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GEOPOLITICAL CONCEPTS AND MARITIME TERRITORIAL BEHAVIOUR IN INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY

by

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B.A., Carleton University, 1986

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"Geopolitical Concepts and Maritime Territorial Behaviour in Indonesian Foreign Policy"

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ABSTRACT

This thesis undertakes to examine Indonesia's maritime territorial behaviour from a geopolitical perspective. More specifically, it aims to identify the geopolitical factors which have shaped the development of the so-called Archipelago Doctrine. Promulgated in 1957, this doctrine revoked the colonial three-mile territorial waters in favour of a territorial model whose boundaries circumscribed the archipelago, thereby placing under the country's sovereignty a predominant portion of the inland seas within the Indonesian archipelago.

The Archipelago Doctrine is examined in this thesis by evaluating its bureaucratic sources (particularly the role of the military), the political circumstances which surround the various stages of the doctrine's development, the nature of political priorities and perceptions which are attached to it, and the doctrine's relationship to other national doctrines. This study finds that the Indonesian elite's "need" to control the waters of the archipelago has been determined by symbolic, strategic and economic considerations: symbolic, because the territorial model is perceived to bear relevance to the theme of national unification; strategic, because it involves an attempt to control foreign maritime - but especially naval - movements within the archipelago; and economic, because it relates to the resource exploitation (mainly oil) in offshore areas. These three variables, acting individually or collectively, have at different points in time shaped the policies and level of interest of successive Indonesian governments toward the Archipelago Doctrine. These variables are also considered as "geopolitical" because they amalgamate geographical and political elements.

The present analysis also demonstrates that the rise of the
Archipelago Doctrine to the top of the national agenda during late 1960’s was directly connected to the military’s advent to power. By committing itself to such tasks as the reform of political symbolism and the acceleration of economic development, the military created a strong incentive for the revival of interest in the maritime territory. Furthermore, the emergence of the military also meant that Indonesia’s national policy had become amenable to the line of thought of the new elite, of which geopolitical rationalization is an important part. This explains why, unlike its predecessor, the present administration has been outspoken in pointing to the linkage between the Archipelago Doctrine and some traditional geopolitical themes in Indonesia’s foreign relations.
To Indonesia
and
to mama and papa
Acknowledgements

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There are two people, however, who need to be singled out: my mother and father. All my life they have always been there for me, but the emotional cushion and financial support which they provided me during the past two years have been especially invaluable. Time and time again they came to my aid when the chips were down. No one could ask for better parents. Without their untiring assistance and faith in me, I can not imagine that this thesis would be completed. I therefore dedicate this thesis to my mother and father, the two most important people in my life.
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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of This Inquiry

This thesis undertakes to examine Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour from a geopolitical perspective. The choice of a geopolitical framework rests on two assumptions. The first is that the subject matter in question is more than just a legal phenomenon: it is a geopolitical phenomenon in that it constitutes territorial behaviour induced by clear-cut geographical determinants and political objectives. Secondly, the factors which have generated Indonesia’s growing maritime interests aptly qualify as geopolitical (being a combination of the interplay of geography and politics) since they touch upon questions of territorial symbolism, naval movements and natural resources.

A geopolitical analysis is also of merit because the present Indonesian government has made explicit claims that its maritime territorial policy is inextricably linked with what it terms as "Indonesian geopolitics". Armed forces commander Maradean Panggabean for example, states that the Archipelago Concept "is the fundamental concept in Indonesian geopolitics." Although the exact meaning of "Indonesian geopolitics" is rather difficult to pin down, it refers to be sure to certain traditional themes about the country’s geographical and foreign policy environments which have coloured the perceptions and animated the behaviour of the post-independence elite.

The particular objectives of this thesis are two-fold:
1. To identify the factors and considerations which shape Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour.
2. To evaluate the extent of the influence of geopolitical thinking in Indonesia on national maritime territorial behaviour.

For analytical purpose, it may suffice to clarify certain terms in this thesis. Maritime territorial behaviour refers to those policies and activities which are pursued by the government as regards the maritime territory. In this thesis, Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour is mainly focussed on the Archipelago Doctrine - i.e., the assertion of territorial sovereignty over the inland seas of the archipelago - although there will be occasions where reference will be made to other concepts such as the continental shelves and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), both of which are technically linked to the former. The Archipelago Doctrine is particularly singled out because it is a clear-cut territorial issue where the country’s sovereignty is at stake, unlike the continental shelves and the EEZ which are more confined to resource-bound jurisdictions.

Maritime territorial behaviour consists of two major components: (1) territorial extension and (2) territorial orientation. The former denotes the structural enlargement of the country’s boundary at sea as signified by the pronouncement of the Archipelago Doctrine in 1957. Thus, the main concern here is with the spatial alterations of the territorial arrangement. After the new territorial model was in place, what follows is the development of political identification toward it, a process which is called territorial orientation. The latter is a summary term which
covers a number of things, viz., looking into the level of support from the domestic power centres, the intensity of diplomatic activities marshalled on its behalf, its significance to the agenda of the country's relations with external actors, its political-symbolic value to the political establishment, and the extent to which the maritime territory is organized by the government.

Geopolitics is used in this thesis in two different meanings. The first is that it is simply a concept of analysis employed in this inquiry which is concerned with the interaction between political and geographical phenomena. In this sense, geopolitics is a useful concept to organize the inter-relationship between dependent and independent variables examined in this thesis - the former being Indonesia's maritime territorial behaviour and the latter being the geographical and political causalities behind it. This amounts to a method whereby geographical and political data and events are gathered, and their interplay are then studied with a view to establish some causal relationships with certain types of policy-behaviour. The most notable example of such linkage in this is the Archipelago Doctrine.

But geopolitics is also used in this thesis to denote certain "perceptions", containing both aspirations and anxieties, which are held by the policy-makers about their natural and policy environment. One analyst has referred to this as "a mental framework subsumed under the heading of geopolitics". Thus, geopolitics in this sense is not a method of analysis, but an object of inquiry, one to be examined to determine its connection with territorial behaviour. For this reason, the term is used in quotations
- "geopolitics" - or under the heading of "geopolitical thinking". Our analysis, as stated, will be concerned with how these forms of thought help shape the government's interests in the maritime territory.

**Statement of the Issue-area to be Investigated**

In December 1957, the Indonesian government, then under the leadership of Prime Minister Djuanda, announced a major reform of the country's maritime boundary. The old three-mile principle was revoked and in its place was a new concept of boundary delimitation which was generally out of touch with the existing practices of the law of the sea: straight baselines were drawn connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands, and Indonesia's sovereignty was claimed over waters within the baselines (shoreward) and 12 miles beyond them (seaward). Hence, the so-called "Archipelago Concept" or "Archipelago Doctrine". It did not take long for this declaration to receive strong objections from the maritime states (e.g. the US, UK, The Netherlands) which were moved by the concern over the prospect for navigational freedom in the strategic waterways of the archipelago and accused the Indonesian government of "expansionism" and "grabbing the sea".

The Archipelago Doctrine has received attention only among a handful of scholars outside Indonesia and has been generally overlooked by studies dealing with the country's foreign and security policies. This in itself is rather odd given the doctrine's clear significance to the present political establishment and given its linkage with a number
of political and strategic concepts. In fact, Indonesia's policies toward its maritime territory are so laden in insights into the external and internal concerns of the governing elite, that any general observations on Indonesia's national policies which fail to appraise them would be incomplete. Even among those who have paid some attention to the Doctrine, the matter is usually given no more than a cursory review, whether as a passing textual reference or merely as a footnote to other topics. To date, a systematic and in-depth study outside government circles on Indonesia's maritime territorial policies has yet to be produced.

Given its scant attention, it is not difficult to discern that much remains to be done in the study of the Archipelago Doctrine. One of the still-obscure areas of inquiry pertains to the factors which have shaped the interest of a succession of Indonesian governments in this doctrine. The lack of knowledge on this matter perhaps has something to do with the fact that the literature has for the most part discussed the Archipelago Doctrine within the context of the law of the sea, by, among others Draper, Lee, Tangsubkul, Polomka, and Sanger. This is, of course, to be expected given the nature of the subject in question (maritime boundaries). But from the point of view of the political analyst the problem is that the law of the sea approach places too much emphasis on the question of legal credibility and implications of the new territorial structure, on ensuing border treaties and resource claims, and not enough on the perceptions, interests and circumstances which have generated and guided these policies. Granted, some causal explanations for the
Archipelago Doctrine are occasionally found in several writings. But commonly such explanations are too brief and too incoherently scattered to be able to deliver meaningful and concrete explication of the matter at hand. Some of them even accept the official line at face value, making no attempt to read between the lines or to weigh the actual strength of the variables vis-a'-vis the subject matter at their disposal.

The bureaucratic dimension of the maritime territorial policy is also an aspect which has been largely neglected. Little is known about the bureaucratic origin of the Archipelago Doctrine, and what are the attitudes of various political forces toward the doctrine since its implementation. The role and interest of the military in the development of the maritime territorial policy is rarely acknowledged, while the views of President Soekarno toward the issue have not been scrutinized.

Knowledge of these factors is particularly required if one is to appreciate the sharp fluctuations which have taken place in the belief in the legal feasibility of, as well as in the political will mustered by successive governments towards, the new territorial model. There is a misconception, unstated but implied, in the literature that the Archipelago Doctrine is "static" in nature: after being conceived in 1957 and enacted in 1960, the matter was laid to rest. As one official asserts, since its codification the issue has always been "beyond politics", commanding bipartisan support and removed from internal political disputes. This notion can easily be refuted by pointing out that the concept had been subject to serious doubt by the power-wielders. For example, at one point in the 1960's the
new territorial model was put into a state of abeyance—if not disuse—by the governing elite. But shortly thereafter it was strikingly resuscitated, and over the past two decades the Archipelago Doctrine has become a matter of high-politics, and has received extensive political support and promulgation at home and abroad. Clearly, somewhere along the line a transformation has occurred in the nature of the political stakes involved in defining the maritime territory. Identifying what these stakes are and how they have evolved over time is central to the purpose of this thesis. For this reason, focusing only on the considerations which applied in 1957, something which most writings have tended to do, is hardly sufficient.

Statement of Hypothesis

There are two sets of hypotheses which will be explored in this thesis. The first is that Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour has been shaped by a combination of three geopolitical factors:

A. The need for a geographical-territorial basis for national integration.

B. The quest for offshore natural resources—chiefly oil—to fuel economic development.

C. The need to regulate and/control foreign maritime movements within the Indonesian archipelago.

These variables vary at different points in time, which is one reason why it may not be feasible to rank them according to order of importance. In any case, it is assumed that the Archipelago Doctrine, both in terms of territorial extension
and territorial orientation, are explicable by way of reference to these factors, individually or collectively.

The second hypothesis which will be tested is that there is an interplay between the policy-makers' interest in the Archipelago Doctrine and certain themes in Indonesian "geopolitical thinking". These themes are identified as follows: the concern over cross-road location, the aspiration for regional leadership, the distrust toward external powers' involvement in the nearby regions, and national unification. It is not until late in the 1960's - that is, until the advent of the New Order government under the leadership of President Suharto - that these currents in Indonesian geopolitical thinking began to interpose in the maritime territorial issue. More specifically, the Archipelago Doctrine began to be perceived as bearing pertinence to the cause of these themes. This may be taken as an indication of a much-heightened level of territorial orientation toward the Archipelago Doctrine.

A theme which will be highlighted from chapters three to six is the role of the military in the procession of Indonesia's maritime territorial interest. It will be demonstrated that there exists a correlation between the rise of the military to power on the one hand, and a much-heightened interest in the Archipelago Doctrine, on the other. In fact, the emergence of the military to the political throne ranks as one of the most important catalysts to the revival of interests in the maritime territory since the late 1960's.
Organization of the Thesis

While chapter I serves as an introduction, chapter 2 reviews the analytical approach of "geopolitics". Its main purpose is to show the limitations and usefulness of the geopolitical approach. This chapter also discusses some of the geopolitical theories on territorial behaviour and reviews several works on the geopolitical aspect of the maritime territory. Chapter 3 looks into Indonesia's maritime territorial extension as signified by the conception of the Archipelago Doctrine in 1957 and its subsequent enactment in 1960. Of particular interest here is the wider political circumstances within which the policy was developed, and the kinds of considerations and factors which governed the policy-makers' attitude toward the maritime environment and, thus, the boundary at sea.

Chapter four reviews the evolution of territorial orientation toward the new boundaries. Here, a distinction is made between two time-periods: the Soekarno era, which lasted from 1960 to 1966; and the Suharto era, which has endured from 1966 up to the present time. The concern in this chapter is similar to the one which precedes it: to explore and explain the factors which influenced the elite's interest - or disinterest - in the legal, diplomatic and political progression of the Archipelago Doctrine. In this connection, an enquiry into the conceptual linkage between the Archipelago Doctrine and a host of other national doctrines of the Suharto administration allows us to indicate the degree by which such territorial orientation has evolved.

Chapter 5 probes into the question of natural
resources. Because it is assumed that the resource dimension came to the fore mainly in late 1960’s, this chapter will concentrate on the Suharto era. It demonstrates that the quest for additional natural resources (mainly oil) in the pursuit of economic development, shaped the government’s interest in obtaining diplomatic and legal recognition of the maritime territory set forth by its predecessor.

Chapter 6 demonstrates how under the Suharto administration the Archipelago Doctrine merged with "geopolitical thinking" in Indonesia. This chapter reviews the development of "geopolitics" in Indonesia, identifies its major proponents, and highlights certain themes which have gained prominence. The chapter concludes by demonstrating how important geopolitical themes were used to support the promulgation of the Archipelago Doctrine.

The final chapter wraps up the preceding discussions and presents several concluding observations about Indonesia’s past maritime territorial behaviour as well as some speculative thoughts on the direction of future territorial policy.
Notes - Introduction

1. Translated from a speech by General Maraden Panggabean to the Committee for the Coordination of National Territory (PANGKORWILNAS) titled, "Implikasi Wawasan Nusantara Pada Bidang Politik dan Keamanan Nasional Indonesia", in Bunga Rampai Wawasan Nusantara (Jakarta : Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional, 1982), p. 349.


4. Draper, for instance, points out that the archipelagic seas "constitutes an important element in the national consciousness of Indonesians", while also highlighting the importance of "ocean resources". Leifer, on another occasion, makes brief mention of the concern over "national integration."
Chapter II

Geopolitics and Territorial Behaviour: A Literature Review

This chapter examines the academic study of geopolitics in order to evaluate its limitations and usefulness as a tool for analyzing maritime territorial behaviour. It is not the task of this thesis to chronicle the history of geopolitical thought or account for its theoretical development over the years. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this thesis. In so far as its history is concerned, all that is worth noting is that geopolitical writings span more than a century, that geopolitical thinking fell into disrepute after World war II ended owing to its association with the Nazi pseudo-science of "Geopolitik", and that it revived in late 1960’s. Beyond this, one may like to consult the works of Geoffrey Parker, M. Busteed or Peter Taylor.¹

Our particular concern is to shed light on the concept of geopolitics itself, through precise identification of its analytical objectives. After outlining the features of geopolitical analysis, we will examine some of the geopolitical theories which are relevant to explanation of territorial behaviour, concentrating primarily on the "organismic concept" and "territoriality". Such theoretical discussion is then followed by a review of some of the geopolitical works done specifically on maritime territorial behaviour. A concluding section summarizes the preceding discussions and demonstrates the usefulness of geopolitical analysis for our case study.
Geopolitics as an Analytical Approach

The first problem which immediately arises when one applies a geopolitical analysis to a particular inquiry is to clarify what is precisely meant by "geopolitics". There is an abundance of definitions of geopolitics, but they have yet to agree with each other. In fact, since its popular revival in the late 1960's, geopolitics has been used in so many different contexts and meanings that it has become very difficult to obtain a clear grasp of its precise disciplinary nature and substantive properties. The following complaint by Robert Harkavy is widely shared by other writers who employ geopolitical analysis:

In the past few years, the term "geopolitics" has come to be used in such a variety of meanings that it is no longer clear just what it means. Like the heavily belabored terms "imperialism", "colonialism", and "interdependence", it has come to mean almost everything, and therefore perhaps almost nothing, at least for someone searching for empirically based definitions.

According to Harkavy, geopolitics may connote any of the following: (a) "a euphemism...denoting the playing of traditional balance of power politics", (b) "a stress on geography or territoriality...as explanatory of diplomacy and alignments", (c) "a stress on short- or long-run maximization of national power and interest and on total war and diplomacy", (d) "a mode of waging diplomacy and/or warfare", (e) "power politics". Yet, other scholars have an equally complex typology of the meaning of geopolitics. Stephen Gorman identifies three categories of usage: in reference to a general style of foreign policy; as the embodiment of a particular school of thought about foreign policy; or thirdly, as a subset of environmental forces or policy concerns in a specific nation's foreign policy.
Nicholas Spykman drew a distinction between geopolitics as a framework for a whole philosophy of history, and its usage either as a synonym for political-geography, or as the planning of a national security policy of a country through study of geographic factors. To Basil Chubb, it means either the German pseudo-science of "Geopolitik", or "something hardly distinguishable from political geography."

The typology of geopolitical writings is equally perplexing. Saul Cohen identifies six approaches: power analysis, historical, morphological, functional, behavioural and systemic. Ladis Kristof, on the other hand, catalogues three kinds of geopolitical inquiry: strategical, environmental-historical and political-geographical. Meanwhile, Geoffrey Parker groups six major perspectives in geopolitical works: binarist, marginal, zonal, pluralist, idealist and centre-periphery. Finally, many analysts differentiate between geopolitical analysis at the global, regional, state and even bureaucratic levels.

A second problem with geopolitical analysis pertains to a general state of theoretical and conceptual disorder in this sub-field. For one thing, there is no such thing as a "geopolitical theory". As Child and Kelly point out:

A major problem with the academic study of geopolitics ...is that it is conceptually and theoretically vague. An adequate geopolitical model does not exist. Such a model would possess clearly defined concepts and rigorously tested theories for analyzing foreign policies and international events, and enable its users to interpret and predict a wide scope of international phenomena based upon a consistent, well-integrated assortment of geopolitical conceptual images.

The existing theoretical and conceptual propositions of geopolitics are scattered in a confusingly unstructured fashion, with no clearly-established relationship among
them. The following comment by Brunn and Mingst is instructive:

The difficulty with all geopolitical concepts is there is no systematic organization; authors seem to pick and choose those concepts which are best suited to their purposes, discarding those which are inappropriate, even though they might be key components of geopolitical theory. In fact, there is no agreed-upon geopolitical theory which specifies the relationship among the various concepts. Rather, we are left with a highly eclectic list of concepts, heavily borrowed from other academic disciplines and in which there is loose agreement among geopoliticians that these terms are central.

In short, the problem with geopolitics is that no one is entirely sure what it is, or how to define it, or just how much theoretical guidance it is able to provide usefully.

Despite such shortcomings, geopolitical analysis is still valuable. David Haglund has argued that:

For all the problems associated with it as an analytical tool, I would argue that it is still possible to put geopolitics as a concept to scholarly device, provided we avoid falling into the bad habit of asking it to do too much.

The merit of a geopolitical perspective rests primarily upon the nature of its analytical interest. Thus, although the theories and concepts may differ radically from one another, they still share certain similarities in terms of the line of inquiry in which they are engaged. The central feature of a geopolitical analysis is that it focusses closely on the geographical dimension of a state’s policies. Robert McColl points out that:

Geopolitics is a perfectly legitimate and useful word with explicit meaning and simply refers to geographical factors that lie behind political decisions.

In general the dependent variable in geopolitics is the political behaviour of individuals and state collectivities. But geopolitics pays particular care to the interaction of geographical and political variables to explain reciprocal causal processes whenever they occur. Although the ways in
which such inter-relationships are interpreted often take the wrong turn—among others, by becoming too deterministic, expansionist or policy-prescriptive—the area of inquiry of geopolitics itself, namely the interaction between politics and geography, remains valid. It certainly does not require any stretch of the imagination to assert that geography in one way or another fundamentally conditions political processes and behaviour.

Geopolitical analysis directs attention to the spatial behaviour of states. Such analysis is generally premised upon the notion that the political interests of states must find spatial expression and application. On this basis, international events such as territorial claims, the pursuit of regionalism, disputes over natural resources, the formation of alliances, the search for access to the sea, all become natural topics for geopolitical inquiry. It is also helpful to note here that such concepts as the Heartland, the sphere of influence, containment, falling dominoes, centre-periphery relations, buffer zones all relate to behavioural phenomena which have clear spatial patterning.

The emphasis on spatial behaviour underscores the importance of "movements". Saul Cohen has defined it as "the directional flow of transportation and communication of goods, men and ideas". Movement is significant because it allows us to identify and measure the spatial behaviour of states. Stephen Jones writes that movement "is the essence of strategy". On another occasion, Jean Gottman, referring to the phenomenon of "circulation" to denote the "status of traffic, communications, transportation, and trade", suggests that:
analysis of the movement factor as it applies to a position helps us to understand easily the motives and imperatives of the policies...emanating from that position.18

One example of the importance of 'movement' in geopolitical inquiry is found in the works of Martin Ira Glassner, who has analyzed Bolivia's geopolitical behaviour as a land-locked country, and found that its relations with its neighbours (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Peru Chile) are by and large determined by the need to ensure free movement, and effective communications in order to sustain useful access to the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.17

He also notes that problems with Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay have, of late, augmented the "Pacific orientation" in Bolivia's foreign policy.18

Finally, a geopolitical analysis draws attention to the perceptions which are held by the policy-makers as they respond to their surrounding environment. For this purpose, such concepts as "mental map", "psycho-milieu" or "subjective impact" have been introduced to denote the subjective intimation on the part of decision-makers toward their geographic environment. Ladis Kristof, for example, points out that the natural environment exerts a "subjective impact" on politics, which - referring hypothetically to Ruritania - he describes as:

the prism through which the Ruritanians view their 'natural' environment and setting, and, conversely, of the geographical prism through which the Ruritanians view the world at large and form their Weltanschaung.19

Identifying this "prism" is crucial if one is to comprehend the perceptual context within which policies are formulated. Not all foreign policy perceptions, of course, are geography-related, but many of the most important are. Americans have subscribed to their geopolitical doctrines of
"Manifest Destiny" and "containment" with great intensity, as well as the even more fundamental "Monroe Doctrine". The Soviets and the Chinese were at various times each convinced of the "capitalist-imperialist encirclement", while the Chinese theoreticians in the mid-1960's of the global 'countryside' surrounding and ultimately engulfing the imperialist 'cities'. Poland regards itself as the "Gatekeeper of Europe", while the Germans historically have lived in fear because of the porousness of both their eastern and western frontiers, and so on. Apart from revealing a perception of self-identity, such notions also signify the nature of the world which surrounds them. In turn, these perceptions mold the actual political behaviour of states.

In this regard, Muir and Paddison comment:

Collectively or individually, and consciously or subconsciously, the makers of international policy form decisions in relation to political-geographical mental maps. These maps include the distribution of friendly and antagonistic powers, areas of opportunity, the sphere of influence of respective powers and critical zones over which the status quo must be upheld or changes attempted or resisted.

The examples indicate the type of subject matter to be systematically investigated in geopolitical analysis. Various geopolitical theories and concepts may qualify under these headings. The usefulness of geopolitical concepts for the analysis of the present case study is beyond question. Geopolitics provides viable organizing concepts for dealing with, and explaining, a set of geographical and political variables that have influenced the maritime dimension of Indonesian foreign policy. The Archipelago Doctrine itself constitutes a clear case of spatial behaviour. The examination of Indonesia's maritime territorial policy which follows takes into consideration such geographical factors as morphology, location, and resources. Lastly, the
Archipelago Doctrine is examined and analyzed through detailed investigation of the mental-map of the policy-makers.

Geopolitical Behaviour: The Importance of the Concepts of 'Boundary' and 'Territoriality'.

Boundaries have long been a subject of interest to geopolitics. A number of reasons explain this interest. To begin with, the border of any given state is an explicit instance of a phenomenon where the political and the geographical are synthesized; boundaries, according to Julian Minghi, "are the most palpable political-geographic phenomena". A boundary is the manifestation of a state's territorial sovereignty, as it marks the territory within which the authority of the state is supreme. A boundary at one stroke designates "who" has authority, and "where" or "how far" such authority may belegitimately exercised.

Furthermore, some analysts believe that boundary provides a useful indicator in the relations between states. As Nicholas Spykman suggests:

The boundary is not only a line of demarcation between legal systems but also a point of contact of territorial power structures. From the long-term point of view, the position of that line may become an index to the power relations of the contending forces. Geopolitical analysts thus study territorial configurations in order to measure power interactions between states. When a territorial change occurs, this is seen as a sign that the power equilibrium in question has been altered.

The earliest attempt at a theory on why boundaries evolve is found in the organismic concept of the state,
which was conceived at the end of the 19th century by Frederich Ratzel and developed further by Rudolph Kjellen. It is worthy of note that the very term "Geopolitik", which Kjellen was the first to coin, was defined as "the science which conceives of the state as a geographical organism or as a phenomenon in space."\textsuperscript{23}

Ratzel believed that the state is a "geographical organism".\textsuperscript{24} This meant that the state functions and behaves like any other form of organism, in that it: (1) experiences a process of birth, growth and decay; (2) has the biological need to feed itself, the nutrients being space and resources; (3) is subject to the Darwinian law of evolution, because its struggle for survival will ultimately determine its form. In this theory, the relation of boundary to the state is no different than that of skin to organism: it grows in accordance with what it consumes (space and resources). The implication of this is that states expand simply because they "must" do so by nature of their raison d'être and need for survival. Ratzel indeed goes on to develop what he termed the "Laws of the Spatial Growth of States", which \textit{inter alia} asserts that the nation's boundary will inevitably grow in accordance with its population increase, cultural maturity, trade expansion and power build-up. Ratzel's ideas made a strong imprint on the works of Rudolph Kjellen, who applied the organismic theory to a more "practical" theory of state power and expansion.\textsuperscript{25} He noted three preconditions which a vital state should have in order to be a great power: spaciousness, internal coherence, and freedom of movement. These three preconditions required territorial expansion in his view. This was, in effect, the core appeal of the
theory to the Nazi geopoliticians when they adopted it as the intellectual basis for German expansionism.

In any case, it is clear that this organismic theory suffers from an overdose of determinism. It also has the chilling effect of narrowly simplifying international politics to a mere form of territorial dispute and conquest, with the implication that expansion, as a state's raison d'être, becomes a "necessary" and perfectly "legitimate" conduct of behaviour. There is more to the history of international politics than the mere quest for territory by states. Ratzel and Kjellen have created an overblown and finally unconvincing theory of the phenomenon of boundary evolution.

Their theory is countered by a considerable number of contrary cases. To illustrate, the momentary rise of OPEC's strategic-political value through its oil diplomacy in the 1970's was not caused by nor did it produce major alterations in territorial conditions of the EEC countries. Similarly, contemporary Japan achieved its status as an "economic superpower" without altering its borders. This list, of course, may go on indefinitely, but the point is clear: power-relations are not always contingent upon territorial relations, and indeed, power-relations do frequently change without similar occurrence in territorial conditions. The deterministic inter-relationship of power and territory as established by Ratzel and Kjellen can therefore be dismissed. The above examples also provide grounds for disqualifying the alleged "organismic" character of modern states and their alleged "biological" need and imperative for territorial expansion. It is thus not surprising that the type of theorizing done by Ratzel and
Kjellen was quick to fall into disrepute and has been generally abandoned in the post-Word War II period.

Another concept which needs to be mentioned is "territorality", which implies proprietorship and jurisdiscional space. This concept was first introduced to denote a certain spatial pattern in animal behaviours. Eventually, it was adopted for similar use in the study of human behaviour, individual and social. In the 1960's, some geographers began to apply this concept to their field. Derwent Whittlesey used it to describe a phenomenon where "government occupies space and administrates the people and natural resources of that space". Kasperson and Minghi define it as "the propensity to possess, occupy and defend a particular portion of a territory." Robert Sack, meanwhile, defines it as "the attempt to affect, influence or control actions or interactions (of people, things, relationships, etc) by asserting and attempting to enforce control over a specific geographical area." Edward Soja claims that territoriality is "a behavioural phenomenon associated with the organization of space into spheres of influence or clearly demarcated territories which are made distinctive and considered at least partially exclusive by their occupants or definers." Van Den Berghe, finally, simply defines territoriality as "the defence of a fixed space against the use or occupation by conspecifics."

The weakness of this concept however, is that it concentrates too much on the description of the phenomenon rather than the causalities behind it. That "territorality" constitutes an impulse or desire to control a particular geographic area is well-taken, but the question
of why or under what kind of circumstances do states resort to this kind of action has not received much attention and, hence, has not been sufficiently answered. One exception to this is Van Den Berghe, who points to "the competition for resources" as the driving force behind territoriality.\textsuperscript{32} But although this in itself is an important variable, it hardly constitutes the whole picture. Another shortcoming of the concept of territoriality is that it is seldom used in geopolitical and politico-geographical studies. Robert Sack's words may be of interest:

\begin{quote}
Political geography, more than any other area, has sensed the significance of territoriality but, with the exception of Soja (1971), has not had a sustained and systematic analysis of its role and function. In fact, much of political geography is defined in terms of the spatial analysis which has ignored territoriality events at the state level.

Apart from organismic concept and territoriality, alternative theories are severely lacking. In the post-war era, the prevailing trend has been to avoid universal theories, while concentrating more on the middle-range level. As a matter of fact, many analysts have restrained themselves from resorting to conceptualization in their case-studies. A good portion of them would shy away from the "whys" of territorial behaviour and instead resort to the less ambitious task of cataloguing types of territorial conflicts.

Sven Tagil et al. insist there are two types of explanations for territorial conflict.\textsuperscript{34} First, are those where border dispute is "a symptom of some other conflict between the states as units or of more basic conflict within them."\textsuperscript{35} Second, those where "the cause of the conflict is the boundary's relationship to the border area's topography, resources and population", and that here "conflict exists
between actors within states. Thus, according to Tagil, boundary conflict may be either "about" a particular border or "across" it. He concedes however, that the distinction between the two is not always clear and that, in fact, in most cases they tend to overlap.

East and Prescott, meanwhile, identify four types of boundary disputes: territorial, where a state claims an area of another state; positional, where a state disputes the definition and the demarcation of its boundary; functional, where states are in disagreement over the functions which apply at the border; resource-based, where states compete to obtain jurisdiction in a certain area. Andrew Burghardt proposes seven categories to sort out the territorial claims of nations: "effective control, historical, cultural, territorial integrity, economic, elitist, ideological." Norman Pounds, on another occasion, lists six: strategic, economic, ethnic, proximity, spheres of influence, and geographical. A lengthier criteria is provided by Strausz-Hupe and Possony, who basically endorse those of Burghardt and Pounds, but add religious, ideological, sociological, administrative and psychological.

Maritime Territorial Behaviour

The theories and concepts on boundary are generally focussed on land boundaries. This is hardly surprising if one considers that in the first half of this century territorial conflicts among states primarily occurred on land. In the post-war years, however, a considerable share
of the world's territorial fluctuations have taken place at sea much more so than on land, a result of the burgeoning claims over extended territorial waters, the continental shelves, and the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). As J.R.V. Prescott writes:

competition for exclusive control of areas of seas and seabed in the present period has been likened to the scramble for colonies by European countries in the 18th and 19th century."

Doubtlessly, this phenomenon had brought major implications for national geopolitical debates as the economic importance of the world's oceans has increased. Thomas Anderson, for example, studying Geopolitics in the Caribbean, found that recent maritime extensions in the Caribbean have forged two geopolitical implications whereby "no waters in the region remain unclaimed by a coastal state", and that "the large number of political units produces a very complex pattern of marine claims." In another study, Elliot Richardson points to how the United States has deplored the fact that some two-fifths of the world's ocean space is now jurisdiction-bound--a consequence of the proliferation of EEZs.

The maritime boundary, therefore, has received growing attention from scholars in various disciplines, most notably geography, political geography, strategic studies and international law. But the writings on this topic are generally preclusive of theoretical and conceptual tools, and are chiefly geared toward empirical observations. As to the question of the causalities behind the maritime claims, answers have been varied and eclectic. Barry Buzan, for instance, points to the factor of natural resources, a common explanation in the literature on maritime boundary questions. He offers two reasons why the oceans have become
an arena for dispute and conflict between states:

first, a dramatic rise in the realizable economic value of the oceans; and, second, the rapid spread of sovereign states to cover virtually all the land areas of the planet.

Increasing use of the oceans resulted from the general phenomenon of ever-increasing populations seeking ever higher standards of living, and commanding ever more sophisticated and powerful technology. 43

Although Buzan's argument may well be valid, it is far from all-encompassing. It may be pointed out that with respect to Indonesia the resource consideration was but one minor consideration in the decision to extend national jurisdiction, and it paled in comparison with other reasons.

Some of the more relevant geopolitical works on maritime territorial behaviour are produced by scholars of Latin American studies. Theirs are of particular interest to us because some of their findings have parallels with the Indonesian experience.

Jack Child, in his Geopolitics and Conflict in South America, finds a correlation between conflictual relations in South America and the geopolitical thinking in countries of that region. 45 The tradition of geopolitics has flourished in South America, with the military being its strongest - but not the only - proponent. In Child's view, the rise of the military to power has more often than not led to the emergence of a foreign policy geared toward "geopolitical themes" or "geopolitical rationalization". As he points out:

When geopolitically influenced individuals assume positions of national leadership and begin to govern using geopolitical strategies and designs, then geopolitics can provide a rather consistent explanation for schemes of national development, territorial integration and relations with neighbouring states. 46

In this connection, he notes that such classical geopolitical concepts as the "organismic state", the "law of
the valuable areas"\(^47\), and "law of the living frontier"\(^48\), have been used by the power-elite when it decides upon policy.

Child demonstrates that the correlation between "geopolitical thinking" and maritime territorial claims and disputes is strong in Argentina, Brazil and Chile—the so-called ABC countries—all of which have made extensive claims in their respective oceans. Argentina’s offshore claims are, for example, integral to its concept of Greater Argentina or Tricontinental Argentina, which sees the unity between continental Argentina, insular Argentina and its territory in the Antarctica. In this scheme, the country’s territorial waters, which the Argentines regard as their "mare nostrum" and have termed as Mar Argentino (Argentine Sea), are said to be the connecting link between the three land areas.

In addition to the theme of "integration", Child also points to the notion of "prestige" as a driving force behind the maritime behaviour of the ABC countries. Chile’s concept of Mar Chileno (the Chilean sea), which extends up to 200 miles from its shore, has roots in the perception that the country should maintain a strong presence in the South Pacific, which officials in Santiago herald as the Chilean Lake. Similarly, Brazil’s 200-mile extension is also linked to its aspiration to become a subregional power.

Whereas Child downplays the factor of natural resources as "not significant", Howard Pittman takes the opposite view. Writing in Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil and Chile, he points to population pressures and economic demands for food, energy and minerals as the cause for an increasingly competitive drive amongst
those three countries to obtain natural resources on the continent and in or under the adjacent ocean. This has led to not only the augmentation of geopolitical interest in the ocean, but as well to a situation whereby old political conflicts and territorial disputes have become carried over to the sea. Such extension of territoriality to the sea forms a part of what Pittman calls "the new expansionism" pursued by the ABC countries. In his opinion, there is a new "geopolitical trend" in Latin America whereby the maritime space is seen as being no different than land space, both of which are "subject to the same rules of occupation and possession." Strategic factors, however, are not entirely dismissed by Pittman. The Argentine claim to the Beagle channel, he suggests, is designed partly to deny Chile access to the Atlantic ocean. This is particularly necessary in order to prevent Chile and Brazil from attaining a "maritime link-up", an event which would be translated in the Argentine as a case of "encirclement".

Michael Morris, in Maritime Geopolitics in Latin America, assumes a view similar to Child in that strategic considerations and regional prestige interpose with maritime claims in that region. He further demonstrates that the post-war trend of "national enclosure movement" combined with inter-state conflict have lead to increased naval competition among these states. These naval rivalries, in turn, aggravate the conflicts and complicate the settlement of the maritime and land territorial disputes.
Conclusion

It should be clear by now that no geopolitical theory provides adequate guidance to our subject of inquiry. Nonetheless, the concept of geopolitics itself remains useful for our purpose, because it explicitly calls attention to the interaction of geographical and political phenomena and helps to explain certain political events, which in our case is the maritime territorial behaviour of Indonesia. Hence, the emphasis in this thesis is on middle-range explanations focusing on the geopolitical factors which underlie the interest of the Indonesian government in the expansion of the national maritime territory. In this connection, it is of interest to once again refer to Brunn and Mingst, who suggest that recent geopolitical writings at the state-level are usually more concerned with empirical findings than theoretical applications:

In most of these studies, geopolitical theory really does not inform the analysis. Rather geopolitical factors are utilized as a framework or typology to organize the country study. As a framework, geopolitical concepts are useful, but geopolitical theory is not advanced significantly by the plethora of the state idiographic studies.

The literature of maritime geopolitics has offered several explanations as to why governments seek to extend their offshore territory. As the findings reveal, control over ocean space in different countries has been linked to a variety of themes, chief among which are national prestige, regional aspirations, strategic concerns, and access to resources. These themes, in fact, in one way or another do play a role in Indonesia's maritime territorial behaviour. The following discussions will demonstrate how.
Notes - Chapter II


9. According the Parker, the binarists view the world in terms of the presence of two major centres of power, in contrast to the marginalists (such as advocates of the Rimland theory) who see only one centre of power. The zonalists "put the major centres of world power in a great swathe through mid-latitudes, roughly from 30 to 60 North", while the pluralists see a much greater diffusion of power spreading in both the northern and southern hemispheres. The idealists concentrate more on the prescriptive aspect of geopolitics. Finally, those who endorse the centre-versus-periphery ideas view the world in terms of the presence of a core - which is said to be in and around the North Atlantic basin - and the periphery - which is said to be the countries which lie outside it. For further elaboration, see chapter 11 of Parker, ibid.


18. Ibid.


24. Ratzel's work was written in German, and it is therefore rather difficult to obtain his original works. Ronald L. Bolin, however, has translated one of his most relevant articles, "The Laws of the Spatial Growth of States," in The Structure of Political Geography, edited by Roger Kasperson and Julian Minghi, (Chicago : Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 17-28. Parker (1985) and Thermaenieus (1938) also provide a useful discussion on the ideas of Ratzel.


26. See, for example, the work of Robert Ardrey on The Territorial Imperative : A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations (New York : Atheneum, 1966).


32. Berghe's words may be of interest: The root cause of aggression is the competition for resources. There are two basic ways of regulating competition: territoriality which establishes monopoly rights over the resources within the portion of usable space, and hierarchy which creates an order of precedence and access to, and distribution of, resources. (p. 3)

33. Sack, ibid.


36. Ibid.


40. In Burghardt, p. 228.


46. Child, p. 5.

47. The 'law of the valuable areas', crafted by Frederick Ratzel, asserts that countries compete to gain access to and control geographic areas, and that if a country does not utilize and exploit the space and resources of a certain arena, then others will.

48. The "law of the living frontier" is closely tied to the "organismic concept of the state". Because states experience a process of birth, growth and decay, their borders become dynamic and 'grow' in tendem with the augmentation of the power of states. As Child explains, this theory assumed that "frontiers are the temporary resting point of two national forces in contact at a border; when one force gains strength, it pushes the border back into the neighbour’s territory." See, for more, Child, p. 176; or Jean Klein, "Reflections on Geopolitics: From PanGermanism to the Doctrines of Living Space and Moving Frontiers", in On Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, edited by Ciro Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985), pp. 45-77.


51. Ibid.


Chapter III.

INDONESIA'S MARITIME EXPANSION:
The Origin of the Archipelago Doctrine

This chapter focusses on the process of territorial expansion which occurred on the Indonesian seas as signified by the inception of the Archipelago Doctrine in 1957. Of particular interest to the following discussions are: the political circumstances which surrounded the event; the domestic actors involved in the affair and the nature of their interest in it; and the particular policy considerations which gave rise to the cabinet's decision to implement the doctrine. This chapter demonstrates that the government's territorial interest in the maritime territory stemmed primarily from strategic and symbolic considerations.

Our time-frame here is between 1949 and 1960. 1949 dates the formal birth of the Republic, while 1960 marks the time the new territorial line (the 12-mile territorial waters, point-to-point model) was actually enacted as national law. The distinction between the 1957 "declaration" and the 1960 "codification" should be noted because the 1957 decision to extend the maritime boundary was only in the form of a political declaration and constituted no binding legal force.

It is within the time frame of 1956 to 1960 that the seeds of Indonesian geopolitical concern over the maritime territory are found. 1957 marked the time when the elite started to connect the maritime territory with the notion of national unity. This was also the time when the concern

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over foreign maritime passages within the archipelago first came to form, although at that time it pertained specifically to the activities of the Dutch navy. In any case, these two concerns would continue to provide substance to Indonesia's perceptions and interests in the maritime boundary in subsequent years. In fact, the eventual interjection of the Archipelago Doctrine into the currents of Indonesia's geopolitical thinking (as will be examined in chapter six) revolved around the questions of symbolism and movements.

This chapter is structured by following the chronological order of the stages which lead to the implementation of the Archipelago Doctrine. The first section looks at the colonial maritime boundary, which was adopted by post-independence Indonesia (1949-1956). This is followed by a discussion of the Inter-Departmental Committee, which was formed in 1956 to revaluate the colonial maritime border. The establishment of this committee warrants review because it is embryonic of the government's maritime territorial interest. Next, is the proclamation of the Archipelago Doctrine in 1957, and a following section reviews the events which led to its codification in 1960. These two sections show the relationship between the Archipelago Doctrine on the one hand, and the West Irian conflict and the provincial uprisings, on the other. They also reveal the role of the military - especially the navy - in the doctrine's development. A final section will attempt to make some observations on the preceding discussion.

Some comments are required on matters of terminology. The Archipelago Doctrine will at times be referred to in its
other manifestations: the Archipelago Concept, the Archipelago State Principle, the Djuanda Declaration, or its Indonesian term of Konsep Nusantara. Also, the term "Indonesian seas" is to be differentiated from "Indonesian waters". The former is used as a loose reference to the maritime areas - inland seas and straits - within and near the archipelago. The latter however, denotes the territorial limit of these maritime areas, which, in the case of the Archipelago doctrine, includes the 12-mile territorial limit and the internal waters inside the baselines. This will be explained further in due course.

The Colonial Maritime Boundary

The Republic of the United States of Indonesia came to birth on December 27, 1949. As part of the agreement previously made with Holland, it was obliged to retain legal regulations which were made during the colonial rule:

All provisions in existing legal regulations and administrative ordinances in as much as they are not incompatible with the transfer of sovereignty... remain in force without modification, as regulations and ordinances of the republic of Indonesia...as long as they are not revoked or modified by competent organs.¹

Insofar as the maritime boundary is concerned, Indonesia's territorial arrangement was now administered under the Territoriale Zee en Maritieme Kringen Ordonnantie 1939, a colonial ordinance which stipulated that the country's sovereignty extended three miles from the low-water mark.² This, of course, conformed to the general practices of the law of the sea at that time. There was a minor exception: in the case of groups of islands, the three-mile belt would
be drawn from baselines which connected the edge points of the islands. But no significant bearing was produced out of this as each of the baselines was not allowed to exceed 6 miles in length.

There are two particular territorial characteristics, forged by the colonial regulation, which were to become a major source of concern to Indonesia’s post-independence elite. These characteristics were especially significant in that subsequent maritime policies were substantially shaped by the government’s attempts to overcome them and problems associated with them. To start with, the 1939 ordinance produced a maritime boundary which approximated its morphological structure, and as such, the same quality of extreme discontiguity which marks its coasts was transformed to its territorial framework. This can easily be seen by taking a glance at an early territorial map of the country, as displayed in appendix I.

As the world’s largest archipelago, Indonesia is a country of 13,677 islands, which are structured into 5 major islands and 30 sub-archipelagos; only 6,000 of these however, are inhabited. Since most of its islands or island-groups are separated by distances exceeding six miles, the three-mile belts could not contain the archipelago within a single jurisdictional blanket. Instead, what emerged was fragments of territorial waters which were nearly as multitudinous as the islands themselves. There is no data on the precise amount of these fragments, but most of Indonesia’s major islands and sub-archipelagos were territorially detached from each other. For instance, the island of Java, often referred as Indonesia’s "ecumene", had borders which are separated
from Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, West Irian, etc. The same goes for the other major island/island-groups: Sumatra and Borneo, Borneo and Celebes, Celebes and the Moluccas, Java and Borneo, Java and Celebes, the Greater Sundas and the Moluccas, the Greater Sunda and Celebes, and the list goes on. Incidentally, one exception to this was Java and Sumatra, two of the most populous and largest islands which are separated only by a 2-mile Sunda strait.

Furthermore, in every instance of fragmentation, a gap of international sea was produced. Also known as "open sea" or "high sea", it is marked by the absence of national jurisdiction and is open for use to all parties irrespective of their purpose. According to the colonial ordinance, virtually all of the inland sea and the major straits (in terms of international navigation) within the archipelago would fall under the "open sea" classification, including: the seas of Java, Flores, Banda, Sawu, Natuna, Molucca, Seram, Halmahera; and the straits of Malacca, Makassar, Karimata, Lombok, Ombai-Wetar, etc.

In sum, two features, both of which are mutually reinforcing, are most salient with regard to Indonesia's maritime boundary at the time of independence: (1) distinct and rather fragmented territorial compartments, (2) the pervading presence of open sea.

Before we proceed to examine how this colonial boundary was viewed by post-independence elite, it is useful to register some words on the state of relations between Indonesia and Holland, given its contextual relevance to certain phases in the development of Indonesia's maritime territorial policy.

Indonesia proclaimed its independence in 1945 during a
power vacuum created by the defeat of Japan at the end of
world war two. But it was not until 1949 that formal
transfer of sovereignty was obtained from the Dutch, who had
returned to the archipelago after the war's end seeking to
regain its former colony from the Japanese forces. The
period between 1945-1949 was characterised by violent
physical confrontations between the Japanese-trained
indigenous forces and those of the Dutch/Allied powers,
which spread throughout the archipelago and claimed immense
human and material casualties on both sides. Indonesians
proudly call this the era of "independence war".6

The final settlement however, came by way of diplomatic
negotiation, not force (although the latter was certainly
used by both sides as a bargaining chip). In December 1949,
both sides met at the so-called Round Table Conference in
The Hague. Here, The Netherlands finally agreed to transfer
sovereignty to the Indonesians, which were to form the
Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RUSI). As quid
pro quo, the Dutch were granted a special political
accommodation in the new Republic by way of the Indonesia-
Dutch Union - to be headed by Queen Juliana - which
ensured, however loosely, consultative arrangements between
the two, somewhat similar to the notion of commonwealth
which exists between Britain and its former colonies.
Moreover, the Netherlands also managed to retain control
over West New Guinea (or "West Irian" as Indonesians call
the western part of the island). Although the Indonesian
delегtion had objected to Dutch intention of control, it
elected not to press on the matter for that time being
because of its eagerness to finalize the ultimate deal of
independence.7
As it turned out however, it was "West Irian" which kept sour the relations between Jakarta and The Hague subsequent to independence. The issue was stubbornly placed as top priority in the working-program of successive Indonesian cabinets. Jakarta's claim to the area rested on a mixture of legal, historical, political and strategic arguments. Legally, it claimed that as successor state to the colonial administration it had entitlement to all of the Netherland East Indies' territory, which included West Irian. Even prior to decolonization, Jakarta insisted, West Irian had already belonged to the local Tidore empire.

Politically, the elite regarded Dutch presence in West Irian as a continuation of the Dutch colonial design. President Soekarno stated:

The Irian question is a major issue to us... The Irian question is a question of colonialism or non-colonialism, a question of colonialism or independence... In our present constitution it is expressly laid down that the territory of our state comprises the entire former Netherlands Indies, that is from Sabang to Merauke. Thus.. Irian is also Indonesian territory, territory of the Republic of Indonesia.

Vice-President Mohammad Hatta, who also became foreign minister, shared a similar view:

In Indonesian eyes continued Dutch occupation of West Irian is both a remnant of colonialism and illegal seizure of a portion of Indonesian territory.

Lastly, as a corollary to the former argument, there was a strategic concern that the Dutch would use their position in West Guinea as a springboard from which to launch subversion and to encourage regional sentiments against the central government. In this connection, the Indonesian elite adamantly cited previous attempts by Holland to undermine the country's procession into political integration, viz. divide and rule tactics, encouraging the formation of mini-republics, advocating loose federal state in Indonesia, etc.
Clearly, the Dutch presence in West Irian was seen as a bad omen and an act of bad faith on the part of a still-ambitious ex-colonial master. To the Indonesian elite, it was an offence to their sacred cause of "nationalism" and "anti-colonialism".

On the other hand, The Hague's reason for staying in West Irian is more difficult to figure out. Whether or not it was based on political ambitions against Indonesia has remained an open debate. Most analysts however, agree that economics was certainly not a factor in this scheme - the area was severely underdeveloped, with no sign of resource potentials, and inhabited by a small population of primitive tribes. Others, such as Leslie Palmier, propose that The Hague's policy was driven by the desire to find a Eurasian homeland in the archipelago. William Henderson, meanwhile, attributes it to the psychological bitterness due to the breakdown of the empire:

The conclusion is surely correct that Dutch policy with respect to West New Guinea was primarily the consequence of an irrational psychological reaction to a painful and resented loss. Whatever the possible misgivings of individual statesmen in office, the Dutch government was responsive to this emotion for more than a decade.

Whatever the reason, the argument put forward by The Hague to reject Indonesia's claim was that the Papuans on West New Guinea do not share the racial and cultural make-up of the Indonesian peoples. This alone, they proposed, rendered impractical the notion of the area's integration with Indonesia.

"West Irian" was the single most important issue defining post-independence Jakarta-The Hague relations. There was no doubt that it posed as Jakarta's number one foreign policy preoccupation until the dispute was solved to
its favour in 1963. The time span between 1949-1963 was characterized, initially, by repeated breakdowns in bilateral talks and multilateral (UN) mediation, and, eventually, by the resort to brinkmanship diplomacy which climaxed in a series of armed/naval clashes. In the following discussions, we will see how this dilemma has contributed - but not determined - to the evolvement of Indonesia's maritime territorial policy. We proceed now to the discussion of the elite's attitude toward the 1939 colonial ordinance on the maritime territory.

The View of the Indonesian Government

The colonial territorial arrangement did not find favour among post-independence elite. Several contemporary government sources have reiterated a common explanation for this negative response: the three-mile regulation made it very difficult for the government to execute various functions of the government, namely defence and security, law enforcement and administration, and economic development. In order to further grasp the official view on the matter, it may suffice to highlight some remarks made by a selection of government writings.

With regard to politics and security, an Indonesian Foreign Ministry publication writes that:

The presence of pockets of open sea amongst the Indonesian islands posed a grave danger to the security and territorial integrity of Indonesia, since such a situation had given opportunities to external elements to imperil Indonesia by way of those high seas to support local political unrests.

Boer Mauna, a senior official of the Ministry, offers a
similar explanation:

On those pockets of open seas, due to its freedom of navigation, all states could conduct all kinds of activities there, even war.... In the event of a naval war, not only our food supplies, but the security and well-being of our population will also be in jeopardy.16

Mauna has also emphasized the inconvenience of the colonial maritime boundary from the viewpoint of border patrol and administration:

At all times, our patrol boats must be cognizant of their position, whether they are on our territorial waters or on the high sea because the juridical regime of the two waters differ.17

His view is echoed by Hasjim Djalal, also of the Foreign Ministry:

From the vantage point of governance, since Indonesia consists of thousands of islands which are communicable only by water or air, an integrated Indonesia is essential to assure administrative conduct from the centre down to the peripheries.18

Finally, government officials have also mentioned the problems imposed upon the country’s fisheries. To quote Mauna once again:

Foreign states, which were much more advanced in their technology, could easily deplete our fisheries resources on our nearby seas.19

And a Foreign Ministry report adds:

Fish is a very important source of protein to Indonesians, and therefore the natural resources contained by the nearby seas must be reserved for our own use.20

The problem with these explanations is that they seem to throw all the variables into the basket without providing much insight into which consideration was most instrumental at a certain point in time. That the colonial arrangement might have produced various "inconveniences" as described above may well be true, but whether or not they actually reflected the policy-makers’ perceptions in the early years

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of the Republic is certainly a question of another sort.

It is not entirely clear as to when and by whom the maritime issue was first instigated in post-independence Indonesia. But it is clear that it did not constitute a call during the early years of the Republic. For instance, when Indonesia's founding fathers convened to decide on the territorial basis of a future Indonesian state shortly before they proclaimed independence on 17 August, 1945, the maritime territorial border was nowhere on the agenda.\textsuperscript{23} This is the more revealing if one considers the wide range of proposals which were submitted at the meeting, all of which involved land territories: the Netherland East Indies, North Borneo, Brunei, Sarawak, Portuguese Timor, Malaya, New Guinea - the committee opted for the Netherland East Indies. Furthermore, a glance at Ali Sastroadmidjoyo's account of the Round Table Conference, which resulted in the finalization of the Republic's formation, would show that the maritime territory totally escaped the attention of the negotiating parties.\textsuperscript{24} There was no sign that the Indonesian delegation was concerned or even aware of the topic, as the conference's agenda was mainly centered on the questions of land territory, the transfer of colonial debt, and the future framework of the Indonesia-Holland Union. In fact, until the first half of the 1950's, there were no records or indications that the borders at sea were given any significant attention by the government.

This is supported by the fact that between 1949 and 1956 none of the decrees and regulations produced by the government and/or parliament were sea-related.\textsuperscript{25} The only territorial issue which loomed large then was chiefly land-related: the status of West New Guinea (or "West Irian", as
Indonesians call it), which continued to be under Dutch rule.

Indeed, evidence suggests that Indonesia’s geopolitical orientation toward its maritime environment during its early years was still minimal. In this regard, the country may be classified as what Donald Meinig termed as an "intra-insular" state, that is, a state which is feeble in its use and reliance on the maritime environment.\textsuperscript{26} Indonesia’s economy was almost exclusively sustained by productive forces situated on land. The biggest exports for instance, were rubber and petroleum – the latter totally produced onshore. In fact, all of its exports in the 1950’s were of land-related commodities.\textsuperscript{27}

In contrast, maritime activities remained very minimal. Fisheries barely contributed to the nation’s GNP, while offshore mining was at zero level. Inter-island trade was sluggish, as was the case with inter-insular communication by sea: in 1952, a mere 776,000 passengers (in a country of 100 million) were recorded to have travelled with the inter-island shipping service; in that same year, the sea fishery service were noted to have at its disposal only 331 motorized vessels (mostly in Java and Sumatra) and 90,373 sailing vessels.\textsuperscript{28} The Indonesia naval force, meanwhile, was tiny and ill-equipped to defend the country’s territorial sea.

We may therefore assert that in its early years the maritime environment did not constitute any strong geopolitical appeal to the Indonesian government. This explains why, during the first half of the 1950’s, there was hardly any interest among the political elites toward the colonial maritime boundary.
The Inter-departmental Committee of 1956

By the 1950's however, there were palpable signs that the government was interested in probing for ways by which the country’s territorial conditions could be altered. This was signaled by the creation of the Inter-Departmental Committee by prime minister Ali Sastroadiredjo on October 17, 1956. The primary task of this committee was to re-evaluate the 1939 ordinance and "prepare a draft on the Law on Indonesian Territorial Waters and Maritime Environment". 29

It seems rather clear that the establishment of the committee was linked to the overall political mood at the time to dispose of the highly inconvenient arrangements which were imposed upon the new republic through the mechanism of the Round Table Conference Agreement. Prior to this, on April 6, 1956, the Parliament passed a law declaring an end to "all relationships on the basis of the Round Table Conference Agreement concluded at The Hague in 1949 and registered at the United Nations Secretariat on 14 August 1950 under number 894". 30 This spelled the termination of the Indonesia-Dutch Union and the federal structure of the state. Concurrently, public outcries were galvanized against West Irian's exclusion from Indonesia, and the Indonesian leaders began to propagate the theme that the process of Indonesia's decolonization was still incomplete so long as West Irian remained "occupied" by the Netherlands. From this vantage point, the 1939 regulation distinguished itself as one of those 'colonial legacies', and its removal was seen as rudimentary in the reordering of
the political framework between the two countries.

But here, the particular considerations which prompted Sastroadmidjoyo's move remains an open question. The document on the committee's formation contained no sufficient explanations on why the Prime Minister viewed it necessary to alter the 1939 ordinance; it merely stated that the government has "considered the need for a new Law to replace Law no.2/1949 of the Provisional Republic of Indonesia, which would contain stipulations pertaining to the alteration of 'Territorialie zee en maritieme Kringen Ordonantie' (Stbl. 1939 no. 442), to suit present condition." No elaboration was made regarding what was meant by "so as to suit present condition", nor was it clear what it was about the colonial boundary which made it incompatible with the "present condition".

An attempt at some explanations however, is not entirely out of reach. In Sastroadmidjoyo's autobiography, he cited 1956 as a year when smuggling had become the "major issue, causing a great deal of unrest in the community...(as) it was made a political weapon (by the opposition) to bring about the downfall of the government"; he then pointed out that the government was severely handicapped "to properly patrol our extensive coastlines." Although Sastroadmidjoyo provided no elaboration on this question of smuggling and although the issue was in itself a ubiquitous problem at that point in time, it appears that Sastroadmidjoyo was making categorical reference to the army colonels in the Celebes and Sumatra who were engaged in illegal barter trade involving large-scale operations to smuggle copra and rubber. The affair was regarded with serious concern in Jakarta not just for
the blow which it caused to the central authority, but as well for the loss of revenues which might otherwise go to the central government. Given this, it is not beyond reason to assume that the committee’s formation was partly a political move on the part of the Prime Minister to signal that something was being done about the problem. It may be surmised that the letters which the Prime Minister received from the Minister of Justice and Chief of Police - both put forward the inconvenience of the maritime border and both were mentioned in the Inter-departmental committee document - were in reference to the problem of smuggling.

There is another, perhaps the most compelling, reason behind Sastrohardjo’s move, and this brings us to the strategic dimension.

Throughout the 1950’s, the central government was severely plagued by the crisis of separatist and revolutionary rebellions in various regions. In this, the government was particularly concerned with the presence of "foreign maritime activities" with hostile intent on the nearby coasts where the rebellions occurred; allegedly, these "foreign ships" were supporting the rebels by means of covert arms-shipment through the open-sea pockets. This will be further elaborated in due course.

Moreover, there was also anxiety among the elite in Jakarta with regard to Dutch naval activities within the archipelago. The Netherlands, resolved on maintaining its control over West Irian, was well aware that its strategic well-being there was by and large contingent upon its ability to maintain a naval presence while keeping intact strategic and logistical communication with the headquarters in Holland. To do this, ships of the Dutch navy were
routinely operating on the Java sea and the inland seas on the eastern part of the archipelago, either for the purpose of showing the flag, or enroute from their West Irian bases to the Indian ocean, and vice versa.

It should be borne in mind that at this time (1956) the level of Dutch forces stationed in West New Guinea was less than alarming. The Dutch navy there possessed a few small vessels plus a squadron of Fireflies from World War two. The London Times reported that at this time, "the garrison of West New Guinea consists of about 1,000 marines and a few hundred artillerymen," which were supported by two frigates and one destroyer. Nevertheless, this did not deter Jakarta from being anxious about the prospect of strategic build-up in West Irian. General Nasution, the army’s number one man and unquestionably the most important figure in the military, was nervously citing figures relating to Dutch military capabilities and raised his concern about the possibility that some of them might be transferred to West Irian. Some excerpts:

In a recent statement to the press I said that the Netherlands has a military strength, a territorial strength, of one army corps composed of six divisions which they now have ready within the NATO alliance. More important than this however, is their air and naval strength. We have read and we can see from the earlier situation in the eastern part of Indonesia that air and naval operations are truly decisive...

We know that they have one carrier, 2 cruisers, 9 destroyers, and 6 submarines. However, they also have, if I am not mistaken, an air strength of 6 tactical squadrons and smaller amount of fighters. These are now being used and will be included in the NATO alliance. They can not possibly move all these forces, since some of them are in the NATO alliance, the land forces primarily. However, they can move the majority of them. Most of their air and naval strength is not active in NATO, it is merely a part of NATO’s potential. Thus, it is still fully controlled by their own minister of defence.

We can see that these forces can be brought to and
use the bases in West Irian, as long as these bases still exist. If we can not eliminate these bases they will bring their forces there and we will be subject to air and naval operations. We must figure that every area in Indonesia can be attacked from the air and from the sea, for example, the air base in Bandung, the naval base in Surabaya, and our capital. Furthermore, at the present time Kenajoran is our only bomber base and it certainly can be directly threatened. Our naval bases can also be threatened, for we have not been able to develop an adequate antisubmarine defence against the 6 Dutch submarines. We can also count on inter-island communications, both by air and by sea, being disrupted. We must look at all these things realistically.36

Nasution, whose view was fairly representative of the army and the military37, went on to assert that such prospect of Dutch "intervention" was very real, and in the event of war, Australian and British (and possibly even American) support would likely be given to the Dutch. He also made reference to numerous sightings of "submarine and other craft" operating on the waters of the archipelago.38

These maritime activities, both in relation to the regional revolts and West Irian, were causing considerable perturbation to the elite in Jakarta. The issue was inevitably brought to the cabinet agenda on numerous occasions; the further deterioration of the rebellions and the West Irian conflict had had the effect of magnifying the government's concern over the maritime affairs. However, no legal or political action could be taken against them since these maritime activities were taking place in areas belonging to the "high seas", and that as such, these actions - however harmful to Indonesia's interest - were perfectly permissible given the principle of navigational freedom which applied on those waters. Consequently, a view began to develop among the elite that the legal situation which they faced was putting Indonesia at a disadvantageous position. They began to consider that perhaps the remedy of
This predicament could be found by some kind of alteration of the country’s territorial structure in ways which would permit greater jurisdictional leverage for it to deal with the "hostile" maritime conduct within the archipelago.

This explains why it was the then Minister of Defence, Iwa Kusumasumantri, who first raised the issue to the Prime Minister Sastroadmidjoyo in a secret letter dated April 30, 1955. In that letter, the Minister requested the Prime Minister to take steps to modify the 1939 Ordinance and create "our own national maritime territorial system".

The extent to which Iwa Kusumasumantri’s concern reflected that of the Indonesian military is difficult to ascertain: Kusumasumantri was a civilian, and Sastroadmidjoyo has written that he "never had the confidence of TNI (armed forces) leadership." Moreover, given the high level of factionalism within the armed forces at the time, it was also hard to determine which military figures were behind Kusumasumantri’s request. But the sheer fact that the request came from the Ministry of Defence is sufficient for us to assert the importance of the strategic dimension behind the formation of the Inter-Departmental Committee. The Ministry of Defence, it is worthy of note, continued to maintain its interest in the maritime territory even after Iwa Kusumasumantri was removed from his position. Prime Minister Sastroadmidjoyo, who assumed Kusumasumantri’s portfolio after the latter departed, made a point of maintaining interest in the maritime territorial issue by issuing two letters - one on June 4 and the other on August 15, 1956 - echoing the previous concern of Kusumasumantri. It is also telling that chairmanship of the Committee was given to a military
officer—Colonel R.M.S. Pirngadi, chief of naval operations. The group soon came to be known as the "Pirngadi Committee".43 Reportedly, it was also an officer by the name of Let.Col. Widya who prepared the concept and final draft of the policy-proposal of the Committee.

The Archipelago Doctrine

At the end of 1957, roughly one year after the Inter-departmental Committee was formed, a declaration was issued by (the new) Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaya to the effect that the colonial ordinance was being shelved in favour of a completely new territorial model. In what became known as the Djuanda Declaration, the Prime Minister asserted the radically new approach:

The government declares that all waters surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breadth, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state.... The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breadth of which is 12 miles) is measured from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia. (see appendix III)

Interestingly however, the credit for this policy was not due to the Inter-departmental Committee. Rather, it originated with a politician by the name of Chaerul Saleh, then Minister of Veterans Affairs, known as a "radical nationalist" with close ties to the military circles (as self-evident in his cabinet portfolio).44 Saleh was in the main concerned about the strategic vulnerability of the Java sea, which connects Java with most of the important outer islands and which is strategically indispensable for the
defence of the Java island itself. Keenly interested to find out whether some legal remedy could be worked out to convert its high sea status to that of Indonesian territorial waters, he assigned Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, a young lawyer and a distant relative, to look over the matter.

In his undertaking, Kusumaatmadja stumbled upon the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, ICJ Reports 1951, where the International Court of Justice approved Norway's act of drawing straight base-lines connecting its 120,000 islands and fjords as the basis from which its territorial waters were drawn, and denied British fishermen entry into that circumference. Kusumaatmadja was struck by what he perceived as a circumstantial similarity between Norway and Indonesia, and he proceeded to use this "point to point" method of boundary demarcation to draw baselines connecting the outermost points of Indonesia's outermost islands. He then proposed that:

1. the seas and straits within the baselines be considered Indonesia's internal waters.
2. a 12-mile territorial waters be established beyond these baselines.

This new territorial configuration came to be known as the "Archipelagic State Concept" or the "Archipelago Doctrine". Clearly, this territorial model was far more ambitious than Saleh's original intent. It claimed not just the sea of Java, but virtually all of the inland seas of the Indonesian archipelago, i.e. Natuna, Banda, Flores, Halmahera, Maluku, Seram, Sawu, etc. (see map in appendix II)

As it turned out however, Kusumaatmadja's proposal -
which Chaerul Saleh was only too eager to approve — was resisted by the Inter-departmental Committee. The latter was more inclined with the idea of extending the current three-mile territorial waters to 12 miles (also drawn from the low-water mark). Although this model was still deficient in closing the open-sea holes, the committee nonetheless viewed this as a more conventional formula with a better chance at international approval than Kusumaatmadja’s. By this time, some countries had already abandoned the three-mile principle in favour of a 12-mile principle, and the Committee was eager to jump on the bandwagon. The Committee also regarded Kusumaatmadja’s model as overly ambitious in terms of its areal consequence, and that it would unnecessarily cause harm to international trading/shipping movements requiring passage through the archipelago. Finally, in this writer’s opinion, it is also plausible that the Committee was content that the 12-mile formula was sufficient in closing some of the major straits within the archipelago — Malacca (appr. 8 miles at its narrowest width), Lombok (11 miles), Macassar (20.5 miles), Ombai-Wetar (17 miles) — thereby providing the country the opportunity to deny access for entrance to unwanted ships.

Upon closer examination, it appears that there is agreement between the competing proposals with regard to two issues. The first is that the three-mile breadth of territorial sea was insufficient and that its extension was deemed as pivotal to any attempts at new boundary concepts. The second consensus relates to the adoption of the 12-mile belt of territorial waters. But here they differ fundamentally on how this is to be drawn: the committee
preferred the classical method of drawing them from the low-water mark; Saleh-Kusumaatmadja, on the other hand, offered the more innovative and ambitious technique of delimiting them from continuously-drawn point-to-point baselines. Equally pertinent is the fact that Kusumaatmadja’s model, unlike that of the committee, produced a territorial structure which did not follow the morphological configuration of the country.

The two options were finally put before a cabinet session in December 1957. As it turned out, Kusumaatmadja’s model was unanimously favoured. Reportedly, the cabinet members regarded the archipelagic concept as more remedial in providing a territorial framework capable of containing the on-going proliferation of regional secessions against the central government. The problem could not be more serious: in December 1956, army officers had launched a bloodless coup against the civilian governors in Central, North and South Sumatra, and in March 1957, a different group of officers took control of important areas in Eastern Indonesia: Celebes, the Moluccas, the Lesser Sundas. By the time Djuanda cabinet met in December 1957, the general perception by the elite in Jakarta was that the situation would continue to deteriorate rather than improve; the loyalist officers even considered a military solution, which they eventually resorted to the following year.

In reviewing the situation, the cabinet subscribed to the assumption that the provinces’ political detachment partially emanated from their territorial detachment. This view, as noted by the author, is not beyond criticism: the most serious challenge against the central government occurred in West Sumatra, where the rebels would go so far
as forming the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Indonesia (February 1958); but, as stated earlier, Java and Sumatra belonged to the same unit of territorial waters — thus dispelling the aforementioned "territorial detachment" theory. It may also be pointed out that other factors — such as competition over budgetary share, ethnicity, religion — were more a fortiori in providing cause for the dissensions.

Nonetheless, the consensus which reportedly predominated in the 1957 cabinet session was that the condition of Indonesia’s political integration was somehow contingent upon the symbolic attainment of territorial unity. Kusumaatmadja, who was present at the meeting, offers his recollection of the line of thought which prevailed at that point:

It was a matter of survival; our country was falling apart... I think you can understand the way our politicians thought. They envisaged Indonesia being carved up into several regional parts. These rebellions were going on, supported from the outside. Then they were confronted with these two drafts of the Territorial Waters Revision Committee, and were shown on the maps where one showed a solid unit of the whole Indonesian archipelago, and the other a map of the national territory full of holes — or gaps of "high seas" in between the islands. The answer to the question of defending or policing this was by no means easy.... (A)s the policemen saw the country falling apart, they said, "We must have a concept that shows these simple people that we are one.... So I think the archipelago theory makes sense. The people had to be shown in simple symbols that Indonesia was one. We have just gotten our independence, and we had all these big boys interfering, trying to keep us apart because they had their own designs. So this archipelago principle seemed to be a good thing for the important political unity of Indonesia. This is how, on December 13, they decided to go ahead inspite of tremendous opposition.49

Kusumaatmadja’s statement also alludes to the intervention of external elements — what he referred to as
"the big boys". It is worth noting that the government had developed a strong sense of suspicion toward the US, which was believed to be conducting covert operations to supply arms to the rebels. This allegation was not without merit. Several studies have confirmed CIA complicity in the rebellion, and records have been made from some credible sources in the American government and among the Indonesian rebels admitting to this fact. According to Satish Kumar, the CIA had planned these operations as early as the fall of 1956, when Frank Wisner, Deputy Director of Plans, instructed his agents in the Far East that "its time we held Soekarno's feet to the fire". Steps were then taken for what Fletcher Prouty, a retired US Air Force colonel, describes as a "massive special operation" and the CIA's "most ambitious peacetime operation" to aid the rebels. These preparations are detailed by Prouty in the following:

A headquarters was established in Singapore, and training bases were set up in the Philippines. An old World War II airfield on a deserted island in the southwest Pacific was reactivated, and other airstrips on remote Philippine territory were prepared for bomber and transport operations. Vast stores of arms and equipment were assembled in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Indonesians, Filipinos, Chinese, Americans and other soldiers of fortune were assembled in Okinawa and in the Philippines also, to support the cause. The US army took part in training the rebels, and the NAVY furnished over-the-beach submarine back-up support. The Air Force provided transport aircraft and prepared the fleet of modified B-26 bombers. A small fleet of Korean war B-26s was prepared, and a number of covert crews were assembled to fly them... Tens of thousands of rebels were armed and equipped from the air and over the beach.

Contact with Col. Hussein, the rebel leader in Sumatra, was made in April 17 1957, and, according to Feith and Lev, "..before and for a short time after the rebellion began, modern American automatic rifles, bazookas, machine guns and radio transmitters were dropped in West Sumatra."
Legge⁵⁵, meanwhile, reports that American military advisers had been present in the rebels' stronghold of Padang, Sumatra, before the rebellion took place.

But a more relevant question at this point is what the elite in Jakarta knew, or the extent of their knowledge, about these activities. In other words, the question is whether the 1957 cabinet session was aware of - and thus gravely concerned with - the actual threat posed by the CIA operations. Ide Anak Agung Gde Agung, a former foreign minister, has made suggestions that the cabinet did entertain the view that "foreign" sources were supplying modern arms and fuel to the rebels⁵⁶. But it may be argued, that by December 1957 they were still groping in the dark as to who these "foreign sources" were and what types of arms were being shipped to the rebels. Suspicions fell on a wide group of actors: the Kuomintang in Taiwan, Syngman Rhee in South Korea, the government of the Philippines, the American CIA, the British in Singapore, or any combination of them.⁵⁷

Hard evidence which proved the American involvement however, came in mid-1958 in the wake of two events: (1) when a B-26 piloted by an American US Air Force officer was shot down while on a bombing mission in the Moluccas, and (2) when the army captured a large quantity of US-made weapons subsequent to the rebels' defeat in Sumatra in May 1958. Still, this evidence was at hand only after the 1957 cabinet meeting, and by this time the government's suspicion was only a matter of conjecture, lacking in concrete proof and still inhibited by a trace of self-doubt.

If the rebels' source of support was still up in the air, the question of how extensive foreign involvement was,
also remained unanswered. In other words, it seems that the cabinet was not fully aware of the severity of the situation regarding CIA's activities as described above. This is not all surprising given the extremely clandestine nature of the operations. One clear indication of this point is that Jakarta's relations with Washington, despite occasional expressions of displeasure on other issues, were hitherto maintained without disruption. It is very hard to imagine that the Indonesian government would have treated Washington this way had it known that US-sponsored "massive special operations" were taking place against the country.

What is proposed here, hence, is that the perception of foreign intervention in the regional uprisings seemed to carry secondary weight in terms of its pertinence to the cabinet session. Accordingly, one may conclude that the symbolic aspect was more important in the decision to implement the new territorial model of the Archipelago Concept than fears of foreign subversion.

The cabinet meeting however, was not solely preoccupied with the concern over the regional rebellions and the fate of "national unity"; there was also anxiety over West Irian. Indeed, as recalled by one participant, the cabinet meeting started with a lively discussion on the political and strategic situation of the West Irian conflict, including the issue of the Dutch naval activities on Java sea and the eastern seas. The cabinet members were generally in agreement that a solution was urgently needed to tackle the problem. By the time the two draft proposals for the maritime boundary were put forward, the cabinet was quick to evaluate their relevance vis-a-vis the West Irian conflict. The closing of the inland seas of the archipelago, so the
participants had it, would provide a major boost to the legal and strategic leverage of Indonesia in dealing with The Hague.

The West Irian connection itself had been conceded by several official statements. Shortly after the Djuanda declaration was made for example, the Ministry of Information made the following announcement in a radio broadcast:

It is not a coincidence that the new territorial waters is decided upon at a time when the state is facing a crisis in its struggle regarding West Irian.

In that same month, Kusumaatmadja made statements denying suggestions that West Irian was a primary factor in "Djuanda"; he admitted, however, that the issue did enter the equation:

I would like to clarify that the government’s declaration on territorial waters as announced on 13 December 1957 should not be seen solely as a consequence of our conflict with Holland over West Irian. This declaration and the forthcoming new territorial ordinance must be seen as a principal action by the people and state of Indonesia to promote its interests.

This reformation would still exist even if the West Irian conflict was non-existent, although we can not deny that our current conflict with the Dutch has pressed the need for such act.

The link between "West Irian" and the Djuanda declaration gets more apparent as one considers the events surrounding the negotiations which were then unraveling in Jakarta-The Hague relations. The last bilateral negotiation between the two had broken down again in early 1956. The 1957 UN General Assembly, a forum in which Indonesia keenly tried to rally international - especially Afro-Asian - support, for the fourth time failed to endorse Indonesia’s position in the dispute. Shortly after learning of the UNGA voting result, Foreign Minister Soebandrio
claimed that his country would no longer bother to seek the UN channel. This was perfectly consonant with Soekarno’s attitude, who had warned that if the UNGA voting did not go Indonesia’s way, he "would resort to methods which will startle the world". 62

The domestic scene was equally restless. Just the previous year, Jakarta signified its impatience with the issue’s dead-lock by issuing a decree which granted "provincial status" to West Irian. 63 A "provisional provincial government of West Irian" was formed, situated in the Indonesian island of Tidore. When Prime Minister Sastroadinjojo stepped-down in early 1957, his replacement, Djuanda, proved to be more inclined to the views of the hard-liners who favoured a more militant approach to the West Irian issue. This was the time when President Soekarno, well-reputed for his bellicose West Irian view, was noted to go beyond his ceremonial Head-of-State responsibility and started to assume more and more de facto political power, by defining the political agenda, directing its execution, playing a greater role in cabinet / government affairs, and restricting the role of Prime Minister Djuanda mainly to that of government administration. 1957, therefore, witnessed increased militancy in the political attitude of the elite and the masses toward the West Irian question. This is most telling in the government’s seizure of Dutch properties in Indonesia, worth some US $ 2 billion, in December 1957 (the same month of the Djuanda Declaration), which put Jakarta-The Hague relations at their lowest point since independence.

From this light, the Djuanda Declaration may be taken
as an expression of the government’s maritime concern as it faced the probability of physical confrontation with the Dutch. Here, it is useful to keep in mind that the Java sea, which had been Saleh’s original concern, was the most direct route for any Dutch naval vessels heading toward West Irian waters, either by way of Malacca strait or Sunda strait. The closing of the seas thus was expected to provide a hindrance to the strategic mobility of the Dutch within the archipelago. Captain Richard Miller correctly asserts:

"By proclaiming the Archipelagic Doctrine, Indonesia sought to make it difficult for the Dutch to operate in their colony without violating Indonesian territory."

"Act no.4" of February 1960

Despite the perceived importance of the Archipelagic Doctrine, there was no sense of urgency in Jakarta that the Djuanda Declaration had to be embodied in national legislation. Indeed, two years were to pass before the Djuanda Declaration was finally ratified by the Legislative Assembly. This requires some explanation.

One reason for the delay was that the existence of a wait-and-see attitude which prevailed among the elite who were anticipating constructive action during the First United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). This conference was held in Geneva shortly after "Djuanda" was declared. The forum was seen as an important medium to test the conceptual credibility as well as the diplomatic expediency of the Archipelagic Doctrine.

The other reason for the delay was the strong
opposition expressed by the maritime nations, all of whom had considerable interests, commercial and strategic, in halting the "creeping jurisdictions" of the coastal state over the high seas. Some elaborations on this point are in order. Two weeks after the declaration, Washington sent a diplomatic note to the Indonesian foreign minister to express its rejection of Jakarta's move. The note stated that the US government viewed the event with "serious concern", and that given the "long established principles of customary international law" and in view of its stake in freedom of passage in these waters, it claimed that it would not recognize the new extension and would only submit to the old three-mile border. This opposition was again expressed by the US during a heated debate with the Indonesian delegation during UNCLOS I (1958) in Geneva. Responding to the statement made by Ambassador Subarjo (March 7, 1958) regarding Indonesia's territorial extension, US chief-delegate Arthur Dean stated the following:

The Committee should bear in mind that whatever was added to an individual State's territorial waters must inevitably be subtracted from the high seas, the common property of all nations. For example, if islands were treated as an archipelago and a twelve-mile belt was drawn round the entire archipelago according to the straight baseline system, then areas of the high seas formerly used by ships of all countries would be unilaterally claimed as territorial waters, or possibly even internal waters. It would be a misnomer to describe such restrictions on the free use of the high seas as "progressive" measures. This delegation was ready to listen with understanding to the views of others, but hoped that the views of the maritime powers would likewise receive full and fair consideration.

The United States position regarding the breadth of the territorial sea was determined by its consistent support of the universally recognized doctrine of the freedom of the high seas, no part of which could be unilaterally appropriated by any one state without the concurrence of the others.

The US knew well that the strategic posture of its extensive network of allies - regional and bilateral - from
South Asia, to Southeast, to the Southern Pacific and the Far East was contingent upon assured naval mobility, including crucial unimpeded transit rights through the Indonesian straits and inland seas. Passage on these waters, furthermore, was also indispensable to the economic health of key trade-dependent, energy-importing American allies in the Far East: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan.

The US position was generally supported by other western maritime powers. On January 3, 1958, three days after Washington’s protest, Britain notified the Indonesian government that the new territorial limit was invalid and thus not applicable to its citizens, ships and airplanes. Other governments followed suit: Australia (January 3, 1958), The Netherlands (January 7), France (January 8), and New Zealand (January 11). The objections raised by these governments were based by and large on arguments similar to those voiced by the US.⁶⁹

The Soviet Union and China, on the other hand, supported the Archipelagic Concept. Their endorsement, according to Hasjim Djalal⁷⁰, was driven by two factors. First, neither Moscow nor Beijing possessed a blue-water navy. Their respective naval forces were primarily dedicated for the task of coastal defence. As such, they had no compelling strategic stake in the use of Indonesia’s seas. Indeed, it was in their interest to support Jakarta’s move considering the potential difficulties which the Djuanda Declaration might impose on the Western strategic position in the region. The second reason, Djalal continues, was the desire of both Peking and Moscow to make political inroads in Indonesia. Both had taken note of Jakarta’s proud non-alignment, strong nationalism, and anti-
imperialist sentiment. Soviet and Chinese leaders took every opportunity for capitalizing on these traits to improve bilateral relations, and, perhaps, to enhance the role of the Communist Party in Indonesian politics.

In any case, the uproar which the declaration caused among the maritime states raised fears in Jakarta that this territorial issue would come to overshadow "West Irian". Furthermore, the Indonesian government saw no virtue in having confrontations with the maritime states at a time when it was considering the possibility of third-party involvement (i.e. the US) in its dealing with The Hague over West Irian. In such circumstance, UNCLOS I (1958) became particularly appealing as a multilateral forum where Indonesia's territorial concern and aspirations could find legitimate expression but in a much more conciliatory manner. Having the sympathy of newly independent Afro-Asian would be of considerable diplomatic help.

UNCLOS I, however, failed to recognize the Archipelagic State Concept. This was regarded as a serious blow by the Indonesian government. Consequently, some individuals began to question the expediency of the new territorial concept. Why, it was argued, should the government commit itself to a cause apparently lacking in diplomatic and legal credibility. Perhaps the most notable proponent of this position was Admiral Subiyakto, then Naval Chief-of-Staff. Subiyakto was well-aware that he would be the man responsible for the execution of strategic tasks relating to the enforcement of the new boundary. But in his view, the small Indonesian navy was incapable of serious enforcement duties. He therefore regarded the Archipelagic Doctrine as an "unrealistic" undertaking, one driven by "excessive
political emotions".

Actually, Subiyakto's pessimism was well-grounded. According to a report made by the Indonesian navy, in 1949 the naval force consisted only of a few vessels contributed by the Dutch government: a few patrol boats, four Corvette-class ships, a few LCI-class landing-craft, and one torpedo boat. It was not until 1954 that the government obtained additional vessels from a number of Western countries (US, West Germany, Japan, Italy and Yugoslavia). These purchases provided the navy with 47 new vessels, but no information is available on the types of vessels acquired and the amount of money paid for them.

In 1957, after learning that the rebels in the outer-islands were receiving arms from a foreign supplier, the government once again sought to upgrade its military hardware. For this purpose, the government approached both Washington and Moscow. The American government turned down Jakarta's request for US$ 600 million in military aid, but Moscow willingly filled the gap when it extended to the Indonesian military delegation a modest arms-package worth approximately US$ 250 million. What the navy got out from this transfer is not known with precision (a submarine was reportedly included in the deal), although it is certain that naval upgrading was worth considerably less than that of the army, given the army's political clout and the fact that it was fighting a land-battle. But whatever new equipment came its way, a safe assertion can be made that the navy's share would not have been adequate to deliver a promising naval force, and this, apparently, was the viewpoint which Subiyakto assumed. It is telling that during Subiyakto's term, the navy did not
constitute a separate command of its own\textsuperscript{74}.

At any rate, according to several accounts Subiyakto's reservations proved effective in halting the momentum of the promulgation and implementation of the Doctrine. Diplomatic maneuvers to secure its recognition were put on hold. For instance, when Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani was approached by Ambassador Subarjo Djoyoadisuryo, chief delegate at UNCLOS, about the fate of the Doctrine, he replied that it was still unnecessary to commit diplomatic energy on the matter.\textsuperscript{75} Domestically, the maritime border also disappeared from the political agenda, and there was no record of it being brought up in cabinet sessions. A lapse of political will took place with regard to the doctrine's implementation.

In July 1959, Admiral Subiyakto was replaced by Colonel R.E. Martadinata, who became the new Naval Chief-of-Staff. As it turned out, the latter showed immediate interest in reviving the Archipelagic Doctrine. Kusummatmadja has drawn a comparison between Martadinata and Subiyakto in the following:

\begin{quote}
Although he (Martadinata) was aware of the deficiency in the strength of the naval force should the need arise to defend the extended maritime territory, the new navy chief was open-minded and did not assume a negative view toward the Archipelagic Concept.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

According to Danusaputro\textsuperscript{77}, the new commander's optimism stemmed in part from his intent to use the issue as a platform by which to upgrade the navy's share of the armed forces budget, which hitherto had been minimal. He therefore emerged as a major proponent in the attempt to codify the Archipelagic Doctrine into national law. To ensure this, he placed himself as the chairman of the Inter-departmental Committee (thus, relieving Col. Pirngadi from
his duties) and his ministerial rank assured the Committee the greater political clout which it needed to push the maritime issue back to the spotlight and on the cabinet’s agenda.

Martadinata, supported by influential figures like Chaerul Saleh and the persuasive voice of UNCLOS I and II chief-delegate Subarjo Djjoyoadisuryo, succeeded in placing the maritime boundary once again on the cabinet’s agenda. This time, the question was whether to proceed with the codification of the Archipelagic Doctrine. UNCLOS II was just around the corner, and it was argued that a codification would do much to signify to that forum Indonesia’s resolve to uphold the Archipelagic Concept.

The Djuanda Declaration was enacted as a national law on February 18, 1960, thus finally formalizing a new territorial structure which in 1957 was merely a political declaration short of legal force. The bill, Act Number 4 of 1960, was signed by President Soekarno, who, through a recent constitutional fix, had assumed executive power in July the previous year while maintaining his position as head of state. The bill expanded Indonesia’s overall national territory by about 2.5-fold, from 2,027,087 sq.km to 5,193,250 sq.km. With the exception of the land area of West Irian, the bulk of the newly-claimed territory involved the maritime areas within the Indonesian archipelago. Furthermore, the new territorial configuration consisted of 196 straight baselines, which formed a circumference around the Indonesian islands and which amounted to 8069.8 nautical miles in overall length.\(^78\)

The most interesting feature of the Act however, is that it included West Irian in the new maritime territorial
structure. Twenty-nine of Indonesia's baselines were tangential to that island, signifying proprietary right (see map in appendix II); this was rather odd considering the area itself was under Dutch control, de jure and de facto. Again, this may be taken as evidence that at this time a correlation still exists between the issue of the maritime boundary on the hand, and the West Irian conflict, on the other. It seems that by "legislating" its territorial claim, the government was trying to project the notion that the area's inviolability was a matter of constitutional imperative.

It is not known if the West Irian theme was used by the proponents of "Djuanda" to press for codification, but circumstances do point to that direction. After Soekarno achieved full executive power in mid-1959, the mood in Jakarta concerning West Irian had become very positive as the hard-liners were now in complete control over the course of the campaign. Just six months prior to the 1960 Act, foreign Minister Soebandrio formally announced plans for a "contest of power" against the Dutch⁷⁹. The following February, army commander A.H. Nasution briefed the Parliament on preparations for a West Irian invasion. Finally, it may also be surmised that the most plausible way for Martadinata and Saleh to convince Soekarno of the merits of the Archipelagic Doctrine was through linking it to the West Irian issue which had become an obsession of the President by that time.

One is tempted to ask at this point about the relevance of the regional insurrection, and whether in 1960 it remained as important a factor as much as it had been in 1957. In this writer's view, it had declined in importance.
The rebellions were effectively put down in 1958. Although some fighting continued to be waged by some rebels who fled to the mountains, the loyalist forces generally had the situation under control by late 1959, and it was just a matter of time before the rebels finally surrendered to government troops. Hence, the decision by the Soekarno cabinet to go ahead with the 1960 Act was almost certainly influenced much less by the provincial issue than by the West Irian question. Whether or not this meant that the symbolic appeal of the maritime territorial issue had also declined in importance is open for debate. Official statements documenting such a decline are yet to be found. But the fact is that a majority of the members of the Soekarno's cabinet, not surprisingly, were not part of the Djuanda cabinet in 1957, and this makes it plausible to assert that the latter's hypothesis of territorial symbolism might not be as fully entertained by the former.

There is also no indication that relations with the US had any particular bearing on this decision. It is true that the CIA had been involved in the regional rebellions, and that by mid-1958 (after the Djuanda Declaration) the Indonesian government would become convinced of this fact. But, somewhat strangely, subsequent relations between Washington and Jakarta in fact improved. One explanation for this is Washington's eagerness to deflect charges of complicity at a time when the rebels' defeat was becoming inevitable.

Previously, the Eisenhower Administration had repeatedly claimed "neutrality" in the strife between Jakarta and the provinces and denied vehemently any involvement with the rebels. The capture of the CIA-hired
pilot however, along with the seizure of American weapons in Sumatra, compelled Eisenhower to "prove" his benign intentions to Jakarta. Thus, shortly after the pilot's capture was made public by Jakarta, Washington swiftly approved the sale of 37,000 tons of rice and, more importantly, the transfer of US$ 1 million worth of weaponry to Indonesia. Both requests had been made previously by Jakarta, but to no avail. A new ambassador, Howard P. Jones, was appointed to assume the Jakarta post, and he was quick to make public his view that "the nature of Indonesian nationalism had not been correctly understood" by the US administration. Jones also developed a close personal relationship with Soekarno, and the latter had mentioned that the US ambassador was among his "closest friends". Jakarta, meanwhile, was receptive to the US move not only because of the financial and military benefits which it received from Washington, but more importantly, because of the hope of pulling Washington toward Indonesia's side and away from the Dutch concerning the West Irian conflict.

Thus, to reiterate an earlier point, given the state of Indonesia-US relations then, it seems unlikely that the decision to codify the Djuanda declaration in 1960 derived from a sense of anxiety toward the US. Rather, as stated earlier, it was mainly aimed at the Dutch within the context of the West Irian issue.

Finally, it must be kept in mind that at this time the concept of "archipelagic state" was not an accepted convention among the law of the sea community. Norway's status as a "coastal archipelago" could not be applied to Indonesia's case, whose geographical position places it under the category of "mid-ocean archipelago", which was yet
untouched by the law the of sea conventions at the time. Indonesia’s territorial concept therefore, was unconventional by almost every standard, and it is not surprising therefore that it received little or no support upon submission to both the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS) I and II, in 1958 and 1960 respectively. It was not until two decades later, after years of laborious diplomacy in UNCLOS III, that the regime of "archipelagic state" was finally recognized among the international community, as signified by its incorporation in United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 1982 (not enforced).\textsuperscript{83}

Conclusion

Several concluding observations are in order. First, it was not until the mid-1950’s that geopolitical considerations began to influence Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour. This by and large stemmed from the concern over "hostile maritime activities" relating to regional revolts and the anomalous presence of the Dutch in West Irian. These two political issues, in fact, proved to be important catalysts to the eventual conception and adoption of the Archipelagic Doctrine. The formation of the Inter-departmental Committee in 1956 signalled the emergence of a perception among the elite that the colonial maritime border was incompatible with their strategic-political interests; a connection was established between (maritime) "movements" and "territory". However, although at this time it was understood that the problem rested on the colonial
territory, there was still ambiguity with regard to the precise concept of territorial reform. Only in 1957 did the elite opt to territorialize the inland seas within the archipelago, viewing this as the most effective way to deal with both centrifugal regionalism and the problem of gaining control of West Irian.

Secondly, the functions that the archipelagic concept was expected to perform were both symbolic and strategic. The "symbolic" value of the concept relates to the notion that Indonesia's territorial arrangements strongly affected the popular self-image of the country. An integrated territory could help to promote a more psychologically unified country. This concept pertained mainly to the regional rebellions. The "strategic" aspect of the concept involved both a fear of regional revolts and a perceived need to ensure Indonesia's control over the archipelagic waters, thereby denying its use for subversion by hostile external powers. This function applies to both separatism and West Irian.

Thirdly, the specific choice of territorial model by the government allows us to assert that the primary concern was with the territorialization of the maritime areas within the Indonesian archipelago. It was for this reason that the 12-mile extension proposed by the Inter-Departmental Committee was set aside. One source has it that a 200-mile extension was also considered by the policy-makers at some point in time, although no formal proposal was made out of it; but this was readily dismissed since it would mean the inclusion of areas in the Indian and Pacific oceans. This was viewed as "unnecessary to the vital interest of Indonesia". On the other hand, the appeal of the
Archipelagic Concept was that its point-to-point method was able to place a vast territorial blanket over the inland seas, something that the 12-mile model could not deliver.

One final point deserves comment. The maritime border appears to have been an issue which absorbed the attention only of Indonesia’s political elite. Unlike the desire to gain control of West Irian or the great public interest in the Bandung Conference for instance, the maritime boundary did not involve any significant public and media exposure. In fact, when the Djuanda Declaration was issued in 1957, there was little to suggest that public interest was the least bit aroused by the event. This is why study of subsequent efforts by the New Order elite to rigorously internalize this doctrine, by means of national exposure and romantic conceptualizations, will allow us to effectively measure the extent to which the maritime boundary gained increasing importance to the political establishment in later decades.
Notes - Chapter III

1. This clause was contained in the Agreement on Transitional Measures, signed in 1949 at the Round Table Conference in The Hague, see Phiphat Tangsubkul's *The Southeast Asian Archipelagic States: Concept, Evolution and Current Practice* (Honolulu: East-West Centre, 1984), p. 30.


3. Ibid.


5. This attribution owes to the fact that Java is Indonesia's most populated island, where some 60% of the country's 180 million people reside; the Javanese culture is one with the most imprint on the nation's culture. Java also has the most developed economy with sound infrastructure, hosts the capital city of Jakarta, and a crucial centre of political activities. During the independence struggle, control of this island constituted by far the greatest prize in the strategy of the Dutch and the Allied powers.


8. This persistence of the West Irian issue to successive Indonesian cabinets is best accounted for by Herbert Feith, in *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (USA: Cornell University Press, 1962).


14. One source which well illustrates the state of underdevelopment in West Irian is Paul van der Veur’s "Political Awakening in West New Guinea", Pacific Affairs, 36, no.1, (Spring 1963), pp. 54-6.


17. Translated from a publication of the Research and Development Agency of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Perjuangan Indonesia di Bidang Hukum Laut (Jakarta : Department of Foreign Affairs, 1986), p. 10.


21. Mauna, p. 413.


23. For a good account of the meeting’s proceedings, see Garth Jones, "Soekarno’s Early Views Upon the Territorial Boundaries of Indonesia," Australian Outlook, 18, no. 1 (April 1964).


25. The writer of this thesis has looked into a list of decrees made by the government during the 1950’s as filed in the protocol section of the Indonesian Consulate in Vancouver, B.C. None of them, extensive in range of issues as they were, contained any regulations pertaining to the maritime areas until about the turn of the second half of the 1960’s.


27. Until well into the mid-1960’s, Indonesia’s export commodities consisted primarily of rubber, oil, copra, coffee, tobacco, all of which were produced on land. The near-absence of economic activities in the maritime areas - apart from small-scale fisheries - can be seen in an economic map produced by Leslie Palmier in her book on Indonesia (London : Thames and Hudson, 1965), pp. 146-7. Her statistics on sources of the country’s foreign exchange and overall economic productions, contained in chapter 10 ("The Economy"), may be of interest to those interested in dwelling deeper into the geographical pattern of Indonesia’s economic activities. Similar information may also be found in chapters four and seven of Richard Butwell’s Indonesia (Boston : Gin and Company, 1967).
28. For more statistical information relating to Indonesia’s economic, transportation and communication conditions, see Benyamin Higgins, *Indonesia’s Economic Stabilization and Development* (Institute of Pacific Relations Source, 1957). The statistics on the inter-island shipping is on p. 175, while the ones on the motorized vessels is on p. 168.

29. For the content of this document, see Munadjat Danusaputro, *Tata Lautan Nusantara: Dalam Hukum dan Sejahternya* (Bandung: Binacipta, 1980), pp. 131-134.


31. Translated from the document on the Inter-departmental Committee, Danusaputro, *ibid*.

32. Penders, p. 337.

33. See Yahya Muhaimin, *Perkembangan Militer Dalam Politik di Indonesia, 1945-1965* (Yogyakarta: Gajah Mada University Press, 1982), pp. 84-6. All these operations were taking place throughout the first half of 1956, and continued well into the beginning of 1957. These colonels grieved that the policy of Jakarta made it very difficult for them and their respective provinces to sustain their economic well-being. On a more personal level, the affairs also involved the rivalry between Col. Simbolon in Sumatra and army chief Col. Nasution in Jakarta.


36. General A.H. Nasution was speaking before the Army Staff and Command School in August 7, 1961. His speech was titled "Our military policy", and Guy Parker has made a verbatim record of it in his *The Indonesian Doctrine of Territorial Warfare and Territorial Management* (California: Rand corporation, RM-3312-PR, November 1963). The above quotation is on page 287.

37. Nasution had always been a rival to Soekarno. But he enjoyed the support of a majority of army officers with nationalist - as opposed to communist - credentials. This is clearly testified by the fact that Soekarno’s attempts to remove him from the army leadership, which temporarily occurred in 1952, were consistently frustrated by the stiff objection of army generals, as well as some high-ranking officers of the other services when President Soekarno decided to reinstate him as army leader following a failed coup attempt by Nasution, he was the one who devised the army’s doctrine of territorial warfare and management, which became the country’s formal defence strategy. Throughout the 1950’s and the earlier part of the 1960’s, he became the most powerful leader of the rightist element to challenge the growing influence of the Communist Party on the left. It was also Nasution who led the Indonesian delegation to Washington and Moscow in search for military aid for the West Irian campaign.


40. Ibid.

41. Penders, p. 272.

42. This information is provided by the 1956 Inter-departmental Committee document, which made reference to a list of departmental letters (presumably regarding the maritime territory) which prompted Sastromidjoyo to form the committee.


45. This well-cited information is found in most works dealing with the Archipelago Doctrine. But perhaps the most credible account is one by Kusumaatmadja himself, in a paper which he wrote for the Department of Foreign Affairs titled *Indonesia dan Perkembangan Hukum Laut Dewasa Ini* (Jakarta: Research and Development Agency of the Department of Foreign Affairs, September 1977).


47. Danusaputro, *ibid.*


49. Kusumaatmadja makes this statement during a question period following his presentation to the Seventh Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute of Rhode Island University, Kingston, Rhode Island, in 1972. His paper was titled *The Legal Regime of Archipelagoes: Problems and Prospects*, and it, along with the verbatim record of the question period, can be obtained in Kusumaatmadja’s *Bunga Rampai Hukum Laut* (Bandung: Binacipta, 1978), pp. 65-90.


51. Ibid.


57. Reinhardt, *Foreign Policy*, pp. 50-1.

58. Danusaputro, pp. 105-6.


60. Kusumaatmadja made this comment in a December 29, 1957 speech to the Indonesian Lawyers Association at the University of Indonesia. The title of his speech was "Wilayah Perairan Indonesia". See Bunga Rampai, ibid, for full text.


62. Henderson, p. 56.


65. For further elaboration on the view of the elite in Jakarta regarding the delay in the codification of the Djuanda Declaration, see Mochtar Kusumaatmadja's "Wawasan Nusantara*, *Polkam*, (1982), pp. 19-27.

66. Danusaputro, p. 112.

67. Ibid.


It may be useful to highlight other comments about the condition of the naval force during the first half of the 1950's. **US Army Area Handbook on Indonesia** (Washington, D.C. : FAS-American University, 1970) offers the following description on the condition of the Indonesian armed forces, including the navy, up to the first half of the 1950's:

Adequate stocks of small arms were available for all services, but they were old and their serviceability was questionable. The army received minor quantities of additional weapons, including some light artillery, from the departing Dutch forces; the navy's complement of vessels, however, totalled only a few launches and motor torpedo boats, and the air force had fewer than 50 outdated aircraft of various types left over from the Japanese at the end of World War II. Financial considerations precluded the acquisition of significant quantities of new arms or equipment, and the program of military modernization and buildup lagged far behind both needs and expectations. (pp. 496-7)

An earlier edition of the same publication (1964) provides an equally dim sketch on the Indonesian Sea Police:

The Sea Police, established in 1951, is a quasi-naval force of about 800 officers and men. Operating with vessels no larger than armed speed boats and launches, it is charged with curbing smuggling and robberies at ports, upholding maritime law in territorial waters, and performing other tasks... The line of demarcation between similar responsibilities of the navy for anti-smuggling and territorial water patrol is obscure. (p. 495.)

**71. Information Section of the Indonesian Navy, "Lahirnya Armada Republik Indonesia, Armada Republik Indonesia, (Jakarta : Dinas Penerangan TNI-AL, 1975), p. 16.**

**72. Ibid.**

**73. Henderson, p. 76.**

**74. Information Section, "Lahirnya Armada", p. 26.**

**75. Letter by Ambassador Soebarto Djodyadikusumo to Mochtar Kusumaatmadja dated June 26, 1959, from Danusaputro, *ibid*, p. 162.**

**76. Translated from Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, *Indonesia dan Perkembangan*, p. 7.**

**77. Danusaputro, *Tata*, p. 125.**


**79. From Kroef, *Nasution, Sukarno*, p. 20.**

**80. Feith and Lev, p. 36-7.**

82. Quoted from Henderson, p. 119.

83. The provisions on the Archipelagic State is to be found in Part IV of this document.

84. Djalal does not inform us as to who was considering this option - either Kusumaatmadja, the Inter-departmental Committee, or other possible actors. He also does not inform us at what stage of the policy-process did this 200-mile model come up. All we know is that during the December 1957 cabinet session, only two models were present, and that the 200-mile model was not among them. Thus, it must have been thought of and dismissed before this event.

Chapter IV

Maritime Territorial Orientation: From the Archipelagic Doctrine to Wawasan Nusantara.

In the previous chapter, we have reviewed Indonesia's territorial expansion at sea and the factors which account for it. The aim of this chapter is to examine the evolution of the government's territorial orientation toward the new maritime boundary. Territorial orientation involves the process and extent to which the Archipelago Doctrine is internalized and externalized.

After the inception of Archipelagic Doctrine, it took some time and a categorically different process for the elite to develop political identification with the new boundary and commit wholehearted diplomatic energies to secure its legal and political approval among the international community. Territorial orientation therefore, draws attention to the events and process which follow the declaration of extended boundaries and which relate to matters of implementation.

Territorial orientation is also significant in that it allows insight into the geopolitical perceptions which the elite accord to their maritime environment. There exists, as I shall demonstrate, a correlation between the growth in territorial orientation on the one hand, and a rising interest in geopolitics, on the other.

The following discussion distinguishes between two political eras: that of President Soekarno (from 1960-
1966)¹, and that of President Suharto, also known as the New Order era (1966–__). As we shall see, the Soekarno administration was sluggish in developing its territorial orientation. In contrast, its successor has shown much greater interest in the Archipelagic Doctrine. The latter is an essential component of the effort to promulgate the broader Wawasan Nusantara Doctrine, which has taken on central importance over the past two decades. The Wawasan Nusantara Doctrine defined Indonesia’s national identity and political integration on the basis of territorial unity.

The Soekarno Regime and the Act on Innocent Passage of 1962

The Act on Innocent Passage was the most important corollary to the Djuanda Declaration produced by the Soekarno administration since codification in 1960. The Act deals with navigational conduct, and establishes the operational criteria by which to determine the "innocent" character of maritime passage through its waters. It also contains regulations which must be obliged by foreign ships intending innocent passage. Like the Djuanda Declaration, the 1962 Act was engineered by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja together with Hasjim Djalal and others, then working under the auspices of the Legal Committee of the Maritime Council, who was headed by navy-chief Martadinata.¹ The latter, to recall, played a major role in the enactment of the 1960 Law and Djalal was the Secretary of the Legal Committee of the Maritime Council.

¹ Soekarno was president from 1945, but since our main concern is the events in the aftermath the Djuanda Declaration’s enactment, we start the discussion of Soekarno’s territorial orientation beginning with 1960.
There is very little information on the background behind this event. However, if we look at the political situation at that time, a good case can be made that the Act on Innocent Passage—like its previous counterparts—was also connected to the West Irian issue. In order to appreciate their inter-connection, it is useful to review the development of the West Irian conflict following the 1960 Act.

Between 1960 and 1962, the West Irian situation was steadily deteriorating. In mid-1960, the Netherlands launched a process of military build-up in West Irian, with the view of beefing-up what was previously a modest military presence in the area. It started with the dispatch of an 18,040-ton aircraft carrier—Karel Doorman—and several destroyers to West Irian waters. Additional shipments arrived in that same year, which included a dozen Hunter jet fighters, Neptune long-range bombers, light aircraft artillery, and naval reconnaissance aircraft. The Dutch troops increased to about 2,500 ground troops and 1,500 marines. Concomitantly, an admiral was assigned to West Irian to command the Dutch forces there.¹

This, in effect, caused immediate trepidation in Jakarta, and on August 17, 1960, in his independence day speech, President Soekarno announced the breaking-off of diplomatic relations with The Hague². Jakarta, of course, had long expected the Dutch arms build-up to occur at some point in time—we have discussed in the previous chapter General Nasution's comment on this. But nevertheless, the event served as a rude awakening to the elite that a military conflict had actually begun to take its course and
would emerge as a decisive factor in the West Irian affair. That The Hague was sending its only aircraft carrier to the archipelago was certainly an event not to be taken lightly. Immediately, the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian issued a statement that the move by the Dutch was taken as "an act of war".

More alarming however, was the realization that the Indonesian armed forces were still in no condition to challenge the Dutch. Although Jakarta had for some time boasted of its willingness to resort to physical measures, thus far such threats had not been backed by sufficient military credibility. The recent Soviet military aid only led to modest improvement, while the previous East European arms which were used to fight the regional revolts, in the words of former Foreign Minister Agung, "was not sufficient and sophisticated enough to carry-out a full-fledged amphibious attack in West Irian on the Dutch position."

It was for this reason that General Nasution, then Minister for National Security and army chief, again was sent in January 1961 to Washington and Moscow on a mission to obtain arms. The first stop, Washington, failed to produce fruition, mainly owing the reluctance of the Eisenhower’s administration to disappoint The Netherlands, a NATO ally. Nasution’s next stop however - Moscow - proved to be a success. To his own astonishment, Khrushchev agreed to provide Nasution with approximately US $ 400 million of military supplies. The package, which made Indonesia the Soviet bloc’s largest non-communist military aid recipient, included sophisticated hardware such as MiG-19 fighters, Badger jet bombers, naval destroyers, submarines, torpedo boats, Sverdlov-class cruiser; there was even talk of an
Both the Soviets and the Indonesians were frank in admitting that the deal was strictly a function of the West Irian campaign. Nasution for instance, stated that the arms-transfer "was not detached from the confrontation in all fields in the struggle for recovering West Irian." On another occasion, a Soviet communique (January 6, 1961) made the following statement on Nasution's Moscow trip:

The mission had been sent to the Soviet Union by the government of Indonesia in accordance with measures taken to build-up the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia, mainly in connection with the special situation which has arisen as a result of the tension increasing of late on the question of West Irian. The government of the Soviet Union met the requests of Nasution's mission concerning the purchase of new items urgently needed by the armed forces of Indonesia.

Nasution's trip was significant for the following reasons. For the first time, (1) Indonesia would soon possess the naval capability which it had long desired in order to strike at West Irian. As General Ahmad Yani stated: "I think you can properly say that our planning on West Irian has moved from our heads to our hearts. In our Indonesian way, we now have the capability to act." The hardware from Moscow did not take long to arrive. In October that same year, Admiral Gorshkov himself arrived in Jakarta to deliver a set of motor torpedo boats. By the end of the first half of 1962, the bulk of the promised-equipment would have arrived. Foreign Minister Soebandrio even made mention regarding the arrival of an aircraft carrier in that year. By August 1962, the second-deputy of the naval chief stated that 120 naval vessels had been mobilized for West Irian. Another source - the Navy's Information Section - claimed that at the time of the West Irian attack:
Indonesia had in its disposition over 200 vessels, including a number of commercial ships which had been mobilized. Among those ships were one cruiser, eight destroyers, eight frigates, twelve submarines, ten chase submarines, 22 MTB, 12 speed boats with rockets, and many other small vessels. Additionally, the fleet also had a number of fighter jets, such as IL-28, Gannet and others.

This follows that (2) the course of the conflict between the two sides had become increasingly predisposed to the element of gunboat diplomacy. A testament to this was the establishment by Soekarno of a special military task force (the Mandala Command) - situated in Makassar, Celebes, and led by the now-President Maj.Gen. Soeharto - whose task was to conduct preparations for a future physical assault against the island. Thousands of "volunteers" were soon recruited by this command. Notably, at this time the elite in Jakarta were becoming increasingly outspoken in the prospect for a military solution to the problem. Foreign Minister Subandrio was quoted as saying that soon "...Indonesian forces will meet the Dutch on the same island." President Soekarno, with his usual fiery rhetoric, claimed:

At this moment the Indonesian people feel itself strong enough to defy the Dutch imperialism in West Irian. We are strong enough to confront the Dutch in all field - in whatever field. The Dutch challenge in the political, economic and financial field we’ll answer promptly with an equal counter challenge. The Dutch military challenge we’ll answer with a military challenge, too. we are determined to put in action a policy of confrontation against the Dutch because we feel we are strong."

On July 28, 1962, the Soekarno administration enacted the Act on Innocent Passage. The Act was produced the following month after Soekarno launched the much-awaited attack against West Irian; it was a time when naval confrontation with the Dutch had reached a boiling point. By mid-1962, some 2,000 Indonesians were reported to have
infiltrated into West Irian for guerilla actions against the Dutch. In mid-January 1962, just shortly before the signing of the Act, the Dutch navy destroyed several of Indonesia’s naval vessels near the island of Aru, claiming eleven crew-members including the navy’s deputy-chief commodore Yos Soedarso, causing Indonesia its largest number of casualties throughout the whole affair. There is little doubt that mounting anxiety was developing in Jakarta over navigational activities within the archipelago. This, in turn, elicited an urgent sense of necessity among the elite to produce yet another legal document, within the framework of the 1960 Act, which pertains to this particular matter. Hence, the Act on Innocent Passage.

That the 1962 Act was preoccupied with strategic questions is well revealed by its very content. The Act stipulates that foreign ships are guaranteed the right of "innocent passage" in the Indonesian waters. "Innocent passage" however, is fundamentally different than the principle of "navigational freedom" as found in the high sea. Innocent passage is granted so long as it does not pose a threat to Indonesia’s "security, public order, interests and/or... the peace of the Republic of Indonesia." (see the document in appendix 5) Should such a situation occur, the President of Indonesia reserves the right to temporarily close foreign access to Indonesian waters; the government is also entitled to ask unwanted ships to leave its waters.

"Innocent passage" therefore, allows foreign ships much less freedom of movement and imposes a much narrower criteria of navigational activities while in archipelagic seas. The criteria for what constitutes "peaceful
navigation" for example, is narrowly defined as "navigations with peaceful purpose through the territorial sea and internal waters (1) from the high sea to Indonesian ports, and vice versa; and (2) from one high sea to another high sea." In conducting this, foreign ships are not allowed to "stop, anchor and/or sailing back and forth without valid cause" on Indonesian waters as well as on the nearby high seas. By this definition, Dutch naval passages through the Indonesian straits and inland seas as well as its presence on West Irian waters (which Indonesia's law regards as part of its territorial waters) were well within the bound of objectionable activities.

It is also significant that the Act requires military vessels and non-commercial governmental ships intending innocent passage to give prior notification to the country's naval chief before entering Indonesian waters. It also states that at some point in time the naval chief will establish "archipelagic sealanes" on Indonesian waters, and foreign ships will not be required to give prior notification when navigating through these lanes; any deviation from these sealanes however, would render the passage as "not innocent". Submarines in particular are obliged to surface to the water-level while passing on Indonesian waters.

The Temporary Decline of the Archipelago Doctrine
Under Soekarno

Apart from the 1962 Act however, there is little to indicate that the maritime territorial issue constituted a major
concern to the Soekarno regime. Although the 1957 cabinet session asserted the significance of the Archipelagic Concept *vis-a'-vis* "national unity", under Soekarno efforts to propagate its symbolic role to the domestic audience were almost non-existent. The very fact that there is so little information by way of official stouts or media coverage on the matter may be taken as evidence of Soekarno’s lack of interest.

On the diplomatic front, there was no attempt to seek border agreements with neighbouring states so as to muster diplomatic support for the new maritime boundary. Moreover, compared to "West Irian" (1950-1962) or the "Crush Malaysia" (1963-1966) campaign, the borders at sea were unquestionably lagging far behind in terms of the allocation of political energies. Unlike the other issues, it was a far cry from being a topic which animated Indonesia’s relations with other countries — say the US, the Soviet Union, China — and it was never projected as a make-or-break foreign policy issue upon which national prestige was contingent.

After 1963, the elite hardly made any meaningful mention of the maritime boundary — which was rather odd considering the still dubious credibility of the Archipelago Concept from the viewpoint of law of the sea at the time. The ending of the West Irian conflict early in 1963 is perhaps a major factor in this process. The West Irian issue had been so important in forming the interest toward the maritime territory that its withering was bound to have some effect on the way the Djuanda Declaration was to be valued afterwards.

"Malaysia" became Soekarno’s next obsession during the remainder of his rule. He viewed Malaysia’s independence as
a "neo-imperialist and neo-colonialist" design by the Western powers to retain their "regional hegemony" while seeking to encircle Indonesia.\textsuperscript{16} Unlike the experience of West Irian however, there is no evidence that the elite in Jakarta were again connecting the maritime territorial issue to the campaign against Malaysia. According to D.P. O'Connell's account, Malaysia and its Western supporters were actually aware of Indonesia's archipelagic claim, and in fact managed to employ caution when navigating on Indonesian waters\textsuperscript{17}. But they had also made it a policy to routinely assert right of passage through certain areas of the Indonesian waters, so as to signify rejection of the Archipelago Doctrine. Despite the frequency of these activities and despite the clear grounds by which Indonesian maritime law might construe them as not "innocent" passage, Jakarta was generally reticent in its reaction.

Hasjim Djalal\textsuperscript{18} attributes this lethargy to the fact that of a number of the Djuanda Declaration's proponents had withdrawn from the scene. Naval-chief Martadinata\textsuperscript{19} retired in mid-1960's and was sent to Pakistan for an ambassadorial appointment. Around the same time, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja\textsuperscript{20} was stripped of his governmental positions and was discredited for the remainder of Soekarno's rule. Mochtar had made a political remark which was critical of President Soekarno's leadership, and the authority apparently treated his comments with more offense than he had intended; overnight, he became an outcast to the Establishment. Next to Mochtar, Hasjim Djalal himself, the secretary of the legal committee of the Maritime Council, remained the only legal expert on the matter, having written a doctoral dissertation on Law of the Sea in an American
university. But he too was sent-off abroad for diplomatic posting. All three men were important figures in the Maritime Council, and their departure, Djalal suggests, was a significant setback to the Council. This was why the Council became inactive in 1963. It did not produce any further addendums to the Archipelago Concept.

Perhaps the most significant factor explaining the declining interest in the Archipelago Concept was its failure to project political appeal to various power centres within the political establishment. This calls for an examination of the attitudes of three major actors: Presiden Soekarno, the Communist Party and the military/the army. By the first half of the 1960's, these power centres had emerged as the three biggest players in Indonesian politics, and analysts generally agree that the course of Indonesia's domestic and foreign policy undertakings were by and large determined by the level of support which emanate from these actors. Before we go on, it should be noted that the precise attitude of these actors toward the Archipelago Doctrine is generally unavailable. But a reasonable supposition is still within reach by way of a deductive analysis on the general political situation at the time.

The view of President Soekarno toward the Archipelago Doctrine is hard to establish; he was not known to have made recorded statements on the matter. We do know, of course, that as Head of State he signed both the 1960 Act and the 1962 Act. We know that he was not present in the 1957 cabinet meeting which produced the Djuanda Declaration, but we are also aware that, in his newfound position as chief-executive since July 1959\(^1\), he had chaired the cabinet sessions which produced both the Acts of 1960 and 1962. As
mentioned earlier, it is very likely that Soekarno’s interest in the issue stemmed to a large degree from his fixation with West Irian. Hence, it is plausible that his signature on both legal documents represented more than mere nominal endorsement; however, the extent of his support remains an open question.

What is clear however, is the fact that Soekarno did not attempt to project the Archipelago Concept as a uniting symbol, something which his predecessor had intended in 1957. Instead, Soekarno’s choice of symbolic instruments was more bent on abstract political concepts, i.e. Pancasila, Manipol, Usdek, Nasakom, Djarek, Resopim, Oldefos-Nefos. It is not the task of this thesis to detail these doctrines. The important point to note about them is that they all contained romantic, revolutionary maxims, and geared toward the theme of integration between the socio-political forces in Indonesia.

Furthermore, that these doctrines were all conceptualized by President Soekarno brings revealing ideas about his motivations: It was well within Soekarno’s interest to consolidate his power-grip by filling Indonesian political discourse with symbols and philosophies for which he alone was responsible. The Archipelago Doctrine was not his brainchild; it was engineered by an unknown bureaucrat, and worse, it bore the name of his predecessor (the "Djuanda Declaration"). It is no accident therefore, that although President Soekarno had claimed conceptual ties (or "continuity") between all of his self-made political doctrines, he never made any attempt to relate the Archipelago Doctrine with them.

There is also a possibility that Soekarno, a fanciful
revolutionary, did not find enough romantic zeal in the maritime territorial issue to foment his obsessive preoccupation with the "struggle against imperialism". He had perhaps realized this upon learning the general public's indifference when "Djuanda" was declared in 1957. The Archipelago Concept entailed complex and dry legal paraphernalia - a field of study which, like economic policy, was anathema to Soekarno. He much preferred to leave the handling of the matters in this area to his diplomats and lawyers in UNCLOS.

The Communist Party did not develop any maritime policies throughout the 1950's. Sastroadmidjoyo was an ardent anti-communist, and he gave no room for their participation in the cabinet nor the 1956 Inter-departmental Committee. The Communist Party had no representation in the Djuanda cabinet which in 1957 produced the Archipelago Doctrine. In 1960, the year of codification, the party had only started to make its way into the Soekarno cabinet. Given its absence in a good portion of the process, it is little wonder why the Communist Party felt that it had no political stake in the doctrine. Members of the Communist Party were not known to have actively participated in the development of maritime territorial policies during the Soekarno rule.

It may also be surmised that the Communist Party was uncomfortable with the fact that the issue was riddled with imprints of the rightist element. Saleh, Kusumasumantri, Martadinata, Kusumaatmadja, Pirngadi, Djuanda, Sastroadmidjoyo, Soearjo are names which were known to be either "nationalists" or "rightist". The Communist Party might also have calculated that territorial policy more
often than not stimulated the role of the military (which was one reason why Martadinata supported "Djuanda" in the first place). Thus, it was not a politically appropriate move for the Communist party to lend its support to the Doctrine.

Finally, it must be noted that military figures played an important role in the various stages of the maritime issue. But it is fallacious to assume that the military has a clear-cut support toward the matter. Since President Soekarno assumed executive power, the services became autonomous of each other, and were since engaged in competition for political influence, owing to the automatic cabinet position which Soekarno awarded to each service commanders. This rivalry was also manifest in the realm of strategic doctrines: the army had its conception of "land power" (Tri Ubaya Sakti), the navy with its "sea power" (Sasana Jaya) and the air force with its "air power" (Swa Buana Paksa). According to several analysts and officials, these competing power conceptions had the effect of minimizing the appeal of the maritime territory. The army for instance, held the view that a military attack from any Western power/s would have no difficulty setting foot on Indonesia’s islands, and that the only viable means of resistance would be through guerilla warfare conducted on land ("total people’s defence warfare"). Army leaders therefore were somewhat apathetic towards the establishment of clear maritime boundaries, seeing little strategic value in them.

The navy qualifies as the most ardent supporter of the Archipelago Doctrine. Naval officers were strong participants in the Inter-departmental Committee and the
Maritime Council; they were also part of Indonesia’s delegation to UNCLOS I and II. We may recall that (navy chief) Martadinata saw in the Archipelago Doctrine a chance at obtaining more funds from the government to increase the size of the naval force, which, in effect, would add clout to its political posture. The dilemma of hostile maritime activities - in relation to regional revolts and West Irian - also brought the navy in direct touch with the strategic stake of the border at sea. However, the navy was outmanoeuvred by the army, which had much greater political influence, and it was the army’s strategic doctrine with its land emphasis which eventually found formal endorsement from the government as the basis of national defence planning.

Finally, the air of uncertainty which surrounded the legal feasibility of the new maritime boundary is also a factor which contributed to the lethargic attitude at home. Both the 1958 and 1960 UNCLOS conventions had ignored Indonesia’s novel concept. Mochtar has correctly described that at the time "...we were pretty much alone in our endeavour." Once again, the elite in Jakarta, which had hoped to see their cause prevail in the second UNCLOS conference, began to see the futility in committing themselves to a unilateral territorial undertaking with no legal base in international law and which was practically ignored by those states who were active-users of these waters. (In this, the support given by China and the Soviet Union was of little value given their non-user status - even Moscow, after Soekarno’s policy-line tilted more and more toward Peking, eventually gave the cold-shoulder to the issue.) Moreover, the maritime states were not reluctant to demonstrate their adamant opposition to the doctrine: in
1958, the US sent a naval mission for flag-showing on Indonesian waters strictly for the purpose of belittling the Djuanda Declaration and assert right of passage within the archipelago.24

Some of the elite in Jakarta then, did not feel it worthwhile to pursue the matter any further. Some indeed had readily dismissed its presence. Most telling to this is a territorial map on Indonesia which may be found in a 1963 national yearbook. The map25 showed Indonesia’s territorial sea as encompassing the old three-mile line, and stated unequivocally that Indonesia’s territorial waters covered 1,263,381 miles (the colonial figure).(see map in appendix I) This is rather striking considering the yearbook’s map was an official production, one generally distributed to external audiences, and it was published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the Ministry of Information. The latter was headed by Roesland Abdulgani, a member of the Soekarno inner-cabinet and who actually served as Foreign Minister when the Djuanda Declaration was made, thus dismissing the possibility that he was perhaps unaware of the issue.

Another contradiction is found in a statement made by Foreign Minister Soebandrio in mid-1961 - which was after the UNCLOS II failure - whereby he claimed that the boundaries between Indonesia and Dutch New Guinea were still not clearly determined, perhaps to signal the imminence of a future border clash with the Dutch26. But in effect, his statement was inconsistent with the fact that the 1960 Act had clearly established territorial boundaries which made precise and detailed connections to many of the outermost points of the West Irian island.
In any case, the Ministry of Information's map and Soebandrio's comment are instances which reflect the political uncertainty and bureaucratic indifference which surrounded maritime territorial politics during the Soekarno administration.

The Suharto Era's Rediscovery of the Maritime Boundary Issue

In contrast to its predecessor, the Suharto (or the so-called New Order) regime has accorded much greater attention toward the maritime boundary. Shortly after coming to power, the new elite proceeded to expand the country's maritime jurisdictions by claiming the continental shelf areas outside the archipelagic borders (1969). In 1981, the government made its Declaration on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In the late 1960's and throughout the 1970's, the new government launched a vigorous diplomatic effort to obtain maritime border treaties with neighbouring states, either in relation to territorial sea or continental shelf. Maritime boundary classification was among the first items of the agenda when Jakarta courted regional states for improved good-neighbourly relations in the late 1960's. By 1980, as many as 12 treaties involving six countries had been concluded. (see appendix 12) Foreign Minister and later vice-President Adam Malik, went on record as saying with some degree of intended hyperbole that the Archipelagic Concept "is a matter of life or death to us."27

The New Order has also established an extensive system of maritime laws and regulations within the archipelagic boundary. It is also a testament to the Doctrine's rising
fortune that Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was relieved from his "forced retirement" and were given cabinet positions in three of Suharto’s terms in office. He served once as Minister of Justice (1973-1978), and twice as Foreign Minister (1978-1988). In both portfolios, he emerged to personify the government’s diplomacy regarding the Archipelago Doctrine, bilaterally and multilaterally. Kusumaatmadja also assumed the chair of Indonesia’s delegation to UNCLOS III; his cabinet positions effectively boosted the clout of a delegation which in the past was merely supervised by a middle-ranked Ambassador in Bern.

It may be useful to compare the treatment which the Archipelago Doctrine received from Soekarno and Suharto. If the precise role of Soekarno in the course of the Djuanda Declaration is not known, Suharto personally took part in the formulation of maritime policy by calling for the establishment of axis sealanes for international navigation within the Indonesian waters. Furthermore, in contrast with his predecessor, Suharto made a point of frequently promoting the Archipelago Doctrine himself in encounters with leaders of other countries. Suharto made routine statements in his annual State Address on the Archipelago Doctrine, an issue which completely escaped mention in Soekarno’s Independence Day speeches. Finally, it is worthy of note that a whole section in Suharto’s recent autobiography was devoted to "Wawasan Nusantara"; by comparison, Soekarno’s autobiography made no single reference to the maritime issue.

The most important occasion at home marking the government’s maritime interest is the birth of the doctrines of Wawasan Nusantara. It was first announced in 1966, and
its revised version was promulgated in 1973. Before we examine these Doctrines, it may suffice to first look into some of the political changes which took place in 1966, and how they have affected the course of the country's maritime politics.

The Rise of the Military and Its Impact on the Archipelago Doctrine

In March 1966, after a severe political crisis which followed an abortive coup attempt by the Communist party in September 1965, President Soekarno transferred de facto power to Gen. Suharto, who by then had emerged as the leader of the army in the absence of his assassinated superiors. Suharto immediately took steps to oust the Communist party in a massive - some describe as violent - campaign. The following year, after an intense backstage political battle with the army, Soekarno relinquished his Presidency, and the position of acting-President was filled by Suharto; in 1968, the latter was formally sworn-in as Indonesia's President. The withering of Soekarno and the Communist Party from the political scene meant that the military - in particular the army - was left as the most predominant political force in the country. From then on, the military has continued to direct, substantially but not absolutely, the course of Indonesia's domestic and external politics. The military's power attainment is also the most significant event contributing to the rise of the territorial orientation since the latter half of the 1960's.
The following reasons explain why. First, the rise of the military meant that policy-making was now being determined primarily by a group which found geopolitical thinking more congenial than any other actors. "Geopolitics" itself is a field and a term to which most military figures in Indonesia are well accustomed - this will be detailed further in the following chapters. In any case, the military's "geopolitics" would eventually involve it more and more with the territorial theme, specifically the maritime territorial theme.

Secondly, the changing of the guards marked the emergence of new political priorities. Two undertakings are particularly critical to our topic:

* the attempt to devise a new system of national symbols to replace those of Soekarno
* the attempt to launch an extensive, long-term program for economic development.

As we shall see, these undertakings would increasingly draw the new elite to the maritime environment, and this has proved to be a potent factor in the dramatic rise of interest in the Archipelago Doctrine. This is most symptomatic in the birth of the doctrines of Wawasan Nusantara. The following discussion in this chapter will focus primarily on the symbolic aspect of the maritime boundary, while the economic aspect will be examined in chapter five.

Before we proceed however, some comments need to be made regarding the topic of symbolism. To begin with, symbols and/or slogans have been one of the defining characteristics of post-independence Indonesian politics. This by and large arises from a widely-held notion that the
fragile plurality of the Indonesian society warrants the creation of uniting images with which the diverse populace may commonly identify. Post-independence elite therefore, have been much consumed by the task of devising and organizing political symbols and slogans for exposure to the national audience. More than just providing a sense of identity however, these symbols also function to foster a sense of "national mission" and "political wisdom". In this regard, Justus van der Kroef, an avid Indonesia-watcher, has written that:

Indonesia is perhaps more committed than any country in Asia to the creation of political "slogans" - euphonious summations that symbolize and seek to define the character of Indonesia's organizational life and political ideology. Frequently invented by President Soekarno or other public figures, these slogans have a clear charismatic purpose; leaders constantly hold them before the public as the country gropes for unity under present conditions of political and economic instability. At the same time, the concepts embodied in the acrostics reflect much of the officially sanctioned Indonesian "public philosophy" to which everyone is expected to subscribe and, in these terms, merit consideration in any analysis of the Indonesian political and cultural scene.

Similarly, Herbert Feith has made the following remarks about this aspect of Indonesian politics:

A striking feature of politics in Indonesia, as in some other new states, is the great importance of the government's symbolic activity - gestures, ceremonial, and ritual on the one hand, propaganda and indoctrination on the other. The Indonesian government of the post-1958 period allots immense resources to creating and maintaining particular attitudes and states of mind, in ways that often detract greatly from the effectiveness of its administrative and economic performance.

If the significance of "symbolism" in Indonesia is well-established, for future reference mention must be made of the two symbols which have earned the allegiance of the New Order: Pancasila, and the 1945 Constitution.

Pancasila, meaning "the five principles", has earned the status of "national ideology", and it consists of the
following tenets: (1) theism, (2) humanitarianism, (3) Indonesian unity, (4) representative, consensual democracy, (5) and social justice. These principles were first conceived by Soekarno prior to independence, and on 18 August, 1945 they were eventually incorporated into the preamble of the Republic's first constitution - later to be known as the 1945 Constitution, of which Soekarno was also a co-founder - thus formalizing Pancasila's position as the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. This also explains why Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are usually mentioned conjunctively.

Both Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution were supported most strongly by the military, especially the army. One major explanation to this is the feeling of historical and sentimental attachment which derive from the repute of these symbols as the Republic's and the army's original birthmarks. The legendary General Soedirman, army commander during the independence war, had established a soldier's oath professing devotion to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the ideology of the armed forces. If the experience of the independence war is said to be the most significant event shaping the army's professional and political outlook, it should come as no surprise why that group accords such great emotional investment to the two state icons which dominated the revolutionary scene at the time. Military officers proudly talk of the "spirit and values of 1945" which are embodied in the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila.

The other reason is that the army finds the values of Pancasila and the contents of 1945 Constitution as normatively compatible with its own and practically
expedient. This in itself is a topic which is very complex and wide-ranging and it is not necessary to open-up this can of worms.\textsuperscript{35} But for the purpose of future discussion, one is of particular interest: national unity. Again, here there is little doubt that the experience of the independence war, which was highly coloured by the aura of newfound nationalism, has been instrumental in shaping the army's receptiveness to this notion. Aside from the purpose of ejecting the colonial ruler, the independence war, the military adamantly insists, was a war for national integration. On this basis, the campaign to "regain" West Irian was a perfectly legitimate undertaking to the military for without it "Indonesia's unification" would still be incomplete. This - the element of "national unity" - also explains why the cause of West Irian received much more genuine emotional and practical support from the military than Soekarno's "crush Malaysia" campaign, which was viewed as an anomalous undertaking and one with a disastrous impact on the country's economic welfare.

To illustrate the matter further, the notion of a unitary state has also received strong support from the army on the basis of its integrative appeal. As Gen. Nasution asserts:

\begin{quote}
In analyzing the Preamble to the 1945 Constitution.. we find the objective of our revolution ..(which is) the formation of a unitary state from Sabang to Merauke, which provides us with an organizational framework for our struggle.\textsuperscript{36}
\end{quote}

The army leaders were defiant of the decision reached by civilian elite at the Round Table Conference to establish Indonesia as a loose federation of states; this, they contended, was just another "divide and rule" ploy by the Dutch. When the unitary republic was eventually put in
place in 1950, the military's direct involvement in crushing a series of separatist and anti-Republican movements throughout the 1950's was certainly effective in reinforcing its esteem toward the theme of national unity. Finally, the army had repeatedly condemned the Communist Party on the ground that its propagation of "class struggle" was harmful to the fabrication of Indonesian unity; similarly, its distaste toward the competitive liberal democracy (which Indonesia adopted from 1950 to 1957) also stemmed from what it perceived as the disintegrating (and destabilizing) effect of the model.

Significantly, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution have become important rallying points for the military's political conduct. Whereas post-independence civilian leaders have tended to toy around with other political concepts and even revoked the 1945 Constitution, the army has consistently maintained its commitment to them. The soldier's oath, Sapta Marga, which was introduced in 1945, proclaims Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the army's "political foundation". The army for example, was a major exponent of President Soekarno's decision to reinstate the 1945 Constitution in the late 1950's, thus ending a ten-year constitutional vacuum since the latter was repealed in 1949. The army's conflictual relations with the Communist Party, meanwhile, rested, among other reasons, on the assumption that an eventual power seizure by that party would lead to the rejection of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution in favour of a "foreign ideology" of communism. Finally, it is rather ironic that the army, on the pretext of being a vanguard to the two symbols, would come into direct collision with their very founder, President Soekarno. The
policies of the latter were regarded as deviating from the norms and principles of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution: i.e. the Jakarta-Peking axis from the independence and active line; confrontation with Malaysia from the pursuit of "peaceful international order"; Soekarno's President for Life status from a contrary regulation in the constitution; the support toward the Communist Party from the "indigenous values" of Pancasila; etc.

The New Order government therefore, insisted that its rule, and its predecessor's ouster for that matter, was perfectly justified on the grounds that it was done in the service of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In fact, these two symbols have been claimed as the roots of a wide range of political, foreign policy, and economic concepts established later on. For our purpose however, it is the emerging interconnection between Pancasila-Constitution of 1945 and the Archipelago Doctrine which signifies the rise in the symbolic value of the maritime boundary under the New Order rule. This will be discussed in the following section.

The Doctrines of Wawasan Nusantara: Internalizing the Archipelago Doctrine

In November 1966, some eight months after the (de facto) power transfer, a seminar was held by the Department of Defence and Security (DEPHANKAM) at the initiative of the army. Most sources consulted by this writer agree that this
event, which was attended by high-ranking officers of the services, was not a function of any particular strategic preoccupation as it was an undertaking to sort out "internal" matters. The army was planning a major effort to renovate the organizational arrangement of the armed forces, mainly as a preparatory measure in anticipation of actual power attainment. Its major aim was to end the previous autonomy and rivalry of the services. This was to be done by reinforcing the element of structural integration and central command. Thus, in the late 1960’s, the ministerial rank of each of the services were taken away, and their leaders were no longer called "commanders", but rather, "chiefs-of-staff". In turn, they were made subordinate to the Department of Defence and Security, which now assumed complete control over the operational command previously held by the service commanders.  

The 1966 seminar produced the Doctrine on National Defence and Security and the Doctrine of the Struggle of the Armed Forces (Doktrin Hankamnas dan Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI). The two doctrines made use of the term "wawasan", in itself a novel ring to the Indonesian ear, was introduced, and defined as follows:

Wawasan is an outlook embodying some aspects of a nation’s worldview, which contains motives and drives in order to attain its national aspirations and goals.

The doctrine claims that the "wawasan" (hereafter "outlook") for national defence and security is the concept of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari. This is elaborated by an official statement:

A. Conceptually, we adhere to Wawasan Nusantara in responding to our geographical constellation, whereby a conformity is needed between the continental outlook, maritime outlook and aerial outlook in order to materialize the motives and drives in the context of
achieving Indonesia’s national aspirations.

B. In practical and pragmatic terms, in the foreseeable future we will place emphasis on Wawasan Bahari, which is an outlook, an aspect of a nation’s worldview, where the utilization and mastery of the sea is an absolute necessity to enhance national prosperity and glory, while holding firm on to our anti-imperialist beliefs.

Wawasan Nusantara Bahari, which terminated the previous competing doctrines of the services, was terminologically modified into Wawasan Nusantara in a second MENHANKAM seminar the following year. The doctrine itself represents an attempt by the military circles to create a doctrinal framework by which the strategic-perceptual differences of the past could be tamed, and by which structural-organizational integration may be facilitated. In this regard, Kusumaatmadja has made the following comments:

The archipelagic state principle is actually important for safeguarding the wholeness and unity of the Armed Forces and greatly assisted the national and Armed Forces leadership in the second half of the 1960’s to overcome the tendency of the forces to each follow their own course as a result of domestic political developments during that critical period.

The archipelagic state principle was able to overcome the danger of dissension that arose at that time because each forces was following its own path with its own ideas. The crisis was overcome and there was born the Nusantara concept with the Armed Forces firmly united and integrated.

In any case, for our purpose the significance of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari/Wawasan Nusantara is that it signalled a renewed interest in the maritime territorial structure as set forth by the Djuanda Declaration. It also had the effect of formalizing the notion that this area was a strategic arena, although as mentioned earlier this may not be the primary purpose of the doctrine in the first place. As Justus van der Kroef comments, under the new doctrine "..the whole entity of land and water becomes a single strategic defence system." A final point about
Wawasan Nusantara Bahari is that it marked the first time since the Djuanda Declaration that the maritime boundary found substantive and practical endorsement from the highest political authorities.

In the subsequent years, the military began to display interest in submitting this doctrine to a wider national audience. Leut.Col. Wahyono writes about the line of thought of the elite subsequent to the 1966 Wawasan Nusantara:

As time passed by, there was a realization that what was needed was a solid and all-encompassing conception in the service of the development of the state and nation, in the realms of politics, economics, socio-cultural, security and defence.

A similar note is delivered by Ambassador Mohammad Sabir:

As a conception of power which was limited to the realm of war, the realization of which would focus mainly on the development of the armed forces, this concept (Wawasan Nusantara) could not last too long due to the limited nature of its substance. What was needed was a larger conception and all-embracing to build the nation and the state, in all of its aspects: politics, economics, socio-cultural, as well as defence and security. The perception was that the country needed a state conception in its real sense.

The New Order government had abandoned most of Soekarno’s political concepts. However, two symbols - the Constitution of 1945 and Pancasila - were restored to prominence. Still, the elite felt it necessary that new symbols be created to complement the values and norms embodied in the constitution and Pancasila. A new doctrine or philosophy would add weight to claims made by the elite that a "new era" had begun. A symbol created by the military, structurally accommodated and publicly exposed would also provide a legitimating link between the military on the one hand, and the political establishment, on the other. After all, as mentioned earlier a heavy emphasis on political symbolism has been one of the defining features of Indonesian politics.
since independence. In this regard, it is useful to make note of the fact that the first decade of New Order rule was marked by the promotion of a rather extensive series of political concepts.

On July 26, 1972, the Institute on National Defence (LEMHANAS), a military think-tank, was given the task of revising the conceptual substance of (the 1967) Wawasan Nusantara. The governor of LEMHANAS, in turn, formed a committee comprising civilian and military figures. The chair of this committee was given to Maj.Gen. Sutopo, and its seven members included two army officers, a naval officer, an air force officer, and three civilian technocrats. During the next six months, the Committee held consultations with a wide-range of social-political actors and government institutions. Finally, on November 10, 1972, LEMHANAS completed the final draft of the concept, which retained the term "Wawasan Nusantara". It was then submitted to a committee which was responsible to process and prepare the materials to be reviewed by the upcoming general session of the Deliberative Assembly. As it turned out, and as was expected, the Assembly ratified the concept with only slight alteration, and Wawasan Nusantara was then incorporated into the National Policy Guidelines, a five-year policy-manual for the government.

The 1973 version of Wawasan Nusantara took form as a political doctrine. The government referred to it as the "national outlook", or "a conception of nationhood and statehood." As the National Policy Guidelines have it:

The basic outlook to achieve national development is Wawasan Nusantara, meaning: The realization of the archipelagic state (Kepulauan Nusantara) as a single political entity. as a single socio-cultural entity. as a single economic entity. as a single defence and security entity. (see appendix 6)
From the above definition, it is clear that the doctrine is geared toward the theme of national unification. The doctrine itself has several sub-components which are elaborated in greater detail in the Guidelines, but in view of our analytical particularity, they need not require further examination.

It is important to note that the New Order regime has established conceptual linkage and political parity between (the 1973) Wawasan Nusantara and its other sacred symbols, the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. The nature of this "linkage" is, of course, an entirely subjective and emotional undertaking, and it is not necessary for us to dwell at length on this. But by the same token, appreciation of this fact allows us to comprehend the extent to which the maritime territory has been catapulted to a status of high politics. It also provides an index of the perceived symbolic value of these borders. Whereas before 1966, Soekarno was able to preach passionately about his romantic concepts of revolutionary struggles, now the rhetoric of the New Order regime has become equally "romantic" about the assumed virtues of its maritime boundary.

The following quotations are illustrative. Armed forces commander Benny Murdani has stated the following:

In accordance with the philosophical and ideological tenets of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, we the Indonesian nation must cling to Wawasan Nusantara, as an outlook (wawasan) of our nation's development. Wawasan Nusantara must be made the basis of our national dynamics in all its efforts to attain its national goals as inscribed in the preamble of the 1945 constitution.

A similar line is echoed by Admiral Wahyono S.K.: "Wawasan Nusantara is a basic doctrine in the implementation of Pancasila." On another occasion, Maj. Gen. Soetopo, a
member of LEMHANAS, points to the question of how "to promote the aspirations of the 1945 Constitution. This is the reason why we develop an idea of a national outlook, which may be identified with the mental disposition of our nation... Such national outlook must be compatible with the mentality of Pancasila." Finally, a LEMHANAS publication writes that:

Wawasan Nusantara is an outlook of the Indonesian nation based upon Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution regarding its own being and natural environment.

Owing to its 'linkage' with Pancasila, Wawasan Nusantara has gained tremendous exposure in the national scene. In late 1970's, the government launched an ambitious campaign to promote the ideology of Pancasila. The program, called Pedoman Penghayatan dan Pengamalan Pancasila, or "P-4", was applied to all government institutions, educational institutions, and socio-cultural and political organizations, a process which took years to implement given its vast scope of ambition. The doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara was included in the P-4 curriculum, and was in fact a term of frequent use. At any rate, the P-4 campaign has had the effect of greatly facilitating the internalization process of Wawasan Nusantara. Like Pancasila, it has become a term ubiquitously found in the Indonesian political and media vocabulary.

The Relationship Between the Archipelago Doctrine and Wawasan Nusantara: The View of the Elite.

Up to this point, we have reviewed the development of three concepts: (1) Archipelago Doctrine or "Konsep Nusantara"),
(2) Wawasan Nusantara, in its 1967 version; and (3) Wawasan Nusantara, in its 1973 version. It is useful to note that the inception of the 1973 Wawasan Nusantara does not imply the termination of the 1967 version. Both doctrines continue to exist; the difference is that the latter, being a strategic doctrine, is more exclusive to the military circles.

The relationship which exists between the Archipelago Doctrine and Wawasan Nusantara needs to be further elaborated. This is particularly necessary in order to comprehend why the allegiance to Wawasan Nusantara necessarily leads to greater commitment toward the maritime boundary.

One common line which Indonesian officials frequently cite is that Wawasan Nusantara is a political concept which departs from a territorial conception - the Archipelago Doctrine. As Kusumaatmadja explains:

Whenever it is asked what is its (Wawasan Nusantara) relationship with the archipelagic state principle, which in the international law of the sea exists as a conception of an island state or an archipelagic state (the Indonesian islands) the answer is that whereas the archipelagic state principle is a concept of national territory, the Nusantara concept is a way of looking at the political unity of a nation and people that subsumes the national geographic reality of an archipelagic state. It can also be said that the conception of the unity of land and seas contained in the concept of the archipelagic state constitutes the physical forum for the archipelago’s development.

Ambassador Mohammad Sabir, a Foreign Ministry official, stresses the distinction between the two doctrines, but his elaboration essentially leads to the same conclusion as that of Kusumaatmadja:

The two conceptions have strong mutual relations, although they both differ in meaning. If Wawasan Nusantara is a basic doctrine, then the Archipelago Concept is only one of its aspects. The Archipelago Concept is a matter of law of the sea, whereas Wawasan Nusantara is a political matter, in this case a
political concept which is linked to the geographical conditions or geopolitics of the Indonesian nation.  

Finally, Nugroho Wisnumurti, former Foreign Ministry’s Director of International Treaties, writes:

The archipelagic state concept therefore reached its ultimate legal form in Law no.4 of the year 1960 on Indonesian waters, which gives a legal and territorial meaning or framework for the national philosophical outlook of Indonesia known as Wawasan Nusantara, the concept of unity of land, the waters and the people... Thus the Wawasan Nusantara is a national philosophical outlook while the archipelagic state concept or regime is the legal and territorial framework or form of the Wawasan Nusantara.  

The above quotations make it clear that the elite, by connecting Wawasan Nusantara with the Archipelago Doctrine, have crystallized the symbiosis between "the political" and "the territorial". As General Panggabean, armed forces commander, states: "The core substance of Wawasan Nusantara is the Archipelagic State Concept." Wisnumurti, in an interview with this writer, has stressed that the concept of Wawasan Nusantara is strictly a domestic political matter; therefore, it does not need external recognition.

Nevertheless, owing to their interconnection, the political credibility of Wawasan Nusantara would be severely undermined had not its underlying territorial framework - the Archipelago Concept - obtained legal credibility. This forms the basis for the New Order’s stake in obtaining diplomatic and legal (UNCLOS) recognition of the Archipelago Concept. The failure of the archipelagic boundary to receive an international stamp of approval would raise serious doubts as to the political expediency of Wawasan Nusantara, and this would certainly hurt the cause of the elite’s political symbolism. This is what prompted President Suharto to assert that:
the endeavour to obtain recognition as an archipelago state is an absolute necessity. Such recognition must be obtained.

At any rate, it should be understood now the geopolitical function which the maritime territory performs from the viewpoint of "national integration". Actually, this line of thought, as observed in earlier discussion, was at hand as far back as 1957 when the Djuanda cabinet decided to promulgate the Djuanda Declaration. But back then such an idea was held only in an ad hoc manner, and it was not until the advent of the New Order that this notion began to actually exert practical substantiation. The maritime territory, in other words, has become an important part of the New Order's mental map.

The geopolitical conception of the maritime environment as an "integrative element" to the Indonesian state may be further illustrated by highlighting some comments made by civilian and military policy-makers regarding the "virtues" of the Indonesian seas. Perhaps no other statement carries more authority than that by President Suharto himself:

The struggle of the Indonesian nation to acquire its independence is naturally also based upon the aspiration for a single, united territory. The preamble of the 1945 Constitution refers to the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. This means that the Indonesian environment which consists of thousands of islands which are separated by straits and seas must also be transformed into a united territory.

Writing of "The Aqua Culture: The Key Factor in the Longevity of the Indonesian Nation", the late Maj. Gen. Ali Murtopo, predicated by many as an architect of the New Order, writes:

The Indonesian nation as a nation whose existence has grown within the environment of Nusantara, in an environment of land and water, has the awareness that its waters is part of its life, livelihood and nourishment.
As such, through Wawasan Nusanfara, we consciously realize that the seas are the integrating element of the Indonesian archipelago. The islands which number in the thousands are in fact connected into one, connected by the waters of Nusantara. We can say that the seas constitute the "strategic linkage" in the life of the Indonesian nation.

Finally, we refer once more to Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, who, speaking before UNCLOS III in Caracas, Venezuela in 1974, attempted a similar passionate tone to convince his audience of the importance of the sea to his countrymen:

It might be interesting for the conference to know that the Indonesian language equivalent for the word "father land", "patrie", "patria", is "tanah air", meaning "land water", thereby indicating how inseparable the relationship is between water and land to the Indonesian people. The seas, to our mind, do not separate but connect our islands. More than that, these waters unify our nations.
Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that there have been fluctuations in the territorial orientation of various governments toward the new maritime boundary since its enactment in 1960. The interest of the Soekarno administration in the Archipelago Doctrine, like that of Djuanda, continued to progress in the context of the West Irian conflict. In this, the geopolitical value of the territorial model rested primarily on its restrictive impact on the Dutch naval movement within the archipelago. The enunciation of the 1962 Act on Innocent Passage was instructive of this point. Beyond this however, there was no indication that the Soekarno administration registered a strong interest in the maritime territory. No attempt was made by President Soekarno to project it as a unifying symbol for his country - as Prime Minister Djuanda had intended it to be. Thus, when the West Irian conflict came to an end, and when UNCLOS I and II ignored the legal credibility of the new territorial model, the Archipelago Doctrine, lacking in domestic political support, plunged into abeyance and a great deal of uncertainty surrounded the territorial status of the country.

In contrast, the Suharto government had developed a much stronger political commitment and identification toward the maritime territorial issue. By this time, the West Irian conflict and the provincial uprisings, two issues that provided the backdrop for the Djuanda Declaration the previous decade, had ceased to exist. But the new regime was faced with the problem of reforming the political symbols of the country, and they proceeded to devise
national doctrines which relied heavily upon the territorial theme. In this, the new elite saw the virtue of Archipelago Doctrine in terms of its integrative feature – a viewpoint which was identical to that of the Djuanda cabinet in 1957. In this regard, the doctrines of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari and Wawasan Nusantara constituted a political endorsement to the notion that Indonesia’s political integration, national identity and strategic well-being were to be promoted upon the condition of territorial unity. This, of course, was a notion which had been around since 1957, but it was not until the New Order era that it found actual institutional accommodation within the establishment. Meanwhile, the association which is claimed to exist between the Archipelago Doctrine/Wawasan Nusantara and the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila revealed the degree of the new elite’s emotional attachment toward the boundary at sea. They also elucidated the fact that the symbolic value of the archipelagic waters had reached a high-water mark.
Notes: Chapter IV


3. Jakarta maintained indirect contact through the mediation of United Arab Republic, while The Hague used Great Britain to look after its interest in Indonesia. Jakarta’s indirect contact, however, was later terminated in March 1961. See Arend Lijphardt, "The Indonesian Image of West Irian," Asian Survey, 1, no. 5 (July 1961).

4. The Times, ibid.


11. Translated from an article by the Information Section of the Indonesian Navy, "Lahirnya Armada", p. 29.


13. From Agung, p. 299.


16. For further information on Indonesia’s relations with Malaysia at this time, consult Jan Pluvier’s Confrontation: A Study in Indonesian Politics (London: Oxford University Press, 1965); see also, Agung, ibid.

18. This information was obtained during an interview with this writer during the summer of 1990. Hasjim Djalal joined the Foreign Ministry in 1956, and later pursued graduate studies at Virginia University, where he obtained a Doctorate degree in 1961, after writing a dissertation on "The Limit of Territorial Waters in International Law". He had since become an active participant in the development of Indonesia’s maritime territorial policy: a secretary to the legal-committee of the Maritime Council, vice-chairman of Indonesia’s delegation to UNCLOS III, special advisor to the naval chief-of-staff. His diplomatic postings include Yugoslavia (1964-66), West New Guinea (1962-63), Guinea (1966-1969), Singapore (1972-76), Washington D.C (1979-81), New York (1981-83), Ottawa (1983-86), and Bonn (1990-...). The last three postings were ambassadorial appointments.

19. Rear Admiral Martadinata became naval chief-of-staff in 1959, replacing Soebiyakto. During his term, he undertook a rapid program for the development of the Indonesian naval forces in the first half of the 1960’s, which he achieved with some success. Sometime in the mid-1960’s, he was appointed as Ambassador to Pakistan. In 1966, however, he died in a helicopter crash near Jakarta.

20. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja obtained his law degree from Yale University in 1955, and received his Doctor of Law from Padjadjaran University in 1962, where has served as Rector from 1958-1974. Since 1958, he had actively participated as member of the Indonesian delegation to numerous international conferences on Law of the Sea. Some time in mid-1960’s, he was put on house arrest by the Soekarno administration, but was released when the New Order government came to power. Suharto subsequently appointed him as Minister of Justice (1974-1978), and as Minister of Foreign Affairs for two consecutive terms (1978-1988). He is now a professional lawyer in Jakarta, and heads a research institute on Wawasan Nusantara.

21. In July 1959, President Soekarno produced a Decree whereby he reinforced the Constitution of 1945. Under this constitution, the President of Indonesia is both the Head of State and Government. Thus, since 1959, Soekarno had assumed the executive leadership of the country.

22. Manipol, or "Political Manifesto", was declared on August 17, 1959 by Soekarno, asserting the return to the 1945 Constitution, and defined a set of long-term and short-term goals for the Indonesian national life. There are many components to these goals, but just to mention a few: the preservation of national identity, anti-imperialism, provision of public welfare, the attainment of national security. In February 1960, Soekarno declared that Manipol consisted of five tenets: the 1945 Constitution, Indonesian Socialism, Guided Democracy, Guided Ekonomi, and Indonesian Identity. These were to be known in the acronym of USDEK. The concept of NASAKOM, announced in October 1960, asserted the unity of Indonesia’s three main political forces: the nationalists (NAS), the theists (A), and the communists (KOM). Soekarno ordered that decision-making structures at all levels must reflect the consensual unity of all these three forces.
On independence day in 1960, yet another doctrine was introduced: "D'arek, which was short for "the March of Our revolution". Here, the President claimed that in order to realize Manipol, the nation must have four ingredients: "national concept", "national spirit", "national will", and "national deed". And in the following independence day, Soekarno introduced RESOPIM, another set of foundations which underlie national politics: Revolution (RE), Socialism (So), Leadership (PIM). Finally, the doctrine of OLDEFOS-NEFOS, announced also in 1961, pertained to Soekarno's foreign policy, and it outlined his "two-world" theory, that is, that the struggle of the world was not defined in terms of East-West conflict, but between those countries which formed the Newly Emerging Forces (NEFOS) struggling against all forms of imperialism and colonialism, and those countries which formed the Old Establish Forces (OLDEFOS) striving to maintain their colonial empire. The Western democracies were generally held to be in the category of the latter, while the Third World and the Second World states belonged to the former.


27. From Kroe, p. 482.

28. This information was disclosed by Mochtar Kusumaatmadja in a special report which he made to President Suharto titled Paparan Tentang Wawasan Nusantara (Perjuangan Pengakuan dan Pengimplementasiannya), published by the Secretariat of the Committee for the Coordination of National Territory (PANGKORWILNAS), May 1982. His acknowledgement on the President’s role is on page 35.


30. Suharto (1921-...), a Javanese General, joined the military in 1941 with the rank of corporal. His career was quick to rise during the independence war, where he gained fame for leading a 1949 military operation which succeeded in seizing, however briefly, the then-capital city of Yogyakarta from the Dutch forces, thus improving Indonesia’s bargaining leverage in the negotiation for independence then underway in the UN. In the post-independence era, Suharto participated in several missions to crush the regional rebellions, and in January 1962, he was promoted to the rank of Major General and was assigned as commander of the special task force to attack West Irian. In 1963, he became commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command, and it was in this capacity that Suharto assumed army leadership when his superiors were assassinated in a 1965 abortive coup attempt by left-wing elements. He was then appointed by President Soekarno to become the formal army commander. The years between 1965 and 1967 were marked by
intense conflicts between the army, lead by Gen. Suharto, on the one hand, and President Soekarno and the Communist Party on the other. The army finally prevailed, and in 1967 the Deliberative Assembly appointed Suharto as Acting President, and the following year he was formally sworn in as Indonesia's second President. Suharto is currently in his fifth term as President. For more, see his autobiography as told to Dwipayana and Ramadhan, ibid; or an earlier biographical work by O.G. Roeder, The Smiling General (Jakarta : Gunung Agung ltd., 1969).


34. See chapter on the Indonesian military in Nawaz Mody's Indonesia under Soeharto (New Delhi : Sterling publishers, 1977).

35. The Department of Defence and Security, in its publication titled The National Struggle and the Armed Forces in Indonesia, has outlined what it terms as "the values of 1945", which are embodied by Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. And the values identified by it are quite wide-ranging : anti-colonialism, active neutralism in foreign policy, national unity, stability, a belief in Indonesia's socio-cultural diversity, etc. These principles, in turn, connect with the military's political interests. Just to mention a few:
- the 1945 Constitution features a strong Presidential system. The army sees this as more conducive for political stability and continuity, something which liberal democracy (1950-1957) failed to provide;
- the constitution requires that half of the seats in the Deliberative Assembly, the highest constitutional organ, be made-up of appointed representatives of functional groups. This means that the military, which has been recognized as a functional group, occupies seats in this body;
- the principle of Thelism, the first order in Pancasila, has a discrediting effect toward the "godless communists", which until 1966 were the military's utmost rival.


37. In this connection, President Suharto has issued a remark whereby he blamed the Communist Party for inciting national disintegration in Indonesia in the 1960's, and he claims that: "The Indonesian nation does not pay tribute to the notion of class, because essentially we do not go by classes and we will not go by classes." See the 1967 text of State Address, ibid.

38. A number of sources have looked into this reorganization scheme taken by the military during the 1970's. See, for instance,
the chapter on "Concentration of Power", in Nawaz Mody's, Indonesia Under Suharto (India: Sterling Publishers Private, 1987); also, E. Utrecht, The Indonesian Army: A Socio-politico Study of an Armed, Privileged Group in the Developing Countries (Australia: James Cook University, 1980).

39. Translated from a publication by the National Defense Council, "Pokok-pokok Pengertian dan Sejarah Pengembangan Wawasan Nusantara", Wawasan Nusantara, (1982), p. ix. It may be of interest to note that the literal translation of the Indonesian word for "worldview" is "the nation's philosophy on life", while the terms "motives" and "drives" are both found in its English form in the original document.


43. Translated by this author from Wahyono, "Wawasan Nusantara Sebuah Konsepsi Geopolitik" Wawasan Nusantara, (Jakarta : 1982), p. 23.

44. Sabir, Politik Bebas, p. 140.


46. Ibid.

47. From a speech by Gen. Benny Murdani to the Second Conference on Indonesia's Naval Strategy, the verbatim record of which is found in the Forum Strategi TNI-AL KEDUA, Tahun 198, published by the School for Military Staff and Command (Jakarta, 1988). The cited quotation is from p. 2.

48. Wahyono, ibid.

49. From a television interview as aired by the TVRI (Television of the Republic of Indonesia) on January 30, 1978. The verbatim record of this interview was published by the Department of Information of Indonesia, in a booklet titled Wawasan Nusantara: Kumpulan Wawancara TVRI (1978).


52. Translated from Sabir, p. 143.


54. Gen. M. Panggabean made this statement in a speech before the National Committee for Territorial Coordination (PANGKORGILNAS), in 1979, in a lecture titled "Implikasi Wawasan Nusantara Pada bidang Politik dan Keamanan Nasional". The verbatim record of this lecture can be obtained in Bunga Rampai Wawasan Nusantara I (Jakarta: National Defence College, 1982). The cited quotation is on p. 349.

55. Interview with the author, April 1990.

56. Dwipayana, Suharto, p. 319.

57. Ibid.


Chapter V

The Resource Dimension:
The Role of Offshore Natural Resources in Shaping the New Order’s Geopolitical Interest in the Maritime Territory

The previous chapter has discussed the development of the New Order’s territorial orientation towards the archipelagic boundary. It has been demonstrated, inter alia, that during the Suharto era the politics of symbolism was a major cause of the renewed interest in the Archipelago Doctrine. However, there is yet another reason which explains the new elite’s geopolitical interests in the maritime environment, and this brings us to the topic of natural resources. An inquiry into the resource aspect of the Archipelago Doctrine is necessary in order to further elucidate the geopolitical nature of the New Order’s maritime territorial behaviour.

The aim of this chapter is to show the correlation between offshore economic activities on the hand, and the elite’s territorial orientation toward the archipelagic boundary on the other. Thus, their identification with the maritime territory has grown in conjunction with the steep rise in the contribution of offshore natural resources to the national economy. As evidence of this, the maritime territory has witnessed extensive organizational activities in relation to these resource extractions: the proliferation of maritime regulations, the establishment of "economic zones", the pursuit of border diplomacy.

The following discussions concentrate chiefly on the New Order era (1966-____). This is because it is only during this period that the government began to undertake serious efforts
to exploit the natural wealth of the sea. Although the term "offshore natural resources" may imply a wide-range of commodities, ours will focus only on two: petroleum and fisheries. Both of these, but especially the former, are chosen because of their special economic significance to Indonesia.

This chapter is organized into six sections. First, we will look into the importance of economic development to the New Order administration. The next two sections review the New Order's search for offshore petroleum and evaluate the extent of its contribution to the national economy. This is followed by an inquiry into one of the New Order's resource-related border disputes regarding the so-called "Timor Gap". The fifth section examines the topic of fisheries. And the final section discusses the link between offshore natural resources and Wawasan Nusantara.

The New Order and the Commitment of "Economic Development"

When Gen. Suharto became acting-President in 1967, one year after he assumed de facto power in March 1966, his immediate resolve was to "put an end to politics" and start on an all-out program of economic development. He was well aware that chronic inflation and poor living standards had effectively catalyzed the popular outrage against President Soekarno; this, in turn, changed the political balance in favour of the army and away from Soekarno. "Development\(^1\) henceforth, was more than just a catchy phrase; it became a very urgent political theme and a critical legitimizing factor to the new order. The new elite understood that the only way
for them to neutralize the volatile mass and earn some token of political credibility from them (especially the students) was by alleviating the economic plight. Suharto made clear of this fact when, in a 1967 state address to the Parliament, he announced that should conditions fail to improve in the very near future it would not take long before the people run out of patience, leading to yet another cycle of crises. In that same speech, Suharto claimed that "we are struggling with all our might to improve our economy, to reorganize the household of our country which has been chaotic for years," and disclosed that he had instructed his economic ministers to concentrate strictly on the following short-term tasks:

- to control inflation, to fulfill the need for food, to rehabilitate the economic infrastructure, to increase export activities and to fulfill the need for clothing.

Apart from the political necessity for economic rehabilitation, there was also some credence behind the notion that these men in uniform considered this task of development somewhat as their "true calling". The military officers had persistently regarded themselves as a "special kind of army", whose historical upbringing justified their having a permanent role in all aspects of national life - defence, politics, economics, culture. This is what is known as the doctrine of the Dual Function of the Armed Forces. Such a sense of "role" fits to some extent Amos Perlmutter's definition of a "revolutionary army". A member of such an organization will have:

- expectations (that) are higher than the corporate professionals, for he sees himself as a builder and innovator of structures beyond a 'narrow' military professionalism and corporate orientation. The revolutionary soldier may see himself, perhaps, as an instrument for the successful consolidation of society and the regime.

This illuminates why the military circles had long taken
a particular interest in what they considered to be Soekarno's economic neglect, which they believed was a consequence of his excessive political undertakings, at home and abroad. Throughout Soekarno's rule, this issue persisted and created friction between the army and President Soekarno. To illustrate, the army failed to share the rationales behind Soekarno's "crush Malaysia" campaign, his high-profile international projects, and his grand architectural enterprises at a time when the country's economy was plagued by severe shortages of food, clothing and other basic necessities.

The importance of "economic development" to the new elite was symptomized by the overall change in foreign policy conduct. In pursuit of breathing space to focus on domestic order, and eager to signify that its days of adventurism were over, Jakarta launched a series of initiatives to project its policy of good-neighbourliness and "pragmatism": the termination of confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore (1966); the participation in the birth of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967; and the resumption of its UN membership. With regard to Western states, economic diplomacy now replaced the previous line of unconditional struggle against "all forms of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism". Thus, the first diplomatic venture of the New Order was to negotiate the repayment of Indonesia's debts, while seeking to obtain capital aid from western countries. The government succeeded in both endeavours.

In the case of foreign aid, an Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia was founded in 1967, consisting exclusively of donor countries and financial institutions from Western countries, which managed to provide annual aid of increasing
sums to Indonesia: US $ 200 million in 1967, $ 360 million in 1968, and $ 920 million in 1975. Such aid formed a large share of the government’s budgetary requirement, at one point comprising almost three-quarters of total revenues. It is worthy of note that at this time relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe cooled off, and the diplomatic line with Peking was frozen because of suspicion of Chinese participation behind the 1965 coup attempt. Meanwhile, participation in Third World multilateral groups, such as the Non-aligned Movement, was reduced to a shy presence.

If Soekarno had regarded economics as a matter of low-politics, one which he could always afford to delay, for the new elite economics was a question of high-politics, compared to which other issues were secondary. For the new elite, all aspects of national activity had to be coordinated to the requirements of economic development. Suharto regarded national will as the "unconditionally fundamental prerequisite for a successful development." In his views, it was important to encourage:

..the true desire and firm unswerving resolve of the whole nation to implement this development. Every thought and efforts should be concentrated and directed toward its success. All the people should involve themselves wholeheartedly to the realization of development! Since the desire and resolve to build are not mere political slogans, the development plan should be sensible, its implementation should be feasible viewed from economic considerations, and it should get the undivided support of the whole population.

It was at this time and under such conditions that a new geopolitical phenomenon began to emerge whereby the archipelagic seas became increasingly seen by the elite as an important site of natural resource exploitation and, hence, an important arena for economic development.
The Quest for Offshore Oil

By the second half of the 1960’s, the elite in Jakarta had become keenly aware of the resource potential of the sea, mainly through the information provided by its diplomats in UNCLOS. Actually, the Indonesian delegation had taken note of this fact as early as 1960 when UNCLOS II witnessed the emergence of the resource issue, but apparently neither the Foreign Ministry nor the Maritime Council in Jakarta paid much heed to it as their concern was narrowly confined to the forum’s reaction to the Archipelago Concept. The New Order elite, on the other hand, proved to be more receptive to this information. Notably, in 1967 Jakarta lauded Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo when he made his famous speech at the UN, whereby he drew attention to the immense wealth of the ocean floor beyond national borders and provoked questions as to the nature of its legal status.

At this conjuncture, the elite had also become acquainted with the rapid progression taking place in the drilling technology on the deep ocean. As Alan Couldrey writes:

By the time Indonesia was ready to consider exploiting the seabeds that make up 70 % of Indonesian sovereign territory, in the mid-1960’s, offshore drilling was an established skill.

The world’s very first offshore drilling dates back to 1947 in the Gulf of Mexico, but it did not come to Southeast Asian waters until 1956 when exploration drilling was taken-up in northwest Kalimantan in depths up to 180 metres. The following year, an offshore well - Asia’s first - was established in that area.10

The first sign of Indonesia’s offshore petroleum interest took place in early 1966, a few months after the abortive communist coup, when it entered a "production-sharing"
agreement with a small oil-company, Independent Indonesia American Oil Company (IIAPCO). The contract gave IIAPCO exploration rights over an area of 54.776 sq.km, making it the first mining venture ever taken on the archipelagic waters. Within a year, more contract areas were assigned to foreign oil companies, three Japanese and one Canadian.

In 1967, the New Order government passed a law introducing measures to liberalize regulations concerning foreign investment in the country. This law was supplemented by passage of another law which extended new concessions toward foreign mining activities. In doing this, the government was wooing the participation of foreign multinationals in an effort to close the gap in the capital-supply and technological know-how in order to stimulate economic production.

The bait worked. In May 1967, the government signed a working-contract with Continental Oil Company (CONOCO), a first with a major company, involving the Barito basin in Borneo. Two other major companies, Union Oil and Sinclair Oil, shortly received offshore concessions near North Sumatra and East Kalimantan. By 1968, 15 production-sharing contracts, mostly in offshore areas, involving 13 companies were concluded by the new government. In 1971, this figure would rise to 40 contracts, three-quarters of which were involved in offshore operations; ten years later, the number of production-sharing contracts reached 105.

These oil companies have by and large furnished the financial requirements needed by the New Order for petroleum exploration and development. In the 5 years between 1969 and 1974 the supply of capital for such purposes rose sharply. From US $ 78 million at the close of the 1960’s, the figure
rose over ten-fold by 1974, and the following year it went over the US $1 billion mark. Oil expenditures remained around this digit in 1981 and 1982.\textsuperscript{14}

Significantly, a great portion of this money was spent on offshore operations. "Oil action now centers on offshore drilling," write Leon Howell and Michael Morrow, "and Indonesia stands on the largest single platform of continental shelf in the world."\textsuperscript{15} By the mid-1970's, 60\% of exploration activities were conducted on the sea,\textsuperscript{16} which was a striking comparison to the non-existent level during the Soekarno administration. Ooi Jin Bie has done a review of seismic, aeromagnetic and surface geology surveys in Indonesia (in connection with oil search), and he found that since 1968 the offshore figure had risen to match - if not surpass - that onshore.\textsuperscript{17} As Willard Hanna, reported in 1971:

"...geologists are prospecting Indonesia's far-reaching offshore waters in almost every part of the archipelago except Nusatenggara and North Celebes, where indications are dim."\textsuperscript{18}

It is a measure of these explorations' intensity that in the six years between 1970-1976 the number of oil fields discovered was more than twice the amount found in the seventy-nine years between 1880-1969.\textsuperscript{19}

Significantly, the New Order government has organized its maritime territory into an extensive network of contract areas, or "blocks", over which the government assigns oil companies to explore and exploit hydrocarbons with a 60-40 production split in favour of the government and an obligation for gradual relinquishment after a certain amount of time. The pervasive presence of these blocks attests to the seaward surge of the petroleum industry. As shown in a map on appendix 7, virtually all of the waters on the western and central part of the archipelago have been covered by these
blocks. In eastern Indonesia, block formations have been less extensive as some areas in the Flores sea, Molucca and Banda are still unallocated.

A chart in appendix 8 details the growth in the scope of these offshore blocks during the New Order era. It shows that a large portion of the blocks were allocated between 1967 and 1968, mainly in the areas of the Java sea, the South China sea, and the Makassar strait. Here, it is of interest to note that the most productive offshore fields are found in the Java sea and the Makassar strait. The latter for instance, hosts the two largest offshore fields in Indonesia: Attaka (100,000 BPD) and Handil (166,000 BPD). Those on Java sea, with the exception of Arjuna (100,000 BPD) are generally medium or small in size. It is also of significance that these fields, save Udang in Natuna sea, are located within the Indonesian waters, that is, in areas within the archipelagic baselines or as far as 12 miles beyond them.

**The economic significance of offshore oil**

It is difficult to assess the precise contribution of offshore oil to the national economy. This is because data such as petroleum exports or domestic oil revenues do not distinguish between off and onshore production. The significance of offshore oil therefore, may be examined by the following steps: first, by looking at the overall contribution of oil to the national economy, and secondly by assessing the contribution of offshore fields relative to those onshore in relation to total oil production.

In the New Order's first decade, the oil industry
underwent a phenomenal growth. As foreign oil companies joined the government in production-sharing schemes, crude oil production rose rapidly from 170 million barrels in 1966, to 270 million barrels in 1969, to 501 million barrels in 1974. (appendix 10) This, coupled with the steady rise in the price of crude oil in late 1960's and (especially) early 1970's, made the petroleum industry not only the fastest growing sector but as well, the backbone of the Indonesian economy. To illustrate: in 1966, export earnings from oil amounted to US $ 225.4 million, which was 32% of the country's total; in 1973, it went up to US $ 1708 million or 47% of total exports, while increasing further in 1976 to US $ 5690 million and, at 73% of all export earnings, over two times greater than the share of non-oil products. Meanwhile, as a source of fiscal revenue, the tax on oil corporations ballooned from US$ 2 million (1966) to US$ 477 million (FY 1972/3), to US$ 2345 million (1974/5), the latter being 56% of total government revenues. Oil money, in fact, was instrumental in reducing the government's dependence on foreign aid to finance its development expenditure. Foreign assistance in the fiscal year 1974/75 constituted approximately 44% of the overall development budget, down from a previous 77% during fiscal year 1969/70.

The picture which emerges out of the above statistics is clear: Indonesia's economic health had become increasingly reliant upon the commodity of oil. National prosperity and the oil industry were regarded as two sides of the same coin. Let.Gen. Ibnu Sutowo, who headed the state's oil company (PERTAMINA) and was at one time Indonesia's most powerful petroleum personality, stated:

Perhaps our goal can be summed up this way: in the years ahead we hope to use the oil God has given us - oil as a
product and oil as an income - in the best possible way to build the Indonesian nation. 23

Significantly, the oil bonanza was the most important factor accounting for a period of exceptional economic performance experienced by Indonesia in the late 1960’s and throughout the 1970’s. Harvey Demaine has written:

Since 1967, Indonesia’s economy has grown at an extremely rapid rate, averaging over 7 per cent growth in gross domestic product per annum throughout the 1970’s, and 9.6 per cent in 1978-1980, second in the world only to the nearby island of the Republic of Singapore. 24

At this point, the question which comes to mind is this: what is the contribution of offshore production in comparison with that onshore in the above scheme? Although offshore explorations had been carried out since 1966, actual production did not take place until 1971, when two offshore fields on Java sea began producing some 4 million barrels of oil, a miniscule amount relative to the country’s total. More fields however, were put on-stream and in 1975, with the commencement of two major fields off East Borneo’s shore, offshore output rose over 22-fold to reach 90 million barrels. In 1983, this figure would rise further to 458.5 million barrels, marking a 100-fold increase from the 1971 figure. 25

Significantly, the output of offshore petroleum relative to that onshore has improved. When the oil rigs in Java sea first began producing in 1971, the ratio with onshore production was 1 : 80, in favour of the latter. The following year, the gap decreased to 1:14, and further to 1:6.6 in 1973, the year Wawasan Nusantara was proclaimed. In 1977, total production on Indonesian waters was approximately half the amount of that on land.

It may also be useful, to play with more statistics, to compare off and onshore share in the total petroleum
production. As shown in a chart in appendix 10, the offshore portion had substantially grown from non-existent in 1970, to 1.2% in 1971, to the 35.8% of total production in 1977, remaining at this level through the end of the decade and throughout the first half of the 1980’s. This, however, not only means that the onshore share of national output has declined, it also points to the fact that the growth rate in production has been much greater in offshore than onshore areas. As the chart in appendix 10 shows, onshore production was in decline for a considerable period between 1972 and 1977, but at the same time, the oil rigs of the sea, with the exception of 1974, were pumping more and more oil, with an annual growth average of about 61%. It was only in 1978 that offshore production experienced a negative growth of -9%, while the onshore figure rose slightly by 0.5%. This allows us to assert that the offshore fields were compensating for the loss in onshore production and, more, that offshore production was responsible for the continued rise in Indonesia’s overall oil production throughout a good part of the 1970’s.

Resource Interest and Boundary Disputes: The Case of the "Timor Gap"

The "Timor gap" refers to a disputed seabed area between the continental shelf boundaries of Indonesia and Australia on the Timor sea. This hole, approximately 9,100 sq. nautical miles in size, was produced when Jakarta and Canberra agreed, in 1971 and 1972, to delimit the continental shelf areas between Indonesia’s southeastern coasts and Australia’s northern
coasts. But the agreements left untouched a certain seabed area which was connected to the Timor island, because this area was under the jurisdiction of Portugal, who controlled the eastern portion of the island. A part of this unsettled portion of the seafloor became the site of overlapping claims - first between Lisbon and Canberra and later between Jakarta and Canberra - and this is the area known as the "Timor Gap".

In 1976, subsequent to political complications in East Timor, Portugal's colony became part of Indonesia. This immediately raised question as to the future status and extent of the nearby continental shelf. Previously, Australia had not been able to come to terms with Portugal, which maintained that the continental shelf area should be divided on the basis of equidistance, that is, by drawing a line half-way between East Timor's and Australia's coasts. Australia however, proposed a boundary that would run closer to East Timor's coasts, on the basis that this was in tandem with the geomorphological structure of the shelves. Neither side was willing to compromise its stance, and as such, the matter was left to a standstill throughout Portugal's colonial rule in the 1970's. Indonesia's control of East Timor was therefore regarded by the government in Canberra as light at the end of the tunnel, the assumption being that the New Order government would be likely to agree to delimit that seabed zone by simply drawing a straight line between the two points which left a 200-n.mile-gap open under the 1971 and 1972 agreements.

To Australia's surprise however, the New Order government changed its policy-line. The latter insisted that the previous agreements were "unfair" and "unfavourable" to the country's interests. It is worthwhile to further elaborate on
this: the 1971/2 treaties were based upon a geomorphological premise, proposed by Australia and shared reluctantly by Indonesia, that the ocean floor between Indonesia and Australia comprised two distinct continental shelves, which were determined by the presence of a deep Timor Trough which separated the two shelves. In the late 1970's however, this premise was rejected by Jakarta. The Indonesian view is that the Indonesian and Australian seabed on that area formed a single, continuous (as opposed to dual and separated) continental shelf and that the Timor Trough is just an accidental depression on this structure which does not affect its geomorphological predisposition. Jakarta's answer to why it had accepted the previous agreements was that "we were in a hurry in 1971 and 1972" and that consequently they "were taken to the cleaners". Kusumaatmadja insists:

The Australians were able to talk us into (accepting) that the Timor Trench constituted a natural boundary between two continental shelves, which is not true. The latest evidence shows that the trench does not represent a natural boundary, that the continental shelf edge is really north of Timor, and that the trench is really a depression. Any number of geologists would confirm this.

Kusumaatmadja may be too sure of his own assertion, as the fact remains that as of yet geologists are still engaged in a continuing debate about the geomorphological status of these seabed areas. As Prescott points out:

The geological evidence is inconclusive. A controversy exists on whether Timor Trench is in a subduction zone underthrust by the Australian plate, or whether it forms the overthrust edge of the Australian plate, with plate boundary situated north of the island. Fitch and Hamilton hold the former view, while Audrey-Charles, Milsom, and Chamalaun take the contrary position. Veevers, Falvey and Robins have pointed out that if the answer to this question is going to be found, it will require research that probes beyond the surface and near-surface layers.

In any case, Jakarta's new proposal was that the Timor Gap question be settled on the basis of equidistance. Jakarta
thereby assumed the position previously held by Portugal. Of late, it has polished this policy further by insisting that it is in conformity with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, December 1982 (not enforced) which both Jakarta and Canberra have signed. On the same basis, it challenged the credibility of the 1971/2 agreements in that they were produced on the basis of the definition of 'continental shelf' as endorsed by the Convention on the Continental Shelf, Geneva, March 1958 (enforced in 1964) which had been abandoned in state practice in favour of that set forth in the 1982 Convention.34

Jakarta’s new and adamantly-held position appears to be more than just legal haggling. There is sufficient evidence that its position is influenced to a large degree by the interests in obtaining access to the prospective hydrocarbon deposits of the disputed area. The Timor Gap consists of two major basins: Timor and Bonaparte Gulf. Both of these basins, unlike the other two major (Sahul and Browse) basins in the area, are less than 200-metres in depth, which makes them very attractive for drilling, and government and petroleum circles are well aware of the hydrocarbon potential contained by them. A major area of interest in the Timor Gap is what is known as the "kelp", a large jurassic rock-structure on the Timor basin. Experts have estimated its recoverable oil potential to range between 500 million to 5 billion barrels. Both are large figures by any standard: the top ceiling would make it into one of the 25 largest oil fields in the world, while the low ceiling would avail Australia its second biggest oil field. In fact, Australian officials have claimed that possession of this structure would give Australia self-sufficiency in petroleum
energy in the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{37} The Indonesians authority, meanwhile, believes that at least 1 billion barrels of recoverable oil are contained in the Timor Gap. Control of this would mean an increase by as much as 20\% to the country’s current known recoverable petroleum reserves (which stands at approximately 5 billion barrels).\textsuperscript{38} Indonesia’s Minister of Mines and Energy, Ginanjar Kartasasmita has stated that even the acquisition of half of these deposits "would be good enough for us."\textsuperscript{39}

Furthermore, Jakarta has also taken note of the fact that the continental shelf of Arafura and Timor seas have been the site of extensive petroleum explorations and successful finds. Natural gas deposits for instance, were found in considerable amount on several parts of the Bonaparte basin in early 1970’s. Gas and oil discoveries were also reported in the nearby Browse basin. The most significant finding thus far was the Jabiru field in 1983, with an estimated 200 million barrels of recoverable oil. Jabiru is located well within the Australian shelf, but it is only about 200 km away from the Timor Gap, and it is part of a larger oil-bearing structure which extends into the disputed area.\textsuperscript{40}

The adoption of the equidistant boundary would serve Indonesia’s resource interests on several counts. First, it would place the entire Timor basin under its jurisdiction. This means, more importantly, that it would have authority over the aforementioned "kelp" structure.\textsuperscript{41} On the other hand, the implementation of Australia’s boundary proposal would result in the yielding of the "kelp" and other parts of the Timor basin to Canberra. Secondly, the equidistant line would avail Indonesia access to approximately one-third of the Bonaparte basin.\textsuperscript{42} Otherwise, under Australia’s terms, it
would lose all of this basin to its southern neighbour. Finally, a new boundary would lure many foreign oil companies to enter into contractual arrangements with the Indonesian authority. The equidistant line, if adopted, would cut across a sizable part of the concession areas which the Australian government has allocated to a good number of oil companies.\textsuperscript{43} As a matter of fact, Canberra has already issued exploration permits to several multinationals for seabed areas which extend into a good part of what would be the Indonesian side of the hypothetical equidistant line.\textsuperscript{44} Meanwhile, Jakarta itself has renewed a leasing contract made previously between Lisbon and Oceanic Exploration covering 20,200 sq.m of seabed which extends well into the disputed area up to the limit of the equidistant line.\textsuperscript{45}

The "Timor Gap" issue doubtlessly has been one of the major irritants to Jakarta-Canberra relations. In this regard, Jakarta has clung to its position much more stubbornly than ever: whereas the 1971 continental shelf negotiations took only one week to reach an agreement,\textsuperscript{46} this time the "Timor Gap" dispute has remained unsettled since it came to the surface in 1978. The issue has also served as a top agenda-item in several high-level meetings between the two sides.\textsuperscript{47}

The issue has been further complicated by the East Timor diplomacy. Canberra had hoped that Jakarta’s diplomatic vulnerability with respect to its presence in East Timor would induce it to be more flexible on the seabed issue, perhaps as a trade-off for Australia’s support for its East Timor policy.\textsuperscript{48} A boundary agreement, after all, would serve as a de facto recognition of the former colony’s incorporation into the Indonesian state, and Australia indeed had stated its
willingness to wrap-up a deal with Jakarta. But Jakarta refused to play by this game, and, in fact, was in no mood to accept a rushed compromise. Apparently, Jakarta did not regard Australia's de facto recognition of East Timor's status - in itself an important feat - as a necessarily better prize than the attainment of its Timor Gap portion. This, significantly, illuminates the degree of importance which the New Order accords to the issue.

Negotiations on the "Timor Gap" were started in February, 1979. Three more negotiations would have taken place by 1981. After a brief three-year lapse, further talks occurred in 1984 and 1985, and as of December 1989 as many as fourteen meetings on the Timor Gap had been held by Jakarta and Canberra. Yet, a boundary agreement is still not in sight.

There seems to be progress however, since the sixth meeting in November 1984. Here, the Australian delegation had modified its position by proposing that the two countries form a "joint authority" to exploit certain - but not all - parts of the disputed seabed area. Jakarta eventually succumbed to this initiative, and in December 1989, Foreign Ministers Ali Alatas and Gareth Evans symbolically signed an agreement to this effect ("the Timor Gap Treaty") in a jet which flew directly above the disputed area.49 Three zones were commissioned by this treaty: Zone A is handled by a joint-authority with headquarters in Jakarta; Zone B is managed by the Australians, but Indonesia gets 16% of the oil tax produced by the oil contractors there; Zone C is controlled by Indonesia and, conversely, 10% of oil tax production in this area will go to Australia.50 It is worth noting all this does not mean that a boundary delimitation treaty is nearing
conclusion, although it certainly has helped to place Jakarta-
Canberra relations on a better footing. As Indonesia’s
Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stated: "We have now succeeded in
changing a potential conflict into a potential cooperation."51

FISHERIES

The topic of fisheries has been intermittently mentioned at
various stages of the Archipelago Doctrine. For instance, the
reference to natural resources in the Djuanda Declaration and
in the 1960 Act appeared more to denote to these "living
resources" of the sea. Kusumaatmadja himself has confirmed
that the issue of fisheries did enter the discussion, albeit
in passing, during the 1957 cabinet session. And during
UNCLOS I in 1958, the Indonesian delegation made the following
statement:

Fish were a very important factor in the diet of the
Indonesian people, and would become even more as the
Government’s plans for raising the standard of living
matured. Accordingly, this delegation supported the view
that the coastal state has a special, vital interest in
the living resources of its maritime domain.6

The 1962 Innocent Passage Act meanwhile, contains a clause
relating to the activities of foreign fishing boats.

But this writer opines that fisheries was only but a
minor consideration in the government’s decision to implement
the archipelago doctrine. This is because, first, fisheries
sank in relative importance to the concern over West Irian and
regional separatism. Secondly, the marine catch comprised
only a miniscule share of Indonesia’s exports and overall GNP.
And thirdly, fishing activities at that time were
predominantly confined to small-scale traditional fishermen,
whose non-motorized vessels would not allow them much capability to sail too far from the shore. As Tangsubkul writes: "Generally, the marine fisheries in Indonesia are confined to shallow and inshore waters along the coasts." 

Still, the issue deserves some examination because there has been a rising interest and growing activities in fisheries since the New Order era. This is axiomatic in the government’s pronouncement of the Exclusive Economic Zone in 1981, which substantially increased the scope of its jurisdiction over living-resources of the sea, be it on the surface, mid-water or the ocean floor.

There are several indicators to the growing use of the archipelagic waters for fisheries. To begin with, its share of the labour force has been on a steady rise. In 1974, fishermen comprised about 2.4% of total employment, but by 1980, the figure rose to 4%, or about 2.5 million people. It is noteworthy that they are still predominantly composed of small-scale fishermen, which make-up for 95% of Indonesia’s total catch. In this respect, some point out that what fisheries lack in relative contribution to the national economy, it makes-up in the social realm.

Furthermore, despite its low contribution to the GNP (3.4% in 1972 and 1.8% in 1980) and despite its minimal share of exports relative to petroleum, marine fisheries have generated an increasing sum of foreign exchange to Indonesia. In the last days of the Soekarno administration (1965), exports in this sector amounted to a mere US$ 368,000. But by 1970, this went up to just short of US$ 7 million, and that at the start of the second half of 1970’s, it substantially rose to over US$ 131 million. (see appendix 11)
Another evidence of the rising fisheries activities under the New Order is the establishment of "fishing belts" within the Indonesian waters. This stems largely from the conflict over marine resources which occurred in the 1970's between the small-scale fishermen on the one hand, and the more sophisticated trawlers and modern fishing boats, on the other. Thus, in 1976, the government introduced a bill which set-up the offshore areas into four categories of Fishing Belts; the first three belts are located within 12 miles from the shore, while the fourth one covers marine areas beyond the 12-mile line.\(^58\) Additionally, the government has also structured the Indonesian waters into four Fishing Zones, whereby trawlers engaged in demersal fisheries must obtain a certain license which permit them access to a different part of the zones. These zones consist of the Indian Ocean (Zone A); the strait of Malacca and South China sea (Zone B), the straits of Karimata and Makassar, Java sea (Zone C) and the seas on the eastern part of the archipelago (Zone D).\(^59\)

These belts and zones were established with the view of minimizing the conflict between the modern and traditional fishermen, as well as for the purpose of the ecological preservation of these marine environments. But in any case, these zones/belts are relevant to our discussion because they are symptomatic of the surge of organizational activities which have occurred on the archipelagic waters under the New Order government. In this respect, they share a commonality with the proliferation of the petroleum blocks mentioned earlier.
Offshore Natural Resources and Wawasan Nusantara

It would be fallacious to assume that, insofar as the maritime territory is concerned, natural resources completely evaded the attention of pre-1966 governments. The Djuanda Declaration for instance, made mention of the need "to protect the resources of Indonesia", and as stated earlier, there was a brief reference to fisheries in the 1957 cabinet meeting. The 1960 Act also contained a section in its appendix regarding the "living and non-living resources of the sea", while the fifth clause in the 1962 Act regulated the activities of foreign fishing boats.

All this however, does not contradict the fact that the natural resources were not a major variable in the elite's interest in the maritime environment. There is little to indicate that the above references to "resources" were any more than token citation. The fact remains that, apart from the activities of subsistence coastal fishermen, economic activities on the sea were severely limited. The Soekarno administration never bothered to explore, let alone exploit, the mineral resources of the ocean floor. It is revealing that a series of requests by a foreign oil company between 1964 and 1965 to conduct offshore explorations was flatly turned down, for reasons which, this writer surmise, ranged from economic nationalism and anti-capitalism to sheer indifference owing to the preoccupation with the "Malaysia" crisis then.

Under the New Order however, offshore resources became the theme of the day. The euphoric success of deep water oil-finds had the effect of establishing a connecting link between the maritime territory and the one issue which concerned the
New Order most - economic development. More and more, the archipelagic waters began to be increasingly valued in terms of its economic potentials. This means that pursuit of resources was making its way into, and helped shape, the new elite’s geopolitical interest in the maritime environment. In 1970, M. Sharif, Indonesia’s Ambassador to the UN, made the following statement before the Political and Security Committee of the UNGA:

Not only are matters relating to the sea close in the mind of the Indonesian people as inhabitants of an archipelago of more than 13,000 islands is a sea-areas of two to three times the area of our islands, situated on a cross-roads between two continents and two oceans, but also because it is our firm belief that the increasing ability of modern ability and science to exploit under-water resources at greater depths will continue to open new vistas of knowledge, offering mankind thereby a larger reservoir of resources to meet many of its needs.

From time immemorial, the inhabitants of the Indonesian archipelago, like the people of any island or island-groups, regard the seas surrounding our islands as part and parcel of our national life and a God-given source of living. While farmers are tilling the soil of plains and mountains and making agriculture and cattle breeding their main source of living, the seas have become similarly the playground and the main source of living for our fishermen and seafaring people of the coastal areas. When industry and mining are making progress on the land, it is only natural that the people start looking beyond their horizon on the land and extend their explorations to the area of the adjacent waters and the subsoil underlying the seas.

President Suharto has also made statements signifying his resource interest in the archipelagic seas. In a 1974 State Address to the Deliberative Assembly, he declared:

We have to endeavour so that the seas and all the straits connecting the chain of thousands of islands of our archipelago including the bottom of the seas and the natural resources in it which form an inseparable unity with the entire national territory of Indonesia, will be really peaceful and secure, so that we will be able to take the maximum benefit from the natural resources of our nation as a gift from God Almighty for the interest of the whole people. It is for that purpose that we are doing our utmost to get the Indonesian Archipelago Concept accepted and acknowledged by the world.

It is also significant that the (1973) doctrine of
Wawasan Nusantara explicitly addresses the issue of resources. The doctrine issues a claim that the archipelagic territory constitutes a single "economic entity" :

> The realization of the Indonesian Archipelagic Outlook as one Economic Entity, in a sense that the riches of the territory of the archipelago, potentially as well as effectively, are the collective asset and property of the Nation...(see appendix 6)

This assertion, in effect, provides a confirmation to the notion that the New Order regards "territorial unity" as more than just a question of "national integration"; it is, as well, a function of "national prosperity".

Thus, one distinctive feature of the New Order's maritime territorial behaviour is the attempts to expand its resource jurisdictions. To illustrate: Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, after being relieved from charges of political dissension, was called by the new elite to formulate yet another maritime declaration to claim the continental shelf areas on the southern South China sea. The end-product, the Promulgation of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia on the Continental Shelf, was completed on February 17, 1969, and was codified into national law in 1973. Shortly after, in a speech to the faculty members of Padjadjaran University, Mochtar frankly admitted that his government made the move with the view of obtaining jurisdictional access to the well-known petroleum deposits situated on South China sea's continental shelf areas beyond Indonesia's archipelagic boundary. This was particularly needed to provide legal credibility to the exploration leases which the elite had allocated - and were planning to allocate further - to the oil companies on that area.

On March 21, 1980, the New Order extended its resource base further when it claimed rights over "living and non-
living natural resources" on the seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters 200 miles from the archipelagic baselines; hence, the Declaration on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Indonesia. In effect, the government considerably expanded its access to fisheries in parts of the Pacific ocean, Indian ocean, Celebes sea, and South China sea. It is worthy of note that, unlike the archipelago concept, both the continental shelf and the EEZ were implemented by Indonesia at a time when they had already become fashionable among the international community.

The impact of these declarations on Indonesia's resource jurisdictions is significant. The 1969 Act expanded the government's access to the seabed areas beyond the archipelagic territory by as much as 800,000 sq.km. The 1981 Act, on the other hand, added another 1,577,300 sq.nm of resource jurisdiction beyond the 1960 territorial boundary. In fact, counting the EEZ, Indonesia has become the seventh largest country in the world, up from a previous seventeenth.

A question may be asked whether the New Order's spatial definition of Wawasan Nusantara also include the continental shelf and the EEZ. This writer has posed this question during an interview with Nugroho Wisnumurti, Indonesia's UNCLOS delegate and former director of Foreign Ministry's International Treaties division. In answering this, he points out that the 1982 law of the Sea convention has recognized the rights of the archipelagic state over its continental shelf and EEZ areas. The Indonesian government, he continues, has ratified the 1982 Convention in a 1985 Presidential Decree. Consequently, although Wawasan Nusantara is formally based on territorial definition of the 1960 Act,
it also indirectly involves the continental shelf and the EEZ since they are technically attached to the archipelagic territory.

**Conclusion**

The preceding discussion reveals that the resource interest of the elite in the maritime territory did not become significant until late in the 1960's when offshore oil exploration and exploitation began to take place in these waters. Thus, although before this Indonesian officials had made occasional mention of the theme of "resources", it was not until the New Order era that this went beyond tokenism and took on tangible importance.

The resource dimension has been a significant factor shaping the New Order elite's geopolitical interest in the Indonesian waters. The new elite, with the military as its core, had committed itself to the task of economic development, on which its legitimacy largely hinged. This provided context to, and illuminates the stakes involved in, the New Order's extensive economic activities in offshore territories. We have examined, for example, the extent to which the government has organized, regulated, and exploited the Indonesian waters, and the degree to which offshore petroleum contributed to the national economy. The Timor Gap problem, meanwhile, elucidates how the resource issue has entered the agenda of the government's foreign relations; in contrast to this, the wealth of the ocean completely evaded the agenda of Soekarno's bilateral relations. Thus, although natural resources did not cause the decision to remodel the
territorial structure in 1957, it certainly has been a potent factor in the interest of the New Order government in maintaining the new boundaries.
Notes - Chapter V

1. The New Order government sees "development" as comprising a wide-range of dimensions: social, economic, cultural and political. But in this study, "development" will be discussed mainly in terms of "economic development".


3. Ibid, p. 64.


5. This concept was first expounded by Nasution in 1957, when he introduced the concept of "the middle-way" to define the military's political role in Indonesia. This meant that the Indonesia military was not just a professional group like those in the Western democracy, but it also did not aspire to despotic rule as in many Latin American states. Instead, its place is somewhere in between, thus lending to the term "the middle-way". In the early 1960's, this concept finally received formal recognition from Soekarno as the doctrine of Dual Function.


10. For further informations on this, see Corazon Siddayao, "Southeast Asia's Offshore Petroleum Resources and the Law of the Sea", in Southeast Asian Affairs (Singapore: ISEAS, 1977) p. 77; also in Couldrey, ibid.

11. A production-sharing agreement is a new type of contractual arrangement devised by Indonesia's Dr. Ibnu Sutowo in the mid-1960's. Whereas under the old arrangement, the so-called "work-contracts", the Indonesian government would split the profits made from oil, under this new agreement the production of oil would be split 60 to 40 in favour of the government. "The beauty of this system," explains Minister of Mines and Energy Prof. Soebroto, "is that does not need us to furnish the capital funds for exploration, but we can have the benefit of that as long as the split is attractive for the contractors." (in Kaleidoscope, ibid, page 150). Production-sharing has become the most predominant arrangement between the government and oil companies, and most of the "working-contract" arrangements still operational now are just left overs from the previous administration. A very detailed and informative treatment on the types of contractual arrangements in the country's
petroleum industry is found in the work of Rudioro Rochmat, *Contractual Arrangement in Oil and Gas Mining Enterprises in Indonesia* (USA: Sijthoff & Nordhooff, 1981).


17. See chapter four on "Exploration" in Ooi Jien Bee, *Petroleum resources of Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1982).


23. Quoted from Howell and Morrow, p. 74.

25. See chart in appendix 10.


31. Quoted from Richardson, "Tying Up", p. 45.


33. Michael Richardson, "Timor Gap Rift Remains", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, (April 19, 1984). Mochtar’s remark on this matter may be worth noting:

> I think the median line is a fair settlement because the new law as laid down in the law of the sea convention which... both Australia and Indonesia signed, has abandoned the old definition of continental shelf of the 1958 convention, on which the previous negotiations were based. (p. 40)

34. Ibid. It may be noted that the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention now defines the continental shelf according to the "distance" criteria, thus replacing the 1958 definition which was based on the geographical feature of the shelf.


39. Ibid.


41. Valencia, *Southeast Asian Seas*, p. 44.

42. Ibid.
43. See Richardson, "Tying up"; Usman, 992; Danusaputro and Valencia, pp. 470-1.


45. Richardson, "Tying up", p. 45.


47. Usman, p. 995.

48. Richardson, "Drawing", ibid.

49. Abdullah, ibid.

50. Ibid; also in "Kesepakatan Indonesia dan Australia Mengenai 'Timor Gap' Masih Sementara", Suara Karya, March 6, 1989.

51. From Abdullah, ibid.

52. From Tangsubkul, "ASEAN States : The Law of the sea and Fisheries Jurisdiction", in Southeast Asian Affairs, p. 81.


55. Ibid.


58. Tangsubkul, ASEAN, p. 53.


60. From Dua Puluhan Lima Tahun, p. 140.

61. State Address, ibid, page 381.

62. Mochtar made this comment in his acceptance speech during his inauguration as Professor to the law faculty of the padojadjaran University on March 1, 1969. His speech was titled "The
Exploitation of Seabed and Subsoil Resources and International Law", the copy of which is found in *Bunga Rampai*, pp. 105-125.


64. *Ibid*, p. 90.

65. Interview with Nugroho Wisnumurti, April, 1990.
Chapter VI

Wawasan Nusantara And Its Relationship With Geopolitical Thinking In Indonesia

To this point, we have discussed the origin and development of the Archipelago Doctrine, and how it relates to the factors of strategic movements, national symbols, and natural resources.

Curiously, in a trend which started somewhere in the 1970's, the Archipelago Doctrine along with its counterpart Wawasan Nusantara have been widely associated with the term "geopolitics". Indeed, New Order officials have made unequivocal claims that these concepts are determined by "geopolitics". Armed forces commander Maraden Panggabean for example, stated that "Wawasan Nusantara is the geopolitics of Indonesia," and that "it is the fundamental concept of Indonesian geopolitics." Others, such as Subroto, Sunardi and Wahyono, asserted that the Archipelago Doctrine is a "geopolitical conception which is distinctively Indonesian", while Ambassador Mohammad Sabir, a foreign ministry diplomat, wrote that "Wawasan Nusantara is a political concept which is tightly linked to the geographical condition and the geopolitics of the Indonesian nation." Finally, foreign minister Ali Alatas stated that the Archipelago Doctrine is premised on the "geopolitical situation of our island state", and talked of the doctrine "as applied to international relations. (This aspect) has nothing to do with internal relations, it has to do with international relations with other states."

It is of significance that this reference to
"geopolitics" came about only after the military came to power in the late 1960's. Prior to this, the author has not encountered any instances where the term was mentioned in the course of the Archipelago Doctrine. To be sure, it completely evaded the oration of the Indonesian delegation to UNCLOS I and II. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja himself started to refer to "geopolitics" only recently in the 1980's, that is, long after he became Suharto's cabinet member and leading spokesman on the law of the sea.

It is most probable that the military elite first injected the term 'geopolitics' into the lexicon of the Archipelago Doctrine. This proposition rests on the fact, however circumstantial, that they were completely in charge in manipulating the fate of the doctrine subsequent to Soekarno's fall. Apart from this, it may suffice to point out that "geopolitics" itself is a term and an approach which had found the military as its most eager long-time exponent. On this account, the use of the term by civilians in recent times may in large measure be construed as a gesture of compliance to the line of thought of the men in uniform.

At any rate, the pervasive reference to "geopolitics" is of particular interest to this inquiry because it sheds light on the link which exists between the Archipelago Doctrine on the one hand, and what may be termed as Indonesia's geopolitical thinking, on the other. This - the emerging interconnection between the maritime territory and geopolitical thinking in Indonesia - is the hypothesis which will be explored in this chapter.

The following discussion is organized into three sections. In section one, we will briefly observe the
tradition of geopolitics, if we may call it that, in Indonesia. This is then followed by an examination of geopolitical thinking in Indonesia, with special focus on the underlying themes or assumptions which animate such thinking. A final section attempts to establish the correlation between these themes in Indonesian geopolitics and the Archipelago Doctrine.

Some Comments on the Tradition of "Geopolitics" in Indonesia

It is not known when or how the concept of geopolitics first came to Indonesia. One may surmise that it came by way of the Japanese who invaded the archipelago during World War II. To remind, "Geopolitik" had been a major concept among the axis powers. This suggestion is supported by the fact that on the days of Indonesia's independence, such terms as "Kultur und Boden" and "sphere of Greater East Asia" were uttered by some nationalist leaders. One account has it that the number one military figure in the early 1950's, known for his fondness toward the term "geopolitics", was an avid reader of German military literature during the independence war.6

The earliest recorded usage of "geopolitics" by Indonesians dates as far back as August, 1945, when one of the country's founding fathers, Muhammad Yamin, expressed to a Preparatory Committee for Independence his vision of a "Greater Indonesia", which would include not only the territory of the Netherland East Indies, but as well, that of the British in Malaya and North Borneo, the Portuguese in East Timor and the Dutch in West New Guinea.7 These
claims, he argued, rested on the "geopolitical" imperatives to territorialize Indonesia's "historical motherland" and any possible "enclaves" within it, and to control strategic entrances into the archipelago in order to deter foreign invasion. Fortunately, this grand vision for a "Greater Indonesia" was not shared by the rest of the forum’s participants, and in fact, was criticized as being "aggressive", "imperialistic" and unnecessarily swayed by "uncontrolled passion". It is noteworthy that in the same forum (future President) Soekarno, in his historic speech on "Pancasila", twice made use of the term "geopolitics", albeit in less grandiose tone than Yamin’s, to assert the integrative character of the islands in the archipelago.

In the post-war years, Yamin’s brand of geopolitics faded from the scene, as was the case with the vestiges of ‘Geopolitik’. Nevertheless, the concept of geopolitics maintained its currency among policy-makers. As a phrase, it was occasionally used in the speeches and writings of the elites; although the exact meaning in which they were used were often left unclarified, it was apparent that the officials in Jakarta liked the adjective "geopolitical". In fact, several articles about "geopolitics" by the power elites appeared in print. President Soekarno himself was noted at one time to deliver a special lecture titled "Geopolitics" to members of the National Defense Institute (LEMHANAS).

What this reveals is that the Indonesian leaders have treated geopolitics, as a term or approach, with a fair degree of affinity. Geopolitics may have been regarded at one time or another with suspicion in certain countries, but in Indonesia this does not seem to be the case. The phrase
has long been a part of the Indonesian political vocabulary, and there is no evidence to suggest that the elites have been particularly averse to it. On this basis, its frequent use by the New Order officials does not represent a bandwagon phenomenon in relation to the recent popular revival of geopolitics elsewhere.

Another point which needs to be highlighted about geopolitics in Indonesia pertains to the military’s special propensity toward it. The reasons for this are not difficult to find. Military officers, first of all, are acquainted with this approach in a more systematic fashion: the curriculum of military schools is sure to include a course either on geopolitics or one which includes discussion of geopolitical theories. This made it possible for the military circles to acquire familiarity with the concepts which were developed in the West. One case in point is an article written in 1954 by armed forces commander Simatupang in which he discussed at length the ideas of Kjellen, Haushofer, Mackinder, Mahan and Spykman. This writer has found many other works written in recent times by high-ranking military officers which exhibited the same cognizance. It is of interest to note that whereas the term "geopolitics" or "geopolitical" has been commonly used by both civilian and military figures, writings which specifically deal with the study of geopolitics has been generally confined to the latter.

It is also telling that, during the 1960’s, the services of the armed forces were formulating "powerslogans" which sounded a lot like certain conceptions made in the West: Doktrin Sasana Jaya advocated the development of "sea power"; Doktrin Swa Buana Paksa propagated "air
power"; while Doktrin Tri Ubaya Sakti pleaded for the build-up of "land power". As one military source admitted, these slogans drew a lot of reference from "western bibliography at that time on the military power concepts", and he cited names such as Clausewitz, Mackinder, Haushofer, Liddell Hart, Sir Walter Raleigh, Nicholas Spykman, Mahan, Douhet, Mitchell.12

A second explanation of the military's affinity to geopolitics is that the nature of their profession demands an intimate understanding of the factor of geography. Defense planning, strategic evaluation, threat assessment, and organizing the forces are all tasks which require a fair deal of knowledge of the physical features of the country and its surrounding regions. Hence, military officers, far from being subdued by the approach, in fact see "geopolitics" as a useful concept, one which is well-suited for their professional inquiry. Military professionals do not shy away from the element of policy-prescription found in some geopolitical concepts; on the contrary, this practical aspect of geopolitics is precisely what draws them to the approach in the first place.

Geopolitical Thinking in Indonesia

It is not easy to grasp the substance of Indonesian geopolitics. There is no figure in Indonesia who can be regarded as the doyen of geopolitics in the country, comparable to people such as Mackinder, Spykman, Mahan. There is also no such thing as an indigenous school of thought on geopolitics in the country, as would be found in,
say, Germany, the US, France or some countries in Latin America. In addition, some members of the elite have denied subscribing to Western geopolitical concepts. The organismic theory of the state has been denounced by several military elites, while the concepts of Mackinder, Spykman and the likes have been dismissed by others as unapplicable to Indonesia’s case.

Geopolitical thinking in Indonesia has more to do with practical "themes" than academic "theories". By "themes" here we mean a set of underlying assumptions which are held by the elites about Indonesia’s geographical and foreign policy environment. These assumptions are not in themselves policies: they are premises which animate the policy-behaviour of the elites. A succession of post-independence governments have subjected themselves in one way or another to these assumptions, and over such period of time, they have crystallized into axioms whose credence is generally accepted at face value by the ruling elites, civilians and military alike. In fact, they are so deeply embedded in the mental map of the policy-makers that the latter are almost sure to draw reference to these premises when making foreign policy decisions.

The themes in Indonesian geopolitical thinking may be outlined as follows:

1. A concern over the geographical location of the country.
2. A suspicion toward extra-regional major powers’ involvement in the region.
3. An aspiration for regional activism.
4. A concern over national unity in wake of fragmented geography.
Theme number four has been discussed at length in the previous chapters, both with respect to the Soekarno and Suharto administrations; thus, it is not necessary to comment further on it. We will therefore concentrate only on themes one, two, and three.

Indonesia has many geographical traits, but there is one which has had the most significant imprint on the mental map of Indonesian policy-makers: relative location. Indonesian elites are long-acquainted to call upon the fact that their country is located between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans and between the Asian and Australian continents. Assertions regarding, say, Indonesia’s historical experience, strategic role or geopolitical identity have been generally predicated on the so-called posisi-silanq, meaning cross-road location. There is not a single evaluation of the country’s strategic policy which fails to mention this term.

The endurance and scope of appeal of this theme is striking. Indonesia’s founding fathers constantly referred to it in their speeches when they convened on the eve of independence in August 1945. In the post-independence era, the mercurial President Soekarno never ceased to romanticize about his country’s ‘posisi-silanq’, a term to which his more sedate successor, Suharto, has also paid routine homage. "Posisi-silanq" is also one of the very rare matters whose undisputed credence was shared by the two rivaling power-centres in the Soekarno government: the military and its allies, and the Communist Party and its allies. Under the present administration, the military has made most play of the theme of "location", but as in the
past, it is also widely uttered by various actors: cabinet ministers, party members, bureaucrats, diplomats, members of Parliament, the media, and intellectuals.

"Posisi-silang" has been at the root of many state policies. The Independent and Active foreign policy, which Soekarno adopted for some time and is currently practiced by Suharto, was originally conceived as the most expedient way to deal with the competing blocs which were bound to court Indonesia on account of its strategic location. As pointed out by the architect of that policy, Mohammad Hatta:

"Indonesia is bounded by the British navy and the American navy, which control the Indian and Pacific Ocean,‖ and he went on to argue that the Independent and Active line is reinforced by the objective facts of Indonesia’s geographical position. Nature has ordained that Indonesia, lying between two continents—the Asian mainland and Australia—and washed by the waters of two vast oceans—the Indian and the Pacific—must maintain intercourse with lands stretching in a great circle around it. From time immemorial, it has had relationship with all of them, varied as they are. Four decades later, the same assumption is still in effect: a recent policy-platform produced by the Foreign ministry begins by noting the country’s geographical location as "the determinant factor in the direction of Indonesia’s foreign policy". A similar assertion is made by the government’s quinquennial policy-manual, the National Basic Policy Guidelines. In four successive editions the authors of the manual have outlined "the geographical position of Indonesia...as a connecting link owing to its cross-road location between two oceans and two continents" as one of the fundamental assets ("modal dasar") of the nation, second on the list after "the independence and sovereignty of Indonesia". The military, meanwhile, has devised the much-touted doctrine of "National Resilience" whose
attainment is contingent upon "Astra Gatra", meaning eight aspects, of which location constitutes the first "gatra".

The second theme pertains to the suspicion over extra-regional major power involvement in Southeast Asia. This is partly attributed to the strong feelings of nationalism and anti-colonialism, both of which developed as a result of bitter experiences with foreign powers prior to, during and after independence. The fact that each of the major powers has at one time or another been engaged in hostile acts against the country is bound to have an impact on the policy-makers' perception of these powers: the Japanese occupied the archipelago during World War II; the Dutch colonized the country for three centuries and continued to briefly control West New Guinea in post-war years; the British assisted Holland's attempt to recolonize Indonesia subsequent to Japan's defeat; the Soviets were believed to play a role in the abortive 1948 communist revolt against Republican leaders in Madiun; the Americans were found to be supporting the dissenting colonels in Sumatra and Celebes; and the Chinese were blamed as the principal political force behind the abortive coup in 1965.

As a consequence of this, Jakarta has never been comfortable with the activities of the major powers in the nearby regions. The Soekarno administration for instance, was convinced that SEATO's formation and the presence of its military bases in neighbouring states were clear attempts to "encircle" Indonesia. Similarly, the creation of Malaysia was seen as a Western conspiracy aiming to assure its foolhold there while establishing a buffer zone to contain Indonesia. Ironically, it was this fear of "encirclement" which drove Soekarno into the hands of
another major power, China - although he rationalized this by depicting his as a regional alliance.

The Suharto government, on the other hand, has reversed many of his predecessor's external policies, and unlike Soekarno it does not seem to regard major powers' presence in the region as necessarily a direct threat against the country. Nonetheless, the new elites still hold the view that their non-aligned policy could not function effectively in a region webbed by alliance systems. Hence, although it has improved economic and political relations with Western states, the New Order has continued to raise vocal objections toward the entanglement of major powers in Southeast Asia. As an example, US activities in the Vietnam conflict were criticised by Jakarta as a form of foreign intervention in regional affairs. Similarly, when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea sometime later, the Suharto administration reacted strongly by committing full-scale diplomatic ventures along with other ASEAN members to oppose the occupation, which it feared would - among other things - perpetuate Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina. On other occasions, the US theory of "falling dominoes" and Brezhnev's call for a Collective Security System in Asia were dismissed as mere ploys by the superpowers to force inroads into the region.\(^{18}\) Then there is the case of East Timor: Jakarta's involvement in East Timor decolonization stemmed, inter alia, from the premonition that Indonesia would have on its doorstep a "trouble corner" which would be amenable to the influence of foreign powers.\(^{19}\)

Consider also the congeries of regional doctrines endorsed by Suharto government. There is, first of all, ASEAN's doctrine of Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN), which envisages Southeast Asia’s long-term future in terms of the absence of foreign intervention in regional affairs. Within the context of ZOPFAN, the concept of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEA-NWFZ) has also found support in Jakarta. The New Order itself has introduced to ASEAN the doctrine of "National Resilience and Regional Resilience" which emphasizes the theme of self-reliance in the national conduct of each member state; the condition of "regional resilience" is said to occur when each of ASEAN states has succeeded in promoting its own security and prosperity by relying on its own "resilience", as opposed to external assistance. The Suharto government has also signed the 1976 Declaration on ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which among others advocates the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. To rest the matter, all of these doctrines are alike in that they project critical attitudes toward the involvement foreign powers.

Although Southeast Asia remains at the forefront of its concern, the New Order has not ignored developments in other regions. The superpowers’ strategic build-up which took place in the 1970’s and early 1980’s in the Indian Ocean has been closely monitored in Jakarta with anxiety. On this matter, Lt.Gen. Ali Murtopo has written:

The growing superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean is deplored by Indonesia which values highly the tradition of an independent and active foreign policy. Indonesia fears that such a rivalry could not only lead to an armed confrontation, but might also generate undesirable pressures and demands on riparian and hinterland nations.

In this connection, the status of two islands, Christmas and Cocos, situated on the southeastern tip of the Indian ocean has been a source of anxiety for the Suharto administration.
In the mid-1970’s, Australia began to contemplate whether or not it should relinquish administrative control over the islands. Suharto, upon learning this, personally told Prime Minister Gough Whitlam that he would prefer to see no change in the status quo, adding that he would firmly oppose the setting-up of military bases there by the US, which was thought to be courting these islands. With regard to the Far East, Suharto also expressed his concern over the Reagan administration’s military aid to China as well as the prospect of Japan’s increased military posture; both issues were seen as related to their capability for force-projection into Southeast Asia. Of late, Jakarta has also begun to consider increased relations with countries in the South Pacific, a region which Indonesians fear could become host to increased major power presence. It is of interest to note that the 1983 National Policy Guidelines mentioned the Southwestern Pacific in conjunction with Southeast Asia as regions of clear importance to the country’s national interest.

The third theme of interest brings us to the question of regional activism. What this means precisely is a little difficult to sketch. Some portray Indonesia’s regional aspiration in terms of "hegemonic" design, but in the view of the author this suggestion does not seem to be accurate. A more apt characterization, one which several analysts have offered, is somewhere along the line that there is a sense of entitlement among the elite at a regional role which is proportional to Indonesia’s status as Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous nation. As Peter Lyon explains:

Indonesia’s present leaders see their country as a regional power not unlike India in Southeast Asia in terms of natural predominance.
Indonesia’s foreign policy therefore, has been marked by constant attempts to shape the regional order, and resist those which do not bear its imprint. Jakarta’s role in the formation of such regional groupings as the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), Maphilindo\textsuperscript{26} and ASEAN are cases in point. On another occasion, the policy of confrontation against Malaysia was claimed by Soekarno as related to the country’s regional prestige. Soekarno clearly spelled this out during his 1963 Independence Day speech, whereby he complained that:

..Indonesia’s voice is not heeded, looked upon as if, as if Indonesia does not have the right to assess an event that is to take place on its very doorstep. ‘Hands-off Malaysia’ is what they say to us, and then, Full stop! It’s as if we were small children, it’s as if we were small children who still couldn’t keep their noses clean.

Previously, indeed, we kept all our feelings to ourselves. But eventually we adopted an attitude that is firm and clear. We are not willing to be mere spectators of all the changes being made in the status quo around us. We are not willing to take a passive stand like a nation that sits idly by, hugging its knees, watching things happening on the other side of the fence.\textsuperscript{27}

Suharto, by comparison, has been less vitriolic and more low-profile in his claims at regional leadership. But there is no evidence to suggest that his government has ceased to entertain any regional aspiration. In all of his annual State Addresses since becoming President, there is not one occasion where Suharto failed to stress his government’s "role" in Southeast Asia. In 1974 for example, he made a statement which was more or less on a par with that uttered by Soekarno a decade earlier:

We are fully aware of the expectations of the world that we should play a bigger role in the strengthening of stability and peace in the region. We are fully aware of these expectations because we have indeed the potentials to realise them.\textsuperscript{28}

ASEAN counts as the most significant manifestation of
the New Order's regional activism. The organization was designated by foreign minister Adam Malik as "a cornerstone of our foreign policy" in 1976. Since then a great deal of diplomatic energy has been spent by Jakarta to strengthen relations with ASEAN partners. According to Michael Leifer, the Suharto administration regards ASEAN not merely as a forum which would accommodate its interests, but also "as the vehicle through which a willing acceptance of Indonesia's political primacy in Southeast Asia may be facilitated". A similar note is offered by Sheldon Simon: "For Indonesia, ASEAN provided an opportunity to legitimate its regional leadership aspirations after years of confrontation under Soekarno." The current government may have intentionally downplayed its role in ASEAN, but there is little doubt that it sees itself as primus inter pares. One senior Foreign Ministry official made a comment which seems to reflect the view of his colleagues:

Indonesia has no need to be high-profile and show-off its muscles in ASEAN. But we all know well that all we need to do is just sneeze a little, and all of ASEAN will stop whatever they are doing and analyze it.

There are at least two occasions where Indonesia found some degree of veneration from its neighbours. The first is when ASEAN agreed to formally endorse Indonesia's view on how national security and regional security should be attained by ASEAN countries. This is signified by the commencement of the doctrine of "National Resilience and Regional Resilience", which the New Order fabricated from its own domestic concept of "national resilience", during the organization's second summit in 1976. The other occasion occurred when several ASEAN states made a point of showing sensitivity to Indonesia's position while pursuing their relations with China. The Malaysian authority, for
example, felt it necessary to consult Jakarta several times before proceeding with diplomatic relations with Peking. Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew, meanwhile, stated that he would establish diplomatic contact with China only after Suharto had done so.33

Wawasan Nusantara and Indonesian Geopolitics

Thus far, we have outlined several major themes in Indonesian geopolitical thinking. Our next task is to examine their interconnection with the Archipelago Doctrine and Wawasan Nusantara. As stated earlier, we will not discuss the theme of "national integration" since it has been already examined at length in chapter four. Hence, we will concentrate mainly on "location", "suspicion of major powers", and "regional activism". Since the last two themes concern the regional theatre, and since they are mutual components of Indonesia's political design in Southeast Asia, we will lump them together in the following discussion under the rubric of "regional interests". "Location" however, will be examined independently.

The theme of "Location"

The first clue to suggest the correlation between 'location' and 'maritime boundary' is found at the level of terminology. During the Soekarno era, there was no record that the Soekarno administration ever alluded to the concern over location. The Djuanda Declaration was chiefly
justified on the grounds of morphology, namely on "Indonesia’s unique geographical configuration as an archipelago consisting of thousands of islands". Throughout Soekarno’s rule, this was the standard explanation used by government officials to audiences at home and abroad. Since the New Order era however, the phrase "posisi-silang", or cross-road, began to make its way into the language of the Archipelago Doctrine. In fact, it has become such pervasive usage that it is not necessary to exemplify it. Interestingly enough, this occurred at about the same time "geopolitics" began to be uttered by the same elites.

The popularization of "posisi-silang" is related to yet another terminological event. This pertains to the introduction of the phrase "nusantara" into the lexicon of the government’s maritime policy. "Nusantara" is a traditional Javanese expression consisting of two words: "nusa", which means islands or archipelago; and "antara", which means "situated in between". Put together, they come to mean "the islands located in between". It was the military who first brought the term to the fore during a 1966 seminar. Before long, a trend emerged whereby the New Order’s territorial, strategic and political concepts took on denominations which made use of "nusantara". To recall, the military produced the strategic doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari, and this was followed by the political concept of Wawasan Nusantara in 1973. The Djuanda Declaration itself was giving way to a new term: Konsep Nusantara (the Nusantara Concept). These terms - "posisi-silang" and "nusantara", both of which emphasize location - are indicative of the convergence which has taken place between the elites’ perception of the
maritime territory and their concern over the country's location. Apparently, Indonesia's geographical position is now used as a theme to rationalize its views on the Archipelago Doctrine, as if inter-continental and inter-oceanic location has something to do with the need to exercise territorial control over the waters of the archipelago.

Actually, the nucleus of this logic has been around for quite some time among the military circles. It is therefore necessary to delve deeper into the military's perception of "location". After all, they were the ones who first initiated the usage of "nusantara" in connection with the Archipelago Doctrine.

As a starting point, it is worthwhile to draw attention to a special map of Indonesia produced by the military sometime toward the end of the 1960's. The map was titled "Indra Jaya", an acronym for what would translate as "Greater Indonesia as the World's Cross Road", and was widely distributed to government institutions. The striking feature about this map is that it placed Indonesia at the centre of the world and in a way which only accentuated its position as the intersection between two continents and two oceans. Map-making, of course, can be a notoriously subjective undertaking, especially when related to geopolitics. Some cartographers tend to be partial to methods or angles which exaggerate the country's position vis-a'-vis others. "Indra Jaya" exemplifies this trend. A more important point however, is this: the map's partial treatment of Indonesia's "nodality" in the globe is indicative of the importance of location to how the military constructs the jigsaw puzzle of the world which "surrounds"
A commonly-held notion among the military is that, because of its cross-road position, Indonesia has been "caught" in the middle of competing forces on either side of the archipelago. As a consequence of this, the country is proned to be victimized by these forces. As Gen. Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo argues:

Because of its strategic location, as a crossroad between continents and oceans, Indonesia has been an avenue for several movements all along man's history. The last important movements the world has seen was the Japanese movements in its offensive towards Australia in the Second World War, and afterwards the movement of the Allied Forces under General Douglas MacArthur in its counter-offensive against Japan. Both movements were obliged to go through Indonesian territory and have taken Indonesia through the troubles of the war. The military circles thus see location as a source of vulnerability, a factor which has led them to virulent contacts with foreign powers. There is a sense of anxiety in the officers' view of the world which surround them. By constantly depicting the country as being "in the middle" of two major land-masses and two major water-bodies, the officers were conveying a feeling of unwilling "entrapment" in power politics, one which would be likely to inflict some sort of harm upon the country. For instance, an army document on national security, produced in 1962 for "restricted" use, warned that in the context of East-West conflict "Indonesia's position is constituted as: (1) a broken link in the 'containment strategy', (2) a transit area toward the 'reliable rear'". On a more recent occasion, armed forces commander Benny Murdani made a remark whereby he reminded his colleagues at the National Defense Council that:

The threat which endangers the sovereignty of the Indonesian Republic comes not only from the Northern
area. Rather, danger would also come from all directions, be it from the south, from the east, or from the west of the Nusantara archipelago."

A similar tone of unease is delivered by Maj.Gen.Iwan Stamboel, who insisted that Indonesia is also at the "crossroad" of a variety of socio-political configurations, neither of which it identifies with. It is worthy of note that the following statement by Stamboel has been repeated in other military writings:

Up on closer examination, Indonesia's crossroad location does not only involve the physical-geographical aspects, but also the many aspects of social realms, namely:

a. Demography: between highly populated areas in the north and areas with low-density population in the south.
b. Ideology: between communism in the north and liberalism in the south.
c. Politics: between proletarian democracy in the north and parliamentary democracy in the south.
d. Economics: between central command economies in the north and liberal economies in the south.
e. Between socialism and communism in the north and individualism in the south.
f. Between the Eastern cultures in the north (Buddhism/Confucianism) and Western cultures in the south.
g. Defense and Security: between continental defense system in the north, and maritime defense system in the west, the south and the east.

Apart from the vulnerability which it has brought to the country however, the officers do admit that location is not entirely without dividends. Stamboel pointed out that it would not be possible for Indonesia to acquire its present "cultural richness and diversity" had it not been for the exposure to foreign cultures which came to the archipelago on account of location, a view which is also shared by his colleagues. Others draw attention to the economic advantages as the archipelago becomes a "centre" for inter-regional trade and communications. But perhaps the most commonly held view is the notion that 'cross road' is the most strategic asset to the country. In a chapter on "Wawasan Nusantara" in his autobiography, President Suharto
mentioned that:

Geographically, Indonesia has a distinction. We are at the intersection of two continents, between Asia and Australia, and two oceans, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, our location is very strategic.

In fact, there is a general consensus among the military circles, and among policy-makers in general, that it is precisely on the basis of its strategic location that Indonesia would be able to become a more influential and effective player in regional and international politics.

Because location is seen as a source of both advantage but also vulnerability, a notion emerged whereby the country’s well-being is seen being contingent upon the ability to exercise effective control over this intersection, specifically the maritime waterways. It is significant to note that initially the idea of "control of the cross-road" was largely voiced within the context of a military build-up. This was first uttered in 1954 when armed forces commander T.B. Simatupang, writing of "Geopolitics and Our Defense Problem", advocated that Indonesia:

develop a military strength which is in conformity with the importance of our country's location, especially with regard to the forces at sea and on air, so that we may be able to exert influence on the military movements on our part of the world.

At the time of this article, Simatupang's view was no more than an exercise in strategic theorizing, void of practical follow-up. But as it turned out, this line of thought has endured well into the present generation of officers. In 1969, an army senior officer Gen. Sayidinan Suryohadiprojo wrote the following:

(Indonesia's) important location forms a permanent factor which will not change; it has caused and will continue to cause the entry of many influences from without, some beneficial others detrimental to the
people. In order to be able to select the entry of bad and good influences, it is imperative that Indonesia controls this crossroad and does not let anybody else do that.

He then made some propositions which echoed that by Simatupang the previous decade, and which drew attention, albeit indirectly, to the Archipelago Doctrine:

As an archipelago Indonesia has to build a defence system that is principally a maritime defence system. This maritime defence system is based on two pillars, namely:

A. The complete control of the island, particularly the main islands, as the land territory of Indonesia and as the main source of national potentials.

B. With the main islands as strong points, the rule of the seas between and around the islands have to be established, making the Java sea and further eastward to the Banda sea a "mare nostrum" to Indonesia.

The implementation of this defence system requires a balanced organization, consisting of an army of sufficient strength to control the whole land territory, a navy strong enough to secure the seas within and around Indonesia, and an air force to master the air above the national territory and the surrounding areas. The manpower needed for this organization presents no problem for a country with 100 million people. But the material power and the logistical requirements of a modern army, navy and air force can only be furnished by an industrial country, as a product of national development.

All such concern about "controlling the crossroad" is of relevance to our inquiry because it throws additional light on the nature of the military's interest in the archipelago doctrine. For years, the theme of gaining mastery over this intersection revolved by and large around the question of "force build-up". But of late, "territorial control" has also become an integral part of the picture. "Konsep Nusantara", or the Archipelago Doctrine, is seen as providing a territorial blanket which effectively "closes" the seaways within the archipelago, so that interoceanic navigations would be bound to pass through waterbodies which fall under Indonesia's jurisdiction - unless they opt to circumnavigate by way of Australia. It is equally pertinent
that the Archipelago Doctrine provides regimes of passage which allows Indonesia to regulate and manipulate maritime movements in their area. The regime of Innocent Passage allows Indonesia, at least in theory, to forbid passages which are hostile to Indonesia, while the regime of Archipelagic Sealanes allows Indonesia to restrict maritime movement to certain areas in the archipelago.

On this basis, it is small wonder that the military has come to regard the Archipelago Doctrine as an essential component of 'crossroad control'. This is signified by the doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari, which, to recall, was produced by the military in 1966 to assert that the territorial framework of the Archipelago Doctrine constitutes a single strategic arena for the Indonesian armed forces. Inherent in this is the notion that the maritime territory is a clear-cut arena for Indonesia's strategic operations, and an area over which the country's security and sovereignty were to be upheld.

It may be argued that the doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari was originally crafted by and large as an attempt to sort out internal problems within the military; thus, it was not necessarily a resolve to establish immediate control over the waterways. But this information does not contradict the fact that as of yet Wawasan Nusantara Bahari has endured to the basic strategic doctrine of the Indonesian armed forces, and that it has become the underlying concept upon which the New Order's defense planning and operations have been organized. In fact, Wawasan Nusantara Bahari has become more and more valued in terms of its "strategic" function, while its "internal" value has diminished as the objective of structural reform
had been long remedied.

Another indication to how the Archipelago Doctrine is related to the locational concern is that the New Order government has come up with an official line that Wawasan Nusantara is symbiotically linked to the doctrine of National Resilience. According to this doctrine, the attainment of national security does not depend on external alliances, but rather on the strengthening of internal "resilience" on all aspects of national life, socio-cultural, economic, political, military. Security, therefore, is assured when domestic conditions have reached such a point that, like "an anti-body", it would neutralize any external attempt to disrupt it.

National Resilience therefore shares commonality with "crossroad control" in that it addresses the question of how to deal with "external threats". More importantly, as in case of "crossroad control", National Resilience is seen as being promoted by the Archipelago Doctrine. It is reasoned that "national resilience" requires "an optimum level of national integration", and that in turn national integration is reliant upon "territorial integration". As such, "territorial integration", which is symbolized by the Archipelago Doctrine, is seen as rudimentary to the task of augmenting "national resilience" in order to deter foreign threats. As Simatupang and Kuncoro-Djakti suggest, in order to attain national resilience, "there should be a geopolitical awareness of Nusantara as a single political, socio-cultural, economic and defense entity." There are many elaborations to this line of thinking. A succinct version is offered by Brig.Gen. Nitikoesoema:

Our National resilience faces a strong challenge from the waves passing through our crossroad, which presents
only two alternatives: whether to survive or be drowned in those waves. And our national resilience can only be guaranteed if the precondition of territorial integration is fulfilled. Therefore, it is imperative that we have Wawasan Nusantara so as to form and maintain national integration.

Wawasan Nusantara and Indonesia’s Regional Interests

Indonesian officials have been adamant in projecting the decision to implement the Djuanda Declaration as strictly a defensive move, one taken-up for the sake of "self-preservation". The government has been at pain in explaining that such a course of action was not the least bit intended to disrupt the navigational interest of the international community. To underscore this, it persistently points to the assurance of innocent passage made by the declaration. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, after a lengthy explanation of the Archipelago Doctrine to the Law of the Sea Institute, Rhode Island University, concluded by saying that:

What I am trying to say is that what we did was not to bother others, but just in self-preservation; and we ask for your understanding of our position... we never interfered with navigation. Even if we wanted to, physically we can not.

Adam Malik, Suharto’s first Foreign Minister, was equally adamant in stressing the defensive nature of the Archipelago Doctrine. Commenting in 1980 on why the New Order government opted to adopt and revitalize the maritime territorial policy of the previous government, he reasoned:

One may wonder what motives induced the government of President Suharto, in which I served as foreign minister, to adopt this extreme policy? By no means was it intended as a manifestation of a new spirit by the New Order in Indonesia to reign supreme over the region of Southeast Asia. Nor did we want to advance our national ambitions at the expense of regional peace.
in the ASEAN area. This decision was solely motivated by the desire for self-preservation. We looked closely at our long history and saw the trials and tribulations of our forefathers caused by a long series of foreign invasion either peaceful or warlike. This prompted us, as much as it had prompted Bung Karno earlier, to introduce policies which reflect our apprehension of the problems, perils and challenges that confront contemporary Indonesia.

Given the issues which gave rise to the Djuanda Declaration, there is a good deal of credence in the above assertions. As already discussed in the previous chapter, the conception and implementation of the Archipelago Doctrine was precipitated by the concern over national security and integration as signified by the West Irian conflict and the regional revolts. Hence, "self-preservation" was not a far-fetched notion to describe the line of thought which prevailed in Jakarta at the time.

Nonetheless, in more recent times there is reason to believe that additional "roles" have been grafted on the Archipelago Doctrine. This does not imply that "self-preservation" is being relegated, but it does signify a broadening in the thematic framework which hitherto underlied the government's stake in maintaining control over the maritime environment.

In the mid-1980's, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja delivered a lecture on "Wawasan Nusantara from the Viewpoint of Geopolitics and Geostrategy". It may be of interest to note that this was perhaps the first time in his long-time involvement in the government's maritime policy that he made explicit reference to "geopolitics". In that speech, he suggested that from the viewpoint of geopolitics and geostrategy Wawasan Nusantara performs two categories of functions. The first is internal in nature, and it pertains to "the promotion of territorial integrity, political
stability, national integration, socio-economic advancement as well as national security and defense". This is, of course, nothing new. Kusumaatmadja and his colleagues had been reiterating this argument ever since 1957. What is interesting however, is what Kusumaatmadja claimed to be Wawasan Nusantara’s second geopolitical and geostrategic function: it is the external tasks "to help strengthen stability and cooperation as well as regional resilience; (and) to help create international peace and security."52

This statement is of interest to us because he submitted the notion that there is, to use his own words, an "external function" to Wawasan Nusantara. Whereas previously the virtue of the doctrine was confined to "national security" alone, now the theme of "regional security" has come to matter.

Speaking in 1986 however, Kusumaatmadja’s statement could not be considered as novel. If anything, his message was merely an echo to a viewpoint which had been well in place among the New Order’s military circles for quite some time. In this, it is useful to note that army officers, like their civilian counterparts in the previous administration, too, are partial to the notion that Indonesia should exercise some sort of regional activism. Michael Leifer’s comment on this may be of interest:

The generals who have the ultimate say in the making of foreign policy in Indonesia have a strong sense of their country’s significance within Southeast Asia and are determined to ensure that its voice will count on every issue affecting the region. In this respect, there is a clear measure of continuity with the Soekarno era in which Indonesia gave notice to foreign interest that it was determined to be the predominant power in Southeast Asia.53

It is also illuminating that on the eve of their ascendance to power in 1966, army generals laboriously attempted to
engineer a Deliberative Assembly's resolution whereby a categorical reference is made regarding "the role of the TNI (armed forces) in creating stability and security in Southeast Asia in particular and the world in general". The resolution went on to assert that:

Indonesia as an Asian country will certainly play an important role in keeping the stability, security and peace in Asia in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. The TNI as one of the big military powers in Southeast Asia has the ability to contribute to the efforts to keep the stability and security in Southeast Asia. The TNI accepts the calling from history with full responsibility.

Sometime in the early 1970's, the New Order's Generals began to expati ate on what they regard as the aspect of "direction" or "orientation" in Wawasan Nusantara. As explained by Gen. Panggabean, "Wawasan Nusantara, as the geopolitics of Indonesia, is an outlook with two directions: inward and outward". A similar view is offered by naval chief Sudomo:

In terms of direction, Wawasan Nusantara strives to achieve two objectives: the first, which is inward looking, is the realization of integration in all aspects of national life; the second, which is outward looking, is the promotion of Indonesia's national interest in a constantly changing world."

To show how much this thesis has persevered, it is useful to include a more recent statement made by army chief Edy Sudrajat in 1988:

From the viewpoint of its outlook (wawasan), Wawasan Nusantara has two underlying concepts, namely: first, inward "wawasan", which is the attainment of integration in all aspects of national life, and second, to protect and promote Indonesia's national interest in a constantly changing and developing world."

One striking feature of the above remarks is that they do not exhibit much variety in terms of verbalization. They basically used, or rather "stuck" to, the same selection of words in expounding the matter at hand. This, coupled with
the fact that such explanations have endured to the present time, provides room to suggest that the "inward-outward" thesis is a pre-formulated component of the military's view on Wawasan Nusantara.

At any rate, the reference to the "outward direction" of Wawasan Nusantara provides a clue to the proposition that there is an emerging inter-connection between the Archipelago Doctrine and Jakarta's regional interests. A foreign-policy role, so it seems, has been attached to the Archipelago Doctrine. The control of the archipelagic waters is now seen as linked to the advancement of Indonesia's regional standing as well as its politico-strategic leverage in dealing with external powers. In order to appreciate this connection, it is useful to draw reference to two case studies: ZOPFAN and the Malacca straits. Our objective in the following sections is to establish the ways in which the Archipelago Doctrine correlates with these issues.

The Straits of Malacca

No case study is more apt to illustrate the maritime geopolitical interest of the New Order than its diplomacy over the Malacca Straits. To begin with, it was Indonesia's first, and successful, attempt at obtaining a bilateral agreement to delimit territorial waters since the enunciation of the Djuanda Declaration in 1957. Indonesian officials have interpreted their cooperation with Malaysia and Singapore in Malacca as a implicit gesture of regional approval of the Archipelago Doctrine. Moreover, on account
of its importance to international navigation, the Straits of Malacca are a high-stake area not just for the littoral states but also to extra-regional states which rely on passage through such waterway to uphold their strategic and/or economic well-being. This follows that whatever course of policy Jakarta sets forward on the narrows, it is certain to come into contact, and possibly clash, with the interest of the maritime states. Given the diplomatic risk at hand, the New Order’s resolute handling of the "Malacca diplomacy" may therefore be taken, first, as a measure of a much-heightened level of political will on the part of the New Order to preserve and promote its territorial boundaries at sea and, secondly, as an indication that an interplay exists between Jakarta’s politics of the maritime boundary on the one hand, and its perceptions of the major powers, on the other.

It is necessary to begin this discussion by inquiring into the basis of the Suharto government’s concern over the Malacca straits. A first-hand suggestion would be the fact that Malacca is seen as a major entrance to the Indonesian archipelago. This is certainly a notion which the military circles have long appreciated, as they have repeatedly seen the intrusion of foreign powers into Indonesian territory by way of that sealane. Malacca, therefore, has strategic importance as a frontline defence to deter a foreign aggressor from entering deep into Indonesian inland seas. For this reason, the regional military command in North Sumatra, Indonesia’s northernmost tip in the Malacca area, is said to be a very important prestige post among military officers.

An equally pertinent source of disquietude to the
Suharto administration is the fact that, since the late 1960's, the significance of Malacca to the superpowers was on a rapid rise. This began with the announcement made by President Nixon during his 1969 visit to Guam that the United States was planning to disengage its forces from mainland Asia and would, instead, adopt an "offshore strategy". Hence, the so-called Nixon doctrine or Guam Doctrine. At about the same time, the Soviet Union was rapidly developing its naval forces for blue-water operations, and was on the verge of becoming, if not already, a global maritime power. Its 1968 naval mission in the Indian ocean was regarded by some analysts as evidence to this point. Furthermore, the growing strategic presence of the superpowers in the Indian ocean also provided cause for alarm in Jakarta. This was signalled by the deployment of American naval forces on the Indian ocean during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, and the Soviet navy's acquisition of port facilities in India. It was also around this time that the US Senate approved a plan to build a US$ 20 million "communication centre" in Diego Garcia.

As Jakarta saw it, all this would only lead to the intensification of the superpowers' strategic rivalry on the waters of Southeast Asia and in the Indian ocean. And the waterways mostly likely to be used for inter-oceanic naval movements would be that of Malacca, being the shortest route from the Indian ocean. As G.G. Thomson pointed out:

An increase in Russian naval power in the Indian ocean pointing towards Southeast Asia, and the US naval presence in the Indian ocean during the conflict, broke the myth of the separability of the two oceans, linked their problems and escalated the importance of the straits as the most speedy route from one ocean to the other for the ships of war.

The rise in the strategic utility of Malacca was clearly
demonstrated to the policy-makers in Jakarta on several occasions: in December 1971, when, as a response to the Indo-Pakistani crisis, the US aircraft-carrier Enterprise and a squadron of the Soviet navy navigated to the Indian ocean by way of Malacca; in October 1973, during the Yom Kippur war, when the US deployed a carrier and several destroyers on the Indian ocean; in November 1974, when American warships headed for a naval exercise with CENTO powers in the Indian ocean; in July 1976, when a US carrier again sailed through Malacca heading toward waters near East Africa in response to the hostage crisis in Uganda. The Soviet Union in particular, also became increasingly reliant on the narrows to connect its ports in Vladivostok with those in the European theatre because the Bering strait is ice-bound for a good portion of the year. The Straits of Malacca, therefore, are seen as an essential part of the strategic events which were occurring around Indonesia. Malacca is certainly the first thing that comes to the mind of the policy-makers in Jakarta when the situation in the Indian ocean is raised, or when they ponder upon the growing activities of the US Seventh Fleet on the nearby waters.

Apart from the strategic aspects, there was a concern about the state of navigational congestion in the straits. Next to Dover, Malacca is the world’s second busiest strait. According to statistics, in the early 1970’s an average of 140 ships per day, or roughly 50,000 per year, go through Malacca. A considerable portion of the vessels consisted of oil-tankers, the estimate being that 40 tankers sailed through the straits per day. Japan alone was known to use Malacca as a tanker route 1,400 times in one year. Another source has it that there were over 35 Very Large
Crude Carriers (VLCC) over 200,000 dwt navigating through the straits some eight to nine times a year. Given the rapid development of trade in the Far East and Southeast Asia, these figures could only increase by the year.

Congestion posed a problem because of the potential for collision and, worse, pollution, particularly because some parts of the straits are known to be unfavourably shallow and narrow. Such fears were not without grounds: in 1974, 10 out of the world's 77 collisions took place in that area, while in the following year, the figure was 9 out of 51. A particular source of alarm however, was the prospect for a tanker collision which would result in a massive spillage of oil. The elites in Jakarta had on numerous occasions made a nervous reference to the Torrey Canyon accident, whereby some 30,000 tons of crude oil were released to the waters near England and France. As Jakarta points out, such an ecological nightmare could very well occur in Malacca, where the increased frequency of tanker-passage was nearing an alarming level.

With this background, in March, 1970 the Indonesian government invited Malaysian officials to meet in Jakarta to negotiate the settlement of boundary delimitation in the Malacca Strait. The meeting was deemed necessary in order to settle the overlapping claims in some of the narrower points in the strait, a problem which arose in 1969 when Kuala Lumpur announced the extension of its territorial waters to 12 miles. As it turned out, a common ground was easily reached by the two sides: in areas where the width of the strait is less than 24 miles, the boundaries of the two states would be fixed at a median line to be drawn precisely half-way between the outermost points on each side
of the islands, not the baselines. The agreement was signed by President Suharto in that same month during his visit to Kuala Lumpur, and went into effect on October 8, 1973.

The scheme however, was still void of Singapore’s participation, and both Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur were of the opinion that their Malacca policy would be best delivered if all of the littoral states in that area were behind it. This prompted the Indonesian government to woo Singaporean officials to participate in new rounds of tripartite consultations which took place in the months of October and November, 1971. The ensuing agreement, signed on November 16, 1971, produced stipulations on matters relating to navigational safety.63

Upon closer examination, the New Order’s policy towards the straits of Malacca entails two inter-connected issues: the territorial status of Malacca, and the regulation of navigational passage in the straits. In both cases, there is evidence to suggest that the elites’ regional perception and interests came to play.

As stated earlier, Indonesian officials have been adamant in pointing out that the Straits of Malacca did not fall under the category of "international straits", and that they were part of the territorial waters of the riparian states. This was a position which was identical with that of Malaysia. The signing of the 1970 delimitation treaty with Malaysia therefore, which effectively placed a jurisdictional gate over the narrower sector of Malacca, may be seen as an obvious attempt to drive this point home to the international community. Jakarta might have calculated that a joint-undertaking with Malaysia would augment the legal-political credence of such a policy in ways which
would not be delivered by a unilateral declaration.

It must be noted however, that Singapore apparently was in no hurry to endorse its neighbours' view. Its main concern was that such a move might bring implications which would not be in the best interest of a country whose economy is acutely dependent on international maritime shipping and trade. This is why the 1971 trinational negotiations, which brought Singapore to the negotiating table concerning Malacca, focussed more on the issue of navigational management in the straits, and it was agreed that this latter issue was to be discussed and dealt with independent of the legal status of Malacca. It is interesting to note that while Indonesia and Malaysia reiterated their earlier understanding in the 1971 agreement that the Straits of Malacca are not international straits, the Singaporean officials chose to refrain from supporting this assertion and decided only to "take note of the position of the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia on this point". The boundary delimitation treaty between Indonesia and Singapore was concluded in 1973; no settlement, however, was reached on the question of "international straits".

Malacca's legal-territorial status is of importance to Indonesia because it would have a direct consequence for the nature of its role and authority over the straits, especially when dealing with foreign navigation in that area. The Indonesian policy-makers had hoped that the designation of Malacca as Indonesian territorial waters would logically lead to the application of a regime which applies in other parts of Indonesian waters, namely that of innocent passage. Since under the latter passage is granted
as a "concession" (as opposed to being a "right" of the vessels) by the coastal state and since the terms of passage are closely knitted with considerations of the coastal state's security and sovereignty, Indonesia would certainly have the upper-hand in dealing with navigation in the straits. Conversely, if the Straits of Malacca were to be regarded as an "international strait", the regime of "free transit" would be in effect, which means that the littoral states would be jurisdictionally barred from exercising any course of action to diminish the "right" of international navigation. The implication of "free transit" to the riparian states is best illustrated by Gupta, Poulos and Bhatia:

This concept would apparently permit complete freedom of passage for warships and nuclear armed submarines, on the surface or submerged, without notification and irrespective of mission. It would also deprive the coastal states of the power to categorize certain passages, such as those of nuclear powered vessels and mammoth oil tankers, as non-innocent. It would be applied not only to the territorial sea lying beyond the old three-mile limit but to the whole of the strait.

This was certainly a notion which the elites in Jakarta opposed. To them, the difference between 'innocent passage' and 'free transit' is simply that of jurisdiction: the former enhances it, the latter denies it. Without jurisdiction, the legal basis upon which Indonesia could regulate and manipulate navigational activities in Malacca in ways conformable to its national interests would be severely curtailed. On this account, the Indonesian delegate to the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee stated in 1971:

Indonesia is not a party to the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958. Nevertheless, the Indonesian Law no. 4 1960 recognizes the principle of innocent passage for foreign ships through our waters. I must stress here, the words
"innocent passage" and not the words "free transit" as seem to have been used by some delegates.65

In line with such a position, a major part of Indonesia’s Malacca diplomacy has been to deflect any attempt to "internationalize" the straits. "Internationalization", it is worthy of note, can be an ambiguous term, since it may imply a supervisory role by an international body or it may take the form of complete control of the straits by a transnational authority. Neither of them was favourable to Jakarta. This was exemplified by its nervous reaction when it received news that Japan was proposing to an IMCO meeting in 1971 that the Malacca straits be "internationalized". This, according to several analysts, was in fact an event which helped accelerate the decision to produce the tripartite agreement of "Safety of Navigation" mentioned earlier. Indonesia, along with the agreement’s co-signators, simply viewed "internationalization", even at the level of straits management and supervision, as a contravention of its territorial sovereignty in Malacca.

Significantly, the rejection of Malacca’s internationalization was also linked to the view that foreign interference in the region, especially in an area of vital significance such as Malacca, should be kept to a minimum. The 1971 agreement should also be seen in this context. By asserting that "the safety of navigation in the straits of Malacca and Singapore is the responsibility of the coastal states", Indonesia - along with neighbouring states - was essentially closing the door on one of the key areas in straits control on which foreign powers were eyeing to set foot. On this matter, Das and Pradhan suggest the following comment:

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This provision (of Navigational Safety) is obviously intended to preclude foreign interference in the affairs of the straits under the guise of ensuring safety of navigation there.

There was also the view that by controlling Malacca Indonesia would, somehow, be able to affect the course of events taking place in other parts of the region, particularly where big-powers rivalry is at stake. The clearest statement on this line of thought was provided by Rear Admiral Soewarso in a paper which he presented to the Seventh International Seapower Symposium at National Defence University (Washington, D.C.) in 1983. Since he was speaking in his capacity as a representative of the Indonesian armed forces, his views could be regarded as identical to that of the Indonesian military. Writing of "Security Problems and Strategic Considerations of the Malacca Strait", he began his presentation by portraying what he believed to be an increasingly tense and conflict-prone regional atmosphere, citing such cases as the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea, the formation of ANZUS, communist insurgencies of Indonesia and Malaysia, and the conflicts in the Indian sub-continent. He then asserted that:

...the coastal nations realize that in the case of a confrontation in Southeast Asia whereas several countries shall be involved, then the Strait of Malacca may turn into a theatre of war and several littoral states shall be dragged into it. Indonesia realizes that the Indian Ocean littoral states due to their weaknesses may not be able to force their view upon the superpowers so that the most suitable alternative is to create such a situation where the strength of the navies of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean must be kept as small as possible. And this may be done partly by way of limiting the passage of foreign warships through the strait of Malacca.

Soewarso was explicit in claiming that his government's need to control Malacca was a function of its concern over the strategic developments in the Indian Ocean. The question of
how he was going to "limit" naval passages was not difficult to answer, for it was clear that something could be done under the couch of "innocent passage", which allows the government to close the seaways in times of national emergency. In 1971 however, President Suharto issued yet another decree pertaining to foreign navigations in Indonesian waters. The decree obliged foreign warships intending on traversing through the Indonesian waters to obtain a special "sailing permit" from the Minister of Defence and Security. The decree did not make specific reference to the Straits of Malacca, but given the saturation of the Straits by naval shipping, there was little doubt that it was in this area that the enforcement of the regulation was to be particularly implemented. That the decree was enunciated in the same year of the "navigational safety" agreement and just shortly after the delimitation treaty with Malaysia did not seem to be a coincidence in timing.

In this, the Indonesian authority had intentionally expressed verbal threats so as to buttress its policy. In 1972 for example, naval chief-of-staff Admiral Soedomo stated that:

Our armed forces will attack any foreign submarine entering territorial waters without permit, because it meant a violation of Indonesia's sovereignty.

Whether or not this was a threat that the Indonesian military forces can live up to was open to debate, but it was useful to note that the New Order's officers were fairly confident that they have the means to do so. On this point, it might suffice to refer once more to Soewarso's 1983 presentation:

(A) favourable factor for the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca is the fact that the strait may be
covered by land-based artillery or other weapon systems. Also, the narrow sealane may easily be sown with mines or blocked by shipwrecks which Egypt had done in the Suez canal in 1956. If the coastal nations has sown the strait of Malacca with mines then their air cover and their artillery from the coasts are sufficiently capable to prevent the other side from mines sweeping operations.

Despite the 1971 Decree, the verbal threats and the confidence of the military, the Indonesian government has not yet attempted to use its force to interfere with international navigation in Malacca. The 1971 passage of the US aircraft-carrier Enterprise for example, received no strategic reaction from the Indonesian armed forces. The explanation to this was not hard to find: it would be absurd for Indonesia to risk war for a cause (the Indo-Pakistani war) which did not pose a direct impact on its national security. After all, Indonesia was not engaged in confrontation with the US. Here, there was room to believe that Admiral Soedomo's threat appears to be a response to a rumour which was widely-spread at that time regarding the sighting of Soviet submarines near the country's shores, allegedly to help political prisoners escape.69

Evidently, the Indonesian government has been more willing to accept the other alternative to the requirement of "sailing permits": prior notification. Whereas the maritime powers reject the idea of requesting "sailing permits" from Jakarta, they have been more willing to give notification to the Indonesian authority on naval passages through the archipelago. This is what Washington did when the Enterprise passed through Malacca, and foreign minister Adam Malik, which made public this issuance of prior notification (possibly as a measure to save face), seemed to have regarded this as sufficient.70 Malik had also stated that he had obtained Moscow's promise that its naval units
would give prior notification before entering Indonesian waters. According to Yaacov Vertberger, since the mid-1970's this has become a routine procedure to both American and Soviet naval forces in dealing with Jakarta, and although he notes that "the coastal countries would have liked to have the power to regulate such passage on the basis of a legally binding agreement."  

Finally, mention must be made about the question of "regional role". To begin with, Suharto's Malacca diplomacy was pursued in the midst of its laborious attempt to rearrange its relations with other governments in the region. It had just recently abandoned the policy of confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore, and in the following years it spent a great deal of efforts searching for a political format to guide its relations with these countries, an objective which found some expression in the formation of ASEAN in 1967. Jakarta's regional assertiveness was also fueled by a sense of "opportunity" as they learned that a reduced major powers' activities in Southeast Asia were in the making: the British government, in 1969, announced its decision to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia, while the US was planning for strategic disengagement from continental Asia. Hence, the series of diplomatic moves which Jakarta launched on the issue of the Malacca Straits were well within the context of Suharto's fresh brand of regional approach and newfound goodneighbour policy.

In this scheme, the issue of "Malacca" emerged as an attractive rallying point to display regional cooperation and solidarity, especially among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The issue also posited symbolic value because,
as Jakarta well realized, it would put the regional littoral states on the other side of the fence from the major powers. The attempt to control the straits therefore, was a signal loud and clear that Indonesia and the littoral states were developing a kind of regionalism which was assertive and, more importantly, not reluctant to challenge the interest of the major powers to protect their interest.

Thus, to the New Order government, "Malacca" was in fact a "regional issue", and its progression should be in a way which would only strengthen the regional ties among the ASEAN littoral states. This point is confirmed by Hasjim Djalal, a senior foreign ministry diplomat who, owing to his expertise on the law of the sea and his posting to Singapore as chief of the political section, was one of the key players in the diplomacy over Malacca. In his book on "Indonesia and the Law of the Sea", Djalal explained that:

The problem of the Straits of Malacca-Singapore also entails political aspects. The more important political aspects involve the unification of the views of the three coastal states in dealing with the outside world, especially in dealing with Japan... and major powers, especially with the US and the Soviet Union which also had major interests in the passage of their military vessels.

In Djalal's view, such regional cooperation was clearly demonstrated with the signing of the 1971 "Safety Navigation" agreement, where inter alia it was agreed that from then on the straits of Malacca and Singapore were no longer to be regarded as separate entities, but as a single strait. This had a direct consequence for the way Malacca was to be handled by the states: the bilateral channel was shelved in favour of a trilateral approach. As he corroborated:

This is a very important event because the problem from then on was no longer a bilateral matter between Indonesia and Malaysia as regards the Malacca strait or
a bilateral issue between Indonesia and Singapore as regards the Singapore strait, but that it had become a three-way matter (tripartite) between the three coastal states (Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore) as regards the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

To sum up, Indonesia’s Malacca policy reveals much about the wider strategic perceptions of the policy-makers in Jakarta. Control of the straits is seen not only as a rudiment of national security, but as well as a means to affect strategic developments in the surrounding regions, project Indonesia’s prestige and foster political solidarity with the neighbouring states.

Policy towards the "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality"

The New order elites have also made claims to the effect that the Archipelago Doctrine is essential to ASEAN’s objective of establishing ZOPFAN. By and large, their views on this have been focussed on the issue of naval passages. One of the earliest statements on this matter is found in 1974, when Minister Kusumaatmadja, who headed the Indonesian delegation to Caracas-held UNCLOS III, remarked:

The problem of passage in the interest of the international community should not, however, be confused with the problem of passage for the particular interest of a few specific countries, especially the passage of warships and submarines for military purposes based upon considerations of their respective global strategies. Although the free and unhampered passage of such vessels in one view is essential for the maintenance of global peace and security, I submit that there is another equally valid view which sees it as running counter to the best interest of the international community especially when considered within the context of the arms race which will only heighten world tensions. According to the latter view, the unrestricted, free passage of warships is against the aspirations of peace-loving nations which would like to see the use of the seas for the cultivation of closer, fraternal relations among nations. Consider,
for example, the case of free and unhampered passage of warships through the Indonesian waters. If warships and submarines of foreign contending powers have the fullest freedom in navigating through our waters, what would happen not only to our national security but also to the aspirations of the Southeast Asian nations to establish a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in their area, an aspiration which has been welcomed by the Non-aligned Chief of States? Kusumaatmadja was pointing out that the passage of warships in the archipelagic waters would be antithetical to the cause of ZOPFAN. The question of the day however, is whether or not he was alluding to the possibility that Indonesia would interfere with foreign naval passage in its waters in the event that such passage was deemed as inimical to its regional interest. In other words, would the New Order restrict foreign warships access to its waters in order to uphold a regional design, even if its national security was not directly or immediately threatened?

This is a question to which Indonesia has not provided a clear-cut answer. In 1979 for example, Indonesia's number one military man, armed forces commander Maraden Panggabean, still presented the matter as a question mark. Speaking before the Coordinating Committee for National Territory (PANKORWILNAS), he drew special attention to a certain clause in the ICNT which stipulated that "all ships and aircrafts enjoy the right of archipelagic sealanes passage in such sealanes and air routes." According to Panggabean, this definition should be treated with caution since it made no distinction between civilian and military vessels. This, in effect, would provide hindrance to the objective of ZOPFAN. He then posed a question to his audience, one which he failed to answer, which was echoed by Kusumaatmadja six years earlier:

ASEAN is currently striving to establish the ASEAN area as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality. In times
of war, if Indonesia allows military vessels of a warring country to pass through the archipelagic sealanes would it not render defunct the doctrine of ZOPFAN?

Panggabean went on to assert that "ZOPFAN is compatible with Wawasan Nusantara", and on this premise, he urged the members of PANKORWILNAS to ponder on the question of "the extent to which foreign military bases in Indonesia's sector poses a challenge to the concept of Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, and on this basis, to try to come up with national security policies which would be consistent with Indonesia's Wawasan Nusantara". To date, no policies on this matter have been formulated.

In an interview with this author, current Foreign Minister Ali Alatas pointed out that although the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone has not been established, "it remains a wish, it remains a political desire" to his government. He proposed two reasons why Jakarta opposes the passage of nuclear ships on Indonesian waters: first, is the fear of a disastrous nuclear contamination should an accident occur, and second, is the concern that the superpowers' strategic rivalry will be brought to its waters, which means that the country "will be drawn to the conflict of the nuclear powers." But Alatas admitted that at the present time his government may not be able to do much about the matter. In his view, in order to actualize the concept of NWFZ:

you need a guarantee or allegiance of other countries also. Not only our country need to stick to those rules, but these rules must be respected by outside powers, namely the US, the Soviet Union and everybody else which uses our waters. And because we have not achieved it yet, it remains a wish... but that is our concept. We want that concept one day to be materialized, but it has not materialized.

Alatas himself was careful not to raise too much expectation on his government's ability to deliver results. He pointed
out that the maritime states have not been willing to reveal whether or not their ships carry nuclear-arms. As a consequence to this, Jakarta has been unable to deal effectively with them:

So these ships pass through our archipelagic waters and we can do nothing because we don’t even know if they have nuclear arms, they won’t announce it, and we can not stop them because we have to let them pass - there is the archipelagic passage principle.

Thus, although Alatas shared the views of his predecessor and Panggabean that the passage of nuclear ships is not in Indonesia’s long-term interest, he was very cautious about the prospect that such passage may one day be prohibited on archipelagic waters. Implicit in his statement is that his government would not resort to unilateral action to close its waters to nuclear ships. Furthermore, by placing emphasis on the consent of the nuclear powers as the key factor, he was insinuating that a nuclear-free Indonesian waters would come by way of a political agreement involving Indonesia and the flag-states, instead of a self-made legal fix which it did in 1957 (the Djuanda declaration) or in 1969 (the continental shelf declaration). The tone of Alatas’ statement suggests that it is unlikely that his government would resort to "drastic" or "radical" measures to forbid the passage of nuclear ships. For the time being, Alatas feels that the issue is not one of urgency to Jakarta - at least, not yet - and he submits that "it would be very difficult to obtain it realistically."\(^{82}\)

It seems that there is a difference in "style" in the way the military circles and the diplomats view the issue of foreign navigation on Indonesian waters. With regard to the options of what to do with warring foreign warships traversing through the archipelago for example, the
diplomats tend to be more "cautious" in their answer. During an interview with one senior Foreign Ministry diplomat, this author asked what Indonesia would do if a situation were to arise whereby foreign naval forces required passage through Indonesian waters in order to launch an attack against a friendly neighbouring state. His answer was that if Indonesia does decide to interfere, it would be solely a political decision, and not a legal one. In essence, he was proposing that Konsep Nusantara does not endow Indonesia with any rights to intervene with any foreign passages unless its own security was clearly at stake. In other words, Indonesia is certainly in no position to disrupt passage in the name of "regional security", although granted it might have something to do with Indonesia's security interest. Thus, whether or not Indonesia would intercept or restrict naval movements is basically an issue of whether or not it has the "political will" to do so, and not whether or not it has the "legal power" to do so, for it is clear that Indonesia does not have that authority. This author then asked if he could imagine any circumstances other than a physical attack against Indonesia where the government would, either through a political or legal decision or both, intervene with passages of foreign warships in Indonesian waters. His answer was that he could not.

On the other hand, the military circles seem to be more, for want of a better description, "assertive". In the previous section on Malacca, we have already noted how naval chief-of-staff Admiral Soedomo claimed in an unreserved tone that he would attack any foreign warships that did not possess "sailing permits" from the Ministry of Defense.
Interestingly enough, he did not bother to qualify if he would distinguish between those warships which posed a direct threat to Indonesia and those which did not. The effect of his statement was that not having a permit alone was enough reason for the Indonesian navy to act against it, and that, although he did not state this in an outright manner, the intention of that warship would be of lesser importance.

Sudomo's statement, of course, never led to practical action, and if anything it appeared to be a case of an overexcited statement. Nonetheless, by not underscoring the criteria of "intention", Soedomo was conveying a viewpoint which was not consistent with the earlier statement by the foreign ministry official. To provide a further illustration, we may also recall the comment made by Rear Admiral Soewarso that Indonesia intended to "restrict" the passage of foreign warships in Malacca in order to influence strategic events in the Indian ocean; he even expressed confidence that his armed forces were well within means to do the job.84 One may like to compare these statements with an answer contemplated by Kusumaatmadja, who, in the same year of Sudomo's statement, suggested in a tone which was propitiating to his audience that his government did not have the intention nor, in contrast with Soewarso's opinion, the capability to disrupt foreign passages:

"..we can prove that we never interfered with navigation. Even if we wanted to, physically we can not; and it is with great comfort that I see in the Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones that as far as warships are concerned, all a coastal state is required to do is ask for the warship to leave its waters. It does not say you have to enforce and shoot at it. This is all we do. In fact, all we ask for is notification, so if they are nice enough to say "..we are going to pass" then warships can pass.85"

The difference in the "strength" of their tone may
perhaps be explained by the supposition that the foreign ministry and its diplomats are much more cognizant of the legal and political complexity which surrounds the issue of navigational passages in archipelagic waters. The diplomats were the ones who played the card in multilateral forums, especially in UNCLOS, and that the long-time exposure to the tenuous debate in the law of the sea would be enough to sensitize them to the rules of the game. It is not beyond reason to assume that the diplomats have a greater sense of awareness that the issue of "passage" is amongst the most important factor shaping the credibility of Indonesia's archipelagic claims, and that it is only by clever - if not compromising - engineering of this issue that the Archipelago Doctrine could find a more prospective political and legal marketing. The diplomats thus tend to be extremely careful with their choice of words, and are more eager to avoid the appearance of being "hawkish". They usually stick to the line that the country would only interfere with navigation in the event of a direct threat to national security, and nothing else beyond that. This, in essence, is the view which is consistent with the Djuanda Declaration and the 1960 Act.

The military leaders, on the other hand, do not participate directly in the multilateral forums. They remained mostly in Jakarta, where they read the reports made by the diplomats. But receiving a summarized account on the progress of the law of the sea debate is certainly not the same as being there, having to master all the details and formulations, and doing the actual bargaining. The military elites are more interested in the bottom line, and in the big picture. Given this, there are times that the officers
issue a statement on the Archipelago Doctrine which not only tend to be simplistic, but may also on occasion have some degree of dissonance in tone with that of the foreign ministry.

This author has brought this variance in the views of the military and the diplomats to the attention of Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, and the latter’s response seems to confirm the point stated above. Alatas pointed out that, with regard to the straits of Malacca for instance, "Deplu (the Foreign Ministry) has always been saying 'watch out'!", referring to the occasional statements made by officials in Jakarta which were not compatible with the regime of navigation which applies on that waterways. As he elaborated:

The strait of Malacca is an international strait, and as long as it is classified as an international strait, the regime of international straits applies. That is why we have to be careful with our statements, otherwise we will invite retaliation or reaction from the maritime nations because they consider it (to be) international straits.

In this, it is of interest to take note of a related event which occurred just recently: the closure of Sunda and Lombok straits by the Indonesian government. In late September 1989, the government suspended navigational activities in two of its southern straits, Sunda and Lombok, in order to hold a naval exercise in those areas. The event lasted only for a short while, and before long, the two straits were reopened for commercial and military traffic. But the action itself stirred some commotion in the outside world and in the media: the US, Australia, and West Germany sent a diplomatic note to protest - the Indonesian officials used the term "inquire" - about the event, obviously concern that, unheeded, it may serve as a precedent for future
There was a considerable amount of legal haggling over the matter. Ali Alatas, who had just replaced Kusumaatmadja as foreign minister, came to the defense of Gen. Benny Murdani, who set the government's line on this issue by stating earlier that the two straits were "part of Indonesian territorial waters", and that as a consequence to this, the closure of the straits was perfectly within the country's jurisdiction. The maritime states, on the other hand, challenged this on the premise that the two straits are waterways normally used for international navigation and that Indonesia does not have the right to suspend "continuous, expeditious and unobstructed" passage through the archipelagic sealanes in Sunda and Lombok.

What is of interest to us is that the closure of the straits appears to be a decision made by the military circles. It is not very difficult to make this inference given the nature of activities (naval firing) which formed the basis for such a move. One could also point out that it was Gen. Benny Murdani, the Minister of Defense and Security, who first made a public explanation of the event, and when his version proved to raise more eyebrows, it was foreign minister Ali Alatas who came forward in an attempt to defend and clarify Murdani's statement by "inferring" what the latter "probably" meant to say. At least one source stated that the event might have been coloured by the complicity of, or coordination with, the Navy and the Foreign Ministry.

Furthermore, the closure itself was particularly significant because the straits were not without strategic value. The strait of Sunda connects the US bases in the
Phillipines with facilities in Diego Garcia, while that of Lombok is known to be an area of interest to Washington's nuclear deterrent strategy as its suitable depth provides an ideal passageway to American nuclear submarines traversing between the Pacific and Indian oceans. Thus, by closing the straits, two messages, either by design or by accident, were signalled from Jakarta. The first is that the Indonesian authority, in particular the military, believes that it could, in the legal understanding of the Archipelago Doctrine, close the straits, even just for a temporary period. The second and more important point, is that it has no reservation in doing so even if it would be at the expense of foreign/major powers' interest. Whether or not this is the hidden intention of Jakarta is open for debate; some may argue that the fact that the military chose, of all places, Lombok and Sunda as sites of naval firing is sufficient to assert that it had a point to make toward the foreign users of the straits. But the fact remains that the 1958 straits closure was the first time the New Order actually restricted passage on its sealanes and that it did so in areas of clear strategic interest to the major powers. This is an important point because it relates to an earlier question put forward by Kusumaatmadja and Panggabean about the passage of foreign warships which may not be compatible with the objective of ZOPFAN. Although mention of ZOPFAN was not made by Jakarta, the straits closure was an undertaking which doubtlessly bore impact on the movement from and to the American military bases in the Phillipines.
CONCLUSION

Since the New Order era, the Archipelago Doctrine has become affiliated with certain traditional themes in Indonesian "geopolitics". Symptoms of this linkage can be found at the level of terminology, where reference to "geopolitics", "cross-road location", "nusantara", "outward direction" has been extensively found in recent official corroboration of the doctrine. These terms signal that the contextual significance of the Archipelago Doctrine has been amplified. Its relevance is no longer confined to the themes of "unity", "development", and "national security"; locational concern and regional concerns and aspirations have now come to matter.

The linkage between the Archipelago Doctrine and the elite’s geopolitical thinking means that the issues which relate to the government’s maritime territorial policy have also broadened. It has been examined, for example, that Jakarta’s line of the Straits of Malacca was animated, among other things, by its concern over strategic build-up in the Indian Ocean, the increased American and Soviet naval activities in Southeast Asia and its desire to enhance Indonesia’s gate-keeping role while at the same time bolstering regional solidarity with the littoral states. Similarly, government officials have expressed anxiety over the passage of nuclear vessels on Indonesian waters. By putting the issue in the context of ZOPFAN, the government in effect is asserting that its maritime territorial policy is not removed from its regional interests and objectives.
Notes - Chapter VI


4. Interview with author, October 1990, in Vancouver.

5. These terms were uttered by some members of the Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia (PPKI). Some of these speeches may be obtained in the anthology on Indonesian Political Thinking, edited by Feith and Castle (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1970).

6. The man in question was T.B. Simatupang, Indonesia's first chief of the armed forces in the post-independence era. He was known to be one of the intellectuals of the military circles and was believed to have played a considerable role in restructuring the organization of the armed forces. See "Wafatnya Jenderal Dunia Akhirat", Tempo, January 13, 1990, p. 26.


8. These charges were levelled by Mohammad Hatta when he responded to Yamin's speech. See Mohammad Hatta, "Let Us Not Encourage the Spirit of Expansionism", Indonesian Political, ibid.


13. By "extra-regional" powers we mean those states which are not situated in Southeast Asia.


17. Army chief-of-staff Ahmad Yani for example, stated that: "The presence of foreign bases with their striking forces around us we consider to be this very threat, as we have experienced several years ago." President Soekarno delivered an identical view: "All the foreign bases in Indonesia were used as bases of subversion against Indonesia. Bearing in mind those facts, are there not grounds for us to be on our guard about amalgamations of a number of countries surrounding us, especially if we know that these amalgamations are a foreign project?" See Soekarno's Independence Speech titled, "The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution", in Indonesia 1963, ibid, p. 40.


24. Decree, p. 73.


26. The term Maphilindo is a contraction for "Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia".
27. From a speech titled "The Resounding Voice of the Indonesian Revolution" by President Soekarno on August 17, 1963. A full-length record on this speech is found in an yearbook published by the Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia : 1963, p. 41.


29. Adam Malik made this assertion during a speech titled "Peace - A Prerequisite for Development", the complete citation of which may be found in Boni Ray Siagian (ed), Eight Year Cycle of ASEAN, edited by Boni Ray Siagian, (Jakarta : ASEAN National Secretariat, 1976), pp. 149-155. The above quotation is on p. 153.


33. See Estrella Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN, (Manila : Foreign Service Institute, 1983).

34. See, among others, Munadjat Danusaputro, "Wawasan Nusantara and the International Sea System", National Resilience, II, no. 2 (September 1982), pp. 4-27.

35. Prior to this, there were two terms which described Indonesia's maritime territorial concept : Deklarasi Djuanda (The Djuanda Declaration), and Konsepsi Negara Kepulauan (Archipelago Doctrine or Archipelago State Principle). Although externally the New Order kept the term "Archipelago State Principle", at home the term 'Konsep Nusantara' has been preferred more so than the other two.


40. Stamboel, Wawasan, ibid.

41. Ibid.

42. Dwipayana, Suharto, p. 319.
43. Simatupang, *Pelopor*, p. 221.

44. Sayidiman, *ibid*.

45. *Ibid*.

46. This is the analogy that was drawn by General Edy Sudrajat, army chief-of-staff, during his lectures on "Wawasan Nusantara", *Angkatan Bersenjata*, (July 5, 1989).


51. For a complete account of this speech, see Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, "Wawasan Nusantara dari segi geopolitik dan geostategis", *Jurnal Luar Negeri*, vol. V, (November 1986).


56. Sudrajat, *ibid*.

57. In this regard, Lee Yong Leng has written that with regard to Malacca, "one of the main issues for the Indonesians is that of security. They are fearful that if they do not take the necessary steps to insulate themselves from the wider stretches of the sea, their inner line of defence will be easily penetrated by the fleets of superpowers... The Indonesians see the Malacca strait in the context of their "Archipelago principle" because it provides a routeway into the "internal waters" of their archipelago." See Lee Yong Leng, "Malacca Strait, Kra Canal, and International Navigation", in *Pacific Viewpoint*, vol. XIX, no.1, (1978), pp. 65-74.

Similarly, Michael Leifer writes that the Malacca straits "are certainly contemplated in Indonesian military circles as coming within its strategic ambit because they provide a direct channel into and through the maritime approaches and interstices of the Indonesian state." For more, see his book on *International Straits of The World : Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia*, (The Netherlands


60. All this data are complied from Michael Leifer, Malacca, Singapore and Indonesia, ibid, p. 122-3.


63. See, among others, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Munadjat Danusaputro, "Elements of an Environmental Policy and Navigational Scheme for Southeast Asia; with special reference to the Straits of Malacca", in Bunga Rampai, ibid, pp. 227-274; and chapter four of Hasjim Djalal's Perjuangan, ibid.


65. Ibid, p. 35.


68. Quoted from Oliver, p. 29.

69. Yaacov Verzberger in this regard has written that: In April 1972, hysterical rumours spread in Indonesia that Soviet submarines had been sighted near the Indonesian coasts and that their mission was to help political prisoners escape. See his work titled Coastal States, Regional Powers, Superpowers and the Malacca-Singapore Straits, (Berkeley: Institute of Southeast Asian Affairs, 1984), p. 27.


71. Verzberger, ibid, p. 29.

73. Ibid.

74. This was part of a speech which Kusumaatmadja made in Caracas, on July 15, 1974, titled "Statement Made by H.E. Prof. Dr. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Justice and Leader of the Indonesian Delegation to the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea". See pages 91 to 102 in his Bunga Rampai for complete citation of the speech.

75. Panggabean, ibid, p. 366.

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. The interview with foreign minister Alatas was conducted in October 1990, in Vancouver, B.C. The session was recorded on tape.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Confidential interview material, 1990.

84. In this, we refer once more to Rear Admiral Soewarso, who confidently stated:
Indonesia has already possessed modern submarine torpedoes. The sea denial capability of coastal nations of the Malacca strait is really impressive so that in the near future control of the sea by unfriendly countries may always be prevented or abolished.
See, Security Problems, ibid, p. 9.

85. Kusumaatmadja, "The Legal Regime", p. 89.

86. Granted, few colonels, usually from the navy, were included in Indonesia's UNCLOS delegation, but more often than not they are shy observers and were not known to hold - or proceeded to hold - leadership positions in the military. Besides, military participation was often a matter of personnel rotation, and unlike the foreign ministry's diplomats, the same figures do not stay as members of the delegation for a long period of time. No military figures are known to play a major role in the multilateral diplomacy of the Archipelago Doctrine. Their presence in the delegation, in sum, appears to be in the token capacity of "observers".

87. Interview material, ibid.

Conclusion

Indonesia’s Maritime Territorial Behaviour in Retrospect

By now, it should be evident that the Indonesian elite has registered clear geopolitical interest in the waters of the Indonesian archipelago. The evidence for such interest is the attempts to assert territorial control over these waters, to organize and regulate activities which occur there, and to create some kind of national political-psychological identification with them. In policy-terms, the origin of this geopolitical interest was in 1957, when the Djuanda cabinet extended Indonesia’s territorial sovereignty over the seas within the archipelago. President Soekarno, paid some interest in the Doctrine, but, for a variety of reasons, became lethargic in its implementation. It was under the Suharto government, that the geopolitical interest in the maritime territory reached its apex, which is indicated by its vigorous effort to internalize and externalize the Archipelago Doctrine. In all this, three factors have determined the interest of various governments in the maritime environment: the need to symbolise national unity, the desire to control the maritime and naval movements, and the quest for natural resources.

The element of territorial symbolism first came to the fore during the December 1957 cabinet session, when participants of that meeting decided that the "point to point" territorial model was more apt to project the integrative feature of the Indonesian state at a time when the country was plagued by regional uprisings in the outer islands. A contiguous territory, they reasoned, symbolised
unity. But this sort of rationalization did not seem to be passed on to the Soekarno administration. For a number of reasons discussed in chapter four, Soekarno opted for self-made integrative themes which were geared upon political as opposed to territorial doctrines, and the other power-centres in Indonesian societies—the military and the Communist Party—tagged along.

The issue of territorial symbolism strongly revived under the Suharto government. The new elite was looking for new symbols to strengthen the new political establishment and, again, it was lured by the integrative feature of the maritime territory. Chapter four demonstrates how the Archipelago Doctrine provided content to the doctrines of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari (1966) and Wawasan Nusantara (1973). These doctrines, in effect, reflect how the Indonesian political elite conceptualized "national identity" in territorial terms. The much touted linkage between the Archipelago Doctrine and the country's sacred symbols (Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution) as well as the equally glorified romanticization of the Indonesian seas as the "integrative link" of the country, are indicative of the degree of emotional attachment which the elite accords to the maritime territory. Clearly, the symbolic significance of the Archipelago Doctrine has been fully institutionalized in both domestic politics and foreign policy.

Natural resources, contrary to the line offered by Jakarta, played only a minor role in the initial consideration to establish the new maritime boundaries in 1957, and until the end of Soekarno's rule there was little to indicate that this had changed. The Indonesian government had no knowledge of the presence of oil in these
waters, while fisheries, which were mainly confined to small-scale traditional fishermen, were no factor of consequence in the country's GNP. It was only since the second half of the 1960's, under the New Order government, that tangible economic activities were extended to the waters of the archipelago, mainly in the form of oil exploration and exploitation. Chapter five demonstrated how the maritime territory has been extensively sub-divided into "petroleum blocks", and how huge sums of money were allocated to offshore petroleum activities. More importantly, it noted how offshore petroleum production has risen substantially in value and become an important source of national revenues. The government's resource interest in the Timor Gap and relations with this major issue were also outlined in detail.

The need to control maritime movements has its origin in the West Irian conflict, when the elite in Jakarta was becoming increasingly restless about the passage of the Dutch navy within the Indonesian archipelago. This was the reason why Mochtar Kusumaatmadja was instructed to sketch the new territorial model in the first place. As shown in chapter III, the same concern over the Dutch naval movement prevailed in the December 1957 cabinet meeting (which produced the Djuanda Declaration), in the 1960 Act (which codified the new territorial configuration), and in the 1962 Act on Innocent Passage. It appears that by instituting the new territorial structure along with its restrictive criteria for navigation, the government was aiming to establish a jurisdictional mechanism to curtail or challenge Dutch naval operations on the waters of the archipelago. It is not a coincidence that the Act on Innocent Passage was
produced at the time when 'gunboat diplomacy' had begun to play a role the West Irian conflict and at a time when naval confrontation between Indonesia and Holland had come to a boiling point. Thus, between 1957 and 1962, the "movement" factor seemed to be the most instrumental in shaping the government's formulation of maritime territorial policy.

When the Suharto administration came to power in the second half of the 1960's, the need to control maritime movement—in contrast to its predecessor—assumed a much less urgent tone. At this time, the symbolic and resource factors took precedence. But in the early 1970's, the maritime movement issue returned to the agenda. This was evident in the government's policies toward the Straits of Malacca, as manifested in the remarks made by some high-ranking military officials; the 1971 Presidential Decree requiring naval warships to obtain sailing permits from the Indonesian authority; the plan to establish archipelagic sealanes; and the concern of the government over the issue of the nuclear warships' passage on Indonesian waters. Such policy statements indicate the desire to control and regulate movements within Indonesian waters. It is true that the regimes on Innocent Passage and Archipelagic Sealanes for example, both of which are reinforced by the current government, do not allow the Indonesian government the right to disrupt international maritime passages. But the point is that these two regimes have narrowed the criteria of permissible navigation in Indonesian waters (in the case of Innocent Passage) while restricting the movement of foreign vessels only to certain designated areas (in the case of the Archipelagic Sealanes).

The fluctuations in the governments' maritime
territorial interest can be explained by how these three factors combined at different points in time. Both symbolic and strategic concerns predominated in the decision of the Djuanda cabinet to territorialize the Indonesian seas in 1957, and until 1962, the strategic consideration - more than the symbolic - continued to shape the government's stake in the Archipelago Doctrine. But between 1962 and 1966, the years the Archipelago Doctrine plunged into abeyance, the strategic, symbolic and resource factors had little impact on policy-makers. In the period since 1966 however, the symbolic, resource and (and eventually) strategic interests in the Indonesian waters has rapidly grown. As already noted, by the 1970's Indonesia's maritime territorial orientation had reached maturity.

One important point in the development of the Archipelago Doctrine pertains to the role of the military. We have found that the military officers have been involved in the many stages of the Archipelago Doctrine. During the Soekarno era, military officers chaired the Inter-Departmental Committee and the Maritime Council, pushed for the codification of the Djuanda Declaration in 1960. Some military officers even became members of the Indonesian delegation to UNCLOS I and II.

During the Suharto era, as the most powerful political force, the involvement of the military in maritime territorial policy became more systematic and coordinated. It was during a military seminar that the doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara Bahari was produced. The initiative to revise its conceptual substance for broader national exposure - which resulted in Wawasan Nusantara - also came from the armed forces. Finally, it was the military who set
the priorities of economic development and the reform of the national symbolic doctrinal systems, both of which proved to be conducive to the promotion of the Archipelago Doctrine.

The military is also responsible for the broadening of the contextual significance of the Archipelago Doctrine. Chapter VI has shown how territorial control over the waters of the Archipelago Doctrine has become associated with traditional geopolitical themes in Indonesia. The concern over cross-road location, the distrust toward major powers' involvement in the region, and the aspiration for regional activism are themes with long-standing significance for the Indonesian polity, but it is not until the advent of the Suharto government that Indonesia’s maritime territory was seen to possess relevance for these themes. Much of this linkage has revolved around the question of strategic "movement". The concern over cross-road location, for example, pertains to the feeling of vulnerability but also the opportunity derived from Indonesia’s location at the busy intersection of two oceans. Similarly, the policy towards the straits of Malacca as well as the concern over the future of ZOPFAN also relate primarily to concern about the maritime civilian and naval movements. In both cases, the government sees a chance to bolster its regional activism while signifying its resolve to minimize foreign powers' involvement in the region.

In the future, it is not difficult to conjecture that the maritime territory will continue to be a top national priority to the present establishment. The Indonesian government will continue to organize, regulate, exploit the Indonesian waters. These waters have consumed such political emotions from the New Order government that it is
hard to imagine otherwise. Furthermore, the economic dividends of these waters are yet to be fully explored. Given the growing demands of development, increased economic activity on these waters seem more likely. A considerable portion of the seas on the eastern part of the archipelago, for example, are yet to be organized into petroleum blocks. If there is any theme which is prevalent in current official writings on the Archipelago Doctrine, it is that the country is yet to utilize the seas to their fullest potential. From this viewpoint, the settlement of continental shelf boundaries in the Timor Gap (with Australia) and in other areas - such as the Natuna Sea (with Vietnam) - will continue to receive serious attention from the elite.

One important question pertains to international navigation. In this, attention will be focussed on establishing the archipelagic sealanes, which thus far have not been implemented in Indonesia. The key questions here are where these sea lanes will be designated within the archipelagic waters, and how many of them will be created. Although the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention provides guidelines on this matter, there is still room for differing interpretations. As pointed out by Wisnumurti, former director of the Foreign Ministry's International Treaties Division, the maritime states will likely opt for a more "liberal" establishment of sealanes, while the Indonesian government will favour "only those absolutely essential for maintaining international communications, and as such sealanes should traverse the archipelagic waters through the shortest possible routes."¹

One important question remains unanswered as well. The Indonesian government's position toward the passage of
nuclear-armed or nuclear-powered ships through its waters has yet to be fully developed. It has already been noted that Jakarta sees this issue within the context of the ZOPFAN doctrine as well as in general interest in Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (NWFZ), which concomitantly makes it a part of the government's long-term foreign policy agenda. But the regimes on innocent passage and the archipelagic sealanes do not grant Indonesia the jurisdiction to restrict nuclear vessels. Thus, the debate on restricting this type of passage is likely to take place outside the realm of the Law of the Sea. As Foreign Minister Ali Alatas has already noted, this task will be extremely difficult and would require, first and foremost, the political will of the flag-states to comply. In any case, the degree of political will on the part of the Indonesian government to muster diplomatic energy toward the issue of nuclear-warships' passage will be contingent upon the extent to which the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone climbs up the agenda in Jakarta. At present, the elite feels no sense of urgency about the NWFZ, and officials usually speak of it as a long-term policy-goal. But as long as ZOPFAN and the NWFZ remain to be endorsed by Indonesia and ASEAN, and so long as the Indonesian elite continues to see them as the key answer to its long-standing sense of regional concerns and opportunity, the issue of what to do with the passage of nuclear ships will continue to matter.

Some final comments on the question of "geopolitical theory" may suffice. This study confirms that Indonesia does have the propensity toward "territoriality". It has been stated earlier in chapter 2 that the problem with the concept of "territoriality" is that it lacks explanations on
why states develop the impulse to territorialize certain geographic area. Our examination of Indonesia's Archipelago Doctrine elucidates how the evolvement of Indonesia's maritime "territoriality" stems from the goals of "security", "identity" and "prosperity". Thus, any conceptual broadening in the study of "territoriality", in particular with regard to the question of why it occurs, should take into account these three factors.

This thesis also verifies the usefulness of a geopolitical analysis to our case study specifically, but also to the political behaviour of states generally. If geopolitics is to be broadly regarded as the interaction between geography and politics, then this study has demonstrated the mutual interplay which exists between geographical factors, psychological-cultural attitudes and political behaviour in Indonesia’s national policy. The preceding discussion has shown, for example, how such geographical attributes as morphology, location and natural resources come into play in Indonesia’s maritime territorial behaviour. A geopolitical approach therefore is an entirely appropriate undertaking, as it warrants the investigation of how the "geographical" and the "political" interact in the behaviour of state/s. It is high-time that scholars rehabilitate geopolitics as a legitimate and useful approach in the study of international affairs. In doing this, it is, of course, necessary to do away with the elements of expansionism, determinism or policy-prescription which coloured the development of geopolitical analysis in the past.
Notes:

APPENDIX I

Indonesian Territory Under the 1939 Colonial Regulation

APPENDIX I

Indonesian Territory Under the 1939 Colonial Regulation

Legend

Land over 10,000 feet stippled.
Double line, except on land boundaries, indicates Indonesian territory.
APPENDIX II

Indonesia’s Territory Under the Act Concerning Indonesian Waters, February 18, 1960.

* Note: Indonesian Waters include the bold lines and the maritime areas within them. The boundaries outside the boldlines are either those of the Continental Self or the EEZ.

APPENDIX II

Indonesia's Territory Under the Act Concerning Indonesian Waters, February 19, 1960.
APPENDIX III

The Djuanda Declaration of 1957

GOVERNMENT DECLARATION CONCERNING THE WATER AREAS OF INDONESIA, 13 DECEMBER 1957.

The Cabinet, in its session of Friday 13 December 1957, discussed the problem of the water of areas of the Republic of Indonesia.

The geographical composition of Indonesia as an archipelago consisting of thousands of islands has its own particular characteristics.

For the purposes of territorial unity, and in order to protect the resources of Indonesia, all islands and the seas in between must be regarded as one total unit.

The delimitation of the territorial sea as laid down in the "Territorial Sea and Maritime Districts Ordinance of 1939" (Official Gazette, 1939, no. 442, Art.1, par.1) is no longer in accordance with the above-mentioned considerations (as it divides the land territory of Indonesia into separate sections, each with its own territorial waters).

On the basis of these considerations, the Government declares that all waters, surrounding, between and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian state, regardless of their extension or breath, are integral parts of the territory of the Indonesian state and therefore, parts of the internal or national waters which are under the exclusive sovereignty of the Indonesian state. Innocent passage of foreign ships in these internal waters is granted as long as it is not prejudicial to or violates the sovereignty and security of Indonesia.

The delimitation of the territorial sea (the breath of which is 12-miles) is measures from baselines connecting the outermost points of the islands of Indonesia.

The above-mentioned provisions will be enacted as soon as possible.

This Government position will be maintained at the International Conference on the Law of the Sea which will be held in Geneva in February 1958.

APPENDIX IV

Act Concerning Indonesian Waters, 18 February 1960

INDONESIA

ACT NO. 4

The President of the Republic of Indonesia

Considering:

1. that the geographical configuration of Indonesia as an archipelagic state which consists of thousands of islands has its own characteristics and peculiarities,

2. that since time immemorial the Indonesian archipelago has constituted one entity,

3. that in the interest of the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state all the islands and waters lying between those islands should be regarded as a single unit,

4. that the delimitation of the territorial waters as provided for in article 1, paragraph 1 of the Territorial Sea and Maritime Circles Ordinance of 1939 (Government Gazette 1939 no. 442) is not in accordance with the above considerations, as it divided the territory of Indonesia into separate parts having their own territorial sea,

5. that it is therefore deemed necessary to enact an Act concerning the Indonesian waters in accordance with the above considerations,

Having regard to:

Article 5 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia

Having heard:

The deliberations of the Cabinet of Ministers of 20 January 1960,

Decides to enact:

Act concerning Indonesian Waters:

Article 1

(1) The Indonesian waters consist of the territorial sea and the internal waters of Indonesia
(2) The Indonesian territorial sea is a maritime belt of a width of 12 nautical miles, the outer limit of which is measured perpendicular to the baselines or points on the baselines which consist of straight lines connecting the outermost points on the low water mark of the outermost islands or part of such islands comprising Indonesian territory with the provision that in the case of straits of a width of not more than 24 nautical miles and Indonesia is not the only coastal state the outer limit of the Indonesian territorial sea shall be drawn at the middle of the strait.

(3) The Indonesian internal waters are all waters lying within the baselines mentioned in paragraph (2).

(4) One nautical mile is one sixtieth of a meridian.

Article 2

On the map annexed to this Act is indicated the position of the points and baselines mentioned in the article - paragraph (2).

Article 3

(1) Innocent passage through the internal waters of Indonesia is open to foreign vessels.

(2) The innocent passage as mentioned in paragraph 1 shall be regulated by Government Ordinance.

Article 4

(1) This Act comes into force on the date of its promulgation

(2) Article 1 paragraph 1 sub-paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Territorial Sea and Maritime Circles' Ordinance of 1939 is no longer valid as from the date mentioned in paragraph 1.

In order that the Act be known to everybody whomssoever it is instructed that this Act be promulgated by publication in the Government Gazette.

Promulgated at Djakarta on February, 1960
Minister of Justice sd. (Sahardjo)

Done at Djakarta on 18 February, 1960
President of the Republic of Indonesia sd. (Soekarno)

APPENDIX V

Act no. 4 Concerning Innocent Passage of Foreign Vessels in Indonesian Waters (February 28, 1962)

PERATURAN PEMERINTAH NOMOR 8 TAHUN 1962
TENTANG
LALU LINTAS LAUT DAMAI KENDARAAN AIR ASING
DALAM PERAIRAN INDONESIA

PRESIDENT REPUBLIK INDONESIA

MENIMBANG : perlu mengadakan ketetapan-ketetapan lain lanjut tentang lalu-lintas laut damai kendaraan air asing dalam perairan Indonesia;

MENGINGAT :
1. Pasal 4 ayat (2) Undang-undang Dasar;
2. Pasal 3 Undang-undang no. 4 Prp. tahun 1960 tentang Perairan Indonesia;

MENDENGAR : Musyawarah Kabinet Kerja pada tanggal 27 Desember 1961;

MEMUTUSKAN

MENETAPKAN : PERATURAN PEMERINTAH TENTANG LALU-LINTAS LAUT DAMAI KENDARAAN AIR ASING DALAM PERAIRAN INDONESIA

BAB I
Pasal 1
Lalu-lintas laut damai kendaraan air asing diperairan pedalaman Indonesia, yang sebelum berlakunya Undang-undang no. 4 Prp. 1960 merupakan laut bebas atau laut wilayah Indonesia, dijamin; ketentuan ini tidak berlaku untuk teluk, anak laut dan muara sungai, yang lebarinya mulutnya kurang dari dua-puluh empat mil laut.

Pasal 2
(1) Yang dimaksudkan dengan lalu-lintas laut damai kendaraan asing dalam Peraturan Pemerintah ini ialah pelayaran untuk maksud damai yang melintasi laut wilayah dan perairan pedalaman Indonesia:

a. dari laut bebas ke suatu pelabuhan Indonesia dan sebaliknya;

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b. dari laut bebas ke laut bebas;

(2) Lalu-lintas laut damai termaksud pada ayat (10 dianjurkan untuk mengikuti alur-laur yang dicantumkan di dalam buku-buku kepanduan bahari dalam dunia pelayaran.

(3) berhenti, membuang jangkar dan/atau mundur-mndir, tanpa alasan yang sah di perairan Indonesia atau di laut beas yang berdekatan dengan perairan tersebut tidak termasuk perngertian lalu-lintas laut damai termaksud pada ayat (1).

Pasal 3

Lalu-lintas laut termaksud di dalam pasal 2 dianggap damai selama tidak bertentangan dengan keamanan, ketertiban umum, kepentingan dan/atau tidak mengganggu perdamaian Negara Republik Indonesia.

Pasal 4

(1) Untuk menjaga kedaulatan dan keselamatan Negara Presiden Republik Indonesia berhak melarang untuk sementara waktu lalu-lintas laut damai di bagian-bagian tertentu dari perairan Indonesia.

(2) Pelarangan untuk sementara waktu tersebut pada ayat (1) dilaksanakan setelah diadakan pengumuman terlebih dahulu dengan penyiaran yang lazim dalam dunia pelayaran.

BAB II

Pasal 5

(1) Dalam pelayarannya dari laut bebas ke laut bebas, maka selama berada atau melintasi laut wilayah dan perairan pedalaman Indonesia kendaraan air penangkapan ikan asing diharuskan menyimpan dalam keadaan terbukung alat-alatnya penangkap ikan di dalam palkah-palkah.

(2) Dalam pelayaran yang disebutkan pada ayat (1) kendaraan air penangkap ikan asing harus berlayar melalui alur-alur yang telah atau akan ditetapkan oleh Menteri/Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut.

BAB III

Pasal 6

Penyelidikan ilmiah oleh kendaraan asing di laut wilayah atau perairan pedalaman Indonesia hanya boleh dilakukan setelah mendapat ijin lebih dahulu dari President Republik Indonesia.

BAB IV

Pasal 7

(1) Sebelum mengadakan lalu-lintas laut damai dalam laut wilayah atau perairan pedalaman Indonesia kapal perang dan kapal pemerintah bukan kapal niaga asing, harus
memberitahukan lebih dahulu kepada Menteri/Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut, kecuali kalau lalu-lintas itu melalui alur-alur yang telah atau akan ditetapkan oleh Menteri/Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut.

(2) Pada waktu melintasi perairan Indonesia kapal selam asing harus berlayar di permukaan laut.

(3) Lalu-lintas laut kapal perang dan kapal pemerintah bukan kapal niaga asing di luar alur-alur termaksud ayat (1) yang tidak didahului oleh pemberitahuan kepada Menteri/Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut, termaksud kapal-kapal selam asing yang tidak berlayar di permukaan air pada waktu melintasi perairan Indonesia, dianggap tidak damai, dan karena itu dapat diwajibkan untuk denagn segera meninggalkan perairan Indonesia.

BAB V
Penutup
Pasal 8

Peraturan Pemerintah ini mulai berlaku pada hari diundangkannya.

Agar supaya setiap orang dapat mengetahuinya, memerintahkan pengundangan Peraturan Pemerintah ini dengan menempatkan dalam lembaran-Negara Republik Indonesia.

Ditetapkan di : Jakarta

Presiden Republik Indonesia,

ttd.

Sukarno

Diundangkan di Jakarta
pada tanggal 28 Juli 1962,

Sekretaris Negara,

ttd.

Mohd. Ichsan

APPENDIX VI

The Doctrine of Wawasan Nusantara (1973)

THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGIC OUTLOOK (WAWASAN NUSANTARA)

The concept applied to achieve the aim of National Development is the Indonesian Archipelagic Outlook, which includes:

1. The Realisation of the Indonesian Archipelago as one Political Unity, in the sense:
   a. that the whole National Territory with all its contents and resources shall form one Territorial Unity, one place, one sphere of life and one unity of norms of the whole of the People, and be the asset and property of the People.
   b. that the Indonesian Nation, consisting of various ethnic groups and speaking a variety of regional languages, embracing a variety of religions and beliefs and worshipping God in various ways shall form one complete National Unity in the broadest sense of the word;
   c. the psychologically, the Indonesian people must have the sense of belonging to one unity, with the sense of one destiny, and one responsibility of being one Nation with one Motherland, imbued with one strong determination to achieve the national ideals;
   d. that Pancasila shall be the only philosophy and ideology of the State and Nation, the foundation and guidance leading the Nation toward its goal;
   e. that the entire Indonesian archipelago shall form one National Law in the sense, that there shall only be one National Law serving the national interests.

2. The Realisation of the Indonesian Archipelago as one Social and Cultural Unity, in the sense:
   a. that the Indonesian society is one; the life of the nation is shall be one that is harmonious with equal stages of social progress, evenly spread and balanced, well-adjusted and in keeping with the progress of the nation;
   b. that the Indonesian Culture is essentially one; whereas the existing various cultural expressions expose the cultural wealth of the Nation which constitute the assets and foundation for the flourishing of the entire National Culture, the result of which can be enjoyed by the Nation.

3. The Realisation of the Indonesian Archipelago as one
Economic Unity, in the sense:

a. that the riches of the territory of the Archipelago, potentially as well as effectively, are the collective asset and property of the Nation; and that the daily necessities of the People shall be provided for evenly throughout the country;

b. that the stage of economic development in all the regions shall be harmonious and balanced without neglecting the specific characteristics of the regions in developing their economic life.

4. The Realisation of the Indonesian Archipelago as one Unity of Defence and Security, in the sense:

a. that a threat to any island or region is essentially a threat to the entire Nation and State;

b. that every citizen shall have equal rights and duties regarding the defence of the State and Nation.

APPENDIX VII

Map of the Allocation of Petroleum Blocks in Indonesia
As of 1978

APPENDIX VII

Map of the Allocation of Petroleum Blocks in Indonesia
As of 1978

Source: Pertamina, Jakarta, 1978
APPENDIX VIII

Offshore Allocation of Petroleum Blocks in Indonesia

APPENDIX IX

Petroleum Exports by Indonesia

APPENDIX X

Crude Oil Production in Indonesia: Onshore/Offshore

APPENDIX XI

Fisheries Exports by Indonesia

(Thousands)

US $000 DOLLARS


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<th>Type</th>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>The Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
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<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>The Malacca Straits</td>
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<td>1971</td>
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<td>Arafura Sea</td>
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<td>Australia</td>
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