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A LAND WITH A PEOPLE: The Political Economy of Jerusalem and Nablus in the Nineteenth Century

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The historiography of modern Palestine is largely confined to studies of the period of the first Zionist aliyah onward. This approach has two inherent shortcomings: the history of Palestine becomes little more than an addendum to the history of Zionist colonization, and, minimal attention is given to the origins of the so-called 'traditional' Palestinian Arab elites. The works which do concern themselves with the earlier part of the nineteenth century do so for shorter periods, rather than examining the social, political, and economic development of Palestine throughout the entire century. Moreover, there is a tendency to impose stubbornly held generalizations about the Middle East as a whole onto Palestine, taking little or no account of the unique features of Palestine in the late Ottoman era.

This thesis attempts to address some of the neglected areas in the historiography of Palestine for the 'long' nineteenth century. Through the study of Jerusalem and Nablus, and more specifically of the most important families of notables, the present work hopes to provide a clearer picture of crucial social, political, and economic developments in Palestine over the entire period. Chapter one first traces the origins of the Husayni, Khalidi, Nashashibi, 'Abd al-Hadi, and Tuqan families and then examines their fortunes during the first half of the nineteenth century. Chapter two examines the Palestinian notables' response to the new bureaucratic and administrative structures of the Tanzimat and Hamidian periods. Chapter three, concentrating on awqaf, land tenure, soap production, and citriculture, examines the economic development of Palestine in the nineteenth century.

In examining the most important notable families of Jerusalem and Nablus and their role in the economic development of Palestine, this thesis establishes a
number of points regarding commonly held generalizations on or about Palestine in the nineteenth century. Firstly, certain of the so-called traditional political leaders of Palestine were in fact relatively new to positions of prominence. Secondly, the notables of Palestine continued to prosper in the changing administrative climate of the nineteenth century, while becoming the willing agents of Istanbul's policy of centralization. Lastly, the economy of Palestine was not moribund prior to the arrival of Zionist colonizers, nor was it ever totally incorporated into the world economy.

This thesis is based on relevant primary sources in the British Foreign Office Confidential Prints FO 424 and Arab Bureau Papers FO 882, on contemporary European accounts and a wide range of secondary published and unpublished sources, including the most recent historical scholarship.
Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of Robert Norman Holt.
Acknowledgments

I would like to offer my gratitude to Dr. William L. Cleveland and Dr. John P. Spagnolo for the assistance and encouragement they have offered through the course of two degrees. It was they who first introduced me to the study of the Middle East six years ago and who have, since that time, shown the patience of saints when confronted by my various peccadillos. I would also like to express my appreciation to the various students I have had the pleasure to work with during my time at Simon Fraser University. In particular I would like to thank Michael James Peter Joseph Quilty, I'm sure if he ever hears another thing about soap or oranges he will never go near either for the rest of his life. Finally, I would like to thank the support staff of the History Department at Simon Fraser University, three Js, an M and a D, for their assistance, patience, and wit, which made my stay all the more pleasurable.
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Introduction

The historiography of modern Palestine\(^1\) is largely confined to studies dating from the first Zionist aliyah of 1882 forward.\(^2\) The works which do concern themselves with the pre-1882 era are very narrowly focused, and do not examine the social, political, and economic development of Palestine throughout the entirety of the nineteenth century. Moreover, many of the works which do concern themselves with nineteenth century Palestine exhibit a tendency to impose stubbornly held generalizations concerning the entirety of the Middle East onto Palestine, taking little to no account of the unique features of Palestine in the late Ottoman era.

This thesis offers a tentative beginning of the restoration of Arab Palestine to its rightful place within the historiography of the Mashriq in the nineteenth century. Through the examination of Jerusalem and Nablus over the course of the nineteenth century, this thesis shows that the history of these two cities did differ from others in the region, and in fact, from each other. Such an examination serves to refute the stubborn Orientalist tradition which seeks to compress a highly heterogeneous entity, the Islamic world in general, and more specifically the Middle East -- the "Other" -- into a comfortable, uniform whole.

Little account has been taken of the diversity which existed within the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The corpus of literature on the Arab

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\(^1\)Within the context of this thesis Palestine is taken to mean the geographic area contained within the borders of British mandatory Palestine.

\(^2\) Commenting on this phenomenon, Beshara Doumani notes that: "Israeli academics, and ironically, their Palestinian counterparts who sought to rebut them, generally assume that the real history of Palestine did not begin until after the first aliyah or wave of Zionist immigration in 1882." Beshara Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change and the State in Ottoman Palestine: The Nablus Region, 1800-1860," Ph. D., Georgetown University, 1990, p. 10.
provinces does stress the difference between Damascus and Beirut, yet these differences are most often attributed to the divergent developmental lines supposedly inherent within Islamic and Christian polities. The development of divergent Islamic cities, however, is usually seen as a related phenomenon. Jerusalem was not Damascus, Nablus was not Aleppo, yet numerous works, such as Moshe Ma'oz's *Reform in Syria and Palestine*, display a tendency to treat all as one and to extrapolate information gained from one city onto all others.

Through a prosopographic analysis of the Husayni, Khalidi, and Nashashibi families of Jerusalem and the 'Abd al-Hadi and Tuqan families of Nablus during the final century of Ottoman rule, this thesis addresses notable adaptability to a changing administrative environment and the question of class consolidation in nineteenth century Palestine. Moreover, the examination of Jerusalem and Nablus in the nineteenth century shows that far from the moribund entity so often described in the literature on the region, the Palestinian economy was both prosperous and vibrant long before the incursion of the Zionist colonists.

Much attention has been devoted to socioeconomic transformation and notable politics in the nineteenth century in the geographic regions which constitute modern day Syria and Lebanon. Palestine, however, has only recently

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3 The difference between the development of Damascus and Beirut might not be quite as significant as usually posited. See M. James Quilty, "Bridging the Dichotomy: Socio-Economic Change and Class Consolidation in Ottoman Beirut and Damascus," M. A. Thesis., Simon Fraser University, 1992.


begun to receive the same type of attention. The preponderance of Damascus and Beirut in the historiography of the Mashriq is a product of their relative importance within the economic and political history of the area, both for the Ottomans and contemporary Europeans and the availability of sources.

Jerusalem and Nablus were chosen as the foci of this study because of their rising political and economic importance during the course of the nineteenth century and the dominant role which their notable families came to exercise in all aspects of Palestinian society. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Jerusalem was a relatively impoverished provincial town whose influence scarcely extended beyond its gates and whose population was a mere 8-10,000 inhabitants. By the end of the century Jerusalem had emerged as the de facto capital of Palestine and had a population of about 70,000 inhabitants. Moreover, the Palestinian Arab notables of Jerusalem were the wealthiest and most powerful individuals in the region by the close of the century. Nablus, while never more than a local centre of political power, was an important commercial entrepôt from at least the eighteenth century. By the end of the nineteenth century, Nablus was the most important centre of overland trade in the region, possessing important commercial links with Egypt and northern Syria.

Numerous works on the Middle East point to the family as a crucial unit of interaction. Few of these works, however, use the family as a unit of analysis

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when investigating the politics of the region. James Bill and Robert Springborg note the importance of kinship and marriage patterns in the Middle East, and argue that their study can explain much about national elites and the political processes in the region. Philip Khoury, in a retrospective of his Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism, notes an inadequacy from which his earlier work suffered was its lack of "adequate information on notable families, their economic interests, political activities, and marriage alliances." This study employs the study of specific Palestinian Muslim Arab notable families in order to gain a clearer picture of the development of Palestine in the nineteenth century.

The choice of solely Muslim notable families for this study accurately reflects the social, economic, and political reality of Jerusalem and Nablus, and indeed all of Palestine, in the nineteenth century. By the dawn of the First World War, Muslims may no longer have constituted the majority of the population of the city of Jerusalem itself, but within the larger administrative area controlled by Jerusalem -- vilayet of Jerusalem -- they represented eighty

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percent of the population. Moreover, within the city of Jerusalem itself, Muslim notable families continued to hold absolute dominance in the political sphere. Within Nablus, and the larger administrative area it administered -- sanjaq of Nablus -- the non-Muslim population remained as insignificant in 1914 as it had been in 1800: non-Muslims equalled a mere two percent of the population of the sanjaq of Nablus in 1914.

The Husaynis, Khalidis, Nashashibis, 'Abd al-Hadis, and Tuqans all played a role in the politics of mandatory Palestine, and a study of their histories in the nineteenth century enables us to question whether they actually conformed to the pattern of traditional notables in the Middle East described by Albert Hourani. The use of specific families, who later played a prominent role in Palestinian national politics, also allows us to question the assertion that in the late Ottoman and Mandate periods a split emerged between so-called "old" and "young" politicians, which was then reflected in their stance on various political questions. In many cases the "young" politicians were in fact from the same families as the "old" politicians, therefore we must ask whether this "generational split" actually represented a marked shift in Palestinian society.

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13 In 1914/15 there were 186,325 Muslims, 3,542 Christians, and 219 Jews living within the sanjaq of Nablus. Ibid., p. 9.


15 In his work on the origins of Palestinian nationalism, Muhammad Muslih places great emphasis on the impact of generational differences going so far as to state: "Within the active political elite, therefore, age rather than conflict was the foundation of political affiliation and ideological differences." On the general question of the importance of this "generational split" see the works of C. E. Dawn. C. E. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Muslih, The Origins of Palestinian Nationalism ..., pp. 151-174.
In 1917, Shaykh Fuad al-Khatib, acting secretary of Sharif Husayn, stated that local power in Syria had "already passed largely, and would pass still more, out of the hands of the old feudal families, now much reduced, into those of young men, strong in their education." Certainly, a number of individuals from outside the established power structure, notably journalists, educators, professionals and members of the military, did enter the political arena. However, these newcomers would have a lengthy wait before they could displace individuals hailing from the families of the "old" politicians. A new generation did emerge, but this was not a radical upheaval; but rather a logical generational progression, with the new generation representing the same families who consolidated their power during the nineteenth century.

This thesis, also addresses the debate over class consolidation in nineteenth century Palestine. Gabriel Baer argues that the notables of Palestine "were by no means a well-defined class ... ." Baer's assertion, however, reflects stubbornly held conceptions more than the reality of nineteenth century Palestine. Rather than attempting to apply some elusive universalistic law centred on relations to the modes of production this thesis employs far broader, and it is felt more accurate, criteria in the definition of class in the Middle East.


Beyond merely examining the relationship of Palestinian notables to the modes of production, their relationship to "modes of manoeuvre," is also used in determining their status as an identifiable class in the nineteenth century. That is, the ability to use political and societal position to achieve and maintain material advantage. The examination of the Jerusalem and Nablusi notables contained within this thesis, then, concerns itself with the transformation of Palestinian notables, in general, from status groups to a unified class.

The assertion that notables of Jerusalem and Nablus did, in fact, represent a cohesive, identifiable class takes as its point of reference Hanna Batatu's argument that, "a class need not -- and in fact does not -- at every point of its historical existence act or feel as a unit. In other words, it need not be an organized and self-conscious group. ... The members of a class may not be class-conscious in their behaviour, but their behaviour could nonetheless be class-conditioned." Using Batatu's framework of analysis, this thesis explores the crystallization of the Palestinian Arab notables into a "class for itself," that is, a relatively stable, identifiable, and politically conscious social entity, in contrast to a "class in itself," which did not act in a conscious manner to protect or expand its interests.

The class of notables which emerged in nineteenth century Palestine used a combination of ascriptive and political power, often coupled with their own, or their allies, mercantile wealth, to acquire dominance over large sectors of the productive capacity of Palestine by the close of the century. By examining the

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21 See the discussion in Batatu, *The Old Social Classes* ..., pp. 5-12.
processes which facilitated the rise of this notable class, not only are questions surrounding the class structure addressed but also questions surrounding the development of the Palestinian economy in this period.

Numerous works on Palestine in the nineteenth century paint a picture of desolation and economic stagnation. Concomitant to such assertions is the argument that it was only with the growing influence of the West, culminating in the beginnings of Zionist colonization in the final decades of the century, that Palestine emerged from its economic toper. Such arguments, however, have more to do with ideology than reality.

During the course of the nineteenth century, the economy of Palestine experienced a remarkable boom, but it was not a boom predicated exclusively on Western "enterprise" and the pull of the European marketplace. The overwhelming majority of the Palestinian economic infrastructure remained in the hands of the indigenous population, who used both "traditional" and "modern" means to increase its productive capacity. Moreover, while the incorporation of Palestine into the European-dominated world economy did affect certain sectors of the economy this effect was far from universal.

While not pretending to offer the definitive answer to questions surrounding the changes which occurred in Palestine during the nineteenth century, this thesis does present evidence which must call into question a number of commonly held positions. It compares the changes which occurred in the social, political, and economic structures in Jerusalem and Nablus and the role which the Husaynis, Khalidis, Nashashibis, 'Abd al-Hadis, and Tuqans played in this process.

Chapter one first traces the origins of the five families, in the process offering evidence as to their status as "traditional" families, and then explores their interaction with the three regimes which controlled the region in the first
half of the nineteenth century, namely the valis of Sidon, who were themselves nominally under the authority of Istanbul, the Egyptians, and the Ottomans. Chapter two examines the response of the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus to the new bureaucratic and administrative structures of the second half of the century. Within this context, the notables' manipulation of new administrative institutions and educational opportunities to protect their positions gained in the earlier decades of the century and to expand their material base are explored. Chapter three, through a concentration on awqaf, land tenure, soap production, and citriculture, examines the economic development of Palestine in the nineteenth century, and the role which the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus played therein.
Chapter I: Notable Power in a Changing Environment

In the opening decades of the nineteenth century the leading families of Jerusalem and Nablus were enmeshed in a struggle for power and authority in their respective towns. The differing social, political, and economic realities which prevailed in Jerusalem and Nablus at the time, and which would themselves evolve over the course of the nineteenth century, dictated that the contest for power was played out under different rules in each town. At the turn of the nineteenth century Jerusalem was "little more than a remote country town"\(^1\) whose authority did not extend past the walls which enclosed it. Virtually bereft of any commercial activity, Jerusalem's importance was based solely on its religious stature. In contrast to the situation in Jerusalem, Nablus exerted a great deal of influence in the surrounding environs and was the commercial entrepôt of an economically vibrant and virtually autonomous sanjaq. Thus, in Jerusalem power was a function of religious authority while in Nablus power was a function of secular authority.

Within the Muslim community of Jerusalem the contest for power centred on control of the positions of Hanafi mufti, naqib al-ashraf, bashkatib -- chief secretary -- of the Shari'a Court and na'ib -- deputy -- of the molla qadi of Jerusalem. While the positions of Hanafi mufti and naqib al-ashraf were officially the highest positions within the local Ottoman administration open to inhabitants of Jerusalem, control of the positions of bashkatib and na'ib often ensured de facto control of the Islamic judicial system in Jerusalem. None of these positions brought with them substantial salaries. What they did offer,

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however, was ascriptive power and social influence which could, and in fact did, translate into substantial material gain in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In Nablus those involved in the contest for dominance looked not to religious office but to secular office as the means to accumulate wealth and power. The positions of governor of the sanjaq of Jabal Nablus and governor's deputy of the qaza of Nablus were the coveted prizes in the contest for local dominance.\(^2\) Through control of the governorship of Jabal Nablus and/or Nablus, the competing families of Nablus were able to extend their influence throughout the entire sanjaq and thereby increase their access to its economic base. The reward of office in Nablus in the early nineteenth century, then, went beyond mere ascriptive power and offered immediate and substantial material rewards.

\(^2\) In the interest of clarity, the term governor, rather than mutasallim and qa'immaqam, is used in the present context. While numerous writers use the terms mutasallim and qa'immaqam as constants, this use of terminology is in fact a misrepresentation of the relative nature and status of these positions in the course of the nineteenth century. The evolution of these positions in the nineteenth century was such that at various times their relative position of import was substantially altered or even reversed. During the early years of the nineteenth century, mutasallim denoted a civilian governor of a sanjaq and qa'immaqam denoted a civilian deputy-governor of a qaza. With the Egyptian reorganization of the administration of Palestine, qa'immaqam (or müdir) came to denote a military governor, usually a member of the Egyptian army, who was the supreme commander of the region and therefore had both military and civil authority. During the same period, mutasallim denoted a civilian deputy-governor of either a region or a town. The Ottomans retained the Egyptian structure with only minor changes until the promulgation of the Vilayet Law of 1864. From 1864 forward mutasallim denoted a governor of a sanjaq and qa'immaqam denoted a deputy-governor of a qaza. See Roderic H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876 (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.5; Mordechai Abir, "Local Leadership and Early Reforms in Palestine, 1800-1834," in Moshe Ma'oz, ed., Studies in Palestine During the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1975), p. 284; Yitzhak Hofman, "The Administration of Syria and Palestine under Egyptian Rule (1831-1849)," in Moshe Ma'oz, ed., Studies in Palestine During the Ottoman Period (Jerusalem: Magnes Press) pp. 318 and 325-326; E. Kuran and P. M. Holt, "Ka'immakam," E. I. 2, Vol. 4 (Leiden, 1982), pp. 461-462.
Origins of the Five Families³

The Husayni family traces its origins to Husayn, son of Ali and Fatima. Tradition follows that in the twelfth century the Husaynis migrated from the Arabian peninsula taking up residence at Wadi al-Nasur, a small village southwest of Jerusalem, where they remained for approximately two hundred years before a member of the family moved to Jerusalem in 1380.⁴ Ya'cov Shimoni notes that the Husaynis are mentioned in thirteenth century Jerusalem chronicles, which refer to them renting the Sharafat lands in Jerusalem. Others claim that the Husaynis settled in the vicinity of Jerusalem during the sixteenth century and resided in the village of Dayr Sudan, after which they were called "al-Aswad" - the Black. According to this tradition, the family did not begin using the name Husayni until three hundred years later.⁵ This later day change to the name Husayni is also supported by Butrus Abu-Manneh, who argues that it was only in the late eighteenth century, when the Husaynis were deeply embroiled in a rivalry with the Khalidis, that the family began to use the name Husayni.⁶

³ While the Nashashibis only became a significant factor in Palestine in the later decades of the nineteenth century their origins are included in this chapter for reasons of clarity and continuity.


⁶ While it is difficult to ascertain the veracity of the various traditions, the assertion that the family only began to use the name Husayni in the late eighteenth century, and then only for reasons of rivalry with another family, seems plausible in light of the importance placed upon 'sacred' lineage by leading families of the Middle East. Batatu notes that for the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent "a holy pedigree counted for much. Hence the eagerness of many of their leading families to relate themselves either to the House of the Prophet or to a prominent general of the age of Arab conquests, like Khalid ibn al-Walid, or a renowned saint, or some redoubtable tribe." Jaussen, writing on Nablus in 1927, also noted the import of such claims: "j'ai pu constater l'importance accordée par tous à
The beginnings of Husayni influence in Palestine can be traced to the early years of the eighteenth century when the post of Hanafi mufti of Jerusalem was held by 'Abd al-Qadir ibn Karim al-Din Husayni. 'Abd al-Qadir, however, died leaving no male heir and the Hanafi mufti-ship passed to the Alami and Jaralla families. Nonetheless, 'Abd al-Qadir's female descendants were allowed to retain the family name and their claim to sharifian lineage. Various members of the family also continued to hold a number of important religious posts such as the naqib al-ashraf and shaykh al-Haramayn, as well as serving as the mutawalli --guardian-- of the important Nabi Musa waqf.7

The actions of Muhammad ibn Mustafa Husayni in the early years of the eighteenth century, also, dealt a serious, if only temporary, blow to the aspirations of the Husaynis. As the naqib al-ashraf Muhammad led a group of followers consisting of the qadi and Jerusalem’s social elite, backed by the jannisarries, the sipahis and rebels in the surrounding countryside, against the Istanbul appointed governor. When the revolt was crushed on 27 November 1705, Muhammad and his remaining supporters -- the jannisarries and sipahis

had turned against the revolt -- were forced to flee Jerusalem and his mansion was demolished. With the downfall of Muhammad ibn Mustafa Husayni, the position of naqib al-ashraf also passed into the hands of the Alami family.

Notwithstanding the defeat of Muhammad ibn Mustafa's rebellion, by the mid-eighteenth century the Husaynis reestablished themselves as one of the leading families of Jerusalem. In 1745 Sayyid 'Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah bin 'Abd al-Latif was appointed naqib al-ashraf, and a contemporary argued that nothing was done in Jerusalem without his approval, and that he was "the head of Jerusalem and its most prominent notable." Following 'Abd al-Latif's death, his son, Shaykh Hasan 'Abd al-Latif, who combined the positions of naqib al-ashraf, Hanafi mufti, and shaykh al-Haram, consolidated the family's power and set about improving its fortunes. From Shaykh Hasan forward, the Husaynis retained, almost without interruption, the positions of both Hanafi mufti and naqib al-ashraf of Jerusalem well into the twentieth century.

In addition to their control of religious office within Jerusalem, the Husaynis extended their influence through intermarriage with other notable


9 Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab ..., p. 184.

10 Prior to his appointment as naqib al-ashraf, 'Abd al-Latif travelled to Istanbul, a trip quite possibly predicated upon the need to overcome the stigma of Muhammad ibn Mustafa's revolt, and it seems that this journey may have been instrumental in his appointment. Kupferschmidt notes that in most cases a journey to Istanbul by members of the ulama had a material rather than intellectual purpose with those travelling to Istanbul generally doing so for the purpose of gaining public office. In support of this assertion Kupferschmidt points to numerous cases of Jerusalem ulama who travelled to Istanbul and were rewarded with positions as mufti, qadi, naqib or prestigious teaching positions. Uri M. Kupferschmidt, "Connections of Palestinian Ulema with Egypt and Other Parts of the Ottoman Empire,” in Cohen and Baer, eds, Egypt and Palestine: A Millennium of Association (868-1948) (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984) pp. 185-186 and 186n; Goiten, "al-Kuds,” p. 334.

11 Abu-Manneh, "The Husaynis ...,” pp. 94-95.

12 Asali, "Jerusalem under the Ottomans ...,” p. 217.
families of Palestine. In 1808 Umar ibn 'Abd al-Salam Husayni created a double marriage alliance with the marriage of a daughter to Musa Tuqan, mutasallim of Nablus, and the marriage of a son to one of Musa's daughters.\textsuperscript{13}

The Husayni family also manipulated connections with highly placed individuals from outside Palestine to enhance their position. In the early 1800s Muhammad Tahir Husayni formed friendships with 'Arif Hikmet Bey, then molla qadi of Jerusalem and later shaykh al-Islam, and Hasan al-'Attar, an influential 'alim from al-Azhar who later became shaykh al-Azhar\textsuperscript{14}

The Husaynis' foremost rivals in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were the Khalidis. The Khalidis' status was a function of their position within the ulama, and while not claiming sharifian lineage, they did trace their origins to one of the great generals of the Arab conquests, Khalid ibn al-Walid, who conquered Syria in 636 A. D.\textsuperscript{15} Originally a lesser branch of the powerful Dayri family, the most important Hanafi family in Jerusalem during the Mamluk period,\textsuperscript{16} by the eighteenth century the Khalidis were an important and independent force in their own right.

The Khalidis' power centred on their control of the positions of bashkatib of the Shari'a Court and na'ib of the Ottoman molla qadi of Jerusalem -- Jerusalem's most important administrative link with Istanbul at that time -- from the mid-eighteenth century onwards. The Khalidi monopoly of the positions of


\textsuperscript{14} Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period ...," p. 31; Manna, "Cultural Relations ...," pp. 141-145.


\textsuperscript{16} Goiten, "al-Kuds," p. 33.
bashkatib and na’ib gave them virtual control of all Islamic judicial affairs in Jerusalem. Adel Manna argues that the Khalidis were, in fact, the true power behind the mollqa qadi of Jerusalem, stating that this power derived from their permanence of position in contrast to the transitory nature of the mollqa qadi. In addition to their positions within Jerusalem -- the centre of Islamic judicial affairs for all of Palestine -- the Khalidis also extended their influence throughout the region through their intermittent appointments as na’ib to the qadis of Jaffa, Gaza, Nablus and other towns.

Unlike the Husaynis and Khalidis, the Nashahibis made no claim to a "holy pedigree." Nonetheless, they did claim heroic lineage of another sort. Originally from Cairo and allegedly of Circasian or Kurdish origin, the Nashashibis claim that they first arrived in Palestine in the fifteenth century under the leadership of Ahmed Nashashibi. Family tradition holds that Ahmed's son, Nasir al-Din, on orders from the Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, brought relief to the people of Palestine, who were at the time suffering from famine and a failure of the water system. Thereafter Nasir al-Din was known as the Emir of al-Haramayn and the family badge was in the shape of a cup between two swords.

While not a prominent factor in the life of Jerusalem in the early nineteenth century, the Nashashibis provide a primary example of the rise of

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18 Cited in Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ..... ," p. 121. Doumani is refering to Manna's, 'A'lam Filastin fi awakhir al-'ahd al-Uthmani, 1800-1918, (The Notables of Palestine during the Late Ottoman Period, 1800-1914), (Jerusalem, 1986). Manna notes that the Khalidis were the only non-Nablusi family able to compete with the local families of Nablus, especially the Khammashs, for the position of na'ib in Nablus.

19 Mulish, The Origins ..... , p.27; Nasser Eddin Nashashibi, Jerusalem’s Other Voice: Ragheb Nashashibi and Moderation in Palestinian Politics, 1920-1948, (Exceter: Ithaca Press, 1990), p. 2. The Nashashibi arrival in Palestine may, however, be of less heroic origins given the fact that in this period Jerusalem served as "a place of compulsory sojourn for discharged, dismissed, or exiled members of the Mamluk military nobility, the so-called battals." Goiten, "al-Kuds," p. 332.
merchant families -- "secular dignitaries," as Khoury has labelled them\(^\text{20}\) -- to positions of power within society and politics during the latter part of the nineteenth century.

In the 1830s the Nashashibis increased their wealth by acting as suppliers of food stuffs to the Egyptian army and in the 1840s forged a number of marriage alliances with established families which affirmed the family's growing importance. Sulaiman Nashashibi married the sister of Umar Fahmi Husayni and thereafter was one of the pillars of the Husayni faction.\(^\text{21}\) In 1846, Sulaiman's sister, Fatima, married Mustafa Abu Ghosh, one of the most powerful figures in the hill country surrounding Jerusalem, and himself an ally of Muhammad Ali Husayni.\(^\text{22}\) Building upon these alliances, and their growing involvement in money lending,\(^\text{23}\) the Nashashibis amassed substantial landholdings and by the end of the nineteenth century established themselves as one of the leading, and wealthiest, families in Palestine.

Whereas the "secular dignitaries" of Jerusalem only began to assert their power in the later part of the nineteenth century, the "secular dignitaries" of Nablus had dominated the affairs of Nablus and Jabal Nablus for quite some time. Positions within the religious hierarchy of Nablus certainly had ascriptive

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\(^{21}\) Nashashibi, Jerusalem's Other Voice ..., p. 17.

\(^{22}\) The importance placed upon this alliance is shown by the size of the dowry involved, 9,000 piastres, whereas most dowries ranged from 300 to 600 piastres. The marriage contract also reveals the depth of the Husayni-Nashashibi alliance in this period. Fatima's guardian at the time of the marriage was Muhammad Ali Husayni. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Arnold Green for providing a copy of the marriage contract of Mustafa Abu Ghosh and Fatima Nashashibi. Dr. Green also supplied information on the Nashashibi's rise in the 1830s and the unique nature of this particular marriage contract. Jerusalem Shari'a Court, Sijils / vol. 328, p. 110. On the Husayni-Abu Ghosh alliance see Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period ...", p. 30.

power but the dominant force in the politics of Nablus was exercised by those who controlled the economic infrastructure of the surrounding hill country.

In the closing years of the eighteenth century the Tuqan family was the most influential family in Nablus and the surrounding area of Jabal Nablus. Depending upon the source, the Tuqans' presence in Palestine dates to either the twelfth or seventeenth century. Family tradition holds that the family is descended from a chief of the ancient Hayyary clan of Arabia and that it migrated to Palestine in the twelfth century under the leadership of Shaykh Saleh Tuqan. Shaykh Saleh, we are told, went on to become the governor of Palestine, Syria and Trébizonde. His son, Ibrahim, became the mutasallim of Nablus, while another member of the family, Mustafa, served as the governor of Egypt and Jedda in 1187.24

While Muslih, and Shimoni and Levine agree with Tuqan tradition concerning the family's arrival in Palestine in the twelfth century,25 Abir and Hoexter, both relying on Ihsan al-Nimr's Ta'rikh Jabal Nablus wa al-Balqa, argue that the Tuqans arrived in Palestine in the seventeenth century. Abir states that the Tuqans were "probably of Turkoman origin" and migrated to the Nablus area from al-Salt on the eastern side of the Jordan in the late seventeenth century. Hoexter adds that the Tuqans arrived in Palestine in 1656 as part of an Ottoman military expedition.26

24 Jaussen, Coutumes ..., p. 135. While the claim to the "governorship" of Palestine and Syria is somewhat suspect given that no such administrative units existed at the time, the claim to high office at this early point in time is however seen as significant to later Tuqan claims to prestige.


26 Mordechai Abir, "Local Leadership ....," pp.288-289; Miriam Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays and Yaman Factions in Local Political Divisions: Jabal Nablus Compared with the Judean Hills in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," Asian and African Studies, 9 (1973): 251n and 255-256. The assertion that the Tuqans were originally from al-Salt is perhaps supported by the fact that throughout the nineteenth century, and in fact until the creation of Transjordan as a separate state, Nablus and al-Salt enjoyed extensive trade links connected with the soap trade, in which the Tuqans were intimately involved.
Originally traders and rural *shaykhs*, the Tuqans rose to prominence at the beginning of the eighteenth century under the leadership of Salih Tuqan, who served variously as the governor of Nablus, Jerusalem, and Gaza -- the latter the most important *sanjaq* in Palestine at the time. Displaced from the *mutasallimiyya* of Jerusalem in mid-century by the Nimr family, the Tuqans turned their attention to Nablus.

By 1766 the Tuqans succeeded in displacing the Nimrs from the *mutasallimiyya* of Nablus. Within a decade, however, the Tuqans ran afoul of the centralizing efforts of Jazzar Pasha, *vali* of Sidon, and were forced to flee Nablus. In 1794 Jazzar Pasha, now fearing the growing power of the Nimrs and their allies the Jarrars, came to an accommodation with the Tuqans and appointed Ahmed Tuqan *mutasallim* of Nablus. The Tuqans quickly asserted their power not only in the realm of politics but also in the realm of economics: Muhammad Tuqan was appointed *shaykh nahiya* of the important cotton producing *nahiya* of Bani Sa'b, numerous *multezims* were awarded to members of the family, and the family, as a whole, increased their interests in the Nablusi bazaar and local soap production.

However, the Tuqan consolidation of power in Jabal Nablus was soon faced with a challenge from another up and coming family of rural *shaykhs*, the 'Abd al-Hadis. The 'Abd al-Hadis, like the Tuqans, trace their lineage to the Arabian peninsula and the time of the Prophet, claiming that they were members of the Hunyar clan in the south of Arabia. Variously, the 'Abd al-Hadi entry into Palestine has been placed at the time of Salah al-Din, under the leadership

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27 Asali, "Jerusalem under the Ottomans ....," p. 216; Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ..., p. 54n.

of Abu Bakr and Salih 'Abd al-Hadi, or, somewhat less gloriously, during the seventeenth century, under the leadership of Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi.\textsuperscript{29}

Initially aided by the Nimrs and their military strength, the 'Abd al-Hadis began to impose their authority in the Sha'rawiyya district in the early eighteenth century and established their centre at 'Araba.\textsuperscript{30} By the latter part of the eighteenth century, the 'Abd al-Hadis had succeeded in consolidating their hold in Sha'rawiyya and now turned their attention to broader horizons. Under the leadership of 'Abu Bakr 'Abd al-Hadi, at the time shaykh nahiya of 'Araba, the family began their quest for power in Nablus.

The fortunes of the notable families of Jerusalem derived from their positions within the urban environment whereas those of the Nablusi notables were intimately tied to their positions within the rural environment. In contrast to the notables of Jerusalem, who had little contact with the surrounding countryside until the later part of the nineteenth century, the notables of Nablus first consolidated their positions in the countryside of Jabal Nablus, and then exerted their power within the town itself. In Jerusalem wealth was a function of power whereas in Nablus power was a function of wealth.

\section*{Family Consolidation in the Early Nineteenth Century}

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Jerusalem was of minimal interest to the authorities in Istanbul. What importance Jerusalem did possess was predicated upon the town's religious stature rather than on any economic

\textsuperscript{29} Jaussen, \textit{Coutumes} ... , p. 132. Both Abir and Hoexter support the tradition that the 'Abd al-Hadis entered Palestine in the seventeenth century. Abir, "Local Leadership ... ," p. 289; Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays ... ," p. 251n.

\textsuperscript{30} Hoexter, "The Role of the Qays ... ," p. 254.
considerations. As the fabled site of Muhammad's night journey to heaven, Jerusalem followed Mecca and Medina as the third holiest site of Islam, and this position of religious import not only gave Jerusalem whatever external status it possessed but also shaped the social structure of the town. Given Jerusalem's special religious status the head of its judicial system, and the most important link with the central government in Istanbul, was a *molla qadi* -- one of only twenty-seven in the entire Ottoman Empire in the later part of the eighteenth century -- appointed directly by the *shaykh al-Islam* in Istanbul. In addition to controlling appointments to religious office in Jerusalem, the *molla qadi* also oversaw the appointments, against a cash consideration, of the secretaries of *qadis* throughout Palestine. While these appointments were usually no more than confirmation of locally made decisions, the *molla qadi* could, and sometimes did, appoint his own candidate in place of a local resident. Given this situation, the religious notables of Jerusalem who had access to the *molla qadi*, or who actually served as *molla qadi*, were able to garner appointments throughout Palestine.\(^{31}\)

Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the families of Jerusalem who were members of the *ashraf* and *ulama* used the special privileges accorded them to emerge as the dominant force within Jerusalem. Exemption from taxation, military service, and prosecution under normal judicial procedures -- members of the *ashraf* could only be tried by the *naqib al-ashraf* -- coupled with the emerging practice of heritability of official positions helped to forge an elite infrastructure that would dominate first Jerusalem and then the entirety of Palestine.\(^{32}\) Preeminent among those individuals who benefited from the

\(^{31}\) Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ...," pp. 108n and 118-120.

changing climate in Jerusalem were members of the Husayni and Khalidi families.

By the dawn of the nineteenth century, the Husaynis enjoyed undisputed control of the positions of *naqib al-ashraf* and Hanafi *mufti*, with Umar ibn 'Abd al-Salam holding the position of *naqib* from 1800 through 1834 while in 1809 the position of *mufti* passed from Umar's grandfather Hasan to Umar's cousin Muhammad Tahir. Further enhancing the Husaynis' position within the Islamic community of Jerusalem were Umar's positions as *shaykh al-Haram* and *mutawalli* of the important Nabi Musa *waqf*, which along with the *naqib*-ship passed to his son Muhammad Ali upon Umar's death.33

The Husaynis' position within the religious hierarchy of Jerusalem also assured them a voice within the secular administrative structure of the town. In the early nineteenth century, control of the administration of Jerusalem was nominally in the hands of the *mutasallim*, who was appointed alternately by the vali of Damascus or Sidon. True power, however, lay in the hands of the *molla qadi*, who was appointed directly by Istanbul.34 Assisting the *molla qadi* in his task was a *diwan* which was composed of the Hanafi *mufti*, *naqib al-ashraf*, the *shaykh al-Haram*, and a number of other religious functionaries.35 This tradition continued throughout the nineteenth century with the *naqib al-ashraf* and the Hanafi *mufti* remaining *ex officio* members of the various civic councils

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33 Butrus Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period ...," pp. 16-17; Baer, "Jerusalem's Families of Notables ...," p. 110 and 112; 'Adel Manna, "Cultural Relations Between Egyptian ...," pp. 141, 141n and 144n.

34 The *molla qadi*, in addition to his position within the Islamic judicial system, served as the most important link between the central Ottoman government and the local population. Most sultanic orders concerning the administration of the town were addressed to the *molla qadi* and usually enjoined him to carry them out in person or to see to it that they were carried out. In recognition of the importance of the *molla qadi's* work he was paid a salary equal to that of the *mutasallim*. Asali, "Jerusalem under the Ottomans ...," pp. 212-213; Haim Gerber, "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in Kushner, ed., Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period ..., p.39.

35 Abir, "Local Leadership ...," pp. 292-293 and 292n.
established by the Egyptians and subsequent Ottoman reformers. Given the Husaynis' absolute hold over these positions, the family was assured a continuous voice in secular as well as religious affairs.

The Khalidis also used the custom of heritability of position to their advantage and gained virtual control of the Islamic judicial affairs of Jerusalem, and by extension influence throughout Palestine. The Khalidis' continuous control of the positions of bashkatib of the Shari'a Court of Appeal and na'ib to the molla qadi from the mid-eighteenth century forward placed them in such a position that they were arguably the true power behind the molla qadi for the first third of the nineteenth century.36

The role of Musa Khalidi in the first decade of the nineteenth century established the continued preeminence of the family in the following decades of the century. Following a dispute with the Husaynis, Musa left Jerusalem and took up residence in Istanbul where he served first as an adviser to Mahmud II and then as qadi'asker of Anatolia,37 a position near the pinnacle of the entire Ottoman religious hierarchy. From his position in Istanbul, Musa was certainly able to influence events in Jerusalem and to ensure that the position of the Khalidis was enhanced. The utility of Musa's actions were confirmed in 1844 when Mustafa Hamid Khalidi, Musa's son who had grown up in Istanbul and was thoroughly Ottomanized, was appointed molla qadi of Jerusalem.38 Musa Khalidi's rise to power in Istanbul, in fact, established a precedent which

36 In his work on Jerusalem notables in the nineteenth century 'Adel Manna argues that this was in fact the case. Cited in Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ....," p. 121.


continued throughout the remainder of the Ottoman period. Other families of religious notables in Jerusalem were able to establish their power within the surrounding region but none were as successful as the Khalidis in gaining positions within the larger Ottoman religious bureaucracy.

Jerusalem, then, was a town of religious rather than economic importance and the actions of the Ottoman government and the social make-up of the town reflected this reality. The constant efforts of Western writers such as Amnon Cohen to paint a picture of anarchy and collapse in respect to Jerusalem completely ignore the particular nature of Jerusalem and fail to place it within the proper context. The central point which such writers seem to miss is that the Ottomans did influence the politics of Jerusalem in the area which truly concerned them, namely religion. Given Jerusalem's relative lack of economic importance, it would have been foolish for the Ottomans to expend their energies in bringing the civil administration of the *sanjaq* firmly under their control. The religious notables of Jerusalem, especially the Khalidis and the Husaynis, fully realized that the special nature of the town dictated that real influence derived from control of religious office and thus centred their efforts in this realm rather than in the quest for secular office.

In contrast to Jerusalem, the focus of power in Nablus was secular rather than religious office. Given Nablus' position as an important regional entrepôt and the extensive links between the town and the surrounding countryside, the true prize was the *mutasallimiyya* of Jabal Nablus. By the end of the eighteenth century the struggle for control of the *mutasallimiyya*, and the concomitant opportunities for material gain which followed from this office, centred upon the rivalry between the Tuqan and Nimr families.

Through a series of alliances with the *valis* of Sidon, the Tuqans displaced the Nimrs and emerged as the dominant family in Nablus in the opening decades
of the nineteenth century. Under the aegis of Jazzar Pasha, Ahmed Tuqan gained the *mutasallimiyya* in 1794 and in turn was succeeded by Musa Tuqan, who held the position from 1800 to 1824.\(^\text{39}\)

The Tuqans' control of the *mutasallimiyya* of Jabal Nablus quickly translated itself into substantial material gain for members of the family, often at the expense of older, established families. The Tuqans consolidated their hold over the important cotton-producing *nahiya* of Bani Sa'b, attained numerous *iltizams* throughout the region, and in general brought increasing amounts of the rural surplus under their control. With the funds gained from their rural interests, the Tuqans also attained substantial holdings in the Nablusi bazaar and soap industry.\(^\text{40}\)

The Tuqans' growing dominance within the local economy, the use of a mercenary force supplied them by Sulayman Pasha, and their alliance with 'Abdullah Pasha in the suppression of a region-wide revolt in the 1820s caused no little resentment among those families at whose expense the Tuqans prospered. The acrimony felt toward the Tuqans manifested itself in the deaths of Musa Tuqan and his only son: in 1808 Musa's son was killed in a clash with the Jarrars, and Musa was poisoned in 1824 after being lured to the home of Qasim al-Ahmad, head of the Qasim family.\(^\text{41}\) Musa Tuqan's death at the hands of his rivals heralded the end of the family's absolute dominance in Nablus. Cognizant of the growing resentment of other notable families, 'Abdullah


thereafter alternated the *mutasallimiyya* between the Tuqan, Jarrar, and Qasim families.

In 1830 it seemed that the Tuqans might regain their previous position of dominance: Mustafa Tuqan was *mutasallim* of Nablus, As'ad Tuqan held the newly created *mutasallimiyya* of Magharib, and Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi, who was rapidly emerging as the Tuqans' foremost rival, was arrested by 'Abdullah Pasha.42 On the eve of the Egyptian invasion, however, the Tuqans again fell from grace and thus looked to Ibrahim Pasha as a potential benefactor. The Tuqans' rivals in Nablus also viewed Ibrahim's arrival in Palestine as a fortuitous event which might herald the end of Tuqan power and their own subsequent assumption of power.

**The Egyptian Period in Palestine**

The Egyptian period in Palestine, and Syria as a whole, is often pointed to as a watershed in the history of the region. The history of Jerusalem and Nablus in this period, however, call into question some of the central assertions of this argument. Certainly the Egyptians effected certain changes in the region but the question which begs asking is just how radical a change were these actions from past practices and, indeed, how successful were they in their implementation.

On 20 November 1831 Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi, 'Abdullah Jarrar, Qasim al-Ahmad, and his son, Muhammad, presented themselves at the Egyptian camp, pledging their allegiance to Ibrahim Pasha and in return asking that they be confirmed in their previous positions and possibly new ones. Ibrahim realized

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that any confirmation of the Tuqans in their previous positions would likely result in widespread resentment among the majority of Nablusi notables. Ibrahim therefore spurned the Tuqans and decided in favour of the 'Abd al-Hadi/Qasim faction. Ibrahim's decision was most likely also influenced by the fact that the 'Abd al-Hadis and Qasims were relatively new families and thus their power base in Nablus was not yet firmly established. Given this circumstance the newly appointed officials would be much beholden to the largesse of their new-found Egyptian benefactor.

The 'Abd al-Hadis quickly supplanted their erstwhile allies, the Qasims, and, relying upon Ibrahim Pasha's favouritism, consolidated their administrative power. Over a two year period the 'Abd al-Hadis were appointed as mutasallims of Jenin, Jaffa, Nablus, and Jerusalem. The family's dominance was confirmed by Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi's appointment as qa'immaqam of the eyalet of Sidon in 1834 -- the only non-Egyptian to attain such a position. The 'Abd al-Hadi's rise was unprecedented and offered the family an opportunity to entrench themselves at the highest levels of the administrative authority, while at the same time substantially expanding their material base.

Notable families throughout Palestine resented the emergence of the 'Abd al-Hadis as Ibrahim's chosen proxies and de facto rulers of the region. The Muslim population as a whole further resented the upgraded civil status of non-Muslims, the imposition of a progressive capitation tax for both Muslims and non-Muslims, and the Egyptian policy of conscription. The boiling point was reached in 1834 when the Egyptians ordered all notables to provide a list of their

43 Abir, "Local Leadership ....," p. 302; Hoexter, "Egyptian Involvement ...., pp. 192-195 and "The Role of the Qays ....," p. 266.
kinsmen and followers, in numbers determined by the Egyptians, for conscription into the army.\textsuperscript{44}

In May 1834 a revolt unlike any previous ones in the region encompassed all of Palestine. The revolt cut across established social lines and united the ulama, the secular notables, and the peasantry in a common struggle against the Egyptian occupation. In retaliation for their role in the revolt, which was crushed in August 1834, Qasim al-Ahmad, the leader of the revolt, and two of his sons were executed, and a number of other notables, including Muhammad Tahir Husayni and Muhammad Ali Khalidi, were exiled.\textsuperscript{45} Qasim al-Ahmad's remaining sons, however, were spared, with one of them eventually serving as an officer in the Egyptian army, and his property left intact. Muhammad Tahir Husayni soon returned to Jerusalem to resume his position of Hanafi mufti and by 1840 was serving as nazir -- head -- of the newly-established Jerusalem majlis al-shura.\textsuperscript{46}

Ibrahim sought only to punish, not destroy, those families who opposed him. Bloody-minded vengeance was an indulgence Ibrahim could ill afford if he was to achieve his primary goals of revenue collection and conscription for the Egyptian army. The impossibility of attaining either of these goals without at least the tacit cooperation of the established notables was made infinitely clear by

\textsuperscript{44} The religious notables of Jerusalem were especially resentful of Ibrahim's abolition of the jizya and its replacement by the universal fara. Previously the religious notables had overseen the collection of the jizya and had taken a part as their own. The abolition the jizya meant an end to this very lucrative source of income for a number of influential members of Jerusalem's religious notability. Abir, "Local Leadership ...", pp. 303-310; Ma'oz, Reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1862: The Impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society (London: Oxford University Press, 1968) p. 14.


\textsuperscript{46} Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat Period ....," p. 12; Hoexter, "Egyptian Involvement ....," p. 204. Muhammad Tahir's rapid return to power was quite possibly assisted by the offices of Hasan al-'Attar, who Muhammad Tahir had forged a friendship with during his studies at al-Azhar and who was at the time shaykh al-Azhar.
the events of 1834. Ibrahim was unable to destroy the established families of Palestine, therefore he incorporated them into the bureaucratic infrastructure he was imposing upon the region. The notables' ability to oppose governmental initiatives with impunity was curtailed but their central role as the necessary intermediaries between the government and the populace not only remained but was actually strengthened. The Egyptian period in Palestine is often pointed to as a radical departure from the past and the "necessary" transitional point for the emergence of the "modern" period in Palestine.\(^{47}\) The establishment of a majlis al-shura in all towns of 2,000 inhabitants or more, the imposition of a centralized government and greater security for the inhabitants of the region are deemed among the more important changes brought about by Egyptian rule. The Egyptian period certainly did witness certain changes from past practice, but these changes were not as revolutionary as is generally argued.

Shimon Shamir states that the establishment of the majlis al-shura "embodied a new concept in civic participation in that its basic composition included non-Muslims and it was given a broad range of judicial, administrative, economic and municipal responsibilities."\(^{48}\) The inclusion of non-Muslims in administrative councils did represent a departure from past practice, yet the recalcitrance of the local oligarchies largely negated the effects of this action. In Jerusalem, Ibrahim's ability to control the religious establishment was circumscribed by the fact that the top religious officials continued to be appointed by Istanbul and remained ex officio members of the majlis, where they ignored the wishes of the non-Muslim members. Moreover, the actual powers of

\(^{47}\) For example see Shimon Shamir, "Egyptian Rule (1832-1840) and the Beginnings of the Modern Period in the History of Palestine," in Amnon Cohen and Gabriel Baer, eds., *Egypt and Palestine: ...,* pp. 351-381.

\(^{48}\) Shimon Shamir, "Egyptian Rule (1832-1840) ...," p. 221.
the majlis al-shura in judicial, administrative, economic and municipal affairs remained fairly limited under the Egyptians. Indeed, municipal responsibilities were not even a factor, nor were municipalities even a recognized corporate entity, until the creation of a majlis al-baladiyya --municipal council -- in Jerusalem in 1873. The effect of the majlis al-shura on the politics of Nablus was non-existent for the simple reason that the Egyptians never established one in the town.49 The establishment of majlis al-shura did represent somewhat of a change from the past and did assist in the entrenchment of the notables' positions, but to impute revolutionary change in this area to the Egyptian period is to read forward into the history of the region.

The re-ordering of the administrative superstructure and its centralization in Damascus did allow Ibrahim to realize a greater degree of success than his Ottoman predecessors in the imposition of his will on the local populace, yet even this achievement was far from absolute.50 The end of the 1834 rebellion did mark the end of overt, large-scale opposition to Egyptian rule but it did not mean the complete subjugation of the populace to the will of the government. Notable families remained the crucial intercessors between Damascus and the local populace and used this position to thwart certain Egyptian initiatives and to divert a substantial portion of the rural surplus to their own benefit. The elevation of the 'Abd al-Hadi family to a position of near absolute dominance in the entire region did represent a substantive change from the past. The crucial

49 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ...," p. 150. Doumani argues that the most likely reason for the Egyptians not establishing a majlis in Nablus was that they did not want to introduce major administrative changes in the home town of their principal client in Palestine, Husayn 'Abd al-Hadi.

point which must be made, however, is that the established families not only survived, but also prospered under the Egyptians.

The one area which did represent a substantive change from past practice and which seriously affected the future of Palestine was the opening of the region to European powers. In contrast to his Ottoman predecessors, Ibrahim allowed the European powers to expand and institutionalize their missionary activities in the region and to establish diplomatic missions in the interior. Ibrahim's actions "opened a floodgate which could not be closed" and, arguably, had implications for the future of the region, and especially Jerusalem, of far greater importance than any other policy instituted in the 1830s.

The Return of Ottoman Power to Palestine

The resumption of Ottoman suzerainty over Palestine in 1840 brought with it the recently promulgated Tanzimat reforms and the attempt to either punish or reward notable families in accordance with their actions during the Egyptian period. The return of Ottoman suzerainty, however, did not mean the imposition of absolute control. The notable families of Palestine remained as recalcitrant as in the past. Indeed, it would take the central government two decades before it was able to successfully impose their will in the region.

Upon the return of Ottoman control, the sanjaq of Jerusalem was immediately expanded to include the sanjaqs of Jaffa and Gaza, while the sanjaq of Jabal Nablus was appended in 1842. Jerusalem's increasing prominence arose from its status as the largest town in the region, its relative security, and perhaps

most importantly, the growing attention focused upon it by the European powers. The governor of the newly expanded sanjaq of Jerusalem was a mutasarrif, normally a pasha of one or two horsetails, who was responsible to the vali of Sidon. Confirming the growing importance of Jerusalem was its elevation to the status of an independent eyalet in 1854, ruled by a pasha of three horsetails who answered directly to Istanbul. Parallel to the elevation of Jerusalem to new status was the attempt of the Ottomans to punish those notables who had cooperated with the Egyptians and those who opposed the policies of the Tanzimat.

In 1832 members of the Husayni and Khalidi families had signed a fatwa against the Sultan and for this impolitic action they were now made to pay. Muhammad Tahir Husayni was dismissed from his position as Hanafi mufti and exiled to Istanbul where he died in 1855/56; Muhammad's son, Mustafa, was dismissed from his position as deputy to the mufti; the office of naqib al-ashraf was transferred to Abdullah 'Alami; and Muhammad Ali Khalidi was dismissed from his post as bashkatib and exiled - albeit this exile was not overly onerous given that Muhammad Ali served as qadi of Erzurum from 1842 to 1844. The

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52 The main interest of the European powers in the Ottoman Empire at this time was with the expansion of trade, as such most of their attention was focused on the coastal cities of the Empire. In Palestine, the Europeans were also concerned with trade, as evidenced by the establishment of a consulate in Jaffa, but the focus of their attention in the region was on Jerusalem and the religious significance it held for Christianity. On the growing European interest in Jerusalem, and especially its religious significance see R. W. Greaves, "The Jerusalem Bishopric, 1841," English Historical Review, 64 (1949): 328-352; Schölch, "Britain in Palestine ....," pp. 39-56; Mayir Vereté, "A Plan for the Internationalization of Jerusalem, 1840-1841," Asian and African Studies, 12, 1 (1978): 13-31 and "Why Was a British Consulate Established in Jerusalem?" English Historical Review, 85 (1970): 316-345.

53 Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat ....," pp. 8-9; Ben-Arie, Jerusalem in the Nineteenth Century ...., p. 112; Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ....," p. 157; Ma'oz, Reform in Syria and Palestine ...., pp. 32-34.

54 Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat ....," pp. 18, 25 and 31; Doumani. "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ....," p. 16; Manna, "Cultural Relations Between Egyptian ....," p. 141. Manna states that Muhammad Tahir Husayni was honoured by the Ottomans upon their return to power and was merely invited to take up residence in Istanbul. Such "invitations," however, were not easily declined.
retribution which the Ottomans visited upon the Husaynis and Khalidis was not meant to destroy the families, which in any case would have proven most difficult, but to punish them and re-assert central authority: within the decade both families would return to their former positions, with the Khalidis actually increasing their influence.

The fortunes of the notable families that are the focus of this study were also dictated by their response to the Tanzimat reforms and the relative power of their patrons in Istanbul. The Khalidis supported the reforms of Ali and Fuad which emphasized the establishment of a more orderly government and the social and political integration of non-Muslims as the necessary pre-conditions of the survival of the Empire. In contrast to the Khalidis, the Husaynis felt that the interests of the Empire, and not inconsequentially their own, were best served by the maintenance of the status quo, especially the continued dominance of Muslims within the ruling hierarchy.55

The Khalidi return to favour was marked by the appointment of Mustafa Hamid Khalidi, the Istanbul-educated son of Musa, to the qadi-ship of Jerusalem in 1844. Upon his appointment as qadi, Mustafa Hamid immediately extended the Khalidis' power throughout the Islamic judicial system of Palestine: family members were appointed as bashkatib of Jerusalem and as na'ibs in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jaffa, and Lydda.56

The rehabilitation of the Husaynis came in 1846 and was largely attributable to the rise of Sayyid Ahmet 'Arif Hikmet Bey to the office of shaykh al-Islam in the same year. In the early years of the century, Hikmet Bey served

56 Muhammad Ali was appointed bashkatib and na'ib in Jerusalem, while his brothers, Ali, Sulayman, and Ibrahim, served as na'ibs. Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat ...," pp. 24-26.
as *molla qadi* of Jerusalem and found a ready friend and mentor in the person of Muhammad Tahir Husayni. This earlier friendship Hikmet Bey now re-paid in kind and the Husaynis again assumed the positions of Hanafi *mufti, naqib al-ashraf*, and *shaykh al-Haram*. In addition to the largesse of their patron in Istanbul, the Husaynis also enhanced their position through alliances with a number of the other leading families in the area. In the countryside, Husayni influence was fostered by their alliance with the Abu Ghosh family, long the dominant family in the hinterland surrounding Jerusalem. In the town of Jerusalem itself, the Husaynis forged an alliance with Sulayman Nashashibi, scion of one of the newly-important merchant families, and with the Darwish family, who were *mutawallis* of the important Khasseki Sultan *waqf*.

The series of alliances which the Husaynis forged in this period not only served to reinforce their power base but also represented a qualitative change in its nature. The triangular alliance between the Husayni, Abu Ghosh, and Nashashibi families united the ascriptive power of the Husaynis, the rural influence of the Abu Goshhs, and the merchant capital of the Nashashibis. Where once the power of the Husaynis, and the other notable families of Jerusalem, had been restricted to the city, the alliance with the Abu Ghosh family now extended their influence into the surrounding countryside. The alliance with the Nashashibi family provided the necessary capital to exploit the Husayni's expanding access to the rural surplus.

The return of Jabal Nablus to Ottoman suzerainty brought with it far fewer changes than transpired in Jerusalem. Within the town of Nablus, the Ottomans were able to assert a certain degree of administrative control but in the

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58 Abu-Manneh, "Jerusalem in the Tanzimat ...," pp. 23 and 30;
surrounding hill country the local notables remained the dominant force. The most that the Ottomans were able to achieve in this situation was to play the opposing factions against each other in the hope of weakening both while at the same time strengthening their own hand.

In light of the the 'Abd al-Hadis' cooperation with the Egyptians, it seemed probable that they would enjoy little favour with the new Ottoman administration and that the Tuqans would easily regain their old positions. Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi's removal from office and Sulayman Tuqan's appointment as qa'immaqam in 1842 seemed to justify the Tuqan's optimism. During the following decade the 'Abd al-Hadis were excluded from the position of qa'immaqam, but Sulayman Tuqan's inability, or reluctance, to impose the changes desired by the central authorities led to his frequent dismissal and replacement by a Turkish representative and eventually the return of Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi to office. In pursuit of a policy of divide and conquer the Ottomans then alternated the office of qa'immaqam between the Tuqans, the 'Abd al-Hadis, and, briefly in mid-decade, a Turkish representative.59

The influence that the Ottomans were able to exert in Nablus did not extend into the surrounding hill country. Violent factional struggles remained endemic - in 1851, 500 individuals were killed and 500 wounded in factional violence - and the illusory nature of Ottoman control led James Finn, British Consul in Jerusalem, to argue that in the 1850s the "Turkish visible government ... in Nabloos [sic] district was barely a mere scarecrow with scarce any

The lack of Ottoman control in the rural districts was further exacerbated by the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853. In the face of the threat from Russia, the Ottomans withdrew nearly all their troops from the region. In the absence of any coercive force the notables of Jabal Nablus attempted to reassert the independence of action they had enjoyed in earlier times, and during the next six years the area was in a state of near constant upheaval.

The crucial point in the sociopolitical history of Nablus came with the arrest of Mahmud 'Abd al-Hadi in January 1859. Relations between Mahmud and the central authorities first soured when he was serving as qa'immaqam in April 1856 at which time there were widespread disturbances in Nablus over the raising of the French flag in the town. This incident, which Finn states was engineered by the "fanatical party of Tōkan" in order to embarrass the 'Abd al-Hadis, seemed to mark the beginning of the end for the 'Abd al-Hadis. Following the arrest of Mahmud, the 'Abd al-Hadis rose in open revolt against the central authorities. In response to the 'Abd al-Hadis' insurrection, the Ottomans, with the assistance of the Tuqans and the Jarrars, besieged their stronghold at 'Araba and on 22 April 1859 succeeded in taking the town and capturing a number of the leading members of the family.

Haim Gerber argues that the subjugation of the 'Abd al-Hadis in 1859 led to the annihilation of the family's power. Given Salih 'Abd al-Hadi's rapid

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60 Rogers, Domestic Life ..., p. 215; Finn, Stirring Times ..., Vol. I, p. 409.

61 Rogers also seemed to think that Mahmud was innocent of involvement in the disturbances and states that he did his best to protect the Christians of Nablus from the rioters. Finn, Stirring Times ..., Vol. I, pp. 433; Rogers, Domestic Life ..., p. 295.

62 Rogers, Domestic Life ..., pp. 389 and 395n.

63 Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem ..., p. 17.
return to his former position as mutasallim of Haifa and the future role which the 'Abd al-Hadis would play in the political life of Palestine, Gerber's statement seems much like the Associated Press announcement of Mark Twain's death in 1897.

The subjugation of the 'Abd al-Hadis in 1859 did, however, mark the end of organized armed opposition to Ottoman control in Palestine. Henceforth the notables of Palestine recognized, if somewhat reluctantly, Ottoman control in the region. As with Ibrahim in the 1830s, the central goal of the Tanzimat statesmen in the 1840s and 1850s was the taming of the notables through their integration into the bureaucratic infrastructure of the empire. The vehicle for the integration of the notables of Palestine into the Ottoman ruling structure was the majlis al-shura established first by Ibrahim and then institutionalized by the returning Ottomans. Nonetheless the institutionalization of the majlis al-shura and the notables' participation therein proved a double-edged sword: henceforth the notables used their positions within the majlis to circumvent the various reforms which Istanbul attempted to institute and simply moved their internecine battles from the streets of the towns to the floor of the majlis al-shura.
Chapter II: Adaptation and Manipulation under the Ottomans

By 1914 Jerusalem had emerged as the *de facto* capital of Palestine and its notable families were among the richest and most influential men in the region. Nablus, while not experiencing a growth in political power concomitant to that of Jerusalem, was the most important centre of local and regional trade and an important centre of soap, olive oil, and cotton goods production.¹

The expansion of the area administered by Jerusalem in the 1840s and its elevation to the status of independent sanjak in 1854 were indicative of Istanbul's growing interest in the affairs of the town, and the region as a whole. Jerusalem's special status was further institutionalized by the cumulative effects of the administrative reforms of the 1860s and 1870s. The implementation of the Vilayet Laws of 1864, 1867, and 1871 was irregular in other parts of the Ottoman Empire,² but the speed with which they were implemented in Jerusalem, as well as the completion of a telegraphic link with Istanbul in 1865,³ revealed the importance which the Ottomans placed upon their links with the town.

From at least the 1860s, the mutasarrif of Jerusalem answered only to Istanbul, and for all practical purposes was a vali equal in authority to those of Beirut and Damascus. While the mutasarrif of Jerusalem officially remained subordinate to Beirut in judicial matters until 1910, and remained within the

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² The original law was in fact only meant to apply in a single, specially created Danubian province, while the term vilayet did not replace eyalet until 1867.

military sphere of the Fifth Ordu -- Army -- Headquarters in Damascus, this was a bureaucratic fiction rather than an administrative reality which was finally corrected in 1913 with Jerusalem's formal recognition as an independent vilayet.⁴

Within the changing administrative atmosphere, the notable families of Jerusalem and Nablus turned their attention to the consolidation of positions gained in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century. The return of Ottoman authority in 1840 had not posed an immediate and total challenge to the autonomy enjoyed by the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus. By the 1860s, however, a resurgent Ottoman government successfully imposed its will in the region and brought an end to overt opposition to the central authorities. Henceforth, the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus were forced to work within the new political, administrative, and fiscal structures established in Istanbul.

The notables of Jerusalem and Nablus not only successfully adapted themselves to these new structures, but most often were able to redefine them in a manner which served both their and the central government's interests. Through their near monopoly over positions on the various civic councils established during the second half of the nineteenth century, the Palestinian Arab notables of Jerusalem and Nablus ensured that the administrative and fiscal reforms initiated by Istanbul did not have an overly negative effect on themselves or their allies.

The Civic Councils
At the centre of the Ottoman program of centralization were the various civic councils established throughout the Empire in the second half of the century.⁴

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The consultative, administrative, and municipal councils were established to bring the provinces of the Empire under the control of Istanbul while at the same time incorporating the provincial notables into the administrative structure. Through the various councils a symbiotic, if not always smooth, relationship evolved which was of benefit for both parties concerned: on the one hand Istanbul increased the revenues of the central treasury -- its primary goal -- and on the other hand, the provincial notables consolidated and legitimized their regional dominance while at the same time accruing substantial material benefits.

The council established by the Egyptians in Jerusalem -- none was ever established in Nablus -- was essentially advisory in nature and lacked the power to exercise any significant influence. Conversely, the councils established by the Ottomans in Jerusalem and Nablus in the 1840s were invested with increasing powers and the ability to exert significant influence in areas of particular interest to those who sat on them. The authority of the *majlis al-shura* encompassed nearly all aspects of administration, finance, and the judiciary. The *majlis al-shura* assessed taxes and distributed iltizams, kept tax registers, inspected and policed tax collectors, acted as the conduit for the remittance of taxes to the central government, rated customs duties, and supervised the production, marketing, and pricing of agricultural production. Moreover, the *majlis al-shura* played a role in the recruiting and employment of irregular troops, held the power to confirm the nominations of officials in the districts under its authority, inspect the conduct of public officials, and fix the rate of pensions.6

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5 The Ottomans established a *majlis al-shura* in Jerusalem in 1840 but not in Nablus until the second part of the decade. Beshara Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change and the State in Ottoman Palestine: The Nablus Region," Ph. D., Georgetown University, 1990, pp. 151-152.

While nominally remaining only an advisory council, the members of the majlis al-shura exercised influence beyond that which they were officially designated. Throughout the 1840s and 1850s, Ottoman authority in Palestine remained at best tentative and in light of this situation the "advise" proffered by the majlis al-shura often assumed the status of administrative edicts.

The Vilayet Law of 1864 established the majlis al-idara as a permanent administrative body which superceded the majlis al-shura. While the majlis al-idara was stripped of the judicial authority enjoyed by the majlis al-shura, except in the realm of administrative justice, it gained almost total authority over the disposition of land and all areas of taxation. The majlis al-idara had final say in the issuing of tapu certificates, the legality of land transfers, approval over construction on state lands, the future of mahlul lands -- private lands deemed to have lain fallow for three years and therefore returned to state control -- and a significant voice in the future of mawat lands -- uncultivated state lands. The 1871 Law of Vilayet Administration further expanded the majlis al-idara's authority into the realm of awqaf affairs, especially in the area of mazbuta waqf -- administered waqf. The majlis al-idara approved expenditures, the leasing of waqf property, the appointment of small office holders, and collected awqaf taxes. Combined, the provisions of the 1864 and 1871 laws gave the members of the majlis al-idara and their allies virtual control of the land regime at the very time that it was emerging as the most important form of capital investment in Palestine.


8 On the use of the majlis al-idara to expand notable land holdings see Chapter Three below.
Beyond its control of the land regime the majlis al-idara also had the final say in the granting of iltizams for the collection of the ‘ushr, as well as on roadway khans, shops owned by awqaf, customs dues, fishing taxes, weighing taxes, and slaughtering taxes. Moreover, the majlis al-idara was responsible for the collection of the farda -- capitation tax, which at the time was the most important source of revenue for the central treasury -- and in turn the vergil -- property tax -- when it replaced the farda in 1852/53. In short, a seat on the majlis al-idara ensured that its possessor had access to, or control over, virtually the entire revenue producing infrastructure of the region. Such power far exceeded any which the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus, especially Jerusalem, had enjoyed in the past and opened the door to substantial material benefit on the part of those who dominated the majlis al-shura and in turn the majlis al-idara.

The advantage derived from membership on these councils was not lost on the prominent families of Jerusalem and Nablus and they quickly gained control of these institutions and transformed them into the main base of their expanding power. Indeed, as Beshara Doumani notes in his discussion of the Nablusi majlis al-shura, the social composition of the majlis contained no real surprises, composed as it was of families who previously held the reins of political power and religious authority in Jabal Nablus or who had gained material prominence in the earlier decades of the nineteenth century. The majlis, as Doumani also notes, was neither the cause nor the outcome of any major social upheaval nor did it represent increasing participation in the political arena.

9 Haim Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration ..," pp. 44-45.
10 Ma'oz, Reform in Syria and Palestine ..., p. 184.
The changes within the Nablusi oligarchy which did occur had transpired in the latter part of the eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century and were now reflected in the social composition of the majlis al-shura. The confluence of mercantile and political power which occurred in Nablus in the first half of the nineteenth century, as exemplified by the soap industry, ensured that the majlis of Nablus emerged as "a club of political power brokers who guarded the privileges of the ruling families of Nablus."13

The social composition of Jerusalem’s majlis al-shura and in turn majlis al-idara while somewhat analogous to that of Nablus differed as a result of the continued dominance of religious notables within the city. The importance of religious notables in Jerusalem, especially the Husaynis and Khalidis, was reflected by the dominant role which they played within the various councils established in Jerusalem. The Husayni’s control of the positions of mufti and naqib al-ashraf, both of whose holders sat as ex officio members of the councils, ensured their representation. The Khalidi’s influence over, if not actual control of, the molla qadi, who also sat as an ex officio member, ensured their family a voice within the councils. Even in the face of the continued dominance of religious notables, certain merchant families, such as the Nashashibis, did gain seats on the councils as a function of their growing economic power. Moreover, the growing entry of religious notables into mercantile activities, and the various

12 Unfortunately only scant information could be located on the actual positions held by the 'Abd al-Hadis and Tuqans on either the majlis al-shura or majlis al-idara. Prior to 1859 their frequent tenure as qa'immaqam would have insured them a seat as an ex officio member and Doumani also notes that the 'Abd al-Hadis even when not actually holding a seat were represented by their allies from the Taher family. Stein also states that in the later part of the nineteenth century the local administrative elites in Nablus tended to remain constant and notes that a survey of membership on governmental bodies at the qaza level suggests that certain local families dominated the local administration. The 'Abd al-Hadis are among those specifically cited in the qazas of Nablus and Jenin. While the Tuqans are not mentioned, Stein also cautions that the survey is far from complete. Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ...", p. 155; Kenneth Stein, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917-1939 (Chapel Hill, N. C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1984) pp. 10, 245 and 246n.

13 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ..., p. 140.
alliances forged between religious and secular families, tended to blur any finite distinction between these two groups.\textsuperscript{14}

Notable manipulation of the \textit{majlis al-shura} for material gain was displayed by various incidents which occurred in both Jerusalem and Nablus during the 1850s. In 1855, Palestine experienced a severe drought and subsequent famine which necessitated the release of grain from the public stores in Jerusalem. Before releasing the grain from the public stores the governor of Jerusalem required the permission of the \textit{majlis al-shura}. The \textit{majlis} did grant its permission, but only for the sale of 1,000 kilos and at the inflated price of thirty-six piastres per kilo. In the face of this inflated price, and the destitution of the populace a mere forty kilos of grain were sold. To decrease the price of the grain, and bring it within the price range of the majority of the population, the governor needed a further decree from the \textit{majlis}. The notables sitting on the \textit{majlis}, however, were reluctant to issue this decree, knowing full well that any grain which remained unsold at the end of the year would be divided among themselves.\textsuperscript{15}

During the early 1850s the Nablusi \textit{majlis al-shura} emerged as the central arena in the struggle between the soap manufacturers and merchants of the city


who controlled the *majlis* and the central government. In 1851 the soap manufacturers and merchants of Nablus launched a tax strike protesting customs regulations introduced in 1846 which challenged their control of the flow of commodities and cancelled tax exemptions enjoyed by the soap industry. The new regulations, which were applicable to all processed goods, levied three taxes on the transit of goods: *amd*, *raft*, and *kharj* -- entering, exiting, and exporting. The soap merchants reluctantly, and only after a rather bitter exchange with the governor in Jerusalem, agreed to pay the *amd* and *raft* taxes.

However, the soap interests of Nablus balked at payment of the *kharj* tax on Nablusi soap shipped overland to Egypt, Damascus, and Jerusalem, the principal markets for the product. The soap merchants and manufacturers argued that whereas the *firman* establishing the new customs regulations specifically mentioned the *kharj* on goods passing through port cities it made no mention of overland transit. Throughout the correspondence concerned with this struggle the *majlis al-shura*, as a body, openly supported the strike and labelled the position of the soap merchants and manufacturers fair and just.16

In the midst of the struggle over the new customs regulations the *majlis al-shura* also involved itself in a dispute with the government over new regulations which prescribed that all commodities collected as *miri* tax in kind were to be auctioned to the highest bidder, whether local interests or agents representing foreign concerns. If implemented, this new regulation threatened the powerful soap interests of Nablus in a two-fold manner: it meant the end of their first right to olive oil collected as *miri* tax, and, perhaps more importantly, created inflationary pressure on all olive oil, already the most expensive commodity in soap production, produced in the region. Faced with a direct challenge to their

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16 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic ...," pp. 369-380.
profits, the soap interests of Nablus banded together to defy the central government, and, again, had the full support of the members of the majlis al-shura, who, with the possible exception of one individual, were themselves all involved in the soap industry.\textsuperscript{17}

Though the final outcome of the above disputes is not clear -- Finn's narrative does not carry the dispute over the sale of wheat in Jerusalem to its conclusion and the record in Nablus ends before either dispute was resolved -- the question of whether the notables or the central government prevailed is secondary for present purposes.

In the three cases described the majlis al-shura was used as the vehicle through which notable interests attempted to frustrate the initiatives of the central authorities. In Jerusalem, the notables saw an opportunity to reap increased profits from their control of the grain surplus, on the other hand, the notables of Nablus fought to ensure that their profit margin did not shrink. The government, in its attempt to implement policies of benefit to the population as a whole or the well-being of the central treasury, but which adversely affected those who sat on the majlis al-shura, was confronted with a concerted effort to frustrate its initiatives by the very body created to effect administrative and fiscal change. The notables of Jerusalem and Nablus acted to expand or protect their material base, and win or lose, their actions represented those of a group acting in the interests of a specific and identifiable class, namely themselves.

The final imposition of Ottoman control in Palestine in the early 1860s may have precluded such overt opposition to the initiatives of the central government in the future, but it did not signal the end of the use of the majlis as a means of material accumulation, nor an end to notable dominance within

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., pp. 360-369.
Palestinian society. The cost to both sides in the struggles of the 1840s and 1850s convinced each of the need to reach an accommodation if either was to prosper. The central government did possess the power to contain the notables by military force if necessary, but such actions were quite costly and extremely counter-productive. If the government was to attain its goal of increased revenue, the co-optation of the notables was a far more expedient tactic. Given the fiscal imperatives of the government, the government's granting of unparalleled power to the majlis al-shura, with the concomitant opportunities for notable self-aggrandizement, becomes quite comprehensible. The notables gained the legitimization of their dominant position within society and an important means of accumulation, which in turn gave them a vested interest in the success of the various administrative reforms originating in Istanbul. For its part, the central government benefited from the increase in economic activity, which in turn increased the taxable base of the Empire, while at the same time gaining the necessary conduits for the implementation of its centralizing policies.

The interaction between the notables of Palestine and the central government was not transformed overnight into an idyllic relationship. Until the end of the Ottoman era the notables and Istanbul maintained an uneasy truce, with each vying for supremacy. Nonetheless, the situation which existed in the closing decades of the nineteenth century was far different from that of the early decades of the century. Whereas recourse to arms had once been the preferred method of expressing independence a far subtler process of give and take now prevailed.

Within Jerusalem, the position of the leading notable families was further enhanced by the creation of a municipal council -- majlis al-baladiyya -- in the early 1860s. Far more limited in its range of powers than the majlis al-idara, the majlis al-baladiyya nonetheless mirrored its larger counterpart as a vehicle for
the expansion of notable influence. Moreover, the establishment of the majlis al-baladiyya in Jerusalem in the early 1860s reflected Istanbul's growing concern with the affairs of the city and the growing presence of foreigners therein.¹⁸

Whereas control of the majlis al-idara afforded notable families the opportunity to dominate the land regime and to expand their rural clientele networks, the majlis al-baladiyya provided parallel opportunities within the urban environment. In addition to controlling a substantial budget -- £T11,000 in 1913 -- the municipal council was charged with a wide range of duties concerned with the day to day running and control of the city, law and order, public services, taxation, and commerce. Among the responsibilities of the majlis al-baladiyya were the supervision of all construction in the city, the expropriation of land in the public interest, the sale of surplus land after roads were laid out, leasing of public lands and properties, registration of urban property, the farming of taxes used to support the activities of the council, and approval of municipal appointments.¹⁹ Moreover, the majlis al-baladiyya of Jerusalem oversaw the activities of all other municipal councils within the vilayet of Jerusalem, thus affording the opportunity for the notables of Jerusalem to extend their influence throughout all the urban centres of the vilayet.

The dominance which a limited number of families exercised over the affairs of the majlis al-idara was reflected in the social composition of the majlis al-baladiyya, with "a close corporation of Arab families, not recognized by law,

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¹⁹ Kark, "The Jerusalem Municipality ...," pp. 125-139.
but influential by position," usurping all the municipal offices. The clique which dominated the municipal council became even more narrowly defined in the case of the mayor: throughout the Ottoman period the office of mayor was filled almost solely by members of the Husayni and Khalidi families.

Yusuf Diya Khalidi, was appointed mayor in 1866 and held the office continuously for the next eight years, and again briefly in 1876 and 1879. From 1879 through the end of the Ottoman era the Husaynis dominated the mayoralty of Jerusalem -- Salim Husayni and his sons, Husayn Salim and Musa Kazim, served a total of twenty-nine years.

In 1898 Tewfiq Bey Pasha, vali of Jerusalem from 1897-1901, attempted to break the Husayni's monopoly and restore the political equilibrium within the city by divesting them of certain key administrative posts. In the aftermath of the 1898 elections, which saw both Husayni and Khalidi candidates competing for the office of mayor, Tewfiq Bey chose Yasin Khalidi over the Husayni candidate. During the following decade the mayoralty rotated between the Khalidis, Husaynis, Alamis, and Dajanis but in 1909 the Husaynis regained their monopoly of the mayor of Jerusalem.

The majlis al-idara and the majlis al-baladiyya had the combined effect of elevating certain notable families from Jerusalem to a position of almost total

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22 In the 1898 elections the Khalidis put forth one candidate and the Husaynis put forth two. All three were elected to the majlis al-baladiyya thus leaving the choice in the hands of Tewfiq. The pressure exerted by a member of the Khalidi family holding an important administrative post in Istanbul -- most likely Shaykh Khalil al-Jawad, who was president of the Shari'a Examination Council at the time -- also played a role in Tewfiq's selection of Yasin Khalidi. On the 1898 elections see Gerber, *Ottoman Rule,...*, pp. 133-134 and "A New Look at the Tanzimat: The Case of the Province of Jerusalem," in Kushner, ed., *Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period,...*, p. 41.
dominance within both the city and the entire vilayet. Individuals could, and
did, serve simultaneously on both councils, while at the same time retaining
important religious offices. This situation enabled certain families to consolidate
into their hands an unprecedented amount of political, social, and economic
power. In light of the benefits derived from participation in the new
administrative regime it is little wonder that the notable families of Jerusalem
most often cooperated with the authorities in Istanbul.

The growing bureaucratization of the Ottoman Empire and the
concentration of power into the hands of a small number of notable families
increasingly stratified Palestinian society and led growing numbers of the
peasantry to place themselves under the "protection" of notable patrons.
Clientelism had long been a feature of Palestinian society, and indeed all
agriculturally-based societies, but the centralization of the late nineteenth century
served to vastly increase its importance. Previously, when power was of a
more diffuse and localized nature, rural shaykhs possessed sufficient influence
and authority to protect the interests of the peasantry. The gradual erosion of
the power of rural shaykhs, and their eventual displacement in the latter part of
the nineteenth century by the newly-created position of mukhtar, necessitated the
acquisition of patrons whose influence extended from the village level to the
highest echelons of the new administration.

23 For a discussion of the effects of centralization on patron-client relationships see René Lemarchand and Keith
Legg, "Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis," Comparative Politics, 4 (1971/72): 152-
155 and 159.

24 On the decline of rural shaykhs, the office of mukhtar, and the growth of notable-dominated clientele networks
see Gabriel Baer, "The Office and Function of the Village Mukhtar," in Joel S. Migdal, ed., Palestinian Society and
Effects of Regime Policies on Social Cohesion and Fragmentation," in Migdal, ed., Palestinian Society ..., pp. 11-
12.
While the notability as a whole benefited from the destruction of localized relationships and the increased stratification of Palestinian society, the notables who dominated the civic councils were the primary beneficiaries of this altered social reality. The civic councils enabled the notables who dominated them to combine the social power which they already possessed, and which was not dependent upon the state, with their newly-acquired access to authority, thereby establishing themselves as the indispensable intercessors between the central authorities and the local populace.

The role of the notable patrons, however, was not confined to the mere advocacy of peasant interests; if a patron was to maintain, or, in fact, expand, his clientele network he must also provide tangible material benefits for his clients, and the power of the civic councils provided unparalleled opportunities in this area. The councils' control of the land regime, iltizams, the census, the collection of the farda and in turn the vergil, supervision of construction on state and awqaf lands, letting of contracts for government work, and the appointment of certain officials placed at their disposal a wide range of benefits and services which allowed them to extend their clientele networks into all strata of Palestinian society.

The central authorities were not oblivious to the growing power of the notables and the use of their positions to frustrate various initiatives while furthering the interests of a small oligarchy. The central government did not remain quiescent in this situation and on occasion did assert its authority. In 1860 Süreyya Pasha, the mutasarrif of Jerusalem, attempted to broaden the class basis of the majlis al-shura and replaced a number of members from established

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families with merchants. Rauf Pasha dismissed the entire Jerusalem *majlis al-idara* in 1879, ostensibly because of inconsistencies within certain land transfers, and used his influence to ensure the appointment of members whom he favoured. Both the Husaynis and the Khalidis were dismissed from office at this time but the Khalidis, especially, suffered as a result of Rauf Pasha's purge. The singling out of the Khalidis was in all likelihood punishment for Yusuf Diya Khalidi's role as the leader of the opposition during the 1876 parliament.\(^{26}\)

Despite the efforts of certain governors to break the control of the local oligarchy, a number of systemic and socioeconomic factors worked against the success of their efforts. Firstly, the very structure of the membership, as decreed by Istanbul, insured that the membership of the councils was drawn from a select group of families. Sitting on the Jerusalem *majlis al-shura* and *majlis al-idara* as *ex officio* members were the governor, or his deputy, the *molla qadi* -- who acted as president of the council -- the *mufti*, the accountant-general, and one representative each from the Greek Orthodox, Latin, Armenian, and Jewish communities. The *ex officio* members were supplemented by a lesser number of elected members, usually numbering four. While there was a certain amount of rotation among the elected members a significant number were continually drawn from the same families. Moreover, eligibility to sit on the councils was limited to those who paid 500 piastres per annum in taxes.\(^{27}\)

Secondly, the transient nature of the *vali* of Jerusalem, in contrast to the continuity of the local notables, mitigated against the success of the *vali* and often

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\(^{26}\) Scholch, "Jerusalem in the 19th Century ...," p. 243.

shortened the life of any initiatives they were able to implement. Most valis served an average of two years -- between 1864 and 1913 twenty-three individuals served in Jerusalem -- and some as little as a few months. The longest serving vali was Rauf Pasha --1877-1889 -- yet even his tenure was marked by an almost constant feud with the Husaynis and Khalidis, and while Rauf Pasha managed to temporarily unseat the Husaynis and Khalidis in 1879 he never managed to successfully curb their power.28 Additionally, the notable families which dominate the councils were able to use their own patrons, sometimes family members, in Istanbul to frustrate the efforts of the local governors and at times conspire for their dismissal.29

Lastly, the Ottomans recognized that while they may have succeeded in imposing a far greater degree of central control in the provinces the established notables had played a crucial role in this process. The notables who controlled the councils did not attempt to undermine all the policies put forth by Istanbul or the local governors, only those which directly affected their interests. The councils did act as the government's agent in the implementation of changes, and if the notables benefited from their manipulations so too did the government, especially the central treasury. The central government, indeed, had to allow the local notables a certain amount of freedom if they wished to exploit the linkages between the notables and the local populace.

The emergence of the various civic councils in Palestine during the second half of the nineteenth century were the crucial nexus in the emergence of a

28 Finn, Stirring Times ..., p. 181; Kushner, "The Ottoman Governors ...," pp. 274-290.

29 F. O. 424/91, Layard to Salisbury, 20 October 1879; F. O. 424/192, Dickson to Curries, 8 November 1897. During Layard's visit to Jerusalem, Rauf Pasha complained "greatly" of Istanbul's interference. The fact that Ibrahim Pasha was dismissed as vali of Jerusalem right at a time when he was involved in a struggle with the Husayni family suggests that the Husayni's use of patrons in Istanbul may have had something to do with this occurrence.
unified upper class. Through the use of these councils the Palestinian Arab notables were able to deflect challenges to their position of social and economic dominance while at the same time extending their influence over, and domination of, the local peasantry and the rural surplus. While much has been made of the inter-familial rivalries which continued to be a characteristic of Palestinian society such discussions are misdirected. The presence of inter-familial rivalries in the nineteenth century no more precluded class consolidation than does the existence of rival political parties in contemporary society. The notables of Jerusalem and Nablus certainly did not blanch at the prospect of gaining at the expense of their rivals, but the crucial point remains that they reacted as a group when challenged, either from above or below. Nor did this class remain complacent in the face of their dominance over local institutions. In order to ensure that their position within Ottoman society and politics was not usurped, the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus continuously adapted themselves to the changing realities of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

Educational and Adaptation

In the latter part of the nineteenth century the increasing professionalization of the Ottoman administration meant that religious training was no longer sufficient to rise within the higher echelons of the bureaucratic infrastructure. Increasingly, coveted positions within the administration were reserved for those with a "modern" education, received either at a European institution or at one of the higher schools in Istanbul, especially the Mekteb-i Mülkiye -- Civil College -- and Mekteb-i Harbiye -- War College. In order to preserve their positions, and to ensure that their families were included in the new "aristocracy of service," the notable families of Jerusalem and Nablus
increasingly sent their sons to Istanbul, the local European schools, such as the Bishop Gobat College in Jerusalem or the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, or to Europe itself, to gain an education. The movement towards a Europeanized education did not, however, mean that religious education was completely neglected by the notable families. Rather, there was a tendency to combine both religious and secular education, either within an individual or among members of the family, thereby ensuring the family's access to all positions within the administrative structure. Moreover, families with inferior social prestige due to their lack of influence within the religious sphere, such as the Nashashibis, displayed a tendency to compensate for this shortfall by concentrating on higher education.30

The growing movement towards secular education, or a combination of secular and religious education, as a means of ensuring continued familial influence was amply evidenced by all the families with which the present work is concerned. An exploration of the educational careers, and subsequent professional lives, of various family members serves not only as a demonstration of their individual histories but also of the larger trend within the notable community of Palestinian society as a whole.

Over the course of the nineteenth century the Shari'a courts of Jerusalem, the Khalidis traditional base of power, lost much of their power to the newly-established secular courts and this fact seems to have led the Khalidi family to pursue secular education more vigorously than the other religious families of Jerusalem. Indeed, Yehoshua Porath claims that the Khalidi's influence radically declined during the late Ottoman period.31 However, this assertion

30 Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration .... p. 45n.
31 Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian .... p. 13.
seems based on the assumption that their decline paralleled the decline of the Shari'a court and takes no account of the numerous positions they continued to hold nor the education which made this possible.

Yusuf Diya Khalidi (1841/42-1906) who first served as mayor of Jerusalem at the age of twenty-four and led the opposition within the 1876 Ottoman parliament at the age of thirty five, began his education at the Bishop Gobat School in Jerusalem. Following his time at the Bishop Gobat School, Yusuf Diya spent two years at the Protestant College at Malta, after which time he moved to Istanbul where he studied at the Medical College and for a short time at the newly-founded American Robert College.32

Ruhi Khalidi (1864-1913), sat in the 1908, 1911, and 1912 Ottoman parliaments and was the author of the first work on comparative literary studies in modern Arabic literature -- Ta'rikh 'ilm al-adab 'ind al-Ifrani wa al-Arab wa-Fiktor Huku -- as well as numerous political and scientific studies, received both a religious and secular education. Ruhi studied at the Alliance Israélite Universelle in Jerusalem, received a religious and linguistic education at various schools in Jerusalem, Nablus Tripoli, and Beirut -- likely the Syrian Protestant College -- and studied philosophy, law, and politics at the Royal College in Istanbul.33

The Khalidis, however, did not totally abandon religious education or the benefits derived from such a path. Shaykh Khalil Jawad Khalidi, a member of the Shari'a Publications Council, President of the Shari'a Examination Council in Istanbul, and President of the Jerusalem Shari'a Court of Appeal from 1921 to

1935, received his education at al-Azhar in Cairo and the Qadi's College in Jerusalem.34

Given the continued importance of the religious positions -- mufti and naqib al-ashraf -- which the Husaynis dominated, the educational path of members of the family differed from that of the Khalidis. Nonetheless, the Husaynis did combine secular education with their religious training. Musa Kazim Husayni (1850-1934), a graduate of the Mülkiye, served as a qa'immaqam and a mutasarrif in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, mayor of Jerusalem from 1918 to 1920, was a founding member of the Jerusalem Muslim-Christian Association, and President of the Arab Executive from 1920 until his death in 1934.35

The education of Hajj Amin Husayni (1895-1974) who, while not gaining prominence in the Ottoman period, did go on to become the most influential political figure in Palestine during the Mandate exemplified the combination of secular and religious training within the religious notability. Hajj Amin began his education in Jerusalem at a local Islamic elementary school -- küttab -- before attending the Alliance Israélite Universelle and Frères, a local French school. Hajj Amin then travelled to Cairo where he studied at al-Azhar, Rashid Rida's school, and most likely attended the University of Egypt where he studied literature. After the completion of his studies in Cairo, Hajj Amin turned to


secular studies, attending the *Harbiye* in Istanbul until his studies were interrupted by the outbreak of World War I.36

Little information is available on the specific educational activities of the Nashashibi family other than those of Ragheb Nashashibi. Ragheb (1875-1951) studied engineering at the University of Istanbul then gained a seat in the 1912 Ottoman parliament and served as mayor of Jerusalem from 1920 to 1934.37 Nonetheless, given the information available on the various careers of members of the family it seems safe to assume that these individuals received higher education in fields such as engineering, economics, medicine and literature.38

Similarly, there is little information on the educational activities of the 'Abd al-Hadi and Tuqan families. However, the information which is available allows us to conclude that higher education did play a role in their quest for office in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 1856, Salih 'Abd al-Hadi, at the time *qa'immaqam* of Haifa, told the sister of the British Vice-Consul in Haifa that he planned to send two of his sons to the Latin College at Ayntûra near Beirut.39 The educational background of 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi is also instructive for the present purposes. 'Awni (1889-1970) received his elementary and preparatory education in Nablus, Beirut, and the Marjan preparatory school in Istanbul. He then attended the *Mülkiye* for two years before travelling to Paris


38 Members of the Nashashibi family who were identified as having received a higher education include: Dr. Ali Umar, Aref Hikmat, Azmi, Fakhri, Ibrahim, Is'af -- who also studied theology -- and Sa'id. Gerber, "The Ottoman Administration ....," p. 45n; Nashashibi, *Jerusalem's Other Voice* ..., pp. 3 and 14-21.

where he received a law degree from the Sorbonne. While 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi never served within the Ottoman administration, his educational career does denote such a goal had the Ottoman Empire not ceased to exist.

These individuals, and numerous others, often represented the younger, educated generation frequently discussed in the literature on early twentieth century Palestine and the rise of Arab nationalism. The description of these, and other individuals, as representing a break from the past is, however, misleading. This educated elite was still drawn from the same notable families who dominated Palestinian society during the nineteenth century. The methodology may have changed, and the faces might be younger, but the entry of these individuals onto the Palestinian stage in many ways represented no more than yet another form of notable adaptation.

Even in the face of changes within the Ottoman administration occasioned by the 1908 Revolution, the established notable families of Jerusalem, among whom the Nashahibis must be included by this time, and Nablus managed to preserve, if not increase, their positions within local society and the larger political structure of the Empire. In addition to retaining their positions within the local administrative structure, the Husaynis, Khalidis, Nashashibis, 'Abd al-Hadis and Tuqans had at least one family member elected to one or more of the Ottoman parliaments between 1908 and 1914.

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There did exist a number of tensions between the C. U. P. and the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus, especially over issues such as the use of Turkish for administrative discourse and the sale of state lands to Zionist colons. Some members of the notable families joined, and often took part in the founding of opposition movements, and a number of Palestinian delegates to the Ottoman parliaments were members of the Entente Liberal. Nonetheless, the specific aims of these individuals did fit into established patterns. The protest against the so-called Turkification movement was a protest against the exclusion from administrative and judicial office of those who did not understand Turkish, a significant portion of the local notability. The protest against the sale of land to Zionists, which became one of the chief rallying points of the oppositionist Entente Liberal, was a protest against the loss of a virtual monopoly over mawat lands, as well as the weakening of clientele networks due to the dispossession of indigenous clients at the hands of the Zionists. The goals, and opposition to policies which impeded these goals, during the C. U. P. era were little different from the protests of the majlis al-shura in the mid-nineteenth century. The character of the actors in the centre may have changed, but the character of the central actors in Jerusalem and Nablus remained remarkably consistent, from at least 1840 to the end of the Ottoman era.
Chapter III: The Fruits of Power

Palestinian Arab notables used the political and social power they acquired over the course of the nineteenth century to gain control of the expanding economic sector. Religious notables, and their allies, gained control of an inordinate amount of *awqaf* properties; members of the civic councils acquired large landed estates through the manipulation of the laws governing the land regime; Nablusi notables used profits gained by their control of the agricultural surplus to gain control of, and expand, the local soap industry; finally, the notables of the *vilayet* of Jerusalem encouraged and dominated citriculture, the single largest export commodity passing through Jaffa by the close of the nineteenth century.

This chapter explores the factors which enabled a small number of Palestinian notables to gather such a large portion of land, both urban and rural, under their control. An examination of the manipulation of *awqaf* and the utility of bureaucratic, administrative position sheds light on some of the forces behind land accumulation, and in the process also calls into question some of the more commonly held perceptions concerning the land regime in nineteenth century Palestine.

The study of soap production and citriculture offers concrete examples of the material gain which certain notable families accrued as a result of their social and political positions. Soap production was instrumental in the transformation of the Nablusi elites, and a considerable determinant in Nablus' relationship with the regional and European economies. By the end of the nineteenth century, citriculture was the most lucrative form of capital investment within the agricultural sector as well as the focus of a number of the notables of the *vilayet* of Jerusalem. Moreover, the study of soap production and citriculture raises a number of questions concerning Palestine's relationship to the world economy,
the nature of capital accumulation in the area, and the overall economic development of nineteenth century Palestine.

Urban and Rural Land Accumulation

The manipulation of various provisions governing the disposal of awqaf properties was one of the primary means of accumulation for the religious notables of Jerusalem and Nablus in the first half of the nineteenth century. The manipulation of awqaf enabled religious notables, and to a lesser extent their secular notable allies, to gain control of large portions of urban real estate at the very time its value was sky-rocketing in the face of growing population pressures. Urban notables, especially those of Jerusalem, were also able to expand their influence in the rural sector through control of awqaf, such as the Khasseki Sultan waqf, which possessed large rural holdings. Moreover, the manipulation of awqaf exemplifies the amalgamation of social, political, and economic power in the hands of ranking members of the Palestinian ulama.

Originating in the first Islamic century, with tradition holding that the first waqf was established by 'Umar upon the advice of Muhammad, the purpose of awqaf was to provide income for various charitable institutions such as mosques, madrasas, and imarets.1 The charitable nature of awqaf was soon expanded to include family awqaf, whose main purpose was to circumvent the strictures of Islamic inheritance laws while concomitantly serving to safeguard property against arbitrary confiscation in times of political insecurity. The most

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salient feature of both *khayri* -- charitable or public -- and *dhurri* -- family or private -- types of *awqaf* was that they were made in perpetuity and were an irrevocable legal transaction.

By the nineteenth century the majority of urban real estate in Palestine, including mosques, *madrasas* and other religious structures, caravanserais, shops, stores, warehouses, coffeehouses, public ovens, baths, soap factories, water installations, and apartments, was endowed as *awqaf*. While most notable families held a variety of *dhurri awqaf* -- the endowing of the first family *waqf* was usually the most important step in consolidating the future fortunes of the family and a mark of success\(^2\) -- the goal now became control of, in whole or in part, of the numerous *khayri awqaf* throughout Palestine. In the effort to circumvent the strictures which governed the disposition of *awqaf*, the positions of power which various family members occupied proved themselves invaluable.

The primary means employed in the nineteenth century to circumvent the laws governing *awqaf* was the use of *khulu* and *istibdal*. In existence since the sixteenth or seventeenth century *khulu* -- more broadly known as *hikr* -- was originally designed to give tenants of *awqaf* an incentive to maintain and improve dilapidated *waqf* property. In return for his efforts, and an initial payment to the administrator of the *waqf*, the tenant was granted priority of lease on the property, albeit this was to be a lease of short duration after which time the *waqf* would repurchase the property at market value plus the added value.

By the nineteenth century *khulu* had been distorted to the point where it often meant that the tenant gained *de facto* control over the property. Supposedly short-term leases were now in fact leases in perpetuity with the tenants holding *de facto* private property rights. The crucial players in this transformation were the *mutawalli* of the *waqf* and local *qadis*, both of whom had to approve all *khulu* transactions. The *mutawallis* also bore further responsibility for the denigration of certain *awqaf* due to their failure to collect the rent due: the failure to collect rent often led to portions of the *waqf* becoming known as the leasee's property. Obviously then the control of these positions, or influence over the individuals holding these positions, facilitated the acquiring of control over the properties of various *awqaf*. The duplicity of the *mutawallis* and *qadis* in the transformation of *awqaf* in Palestine led J. B. Barron, writing in 1922, to comment that "the conversion of Wakfs held as *ijare wahide* [short-term lease] into *ijaretein* [long-term lease] proceeded at a rapid rate in the nineteenth century, mainly through the dishonesty of the local Kadis and Mudirs [*mutawallis*] of Awkaf, who were often interested parties in such transactions. ... vast tracts of land were converted about this period into *ijaretein*, the Wakf being the sole loser, whilst the mutawalli received a considerable accession in his income."³

The widespread use of *khulu* in the nineteenth century is evidenced by the establishment of seventy-four new *khulus* in Jerusalem between 1805 and 1820. The majority of the *khulus* in this period were established on residential buildings, albeit the two largest were on deteriorated soap mills and involved the Husayni and Khalidi families.⁴ This sudden interest in residential properties is

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explained by the continuous expansion of Jerusalem's population during the
nineteenth century, and the desire of the notables to benefit from this
development.

In Nablus the 'Abd al-Hadis used the practice of *istibdal* to substantially
increase their holdings during the 1830s and 1840s. *Istibdal* was the practice
whereby *waqf* property was exchanged if the *mutawalli* could show that it was
no longer producing revenue. Such dispensation was granted if it could be
shown that the property had deteriorated due to natural elements and/or a lack of
money for maintenance or the wish of the *mutawalli* to sacrifice part of the *waqf*
in order to renovate or expand another *waqf*. This practice was as open to abuse
as that of *khulu* and was widely used by the emerging families of Nablus to
increase their holdings at the expense of those whose political fortunes were on
the decline. Through their alliance with the Khammash family, especially 'Abd
al-Wahad Khammash, *qadi* of Nablus from 1832 to 1843 and again from 1850 to
1859, the 'Abd al-Hadis were able to effect the transfer, through the use, or
misuse, of *istibdal* to gain control of, or interest in, a number of soap mills and
ownership of a substantial amount of urban property from the hands of the
older families.5

The transparency of the abuse of *istibdal* and the need for connections
within the Islamic judicial system to effect these dubious transfers was
exemplified by the controversy surrounding the legitimate ownership of a soap
mill which had been within the Nimr family since the seventeenth century. In
1838, Ahmad Agha Nimr exchanged half the family interest in a soap mill with
Ibrahim Muhammad 'Anabtawi, an ally of the 'Abd al-Hadis, for 18,000
piasters. The transfer was originally approved by 'Abd al-Wahad Khammash but

5 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ....," pp. 94, 122-124 and 127-130. .

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in 1865 'Abd al-Fattah Agha Nimr disputed the legitimacy of the transaction. 'Abd al-Fattah argued that the exchange had been illegal from the outset because the soap factory was operational and profitable at the time of the transaction. 'Abd al-Fattah was successful in his petition and the original exchange was invalidated and upon the payment of 18,000 piastres the Nimr family regained control of the soap mill.6

In addition to the abuse of *khulu* and *istibdal*, the religious notables of Palestine used their positions of power to gain a disproportionate control of public *awqaf* through the office of *mutawalli*. Stewardship of public *awqaf* provided the *mutawalli* with a salary, the opportunity to distribute patronage in the form of employment, and the ability to dictate the fate of the properties under his control.

Among the largest and most important public *awqaf* in Palestine was the Khasseki Sultan *waqf*. Founded in 1552 by Khasseki Khurrem, the wife of Sulayman I, as an *imaret* for the poor and students in Jerusalem the *waqf* drew its income from twenty-five villages in five *sanjaqs* -- Jerusalem, Gaza, Nablus, Safad and Sidon -- and various urban properties such as public baths, caravanserais, shops, covered markets, soap factories, and flour mills which had been endowed on its behalf.7 Control of this vast *waqf* provided not only the opportunity of increased influence throughout the lands under its control but also the ability to distribute largesse in the form of employment to various


clients. In the past, members of the Husayni family had served as *mutawalli* of Khasseki Sultan, but by 1840 this valued position was in the hands of the Darwish family. Nonetheless, through their alliance with the Darwish family, the Husaynis retained access to this important *waqf* and the benefits which derived from this access. In addition to their interests in the Khasseki Sultan *waqf*, the Husaynis also served as *mutawalli* of the Nabi Musa -- the Prophet Moses -- and Abu Maydan -- founded by the Maghribi mystic Abu Maydan Shu'ayb in 1320 -- *awqaf*. While not as large as the Khasseki Sultan *waqf*, these *awqaf* were imbued with great religious and social prestige. The annual festival surrounding Nabi Musa was a centre-piece of Islamic religious life in Palestine and it developed into a centre of nationalist sentiment in the twentieth century. The Abu Maydan *waqf*, which controlled the properties in the area in front of the Wailing Wall, also became a focus of nationalist sentiment. In the late nineteenth century, Baron Edmond de Rothschild attempted to orchestrate the exchange of the Abu Maydan properties for other lands: in response to this effort, Bashir Husayni, at the time *mutawalli* of the *waqf*, argued that no such transaction was allowed due to the illegality of selling *waqf* lands. Bashir's success in this matter helped reaffirm the Husayni credentials while at the same time undoubtedly winning the gratitude of the substantial Maghribi neighbourhood which occupied this district.

The central authorities were well aware of the benefits which arose from the control of *awqaf* and attempted to exert their influence over their disposition. In 1831, Muhammad Ali expropriated large tracts of land controlled by the

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Khasseki Sultan *waqf*. Nonetheless the income generated by the *waqf* remained substantial -- when control was turned over to the Supreme Muslim Council in the 1920s its annual revenues still amounted to £E10,400 -- as did the influence of those who controlled it. In 1840, the Ottomans established a Ministry of *Awqaf* in an attempt to centralize the control of these vast properties and direct some of their revenue to governmental priorities. In the face of opposition from the *ulema*, who sanctimoniously attacked these reforms by citing the sacred origins of *awqaf* and accusing the reformers of undermining the very foundations of Islam, little of the original intent of the reforms was ever carried through. A disproportionate number of public *awqaf* remained in the hands of a small group of religious notables who used, and abused, these properties for their own self-aggrandizement.

The acquisition of urban property through the manipulation of *awqaf* was in many ways mirrored by the entry of established notable and emergent merchant families into the rural land market. Impelled by the commercialisation of agriculture, certain Palestinian notable families acquired large landed estates in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The acquisition of these landed estates was not the result of an imaginary "stampede" of peasants bent upon the abalienation of their land in the aftermath of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code.

Certainly, the 1858 Land Code did play a role in the transformation of the land regime in nineteenth century Palestine, but its true impact and importance have often been misinterpreted. Assertions are regularly put forth that Palestinian notables perverted the Code to their own means and frustrated the true intentions of the central government, as the peasantry, fearing taxation and conscription, registered their land in the name of notable patrons. This line of

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9 Kupferschmidt, *The Supreme Muslim Council* ... , p. 111 and 114-117.
argumentation further posits that land speculation, not agricultural enterprise, was the motive force which impelled notable acquisition of land.\textsuperscript{10}

The 1858 Code was not a revolutionary departure from contemporary practices, rather it was the logical extension of centralizing tendencies of the Tanzimat into the areas of land tenure and land taxation. The Code was an integral part of the larger program -- of which the majlis were a crucial component -- aimed at the creation of an administrative infrastructure which would provide more efficient access to the economic base of the Empire. In pursuit of this goal, the 1858 Code was aimed at asserting of the state's ultimate authority over miri land and a concomitant increase in state revenues. The central government was little concerned with the fate of small-holders, as demonstrated by the fact that small-holders are mentioned only once in the Code, and then only in an oblique fashion. The fact that the central treasury's tithe revenue increased from 426 million piastres to 718 million piastres between 1887 and 1910 -- and this at a time when the land mass of the Empire was shrinking -- speaks of the success of the Code when viewed from the centre.\textsuperscript{11} Moreover, by 1913 ninety percent of the state's direct income was from agriculture, with tithe revenue accounting for half of this figure.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12} Stein, \textit{The Land Question} ..., p. 16.
Palestinian notables, especially those who sat on the *majlis* or had allies therein, certainly did benefit from the 1858 Land Code, but not for the reasons which are most commonly identified. A certain amount of dispossession of small-holders did occur in the nineteenth century and some peasants did register their land in the name of notable patrons or endow it as *waqf* on the condition that they continue to work it, but the Land Code's role in this process was not paramount.

Where the transfer of peasant land into the hands of the notables did occur, it was most often the result of peasant indebtedness, not the voluntary transfer of title. The change from taxation in kind to cash payment of the tithe led many of the peasantry to turn to money lenders to meet their obligations to the state. The central government was aware of the deleterious effects of the growth of usury and in 1851 fixed the maximum rate of interest allowable at eight percent -- increasing to nine percent in 1887 -- and prohibited the amount of the interest from exceeding the principal. Supervision of the new laws governing usury, however, was left in the hands of the *majlis*, most of whose members were themselves actively involved in money-lending. Moneylenders, in fact, continued to charge interest rates up to fifty percent per annum, and once caught in this vicious cycle the indebted peasant was often faced with the choice of either moving to urban centres or placing himself under the "protection" of a notable and becoming his tenant. Still, the incidence of

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peasant transfer was insufficient to account for the size of notable holdings by the end of the Ottoman era.

The purchase of *mawat* -- uncultivated state land -- and *mahlul* -- land which had lain fallow for three years or for which there was no heir -- lands was the most important factor in the emergence of large estates in nineteenth century Palestine.\(^{16}\) The 1858 Land Code provided the mechanism for notable acquisition of *mawat* and *mahlul* lands, but the necessary precondition needed to activate this mechanism was the existence of a class which combined power and capital. In turn, the *majlis al-shura* and the *majlis al-idara*, together with the promulgation of the *Vilayet* Law of 1864, provided the administrative framework which enabled the class which dominated them to use their power and capital to gain the majority of state lands for themselves.

The *majlis al-shura* and *majlis al-idara* imbued those who dominated them with an unprecedented amount of administrative authority which, in turn, allowed them to manipulate the initiatives of the central authorities to their own advantage, especially in the area of the land regime. The *Vilayet* Law of 1864 did divest the *majlis al-idara* of its judicial powers in the area of land disputes, but at the same time gave it total control over the issuing of *tapu* certificates, the granting of *iltizams*, the fate of *mahlul* lands and a significant voice in the disposition of *mawat* lands. The continued role of certain families within the *majlis al-idara* provided them with the necessary administrative authority to ensure that they were among the primary beneficiaries in the disposition of uncultivated lands.

The inter-relationship between positions on the *majlis*, or an alliance with members of the *majlis*, and the acquisition of land is seen by the success of the

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Husaynis, Nashashibis, and 'Abd al-Hadis. In the opening decades of the nineteenth century the Husaynis had virtually no interests in the rural areas, yet by 1919 they held 50,000 *dunums* in the districts of Jerusalem, Gaza, and Transjordan. The Nashashibis used the capital they acquired from mercantile activities and their influence in the *majlis* to enter the agricultural sector, and by the twentieth century were the richest land owners and citriculturalists in Palestine. In 1919 Osman Nashashibi alone held 15,000 *dunums* of land in the districts of Jaffa and Jerusalem. The 'Abd al-Hadis' control of rural lands originally enabled them to gain political influence. The family then used their political influence to further increase their rural holdings and by 1919 were the largest land owners in Jabal Nablus and possessed some 60,000 *dunums* of land.\(^{17}\)

Similarly, the Tuqans controlled the lands of the villages of "Burqa', Sannur, Siris, Djeba', and Fentakumiyah."\(^{18}\) However, it must be noted that not all branches of these, or other families, enjoyed equal success in the realm of land acquisition. Certain branches of the various notable families acquired far more land than others, and this, in turn, led to a great deal of differentiation within the larger family units themselves.\(^{19}\)

Speculation, however, was not the primary motive behind the acquisition of rural land. Certainly the price of rural land in Palestine did increase in the

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\(^{17}\) Stein, *The Land Question* ..., pp. 223-225.


\(^{19}\) By 1927 the 'Araba branch of the 'Abd al-Hadi family were the wealthiest members of the clan and owned 200,000 *dunums* of land. Within the Nablusi branch of the clan, the Mahmud and Husayn families overshadowed the Sulayman family. While this information is from the Mandate period it seems safe to assume that it is a reflection of a trend which began much earlier. Jaussen, *Coutumes Palestiniennes* ..., pp. 132-133; Smith, *Palestine and the Palestinians* ..., pp. 11-15.
latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries but this price increase was only minimally related to land speculation. Of far greater importance to the increase in the price of land was the commercialisation of agriculture and the demographic revolution which occurred in the nineteenth century. Some Palestinian Arab notables did sell land to, or act as land brokers for, the Zionists and German Templars, but the frequency of this prior to World War I has been overemphasized. In many cases the notable land holders did not even possess absolute freehold rights over the land they controlled but merely the right of usufruct. The distinction between miri and mulk tenure was increasingly blurred during the late Ottoman period but it was only with the Law of Transfers of Immovable Property of 1913 that holders of miri land were given "l'entière et libre disposition de leurs biens avec droit d'exploiter, vouer, vendre, hypothéquer et légeur."

Also mitigating against the widespread sale of land by Palestinian notables was the effect that such action would have upon their social base. Absentee


landlords, such as the Beiruti Sursuqs, did not derive any social power from landownership in Palestine. For them the sale of land, especially land which required substantial investment to bring under cultivation, was a profitable enterprise with few negative repercussions. In the case of Palestinian notables the sale of land, especially land occupied by tenant farmers, could seriously undermine the seller's social prestige and damage clientele networks which had only recently been forged. Given this situation, the Palestinian notables had to weigh the capital returns of agricultural production and possible damage to social status against the singular return derived from land sales to Zionists and German Templars. In the balance it appears that the former considerations prevailed until at least the end of the Ottoman era.

The control of awqaf properties and the ownership of landed estates combined to give the notables of Palestine access to the most lucrative forms of commercial enterprise in nineteenth century Palestine. The manipulation of the provisions governing awqaf were used extensively by the notables of Jabal Nablus to expand their interests in soap production. In both Jerusalem and Nablus, the notables control of awqaf provided them with a near monopoly of urban real estate at the very time when the demand for these properties, and therefore the income derived from control, was increasing. In the vilayet of Jerusalem, citriculture emerged as the most lucrative form of agricultural investment in the latter part of the century and it was to this endeavor that many


of the notables of the area devoted the lands which they acquired in the course of
the century.

Soap Production and Citiculture

The manufacture of soap was an important facet of the Palestinian economy from at least the tenth century: a tenth century Palestinian geographer, al-Maqqdisi, stressed the importance of soap manufacturing; the sijils records of the Jerusalem Shari'a courts show a soap mill registered as waqf in 1295; and, Ibn Batuta described the production of soap in Nablus in the fourteenth century.26 In the early centuries of Ottoman rule, Jerusalem was one of the centres of soap production in Palestine with many of the leading members of the ulema involved in its manufacture.27 Soap production remained a factor in Jerusalem's economy, with notables such as the Husaynis and Khalidis involved in its manufacture,28 but by the nineteenth century Nablus had replaced Jerusalem as the most important centre of the industry in the region.

Whereas cotton was once the most important export commodity in Jabal Nablus, and instrumental in the early integration of the region into the world


27 On soap production in sixteenth century Jerusalem see Cohen, Economic Life ..., pp. 81-97.

28 'Abd al-Latif bin Abdallah bin 'Abd al-Latif, the patriarch of the Husayni family, owned a soap factory in Jerusalem in the eighteenth century and in 1813 Umar ibn 'Abd al-Salam Husayni obtained a khulu on the waqf of 'Abd al-Latif and established a soap factory on the property. Musa Khalidi had interests in the soap business during the early years of the nineteenth century and in mid-century 'Abdullah Khalidi was named by Mrs. Finn, wife of the British consul in Jerusalem, as one of the six Jerusalem notables who had complete control of the local olive oil yield, which in all probability also meant involvement in soap manufacturing. Butrus Abu-Manneh, "The Husaynis: The Rise of a Notable Family in 18th Century Palestine," in Kushner, ed., Palestine in the Late Ottoman Period ..., p. 98; Gabriel Baer, "The Dismemberment of Awqaf ...", p. 241; Alexander Scholch, "European Economic Penetration and Economic Development of Palestine, 1856-82," in Owen, Studies in the Economic and Social History ..., p. 32.
economy, in the course of the nineteenth century it lost much of its importance. Except for a short-lived boom during the American Civil War, by the late 1860s cotton was no longer a crucial factor in the local economy. While still a factor in regional trade, Nablusi cotton had lost its international markets to the Egyptian juggernaut and the deleterious effects of the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Trade Convention. With the decline of cotton, those families who rode the wave of the cotton boom in the eighteenth century to positions of dominance now turned their attention to the burgeoning soap industry.

During the nineteenth century, most, if not all, of the towns of Syria and Palestine experienced a decline in their production of soap while that of Nablus trebled. By the end of the nineteenth century Nablusi soap accounted for one-quarter of the total production in greater Syria and represented one-fifth of all exports through the port of Jaffa. The growth of the Nablusi soap industry in the nineteenth century was a pivotal factor in the transformation of the nature of Nablusi elites and in Nablus' relationship with the world economy.

Prior to the nineteenth century, the notables of Nablus did not represent a unified, identifiable class. Rather they were composed of a disparate amalgamation of olive oil merchants, textile merchants, tax farmers, landowners and soap mill owners, each grouping with its own parochial interests. Soap production, and its meteoric rise in the nineteenth century, however, brought together artisanal, landed, and mercantile interests, forging them into a cohesive

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class which monopolized a large portion of the rural surplus and employed a substantial force of wage labourers. Furthermore, this newly emergent class acted as a unified whole in the face of challenges, both from below and above, to their position.

The manufacture of soap required the marshaling of commodities which cut across the entirety of the local economic base as well as the political power to hold together these disparate elements. Soap production required ready supplies of soda ash -- supplied by bedouin from the eastern banks of the Jordan -- lime, wood, and crushed olive pits - all supplied by local villages -- large quantities of olive oil -- the most expensive of all ingredients -- skilled labourers, and the premises in which to manufacture the product. Such an undertaking required substantial sums of money, and in the early nineteenth century no single economic group possessed the income or the power to combine the disparate elements involved.

The high cost of the manufacturing premises and the equally expensive copper vats in which the soap was cooked necessitated that all soap factories were held in partnership. The cost of the raw materials and labour dictated a further partnership between the owners of the mill and holders of capital. The quantities of olive oil required -- one tabkha, the standard measure of a batch of soap, required 5,000 kilos of olive oil at a cost of approximately 120,000 piastres -- necessitated the pooling of resources of the olive oil merchants.31 The lengthy turn around time required all investors to possess sufficient resources to await the return on their investment. Finally, the quantity of the soap produced required extensive trade contacts for marketing the finished product. Nonetheless, the high profits involved -- in 1825/26 the commission from

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31 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ...", pp. 293-294 and 312.
twenty-one tabkhas of soap brought the mill owner 10,000 piastres in profit -- led to the continuous construction of new factories and the upgrading of old ones throughout the nineteenth century.32

The migration of rural families to Nablus and their subsequent rise to political power created a force which possessed sufficient wealth, influence in the countryside, and political power to begin the centralization of the soap industry. These individuals used the monies they gained from their mercantile activities, their control of numerous iltizam, usurious contracts with the peasantry, and their growing political power to displace older established elites and to become the dominant force in the manufacture of soap.33

The correlation between wealth, political power, the soap industry, and the displacement of older, established families by emerging families is seen in the varying fortunes of the Tuqan and 'Abd al-Hadi families in the first half of the nineteenth century. In the first two decades of the century, the Tuqans, then at the zenith of their political power, used the large sums they obtained from their numerous iltizams to become the most aggressive purchasers of soap mills in Nablus.34 Following their political defeat in 1829, the Tuqans were forced to

32 At the end of the eighteenth century in Nablus there were approximately 9 soap factories producing 9,000 qintars of soap. In 1825 at least half of the soap factories in Nablus were undergoing renovations. From 1882 through the First World War there were thirty factories which in 1916 produced 20,000 tons of soap valued at £600,000 and which employed from two to three thousand individuals. Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change and the State ...", p. 307-308; Haim Gerber, Ottoman Rule in Jerusalem, 1890-1914 (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1985), p. 71 and The Social Origins ..., pp. 256 and 260; Charles Issawi, ed., The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914: A Documentary Economic History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988) p. 377 & Khalid Kishtainy, Palestine in Perspective ..., pp. 78 & 81.

33 The rise of rural migrants and merchants to the forefront of the Nablusi soap industry was shown by the circumstances surrounding the disposal of the estate of 'Abd al-Qadar Hanbali, a Nablusi soap manufacturer who died in debt in 1807. Among those gathered for the liquidation of the estate were a number of merchants who had commissioned soap from Hanbali. At the time none of these merchants possessed any shares in soap mills but without exception they, or their heirs, would go on to become soap mill owners in the 1830s and 1840s. Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ...," pp. 336-339.

34 Smith, Palestine and the Palestinians ..., p.24.
sell two of their soap factories to allies of the 'Abd al-Hadis in order to raise
desperately needed funds. In turn, the 'Abd al-Hadis used their position of
dominance to acquire substantial interest in the soap industry. The 'Abd al-
Hadis' political power facilitated their takeover of a soap factory owned by
Qasim al-Ahmad following his execution in 1834, the acquisition of interest in
two soap mills owned by the Nimr family, and exemption from taxation on the
output of their soap factories.35

In the course of the 1830s and 1840s, the newly urbanized large
landowners displaced the majority of the older established families from their
positions within the Nablusi soap industry. With the partial exception of the
Nimrs and the Tuqans, who retained only fragments of their previous interests,
the older families were gradually forced out of the industry which they
previously dominated. In their turn, rising merchant families entered into the
soap industry, injected additional capital which enabled the construction of new
mills and the expansion of older mills, and completed the process of displacing
the older families.

The arrival of merchants in the soap industry in the 1840s and 1850s did
not mean the displacement of those from the landowning class who themselves
had only just entered the soap industry. Quite the contrary, the growth of
merchant interest in soap manufacture led to the formation of a group which
shared in a common enterprise, had similar goals, and acted as a unified class
"for itself" which sought to avoid incursions on its position both from above and
below. The *majlis al-shura* rapidly emerged as the primary forum used by
Nablusi soap manufacturers to filter, direct, and circumvent initiatives from

35 Doumani, "Merchants, Socioeconomic Change ....," pp. 291, 299-300 and 338-350; Gerber, *Ottoman Rule ....*,
p.71.
Istanbul which threatened their interests. While the central government looked upon the majlis al-shura as a means to integrate the notables into the ruling structure and to rationalise income collection, the soap manufacturers saw it as a vehicle to frustrate the central treasury's efforts to extract greater tariffs from soap and to gain control of the raw materials, especially those collected as miri tax, needed for production. The notables of Nablus were not always successful in preventing the implementation of new regulations but they were able to slow the pace of implementation and quite often managed to wrest concessions from the central government which softened the effects of these changes.

In addition to transforming the nature of the internal political economy of Nablus, the soap industry also altered Nablus' relationship to the world economy. Whereas cotton had led to Nablus' integration into the world economy in the eighteenth century, soap production in the nineteenth century led to its partial "de-incorporation" and a concentration on local and regional markets. The deluge of European goods which flooded Middle Eastern markets, especially in the aftermath of the 1838 Anglo-Ottoman Trade Convention, caused the destruction of numerous indigenous handicrafts. The soap industry, however, not only remained immune from European competition but in fact prospered. Nablusi soap was able to resist European competition because the majority of the production was of a popular nature and much cheaper than any soap imported from Europe, while the best of the production was a highly prized, and expensive, luxury.

36 For specific examples of the struggle between the soap merchants of Nablus and the central government see chapter two.

37 Shmuel Avistur, "The Influence of Western Technology...," p. 490.
Not only did Nablusi soap remain immune from European competition and prove the central motor of the local economy, its growth was such that it actually reversed the normal pattern of trade within the European dominated world system. In the years just prior to the First World War Nablusi soap production had grown to such an extent that the quantity of locally produced olive oil was no longer sufficient to meet the demands of the industry. In 1911 and 1912 olive oil imports passing through Jaffa destined for the soap mills of Nablus amounted to 647 and 1,100 tons respectively. Over and above the importation of olive oil large quantities of coconut, cotton, and maize oil were imported for the manufacture of cheaper grades of soap.38

The prosperity of the Palestinian soap industry calls into question a number of the main tenets of world systems theory. World systems theorists assert that the majority of production in the Middle East was small-scale in nature, with the household as the primary unit of production, and that commerce therefore followed a pattern of commodity-species-commodity exchange.39 Another central tenet of world systems theory is that large-scale merchants involved in long-distance trade limited their activities to trade in luxury goods and did not invest their profits in productive activities but squandered them on conspicuous consumption or at best invested in land. Peter Gran exemplifies this trend with his assertion that the merchant capitalists of the Middle East differed from modern western capitalists "in that they did not seek to re-invest in trade or


production but in land, preferring an extractive relationship to productive processes as a matter of course."40

The modalities of the Nablusi soap industry counter these arguments on a number of points. Firstly, the soap industry was anything but a small-scale, household industry. Quite the contrary, the soap industry consisted of a small number of large enterprises which employed a considerable force of wage labourers. Secondly, soap merchants involved in long-distance trade dealt in both popular and luxury grades of soap and exchanged these goods both for other goods, especially Egyptian textiles for sale in Nablus and the Syrian interior, and species. Lastly, assertions that the merchant capitalists of the Middle East squandered their profits simply does not stand up to evidence surrounding the Nablusi soap industry. The continual upgrading of older soap factories and the construction of new ones throughout the nineteenth century belies assertions on the spendthrift ways of these merchants. The investment of mercantile capital in productive enterprises was clearly shown during the cotton boom of the early 1860s. During the American Civil War, cotton re-emerged as an important export crop for Jabal Nablus. The concomitant doubling of the number of soap factories between the 1860s and 1882 strongly suggests that the profits from this temporary cotton boom were re-invested in the local soap industry.41

40 Peter Gran, "Late-eighteenth-early-nineteenth-century Egypt: merchant capitalism or modern capitalism?" in Islamoglu-Inan, The Ottoman Empire ..., p. 28.

Whereas the soap industry transformed the political economy of Nablus in the nineteenth century, citriculture performed a similar function in the vilayet of Jerusalem in the second half of the century. Citriculture existed in Palestine from at least the sixteenth century -- in 1775 Volney described Jaffa as surrounded by "a forest of orange and lemon trees"42 -- yet it was only in the nineteenth century that citrus emerged as a significant cash crop. In the second half of the nineteenth century the orange groves surrounding Jaffa were the most lucrative form of capital investment in the region and by the end of the century were the most valuable export commodity passing through the port of Jaffa -- trade in citrus fruit elevated Jaffa to a position of importance in the eastern Mediterranean second only to that of Beirut.43 Citriculture also transformed the nature of land tenure in the coastal plain, leading to the emergence of large estates as the dominant form of tenure in the region. Moreover, the study of citriculture refutes the polemical myth that it was Zionist colons who made the erstwhile barren lands of Palestine bloom. Until the Mandate period citriculture was an enterprise almost exclusively in the hands of the indigenous Palestinian Arab population.

In the interior hill country, the rugged terrain and the variety of crops grown meant that small holdings, especially mush'a'a, remained the dominant form of tenure.44 The notables of Jabal Nablus found it easier, and of greater monetary benefit, to exploit the peasantry through control of iltizams, salam

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43 Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," p. 78.

contracts, and money-lending rather than taking physical possession of the large tracts of land.\textsuperscript{45} The economies of scale involved in citriculture dictated that large estates were the dominant form of land holding in the coastal plains and barred all but the wealthy from participation in this enterprise. The large initial investment required and the lengthy turn around time on initial investment meant that only those who possessed sufficient capital reserves, or access to them, could undertake such ventures. Among those who did invest large sums in citriculture were the notables of Jerusalem, under whose administrative authority Jaffa fell. The Nashashibi family, in particular, gained from the orange trade, and by the end of the Ottoman era were the richest citrus fruit growers in Palestine.\textsuperscript{46}

The growth of citriculture, and the concomitant emergence of large estates, did not necessarily mean wide-spread dispossession of small-holders in the area. While a certain amount of dispossession likely did occur, the main factor was the extension of the area under cultivation.\textsuperscript{47} Notable control of the land regime, especially the disposition of \textit{mawat} lands, was of far greater importance in the growth of large estates in the coastal plain than the dispossession of small-holders. Equally important was the stability which came with the imposition of Ottoman control and the permanent stationing troops in the region which allowed those with the necessary influence and capital to expand their holdings in the fertile lands surrounding Jaffa.

\textsuperscript{45} This is not to say that certain notables did not emerge as absentee owners of large estates -- the 'Abd al-Hadis were among the largest landowners in Palestine by the end of the nineteenth century -- rather to point to the continued prevalence of small holdings in the hill country.


\textsuperscript{47} Scholch, "European Economic Penetration ...", p. 42.
In the 1870s there were approximately 400 orange groves covering 5,000 *dunums* in the lands surrounding Jaffa, producing approximately £25,000 profits *per annum*. As a result of "continuous planting" this figure had grown to 500 groves in the mid-1880s and by 1913 had mushroomed to 30,000 *dunums* under cultivation. As a result of "continuous planting" this figure had grown to 500 groves in the mid-1880s and by 1913 had mushroomed to 30,000 *dunums* under cultivation.48 Entry into the citrus business represented a substantial investment on the part of those involved: a 1908 British Consular report estimated that the cost of bringing a 100 dunum orange grove into production cost a total of £4,500.49 Indeed, the citriculture sector represented the largest single investment of capital in the Palestinian agricultural sector in the nineteenth century, with the value of the citrus groves of Palestine in the mid-1890s estimated at 14 to 17.5 million francs.50 However, the profits involved were commensurate with such investment. In 1881 the British Consular Agent in Jerusalem reported that citriculture was now regarded as the best form of capital investment in Palestine, with an annual net return of ten percent on the initial investment.51

The growing importance of citrus fruits to the export trade of Palestine was shown by the quantities passing through the port of Jaffa and their percentage in relation to value of the total exports of the port. In 1860, orange exports passing through Jaffa were approximately 37,000 cases; in 1880, 145,000 cases; in 1890, 200,000 cases; in 1900, 251,070 cases; in 1905, 456,150

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49 Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," p. 79.


cases; and in 1913, 1,553,861 cases — a growth of almost 2,500 percent in fifty years. As a percentage of the value of total exports oranges represented 15 percent in 1860; 18 percent in 1880; 19 percent in 1890; 28 percent in 1900; 31 percent in 1905; and 40 percent between 1908 and 1913.

While Palestine's incorporation into the world economy did play an important role in the growth of citriculture, especially after the beginning of regular and direct steamship traffic between Jaffa and Liverpool, the internal Ottoman economy also played an important role in this process. In the 1890s Vital Cuinet estimated that out of an average crop of 60 million oranges, 20 million were destined for Europe, 30 million for Istanbul, Asia Minor, Bulgaria, Romania, and Russia, and 10 million for local consumption.

The study of the history of citriculture in Palestine also provides valuable evidence which counters assertions surrounding the role of Zionist colons and the use of technology in the development of the agricultural sector in Palestine in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Contrary to assertions that there was substantial Zionist involvement in citriculture during the Ottoman period and that there was minimal use of technology, and then only as a result

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53 The actual value of the orange exports for these years were £1,000,000, £5,800,000, £83,120, £74,210, £114,650, £297,700 in 1860, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1905, and 1913 respectively. Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," pp. 70-71; Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 265; Scholch, "The Economic Development ...," pp. 41-42; Tolkowsky, The Gate Way of Palestine ..., p. 184.

54 Cuinet, Syrie Liban et Palestine ..., p. 592.

55 Pamela Ann Smith states that the Zionists were responsible for 24 percent of citrus exports passing through Jaffa in 1913, while Charles Issawi states that the Zionists owned one-third of the citrus groves of the area by 1914. Nahla Zu'bi asserts that Baron Rothschild invested more than £15 million in citiculture in the coastal plains between 1882 and 1912. However, if British Consul Blech's estimated cost of £4,500 for a 100 dunum orange grove is accepted this would mean that Rothschild purchased approximately 333,000 dunums of orange groves. This figure becomes all the more improbable in the face of the fact that there were only 299,500 dunums of orange groves in Palestine in 1934. Brown, "Agriculture," pp. 137-138; Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," p. 79; Issawi, "The Trade of Jaffa , 1825-1914," in Asali, ed., Jerusalem in History ..., p. 45; Smith, Palestine and the
of Zionist innovations, there is virtually no evidence to support such arguments.

Citriculture in Ottoman Palestine was almost exclusively an indigenous enterprise, with both cultivation and trade overwhelmingly in the hands of Palestinian Arabs. The assertions of Zionist involvement are perhaps attributable to Mandate realities -- in 1934 Zionists owned 56 percent of the orange groves of Palestine -- being projected backwards rather than an accurate reflection of the Ottoman realities. An 1893 British Consular report states that "orange growing in Syria is conducted exclusively by natives." In 1907, a Zionist source, states that Jews owned only nine citrus groves which equalled only a few hundred dunums. Ruth Kark also emphasizes the near absolute lack of Zionist involvement in citriculture. In regard to the export trade, a British Consular report of 1878 states that "trade between Palestine and Great Britain [in citrus fruits] is almost entirely in the hands of the natives [sic], there being one English house engaged in the export trade at Gaza and Jaffa." Kark, confirms that indigenous Muslims, and to a lesser extent Christians, [Palestinians ...] p. 206n; Nahla Zu'bi, "The Development of Capitalism in Palestine: The Expropriation of the Palestinian Direct Producer," Journal of Palestine Studies, 13.4 (1984): 94.

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56 Roger Owen specifically points to the Zionists as the force behind technological developments in citriculture. Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 267.


58 Cited in Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," p. 78.


60 Ibid., p. 244.

remained the dominant force in the ownership, harvesting, and marketing of citrus fruits throughout the Ottoman period.62

The near total absence of Zionist involvement in citriculture renders claims that it was Zionist "enterprise" which led to technological innovations and that Palestinian agricultural capitalists shunned the use of technological innovations in favour of traditional methods completely untenable. The increase in the area under cultivation and the fertility of the soil did account for the initial increase in citrus production, but growth in the closing decades of Ottoman rule was the result of horticultural and technological innovations undertaken by Palestinian Arabs.

Horticultural innovations led to the introduction of a new, thick-skinned orange -- *shamuti* -- far more suitable for export to Europe than the smaller, thin-skinned orange -- *baladi* -- which was the staple of local and regional trade. The American Consul in Jerusalem, Henry Gillman, wrote in 1886 that the orange growers of Florida would find it advantageous to adopt Palestinian horticultural techniques.63 In a similar vein, the British Consular Agent in Jaffa in 1893 commented on the value of agricultural information from Palestine and reported that: "Attention has been drawn to the superior qualities of the [orange] fruit, both at the cape and in Australia, and these colonies may find it advantageous to promote the planting and cultivating of young trees procured from Jaffa."64

The increasing density of orange trees in the environs of Jaffa also led to the widespread use of mechanized irrigation systems. British Consul Blech's

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63 Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...," pp. 75-76.

64 Ibid., p. 75.
1908 estimate of the cost of a 100 *dunum* orange grove includes £950 for the sinking of an 18-metre well, purchasing a motor pump, and constructing a reservoir and irrigation channels.\(^6^5\) Weakley's 1911 report states that the "great increase in orange tree cultivation in the district [of Jaffa] has rendered the question of irrigation a very important one, and modern appliances have almost entirely taken the place of old water wheels."\(^6^6\) Obviously, then, the indigenous citriculturalists of Palestine did employ a variety of "modern" methods to increase the volume of their crop, and therefore their profits, and were not shackled by a mythical connection to traditional methods of agriculture.

Palestine was incorporated into the larger world economy in the nineteenth century. However, this process was far from absolute. Substantial quantities of Palestinian exports continued to flow into regional markets, especially Egypt, Istanbul and Anatolia, and the Syrian interior, wholly independent of the European marketplace. Nonetheless, these regional markets, and their implications, have received scant attention. The continued emphasis on European trade is more a reflection of available sources, especially European statistics for the principal ports of the region, than of the economic realities of the time. Moreover, certain trends evident even in European trade reports are often ignored, or at best denigrated, in favour of the re-iteration of Palestine's status as a dependent economy.

Between 1856 and 1882 Palestine experienced an economic boom in its agricultural sector. During this period the beginnings of Palestine's incorporation into the European economic system did occur. However, the bulk


of the agricultural surplus was still destined for local and regional markets. Indeed, through the end of the Ottoman era, local and regional markets continued to play a significant role in the Palestinian economy.

From 1885 to 1905 exports passing through Jaffa destined for Great Britain and France amounted to £3,601,904, yet those destined for Egypt, Istanbul and Anatolia still equalled £2,339,825, or thirty-nine percent of total exports passing through Jaffa. Indeed, between 1893 and 1896 exports passing through Jaffa destined for regional markets surpassed those destined for Great Britain and France, with regional exports equaling 53%, 56%, 56%, and 52% for the years 1893, 1894, 1895, and 1895. Moreover, these figures, and those of other ports, are themselves deceptive for they only encompass statistics for maritime trade while excluding the important overland trade.

The emphasis on maritime trade has produced a skewed picture of many of the realities of the Palestinian economy in the nineteenth century. The actual economic production of Palestine was far greater than the sum of commodities which passed through its ports. The towns of the interior, especially Nablus, retained extensive trade links with the towns and cities of northern Syria, yet this trade is rarely factored into calculations of Palestine's productive output. The example of soap production, in particular, raises serious questions about the relationship between maritime and overland trade. In 1905, 2,270 tons of soap were exported through the port of Jaffa, conversely the total production of Nablus in 1916 was estimated at 20,000 tons. While these are not contemporaneous statistics they do provide evidence of the disparity between maritime exports and the total productive capacity of Palestine.

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67 Based on figures from Buheiry, "The Agricultural Exports ...", p. 71.

Palestine's so-called negative balance of trade -- calculated using only maritime trade figures -- is also used as evidence of its growing incorporation into the world economy and the poor state of its economy. Such conclusions, however, take little account of the special circumstances of Palestine. The presence of numerous pilgrims, both temporary and permanent, in Jerusalem, and after 1882 the influx of Zionist colons, distorted Palestine's actual balance of trade. Most of these Europeans were urban residents who contributed little to the productive economy of Palestine. On the contrary, pilgrims and Zionist colons accounted for a large part of the imports, especially luxury items, which inflated Palestine's negative trade balance.69

The construction of rail lines in the Middle East is also pointed to as an important tool for, and indicator of, the region's incorporation into the European economy in the nineteenth century. In Anatolia, Egypt, and northern Syria rail lines certainly were crucial in the expansion of trade between Europe and the interior markets. The effect of, and motivation behind, the construction of rail lines in Palestine, however, differed from other regions. The construction of the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, the first in the region, was undertaken as much for the transportation of pilgrims as for the hauling of freight. Initially opened in 1892, in 1913 the Jaffa-Jerusalem rail line carried 183,000 passengers and 183,000 tons of freight,70 much of which was probably destined for the use of the European community in Jerusalem. Equally significant is the fact that the line only reached the pilgrimage centre of Jerusalem but never the economically vibrant interior. Finally, the fact that the largest single export commodity of Palestine in the closing decades of the

69 Gerber, *Ottoman Rule ...*, pp. 74-78.

Ottoman era, namely citrus fruits, was produced in the immediate vicinity of the coastal ports rendered rail transport superfluous in this most important of agricultural activities.

Roger Owen cautions against the tendency "to generalize and to assume that the economies in every part of the Middle East were subject to the same pressures and thus moving in the same general direction." This caution is one which historians of the Middle East would do well to heed. Unfortunately, very few, including Owen himself, have done so. Each area, or indeed town or city, of the region must be studied in its own right rather than extrapolating information from one area and asserting that its particular reality held true for the entire region. Even a limited study of the economy of Palestine in the nineteenth century shows that it did not conform to many of the commonly accepted generalities concerning the Middle East in this era. Jerusalem and Nablus were not incorporated into the world economy in the same manner as the towns and cities of northern Syria, nor, in fact, to the same degree as each other. Nablus' position as an important centre of soap production meant that much of its economic activity was wholly independent of the European system. Conversely, the growth of citriculture in the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted in Jerusalem's growing integration into the European economy. Nonetheless, even in the vilayet of Jerusalem, regional trade continued to play a significant role in the local economy.

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71 Owen, The Middle East ..., p. 1.
Conclusion

At the beginning of the nineteenth century Palestine was an area suffering from, at best, benign neglect on the part of the Ottoman centre and one which was of utter disinterest to the European powers. By the final decades of Ottoman rule, Palestine, especially Jerusalem, had emerged as a significant political centre of the Ottoman Empire and an area which occasioned a great deal of attention, on the part of both Istanbul and the European capitals. Certain notable families of Jerusalem and Nablus controlled both the political and economic infrastructure of their respective regions, and proceeded to maintain these positions into the future. Paralleling the rise of Palestine's political importance over the course of the nineteenth century was the phenomenal growth of its productive capacity: not only did Palestine support its own population, but its agricultural surplus fed both regional and European markets.

However, the political, social, and, economic changes which occurred in the region were far from uniform. While the political importance of Nablus remained basically unaltered, that of Jerusalem soared. An administrative backwater at the beginning of the nineteenth century, by the end of the century Jerusalem was the de facto capital of Palestine, with over three-quarters of the area which became Mandatory Palestine under its administrative control. Concomitant with Jerusalem's rise in political importance was the rise of its notable families to positions of unparalleled dominance in the region. Whereas, at the turn of the nineteenth century the political, social, and economic influence of the notables of Jerusalem reached no farther than the gates of the town, by the end of the Ottoman era their influence had spread throughout the region. The
case of the notables of Jerusalem was the quintessential example of the spread of urban control over the rural hinterland so often discussed in the literature on the "politics of notables."

To state that the pattern of political, social and economic interaction seen in Jerusalem was indicative of all of Palestine is, however, totally misleading. Within Nablus the situation was almost the complete opposite of events in Jerusalem. The families which came to dominate Nablus in the nineteenth century were of rural origin, gained their initial wealth and power through their positions within the rural environment, and then used this influence to dominate the urban centre. Moreover, Nablus was an important commercial centre even before the nineteenth century, and continued to increase its prominence in this area throughout the century. Jerusalem, on the other hand, lacked any real economic infrastructure at the beginning of the century and only became economically prominent in the latter part of the century as a result of the expansion of the area under its control.

Equally, the assertion that the notable families who dominated Jerusalem and Nablus, and, indeed, all of Palestine, in the early twentieth century were the same ones who had held this position for centuries requires certain revisions. Within Jerusalem, the Husayni and Khalidi families largely conform to the pattern of older, established religious families using their ascriptive power to gain political and economic advantage. Nonetheless, the categorization of the Husyanis and Khalidis as strictly religious notables at the end of the nineteenth century is not completely accurate. Over the course of the century both families entered into the field of commercial activity to such an extent that finite definitions of religious or secular power became somewhat blurred.

Conversely, the case of the Nashedshibis does not in any way conform to the model of "traditional" notables. The Nashedshibis had been a presence in
Jerusalem since the fifteenth century and did acquire material prominence in the first half of the nineteenth century, but it was only in the closing decades of the century that they were able to translate their economic power into political power. Nor did the histories of the 'Abd al-Hadis or Tuqans conform to the patterns of long-established prominence. Both rose to prominence within Nablusi society using their positions as *shaykh nahiya* for a springboard. However, the Tuqans were not able to sustain their position past the early decades of the century and the 'Abd al-Hadis only gained real political power in 1830.

The common denominator which all the families did share, and one which does conform to commonly accepted patterns, was their use of the various civic councils and newly-created administrative positions as a means of accumulation. Whether through direct membership or alliances, the notables of Jerusalem and Nablus all used the councils to channel the initiatives of the central government, increase their wealth, and expand their clientele networks. It was within the confines of the civic councils, and through the manipulation of administrative edicts initiated by the central authorities, that the families of Jerusalem and Nablus most clearly exhibited the characteristics of a unified "class for itself."

The notables of Jerusalem and Nablus consistently used their positions, or those of allies, to ensure that the more onerous initiatives were either diluted or the burden shifted onto the shoulders of the non-Muslim population and the peasantry. Equally, if not more important, in the process of class consolidation was the notables' use of the civic councils to ensure that they benefited from the changes in the land regime and gained control over a disproportionate percentage of the arable land of Palestine.

Additionally, these families displayed their continued adaptability in the latter part of the nineteenth century through their use of education of younger members of the family in order to ensure that they were not excluded from the
administrative hierarchy. The rise of this younger, educated generation from within the notable families of Jerusalem and Nablus did not represent a discontinuity within the politics of the region. The existing scholarly emphasis on a generational split within the political elite during the closing years of the Ottoman era is misdirected. The same families continued to dominate the politics of Palestine, and in most cases the presence of a younger generation, possessed of a "modern" education, was little more than an example of notable adaptability. Indeed, the emphasis on "old" versus "young" politicians becomes all the more fragile in the face of the reality that the median age difference between these two supposedly antagonistic groups was only ten years.

The success of the Husayni, Khalidi, Nashashibi, 'Abd al-Hadi and Tuqan families in consolidating their positions -- albeit some with more success than others -- not to mention the material wealth they possessed, was evidenced by the prominent positions they occupied at the end of the Ottoman era and throughout the Mandatory period. The Husaynis, along with those related to them by marriage, controlled the nationalist Arab Club -- al-Nadi al-Arabi -- ran their own newspaper -- al-Liwa -- and headed one of the two main political parties, the Palestine Arab Party, in Palestine during the Mandate period. The Khalidis remained active participants in the political arena, and members of the family headed the Reform Party -- Hizb al-Islah. The Nashashabis, with their allies, virtually took over the nationalist Literary Club -- al-Muntada al-Adabi -- controlled the newspaper Filastin, which while not owned by the Nashashabis was considered their official organ, and founded the National Defence Party -- Hizb al-Difa' al-Watani -- the main opposition to the Husaynis' Palestine Arab Party. The 'Abd al-Hadis were active in the Literary Club, the newspaper al-Difa' was considered their official organ, and 'Awni 'Abd al-Hadi was one of the founders, and prominent leaders, of the Independence Party -- Istiqlal -- which challenged
the dominance of the Jerusalem-based political parties in the 1930s and 1940s. The Tuqans, however, never recovered the dominant position they held in the early nineteenth century and did not attain the same prominence in the twentieth century as the other families under consideration. Nonetheless, they did remain active in politics and were important members of the Nashashibi's National Defence Party.

The prominence which the Husaynis, Khalidis, Nashashibis, 'Abd al-Hadis and Tuqans exercised within the economy was another common denominator which they all shared, and one which derived from the use of their positions within the administrative hierarchy, both secular and religious. The religious notables of Jerusalem and Nablus, and their secular allies, used their positions to manipulate various provisions governing awqaf and thereby gained control of large amounts of both urban and rural real estate. Within the rural land regime, the notables were not averse to dispossessing the peasantry from their land, but the incidence of this was not widespread. The incidents of dispossession which did occur were more often the result of peasant indebtedness rather than the direct outcome of the 1858 Ottoman Land Code, as has been frequently asserted. Far more important than the dispossession of the peasantry was the granting of title, if only right of usufruct, to vast amounts of previously uncultivated state lands. And in this area the notables dominance within the administrative hierarchy proved crucial.

Soap production in Nablus and citriculture in the vilayet of Jerusalem emerged as the most lucrative enterprises within the Palestinian economy in the nineteenth century. Both of these areas were ones in which the five families of this thesis flourished. Within Nablus, soap production not only provided substantial profits for those involved, while at the same time acting as a crucial link in Nablus' trading networks, but was also instrumental in the emergence of a
unified class within the city. By mid-century, the Nablusi soap industry brought together diverse landed, mercantile, and artisanal interests and forged them into a cohesive class which controlled the rural surplus of Jabal Nablus.

By the end of the nineteenth century citriculture was the most lucrative form of capital investment in all of Palestine, and the notables of Jerusalem, especially the Nashashibis, lost little time in involving themselves in this enterprise. In addition to exposing methods of notable accumulation, citriculture also gives the lie to assertions concerning the lack of agricultural innovation within the indigenous Palestinian Arab community. Citriculture was almost exclusively controlled by Palestinian Muslim Arabs through the end of the Ottoman era, and they invested monies not only in horticultural innovation but also in the improvement of the infrastructure which served the citrus crops.

Moreover, citriculture and soap production helped to define Jerusalem and Nablus' relation with the world economy. The rising European demand for Palestinian citrus fruits, especially the Jaffa orange, led to the region's incorporation into the European economy, albeit a substantial portion of the crop remained destined for local and regional markets. Conversely, Nablusi soap remained a product destined solely for local and regional markets, thereby leaving the city far more independent of the European economy.

Finally, it should be noted that the circumstances surrounding soap production and citriculture provide evidence, however impressionistic, of an alternate explanation for the stance of various Palestinian notables vis-à-vis the question of Palestinian separatism or inclusion in Bilad al-Sham during the immediate post-war years. The discussion of ideological considerations, the so-called generational split, and concern over marginalisation within the larger political entity of Bilad al-Sham plays a prominent role in the literature on Palestine in the years immediately following World War I. The consideration of
economic imperatives, however, is most often lacking in these discussions. A fruitful avenue of enquiry might exist in the study of the actual economic interests of those involved and how this affected their stance on the future political status of Palestine. To what extent did the incorporation of the coastal regions into the European economy, through the vehicle of products such as citrus fruit, lead the notables of these areas to support Palestinian exclusivism? Conversely, to what extent did the extensive trade links which Nablus had with the Syrian interior, especially the soap and textile trade, lead these notables to support the inclusion of Palestine in Bilad al-Sham? The importance of this issue has been hinted at, but to date no study strictly concerned with this question has been undertaken.
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