. Peasant Differentiation Under Peripheral Capitalism 277
5. Recent Trends 279

Appendices 281
Glossary 292
Bibliography 296
# List of Tables

1. Non-Agricultural Activities in Marangani, 1971 
2. Indian Households According to Fiscal Distinction in the Colonial Parishes of Marangani and Ccapacmarca 
3. Non-Indian Population in the *Partido* of Chumbivilcas, 1786 
4. Number of Haciendas in the Department of Cusco: 1756-1786 
5. Types of Landowners in Chumbivilcas and Canas/Canchis, 1682 
6. Labour Composition in the Haciendas of the Parish of Ccapacmarca, 1826, 1839 and 1850 
7. Peasant Uprisings Between 1901 and 1930 
8. Peru's Total Land Allocation Under the Land Reform 
9. Land Tenure in the *Provincias Altas*, 1961 
10. Land Ownership: Estates of 500 hectares and Above, Canchis and Chumbivilcas 
11. Forms of Adjudication: Zone X, Cusco 
12. Economic Units Belonging to PIAR Marangani 
13. Annual Funding per Province in the *Provincias Altas* 
14. Agricultural Production Growth (in Metric Tons) in Cusco 
15. Livestock Production in Cusco Between 1967 and 1980 
16. Ccapacmarca, Maize Annual Cycle 
17. Ccapacmarca, Number of Plots per Household Including Fallow, 1984 
18. Ccapacmarca, Estimated Landholding Pattern Per Household Without Adjudicated Plots 
19. Size of Landholdings in Ccapacmarca, 1984 
20. Ccapacmarca, Average Maize and Potato Production per Household Unit in 1984 
22. Ccapacmarca, Barter Rate for Maize, 1984
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Capacmarca, Sheep and Cattle Production by Number of Holdings</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Pre-Post Reform Livestock Production in the District of Capacmarca</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Capacmarca, Composition of Seasonal Migration in 1983</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Capacmarca, A Two Month Survey of Teachers' Work Schedule</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>Marangani, Livestock Production Prior to Reform</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Marangani, Decapitalization of Four Livestock Haciendas Prior to Reform</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>Marangani, Land Expropriation in 1973</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>SAIS Marangani, Yearly Production of SAIS Sheep and Alpaca</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>SAIS Marangani, Livestock Production, 1982</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>SAIS Marangani, Pastoral Labour Force</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>SAIS Marangani, Crop Production, 1978-79</td>
<td>224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Llallahui, Household Land Distribution</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Llallahui, Landholdings and Crop Cultivation for 12 Households</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>Llallahui, Annual Yield of Major Crops for 12 Households</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>Llallahui, Projection of Yield/hectare of Three Major Crops</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>Llallahui, Percentage of Animal Stock per Household Prior to Reform, 1966</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Llallahui, Land and Animal Stock in 12 Households</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Llallahui Main Expenditure Items Among 12 Households</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>Llallahui, Revenue From Domestic Economy, 1982-3</td>
<td>249</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Llallahui, Cash Income Available to Residents, 1983</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>Llallahui, Economic Categories of Male Household Heads, 1969</td>
<td>251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Quisini, Pre- and Post-reform Plot and Herd Sizes</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Cash Grants Allocated to the Communities, 1975-1981</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Marangani, Illiteracy Rate by Age Groups in 1982</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### List of Figures

1. Peru 3
2. The Four *Provincias Altas* 3
3. Canchis Province 72
4. Province of Chumbivilcas 74
5. Marangani, Non-agricultural Activities 77
6. The Landlady of Percasenqa in 1984 110
7. Province of Chumbivilcas 162
8. View of the *Altiplano* near Ccapacmarca 163
9. Aerial Photograph of Ccapacmarca 166
10. Ccapacmarcaños in 1984 168
11. *Chakitacilla* or Andean Foot Plow 171
12. Ccapacmarca, Peasants Working in their Potato Field 175
13. Ccapacmarca, Potato Yield per Plot 175
14. Southern Vilcanota Valley Settlements 208
15. SAIS Marangani 214
16. Puna Shepherds and their *Waqcho* Herds 221
17. Aerial Photograph of Llallahui and Quisini 233
18. Panoramic View of the Vilcanota Valley Near Llallahui 234
19. A Llallahui Peasant Family 236
20. Women Drinking During Carnival 255
CHAPTER 1

Introduction to the Study

Since the 1950s, successive Peruvian governments have given priority to land reform policies in an effort to improve agricultural production and to set in motion a process of self-sustained industrial development. However, the country's foreign debt and external dependence have contributed to considerable economic and political instability. In 1969 increased pressure on the available land and potential violence led the Velasco military government to introduce major tenurial change by creating rural cooperatives and by redistributing land to peasant communities and ex-hacienda tenants. Yet, in spite of this radical effort, highland standards of living and peasant production continue to worsen. In an attempt to better understand the growing impoverishment of Andean small farmers, this thesis examines the impact on social relations of Peru's 1969 agrarian reform program as encountered in two specific rural situations of the southern Andes.

1-Scope of the Project

This thesis explores to what extent state interventionism in agriculture has affected existing patterns of social differentiation in two districts of the department of Cusco. Following Bernstein (1981:12), the study postulates that agrarian reform programs are state mechanisms that tend to promote the incorporation of the peasantry further into commodity relations. The state acts as a mediator in the historical expansion of capitalism and, consequently, becomes a major agency of changing social relations. It is important, thus, to comprehend under what circumstances state strategies accelerate capitalist penetration, promote socio-economic differentiation or encourage re-peasantization and whether such programs lead to either proletarianization or marginalization. Specific questions are addressed: 1) Have land reform policies affected differently social relations in regions
producing for domestic consumption and those producing for export? 2) To what extent has the reform hastened or inhibited capitalist development at the local level? 3) Have reform measures reversed, retarded, or encouraged new forms of socio-economic class differentiation?, and 4) In which way have state policies laid the foundation for additional violence in the countryside?

Based on two detailed, historically-grounded case studies, the present work shows that the reform has intensified Peru’s ties with the agro-export system. This resulted in an increased marginalization of smallholders. This trend toward increased marginalization is, in some instances, related to growing differentiation among the peasantry without necessary eviction from their land and, in others, to re-peasantization. Through detailed empirical analyses of the dynamics of local economies under the impact of new structures, this study examines the circumstances which have led to either de-peasantization or re-peasantization of Peru’s smallholding sector.

Fieldwork for this study was conducted in southern Cusco (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Two main reasons motivated my choice of Cusco as a research area. First and foremost, this department depends largely upon agriculture. Though only 5.17 per cent of its territory (7,622,459 hectares) is fit for cultivation, some 57 per cent of Cusco’s economically active population are still engaged in subsistence farming and animal raising as opposed to a national average of roughly 30 per cent (Villasante, 1981:7). A further indication of the importance of agriculture in the region is that Cusco has one of the highest numbers of officially recognized peasant communities each having a legal identity and an administrative local council (604 in 1986)\(^1\). Second, though fully integrated into peripheral capitalism since the nineteenth century, southern Cusco is one of the most underdeveloped regions in

\(^1\) The overwhelming majority of Cusco’s rural population is comuneros or members of indigenous peasant communities (64 per cent according to Ccori, 1981:3).
Figure 1. Peru

Figure 2. The Four Provinces of Cuzco, Cusco
Peru with a long tradition of peasant unrest. To improve the standard of living of the rural population and to prevent political turmoil Cusco, with Junín, became a major reformed centre after the passing of President Velasco's land reform in 1969.

The districts selected for intensive research, Ccapacmarca and Marangani, belong to the *provincias altas* ². This frontier area falls within the boundaries of the four high plateau provinces of southern Cusco - Chumbivilcas, Canchis, Canas and Espinar (see Figure 2). The districts under study belong to the first and second provinces respectively.

Ccapacmarca and Marangani are typical of the *provincias altas* in terms of landholding sizes and patterns of agro-pastoral production. Further, they share ecological and cultural characteristics. Both are high altitude, Quechua speaking regions practicing a similar type of agriculture. Farm plots are small (less than two hectares) and cultivation is primarily based on the use of individual tools especially the foot plow or *chakitaclla*. In both districts, pre-reform agrarian structures consisted roughly of a mixture of privately owned animal raising ranches plus a large number of small farms under peasant tenure.

Two social groups can be identified. Quechua speaking peasants are numerically dominant (64% according to Ccori, 1981:3) but referred to by the opposite group as commoners or "indios" (Indians). Meanwhile, mestizos (mixed-blood) rule local affairs and include schoolteachers, merchants, and landowners (gamonales). The difference between these two groups is expressed along racial lines yet their relation is primarily one of class derived from the domination of the rural Andes by larger society. Ethnic status is a question of "social race" based on class distinctions since Peru's population is of mixed-blood including cholos and mestizos (Stein, 1984:289; Piel, 1970:108).

² In Peru, departments (above), provinces (in the middle) and districts (at the bottom) are part of a three-level, centralized administrative organization.
Economically, capitalist relations of production have been increasingly extended in these two districts. Starting in the nineteenth century, cattle and sheep raising in Ccapacmarca and alpaca wool production for export in Marangani have developed at the expense of basic food crops for peasant households. Insufficient land and capital have constantly forced small cultivators to seek employment in urban centres. Clearly, thus, this southern region forms an integral part of peripheral capitalism as evidenced by factors such as its limited internal market, the declining production of basic food crops and increasing reliance upon commodity production.

However, Ccapacmarca and Marangani have differed considerably with regard to their historical integration into Peru's capitalism. As we will see, since colonial times, the economy of Ccapacmarca has remained tied to domestic meat production while that of Marangani, starting in the mid-1800s, became part of the international wool trade. Subsequently, Ccapacmarca's despotic landed class ruled over purely local affairs, while Marangani's large estate owners became more nationally-oriented, absentee landlords playing a less significant role in village affairs (Orlove, 1977b).

The reformist policies of the 1968 military government tended to reinforce such local differences. Following the 1969 land reform, in Marangani the government created a rural collective called sociedad agrícola de interés social or SAIS (Social Interest Agrarian Society) to promote alpaca raising. Under such an arrangement, ex-hacienda tenants (feudatorios) became direct members of a SAIS organized into production units (sectores de producción). Each unit acquired one collective voting membership to represent its workers but its land remained the ownership of the SAIS administration. Meanwhile, free-holding communities within the same area were affiliated to the SAIS and, though not directly involved in the production process, received rights to SAIS surplus and decision making.
SAIS Marangani encompasses forty three adjoining haciendas and eleven nearby valley communities. All permanent SAIS shepherds are ex-hacienda tenants now living in seven production units in the high plateaus. Each affiliated valley community (comunidad) has received one collective membership, meaning that it is entitled to receive part of the SAIS profit for infrastructural improvement.

In contrast to Marangani, the district of Ccapacmarca engaged in domestic foodstuff production and, excluded from the international trade market, was not integrated into any collective. However, because of earlier peasant revolts in the area, the government expropriated several livestock raising estates and returned to local communities parcels of land that had been lost to these encroaching haciendas. In the process, former hacienda tenants (feudatorios) received permanent rights to plots that, in the past, they rented from local landowners.

Thus, differences in production orientation were key variables in determining the nature of state reform policies. Because of its long tradition of alpaca wool export, Marangani was integrated into a SAIS to promote livestock expansion. No SAIS were created in Ccapacmarca, but adjudication played a crucial role due to previous peasant unrest.

2-Theoretical and Methodological Assumptions

In this thesis, Andean peasants are defined as a historically constituted and politically dominated social category of small scale producers who attempt to reproduce themselves through capital and agriculture. The social relations of production that characterize their economy form an integral part of capitalism. Analytically, these peasants are located within a set of socio-political structures buttressed by the state and the world economy. Thus, they operate within the uneven development of peripheral capitalism
which tie them to the international capitalist system through relations of commodity
production and exchange.

Conceptually, this thesis does not find support for the model of agrarian transition
whereby capitalism rapidly "de-peasantizes" the peasantry - a model which entails the
formation of only two new classes: a rich peasant class from which capitalist farmers may
potentially emerge and a landless rural proletariat (Lenin, 1899/1964). As well, this work
challenges the point of view that homogeneity of the peasantry and stability in the economic
organization of the peasant household would prevent capitalist development
(Chayanov, 1925/1966). Rather, it argues that, under the effect of the intensification of
commodity relations, Andean peasants can become either more internally differentiated or,
actually, re-peasantized depending upon concrete sets of circumstances. In all cases,
however, and in agreement with authors such as Caballero (1984:29) and Shanin
(1983:71), agrarian transition in peripheral economies likely means further marginalization
through exploitation of wage labour and population surplus rather than the complete
expropriation of smallholders from the land.

Methodologically, the relationship existing between Andean peasants and the state
is examined from a political economy perspective that combines macro-structural processes
with micro-social phenomena. An ethnographic, micro-level analysis helps us comprehend
the actual workings of the capitalist system and the concrete reality of Andean peasantry.
Also it enables us to establish empirically whether different kinds of peasantries are, under
specific circumstances, created in the Andes. For, as it will be argued in Chapter 2, we
cannot adequately speculate on the fate of the peasantry in abstract terms because it is
increasingly evident that capitalist transformation of agriculture is primarily an empirical
question. An anthropological approach highlights regional variations and provides a view
of social phenomena from the bottom up.
A macro-structural analysis enables an understanding of the objective social and economic conditions shaping the historical relationship between Andean people and the evolving world system starting in the sixteenth century. This methodological tool is essential for studying the ways in which constantly shifting relations of production and worldwide exchange have conditioned the organization of Andean society over time. Thus, it is my understanding that the nature and direction of Peru’s contemporary southern peasantry is rooted in the historical specificity of the development of the provincias altas. A macro-structural approach also helps refute some traditional myths about Andean peasant goals and actions. For example, the historical analysis of Canchis and Chumbivilcas presented in Chapter 3 shows that peasants were not passive by-standers or automatically resistant to forces of change. Peasant movements which, in the past, accompanied colonialism and, later, the development of commercial agriculture were generally not inspired by a desire to return to a pre-colonial, typically Andean mode of life. On the contrary, in many instances peasants simply reacted to the rural elite’s overt attempts to block their efforts at entering into the national economy. These examples demonstrate that peasants may fight for their autonomy when better alternatives exist in the market - an aspect not to be ignored in peasant studies.

Throughout this thesis, an intra-regional comparative approach is used to unveil the diversity of situations and the varying social consequences of national reform strategies in local economies. The intra-regional comparative method is particularly useful in this work as it avoids treating the provincias altas as a homogenous spatial entity. Though these high-plateau provinces share common ecological and cultural features, their historical and economic evolution have differed markedly. Intra-regional comparison permits emphasis of the uniqueness of local patterns of development and better comprehension of internal socio-structural relations that may produce variations within regions. By comparing both areas, this study highlights differences as well as similarities and, thus, can
meaningfully contribute to Andean regional analysis. Though restricted to a specific
geographic area, this intra-regional comparative study hopes that by placing local
development within national contexts it raises problems of general significance for Peru as a
whole and, as such, can clarify the current agrarian crisis.

The data that form the basis for this thesis come from a combination of secondary
sources and direct field research based upon survey methods, observation and interviews.
Background bibliographical work was carried out at Simon Fraser University in British
Columbia during the writing of my MA thesis between 1981 and 1982. The actual
Altogether, seventeen months were spent in southern Cusco.

3-Documentation

a-Ministry de Agriculture - Sicuani

This archive is found at the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani, the capital town of
Canchis which is also the administrative centre of the high provinces of Cusco. It contains
communications concerning pre-reform land conflict, land claims, violations of property
and petitions from community members dating back to the turn of the century and beyond.
This was a valuable source of information for the thesis. Notarial records, letters and
requests by various individuals or groups addressed to the prefect or political authorities
residing in Lima and Cusco, provided a unique perspective on past village living
conditions, labour relations and conflicts. Such documents have also shed light on local-
level political relations including abuses of power.

In addition, this office housed census schedules sent by each community to the
Ministry of Agriculture at the time of its application for an officially recognized status prior
to the 1969 reform. These schedules, which contained specific socio-economic data,
provided useful information on household economy prior to reform. As McClintock states, to determine the agent of change adequate research design requires data on both the "before" condition ("baseline data") and the "after" (1981:85). Though the reliability of such data is methodologically questionable, they do help understand the background of peasant communities.

b-Departmental Archives - Cusco (ADC)

In the archives of Cusco, there exists a set of revenue record books itemizing indigenous tax payers during the colonial period. Their use augmented my historical perspective and understanding of Indian/state relations and members and non-members relations in the provinces of Chumbivilcas and Canas/Canchis. While the possibility of errors must be kept in mind, archival data none the less give us an idea of past rural society.

These archives also contain a large body of human geography theses written in the 1940s and 1950s by Cusqueño students. Such descriptive essays offered extensive details on systems of production, technology and customs and provide some useful insight into pre-reform social relations in rural Cusco.

c-Newspapers

In Cusco, I relied on local newspaper archives to collect data on peasant land seizures in the period of 1959-1964 that took place in the high provinces of Cusco. The following newspaper sources were used: La Voz Rebelde (Cusco), 1959-1964; El Comercio (Cusco), 1959-1964 and El Expreso (Cusco), 1959-1964.
Recent theses written in the 1980s by students from the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco have been an important source of information. Taken together they provided a considerable body of regional substantive data. For example, since 1980 the university has been working in Chumbivilcas in collaboration with a Dutch-Peruvian socio-economic project (Instituto de Investigaciones UNSAAC-NUFFIC) headed by Professor Marco Villassante from the Anthropology Department at the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco. Their studies have focused upon Charamuray, a peasant community only a few kilometers away from the district of Ceapamarca. One of their students, Serafino Monje, in 1985 completed a thesis on Ccapacmarca entitled "Estructura económica de la comunidad campesina: caso Ccapacmarca, Chumbivilcas". His work has been a helpful complement to my own and the validity of his data was cross-checked in my research by the application of my own questionnaires.

I used several published manuscripts written by micro-regional development project agencies including the Dutch-Peru Project, the Government's Support Project for Agricultural Development in Chumbivilcas (Proyecto Apoyo al Desarrollo Agropecuario de la Provincia de Chumbivilcas) and the International Cooperation Center for Agricultural Development (Centre International de Coopération pour le Développement Agricole). These documents come from technicians and social scientists who have worked over a period of several years in Chumbivilcas. Their information on that province tends to be more up to date than official statistics.
4-Fieldwork Data Collection

The scheduling of fieldwork, partially governed by funding, was as follows. From December 1982 to mid-May 1983, the study began with one month in Lima and one month in Cusco establishing contacts, field orientation and screening interpreter assistants among anthropology students from the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco. Following this, I lived for four months in Llallahui near Marangani and, in May 1983, I travelled throughout the province of Chumbivilcas and paid a first visit to Colquemarca and Ccapacmarca.

The following year, I spent another four and a half months in the region including a month in Cusco, eight weeks in Sicuani and Marangani and a month in Ccapacmarca. In Ccapacmarca, we gathered socio-economic data for 210 households, a survey that one of my assistants started a month prior to my arrival in that community.

I returned to the field from February to August 1986 to conduct extensive archival research in Cusco, Sicuani, and Santo Tomas - the capital town of Chumbivilcas. Whenever possible, I paid return visits to Marangani and Llallahui. However, a prolonged stay in these communities was not possible due to both a serious field injury and an unstable political climate which made individual fieldwork increasingly risky in the region.

The study greatly relied on empirical research in each site. Besides case history, I used participant observation and intensive surveys of sample households. To carry out field investigation, I hired three local ex-students (two men and one woman) who had studied anthropology at the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco. All were bilingual Quechua-Spanish speakers familiar with the socio-cultural context of the regions. One male assistant had a solid background in agricultural survey techniques. He had conducted previous research on Andean production systems with the NUFFIC and worked in Canas with a
team of foreign Anthropologists in the mid-1970s. His knowledge of local farming enabled us to check more accurately the data collected and to judge whether the information could correspond to what would be normally produced by a household.

The other male assistant worked at SAIS Marangani where he had personal connections. I felt that in order to gain satisfactory research results in the collective, it was important that the personnel of the enterprise previously knew the researcher. All three assistants received a salary, living and travelling expenses and had free access to the data we collected. I opted for a small team approach as I felt that it would be extremely difficult for a foreigner to obtain the necessary information over short periods of time. I communicated with my assistants in Spanish while their fluency in the native Quechua language greatly facilitated my initial contacts with villagers. Further, the presence of my female assistant in Llallahui was extremely helpful and not threatening to peasants. She encouraged their cooperation and responsiveness. In the thesis, all informants have been given fictitious names.

Introduction to the Field and Fieldwork Problems

In the summer of 1981, I was among the Simon Fraser University students going to Peru for nine weeks as part of the Latin American Field School program. We stayed one week in Cusco and one month in Ayacucho conducting research in two villages, Quinua and Santa Rosa de Cochabamba, while attending classes at the University of Huamanga. This sojourn in Ayacucho was extremely valuable for my studies inasmuch as it enabled me to collect empirical material for my MA thesis and permitted contacts with local authorities for an eventual return to Peru for doctoral research.

The following year, however, Ayacucho's political situation had greatly deteriorated with Sendero Luminoso guerilla warfare making any field research impossible in the region. Forced by circumstances to chose a quieter site, I opted for Cusco where land
reform expropriations had been extensive. Upon arrival in Cusco at the end of 1982, Professor Marco Ugarte who had previously conducted anthropological research in Quisini - one of the communities belonging to SAIS Marangani - advised me to work there; he warned nevertheless, "Quisini members are rebellious and often suspicious of outsiders".

On January 2 1983, my female assistant and I travelled by train to Marangani, then on foot to Quisini. Unfortunately, two days later, village leaders informed us that residents were feeling uneasy about our presence and would prefer us to leave soon. Early the next morning, we left Quisini and, on foot, reached nearby Llallahui. There, peasants were in mourning after the suicide of a woman. We were informed that this would be a cause of future calamities to befall the community. Subsequently, during our four month sojourn in Llallahui, seven persons died in sometimes abnormal circumstances - an unusually high number for such a small settlement. Nevertheless, upon arrival, we received a cordial welcome from Don Pedro, the community president who later became my spiritual relative or compadre 3. That is, after the accidental death of his wife, Doña Marcella, I became the sponsor or godmother of his younger son, Victor, who was fourteen. Don Pedro let us stay in the village and accepted that, in return for his hospitality, we would assist the community: my assistant would help peasants with book keeping while I, being also a registered nurse, would aid the ill.

A storage room in the casa communal (community centre), located in the middle of the village near the Cusco-Puno unpaved highway, became our permanent rent-free home. It was a small adobe room with no furniture, a dirt floor and a corrugated roof. Given that it was the rainy season, the inside was dark, cold and damp. As a result, I spent my first week in bed suffering from an acute case of pneumonia. Our cooking arrangement consisted of two light meals, breakfast and dinner cooked at home on a small kerosene

3 Names of individuals are pseudonyms.
stove. Lunch was prepared by an elderly woman who owned one of the several village stores.

By the second week of our sojourn, we began working on Questionnaire 1. This enabled us to visit each household and converse with its residents. Within a month, we felt accepted. In February, one male assistant joined us to collect detailed agricultural data. Upon arrival, he stayed at the president's house. Shortly thereafter, however, a tragic incident took place in that family which almost put an end to our project. It happened during Q'ashwaspan - the walking and dancing period ending Carnival. In the southern provinces of Cusco, a particularly high incidence of deaths takes place during Carnival when people allow withheld frustrations to surface.

In the early morning of February 16 1983, Doña Marcella, the president's wife, her two teenage sons, George and Victor, and my field assistant walked to Quisini to pay a visit to the family's godparents. On the way, Doña Marcella, suddenly very sick, fell unconcerned onto the ground. Within minutes, the same thing happened to her sons. The mother died soon after but, fortunately, the boys survived.

Though only a witness to this terrible murder (poisoning) committed by one of the victim's brothers, my assistant had to leave immediately for personal safety until villagers became convinced of his innocence. This experience, however, profoundly affected the morale of our team and jeopardized the project as a climate of suspicion set in for some time. In the course of my stay, I was nevertheless able to regain the villagers' trust through

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4 A neighbour's child, who paid frequent visits to the family, put poison into the breakfast plates of each member. He received the equivalent of $US 10.00 from the victim's brother to perform this criminal act. My assistant, who ate alone in the bedroom, was spared. The day it happened, the president working as usual in Chectuyoc was not home. The young boy, at first not fully aware of what he was doing, later confessed of the role he played in the murder to the victim's sons. During my stay in Llallahu, I was fortunate that Don Pedro's family fully trusted me and shared with me whatever information they knew concerning this murder.
my nursing activities (which I practiced in my room every day from 6-8 am and 5-8 pm) an aid that peasants highly appreciated. This permitted completion of the research project.

Another difficulty arose in 1984, on the day of my return to SAIS Marangani from Canada. It was the celebration of the enterprise's tenth anniversary. Invited to attend the fiesta by the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani, I arrived the very same day that a drunken policeman shot a young SAIS member. This unfortunate incident caused consternation in Marangani and again a climate of suspicion developed with residents refusing to speak with outsiders. Further, widespread corruption within the SAIS was making any investigation very touchy and, as a foreign researcher, I was the target of mistrust. In 1984, unable to conduct research myself at the SAIS, I relied on a research associate who, through his influential uncle, received permission to work at the SAIS.

In Ccapacmarca, my stay was shorter, but facilitated by the fact that my assistant in the community was also a teacher. During the four weeks I spent in the field, I rented a room in an adobe house near the village center. I had no kitchen facilities and took all my meals at the para-medical agent's home who I helped occasionally. When I arrived, Ccapacmarcanos informed me that the school badly needed an English teacher as this subject is compulsory though useless to youngsters who can barely understand Spanish. However, this opportunity to teach English for two hours a day allowed me to collect data on social networks existing amongst local school teachers. Research on land reform, interviews and socializing took place in the afternoons and on weekends.

Field investigation relied on three basic research instruments. These were: a) participant observation; b) survey questionnaires and c) interviews. A brief discussion of

For example, it was only reluctantly that the accounting service gave us access to data that they knew would be used in my doctoral dissertation. The enterprise budget for 1981 is found in Appendix and provides the basis for rating its performance.
these techniques will provide the necessary framework to evaluate the data and conclusions presented in this thesis.

b-Participant Observation

During my stay in the communities, my assistants and I were able to share in the life of the residents, participate and observe daily activities and go to general assemblies where land issues were often discussed and political conflicts came into the open. A great deal of field work involved casual conversations, home visits and participation in many farm activities such as harvesting and food processing. In addition, I paid frequent visits to weekly market fairs held in Sicuani and to local rural stores so that I would remain informed on price change. Field notes document all of these activities.

In Llallahui, every morning I accompanied my female assistant during household interviews. While she administered the questionnaire, I would take notes, make observations and encourage the respondent to clarify responses or elaborate on issues that emerged during the discussion. Visits generally took two hours.

In Ccapacmarca, the student anthropologist I contracted had worked with me in Llallahui the previous year and was now teaching in the community. He began formal interviews two months prior to my arrival in 1984. This saved me valuable time in the field as that year my stay in Peru was limited to four and half months of research.

c-Survey Questionnaires

Provided that any study of peasant production systems calls for detailed information on farm operations, I considered questionnaires an appropriate method for obtaining specific economic data. Combined with participant observation, surveys thus helped me gather a wealth of quantitative material. However, socio-economic information were based on the respondents' recalled data of their own yields - evidently a technique with a certain
degree of error. Thus, a margin of measurement error must be accepted as this method was
the only available way to collect a large body of data within a relatively short time and
within the limits of my resources.

I used a first set of questionnaires (Questionnaire 1) to sample all households in
Llallahui. This way I have a complete enumeration of the community as well as general
information on land tenure, crops, herd size, average weekly expenditure and luxury items.
Also, certain sets of questions focused on people's attitudes towards the SAIS. This first
survey helped me gain an idea of the economic position of the residents and was used as a
starting point for designing a more rigorous questionnaire (Questionnaire 2) that would
seek to obtain precise data on production, consumption and marketing.

Questionnaire 2 was applied to a random sample of 12 per cent of the residents. To
choose the sample, Questionnaire 1 had been arranged numerically according to the date of
the interview and I drew the respondents by a set of random numbers. Questionnaire 2
contained specific items on land use according to cropping pattern, crop yield,
consumption, marketing and on the hiring and exchange of labour. This questionnaire also
recorded the disposition of the crops harvested in 1983 showing the quantity used for
family consumption. It indicated the amount purchased in order to meet household
subsistence needs and provided information on the operating expenditures including seeds,
fertilizer and veterinary medicine as well as data on actual livestock transactions in 1983.
This schedule, designed to gain a more accurate picture of Llallahui's household resources,
was of critical importance to the thesis as it allowed a construction of individual household
budgets.

At the headquarters of SAIS Marangani, we conducted a short random survey to
probe workers' attitudes toward the enterprise (Questionnaire 3). In terms of procedure, the
sample represented 22.5 % of those on the 1984 SAIS payroll (204 employées
including the administration). Type of employment was the most significant variable for choosing respondents since I wanted to gain a fair representation of a variety of occupational positions within the SAIS. It had to include herders from the production units, delegates from the communities, workers, administrators and clerks working at the headquarters. As mentioned previously, data from the SAIS were difficult to obtain because of suspicion and uncertainty arising from difficulties within the SAIS. Employees were not very talkative, thus, we limited ourselves to interviewing only those most willing to cooperate.

In Ccapacmarca, I was unable to enumerate all of the some 430 households of the community, but succeeded in sampling 210 domestic units or 49 per cent of the total population (Questionnaire 4). For practical reasons, location became the major criterion. I chose to focus the sample on households located not too far from the centre of the village, that is, no more than a couple of hours walking distance. This survey covered household membership, number of parcels, crop production and herd size. Its aim was to gather detailed information on the amount of land that community members had access to through land reform, inheritance or purchase. The survey also focused on seed input and harvested yields. This aspect of the questionnaire was vital to an understanding of output per hectare of the two major crops (maize and potato) grown within the community. The survey also garnered information on the size of livestock in the household. Though, on the whole, the questionnaire was less broad than Questionnaire 1 used in Llallahui, it was more specific and its reduced size made it more manageable to apply on a large scale within a short period of time.

In both communities, it was always a challenge to obtain reliable information on production, sale and expenditures because of peasants' frequent reluctance to discuss openly personal matters or to remember specific information. Furthermore, units of measurement could often be imprecise leading to approximation which I have cross-referenced with other
findings and sources whenever possible. Errors could also have occurred in translation form Quechua to Spanish (and vice versa). However, the aim was reached as I wanted to collect detailed information for a reasonably good approximation of the peasant economy so that the setting within which the Andean farm operated could be established.

d-Interviews

In Marangani, every opportunity was taken to engage in formal and/or informal discussions with employees of the SAIS or the Ministry of Agriculture on issues pertaining to the collective enterprise. These interviews were open-ended and flexible as it was felt that this would give better access to unexpected material. In Ccapacmarca, informal conversations with local informants were recorded shedding light on local politics and the peasant land-invasions of the 1960s. In both Llallahui and Ccapacmarca, my male assistant conducted taped interviews on the cultivation of the major crops including maize, potatoes, wheat and beans. All field interviews were taped in Quechua and transcribed in Spanish the same day. The various interviews on which this thesis relies are listed in the appendix.

5-Organization of the Thesis

The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the predominant theoretical paradigms analyzing Andean agrarian society during the last three decades. In doing so, it focuses upon the continuing theoretical debate pertaining to the persistence or maintenance of non-capitalist relations and forms of production in regions integrated into the world economy.

Chapter 3 begins with an ecological description of the districts under study. The remainder of the section examines the agrarian question in Chumbivilcas and Canchis from the colonial period onwards. It examines the role of the state in the indigenous populations and the ways in which the creation of an export-dependent agriculture transformed relations
This chapter traces the historical roots of regional variations and brings forth the relations between past and current agrarian conflict as contemporary situations often embody earlier antagonism.

Chapter 4 sets out the parameters of Peruvian agriculture and, then, outlines the changes proposed by the Velasco military government delineating the technicalities of the reform and reviewing the framework within which the new law operated. An overall assessment of the land reform is offered. Particular attention is paid to the ways in which the program was implemented in the two regions under study.

Chapters 5 and 6 take an ethnographic approach assessing the effects of varying reformist policies on the local economies of the studied districts. Detailed socio-economic data permit an evaluation of the aftermath of the reform on production and social relations. Research shows that in agro-export valleys such as Marangani, the reform has further differentiated the smallholding sector while in remote Ccapacmarca, the reformist policies of the state have "re-peasantized" the subsistence sector.

To conclude, Chapter 7 argues that the land reform has led to considerable local socio-economic variations. Land redistribution combined with the elite's reactionary counter-offensives prevent unrest in Ccapacmarca while a popular anti-reform movement seems under way in southern Peru where SAISs were created.
CHAPTER 2

Review of the Literature

1-Development of Concepts and Methods in Andean Research

The fate of the peasantry during periods when agrarian-based nations are transformed into industrial economies is currently the theme of a lively debate in the social sciences. The picture emerging from studies conducted in different parts of the developing world shows that the transition process puts a great strain on small cultivators. Only a few will eventually succeed in becoming large scale commodity producers. The impoverished majority, however, will be either squeezed out of the agricultural sector, turned into rural proletarians or further marginalized by capitalism as they will barely survive on minuscule plots. Increasingly, the central issue is to know whether rapid industrialization, as experienced in Latin America, perpetuates peasant poverty possibly "by creating a rural social category which is neither a traditional peasantry nor a fully developed rural proletariat?" (Kearney, 1980:116).

The debate on the fate of the peasantry within capitalism is by no means new. It dates back to the writings of Marx (1850/1971), Lenin (1899/1964) and Chayanov (1925/1966). While Marx explained the manner in which peasants are exploited by capital and transformed into wage labourers and capitalist farmers, his usage of such terms as "potatoes in a sack" when referring to reactionary elements within the peasantry (op.cit:230) has led certain critics to state that he held an ambivalent, if not pejorative, attitude towards peasants. Harris, however, rejects such criticisms arguing that Marx made a clear distinction between "revolutionary" and "conservative" peasants. He states:

It is also clear from a careful reading of his works, that Marx's derogatory references regarding the peasantry were directed at the reactionary elements of the peasantry in certain
Lenin's writings rather than Marx's present a more elaborate class conception of the peasantry. According to Lenin, the penetration of capitalism and commodity production in agriculture leads to a rapid erosion of the peasantry through increased differentiation. In *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), Lenin traces the mechanisms of social differentiation within simple commodity production under capitalist domination to show the role this plays in creating "free" labour among small producers and in increasing commodity exchange. His model confirms the law of capitalist expansion whereby the development of a domestic market presupposes a growing mercantilization of the factors of production. "The differentiation of the peasantry is the process without which the urban capitalist market cannot develop" (Goodman and Redclift, 1982:6). Thus, proletarianization and decay of small producers and their consequent replacement by large scale farm production are seen as the inevitable outcome. In later writings, however, Lenin carefully states that this transition may be a very long one (Lehmann, 1982:4; Shanin, 1983:69).

Lenin's thesis of rural transformation has been challenged by Chayanov (1925) who laid the theoretical basis for the analysis of peasant household by arguing that the peasant farm was an economically rational undertaking capable of surviving under capitalism. He viewed differential access to resources not as a manifestation of class differentiation in the village but, rather, as an expression of families at various moments in their life cycles attempting to keep a balance between household labour and available land. Thus, in contrast to Lenin, Chayanov contended that inequality among peasant households

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1 Shanin (1983:69) mentions that Lenin's own view on the capitalist transformation of the peasantry underwent a slow change and accepted the possibility of persisting peasant traits.
could be explained by demographic differentiation - a process totally dependent on the biological cycles of the peasant family².

Before reviewing a number of theoretical contributions on patterns of contemporary peasant change influenced by the formulations of Lenin and Chayanov, this chapter will discuss some of the traditional views that have long shaped scholarly work on Peru’s countryside.

a-Indigenismo and the Creation of an Andeanist Discipline

Indigenismo was a progressive, intellectual movement of the turn of the century representing an early interest in the fate of the peasantry³. It originated in Mexico and Peru and later spread throughout Latin America. A tradition of Peruvian authors such as Gonzalez Prada, José Carlos Mariátegui, Victor Haya de la Torre and Hidebrando Castro Pozo glorified the indigenous past by postulating the existence of an ideal socialist community as represented by the Andean community or ayllu ⁴. After Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), Gonzalez Prada, an outspoken social critic, repeatedly called for a complete restructuring of Peruvian society and for the national integration of the Indians - namely, the Quechua or Aymara speaking rural population living on farms in the highlands. His thinking and ideology deeply influenced one of his younger disciples, José Carlos Mariátegui⁵. In the 1920s, this scholar was an ardent Marxist nationalist actively

Some authors such as Harrison (1977) claimed that Chayanov attempted to develop a theory of the peasant mode of production.

³ A comprehensive overview of official indígenismo in Peru is offered by Davies Jr. (1974).

⁴ In precolonial times, the ayllu was a complex notion which denoted a particular kinship unit with political significance. Here, it means the Quechua name for the surviving indigenous community.

⁵ For a biography on Mariátegui, see Chavarría (1970), and also Baines (1972).
involved in politics who brought emphasis on crucial issues concerning Peruvian society.

Some of the major themes that he developed were national integration based on indigenous heritage; land reform with elimination of the *hacienda* system and condemnation of Peru's economic dependency on foreign imperialist capitalism (Saba, 1987:19). In an attempt to solve Peru's problems of racial and cultural pluralism, he strongly defended the native community as an institution more adaptable to national socio-economic changes than the *hacienda* which he considered to be a system unfit for efficient agricultural production (Mariátegui, 1967).

To incorporate Quechua and Aymara speaking peasants into the nation, Mariátegui advocated revolution based on individual participation and on the development of traditional Andean moral and spiritual values. His nationalist revolutionary vision contended that each nation developed according to their peculiar cultural and ethnic tradition. This position had a long lasting influence on Peruvian politics inspiring Marxist intellectuals as well as politicians of varying ideologies. Even today, some of his ideas still find expression in political programs such as *Plan Inca* drafted by the military regime of General Velasco (1968-1975) and, more recently, the politics of President Alan García elected in 1985.

The themes of social change developed by Mariátegui formed the ideological basis of Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre - the founder of the political party: *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* or APRA (American Popular Revolutionary Alliance) in the 1930s. Haya also stood against *latifundismo* and favoured "Indian" integration and agrarian reform. To follow the Inca tradition of landownership, he proposed communal

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6 *Haciendas* are landed estates owned by *hacendados* and worked by tenant-workers called *colonos* who have usufructuary rights to a plot of land. Labour services take several forms: agricultural work on the land of the *hacendado*, domestic work in the landlord's house and periodic work such as clearing of the irrigation system. Generally, the *hacendado's* obligations consist of the giving of small gifts, food or coca to the tenants and the right to pasture animals on the estate land (see Long, 1977:97-98).
property or cooperatives over privately owned land (Saba, 1987:25). This ideology is still very much part of the present APRA government headed by Alan García.

Equally, Hildebrando Castro Pozo (1924), the acclaimed *indigenista* author, felt that latifundismo was an agrarian regime unable to modernize. Further, he fervently believed that the socialist *ayllu* had persisted and continued to represent the contemporary Andean community. Later, the novelist and anthropologist, José María Arguedas, who died in 1969, denounced class and ethnic oppression and became one of Peru's strongest anti-integrationist and pro-indigenous voices. The Andean population, he believed, was the only hope for Peru. As Kemper Columbus writes:

> His bifurcated battle to live between cultures brought him to fight racism and prejudicial religiosity supporting shattering repressions and degradations inflicted on the Indian populations. He fought irresponsible forms of capitalism showing themselves in Perú in "mafia" forms, that, on the international scene, rationalized the Vietnamese war of the '60's; and, on the national scene rationalized moving the Indians away from their communal societies and lands into competitive and technological market places (1986:23-4).

Though such views contributed to a romantic interpretation and an idealization of the *ayllu*, Peru's "indianist" movement had a decisive influence both on shaping land policies and on giving direction to Andean research. In other words, these early intellectuals could be regarded as the pioneers of an Andeanist discipline and ideology.

*Indígenismo* stimulated research on social change starting as early as the 1920s with Castro Pozo's study of Muquiyaupo (1924). By the mid-1940s, Kuczynski discussed the inevitable decline of the *hacienda* system in a survey of Lauramarca near Cusco (Kuczynski, 1981). The intolerable sanitary and living conditions in the valleys of La Convención, Lares and Ocotamba were studied by the Ministry of Health in 1944 (ibid). Tschopik (1947) surveyed highland communities to record their socio-economic
features. In the highland province of Ayacucho, in the early and mid-1950s, Arguedas (1975) studied Indian religious revival. Later, Escobar (1958) examined the adaptability to change of the indigenous community and the cultural significance of *mestizaje* a term referring to the assimilation of the Andean rural population into national life. This type of research emphasized factors such as nutrition, migration, exchange, income and economic differentiation providing, this way, both a graphic account of the conditions in the field and a useful insight on the heterogenous character of the highlands. For example, Tschopik observes:

Indeed, our survey can claim to have revealed a diversity of patterns and an essential lack of cultural unity in the Central Peruvian highlands. Marked differences from one community to the next have been described with reference to economic adaptations, trade and marketing, social and political organization, religious practices and material culture. Without any intention of postulating a unilinear evolution of Central Sierra culture through a fixed series of stages, the range of adaptations represented by the contemporary highland communities does, in a very general way, seem to mirror the post-Conquest development of highland Peru (In Long and Roberts, 1978:17).

Following an *indigenista* interest for the ways in which communities would adapt to "modern life", Andean research became particularly important in the rapidly changing Mantaro Valley of Central Peru. This region, undergoing rapid development due to its proximity to Lima and to the impact of the Cerro de Pásco Corporation, has attracted numerous researchers interested in social change. Starting in the 1950s, Escobar (1958) focused on the cultural and socio-economic change occuring in Sicaya; Adams (1959) on ethnic change from a caste-stratified society (Indian, *mestizo*, Caucasian) to one gradually organized along class lines; and Arguedas (1957) examined the significance of peasant labour for the development of capitalism through enclave mining and plantation agriculture. Recently, Long and Roberts (1978) have brought together a collection of case studies on socio-economic change; some of their research sites are those originally studied by Adams,
Escobar and Tschopik. Long's and Roberts's efforts have contributed to the development of an in-depth perspective on changes taking place in that region.

Extensive community development projects have been carried out in the Andes under the auspices of the Peace Corps in the 1950s and 1960s. Usually their approach displayed an indigenista vision of how to "integrate Indians" and how to "plan" social change that would improve the condition of Andean people. The solution proposed was a type of cooperativist model through social scientific intervention (Skar, 1981:90). The Vicos Project initiated in 1954 and sponsored by Cornell University was a notable experiment in integrated agrarian reform conducted in the inter-Andean valley of Callejon de Huaylas about 250 miles northeast of Lima. The government turned over an hacienda to the peasants in an effort to achieve community development through the incorporation of the peasants into national life. Campesinos were encouraged to become assertive and modern producers.

Though the project brought attention to the plight of the hacienda labour force, it nevertheless met with limited success because of the unrealistic vision that governments and intellectuals alike had of the Andean social world (Skar, op.cit). Commenting on the problems associated with the Vicos experiment, Yambert notes:

This was due to unwarranted expectations of great community solidarity and cohesion during the project, and to insufficient recognition of both the individualism within the community and the social and institutional hindrances to continued and efficacious action at the local level (1980:72).

Kuyo Chico was a similar project in the southern Andes headed by Nuñez del Prado (1973). It attempted to integrate "Indians" into the market through the inculcation of new forms of consumption. The assumption was that integration could be achieved by breaking down local power relations between Mestizos and Andean peasants. Such an indigenista perspective suffered inherent limitations resulting from an idealist view of the Andean
world which distorted and oversimplified the complexity of rural life. Profound misconceptions of the peasantry arose insofar as solutions were sought in a mystified past without ever challenging the contemporary socio-political context of rural society. Commenting on the lack of understanding of Andean social organization that has prevailed amongst Peruvian officials, Skar states:

(It ) is the difference between science and research, on the one hand, and politics and ideology, on the other. Gonzales Prada, Maristegui, and Castro Pozo were first of all politicians and ideologists, not social scientists... Only by a thorough understanding of the true nature of the problem with which one deals, can one hope to have a chance of solving it (1981:90-91).

Equally, Guillet discusses the work of that early period in the following terms:

Many fieldworkers made the journey into the Andes and returned to the city replete with field notes describing a social world that was bounded, visible, homogenous, and easily reconstructed through the vivid descriptions of the informants. Researchers were often struck by the propensity of rural folk to exchange labor and cooperate in public works projects; which led them to conclude that Andean social relations were generally harmonious, cooperative, and conflict-free, characterizations similar to those made by Redfield about the folk society (1983:240).

b-Ethnohistory: the Destruction of the Andean Myth

Andean studies displayed a marked theoretical change by the late 1960s and the early 1970s. Knowledge of the indigenous past was sought by demystifying Peru’s pre-colonial history. Zuidema (1964) believed "that the whole of Inca civilization should be described anew" (ibid:x). This quest for a more finely honed understanding of the region brought together several disciplines, particularly economics, history and anthropology.

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To procure deeper insight into Andean socio-political structure Zuidera studied the Inca ceque system as a representation of the social organization of Cusco. The author argued that this system, a segmented method of Inca state division, still functions today. His study was intended as "a point of departure" that could throw light on modern forms of native American social structure, particularly those based on non-unilineal descent groups (1964:xiii). Stimulated by Zuidera's work, structural anthropologists have focused upon contemporary Andean representations of social structure. Cultural dualities in thought — articulate social relations and find representation in cosmology, kinship, economics and village organization (Isbell, 1978; Fiorinanti-Moliní, 1975 among others). Such research has contributed substantially to the understanding of Andean structure, economic inter-relationships and ideology including the contemporary expression of pre-conquest patterns of thought, belief and organization 8.

Equally important is Murra's ethnohistoric research method applied to Andean economy. This approach treats written sources such as chronicles and colonial documentation as de facto anthropological informants (Millones, 1982:202). As such, it reveals the complexity of relations existing at a time when the region was moving from a communal to state economy under Inca influence. La organización económica del estado inca (1955) removed Incaic social and economic structures from the limitations of European political categories and placed them within the Andean historical tradition (Campbell, 1986:194). Murra argues that the Andean community displays a vertical orientation dating back to pre-colonial times. Vertical control was then the basis for intensive agriculture and the foundation of Inca civilization. In Formaciones económicas y políticas del mundo andino (1975), a compilation of twelve articles, Murra shows that native communities could maintain access to communal rights through a complex network of reciprocal conventions and redistributive mechanisms stemming from control over a series of "vertical

8 Other studies of Andean symbols and beliefs include Bastien (1978); and Ossio (1973).
archipelagos" or productive zones located at varying ecological levels. These "vertical archipelagos" enable settlers (mitimaes) to make a better use of resources outside the home territory (ibid:110). "Archipelagos" are geographically distant from one another and vary according to the complexity of economic and political organization (ibid:113). By stressing the importance of the ecological base, Murra's work has led to a better understanding of the means used to maintain large scale production in high altitude environments and of the process of Andean reciprocity.

However, some of Murra's views have not remained unchallenged. For example, Poole (1986:265) argues that in Chumbivilcas, uplands (punas) belonging to ayllus did not correspond to distinct ecological zones. These were widely dispersed lands neither necessarily located at varying altitudes nor dedicated to differing production. On the other hand, Sanchez (1982) rejects the notion of "vertical archipelagos" on the ground that it is an ideological description that does not encompass unequal holding patterns. While Murra sees Andean reciprocity as the basis for Inca organization and domination, Sanchez regards it as an intrinsic feature of the system of inequality in peasant society. Montoya takes a similar position by claiming that "the ideal of reciprocity becomes an ideology because it distorts reality by hiding inequality, showing only the collective aspect of cooperation" (1982:63).

Drawing on ethnohistory, authors like Wachtel in The Vision of the Vanquished (1977), analyzed the Spanish conquest through the eyes of the Indians. This represented an attempt at demystification of European interpretation of the arrival of the Spaniards in the Andes by presenting the colonial situation through the experience of the oppressed. Commenting on this provocative work, Campbell states that it represents "a move away from a historic vision of European activity in the Andean area" and "a commitment to preserving the Andean legacy by questioning the nature of Andean identity and the crises....

9 For a review of Andean ethnohistory, see Murra (1976:3-36); Millones (1982:200-216); Gonzales (1985:287-293).
that threatened it" (1986:200). Thus, such a view opposes the idea of Inca history ending with the arrival of the Spaniards.

In recent years, major historical research has provided a clearer picture of the socio-economic phenomena of the pre-hispanic and colonial era into which contemporary problems can be placed for more accurate analysis. Sempat Assadourian's work (1982) on the interrelationship between the market and the mining industry and their combined impact on the agrarian and urban sector represents an important shift away from viewing the history of Peru from the perspective of Lima to that of more obscure rural regions. In the field of regional studies, Spalding's work (1975, 1980) provides invaluable information on the structure of the colonial system and on the complex historical development of agrarian relations in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as the world economy transforms the Andes.

Spalding's (1975) examination of the impact of the colonial state in the village-hacienda system demonstrates the critical role of the state in preventing rapid peasant differentiation in southern Cusco. Spalding successfully argues that peasant villages may not have been as dependent on large estates as so widely thought. She hypothesizes that the state, by restricting land access to Indian communities, made it possible for haciendas to limit the process of internal differentiation within indigenous society. She states:

...during the colonial period, the activities of the state made it possible for the hacendado to obtain cheap labor with a minimum of independent violence against the Indian communities. To the degree that the state limited the land resources of the Indian communities and reduced or reversed the process of internal differentiation and the development of a wealthy "kulak" sector within Indian society, it served the interests of the hacendados. (ibid:118).

As we will discuss in later chapters, the case studies of Ccapacmarca and Marangani offer support to Spalding's view on the critical role of state intervention in the process of peasant differentiation. In this thesis, the role of both the colonial and, later, the republican
state is regarded as a major force on the process of contemporary peasant differentiation.

Also, Morner's study on the department of Cusco between 1689 and 1786 (1977, 1985) is of particular importance for this thesis as its author contributes new and meaningful data on the provincias altas pertaining to demography and land tenure. Such work helps us understand the regional history of social change and conflict during the colonial period and complements the studies of Piel (1982, 1983) on Peru after independence. Studies of this kind advance our knowledge of the ways in which Andean natives responded actively to the process of Spanish domination by exploring the context of the frequent bloody peasant revolts typical of Peru's modern history.

Under the influence of Murra's work, a new generation of anthropologists has emerged seeking to analyse core practices within contemporary Andean production. Brush (1977), for example, examines recent expressions of the vertical archipelago strategy and the ways in which kinship organizes labour under a given vertical system. On the other hand, others have focused on the complementarity of relationships existing between agricultural and pastoral systems. Custred (1974) extensively studies the transumance system between scattered pasture zones in Alccavitoria, a community in Chumbivilcas. Here, people still exchange their meat products with the lower agricultural zones in direct barter relationships. Flores Ochoa (1964, 1968) and Nachtigall (1966) investigate pastoral settlements not dependent upon agriculture showing that pastoralism is a separate, viable economic system in the punas of the southern Andes. Webster's work (1972) on Q'ero near the city of Cusco, reinforces the validity of Murra's thesis by arguing that self-sufficiency among pastoralists is achieved through vertical diversification. Agricultural lands are found from 2,000 meters to 5,000 meters in altitude and their exploitation requires constant movement between zones. Such empirical evidence has greatly contributed to a better understanding of the concept of "Andean community".
The determination of "Andean community" appears to be the result of a conjunction of local, regional and national forces. According to Yambert, rather than being fixed and unproblematic, communities are constantly renegotiated:

It is evident, then, that the structure, organization, and concepts of the community (and, by similar reasoning, the hacienda) are not in any way given or eternal. They are, instead, an intimate part of the preeminently human activity of creating a world in which to live by putting thought into action and adjusting belief according to experience. Communities are created in a ceaseless process of definition, conception and activity, impingement and reaction (1980:78).

Meanwhile, Figueroa calls Andean communities "a reality without a theory". As a palliative for this lack of analytic framework, he proposes to study them "in the same terms as one analyses a national economy, with an internal and external sector" (1979:123). By applying his model to communities in southern Peru, the author is able to demonstrate that, even in fairly isolated regions, these settlements are well integrated into the national economy and cannot be treated independently from the rest of the economic system. As Chapter 3 will discuss, since Spanish conquest, southern Andean peasant communities have actively participated in both commodity and labour markets. Consequently, when analyzing modern day Peru's peasantry, it is important to keep in mind that small scale producers have long been incorporated into the larger economic system; their marginalization comes from the fact that "the integration has been such that it has not generated an overall increase in peasant output or income" (Caballero, 1984:22).

In the early 1970s some Andean studies, still influenced by indígenismo, viewed haciendas as preventing rural development. Emphasizing the cultural and historical uniqueness of Andean society, Matos Mar used the concept of "plural society" to examine patterns of dependence resulting from integration into national structures of inequality.

Andean society is plural by reference to its specific mode of articulation with the national economy based on feudal forms of internal domination:
The units of each subordinate level are connected to one another only by means of a superior instance. It depicts a form of articulation that is highly centralized and in which the different instances of power assume gradually more capacity for decision, control a larger amount of wealth, and have access to a wider range of information as one approaches the summit (Matos Mar et al, 1969, translated by Long, 1977:68).

The Institute of Peruvian Studies with Matos Mar (1969, 1976) and his associates (Cotler, 1968, 1969, 1975; Alberti and Mayer, 1974 among others), became instrumental in researching micro-level patterns of domination existing within Andean social systems (indigenous communities, highland haciendas and large coastal haciendas). As McClintock states 'Julio Cotler's "baseless triangle" image describing social relations among peones and the patron on a traditional hacienda were powerful and enduring ideas' (1987:236).

In studying the conditions of internal domination of the Andean peasantry, Cotler (1976) argues that traditional haciendas are unlike peasant communities since the latter show more egalitarianism and social solidarity and a greater propensity to cooperative organization than the former. In traditional haciendas such as those of southern Cusco where there exists an acute landownership concentration, resources are under the monopolistic control of the hacendado. The landlord uses paternalistic ties to strengthen the landless peasant's dependence upon the tenure system. This structural characteristic which Cotler calls the "triangle without a base" prevents peasant mobility because of the monopolistic position of the landlord. The lack of a base to the triangle indicates that peasants are atomized and excluded from access to social resources and public decision-making. Multistranded ties to the landlord not only prevents the formation of social bonds amongst peers, but also encourages peasants to compete among themselves for the favour of their landlord. Cotler considers such multiple links to one patron as effectively preventing Andean peasant political mobilization.
On the other hand, in regions of rapid economic transformation such as the coastal haciendas, externally generated changes (for example, new roads) lead to the creation of alternative alliances which substantially undermine the position of the patrón. Consequently, the base of the triangle closes as peasants shift from one patrón to another. Scattered ties to numerous patrones help peasants develop consciousness and engage in protest activities by establishing outside and upward linkages.

Though by definition models tend to oversimplify the complexity of social relations, I would suggest that paternalistic relations are not fixed as Cotler conceives of them and would reject his view that hacienda peasants "perceive their welfare as being dependent on the deprivation of their peers" (1970:537). Hacienda tenants have turned to collective action such as strikes (see Chapter 3) to improve standards of living and have, over the centuries, actively contested their subordination. Peasants' attitudes would depend primarily on local conditions. Cotler's model of peasant consciousness based on single-stranded ties to numerous landlords avoids discussion of the complexity involved in questions related to peasant mobilization. In the process, it brushes over the specific socio-political context of peasant movements including market conditions, the impact of the state or leadership skill. Also, the idea that communities have a great sense of solidarity seems to ignore their differentiation, internal power struggle and the divergence between collective and individual interests. For example, the case study of the 1963 Ccapacmarca uprising described in Chapter 3 indicates that when certain villagers realized that the rebellion had failed, they promptly sent petitions to the authorities to dissociate themselves from the events in order to protect their individual security. By not supplying any historical depth on the origin of these Andean institutions, Cotler seems to misinterpret the nature of contemporary communities.

Thus, implicit in the type of research such as Cotler's is the acceptance, to one degree or another, of an indigenista idealization of the Andean community. The
"community-hacienda" model Cotler applies to study the estates and peasant settlements of the provinces of Paucartambo and Canchis. He assumes that rural people are partitioned into two forms of organization, "community" and "haciendas". This framework tends to regard rural systems as separate entities by not sufficiently emphasizing that all are functionally and structurally connected (Yambert, op.cit:73). Also, it overemphasizes the destructive effect of haciendas on Andean communities without taking into consideration the impact of the colonial economy or of the late nineteenth century world economic development.

Grieshaber (1979:115) mentions that through their integration into the Potosí mining industry, Andean communities experienced an early trend of increasing differentiation between rich community members (originarios) selling goods to the mines and poor runaways (forasteros). It was only later that Andean communities were removed from competition in order to make hacienda profitable by taking advantage of an available labour force. Therefore, as Grieshaber argues, the direction of a particular interaction between haciendas and communities would depend on local conditions such as demographic and ecological factors as well as the distinct type of society found in each region.

In Land and Power in Latin America (1980), Orlove and Custred reject the idea that Andean society includes only haciendas and communities. Instead, the authors propose a micro-level model considering the household and its network rather than the community as the basic unit of social and economic organization. The argument presented converges with the dependency paradigm to some degree by recognizing that the strategies and struggles of households for resources are unequal. In other words, its actors (households) are not free and unconstrained; rather they interact with different interests, perceptions and resources which either enhance or hinder their ability to compete against other decision-making bodies. Though this approach often encounters difficulties in defining household and tends, among other things, to neglect the historical process of family development, it nevertheless takes into consideration individual actions. Furthermore, it allows an examination of
peasant domestic units "as a set of strategies for survival under conditions which are constantly shifting" (Rapp, 1983:34).

c-Critical Theoretic Approaches

Authors influenced by Marxism and sensitive to Peru's socio-historical peculiarities have also entered into the debate. In agreement with indigenismo, they are concerned with ways to better integrate highland peasants into Peru's nation-state. However, unlike indigenistas, they have reacted against earlier misconceptions and ideological manipulations about Andean communities. Research within this perspective has focused on the relationships between capitalism and rural society in order to understand the agrarian crisis currently affecting the region. As Montoya states:

Is the Andean countryside moving toward capitalism, toward refederalization or, as the Valesquita utopians claim, toward a Christian and humanist sort of socialism based on self-management? (1982:62).

Communities are not "homogenous and egalitarian wholes" as the communitarian ideology assumes, but exhibit a variety of social and economic patterns of organization; they are "crisscrossed with a fairly high degree of internal differentiation though not enough to make them explode" (ibid:66). For example, the Mantaro Valley exhibits extremely pronounced social differentiation (Long and Roberts, 1978) more so than the southern Andes which tend to be comparatively less differentiated (Harris, 1979; Figueroa, 1982). Sánchez's study (1982) of Andarapa shows that most household heads have labour-migration experience; therefore, he concludes that conceiving of small cultivators as not being involved in the capitalist economy is a fallacy. On the contrary, the peasant economy is increasingly part of capitalism even though the local economy is not in itself capitalist.

Thus, class differentiation within communities such as Andarapa needs to be examined in a national rather than a local context, for "inequalities which exist within them relate to the class structure exclusively through the external links and activities of members and their
close kin" (ibid:178). However, Montoya (1982) argues that we can speak of an "embryonic class structure" though he agrees that an analysis of class formation can only be deduced from an examination of the "community's structural relationship with the dependent capitalism of the Peruvian social formation as a whole". But, he adds, "their internal differentiation will not make them explode" (ibid:66).

A large body of recent research concentrates on the documentation of differentiation in order to understand the exact nature of Andean society and the resulting class position of its peasantry. This argument belongs to the broader issue within the social sciences surrounding both the theoretical notion of "peasant" and the relationships between capitalism and the peasantry. A schematic summary of the controversy is here presented.

2-Peasant: a Redefinition

a-Modernization and Peasant Society

The problematic of how to define "peasants" is a source of endless controversy. In anthropology, an early use of the term dates back to Redfield (1930:16). Influenced by a Tonnies's bipolar typology, Redfield distinguishes between folk and urban society and defines Mexican peasants as "people whose culture is neither tribal nor cosmopolitan". Tepoztlan the peasant village he studies is a "folk culture" - a concept referring to a transition between the tribe and modern city:

no longer a primitive tribal society nor yet an urbanized community, it (Tepoztlan) must nevertheless be defined, as it tends to define itself, with reference to the world-wide city culture with which it is now included (ibid:51).

Later, Redfield describes rural society as "folk society" in the following terms:

(It is) small, isolated, non-literate and homogeneous, with a strong sense of group solidarity. The ways of living are conventionalized into the coherent system which we call a "culture". Behaviour is traditional, spontaneous, uncritical and personal; there is no legislation or habit of experiment and reflection for intellectual ends. Kinship, its relationships
and institutions, are the type categories of experiences and the familial group is the unit of action. The sacred prevails over the secular; the economy is one of status rather than the market (1947:293).

"Folk-culture" and "folk-society" are notions based on a folk-urban continuum. Such a conceptualization rests on the idea of unilinear development whereby rural societies become urban under change generated by the increased influence of the city. "What is to be found in the remote communities represents on the whole an earlier condition of the same general custom or institution than what is found in less remote communities" (1941:340).

Redfield's formulation had a major influence on the anthropology of peasantry. However, his evolutionary, integrative and fundamentally functional approach to peasant society has been widely criticized (see Silverman, 1979). Long (1977:34-38) summarises some major problems as follows: 1) it assumes a diametrical opposition between rural and urban phenomena; 2) it gives too much weight to the city in the generation of social change and, as a result, disregards the "push" elements that force peasants out of the rural sector; 3) it implies a uniform and simultaneous process of change occurring in all the institutions of society; 4) it suggests homogeneity within folk societies and, finally, 5) it is ahistorical in that peasants have been in "transition" for ever.

Another early approach comes from Kroeber (1948). This author conceived of peasants as occupying some intermediary position between tribal societies and western civilization whereby peasants represent "a class segment of a larger population which usually contains also urban centres... They constitute part societies with part culture" (ibid:248). As Stein comments (1985:5) "It is a part definition which leads us only to a part understanding". While Kroeber recognized that peasants formed a specific conceptual category, his cultural definition offers only limited theoretical insight into a social and historical construct of this entity. Steward (1951), on the other hand, contends that peasant communities are part of national socio-cultural systems. Communities, he argues, are not
absolute and universal entities; they belong to a larger whole that needs to be taken into account in any analysis.\textsuperscript{10}

An emphasis on structure is found in the work of Foster (1961). According to him, peasant societies are not self-sufficient but depend upon decisions made from the outside. They are held together by a complex web of dyadic relationships or contracts between social and economic equals within the same community or similar people in other villages (ibid:1174). Interpersonal ties permeate all aspects of peasant society. They are highly competitive, based on mutual distrust and guide the villagers' understanding of the ways in which their world is organized: "The Tzintzuntzeño recognizes that these contractual ties are the glue that holds his society together and the grease that smooths its running" (ibid:1176).

Arguing in favour of a universal peasant view of the world, Foster (1965) identifies such traits as distrust, suspicion and envy which are attitudes that prevail in peasant society and make cooperation between members extremely rare. He suggests that peasants hold a complex of values, the "Image of Limited Good". This conception assumes that all good things in life exist in limited and unexpandable quantities. The pie is small and constant in size. Life for peasants is a zero-sum game and the lack of cooperation is logical in a society where success depends upon forces wholly beyond the control of its members. Thus, it is better to do nothing than to risk the possibility that a neighbour will advance at one's expense. Further, "Given a market, a peasant family potentially is the most independent of all social units. One reason, then, that peasants are not very cooperative is that they do not have to be" (op.cit:178). Clearly, Foster's interpretation of rural society does not correspond to the Andean peasant reality where intra- as well as inter- village

\textsuperscript{10} Silverman (1979) examines the ways in which Redfield and Steward influenced the development of conceptions of peasantry and argues that their divergent approaches corresponded to different notions of culture, community and tradition.
reciprocal exchange and long-standing close ties with other communities continue to be major aspects of social life in many Andean regions (see Orlove, 1977c).

Foster considers the idea of "limited good" as a major cultural barrier to problems of development since peasants lack interest in new social and economic opportunities. This view coincided with the "modernization" approach of the 1950s which postulated that peasants must change their life style in order for an agriculturally-based nation to move forward into the industrial era. Modernization theorists regarded peasants as living in a static and backward economy with their traditional cultural values preventing progress. Social change ["the road to the light" as Redfield calls it in A Village That Chose Progress (1970:17)], attributed to external forces, would take the form of technological change trickling down from the cities to the countryside and from more innovative to less innovative individuals.

Social research following a modernization approach and anchored in the objectives of ushering in transformation in rural society, was geared towards guiding and organizing the peasantry in order to aid the process of growth and development in Third World nations. This gave rise to community development projects such as Vicos and Kuyo Chico in Peru carried out with the support of the Alliance for Progress. These projects received the support of national governments as well as that of international and private agencies, notably the Rockefeller Foundation. Geo-political considerations played a crucial role in shaping their objectives. Ultimately, the goals of such aid programs were to encourage social reform along participatory lines according to approved state ideology in order to prevent what happened in Cuba i.e., a "communist takeover".

In 1961, at the Punta del Este Conference, the United States set up an economic program as part of its assistance to Latin America. This program named the Alliance for Progress was devised to support rural change through reform rather than risk peasant unrest. It promoted social transformation within a capitalist and demographic framework and placed land reform and progressive taxations programs high on the list of priority.
Within anthropology, Eric Wolf has been a leading opponent of modernization theory and of a Redfieldian approach to community studies. His conceptualization of peasants is that they form part of a larger system (1966:2), are rural producers in effective control of land who carry on agriculture as a means of livelihood but not as a business. Further, his use of "peasant" denotes an asymmetrical power relationship that, through the state, siphons a surplus from subsistence producers in the form of a fund of rent as part of "the fund of power on which the controllers may draw" (ibid:10). He states:

(P)easants...are rural cultivators whose surpluses are transferred to a dominant group of rulers that uses the surpluses both to underwrite its own standard of living and to distribute the remainder to groups in society that do not farm but must be fed for their specific goods and services in turn (ibid:4).

In Peasants 1966, Wolf rejects the use of Redfield's and others' notion of "city" for an understanding of the peasantry. Instead, he stresses that wealth and power in peasant society are affected by the nation-state. In the light of historical examples he demonstrates (1969) that, contrary to expectations, peasants are not a conservative force. Rather, Wolf argues that "middle peasants" (or smallholding independent peasant proprietors) are prone to militant political action, they are those most likely to enter into sustained rebellion. However, Alavi (1973) points out that it is not so much militancy or non-militancy which determine whether the certain classes within the peasantry engage in political action. Instead, the question arises about the conditions in which peasants have the ability to rebel. These conditions are themselves "contingent on changing conjectures of social circumstances and movements" (op.cit:28). In the Andean sierra, for example, the peasantry's militancy is frequently impeded by its inadequate fluency in the Spanish language, low level of literacy and relative isolation (Handelman, 1981:107). However, throughout the 1950s and 1960s, Peru experienced widespread peasant mobilization because socio-economic changes where rapidly taking place in the area.
The mid-1960s were significant in terms of integrating peasant studies into the question of underdevelopment. An understanding of what happened, then, requires a brief return to circa 1950 and the thinking of Raúl Prebisch, the Executive Secretary of the Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL, Economic Commission for Latin America or ECLA). Prebisch, the leading theorist of developmentalism in the post-war period, claimed that poor agricultural countries had to create a manufacturing industry for the domestic market through tariff protection so that surplus rural workers could be absorbed by the industrial sector. He proposed the theory of declining trade for primary products which calls for rapid industrialization supported by vigorous state action. He and his Latin American colleagues argued that industrialization was necessary because it meant progress, development and above all economic independence.

During the 1960s, developmentalist ideas had strongly influenced Latin American thinking, but *cepalistas* (ECLA economists) did not represent a conceptual break from modernization. They did not question industrialization, nor promote land reform nor even examine the problems of peripheral economies associated with world capitalism. It was only later that such questions surfaced when authors, opposing modernization theory, began to work within a dependency perspective.

Following a Marxist tradition, particularly the theory of imperialism, *dependistas* (or dependency scholars including Frank, Dos Santos, Quijano and Cardoso) conceptualized capitalism as a single, unified world system (Goodman and Redclift, 1981:46). Although these scholars disagreed on various theoretical points, they nevertheless perceived the poverty associated with the Latin American rural sector as a

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result of capitalism and the subsequent dependency relationships existing between developed Western nations and the Third World. These relations, expressed in the economic, financial as well as political spheres resulted from the subordination of peripheral economies to the capitalist core. Dos Santos defines dependence as a "structural conditioning":

It is a conditioning situation in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others. A relationship of interdependence between the two or more economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when two countries can expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have a positive or negative effect on their immediate development (1973:76).

Unlike cepalistas, dependistas did not believe that industrialization, technological development and foreign investment were the answer for Latin America. Dependency purported to explain the ways in which western imperialism created underdevelopment by transferring surplus from peripheral nations to the metropolis. Baran (1957), who influenced early dependency theorists, argued that industrially advanced countries were opposed to the development of their subordinate partners because the latter provide cheap raw materials to the West. Hence, he believed, the economic backwardness of the Third World comes from its dependence on an international trading system that favours the developed metropolises.

According to Frank (1967), one of the initial critics of modernization theory, satellite economies are locked into a structural exploitative relationship with metropolis centres: the metropolis expropriates a surplus from its satellites to be appropriated for its own economic development. Frank's "surplus appropriation" argument is based on Baran's (1957) distinction between "actual" economic surplus produced in current economic activity and "potential" or potentially investible economic surplus which is not available to society because its monopoly structure prevents its production or it is appropriated and wasted.
through luxury consumption' (Frank, op.cit:6). Underdevelopment results from both the
expropriation/appropriation of "actual" surplus and by the "monopoly structures"
established by capitalism in satellite economies which reduce the "potential" economic
surplus (Goodman and Redclift, 1981:34). The dependency perspective which examined
relations between advanced and developing nations, encouraged the study of
underdevelopment as a "process" or as the "development of underdevelopment". Applying
the centre-periphery notion to the urban versus rural sector, Frank contends that the process
generating rural underdevelopment is that of satellization - that is, "a whole chain of
metrópolises and satellites integrating the sectors of dependent economies to the
international capitalist system" (1967:150).

Frank's formulation of development of underdevelopment has been strongly
criticized on multiple grounds (see Long, 1977:89-91). Particularly, Laclau (1971) rejects
Frank's view that Latin America had been capitalist since Spanish conquest. Laclau bases
his critique on the fact that Frank confuses the realm of production and exchange. Frank
locates "capitalism" or "feudalism" in the sphere of commodity exchange instead of the
sphere of production "thus, transforming the presence or absence of a link with the market
into the decisive criterion for distinguishing between the two forms of societies" (Laclau,
ibid:21). While Laclau agrees with Frank that development generates underdevelopment,
his reasoning differs in that he bases his analysis "on relations of production and not only
on those of the market" (ibid:23). Laclau adds:

*but by trying to situate the fundamental contradiction in the
field of circulation rather than production they can go no more
than half-way towards an explanation of why development
generates underdevelopment.* (ibid, emphasis in text)

Laclau argues that by viewing production as subordinate to circulation, Frank downplays
class relations and is unable to account for certain elements which belong to non-capitalist
social relations of production. According to Laclau, primary production for export can lead
to "feudalization" or even "refeudalization" of peripheral areas. He stresses that such was the case in outlying parts of Peru and Chile until the end of the nineteenth century. In his rebuttal to arguments on the questions of feudal and capitalist underdevelopment, Frank (1974), in fact, welcomes Laclau's reformulation of the problem of dependence at the level of production.

Cardoso's views of "development with dependence" (1972) and "associated development" (1973) attempt to re-examine contemporary imperialism with respect to changes in the West, namely the rise of monopoly capital and corporate enterprise. Dependence represents a new stage of monopoly capitalism dominated by transnational corporate capital. Speaking about the dominant traits of imperialism in Latin America, Cardoso states:

However, the dominant traits of imperialism in those countries, as the process of industrialization continues, cannot be adequately described and interpreted on the basis of frames of reference that posit the exchange of raw material for industrialized goods as the main feature of trade, and suppose virtually complete external ownership of the dependent economies' means of production (1972:89).

Consequently, he argues, monopoly penetration in the industrial sector of dependent economies can lead to dependent capitalist development: "some degree of local prosperity is possible insofar as consumption foods locally produced by foreign investments can induce some dynamic effects in the dependent economies" (ibid:91). This point had also been discussed by Frank (1967) who stated that this type of "active capitalist involution" could only lead to limited autonomous development.

Thus, according to Cardoso, in some instances, capitalist expansion contributes to development in peripheral economies by raising the level of productive forces and by widening domestic markets. However, this type of development produces "an internal structural fragmentation" whereby the industrial sector becomes integrated into world
capitalism at the expense of the more rural areas. Agriculture then acts as an internal colony with regard to the more dynamic sectors of the economy. This structural duality is "functional" to the expansion of capitalism in that it keeps wages low and diminishes political tension within the modern sector (1972:90). Using Brazil as a case study, Cardoso argues that this new model of "associated-dependent development" gives rise to new bureaucratic-authoritarian political regimes (1973).

In Miners, Peasants and Entrepreneurs: Regional Development in the Central Highlands of Peru (1984), Long and Roberts use the notion of peripheral capitalism combined with the actor orientation model to emphasize the dynamic forms of dependency encountered in Central Peru. According to these authors, in the mining enclaves of the Mantaro Valley, dependent development has brought both inequality and economic opportunity with significant growth and diversification taking place in the region. This tends to confirm Cardoso's view that the relationship between developed capitalist countries and an underdeveloped economy does not necessarily perpetuate stagnation.

Quijano's work (1983) illustrates another major approach of dependency as a revision of classical theories of imperialism. For Quijano, the emergence of an international circuit of accumulation creates a growing mass of relative surplus population. Under imperialist domination of monopoly capital, there exists constant disintegration of non-capitalist forms though the productive apparatus is unable to absorb the working class. Inevitably, this situation implies a continuing impoverishment and also marginalization of the excess labour force in that it has no effect on the movement of wages.

In regard to the particular question of Peru's 1969 land reform, Quijano (1971) argues that the military regime intended to establish a "national-capitalist" system by liberating the energy of delayed capitalism. The restructuring rather than the breaking with the international capitalist system came from the fact that Peru did not have a strong anti-
imperialist bourgeoisie. He contends that the Peruvian national bourgeoisie was not merely the result of foreign capital but embodied an alliance with it, pointing, thus, to the need for a dialectic understanding of the relationship between national and foreign capital (Dore and Week, 1977:50).

The dependency perspective undermined modernization theory and clarified the external dependence between Latin America and Western nations. By arguing that the various sectors of an underdeveloped economy were well integrated, forming part of the core-periphery relationship, it rejected the notion of dualism implicit in the urban-rural continuum of modernization theory. Further, dependency led to a re-examination of the theory of imperialism. However, it presented an overly abstract concept of the world economy and, thus, had only limited value for empirical research. Brenner (1977) has denounced the trade-centered biases of dependency and demonstrated that this approach has failed to grasp the importance of the emergence of capitalism and, in the process, not clarified the analysis of transition from feudalism to capitalism. Brenner also points out the crucial need to focus on the primacy of class and class struggle in the study of underdevelopment. Rather than being determined by surplus transfer, underdevelopment results from an internal class structure that blocks the development of the forces of production and exploitation is a class phenomenon within the sphere of production. Dore and Weeks denounce the oversight of dependency - especially Frank's formulation - by saying:

(1) It is a fundamental error to imagine that dependency theorists, through the use of the concept "surplus extraction", have built upon Marx's category of exploitation and extended it from the class level to the international level. In fact, what we have is a substitution of concepts, a break with Marx, a replacement of one concept with another. For it is at the class level that all "extraction", appropriation, or expropriation of surplus product occurs, with the categories of community, region, or country merely providing the geographic context of this class appropriation of surplus product (op.cit:16).
Another shortcoming of dependency is that analyses within this perspective have tended to be predominantly economic thus failing to incorporate questions of culture and identity as well as particular forms of class struggle.

Increasingly, scholars have pointed to the growing need of applying Marxist analysis more rigorously to the experience of Latin American societies. Subsequently, Marxist theory and investigation are paying particular attention to relations and modes of production in order to understand the process of transition.

c-Towards a Historical Materialist View: Mode of Production Analysis

It becomes increasingly apparent that the process of transition is neither homogenous nor linear due to an uneven penetration of capitalism in subordinate economies. Unlike classic Marxist theorists such as Lenin, some authors argue that Third World capitalist expansion tends to create or reinforce non-capitalist forms. Roseberry (1983) demonstrates that Venezuelan coffee producers became peasants through their incorporation into European capitalism. Laclau (1971) explains that, in Latin America, local underdevelopment resulted from the fact that capitalist expansion reinforced non-capitalist forms of economic and social organization. According to him, haciendas were influenced by the nature of dependent capitalism in so far as such enterprises produced commodities at low cost due to access to cheap labour - a form of production that contributed to the economic expansion of the industrial sector:

Now this pre-capitalist character of the dominant relations of production in Latin America was not only incompatible with production for the world market, but was actually intensified by the expansion of the latter. The feudal regime of the haciendas tended to increase its servile exactions on the peasantry as the growing demands of the world market stimulated maximization of their surplus. Thus, far from expansion of the external market acting as a desintegrating
force on feudalism, its effect was rather to accentuate and consolidate it (ibid:26).

Non-capitalist relations of production could be destroyed or recreated by capitalism according to the logic of its needs. In other words, these relations seem to be "functional" for the continued reproduction of capitalism.

One Marxist current of thought approaches the peasant problematic from a theory of "mode of production and articulation" and offers an alternative to the conceptual limitations posed by the previous dependency perspective. "Mode of production and articulation", seeking greater analytical rigour for concepts such as mode of production, states that peripheral social formations are constituted by the articulated combination of the dominant capitalist mode with traditional, non-capitalist modes. Through an analysis of production systems, it examines the ways in which these subordinate modes prevent the expansion of capitalist production relations and impinge upon a full development of productive forces. This approach challenges the dependency perspective in that it redirects research to the Marxist concept of social relations of production and seeks to investigate the functioning and evolution of non-capitalist modes of production. In Meillassoux's words (1972:97), Marxist anthropologists have "to find out the law of the inner functioning of pre-capitalist formations". For example, in his own work on African societies, Meillassoux (1964) shows that the Guro social formation is the result of the articulation of two distinct modes of production with one being dominant and the other subordinate. Also, he contends that "pre-capitalist" modes are a function of the needs of the capitalist mode because capital moves to countries where non-capitalist modes still prevail in order to take advantage of

13 Much of the debate concerning the dependency approach versus the mode of production approach can be found in the writings during the 1970s of two journals, the Journal of Peasant Studies and, for Latin America, Latin American Perspectives.

14 "Articulation of modes of production" has its origin among the French structuralists. See, for example, Balibar (1970); Meillassoux (1964); Rey (1973); Terray (1969).
both cheap labour and of the vital needs that the "traditional" mode of production will endorse. In underdeveloped countries, the peasant economy fulfills the "functions of social security" that capitalism prefers not to assume (1972:102).

A re-examination of the role of the peasantry for capitalism has led authors, some presumably inspired by the writings of Chayanov, to argue for a specific peasant mode of production. Bartra (1974) refers to peasant economy as a petty commodity mode of production forming an integral part of capitalism. For him, this mode forms a reserve of cheap labour through a process of "permanent primitive accumulation" whereby low prices for agricultural exports result in unequal exchange between the peasant sector and the rest of the economy. As a consequence of a structural articulation of exploitation, peasants become a reserve of cheap labour in times of seasonal demand at little or no cost to the state within a context of dependent development. In this way, small producers contribute to both industrial growth and the expansion of the export agricultural sector. Recently, Bartra and Otero (1987) have argued that Mexico's agrarian crisis illustrates the fact that "permanent primitive accumulation leads to an eventual erosion of the peasantry with gradual "de-peasantisation without necessarily complete proletarianisation" (ibid:353). According to their study, middle units are vanishing rapidly: "both the semiproletarian and the bourgeois sectors tend to increase, while there is a 'disappearing middle'" (ibid:358).

Basing his argument on the Mexican case, Bartra (1982) regards state-imposed land reforms as major forces contributing to the retardation of peasant dissolution. However, this does not imply that there is no increased semiproletarianization and pauperization. The state plays an important role both in the strengthening of non-capitalist institutions and in the deterioration of peasant economy. State intervention in agriculture serves merely the political purpose of pacifying land hungry peasants. Land reform controls destabilizing violence that could originate with a transition to capitalism. In Chapter 3 we will see that
land redistribution in Capacmarca was partially dictated by the need to prevent further peasant uprising in a district that, in the 1960s, had become a major centre for unrest.

Vergopoulos (1978) views peasants as members of a simple commodity mode whereby only family labour is used and the objective of production is subsistence and not profit. His assumption of an anti-market peasant sentiment can be challenged by data from southern Peru which show that peasants are often more willing than not to enter the market and to be competitive (Piel, 1970). Also, he regards peasant agriculture not as a "pre-capitalist residual economy" but as a form of "capitalism without capitalists" which has been recreated by capitalism because it is cheaper to produce food under peasant production than under capitalism. Thus, Vergopoulos stresses the subordination of agriculture to industry as necessary for capitalist expansion. The minifundio system, rather than being a bastion of "traditional agriculture" is part of the wider economy. Its function within a peripheral economy is to relieve the state from undertaking the cost of the reproduction of rural and urban migrant labour. This form of analysis is related to the notion of "permanent primitive accumulation" advanced by Bartra (1974) whereby low prices for agricultural products result in an "unequal exchange" between the peasant sector and the rest of the economy. This process leads to the maintenance of the peasant economy to lower the reproduction costs of labour for the capitalist sector through cheap urban food and low urban wages.

Bradby (1975) successfully modifies the above functionalist views of articulation between non-capitalist and capitalist modes of production. Rather than assuming that non-capitalist modes are maintained to fulfill the need of capitalism, she questions under which circumstances capitalism transforms, destroys or maintains non-capitalist modes of production. Her analysis stands out as one of the most theoretically and methodologically significant contributions, in that articulation does not take a universal form but differs according to 1) the internal nature of the modes of production under attack that make certain
natural economies (i.e., economies based on the natural products of the land) more resistant than others, and 2) the changing needs of capitalism at different historical stages of development. Such variations can be explained by the contingencies of concrete historical circumstances. She concludes:

Where capital has got to the stage when it no longer needs pre-capitalist modes for the expansion of the labour-force, but creates its own relative surplus-population at the centre, then the maintenance or destruction of natural economy ceases to be of any importance to it. The development of commodity exchange within these modes, or the growth of capitalist relations of production just do not matter to world capital, except in the cases where it needs local labour power for the extraction of some raw material, or where it actually needs something that they produce (ibid:160).

Bradby also points out that capitalism places different demands upon peripheral economies at varying stages of its expansion. The specificities of capitalist transformation in these economies, will be determined by "the internal structures of pre-capitalist modes" and by what "capitalism needs of pre-capitalist economies at different stages of development which arise from specific historical circumstances" (ibid:127). Thus, an adequate understanding of Andean reality should address the question of the periodization of the historical development of capitalism for each studied region.

Although the notion of peasant as a distinct mode has been rejected on many grounds (see Ennew et al., 1977; Roseberry, 1978 among others) Chayanov's influence has led to a reconsideration among Marxists of the labour and production processes taking place within peasant households. Further, Chayanov's contention that the peasant economy exhibits competitive advantages over capitalist production and is adaptable to change has important relevance for developing nations in the process of transition. His model became useful for the understanding of the dynamics of household resistance to capitalist expansion. However, Chayanov's thesis that the demographic processes of family growth
explain the distribution according to size has not been supported by data from Peru (Deere and de Janvry, 1981).

Deere and de Janvry (ibid) combine Chayanov's concept of demographic differentiation (i.e., family size determines control over land and other means of production to create inequality among households over several generations) with Lenin's materialist notion of social differentiation (inequality is based on the unequal access amongst direct producers to the means of production representing the starting point to capitalist class formation). They show that, in the region of Cajamarca, changes in class position among generations become the most important determinant of social differentiation. These authors argue that though Chayanov's concept of the family life cycle provides a useful insight into household structure, labour use and income inequality, it fails in its explanatory power. They conclude:

Our analysis has shown that social differentiation among the Cajamarcan peasantry is acute. And the process of social differentiation appears to support a varying of household size among different strata of the peasantry. Our analysis demonstrates that Chayanov's demographic explanation of increasing family size over the life cycle is insufficient to explain the differing patterns exhibited by different strata of the peasantry. Moreover such factors as mortality and household structure seem to be strongly affected by the household's access to material resources (ibid:364).

Household models of peasant economy have frequently stressed the autonomy of the domestic unit based on the premise that peasants have access to land and that agricultural activities are their primary occupation. However, authors supporting the "decomposition" argument stress the vulnerability and productive insufficiency of smallholder agriculture (Long, 1984). In her work on Aymara communities in southern Peru, Collins (1986) rejects Chayanov's notion of family farm viability and contends that households are not fundamental units of Andean society but are subminimal units incapable of providing for their own maintenance and reproduction within their boundaries. She
argues that households encompass some types of economic behaviour but not all. "Economic decisions of individuals are not always made with regard to the well being of the household, and its members do not always have common interests and goals" (ibid:667). The integration of Andean peasants into the national economy creates and reinforces the nuclear household unit by peasant participation in the Andean market economy which limits extrahousehold networks of productive relationships. Consequently, Collins attempts to go beyond a "functionalist" treatment of the household as the primary productive unit. Because the Andean nuclear household results from the contradictions created by the incomplete integration of peasants into the cash economy, the author rightly questions the relevance of this unit as a basis for analyzing contemporary peasant economy.

The articulation approach has enabled a more dynamic treatment of non-capitalist forms under capitalism questioning Lenin's early assumption that the peasantry is doomed to disappear as a result of assimilation into the proletariat. Another advantage of the "mode of production" approach is that it focuses the study of internal processes such as the reproduction of capital through its articulation with other modes (Chinchilla and Dietz, 1981:144). Further, in the Third World where capitalism was not generated internally but imposed through colonialism, articulation presents an alternative approach that could help us explain how capitalism penetrates and dominates non-capitalist social forms. For example, Rey's (1973) rigorous study offers a theoretical framework for the periodization in the articulation between feudalism and capitalism. Supporting the idea of articulation, Mallon contends that:

In areas where capitalism did not emerge organically from the internal relations of a society, but was instead brought in through colonial or neo-colonial contact, one would expect the complexity of social and economic relations to be even greater. Articulation could therefore provide a context within which it was possible to explain the penetration of capitalism, while at the same time understanding the multiple long-lasting, and stubborn resistance of non-capitalist cultural, economic, political, and social forms to its dominance (1983:6).
Thus, we see that the expansion of capitalism does not imply the automatic dissolution of non-capitalist forms and relations of production. On the contrary, such forms can survive as a specific response to capitalist penetration.

However, the modes of production approach has remained abstract and difficult to apply to concrete situations. For instance, Taylor's (1979) examination of the importance of the concepts of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production for analyzing the structure and development of Third World societies has not led to a large body of empirical research (Munck, 1982:173). Generally speaking, the mode of production and articulation approach offers only limited empirical tools for detailed analyses of agrarian differentiation and social relations of production in the countryside. The focus on non-capitalist forms consolidated by the dynamic of capitalist domination tends to obscure the character of class relations among the peasantry. For example, in the southern Andes, the quality and the location of the land are important indicators of differentiation - factors which have to be taken into consideration in the study of agrarian relations.

In addition, the mode of production and articulation approach leads to misconceptions stemming from the fact that many modes have been identified - seventeen in the case of Peru (Villasante, 1986: personal conversation15). Consequently, the notion of modes loses its usefulness for explaining rural societies16. De Janvry, for instance, rejects it on the following grounds:

By definition, a peasant mode can have only one single class - that of peasant producers. Consequently, relations of exploitation - if they exist - must be external to the mode: a surplus is extracted from the peasant mode through a variety of mechanisms and is captured by external social classes. For this reason... the peasant mode is always postulated to exist in isolation, not in a dominant position in a social

15 The conversation took place in August 1986 at the one-week seminar which was held at the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco and headed by Professor Marco Villasante.

What de Janvry points out is that an articulation of mode of production approach considers peasant society as articulated through various relations to the dominant capitalist mode of production and that this articulation, external to the peasantry, is what constitutes the "class relations" of which the peasantry is part. Thus, it transforms what are exploitative class relations into an articulation between two modes. To de Janvry, "peasants are not a mode but an unstable fraction of class that ranges from the petty bourgeoisie to the semiproletariat" (ibid:4).

**d-Challenges Within Marxism**

In an attempt to go beyond the theoretical confines of the "articulation of mode of production", Roseberry contends that the problem of "articulation" disappears when we drop all notions of "peasant" and start examining the larger system: "If peasants exist within larger societies, let us begin with those societies, examine the social, political, and economic processes of development (or underdevelopment) which are at work in them, and then analyze rural regions in terms of those larger processes" (1978:3). Then, he argues, "we are no longer talking about two discrete units which somehow are related but about a total society" (ibid). Instead, the author regarding wage employment as a critical factor of contemporary peasant economy proposes a study of agrarian relations derived solely from their location in the larger socio-economic structure. His approach theoretically rejects the concept of a "peasant mode" dissociated from the dynamics of capitalism.

Bernstein explains that the difficulty of examining peasants within "the mode of articulation theory" is that the object of analysis is not a mode of production in the
materialist sense, but the peasant family as a unit of production and reproduction" 

(1977:422). In other words, such relations are those internal to the family. Bernstein is worth quoting at length:

In these 'models' of peasant economy, the social relations suggested are those internal to the producing unit, the peasant household. They cannot formulate the social relations of production which provide the most important element in the materialist theory of a mode of production. The social relations of production encompass and relate the relations of production, appropriation, distribution and utilisation of the social product as a whole. Analysis of the social relations of production therefore includes the relations between various units of production, between various classes, and the relations of the process of social reproduction (no household can satisfy the conditions of its own reproduction outside the process of social reproduction). For those who try to constitute a theory of a peasant or domestic mode of production these kinds of relations are external to the dynamics of the elementary unit of production (the households); something which is clear enough in the work of both Chayanov and Sahlins (ibid:425).

Bernstein speaks of plural peasanties - a more accurate term since there exists no "single" and "essential peasant". Consequently, peasants do not fit any general definition - they take on historically specific forms. He contends that a study of contemporary peasants necessarily entails an analysis of the circuit of capital and needs to consider the particular historical forms of capital penetration and commodity extension. Thus, Bernstein offers the following alternative approach to the mode of production model - an approach examining the ways in which modern capital destroys "natural economy" - a social formation where the production of use-value is dominant - through the mediation of the state. The process of natural economy destruction contains two dimensions: 1) the withdrawal of labour from use-value production and 2) the creation of the social conditions of commodity production. Thus, rather than considering peasants as a mode, Bernstein asserts:

(P)easants have to be located in capitalist relations of production, but in conditions less determinate than those of
the proletariat to the degree that household production is not subject to complete expropriation nor to the particular modes of regulations and discipline of labour exercised within the capitalist production process (ibid:437).

De Janvry's position represents another view on the impact of capitalism in peasant economies which rejects the notion of modes of production. Rather, his focus is on "functional dualism" meaning social articulation in the central economies versus social desintegration in the periphery. Social articulation at the centre means that "a portion of the productivity gains in the labor process translates into increased real wages, thus permitting a dynamic equilibrium to obtain among sectors and between production and consumption" (1981:16). Consequently, de Janvry adds: "A self-sustained process of accumulation is thus possible in the centre" (ibid). Peripheral economies, meanwhile, seem to be prevented from adopting a socially articulated pattern of accumulation by the centre through the hegemonic dominance of particular class alliances: international capital, dependent bourgeoisie and landed elites. Given this context of disarticulated accumulation, de Janvry then argues that dualism is functional. This "functional dualism" usually existing between commercial capitalist agriculture and subsistence oriented peasant production, is defined as both a source of primitive accumulation through cheap food and semiproletarian labour and also a contradictory process that leads to the destruction of the peasantry. De Janvry explains:

Thus, unequal development is a process whereby growth of capitalist production in the periphery feeds upon the stagnation, impoverishment, and destruction of the peasant and artisan spheres. This process is consistent with the classical interpretation of the law of unequal development and its restoration by the critics of the underdevelopment school. (ibid:22).

This model also implies that, in disarticulated economies, full proletarianization of the rural sector is not a necessary condition since wages can be maintained at a low level by perpetuating a peasant economy which partially assumes the cost of maintaining and
reproducing the labour force. However, de Janvry stresses that peripheral capitalism is not a mode of production but only a historically specific phase in the development of capitalism in the periphery. An eventual full proletarianization of the peasantry will take place through import-substitution to bring about a socially articulated alliance. According to de Janvry, Peru's 1969 land reform represents such an attempt to articulate the national bourgeoisie, the proletariat and the peasantry together. However, as Assies (1987:511) states, it is doubtful that this was the case in Peru since the reform resulted from the weakness of, rather than the strength of, the national bourgeoisie and, as I will discuss in Chapter 4 the military also failed to achieve popular support - an aspect that de Janvry sees as a condition for articulated accumulation.

Recent efforts at rethinking the category of "peasants" within capitalism has led authors such as Assies (1987), Ennew et al. (1977), Bernstein (1977) to look upon peasants as simple commodity producers. "Simple commodity production", according to Bernstein (op.cit:425) "is distinguished from capitalist production by its 'logic' of subsistence (meeting the needs of simple production) as opposed to the logic of the appropriation and realisation of surplus-value and the accumulation of capital". To these authors, simple commodity producers are fully part of the capitalist economy. "It is a form of production which is a normal feature of capitalist social formations, that is, social formations characterised by generalised commodity production in which reproduction outside the commodity economy has become impossible" (Assies, op.cit:506). Thus, contemporary peasants need to be examined as products of capitalist growth. If peasants form an integral part of capitalism, then the crucial theoretical problem lies in an understanding of their class nature.

Marxist scholars are increasingly concerned with the complex relationships existing among various categories of agricultural producers and with the ways in which these categories could be integrated into more-rigorous class analyses. For example, Ennew et al
(op.cit.) argue that "peasant" as category is incompatible with a class analysis. Roseberry (1983), following Lenin, asserts the priority of wage labour over other non-wage forms of production and proposes a new perspective that would replace peasant by proletarianization studies whereby complex relations are examined in terms of "a world-historical whole":

...I am suggesting that we need to look at the formation of peasants, tenants, proletarians, and other "types" in terms of the uneven processes of capitalist development, that we need to see them all in terms of the processes of proletarianization. Various types become, in part, precipitates of uneven development, the human results of uneven proletarianization (ibid:203).

According to Roseberry, Venezuelan coffee producers are neither fully peasant nor fully proletarian. On the other hand, Bernstein (1977) rejects the notion of small commodity producers as proletarians asserting that "wage labour equivalents" are peasants and not "wage labourers". That is, they are "producers of surplus value, but in less determined conditions than the proletariat" in the sense that they are not "fully expropriated nor dependent wholly for their reproduction on the sale of labour power through the wage form" (ibid:436). Because the process of full proletarianization has remained incomplete and because capital does not control production, direct producers can struggle against or resist capital. However, essential to the relationship between rural producers and capital is the state. The appearance of the state marks a significant stage in the periodization of the processes at work and in the numerous variations of social relations of production.

It should be recognized that the state plays a central role in the process of agrarian change and class formation. Increasingly, a strong state intervening in the economy has become part of peripheral capitalism (Petras, 1983:119). For example, state policy toward the peasantry was a great concern for the Velasco Military government (1968-1975) which, having recognized the importance of agriculture to Peru's industrial development, attempted to control production by strengthening the apparatus of the state in the countryside.
According to Bernstein (1983:21) this new interest in agriculture comes from the realization
on the part of the classes in power that a strong basis in food production is a condition of
successful development of commodity relations in other branches of production. Thus, the
question of peasant differentiation needs to encompass the ways in which the peripheral
state extends its role into areas previously restricted to private enterprises in order to
understand how the state promotes industrialization and encourages the penetration of
commodity relations.

The proletarianization argument has recently centered around labour/capital in order
to explain the subsumption of agricultural producers within the logic of capitalist
exploitation. Subsumption here means the subordination of some forms of peasant
economic activity to the dynamics of capitalism. For example, Roseberry (1978) examines
the structural position of coffee growers in Venezuela in terms of the ways in which
agriculture becomes integrated within industrial-commercial networks. He shows that, in
the twentieth century, the increasing domination of industrial capital over the production
processes of rural areas did not lead to the expropriation of the means of production from
the producers. At the turn of the century usurer/merchant capital was displaced from the
coffee sector by industrial capital, with the state acting as the principal creditor and coffee
buyer. Although usury capital achieved only partial control over the labour process it,
nevertheless, constituted a form of capitalist production. While coffee producing units had
acquired certain features specific to a capitalist enterprise their members were still
concerned with subsistence. Therefore, coffee growers were neither peasants nor
proletarians:

As peasants they still maintained some control over the means
of production even though those means had been alienated by
long term credit ties with merchants. In spite of such
alienation, the final separation characteristic of industrial
capital had not occurred and producers maintained some
control over the production process. Coffee growers were family farmers investing in commercial production (ibid:11).
Another challenging attempt at conceptualizing the ways in which capital dominates the process of small commodity production also comes from Bernstein (1977). He proposes a "penetration" model in which capital controls the process of production, even if it does not organize it directly. Thus, under certain conditions, capital is free from the necessity to develop the productive forces. Central to his argument is that peasant household production is partly subsumed by capital within the wider capitalist system. The process of peasant reproduction is disrupted when cash, required for survival, pushes rural producers into commodity production. Capital can appropriate a significant portion of the peasant surplus through a deepening of commodity relations within the cycle of reproduction - i.e., through the withdrawal of labour from use-value production (ibid:423-4). As a result, small scale producers are left with only a subsistence wage to, thus, become "wage labour equivalents". Although the household is under the control of commodity relations and increasingly tied to particular types of production, its members retain a semblance of independence through the ownership of land. This is what controls, at least partially, the production process and explains why peasant production will most likely survive despite the precariousness of the economic life of rural producers.

The precariousness of peasant production can be intensified by the pressure exerted by commodity relations - a situation which leads to what Bernstein calls the "simple reproduction squeeze" (ibid:427-8). This "squeeze" functions as a mechanism of intensifying the labour of the household to maintain or increase the supply of commodities without capital incurring any cost of the production process. In his article on the Peruvian coastal cooperatives, Assies (1987:503) follows Bernstein and argues that these enterprises can be conceived as a form of simple commodity production in which labour is only formally subsumed under capital. According to him, coastal cooperatives (CAPs) have reacted to something similar to the simple reproduction squeeze as a new exploitative and conflictive relationship has developed between members (socios) and temporary workers.
Quoting Marx, Assies explains that, unlike industrial capitalism, the development of capitalism in agriculture leads to an "absolute" decline in the demand for labour and brings about the growth of an "absolute" population surplus which contributes to the growth of an enormous latent reserve army of labour. He adds, "the population surplus, as far as it cannot be functionalised in profitable activity, is marginalized and, as far as capital is concerned, left to pauperisation" (ibid:507). Unable to find work as full time proletarians, Andean peasants must maintain their meager food production activity though locally produced foodstuffs barely meet their reproduction requirements.

Authors such as Bernstein (1981), Bartra and Otero (1987), Caballero (1984) and Shanin (1983) emphasize the importance of the incomplete expropriation of the producers from their means of production. This is due to the fact that surplus appropriation from wage labour requires the maintenance of the minifundio sector. Bartra and Otero (op.cit:353) observe that, in Mexico, the dominant tendency is toward de-peasantization without, however, total proletarianization. Increasingly, thus, surplus extraction leads to peasant marginalization within national capitalist economies. Marginalization primarily comes from wage labour exploitation in agricultural export - such is the case of herders working for SAIS Marangani (see Chapter 6). However, de-peasantization with incomplete expropriation is not necessarily the only direction of the penetration of commodity relations. For example, the Ccapacmarca data indicate that, depending on local factors, after erosion of the peasant economy (sixteenth to mid-twentieth century) re-peasantization and marginalization can also develop - a process which is similar to Caballero's understanding of the condition of contemporary Andean peasants.

Caballero (1984:29) defines the relation between peasants and capital as consisting of two simultaneous processes of "destruction" and "recreation". To substantiate his rejection of the argument that peasants reproduce themselves because they are functional to capitalism, the author offers four reasons: 1) capitalism can secure its own reserve army of
cheap labour; 2) the peasantry is unable to produce a food surplus sufficient to support the urban areas - this supply will eventually be achieved through imports or capitalist agriculture; 3) it is incorrect to assume that the needs of capital are sufficient requirements for the maintenance of the peasantry; 4) the destruction of the peasantry is not possible because the national economy could not absorb peasants as wage labour as there exists strong ecological barriers to the penetration of capital in the highlands and also because rich peasants do not reinvest their savings in the rural sector. Consequently, Caballero speculates that peasants will go on existing "at levels of extreme poverty occupying an increasingly marginal place within the economy as a whole" (ibid:30). Though he does not propose any new conceptual category for the analysis of Andean peasants, Caballero offers some useful insight into their persistence and marginalization.

The data that I collected in the district of Ccapacmarca and Marangani in southern Peru tend to show contradictory tendencies associated with state intervention in the rural sector. In Ccapacmarca, the trend is toward delayed differentiation and re-peasantization due to the consolidation of the local elite's political power (namely, gamonalismo). Meanwhile, in the export district of Marangani, the extension of commodity production leads to internal peasant differentiation with partial rather than full proletarianization. Peasant labour is not completely commoditized and peasants' low wages are supplemented by household agricultural production. However, as I will discuss, both regions witness increased marginalization. Marginalization of these southern Andean peasants seems to relate to the exploitation of wage labour and, as well, the creation of a population surplus incapable of being absorbed by the industrial sector.

Following Bernstein, this thesis recognizes that an adequate understanding of the impact of land reform on Andean social relations requires an examination of the political economy of contemporary Peru. The approach takes into consideration the relations of commodity production and exchange which tie southern peasants to peripheral capitalism
and subsume their household economy to the logic of capitalist accumulation. However, Andean relations cannot be fully understood on a materialistic level alone. They have to be recontextualized in terms of cultural factors. For example, re-peasantization in Ccapacmarca can be fully understood only if we examine the role played by *gamonalismo* (rural landlordism) at the local level. Thus, a socio-political analysis of social relations cannot be completely divorced from cultural reality. Cultural and sociological data broaden the ethnographic enquiry of Andean social relations.

3-Summary

To sum up this section, the work of Lenin and Chayanov have been of special value for a better understanding of peasant societies. Though highly enlightening, Lenin's formulation of rural transformation has been increasingly challenged as to its relevance to peripheral economies where capitalist expansion has followed divergent paths from the West. Stressing the multi-faceted nature of that evolution, Roseberry warns that "we must at once be sensitive to variation and analyse processual regularities. This requires constant movement between abstract and concrete levels of analysis in an attempt to understand peculiar societies" (1978:15).

This thesis accepts the basic premise of dependency (historical analysis of imperialist domination) but seeks in the Marxist approach adequate theoretical tools (namely, relations of production and exchange) to conceptualize the precise mechanisms of peasant differentiation. It uses both a political economy perspective to examine the impact of state policies on social processes in southern Peru and a bottom-up ethnographic approach of the social relations of production that subordinate peasants within a larger capitalist system. In order to examine the realities that shape Andean peasant life, it is necessary to locate the peasantry within the class structure of the nation-state while taking into consideration its concrete cultural characteristics.
In this work, I would argue that a purely abstract analysis of the peasantry is insufficient. The basic starting point must be the concrete reality in order to ascertain the empirical circumstances that account for the maintenance, the decay or marginalization of the peasantry. In agreement with Bernstein, I would state that a viable theory of contemporary peasantry must be based on empirically grounded research. An empirical approach enables better interpretation of the complex relations existing between capitalism and forms other than its own. Peasant economic organization responds, to and is transformed by larger systemic structures to which it is connected and differing forms of capitalist domination. Thus, it is a matter of concrete circumstance, rather than of theory, to comprehend under which conjunctures older forms of production either rapidly desintegrate or become selectively sustained and, as such, survive as transitional relations within capitalist production. With this in mind, the following chapters examine the social character of southern agricultural producers under colonial and later, republican state structures.

Some of the theoretical ideas outlined above will help explain the distinct character of the peasantries found in the two regions studied.
CHAPTER 3

The Economic History of the Provincias Altas

After Loreto and Madre de Dios, Cusco is the third largest of the country's twenty-three departments (see Figure 1, Chapter 1). Located in the southern Andes, it embraces some 76,224 square kilometers and three mountain ranges separated by two broad valleys, the Vilcanota and the Apurimac, that run in a northerly direction. Although the latitude of the region is tropical, the climate is primarily determined by altitude.

Introduction to the Region

The provincias altas, where the research sites are located, are comprised of four provinces: Canas, Canchis, Chumbivilcas and Espinar (See Figure 2, Chapter 1) in the extreme southern tip of the department of Cusco. Here, broad altiplano plains are found above 3,000 meters and constitute, for the most part, natural pastures unfit for cultivation. They are frigid uplands traversed by two northward intermontane waterways—the Apurimac and the Vilcanota—and by numerous smaller transverse valleys or quebradas. These are temperate gorges offering rich agricultural lands.

Physical Characteristics

The climate is characterised by two major seasons. Although the pattern is not always predictable, a dry winter period extends from May to September with little precipitation. Heavy rainfalls are expected during the milder season from November to April (75 per cent of the annual precipitation occur during that time). Though variations occur, usual total yearly rainfall averages between 730 and 750 mm. Droughts (as in 1982-
3), hail, heavy frost or excess of rain (as in 1986) are common features significantly reducing crop and animal production¹.

Diurnal temperature variations are pronounced since the tropical latitude moderates this alpine climate. This leads to what Troll (1968) calls a "diurnal temperature climate" meaning that the diurnal temperature change (over 20 degrees Celsius) is much larger than the annual range. The average yearly temperature is near eight degrees Celsius which is relatively low and explains the slow crop growth of seven to eight months above 2,500 meters (Gade, 1975:14).

The region may also be divided into three major vertical zones - each corresponding to a unique ecology. First, the puna is a treeless, barren high-plateau lying between 4,300 and 3,900 meters above sea-level. Also known as the altiplano, it represents the uppermost limit for crop cultivation in the Andes (only the bitter potato or Kanuwa can grow at this altitude). This undulating plateau is a pastoral upland with livestock (alpaca, llama and sheep) grazing on the wild grass or stipa ichu. Its carrying capacity for pasture averages to two head of animals per hectare.

The second zone, the suni, lies between 3,900 and 3,300 meters and is a region where we find wheat, barley, broad beans and potatoes as well as Andean root crops such oca (oxalis tuberosa), ulluco (ullucus tuberosa) and isano. The principal herd animals are sheep, cattle and horse; the latter found mainly in Chumbivilcas. Third, the Qheshua zone is more temperate lying between 3,500 to 2,360 meters. Its leading crop is maize, but barley, wheat and beans are also cultivated. Pigs may be found higher up, but are concentrated in this region.

¹According to Gade (1975:13), the province of Canchis where Llallahui is located suffers from most frequent droughts in the Vilcanota Valley.
The province of Canchis lies in the southernmost part of the department of Cusco. It covers some 4,178.3 square kilometers between 3,250 and 3,695 meters (Map 3 below). Pass Sichani (altitude 3,531 meters), on the way to Cusco (3,382 meters), some quebradas exhibit a qheshua climate. However, the predominant ecological zones, as found in Marangani, are puna and suni.

The district of Marangani, located in the highest and southernmost part of the Vilcanota Valley, covers an area of 400 km². This includes some 45.5 km² of quebrada and 3,54.5 km² of puna and cordillera. In this region the topography is rugged with elevations varying between 3,540 to 5,000 meters above sea level (the pueblo of Marangani is located at 3,681 meters).

The vegetation of this micro-region varies with the altitude. Below 3,500 meters, one finds eucalyptus trees, wild plants like Chirichiri and cacti. Between 3,600 and 3,900 meters potatoes, broad beans, ocas, barley, wheat and ollucas are cultivated. In the puna, above 4,000 meters, we find a bitter potato or ruquipu from which moraya and chuño (dried potato) are made. Only a few small trees are seen at this elevation which, once dried, are used as combustible material. The fauna of this zone includes alpaca, sheep, cattle, llama, horse, deer, foxes, pumas and condors. Agriculture is based on small grains and tubers while hardy root crops are grown on some of the slopes. In the puna, animal husbandry prevails over crop raising.

The Vilcanota Valley covers only 4 per cent of Canchis but contains some 95 per cent of the province’s inhabitants. Here, population density is over four hundred times as high as in the puna (Orlove, 1980:182). In pre-Colombian days, the valley was at the

2 Source: Diagnóstico departamental del Cusco, (Cusco: 1982), cuadro 001 (no page number).

3 The ecozones of the Vilcanota Valley have been studied in details by Troll (1968); Gade, (1975); and Fioravanti-Moliné, (1975).
center of the Inca empire with its capital, Cusco, placed mid-way along its alluvial basin. The southern part of the valley has been, for centuries, a major trading route linking Cusco to Lake Titicaca through La Raya. La Raya (4,313 meters), some 30 kilometers south of the town of Marangani, is the highest yet only accessible pass to Bolivia.

Sicuani, the provincial capital, remained relatively isolated from the national economy until the construction of a railway by the British in 1897. This train line constructed during the guano wool boom, now connects the coast to the southern highlands and plays a major role in the economy of the whole province. A major southern highway also traverses the province where numerous buses pass through the area en route to either Cusco or southward to Puno and Arequipa then Lima. Along the perimeters of this highway, one finds the majority of Canchica peasant communities.

Like Canchicas, Chumbivilcas is one of the high provinces of Cusco with an altitude varying between 3,512 to 3,796 meters (see Figure 4). The district of Ccapacmarca, in the northern tip of the province, is found at some 3,500 meters. As such, it contains the three ecological zones typical of this southern region. However, as in the case of Canchicas, the puna and suni zones are the most important. Consequently, this economy is primarily agro-pastoral with herding traditionally holding an important position.

This area is extremely isolated and of difficult access. Roads are unpaved and in poor condition. Depending upon the type of motor vehicle one uses, it will take between 20 to 30 hours to cover the 400 kms separating its capital town, Santo Tomas, from the city of Cusco.

\[4\] The flora of this province has been extensively studied by Vargas Calderon (1967).
Figure 4. Province of Chumbivilcas
b-Socio-economic Setting of Canchis and Chumbivilcas

Traditionally, social relations in the provincias altas are characterized by a polarity between mestizos or notables and Quechua speaking peasants also referred to as Indians. Notables control land, market networks and education while peasants, who constitute the main social group, own microholdings of two hectares or less per family enjoying little social and economic power.

In 1981 the official census indicated that the population of Chumbivilcas was 63,603 inhabitants while that of Canchis counted 82,918 people of which 51,988 were peasants living off their own land. Both provinces are part of the mancha india (Indian stain) - an area where living standards are among the lowest of Latin America (Cotler, 1968; Lowenthal, 1975: 23; North, 1981: 103; Spalding, 1980:81).

Illiteracy is high in both provinces. Chumbivilcas is the least literate of all the 13 provinces of the department of Cusco. According to the 1971 census, 67 per cent of those ten years or older were illiterate. The same year national statistics showed that illiteracy stood at 52 per cent in Canchis. Average life expectancy in Chumbivilcas is still 40 years with more than one quarter of the deaths occurring in children under two years of age. The 1981 census also indicates that 98.2 per cent of its residents had no running-water nor electricity.

Canchis and Chumbivilcas exhibit a pattern of low industrial development typical of

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5 In 1972, the department of Cusco counted over 335,000 peasant households owning an average of 1.8 hectare of land each (Villassante, 1981:4).

6 "Mancha india" means 'Indian Stain' - a derogatory expression referring to predominantly Quechua speaking departments including Ayacucho, Ancash, Apurimac, Cusco, Huancavelica and Puno. According to Handelman (1981:105), two thirds of the population is rural and less than half the adults are literate.
the southern sierra. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the coast and the central sierra have been the most dynamic economic sectors of the country. Prior to 1968, Peru's oligarchy and foreign capital dominated this highly productive sector oriented toward international trade rather than domestic consumption. Meanwhile, outlying highland regions such as the provincias altas remained underdeveloped.

Chumbivilcas lacks any industry except for some home-based weaving and pottery. Canchis exhibits a more diversified economy including hand embroidery, ceramics, metalwork, furrier as well as stone, wood carving and cloth manufacturing. Table 1 and Figure 1 show that in the mid-1970s Canchis enjoyed a relatively wide range of occupations for both men and women. The reasons lying behind the different pattern of regional development between Canchis and Chumbivilcas is related to the specific socio-economic character of each province.

Table 1: Non Agricultural Activities in Marangani, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th># of Male Jobs</th>
<th># of Female Jobs</th>
<th>Total Number of Jobs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handicraft</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities: Electricity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cloth manufacturing was particularly important in Marangani due to the presence of the textile factory of Chectuyoc.
To sum up, the physical geography has imposed powerful constraints upon the inhabitants of southern Cusco. However, that these highlanders are amongst the poorest of all Peruvians does not result directly from their natural environment. Through the course of time, Andean natives have adapted very well to harsh terrain and high altitude. Rather, their current plight is more directly related to events that have taken place in the region since Spanish conquest in 1533.

2-Integration of the Provincias Altas into the Colonial Economy

In part, the uniqueness of the development of the provincias altas is due to the ways in which the physical geography has constrained socio-economic processes. Prior to conquest, sedentary cultures developed mainly in the cooler altiplanos. Under Inca rule, this southern region was an agricultural society organized hierarchically around a complex of administrative units which provided the basis for an extensive division of labour to
support a redistributive economy controlled by a king also considered a sun-deity. Land
dights were vested in ayllus - a pre-Inca, clan-like institution where blood bonds were a
requisite for access to land8. The organization of the ayllu was instrumental in facilitating
exchange throughout the vast Inca empire and in the functioning of the corvée work system
called mita9.

a. Creation of a Labour Reserve Under The Colonial State

In 1531 the Spanish Crown, under the leadership of Francisco Pizarro and Diego
de Almagro, began its conquest of Peru and in 1533, Cusco fell. Under the impact of
colonialism, the native population of the provincias altas became integrated into the state as
both a labour reserve for precious metal production and a heavily taxed social category.

Under colonial administration, conquerors received encomiendas which gave them
rights over indigenous labour10. In 1581 Chumbivilcas, wherein lies Ccapacmarca,
became divided into nine private encomiendas and two repartimientos (trusteeships)
entrusted to the Crown. In the process, farming clusters were reduced from over a hundred
to only eight settlements of fourteen hamlets (Poole, 1987:266). The corregimiento (area of
jurisdiction of a Spanish royal official) of Canas/Canchis, where Marangani is located, was
comprised of eighteen encomiendas or repartimientos twelve of which contained over a

8 Spalding defines the "ayllu" as follows: "The term 'ayllu', now applied to a kin group of
a particular, limited size, had a much broader range of meaning in traditional Andean
society. In sixteenth century Quechua dictionaries, it is defined as any group - family,
lineage, or generation - whose members are related to one another through their descent
from a common ancestor" (1975:108).

9 The Inca labour system called mita means that Ayllu members were obliged to work in
the construction and maintenance of irrigation canals and other public services.

10 An encomienda was more a "labour" than a "land" grant. Ramirez (1986:17) states that
conquerers defined encomiendas in terms of population because there was no scarcity of
land and Spaniards did not have a precise idea of Peru's geography. Consequently, the
encomendero was primarily the master of indigenous people rather than the owner of the
land.
thousand inhabitants each (Cook, 1981:243). To facilitate tax collection, these new villages were usually relocated at mid-altitude between high *punas* and warmer, relatively accessible lowlands. *Kurakas* or Inca rural elites became crucial middlemen standing between Indian villagers and grant holders. These local leaders often used their intermediary position to build personal fortunes by controlling access to resources within their villages. Thus, from the outset differentiation became exacerbated as a result of increasing colonial state interventions in Andean society.

State policies grouping communities into fewer villages or *reducciones* were promulgated in 1579 by the Viceroy Francisco de Toledo. Local Indian lords, traditionally in charge of Andean communities, were fitted into a system of "indirect rule" to enforce and administer the new order. These resettlement policies brought Indian labour within the Crown tribute system while converting the natives to Christianity and asserting a more efficient Spanish dominance over the area. Toledo's reform led to a significant deterioration of community life. Piel states that the Indians in the *reducciones* "were enclosed within a marginal and autarkic economy, on an amputated territory composed of excessively small plots of land; they continued the traditions of culture and folk-lore which were no longer more than the shadow or parody of the ancient pre-Columbian societies" (1970:11). The loss of *puna* lands forced Indians into farming activities away from herding, deeply affecting indigenous social organization. For example, Poole (1975) argues that

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11 The communities of the district of Capacmarca originated as *reducciones* shortly after this resettlement period in 1656 while those of Marangani were founded in 1790.

12 This concentration of large populations facilitated the spread of European diseases and, thus, tremendously increased native mortality (see Cook, 1981:79). Official overseers (*corregidores*) were designated to control and manage the rapidly depleted Indigenous population.

13 In Chumbivilcas many indigenous communities were dispossessed of their *punas*. Only three settlements - Cangalli (Velille), Warago (Colquemarca) and Huininquiri - were able to maintain access to their high pastoral lands (see Poole, 1987:265).
estancias and pastoral lands were traditionally of matrilineal inheritance while farming lands were patrilineal. The shift away from animal raising suppressed the female side of the inheritance pattern and, thus, weakened the position of indigenous women.

The removal of Indians from their ancestral sites made it easier for the Spaniards to seize deserted pasture lands. However, despoliation of indigenous lands eventually reached alarming levels such that the state was finally forced to defend Indian communities so that they could meet subsistence quota and state levies. During this period, Chumbivilcan and Canchis settlements received their land titles officially labelled "ancestral rights since time immemorial"14. Each new community became a closed corporate group receiving a legal and ecclesiastical identity (Wolf, 1972:76). For this reason, Wolf declares that Latin America's upland closed corporate peasant communities are the result of Spanish colonial policy - a point which unambiguously restates the analytical primacy of history in the study of contemporary Andean communities.

However, these corporate units had suffered extensive property damage having lost forever access to large tracks of farming and pastoral lands and aspects of their native social structures. For this reason, Stein (1984) rightly states that the term "Indian" cannot be applied to modern day Andean peasants since there is no major cultural continuity with pre-conquest civilization. Therefore, he adds, "ethnicity is not a cause of their social situation but a consequence" (ibid:289).

14 Spalding (op.cit:109) mentions that the Crown retained ultimate ownership of the land. Indians had rights of possession by virtue of their cultivation of the land from Inca times, but the possession, officially called "posesión precaria", was not ownership.
Constant state demands for peasant labour and tributes led to a labour crisis caused by depopulation through death and desertion\textsuperscript{15}. Colonial mining was most demanding\textsuperscript{16}.

On the harsh and inhuman character of this \textit{mita de minas}, Lewellen comments:

There was a death rate of 2 out of 3 \textit{mitayos} at Potosi where workers were forced to live chained together in the shaft for 5 days, without seeing daylight. Work was supposedly for a year, but one could seldom accomplish production quotas in a year, even with wife and children helping... (T)he high grade of mercury ore was so poisonous that even families living near the mines suffered the effects (1978:20).

Discussing the plight of the rural population at Huancavelica, Mörner reports cases of women who crippled their own children to save them from \textit{mita} service:

The extreme shortage of males and the grievances unanimously voiced by the parish priests in the districts subjected to \textit{mita} at Huancavelica toward the end of the seventeenth century suggest the proportions of a genocide (1985:55).

Equally, Silverblatt (1980) contends that an underground female culture of resistance developed in the \textit{puna} against the colonial power. Basing her argument on Guaman Poma's writings, she explains:

(S)ometimes women became so desperate at seeing their culture destroyed that they preferred to commit infanticide than allow a new generation to suffer at the hands of priests, colonial magistrates, \textit{Mayordomos}, or their own native functionaries. But women who practiced infanticide killed only their male children (ibid:179).

\textsuperscript{15} Under the colonial regime, the \textit{mita} system of forced labour was extremely coercive. It postulated that one seventh of the adult male population had to participate in free mine work service.

\textsuperscript{16} In the dioceses of Cusco, natives from the \textit{partados} of Aymaraes, Cotobambas and Chumbivilcas were required to serve in the mine of Huancavelica (Poole, 1987; Mörner, 1977:22). Meanwhile, Canas, Canchis and Quispicanchis were part of the sixteen Peruvian provinces subjected to work at Potosi (Mörner, ibid:112-3).
Mita, epidemics and malnutrition led to a drastic demographic decline. Within less than a century after conquest, Peru's indigenous population had dropped from several million to some 700,000 (Mörner, op.cit:40)\(^{17}\). In Ccapacmarca, for example, the parish counted 2,455 Indian tributaries in 1572 - a number which fell to 1,607 in 1621. Equally, in 1754 the *partido* of Canas/Canchis counted only 12,785 tributaries as opposed to 34,713 in 1628\(^{18}\). It was not until the end of the eighteenth century that the rural population, no longer "natives" but nevertheless labelled "Indians" for tax purposes, began to rise again in southern Cusco (Stein, 1984:287).

Flight was the most common form of popular resistance to forced labour levy (Spalding, 1975; Mörner, 1978, 1985; Grieshaber, 1979). Through the desertion of their hamlets, Indian males could avoid being drafted by entering into another settlement where they would live as unregistered community members or *forasteros* with no communal land rights\(^{19}\). Spalding (op.cit:111) mentions that by the mid-eighteenth century, over 40 per cent of the population of the southern provinces consisted of these landless escapees. Rapidly, they became dependent on work provided by either permanent landed members (*originarios*) or by *hacendados*. Control over *forastero* labour ended up generating fierce competition within rural society (Grieshaber, op.cit:115).

The demographic impact of the *forastero* phenomenon on Ccapacmarca and Marangani can be appreciated from the colonial data presented in Table 2. The decline of silver mining in Potosí at the end of the seventeenth century appears to have led to a faster decline of the indigenous population.

\(^{17}\) Estimates of indigenous population prior to conquest vary considerably. According to Mörner (1985:40), the population that is now modern Peru was of the order of nine million. However, Rangel (1987:153) argues that the Inca empire could not have fed more than a million and a half inhabitants.

\(^{18}\) These two *partidos* (administrative division implemented by the Crown for tax purposes) were counted together until 1833.

\(^{19}\) For a fuller treatment of *forasteros*, see Sanchez-Albornoz (1978).
decrease of runaways in Canchis. By contrast, the high incidence of forasteros in Ccapacmarca during the eighteenth century could have been due to several reasons. First, mercury mining at Huancavelica, which affected the province of Chumbivilcas, started later than silver mining at Potosí. Second, the high number of fugitives in this district was later related to the early encroachment of haciendas in the region.

Table 2: Indian Households According to Fiscal Distinction in the Colonial Parishes of Marangani and Ccapacmarca

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tributaries</th>
<th>Originarios</th>
<th>Forasteros</th>
<th>Tributaries</th>
<th>Originarios</th>
<th>Forasteros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1728</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1791</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1801</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1815</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Macera, 1972:114-140

The intrusion of forasteros brought further division within Andean society. These landless residents, excluded from shares of community resources, were looked down upon by community members who had access to land to support themselves. Rivalries and mistrust developed between these groups - a phenomenon which still persists today.

b-Emergence of Haciendas

After conquest, the provincias altas became integrated into the Lima-Cusco-Potosí axis and supported a large inter-regional commodity economy arising out of the needs of the mines (Spalding, 1975; Piel, 1970; Assadourian, 1982). From the outset, extractive
activities like Potosí's silver mining had a decisive impact on the development of internal and interregional markets (for cattle, agricultural products, cloths and mules) throughout southern Peru.

Rapidly, Cusco attracted non Indians (Spanish and Mestizos) looking for mercantile opportunities. The province of Chumbivilcas, one of the most isolated regions of southern Cusco, received large waves of non Indian migrants as early as the seventeenth century. Table 3 shows that in-migration averaged 57 per cent in that region, with Capacmarca counting 263 individuals or 43.5 per cent of its population which were new migrants by 1786 (Mörner, 1977:27). Spaniards came to Chumbivilcas for silver mining and gold panning. Mestizos either became mule track drivers supplying camps, plantations and towns or settled on cattle ranches (Mörner, ibid:28, 1985:64). Mestizaje - the process of race mixture between Indians and Europeans - was well under way in the region by the end of the eighteenth century. Inspite of this, however, the colonial state maintained a tax system organized along racial criteria whereby "Indians" or Quechua and Aymara speaking peasants paid a tribute while Mestizos, constituting a distinctive fiscal category on their own, paid a caste contribution (Piel, 1970:113).

20 Spaniards opened mines in Chamaca in mid-sixteenth century (Mörner, 1977:88), in Phuyani located in the present day community of Yanque and in San Bernardo and San Antonio in Colquemarca, the district near Capacmarca.

21 Mörner (op.cit:28) mentions that by 1780, some 980 mules were raised in the local ranches of Chumbivilcas.
By 1689, official records show that 705 haciendas were established in the region of Cusco; with the closing of the Potosí silver mines a century later, their number decreased slightly to 647 (Mörner, 1985:75). These estates produced first and foremost for an internal and highly competitive market system (Spalding, op.cit:114). In the region of Cusco, haciendas provided fruit, vegetables and meat for colonists, coca for mine workers and coarse textiles for Indians and Mestizos. Livestock breeding for wool and beasts of burden (mules) became important. Wool was tied to the profitable textile production in individually owned sweatshops called obrajes and chorillos 22.

Though colonial haciendas developed a strong territorial presence in the department of Cusco, there were only a few extremely large ones. In Chumbivilcas, for example,

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22 Herrera Tamayo (1978:56) reports that prior to 1780 an estate of average size near Cusco would be valued at around 3,000 pesos. However, with an obraje, its value would increase to roughly 76,000 pesos as seen in the case of Hacienda San Juan de Taray. Similarly, the large sweatshop of Pichiuphum was worth 148,745 pesos in 1760 while a livestock hacienda would be worth only 800 pesos.
haciendas were relatively numerous yet small as the size of the labour force tends to indicate (Table 4). On the other hand, estates in Canas/Canchis were fewer but larger23.

Table 4: Number of Haciendas in the Department of Cusco in 1689 and 1786

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Estate</th>
<th># Haciendas</th>
<th>Indians (forasteros) per</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1689</td>
<td>1786</td>
<td>1689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abancay</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aymaraes</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calca/Lares</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urubamba</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotabambas</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paruro</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumbivilcas</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canas/Canchis</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quispicanchis</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paucartambo</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mörner, 1977:51

Table 5 shows that the partidos of Canas/Canchis and Chumbivilcas had no titled men - only titled women who were most likely Indian widows of noble blood who had married conquistadores24. Most likely, titled Spaniards and their families preferred to live in Cusco. This demonstrates that, under colonial state, political position and mercantile

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23 Mörner (1985:72) reports that in 1689, one estate in Canas/Canchis near Langui owned as many as 10,000 sheep and 100 head of cattle while in 1703 two others counted together some 32,000 sheep.

24 Mörner (op.cit:51) mentions that by the end of the sixteenth-century, one fifth of Cusco’s landowners were titled and were to be addressed as "don"; the estates of such persons were usually larger and often included a sweat shop or obraje. Women, usually members of the Inca elites, owned 15 per cent of the private land and the church had control of seven per cent. These titled individuals were dominant local figures being at once landowners, merchants and a part of the Spanish aristocracy.
activity did not necessarily merge. The landed class residing in isolated places like Ccapacmarca bore no titles of nobility; they were neither wealthy nor aristocratic. Often, to make up for their subordinate political position, they formed solid family networks among themselves. The example of Cotahuasi, Chumbivilcas shows that three of the four village hacendados were blood related (Mörner, 1977:39). To break down the colonial economic monopoly, these early hacendados often manipulated peasant dissatisfaction into protest against the state by forming alliances of convenience with the peasantry in order to undermine the power of the Spanish Crown. The main source of conflict between hacendados and state officials was control over peasant labour. Interestingly, during the colonial period haciendas did not expand in the southern Andes (Spalding 1975:108). Most likely, this was due to considerable state control over the subsistence sector because, as Spalding (ibid) argues, in the early republican period, the absence of state intervention in rural affairs crucially helped rapid accumulation of land by the hacendados.

Table 5: Types of Landowners in Chumbivilcas and Canas/Canchis, 1682

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dons</th>
<th>Doñas</th>
<th>Church Orders</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total Haciendas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chumbivilcas</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canas/Canchis</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mörner, 1977:35

25 In Chumbivilcas, there existed a great divide between the Spanish elite and hacienda owners. The provincial upper class, caciques and corregidores resided in the chief town of Velille since the late sixteenth century and were part of the Crown gentry. A list of the famous administrators of Velille shows that all local caciques were titled men - Don Carlos Quispe, Don Diego Nina Chaquayo, Don Santiago Supanta, Don Garcia Guacravine, Don Francisco Sunquilpa (Valcarcel,1981).

26 Poole (1987:273) cites the example of the villagers of Challa who opposed the partado system in 1768 by raising against the corregidor of Velille. These people were apparently acting under pressure from their priest/hacendado who had hoped that, in the process, he could gain greater independence from the administration of Velille to free himself from the burden of colonial taxes.
On the *haciendas* , the dominant form of production was debt-peonage. There, *forasteros* lived in virtual servitude "regarded merely as cattle destined to obey" (Mörner, 1985:132). Along with other Indian workers assigned to the estates (Indians from the surrounding villages: *colonos, peones, arrendires* ), *forasteros* had unpaid, quasi-servile obligations to perform in exchange for a piece of land. As Table 6 shows, it was primarily *forasteros* who constituted *hacienda* labour. Poor living conditions and brutal methods of social control characterized these highland *haciendas*. However, the *gamonal* system (despotic political bosses) began later following the disorganization of the Peruvian state after independence in 1822 (Langer, 1986:122).

Table 6: Labour Composition in the *Haciendas* of Ccapacmarca in 1826, 1839 and 1850

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Originarios</th>
<th>Forasteros</th>
<th>Originarios</th>
<th>Forasteros</th>
<th>Originarios</th>
<th>Forasteros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ayllu Collana</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hac. Percasenqa</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hac. Quencarpa</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pue. Carcahuani</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayllu Taqscabamba</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hac. Pumacpucayo</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hac. Pucatccalla</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Andean villages not attached to an estate were called "free" holding communities. This meant that their members held sufficient land to support themselves (Skar, 1981:79). Though to some degree autonomous, these communities were burdened with heavy colonial taxes and, thus, forced to actively participate in the larger commodity producing economy sending wool and meat to the mining centres. This indirectly led to increased socio-economic differentiation within Andean villages (Spalding, 1975:112). Citing the case of Chumbivilcas, Mörner (1977: 72) mentions that by 1689, two or three "Indians"
owned between 60 to 100 sheep and, in a beef cattle producing community near Velille, some 30 "Indians" together possessed roughly 200 head. These natives usually were local village leaders or Kurakas monopolizing much of the land and the herds.

The development of an interregional economy gave community peasants an opportunity to have access to markets as a chance to pay for onerous dependencies. However, it seems that markets were under the monopolistic control of "intermediary powers" - a factor which became instrumental in sustaining a climate of violence in southern Peru between 1700 and 1820 (Piel, 1967)27. According to Piel, burdened by the reparto which forced them to purchase Spanish merchandise at high prices, Andean peasants increasingly wanted free and direct access to the market economy. Apparently, it was this issue which led to the radical 1780 rural unrest starting in Canas/Canchis under the leadership of Tupac Amaru28: In 1780, this great revolutionary leader crystallized the demands of a peasantry that was doubly colonized: victim of the colonialism of the Spaniards in Peru, and of the internal colonialism of the creoles over the Indian peasantry (Piel, 1970:115).

The rebellion spread throughout the southern sierra and led to outbursts of punitive property destruction accompanied by looting and stealing. The case of Livitaca in Chumbivilcas is typical: a rich owner of three haciendas lost for over 30,000 pesos in

27 The first serious rebellion began in 1742 among the Campa Indians in the sierra east of Lima under the leadership of Juan Santos Atahualpa. For an analysis of this uprising, see Stein (1982). The rising was never suppressed and reached a stalemate 14 years later. Two bloody peasant riots took place in Chumbivilcas in 1776. One of them ended with the murder of the corregidor.

28 This rebellion started with the execution of Antonio Arriaga, corregidor of Tinta who had distributed goods for more than 300,000 pesos, although the arancel for the repartimiento of the province was of 112,500 pesos. Beside improvement of Indian living conditions, Tupac Amaru's principal demands were the abolition of the repartimiento system along with the removal of the corregidores and the creation of an audiencia (high court of appeal) in Cusco.
By the end of the colonial period, Andean society was deeply differentiated through unequal access to community land and inter-regional markets controlled by landed Mestizos. Nationally, the country was in shambles - rampant corruption, rural unrest, wars of independence and, finally, a deep crisis in silver mining resulting from the exhaustion of the surface veins and the collapse of the world silver market after the 1780s. Only when Peru became tied to the capitalist international market through guano, mining, tropical crop export and wool production, was the country able to recover financially. This aspect, examined next, shows the ways in which the wool trade in the south led to the formation of new rural conflicts through landholding concentration and hacienda expansion. Such conflicts, based on new class relations, in turn affected both the course of regional development and government policies towards Andean peasants.

3-Regional Integration into the International Wool Market

Shortly after independence in 1821 and prior to Peru’s involvement into the world trade, the country was dominated by caudillismo - a political style characteristically authoritarian and chronically unstable. This period signals a new phase in the disintegration of community lands following the passing of liberal laws.

After 1822, following the withdrawal of the colonial power, Peru found itself in a state of internal anarchy with no central power authority to unify a country torn by factionalism. Hard hit by the independence wars, the central government was forced to rely on military men in charge of the presidency until a civilian elite gained enough strength and

29 Recently, LeGrand (1986) researched a similar question in the frontier region of Colombia.
cohesion to take over the state. These "caudillos" were officers who, by force of arms and through the support of their followers, achieved some semblance of order and authority in the region. The leadership style they created, "caudillismo", was based on personal loyalty rather than political programs. Struggle over state control within the ranks of the army led to power fragmentation to the benefit of the rural landed class or gamonales "who instituted a system of private justice of the estate, in a number of cases even executing the wrongdoers" (Langer, 1986:122).

The disintegration of highland communities worsened after independence. In the 1820s, Simon Bolivar and San Martin - both strong believers in private property - passed decrees (1824 and 1825) that allowed Indians to become individual owners of ayllu lands. By issuing individual rights, these governmental moves furthered the destruction of Andean communities and advanced rural differentiation by enabling Mestizos and Whites alike to purchase commonly held lands on a large scale. Considerable tracts, therefore, passed to non-comuneros at a time corresponding to Peru's incorporation into the international trade market. This privatization of lands created a national market in land and paved the way for the entrenchment of the hacienda system. By depriving many peasant households of free access to common land, it relegated its members to a subordinate position within the local economy.

The existence of Andean communities was further threatened by the fact that the 1821 San Martin Decree reinforced by the 1824 Decree of Trujillo did not constitutionally recognize them as corporate groups. After independence, the new liberal state ended the collective ownership of inalienable lands which left communities unprotected, without any legal status and only a limited de facto recognition. Communal holdings belonged to the

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30 The law entitled caciques to receive up to five topos or the equivalent of 15,000 square meters each while the figure for comuneros was one or two topos (4,000 square meters) per family depending on its size.
state and, as such, were often turned over as rewards for patriotic action. For example, in Chumbivilcas, the present day owners of Hacienda Chaypa Pampa and Phausi trace back their property rights to their ancestors who received these estates as grants for lending mules to Simon Bolivar, the liberator of the Americas (Diagnóstico, 1979).

The breaking up of communal holdings reached new heights with the introduction of Spanish inheritance law whereby sons and daughters received equally from their parents. Such a law set in motion greater land fragmentation - a process exacerbated in the south by population explosion due to increased economic prosperity following the coming of the railway. This was the case in Canchis where the population increased by 74 per cent in 20 years from 35,482 inhabitants in 1876 to 61,793 in 1896 (Piel, 1983:265).

For decades after independence (1840-1879), the new republican state took advantage of rising European demands for guano and nitrate (two fertilizers) to encourage trade with Britain which brought about a new golden age for this newly formed nation. Prosperity ended when the Republic exhausted its guano and lost its nitrate to Chile after boundary redefinition during the War of the Pacific in 1879. The defeat of Peruvian troops marked the end of formal caudillo politics. A civilian government dominated by the rising of a cotton-sugar-plantation elite came to power. That is, export gave Peru's emerging middle class access to political state power.

Civilian rule provided some degree of stability for economic growth through the penetration of foreign capital in mining (copper, gold, lead, zinc and, in particular, tin), agriculture (cotton, rice, sugar) and wool trades. The resulting expansion led to the construction of a railroad beginning in 1851. Three lines connected the coast with the sierra - one in the south and two in the central region. Trains gave a tremendous impetus to the development of distant rural areas such as the southern regions reaching Puno in 1876,
Sicuani in 1897 and Cusco in 1908. With the arrival of the railroad, land became a highly valued commodity.

Improvement in communication had a major impact on integrating the southern provinces of Cusco within the wool export and expanding latifundio system. Livestock raising became vigorous under British demands for sheep and alpaca wool compounded by the increased price of wool on the international scene. The advent of the wool boom transformed Sicuani into one of the richest wool producing areas of the Southern Andes and the major commercial and administrative centre for the provincias altas. Government employment was drastically expanded and textile plants started to emerge. For example, the Chucayoc textile factory in Marangani, established in 1899 and equipped with European machinery, created an important source of employment for nearby peasant communities. It appears, thus, that a process of limited "modernization" occurred with capital accumulated from the wool export trade being eventually transferred into industrialization (Mörner et al. 1982:74). This largely explains why contemporary Canchis is more industrialized than Chumbivilcas.

Profound administrative and commercial changes at the local level followed the integration of the south into the wool trade. Espinar became a new province; Yauri and Toqroyoc emerged as small urban centres; Coparaque, Pichigua and Santo Tomas expanded as they became better connected with Sicuani, through the construction of the road system: Santo Tomas-Yauri-Sicuani (Figure 2, Chapter 1). During this period, Arequipa - a commercial city near the coast - was the dominant power. Its wealth was in the hands of a few foreign-owned houses, mainly British. In 1901, Arequipa counted 17 such houses; it contained 21 by 1934 (Flores Galindo, 1977:212).

Until the end of the nineteenth century, the peasant pastoral economy of the southern highlands seemed successfully integrated into the wool trade. Piel (1987:9)
provides a useful picture of the province of Canas circa 1891 at the time of the fiscal census conducted by the local subprefecture. He shows that 1) around Yanaoca, some 94 per cent of the peasantry controlled just below 92 per cent of the resources; 2) near Yauri (Espinar) 96.4 per cent of the peasants controlled more than 97.5 per cent of the resources accountable in money terms; and 3) "Indian" pastoral capital near Yauri is 3.6 times greater than crop-livestock capital (Indian and Mestizo/Creole) found near Yanaoca. Yet local hacendados had not succeeded in controlling production and markets. According to Spalding the reason lies in the absence of a strong central government in Lima "to provide the basis for a political monopoly of any real duration of profit" (1980:92). She argues that the rise of an hacendado elite later became linked to political rather than economic factors.

The development of an alliance between the foreign firms and groups within the landed elite favoured hacienda expansion such that the peasant pastoral economy was "subject to a true misti invasion of its own space" (Piel, 1987:13). In the province of Espinar between 1889 and 1940, Piel states "that the Indian pastoral communities...have just undergone a real defeat in the face of the misti of Yauri and elsewhere" (ibid). By 1920s, Mestizos had encroached on over 70 per cent of the punas located in the provincias altas (Piel, 1983:275). The magnitude of these incursions is evident in the example of one estate which covered more than 30,000 hectares of grazing land for over 60,000 alpaca, between 1915 and 1929 by taking over community lands in Canas/Canchis and Quispicanchis (Flores Galindo, 1977:214). However, according to Spalding, land concentration did not increase production. Rather, "it led to the concentration of that same income in fewer hands" (1980:95).
In proximity to the railroad along the Vilcanota Valley, the size and value of haciendas increased considerably\textsuperscript{31}. However, beginning in the 1920s, the local elite of Canchis saw their power eroding drastically at the hands of wholesale traders, foreign exporters, coastal Peruvians, and powerful figures within the haciendo national elite who began to invest in landed properties (Orlove, 1980:337-348). For example, in Marangani, Hacienda Uyucani (6,000 hectares), near the community of Quisini, belonged since colonial times to the church. By the end of the nineteenth century, its owner was a Frenchman Juan B. Lacaveratz (Quispitupa Salinas, 1981:71). These new outsiders became instrumental in integrating the area within larger society\textsuperscript{32}. As Orlove states: "The control exercised by the local elites had not extended beyond the villages; the new elites had power over several provinces. The regional level of articulation became more important than it had been before, and the local level less so" (1977a:162).

In Chumbivilcas, the situation that developed in the course of the nineteenth century was significantly different. The railroad line linked Arequipa through Puno to Cusco but never reached that province. Further, the central state was not in a position to economically sustain such a remote region. As a result, Chumbivilcas became more oriented toward meat production for the internal market than toward wool for a world market dominated by Great Britain. Politically, the landed elite took virtual control of the region. Reactions to the growing marginalization of the province became expressed in Q'orillaso - a cultural

\textsuperscript{31} At the turn of the century, land value was high as the case of Hacienda Chuabamba indicates. Located in the district of Marangani, along the railway line, Chuabamba covered 720 hectares. Its value during the wool boom in 1901 jumped to 4,000 soles. However, by 1913 with the decline of the wool trade, its value had substantially lowered to 2,856 soles (see Quispitupa Salinas, 1981:66-91).

\textsuperscript{32} At the turn of the century, Puno, the department near Cusco, became the main center of large haciendas. Among other families, the Romanos bought Piccotani (46,000 hectares), The Rey de Castro had Yocara (9,000 hectares), the Gibsons became owners of La Sociedad Ganadera del Sur (200,000 hectares) illustrating the rising profitability of livestock (see Flores Galindo, 1977:211-226).
There is an idealized regional identity found among Chumbivilcanos; even the peasant population: this is associated with the trappings and glamour of a herding way of life reminiscent of vaqueros in Mexico, Gauchos in the pampas and Cowboys in the United States Southwest. Horses, chaps, bolos, guns, the myth and the reality of local cattle-rustling, and of bullfighting are all parts of this mystique (1980:208).

While the wool trade led to the replacement of Canchis’s traditional elite by a nationally oriented, absentee landed class, in Chumbivilcas rural hacendados became more entrenched within their region. In fact, these landlords consolidated their local power never challenged by either the state or by Arequipa traders. Gamonalismo— the political system of abusive landlords—gained strength as a consequence of minimal state representation in an area where patron absenteeism was not pronounced. By using direct coercion by unscrupulous strongmen these rural bosses enforced land appropriation and labour recruitment. Given the quasi-absence of state representation in the region, this elite was able to enjoy considerable freedom of action both in siphoning off peasant surplus and in exacting peasant obedience. A number of techniques were used to take over peasant lands. Open force was common practice with gamones, private armed men always keeping an eye on any tracts of pastureland. Although often split over land issues, irrigation or grazing rights, gamones overcame resentment to forge defenses against outside threats to their common interests and local culture.

Poole (1987) reports that in 1892, the subprefect of Santo Tomas requested a minimum of one hundred armed policemen to help him collect taxes from local hacendados who refused to cooperate with the state.
While they lacked the national economic and political influence of the coastal oligarchy, _gamonales_ could exert considerable pressure over their _peones_. The system involved the forcible extraction of ground rent, unpaid labour and debt-peonage. For instance, on a large cattle raising Chumbivilcan _hacienda_ (containing several thousand head of animals) only fifteen families resided permanently on the estate with each peasant household receiving the following per month: 1 _arroba_ (11 kilos) of Chuño or dried potatoes; 1 _arroba_ of barley, 1 _arroba_ of wheat or corn, 1 pound of coca and 1 pound of salt plus grazing rights (Echave Almanza, 1946:10). Generally, a _gamonal_ would force his _peones_ to sell him their animals at below-market prices. For instance, a peasant would have to sell a bull on the hoof at a fixed price which the landlord resold in Arequipa ten times more (Cordova Puelles, 1956:7). Coercion and debt-peonage played an important role in the running of Chumbivilcan _haciendas_ because the Peruvian state never gained sufficient power in this outlying province to challenge the _gamonales_ "justice" system.\(^34\)

In the _provincias altas_, extra-economic pressures exercised on the peasantry ranged from land and herd appropriation to water usurpation. Often entire communities found themselves at the mercy of local _hacendados_ who strategically lived along irrigation systems to monopolize the water. Until recently, water usurpation was a serious problem in the district of Marangani.\(^35\) Landlords would buy land upstream to control the major water channels irrigating _comuneros_ 's plots farther downstream. By being able to divert the flow of water exclusively to their own property, the rural elite could forced peasants to work for

\(^34\) Informants told my assistant that prior to reform a _gamonal_ from Ccapacmarca used his _peones_ as beasts of burden. He commonly administered corporal punishment to trouble makers, but would also require on occasions that the violator carry the master on his back to Cusco - a minimum four-day walk through the mountains. My assistant, himself a Chumbivilcan, confirmed the likely validity of this statement.

\(^35\) Llallahui residents suffered from water usurpation until the mid-1940s. See Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani: "Expedientes relativo a las quejas formuladas por el personero Bautiso Roa del ayllu de Llallahui, Distrito de Marangani, Provincia de Canchis contra Celso Vega, por abusos y deprivation del agua", Sicuani, 1945 y 1947.
virtually nothing on their estates in exchange for access to water. This method helped landlords to round out their labour force.

_Hacienda_ expansion and control over commercialization squeezed the peasant pastoral economy to the point of sparking regional violence. Starting as early as 1905, uprisings grew increasingly more hostile. The demands made by traders from Arequipa on the local peasantry catalyzed unrest. Of the many rebellions involving communities in the _provincias altas_ of Cusco, perhaps the most famous recent ones were Tocroyoc, in 1921 and, ten years later, Molloccahua, province of Espinar. As Table 7 demonstrates, in the south peasants violently resisted the process of land usurpation and their restricted access to the market. According to Piel (1967:404), these peasants were not separatists; on the contrary, they were seeking greater integration into the national economy. However, their efforts were crushed but "only through the hacendado's access to the brute force of the national government" (Spalding, 1980:96).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>National Level</th>
<th>Southern Provinces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1901-1910</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911-1920</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kapsoli and Reategui (cited in Flores Galindo, 1977:217).
These uprisings took place mainly where the process of land concentration reduced small community landholders to landless peasants and curtailed their mercantile activities. *Haciendas* were invaded and often their owners killed or molested. On estates, strikes developed with tenant-peasants refusing to plant and harvest crops. Such actions indicate that among the peasantry a sense of solidarity was emerging.

As landlords continued to appropriate community lands, peasants turned into rustlers. Starting in the 1920s, animal theft became a widespread anti-*gamonal* expression of harassment throughout the southernmost provinces. Following Hobsbawm's interpretation, Orlove (1977b, 1980) argues that rustlers were avengers protecting the interests of the peasantry and regards rustling (*abigeato*) as a defensive act against *hacienda* expansion. Commenting on peasant land despoliation in Canchis, he says: "These incursions met with peasant resistance. In the pasturelands, rustlers who were of peasant origin stole animals from *hacendados*, with the support of the local peasants and shepherds" (1977b:342). However, it is misleading to view rustling as practiced essentially to redress the wrongs done to the poor since it also permitted a certain degree of social mobility within the peasantry (Blok, 1972). Though sympathizing villagers may have received some of the spoils, most likely, rustlers also robbed for their own gains. Peasants opted to defend their livelihood in acts of defiance until the national government finally provided them with some legal alternative.

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37 In the community of Haccoto, Chumbivilcas such an incident occurred in 1913. The estate was invaded by a group of *comuneros* headed by Jesus Calderon. The *hacendada*, Señora Grimaneza N. was raped and left with animal excrement in her mouth (Echave Almanza, 1946:32).
4-Strengthening of Capitalism

The coming to power of President Leguía in 1919 marked another important turning point in the history of the region. Throughout the eleven-year rule (oncenio) of his administration, Leguía consolidated the development of capitalism in Peru by surrendering to foreign capital and offering broad facilities to North American investment in the productive sector of Peru's economy - agriculture and mining (e.g., the United States-owned Cerro de Pasco copper company and Esso's controlled International Petroleum Company)\(^\text{38}\). Illustrative of this fact is that during the oncenio, Peru accepted large public loans from the United States and, as a result, its foreign debt rose from $10 million to some $100 million (Pike, 1977:181; Mörner, 1985:193). In the 1920s, the Communist Party (CPC) was founded by José Carlos Mariátegui and the populist Aprista party (APRA) by Haya de la Torre. APRA won a solid and lasting support on the north coast (Trujillo) among sugar workers and among the lower middle class in areas where capitalism was most developed (Reid, 1985:29). Rapidly, it became a cult party around the charismatic figure of its middle-class support.

Although it remains questionable whether state policies practiced during the oncenio led to any significant industrial growth, they did contribute to urbanization, greater wage employment, a broadening of the internal market and improved educational facilities (Mallon, 1983:231; Pike, 1977:181). Improved communication and transport facilities were vital for an expanding capitalist economy. It was through the implementation of the Roadway Conscription Act that the necessary infrastructure for export trade was established. This state legislation put extra economic pressure on the peasantry forcing all

\(^{38}\) The role of foreign capital during the oncenio is discussed in Pike (1977:179-183).
males to work a specific number of days on a road construction project\textsuperscript{39}. However, in the highlands conscription was imposed on "Indians" alone (Mörner, 1985:198). The rural communities of the Vilcanota Valley actively participated in the building of the highway linking Cusco to Arequipa through Puno. In Canchis, particularly, this compulsion further weakened the power of the \textit{hacendados} as they lost control over peasant labour. On the other hand, conscription substantially benefitted 

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a-Influence of \textit{Indigenismo} on Peasant Community Status

Rural unrest and the \textit{indigenista} intellectuals were major factors that forced the state under Leguía to protect peasant communities. Insofar as economic expansion was not able to ensure the subsistence of the rural population, a complete erosion of the economic basis of the peasantry had to be prevented. Thus, a new constitution, promulgated in 1920, provided community members with the right to register their communities as legal entities. Later, article 209 of the 1933 constitution reinforced legal guarantee - inalienability of community property, direct control over communal resources and official state recognition as legal entities (Skar, 1981:83-4; Brush, 1977:55). Inhabitants received legal usufructuary rights to their land, which could only be disposed of in favour of other members (Skar, op.cit).

Registered communities became more directly controlled by the state to permit the reproduction of the peasant sector (Mallon, 1983:271). The 1933 constitution and the 1938 \textit{Decreto Supremo} led to the establishment of a new organ of state power, the \textit{Dirrección de Asuntos Indígenas} (Bureau of Indian Affairs or DAI) which created new options for

\textsuperscript{39} Although the road construction project was instrumental in integrating the \textit{sierra} into a more modern economy, it became another brutal mechanism of Indian abuse.
campesinos. Now, they could elect their own officials (such as the personero or official community representative) and petition the state for the recognition of legal rights.

Encouraged by the new constitutional provisions, peasants became more assertive and, aware of the prevailing pro-indigenous sentiment of the time, they formulated their demands as members of a distinct ethnic community. Interestingly, peasant charges were usually expressed in an emotional language that pleaded for the recognition of the Indians' true place in Peruvian society seeking, this way, the support of pro-Indian organizations active at the national level. A letter to the President of Peru by Ccapacmarcaños illustrates the point:

We beg you that before the protective authority of your meritorious government, you dutifully and definitively order that the prefect of the department lend us a just and effective backing for the support of our interest and persons. Otherwise, we are abused wrongly and it would be useless to have supreme assurances like the present one that protect us in good times, under the regentship of our governments that have never forgotten their subservient indigenous children living in ignorance, worthy of good luck.

However, their strategy also reveals that by classifying themselves according to the old status ascriptions - i.e., Indians, peasants had not yet developed a sense of "classness" to identify their common interests. By legally petitioning the state, peasants no longer needed to organize to voice their claims and, thus, the risk of campesino political activism was reduced.

40 Some of the ideas of this section have been influenced by Mallon (1983). In Chapter 8 titled "Crisis in the Village", the author discusses the commodification of land within the villages in the Central highlands.

41 For a discussion on the origin of the intellectual reappraisal of Indian culture in the 1920s, see Morner (1985), Chapter IX, 'The Flight for an Andean Revival: Act 1'.

42 See, Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani: " Expediente formulado por los Indígenas de Ccapacmarca, contra Mariano Ccorpuna" mandado al Presidente de la República Cusco, 11 Abril de 1936.
Through registration, communities hoped to strengthen their land claims, to limit encroachment by neighbouring haciendas and to settle boundary disputes. Thus, the communities likely to register were those engaged in land disputes (Alderson-Smith, 1976:115). Such was the case of Ccapacmarca which received official recognition in 1938 of its claim to land granted by Fray Domingo de Cabrera Lartaun in 1656. The new law enabled Ccapacmarcaños to challenge the legitimacy of land claims by neighbouring haciendas.

Such demands were often rapidly followed by haciendas' counter-offensives and actions. For example, two powerful local gamonales, Pacheco and Ccoropuna, not only presented to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas) a certified copy of their property titles but they also made use of their personal influence to arrest the community legal representative, Personero Justo Aguilar, who was jailed in Santo Tomas for slander.

In many ways, the comunero/hacendado confrontations occurring at the local level reflected the ambiguity of the legislation. On the one hand, the state supported economic development and entrepreneurial initiative while, on the other hand, it encouraged communities to engage in land disputes against hacienda expansionism. Such policies, thus, illustrate two contradictory trends taking place in the region: the government's commitment to economic expansionism and the need to protect indigenous communities in

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43 The reference for the recognition of Ccapacmarca can be found at the Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani: "Expedientes de reconocimiento de la comunidad de Ccapacmarca, en el Distrito de Ccapacmarca, Provincia de Chumbivilcas"; " Expediente relativo al reconocimiento e inscripción oficial de la comunidad indígena de Ccapacmarca"; "Memorial que presentan los representantes de la comunidad de Ccapacmarca pidiendo la oficialización del Aymlo".

44 See, Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani: "Expediente formulado por el personero Justo Aguilar de la comunidad indígena de Ccapacmarca sobre acusaciones calomniosos" mandado al Presidente de la Republica, Cusco 1 Abril de 1938.
order to guarantee the reproduction of the peasantry (Mallon, 1983). As Alderson-Smith states:

(T)he peasant economy in the communities was supposed to function as an island of cooperation in a sea of capitalist competition. In effect, the concept of the comunidad indígena as a backwater of Peruvian society was given legal trappings (ibid:115).

Not surprisingly, at first community recognition raised considerable hope among peasants but overall the process remained largely ineffective. Alderson-Smith (op. cit) points out that only a limited number of communities sought registration. With time the Bureau of Indian Affairs (Dirección de Asuntos Indígenas) turned a blind eye to continued community despoliation. An example of this is the case of Capacmarcaños who, for five years, instituted court proceedings against a local landlord for his encroachment on communal lands. In spite of repeated peasant petitions to the government, the suit was left unsettled and officially closed by the prefect of Cusco.

b-Increased Economic Development and Peasant Unrest

As the twentieth century advanced, the export economy grew rapidly at the expense of the domestic sector (Thorp and Bertram, 1978:113). Starting with the Leguía administration from 1919 to 1930, the Peruvian state borrowed heavily from international sources through the issuance of government bonds on the New York stock market. Income increased in select modern sectors such as petroleum, metal mining, sugar, rice and cotton whilst rural areas either stagnated or were actually collapsing (ibid:115-7). As a result of the Great Depression, markets for exports fell and foreign investment drew to a halt between 1929 and 1932. The country then entered a period of economic chaos which lasted until the 1950s when Peruvian exports started to grow again.

The Peruvian economy underwent major changes in the 1950s and early 1960s. As in the rest of Latin America, the government turned to an inward-looking model of
relatively more independent economic development called "desarrollo hacia adentro". This approach was first proposed by the United Nation's Economic Commission (ECLA) upon establishment in Chile in 1948. It emphasized the role of import substitution in the creation of a national industry and encouraged state-run infrastructures in order to expand home markets. The hope was that import substitution would provide an impetus for industrialization and greater economic autonomy by reviving local entrepreneurship within the country.

Highly mechanized manufacturing plants started to flourish on the coast. They generated fast economic growth but limited employment opportunity because of their reliance on imported technology. "Manufacturing jobs only doubled between 1950 and 1975 while manufacturing output increased sixfold" (Reid, 1985:35). Along with this shift in economic orientation, Peruvian politics changed in nature under the growing influence of a rising middle and professional class. For example, white collar employment doubled during the 1950s (ibid:37). This led to the emergence of populist politics such as Acción Popular and the Christian Democratic Party both committed to modernization and geared to pleasing the burgeoning urban labour force.

Meanwhile, modern large-scale agriculture (coffee, cotton, and sugar) constituted over half of Peru's export and played an important role in the growth of the economy, providing enough food for national consumption and an adequate output surplus for export (Alberts, 1983:13). Coastal agriculture was dynamic and relatively well capitalized. This agri-business sector, dedicated to export, combined the country's best irrigated land with

45 The ideological leaning of ECLA, closely related to the thinking of its Executive Secretary, Raul Prebisch, was strongly nationalist and developmentalist. It rested on the observation that unequal transactions were taking place between centres and peripheries as a result of lopsided economic exchanges in the global trade market. To offset this process, ECLA proposed to stimulate and protect national economies through protective tariffs and a planned use of scarce financial resources. For an assessment of the period in Peru, see Thorp and Bertram (1978).
the use of modern techniques of farming (fertilizers and machinery). Productivity of rice, the primary export crop, had increased considerably from 1,700 kilos per hectare in the 1930s to some 3,500 kilos per hectare by the early 1950s. (ibid:7).

The development path followed by the government was based on the assumption that "traditional" rural areas would eventually be absorbed by the more dynamic industrial sector. This approach led to considerable unequal income distribution between regions and sectors. Mörner (1985:224) states that the poorest 20 per cent of the population living in domestic sector received no more than 3.5 per cent of the total individual income and, he add, "the income of those engaged in the traditional rural sector did not increase at all". Meanwhile, people employed in modern sectors saw their income grow by an average of 4 per cent annually. Lewellen's estimation (1978:33) of peasant annual effective income reaching only $37.00 in the 1960s illustrates the situation of the southern Andean provinces. Constant poverty had forced many southern rural farmers to migrate to urban centres. As early as 1958, some 116,000 adults annually left the region to go to Lima (ibid:57). Intense internal migration from all over the sierra rapidly increased Lima's population from 500,000 in 1940 to two million in 1961 (Mörner, 1985:224).

Peasant militancy increased considerably under the expansion of unions established first on coastal plantations by populist APRA (Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana) during the 1930s. Meanwhile, the Bolivian Land Reform of 1953 and the Cuban Revolution in 1959 had a strong impact on young middle class intellectuals sensitive to social ills. Some of them, often radical APRA members, formed the MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria) or the Revolutionary Left Movement and organized guerilla activities in the south including massive hacienda land occupations. Demonstrations started in the northern and central highlands but took a particularly radical character in the coffee growing valleys of La Convención and Lares (Craig, 1969; Cotler and Portocarrero, 1969). In this high jungle area near Cusco, peasants organized under the charismatic leadership of
the Trotskyist, Hugo Blanco. This Quechua speaking agronomist and lawyer from Cusco succeeded in mobilizing the peasantry into an effective guerilla force. However, due to a lack of unity within the left and the arrest of more than thousand left-wing and peasant leaders, Blanco failed to develop the insurrection into a national revolution. The movement was severely repressed and he was sent to exile in Sweden.

During that period, the 1962 national election had turned into a contest between Haya de la Torre - the leader of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA) receiving 33 per cent of the vote and Fernando Belaúnde Terry the founder of Acción Popular with 32.1 per cent. Acting to stem the coming to power of APRA, the military stepped in (1962-1963), ruled for one year and then held free elections in 1963. During their time in office and in order to restore peace in the highlands they enacted a limited land reform (Law Decree 14,400) in La Convención and Lares that suspended labour obligations and allowed tenants to buy their plots. At the same time, they arrested over a thousand workers and peasant leaders, including Hugo Blanco (Reid, 1985:38).

With the support of the officers, Belaúnde won and took office in July 1963. His limited land redistribution program, Law 15,037, sanctioned the continued ownership by the peasants of land occupied in the central highlands. This law also encouraged peasants to form cooperative associations and put an end to the yanacona system (the rendering of service to the hacendado without payment). Part of the legislation emphasized colonization of the high jungle and included several grandiose schemes.

However, in the course of this civilian administration, rural violence reached new heights in the southern provinces, particularly in Ayacucho and Cusco. For example, starting as early as 1959, the Cusco Labour Federation (FTC) organized a strike at the

46 The army's hatred for APRA dated back to 1932 when APRA activists, for two days, held the city of Trujillo killing some 60 officers. In retaliation, the army shot thousands of APRA members in Chan Chan.
textile mill of Marangani which led to the closing down of the factory for several years.

Increasingly, peasant leaders formed alliances with working class organizations to receive legal and organizational aid for their grievances concerning land and working conditions. In early 1964, unrest involving some eight thousand peasants in Pampa Ccalasaya near Sicuani, province of Canta, led to violent confrontations with the police. These mobilizations resulted in heavy bloodshed, numerous arrests and an overwhelming military force deployment (eleven air force planes and six tanks were posted in Sicuani).

Constitutional guarantees were suspended and peasant leaders imprisoned on charges of subversion [Handleman, 1975:121; Expreso (Cusco: 5/02/1964, 4/03/1964); Voz Rebelde (Cusco: 6/02/1964, 7/02/1964, 5/03/1964, 2/04/1964)].

In Chumbivilcas, Hacienda Percasenqa in the district of Ccapacmarca became the major seat of peasant uprisings and police confrontation. The invasion involved three communities: Ccapacmarca, Sayha and Huascabamba joining together to recover land that they felt rightly belonged to the latter community.

In the 1800's Hacienda Percasenqa was owned by the Convent la Merced but run by local landowning families such as the Gonzalez. In 1918, a Catholic priest paid S/5,000.00 for the estate including 600 hectares of land. After the priest's death in 1939, his common law wife and her two sons managed the hacienda which, by the 1960s, employed some 28 peones families (Figure 6 shows a photograph of the landlady taken in 1984).

Prior to mobilization, land disputes between the landlady and local peasants were frequent. Expecting eventual violence, the owner had kept eleven guards living on her estates and ready to evict any invaders. The confrontation started on October 11, 1963.

Coming from Ccapacmarca, Huascabamba and Sayhua, approximately two hundred comuneros carrying farm tools and fire arms proceeded, under the leadership of Arcadio
Hurtado Romero, to invade *Hacienda* Percasenqa. Arcadio Hurtado was a young Ccapacmarcaño who had received some political training in Cusco through the Peasant Federation. The resulting clashes led to the death of six peasants. Some 25 persons including several policemen were seriously injured. During the first night of violence, the landowner, her adult sons and the police escaped by horse to Mara. Shortly after, an additional 150 military troops and one helicopter arrived at Percasenqa. The seriousness of the event was such that newspapers in Cusco (*El Comercio* and *Voz Rebelde*: October 14, 1963) reported that some 2,000 peasants were involved in the rebellion and that a civil war was on its way in Chumbivilcas. Subsequent uprisings led to the arrest of Arcadio Hurtado who was flown to a jail in Cusco. Shortly hereafter, local *gamonales* entered coalitions with the police to murder the peasant leader. Eight months after his arrest, Arcadio Hurtado was assassinated in his cell by one of his guards (Interviews 1,3,9, Annex 2). In 1984, the landlady's son confirmed to me that his mother had given twenty bulls as payment for the killing 47. Another landowner put down the large sum of S/15,000.00 while a third added 500 soles 48. During that time, fear spread quickly among the rural elite. Intimidated Chumbivilcas *hacendados*, in concert with those of Canchis and Acobayo formed their own league to defend themselves (Handelman, 1981).

However, Ccapacmarcaños were not united across the board in their protest action. A petition dated December 5 1963 demonstrates that, following the events at Percasenqa, a group strongly condemned the land-seizure in fear of reprisals. Indeed, retaliation was the

47 I was invited to have lunch at Percasenqa with the landlady's son in May, 1984. During the visit, the son openly discussed the uprisings with me. He strongly defended his mother's side showing little sympathy for the invaders.

48 Incidentally, the sister of Arcadio, who still live in Ccapacmarca, is married to the son of the landlord who paid 500 soles for the murder of Arcadio. In 1984, she, herself, discussed with me her in-laws' involvement in Arcadio's death.
usual *gamonales*’ tactic of playing peasants off against each other. Here is what these *Ccapanmarcaños* write:

In order to clarify the invasion of *Hacienda Percasenqa* occurring on October 11th, the present *comuneros* state that they had nothing to do with what happened. Notwithstanding, the police as well as the legal and political

*Figure 6. The Landlady of Percasenqa in 1984*
authorities commit acts of repression on ourselves and our families... In regard with the event, it falls upon us to explain that the individual, Arcadio Hurtado, became a union member, and he alone acting under the instruction of some leader of the FPCC partook in the invasion. Because he lived in our community, landowners and local authorities are using us for retaliation.

Further, the invasion of Percaenqa failed to bring feudatorios and comuneros closer together. During the uprising, feudatorios (permanent tenant workers on the hacienda) helped the hacendada fight off the invaders. Possibly, this lack of peasant solidarity came from the fact that tenants felt their usufruct rights would be threatened by land occupations. Also, feudatorios were never involved in community hacienda disputes and never contested the hacendada's ownership of land. Instead, their grievances focused on labour payments. According to what the hacendada's son told me, at the time of the invasion, the landlady was trying to pay feudatorios in cash rather than in kind. The measure met strong resistance amongst tenants who were reluctant to accept the new system fearing that it would worsen their livelihood. Under such circumstances, as Handelman (ibid:89) points out, the likely feudatorio form of protest would more likely be a strike than a land invasion.

Nevertheless, comunero mobilization raised the level of feudatorio militancy. This gave birth to sindicatos (unions) on haciendas which helped tenants to receive outside organizational aid from the Cusco Labour Federation (FTC) and the University Student

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50 The introduction of cash on haciendas can be attributed to the dissolution of non-capitalist relations of production and is a phenomenon that was witnessed in other southern haciendas. Martinez-Alier (1977:85) interpretes this shift as a way to get rid of tenants with waqcho herds.
Federation (FUC). For instance, peones on Hacienda Cuchacalla in the district of Ccapnarca formed a sindicato in April 1964 and forced the selling of hacienda land to tenants.

For the first time, unrest throughout the southern sierra enabled Quechua peasants to improve their organizational skill for the creation of peasant unions. In Chumbivilcas, the first and, to date, the only provincial sindicato was founded during that period and named after Arcadio Hurtado. However, nearly all the demands that surfaced dealt primarily with land claims and working conditions on specific estates. As Handelman comments:

With some notable exceptions, however, these hundreds of scattered jacqueries and other "primitive rebellions" were generally isolated movements, lacking organization, ideology, or well-defined goals and, hence, were easily crushed (1981:106).

Thus, a revolutionary sentiment was not really present in these revolts. Rather, uprisings expressed a latent desire for an improvement of the existing order - i.e., less injustice, but not a radical overthrow of the gamonal system.

Campesinos in the central highlands received concessions but the peasant movement in Cusco ended in defeat. The state perceived invasions and rural unionization as a threat to the existing order because of the close ties that peasant leaders had developed with the urban left. Consequently, the army used force to eliminate peasant resistance in the south. In Ayacucho, several thousand peasants as well as their leader - a Trujillo lawyer, Luis De La Puente Uceda were massacred

According to Handelman (1981), these waves of revolt mobilized some 300,000 highland subsistence farmers - a number which represents a significant assault on sierra landlordism. Ultimately, this upsurge of peasant militancy put pressure on the state to institute reforms if order was to prevail. It prompted politicians to reexamine the role of the peasantry in national politics and to consider seriously the question of land reform. Rural
mobilization created an important precedent for peasants themselves. It broke their isolation and made them more aware of their power over the political system. That is, direct action from below could eventually bring reform policies such as the 1964 President Belaúnde's land reform law, Decree 14,400.

The later years of Belaúnde's first turn in office witnessed increased repression, mounting corruption, serious economic difficulties leading to the devaluation of the sol and a political crisis exacerbated by the mishandling of an oil deal with the International Petroleum Company (IPC). In the late sixties, Peru had entered a period of deep recession: the fiscal deficit deepened as public expenditure rose but taxes remained low; the trade balance declined with imports increasing faster than exports. Fitzgerald states that the degree of foreign ownership in almost every sector of the economy had "reached politically unacceptable limits by 1968 - three quarters of mining, a third of fishing, half of manufacturing industry and two third of banking were under direct external control" (1979:119).

Meanwhile, agricultural production was unable to keep pace with increasing demand. Per capita food and total agricultural output began to severely decline in the second half of the sixties and, as a result, Peru had to import an increasing amount of foodstuffs. Between 1960 and 1970 food crop output grew at 3.1 per cent while the growth in demand was at 4.6 per cent (Fitzgerald, 1976:72). Droughts caused a sharp decline in agricultural exports from 1954 to 1968 (Caballero, 1984:4). In the meantime, to compensate for food shortages, Peru became increasingly dependent on the import of wheat, milk, vegetable oils, rice and even potato as the domestic production of this root crop, for the first time in the history of the country, could not meet local demands (Skar, 1981). According to Skar

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51 The Belaúnde administration could not reach a settlement in the long standing controversy with the International Petroleum Corporation over the La Brea and Parinas Oil fields and showed no will to stand up to foreign capital. Faced with a crisis, the state took deflationary measures, in particular, it devalued the sol in 1967.
remained constant, food imports were projected to reach US $500 million by 1980". At the time of the military coup, agriculture still employed 49.6 per cent of the total labour force yet, it accounted for less than a fifth of the national output (Fitzgerald, 1976:10). Again, to prevent an APRA victory in the coming election, the armed forces headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado staged a bloodless coup on October 3 1968. As we will see, the military felt that to restore peace in the Andes, it was necessary to eradicate latifundism. The chapters that follow examine their program of reform in theory and actual practice.

5-Summary

The discussion has so far focused on the place of the provincias altas of Cusco in the national life of Peru since colonial times. Because of its strategic location along the Lima-Cusco-Potosí axis, the region became a frontier zone of crucial importance. It was well integrated into the colonial economy both as a labour reserve and as a source of forced contributions which systematically devalorized peasant labour. This pattern of extra-economic coercion continued after independence and prevented any democratic peasant participation in the colonial as well as the republican economy.

After independence, in the course of the nineteenth century, increased demand for wool from Britain put the provincias altas at the core of the international trading system. While Canchis was involved in the wool boom, Chumbivilcas was excluded. As a result, the former experienced the development of large estates in the hands of a national absentee elite, some degree of industrialization, greater occupational diversification and more adequate communication. By contrast, the latter became more economically and politically peripheral. Its geographical isolation and the absence of infrastructure favoured the maintenance of a local gamonal class who, though powerless in a national sense, ruled
with a heavy hand over rural affairs. However, in spite of these differences, Canchis and Chumbivilcas were both in the 1960s primarily agricultural provinces, each exhibiting exploitative landlord/peasant relations of production.

Since colonial times, and in reaction to an excessively oppressive system, peasant uprisings broke out frequently in the provinicias altas. This openly conflictive area became the seat of the Tupac Amaru rebellion, the focus of numerous peasant revolts in the 1920s and of bloodily repressed peasant mobilizations in 1963-4. The latter, though lacking any internal capacity to sustain long lasting social change, led to the emergence of peasant unions which, for the first time, gave the southern peasantry a stronger political voice. As the existence of the 1969 land reform decree demonstrates, peasants did succeed in exerting some political pressure within Peru's system. The following chapter discusses the ways in which the military government of 1968-1975 chose to intervene in Peru's rural sector. Drawing on evidence presented from two first-hand case studies, a number of observations will be made about the nature of this state induced rural transition in these two altiplano provinces.
CHAPTER 4

Land Reform: The Aggrandizement of the State

The inhabitants of Ccapacmarca and Marangani live in a world which is neither self-contained nor static. The dynamics of change taking place in their communities often corresponds to institutional innovation and state policies. For this reason, an adequate analysis of the effects of land reform at the local level necessarily requires a careful evaluation of the 1969 law within its broad national context.

At the end of the 1960s, when Peru's generals took power, the country's economy had reached an impasse and the civilian government, which was no longer able to exercise hegemony, had to rely increasingly on the repressive apparatus of the state to maintain order. In the fear of further upheaval, the military ousted the civilians in a coup d'état and, shortly thereafter, used the state to implement national development policies including a major land reform program.

1-State Intervention in the Agricultural Sector

The 1969 land reform program has received considerable attention both in and out of the country because, unlike others, it was executed by a "liberalizing" military leadership addressing itself to long term socio-economic reforms in a non-revolutionary setting. Except for Mexico, Cuba and perhaps Chile under Allende, Peru's Agrarian Reform Decree Law 17,716, illustrated one of the most far-reaching reform programs of its kind in Latin America (Lowenthal, 1975:14; Skar, 1982:52). Rapid implementation of the legislation was an aspect that differed radically from any previous reforms (Kay, 1984; Lowenthal, op.cit; Medina, 1970). Apparently motivated by humanism, the reform program called for social
justice in the countryside and an end to the domination of the peasantry ("the boss shall no
longer eat your poverty").

Humanism in the political behaviour of the Peruvian military could be explained in
part by the lower middle class background of the officers. However, this reformist current
appears to be related to the training of the generals at the Centro de Altos Estudios Militares
(CAEM or Centre for High Military Studies). In 1958, the creation of CAEM brought the
institution advocated nationalism closely related to collectivism - a model influenced by
indigenistas (Baines, 1972; Saba, 1987) and to the developmentalist doctrine formulated
by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Once in power General Juan
Velasco implemented a system of ownership affecting both agriculture through the 1969
Land Reform Law, as well as industry through the 1970 Law of "Industrial Communities"
and the 1974 Law of Social Property whereby workers participated in stock ownership and
management. Growth of local industrialization and increased capital investment in the
industrial sector were basic aims for economic autonomy (Bamat, 1983:130).

From the outset, Peruvian capitalism evolved unevenly. In Chapter 3, we saw that it
began with the export of raw materials and later expanded through "import-substitution"
industrialization. This path led to a lopsided economic development. The coast and some
mining enclaves in central Peru have benefitted more from their economic participation than
the Andean hinterland. Although a gradual process of commoditization has spread
throughout most parts of the country, the sierra still remains an area of subsistence
agriculture characterized by rampant poverty and growing peasant discontent. For decades,
the highland population has been composed of miniholding farmers and landless
agricultural workers often underemployed and increasingly marginalized.

Dissatisfied with Peru's poor agricultural achievements and aware that the
deteriorating conditions of the peasantry could lead to further social instability, the military
officers used the state in an attempt to rectify regional imbalance and encourage commodity production. Thus, the state actively pursued a program of structural reforms directed to the urban and rural poor. By implementing a far-reaching land reform detrimental to the interest of the rural oligarchy, the *junta* sought to abolish the neo-feudal tenurial system regarded as a hindrance to national economic independence. Sierra landowners, who did not invest income in agriculture and underutilized their landholdings, had their estates expropriated. In order to uproot colonial latifundism, the new state elite prohibited service tenure, enforced the use of wage labour and made rural education compulsory. Rapidly, the educational system expanded.

Large estates dedicated to export agriculture were turned into workers' cooperatives in an attempt to promote populist reforms based on the slogan that "the land belongs to those who till it". The "participationist formula" encouraged broad class conciliation under the hegemony of the state since the *junta* regarded "social harmony" as a crucial step towards national development. Management and labour brought closer together would prevent any future renewal of peasant insurgency, restore state control over the countryside and, ultimately, gain peasant support so that the economic objectives of the reform could be fulfilled. Not only would greater workers' participation establish the basis for class reconciliation and keep the lid on social tensions, but it would also institute a system of social control that could eventually produce votes for the government.

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1 In this instance we see the state acting relatively autonomously against the interests of a specific sector of the dominant class in order to maintain conditions for continued capital accumulation (Miliband, 1977; Poulantzas, 1973 cited in Grindle, 1986:14). Grindle (ibid) mentions that this relative autonomy of the state tends to occur at moments of economic crisis and social instability.

2 Mörner (1985:253) mentions that from 1960 to 1977, the percentage of youngsters enrolled in secondary schools rose from 15 to 52 per cent.
These populist measures were adopted to build up rural support and, in the process, transform social patterns that had persisted since early colonial days. For example, following the Bolivian model, the government symbolically replaced the word 'indio' (literally 'Indian' but used with deprecatory connotations) by the more neutral term "campesino" or "peasant". Also, the military passed the law on June 24, - "Indian Day" - now renamed "Peasant Day".

Two paradigms inspired President Velasco's state development policy. The first one, professed at the Centre for High Military Studies, emphasized anti-imperialism and independent socio-economic development. This could be achieved through state planning, nationalization of foreign enterprises and transformation of agriculture into a modern sector to support industrialization. The growth of the state apparatus under the military, thus, meant nationalization of property in key sectors - such as transformation of haciendas into state-run enterprises as well as the organization of a complex system of national economic planning.

The second paradigm underpinning the reform was based on indigenismo (the intellectual reformist movement of the turn of the century) and closely paralleled Mariátegui's cultural mystification of the Inca past. To manage rural conflict, the state sought to revitalize the habits of cooperation and corporate life as traditionally found in the mythical ayllu organization of indigenous communities (Skar, 1981:87; Baines, 1972:145, Alderson-Smith, 1976:113). As Skar notes:

The cooperativist reforms could be referred back to a cooperativist past, a past that was known for its grandness and which could be revitalized in the present cooperative movement (ibid:89).

However, the assumption that traditional institutions could become the basis for structural reforms disregarded the fact that Andean communities had been, over the years, deeply affected by colonialism and capitalist penetration. Thus, the government's desire to
revitalize past traditions rather than act upon present day conditions was indeed doomed on

this is point alone. Again, Skar states:

if one of the largest agrarian reforms in Latin America was based
on a misconception of reality, a certain state of confusion is bound
to result. Only by a thorough understanding of the true nature of
the problem with which one deals, can one hope to have a chance
of solving it (ibid:91).

2-Process of Land Reform Implementation

a-Expropriation

The agrarian reform law stipulated that all commercial estates over a certain size
were liable for expropriation. On privately-owned property four aspects were considered in
regard to expropriability: the size of the farm, its state of cultivation, the type of ownership
and its location (Medina, 1970:3). Included as potentially susceptible to expropriation were
estates (private- or state-owned) larger than 150 hectares on the coast and 15 hectares in the
highlands. However, these maximum retainable holdings could be adjusted upwards if
specified efficiency conditions were met. Such requirements could mean, for instance, an
adequate irrigation infrastructure or having 75 per cent of non-irrigated land under
cultivation for the last three years prior to implementation. Another condition was that farm
workers receive 20 per cent of the enterprise's profits. Limits on pasture lands in the
provincias altas depended on the size needed for the grazing of 5,000 sheep. Although
precise data are not easily available on how much land could have been affected by the law,
the Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA) suggested the following figures
by regions: 21.7 per cent on the coast, 55.6 per cent on the sierra and 82.9 per cent in the
jungle (quoted in Medina, 1970:8).
Law 17,716 provided various criteria for compensation. Transferring of state-owned rural land to the reform agency was made without any compensation. Payment for the expropriation of private estates was based on the under-valued hacendado's tax declaration rather than on the commercial value of the land. Cattle were compensated at market value and fixed assets at book value (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980:108, fn.12). However, the inflation rate was not taken into consideration. This would greatly lower the reform debt and, at the same time, undermine the power of the landed class.

Payment to ex-owners included a mixed system of cash and tax exemption bonds. These tax exemption bonds could be transferred into industrial projects for the public sector. This policy was designed to mobilize private capital in support of industrialization but it ended in 1974 when the regime used government investment for development (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980:109).

To reimburse the government the newly formed cooperatives had a grace period of five years in which they did not have to pay anything and twenty to thirty years deferred payments according to the adjudicated value of their holdings. The terms of payment were as follows: 20 years at six per cent interest for efficiently managed farms, 25 years and five per cent interest for inefficient estates and 30 years at four per cent interest for idle lands (Kay, 1983:207).

Medina (1970:22 fn.2) says that the state specified cash payment in the following terms: categories were set up to consider: 1) type of management - direct-personal or indirect-absentee and 2) the value of the land as determined by a special procedure on a scale ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 soles de oro exchanged at $1 for 38.7 soles in 1969-75 (McCleintock, 1981:xvii). Three classes of bonds were issued, A, B and C to compensate for the balances in each category. These classes were yearly redeemable over periods of 18, 20 and 22 years with an interest rate of 6, 4 and 4 per cent respectively. For instance, if a land in full and efficient production, under direct personal management of its owner with an appraised value of 270,000 soles was taken under the agrarian reform law, compensation was to be paid as follows: 200,000 soles in cash, and 70,000 soles in Class A bonds.
A number of procedural innovations were introduced as part of a pro-peasant policy. A special series of courts were established to expedite resolution of conflicts and prevent landlords' recourse to regular appeal courts. The transfer of adjudicated land was an operation under the responsibility of the *Fuero Privativo Agrario* (FPA or Special Agrarian Jurisdiction) - a judicial body operating through the *juzgados de tierras* (agrarian tribunal). It was set up to deal with matters concerning land boundaries, water rights, contracts, inheritance, titles and possession (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980:155). Further, FPA was created to speed up the process and to keep these transactions free from the interference of ex-*hacendados*.

d-Eligibility

Landless and land-poor peasants were to be the main beneficiaries of the program. Peasants working on a given piece of land at the time of expropriation from the *haciendas* received priority to the plots they tilled. Under the law, the male member of the household was considered the head and became the holder registered on behalf of the family. Land allotment was made in his name to the exclusion of women except for widows or females whose husbands had left the community.

3-New Role of the State

In Peru, state interventionism has become the most salient feature of agrarian change. Since the 1940s when import-substitution promoted rapid industrialization, the state in Latin America has typically occupied a central position in the public sector and has played a crucial role in agriculture (Sonntag and de la Cruz, 1985; Petras, 1981, 1983; de Janvry and Ground, 1978; Grindle, 1986). Virtually all current policies for development resort to the extensive role of the state in the economy. Though the reasons vary, de Janvry
and Ground argue that state interventionism represents an attempt by governments to counteract the economic and social contradictions inherent to peripheral capitalism (1978:90). State interventionism tends to occur in situations of crisis when a power vacuum facilitates state autonomy with respect to domestic and foreign capital (Hamilton, 1984:7).

In the 1960s, some of these contradictions had found expression within the Peruvian local bourgeoisie which was divided over class interests; the agro-export oligarchy was witnessing a relative decline of its material base while the urban-industrialists, in control of the manufacturing sector, were expanding (Bamat, 1983:130). In order to create a climate conducive to rapid industrialization and national economic independence, the officers used state power to destroy traditional agro-exporters and to secure capitalist accumulation. A Peruvian sociologist described the increasingly visible expansion of the public sector in the following terms:

The state monopolizes agricultural credit... It controls the agricultural cooperatives. It controls the marketing of inputs; it intervenes directly in distribution through its price policy and its business policy. It alone determines the content, form and infrastructure of education. It exercises direct control over the communication media. All in all, the state is more and more omnipresent in both city and country (Montoya, 1982:76).

The state grew rapidly and took on important functions in investment, production and distribution (Cleaves and Scurrah, 1980:255). Once in power, the military nationalized most of the major firms owned by foreigners and the oligarchy in strategic sectors of the economy. These included oil, mining, agro-industry, fishing, banking, electricity, transport
The nationalizations were important aspects of an integrated development plan leading to a transformation in ownership structure. It envisaged the stimulation of growth by creating a mixed economy in which state enterprises would coexist with a reformed private sector encompassing a broad stratum of local entrepreneurs (Thorp and Bertram, 1978:303; Reid, 1986:46). The government viewed this assertive nationalism as a move toward economic independence liberating Peru from foreign capital subordination.

**Price Control Policies**

For several years, no tariffs were imposed on food imports which would have generated revenue for domestic agriculture; however, exports were heavily taxed. Starting in 1973, food imports were highly subsidized to prevent prices from rising and the internal price of imported foods was kept artificially low. An example is found in the case of wheat, which was bought in 1973 from Canada and Australia for US $110 per ton and sold for US $70 (Stein, 1985:27). The government covered the difference out of its budget in the form of subsidies to lower prices paid by retail marketers. Given such policies, it was difficult for household-based agriculture to compete with commercial agriculture over internal urban markets.

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4 Within a few days of taking office, the military confiscated International Petroleum Company (IPC) including the north coastal fields and the Talara refinery without compensation and reorganized it into PETROPERU. MINEROPERU was another newly created state company. It was granted a monopoly of mineral-export marketing, the control of future projects in metal refining and the development of mineral deposits recovered from foreign firms (Thorp et al., 1978:301). Also, the former Cerro de Pasco mining complex in the central sierra became CENTRAMIN and Marcona iron ore operations became HIERROPERU. Other similar creations were: ENAFER (the railways), EAROPERU (the air carrier), ELECTROPERU (the hydroelectric system) and ENTELPERU (the former IT &T and Swedish cable and telephone firms). PESCAPERU took over the collapsing fishing industry, CECOOPAP controlled the marketing of sugar and EPSA monopolized the domestic market of foodstuffs and food imports.
Price control policies are a traditional Latin American tactic implemented to obtain the support of the urban poor and to assist private capital by keeping wages low for the promotion of industrialization (Stein, 1985). Food prices were the object of government controls through the Empresa Publica de Servicios Agropecuarios (EPSA or Public Agency for Agricultural and Cattle-Breeding Services). This state agency was responsible for purchasing and marketing basic foodstuffs. It paid low prices to small producers in order to keep food at low cost in Lima. While it favoured the poor urban consumer, it also weakened the traditional agricultural regions and left them lagging behind even farther.

Pricing policy is a crucial means of encouraging production, however, by being so strictly controlled by the state, it tends to create a strong desincentive in staple agriculture. Webb makes the following comment on the connection between price policy and the subsistence sector:

...a reverse discrimination in favor of domestic foods, would raise sierra income from potatoes and other substitutes for bread. Potatoes in particular are thought to be in relatively elastic supply, so that a potential exists for import substitution with large benefits to small farmers (quoted in North, 1981:123).

Price control policies under the Velasco government had an important economic significance as they siphoned off the agricultural surplus necessary to feed urban development (Fitzgerald, 1976; Stein, 1985). That is, to some degree, it promoted a direct transfer of value from domestic agriculture to industry. By bringing the urban workers abundant food at low prices, city employers were able to keep wages down. Further, Maletta and Foronda argue that this approach permits a margin of demand:

for non-food products produced by substitutive industry, whose high price, protected by customs duties, did not let them penetrate a market formerly dominated by-artisanry and home industries...The State policy of low prices for agriculture, aimed at minimizing labor costs and maximizing industrial demand, is thus complemented by a policy which otherwise would be most curious, as is that of fomenting the import of food products and selling them with high subsisidies to the consumer (or to local agro-
industry) which are supported through inflation by the State. This aspect of nutritional policy...leads to the stagnation of food production and at the same time generates in the population consumption habits which are at variance with the productive possibilities of the country (quoted in Stein, 1985:53, fn.10).

Urban-biased food policies thus contradict a philosophy of genuine rural development for "the peasantry will be unable to increase the value of agriculture, to create employment, to increase productivity and income, or be in a position to increase industrial demands" (Cotler, 1975:66). According to de Janvry and Ground (1978:93), cheap food remains a major determinant of stagnation by severely constraining land reforms in their impact on production and poverty. Ultimately, this policy means that the poorer strata of subsistence producers have no other choice but to leave the agricultural sector and, as a result, become potentially available as workers for other economic sectors. This situation has led some observers (Cotler, 1978:286; Moncloa, 1980 cited in Painter, 1983:208-9, de Janvry and Ground, 1978) to argue that peasant agriculture has been transformed into a support system for an expanding industrial and agro-industrial sector whereby small scale producers provide a constant stream of cheap labour while, at the same time, becoming larger consumers of manufactured goods. Cotler states:

The choice of this economic policy meant the harsh punishment of peasant economy, but also the sacrifice of landlord interests, in favor of the development of urban capitalism which, in its turn, led to new types of contradictions. Industrial development did not require enclaves or the maintenance of pre-capitalism, as in the past to obtain an abundant cheap, and unskilled labor force. On the contrary, the new pattern of development required the appropriation of the relative surplus-value of workers and the constitution of a wide internal market of producers and consumers of differentiated commodities (1978:286).

The lack of state support for the food production sector was, therefore, one aspect of the government's approach to back up agri-business and industry: seasonal and permanent migratory highlanders could work for low wages as a reserve of cheap semi-proletarian labour force. Subsistence needs of peasants would be obtained through their ties
to communities permitting wages to remain minimum and resulting in the subsumption of household production in the process of extension of commodity relations. Semi-proletarianization, that is, the emergence within the peasantry of a social category of temporary-labourer minifundista appears to have been a growing trend over the last two decades among highland smallholders. Figueroa (1982) argues that, among the six southern communities he surveyed, households increasingly relied on income from temporary migration and remittances from migrant relatives. Undoubtedly, dependence on wage labour strengthens the subordination of Andean household production to industrial capital.

Although this type of development furthers regional imbalance and urban/rural dualism, it also facilitates the accumulation of capital in coastal commercial agriculture and in the industrial sector (Guillet, 1981:44). Thus, laws which attempt to keep peasants on the land maintain the wide gap existing between the industrial and the domestic agricultural sectors. As long as the state supports peripheral capitalist development the logic of the economic system will be to use the ties farmers have to the land to promote the intensification of commodity relations.

b- New Forms of State Control Over the Rural Sector

In agriculture, the political integration of the peasantry was achieved by incorporating the rural sector into a vast network of corporate bodies. This began with the creation of various types of state-run cooperatives. For example, immediately after the promulgation of the law, the eight most important sugar cane haciendas were organised into cooperativas agrarias de producción or CAP (Agrarian Production Cooperatives), all to be directly administered by the government. Together, these coastal estates included 225,000 hectares of irrigated land and involved some 15,000 workers. By the end of 1974,
over 348 CAPs had been formed covering a total of 1,800,000 to 2,000,000 hectares with 87,000 members (Isbell, 1978:25).

In the highlands, Agrarian Production Cooperatives were created along with mixed collectives known as sociedades agrícolas de interés social or SAIS (Social Interest Agrarian Societies). These enormous estates, comprised of expropriated haciendas and surrounding peasant communities, were generally dedicated to animal production. The SAIS model sought to meet the often conflicting demands for land from former hacienda peones and from villagers of surrounding communities (Handelman, 1981:115). SAISs represented an effort by the government to stop the fragmentation of peasant farms and to extend reform benefits beyond the tenants and workers of former haciendas to the peasant communities (Kay, 1983:210). According to Roberts and Samaniego SAISs were created in instances where villages did not legally have claim to the hacienda lands, nor did their residents work on the estate:

The grounds for selection of village-members were various: they exhibited a predominantly agrarian village economy, bordered the haciendas, were villages officially recognized as "indigenous communities", had not previously benefitted from agrarian reform, and eventually had a need of pasture land. Since any outstanding claims that villages had to the ownership of hacienda land were not formally considered in the selection process, it is clear that government did not regard them to be owners of the resources upon which the SAIS was mainly based (1978:244).

Unlike the CAP, SAIS membership was by community rather than on an individual basis (Skar, 1981:66). Profit was distributed solely to communities for improved infrastructure. Knight (1975:366) regards SAIS "as a transitional form which could lead

\[5\] Such collectives are similar to the Mexican collective ejidos (village communal lands). The collectivization of the ejidos was initiated under President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-1940) and strengthened by the Federal Law of Agrarian Reform in 1971. The collective ejido was considered to represent a viable alternative to large capitalist agri-businesses and the unproductive micro-holdings by fulfilling the requirements of industrialization and of the maximum use of resources (Singelmann, 1978).
toward the incorporation of the member communities into an enlarged cooperative thus creating a CAP" (quoted in Isbell, 1978:27; Kay,1983:210).

There were several modalities of collective organization. Among them we find cooperativas comunales (Communal Cooperatives) whereby land was allocated to peasant communities. Grupos campesinos (Peasant Groups) were organized in the form of villagers receiving land collectively but farming it individually. This type of exploitation closely corresponds to the dominant type of Mexican ejidos whereby beneficiaries receive usufructuary rights to land. That is, their rights are permanent, rent-free and heritable but parcels cannot be sold or rented out. Further, a certain percentage of land was returned to peasant communities which claimed was theirs. Such was the case of Capacamarca where, prior to reform, peasants had fought for the recuperation of their communal land. For a summary of forms of distribution, see Table 8 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entities</th>
<th># Units</th>
<th># Families</th>
<th>Areas in Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPs</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>99,152</td>
<td>2,084,632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAISs</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57,617</td>
<td>2,543,609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>55,899</td>
<td>590,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasant Groups</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>26,913</td>
<td>960,885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>258,371</td>
<td>6,316,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Lima Daily *La Prensa*: June 1976 (Quoted in Quijano, 1982: 54)

The government set up Proyectos Integrales de Asentamiento Rural or PIAR (Projects of Integrated Rural Settlement) in order to achieve a better integration of household peasant production in rural areas. Exploitation systems such as Communal
Cooperatives and Peasant Groups were brought together under the administration of the PIARs. These Integrated Rural Settlement Projects would improve conditions in rural areas by allocating funds according to local economic needs. In this way, a region could finance its own development without having to depend on the state for credit. As Grindle observes, this meant that "the state could continue to provide aid and subsidies to large-scale operations while a panoply of new programs targeted for the poor was added" (1986:163). Though PIARs were never used effectively, they increased state's control over the rural sector.

c-The State and Peasant Communities

As part of its structural change, the Velasco government brought under the tutelage of the state all Andean indigenous communities, and officially renamed them "Peasant Communities". According to the law, community land could not be affected. Land survey programs were carried out to secure boundaries and give communities a legal identity with official title to their land. In the process, the government put communities under closer official scrutiny (Orlove, 1977a:346).

Decree 37-70 enacted in 1970 modified the administrative organization of communities to make it correspond to a model more in line with the SAIS organization so that it would "encourage the communities to rationalize their economic administrations along cooperative lines" (Alderson-Smith, 1976:119). This entailed the creation of two councils - administrative and vigilance - each with its own president, secretary-treasurer and delegates. The general assembly included all community members and became the main decision-making body. The purpose was an attempt to eventually transform communities into cooperative production units - more efficient, more democratic and with better economic returns (Guillet, 1976; Isbell, 1978; Winder, 1978).
In order to prevent migration to urban centers while encouraging a return to farming, the revised membership rules prohibited sharecropping, renting or indirect usufruct whereby community land had to be worked directly by members. Guillet (op.cit: 298) shows that the clause prohibiting indirect arrangements had an impact on return migrants because of the security that land represented as compared with living in the city where prices were exorbitantly high.

To keep peasants on the land, the new law stated that *comuneros* had to reside a minimum of six months of the year in the community, derive most of their income from agriculture, be born in the community and not be members of another. Also, it prohibited members from holding plots in other communities. This latter requirement affected inherited lands belonging to the wife's side and obliged women to surrender property to their siblings. Further, according to the law, owners had to own one parcel near to, or adjacent to, their residence (Isbell, 1978:30). Both clauses failed to recognise Andean holding norms where family lands are seldom concentrated in one place. By reorganizing communities in a manner which was often not compatible with Andean holding patterns, the legislation jeopardized fundamental farming practices and survival strategies such as scattered plots at various ecological levels over widely dispersed areas.

d-Sistema Nacional de Apoyo a la Mobilización Social (SINAMOS)

SINAMOS (National Social Mobilization Program), a corporate body affiliated with the government, was established in 1971. Officially designed to integrate vertically the different social sectors within the nation, SINAMOS was responsible for setting up both

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6 A more recent clause stipulates that persons with occupations outside agriculture could become members but would not be granted access to communal land (see Long and Winder, 1975:75-94, fn.5).

7 Such features are regarded by peasants as essential insofar as frost, hail or drought would not destroy all of one's crop - a strategy to minimize risk.
the National Agrarian Confederation (CNA) - an official corporation replacing rural unions

- and the landlords' organization or National Agrarian Society (SNA). Through
SINAMOS, the government sought to "stimulate and channel urban and rural mass
description in the revolutionary process and thereby weaken challenges to governmental
authority either from the right or the left" (Handelman, 1981:113).

SINAMOS rapidly came under fire as observers and politicians of the opposition
regarded this "umbrella organization" as a supra-governmental agency involved in all
aspects of rural and urban life. Soon, it became apparent that SINAMOS was a key
instrument of peasant cooptation and of state control over the countryside (Lowenthal,
1975; Kay, 1983; Orlove, 1977b). It existed to demobilize the peasant movement for,
according to the military, "class conflict and thereby the need for class organisation had
become redundant" (Kay, op.cit:211). Commenting on the part that SINAMOS played in
Canchis, Orlove notes:

Agrarian reform officials, working in coordination with
SINAMOS, exercise an increasing control over the peasants. Close
restrictions have been placed on the slaughter of animals, and there
is increasing pressure to control the crops that are planted.
SINAMOS also attempts to isolate peasant communities from
contact with political parties and other outside influences (1977b:346).

With state consolidation in the rural sector, peasant participation meant more
political endorsement of the government-rather than a sharing of power in local affairs. In
the countryside, it seems that SINAMOS served the state's objectives of mass political
control and cooptation of peasant leaders. The underlying objectives of state expansion
implied greater peasant integration into national life and increased social control over

Peruvian society. As Cleaves and Scurrah wrote:

The state's self monitoring seemed to parallel greater government
surveillance over the society as a whole. The creation of
SINAMOS to supervise popular support for the government, the
elimination and disenfranchising of some interest groups (the
National Agrarian Society, the National Industrial Society), the
expropriation of the national press, the enhanced status of military intelligence, and the frequent deportations of political spokesmen were cases in point (1980:73).

State expansion in the rural sector was a way of stabilizing and pacifying the country by encapsulating the peasantry. By widening their social base, the military hoped to legitimize their rule (Kay, 1983:206). Undoubtedly, SINAMOS and the agrarian cooperative apparatus played a key role in the creation of an increasingly authoritarian state structure set up to organize and reorganize popular demands. As I discussed in a previous thesis (Paponnet-Cantat, 1983:97-102), this type of bureaucratic apparatus is the hallmark of the authoritarianism characteristic of peripheral economies. It breaks down traditional clientelistic solidarities by removing the hacendado and incorporating the peasantry into a broader institutional framework. With no alternative political structures available, such as class based parties or unions, this formula integrates people of all sectors via an elaboration of vertical dependencies. Such dependencies create more modern forms of patronage based on a mass concept of clientelism under the control of the state bureaucracy.

In order to more fully understand the scope of the Peruvian experience, however, it is necessary to examine the way in which this new authoritarianism relates to the functioning of a highly interventionist state within peripheral capitalism. As Bamatt argues by the time President Velasco came to power, capitalism dominated Peru's economy:

Capitalist social relations - initially imposed through imperialism - were widespread and ascendant: the exploitation of wage labor for profit, hierarchical managerial control over labor processes, a classical division of manual and mental labor, universal market exchange, and a generalized use of money in the sphere of circulation. Economic development/underdevelopment was spurred by profits in mining and agriculture for export and, increasingly, in local manufacturing. Peru's class structure included a diversity of rural laborers, a relatively small but growing urban working class and marginalized subproletariat, significant "traditional" and "new" petty bourgeoisie, especially in Lima and a dominant class in historic transition (1983:145).
In the previous chapter, we saw that Leguía's *oncenio* (1919-1930) promoted capitalism with foreign control over mining and agri-business. Between 1955 and 1967, this process of foreign domination was sustained through fishing, import substitution and banking (Fitzgerald, 1976:20). Until the late 1960s, the local agrarian and financial oligarchies encouraged capitalist growth. For example, to support the accumulation of private capital in the industrial sector, they used the state apparatus to engage in the construction of a transportation network (Leguía's *Vial Real* in the 1920s, Belaúnde's road project in the jungle in the mid-1960s). The state provided cheap labour (such as through the *enganche* system of Indian labour contracting), raised import tariffs (as in 1964) and provided tax incentives to the private sector.

After the 1968 coup, and in response to a weakening of the civilian governing class, the military strengthened the state to respond to "imperatives" of development. State expansionism did not alter the social relations of production since no new mode of capital accumulation took place. That is, the interventionist approach failed to increase the economic power of the state for two reasons. First, tax exemption became a policy used to favour private enterprise in the hope of stimulating investment. Second, the profitability of state enterprises remained extremely low. Bamat (1983:146) points out that the low profitability of public collectives came from the fact that compensation was paid to most firms and those nationalized were usually riddled with debts which, in the first place, was the very reason why the state took possession of them. Consequently, in spite of nationalization in export, mining and banking, the government continued to rely on foreign capital through borrowing for development (Bamat, 1983:146, 147; Fitzgerald, 1978:149). Therefore, initially intending to reduce dependence, state involvement in the economy still meant great reliance on private, particularly foreign funds, to support state projects. One of President Velasco's early speeches expresses this need for foreign support:

The Revolutionary Government declares its respect for the international obligations of Peru: that it will be faithful to the
The lack of economic autonomy (no productive investment nor adequate finance) prevented the state from being at the center of the accumulation process - a necessary condition for the emergence of state capitalism. Resource allocation remained in the hands of internationalized capital under the hegemony of foreign banks. The growth of the public debt guaranteed greater reliance on international banking capital and a deepening of peripheral capitalist development. The result was first, a worsening of the public debt which, according to Fitzgerald (1978:149), rose from US $0.7 billions in 1968 to US $3.0 billions in 1975. This figure represented 24 per cent of Peru's gross domestic product (GDP) in that year. Then, in 1977 it led to the return of multinationals and the suppression of labour organisation (Fitzgerald, op.cit). The features of the state under President Velasco corresponded to those of the peripheral state that Petras (1984:119) describes as follows: 1) extensive and prolonged intervention in the economy; 2) growing public sector activity; 3) expanding and deepening of external ties; 4) the creation and elaboration of planning institutes and mechanisms; and 5) the promotion of industrialization. As Petras adds: "Hence state interventionism has become necessary for the growth and security of peripheral capitalism, even when the ideology of the state eulogises its opposite" (ibid).

4-Achievements of the Reform

In June 1976 expropriations officially ended with the reform having completed some 70 per cent of its initially stated aim of roughly 10 million hectares having been redistributed (Quijano, 1982:54). Though nearly 200,000 rural families had benefitted from the law, they still represented only 18 per cent of those who actually needed land. Quijano concludes:

Thus, though much more profound than other Latin American agrarian reforms (with the exceptions of those of Cuba and Chile
under the *Unidad Popular*), the Peruvian one has limitations which preclude the satisfactory resolution of the social problems of the great mass of agrarian workers (ibid:55).

**a-Effects on Production**

In terms of performance, sugar cooperatives increased production by 40 per cent between 1969 and 1976. They reached their maximum level of profit in 1975 when the sugar price rose on the international market. After 1976 cooperatives began to suffer losses because of a fall in sugar price and severe droughts (Kay, 1983:218-219). Cotton and rice production at first registered favourable results. However, in 1973 land seizures and union militancy in the Piura region severely disrupted production. In the highlands, Kay (ibid:226) reports that an assessment of seven livestock - crop CAPs indicated moderate increased production in three enterprises but a decline in three others.

Between 1970 and 1976, overall agricultural production grew at an annual rate of 1.8 per cent which was below the population growth rate of 2.5 per cent. In 1977 agricultural production did not grow at all and, in 1978, it started to decline (ibid). Output of products for direct urban consumption and those for agro-industrial use grew rapidly from 27.9 per cent in 1950 to 65.1 per cent in 1976 (Caballero, 1984:5). Meanwhile, products for restricted rural markets increased very slowly and, in some instances, not at all.

After reform, government investment was primarily concentrated in the modern sector, strengthening rather than eliminating Peru's dual economic structure. As a result, *sierra* food producing areas, where 35 per cent of the workforce was employed in 1976, are still lagging behind the relatively developed coastal regions (Fitzgerald, 1976:96). Bejar and Franco (1985:24) estimate that in 1984 the highland rural population reached a monthly net income of US $ 48.00 as opposed to US $90.00 in the modern agricultural sector and US $180.00 in the urban sector. However, the role that smallholder farmers played in Peru's domestic food production was still essential. In 1977, government estimates show
that *minifundistas*' potato production reached 98.8% of the total national output; quinoa: 81.1%; corn: 78.5%; barley: 73.1%; wheat: 74.1%; beans: 79.5%; and vetch: 72.9% (ibid).

Thus, it is evident that state collectives did not change the dualism existing between coastal and highland regions - a sectoral and regional dichotomy which characterizes Peru's peripheral capitalism. On the contrary, authors such as Thorp and Bertram (1978:305), Wilson (1986:94-103) suggest that state policies accentuated fragmented development. In committing itself to achieving higher productivity for capital accumulation, the state ended up supporting the richest areas first and sponsoring export enterprises such as those dedicated to the production of cotton, sugar and wool. For example, coastal cooperatives obtained 62 per cent of the 5.5 billion soles issued in the earlier years of the reform.

Evidence of a pronounced coastal and urban bias is found in the small proportion of credit allocated to departments with a high rural population. In 1974, Cavena (1978:14) mentions that agrarian regions such as Cusco received 4.59 per cent (or 453 million of soles), Puno 7.57 per cent and Apurimac 0.27 per cent. Meanwhile Piura on the coast was allocated 16.6 per cent or 1,645 millions of soles (See Figure 1). "From 1968 to 1975" Wilson says "four coastal departments captured 55 per cent of total public investment, with the entire coast absorbing three times more than the combined amount invested in the remaining regions" (1986:96). Thus the expansion of the state in the economy contributed to strengthening the "dynamic" sectors without reducing the marginalization of the Andean peasant regions.

The government's policy of intense concentration of agricultural investment in modern farming (over half of the public investment in agriculture went into four large coastal irrigation projects) was instrumental in maintaining unbalanced economic growth. It aggravated the disparities between regions by deepening a "dualistic" economic structure in
favour of the modern sector (Fitzgerald, 1976; Wilson, op.cit). This bias also served to maintain an unequal distribution of incomes between regions. For example, on sugar cane coastal plantations, workers saw their wages rise by 62 per cent from 1968 to 1972 - an increase that could not be matched by the highland CAPs. Further, in the agricultural sector, income differentials between members and non members widened considerably to the benefit of a class of more privileged workers. Discussing coastal enterprises, Kay mentions:

Real incomes per capita for permanent workers increased by 78 per cent whilst those of employees and temporary workers \textit{(eventuales)} increased by only 27 per cent and 20 per cent respectively during the same period (1983:225).

Similarly, in highland SAISs the same author notes that seasonal wage labour makes up 35 per cent of the workforce of the enterprise but receives only half the wage of permanent workers.

In Grindle's terms (1986:188), the Velasco government was promoting a "new dualism" based on integrated rural development which intended to seek solutions to rural poverty but, paradoxically, continued to support the commercial sector at the expense of the food-producing regions. What emerged was greater class differentiation within the peasantry. A minority of the workforce permanently employed on large estates have become better-off than temporary workers and sugar cane labourers now appear to be the most privileged of all. Authors such as Skar (1981) and Sánchez (1982) believe that a process of class formation is accelerating under land reform. In Matapuquio located in the central highland department of Apurímac, Skar (op.cit) finds that, since reform, a segmented but relatively undifferentiated social order has become increasingly economically and politically differentiated. Sánchez's (op.cit) study of Andarapa in the southern Andes shows that distribution and control of land have remained unequal. The proportion of poor peasants possessing less than four hectares each is higher than prior to reform. Sanchez
identifies three processes now taking place in the village - proletarianization, strengthening of household economy and differentiation based on land accumulation by a few peasants:

(F)irst there has been a proletarianization of a large sector of peasant whereby they have been incorporated into a capitalist system as wage labourers. Secondly, and in contrast of the former, there has been a reinforcement and intensification of production based on the nuclear family. This process consists of the increase in the amount of privately (as opposed to communally) controlled land and in the control of labour by the household unit. The third process is the differentiation among peasants which involves the widening of the gap between rich and poor members (ibid:161).

It seems evident that a trend toward greater differentiation, proletarianization and semi-proletarianization is taking place at the national level indicative of the intensification of commodity production. However, official figures show that unemployment and under-employment increased from 45.8 per cent of the work force in 1975 to 53.9 per cent in 1977 (Reid, 1985:67). Montoya (1982:69) mentions that, according to 1980 statistics, some 50 per cent of the economically active agricultural population were *minifundistas* as opposed to 41 per cent in 1961. Such figures indicate that state interventionism has failed to fully proletarianize the peasantry which in part has been re-peasantized by remaining tied to the land. Therefore, Peru's peripheral capitalism leads to a more rapid increase of the labouring population than capital can employ thus creating a marginal labour force. This seems to support both Nun's (cited in Quijano, 1983) and Quijano's assertion that "marginality" is different from "industrial reserve army" since it represents "that part of the relative surplus population that cannot be absorbed by the productive apparatus even during the expansive phases of the economic cycle, and that for this reason, in addition to the skill requirements implied by technological development, it could also be said that this "marginal" labor force has no significant effect on the movement of wages" (ibid:83).
b. Deepening Political Crisis: The Rise of Popular Movements

The years of 1970s witnessed the initial peasant reaction to the reform. Popular mobilization soon began on coastal cooperatives or CAPS (particular in Tumán and Cayaltí) where decision-making power increasingly rested in the hands of appointed technicians instead of agricultural workers (Handelman, 1980:112). Piura in northern Peru became a center of peasant unrest at the end of 1973 followed by Andahuaylas. In 1974, the southern central state of Apurímac witnessed some 40,000 peasants invading 78 haciendas many of which afterwards remained in peasant hands. In this latifundia dominated region, peasant frustration reached a climax when large properties were left virtually untouched four years after the promulgation of the reform law. Demands centered mainly on land expropriation and individual adjudication (García-Sayan, 1980 quoted in Kay, 1983:233).

The 1977 land invasions and the dismembering of the Tupac Amaru agrarian production cooperative in Anta near Cusco (1979) were the first indications of the inefficacy of the Andean cooperative model. Since then, peasant resistance to collectivism led to numerous restructuring or redimensionamientos (redimensioning) of SAIS enterprises with adjudication of land to member peasant communities. This breaking up of cooperatives helped reinforce the smallholding sector (Montoya, 1982:71).

Several reasons account for the poor performance of the SAIS model. From the outset, growth was prevented due to hacienda decapitalization occurring as soon as rumors of land reform started to spread. Before expropriation, hacendados refused to reinvest in their estates and rapidly sold land, equipment and herds while neglecting farming. In addition, the working capital of any SAIS is limited as this type of collective is burdened by taxation, heavy agrarian debt payments and interest on loans that overwhelm most profit whenever there is any at all. To make things worse, sierra crops and stock raising have been severely affected by fluctuating weather conditions, particularly a severe drought in
the southern Andes in 1983. Also, the bureaucracy that run these enterprises have encouraged corruption and undemocratic practices among office holders, destabilizing the economic performance of these collectives even further. Officials are poorly paid and often supplement their income through graft. The staff is inadequately trained and supervision of subordinates is often lax. No effective complaint procedures for members exist when incompetence or corrupt behaviour surfaces. Given that the power structure of collectives follows a hierarchical order, these units tend to be run in an authoritarian manner along particularistic lines. Discussing this issue for CAP Pincos in Apurímac, Skar cites Senior who observes:

Where corruption is endemic even large scale agrarian reforms can do little more than democratize graft, i.e. open up the possibility of peasant participation in bribery and misuse of resources, previously enjoyed by the privileged groups (1981:297)

Although government rhetoric insisted that SAISs would be controlled primarily by peasant members, it soon became evident that the model did not permit much grass roots participation. This has led Alderson-Smith to suggest that the SAIS operation would effectively depoliticize the peasant members:

1) By giving, at least nominally, the land to the communities, the government has managed to deprive them of a form of political initiative represented by the land invasions, despite their obvious disadvantages. 2) On the other hand, by discouraging the formation of a workers' syndicate while at the same time forming a vertical representational unit from administration down to worker (Alta Sierra), which nominally has a voice in the running of the cooperative, the government has created a source of potential conflict between two subgroups within the SAIS. This obscures the greater conflicts confronting peasants outside it (1976:139).

By the time General Morales Bermúdez replaced President Velasco in 1975, the government had moved to the right and purged itself of reformist officers. On February 5 1975 in Lima, riots over the deteriorating economic situation resulted in the death of 200 people. Grindle observed that in Perú as in other Latin American nations, in spite of
agrarian reform and rural development initiatives, when the state became involved in
conflict, it did so largely in the role of a repressive force enlisted to respond to or counter
specific popular demands (1986:175).

Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, the government opted for
deflationary policies such as a devaluation of the sol, a wage freeze and public expenditure
cutbacks. These measures had a negative impact on production, wages and employment.
As we mentioned previously, unemployment and underemployment rose between 1975 and
1977 while real wages fell by some 50 per cent between 1974 and late 1978. A nationwide
popular movement including workers, peasants, students and small businesses rapidly
developed to protest against drastic reductions in living standards. Strikes reached critical
levels in 1977 and 1978. Since 1980, rural warfare triggered by the guerilla group Sendero
Luminoso (Shining Path)8 from Ayacucho and later urban violence led by El Movimiento
Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement) in the coastal
slums and nearby valley communities suggest that the government has failed to rally
popular support.

The elections of July 1980 restored civilian rule. With the return to power of Acción
Popular headed again by Belaúnde, solutions by force were increasingly substituted for
economic policies and the reform program was unceremoniously abandoned. State
monopoly over agricultural import and local marketing came to an end. Decree Law #2 of

8 Sendero Luminoso started in the 1960s as a Maoist group in Ayacucho's university. Its
membership was made up of the Quechua-speaking children of richer peasants and small
traders who eventually received the support of several thousand peasants from the nearby
communities. Unlike other Latin American guerilla groups, Sendero Luminoso is not tied
to any foreign power, nor any Peruvian political party. It avoids the media and seldom
gives interviews. It does not make statements on its political platform. However, the group
believes that Peru's revolution must move from agitation and armed propaganda to full-
scale civil war. Their military tactic is to begin surrounding the cities from the
countryside. The Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement is an urban-based group which
initially in 1985 coordinated some of its activities with Shining Path. However, by 1987,
the two were fighting one another in the jungle regions (Bourque and Warren, 1989 fn:35)
1980 made it legal for private investors to purchase land from the cooperatives and Decree Law #1 of 1982 legalized parcelization which effectively terminated the land reform (Browman, 1987:19, 134). State governed production units affected by this policy change began to be parcelised. According to Reid (1985:101), by 1984, 35 per cent of the cooperatives had been sub-divided.

Unlike the Velasco regime, President Belaúnde’s government turned outward and foreign advisors and investment were again welcome. International market economics was encouraged: import bans and quotas disappeared. As Reid states:

Foreign companies no longer had to "peruvianise" their share holdings, and they were allowed to resume investment in banking, property development and commerce. The maximum amount of profit they could transfer home was doubled. This breached the Andean Pact’s Decision 24 regulating foreign investment, and Peru pushed for the rule to be abolished (ibid:84)\(^9\).

Banks (notably, the Banco de Credito owned by the Romero-Raffo families) and finance corporations became powerful business empires, but foreign capital penetration severely hurt Peru. The local economy had nearly collapsed by 1983; production fell by 12 per cent but inflation rose from 70 to 125 per cent yearly and the foreign debt grew from US $9.6 billion to US $12.4 billion (ibid). Manufacturing, particularly textiles, declined by more than a fifth between 1981 and 1983. To make the situation worse, the Mexican debt crisis of 1982 and that of Brazil led to a stall in foreign commercial bank loans throughout Latin America at a time when the international prices for raw materials were at their lowest because of a recession in the West. By the time of the 1985 presidential election, social discontent and impoverishment had reached new heights. The left had become the target of...

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\(^9\) The Andean Pact limited export profits to 14 per cent on the invested capital.
systematic government repression and *Sendero Luminoso* 's guerilla activities had turned Ayacucho, a poverty-stricken southern department, into the scene of bloody civil war\textsuperscript{10}.

To contain increasing peasant discontent in outlying regions, this post military period witnessed an influx of international development organizations such as in Chumbivilcas where now we find PRODACH (*Proyecto al Desarrollo Agro-pecuario de la Provincia de Chumbivilcas*) and CICDA (*Centre International de Coopération pour le Développement Agricole*). These institutions concentrated their economic efforts in areas where the state was weak. Through my discussions with the authorities at CICDA and PRODACH, I learned that their stated aims are to reduce persistent income inequality within poor rural areas. Peruvian staff members tend to support the party in power while foreign personnel is often young (early and mid-twenties), holding more power in the organization than the Peruvian team but lacking proper Andean field training\textsuperscript{11}. For example, the latter speak Spanish but not Quechua and, as a result, are not always aware of the dynamics of local society. During my visit in 1986 to the provincial Peasant League in Santo Tomas, Chumbivilcas peasant leaders openly regarded these institutions with disdain considering them as another form of social control. The recent murders in 1989 of two French development technicians working for CICDA illustrates the unpopularity of such agencies in the region.

These development organizations have focused their attention primarily on the more accessible communities near Santo Tomas and Colquemarca. Meanwhile, outlying districts like Ccapamarca are ignored and, thus, outside the sphere of assistance by either

\textsuperscript{10} Currently, it is in the areas of Ayacucho, Huancavelica and Andahuylas that *Sendero* has the greatest number of sympathisers (Berg, 1987:191).

\textsuperscript{11} The French personnel working for CICDA are usually young men who have chosen to work for two years in international development abroad rather than having to do one year of military service in France.
government or private institutions. Undoubtedly, in the long term, aid programs will widen the existing intra-regional gap in the southern Andes.

c-APRA and the Rural Sector

The APRA government won power in the 1985 elections and arrested the process of cooperative dissolution began by President Belaúnde. Faithful to the anti-imperialist tenets of the party founder, Haya de la Torre, and following the path of Velasco's regime, APRA renegotiated with foreign capital immediately after taking office. On July 28, 1985 President Alan García announced that Peru, unable to comply with the terms set by the International Monetary Fund, would limit repayment of its external public debt (US $14 billion) to only ten per cent of export earnings in any given year (Saba, 1987:109).

Aware of the pressing needs to contain social violence and growing rural poverty, the new administration has opted for the reallocation of public resources leading to the development of the poorest sierra departments through the implementation of Trapecio Andino. The intent of the project is to increase production of basic foodstuffs in order to achieve national self-sufficiency (in 1986, the aim was to reduce food imports by US $20 million). However, Trapecio Andino may have only a limited beneficial impact on the crisis. According to the economist Barre Nechea only 10.4 per cent of its funds used for the development of the department of Cusco will be destined for agriculture

Capitalizing on the charismatic personality of their leader Alan García, the Aprista government held in 1986 several meetings called rimanakuy ("dialogue" in Quechua) between President García and campesino leaders in order to coopt popular demands before the 1986 municipal elections. However, the regime has so far failed at diffusing mass

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12 On March 12, 1986, I attended a conference in Cusco where Barre Nechea presented a paper. The meeting was organized by Lima's Social Sciences Research Center (CEPES) and headed by Oscar Murillo of the Department of Anthropology at San Antonio Abad del Cusco.
mobilization. There is growing awareness among peasants that the civilian government firmly controls the rural sector through the SAIS system. In 1987, shortly after the municipal elections, the government sent troops to crack down on peasant mobilization involving a total of 156 Puno communities. These communities, rejecting SAIS integration, were demanding cooperative land redistribution - a 1986 presidential promise made during rimanakuy to local peasant leaders (Renique, 1987).

A new wave of peasant unrest has erupted recently throughout Puno, the southernmost department of Peru, where peasant communities and collectives have developed an increasingly antagonistic relationship towards one another. Renique mentions that SAIS Sollocota, in the province of Azangaro, started in 1982 to organize rondas noctunas (night watch) or self-defense units. These rondas made up of SAIS horsemen were set up ostensibly to guard SAIS boundaries in order to prevent possible invasions by affiliated comuneros. Most likely, their role is to intimidate nearby community members as the latter constantly find themselves accused of being lazy, subversive and of terrorist leanings. However, continuing their battle against SAIS political authorities who want to keep the land, united comuneros are gathering strength and pressing for both parcelization of SAIS land and a greater share of political power.

According to Renique, Puno's recent land invasions have shown a definite radical orientation as grievances focus not only on land but also on the affirmation of a new democratic alternative. Thus, the critical question is not only economic (more land) but also political as peasants demand more power and the right for community control of their own productive process. In 1986, two Puno provinces were involved; Melgar and Azangaro. A year later, unrest encompassed nine provinces. Campesinos are now receiving full support from leftist parties especially the Marxist organization, Vanguardia Revolucionaria, and from the urban intelligentsia.
Renique states that Puno peasants invoke an ideology reminiscent of the ayllu’s communal unity to counter state interference in rural affairs. Thus, it seems that by promoting collectivism through the 1969 land reform program, the state indirectly encouraged a revival of a communal sense which has now become a form of peasant protest. Devised to coopt Andean peasants by appealing to cultural consciousness through the manipulation of the notion of the ayllu, collectives ended up generating ethnic resurgence. The notion of "ayllu" gives legitimacy to a democratic anti-reform movement which uses an idiom appropriate to local culture. What is of interest is that this anti-reform current occurs mainly from the ranks of reform beneficiaries. Such is particularly the case in the departments of Cusco, Huancavelica, Apurimac and, lately, Puno. Day labourers, landless peasants and independent small holders are only marginally involved.

Before examining in detail the implications of the land reform law and its potential for counter-reform from either peasant beneficiaries or destitute landlords, it is necessary to assess the ways in which the law was implemented in the provinces of Canchis and Chumbivilcas.

5- Enforceability of the Reform in Chumbivilcas and Canchis

a-Pattern of Land Ownership Prior to Reform

During the early 1960s, the provincias altas exhibited a pronounced degree of landownership concentration characterized by a shortage of land for highland villagers side by side with large, underutilized latifundios. The 1961 agricultural census reveals that, overall in Peru, 1.3 per cent of the 845,000 agricultural units covered 84 per cent of the farm land. Handelman (1975:24-25; 1981:106) mentions that in Ayacucho, Huancavelica, Puno and Apurimac estates of over 500 hectares held 59-82 per cent of the agricultural-livestock land area. In the southern department of Puno alone, there were 11 latifundios of 20,000 to 46,000 hectares. Table 9 illustrates the persistence of this lopsided agrarian
structure in the *provincias altas* where free holding peasant communities held only half of the farming lands (52.40 per cent) but counted for some 97 per cent of the rural population. Meanwhile, large producers represented less than 0.50 per cent of the number of units and occupied over 37 per cent of the area.

*The 1961 Census data presented above need careful consideration since they may underestimate the extent of skewed distribution. The number of smallholdings is probably higher since the land exploited individually by *comuneros* seems to have been considered in the communal category. Similarly, medium and large estates might have been larger than their owners actually claimed. This is suggested by the fact that in 1961, the total declared land in Cusco (with the exclusion of La Convención) was 1,748,151.10 hectares while the official agrarian figure of 1970 was of 1,915,962.80 hectares, thus showing a difference of 167,811.70 hectares (Vera, 1976:81).*

In both Chumbivilcas and Canchis, the landownership structure was broadly similar to that found in the *provincias altas*. However, Table 10 reveals that a greater concentration of large estates was found in Canchis where the economy was tied to the production of wool for export.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of units</th>
<th>Farm Units</th>
<th>Area in Hectares</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Holdings</td>
<td>79,928</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Holdings: 1 to 10 has</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 499 has</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Above 500 has</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Units</td>
<td>82,036</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: *Centre International de Coopération pour le Développement Agricole* 1982:36
A major deficiency in this type of data is that statistics relate mainly to the number of landed properties in each district and not to the number of landowners. This tends to distort the extent of tenurial concentration by disregarding the existence of multiple ownership.

The concentration of landownership was particularly pronounced in Marangani where some profitable stock raising haciendas were located. In the district, only 18 families owned a total of 93,700 hectares of land (Casos, 1981; Rojas, 1978:56).

Meanwhile, in that same district minifundistas lived on the edge of subsistence with a yearly income of approximately US $48.27 as was the case of comuneros from Quisini, Llallahui or Ocobamba (Aguilar Callo, 1973:71).

b-The New Land Tenure Structure

Following the dictates of Article 44, agrarian zones were created by decree of the Executive branch of the government in an effort to adapt the reform to regional socio-economic conditions. Cusco belonged to the agrarian zone XI-Cusco. This contained three departments: Cusco, Apurimac and Madre de Dios. It covered 785,877.00 hectares of expropriated land belonging to 937 ex-estates. Some 553,900 hectares benefitted, directly or indirectly, 29,903 families (Vera, 1976:83). The program included several aspects such as land redistribution, consolidation of small farms, formation of CAPs and of SAISs and, in some instances, communal reallocation. As Table 12 shows, 139 cooperatives were
created including more than 50 per cent of the beneficiaries. Two Agrarian Societies of Social Interest were formed, one being SAIS Marangani. They covered nine per cent of the beneficiaries. On the other hand, 30 per cent or 8,773 families received land on a private basis. These were ex-feudatorios (aparceros, yanaconas, mejoreros and huacchilleros) who had rights of first priority to land and became owners of their usufruct plots. As can be seen, about 11 per cent or 3,302 families who benefited belonged to communities transformed into cooperativas comunales de producción.

Table 11: Forms of Adjudication: Zone XI-Cusco

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Hectares</th>
<th># affected Families</th>
<th># Units</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Individuals</td>
<td>78,017</td>
<td>8,773</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperatives (CAPs)</td>
<td>414,588</td>
<td>15,122</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>22,484</td>
<td>3,302</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectives (SAISs)</td>
<td>38,855</td>
<td>2,706</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vera, 1976:84

PIAR Marangani, like other Proyectos Integrantes de Adentamiento Rural (Integrated Rural Settlement Schemes), was a sub-zonal state institution administrating the two provinces of Canchis and Chumbivilcas. As Table 12 shows, most of the land it covers was organized into some collective tenurial arrangement.

Table 12: Economic Units Belonging to PIA MARANGANI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Type of Unit</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Area (Hectares)</th>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Estates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huanca</td>
<td>Peasant Group</td>
<td>Livitaca</td>
<td>5,596</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>Livitaca (Chumbivilcas)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quehua</td>
<td>Peasant Commune</td>
<td>Sicuani (Canchis)</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>Onocota (Cruzunca)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marangani</td>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td>Marangani (Canchis)</td>
<td>49,122</td>
<td>16,005</td>
<td>Uyucani Queamari Tozaca Tozaca</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vera, ibid:112
c - Adjudication

Two distinct reform processes took place in the provincias altas beginning in late 1974: expropriation and confiscation. Expropriation involved a property transfer to communities which did not necessarily have a legal claim on the land of the expropriated estate. In such cases, community beneficiaries had to pay an agrarian debt over a period of twenty years. The ministry of Agriculture was in charge of such a transfer of funds. The procedure was considered administrative and not judicial.

According to Article 30 of Decree Law 17,716, Chumbivilcas and Canchis were assigned different maximum limits to the amount of land which could be retained by private owners. Expropriation applied to irrigated lands above 40 hectares in Canchis and 45 hectares in Chumbivilcas. Such clauses were lax and contained numerous loopholes that landlords could easily manipulate to save their estate, such as subdivision into units below the maximum retainable size. In total, 180,639.49 hectares of land were expropriated by the reform in Canchis but only 49,180 hectares in Chumbivilcas.

Confiscation with restitution to beneficiaries concerned a recovery of property (revindicación) by communities and individual peasants who had set claims on certain plots and had proof of property titles (usually, Spanish royal land grants to Indian communities). Confiscation could also take place where hacendados were unable to produce legitimate property titles or bills of sale. In such situations, beneficiaries did not have to repay the agrarian debt. The transfer operation was the responsibility of the Fuero Privativo Agrario (Special Agrarian Jurisdiction).

In Canchis, the reform was extensive and tended to assign properties to cooperatives or to a system of communal ownership (see Appendix 1 for details on state enterprises in Canchis). A total of 197 estates were expropriated and transferred to beneficiaries. Another 180 were confiscated and 44 have remained unsettled with peasants and landholders still fighting legal battles.

In Chumbivilcas, land expropriation was much more limited than in Canchis. For example, according to Diagnóstico Departamental del Cusco (1982:20), only 51 estates covering a total of 35,206 hectares were confiscated, 55 others totalling 49,180 hectares were expropriated while 13 haciendas representing 9,998 hectares were considered unresolved cases. Further, the process was more concentrated in the five districts nearest to the capital town of Santo Tomas. In outlying regions of the province such as Colquemarca, the district adjacent to Ccapacmarca, the process of adjudication was never completed. Out of the 24 estates that were supposed to be affected by the reform only ten were eventually redistributed representing 9,770 hectares of land. Of the ten estates, no more than two were expropriated to the benefit of local communities (Saico Armandariz, 1982:17). In Ccapacmarca where campesino political activism had been intense, land was allotted primarily to ex-feudatorios in order to reduce any risk of turmoil.

d. Impact of Reform

It appears that government efforts were selective and uneven. I would suggest that differences in reform policies were attributable to the fact that Canchis produced alpaca and sheep wool for export while Chumbivilcas's economy was oriented to foodstuffs for the domestic market. Peru's continued dependence on export led the state to support regions such as Marangani where wool production was well entrenched [according to Alvarez Illaves (1967:10), in 1964 Marangani produced some 65 per cent of the overall provincial yield]. As a whole, the province of Canchis received preferential treatment over
province is a larger animal raising region than Canchis (Chumbivilcas has 381,896 hectares of pastureland as opposed to 203,440.00 in Canchis). Chumbivilcas received lower priority because of its secondary role as a domestically oriented rather than an agro-export sector. State policies of this kind have reinforced regional "dualism" because they favour better developed regions over less-developed ones. Table 13 indicates that public investment in the provincias altas continues to be geared towards the most dynamic regions such as Canchis where there exists a strong export oriented economy. Unlike Canchis, Chumbivilcas constitutes what Cardoso would call an "unnoticed" sector in agriculture, whose smallholders produce in the shadow of the dominant export economy (cited in Foweraker, 1981:63). As a result of its lesser political importance, Chumbivilcas was also excluded from government funding and technical assistance granted primarily to collectives - a policy maintained after the military left office.

Though Chumbivilcas experienced a limited reform program, the little it received tended to affect previous centers of unrest. Accordingly, Ccapacmarca benefitted more heavily from land redistribution than any other nearby district as this reform measure was devised to diffuse a potentially volatile political situation. Handelman confirms this hypothesis by saying that though the sierra had been relatively tranquil for several years preceding the agrarian reform law, periodic unrest suggested that the potential for a major resurgence of peasant activities persisted (1980:251, fn.17).
### Table 13: Annual Funding per Province in the Provincias Altas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provinces</th>
<th>Million of Soles</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canchis</td>
<td>575.30</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canas</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumbivilcas</td>
<td>38.10</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Espinar</td>
<td>29.20</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total provincias altas</td>
<td>670.60</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CORDECUSCO (cited in FORUM, 1985:12)

Within the department of Cusco the reform had a minimal impact on production. Agricultural production fell from 789,029 metric tons in 1970 to 561,273 in 1982. Confirmation of production decline comes from Diagnóstico Departamental del Cusco (1982) which shows that in 1965 some 216,570 metric tons of domestic foodstuffs were produced while only 172,090 metric tons in 1977 - a figure which slightly improved in 1982 to reach 195,939 metric tones. Meanwhile, Table 14 indicates that agroexport almost doubled during that same period. Thus, domestic crop production has been particularly stagnant with the poor performance of peasant agriculture again coming to the fore.

### Table 14: Agricultural Production Growth (in Metric Tons) in Cusco, 1965-1982

**Type of Crop Production**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Crop Production</th>
<th>1965</th>
<th>1977</th>
<th>1982</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Crop (Potato, wheat, barley, olluco)</td>
<td>216,570</td>
<td>172,090</td>
<td>195,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export Crop (coffee, tea, cocoa, coca)</td>
<td>13,962</td>
<td>35,792</td>
<td>28,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5,573</td>
<td>6,572</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Diagnóstico Departamental Del Cusco (op.cit: Table 26)
However, animal production seems to exhibit a different trend. According to Table 15, llama, sheep and cattle production increased substantially between 1967 and 1980. During that same period, however, alpaca production grew only slightly. Bearing in mind that alpaca raising in Cusco is primarily under SAIS control while llama, sheep and cattle production is in peasant hands, these results appear to indicate that overall individual livestock production has met with greater success than the collective one. Thus, peasant livestock production on farms generally less than five hectares seems to remain substantial and its neglect by the government can be regarded as having critical consequences for national development.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>1967</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpaca</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>286,060</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llamas</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>158,515</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>1,310,000</td>
<td>1,597,085</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>272,000</td>
<td>400,390</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Landlords' Counter-Reform Measures

As expected, the response of the dominant rural class to the passing of the law was quick to come. In Marangani, landlord absentism was high in the 1960s and many hacendados preferred to leave permanently after the application of the new land reform program. However, before departure, landowners resorted to four basic counter-offensive strategies to restrict the effect of the law: 1) selling through parcelization of land; 2) fragmentation into smaller units whose sizes were within the confines of the law; 3) recapitalization by improving facilities and 4) decapitalization.
In Chumbivilcas, whenever possible the indigenous elite used all their influence to initiate counter-reform, determined as they were to make no concessions to the peasantry. In the early 1970s, under SINAMOS, the political climate was favorable to peasants. For a while gmonales, too weak at the national level, were unable to resist state reform agents. After SINAMOS was dismantled in 1975, power again shifted to the advantage of the old landed class who could regain strength through their local connections and influence within their own milieu. The law showed enough laxity and contained enough loopholes that gamonales were often able to manipulate the situation to their benefit. They had plenty of time (five years or more) to prepare counter-offensives before the law seriously affected them. In a region as geographically isolated as Chumbivilcas, peasants had never been organized effectively and the absence of significant union leadership or powerful national groups had left the local peasantry very vulnerable. Often peasants, unaccustomed to legal and political processes, would not file claims after reform. Such was the case of communities in the northern district of Ccapacmarca - a region which remains to date completely cut off from any formal institutional systems, be they national, departmental or syndical. To date, thanks to the force, threat or "friendship" they use to retain their land, some fifty Chumbivilcan hacendados own estates as large as 1,500 hectares (Centre International de Coopération pour le Développement Agricole, 1982). The examples below printed in Su (1980: 29) illustrate the ways in which repression was particularly important in some districts to frighten local peasants.

Case 1: Ahuichanta/Huisuray

Ahuichanta/Huisuray, is a recognised peasant community located some two kilometers from the town of Colquemarca, Chumbivilcas. It covers an area of 2,982 hectares of non-irrigated lands and includes some 120 families. This community is made up of two moities: Ahuichanta and Huisuray Collana. During the early republican period, when Ayllu Choccoyo became an hacienda, its owner took over much of the land
belonging to the community. Later, Hacienda Allpichiri was also created by encroaching upon the same community land. After the promulgation of the 1969 reform law, the peones of Allpichiri laid claim to the estate's land and received 560 hectares on November 16 1979. Twenty four hours later the ex-landlord, who belongs to one of the most powerful gamonal families in Colquemarca and who also owns some 3,000 hectares of land, came to the community harrassing and beating peasants. When informed, land reform officials requested that the subprefect of Santo Tomas provide necessary protection to the comuneros. However, the subprefect, himself a local gamonal, let the former landlord retain 460 hectares of land and granted 100 hectares to Cuipiri, a nearby community which had laid no claim to the land. This strategy made it easier for the landlord to recover the land when he so desired. On January 8, 1980 the land reform authorities arrived on the site to support the sub-prefect and the landlord and ruled out any further comuneros' claim on Allpichiri land. The next day, to teach the comuneros a lesson, the landlord rode through the community setting houses on fire and beating people. On January 18 1980, these abuses were denounced to the land reform office. A dossier was created (file number 0102780) but, typically, no further action was taken.

This case shows the decisive role of physical repression and bureaucratic corruption to resist expropriation and the breaking of the gamonal political monopoly. However, in recent years, peasants have gained enough confidence in themselves to retaliate by taking the law into their own hands. Upon my arrival in Colquemarca on April 2 1983, I soon learned that a tragic incident had just taken place in Allpirichi. Peasants informed me that a local gamonal had sold a large tract of contested land to a thirty three year old man from Arequipa who established himself in Colquemarca by marrying the daughter of an influential local family. Apparently, from the outset, peasants resented him; his estate encroached on community land and his condescending attitude towards comuneros was much disliked. The day prior to my arrival, a general assembly was held in Allpichiri.
Without invitation, the Arequipeno landlord showed up armed with a rifle, verbally abused the campesinos and shot one of them dead. After disarming him, comuneros stoned him to death and mounted his body on a horse sent to Santo Tomas where the body was autopsied.

Case 2: Choccoyo/Toccroyoc/Lloccoco

On August 17 1977, Sur (1980) printed the following account of what took place in the district of Colquemarca, Chumbivilcas where 2,000 hectares of land previously belonging to the estate called Choccoyo/Toccroyoc/Lloccoccco were adjudicated to the comuneros of Allpichiri. Three years later, reforms officials dispossessed these campesinos and granted the paraje or portion known as Lloccoco to a man from Arequipa, Don Juan, whose son-in-law, Pedro is a relative of Don Alejandro, another powerful landowner in Colquemarca. The second part of the estate known as Toccroyoc went to Eliso the son of Don Alejandro. Meanwhile, Choccoyo, the third section of the adjudicated estate went to Don Mateo - a Colquemarcan shopkeeper also related to the landowner of Allpichiri (see Case 1). We see that Colquemarca landlords were able to use family connections to retain land control and, thus, block effective land reform.

These cases are instructive as they reveal that the Velasco reform does not seem to have swept away highland gamonales who resorted to local influence, family connections and even punitive raids in order to defend their interest. Bureaucratic inertia and outright corruption have become as much an obstacle to the enforcement of the process as landlords' attitudes. Local officials still prefer to serve the interest of traditional bosses rather than those of the state. Consequently, the land reform has encountered many problems which, in the long run, will prove difficult to overcome. Only recently have frustrated peasants finally taken matters into their own hands.
Collectivization in Peru assumed its momentum at the instigation of President Velasco and his military regime. Production collectives were the basis for economic development and popular participation. The fact that these new agro-enterprises now link agriculture to international markets illustrates the way in which the peripheral state promotes industrialization and secures capitalism. The restructuring of Peruvian society has stressed the importance of economic planning to support industrialization by shifting traditionally non-state activities to the state itself. Hence, in peripheral economies, state interventionism contributes to the growth of capitalist social relations. The result for Peru is an economic "dualism" with agro-business being encouraged at the expense of the domestic food production sector.

Though the 1969 land reform remains one of the most daring experiments of its kind in the southern hemisphere, its overall effects seem uneven and disappointing. As we saw, with respect to expropriation, the reform completed only 70 percent of its initially stated goals and progressed more rapidly on the coast and on livestock haciendas than in more remote parts of the Andean countryside. Landlordism was almost entirely eradicated in the export-oriented regions but seems to have persisted in domestic production areas. Declines in productivity could be attributed both to the decapitalization of farms and to the apparent failure of the collectives.

Recent research indicates that the reform has prompted three major tendencies within the peasantry: growing socio-economic differentiation, continued seasonal and permanent migration and an increase in the number of smallholdings. As Montoya (1982:72) notes, the trend toward smallholding presupposes the peasantry's subjection to capital and, I would add, their further marginalization.
Designed to prevent peasant unrest, the reform has instead sharpened social conflict to a point where the political climate is increasingly explosive. There is growing evidence that a democratically based anti-reform movement is taking place throughout the southern Andes. Violence is reaching new heights as highland peasantry are prevented from meaningful participation in the political system. Meanwhile in regions of strong indigenous *gamonalismo*, it appears that traditional power-holders have been able to retain control over *campesinos* through their own back door counter-offensive measures. The concrete case studies of Ccapanarea and Marangani should clarify the nature of such trends.
CHAPTER 5

Changing Land Tenure, Unchanging Social Relations in Ccapacmarca

This chapter focuses on the ways in which the district of Ccapacmarca has been affected by the implementation of the 1969 land reform decree: Law 17,716. Based on the case study of one community, the analysis assesses the extent to which the process of reform has transformed the material basis of production and affected social relations between local peasants and the landed elite.

1. Location and Setting of the District of Ccapacmarca

Ccapacmarca, where I resided in 1984, is a district of the northern part of Chumbivilcas (Figure 7). The overriding characteristic of Ccapacmarca is its geographic isolation. No carriage road had yet reached the district at the time of my fieldwork in 1984. A dirt track, usable only during the dry season, was completed in 1986. The extreme ruggedness of the terrain combined with sheer distance make overland travel, usually on foot or horseback, very difficult. Two routes lead to Cusco. One is a forty eight hour journey through the province of Oconmayo requiring one day on a bus and, at least, 12 hours of steady walking through the high and cold altiplano (see photograph below: Figure 8). The second alternative, through Colquemarca, Vellille and Yanaoca takes a minimum of four days travel by truck or bus and on foot. The poorly developed infrastructure of the region has led to a complete absence of industrial development at the local level. Ccapacmarca’s inaccessibility is at once a symptom and a cause of its economic underdevelopment and its marginality with respect to centres like Cusco or Arequipa.

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As Figure 7 indicates, the province of Paruro in the department of Cusco borders Ccapacmarca to the north and east, the province of Cotabambas in the department of Apurimac to the west and the district of Colquemarca, Chumbivilcas to the south.
Figure 7. Province of Chumbivilcas
Figure 8. View of the *Altiplano* near Ccapacmarca
The district of Ccapacmarca covers a total of 37,988 hectares and exhibits an extremely complex topography of semi-tropical valleys, temperate uplands and the ever-present *altiplano*, a broad expanse of flat land above 4,000 meters. Here, the Santo Tomás River and its tributary, the Collpa River, cut deeply into the *altiplano* terrain creating steep canyon walls some 1,000 meters deep. Below, protected ravines known as *quebradas* contain subtropical micro-climates particularly suited for maize - the most common agricultural crop of the district - and fruits such as those found on the surrounding slopes: citrus, peaches and apples.

Such tremendous vertical span creates extreme ecological variation within a very small area. The resulting economy of Ccapacmarca households relies on a delicately balanced control over a variety of ecozones, yet these households are rarely able to achieve complete self-sufficiency. As the aerial photograph of the district indicates (Figure 9), numerous minuscule plots are tilled on the mountainsides right to the edge of the *altiplano* to provide land for the residents.

Ccapacmarca numbers some 4,370 inhabitants or roughly six per cent of the overall population of the province of Chumbivilcas. It consists of a larger village of the same name officially recognized as an independent peasant community in 1938, which is the site chosen for this case study. Geopolitically, this settlement is also a "municipality" and, thus, the administrative centre of the district. Four other peasant communities can be found in the district including: Cancahuani (5,372.50 hectares), Huascabamba (2,487 hectares), Sayhua (270 hectares), Tahuay (8,441 hectares).

A significant characteristic of the underdevelopment of this outlying region is expressed in the rate of illiteracy which was as high as 72 per cent in 1972 (Censo Nacional, 1972). In addition, average life expectancy is only 40 years old and more than
one fourth of the deaths occur before the age of two. Infant mortality in the community of Ccapacmarca was still 67 per cent in the mid-1980s (Monje, 1985: 41).

Medium size *haciendas* predominate along with relatively small privately run family farms organized into communities. The majority of these homesteads are tiny *minifundia* holdings often too small to provide sufficient foodstuffs to their owners. Much of the available land is of poor quality and badly eroded. Generally speaking, the water supply is inadequate and irrigation systems are underdeveloped.

*Mestizo* ranches and *haciendas* have long existed in the district. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the district counted 36 of these estates owned by 19 families (*Archivos de la Nación;*, 1851). Although no official record could be found on the exact number of *haciendas* existing prior to the implementation of the reform, 1972 documents found at the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani indicate the following: Mapay (with 35 tenant households), Percasenqa (19 tenant households) and Patahuasi (13 tenant households) as well as Chuchina, Canchura, Pataclay, Huascabamba, Q'ehuayllo, Ccachuccalla and J'ukucha - the latter bordering with the province of Paruro.

As we saw in Chapter 3, conflicts between peasant communities and local *haciendas* have been a recurring theme in the history of the district. The most recent uprising was the land invasion of *Hacienda* Percasenqa by *comuneros* from Ccapacmarca, Tahuay and Huascabamba in 1963. The community of Ccapacmarca has been chosen as the focus of attention for an examination of the impact of the reform in the district.
Figure 9. Aerial Photograph of Ccapacmarca
2-Case Study: The Community of Ccapacmarca

The trucks that leave Cusco for Ccapacmarca drive on a dirt road for hours to finally stop at the pueblo of Accha (See Figure 2, Chapter 1). From Accha, one walks or rides along a tortuous but steep path cut into the canyon wall to make a precipitous descent to Rio Apurímac, some 1,000 meters below. Then, a narrow path slowly winds up to the ridge of the canyon, crosses the village of Parco and continues until it reaches the cold, treeless and windswept high plateau where it stretches onwards for many kilometers. After a minimum of 12 hours at a good walking pace, one arrives at the community of Ccapacmarca, a hamlet built on a saddle at the edge of the *altiplano*. The same path continues down to the centre of the village toward the spectacular Rio Santo Tomas canyon. Ccapacmarca hangs on the mountain ridges just above the canyon. The nucleated settlement (centre of the village) is located at 3,565 meters which marks the maximum altitude of corn cultivation. Below, in the sub-tropical *quebrada* lies Hacienda Percasenqa.

The approximately 1,970 inhabitants of Ccapacmarca are organized into some 430 households dispersed up the slopes around a small nucleated village whose centre is at mid-altitude (3,565 meters) on the upper edge of the maize and grain zones. These families dedicate themselves to both herding and subsistence farming. Agricultural production takes place above and below the nucleus of the community - a pattern commonly found in the Andes (Isbell, 1978; Orlove, 1977a; Webster, 1971). Houses are made of adobe walls with thatched roofs and packed earth floors and incorporate an upper loft (*marka*) for the storage of grains and tubers.
Figure 10. Caqacamarcaños in 1984
Villagers are predominantly monolingual Quechua speakers, though some are bilingual.

The majority of the inhabitants are of racially mixed origin many of whom have a relatively fair complexion and light coloured eyes - landlords and peasants alike. Two main groups can be identified, the Quechua speaking peasants (see Figure 10) who are pejoratively referred to as "indios" (Indians) and the Mestizos who include schoolteachers, merchants and small but powerful indigenous landlords. The members of the latter group have acquired traits identified with the national Peruvian culture (mannerism, language skill etc.) and their children now are educated in Arequipa or Cusco. More than race, criteria such as family name, bilingualism, landholdings and herd size determine social status. However, all Ccapacmarcaños, regardless of their social position, tend to identify strongly and proudly with their Chumbivilcan identity. They like to dress in Chumbivilcano attires with the red poncho and the large rimmed black hat. Virtually everybody, women included, rides horses.

a-Annual Farming Calendar

Residents practice diversified exploitation at different altitudes. The Andean verticality characteristic of Ccapacmarca is of a "compressed type" with an elevation varying between 2,400 to 4,300 meters above sea level. The land controlled by the community falls within the boundaries of five ecozones. The low qheshua area (from 2,400 meters to 3,000 meters), where the majority of the population live, is characterized by intensive irrigation best for the growing of maize. A temperate climate and the existence of numerous streams facilitate this type of cultivation. Also grown are indigenous root crops and grains such as Q'oapo, wana, kaipl, pukususu, kinua and q'anida. Just above, in the high qheshua (from 3,000 to 3,500) maize is still planted along with beans, wheat

2 The term "compressed type", used by Brush (1977:11), applies to a valley where all the ecozones are accessible to villagers within walking distance. Resources are exploited without major migration or an extended trade network.
and barley. The lower suni (between 3,500 meters and 3,700 meters) is an intermediate, non-irrigated, rainfall dependent agricultural zone dedicated primarily to potatoes and other tubers. The cultivation of potatoes follows a rotation sequence characteristic of the Andean sectorial fallow system or laymi. In the high suni (from 3,700 to 4,000 meters), tuber cultivation is combined with rangeland. The puna above 4,000 meters forms extensive natural pasturage. Here, herds feed on a variety of small grasses (Chilliwa, iru, ichu, pako, maransera and pacha tayanka) capable of growing at such altitudes.

### Diagram 3: Ccapacmarca. Cultivation According to Ecozones

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elevation (meters)</th>
<th>Agriculture Zone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>Puna Rangeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>High Suni Tuber/Rangeland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,700</td>
<td>Low Suni Potatoes/Tubers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>High Qheshua Maize/Beans/Wheat/Barley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Low Qheshua Maize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldnotes, 1984

Within the broad ecozonal boundaries found in Ccapacmarca a number of very specific crops exist that are particularly adapted to micro-climates. For instance, we find thirteen different types of potatoes, nine of maize, eight of broad beans, six of papa lisas, ocas (both are root crops), peas, and wheat, five types of barley and four of tarwi and...
Figure 11. Chakitaclla or Andean Foot Plow
años (a root crop). Such a gamut of local cultivars per species is indicative of cultivation diversification - an Andean farming strategy that not only reduces the possible negative effects of weather fluctuation on overall yield production but also increases the proliferation chance of the seeds (Gade, 1967:153 cited in Brush, 1977:80). Further, citing Golt's work, Villasante (1981:4) confirms that this way of encouraging a wide variety of agricultural products at differing ecological levels appears to facilitate a better use of household labour during a maximum number of days in the agricultural calendar.

The agricultural technology employed by the villagers is completely unmechanized; most of the field operations are performed with lampas (short-handled hoes), picos (pickaxes) and the chakitaclla (Andean foot plow, Figure 11). Draught animals are used to plow maize fields whenever the slopes are not too steep. Farming tasks are usually accomplished by the nuclear family's own labour force. However, some agricultural activities such as maize and potato aporque (banking of the roots) are labour intensive (Brush, 1977:95-96) and require considerable help and cooperation from other households. In such instances, labour is obtained through reciprocal exchange of various types (ayni and minka) based on real and fictive kinship, patron-client ties or hired labour.

Table 16 indicates that, at the end of the dry season in September, fields are cleared and weeds burnt. In the case of maize cultivation, the soil is irrigated thoroughly before ploughing. This operation is called "tomeaq" followed by kuskiy (ploughing). Planting (chacmeo) takes place shortly thereafter and is celebrated as an important festive occasion.

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4 A native taxonomy of the various species of the major crops existing in Ccampañamarca can be found in Appendix 2. I compiled this inventory in 1984.

5 Brush (1980) argues that the Andean vertical regime helps accumulate a store of genetic variation through maximization of the number of cultivated microclimate niches.
marked by rituals to encourage crop growth. The ceremony includes trago (sugar cane alcohol) libations, coca leaf distribution and seed blessing or tinq'ay. Women cook a mid-day banquet or hatun samay and, following the meal, sing the sacred wankay songs.

Subsequently, (as in the case of maize when the sprouts are some 20 centimeters high), several weedings take place. In the case of maize cultivation, these are: urpichupay, kitupay and Qoray. Kitupay, the second weeding, represents an important phase in the crop cycle and, like planting, is celebrated by rituals. Maize harvest or tipity starts in April/May and the stripped corn ears are stored in the taq'e - a one meter high platform made of wheat stems tied together by grass fiber ropes. After harvest, animals feed in the crop fields until September when they are driven to the puna pastureland.

The owner commissions one of the participants to be the compadre and to perform tinq'ay. During the ceremony, each kernel is given individual attention. The compadre fills a chicha mug with seeds and carefully counts the grains while the audience begs the kernel to grow well: "now pitusiray, don't let yourself be overcome by inclement weather- please, grow well! ". It is a good omen if the number of grains counted is found to be uneven while an even number indicates that the yield will be small. According to Gade (1975) and Brush (1977), this concern for the individual plant parallels the New World method of sowing seeds in a serial fashion while in the Old World, where traditionally seeds were broadcast, the field was the focus of attention. The concern given to the individual plant here reflects not only the combination of different kinds of plant sometimes grown together within the same field but also the individual survivability of each plant within fields that vertically span a change in ecological conditions. For instance, frost might damage one part of a field but not another. By contrast, in Europe fields typically fit within an homogenous ecozone.

After the meal, tinq'ay is performed to bless the growing seed. A single plant is selected and, with the audience participation, is addressed in the following manner: "look, you must fight hard against the cold and frost so that you can grow well". Again here, it is the individual plant which is the focus of attention.
Important operations involving rituals are in bold
Underlined words in italic are Quechua terms
Figure 12. Peasants Working in Their Potato Field

Figure 13. Average Potato Yield Per Plot
only be achieved through reciprocal exchange with other households and through systems of payment based primarily on the use of crops.

b-Labour and Animal Exchange Systems Amongst Peasants

Typically, land holdings are small. As discussed later, several households are landless and many are landpoor. Inequality of holdings relates not only to the size and number of plots but also to the quality of land and to the distribution of crop holdings in different subzones. This inequality is not a new phenomenon; its origin can be traced back to at least colonial times. The process began when *kuracas* (native local rulers) became intermediaries between Spanish *encomenderos* and villagers and, as such, were able to accumulate parcels for themselves. Unequal distribution of land sharpened with the coming to Ccapacmarca of a large number of *forasteros* (escapees from the *mita* service, see Chapter 3) who, as non-community members, were deprived of any access to land ownership. The stratification process was also accelerated by the passing of the 1829 law which allowed the buying and selling of communal land and the inheritance law which divided family properties among children.

While land is an essential but scarce resource, a shortage of draught animals is also acute in the community. Those who do not own oxen nor ploughs for cultivation are at a distinct disadvantage. The renting of these means of production from wealthier peasants is key to smallholders' farming. In exchange, payment is generally made through *ayni* or *minga* labour. These traditional cooperative practices sustain household farming and are still performed between the better-off households obtaining access, this way, to the labour of poorer *campesinos*. Meanwhile, the latter can use in return tools and draught animals. Arrangements take a variety of forms; generally the prevailing local rates are the following: two days of male labour for a team of oxen; one day of male labour for the lending of a
horse, mule, donkey or for the use of a plough. Monje's study (1985:181) of fifty households shows that poorer families work in ayu arrangement almost twice as often as the richer ones. This exchange takes place primarily from January to March when there exists a greater scarcity of agricultural produce in poorer households.

3-Effects of Land Reform on the Tenurial System

Archival records indicate that in 1937 at least seven major landowning families possessed one or several haciendas near the community of Ccapacmarca - a number that thirty years later had increased to twelve owning up to five small or medium size estates. By 1968, Ccapacmarcaños were claiming as their own 15,000 hectares of land, mainly pastoral, that had been lost to these encroaching haciendas. Prior to reform, the community controlled approximately 10,850 hectares of land. Cultivated land amounted to 6,480 hectares including 4,215 irrigated hectares. The remainder was pasture.

a-Extent of Expropriation

Land reform was delayed in Chumbivilcas and did not reach the district of Ccapacmarca until 1976. By June 1981 the process of expropriation was terminated even though the terms of the reform had not been completed. Tenant families became the main beneficiaries. Based on the Spanish royal land grants that Ccapacmarca had received in the early seventeenth century, the community could prove ownership of various parcels occupied by local gamonales at the time of reform. As a result, the community was able to recover part of its territory without incurring an agrarian debt.

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8 I would disagree with Monje (1985) who calls this form of labor exchange ayu. It seems that the term minka - would be more appropriate in this case. Sanchez's (1982:157-191) definition of minka and ayu is followed here. Sanchez explains that minka is unequal and involves a more hierarchical division of labour with the landowner directing the team of workers and benefitting more in the exchange. Ayu is more egalitarian and both parties perform the same role.
The precise amount of land redistributed to the community of Ccapacmarca is unknown; at the Ministry of Agriculture in Cusco, an official told me that cadastral surveys had yet to be completed. However, out of the 37,988 hectares covered by the district of Ccapacmarca, some 29,488 hectares now belong to the communities and roughly 8,500 hectares are owned privately. My own field observations and conversations with local informants led me to conclude that, within the district, several processes took place: 1) some haciendas were turned into communities (such as Cconabamba, Poccorhuay, Uyllullu, Q'ehuayllo); 2) others were illegally occupied by peasants (Huascabamba); and 3) several were reduced in size and converted into "family units" (Percasenqa). However, in spite of land reform, haciendas still persist (Mapay, Chuchina, Canchura, Pampacaclanca).

Percasenqa, the estate which had experienced peasant unrest in the 1960s, was partially parcelized. Before reform, Percasenqa owned 1,046 hectares worked by 19 colonos families. In June 1981, its tenants received 659.5 hectares including 55 hectares of crop land and 570 hectares for pasture. At expropriation, the land was formally appraised at S/42,577 to be paid by reform beneficiaries. The owners retained 387 hectares and received cash plus bonds of the B and C categories amounting to S/20,000.00 and S/351,000 respectively or the equivalent of US $7,200.00 (Monje, 1985:32). In 1984, the hacienda owner was trying to sell 180 hectares of her remaining estate plus 27 cattle for S/40 million (roughly, US $14,960.00)9.

After reform, land rights litigation have continued. For example, I found that ten private cases had been filed in the municipality of Ccapacmarca between 1979-1980. These

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9 In 1984, the former hacendada was over 80 years old, blind and incontinent. Her son came to take her to Cusco as he felt that her ex-peones showed a lack of respect for her. According to local peasants, she had been a tyranic landlady and Ccapacmarcaños never forgave her for sending the troops against comuneros and for the killing of their leaders some twenty years ago.
usually deal with contested sales, boundary disputes or usufruct rights. Estates such as Pataclay, J'ukucha and Q'achukalla were abandoned but, in 1984, a dispute was still unsettled between Ccapacmarca and Tahuay over Pataclay.

In 1976 six communal lands known as *laymis*, where sectorial fallowing is practiced, were returned to Ccapacmarca which now counts a total of 12 *laymis*. Further, the community received five collective parcels or 2.6 hectares of maize and wheat land. Today, these are worked communally in *faenas* and their surplus is used to pay legal fees regarding ongoing suits against local landlords (Monje, op.cit:69).

The reform also affected four parcels maintained by the local sodalities or *cofradías*. These were agricultural lands controlled by the church but worked by the *comuneros*. Prior to reform, the harvest of *cofradías* (discounting the amount of seeds necessary for planting) were sent to Santo Tomas to benefit the parish priests; now the surplus is being used to finance the annual religious *fiestas* for the community's *patrón* saints (Monje, op.cit:67). Those lands which traditionally belonged to the municipal council (1.80 irrigated hectares) have remained untouched by the reform and still function to finance administrative expenses.

---

10 One case of particular interest involved a *colono* family and Don Ricardo- one of the most powerful and abusive local *gamonales*. The conflict was over a corn plot near Mollino Haycco which in 1954 belonged to Don Ricardo who sold it to the *colono* in exchange for labour. To guarantee repayment, the landlord demanded that the whole family work for him until the death of the father. By 1979, the landlord was still claiming the plot as his. In a letter found at the archives of Ccapacmarca, the peasant's son states that since 1954 his whole family has been enslaved to Don Ricardo who left them without food or clothing and sexually abused one of the daughters, who gave birth to a baby girl that the landlord refused to legally recognize as his own child.

11 These plots are Alfacancha: 0.89 hectares, Colcapa: 1.97 hectares, Ccasacca: 0.49 hectares and Nuchuccata: 1.28 hectares.

12 They are known as Pinco: 1.13 hectares and Uratambo: 0.67 hectares.
b-Post-Reform Household Land Tenure

The land that the community received after reform was divided into production zones and distributed among its membership for private use. Usufructory rights to such plots are treated by comungros virtually as private property since member families are entitled to permanent land use rights over communally owned subdivided parcels. These plots can be inherited, fallowed or exchanged within the community but cannot be alienated by sale or exchange to outsiders. In exchange for access to communal plots, land users are required to contribute labour (faenas) for the upkeep of communal property such as cleaning irrigation ditches, roofing the church and building schools, roads or bridges.

Change in the agrarian structure is evident in the distribution of holding patterns among Capacmarcanos. Due to the peasants' difficulty in drawing any sharp distinction between "ownership" and "land use" rights, I chose to focus on the "number of holdings" per household. Table 17 presents the results of our 1984 sample survey of 210 households (49 per cent of the population) dealing with the distribution pattern of landholdings. It shows that some 98 per cent of the residents or 206 households have access to land while only four families are landless. Table 17 also reveals that land tenure, nevertheless, remains unevenly distributed and highly fragmented.
Table 17: Ccapacmarca, Number of Plots Per Household Including Fallow, 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Plots*</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-4</th>
<th>5-8</th>
<th>9-12</th>
<th>13-16</th>
<th>17-20</th>
<th>21-24</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>31+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Households</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Households</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Field survey based on a sample of 210 of the approximate 430 Ccapacmarca households.

*The plots are "operational" rather than "owned" holdings since individual access to land is determined as much through community usufructuary rights as it is through ownership. Consequently, peasants seldom differentiate between these two types of tenure.

One way of detecting the extent of recent land redistribution is to reconstruct an approximation of the landholding pattern prior to reform by deducting the number of plots acquired through reform from the total number of plots each of the 210 families had access to in 1984. Table 18 reveals that a moderate decline in the concentration of holdings has occurred as a result of land reform measures.

A comparison between Table 17 and Table 18 estimates that, prior to reform, 6.5% or 14 households were landless as opposed to currently 1.8% of the households (Figure 13). It is then possible to suggest that these landless peasants are newcomers who, as non-members, were unable to benefit from post-reform communal land redistribution. Table 18 also shows that before adjudication, the majority of holders, that is 63% of the surveyed population, would have had access to less than eight plots each. At present, the average number of plots per household is between nine and sixteen representing 54% of all holders and the number of landlessness is relatively low (1.8%) indicating that a certain degree of tenurial upgrading has taken place (Figure 13).
Table 18: Capacmarca. Estimated Landholding Pattern Per Household Without Adjudicated Plots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Plots</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-4</th>
<th>5-8</th>
<th>9-12</th>
<th>13-16</th>
<th>17-20</th>
<th>21-24</th>
<th>25-30</th>
<th>31+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td># Households</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Households</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Questionnaire 4, 1984

Figure 13. Capacmarca,
Pre & Post-reform - Plots/Household
(Questionnaire 4, 1984)

An examination of Figure 13 and of the district's aerial photograph (Figure 9) indicates a large degree of tenurial fragmentation with as many as 20 or 30 tiny plots per family. This dispersion is due to internal as well as external processes. Traditionally, a scattered land tenure system with plots located at different altitudes and ecological levels
was tied to an Andean risk avoidance strategy against "acts of nature" and the uneven quality of the soil (Murra, 1975). Over the years, however, fragmentation considerably increased. Several internal as well as external factors could account for this change. For example, inheritance practices whereby siblings are entitled to a share in parental land encouraged subdivision as well as endogamy through the tendency to keep the plots within walking distance of each other (Dew, 1969). In Ccapacmarca, competition over plots in crucial crop ecozones (such as the maize zones) tends to favour commercial transaction and, thus, further fragmentation. According to my data, the buying and selling of land occur frequently. In 1984, some 28 per cent of the residents acquired parcels this way.

Although in a mountainous environment fragmentation can function as an important mechanism in agricultural risk reduction, authors such as Kay (1983:195) and Dew (op.cit) note that tenurial fragmentation in the Andes tends to prevent economies of scale and to seriously hamper production. In 1984, the average minifundio family controlled nine to 16 plots each within an average of 3.5 hectares. Reform measures did not improve this situation. Rather, the law was a major factor which furthered subdivision of holdings. For example, aymis and hacienda lands returned to the community were broken down into microholdings. Our survey indicates that 182 of the 210 households sampled (86%) received an average of six parcels per household (Questionnaire 4). Table 19 shows that these were typically very small varying between one sixth (one tirapier) to one third of an hectare (one topo) each.

The data presented in Table 19 suggest that only 7% of the sampled population have farm sizes that vary between 5 and 7.5 hectares; the remainder or 87% of the respondents have holdings below five hectares meanwhile, at the bottom of the scale, 1.8% remain landless. Thus, in 1984 some 71% of the population appear to be in the middle strata controlling on the average 3.5 hectares of land against the 1972 pre-reform census
indicating that Ccapacmarca \textit{minifundio} farms averaged 1.2 hectares. A process of horizontal expansion seems to have occurred: the number of landless households has decreased and average family tenure has more than doubled in size. Although unequal distribution of land persists, differences in number and size of holdings are less sharp.

Table 19: Ccapacmarca. Size of Landholdings, 1984 (in hectares)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Holding (has)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>1.5</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>4.5</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>5.5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>6.5</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>7.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% families</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 4.

*Note: Data on landholdings were collected in \textit{yuntas} and \textit{tirapies}.

Several factors seem to have led to Ccapacmarcaños' increased access to land: 1) the breaking up of land returned to the community, and 2) by the sales and other private deals in the land market which occurred in the district after the implementation of the land reform law. For example, before a ruling for confiscation was passed, the owner of \textit{Hacienda} Percaenca sold several plots to peasants and collected, as a result, 12 oxen. According to local peasants, it is the richer farmers with the greatest resources who took advantage of the situation by gaining access to the most coveted ecological zones.

On the whole, it appears that the land reform consolidated small and private holdings by raising the number and acreage that \textit{minifundistas} could have access to. To

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Yuntas} and \textit{tirapies} are local land measurements used in this part of southern Peru. One \textit{yunta} corresponds to one \textit{masa de toro} or the work that a team of draughting oxen performs within a day. It corresponds to 1/2 \textit{topo} or 1,650 square meters. One \textit{masa de tirapie} is the work performed daily by a team of two men and one woman digging the field with the foot plow. It is equal to 1/2 \textit{masa de toro} or 1/2 \textit{yunta}. Approximately, it represents 800 square meters.
further assess the impact of the reform, it is now necessary to examine whether the new policies contributed to increased household production.

B-Crop Production

As mentioned previously, the most commonly planted crops are maize and potatoes. These are essential subsistence crops providing the peasants with their daily food requirements. In 1984, 96 per cent of the landed households had corn fields under cultivation and 91 per cent potato plots. However, from the figures presented in Table 20, we see that there exists a wide disparity in individual household production. Low production tends to correspond to non-irrigated hillside cultivation where the soil is depleted and eroded. Given the unequal quality and distribution of land within ecozones it comes as no surprise that some households can perform better if they control land in the best production levels. Undoubtedly, control of strategically located plots represents a significant variable creating inequality in a community such as Ccapacmarca where landownership is a principal indicator of wealth.

Table 20: Ccapacmarca. Average Maize and Potato Production Per Household Unit in 1984

1-Maize Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity in Kg</th>
<th>-200</th>
<th>-300</th>
<th>-400</th>
<th>-500</th>
<th>-600</th>
<th>-700</th>
<th>-800</th>
<th>-900</th>
<th>-1000</th>
<th>-1200</th>
<th>+1500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average Kgs/Ha</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>387</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>638</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>877</td>
<td>958</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>1477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Households</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-Potato Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quantity in Kg</th>
<th>-200</th>
<th>-300</th>
<th>-400</th>
<th>-500</th>
<th>-600</th>
<th>-700</th>
<th>-800</th>
<th>-900</th>
<th>-1000</th>
<th>-1200</th>
<th>+1500</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average kg/Ha</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>634</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>829</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>1602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Households</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to my data, the average production per hectare is 720 kilos of maize and 400 kilos of potatoes. Although these figures are approximations based on recalled data, their general validity can be ascertained through comparison with Monje's study (op.cit:129-133) whose calculations (also based on recalled data) show that potato production averages 449 kilos per hectare and maize 775. My sample, larger than his, confirms his findings. Clearly, if compared with the 1972 official census shown in Table 21, data thus far presented indicate that the land reform has not improved smallholding productivity. Since tenurial reform, key crop production seems to have stagnated.

Table 21: Ccapacmarca, Maize and Potato Production in Kilos/Hectare, 1972 - 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1972: Census figures</th>
<th>1984: Fieldwork Figures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>620 Kg/Ha</td>
<td>400 Kg/Ha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn</td>
<td>750 Kg/Ha</td>
<td>720 Kg/Ha</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The 1972 data come from Anuario Estadístico, Ministerio de Agricultura, Cusco 1983
The 1984 data are derived from Questionnaire 4.

Production is primarily confined to household subsistence requirements. Potatoes are seldom sold or exchanged. Unlike corn, they can be farmed at any altitude thus their barter value is generally low. Corn is a highly valued exchange crop since its production is limited to lower, warmer zones with well-irrigated soil. Consequently, maize cultivation represents another indication of household differentiation since it requires the control of strategically located plots. Again, we see that not only the size and number of holdings, but also their ecozone location are, in Ccapacmarca, crucial indicators for social inequality.

Barter predominates as the main form of marketing transaction. This non-monetary form of exchange takes place primarily among households within the community. Also, it
functions as a means of acquiring imported goods from other regions such as meat, as well as "luxury" items like sugar, salt, coca or trago (sugar cane alcoholic beverage). Thus, any surplus serves to acquire foodstuffs not produced locally but obtained through puna traders (llameros) who come from the upper zones of Chumbivilcas. These traders leave their communities with chuño (frozen potato) meat and wool; then, they go to Santo Tomas to buy salt, sugar, aji (hot pepper), coca and cloths and barter them in the qhechuá zone (Capacmarca and Paruro) for corn, wheat and barley. Some llameros own up to one hundred pack animals, usually llamas, each capable of carrying two or three arrobas, or the equivalent of some 20 to 30 kilograms.

Table 22 shows that in 1984 Capacmarcaños were paying the equivalent of S/42,000.00 for one sheep that they would have bought in town for S/56,000.00. This exchange of agricultural produce for animals and their derivatives takes place usually between neighbouring communities, therefore, it is a form of trade whose workings are familiar to both parties. On the other hand, when barter involves bringing in products from the cities to the community, Capacmarcaños end up paying many times more for what they buy than what they receive for their export. An examination of Table 22 indicates that peasants pay the equivalent of S/21,000.00 for one arroba of salt sold in town for S/2,200.00, the same for sugar (S/21,000.00) that in the city would cost S/4,500.00. A similar situation develops when peasants need to buy rice, coca or trago.
Table 22: Barter Rate for Maize 1984

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Goods</th>
<th>Quantity of goods</th>
<th>Quantity of Maize</th>
<th>Prices in Sícuani (in Soles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 sheep</td>
<td>20 kgs</td>
<td>2 arrobas</td>
<td>1 sheep = 56,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt:</td>
<td>1 arroba</td>
<td>1 arroba</td>
<td>1 arroba salt = 2,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar:</td>
<td>1 arroba</td>
<td>2 arrobas</td>
<td>1 arroba sugar = 9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice:</td>
<td>1 arroba</td>
<td>2 arrobas</td>
<td>1 arroba rice = 6,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca:</td>
<td>1 arroba</td>
<td>22 arrobas</td>
<td>1 arroba coca = 26,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 lata de trago</td>
<td>4 liters</td>
<td>2 arrobas</td>
<td>1 lata = 2,400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interview 2 and 6 (Appendix 2)

*In early 1984, one arroba of maize was priced in Sícuani at S/21.000.00.

This brief examination of maize barter demonstrates that the prevalence of a traditional form of exchange does not necessarily mean that it is fairer to small producers. On the contrary, it shows that this exchange practice disguises exploitative economic relations characteristic of a system of land tenure based on minifundismo. That is, the large number of small peasants in this isolated region leads to an "atomised" market situation. Foweraker (1981:73-72) describes this process whereby the minifundista lacks the means to transport his own produce and the knowledge of market prices. He depends upon richer neighbours, intermediaries or truckers and the smaller the farms the lower prices are. Thus, the author adds: "Inevitably with so many suppliers and relatively few buyers the marketing structure which evolves is highly oligopsonistic and exploitative" (ibid:74). As Shoemaker (1981:204) points out, in the Andes producers are poor because they do not control the marketing system. For example, in 1979 one kilo of potatoes bought for S/18.00 in a Chumbivilcan community would be sold in Arequipa for S/35.00 (Centre International de Coopération pour le Développement Agricole, 1982:50). Similarly, wheat purchased for S/12.00 from the small producer cost S/30.00 in Santo Tomas. In minifundio areas monopolistic pricing and marketing structures regulate not only the conditions of peasant exchange but of production as well. A further deterioration of the Capacmarcaña...
household economy comes from its lack of control over production and exchange. Larger society dictates that peasants produce maize or wheat because these crops are in high demand in the _sierra_. Producers, however, receive little in return due to the exploitative nature of exchange relations in the region. Increasingly, observers such as Shoemaker (op.cit) suggest that exchange relations rather than production or land-tenure relations are, in fact, at the core of peasant exploitation. Petras follows a similar line of reasoning when he states: "The shift toward non-landowning forms of economic activity to exploit the agrarian sector is one of the characteristic features accompanying the transformation of agriculture" (1981:31).

C- Livestock Production

Traditionally, Ccapamarcaños have regarded ownership of farm animals as an asset of great importance for their economy. Moreover, as Skar (1981: 68) points out recently the government has encouraged meat production in order to cut down on beef import. Increasingly, herding is occupying a prevalent position in peasant economy throughout the _sierra_. In Ccapamarca, animals can be raised in the _puna_ where land is generally more suitable for long term pasture use than for intensive cropping. The most important herds are of sheep and cattle. Although these animals are poorly adapted to the environment suffering from altitude stress and nutrition deficiency, they are raised because of their value on the internal market where the demand for beef on the coast has been growing in response to urban population increases (Browman, 1987)\(^\text{14}\). Animals are sold at weekly fairs taking place in Colquemarca, Mara and Accha.

Stock composition varies somewhat from family to family but concentrates in sheep and beef cattle. Table 23 shows that some 63 per cent of the sampled households raise at

\(^{14}\) Camelids such as alpacas and llamas are best fitted to the environment. However, they are not bred in Ccapamarca because their meat has little value in the national market.
at least a few head of cattle while 51 per cent have sheep. Only two of the 210 families had large herds of 50 to 150 head. Although bred by only half of the households, sheep remain the most numerous herd animals in the district of Ccapacmarca - the reason being that mutton is readily marketable in the region. In addition, we find some 30 per cent of the domestic units have one or two pigs and 12 per cent raise goats. Only one household raises llama (10 altogether). On the other hand, 52 units representing 24 per cent of the surveyed population had no herds.

Data on the number of plots per category of livestock ownership presented in Table 23 testify to the fact that households with herds own more than the average number of six plots each. There exists a positive correlation between livestock ownership and holding size. One wealthy household, however, possessing the largest number of sheep (150 head) as well as a large herd of cattle (24 animals) only owned nine plots - a figure only slightly above average. This could mean either that its main source of wealth lies solely in livestock raising or that the plots it possesses are located in the most fertile zones of the community or both. Meanwhile, the largest cattle owning household counts 34 head and also owns 24 plots. In this case, relative prosperity clearly comes from both land and livestock.

**Table 23: Ccapacmarca, Sheep and Cattle Production by Number of Holdings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1-Size of the Sheep Herd</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
<th>40-50</th>
<th>60-70</th>
<th>150</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#Households</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Households</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Holdings/Unit</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2-Size of Cattle Herd</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16-20</th>
<th>21-25</th>
<th>26-30</th>
<th>31-35</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>#Households</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%Households</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#Holdings/Hld</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 4
Since reform, herd production has fallen drastically. Table 24, taken from the official agro-pastoral pre- and post-reform censuses, gives a reasonable idea of the magnitude of the change - a 50 per cent drop from 1972 to 1980. It appears that for the majority of the households, herding in its contemporary form cannot bring capital accumulation, but is only a means for protecting the reproduction of the household.

Table 24: Pre and Post Reform Livestock Production in the District of Capacmarca

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Animals</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1980</th>
<th>% Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>56,279</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>4,169</td>
<td>2,015</td>
<td>-51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>+24%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas 1972 and 1980

Numerous constraints can affect the development of adequate stock production: lack of peasant managerial capacity, shortage of capital and/or bad weather conditions. Another likely cause is that before haciendas could be expropriated, local hacendados sold off their animals - a decapitalization that would have a long term impact on local herds. Moreover, the recent increase in the number of household holdings has led to more intensive cropping. Andean farming, particularly potato cultivation, is extremely labour intensive. Thus, the more fields there are under cultivation, the more family labour resources are withdrawn from herding. To some degree, this situation has been exacerbated by the expansion of rural education. Traditionally, children have been in charge of grazing herds in the high plateau but, since school attendance has become compulsory, some households have suffered from further labour shortage. Finally, animal stock theft has played a crucial role.
in preventing successful pastoralism. This resurgence of rustling activities is accountable for
great animal losses and seems linked to the hacendados' counter-reaction to land reform.

4-Elite's Counter-Offensives

a-Rustling

As mentioned above, livestock raising is increasingly difficult because of rampant
rustling. Rustling or abigeato has become such a major obstacle that smallholders are
gradually forced to remain in crop farming.

Rustling has traditionally been endemic in this remote region where bandits can
easily prey on herds, loot households and get away with it by using their intimate
knowledge of the rugged terrain. The high incidence of this type of brigandage has
emanated from both peasants and local landlords. In the district of Ccapacmarca, the main
centers of rustling are the elevated, scarcely populated and notoriously unsafe pampas
between Ccapacmarca and Colquemarca. In these high plateaus, lonely shepherds,
travellers as well as whole families are vulnerable. Local peasants are afraid since abigeos
constantly threaten, ambush and kill animal owners and nothing is done to protect them. In
an effort to defend themselves against terror and brutal violence, Colquemarca peasants
created in 1985 a ronda or vigilante committee to patrol the region. However, in
Ccapacmarca, campesinos have yet to become organized.

Several reasons can be discerned for this recent increase in rustling, in particular,
agricultural crisis and black market opportunity in meat sales. Illegal meat markets

15 Social banditry as a concept was developed in the writing of the British historian Eric
Hobsbawm (1959). According to him, it takes place in societies where capitalism is at an
early stage of development. A lack of state hegemony allows bandits to operate in response
to unjust landlordism and major social upheavals. Following Hobsbawm's line of thought,
Orlove (1980:195-211) interprets rustling as a form of social banditry in regions of extreme
domination by a resident elite.
developed as a response to the government's attempts at restricting meat sales on the coast - a policy implemented to improve the quality of beef and mutton production. Increasingly, however, it appears that rustling is linked to the ways in which rural elites assert themselves against state interference in local affairs.

Actual events taking place in the region highlight a situation in which hacendados, teachers and even local authorities such as the guardia civil (rural police created in 1922) all participate actively in the capture of peasant animals. A report concluding a forum held at the Agrarian League of Santo Tomas in 1985 says:

Ex-landlords socially and economically affected by the reform are the 'intellectual' authors of rustling. Their activity is directly supported and protected by official institutions. Rustling has considerably increased over recent years and is frequently carried out in the high zones where no state protection exists. Attackers use firearms. Puna communities are most vulnerable to this type of crime which often leads to losses in human life. However, these settlements have no recourse as authorities refuse to put an end to this serious problem (FORUM, 1985, 19).

My own fieldwork in Ccãpacmarca confirms the complicity of landlords, teachers and police officers in livestock thefts as my assistant and I were present at several of their drinking parties in the village where together they would openly and proudly discuss their deeds. The important door which enabled me to understand rustling was my assistant who was an accepted member because of his Chumbivilcano background and his school teaching position.

One individual, at the centre of rustling, was Cabo Oreste - the community sergeant. He belonged to one of the most powerful gamonal families of Colquemarca and was, himself, the compadre of a famous landlord/rustler, a close friend of the school director and the compadre of several teachers. With the help of his strongmen he devoted

16 For example, Browman (1987: 134) mentions that in Cusco the black market handles more mutton than the official sector and the illegal sheep market in Arequipa is larger than the legal sector.
most of his time to rustling and had made it, for the last twenty years, one of his sources of livelihood and most lucrative activities. Once stolen, the animals were then branded with the mark of the rural police force and sold in Arequipa - a fact that peasants were aware of but could not do anything about.

Throughout the region, organized gangs of rustlers have decisively maintained a prevailing climate of violence. Contrabanding gamonales contest reform measures through intimidating local peasants and also defying the national political system. In the eyes of these hacendados, rustling is a recompense for the expropriation of their land and for the difficulties they now have to face (Poole, 1987). Hacendados resort to this criminal form of appropriation in order to retain power that they perceive as declining. Poole (ibid: 277) says that hacendados told her that in the past (prior to reform) their riches were so abundant that it was necessary to sun their numerous silver trunks in order to preserve the wealth. After reform, they had to bury their fortune in order to protect it from state officials and merchants - the two traditional enemies of Chumbivilcan hacendados. Once buried, silver rotted and wasted away. Like the empty punas, wealth needs the sun in order to prosper. Mestizo landlords attribute their wealth deterioration to the state regarded as responsible for the poverty afflicting the province since the land reform. Gamonales claim they have no other recourse but to use abigeato to make up for the loss of economic vitality they have experienced. Rustling for landlords has become the reassertion of a sense of personal honour - a support for regional power based on bossism.

Thus, the nature of rural criminality changes over time. Whereas back in the past rustling appeared to be a form of peasant resistance against gamonal oppression (Orlove, 1980), nowadays the gamonal's animal theft becomes an act of protest against state reformism and the expanding smallholder sector. Further, rustling offers an avenue for arresting downward mobility among a landed class on the decline. Not only does it reinforce their political power through close bonds with local officials but also it improves
their economic position. At the local level, however, rustling asserts a regional identity
associated with a traditionalist, anti-"progress" ideology which finds expression in the
q’orilazo culture. As discussed previously, q’orilazo is a social construct referring to a
unique Chumbivilcan identity. The past is glorified through the Chuchu - a harsh and
wandering character molded by the cold and tough puna (Poole, 1987: 276). He is a
strongly individualistic cattle thief who takes up arms to defend himself and despises any
state interference in his personal affairs. Given this idealisation of the Chuchu, rustling
(abigeato) earns respect as an activity that symbolizes the daring reality of herding as
regarded in folk culture. The atrocities it engenders are glossed over while the courage and
fear it generates are admired. By association with the traditional practices of q’orilazo and
despite the harm it inflicts to the peasantry, rustling represents an idealized portrayal and a
powerful cultural symbol of local identity still holding considerable appeal. As Poole
(1988:3) states 'rustling is a cultural practice most characteristic of the Chumbivilcan ethos
of "rebellion", freedom from state intervention, and manly adventure'. While it gained
popularity among rural people at a time when the abigeato was viewed as the avenger and
champion against oppressive authority to the peasantry now this is reversed. Rustling has
been taken up primarily by the landed class and peasant organizations call for government
intervention to stop it.

Increasingly, thus, rustling becomes a major counter-reform instrument by
providing local patrones with a new way for recovering lost income. Threatened but not
dislodged, landlords found in abigeato a cultural idiom that they could manipulate to
rebuild their wealth. In terms of peasant differentiation, animal theft prevents small
landholders from becoming competitive by discouraging peasants from investing in
herding. Those who are its prime targets are the somewhat richer peasants whose main
source of accumulation is in pastoralism. As a result of rustling, a transfer of value takes
place with an appropriation of capital from higher income farmers to the coastal sector.
Animal theft siphons off the surplus of small producers for the urban meat market of Arequipa and Lima. This illicit activity adds to the rapid decapitalization of rural economy and ranks high among the problem faced by the Chumbivilcan peasantry - greater poverty.

Ccapacmarcaños are marginalized; they lack sufficient land to reproduce themselves through farm cropping and are prevented by the local elite from accumulating in herding. Rustling not only deprives peasants of their animals but also exploits their labour. Viewed from the capitalist’s vantage point, rustling is profitable. It brings food to the industrial sector without having to pay for the cost of raising the herds. Thus, capital obtains surplus value from unpaid peasant labour. Meanwhile, the immiserated peasantry is forced to remain on the land because, as we will see, this rural labour force is unable to be fully integrated into the industrial sector.

b-Outside Employment: An Unpromising Economic Alternative

Labour market participation is rising as a result of low agricultural output, rustling and rampant inflation. Institutional credit does not exist for Ccapacmarcaños and money can only be borrowed from local usurers. The case of Don Ricardo, a powerful gamonal also the ex-mayor of Ccapacmarca and its only storekeeper, well illustrates this point. In his store, Don Ricardo charges a day of work in his chacra for any empty glass bottle that peasants need to buy for their alcohol beverage. His lending rate of 240 per cent annually traps indebted peasants in a system of perpetual bondage and effective forced labour.

The only alternative to poverty and debt-bondage is wage labour. Migration is usually seasonal. Monje (1985:178) mentions that, in 1982, 46.5 per cent of the 70 households he sampled had male members migrating temporarily (81% are the male head of the household; 19% are male offspring). To date, almost no women participate in seasonal employment outside the community. This may be due to the fact that women stay on the land while their husbands temporarily enter the wage labour force to supplement income.
Table 25 indicates that employment in the agricultural sector predominates. In 1982, a large percentage of the seasonal workers (49%) went to Quillacamba where coffee plantations are located, and another twenty per cent worked in the potato fields of Colquemarca. Twenty four per cent went to the mines of Maldonado and twenty three per cent to Cusco.

Table 25: Composition of Seasonal Migration in Colquemarca, 1982-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage of Household Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Colquemarca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quillacamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cusco</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maldonado</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Elaborated from Monje (1985:178)

Following reform, Colquemarca became a dynamic potato growing centre creating employment for many landpoor peasants residing in nearby communities. Until the 1970s, Colquemarca imported potatoes for its own consumption, but after reform the district began to specialize in the production of this root crop for the market of Arequipa. Under the auspices of a government program, a local ex-hacienda, la Perla, was transformed into an experimental farm receiving considerable lines of credit from the Banco Agrario del Peru. Loans were distributed to 903 recipients and 1,715 hectares of land were brought under

17 During the same period, other loan beneficiaries included 14 families engaged in wheat production (49 hectares), four families for the cultivation of 25 hectares of barley and five families cultivating four hectares of corn.
potato cultivation (Saico Armendariz, 1982)18. In 1978, La Perla produced a potato surplus of more than 5,000 million tons or 700 truck loads. However, due to a lack of adequate funding productivity has since declined by 2.5 million tons. Today, Colquemarca is no longer able to provide the prospect of an income for local farmers. With this option blocked and without the means to migrate elsewhere, poor peasants have to cope as best they can within their native community. Ccapacmarcaños constitute part of the "stagnant" rural labour force which holds a precarious position in declining branches of production and thus has to maintain subsistence farming for survival.

c-Education and Gamonalismo

Ccapacmarcaños regard children's education and Spanish fluency as a crucial vehicle for upward mobility and a secure means of breaking away from the drudgery of rural life. Education in Peru, as in many other Latin American countries, is highly valued because it gives access to the skilled labour market (Caballero, 1984:24). The spread of formal schooling to rural areas, considered by President Velasco government as part of the task of nation-building, was one of the most important corollaries of the land reform. The new education law was promulgated in 1972. Its implementation resulted in the establishment of numerous rural schoolhouses; the district of Ccapacmarca now counts six nucleos or school centres.

During the 1970s, a powerful new teachers' union SUTEP (National Teachers' Union) organized under a Maoist leadership was instrumental in expanding the political base of the left in the countryside by adopting an increasingly combative stance toward the rural social order. SUTEP activism became particularly important in Vellile, Chumbivilcas in the late 1970s during a long union strike which ended with the arrest of several leaders.

18 Saico Armendariz (1982: 43-45), points out that the loans were primarily given to non peasants such as hacendados, local traders storekeepers and outsiders.
The expansion of state education, concomitant with the penetration of the left, presented a double threat to a rural oligarchy already losing access to crucial resources such as land and peasant labour. Today, in an attempt to retain some control at the local level and to prevent the spread of outside political influence, members of the landed class increasingly occupy the available teaching positions which have become important as source of power. In recent years, schoolteachers of *gamonal* origin - sons and daughters of *hacendados* - have eagerly joined and now dominate the educational system. If they are not *patrones* themselves, they are strictly *patrón*-oriented.

Two schools are now operating in the center of the *pueblo* - a primary school with five teachers and a secondary school with two teachers\(^\text{19}\). In 1984, five out of the seven teachers came from the ranks of the local landholding elite. The most prominent propertied *misti* and well known rustler of Ccapacmarca, Don Ricardo, has two of his children teaching in the community. His son, Angel, is not only a teacher but also the mayor of the *pueblo* and, thus, controls municipal politics as well\(^\text{20}\). Teachers who are not themselves from *hacendado* background, are closely linked to traditional power either by marriage or fictive kinship. One schoolteacher couple whose wife is from an eminent local landed family chose as *compadres* the director of the *nucleo escolar* (school district) and Oreste, the *cabo* of Ccapacmarca, himself of *gamonal* extraction. Nepotism and patronage dominate the educational system to the point of dictating community politics.

\(^{19}\) In Ccapacmarca, I gained access to the school system by accepting a voluntary part-time position as an English teacher at the secondary school with the understanding that I would be conducting research in the village. This job allowed me to observe day-to-day teacher behaviour through collective situations such as 'social breaks' and their mid-day soccer games. Though the teachers knew that I was an anthropologist, they usually paid little attention to my work which greatly facilitated my observation.

\(^{20}\) Apparently, in 1985, Angel was involved in buying animals for himself with municipal funds. My assistant, then working in the community, provided me with the information.
Supervision of the staff is neglected. Official visits supposedly taking place every three months have been scheduled three years apart in Ccapacmarca. The last one took place in 1985. During their two day meeting in the community, officials worked no more than four hours checking out attendance and course matriculation. Then, they were wined and dined each day by the local elite from three in the afternoon to five the next morning.

On top of this, teachers themselves lack expertise in their field; they have inadequate training, poor professional skills and low formal schooling (in Ccapacmarca, five out of the seven schoolteachers in the central school had only grade 5 education). To teach "indios" as they say, one only needs the right connection. Further, they show little commitment to their task. From my observation, none have regular work schedules. They seldom teach more than three hours a day and often never show up. My findings of a two month survey of the daily work load of elementary school teachers confirmed that none worked even half of the required four weeks a month. They usually spend most of their spare time drinking (Table 26).

Table 26: A Two Month Survey of Teachers' Work Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>First Month (# of Days)</th>
<th>Second Month (# of Days)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Work</td>
<td>Travel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head Master</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clara (Willy's wife)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juan</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrea</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serafino</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fieldwork data

Peasant education is floundering at the hand of barely literate, corrupt and often drunk teachers who more often than not miss the classes they are supposed to teach. Not
surprisingly, parents fail to see the point of sending their children to school. According to
Monje (1985:37), in 1982 some 86 per cent of the female population were still illiterate and
46 per cent of the men. Of 54 per cent of the males who usually attend school no more than
6 per cent reach the end of secondary school. This figure represents only three per cent of
the total male population.

Abuse is endemic and part of the day-to-day school life. The majority of the
teachers are involved in graft, theft and corruption which continuously drains on the
comuneros 21. Various forms of extortion are employed as mechanisms of domination.
Public funds are misused. For example, in 1983, the Ministry of Education provided funds
to complete the construction of the high school but the director (also an abigeo) used the
money for installing water taps in the pueblo near his home. This led to the closing of the
secondary school in 1985. Also, goods intended for the children are forestalled by teachers
for their own use22. Even worse, students are often used as domestics or carriers. This
practice found the most tragic expression in a particular incident taking place in September
1983. The following is a summary of the account as it was described to my assistant who
was part of the group going to Cusco.

Three teachers' including Clara, her husband and their five year old daughter were
going to Cusco through Accha with one of their colleagues. Accha is a village located some
ten walking hours from the community. The journey involves a long and arduous trek
across the altiplano. A ten year old pupil - the child of Ccapacmarcaño peasants -
accompanied them as he was going to sell his chickens at the weekly market in Accha.
Shortly after leaving the community, the youngster was told to carry on his back the

21 Teachers constantly ask contributions from the peasants mainly in the form of work and
presents such as food, agricultural produce and animals.

22 I found a fifty kilo sugar bag sent by the United States for students' breakfast being
stored at a teacher's home for his own use.
teachers' daughter. On the way, he complained repeatedly of extreme tiredness. Finally, he fell from exhaustion, lost his chickens and was left behind. A student from Ccapacmarca found him and took him on his horse to Accha. Upon arrival, the youngster was in a state of shock: high fever, sweat and exhaustion. While the teachers continued their route to Cusco, the child was left at the police station. That night, the policeman on duty went drinking with village friends. When he came back to the station at 3 a.m., the child had died. Oreste, the powerful cabo of Ccapacmarca, siding with his compadres - the teachers- sent a note to the police in Accha asking them to state on the death certificate that the child had died of pneumonia. In Ccapacmarca, the following week, during the general assembly, the comuneros publicly accused the teachers of constantly exploiting their students and of benefitting unfairly from their unpaid labour. The case was settled with Willy, the teacher, paying S/150,000.00 (US $100.00) to the youngster's father.

Rural schools are gradually becoming the bastion of the local landed gentry. It keeps SUTEP activism out of the region and prevents peasants from acquiring basic education and language skill in Spanish. Drysdale's and Meyers's comments on the situation in the Andes is as valid now as it was in the 1960s:

Failure to acquire competence in Spanish in the schools, at least to the level of literacy, not only eliminated rural Indians from competing effectively for economic rewards in the evermore-prominent "modernized" sectors, but also influence their view of their cultural identity and hampered political participation, making national integration virtually impossible (1975: 274).

If the role of education in Ccapacmarca is to be interpreted in social terms, what is happening in the classroom - paternalism and abusive behaviour - is indicative of what is taking place outside the school within the community where a landed class and its allies still dominate. Education can potentially contribute to local patterns of peasant differentiation by encouraging motivated students to attain better paid jobs that would take them outside their
social realm. However, schooling as practiced in Ccapacmarca acts as a mechanism limiting
differentiation by preventing peasant children from expanding their knowledge.

By not dislodging the landed class from the region, the reform allowed these people
to gain hold of new and more modern avenues of power - one being rural schooling. This
way, the resident élite found another solid foothold over local affairs by using both their
own resources and those obtained via their official positions within government
institutions. Also, it has enabled them to gain an undisputed control over peasant thinking
by imposing their own views on what society ought to be. Here it is appropriate to refer to
the concept of "cultural capital" developed by the New Sociology of Education. Control
over the cultural capital by a dominant group is crucial in the creation and perpetuation of
inequalities:

the reproduction and legitimation of a social order go on in
other than economic ways... Rather, it assumes knowledge
of the way in which both the form and content of the
"legitimate" culture, which is also partly reproduced in
schools, act as instruments of power and as agents in the
legitimation of power in society... one must analyze the
workings of cultural capital in much the same way as one
would analyze the development of the ways schools can
serve the interests of economic capital' (Apple, 1978:497).

In Ccapacmarca, schools have become environments where the persistence of
prejudiced attitudes reminiscent of a feudal mentality are perpetuated and legitimimized. This
way, the cultural values and codes of conduct of the gamonal class are effectively
preserved and reproduced to support the dominant group at the expense of the local
peasantry. The control of education has been an ideologically persuasive means of
promoting and of perpetuating the symbolic and social order of pre-reform Ccapacmarca.

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23 Apple (1978) defines cultural capital as the sum of meanings, language forms, and tastes
that directly or indirectly are regarded by dominant classes as socially legitimate. This
concept was coined by Bourdieu and Passeron, (1970:21-2).
Whereas the landed class was on the defensive for a few years after reform, at present, they have regained their confidence and still remain as key figures in the economic and political operation of Capacmarca's rural life. To block the effects of the reform, they are using counter-reform strategies that have enhanced their local power and prevented peasant socio-economic mobility. That is, through rustling they can effectively deprive the peasantry of the opportunity to acquire viable herds and, thus, to accumulate some capital. Through the control of schooling, they prevent the literacy campaign from reaching local communities. Their strength persists because the reform program allowed this class to maintain and also develop new economic alternatives reinforcing their political power and, at the same time, retarding change in the status quo.

5-Summary

To conclude, I would like to make a few observations on the emerging agrarian structure of post-reform Capacmarca. Broadly speaking, the community now exhibits four types of social categories, namely 1) a small landless peasantry; 2) a large number of small minifundistas; 3) a limited number of richer comuneros and finally 4) an indigenous gamonal or landowning class.

The landless peasantry encompasses less than two per cent of the sample and seems to be composed of newcomers from neighbouring communities who, as non-community members, could not benefit from communal land redistribution. This group has to subsist by hiring-out their labour within Capacmarca at times of peak agricultural activities and outside the community through seasonal labour. Further, they likely find themselves compelled to draw upon loans based on onerous payment terms and may often be indebted to local money lenders.

Small minifundistas, in some instances, controlling up to 16 plots per household, own a few head of cattle and sheep and operate their farm on a family basis planting
potatoes and maize for subsistence requirements. However, because they can barely produce enough for their basic needs, these families have usually to resort to wage labour outside the region on a seasonal basis.

Richer peasants possessing up to 30 plots per family, grow maize in quantities over and above consumption requirements and raise sheep and cattle for a local and coastal market. This group, usually more prosperous, relies on the system of exchange of labour (mainly minka) and hires local labour paid in kind. Their holdings are often concentrated in ecozones of better soil quality and irrigation facilities where the high valued maize can be produced. However, in no way can this group be considered a capitalist class of farmers in formation as they are not entrepreneurial due to the impossibility of economies of scale: poor local environmental conditions, lack of infrastructure and capital and, with regard to herding, rustling activities.

Finally, above the peasantry we find the gamonal class whose power since reform has been enhanced and is of a more complex nature. Not only are they landlords, rustlers, teachers but, as well, they act as local shopkeepers, merchants and moneylenders. As such, they continue to subject the comuneros to the most pervasive exploitation inherent in the pre-reform social system.

To summarize, we see that the reform has allowed the continuing influence of gamonalismo, slowing down, in this way, the process of peasant proletarianization and peasant accumulation. Gamonales' counter-reform strategies have permitted the maintenance of pre-reform social relations based on exploitation and marginalization of the peasantry.
CHAPTER 6

Livestock Collectives as Agri-business: The Case of Marangani

In the highlands, livestock cooperatives (SAIS) established through the agrarian reform have played an important role within regions strongly linked to the export of primary commodities. Marangani is a particularly interesting case in that, under reform, it received government priority because of its leading role in the international wool trade. This chapter examines the impact of agri-business expansion under state initiative on local peasant economy and stresses the need for analyzing the social relations of commodity production and labour exploitation for understanding the kind of land reform being sponsored.

1-General Setting of Marangani

The boundaries of the district of Marangani are enclosed by Sicuani in the north; Langui and Layo in the west; the province of Melgar (Puno) in the south and that of Carabaya (Puno) in the east. (see Figure 3, Chapter 3). It encompasses 104,287.50 hectares at elevations of between 3,600 and 5,100 meters, a large portion of which is covered with pasture grass. Ecologically, it belongs to the "extended type" of verticality - a system particularly characteristic of the Vilcanota Valley in which Marangani is located. The gradient is less steep than the "compressed type" found in Ccapacmarca and the population is "more evenly spread throughout the valley". Brush explains that in the Vilcanota Valley of roughly 300 kilometers long from its source in the puna at 4,300 meters to the selva at 1,000 meters, settlements located at various altitudes differ in their economic orientation and can, thus, exchange products between the different zones (Brush, 1977:13-4). In 1972, of a total population of some 10,155 inhabitants, roughly 9,530 were smallholders (minifundistas) organized predominantly into peasant communities.
Marangani - the capital of the district since 1859 - sits on the fertile and densely populated flatland of the southern portion of the Vilcanota Valley at 3,681 meters (see Figure 14). Access to the area is straightforward. Both a major highway and the Southern Peruvian Railway connect Marangani to Cusco, Puno and Arequipa. Chapter 3 showed that such improved means of communication had a major impact on integrating this southern district within the wool export and expanding latifundism during the late nineteenth century.

The textile factory of Ch'ectuyoc created in 1899 lies on the route between Sicuani and Marangani some three kilometers before the latter. The imposing Mejía stone house - a vestige of the owners' former grandeur - dominates the site. Since reform, the building has been transformed into offices for the factory. The town of Marangani, laid out on a grid pattern, is gathered around a typical central "plaza de armas" dominated by the church built during the colonial era. The church contains some twenty paintings from the Cusqueña School with one of these paintings representing the wedding of the Inca princess Beatriz with Martin García de Loyola nephew of Saint Ignacio de Loyola. It was also on this plaza that María Jerusalem, the female cacique of Lurucachi (currently community of Llallahui) was hung on the gallows for having rebelled against the tributary system of the Spanish crown. Her death occurred only four years before the 1780 Tupac Amaru uprising which profoundly shook the entire country. At the center of the plaza, Enrique Mejía's bust faces the church on one side and the municipal building on the other. Adjacent to the municipality stands the police station. On the outskirts of town, down the major street, we find the headquarters of SAIS Marangani.

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1 Enrique Mejía was from Arequipa and married the only daughter of one of the richest local haciendas. The Mejía enterprises in Marangani included not only the factory but a number of important haciendas and an hydroelectric plant. After the death of Mejía's son in 1967, the factory was sold to a group of Spanish and Swiss investors (Orlove, 1977:97-102).
Figure 14. Southern Vilcanota Valley Settlements

- Quillabamba
- Vilcanota River
- Cusco (3382 m.)
- Calca
- Urcos
- Sicuani (3531 m.)
- Marangani (3650 m.)
- Llallahui
- La Raya (4314 m.)
Starting in the nineteenth century, the alpaca wool boom transformed Marangani into one of the most dynamic wool producing areas of Cusco. Up until the early 1960s, the export sector clearly dominated the economy of the district. Local haciendas specializing in alpaca production owned roughly 76 per cent of the overall district herds and covered over half of the total farming lands (57,460 hectares out of the total 104,270 hectares of the district). Dominated by Arequipa's international trading houses, which until 1966 received 95 per cent of Marangani's wool production, these estates became incorporated into large commercial firms: Haciendas Tanihua and Choqueccota combined to form Santa María Salome, a firm under the control of Pablo Mejía, son of Enrique the founder of the textile mill. In 1948, the Sociedad Ganadera Marangani, also under the Mejía family, brought together two Haciendas: Quenamary and Toxacota. While controlling the export market, these large estates did not contribute substantially to domestic meat production. Table 27 indicates that, prior to reform, 93 per cent of beef and 97 per cent of mutton production came from middle and small landholders (Aguillar Callo, 1973:66).

Table 27: Marangani's Livestock Production Prior to Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Property</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>#</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haciendas</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonos</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minifundistas</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aguillar Callo, 1973:66

In the 1960s the devaluation of the sol and the development of synthetic textile fibres in concert with labour and peasant unrest threatened the wool trade. Furthermore, the announcement of land reform policies, first under President Belaunde in 1964 and then
under President Velasco in 1969, led to a decline in ranching investment within the district.2

Before the passing of the 1969 reform law, the rural elite undertook a counter-reform campaign to stall expropriation and, in some instances, parcelizing their estates by selling to richer comuneros or former hacienda overseers.3 As a result of fragmentation, several medium estates developed within the boundaries of some communities. Other landlords massively decapitalized their ranches by butchering their herds and removing tools and equipment. For example, Quenamari considerably decreased its stock of alpacas from 6,000 head to roughly 600 by the time of expropriation. In this estate, as in Toxaccota, electric generators and radio transmitters also disappeared. Such decapitalization, confirmed by data presented in Table 28, considerably weakened the economic basis of the newly created SAIS which was forced to start with little capital, no equipment and small herds.

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2 There was a long and costly strike at the Mejía textile factory in 1959 causing many workers to lose their jobs. In Marangani, Hacienda Uyucani owned by an Arequipeño was occupied by the peasants of the community of Quisini.

3 Such was the case of two puna haciendas: Quecra and Tanihua whose owners now live in Lima.
Table 28: Marangani Decapitalization of Four Livestock Haciendas Prior to Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Haciendas</th>
<th>1965 Sheep</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
<th>1972 Sheep</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
<th>1973 Sheep</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanihua</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quecra</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyuccani</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>2,166</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>1,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuabamba</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>303</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Documentos de afectación y adjudicación de haciendas del archivo agrario XI zona agraria, Cusco (Cited in Quispitupas Salinas, 1981:85).

Landowners also sought to avoid expropriation via a clause in the law (Article 31) permitting exemption from expropriation upon a demonstration of the profitability of their operation. Some built new roads with unpaid peasant labour linking major haciendas as were the cases of Choqueccota, Taxoccota and Chillihuas; others created animal disinfection baths as in Toxoccota; or installed electricity (Quenamari and Toxacccota). In other instances, owners declared their estates as "Family Livestock Production Units" which could range anywhere in size from 300 to 1,200 hectares. Properties smaller than 200 hectares would be subdivided into units below the maximum retainable size of 45 hectares.

2-Creation of SAIS Marangani

Though promulgated in 1969, the land reform law reached Marangani in 1973. The SAIS was formed by bringing together forty three adjoining haciendas (see Table 29 and Appendix 1). Expropriated estates varied in size. In the altiplano, their area were from 214 to 12,700 hectares and, in the valley, from 12 to 47 hectares. Table 29 shows that the creation of the SAIS was conducted in five phases occurring between 1973 and 1977 with the majority of the properties being taken during the first part of the process. The SAIS

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4 See Appendix 1 for a detailed list of adjudicated properties.
received its official ownership title in December 1982. Table 29 also indicates the sum that
the enterprise now owes the government for the costs of *hacienda* lands as well as the
purchase of *hacienda* livestock and equipment.

### Table 29: Land Expropriation in the District of Marangani

**a-Land**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Order Number</th>
<th>Hectares:</th>
<th>Total Value of Mortgages:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1, 1973</td>
<td>2049-73</td>
<td>27,171.61</td>
<td>S/ 2,787,504.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2, 1973</td>
<td>3795-73</td>
<td>7,297.33</td>
<td>S/ 1,187,884.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3, 1975</td>
<td>1731-75</td>
<td>8,225.52</td>
<td>S/ 1,433,606.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 4, 1977</td>
<td>0080-77</td>
<td>4,296.38</td>
<td>S/ 1,740,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 5, 1977</td>
<td>1543-77</td>
<td>2,131.46</td>
<td>S/ 1,417,562.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>49,122.50</td>
<td>S/ 10,186,498.95</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**b-Other Expropriated Resources (Cattle, Installations, Equipment)**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Buildings and Equipment:</td>
<td>S/ 437,924.69</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantations:</td>
<td>S/ 88,474.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herds:</td>
<td>S/ 13,702,677.04</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal:</strong></td>
<td>S/ 14,229,075.88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>S/ 24,415,574.83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani.

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5 Figures are inconsistent. The archives show S/36,813,495 while Vega's (1986) report from the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani reads 10,186,498.95 for land expropriation, S/14,229,075.88 for herds and equipment amounting to the total sum of S/24,415,574.83. These inconsistencies could be related to inflation rate adjustments.
Currently, SAIS Marangani is one of the largest animal raising enterprises in the department of Cusco. Alpaca production is geared to the international market while sheep and cattle products are destined for the internal Peruvian market. SAIS Marangani now covers some 71,000 hectares of valley and puna land, 81 per cent of which are used essentially for pasture. These 71,000 hectares include 68 per cent of expropriated lands and 12 per cent of community territory. Under the organization of the SAIS, a distinction exists between former hacienda lands now referred to as sectores de produccion (production units) and those lands belonging to affiliated peasant communities (Roberts and Samaniego, 1978:245).

At present, SAIS Marangani includes seven production units; eleven affiliated peasant communities, an experimental alpaca breeding laboratory for controlled breeding at La Raya and a dairy plant at Trinidad (see Figure 15). The lands of the production units and of the dairy plant formerly belonged to haciendas located in the altiplano that is, those above 4,200 meters. Their residents organized in 160 households are ex-hacienda feudatorios now working as shepherds for the SAIS. Prior to reform, these puna pastoralists were pastores huacchilleros or tenant-shepherd families attached to an estate. Their payment, then, consisted largely of the right to pasture their private waqcho herds. Entire households have become the livestock personnel of the SAIS; male herders receive a salary while women and children labelled ancas (helpers) make up an integral part of the labour force yet their work remains unpaid. Under the new regime SAIS herders continue to possess their own animals (waqcho ) but must pay a grazing tax or yerbaje for their private flocks in spite of the fact that they are partners in the communal ownership of the

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6 Vega (1986) gives a smaller figure of 47,736.60 hectares while other sources such as Casos, (1981) cites 71,000 hectares. Such a discrepancy could come from the fact that the latter study has included wasteland and communities.
SAIS grazing lands. The seven production units have one SAIS membership each since membership is established communally rather than individually, but these units do not participate in the division of SAIS profit because their resident families are on salaries.

Affiliated communities, found on the flatland of the Vilcanota Valley where agriculture rather than herding prevails, are primarily crop farming villages. Together, they represent 13,500 hectares of the cooperative territory and, in 1978 contained a total of 2,005 households. Such communities (comunidades) continue to independently own and work their land with individualized cultivation predominating on a household basis. Unlike herding settlements, affiliated peasant communities are not required to participate in SAIS production. The unpaid labour (faenas) of their members is, however, requested whenever the enterprise suffers budget deficit and, as was the case in 1980, relies on free community labour at peak harvest time. Each community, incorporated into the collective as a single membership unit, is entitled to a share in SAIS profit for infrastructural project development.

The status of socio (member) designates the "head" of a household which refers automatically to husbands. Consequently, men only are recognized members of the SAIS to the exclusion of their wives who, as in the case of pastoral households, fully participate in the production system but as unpaid "family labour". Only shepherd widows are legal members.

7Yerbaje or grazing tax was set as follows until the late 1970s: for herds between 101 and 200 animals: S/.30 per day; 201-300 animals: S/.40 a day; 301 and 400 animals: S/.50 per day and 401 to 500 animals: S/1.00 a day (Administrative council, SAIS Marangani). The currency equivalent in 1977 was as follows: US $1.00=S/83.8 (McClintock, 1981:357)

8 A list of the number of households in the eleven communities of SAIS Marangani can be found in Appendix 1.
The SAIS distinguishes several levels of power. At the bottom, peasant members elect delegates as their representatives during general assemblies. The delegate assembly is made up of six peasant delegates from each of the eleven communities and three shepherd delegates from each pastoral unit. In principle, representatives of the membership can influence long term policies. By law, all must be literate since they are supposed to make major financial and administrative decisions. In practice, however, these matters are more likely to be imposed and supervised by the SAIS leadership.

The administration is composed of two committees: the vigilance and administrative councils both made up of white collar workers who are primarily local residents with some high school education. The majority could be small livestock merchants, ex-hacienda overseers, richer peasants, specialized workers (i.e., drivers) or former employees of the Chactuyoc textile mill factory. Through their appointment they decide on the day-to-day operations of the cooperative and supervise the distribution of funds and the repayment of loans and agrarian debts. Though elected for two years, they can take other offices in the SAIS once their term is over. Although the administrative council theoretically chooses the administrator, the responsibility ultimately lies with the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani which must approve the three leadership office holders: the director, the agronomist and the accountant - positions which can be interchangable. Since 1978, the director running SAIS Marangani was a high profile local figure who had previously worked for the state-owned electrical enterprise - Electro Peru. He completed high school, had some background in accounting through correspondance courses, but lacked any sound agricultural expertise.

The decision-making power of the SAIS largely remains in the hands of the government controlling the allocation of economic resources through the debt obligations and statutory requirements that the enterprise must meet. For instance, a certain share of the profit must be reinvested in educational work, social security, capital investment and
government services. The impact of government laws on profit spending considerably
limits the economic autonomy of this type of collective - a constraint often observed in other
similar Peruvian enterprises (McClintock, 1981:224; Roberts and Samaniego, 1978:256).

b-Economic Performance

Typical of any highland SAIS, Marangani was set up as an agri-business for
commercial ranching with the aim of improving wool quality and intensifying production.
To achieve its goals, the SAIS has relied on three major strategies: improved breeding
through scientific stock management in La Raya, herd size maximization and intensive
fodder cultivation.

The alpacas raised in Marangani are improved white breeds of the sury and huacayo
varieties. Corriedale sheep from New Zealand were introduced to upgrade the *merinos* and
*caras negras* stocks. Cattle herds are based mainly on foreign breeds such as holstein and
brownsuis and upgraded *criolla* varieties which are European in origin but introduced in
the Andes long ago (Guillet, 1987:88). These cattle raised in the milk-processing plant of
Trinidad produce milk and cheese. Such produce are now distributed throughout the region
as dairy production is almost exclusively geared to local markets previously supplied by
small scale farmers from nearby communities

As Table 30 shows, the SAIS has considerably increased herd sizes since inception.
Particular attention was placed on the production of indigenous camelids (alpaca) which
have trebled in number within seven years. Since 1980, the cultivation of forage crops for
the fattening of livestock has expanded significantly. Until the late 1970s, the cooperative
dedicated only 22 hectares to alfalfa production - a figure that a year later increased to 57

9 Browman (1987:125-126) reports that under the 1969 land reform, more than 100,000
corriedale breed sheep were imported to replace the highland *criollo* breed. The program
was a failure and many animals died of climatic stresses and low level of nutrition. To
prevent this, it would have been necessary to improve pasturage as well as new winter
fodder storage technology.
hectares. The expansion of alfalfa acreage is related to supplemental feeding required to keep large herds. Alfalfa is a successful forage crop at high altitudes as it can be grown year round and for up to seven years before reseeding the field with fresh stock (Guillet, op.cit:91). However, this intensification of cultivated fodder in staple crop ecozones below 3,600 meters can lead to a decline of food production for humans. As Guillet (ibid:94) observes, in a situation of arable land scarcity, the growing of fodder is competing with the use of land for domestic agriculture.

From the outset, the SAIS pastoral performance has been disappointing. Through government loans the SAIS was able to increase its herds. However, Table 29 shows that between 1973 and 1979, the enterprise had more than doubled its alpaca and sheep stocks, yet wool production less than doubled during that same period. The annual goal of four kilos of wool per alpaca remained unattained except in 1974. On average, only three kilos per alpaca were produced as opposed to a possible eight kilos for wool yield from alpaca grazing in optimum pastureland (Browman, 1987:127). On the other hand, sheep wool production was satisfactory in early years reaching four kilos annually but the figure drastically fell to almost half in 1977 and 1978.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th># Alpaca</th>
<th>Alpaca Wool in Quintal</th>
<th>kg/Alpaca</th>
<th># Sheep</th>
<th>Sheep Wool in Quintal</th>
<th>Kg/Sheep</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4,589</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5,758</td>
<td>238</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>33,082</td>
<td>1,067</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6,504</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>39,369</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>6,452</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>44,869</td>
<td>1,3653</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7,324</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>51,675</td>
<td>1,6793</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7,250</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SAIS Marangani, 1983
Low wool yield is partly due to poor environmental conditions and insufficient pasture nutrients which affect the quality of wool. As well, bad hail storms and inadequate or unreliable rainfall often lead to heavy animal losses. In 1983, some 2,000 alpacas died after a calamitous drought while in 1986 extensive flooding caused severe damage in this region. The planning strategy of preferring to raise indigenous animals over sheep was appropriate in the sense that camelids are better adapted to the harshness of the environment and their hooves cause less destruction to the grazing lands. However, large herds led to overgrazing and to poor performance. These ecological problems are seriously hampering productivity, diminishing wool and meat quality and weakening resistance to diseases.

Further, livestock raising effectiveness is reduced because herders devote a great deal of their time to private waqcho herds which bring them more income than SAIS salaries (Figure 16). The persistence of the waqcho system, whereby shepherds are permitted to rear their animals on SAIS land, discourages them to work for the cooperative and stretches SAIS resources. The extent of the waqcho system in Marangani can be appreciated in Table 31. In 1982, 18,827 animals belonged to shepherds, representing roughly 23.5 per cent of the overall animal stock grazing on SAIS lands.

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10 Browman (1987:126) reports that over 60 per cent of the potatoes and other tubers and 70 per cent of the grain production was lost in Peru during the 1982-3 drought.

11 Browman (ibid.) mentions that unlike sheep, camelids have a soft hoof which does not cause severe tramping damage.
Table 31: SAIS Marangani Livestock Production, 1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>SAIS Herds</th>
<th>Waqcho Herds</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alpaca</td>
<td>53,525</td>
<td>5,301</td>
<td>58,826</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>10,714</td>
<td>17,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>1,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llama</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61,903</td>
<td>18,827</td>
<td>80,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Boletín Informativo, SAIS Marangani 1981-2.

In 1980, the SAIS attempted to limit the internal encroachment of private stock by establishing greater control over the waqcho system. Shepherds were forced to pay higher rent (Yerbaje) on waqcho herd production. In 1981, yerbaje charges increased and the permitted upper limit was of 250 head per worker. Anyone who had herds above that figure had deductions made from his salary for excess livestock at the rate of S/5.00 a day per animal. To further discourage large waqcho herds, the S/2,500.00 bonus to shepherds was eliminated for stocks exceeding 200 sheep.

In retaliation to measures restricting their herds from using the pastures that they formerly had access to under the old hacienda system, high puna shepherds resorted in 1980 to a three month strike and refused to hand in to the SAIS the alpaca fleece. They demanded parcelization or redimensionamiento (redimensioning) of the cooperative.

12 Yerbaje charges were increased to the following figures: the equivalent of S/0.50 a day for 101 to 200 heads and of one dollar a day for 200-250 animals.

13 Three high puna pastoral settlements - Quenamari, Toxaccota and Chilihua - led the strike. These units have always been strongly opposed to the SAIS.
Figure 16: Puna Shepherds and their Waqcho Herds
This endeavour failed because *puna* shepherds did not receive the support of valley communities which, having a share in SAIS profit, allied with the administration against the production units arguing that *waqcho* herds prevented the creation of a surplus (Casos, 1981:104). Only later in 1983, did some communities seek SAIS parcelization after the 1982 state policy (Decree 150) making cooperative land sales legal again (Browman, 1987:135). Poor communities then attempted to break away from the SAIS to manage their own affairs. Overall, dissolution of the SAIS by the membership did not succeed.

*Waqcho* rights were preserved but considerably restricted.

According to Long and Roberts (1984:89), the cancellation of *waqcho* rights would likely lead to labour instability because shepherd wages are meager (less than US $2.00 a day). Without a supplemental income from their private herds, *puna* herders may be forced to seek jobs elsewhere in the valley. However, the issue of the *waqcho* system is intimately connected to the question of the SAIS's ability to maintain wages low. Non-wage forms of production combined with cash employment are more cost effective than full proletarianization: the reproduction of SAIS labour comes not from the low wages paid by the enterprise but from the revenues from the shepherds' *waqcho* herds. Further, it is doubtful that the SAIS intended to get rid of the *waqcho* system as this arrangement represents a lucrative source of income. For example, in 1982, the cooperative was able to collect from *yerbaje* alone a total of S/3,554,447.00.

To save money, the administration has tried to modify its labour policy regarding *puna* wage-earning shepherds. That is, increasingly, the SAIS hires temporary rather than

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14 These communities were: Checutuyoc, Sulli, Ocobamba, Sulca and Llallahui. However, as we saw, the latter refused to vote against the SAIS in 1983.

15 Other SAISs have experienced this type of conflicts between the administration and the shepherds wanting to preserve their right to pasture privately owned animals (See McClintok, 1981; Roberts and Samaniego, 1978:241-265).
permanent herders to reduce wage costs and the payment of fringe benefits. Table 32 sheds light on the extent and pattern of wage employment in the *puna* settlements. It shows that in 1986 there were only 102 permanent shepherds as opposed to 137 in 1980. The growing reliance on temporary labour leads to strata within the peasantry being maintained in a more subordinate and exploited position. Unlike permanent labourers, casual workers do not enjoy steady incomes all year round or social and fringe benefits - a situation which gives rise to a certain hierarchy amongst shepherds themselves.

### Table 32: SAIS Marangani Pastoral Labour Force Composition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1980 Permanent</th>
<th>1986 Permanent</th>
<th>1986 Temporary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quenanyary</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chilliha</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxaccota</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uyucani</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antaccacca</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choqueccota</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casuera/Trinidad</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Archives, SAIS Marangani

Crop farming is far from being as important as herding in Marangani. Irrigated land totals 62.72 hectares and non-irrigated land 38.69 hectares. In 1978-79, out of a total of 101.40 hectares of cultivable land, the SAIS was using only 33 per cent (potatoes: 18 hectares; *quinua*: 7 hectares; beans: 5.1 hectares; wheat: 1.5 hectares; oat and *tarwi* less than one hectare).

Potatoe's continue to be the leading subsistence crop of the district. The 1978-79 data on agricultural production (Table 33) indicates that SAIS crop yields per hectare were relatively successful when compared with Rojas and Tito's figures (1978:33) on potential yield performance of major food staples in Marangani. Their research on Marangani's
peasant economy provides evidence that, when fertilizers are introduced, production could attain 5,000 kilos per hectare of potato Crepis less 1,500 kilos of seeds; 1,000 kilos per hectare of wheat less 120 to 150 kilos of seeds; 1,000 kilos per hectare of broad beans less 100 kilos of seeds. Table 33 shows that in 1978-79, the performance of non indigenous introduced crops such as wheat and broad beans were relatively satisfactory. This intensification of production correlates with improved farm techniques and equipment: better irrigation system, the constant use of fertilizers and insecticides as well as a greater reliance on mechanical traction\textsuperscript{16}.

### Table 3: SAIS Marangani Crop Production, 1978-1979

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crops</th>
<th>Area (Has)</th>
<th>Kilos/Ha</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quinua</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad Beans</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>2,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oats</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarwi</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SAIS Marangani, 1983

Commercial agriculture is advancing in Marangani. This is substantiated by the fact that the SAIS relies upon 1) wage-earning shepherds to tend the enterprise livestock and work the fields; 2) the use of mechanical traction and modern technology which presupposes the existence of landless workers; and 3) increased productivity in livestock raising through improved breeding methods, larger herds and fodder intensification. All these factors are manifestations of Marangani's full integration into the Peruvian national and international economy both as producers of commodities (wool, meat as well as dairy

\textsuperscript{16} The SAIS now owns five tractors for ploughing, one caterpillar D-4 for earth moving, one sowing machine, one harvester and one fertilizer machine.
and agricultural produce) and as a source of labour. However, it is important to emphasize that the SAIS system has retained certain features peculiar to non-capitalist social relations, namely the use of unpaid family labour, the maintenance of the *waqcho* system, and the occasional reliance on community *faenas* to perform agricultural tasks. The existence and growth of capitalist production, thus, does not mean the transformation of the *minifundio* economy. On the contrary, the continuance of *waqcho* herds and the use of *anca* as well as *faena* labour help the enterprise pay below subsistence wages to reproduce labour (Petras, 1981:32).

c-Production Constraints

Since its inception, profits have been fluctuating and the cooperative is still struggling to generate any substantial surplus. From 1975 to 1981 its profit was so small that only one per cent of its surplus could be redistributed to each community. In 1983 the SAIS registered no profit at all. That year, community households only received two kilos of meat and one kilo of potatoes each - a contribution which was more symbolic than of economic relevance. An examination of the 1982-1983 SAIS budget (Appendix 1) shows that the SAIS assumed responsibility for payments to the government of the cost of expropriation and paid S/66,901,282.00 in debt installments representing 10 per cent of its gross annual income. Social security contributions (S/46,771,408.00) and payments of other services further absorbed a large part of its earnings. Total revenues amounted to S/606,003,167.00 while expenses reached S/631,062,293.00. In 1982, the SAIS had a deficit equal to S/25,059,126.00. In the following year, this had increased to S/55 million. In order to reduce labour costs, field tasks were performed through *faena* or corvée labour.

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17 The figures presented here come from the SAIS archives: 'Balance general de la sociedad agrícola de interés social, Marangani LTDA no. 24, correspondiente al año económico comprendido del 1. de enero al 31 de diciembre 1982'.


Difficulties experienced by the SAIS are manifold. Though the enterprise has a small operating budget at its disposal, it is nevertheless responsible for the payment of reform debts and social services. Poor soil quality and unpredictable climatic conditions further threaten agricultural production. However, along with government and ecological constraints management problems considerably limit the SAIS performance.

As in other SAISs throughout Peru (McClintock, 1981), Marangani suffers from serious managerial problems rooted in the fact that, typical of peripheral economies, the enterprise is constantly subject to economic shortage and bottleneck and is, thus, incapable of functioning as a modern bureaucracy. Due to a lack of capital, Marangani is understaffed; its personnel is underpaid and improperly trained to solve local development issues. Leadership lacks both agricultural know-how and a sustained commitment to implement policy. Imbedded in the organization of the SAIS is a structural problem whereby campesino delegates and committee members, each elected for two years, often lack a long term perspective on the issues at stake. During their short period in office, peasant representatives are inadequately trained and often unable to acquire a full understanding of the workings of the SAIS. Consequently, decisions are slow and often inappropriate. For instance, in 1984 one technician pointed out to me that to improve breeding the cooperative crucially needed 200 male alpaca costing between S/90,000.00 to S/150,000.00 each. Instead, however, the SAIS purchased a new radio transmitter which was not on a priority list (Appendix 1, Interview 8).

Poor cash flow creates labour tension as workers end up being irregularly paid (Appendix 1, Interviews 3, 5 and 6). In 1983, workers remained nine months without complete remuneration. Occasionally, they would be given a partial payment of
S/50,000.00 and could buy agricultural produce through the SAIS on credit to be deducted from their salary. Finally, payment was made months later only after the SAIS sold 1,007 quintals of alpaca wool at S/15,000.00 per pound.

Unlike the salaries of the bureaucratic office holders (permanent staff and committee members), shepherds' wages are not adjusted to inflation. In 1981, herders received daily S/1,035.00 (equivalent to US $3.14). By the end of 1982, they were paid S/1,600.00 (or US $1.85) and, in 1984, it went to S/4,350.00 (or US $1.61)\(^\text{18}\). That is, within two years, salaries increased by 171%, but real wages declined as the inflation rate almost doubled from 1981 at 72.7% to 1983 at 125.1%. Meanwhile the prices of basic foodstuffs were rising sharply. Between April 1983 and April 1984, essential items such as potatoes went up by 179%, chuño (dried potato) by 433%, broad beans by 69%, meat by 181%, noodles by 140%, rice by 124%, sugar by 118%, milk by 134% and cooking oil nearly trebled going up by 590%\(^\text{19}\). Within twelve months, prices had increased by an average of 218% while wages increased over two years by only 171%. As these data on inflation reflect, Peru is undergoing a critical economic crisis.

When I returned to the field in 1984, some informants working for the SAIS told me that, in February of the same year, 31 workers and shepherds signed a petition to ask for a 50 per cent salary increase and to demand their overdue Christmas bonus (which represented the equivalent of an extra month's income). The administration took no notice of these grievances. Instead, members of the Vigilance and Administration Councils increased their own salary by S/608.00 per day and that of other "specialized" committees increased by S1,608.00 per day and that of other "specialized" committees

\(^\text{18}\) Currency equivalence:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>US $ 1.00</th>
<th>S</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>328.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>865.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2700.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^\text{19}\) These statistics are based on 1983 government prices and on my own observation of local market prices in 1984.
by S/508.00 per day. Such a decision, taken without consultation with the delegates, created deep resentment among the membership. Not surprisingly that, since workers are poorly paid, some choose to supplement their income through illegal activities. In 1983, I heard rumors that several employees were implicated in cocaine trafficking. Apparently, official SAIS transport vehicles had been used to pass the drug through the Peru-Bolivian border.

In 1984, to assess attitudes towards the collective, I conducted a survey of 46 SAIS workers representing 22.5 per cent of the permanent staff (Appendix 3, Questionnaire 3). Results show that SAIS blue collar workers and shepherds were disillusioned because of low wages, little profit redistribution and abusive bureaucrats who seem increasingly to behave like ex-hacendados. Twenty six respondents or 56.5 per cent of the sampled universe were in favour of unionizing the SAIS while 15.2 per cent were against it. Another 21.7 per cent did not have any opinion on the matter and 8.6 per cent refused to answer. Of the seven respondents opposed to unionization (or 15.2 per cent) only one was a herder, the others were specialized workers of higher status or delegates - that is, those most unwilling to criticize the SAIS.

When questioned on the problem areas within the SAIS, 63 per cent stated that their main concern was low salaries, 39 per cent added bad management, while 34 per cent felt that labour instability was a major problem. Some 32 per cent denounced the administration for being abusive and corrupt. Although generally critical of the way the SAIS was run, many accepted clientelism as normal practice. For example, 15.2 per cent of the respondents had acquired their job through personal network and 67 per cent had one or several relatives working in the SAIS. Meanwhile, 72 per cent of the respondents had developed fictive kinship within the SAIS. In a region where family and kinship networks are very strong, people commonly rely on particularistic ties to obtain jobs and favours - a practice seldom regarded as improper conduct in the public eye.
On the question of performance, 19.5 per cent of the participants felt that Marangani seemed worse than other SAIS they had heard of or known about. On the other hand, 8.6 per cent felt it was better, 21.7 per cent said it was equal to any such enterprise and 50 per cent had no opinion.

In Llallahui, the community where I stayed for several months, people were generally more sympathetic toward the SAIS. Frequently, however, Comuneros seemed to have no precise understanding of what the SAIS was trying to achieve. Items from Questionnaire 1 (Appendix 3) showed that 44 per cent of the residents appreciated the fact that, for its anniversary, the SAIS made a gift of meat to the community though they generally felt that this contribution was very dismal. Only 22 per cent of the interviewees showed strong resentment towards the collective while 39 per cent had no comments.

SAIS shepherds living in the puna and poorer comuneros generally regard the administration as the new boss. For instance, ever since the SAIS built two irrigation channels for pasture in Uyucaui above Quisini, local peasants have complained of water shortage. In accordance with a new water law, Decree 17,752, Quisini comuneros in 1974 attempted without success to regain control over their own water supply (Pino, 1981:90). Peasants often bitterly comment: "SAIS leaders are the new patrones around here and are worse than the old ones". In 1980, general dissatisfaction was aggravated by the fact that an hydroelectric plant expected to be built on the Vilcanota River to bring electricity to Ocobamba, Llallahui and Quisini failed to materialize and a food processing factory in Antaccacca was stalled for lack of funds.

A source of latent conflict comes from the attitude of community delegates who quickly distance themselves from their fellow peasants after being elected. Often these individuals poorly represent the interests of their community because, manipulated or intimidated by the presence of powerful local figures administering the enterprise, they
easily cower and compromise their position. In 1983, I witnessed a case that illustrates this point. In March of that year, five of the eleven communities wanted to pull out of the collective. At the general assembly that I attended in Llallahui, 56 out of the 85 participants voted in favour of leaving the SAIS. However, a few days later, an extraordinary delegate assembly took place at the SAIS headquarters during which Llallahui representatives sided with the administration against the mandate given to them by their own community. That Llallahui representatives in the end bent to the wishes of the administration indicates that, aside from pure political pressure, peasant delegates find the SAIS to be an important means of personal mobility—a privilege these elected members seem unwilling to jeopardize. Later, I discovered that the administrator had left specific instructions with his staff to keep me out of the meeting. Evidently, this kind of assembly did not lend itself to the presence of an outsider, especially an anthropologist.

Additional tension comes from the fact that the patronal system persists within communities. After reform, some local *patrónes* have become legal "*comuneros*" through ownership of land lying within communal territory. As such they can easily interfere with village affairs and create difficulties. For example, in 1980 with the money received from SAIS Marangani, Llallahui bought a second hand bus. However, it rapidly broke down and was resold the following year for S/1,250,000.00 to a medium size landowner who happened to be a legal registered member of Llallahui. Upon acquisition of the vehicle, he still owed S/250 thousand to be reimbursed later. The next year, his wife became Llallahui's secretary. The community's president told me that while she was in office, the papers on the bus transaction conveniently disappeared. During the last visit I paid to Llallahui in 1986, this *patrón* had not yet reimbursed his debt.

In a developing nation like Peru, complexity of regulations, archaic rules and the slow working of the government machinery create great inefficiency in the bureaucracy. To speed up procedures, administrative practices run along clientelistic lines reducing, in this
way, often insurmountable delays so that things will eventually get done. In such a system, positions are allocated as patronage posts to individuals having personal influence and connections. But, no formal and effective safeguards exist to ensure either competence or an ethic of good service. As a result, graft and bribery are rampant. Frequently, the process of obtaining a job in the SAIS depends on speed money - a procedure which favours only those who can afford to pay.

Diversion of SAIS funds into office holders' hands is not uncommon. In 1982, members of the Vigilance and the Administrative Councils were involved in scandalous transactions regarding the sale of wool in Arequipa. Office holders often regard their position as a way to extract as much money as possible from the membership. For instance, in 1982 boots were sold to herders at S/18,000.00 per pair while, in the market of Sicuani, the same boots could be found for S/9,000.00. Apparently, a profit of over S/500,000.00 was pocketed by top administrators. In 1983, a substantial part of the annual profit of the SAIS apparently disappeared. This was never adequately justified by the administration, yet only token sanctions were applied - the "punishment" meted out to the suspected culprits was merely a switch in office.

In Peru, graft is widespread and, to a certain extent, tolerated as part of the social and political scene. However, in Marangani flagrant abuses of office bring increasing disillusion and criticism. The membership resents such practices and denounces them as illicit means of peasant exploitation. The president of Ocobamba, a respected man in the SAIS and among peasants who frequently came to visit me to discuss SAIS issues, explained that, to protest, Ocobamba considered hiring a lawyer "to stop abuses and to

\[20\] I was told that one had to pay a two month salary plus food and beer before starting a job at Marangani.
protect peasants' interests. However, no law suit was launched against the SAIS because his community lacked funds and political influence.

The case of SAIS Marangani is indicative of the ways in which state-run enterprises with limited access to appropriate skills and funds lack efficiency and effectiveness and, thus, become vulnerable to corrupt practices. Local ambitious individuals can easily take hold of bureaucratic offices for personal economic gain. As a result, the SAIS becomes an apparatus through which state funds can be converted for private use in the hands of office holders and their supporters. Szefel's account of Zambia (1983:185-6) demonstrates that there exists often a close relationship between graft and class formation. He observes that "public office can be used to obtain preferential access to state resources and service" because, he adds, "in the context of underdevelopment there is great pressure on state resources to provide the means for individual mobility". Over-all, in Marangani the trend is that resource scarcity encourages corruption which enables cooperative leaders to expropriate a surplus from peasant members. However, further investigation is required to examine the link existing between spoils system and class formation within Peruvian collectives. But, by excluding the majority of the membership from access to office, corruption threatens the legitimacy of these units - a factor which can become politically destabilizing.

3-Farming Communities: The Case of Llallahui

The peasant community of Llallahui, where I resided for four months in 1983, lies along the Cusco-Puno highway and is intersected by the railway line which connects Cusco to Arequipa. The aerial photograph (Figure 17) and the panoramic view (Figure 18) show

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21 I used to talk to the president of Ocobamba whenever he came to shop at Llallahui's communal store near my room.
Figure 17. Aerial Photograph of Llallahuí and Quisini
Figure 18. Panoramic View of the Vilcanota Valley Near Llallahuí
that the Vilcanota Valley broadens out and could provide good farming opportunities for a relatively dense population.

Llallahui is bound by Quisini, and Ocobamba to the east and south respectively. It was officially recognised as an "indigenous community" in 1966. Prior to recognition, Llallahui formed a common unit with Quisini called Ayllu Lurucachi whose land title dated back to 1790. For many years, this ayllu was an annex of the community of Ocobamba which had received its official community status in 1928. Thus, for years, Llallahui's history was linked to that of its two neighbours - Ocobamba and Quisini. All three often joined in their opposition to local hacendados over land and water rights. Llallahui now shares with them an elementary school and a medical centre built with free community labour. No postal service, running and drinking water or electricity exist in this area.

The settlement pattern is of small adobe houses with galvanized tin or calamina roofs and surrounded by canchos or small fenced-in plots. These homes are nucleated around the valley floor along the western bank of Rio Vilcanota and the adjacent hills. The typical dwelling is a one storey structure with a living quarter and two storage areas - one for tools, the other for agricultural produce.

Except for two misti families who are also community members because they own some land within the community boundaries, Llallahui is comprised of a Quechua speaking peasantry of some 100 households (Figure 19). The majority of comuneros are nominally Catholic but increasingly entire families convert to Protestant Evangelism. This church is rapidly gaining control over valley communities because, in the members' minds, Catholicism seems to be associated with the pre-reform order.

In 1944, Llallahui lost over one km² of pasture land called Huayactuyoc- Pampa (see: Llallahui: letter, December 27 1944, Ministry of Agriculture - Sicuani, Section: Land reform). In the mid-1940s, peasants particularly suffered from abuses committed jointly by three local gamonales from Buena Vista, Ocobamba and Lurucachi.
Figure 19. A Llallahui Peasant Family
Evangelists adopt a strict code of conduct rejecting some of their most traditional customs such as coca chewing, wayno dancing and, of course, trago drinking.

Consumption of luxury items is well under way. In 1983, 88 per cent of the households owned a radio, 43 per cent a record player and three families had television sets yet none were functioning because of dead batteries. These items are generally purchased as status items which often far exceed the buying power of these households.

Llallahui contains seven units politically organized along structures laid down by the Velasco Government. Paralleling the greater SAIS, the community is governed by a president, a vice-president and vocales or elected members belonging to an administrative and a vigilance council. The teniente is another figure of importance linking the community to the district. Named by the sub-prefect, the teniente represents the state at the local level.

In order to hold office, one must be literate. Certainly such a prerequisite excludes peasant women who, for the most part, are illiterate. Monthly general assemblies are held to discuss internal matters. Assemblies are unquestionably male dominated. However, women's attendance, though passive and quiet, is fairly regular as many come in place of their absent husbands. A system of cash fines would otherwise penalize households failing to send an adult representative. There exists considerable segregation between the sexes and women cannot rely on their husband's support in public matters. Criticizing male attitudes vis-à-vis women's participation in assemblies, a progressist, young leader one day said to me:

Both sexes should know about politics, women as well as men. We are "brother". We cannot ignore women. They should be equal to men. For example, during general assemblies, the authorities refuse to let women speak. It could be that this woman is more intelligent than a man. Women are put down. They (the authorities) do not
want women to participate. Some women have little to say. But others are very good, and can think better than a man (Appendix 1, Interview 1).

a-Tenancy and Petty Proprietorship

Overall, Llallahui's territory represents only 3.25 per cent of the total area covered by SAIS Marangani. Hacienda Buena Vista located on the north west side of Llallahui was the only nearby estate. It was expropriated in 1973 and its 155 hectares became incorporated into the pastoral sector of Uyucani now belonging to the SAIS. Individually, Llallahui Comuneros have not increased their access to land after affiliation to the SAIS as they had no major ownership claim to former hacienda lands. On the contrary, peasants complain that they lost a communal parcel located on the eastern bank of Rio Vilcanota that was taken over by the SAIS.

Llallahui's economy is primarily oriented towards crop farming rather than livestock raising because the community has limited access to the upper puna where it owns only 50 hectares of pastureland. Consequently, its economy is closely articulated with the valley system of crop farming. Utilizable farming land amounts to 243 hectares at altitudes varying between 3,800 and 4,300 meters.

Communal farming land comprises only four irrigated stretches (some seven hectares) used for the cultivation of potatoes, wheat and barley. These are worked collectively in compulsory faenas. The laymi system of collective decision making in regard to land rotation as found in Ccapamarca is not practiced here. Land scarcity does not permit fallow periods. Thus, unlike Ccapamarca, Llallahui has no system of communal control with divisible rights; its jurisdiction extends over only a very small territory.

23 Fines for not attending a faena amounted to S/1,500.00 in 1983 which was more than the daily wage of a peón agricultural labourer.
Control over land remains the most important household resource. Land is owned privately. Households with no plots or an insufficient number of parcels may rent (arrendamiento) under varying tenant arrangements. The technology employed to work the fields consists of hand tools and draught animals. Among the major agricultural tools, we find: Chakitaklla (foot plow), wikina and wayra (two types of pitched fork) and ccoruna (mattock).

According to a survey that I conducted in 1983 (Appendix 3, Questionnaire 1), seven per cent of the households are landless renting plots for S/15,000.00 to S/20,000.00 per topo (0.33 hectare) for a three year contract (see Table 34). The majority of the residents or some 63 per cent are landpoor, possessing less than two hectares. About 29 per cent have farms of medium size between two to five hectares. The typical peasant family has a very limited number of holdings under cultivation averaging to four plots at a time. These parcels are more or less a topo or one third of an hectare each demonstrating the diminutive character of Andean peasant economy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (Hectare)</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>0.25-0.5</th>
<th>0.5-1</th>
<th>1-1.5</th>
<th>1.5-2</th>
<th>2-3</th>
<th>3-4</th>
<th>4-5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% of Households</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 1

*Data were collected in topos. One topo is equated to one third of an hectare or 3,300 square meters. Twenty three per cent of the respondents stated they had some land but refused to specify the amount they owned. Therefore, the results presented in this table correspond to 77 per cent of the total population.

These figures clearly indicate that, except for the two mestizo families who refused to be surveyed, Llallahui-residents are all minifundistas. However, it is noteworthy that
within this category, a certain level of inequality in land ownership still prevails.

Undoubtedly, land remains to some extent a criterion of variations in the relative wealth or poverty of households but not in the materialist sense (i.e., when wealth becomes capital). As Rahmató says: "The difference between one peasant who may have three hectares of land from another who may have five is a difference of degree and not of quality. The essential factors that matter are the relation of the individuals to the means of production, and the nature of the productive process they are involved in" (1984:34).

b- Peasant Production Constraints

Four major crops are identifiable in the community - potatoes, beans, wheat and barley along with a number of secondary indigenous plants. Although small in scale, production is diversified. Data obtained from Questionnaire 1 indicate that broad beans are cultivated by 98% of the families, followed by potatoes: 97%, wheat: 90% and barley: 85%. Andean domesticates include crops such as ullucu: 66%, isanu: 41%, ocas: 8%, quinua: 3% and chuño 1%. No maize is cultivated because Llallahui is situated at 3,650 meters, that is, some 150 meters just above the maize ecozone.

In order to explore in greater depth the productive structure of Llallahui, Questionnaire 2 was applied to 12 households (or 12 per cent of the population) chosen at random. Table 35 shows that all these units belonged to the landpoor category which, in the community, constitutes the largest social group. Their holdings have been estimated between 0.16 to 2.00 hectares - a property size below the minimum viable unit of three hectares set by the reform. As Table 35 indicates, cultivated plots are dedicated primarily

24 Information on land size has been calculated on the basis of peasant estimates collected in topos. Though such measurements are based on approximations, they can be considered reliable. When compared with information provided by informants and the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani, they accurately represent the scale of cultivation in Llallahui.
Food production remains low. Tiny plot cultivation, soil erosion, extreme fluctuation in rainfall causing either floods or droughts make agriculture very difficult. Table 36 on annual yields per household of the four leading crops shows that overall agricultural output is poor particularly among such families as C, D, H which are producing dismal quantities. A look at the holdings of household C shows that its performance is directly linked to the fact that it is almost landless. Households D and H seem to be performing poorly compared to others like A, B and J who have a similar amount of land but may have other means of production at their disposal and/or larger family labour. Table 36 on productivity tends to confirm this fact.

Table 35: Llallahui, Landholdings and Crop Cultivation for Twelve Households

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hlds</th>
<th>#Plots</th>
<th>Topos</th>
<th>Has</th>
<th>Bean in Topos</th>
<th>Potato in Topos</th>
<th>Barley in Topos</th>
<th>Wheat in Topos</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 2, 1983

to potatoes, beans and grains because parcels are located in the high suni between 3,700 meters and 4,000 meters where maize cannot grow.
Table 36: Llallahu. Annual Yield of Major Crops for 12 Households
(in Pounds and Kilos*), 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hold</th>
<th>Beans (kg)</th>
<th>Potatoes (kg)</th>
<th>Barley (kg)</th>
<th>Wheat (kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>355</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 2, 1983

*Calculations on production are given in kilos but data were collected in arrobas (25 pounds) and quintales (112 pounds). The stocks of seeds required for each crop were taken into consideration and subtracted from the total production figures presented here. These are recalled data referring to crops harvested during the 1983 growing season when the survey was conducted.

Yields per hectare based on data from Table 35 and 36 and shown in Table 37 indicate that some households are more productive than others. The productive capacity of cropping land can differ substantially depending on factors such as irrigation facilities and the quality of the soil - aspects which vary considerably from locality to locality. Therefore, inequality within this community is based not only on the size of holdings, but as in Ccapacmarca, on land quality. Here again, we see that the productive potential of the land and the nature of the ecological micro-zones in which plots are located could influence the productivity of the Andean household. Further empirical studies are required to better understand whether such factors may lead to relatively spontaneous processes of intra-community differentiation based on accumulation from below.
Average yields per farm for the three major crops are the following - beans: 440 kg/ha, wheat: 400 kg/ha and potatoes: 600 kg/ha. As discussed previously, Rojas et al.'s study on Marangani (1980) shows that under best conditions (using fertilizers, herbicides and irrigation), local smallholders could reach the following levels of production - potatoes: 3,500 kg/ha, beans: 900 kg/ha (1,000 kilograms minus 100 kilograms for seeds); and wheat: 850 kg/ha (1000 kilograms minus 150 kilograms for seeds). In the case of potatoes, 3,500 kg/ha would require 100 pounds of aldrin, six bags of 62.5 kilograms each of ammonium and eight bags of 70 kilograms of potassium superphosphate. From my personal observation, any such investment would be beyond the purchasing capacity of Llallahui farmers.

Production is primarily for home consumption. However, comuneros attempting to sell any extra products they may have are often competing with SAIS produce. For example, in the 1970s comuneros sold their onions for $10.00 a pound while the SAIS sold its for $5.00. In 1983 a pound of sheep wool from Llallahui would have cost

Table 37: Llallahui. Projection of Yields per Hectare of Three Major Crops, 1982-3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Beans (Kg/ha)</th>
<th>Potatoes (Kg/ha)</th>
<th>Wheat (Kg/ha)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>815</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1,390</td>
<td>1,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>745</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 2, 1983
S/150.00 on the Sicusani market. Meanwhile SAIS wool was priced at S/50.00 per pound. Within the community, cheeses traditionally traded through barter for foodstuffs are less and less in demand because those of the SAIS are generally better and cheaper. Falling prices for household commodities lead comuneros to frequently say "nuestros productos no valen nada" (our products are worth nothing) as they are well aware of the deterioration of the terms of exchange of their own produce relative to the commodities families need to acquire for survival. Interviewed on areas of concern in Llallahui, 56 per cent of the residents mentioned the high cost of living and another 44 per cent stated a lack of value for their own farm produce. Partly, falling prices result from a declining productivity of the valley soil which increases the cost of production and reduces the returns to labour (Bernstein, 1977). Most likely, though, it comes from outside market forces which place peasant households in an unequal position vis-à-vis the capitalist sector and explains why SAIS Marangani's goods have a decisive advantage over peasant commodities. Painter (1986:235) states that the continuing process of accumulation within the commercial sector reduces the amount of labour required to produce each unit of a product, labour's contribution to the production process declines, and with it declines the exchange value of the product. He writes:

This gives capitalist-produced goods a decided advantage in markets where they compete with the same or similar goods produced by peasants, because peasants respond to the declining exchange value of each unit of their production by attempting to produce more by incrementing the expenditure of their own labour power. Production may increase, but so does the labour power embodied in each unit of product. Peasant labour power expenditures increase in an adverse relationship to the declining exchange value of their production. This further devalues peasant labour because the return per unit of time invested in production declines together with the return per unit of product (ibid).

Overall, community members are confronted with considerable uncertainty in agricultural production. While they are experiencing a deterioration in the demand for their
own produce, they suffer from a constant increase in the cost of living. As we saw earlier, rampant inflation of well over 100 per cent per annum has been typical of recent years.

Livestock production in Llallahui is limited and secondary to crop farming. Animals graze on the hillsides or bottomlands after harvest. Most households own small herds. In 1983, 83% of the families possessed two or three head of cattle; 70% had five or six sheep; 10% a few camelids and 8%, donkeys. When these figures are compared with those of Table 38 it appears that the animal stock of the community has varied very little since 1966. Due to insufficient grazing lands, Andean camelids such as llama and alpaca so important to the region are rarely found in Llallahui.

In terms of stock composition, we see from Table 38 that, prior to reform, 79% of the comuneros raised sheep and 77% raised cattle while in recent years 83% possessed cattle and only 70% had sheep. From the increase of cattle ownership over sheep, we can infer that Llallahui peasants find the former to be a better investment probably as a form of long term security. Overall, figures show little change other than some decrease in sheep production. Herding as an economic activity has remained essentially stagnant for many years.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th># Animals</th>
<th>1-4</th>
<th>5-9</th>
<th>10-14</th>
<th>15-19</th>
<th>20-24</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani.

*The figures presented above come from a survey of 59 out of the 96 Llallahui households conducted by the community's authorities for its official recognition as an indigenous community in 1966. The returns can be found at the Ministry of Agriculture in Sicuani.*
A team of draught oxen, essential for ploughing, is one of the most valuable assets. Households without oxen are at a great disadvantage because of high cost of rental. Payment per day is equivalent to two days of labour by a peón. Thus, ownership of oxen, a major component of rural wealth adds a new dimension to the process of differentiation as the poorest comuneros must enter into unequal relations because of differential access to instrument of labour.

In order to understand the reproduction cycle of the household and the process of peasant accumulation, I tried to establish household resources by calculating the value of possessions based on land and livestock - the two most essential resources that comuneros control. Table 39 reveals that livestock tends to have a greater cash value than land. Household D has slightly less land than average but has a leading economic position because of the number of animals it owns. Although peasant assets are low, there exist differences between households based on herd size - a meaningful criterium of inequality but not of class differentiation.
Table 39: Llallahu Land and Animals Stock in 12 Households, 1983 (in soles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Household</th>
<th>Land (Soles)</th>
<th>Animals (Soles)</th>
<th>Total (Soles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>529,000</td>
<td>629,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>112,500</td>
<td>881,000</td>
<td>993,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>393,000</td>
<td>405,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>87,500</td>
<td>1,222,600</td>
<td>1,310,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>738,000</td>
<td>888,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>1,103,100</td>
<td>1,228,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>527,000</td>
<td>677,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>112,500</td>
<td>223,000</td>
<td>335,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>112,500</td>
<td>858,000</td>
<td>970,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>87,500</td>
<td>762,000</td>
<td>849,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>805,500</td>
<td>955,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>826,000</td>
<td>1,001,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 1 and 2.

* Land value was calculated according to the current price of agricultural land in Llallahu in 1983. According to informants, value fluctuated between S/200,000.00 and S/300,000.00 per topo depending upon the quality of the soil and whether it was irrigated land or not. The average of S/250,000.00 was used as the basis for our calculations. Animal values were estimated by each individual owner. The limitations of the source-data on which the survey was based should be kept in mind as it is difficult to get access to accurate prices. Further, collected land and livestock statistics come from recalled data open to errors due to respondents' biases.

To gain a better understanding of economic precariousness of the household I estimated the annual expenditure of the 12 households calculated on the sum spent on 1) agricultural input including tools, fertilizers and livestock; 2) children's education which constitutes a particularly heavy burden for peasants; and 3) grocery items (noodles, rice, salt, candles etc.) as well as staple crops such as potatoes, maize or chuño. Unfortunately, no data on such expenses as clothing, transportation, medicines, entertainment and funerals were collected. Despite this shortcoming, the results of Table 40 throw an interesting light on the scale of household expenditures and on their dependency on cash for essential items. Households are not self-sufficient units in the sense of producing what they need for their own reproduction. Rather, all have to buy vegetables and groceries such as rice, noodles,
bread to complement their own production. As seen in Table 40, the minimum annual expenses that a household with two children at school can expect to incur is $358,800.

Data point to the fact that commodity relations have deeply penetrated the peasant household reproduction cycle.

Table 40: Llallahui, Main Expenditure Items among 12 Households, 1982-3. (in soles)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#Hills</th>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>Fertiliser</th>
<th>Stock</th>
<th>Children's* Education</th>
<th>Grocery</th>
<th>Staple Crops</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>17,700</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>495,000</td>
<td>30,800</td>
<td>597,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>8,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>415,000</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>479,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>4,900*</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>196,000</td>
<td>663,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>94,200</td>
<td>22,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>47,100</td>
<td>525,000</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>719,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>16,100</td>
<td>11,200</td>
<td>31,400</td>
<td>340,000</td>
<td>37,700</td>
<td>437,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>251,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>480,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>494,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>44,000</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>420,000</td>
<td>23,000</td>
<td>544,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>431,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>27,400</td>
<td>16,800</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>370,000</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>450,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>35,500</td>
<td>30,500</td>
<td>22,000</td>
<td>15,700</td>
<td>600,000</td>
<td>26,000</td>
<td>726,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>60,700</td>
<td>37,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31,400</td>
<td>635,000</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>782,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>31,400</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td>27,200</td>
<td>358,800</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 1 and 2, 1983

*The details in estimating the cost of children's education can be found in Appendix 1. All budget figures are based on recalled data thus include some degree of distortions. As such, they should be treated as rough orders of magnitude rather than precise estimates.

A comparison of the annual expenditure (Table 40, Column: "Total Annual Expenditure") with the total cash revenue (Table 41, Column: "Total Revenue") shows a significant deficit in all household budgets (Table 41, Column: "Deficit"). Table 41 indicates that what Bernstein calls "a simple reproduction squeeze" occurs in Llallahui arising from the pressures which come from the penetration of commodity relations and from deteriorating terms of exchange for peasant produce. This can explain the fact that no class differentiation in the materialistic sense takes place in Llallahui. My data indicate that most likely, all peasant households are in deficit; thus, socio-economic variations within the
community could not form the basis for class differentiation from within. That is, no wealth with the potential of becoming capital is generated from Llallahui’s agricultural production.

Therefore, Rahmato’s comments on the Ethiopian situation can be applied here:

The difference between the lower and upper peasantry is ... a difference in relation to the ability to meet one’s family needs, and not in relation to better marketable surplus production, or the accumulation of capital. The poor peasant will be hard put to meet his subsistence requirements, and indeed is often fairly destitute, but his opposite number is in a relatively better position. But the margin of difference, in qualitative terms, particularly with regard to accumulation, is insignificant (1984:61).

Intensification of commodity relations, thus, does not necessarily imply internal class differentiation (Bernstein, 1977).

Table 41: Llallahui, Revenue from Domestic Economy, 1982-3 (in soles $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#Hlds</th>
<th>Agriculture Sale</th>
<th>Stock Sale</th>
<th>Crafts Sale</th>
<th>Total Revenue</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>45,200</td>
<td>43,800</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>89,600</td>
<td>-507,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>9,400</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>24,900</td>
<td>-455,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>-657,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>19,600</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>539,600</td>
<td>-182,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>-430,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>61,500</td>
<td>-780,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>103,500</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>148,100</td>
<td>-395,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>2,800</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>-418,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>117,000</td>
<td>-333,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>25,400</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30,400</td>
<td>-699,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>29,900</td>
<td>237,700</td>
<td>30,200</td>
<td>297,800</td>
<td>-484,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>203,200</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>203,600</td>
<td>-155,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 2, 1983.

Llallahui residents control only a small stock of capital goods and are usually unable to meet their own needs through farming alone, much less to accumulate capital.

Consequently, they are prone to fall back on borrowing money from community funds,
local usurers or else to combine farming with cash employment and, thus, to become semi-
proletarians.

c-Diversification of Household Incomes and Strategies

In the face of pressures arising from a lack of agricultural resources and low
productive levels, new sources of income are being sought. Field observations indicate an
increased tendency towards wage labour. Table 42 shows that, at present, the community is
not composed primarily of purely subsistence oriented farmers; women as well as men
become increasingly involved into non-farming earning activities either permanently or
temporarily. According to my survey, 34 per cent of the adult men have permanent job and
41 per cent seasonal work. However, all continue to farm.

Table 42: Llallahui, Cash Employment Available to Residents, 1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>Part-Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishing</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Labour</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>Seasonal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS employees</td>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Checyucoc Textile Factory</td>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servicing</td>
<td>Full Time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crafts</td>
<td>Part-Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Questionnaire 1, 1983

A comparison between Table 42 and 43 reveals a rapid diversification in the
occupational structure of Llallahui over the past seventeen years. Table 43 indicates that in
1966 the large majority of comuneros were still involved solely in subsistence farming.
The increased range of occupations characteristic of Llallahui's present economy illustrates
the type of differentiation occurring within Marangani's crop farming communities. In 1983, some 81 per cent of the total households stated that one of the spouses had to work for cash.

Table 43: Llallahui, Economic Categories of Male Household Heads, 1969

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Percentage of Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Subsistence agriculture Only</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Services</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farming and Transport</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Students</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Siquani.

Demographic data show that in 1949 the community counted 45 units - a number which more than doubled in 1966 to reach 96 households. Yet, over the following seventeen years, the overall number of households has changed very little (from 96 in 1966 to 101 in 1983) in spite of an annual population increase of 2.7 per cent in the region (OZAMS, 1975:5). This apparent demographic stability, despite a growth in the birth rate, implies that the land/human ratio has reached its maximum at an average of less than two hectares per family.

It is increasingly difficult to find employment in the region. Even the textile factory of Chectuyoc which in the past employed a large number of comuneros is facing an economic crisis with a subsequent reduction in its labour force. This has had a direct

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25 In the 1940s, 500 comuneros worked for the textile mill of Chectuyoc. In 1973, 299 men were employed, in 1981 only 171 decreasing to 162 in 1982 and falling to 130 people in 1984.
effect on SAIS communities like Llallahui which have traditionally provided labour for the mill. Similarly, with regard to employment by the SAIS, 36 per cent of the households in Llallahui have had, at one point or another, one member working as a field labourer since valley communities are usually sources of seasonal labour. But, in 1984 only three men from the village had secured a permanent job within the enterprise. Currently, valley households cannot give up farming to become proletarians. This avenue is blocked to peasants because the transformation of land tenure into collectives has not created more productive and cash generating activities in the region. Thus, an apparent paradox is developing. On the one hand, unequal exchange and extension of commodity production force peasants into the labour market (Painter, 186:235). On the other hand, "the available options for earning income do not permit survival and reproduction in the absence of the subsidy provided by household production" (ibid).

The economic precariousness of the peasant household is transforming the nature of intra-community social relations. For example, inter-household cooperation based on ayni and minka has changed. Ayni which relies on labour exchange without remuneration, has been slowly replaced by minka—a practice that implies payment, cash or otherwise. Of the twelve households surveyed, all tended to use minka work instead of ayni among which eight relied as much on cash as remuneration in kind.

Conversion to evangelical Christianity is another alternative which reduces levels of consumption. For the poorest families, Evangelism relieves the household from the economic burden of costly events such as festival sponsorship. This protestant ethic rejects traditional community through the religious prohibition of fiesta sponsoring, trago.

26 Data from 1973 indicate that the farming communities of the Vilcanota Valley now belonging to SAIS Marangani were the major labour suppliers of the factory: Chectuyoc 136 workers (45.48%), Mamuera 7 (2.34%), Marangani 47 (15.72%), Huiscacani 4 (4.02%), Quisini 2 (0.66%) Ocobamba 9 (3.02%), Sullka 21 (7.02%), Cuyo 3 (1.00%), Llallahui 3 (1.00%), others 59 (19.74%) (in Villafuerte, 1974:2).
drinking, coca-chewing, dancing and even music. Such a new religious impetus, as can be expected, causes latent conflict among comuneros.

The extension of commodity relations in the cycle of household reproduction, increased competition for land and the growing need for cash lead to greater intra-community violence. Petty robbery, injuries and even death, usually by stabbing or poisoning, increasingly plague community life. Data from Questionnaire 1 show that 77 per cent of the respondents stated that personal vendettas and fights among comuneros over land boundaries and property rights are critical problems of the community. The most common concerns in Llallahui were identified as follows: 1) fights over land issues among comuneros; 2) high cost of living; and 3) low market value of agricultural produce. The drive to secure one's own land is particularly strong since there exists such an excess of unskilled unemployment. As Martinez-Alier states:

"Land hunger" comes from unemployment or from the risk of unemployment or from ill-paid employment. "Land hunger" is not a specifically "peasant" feeling. "Peasants" who are given good alternative employment lose their "land hunger"...and...rural people of all descriptions...desire land of their own in order to have an assured supply of food and an assured opportunity of work. They will cease to desire land if such things are assured to them in some other way (1973:29).

During my four month stay in Llallahui, I noted a great propensity for open conflict. Killings occurred primarily during festive occasions when heavy alcohol consumption led to unrestrained behaviour (Figure 20). A high incidence of death takes place in February during Carnival when people seek to reaffirm group solidarity through socializing, drinking and food sharing yet loose control of themselves allowing withheld frustrations to surface27.

27 The two murders I personally witnessed, one in Llallahui and the other at SAIS Marangani, happened during Carnivals.
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in 1983 Doña Marcella, wife of the president of Llallahui - Don Pedro, was poisoned during Carnival. I later came to know this family better than any other in Llallahui and was told by her sons in confidence that the mother's brother, out of envy and jealousy, had orchestrated the entire murder. However a year later, I was astonished to observe that this maternal uncle and his wife continued to be part of the late Doña Marcella's labour team at planting and harvest times. I learned that despite all the suffering this man had created, Don Pedro and his two sons did not want to jeopardize the unity of the family. All three men preferred a peaceful coexistence for, as one of them confided to me, "it is in our best interest to help each other". The data thus suggest that poverty and the nature of peasant economy maintain an ideology of cooperation which binds members together and exerts pressure for the re-establishing of peaceful relations, particularly among kin members. Unlike during festive occasions when the consumption of alcohol allows an excuse for the expression of heretofore unexpressed resentment, day-to-day behaviour tends to minimize the significance of social tension in order to preserve some sense of cooperation and greater security. Unavenged resolution is still preferred over open conflict. My observations, however, lead me to believe that the intensification of commodity production and the increased competition for land under the subsumption of household production could mean escalating violence within Andean communities like Llallahui.

4- Herding Communities: The Case of Quisini

Earlier we saw that communities such as Llallahui were not affected by land redistribution because of their loose relation to nearby haciendas. However, some more fortunate settlements such as Quisini received large tracts of land from contiguous estates which, over the years, had encroached on communal territory.
Figure 20. Women Drinking During Carnival
Quisini, a predominantly pastoral community near Llallahui, is located between 3,850 and 4,400 meters. In the past its economy was closely articulated to the hacienda production system with many of its residents working as hacienda feudatarios. Prior to reform, Quisini covered roughly 1,115 hectares of privately held land, 358 hectares of which were used for crop farming. At the time of the creation of SAIS Marangani, Pataquisini, formed with expropriated lands from three haciendas: Quecra, Tanihua and Choquecota, became integrated into the community of Quisini. As a result, Quisini considerably increased its area to 2,710 hectares by 1974. The people in Pataquisini became reform beneficiaries and now are the private owners of their land. The annexion of Pataquisini has substantially altered socio-economic differentiation within the community by affecting the size of holdings and herds. A 1980 study conducted by the Anthropology Department at the University San Antonio Abad del Cusco, shows that richer peasants, or 8% of the population, are emerging from the ranks of the ex-feudatarios (see Figure 21 and Table 44).

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28 Quisini's exact extension before the reform is not clear. In 1967, the Ministry of Agriculture mentions 1114. 34 hectares (Levantamiento topográfico, Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani, 1967) while in 1971, it was only 900 hectares (Oficina Cadastral Rural del Distrito de Marangani).
These richer peasants control some 16% of the farming land as well as 42% of the total grazing pastures. This category possesses 320 hectares of pasturelands and 4.79 hectares of farming land per family with herd sizes averaging some 330 head of adult alpaca, 44 sheep and 6 cattle. In 1966, this same group owned only 38 alpacas, 20 sheep and 5 cattle (Quispitupa Salinas, 1981)²⁹.

²⁹ The survey on land and herd sizes sampled 25 per cent of the 240 families registered as community members in Quisini.
Meanwhile, 18% of the population have medium-sized farms. They control 22% of the farming plots and 53.1% of pasturelands. Per household landholdings consist of some 180 hectares of grazing land and 2.72 hectares of cultivable land. Herd sizes typically include 99 alpacas, 29 sheep and 6 cattle as opposed to 28 alpaca, 23 sheep and 5 cattle in 1966.
On the other hand, poor peasants represent 74% of the population possessing 60% of the farming lands but only 4% of the pasturelands. Typically, household plots are 0.74 hectare of farming land and 4.24 hectares of pasture. In 1980, herd sizes among poor campesinos were in the order of 9 alpaca, 11 sheep and 3 cattle as opposed to 1 alpaca, 7 sheep and 2 cattle in 1966. Although these people now have access to farming land, this is of little economic value because it is control over pasture land which is crucial to the economy of Quisini residents.
Table 44: Quisini. Pre- and Post-Reform Peasant Plots and Herd Sizes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peasant Strata</th>
<th>1966</th>
<th>1980</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alpaca</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rich</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Quispitupa Salinas, ibid:81-83.

Figure 24. Herd Size & Socio-economic Differentiation, 1980

Source: Quispitupa Salinas (ibid).

Pre- and post-reform data suggests that differentiation has been exacerbated in Quisini. The overwhelming majority of the population, that is 74 per cent, still consists of minifundio holders. For these minuscule-plot cultivators, as for those in Llallahui, incorporation into the SAIS has not brought any substantial improvement in farm
production. Meanwhile the reform has clearly benefitted the middle peasantry who, in recent years, have trebled the size of their alpaca herds. Most importantly, however, it has favoured a handful of independent rich peasants who are now engaged in alpaca raising for the export market since herding remains the most expandable and readily marketable activity in this region. Evidence of the emergence of a rich peasant class is confirmed by the fact that this class is gradually employing more contract labourers from among poorer SAIS members (Quispitupa Salinas, ibid:95). For example, 58% of the Llallauhui universe sampled in Questionnaire 2, were working through minka for Quisini peasants.

Quisini’s stronger post reform economic position leads to increased social tension within Marangani. According to Llallauhui residents, rich Quisini peasants have adopted a very lordly attitude towards their poorer peers: "They are becoming as abusive as the old hacendados" and are emerging as a strong political force within the SAIS by attempting to monopolize the governing body of the cooperative. For these ambitious peasants, the cooperative represents a political arena for economic mobility.

5-Inequality Within the SAIS: Potential for Conflict

a-Splits Among the Peasantry

SAIS profit has not been equally distributed among valley communities and puna production sectors with the former having a leading advantage over the latter. Two major areas of inequality exist: political representation within the SAIS and share of SAIS benefits.

Communities and pastoral units are unevenly represented in the SAIS delegate assembly and this works to the detriment of puna herders. Although puna pastoral units

30 In Marangani, it is generally believed that Quisini's rich peasants will eventually take over the cooperative.
comprise the most dynamic surplus generating areas of the enterprise because their labour input is for SAIS production, the political participation of *puna* members is less significant than that of *comuneros*. According to the law, pastoral settlements are only entitled to elect three delegates while communities can have up to six.

Under the SAIS system, each of the communities is legally entitled to a part of the profit to be used for investment in their local infrastructure. The extent of cash grants to the communities can be appreciated in Table 45. By contrast, the portion allotted to the actual SAIS herders living in the *sectores de producción* is apparently distributed among workers through salary increase. Unfortunately, these shepherds see their income as a pittance and resent the communities for not contributing labour but absorbing all the profit made by the work performed by the SAIS livestock personnel.

**Table 45: Cash Grants Allocated to the Communities: 1975-1981**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount in Soles</th>
<th>Equivalence in $ US</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>465.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>522.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>2,983.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>1,520.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>2,636,000</td>
<td>976.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SAIS Marangani

Currency equivalents:

*Currency equivalents are missing for 1978, 1979, 1980.*

31 With this type of funds, Llálahui built its communal center including the grocery store (S/7 million) and the roof of the school house (S/800,000.00).
With the SAIS cash grants, communities can enhance their living conditions. Meanwhile, only recently have the high puna sectors of Quenamari, Chihihuia and Toxaccota received some limited funds for improved housing conditions.

Similarly, in the field of transportation, priority goes to communities. For instance, the route from Sicuani to Marangani and Ocobamba has improved considerably thanks to the acquisition by the SAIS of three new buses servicing the valley several times daily. On the other hand, the traditional socio-cultural isolation of the herders as formerly fostered by the haciendas has been maintained in the pastoral regions. SAIS's assistance and investments into those sectors have always been minimal and usually favours the lower puna settlements over the higher ones (Caso 1981:41). No new roads have been built, although in Uyucani and Antaccaca, bridges were restored.

Education facilities have considerably improved in the valley but not in the puna. The Ocobamba-Quisini-Llallahui educational centre was completed in 1975. At the end of the 1960s, 68 per cent of the population of Marangani were illiterate. According to the Ministry of Education statistics, by 1982 illiteracy had dropped to 19 per cent in this valley.

In the pastoral units not only are roads poor, settlements neglected, but illiteracy is still at a level of 70 per cent (Vegas, 1986:15). Only recently, the SAIS improved educational facilities in Toxaccota, Choqueccota and Quenarami and has partly funded a puna literacy program called COZOCOMUNAL or Comite Zonal de Coordinación Multisectoral de Alfabetización (Zonal Committee for the Multisectoral Coordination of Literacy). However, there exists a definite economic connection between the lack of educational facilities in the pastoral units and the necessity for the SAIS to secure labour for herding.

Animal raising is an extremely labour intensive activity requiring the work of women and children as well as that of the men. In a region like the high puna where labour shortage is a constant concern, it is not surprising that the SAIS is not too keen on supporting peasant education. It seems to me that education is neglected since sending peasant children to
school could potentially set constraints on the household working capacity and lead to possible decrease in productivity.

Unequal representation and redistribution of benefits exacerbates already existing tension dating back to hacienda days. SAIS shepherds are ex-hacienda tenants and as such have traditionally been considered by local comuneros as an undesirable group. Prior to reform, they lacked access to their own land and their waqcho herds grazing on hacienda pastures were regarded as encroaching on land that communities considered to be theirs (see Skar, 1981:83). It appears that the creation of SAIS Marangani has antagonized the situation between colonos and comuneros even more than during pre-reform times.

b- Sex Relations

SAIS policy have maintained wide disparities existing between the sexes. Women do not have individual rights as beneficiaries of the SAIS. Political participation is strictly a male domain. No women participated in the three major meetings of the SAIS that I witnessed. Even formal social activities that took place at the head quarters were clearly demarcated according to sex. For example, on February 4 1983 when the SAIS celebrated its tenth anniversary, no women attended the evening party - the men preferred to enjoy the fiesta among themselves. Consequently, awareness about the concerns, needs and viewpoints of women is sorely lacking in Marangani. The SAIS considers as marginal women's full time contribution to herding in the pastoral sectors. For example, the shepherd's wife and children have the status of ancas or helpers. Though women feed, graze and provide animal care, their work is unremunerated and their basic social needs ignored, i.e. unlike their husband, they are not entitled to free medical care or social benefits covered by the National Social Security Plan (IPSS). In the valley, peasant women face similar hardships.
The SAIS has maintained pre-reform discriminatory hiring practices in agriculture based on prevailing sexual stereotypes. Within their own community, women suffer from little recognition and, in principle, male *comuneros* look down upon female contributions to farming. On disparities in wages, men say: "*a las mujeres siempre se da la mitad del salario porque con ellas no avanza el trabajo*" (women are paid half of a salary because work does not progress fast with them), or else: "*Casi nunca solicitamos el trabajo de mujer con salario porque trabajan poco*" (In cash labour we almost never want of a female because women work little). Where women are employed as field workers by the SAIS, their salary is drastically lower than that of men. In 1983, for a day of work males were paid S/1,500.00 and females S/1,000.00. That is a woman was making 66 per cent of a man's wage. In the mid 1970s a typical male's wage was S/70.00 while a woman's was S/55.00. This represents 78.57 per cent of the male's wage. While this undervaluation of female labour indicates the low status of women it also shows that they are harder hit in a poor economy where there is little impetus to maintain salary parity. Further, though it is stated in the SAIS legislation that women are not supposed to do *faneas* (free *corvée* work), the administration uses them as cooks and occasionally as field workers whenever no other family members are available.

The creation of the cooperative has had little positive impact on the quality of day-to-day living for women. The SAIS has taken no steps to protect their livelihood. Wife battering is severe especially with the high rate of alcoholism prevailing in the countryside. Frequent pregnancies, lack of education and medical care have significant implications not only for women but for the entire peasant household.

Further, male literacy is more advanced than female. Consequently, the data on Table 46 indicate a growing gap occurring between educated men and illiterate women (1,779 illiterate women as opposed to 651 men in 1983) contributing decisively to cultural differentiation among household members.
Women perceive themselves as hard working people. In Marangani and Llallahui, the women I knew assumed a fatalistic world view. To them, it was a woman’s lot to work, suffer and have a difficult life. For example, I noted with great surprise that, to a certain extent, women regarded wife beating as “normal” male behaviour. One of my old female informants summarized community sentiment toward such conduct:

My husband always beat me up because of the loss of something in the house. Usually, it was when he was drunk. Sometimes he had no reason to be violent. But I was happy and content with my husband. We got along well. Fights are normal.

On February 24 and 25 1986, MERIS sponsored a meeting of women representatives from the eleven SAIS communities held in Marangani to discuss ways to improve the situation of smallholder households. The meeting was attended by ten male comuneros, ten MERIS experts and sixty female community delegates. Female delegates identified a number of basic needs and urgent problems affecting the quality of female life in their villages, among these, problems related to agriculture, water, health and education. Women spoke up for improved irrigation systems, an urgent need for drinkable water, better bank credits for smallholders and more accessible technical assistance to farmers.

32 MERIS is a German-Peruvian development project whose seat is in Sicuani.

33 Participants came from the following communities: Mumuera 4, Quisini 3, Huascachani 2, Chectuyoc 5, Huayllapuncu 3, Sicuani 1, Llallahui 4, Ccuyo 4, Sulca 7, Accota 1, Ccaycco 7, Huancchocca 5, Ccochapatata 4, Marangani 2.
They asked for a less discriminatory market system for their produce. They expressed concerns on existing health, education and social services that are lacking in the communities and showed a deep interest in improved birth control methods. They also wanted more protection for widows. The report of the meeting clearly indicated that women were aware of the issues at stake. This workshop showed that gradually peasant women are coming out of their silence and are more willing to directly express their grievances. This was certainly influenced by the fact that, since reform, women have become more knowledgeable about their social environment through community general assemblies. Wives have increasingly participated in the decision-making process in lieu of their too often absent husbands. As a result, they are starting to acquire participatory skill and public confidence and their voice is becoming stronger in public.

6-Summary:

To sum up, it would be misleading to regard the creation of SAIS Marangani as a move towards collectivization of production. In the communities, actual production remains entirely in the hands of individual households; in the punas, private waqcho livestock still constitute the main part of peasant incomes. The primary goals of the SAIS is to maximize profit but keep costs low. The existence and growth of such capitalist production means the exploitation of labour through the continuance of non-capitalist forms of production. In outlying punas, anca labour and waqcho herds lessen the need for the enterprise to pay adequate wages to reproduce labour. In the valley, Minifundistas's wages can remain below subsistence since crop farmers produce their subsistence on their own plots. As we see, peasant poverty and low productivity come first and foremost from social structures derived from peripheral capitalism which inhibit development. A land reform program which is more concerned with economic development than social equity perpetuates agrarian problems.
Increasingly, the membership becomes aware of their subordinate position within a larger exploitative society. Their frustration could, in the near future, lead to escalating unrest as certain elements of the peasantry discover that they have been deceived. Sendero Luminoso, the "Shining Path" is gaining support in the district of Marangani as more peasants, unable to find jobs in the cities and struggle for subsistence in agriculture, feel increasing sympathy for the guerillas. In 1983, the installations of la Raya - an alpaca raising experimental farm affiliated to SAIS Marangani was blown up. The Police station in Marangani has been attacked several times over recent years. Given the socio-economic context of the region today, violence is likely to rise considerably in the area.
CHAPTER 7

Conclusions

The new empirical evidence presented here enables a better assessment of whether President Velasco's agrarian reform bill has achieved its economic objectives of growth and income distribution for the benefit of the rural population as well as its political goals of gaining peasant support and depoliticizing rural society. These two ethnographic analyses also clarify the nature and direction of the transformation of agriculture taking place in southern Cusco. Further, an intra-regional approach illustrates the important role of state policies to Andean communities. In valleys of the provincias altas such as Marangani where peasants are directly involved in the international economic system, the reform has encouraged capitalist production creating new forms of social differentiation among reform beneficiaries without their complete separation from the land. On the other hand, in more remote and domestic foodstuff producing regions such as Ccapacmarca, the reformist policies of the state have reduced the insurrectionary potential of local communities by "re-peasantizing" the subsistence sector. Though adjudication of household lands occurred, social relations remain rather unchanged in part as a result of the continuance of gamonalism.

1-Observations on the SAIS Model

Local differences in production orientation were key variables in determining the nature of regional state reform policies. In order to increase badly needed foreign currency reserves the state gave priority to export-oriented regions. Districts such as Marangani became the seat of state-run collectives primarily because their economy responded to the military's export-production approach to development. That is, the state concentrated its infusions of goods and services in rural regions where it was possible to expand
commercial agriculture with a minimum of risk. Therefore, the pursuit of agricultural modernization under strong state intervention was marked by notable regional differences with the domestic food-producing sector receiving little if any credit and infrastructural support.

Undoubtedly, capitalist agriculture has been strengthened in the SAIS sector. However, the SAIS model could not be described as functioning efficiently. These collectives are weakened by their dependence on official institutions such as banks for credit and loans and by state demands and control. Not only are they responsible for reimbursing the government for the cost of land expropriation, but a large part of their earnings has been absorbed by social security payments and payments of other services. SAIS Marangani, though capitalist in nature, has not completed the disintegration of non-capitalist forms of production such as w'aqcho herds, ancäs and faenas. This persistence of archaic forms of social relations is, according to Long and Roberts; characteristic of capitalist enterprises functioning within a context of peripheral economies:

This is the process, for example, that Marx (1972:816-18) described in his account of primary accumulation in the European countries and of the formal (as opposed to the real) subsumption of labour to capital. In the absence of an established and generalized free labour market, capitalist enterprise developed strategies of subordinating labour that included coercion and state legislation. Where these latter strategies are not so possible, then paternalistic ties and non-wage incentives are used (1984:91).

Such non-waged forms of labour act as crucial mechanisms to exploit wage labourers and are keys to the expansion of export agriculture. The continuance of non capitalist forms of production, thus, lessens a need for the SAIS to pay adequate wages for the reproduction of labour.

The setting up of SAIS Marangani has led to a reorganization of social relations with more pronounced socio-economic differentiation. Landlordism was eradicated but a
new rural elite is emerging from the ranks of the SAIS administration and its membership.

We saw that state officials are office holders who use their position to accumulate wealth at the expense of peasant members - a process reinforcing rural differentiation. SAIS authorities tend to exercise not only full control over the enterprise but also over local society. Increasingly, within collectives such as Marangani, there exists among members an overwhelming feeling of powerlessness perceived to be directly linked to the elite-oriented organization that prevails within SAISs. The situation of Peruvian collectives parallels that of Mexican ejidos.

Corruption reinforces processes of differentiation within the land reform communities (ejidos). Whilst poor ejidatarios themselves feel that they are basically 'peónes', deprived of all autonomy in the productive process save the option of working little, selling fertiliser on the black market, or bribing the insurance inspectors to award them a spurious harvest failure (Gledhill, 1985:48).

Though Andean collectives have enabled greater peasant autonomy than was possible under traditional landlordism they have, nevertheless, prevented rural producers from using their new status as members in productive ways. These small scale farmers have had no share in resource control nor in the decision making process since popular political participation is restricted under mandate of social control enforced by the SAIS. This political role of collectives, namely to keep a lid on the countryside, fundamentally contradicts their economic and ideological role - an ambiguity that tends to weaken their profit making ability and to engender economic dysfunction.

Meanwhile, within the membership, a complex process of internal as well as external differentiation is taking place. For instance, the creation of SAIS Marangani has expanded wage labour, reinforced rural dependence on cash employment by not providing financial support to subsistence farmers and consolidated a modern domestic market-oriented agriculture within the region. While a shrinking proportion of the SAIS shepherds
are becoming part of the permanent labour force, an increasingly large number of peasants from affiliated communities are forced to sell their labour as unskilled workers and casual, underpaid SAIS labourers.

Affiliated cropping communities like Llallahui, with, prior to reform, no direct connection to any local wool exporting haciendas, received no additional land from expropriation. Gradually, thus, residents of such a community have to complement their income with cash employment as their tiny plots can no longer cover the consumption needs of their family. With staple agriculture being secondary to herding, Marangani's cropping communities are now witnessing a rapid process of commoditization and semi-proletarianization. While the relations of production are increasingly based on wage labour, the complete separation of these small scale producers from their land is unlikely. That is, minifundio production subsidizes labour by exploiting local peasants at below subsistence wages. Further, a surplus labour has been created and not absorbed by the agro-sector. With Peru undergoing a serious economic crisis, an eroded minifundio production system will persist alongside continuing semi-proletarianization. As discussed in Chapter 2, this situation represents what Bernstein (1977) calls "the simple reproduction squeeze" which refers to the effects of commodity relations on the economy of peasant households.

Meanwhile, the more mixed local economies such as that of Quisini are better off because of their stronger economic foothold based on herding. However, what is more likely to occur in Quisini, rather than in Llallahui, is the development of an incipient class of progressive farmers who were awarded large tracts of land and are now able to raise alpaca herds commercially. Interestingly, this empirical situation confirms Caballero's observation that commitment to livestock rather than farming enables internal accumulation and, therefore, further differentiation from within (1984:24). However, in Marangani a "belt of poverty" is emerging along the Vilcanota River where farming communities increasingly
depend on hard to obtain wage labour while still finding it necessary to maintain their subsistence, family farms for reproduction.

Escalating differentiation, prompted by state intervention in the export oriented rural economy, has exacerbated tensions conducive to polarization and unrest. Conflicting aspirations within the membership have led to sharper antagonism between herding sectors and SAIS authorities who have replaced previous landlords. In the southern Andes, tension is also increasing between puna sectors and affiliated communities. Obviously, by creating two types of beneficiaries, (ex-hacienda tenants becoming permanent SAIS shepherds and valley comuneros having a share of the SAIS profit but also likely to become casual workers), collectives have reactivated old social cleavages that have traditionally existed between Andean comuneros and ex-feudatorios. Increasingly, frustrated SAIS shepherds are aware of the inequalities between themselves and the rest of the membership. The elimination of landlords and of traditional forms of paternalism in the production units may encourage a maturation of class consciousness among shepherds directed against the SAIS administration and, as well, against valley comuneros.

Further, it would be misleading to regard the creation of SAISs as a move towards collectivization of production. Though collectives redistribute part of their profit to the membership, their agri-business orientation make them quintessentially capitalist aiming at profit maximization through low production cost. The SAIS model emerged not out of socialist policies, but rather from the logic of peripheral capitalism; it is a device that stimulates export-led production, paves the way to expanding commercial farming in the southern Andes and promotes commoditization. As Petras states: "Insofar as the state and economy remain in the hands of the capitalist class, a peasant based agrarian reform is doomed to reproduce the class relations and differences inherent to the rest of society" (1981:31).
Collectives centered around agro-export have taken over productive resources such as land, labour, credit, technical assistance at the expense of domestic food production. Thus, instead of addressing the underlying dualism of the economy they have accentuated it. In fact, we see a deepening of this dualism with greater subordination of the rural productive apparatus to national and international agri-business. The failure of the SAIS model is representative of the subordinate integration of the highlands into national economy. SAISs have become mere bureaucratic channels through which the state oversees the Andean peasantry.

2-Observations Derived From Ccapacmarca's Case Study

A radically different process seems to be at work in Ccapacmarca. Oriented towards domestic meat production, this district has remained traditionally more marginal to national politics. President Velasco's land reform bill has only accentuated this marginalization by not creating state-run collectives in non export-led regions. Excluded from the international trade market, the province of Chumbivilcas as a whole has remained outside the reach of state support and infrastructure and consequently becomes further subordinated, as an outlying rural region, to the mainstream of Andean economy.

In the district of Ccapacmarca, land redistribution to individual households came about as a political response to earlier peasant revolts. Adjudication played a crucial role in consolidating rather than dissolving the smallholding system and in elevating peasants from the status of peón to that of private holder. Inequality in land size and in access to strategically located plots has persisted but in a less pronounced form. However, by failing to eradicate gamonalismo, state policies have indirectly prevented change in social relations and, thus, enabled the maintenance of pre-reform patterns of exploitation. Since reform, the landed class has, in fact, strengthened its position through access to new sources of power in forms such as schoolteaching and animal rustling. These power domains constitute
covert mechanisms for the political neutralization of the peasantry. Meanwhile, small cultivators are unable to accumulate and, thus, to become competitive.

The case of Ccapacmarca suggests that an examination of state interventionism in the rural sector enables a decoding of the political dimension of concrete local phenomena. In this instance, it clarifies the covert political significance of teaching and rustling through which the landed elite redefines and reinforces its power contradicting the prevailing belief of authors like Montoya who hold that *gamonalismo* is dead in Peru: "The former ideological and cultural dominance of the *gamonales* is being frontally challenged by every political sector in the country, and the land seizures have dealt the *coup de grace*" (1982:68). This case study thus demonstrates that, in outlying regions where *gamonalismo* was deeply entrenched and where state-structures were weak, *gamonal* bosses have managed to preserve the status quo.

An eloquent sign of the persistence of traditional power relationships in the area is found in the relative political "tranquility" of Ccapacmarca, yet surrounded by zones of high *Sendero Luminoso* activism: The absence of any significant unrest in the district seems the result of several factors: 1) fulfillment of peasants' desire for land ownership; 2) the elite's effective use of counter-reform strategies; and 3) the sharing by the elite and peasants alike of a common Chumbivilcan identity expressed through *q'orilazo* whose traditionalist ideology legitimates the past as "authentic culture" - a discourse which ultimately impedes the development of a social consciousness among the peasantry.

One of the most striking aspects of these unchanging social relations in Ccapacmarca was confirmed by the 1980 presidential elections. Abstentionism was high: 45.7% of the votes were blank. Of the 54.3% which were valid votes, 44.8 % supported the governing populist party *Acción Popular* with Fernando Belaunde as president while
32% of the remaining votes went to the left which represents only some 15% of the total. This expression of conservatism is an indication of continuity in the political structure.

3-Implications of the Reform for Peru

As can be noticed, Peru's land reform has had an ambiguous and uneven impact on the rural sector. On a national scale, it failed to give rise to a more progressive and dynamic agrarian structure conducive to growth and development. Instead, the new law has led to greater development of capitalist agriculture in previously well integrated enclaves such as Marangani and to overall stagnation in the subsistence sector. For many communities, the law acted as a double-edged sword: land titles became more secure but it left peasants more subordinate to commodity production yet without any steady job in the productive apparatus of the national economy.

Furthermore, the consolidation of smallholdings did not imply a return of the household to a self-sufficient economy. On the contrary, the minifundio sector is increasingly squeezed, impoverished and subordinate to an unreliable labour market. Pushed out of agriculture by disintegration of non-capitalist relations, these minifundistas are compelled to seek cash employment at a time when Peru is experiencing economic collapse - a process described by Manuel Ulloa (Belaúnde's ex-finance minister in 1983) as the worst crisis of the century for the country (Reid, 1985:88). Given the socio-economic context of Peru, the future of the southern Andean peasantry seems to lie in greater exploitation and marginalization. This is in agreement with Caballero's statement: "the peasantry will go on existing, always at levels of extreme poverty, while adjusting to the changes introduced by capitalist development and occupying an increasingly marginal place within the economy as a whole" (1984:30).
Evidence, therefore, does not support the argument of a general disappearance of the peasantry in the *provincias altas*. On the contrary, a heterogeneous agrarian class structure is emerging showing that agrarian transformation is multilinear. It is a selective process integral to peripheral capitalist development and mediated by state intervention into the agricultural sector. Consequently, the picture that emerges out of this southern Andean situation refutes a formulation of classic differentiation whereby capitalism exhibits a universal tendency toward forcing direct producers off the land by transforming them automatically into a rural proletariat. Instead, observation suggests that for the foreseeable future peasants will unlikely be fully separated from their traditional means of production, the land, to reproduce labour.

The examples of Marangani and Ccapacmarca carry implications for the way we comprehend the social relations between Andean peasant economies and Peru's peripheral capitalism. This thesis argues that an understanding of peasant differentiation is highlighted by examining the role of the state in restructuring local social relations through policies such as land reform. Rural differentiation calls for a perspective that locates the main forces of change in the nature of state policies. The example of Peru indicates that, under President Velasco, the state played an active and crucial role in strengthening the links with international markets and, thus, facilitating the growth of capitalist agriculture. This resulted in the further entrenchment of small scale producers into capitalism through exploitation of wage labour. Kearney's comments on Mexico are applicable to Peru:

Capitalist development has arrived at some sort of equilibrium of semiproteterarianization, because, as commercial agricultural production in Mexico is increasingly directed to foreign markets, the incentives for the state to see the peasantry as
In addition to examining the role of the state, this thesis argues that a better understanding of contemporary peasantry under peripheral capitalism also requires analyses of concrete situations. Land reform programs reflect the extent to which state interventionism in the rural sector can lead to complex changes in social relations. A perspective based on concrete case studies is crucial to gain sharper and richer information on the nature of such changes in the countryside. Furthermore, peasant social differentiation cannot always be understood on an economic level alone. A contextualization of social relations is necessary so that the empirical role played by ecological factors, cultural values and even ideological systems could be pursued in examining processes of de-peasantization and re-peasantization.

At the level of policy-making, the fact that an impoverished smallholding sector continues to exist casts strong doubt on the adequacy of land reform as generally conceived by developing nation-states and international agencies. Usually, land reform programs implemented under peripheral capitalism have primarily encouraged the production of commodities for export. This has led to a chronic food shortage in many Third World countries. Given the cost of importing food staples, these nations are now faced with unmanageable foreign debts creating, as a result, terrible hardship on their population and inevitably leading to political instability. Therefore, it seems evident that the first step to successful rural development lies in the promotion of domestic food production for national self-sufficiency. This means to provide the smallholding sector with necessary inputs and credits (Bernstein, 1983:20-21).

Finally, the issue of land reform can no longer be that of inadequate tenurial systems, but also that of the particular mechanisms of exploitation and surplus extraction.
which, under peripheral capitalism, affect peasants in the process of food production. 

Petras emphasizes this point in the following terms:

The transformation of the peasantry (small holders, tenants etc.) into a predominantly wage labor force within the nexus of capital growth enterprises has made demands for agrarian reform anachronistic... The problem today is not to redistribute land but to socialize the agro-industrial sector. To redivide the land is to revert to an earlier form of organization of production which undermines the development of the productive forces” (1981:30).

5-Recent Trends

Land reform has not neutralized the class struggle in the Andes. Recently, Peru's rural crisis has reached a critical point marked by spiralling violence. Profound structural changes in the economic and political system created conflict of interest between SAIS political authorities and affiliated communities. Increasingly, the forces of peasant discontent are being unleashed as the national economy worsens and as the agrarian crisis becomes more desperate. Already repercussions are manifest in the local support that some elements within the peasantry are giving to Sendero Luminoso. In Marangani, Sendero sympathizers are increasing. The district is now under close military scrutiny and considered to be an important bastion of guerilla activity. What is taking place in that area is similar to Huancavelica where Favre (Cited in Berg, 1987:168) has observed that Sendero support derived from a stratum of subsistence farmers who can no longer survive from agriculture but can neither find work in the cities. Thus, deprived of a livelihood, they become attracted to the messianic appeal of Sendero.

If the rationale behind the implementation of the reform was to deactivate the rural fuse as Alderson-Smith (1976) suggested, then the spiralling violence that has shaken rural Peru over the last seven years reflects the government failure to grasp the political implications of its own action. Guerilla activism is spreading nationwide, the CCP or
Peruvian Peasant Confederation, though not legal, is resurging and the CNA or "Confederación Nacional Agraria" is becoming more militant. Cooperatives designed according to the model of traditional Andean collectives in the hope of gaining support by giving peasants nominal ownership to land have failed to achieve their political mandate. Instead, they created a climate propitious for violent popular mobilization and, in the process, have revived a communal ideology of past ayllu that peasants, on the verge of pauperization, now invoke to unite against the state.

The voice of peasant discontent is becoming louder and increasingly more violent. In the coca-growing jungle, Sendero sympathizers and drug traffickers are increasingly united against the government. In the sierra, renewed rural mobilization appears to take a more typical revolutionary tone. Agrarian contradictions as expressed by the collective model have provided the framework for current peasant unrest. They are giving rise to a popular anti-reform that in Peru's present political climate could conceivably become more radical. This anti-reform movement, as opposed to the gomonal's counter-reform, springs from below and grows out of the collectivist trend begun by President Velasco. Its ideology is progressive and forward looking arising from peasant demands for political power.

State-run enterprises initially sought to promote peasant participation in decision-making. However, their operations have demonstrated an unwillingness to share power with the membership. As a result, profound popular frustrations have developed into a radicalization of stance within the beneficiaries who, in recent years, have become more aware of their exclusion from the national political process.

The challenge to the existence of SAIs as found in Puno has become the most advanced battlefront of this popular anti-reform movement centering on land and power. Its revolutionary momentum will primarily depend upon the links peasant leaders could maintain with leftist parties and the urban intelligencia at the regional and national level. But it will also depend on the peasant ability to remain an independent political force of its own...
outside Serdero's influence. If this latter condition is not fulfilled, then brutal military repression of the civilian population will undoubtedly result. However, if a radical and independent peasant movement emerges, it could meaningfully induce structural change that would benefit the Andean peasantry.

Since the mid-seventies, Peru has entered a new era of social and economic decay. Food prices are constantly increasing while purchasing power is sharply eroding as the Sol loses in value (in 1986 exceeding S/17,000.00 to the US dollar). There are many exogenous factors accounting for the country's problems, among which world recession, worsening terms of trade and an enormous national foreign debt. However, observers increasingly regard the agricultural sector as a major domestic factor of political instability. It has become apparent that the 1969 land reform, though designed to accelerate economic growth, has not had the desired beneficial effect on development. Modern rural problems show the weakness of a reform model designed to strengthen export revenue areas at the expense of those dedicated to food production for the domestic market. The need for serious rethinking of agrarian strategies becomes increasingly evident in light of the current crisis. Trapecio Andino (the newly conceived APRA rural project), which initially attempted to develop the southern Andean region, now seems to have phased out. Thus, growing political turmoil should be anticipated.

The response of the present APRA government to the peasant crisis will have drastic consequence for the nation as a whole. At this stage, government must realize that there is an urgent need to keep peasants producing basic foodstuffs for self-sufficiency. Agrarian policies have so far been dysfunctional. A development approach that reinforces peasant marginalization weakens the national economy and ultimately damages the peripheral state apparatus.
One way to improve the situation and keep the lid on social tensions is to increase production by re-investing capital in the rural sector. The transformation of the domestic sector into a dynamic economy calls for income equalization and greater peasants' control over productive resources. An alternative strategy would presumably consists in a massive transfer of resources from the industrial to the agricultural sector in order to drastically alter the subordinate position of the countryside vis-à-vis the urban centres. It means redirecting public funds into the countryside so that migration towards the cities comes to an end. It also means better infrastructure for marketing produce and improved price policies aiming at encouraging campesino interest in production rather than supporting the urban consumers.

Further, the issue of peasant poverty is increasingly more political than economic. Smallholders want to assume a new political role and be the masters of their own affairs - a call clearly expressed in popular anti-reform initiatives such as the Puno agrarian movement. There, frustrated peasants want to take political decision-making away from SAIS authorities and national government and become increasingly impatient with national and local elites whose promises are regarded as mere exercise in rhetoric and demagogy. Violence is spreading because the Peruvian state is shifting once again in favour of the elite and peasant demands, as in the past, continue to be ignored. President's García's difficulty of controlling mounting violence suggests military intervention or full-scale guerrilla war in the near future.
APPENDICES

Appendix 1, Canchis

c- State Enterprises in Canchis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Enterprises</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Area in hectares</th>
<th>Households</th>
<th>% of Families</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAP Tiquina</td>
<td>Checacupe</td>
<td>529.00</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>13.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP Quehuar</td>
<td>Sicsani</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS Marangani</td>
<td>Marangani</td>
<td>5,427.20</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>20.17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Communal Cooperatives (land adjudicated to communities collectively)

| Machocomarca    | Tinta        | 37.78            | 300        | 0.11         |
| Gangalli        | Checacupe    | 1,329.00         | 299        | 4.44         |
| Santa Barbara   | San Pablo    | 95.00            | 118        | 8.07         |
| Pampachiri      | Pitumarca    | 1,261.00         | 238        | 5.59         |
| Callanca        | San Pablo    | 8,381.00         | 164        | 51.10        |
| Lituyo          | San Pablo    | 1,495.00         | 120        | 12.45        |
| Chapichumo      | Sicsani      | 1,205.62         | 52         | 23.18        |
| Pampaphall      | Sicsani      | 55.62            | 623        | 0.09         |
| Pampa Ansa      | Sicsani      | 74.97            | 329        | 0.22         |
| Yurcca Kunka    | Sicsani      | 42.50            | 92         | 0.46         |
| Cheecupe        | Checacupe    | 6.00             | 325        | 0.02         |
| Occobamba       | Marangani    | 5.60             | 207        | 0.02         |
| Sutoq           | Checacupe    | 618.15           | 128        | 4.82         |
| Pampachiri      | Pitumarca    | 13,031.38        | 271        | 48.08        |
| Quehuar          | Sicsani      | 189.60           | 412        | 0.46         |
| CAP San Pablo   |              | 20.00            |            |              |
| **TOTAL**       |              | **79,110.42**    | **6,216**  | **12.76**    |

Source: Dirección Regional de Agricultura e Alimentación, Reforma Agraria, 1980.

b-Adjudication of Land Transfers to SAIS Marangani

Phase 1: Order Number: 2049-73

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<th>Cultivable</th>
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<th>Construction</th>
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<th>Value</th>
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<td>Area</td>
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<tr>
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### Phase 2: Order Number: 3795-73

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<th>Construction</th>
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<th>Value</th>
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<td>Sallatira</td>
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<td>Quechamampa</td>
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### Phase 3: Order Number: 1731-75

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<th>Pasture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
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<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>Huara</td>
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### Phase 4: Order Number: 0080-77

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<th>Pasture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Total in Has</th>
<th>Value</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choqueccota</td>
<td>1,877.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,877.00</td>
<td>750,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choqueccota/Alpaquera</td>
<td>1,864.00</td>
<td>0.38</td>
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<td>1,864.38</td>
<td>750,000.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uyuni</td>
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### Phase 5: Order Number 1543-77

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<th>Pasture</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Total in Has</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Choqueccota</td>
<td>745.75</td>
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c-Adjudication of Animals to SAIS Marangani

### Phase 1: Order Number 2049

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Property</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Alpaca</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Value (soles)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Uyucani</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>1,651</td>
<td>1,328</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>Property</td>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>Alpaca</td>
<td>Horses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casuera</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>46</td>
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<td>Puscaylluma</td>
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<td>Trinidad</td>
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<td>Chuabaniba</td>
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<td>Chacapacha</td>
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<td>Huayllata</td>
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<td>Chilihuia</td>
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<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Value (soles)</th>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Huasiccata/</td>
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<td>Molino Callepata 5</td>
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Phase 4: Order Number 0080 (no animal adjudication)

Phase 5: Order Number 1543

<table>
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<th>Property</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Alpaca</th>
<th>Horses</th>
<th>Value (soles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lurucachi</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>148</td>
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<td></td>
<td>214,738.83</td>
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</table>

TOTAL 282 5,682 20,717 24 13,702,677.04

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani 1982
d-SAIS Marangani Operating Budget 1982

1-Animal Production: 1979-1980

Livestock Production: SAIS Marangani

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Alpacas</th>
<th>Sheep</th>
<th>Cattle</th>
<th>Value in Soles</th>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>11,212,875.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>4,589</td>
<td>220</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>29,000</td>
<td>5,758</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>34,534,317.00</td>
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<td>1976</td>
<td>33,082</td>
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<td>371</td>
<td>38,263,202.00</td>
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<td>1977</td>
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<td>6,452</td>
<td>441</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>44,869</td>
<td>7,324</td>
<td>442</td>
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<td>1979</td>
<td>51,675</td>
<td>7,250</td>
<td>366</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>53,525</td>
<td>6,809</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>52,132,827.00</td>
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</table>

Source: SAIS Marangani, Archives

2- Revenues in Soles

Livestock sales including wool, skin and by-produc 479,370,750.00
Agricultural produce 17,521,200.00
Peltry produce 5,736,200.00
Pasture rental 3,556,447.00
Transport service 14,984,160.00
Freight 64,505,240.00
SAIS grocery store 13,896,000.00
SAIS dining service 7,850,670.00
TOTAL 606,003,167.00

3- Expenses in Soles

Permanent labor 50,238,879.00
Hired labor 270,529,116.00
Management fringe benefits 42,215,860.00
Debt Repayments 66,901,282.00
Social security and workers' pension plan 46,771,408.00
Accident insurance 6,016,121.00
FONAVI 14,031,422.00
Seeds, fertilisers, chemicals 22,778,790.00
Indemnities 1,596,215.00
Christmas bonuses 14,716,500.00
Community benefits 15,400,000.00
Workers' benefits 26,716,500.00
Operating costs, improvements etc 35,000,000.00
TOTAL 631,062,293.00
DEFICIT 25,059,126.00

Source: SAIS Marangani
### Communities and Households in SAIS Marangani's Communities, 1978

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communities</th>
<th># Inhabitants</th>
<th># Households</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cuyo</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ccayocco</td>
<td>555</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huancocca</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llallahu</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>101</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sulca</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chetuyocc</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>212</td>
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<tr>
<td>Huiscachani</td>
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<td>139</td>
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<td>Mamuera</td>
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<td>234</td>
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<tr>
<td>Silly</td>
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<td>110</td>
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<td>Quisini</td>
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<td>213</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ocobamba</td>
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**TOTAL**  
9,011 2,005

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani.

### List of Interviews: 1983-1984

<table>
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<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length (minutes)</th>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>28/03/1983</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Community authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10/04/1983</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>BB</td>
<td>Ex-hacendado/</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mayor of Marangani in 1984</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17/04/1983</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Head of education committee</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(SAIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>01/03/1984</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>President of Ocobamba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>03/03/1984</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>EM</td>
<td>SAIS Herder</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>12/03/1984</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>JCC</td>
<td>Administrative staff (SAIS)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20/03/1984</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>RV</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Sicuani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>12/04/1984</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Livestock coordinator (SAIS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12/04/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>JQS</td>
<td>Teacher, president of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>the Human Right Committee,</td>
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<td>Sicuani</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>14/03/1984</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>DA and NB</td>
<td>Female administrative staff</td>
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<td>(SAIS Marangani)</td>
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</table>

### Expense Calculations: Llallahu, 1983

**Indexes of educational cost for each child attending school in 1983 were as follows:**

- **Registration:** $200.00 per year.
- **Food (subsidized by a Dutch project):** $800.00 per year.
- **Outfit**
  - Socks: 700.00
  - Shoes: 2,000.00
  - Shirt: 2,000.00
  - Pants/Skirt: 2,500.00
  - Sweater: 3,000.00
  - Bag: 1,000.00
Stationery

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price</th>
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<tr>
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<td>1,100.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 eraser</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
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<td><strong>15,700.00</strong></td>
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</table>

Source: field notes of 1983 Prices as found in Sicuani's stores and at the cooperative in Llallahui.

2-Animals and Land

Herd capital was calculated according to the informant's evaluation of his own herd. The range of prices were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Range</th>
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<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td>S/ 9,000.00 to S/ 13,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lamb</td>
<td>4,000.00 to 6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ox</td>
<td>150,000.00 to 225,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow</td>
<td>100,000.00 to 140,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calf</td>
<td>40,000.00 to 80,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicken</td>
<td>3,500.00 to 5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea pigs</td>
<td>600.00 to 800.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1983, according to community informants, the price of a topo of land was evaluated at being between S/. 200,000.00 to S/. 300,000.00 depending upon the quality of the plot and whether it was irrigated or not. We used an average figure of S/. 250,000.00

Appendix 2, Ccapacmarca

a- List of Crop Varieties

Potatoes: qompis, casa blanca, mariba, sapa, phoqoya, susu, aruqa-pateq, wamk'uchu, qhochum waqachi, khallwa, charkas, azul suti, moro ponchu.
Corn: ch'ullpi, paraqay, kulli, paqoy warmi, uchukullu, chinko, konfite, kukuli, pataphawayo.
Broad beans: Paq'ay blanco, paq'ay rojo, paq'ay amarillo, paq'ay verde, imico, ch'acha, chirwi, chunchulera.
Papa lisas: antaruphay, q'ello lisa, moro, yuraq, puku, k'uchay.
Ocas or apinas: mishito, nicolas, kuti apina, yuraq apina, q'ello apina, rosado.
Wheat: wana, yana espiga, yana barba, esla quilla, trigo arroz, kanari
Barley: cebada alemana, cebada cerecera, cebada comun, sepa, waskar
Año: mishito, qusa, q'ello, yuraq.
Vetch: nuraq, q'omer, mishito, qoe.
b-List of Laymis:

Qanta pata, punku orqo, jachataqe, pataklay, mayqolloni, wallpawasi, maranniyoq, J'ukucha, molle ponku, wachu molno, pata pata, pisqa puj'o, unutu t'oqaq, qochapata, warmiwillka, q'achukalla, pinko, kusilay, puma chapa, chochoqa era, phunchunko, wayra era, sarosiyq, parqoray, ch'iripa, tambo, trojabamba, pukaqkalla, tarqa, soqosniyoq, chullo, pampa ago, soyoccacca, ccora ccora, ayomocco, chillcapata.

c- Notes on Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Length</th>
<th>Informant</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>05/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>ZBM</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>10/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>17/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>08/05/1984</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>Don A.</td>
<td>Comunero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>14/05/1984</td>
<td>45</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>12/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>DRV</td>
<td>Hacendado</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>13/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>Comunera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20/05/1984</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>Comunera</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>11/04/1986</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>EV</td>
<td>Ex-Capacmarcaño, now in Cusco.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix 3: Survey Questionnaires

a-Questionnaire 1, Llallahui

Date
Name of interviewee Sex Age Language

1a-Household Composition:

Name of Spouses Sex Formal education Occupation
Name of Children Sex Formal education Occupation

b Family History
Are you a native from Llallahui?
Is your spouse a native of Llallahui?
How many children have you had that have died?
How many times have you lived outside the community? why did you leave and where did you go?

2-Household Economy

a-Land

Land owned
Land rented

b-Crops

Type of crops cultivated Quantity consumed Quantity sold
Potato
Broad bean
Wheat
Barley
Hortalitas
Ollucos
Isañu
Lisas
Ocas
Aveja
Quinua
Onions
Chuño

c-Expenses from Agricultural Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Ministry of Agriculture</th>
<th>Veterinarian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stores</td>
<td>SAIS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fertilizer</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

d-Purchased Foodstuff and Household Products per week

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noodles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bread</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Detergent/soap</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Licor</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal oil</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batteries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cloth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarettes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

e-Type of Livestock Raised:

1) Cows 2) Oxen 3) Sheep 4) Donkeys
5) Mule 6) Llama 7) Alpaca 8) Poultry
9) Guinea pigs

f-SAIS Marangani

Are you a member of the SAIS? Have you worked for the SAIS? Has your spouse worked for the SAIS?

Type of work  Type of work  Salary

Salary

g-Manufactured Goods

Do you own

1) radio  2) record player  3) tape recorder
4) sewing machine  5) television?

h-Attitude towards the Community

Are there problems in Llallahui? What is missing in your community?
b-Questionnaire 2, Llallahui

Date
Name of the household
Births in 1983
Deaths in 1983

1-Agricultural Production
a-Land
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parcels owned</th>
<th>Plot Size (topos)</th>
<th>location</th>
<th>crop</th>
<th>seeds</th>
<th>Yield</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b-Use of Labour 1) men 2) women 3) children
Household Labour
Ayni
Payment for ayni

1- Destination of Harvest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price/Unit</th>
<th>Date of Sale</th>
<th>Place of Sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potato</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuño</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moraya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2- Purchased Agricultural produce

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Crop</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Price/Unit</th>
<th>Date of Sale</th>
<th>Place of Sale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Potato</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barley</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chuño</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moraya</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

d-Animal Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Animal</th>
<th>Sold</th>
<th>Consumed</th>
<th>Bought</th>
<th>Lost</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheep</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>adult</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calf</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cattle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cow</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>horse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mule</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Llama</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alpaca</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea pig</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
e-Handicraft Production
Do you weave to sell?
How many years have you been selling your weavings?
This year what have you sold? (*Poncho, bayeta, queperina, fransa, sweater*)

f-Input Expenses

1- Tools
Type: Number Purchased Price
-Chakitaylla* (Foot plow)
-Kitiyoq
-Mui'u
-Shovel
-Pick-axe
-Hoe
-Others

2- Implements

-Saddle
-Reins
-Ropes
-Sacks

3- Fertilizers

Type: Quantity Purchased Price
-Insecticides
-Nitrate
-Aldrin
-Folidol

4- Household and Luxary Items Purchased between 1982-3
-Radio
-Record Player
-Tape Recorder
-Sewing Machine
-Televsor
-Watch
-Primus

---
c- Questionnaire 3, SAIS Marangani 1984

Date
Name, sex and age of informant
Place of birth
Place of residence
Civil status
Number of children
Level of education
Previous work experience
Occupation in the SAIS
Initial and present salary at Marangani
Length of employment at the SAIS
Means of transportation to get to work
Method used for obtaining work in the SAIS 1) to take a course 2) to be elected 3) to have work experience 4) to know someone

Benefits received from the SAIS
Observations:
- Is a union needed in SAIS Marangani?
- How would you grade the SAIS performance in relation to others?
- Identify some of major problems that the SAIS is facing.
- Have you established fictive kin relations within the SAIS?

**d-Questionnaire 4, Ccapacmarca 1984**

Date
Name of the household

**a-Household composition:**
- Name
- Age or date of birth
- Place of birth
- Place of residence
- Occupation

**b-Agriculture**
- Number and location of plots
- Area in use
- Method of acquisition of plots (inherited, bought or adjudicated)
- Type of crops
- Quantity of seeds used at sowing time for each crop
- Harvest yield

**c-Livestock Inventory**
- Cows, sheep, llamas, alpacas, horses, donkeys, mules, goats, pigs, chickens and guinea pigs.
### Glossary of Selected terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Accion Popular</td>
<td>The popular, middle class party founded in the 1950s by Fernando Belaúnde. In 1963 and in 1980 Belaúnde and his party won the presidency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abigeo</td>
<td>sharecropping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al partí</td>
<td>helper. A term referring to the wife and children of SAIS shepherds living in the pastoral units of SAIS Marangani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anca</td>
<td>(Aprista or American Popular Revolutionary Alliance): Peru's most important populist political party in the twentieth century. Founded in 1924 by Víctor Raul Haya de la Torre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arancel</td>
<td>tariff, list of rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arriero</td>
<td>mule trader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arroba</td>
<td>25 pounds or 11.5 kilos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayllu</td>
<td>subdivision of a Quechua social unit, genealogy, lineage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayni</td>
<td>reciprocal work arrangement between ayllu members. One party received a specific service from a kinsperson or a neighbour on the understanding that when time comes exactly the same service will be reciprocated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cacique</td>
<td>Indian chief or headman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calcid</td>
<td>maize harvest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campesino</td>
<td>peasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carga</td>
<td>llama load of 3 arrobas or 75 kilos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caudiljismo</td>
<td>authoritarian political style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chacra</td>
<td>cultivated holding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chacmeo</td>
<td>first plowing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakitaclla</td>
<td>Andean footplow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chicha</td>
<td>fermented beverage generally made of maize.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chunto</td>
<td>dehydrated potatoes or other tubers, alternatively exposed to sun and frost; can be stored.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colono</td>
<td>Indian attached to an hacienda owning some land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coca</td>
<td>a mild stimulant chewed to relieve hunger and fatigue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofradía</td>
<td>land belonging to the church.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comunero</td>
<td>communal member of a recognized peasant community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comunidad indígena</td>
<td>a free-holding peasant community registered with the Ministry of Labour and Indian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corregidor</td>
<td>colonial district officer with administrative and judicial power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegado</td>
<td>community representative in a cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encomienda</td>
<td>land grant entrusting its beneficiary with right to tribute of the Indians residing on the land.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enganche</td>
<td>labour contracting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faena</td>
<td>compulsory public communal work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feudatorio</td>
<td>serf under contract to an estate with no private land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forastero</td>
<td>Indian run-away avoiding mita work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundo</td>
<td>small hacienda or agricultural estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamonalismo</td>
<td>the political system of control used by abusive landlords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guardia Civil</td>
<td>rural police force created in 1922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacendado</td>
<td>owner of an hacienda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hacienda:</td>
<td>- large landed property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatun Samay</td>
<td>- mid-day banquet during planting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hectare:</td>
<td>- two and one-half acres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ichu</td>
<td>- a hardy grass growing in the high Andean plateau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indígenismo</td>
<td>- pro-Indian intellectual movement at the turn of the century originating mainly from Peru and Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitupay:</td>
<td>- second maize weeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latifundio:</td>
<td>- large agricultural or livestock estate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laymi:</td>
<td>- system of collective decision concerning rotation of communal land use in southern Peru</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mancha india</td>
<td>- the poorest highland regions of Peru (Ancash, Apurímac, Ayacucho, Cusco, Junín, Pasco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>- a person with some Indian blood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misti</td>
<td>- offspring of union between White and Indian (mestizo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minifundio:</td>
<td>- small agricultural property usually below five hectares.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minifundista:</td>
<td>- the owner of a small agricultural property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mita:</td>
<td>- forced labour recruitment of Indians on a rotation basis.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obraje:</td>
<td>- colonial textile workshop producing coarse material for Indian clothing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido:</td>
<td>- colonial subdivision of an intendancy, administered by a subdelegate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peon:</td>
<td>- paid field worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personero:</td>
<td>- elected community representative under the pre-1969 structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quintal:</td>
<td>- a hundredweight (112 pounds)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qoray:</td>
<td>- third maize weeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIAR:</td>
<td>- Integral Rural Settlement Project. Intermediate level of rural organization that encompasses different agrarian enterprises within a geographical area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pongo</td>
<td>- Indian labour service at the house of the hacienda owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puna:</td>
<td>- Extensive high plateaus in the Andes above 4,000 meters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reducción de mercancías:</td>
<td>- colonial resettlement policy of Indian populations in order to Christianize them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAIS:</td>
<td>- agricultural Societies for Social Interest consisting of peasant communities and expropriated haciendas designed to improved animal raising production for the national or foreign markets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra:</td>
<td>- highlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SINAMOS:</td>
<td>- National Support System for Social Mobilization created in 1972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio:</td>
<td>- member of a cooperative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol:</td>
<td>- unit of Peruvian currency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagle:</td>
<td>- storage platform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasa:</td>
<td>- early colonial list of tribute goods for Indian communities in the Spanish kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teniente Governador:</td>
<td>- representative of the state at the community level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tinkay</td>
<td>- blessing of the earth or of the seed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirapie</td>
<td>- work performed daily by a team of two men and one woman digging the field with the chakitaclla; equals 1/2 yunta or approximately 800 square meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomoqa</td>
<td>- field irrigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vara:</td>
<td>- unit of measure equal to 33 inches or 0.84 meters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Topo: - unit of land measure equal to 3,383 m², in Chumbivilcas. Originally, it was the plot required to feed a family. As it varied with the size of the family, it was difficult to quantify. In the Vilcanota Valley, an area 84 meters by 42 meters or 3,528 square meters; approximately, one third of an hectare - first maize weeding

Urpichupay
Waqcho: - shepherds' private herds grazing on hacienda or SAIS lands

Yunta: - amount of work accomplished by a team of oxen within a day; corresponds to 1/2 topo or 1,600 square meters

* Quechua words are underlined
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