The Foreign Office and the Elite Press:  
Sir Edward Grey, Sir Charles Hardinge and the Ententes, 1906-1910

by

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ABSTRACT

Between 1905 and 1910 the Foreign Office came to be dominated by a cadre of new officials who were assertive, talented and determined to function as policy-makers. An important and hitherto overlooked aspect of this evolution was how these officials dealt with the elite press at a time when publicity began to have an increasingly important influence upon British foreign relations. The historiography of Foreign Office relations with the press has focused on the systematic and institutional management of information which evolved during World War I. In the pre-war Foreign Office, however, an informal network operated between individual officials and journalists. Information and views were discussed in off-the-record correspondence rather than through the formal release of press statements as was the norm after 1914. The emphasis on personal and informal relations with the press was critical, for it removed the need for official public disclosures distasteful to the Foreign Office. The sources used to examine this issue consists of published primary documents, the most important of which is the series British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914.

The Foreign Office's use of its informal relationship with the press was integrally linked to shifts in the international system after 1900. The Foreign Office feared these developments, viewing them as serious threats to Britain's strategic interests. These fears, combined with growing public interest in foreign affairs, increased the importance of the personal and professional friendships with journalists. While the press remained independent and at times critical of foreign policy and the Foreign Office, these friendships
presented an opportunity for the Foreign Office to exert discreet pressure, thereby mitigating dangerous repercussions both home and abroad.

Two of the key figures in the process were the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and his Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Charles Hardinge, whose attitudes and expectations shaped this approach to the press. Grey and Hardinge were primarily concerned with the impact of the press upon the elite decision makers who controlled foreign policy both within Britain and abroad. Relations with the press were consciously used to maintain the ententes with France and Russia and to ease relations with Germany whose diplomacy caused concern in the Foreign Office. They also aimed at minimizing dissent over foreign policy in the Liberal government which came to power in 1905. Thus the cultivation of the press was a direct response to both domestic and foreign controversies and illustrates the foolishness of ignoring either the internal or external influences on policy making.
to JWK, as always
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Prior to World War I, no formal structure governed relations between the Foreign Office and the press. What did exist was an unofficial and personal network of contacts between Foreign Office officials and prominent journalists of the elite press. These contacts have been shrouded in the past, due mainly to the discretion and secrecy of the two groups regarding their ongoing exchange of information and views. The process of uncovering these illusory contacts requires an abandonment of the search for formal and recognizable bureaucratic bodies or procedures. In the pre-war Foreign Office they do not exist. The professional and personal friendships between officials and journalists functioned in lieu of an official system, providing both groups with access to influence and information. This method appealed to members of the Foreign Office, allowing them to counter the negative effects of the press upon foreign relations without establishing a precedent giving the press an official claim to more information than the Foreign Office wished to provide. A paradox ran through this relationship with the press. The Foreign Office was deeply suspicious of the impact of publicity and public opinion upon foreign relations yet they were drawn to it due to its growing influence on foreign relations. The combination of international pressures and the biases of Foreign Office officials lay
behind the reliance on informal and personal relations used to exert discreet pressure on the tone and substance of the press.

Given the complex nature of the press and the Foreign Office, some explanation of who and what they were is required. While the contacts between them were unofficial and usually friendly, they were conducted against the backdrop of professional interest, a fact that neither group forgot. The Foreign Office of the pre-war period was composed of two separate groups, the Foreign Office and the Diplomatic Service, which worked in tandem to administer foreign policy at home and abroad. While technically independent, the close connections between the two services have more rightly been referred to as a "symbiosis".\(^1\) By the early twentieth century these connections had evolved to the point where prominent figures were able to switch from one service to another with ease. Thus the two Permanent Under-Secretaries prior to the outbreak of war, Sir Charles Hardinge and Sir Arthur Nicolson, were both influential diplomats before their appointments as head of the Foreign Office, their diplomatic record playing a critical role in their selection. Upon accepting the position Nicolson was informed that "it was essential not to have there a civil servant but a 'diplomatic statesman'", highlighting the continuity of diplomatic responsibility between London and the embassies.\(^2\)


Not surprisingly, the two services utilized a similar approach to the press, cultivating well-connected and well-informed friends in the process. There were, however, important differences in how these contacts functioned. The embassy staff utilized British journalists more directly as a source of information about the country to which they had been appointed. The Foreign Office, on the other hand, was primarily concerned with the impact of what the journalists printed, especially when this evoked a reaction in foreign countries. The tendency, therefore, has been to treat the permanent officials and the diplomats together in discussions of attitudes and methods for dealing with the press. Conversely, in discussions of the impact of press contacts on the conduct of foreign relations at home and abroad, officials and diplomats have been dealt with independently.

The press of the early twentieth century was far more diverse than its foreign service associates. Given the absence of other mass media in Britain prior to World War I, newspapers were the one source of information which reached a wide general public. The press was far from monolithic, however, the Foreign Office limited its contact to only a small group of newspapers. The critical question for the Foreign Office was whether or not a paper ranked among the elite press of the day, as identified by its influence, contacts and eloquence. The newspapers emphasized in the following discussion numbered among the elite press were the Times, the Westminster Gazette, the Pall Mall Gazette, the St James Gazette, the Daily News, the Standard, the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Morning Leader, the Daily Graphic, the Star, the Globe, and the Echo. This list is drawn from Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the

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3Papers numbered among the elite press were the Times, the Westminster Gazette, the Pall Mall Gazette, the St James Gazette, the Daily News, the Standard, the Morning Post, the Daily Chronicle, the Morning Leader, the Daily Graphic, the Star, the Globe, and the Echo. This list is drawn from Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall of the
reflect these biases of the Foreign Office. The Times and Westminster Gazette were regarded as the two most powerful papers. Although the Times was the more successful at penetrating the Foreign Office and establishing close relationships with its officials and diplomats, both papers were widely read in the Foreign Office. In 1911, when Grey was under serious attack in the press for his foreign policy, a friend inquired how he was reacting to the criticism. He responded "Well, really I haven't had time to read my papers except Times, Westminster Gazette & Spectator & I have seen very little of the abuse." Grey and the Foreign Office had clear ideas regarding which papers were important and read them differently than others judged to be less important. As one official phrased it when discussing the reaction of Kaiser Wilhelm II to statements in British newspapers not numbered amongst the elite, "the two papers he mentioned were without any practical importance and I thought it a pity that the Emperor should have paid any attention to them." The message was clear; only certain newspapers counted in international relations. Others, such as the mass oriented

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4Ibid., pp. 2-3.


Daily Mail or the ultra-chauvinist Army and Navy Gazette, were monitored only as possible trouble makers for those responsible for Britain's foreign policy.

The two key figures in evaluating and managing relations with Fleet Street were the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and his Permanent Under-Secretary for almost five years, Sir Charles Hardinge. The two men formed a powerful working relationship and had, for the most part, a high degree of respect for each other. Hardinge wrote in later years that the relationship was more one of "two equals than... Chief and subordinate, and he allowed me the greatest liberty of action." Hardinge had good reason to appreciate his superior. Grey sought the advice and views of his permanent officials, providing Hardinge with a unique opportunity to discuss with Grey his evaluation of British policy. It was their attitudes and decisions which shaped the approach of the Foreign Office to the press and thus deserve further consideration.

Edward Grey was the descendent of the prominent Whig family whose most famous member was Earl Grey of the Reform Bill. An ardent liberal himself, he was committed to furthering the interests of the party he served for his entire adult life. Yet Grey was deeply ambiguous about political life. Of his work as Foreign Secretary he wrote:

The Foreign Office leaves the Secretary of State, who is in charge of it, no choice but to fulfil this duty. The

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work besets and besieges him... He is like a man in deep water, who must keep on swimming or be submerged.8

Aspects of politics were distasteful to him yet he remained in one of the highest political office's for over a decade during times of great controversy. Grey justified his political life in deeply moral tones and believed he owed his constituents and his country continued public service. Quoting his wife, Grey wrote: "If we had refused [the foreign] office... we could not have justified the decision to the constituents."9 Perhaps the most poignant and revealing comment on his position as Foreign Secretary and the doubt which plagued him comes from Grey himself. In January 1906, after conversing with Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador, Grey wrote to his wife: "I do not know that I did well, but I did honestly".10 This reliance upon honesty and sincerity was for Grey the most telling justification of his policy.

The ambiguity running through Grey's attitude to public service carried over into his conduct of foreign policy. He remained sensitive to the argument that foreign affairs should be governed by principle, yet he consistently found himself justifying a policy motivated by preservation of British strategic interests. These different bases of policy were not necessarily contradictory, but they did leave Grey vulnerable to attack by Liberals who argued that the strategic interests Grey was defending were antithetical to principles


9Ibid., p. 61.

10Ibid., p. 79.
venerated by the party. The most potentially threatening issue Grey would face was the ramifications of the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente. Throughout his tenure as Foreign Secretary Grey sought to defend the entente without rousing the ire of radical Liberals who detested the autocratic nature of the Russian government. This demanded a delicate balance which Grey was not always able to maintain.

Charles Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary from 1906-1910, knew none of these hesitations or doubts. A career diplomat, Hardinge was also a model one: discreet, powerful, and dedicated to the crown. He had few illusions about either his purpose or his desire to succeed, commenting that "spurred by ambition, I know that I worked harder than most young men of my day in the Diplomatic Service."11 A critical factor in Hardinge’s meteoric rise in the service was his close court associations. These were based on his wife’s connections to the crown, which led to her appointment as Lady in Waiting to Queen Alexandra in 1893, and Hardinge’s own friendship with Edward VII. The King proved a powerful patron. He supported Hardinge’s bid for diplomatic and Foreign Office posts which included Ambassador to Russia in 1904, Permanent Under-Secretary in 1906 and Viceroy of India in 1910, the latter referred to by Hardinge as "the fulfilment [sic] of my highest ambition".12 Edward VII preferred Hardinge’s company during his royal tours to that of Cabinet ministers, raising a potentially troublesome

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12Ibid., p. 172.
constitutional question.\textsuperscript{13} It is a testament to Grey's flexibility and confidence in Hardinge that he defended Hardinge's right to accompany the King on these outings. They gave Hardinge a unique opportunity to discuss international issues with prominent political figures such as German Chancellor Bernhard von Bulow and German Minister for Foreign Affairs Heinrich von Tschirschky as well as Kaiser Wilhelm II and Tsar Nicholas II.

Grey and Hardinge, upon their return to the Foreign Office,\textsuperscript{14} inherited a relatively new diplomatic structure. Since 1902, Britain had successfully sought to secure her international position through negotiated agreements with other powers. The agreements aimed at decreasing the frictions Britain was vulnerable to due to her various imperial possessions. The Fashoda crisis with France, the hostility of the Great Powers during the Boer War and a succession of dismaying conflicts with the United States, such as the Alaska boundary dispute and the Venezuela crisis, drove home Britain's isolation. It became increasingly evident to those responsible for British foreign policy that Britain had neither the diplomatic nor military strength to indefinitely withstand challenges such as these.\textsuperscript{15} The solution

\textsuperscript{13}Grey to Hardinge, August 23, 1908, quoted in Hardinge, p. 164; and Grey, p. 85.

\textsuperscript{14}Grey had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary from 1892-1895, while Hardinge had been Assistant Under-Secretary from 1903-1904, when he left to become the Ambassador to Russia.

adopted by Lord Lansdowne, Foreign Secretary from 1900-1905, was the abandonment of "splendid isolation" in favour of agreements which secured Britain's interests. This was achieved through one of two tactics: resolution of outstanding issues with the concerned country or securing support from another power to counter the threat to British interests. Both tactics effectively minimized Britain's diplomatic vulnerability by forging cooperation where there previously had been little or none.

The first concrete evidence of this departure was the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902. The alliance was designed to counter the Russian threat in the Far East and provided Britain with vital military support in that area of the world. This cooperation proved so successful that the alliance was expanded in 1905, binding Japan to provide military support in the event of an attack on India. The second development was the Anglo-French Entente of 1904 through which, it was hoped, "all causes of misunderstanding between the two countries will be removed."¹⁶ The most important issue settled was the exchange of British recognition of French interests in Morocco for French recognition of British supremacy in Egypt, thus ending the dangers of another Fashoda crisis. Furthermore, France and Britain promised to "afford to one another their diplomatic support in

order to obtain the execution of the clauses" of the agreement in case of conflict with other powers.\(^17\)

The entente with France proved to be a fundamental development in British foreign policy. Where the European ramifications of the Anglo-Japanese alliance had been limited, the entente quickly became a major issue for the rest of Europe. Despite continual British protests that the entente was purely a colonial affair, other Great Powers viewed it as a potentially major revision in European international affairs. Germany especially was fearful of the consequences of Anglo-French cooperation due to the strengthening of France's position in Europe secured by the agreement with Britain. While Lansdowne had not intended the entente to inflame Anglo-German antagonism, fears grew in Britain that Germany aimed at disrupting the entente. The landing of the Kaiser in Tangier in March 1905, declaring Germany must defend its Moroccan interests, aggravated these fears, giving substance to the suspicions that Germany was attempting to demonstrate "that an understanding with England is of little value to... [the French] and that they had much better come to an agreement with Germany."\(^18\) Lansdowne himself did not share these fears. He assumed a matter of fact and moderate approach to the crisis, advising the French ambassador when he complained of hostile German activities "that the moral of all these

\(^{17}\)Article 9, "Declaration between the United Kingdom and France, respecting Egypt and Morocco", \textit{BD}, vol. 2, p. 392.

\(^{18}\)Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, \textit{BD}, vol. 3, p. 75.
incidents seemed to me to be that our two governments should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence".19

Lansdowne's impassive interpretation was short-lived. The collapse of the Conservative government in December 1905 brought to power a man of very different temperament. Grey was committed to maintaining continuity in foreign affairs and was careful to calm fears that a Liberal government would jettison the entente with France. Consequently, he gave very clear instructions to Nicolson, Britain's representative to the conference in Algeciras, to give France the support outlined in the Anglo-French Entente.20 The terms in which Grey spoke of the entente, however, were not necessarily those of Lansdowne's. Grey had a lively sense of the importance of Britain's continued support for the entente, which he typically shared with his ambassador:

...The Morocco Conference is going to be difficult if not critical. As far as I can discover the Germans will refuse altogether to concede to France the special position in Morocco, which we have promised France not only to concede to her but to help her by diplomatic methods to obtain.

If she can succeed in getting this with our help it will be a great success for the Anglo-French Entente; if she fails the prestige of the Entente will suffer and its vitality will be diminished.

Our main object therefore must be to help France to carry her point at the Conference.21

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In this, Grey had the full support of Hardinge, who was equally fearful of the consequence of a French defeat, arguing if "France is left in the lurch an agreement or alliance between France, Germany and Russia in the near future is certain." The price paid would be "France and Russia becoming satellites within the German system."\textsuperscript{22} It was this which Hardinge felt had to be avoided at all cost.

A subtle and important shift had occurred within the Foreign Office by 1906 as a consequence of the new personages at the Foreign Office and the Moroccan crisis. Where Lansdowne avoided attaching blame, Grey and Hardinge were not so restrained. Grey feared that Germany aimed at undoing the results of the entente, concluding that:

\begin{quote}
...the Germans do not want the [Algeciras] Conference to arrive at any solution, which is acceptable to France on the lines of our Entente with her. Such a favourable issue would be regarded as a diplomatic defeat of Germany.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

The perceived threat posed by Germany ran deeper than mere competition between two Great Powers. The Anglo-French Entente was considered by the Foreign Office to be a bridge towards an agreement with Russia. Grey believed that as a consequence of the Anglo-French entente,

\begin{quote}
The door is being kept open by us for a rapprochement with Russia; there is at least a prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22}Minute by Hardinge, February 23, 1906, \textit{BD}, vol. 3, p. 268.

terms with her. An entente between Russia, France and ourselves would be absolutely secure.24

In Grey’s analysis, if Germany was successful in derailing the Anglo-French Entente, Britain would lose not only her concrete gains from the 1904 agreement with France she would lose potential gains from a future agreement with Russia. Consequently, the long term advantages of supporting her newfound partner were a significant factor in Foreign Office thinking during the 1906 Moroccan crisis.

The desire for an Anglo-Russian agreement was a high priority for Grey and Hardinge. Hardinge made it clear that one of his motivations for returning to the Foreign Office was that as Permanent Under-Secretary "I would be more likely to realize my hope of an Anglo-Russian agreement than if I were to remain Ambassador in St. Petersburg."25 Two issues dominated the Foreign Office’s attitude towards Russia: the fear that Russia would embark upon a "policy of expansion" or that Russia would reach an agreement with Germany, thereby threatening British interests in Asia, primarily India. The Anglo-Russian Entente, following the example of the Anglo-French Entente, was designed to eliminate the above fears through the resolution of contentious colonial differences in Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan. By reaching what Nicolson called a "self denying action" in Persia, both Britain and Russia agreed to preserve Persian independence, and the British government "secure[d] their really


25Hardinge, p. 119.
vital interest in the safeguarding of the strategical position on the Indian frontier."

The agreement with Russia roused concern within Britain. As early as September 1907, John Morley, Secretary of State for India, rightfully predicted that "the fight in England will centre on Persia". Lord Curzon, former Viceroy and Governor-General of India, criticized the agreement in the House of Lords for not protecting Britain's historical commercial and political interests in Persia, seeing it as "an almost inexplicable sacrifice". Radical Liberals, on the other hand, feared the government had sacrificed an independent and reform minded Persia by agreeing to divide Persia into spheres of influence, a charge which Grey denied. More critically, the Anglo-Russian Entente helped crystallize the radical's fears that the government was consciously adopting an anti-German stance which not only increased the danger of British involvement in a European war but also imposed higher military costs which, as the naval race with Germany became more acrimonious, limited the money available for social programs. Grey defended the entente against its critics arguing "as any one behind the scenes knows that what


27Morley to A. Nicolson, September 7, 1907, BD, vol. 4, p. 587.

28Lord Curzon, February 6, 1908, Parliamentary Debates (Lords), 4th ser., vol. 183, col. 1008.

we have gained strategically is real, while the apparent sacrifices we have made... are not real."30 These rumblings within Britain in 1907 foreshadowed the controversies and divisions within the country and his party Grey was to face as a result of the agreement with Russia.

The rapid changes in British foreign policy after 1902 had major consequences both at home and abroad. Britain's diplomatic revolution was viewed with mistrust by Germany, who warned Grey that if Britain attempted to create a diplomatic ring around Germany "she would undoubtedly attempt to break through it."31 Britain's assurances that this was not the case did not convince Germany. It was in light of this diplomatic confrontation that the Foreign Office began to take a more active and serious view of the press. An increasing tendency can be seen in diplomatic conversations after 1905 to focus on the role of the press in international relations, which can be credited to the fact that the press was read as an indicator of the harmony existing between countries. An ongoing German complaint was their perception that Britain, as represented by the press, was inherently hostile to Germany. This led to complaints by German Ambassador Paul von Metternich in 1906 that:

...the tone of... [the British] press was very different with regard to Russia and Germany. There was a friendliness and desire to be on good terms with Russia which was not expressed in the case of Germany.32

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30 Grey to A. Nicolson, February 24, 1908, BD, vol. 4, p. 616.
32 Ibid.
By 1906, then, both Britain and her continental counterparts had created a situation which enhanced the impact of the press upon foreign affairs. Given this interest in the press, what can be said of the role the press played in the considerations of the Foreign Office? For Grey and Hardinge, the press was only one of the factors affecting foreign policy. Its impact upon the formation of foreign policy was tangential; its role was to provide information and influence perceptions outside of Whitehall. The major question was how the press would interpret the impact of foreign policy. This in itself was a departure for the Foreign Office. Prior to 1905 officials had few opportunities to cultivate contacts with the press. The situation which developed after 1906 marks the emergence of a powerful bureaucratic presence in foreign affairs. For this new group, publicity became a matter of importance, one their predecessors had not had to consider. This development, more than any other, forced the Foreign Office to seek a means of handling this potentially troublesome factor in foreign affairs.
CHAPTER 2

Historiography of the "New" Foreign Office

From 1906 to 1914 the British Foreign Office was at the height of its influence due to its growing involvement in the formation and conduct of foreign policy. During this period, the Foreign Office was marked by a distinctive style, tone and composition. In its view, the conduct of foreign policy was the domain of discreet specialists and nowhere is this clearer than in its attitude on the press and publicity. The Foreign Office's contacts with the press, however, have usually received limited attention by historians. In order to shed further light upon their relationship, it is vital to look at the assumptions and expectations of the men responsible for foreign policy before the First World War. Despite the unquestionable influence of impersonal forces or structures upon foreign policy, it ultimately was the individual who made the decisions regarding which course of action to recommend. Officials neither ignored nor denied publicity because of their sensitivity to its effect on foreign affairs, a fact which has been sadly neglected in much of the history of the Foreign Office.

Despite the Foreign Office's attention and concern to the influence of the press on foreign relations, only a limited amount of recent work has been done on the development and effect of the relationships the Foreign Office established with prominent journalists. The most recent work on the subject includes a series
of articles by Philip Taylor and Keith Wilson on how the Foreign Office dealt with growing public interest in foreign affairs.¹ Both approach the topic seeking a direct and causal link between the Foreign Office and the press, hoping rather vainly to find evidence proving that the office attempted to lead public opinion. Taylor's article "Publicity and Diplomacy: the Impact of the First World War upon Foreign Office Attitudes" emerges as the most subtle and careful of the group. While his focus is the emergence of British propaganda and the establishment of a formal mechanism for propaganda during the First World War, he extends his investigation back to the pre-war era to prove his argument that only the exigencies of war forced an unwilling Foreign Office to create a formal department for shaping public opinion. During the pre-World War I era a general consensus existed in the Foreign Office that such a structure was unnecessary, William Tyrrell, Grey's private secretary, writing "It was a comparatively easy task in prewar days to deal with the press...".² Yet Taylor recognizes that the lack of a


²Taylor, "Publicity...", p. 47.
formal structure did not mean that no method of dealing with press existed, writing:

...a kind of symbiotic relationship developed between small groups of publicists and officials, each utilizing the other's sources of information in pursuit of their respective duties. True, there did not exist any system of formal contact, but there did develop an unofficial and highly selective system of informal communication, often based upon personal friendship and mutual interests. This is a twilight area where hard evidence is not readily available...3

It is the search for formal structures that hinders the unveiling of this highly personal and distinctively British "system". Taylor's work remains the most wide-sweeping analysis of the tangled web of publicity and diplomacy. More common is the relegation of the issue to academic backwater by examining it only as an adjunct to questions such as Foreign Office insularity or the effect of public opinion upon policy making. Wilson's work is a prime example. His analyses of the release of Blue Books and, as he calls it, the "education" of public opinion are limited forays. They seek to examine specific incidents which reinforce the existing consensus that by education, training and disposition the Foreign Office rejected attempts to allow public opinion to affect foreign policy. Wilson concludes that the Foreign Office ardently opposed pressures to conduct policy in a more open or "democratic" way and made no attempt to deliberately cultivate attitudes within the public in support of their policies.4

3ibid., p. 46.
4Wilson, "Foreign Office, Press, and Public...", pp. 31-49.
The failure of both authors lies in their efforts to document positive and direct linkages between the Foreign Office and opinion. Their conclusion that the Foreign Office made few, if any, attempts to guide or cultivate opinion is historically sound. But as Taylor points out, it cannot be taken as proof that officials were not concerned with the impact the press could have upon policy or that they did not take measures to mitigate this outside "meddling". Taylor's qualification, however, is couched in terms that imply it is nearly impossible to penetrate the deliberate veil of secrecy and discretion cast over the exchange by its participants. The mere fact that such extensive and long-standing contacts existed is itself a means of approaching the topic. If Foreign Office officials did not intend to educate public opinion before World War I, what did they hope to gain from their contacts with journalists?

The limited nature of the above forays into the study of publicity is duplicated in the more general works on the Foreign Office's role in foreign policy and administration. This silence is surprising given the large body of work on the development and political activity of the British press during the nineteenth century. The root of the problem lies in the relegation of the Foreign Office to diplomatic and administrative studies which isolate it from its broader social and cultural contexts. The historiography of the Foreign Office, therefore, can be divided roughly into two fields: first, the administrative development of the service and second, the more complex and controversial connections between the Foreign Office and policy formation.
The administrative approach was merely the beginning of the investigation into the Foreign Office. Unique in that many of the prominent authors were Foreign Service men, these works are characterized by a narrative and structural approach to the topic. The works tend to be highly descriptive and attempt to define the task of the diplomat by outlining departmental duties within the office.\(^5\) The goal of these works is to expand public understanding of "the essential difference of function" between the foreign service and other government departments.\(^6\) This is accomplished by describing how the Foreign Office bureaucracy dealt with the tasks it was responsible for, including: mechanisms existed for gathering and transmitting information, how data worked through the system to become the basis of action and how information returned to the Foreign Office from abroad.

In addition to these descriptive works on the Foreign Office, the administrative approach also includes investigations into "the emergence of order, rule and discipline" in the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service.\(^7\) This attention to the professional aspect of the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service concentrates on two

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\(^6\)Strang, p. 196.

issues: the bureaucratic changes occurring in the nineteenth century and contemporary criticism of the limited social and educational background of the members of the service. These two issues both focus on the personnel of the foreign service but differ in their political tone and aim. The former, as represented by R. Jones, are more strictly historical and seek to "describe the administrative arrangements within which foreign policy was formulated."8 Jones examines the impact of various Foreign Office reforms after 1848 in order to investigate the development of what he calls intellectual and mechanical work.9 The latter, however, are less about the social context of foreign policy than about the ideological conflicts between the establishment and the left-wing. Critics such as the Fabians and Arthur Ponsonby desired greater responsibility to Parliament and the public in foreign affairs.10 These critics were motivated by their belief that the Foreign Office was "too far removed from the common people" and that the Foreign Office perspective was "not

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9Ibid., chap. 1, passim. Intellectual work included such responsibilities as policy formation, correspondence and evaluation of intelligence information while mechanical work encompassed clerical work such as physical preparation of drafts and despatches, cyphering and registration of incoming documents.

characteristic of the nation as a whole."\textsuperscript{11} Despite the difference in emphasis, these studies of the Foreign Office focus on the form and structure of foreign policy decision making rather than the ramifications of the structure.

This tradition was drastically revised by the publication of Zara Steiner's *Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1898-1914* in 1969, which created a dominant and enduring orthodoxy. Steiner establishes the Foreign Office as a cohesive and powerful administrative entity which increasingly exercised influence over foreign policy. One of Steiner's aims is to determine when the transition to more "modern" attitudes regarding the bureaucracy of foreign affairs emerged. In pursuit of this, Steiner introduces a welcome breath of fresh air into the history of the Foreign Office by melding posopography with traditional methodologies of historical investigation, allowing her to examine Foreign Office officials, such as Hardinge and Crowe, who gained prominence due to their influence on policy.

The metamorphosis of the Foreign Office analyzed by Steiner was achieved with the 1906 reforms. The goal of the reforms was to systematize the receipt and distribution of information in a more orderly and useful manner. A new Registry system was introduced in January 1906 whereby memorandums were circulated with a full sheet of paper for notes. This proved to be an important revision as

it allowed "clerks in their various degrees... to write their own suggestions in... [a] detailed way... on each paper that came before them."12 This meant that the Foreign Secretary was now "confronted not merely with a despatch... but with a mass of comments..." which he considered when reaching a decision.13 This alleviation of the drudgery of clerical work was greeted with relief by officials as a "humanisation [sic] of the Office".14 At Crowe's suggestion, the reforms also included the requirement that each embassy provide an annual report on the state of affairs of the country in which it resided. Crowe hoped that this would establish an ongoing history of British foreign relations, a hope which proved illusory. The annual reports met with far less enthusiasm than the new Registry and many reports were late in arriving. As one ambassador complained, "...it has given me a great deal of trouble and I am afraid I did not fulfill all the rules laid down... [by] the F.O.... But no one except Crowe will read it - and it is a perfectly useless and redundant piece of work."15

The reforms marked a dramatic shift away from the nineteenth century Foreign Office "superclerks", chosen more for the quality of

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12 Tilly and Gaselee, pp. 158-159.
13 Ibid., p. 159.
their handwriting than any understanding of foreign affairs and relegated to the dreary tasks of cyphering and preparing information to be forwarded either to diplomats or other officials. The reforms ended this heritage, paving the way for more assertive officials who wished to make their presence felt. In many cases the reforms gave these men the authority to resolve issues previously the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary, such as Hardinge's decision during the 1908 Balkans crisis to send instructions to the embassies without awaiting Grey's approval. Hardinge justified his actions "as the matter is urgent" and hoped "they may meet with the S[ecretary] of State's approval." And Grey did approve.\textsuperscript{16} This devolution of decision making was a critical development in the Foreign Office for it gave officials the opportunity to shape the conduct of diplomacy along lines they felt appropriate. Not surprisingly a group of far more aggressive, opinionated and influential officials than hitherto seen came to dominate the upper echelons of the Foreign Office. These men had concrete ideas regarding the state of foreign relations in Europe and believed that among their duties was the responsibility to advise His Majesty's Government on the best and most productive line of policy for Britain to pursue.

Hardinge was in many respects the epitome of the type of official who wielded power in the Foreign Office during the Liberal government. He enunciated a more aggressive and active role for the Permanent Under-Secretary, rejecting his predecessor's view that

\textsuperscript{16}Minute by Hardinge, October 1908, BD, vol. 5, p. 371.
officials should bow to the jurisdiction of the elected authorities and act as a conduit for the Foreign Secretary’s views on policy. These changes at the Foreign Office reflected the broader change in foreign policy occurring after the turn of the century when Britain was forced to adopt a more forward and active policy in order to preserve at least the veneer of power. The growing involvement of officials in policy began to emerge during Lord Salisbury’s tenure as Foreign Secretary. However, its impact was limited due to then Permanent Under-Secretary Thomas Sanderson’s adherence to his belief in the traditional role of the official in policy formation.17

In stark contrast to earlier works, Steiner is able to effectively prove that by 1906 a new mentality infused the Foreign Office. Her utilization of the collective attitudes of officials is the key to her argument. The spread of these attitudes is reflected in the rapid promotion to positions of power of men of such like minds as Hardinge and his close friend Francis Bertie, Ambassador in Paris. The two paid close attention to those who gained the much sought after promotions and were not above attempting to influence the process. The careers of William Tyrrell, Louis Mallet and Eyre Crowe all blossomed in the post-Sanderson Foreign Office.18 In the case of

17 Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 34-37.

18 Ibid., pp. 75-76, 109-111, 118 and 140. The following is a partial list of the positions held by Tyrrell, Mallet and Crowe after 1906. Tyrrell: Precis Writer to Grey, 1906-1907, Private Secretary to Grey, 1907-1915. Mallet: Private Secretary to Grey, 1906-1907, Assistant Under Secretary, 1907-1913. Crowe: Senior Clerk (Head of the Western Department), 1906-1912, Assistant Under-Secretary, 1912-1920.
the first two men, the support of Hardinge and Bertie was important, while Crowe was less indebted to his superiors, owing to his obvious intelligence and ability. Even as an assistant clerk in 1905, Crowe was expected to reach the highest levels of the Foreign Office and was already being considered as a future Permanent Under-Secretary. Steiner is quick to point out that Crowe was an unusual Foreign Office figure. Born and educated in Germany, he held a deeply felt view on foreign policy which, while always placing Great Britain's interests first, was deeply historical and subtle. Steiner's obvious appreciation of Crowe is no doubt due to his intelligence and his developed historical understanding which was lacking in the pre-war Foreign Office, despite the generally high intelligence of the top ranking officials. 19

This portrayal of the Foreign Office effectively established a viable foundation for subsequent works, the parameters surrounding investigations into the Foreign Office remaining relatively stable. The major criticisms deal with Steiner's portrayal of foreign policy rather than her analysis of the workings of the Foreign Office. The thrust of the criticism centers on her argument that the Foreign Office was governed by a deep-set anti-Germanism. Keith Wilson leads the chorus of those who oppose Steiner's argument with his attacks on the portrayal of the Foreign Office "mentality". There is nothing less than an all out declaration of war in Wilson's work as he seeks to challenge the sacred cows of international history.

argument is based on his assertion that the major guide to foreign policy for the Foreign Office was simply an overriding concern with maintaining British interests. The Foreign Office of the early twentieth century was more assertive and forward looking in its policy due to its desire to prevent a return to the earlier and, in the estimation of some, more shameful policy of approaching others carrying one's proverbial hat in one's hands. The Foreign Office under Hardinge sought to deal with all foreign countries with a firm and even-handed policy in order to increase international respect for British aims and accomplishments, thus maintaining the best possible position for Britain. Wilson, however, is not necessarily an admirer of his subjects. Grey is presented as a narrow-minded Foreign Secretary who embarks on a policy which restricts British flexibility, while Foreign Office personnel are "Anglomanes" who, while acquitted of anti-Germanism, do not fully comprehend the perception of their policies in the Foreign Offices of Europe. Thus they are blind to the possible justice of international critics and fail


22 Wilson, "Grey", pp 172-176.

to understand of the indignation roused by Britain's blithe belief that policies favorable to Britain would be accepted by countries who then would have to pay the price of compromising their national interests.  

The weakness of Wilson work's is his tendency to ignore the shifting tides of opinion within the Foreign Office. As a consequence, his article on anti-Germanism in the Foreign Office fails to take into account the critical shift in British diplomacy in 1904 and 1905 with the signing of the Anglo-French entente and the Moroccan crisis. The periods before and after these incidents are treated on the same level. For the argument to be convincing he needs to show more directly the continuity of British suspicions from pre to post entente. Proof of this would indeed make his argument that the Foreign Office applied the same strictures to all foreign countries more believable. As it is, his presentation has an iconoclasm which mars the force of his thesis.  

This is less true of his other studies but Wilson's desire to challenge the existing authority by forcing it to defend its assertions is a theme running through all his work.

Another trend in the historiography of the Foreign Office is to continue where Steiner left off, embarking upon specific studies.

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24 Robbins also makes this point in his biography Grey during a discussion of Eyre Crowe's reaction to the 1907 Hague Conference and is implicit is his portrayal of the Naval Race, pp. 175-176, and chap 10.

25 McKercher, "Diplomatic Equipoise...", p. 315, footnote 62 provided the correct word to describe Wilson's article.
designed to deepen the understanding of the Foreign Office within the context of the existing historiographical framework. This method is interesting because it has exhibited a tendency to focus on the individual, echoing the trends in international history as a whole.26 This aspect of the history of the Foreign Office has not gained a large number of followers, reflecting in part the limited amount of work specifically being done on the Foreign Office. The prime practitioner is E. T. Corp who has published a series of articles examining the leading figures of the Foreign Office. His work to date includes articles on Hardinge, Crowe and Tyrrell. Corp’s work is unabashedly explicatory in nature. He does not attempt to advocate a new thesis on the Foreign Office, rather his interest is the examination of precise issues affecting the office. Hence the focus of his articles: Hardinge and the question of intervention in the Boer War; Crowe and the administrative reforms of 1905 and Tyrrell’s role in and influence over the Foreign Office between 1912-1915. The ongoing question Corp attempts to clarify is how the machinations of the Foreign Office affected the framework in which policy was created. One of Corp’s particular interests is the struggle over promotions, a question integrally linked to both office politics and policy. The promotion of friends or those of similar views was a prime concern from at least 1902 onward, due to the clash of opinions over the best policy to pursue. Thus in 1903-1904 Hardinge and

Bertie successfully ousted Sanderson and his sympathizers.\textsuperscript{27} With Hardinge's consolidation of power between 1906-1910 the Foreign Office was relatively quiet, in no small measure due to his firm control of the office and his close association with Grey. Hardinge's departure for India marked the outbreak of renewed office competition, inspired primarily by Tyrrell. Tyrrell, however, was unable to duplicate Hardinge's successes, failing to exercise the influence over foreign policy that he desired.\textsuperscript{28} The strength of Corp's works lies in the light he casts on the personal aspect of the Foreign Office, which exercised critical influence in the pre-World War One Foreign Office.

The historiography of the Foreign Office illustrates a remarkable degree of stability as well as an ability to adapt to the demands of the "new" international history with its emphasis on the personal and cultural aspects of diplomacy and foreign policy. The question of publicity and the Foreign Office fits easily into this evolution of Foreign Office history, benefitting from the groundwork into the social phenomenons which fostered the Foreign Office's contacts with the press. Fundamental to any explanation of this issue is an understanding of the cultural baggage which shaped their relationship. For the Foreign Office was imbued with a set of

\textsuperscript{27}Corp, "Hardinge...", p. d1079; and Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 70-76.

expectations, assumptions and prejudices which, for better or worse, provided the intellectual basis for its dealings with the press.
CHAPTER 3
Publicity and Diplomacy

The relationship between officials and journalists was a new component in British foreign policy after 1906 and was one of the developments heralding the emergence of officials as an important factor in foreign policy formation. The introduction of the 1906 reforms initiated this change by providing officials greater opportunity to shape foreign policy. These changes inspired the cultivation of contacts with journalists which were to be characteristic of the "new" Foreign Office. As a consequence powerful Foreign Office officials such as Charles Hardinge emerged who believed their role was to advise the Foreign Secretary on policy. Hardinge, Crowe and others were able to take a more active interest in foreign policy development due to the knowledge that their comments and views would be considered by Grey. By involving officials on this more important level, they became more responsible for evaluating and defending policy. It was this development which gave the relationship with journalists importance, as officials' increased responsibilities required greater knowledge of the effects public debates had on foreign policy.

The Foreign Office's contacts were exclusively with journalists of the elite press, the most frequent being the Westminster Gazette, the Morning Post and the seemingly ubiquitous Times. These newspapers could be relied upon for discretion, sensitivity and,
especially in the liberal Westminster Gazette, a warm reception for the policy followed by the Foreign Office after 1906. Officials and diplomats sought out journalists through extensive private correspondence. Influential men such as Hardinge and Tyrrell as well as lesser figures such as Cecil Spring Rice corresponded for over two decades with Valentine Chirol, foreign editor of the Times. Spring Rice had a number of journalist friends, including J. L. Garvin of the Observer and later the Pall Mall Gazette, St. Loe Strachey of the Spectator and Leo Maxse of the National Review.\textsuperscript{1} Even Eyre Crowe, who placed only a limited emphasis on the domestic aspects of foreign policy, was the brother-in-law and close friend of H. Spenser Wilkinson of the Morning Post.\textsuperscript{2} This circle of friendship was extensive, well-entrenched and although carefully unofficial, gave officials the opportunity to discuss issues with men whose expertise on foreign affairs enabled them to provide valuable information and a critique of foreign policy.

One of the most interesting characteristics of these connections was that officials were closest to journalists who wrote for papers associated with the Conservative party. The Times, Morning Post, National Review, Observer, Pall Mall Gazette and Spectator all had Tory connections either through their editorial staff or their proprietors. The attraction, however, was not one of party; it was one of similarity of views and concerns. The Foreign Office


\textsuperscript{2}Steiner, \textit{Foreign Office and Foreign Policy}, pp. 117-118, 190.
attempted to remain above party politics; the "one party we can belong to... is the party of Europe".\(^3\) These papers shared Foreign Office worries over the German threat to British interests, the need for a strong naval policy, and support for the ententes. While complete accord was never assured, the Foreign Office paid papers such as the Morning Post the compliment of phrasing "the question at issue in an admirable way".\(^4\) The same was not said of the Liberal press and there was concern over what Nicolson called "extreme Liberal sections".\(^5\) Although this has been called a "'golden age' of intellectual Liberal journalism"\(^6\) only the Westminster Gazette had any extensive ties with the Foreign Office and that only through Grey. Leading Liberal newspapers such as the Manchester Guardian, the Economist or the Nation tended to be critical of foreign policy. As such they fell outside the influence the Foreign Office, for ultimately the relationship between journalist and official depended upon agreement over the approach to foreign policy.

Of all the journalists who had contacts with the Foreign Office, Valentine Chirol was the most successful at cultivating the trust of Foreign Office officials. A former Foreign Office official who left the service after only four years, Chirol viewed journalism as an extension of diplomacy. He viewed the Times as part of the


\(^5\)A. Nicolson to Buchanan, August 1, 1911, BD, vol. 7, p. 465.

\(^6\)Kennedy, Anglo-German Antagonism, p. 363.
diplomatic establishment and consistently looked for a policy which he felt would be "in the highest interest of the country as well as of The Times".7 The Foreign Office provided Chirol with extensive contacts and background information on those responsible for conducting British foreign policy. Chirol was confident enough in his sources to write to Nicolson, then ambassador to Russia, "I gather from F.O. friends that you are a staunch believer in Stolypin, and in the present policy of the powers-that-be...".8 Information was the key to the relationship between journalists and officials. From the Foreign Office's perspective, not all of the information journalists had access to was intended for publication; it was intended to improve the journalist's overall view of foreign policy. Correspondence with journalist's gave officials and diplomats the opportunity to discuss both their experiences abroad and their views of British policy. Consequently, Chirol's correspondence with Spring Rice tended to be open and frank; Spring Rice had little reservation about discussing either his mistrust of Germany or Russia with Chirol. Unlike either Grey or Hardinge, Spring Rice had little faith in Russia and his posting in Persia placed him in an area where Anglo-Russian conflicts


strained the entente. Spring Rice's correspondence with Chirol was coloured by his misgivings:

As to the [Anglo-Russian] entente I consider it an excellent thing if it isn't misunderstood... Russia agrees for a term of years not to go further than she can, in that term of years. Very good, and very satisfactory; but we mustn't conclude that therefore she won't go any further when that term is concluded.\(^9\)

Spring Rice, however, was quick to argue that the fundamental issue remained Germany. In his estimation, the Anglo-Russian Entente had been achieved by "painting the German devil on the wall. We are all hard at work at that job, including the Germans themselves, and one of the reasons why I hate 'em most is that they are forcing us into an agreement with Russia...".\(^10\) Chirol's vast correspondence placed him in a unique position to monitor the variety of views and priorities existing in the Foreign Office.

Not all officials at the Foreign Office welcomed closer relations with journalists such as Chirol, Crowe asking rhetorically "is not on the whole our policy of leaving newspapers severely alone the best, if not the only sound one?"\(^11\) Crowe was one of the most insular of Foreign Office officials, limiting his activity to the Foreign Office and mistrusting outsiders.\(^12\) As one associate described him, Crowe "had an abiding horror of all amateur diplomatists, whom he would


\(^{10}\)Ibid.


\(^{12}\)Steiner, *Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, p. 109.
characterise [sic] as 'meddlesome busybodies'. Crowe's attitude towards the press clashed with the intimacy Chirol and others enjoyed at the Foreign Office. Of the high ranking officials, Crowe found himself in the minority as his associates deliberately sought out the contacts with the press which he was so suspicious of.

Members of the Foreign Office were motivated in much of their relations with journalists by the expectation that journalists would report foreign affairs in a manner that did not rouse ire of foreign countries or weaken Britain's international position. Grey believed that when discussing foreign affairs "a public speaker should know what not to say as well as what to say". When faced with the German ambassador's complaints of attacks in the British press over a proposed visit by Bulow, Grey wrote, "What I regret is that something unpleasant should have been published...". Attempting to convince journalists to adhere to this expectation was one of the major objectives in pursuing closer relations with the press. The Foreign Office's primary concern was to mitigate the deleterious affect of journalist reports upon international relations and they reviled journalists who stirred up dangerous emotions both home and abroad. A latent distrust of the press permeated the Foreign Office, which was at odds with the friendships with certain journalists. On the official level, officials constrained themselves to damage control

13 Nicolson, p. 328.
14 Grey, October 11, 1894, quoted in Robbins, Grey, p. 254.
15 Grey to Lascelles, October 10, 1907, BD, vol. 6, p. 86.
by calling in editors when the tone of the newspaper threatened foreign relations. Such a case occurred in 1908, when the Foreign Office opposed the Times’s proposed appointment of H. W. Steed as its Berlin correspondent, resulting in a visit by Tyrrell. As foreign editor, Chirol wrote to the general editor:

Tyrrell came to see me yesterday morning. He had heard from Buckle that Steed was going to Berlin, and is much exercised about it, as he thinks Steed (whom he knows) would be the wrong man there in the interests of the paper, and in those of Anglo-German relations. His arguments impressed me, and I asked him to go and see you and talk it over with you. I have great confidence in his judgement and he has been a most valuable friend to me, and to the paper too.16

The Foreign Office’s action was prompted by Steed’s well known hostility to Germany, which resulted in protests by the German government against his posting to Berlin. Concern over the impact the appointment would have upon Anglo-German relations prompted the Foreign Office’s interference in what normally would have been a purely internal affair of the Times.

The emergence of closer relations with journalists posed certain problems for the Foreign Office. Chief among these was the assumption on the part of foreign governments that the British press was inspired by the Foreign Office. Reports of influence on the press were consistently denied, especially to their German counterparts whose own press was in part subject to the direct influence of the German government. Requests by the Kaiser that the Foreign Office "counteract" criticism of German naval policy in

16Chirol to Bell, June 24, 1908, quoted in The History of the Times, vol. 3, p. 646.
the British press in the wake of the 1907 German naval bill roused the ire of the Foreign Office, which had little sympathy with the Kaiser’s complaints. Hardinge bluntly minuted,

The Emperor knows as well as we do that the new German navy bill has created a feeling of unrest over here and must naturally be an object of hostile criticism. He knows equally well that the British press is independent.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite these statements that British newspapers were independent, hints of the more complicated relationship appeared on occasion. On a royal trip which included a visit to the German Emperor at Cronburg, Hardinge related the following conversation:

On Tchirsky \textsuperscript{sic} alluding to the unfriendly attitude of the British press I made him admit that there had been a considerable improvement in that respect, and I added that considering that the bulk of the press in England was more or less associated with the views of the Opposition it would be absurd to attach undue importance to its opinions.\textsuperscript{18}

In this comparatively rare admission, Hardinge does indicate that the press was more closely connected with political interests than the Foreign Office was normally willing to admit. What he failed to acknowledge was the relative agreement on foreign affairs between the leaders of the Conservative and Liberal parties, fostered by both politicians and journalists.\textsuperscript{19} The Foreign Office was also connected with endeavors to maintain harmony between the Conservative and

\textsuperscript{17}Minute by Hardinge, February 1908, BD, vol. 6, p. 113.

\textsuperscript{18}Hardinge to Grey, August 16, 1906, BD, vol. 3, p. 367.

\textsuperscript{19}Keith G. Robbins, "The Foreign Secretary, the Cabinet, Parliament and the parties" in British Foreign Policy under Sir Edward Grey, ed. F. H. Hinsley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 8. Hereafter referred to as "Foreign Secretary...".
Liberal parties, Tyrrell acting as a go-between for Grey and the Conservative leader A. J. Balfour on foreign affairs. When Andrew Bonar-Law replaced Balfour as head of the Conservative party in the midst of a contentious campaign against Grey's foreign policy, H. A. Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post, offered to introduce Tyrrell to the new conservative leader in order to maintain the heritage of good relations over foreign policy. Gwynne wrote to Bonar-Law, "of course... [Tyrrell] is a vigorous defender of Grey but I imagine we all are, especially as the extreme left are going for him like pickpockets".20 Such ties negated the strength of Hardinge's argument that the press could be dismissed on the basis of party affiliation.

The press was no more willing than the Foreign Office to admit they were vulnerable to pressure from the Foreign Office. J. A. Spender, who as editor of the Westminster Gazette occupied a powerful position in the Liberal party and was a close friend of Grey, steadfastly denied allegations that the Westminster Gazette was a organ of the Liberal Government:

The assumption was that... [the Westminster Gazette] never could have expressed a positive opinion on foreign affairs without private consultation with the Foreign Secretary.

...[This] certainly was not true of the Westminster. I cannot remember a single occasion on which Grey asked me to write an article or prompted me to say one thing and not another. Articles on foreign affairs were written, like others, on the spur of the moment and, I am

20 Gwynne to Bonar-Law, November 20, 1911, quoted in Robbins, "Foreign Secretary...", p. 550, note 74; and Robbins, Grey, p. 252.
afraid, without much thought of what the Foreign Office might think about them.\footnote{21}

Spender was not completely honest in this regard, for at least one occasion occurred when Grey did request Spender's assistance in relaying a political message to his readers. Concerned over doubts in France that the incoming Liberal government would not support the entente, Grey asked Spender in October 1905 to use the Westminster Gazette to draw attention to a forthcoming speech intended to reassure doubters, explaining:

I am afraid the impression has been spread with some success by those interested in spreading it, that a Liberal Government would unsettle the understanding with France in order to make it up to Germany. I want to do what I can to combat this... I think we are running a real risk of losing France and not gaining Germany, who won't want us, if she can detach France from us.\footnote{22}

At the root of the Foreign Office's concern was their belief that the press reflected public opinion. There was a tendency to link the two in discussion, Grey referring to them consistently as "the tone of the British press and of British opinion".\footnote{23} Hardinge shared this tendency, as seen when he assured the Tsar in 1905 that the British government desired friendly relations with Russia, offering as proof that "complete unanimity prevailed in England... since it constitutes part of the policy not only of the Government but also of the Opposition while the press without exception was


\footnote{22}{Grey to Spender, October 19, 1905, quoted in Robbins, "Foreign Secretary...", Footnote 16, pp. 547-548.}

\footnote{23}{Grey to Lascelles, February 26, 1906, BD, vol. 3, p. 277.}
favourably disposed towards the idea.\textsuperscript{24} The Foreign Office was not necessarily consistent in its treatment of the relationship between opinion and the press. On the one hand, Grey could ask Spender to highlight a speech designed to reassure opinion while at the same time use the press as a means of discerning "public opinion". The nagging question remains - what exactly was public opinion to men such as Grey and Hardinge? No clear or detailed contemporary exposition exists, but this is hardly surprising. Foreign Office officials, on the whole, were intelligent, but not intellectual; men of persuasion, not of philosophy. They did not view such a question as relevant; instead they acted on unconscious mental edifices which governed their perceptions. Although they referred to newspapers as vehicles of public opinion, this was a convenient short hand. The select nature of the papers they referred to reflects a very clear and deliberate political bias. The educated and eloquent opinions of the elite newspapers reflected the divisions of the governing classes. It was these opinions which earned the appellation "public".

In its most frequent incarnation, public opinion was used as a justification for a policy or action.\textsuperscript{25} Grey's interpretation of the entente with France was a case in point. Grey believed that Britain was pledged to offer support, friendship and, if necessary, military

\textsuperscript{24}Hardinge to Lansdowne, October 24, 1905, \textit{BD}, vol. 4, p. 215.

planning to back up the agreement. When in 1906 Grey was faced with the question of what assistance Britain would provide to France in the event of a Franco-German war, he told Lord Tweedmouth,

> We haven’t promised any help, but it is quite right that our Naval and Military Authorities should discuss the question in this way with the French and be prepared to give an answer when they are asked, or rather if they are asked.26

Despite this willingness to work with Britain’s entente partners, Grey was adamant there could be no formal or binding declaration "pledging this country in advance before the actual cause of the war is know or apparent...".27 Britain must wait to declare war until there was a specific demand such as war between France and Germany, when he felt "public feeling in England would be so strong that the British Government would be involved in it...".28 The general framework of policy, especially the decision for war or peace, had to be in accord with the opinions of the broader public. Finer points of diplomacy and policy, however, could and were made outside of the harsh and fickle guidelines of public opinion. Grey captures this hesitancy regarding public opinion in his reflection upon public life in 1923:

> There is no more pleasing formula than that of “government of the people, by the people, for the people.”... But it is well not to use that formula too confidently. It presupposes that the people are both willing and capable of governing. If they are not willing

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and capable of governing, the formula has no value. In the same way, consider "government by public opinion" as a formula. Public opinion - that highest tribunal with which I have heard leaders of opposition threaten governments in the House of Commons. It is an admirable formula; but it presupposes not only that public opinion exists but that on any particular question there is a public opinion reader to decide the issue. Indeed, it presupposes that the supreme statesman in democratic government is public opinion. Many of the shortcoming of democratic government are due to the fact that public opinion is not necessarily a great statesman at all.29

For Grey, public opinion was appealing as an ideal, yet dangerous as a practice. This tension between principle and practicality is typical of Grey. He both used public opinion and despaired of it, depending upon the needs of the circumstance. This is also characteristic of the Foreign Office's relations with journalists. It was ad hoc and reactive. It was very rare for the Foreign Office to step in and attempt to control journalists, this being seen as "a somewhat unsavory business".30 The Foreign Office instead responded to events as they arose. The contacts they developed were both more subtle and tenuous and were not amenable to direct control.

After 1906, responsibility for discussing foreign policy with journalists shifted from the Foreign Secretary to the top-ranking


officials of the Foreign Office, especially Hardinge. Interaction with journalists was always confined to only a few in the Foreign Office and demanded firmness and unwavering tact. The men who engaged in this informal publicity were dedicated to the new policy Britain pursued after 1902 and used their contacts with journalists to protect it. The response of the Foreign Office to this increased emphasis on publicity was a curious mixture of distaste, acquiescence and resignation. Officials growing involvement in the formation and execution of policy coupled with the exigencies of the shifting international situation resulted in their adoption of closer relations with journalists, which was a departure for the Foreign Office. The tactics they utilized, however, were consistent with their social and political views. Under the direction of senior officials, publicity became a means of controlling both domestic and international controversies which threatened the new course of diplomacy advocated by the Foreign Office.

By pursuing these ties, the bureaucrats after 1906 abandoned their former more limited role and assumed an active role in evaluating and defending foreign policy which in the earlier Foreign Office had been the responsibility of the Foreign Secretary. The more assertive attitude of men such as Hardinge made the task of incorporating these changes to their bureaucratic function one of relative ease. Relying on the private and personal avenues to relay information, share views and pressure or calm international sentiment

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31Steiner, *Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, pp. 86, 93-94.
was both discreet and reliable. The veil of informality averted the
moral and ideological dilemma which would have resulted from a more
self-conscious attempt to guide the press. In every aspect of their
interaction with journalists, the Foreign Office instinctively and
unerringly steered towards an elite and limited conduct of issues. In
the period prior to the outbreak of war this was carried to such an
extent that "public" did not refer to the general public but to the
elite who controlled political life. This was not a world which
comprehended or trusted such papers as the Daily Mail and the
growing political influence of mass oriented institutions.32

This raises the question of the relationship between Foreign
Office publicity and foreign policy. The development of officials'
contacts with journalists stemmed directly from the pressures of the
international situation and domestic reaction to policy. The
conviction that the dual rapprochement with Russia and France was
vital to British interests dominated officials correspondence with
journalists. The burgeoning power and vision of both Foreign Office
officials and journalists in pre-war Britain formed the basis of their
motivation for engaging in an informal and ongoing interaction with
the press. Their aims and successes during the formative years of
the Entente which they were so determined to promulgate need now
to be investigated.

32Koss, vol. 2, pp. 8-10; and Kennedy, pp. 361-362.
Given the ambiguous view that the British Foreign Office had of the press, what role did it play in the conduct of diplomacy and foreign policy? Foreign Office officials and the Foreign Secretary mistrusted newspapers, especially the mass oriented papers. They feared that the amorphous entity referred to as public opinion would contribute to chaos within the international community and unsettle British policy. Two forms of influence, however, existed between the Foreign Office and the press: first, the Foreign Office and newspapers released information and news which filtered through to readers, the most important of which were the elite decision makers, both home and abroad; second, the reciprocal influence of the press upon the formation and conduct of policy. In the pre-war context, the emphasis was heavily upon the former, the Foreign Office believing that the press needed to be contained and its impact mitigated. It was the fears and concerns of the Foreign Office that drove their relationship with the press. They were not interested in explaining or justifying their policies publicly. They resorted to damage control to prevent public discussions and disclosures that might alter the status quo, especially by influencing the perceptions of foreign countries of Britain's intents.

The most critical and sensitive topic for the Foreign Office under the Liberal government was the preservation of the entente
system that had been developed since 1904. The ententes with France and Russia were designed to decrease the amount of conflict facing Britain in her efforts to maintain her global position in a post-Boer war world.\textsuperscript{1} It was characteristic of British policy of the time that attempts to resolve these points of contention were made through negotiated bilateral agreements. This tactic succeeded in reducing, though not resolving, disagreements with France and Russia. In the case of Germany, however, British policy was far less successful as it aggravated long-standing German fears of encirclement and eclipse. With the protection of British interests which the ententes provided, Britain experienced a general improvement in her diplomatic situation between 1902-1907. British policy, however, was plagued by the fact that these improvements appeared ephemeral. Britain's new security seemed consistently threatened by the vagaries of fate and the potentially threatening steps taken by her European counterparts to protect their own interests. There was a lingering fear that Britain would be isolated and powerless if the ententes collapsed. Grey feared that "enemies of our entente" were working to promote a schism between Britain and France by creating the impression that "now that we have got all there was to get out of France... we intend to leave her in the lurch, and draw towards Germany to see what we can get in that

\textsuperscript{1}For a detailed and interesting discussion of Britain's concern with the global balance of power see McKercher "Diplomatic Equipoise...", pp. 299-339.
quarter." Grey blamed Germany for these efforts "since by doing so she would alienate France from us and draw her closer to herself." The real danger this posed, however, was the threatened loss of diplomatic support and friendship. Grey worried that:

> It will be said that it is entirely consistent the reputation for fickleness which we enjoyed in Europe until quite recent times. And so we shall run the risk of returning to our position of isolation in Europe, and of losing much of the strong position which our recent policy has won for us.

Consequently British statesmen continued to search for ways to protect the gains they had made, all the while checking over their shoulders for those seeking to derail their progress.

Britain's closer alignment with the European great powers was only one of the consequences of her need for greater political and military security. Radical changes in Britain's diplomatic tactics demanded closer attention to the troublesome necessity for public disclosures. In response, Britain's diplomatic establishment sought to create an acceptable veneer for their policy in order to increase its stability and success. Fears that agreements with France and Russia would limit British flexibility had to be countered by Foreign Office statements that British friendship with Russia and France did not preclude close relations with other European countries, namely Germany. Unfortunately, it was easier to hope for acceptance of Britain's policy than it was to obtain it. The Foreign Office faced

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2 Grey to Lascelles, September 18, 1907, BD, vol. 6, p. 81.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
three separate and potentially conflicting issues in the management of public perception of Britain's diplomatic endeavors as discussed in newspapers: first, the affect of journalistic coverage abroad, second, the affect in Britain; and third, managing the British press which was independent of direct and formal government control.

The first concern of the Foreign Office was the tendency of foreign governments to perceive British press reports, sometimes in machiavellian fashion, as semi-official pronouncements by the British government. This left the Foreign Secretary and the Foreign Office with the unpleasant and perennial task of reassuring foreign officials and governments that the British press was not directed by the Foreign Office. Anglo-German relations seemed especially vulnerable due to both the Kaiser's extreme sensitivity to press criticism and the growing number of clashes between the two nations. Anglo-German relations were plagued by German complaints of attacks by the British press. Grey very clearly informed the German Ambassador, when he complained of "a recrudescence of a bad tone" in the British press during the First Moroccan Crisis, that:

...we could not control our Press and that we were not inspiring it, and if I were to say anything in public now to promote a better tone I should at once be told by the Press that this was all very well, but that they must wait till the Morocco Conference took place before they could accept my view. On the other hand, if things went well at the Conference, it would be possible afterwards for any one in my position to speak in a friendly tone with effect.

Such reassurances were met with a marked lack of credulity. Less than eight months later Hardinge was forced to echo Grey's statements during a conversation with the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. But it was the British Embassy in Berlin and especially the ambassador from 1895 to 1908, Frank Lascelles, which bore the brunt of the Kaiser's displeasure. Much to consternation of Lascelles and the Foreign Office, Lascelles had to defuse the Kaiser's ire over reports ranging from allegations of large sums of money being spent on the British press to promote an anti-German line, negative reporting of German elections, to political cartoons in Punch. The persistence of these complaints irritated the Foreign Office, Crowe minuting caustically:

The emperor seems to have the English press on the brain. It is evidently impossible for an ambassador to make the "retort courteous" to H[is] I[mperial] M[ajesty]. If he were to read the press of his own country he would find that the English papers only echo in a faint whisper what the German people shout from the housetops. The only interesting thing about this incident is that it is clearly thought worth the while of the emperor's advisors to cut out and mark the passages from English papers which may be calculated to displease him.

Officials such as Crowe based their evaluations upon the international situation. Grey, however, approached the issue from a different

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7 see above, chap. 3, p.40 for quote.


9 Minute by Crowe, February 4, 1907, BD, vol. 6, p. 12.
perspective, as he was faced with a potentially fractious party and Cabinet over the controversial issue of foreign policy.

It was these divisions which formed the second factor to be taken into account when creating an acceptable public image for foreign policy. What was read abroad was read at home by critics and interested parties only as far away as the House of Commons and the Cabinet meeting room. Grey was all too conscious of the reality that the government would not accept the Foreign Office's evaluation that Britain should pursue an alliance with either France, Russia or both. The moral commitment of the military talks was as far as Grey was willing or able to go - and farther than many of his colleagues wished. The difficult line which Grey walked as a Liberal Foreign Secretary with an entente with France, which included military coordination, and, after 1907, an agreement with Russia, was understood by none better than Grey's long time friend J. A. Spender. Grey's concern over the perception that a liberal government would abandon the entente with France\textsuperscript{10} sparked this thoughtful comment by Spender:

\begin{quote}

a change of feeling is necessary even to the permanence of the understanding with France... we can't live on this razor's edge between doing too much and doing too little but shall infallibly topple over one side or the other, unless feeling grows more stable.\textsuperscript{11}
\end{quote}

In order to navigate this razor's edge without badly cutting themselves, Grey and the Foreign Office consciously sought to use

\textsuperscript{10}see above chap. 3, p. 41 for quote.

\textsuperscript{11}Spender to Strachey, October 21, 1905, quoted in Robbins, Grey, p. 134.
their influence with certain journalists to create a less explosive situation. The primary concern was to deflect outside efforts to damage Britain’s diplomatic edifice. Foreign Office officials and diplomats gently warned journalists who the real threat was. Thus during the first Moroccan crisis, the potential menace to the Anglo-French entente was noted with concern by Cecil Spring Rice in his correspondence with Valentine Chirol.\textsuperscript{12} Shortly afterwards, an article appeared in the Times sharply criticizing Germany’s diplomatic tactics for interfering in other countries’ internal affairs for her own benefit,\textsuperscript{13} a sentiment which echoed that of the Foreign Office. Whether Chirol’s ongoing contact with the Foreign office was a motivating force behind the article is uncertain. None the less, its publication must have been gratifying to the Foreign Office as it examined the crisis in terms which they would appreciate and, more importantly, understand.

The third and arguably the most volatile factor in the creation of an acceptable public persona for British foreign policy was the press itself. The press remained, on the whole, an independent organ in the formal sense, but their ties to the government by bonds of common ethics, experience and professional need for information created a far more complex web of influence than either the government or the press were willing or even able to admit. Yet the

\textsuperscript{12}Wilson, "Anti-Germanism...", p 28, citing Mallet to Spring Rice, May 16 and June 6, 1905 and Spring Rice to Chirol, April 13, 1905.

\textsuperscript{13}The Times, April 27, 1905.
press retained the vital freedom to criticize the actions of the politician and government which they turned to for information or explanation - a right they frequently exercised. This fact helped minimize the deleterious effects of being aligned with a political faction or party and reinforced the view of the Foreign Office that the press was not subject to Foreign Office influence. Yet their criticisms were not accepted with impunity. When the ongoing censures of Russia's internal situation by the press in 1904 became dangerously acrimonious, Hardinge, then Ambassador to St. Petersburg, felt obliged to use his contacts within Fleet Street to moderate the attacks in the name of diplomatic harmony.14

These constraints dictated the means by which the Foreign Office and the press interacted over foreign politics. The goals of the Foreign Office were based on broad ideals, creating a somewhat ad hoc atmosphere which was driven by the needs of the moment. It was more prone to activity during times of crisis rather than peace which given the inflamed opinions accompanying the major crises should not be surprising. It does, however, help clarify why the press became a more frequent topic of conversation during periods of diplomatic conflict. The informality of their nature also meant that the interactions functioned very differently at home than they did abroad. The reoccurring theme, however, was the juxtaposition of personal and professional views, giving the exchange of information

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form and substance. The attraction between the professional journalist and professional diplomat or bureaucrat was their common investment in gaining as much information as possible about the international scene. Both were trained observers, who were expected to digest and then translate the information which they had compiled. A journalist’s prime value to the Foreign Office was in providing an additional source of information on the latest developments affecting foreign affairs. This extended far beyond the news available in the daily papers, although this is traditionally the link that is discussed by historians.

Those journalists who had successfully established close ties to both foreign governments or figures and the Foreign Office were perfectly placed to act as informal conduits for information. The necessity for respectable credentials plus the Foreign Office’s own bias limited access to diplomatic affairs to only the most elite papers. The Times was a prime candidate for relaying information to the Foreign Office, their correspondents frequently being used to draw attention to offers made outside of a more formal governmental structure. An example of the role journalists played occurred in June 1906, when the Times correspondent in Constantinople contacted Grey to inform him of a conversation he had had with the head of the Baghdad Railway Company. At that time, Germany was interested in continuing the construction of the Baghdad Railway, consequently, the director was sounding out the possibility of British cooperation in the construction of a line to the Persian Gulf. In exchange, Britain was offered control of the southern section of the line. Grey treated this enquiry seriously enough to write to the ambassador in
St. Petersburg, informing him that "the Germans are anxious to get us to make proposals about the Baghdad Railway". Grey remained suspicious, however, fearing that here was another German ploy to cause trouble between Britain and Russia. His response was to reaffirm his commitment to a venture involving all interested parties, thus avoiding offending any sensibilities.  

It also was not uncommon for journalists to provide memoranda on discussions with prominent foreign figures contacted in the course of their work. In October 1908, Chirol wrote a long memorandum on his conversation with the former head of the German Foreign Office, Baron von Holstein, concerning Anglo-German relations in general and the naval race and current Balkan crisis in particular. Holstein was anxious to minimize any deleterious effect arising from these incidents but Chirol was not easily convinced, preferring to play devil's advocate. In July 1912 it was H. A. Gwynne's turn, as he submitted a synopsis of a conversation between a fellow journalist and Alfred von Kiderlen-Waechter, German Minister of Foreign Affairs. Gwynne was especially interested in obtaining information on Anglo-German relations which would be of interest to the Morning Post as well as to the Foreign Office, writing he "tried to get from my friend the German view of the international situation as regards the Great Powers" but with little success. The memo instead concentrated on


16Memorandum by Mr. Valentine Chirol, October 19, 1908, BD, vol. 6, pp. 158-161.
the arguments put forth by Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, German Secretary of State for the Navy, promoting the military reasoning for continuing the build up of the German navy - information which was important enough by itself for Gwynne to forward it to the Foreign Office.\(^{17}\) Journalists could also be used for rather mundane tasks such as occurred when Wickham Steed of the Times forwarded notes of his conversation with Georges Clemenceau, former Prime Minister of France, to Edward VII. and Hardinge, outlining the French leaders views on the state of European affairs and the threat posed by Germany. This effectively relieved the responsible ambassador from obtaining the information a second time.\(^{18}\) In all of these communications, there was a marked degree of acceptance of the day to day interaction with the press which is at odds with the Foreign Office's more indefinite suspicions of publicity in general. The accepted few who broke beyond the barrier were welcomed with little fanfare. The remainder of the press, however, were outsiders and potential threats to the careful plans of the Foreign Office.

Among the diplomatic corps stationed on the continent, the aim of contacts was different than that of the Foreign Office in London. Journalists were part of a vital network of information which the diplomats constructed in order to have a reliable guide to the

\(^{17}\) H. A. Gwynne, "Memorandum on conversations with Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter during three days in November last", July 25, 1912, BD, vol. 6, pp. 760-761.

government and culture of the country to which they were posted. British journalists in Russia were a prime example of how deeply journalists could become involved in the flow of information between governments. Two key journalists in Russia were Dr. E. J. Dillon of the Daily Telegraph and Donald Mackenzie Wallace who was associated with the Times. Dillon was a well respected former academic residing in Russia who spoke the language fluently. Through his connections, he was able to provide valuable introductions to such prominent politicians as Sergei Witte, a former Finance Minister and Prime Minister. It was Wallace, however, who was by far the more influential of the two. No stranger to the world of diplomacy and high politics, Wallace sought to promote a greater understanding of Russia through his work. Wallace combined journalism with governmental service and, as a consequence, had extensive connections with the British diplomatic community. In the mid-1880's he had served as private secretary to two Viceroy's of India and political advisor to the Tsarevich. Later he was a valued source of information for Edward VII, especially on Russian affairs. Along the way he struck up friendships with a variety of diplomats, including Hardinge and Nicolson. Wallace also enjoyed widespread fame as the author of the seminal Russia, published in 1887, which

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19Wallace joined the Times in 1877 as their correspondent in Constantinople, a post he held til 1884. From 1884 to 1889 he worked as a public servant in India, returning to the Times between 1890-98 as foreign editor. After leaving this post, he continued to write for the Times on a periodic basis. Douglas G. Morren, "Donald Mackenzie Wallace and British Russophilism, 1870-1919", Canadian Slavonic Papers vol. 9 (1967), p. 174; and Neilson, "My Beloved Russians...", p. 530.
was almost immediately recognized as the definitive work. It was this level of knowledge and influence that a series of British diplomats hoped to exploit by seeking the advice of journalists.\footnote{Neilson, "My Beloved Russians...", pp. 528-530; and Morren, pp. 175-176.}

The shock of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war and the tempestuous state of Russia's internal affairs made this knowledge of British journalists even more critical to the diplomatic corps. The ever present need for reliable information was further complicated by the rapid change in British diplomats to Russia between 1900-1910. During this time, four men held the position while another acted as interim ambassador during the six month gap between appointments in 1905-1906.\footnote{These were: Charles Scott, 1898-1904; Charles Hardinge, 1904-1906; Arthur Nicolson, 1906-1910; and George Buchanon, 1910-1918. The acting ambassador between Hardinge's and Nicolson's posting was Cecil Spring Rice.} Nicolson was keenly aware of the difficulties facing him as a new ambassador without knowledge or contacts and little time to develop them. Upon arriving in Russia, he immediately set about establishing a reliable network for gathering news which included both Dillon and Wallace. He deliberately used them to introduce him to key figures on the political scene and balance the Russian sources which he also desired to cultivate. Local sources were vital, yet the lingering mistrust of foreigners which ran through much of the diplomatic corps made an analysis by a good solid Englishman highly attractive to Nicolson. Wallace was viewed with such great faith that Nicolson invited him to "smoke, read and
write" at the Embassy to his heart's content.22 This close working relationship was well known at the Foreign Office. Equally well known were the political views that Nicolson was developing which strongly favoured the existing regime and were reinforced by his friendship with Wallace. While Nicolson's Foreign Office acquaintances suggested caution in the degree of Nicolson's reliance on Wallace, there was no warning to limit the association with him. It was an accepted facet of being a diplomat.

These personal relationships which developed between Foreign Office figures and journalists were epitomized by the friendship between Valentine Chirol and the most influential man at the Foreign Office in the years 1905 to 1910, Charles Hardinge. What is most striking is Chirol's intimate knowledge of the workings of the Foreign Office. His letters to Hardinge are peppered with evaluations of Hardinge's colleagues and their possible impact upon Britain's interests. When Louis Mallet's name was put forward as the replacement of Gerard Lowther as ambassador to Constantinople, Chirol wrote, "I think the appointment ... may turn out a good one in itself. But there is a danger of his being as jumpy as Lowther was phlegmatic."23 Chirol was able to provide Hardinge with invaluable information on office politics during his absences from the Foreign Office, especially regarding the almost Byzantine machinations

22 Wallase to Nicolson, June 28, 1906, quoted in Neilson, "My Beloved Russians...", p. 530.

23 Chirol to Hardinge, June 2, 1913, quoted in Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, p. 106, note 2.
surrounding promotions. This was critical in the formative years of 1904 and 1905, when Sanderson’s retirement as Permanent Under-Secretary marked the triumph of those in the Foreign Office who desired a more forward and assertive foreign policy. In late 1904, Chirol wrote to Hardinge:

> It seems that he [Sanderson] has been strongly advised not to attempt to resume work, and as he has only about 2 years to run anyway, it would seem to be mere ordinary prudence for him to make up his mind to retire now when he can still save his sight rather than run the terrible risk of a relapse if he stays on. Bertie is evidently very keen to get somebody from the outside...

> What I fear is that Sanderson has made the Foreign Office for so many years a one-man show, that when he goes the rather obsolete and defective machinery he has mainly kept going by his own motive power will collapse altogether...24

Later, when Hardinge was in India as Viceroy, Chirol kept Hardinge up to date on the power struggles at the Foreign Office enabling Hardinge to return as Permanent Under-Secretary in 1916, no mean feat since there was a contingent within the Office scheming to prevent his return.25

Characteristic of the friendship between Chirol and Hardinge is the ease of their exchange on foreign affairs. These were men drawn together by their similarities. With the frank way in which they wrote of their views it can easily be presumed that they helped influence and reinforce the development of these beliefs. This is not to create a causal relationship where none existed or to accord to

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24Chirol to Hardinge, October 18, 1904, quoted in Steiner, *Foreign Office and Foreign Policy*, p. 74.

either man the role of Svengali. As men who liked and respected each other's opinion, the exchange of ideas helped to develop their own judgements. The issue of the naval estimates was a case in point. Hardinge was a strong supporter of laying down eight ships during the hotly contested debate of 1909. In his estimation, it was only through the strong message of naval development that Britain could hope to dissuade German construction of a rival threat. Hardinge was aware of the political difficulties facing Grey over the ententes and stopped short of advocating outright alliance.26

Hardinge was a proponent of maintaining a strong defensive stance for "so long as the defensive forces of Great Britain are put and kept on an efficient footing and England's supremacy at sea is fully maintained" he saw little to threaten Britain's military position even in the event of a defection of her entente partners.27 In 1909 Hardinge did not share the fears of isolation that haunted Grey. Chirol agreed with much of Hardinge's evaluation, writing to him in 1910 that he found the arguments in favour of sending land forces to aid the French "altogether lucid and convincing".28 Chirol also believed that British security depended upon her ability to foil German desires for increased naval power, though he criticized


27Ibid., p. 824.

others at the Times for carrying this belief perhaps too far.  

Chirol believed Britain should "sit tight and watch", preparing to counteract the wave of anglophobia he felt would emerge from Germany in conjunction with German naval construction.

These increasingly close ties between government officials and the press occurred against the backdrop of the growing influence of both groups in politics, their elevation to political power forcing them to deal with issues previously outside of their domain. The Foreign Office's concern over the public reaction to diplomatic activity led to ongoing discussions of public opinion in the official and unofficial correspondence of the Foreign Office. Public opinion was frequently the justification for British policy, such as when Grey cautioned that Britain could only contemplate the question of war if and when British public opinion supported such an act. Grey may have found this justification a political advantage, but there was more than diplomatic coyness in his responses. The belief that the government was the representative of the desires and convictions of the public was a very real and potent force in British political thought and activity. As a committed liberal who was firmly in favour of many of the more progressive aspects of his party's platform, it would have been unthinkable for Grey to countenance a flagrant disregard for

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the wishes of public opinion. However, Grey was very capable of navigating the more unpleasant limitations imposed by such a belief if he judged it to be in the best interests of Britain. Such was the case in the now famous (or infamous) decision to not inform the Cabinet of the military conversations begun in 1906 between France and Britain. Grey was deeply convinced that such talks were necessary for coordinating military plans in the event that the British government decided to provide military strength in support of France. He was also keenly aware that such plans would be greeted with consternation in sections of Cabinet and the Liberal party, yet he honestly and consistently argued that such decisions did not compromise Britain’s freedom of action.31

Here is the most striking example of the ambiguity in Grey’s policy and the problems posed by the Foreign Office’s emphasis on publicity. The ententes with France and Russia were couched in such terms that Britain was technically obliged to provide only diplomatic friendship and support to her partners. However, with the increasing tensions in international affairs after 1905 there were powerful pressures to extend this support to military assistance in case of armed conflict. This pressure came primarily from France, but there were those in the Foreign Office who argued that a firm commitment by Britain in times such as the Agadir crisis would avert war due to the clear message to Germany that Britain would not remain aloof if either her partners or interests were threatened.

31Robbins, Grey, pp. 144-150 and 238-239.
Such tendencies clashed with a vocal segment of British public opinion, and Grey found himself with few options. He resisted committing Britain to an alliance but even his promotion of military co-ordination threatened Cabinet solidarity when it became known in 1911. Grey could not satisfy both the desire of "public opinion" and pressure for closer commitments to France and Russia. While Grey managed to avert the problems arising from these contradictions between 1906-1910, the crises afflicting Britain after 1911 proved too much and Grey faced serious criticism over foreign policy which was complicated by changes in Foreign Office personnel. All of this was to have major consequences for Foreign Office relations with journalists of the British press after 1911.
In 1910, the Foreign Office underwent a major personnel change with the departure of Sir Charles Hardinge for India. His successor, Arthur Nicolson, brought to the position a fine reputation as the diplomat who had adroitly handled the Algeciras Conference and negotiated the Anglo-Russian Entente. Promotion was his reward for exemplary service. Nicolson, however, was a reluctant recruit. Where Hardinge assumed the position as Permanent Under-Secretary with purpose and eagerness, Nicolson viewed his promotion with thinly disguised apprehension. This had important, though not necessarily easily recognized, consequences for management of press relations. By its very nature, the system was extremely sensitive to shift in attitude. The influence and frequency of contacts with the press were ultimately based on the importance the Foreign Office accorded it. Under Nicolson, the general approach remained unchanged: the reliance upon personal relationships continued to dominate the discussions. The purpose and aims, however, shifted subtly, resulting in a deemphasis of press relations which was to remain unchanged until 1914.

These changes were due in large part to Nicolson. He disliked the day to day administrative duties and depreciated his effectiveness as Permanent Under-Secretary, writing gloomily to his
son: "I am afraid that I am not a good head of an office." To another family member, he confessed: "I do deeply regret giving up the diplomatic life. I really loved it." These administrative issues caused friction in the Foreign Office which was compounded by disputes over foreign policy with Grey and Tyrrell. Nicolson had long been regarded in the Foreign Office as a "Russophile" and while he had few illusions about the problems of the relationship with Russia, he continued to favour at best a transformation of the entente into a defensive alliance and at least a British policy which pacified Russian fears arising out of the entente. To give Nicolson credit, this remained a strictly private view. Without direct orders, he would "only speak as a private individual" when questioned on British actions to fulfill her obligations to her entente partners. When speaking as Permanent Under-Secretary, Nicolson was always careful to remain within the boundaries established by the ententes with France and Russia which pledged only diplomatic support: "...it is of the utmost importance that we should support France as far as we possibly can...," he wrote to Goschen, "Of course I mean merely

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1A. Nicolson to son [?Harold], n.d., quoted in H. Nicolson, p. 335.
2A. Nicolson to Lady Nicolson, June 11, 1910, quoted in H. Nicolson, p. 320.
3Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 122-125; and Corp, "Tyrrell...", pp. 700-701.
4Neilson, "My Beloved Russians..." p. 552-553.
diplomatic support [as] by the 1904 agreement...".5 Early on in his under-secretaryship this situation was accepted in the Foreign Office; Nicolson's support for an alliance caused little stir. By 1912, however, the British political scene had shifted with important consequences for British foreign policy, changes that Nicolson found himself doubting and weakened his influence with Grey.6

During Nicolson's tenure as Permanent Under-Secretary, William Tyrrell emerged as the most active figure in Foreign Office press relations. As Grey's Private Secretary, Tyrrell was responsible for the release of official news to the press, a task he evidently relished, and "was on excellent relations with journalists"7. A gregarious and personable man, Tyrrell "disliked putting pen to paper. He preferred to work by word of mouth..." and "relied... upon atmosphere" to influence people.8 Consequently, Tyrrell left few public records of his activities, a fact which obscured the exact nature of his interactions with journalists. This was complicated by the fact that Tyrrell tended to operate outside of the Foreign Office in what Steiner refers to as a "semi-official" role.9 Tyrrell's


6Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 122-124.

7H. Nicolson, p. 328.


influence was based on his close relations with Grey, not on his control over the Foreign Office. Tyrrell's most important activities involved the investigation of diplomatic options beyond those which the Foreign Office was able to pursue, such as the Kuhlmann talks of 1912. Tyrrell's unsuccessful attempt to achieve "closer political cooperation" with Germany was so secret that neither Nicolson or Edward Goschen, then Ambassador to Germany, were informed of the contact, a fact which roused German suspicion. 10

While these activities had Grey's blessing, they differentiated Tyrrell's tasks from other senior officials. All that can be said with confidence is that Tyrrell was involved in press relations and that he reached the height of his influence in the Foreign Office during Nicolson's under-secretaryship. While this leaves an undeniable hole in the history of Foreign Office press relations after 1910, its impact is mitigated by two factors: Tyrrell alone sought out the press and his work on behalf of Grey as a "personal representative" effectively set his job as private secretary apart from the rest of the Foreign Office. It is indicative of the development of relations with the press that Tyrrell was a man with his own agenda and did not necessarily use his influence to pursue the Foreign Office line but to investigate

alternative options which, while useful to Grey, were not destined to become Foreign Office policy.\textsuperscript{11}

The crisis of 1911 enhanced the changes following Hardinge's departure. During this year Germany dominated the attention of the Foreign Office. The Anglo-German negotiations, which had been interrupted in 1909, were resumed in hopes of a resolution of the disruptive naval question. The negotiations were two pronged, focusing upon reduction of naval construction and a political agreement between the two countries. Whereas the Foreign Office placed greater emphasis upon the former, Germany and the British Cabinet regarded the latter as the paramount issue.\textsuperscript{12} This caused great worry in some sections of the Foreign Office who judged that the political agreement could have no other object than to strengthen...[Germany's] hands in a naval conflict, and... she could perhaps hope with a reasonable prospect of success to challenge British supremacy at sea, when necessary.

However legitimate all this may be from a German point of view, it cannot be the object of British policy to encourage it or assist in bringing it about.\textsuperscript{13}

The Agadir Crisis added immediate urgency to Anglo-German relations. The entry of French troops into Fez to quell unrest in Morocco and Germany's countermove of dispatching the German

\textsuperscript{11}Steiner, Origins of the First World War, p. 185-187; and H. Nicolson, pp. 384-386.


\textsuperscript{13}Minute by Crowe, May 14, 1911, BD, vol. 6, p. 628.
warship Panther to Agadir resulted in a full blown international crisis. The Foreign Office remained suspicious of Germany's intentions, believing it was "a trial of strength". British policy therefore was to support her partner to best of her ability for as that realist Crowe pointed out "concession means not loss of interests or loss of prestige. It means defeat, with all its inevitable consequences." This point was driven home with Lloyd George's Mansion House speech, which was "interpreted as a warning bordering on menace", the German Ambassador objecting that "the speech had made a bad impression in Germany".

This consensus over foreign policy did not extend beyond Foreign Office doors, however. The Agadir crisis provoked a virulent press campaign against Grey in 1911-1912. The campaign was due in large part to radical Liberal discontent over the poor state of Anglo-German relations and their anger at the "the microbe of Germanophobia" which they felt hindered peaceful relations. Grey, however, remained aloof from these press attacks confessing "I have too much to do to mind. This was due to Grey's involvement in domestic issues, such as the contentious labour unrest in the coal

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14Minute by Crowe, July 18, 1911, BD, vol. 6, p. 372.


industry, resulting in prolonged absences from the Foreign Office.\footnote{Robbins, Grey, p. 250.} This shielded Grey from much of the criticisms, but Nicolson felt his absence; "I am waiting to see Haldane and have a talk with him... as Grey, unfortunately, is entirely absorbed in these Coal Conferences and has no time to attend to foreign affairs except intermittently...".\footnote{A. Nicolson to Goschen, March 13, 1912, BD, vol. 6, p. 712.} Grey's aloofness, however, was more of a personal matter and he was unable to ignore the clamouring for change demanded in sections of both the government and the press. The press campaign of 1911-1912 marked the high point of radical influence upon foreign policy. It was commonly assumed within the foreign service that the radicals successfully spearheaded efforts to achieve a rapprochement with Germany through measures such as the Haldane Mission of 1912. The impact of this was thoroughly deprecated, Bertie in Paris complaining, "...the Haldane Mission... is a foolish move, intended I suppose to satisfy the Grey-must-go radicals. It certainly creates suspicion here...".\footnote{Bertie to A. Nicolson, February 11, 1912, BD, vol 6, p. 66.}

The attacks focused on two troublesome areas of British policy, Germany and Persia. Grey was the most vulnerable on Persia as the radical's support for Persian political reform and independence clashed with Grey's interpretation of British strategic interests in the Middle East and India. Allegations in the radical liberal press, such as the Manchester Guardian and the Daily News, that the Anglo-
Russian Entente permitted Russia to destroy Persian independence were difficult to counter; the reality was Russia wielded far more direct influence in Persia than Britain due to her geographic proximity and economic ties to northern Persia. Grey recognized this, writing:

the real cause of trouble... was that the "integrity and independence" of Persia, so tenderly cherished in the Preamble [of the Anglo-Russian Entente], did not in practice exist... Persia was honeycombed with concessions, particularly to Russia...21

Grey despaired of his critics' understanding of the issue, especially those who wished for an anti-Russian line. For Grey, the question of Persia and Russia was clear: "how on earth can we help Persia if we do [break with Russia]?

To Spender he wrote that some Liberals "set no... store by the peace we have enjoyed on our Indian frontier..."23 Grey would not jettison what he understood to be Britain's strategic interests for principle. Consequently, there was little he was willing to do to appease his critics over Persia.

The German question proved easier for Grey to handle and the crisis surrounding foreign policy eased, when in early 1912 Germany eclipsed Persia as the dominant issue in the campaign.24


22Grey to Spender, September 12, 1912, quoted in Robbins, Grey, p. 85.

23Grey to Spender, September 12, 1912, quoted in Robbins, Grey, p. 264.

consistently stated he would accept an Anglo-German rapprochement as long as the integrity of the ententes with France and Russia was preserved. He believed it possible to achieve "intimate terms" with Germany, if she was willing to work for an understanding. The crux of the matter for Grey was "we must have friendship if we are to give friendship." Grey proved more flexible on this subject than his officials and, to the despair of Nicolson and Crowe, supported attempts to settle differences with Germany. His success in pursuing a policy unpalatable to two of his most important officials demonstrates how much foreign policy was Grey's own creation after 1910, not that of his officials. Grey relied less on Nicolson than he had on Hardinge as he did not require the same degree of advice and guidance in 1910 as he had in 1906. This, combined with the lack of closeness between Grey and Nicolson, contributed to Grey's greater independence from his officials recommendations after Hardinge's departure.

Surprisingly, few attempts were made to mitigate the charges of the press. Grey either ignored critics, as over Persia, or modified his policy, as over Germany. Grey did not completely ignore the press. He remained in contact with Spender who J. Murray refers to as "the only journalist with whom the Foreign Secretary deigned to


26 Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 209-210; and Robbins, Grey, p. 139-140.
discuss foreign affairs" while he remained under attack.27 In January 1912, Grey began speaking in public in order to explain his policy.28 Prior to this, Grey had also met with C. P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian and one of his most vocal critics. Grey had notably little success in reconciling Scott to Britain's reaction to Germany, the Agadir crisis and foreign policy in general. Scott recorded his impressions of Grey's explanation of British policy:

He at once admitted that this was to give to France such support as would prevent her from falling under the virtual control of Germany and estrangement from us. This would mean the break-up of the triple entente[,] as if France retired Russia would at once do the same and we should again be faced with the old troubles about the frontier of India. It would mean also the complete ascendancy of Germany in Europe and some fine day we might have the First Lord of the Admiralty [McKenna] coming to us and saying that instead of building against two powers we had to build against six.29

Scott rejected this analysis on the rather specious grounds that Grey overstated the threat in light of Britain's historic capacity to defeat hegemonic powers in Europe. Scott's response was,

...the history of the Napoleonic wars showed that any power which achieved European dominance in the last resort came to a check against England, which so long as she retained her sea-power could not be coerced, and that would be the inevitable sequel to a German as to a French supremacy.30

The limited action on the part of the Foreign Office to defend their chief or the policy they were responsible for clearly shows the

27 Murray, p. 158.
28 Ibid., p. 167.
29 Scott, diary entry July 25, 1911, p. 51.
30 Ibid.
limits of the effectiveness of press contacts. Ultimately papers such as the Manchester Guardian remained outside their sphere of influence. Their more conservative counterparts, with whom the Foreign Office did have contacts, such as the Times or the Westminster Gazette, either did not seriously challenge foreign policy or were willing to defend Grey as the Morning Post did in 1912. It was a harsh reality that even if papers with extensive contacts with the Foreign Office took an opposing line, there was little the Foreign Office could do. The relationship was based on the existence of a general agreement over policy between the involved parties. If their views diverged, a gentlemen’s understanding existed to “agree to disagree”, unless the paper roused the ire of a foreign government. Ultimately, the effect of the press campaign of 1911-1912 was to highlight the limited effect of either group to make major changes. The press had limited ability to influence policy development and the Foreign Office had limited ability to get journalists to write something they did not wish to write. All that lingered after the collapse of the press campaign was a certain willingness on the part of Grey to take the sensitivities of his critics into account in details of conducting policy.31

The importance of healthy personal relations between officials and journalists was further demonstrated by the changes which occurred in the paper with the most intimate relations with the

Foreign Office. The Times had undergone far-reaching changes since 1908 due to the purchase of the paper by Lord Northcliffe of Daily Mail fame. These changes did not manifest themselves immediately due largely to Northcliffe’s assurance to the Times staff that "I... do not interfere in the conduct of the paper". The Times was to be guided by the existing editorial staff, including Chirol, "who understand the task better than I ever could." This situation did not last, however. After three years as proprietor, Northcliffe was interested in news that increased circulation, while the heritage of the Times was one of prestigious political and diplomatic reporting. This clash of ideals resulted in the retirement or resignation of some of the most influential editorial staff. From the perspective of the Foreign Office, the most important change was the resignation of Chirol as Foreign Editor in February 1912 after complaints that "the traditions and prestige of the paper [had been] steadily and grievously impaired by Lord N's interference, direct and indirect." Despite the fact that his successor, H. W. Stead, was well known to the foreign service, the intimacy and exchange of information during Chirol's tenure was diminished, and the Times increasingly found

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32 X [Northcliffe] to Steed, September 6, 1908, quoted in History of the Times, vol. 3 p. 652. To hide his identity in the initial period after his purchase of the paper, Northcliffe was known to the senior editorial staff as X. There was concern that knowledge of his identity would cause uncertainty as to the fate of the Times and limit access to sources.

33 Ibid., pp. 755-764.

34 Chirol to Buckle, August 8, 1911, quoted in Koss, vol. 2, p. 189.
itself at odds with Grey's attempts to reach a rapprochement with Germany in 1912-1913. This culminated in a serious breakdown between the Foreign Office and the Times during the July crisis when the Times campaign for intervention received little favour in the Foreign Office.\footnote{Donald G. Bishop, The Administration of British Foreign Relations (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1961), p. 201. Bishop argues that Steed's views were in close accord with many of the officials, but does not comment on the contemporary belief that the Times access to the Foreign Office information was reduced after 1912 due to its criticism of foreign policy. See Steed, pp. 409-410 for a specific account of Steed being denied entry to the Foreign Office. Gregory, pp. 265-266; and Steiner, Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, pp. 160-161.}

By August 4th 1914, then, Foreign Office relations with the press had declined both in terms of frequency and openness. This was more the result of the mentality of the men who staffed the Foreign Office than any outside pressures. It was indicative of the changes in the Foreign Office that during the controversies of 1911-1912 it was Grey who responded to the critics, while his officials, with the exception of Tyrrell, played a less prominent role. After 1911, Grey assumed greater control over both policy formation and the defence of that policy through the press. What must be clear, however, was that in principle little changed; the Foreign Office preserved the elite and personal basis of its approach to the press. After 1910 the system established during Hardinge's tenure was eclipsed not eliminated. This was irrevocably altered with the outbreak of war. The creation of the News Department in August 1914 marked the modest beginnings of structured and systematic
contacts with the press, initiating the process whereby the Foreign Office conducted press relations as a bureaucratic entity rather than solely through individual officials. Thus it was the pressures and demands of war that brought about the major alterations in the Foreign Office's approach to the press, ending the personal contacts characterizing the relationship between the elite press and the Foreign Office in the pre-war years.
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