TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA: AN INVESTIGATION OF CONSTRUCTED MEANINGS

by

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ABSTRACT

The intention of this thesis is to examine and exemplify conceptions of the strategic and theoretical linkages between terrorism and the media. Views of this relationship are presented as examples of a socially constructed reality. From this perspective, they are seen to reflect ideological and moral beliefs. Discussion of these issues is divided into two parts.

In Part I, terrorism itself, is considered as a constructed reality. As such, conceptions of terrorism are not grounded in objectivity, but rather reflect a subjective assessment of human behaviour. Liberal democratic definitions of terrorism serve to exemplify this subjectivity, in that they systematically exclude certain forms of violent behaviour.

Within the constructionist framework, conceptions of mass media and insurgent terrorism also become a matter of perspective. A review of the literature illustrates that social scientists and professionals have expressed a variety of disparate views regarding the nature and consequences of this relationship. Central to these views is a perception of terrorism as a violent form of symbolic communication and the belief that the media serve a key role in the strategy of insurgent terrorism.

At a more abstract level, the theoretical association between the media and terrorism is also subject to various constructions. The consensus and conflict models of society provide alternative frameworks from which to understand this
theoretical relationship.

Part II uses a case study approach to illustrate the various conceptions of the strategic and theoretical linkages between terrorism and the media. This illustration focuses on the October or FLQ crisis of 1970 and the central role played by the media during these events. English-language press coverage of the crisis is described and analyzed using both the consensus and conflict models.
DEDICATION

To My Parents
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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last decade, the interrelationship between terrorism and the media has emerged as a popular area of investigation and commentary. In fact, the attempt to understand the nature and consequences of this relationship has produced a rapidly expanding body of literature. A review of this information would reveal that this interest is eclectic, in that it emanates from several different sectors of society, including government officials (e.g. political leaders and law enforcement officials), journalists and political analysts.

Several distinct, but interrelated factors appear to have generated diffuse interest in the association between terrorism and the media. One key factor centers on the inordinate amount of attention the media accord terrorist violence, especially when it is perpetrated by anti-government or insurgent forces. Anyone who relies on the news media as an information source has undoubtedly noted the media's incessant reference to and commentary on terrorist events. For instance, much of the violence associated with the fractional conflict in the Middle East is presented as terrorism. The most recent grisly incidents occurred in October, 1983, when the American and French military compounds in Beirut were the targets of "terrorist" car bombings.
A corollary of this extensive media coverage is that the general public has become more vividly aware of terrorist phenomena. Television, in particular, has amplified public consciousness over terrorism. Unlike any other medium, television permits millions of people throughout the world to witness terrorist events as they unfold. It also allows them to see the human carnage and misery which sometimes results from acts of terrorism.

Closely related to this point is a second impetus for studying the association between terrorism and the media. It centers on the critical role played by the media in contemporary society, especially in relation to political issues. Often, the media serve as the only source of information the public has about political events, including those defined as terrorism. In this context, media images are seen to significantly influence people's awareness and perception of terrorism. Stated differently, the reality we construct about terrorist events will, in large part, be influenced by the manner in which they are presented and interpreted as news information and editorial commentary.

Interest in the relationship between terrorism and the media has also been generated by beliefs that media attention inherently promotes the strategic objectives of insurgent terrorists. For many political analysts, the media's strategic importance is seen to stem from a paradox in the terrorist strategy. More specifically, a disparity exists between the
goals and means of insurgent terrorism. On one hand, terrorist acts are perceived as sporadic, clandestine and limited in duration and consequence. On the other, they are seen as symbolic expressions. That is, terrorist violence is not undertaken for its effects on the immediate victims, but rather for its impact on a larger viewing audience. In this sense, media coverage of terrorist acts provides the perpetrators of these acts the publicity they invariably seek.

For individuals who morally oppose the use of violence as a means of effecting political change in society, this is only one aspect of the relationship between the media and terrorism which is problematic. In addition to promoting the strategic goals of terrorists, media coverage of terrorist incidents is also believed to encourage further acts of terrorism. It does this by not only enhancing social tolerance of terrorism, but also by providing models for potential terrorists to emulate.

(Law enforcement officials have been particularly interested in the media's role during terrorist incidents.) For them, media coverage is often seen to impair their ability to effectively respond to terrorist situations. For instance, the media work against the police when they furnish terrorists with important tactical information and when they directly interfere in seige management operations. In certain instances the irresponsible actions of media personnel may even jeopardize the lives of hostages.
Various aspects associated with media coverage of terrorist events then, have served to generate tremendous interest in, and intense concern over, the relationship between these two phenomena. What is interesting to note, however, is that this relationship is complex and multi-dimensional. Its complexity is reflected in the disparate concepts and theories that have sought to explain the media-terrorism relationship.

This thesis examines the various linkages between terrorism and the media. It undertakes this task, however, using a distinct analytic framework: social constructionism. From this perspective, social phenomena and the relationship between social phenomena have no objective meaning. Rather, the meaning a social object, event or thing has for someone is seen to be subjectively determined. (Conceptions of "social reality" and "knowledge" of the social world, therefore, do not exist in an objective sense.) They are the products of subjective meanings people assign to things in their social environment. "Social reality" then, is seen to be created and sustained in the human mind, rather than by some external objective criteria.

Because conceptions of "social reality" are human constructions, value and ideological influences are critical. To the extent that different individuals and groups inhabit different moral and political universes, conceptualizations of "social reality" vary. (The same social phenomenon, consequently, have fundamentally different meaning to different people.) Thus, in a politically and socially pluralistic society, there will be
competing and contradictory conceptions of the social world.

Within the social constructionist framework, conceptions of the relationship between terrorism and the mass media are viewed as examples of a socially constructed reality. They are, in other words, inherently subjective. As such, multiple conceptions of the association between these two phenomena are possible. What this thesis principally undertakes is an examination and illustration of various ways in which this relationship can be conceptualized.

It should be noted, that this examination is undertaken without any attempt to search for normative grounds on which to defend the superiority of any particular view.

This thesis is divided into two distinct parts. Part I will examine various ways in which the relationship between the media and terrorism can be constructed. This examination begins with a conceptual analysis of phenomena defined as terrorism. In Chapter 2 the constructionist framework is outlined and used to illustrate how terrorism is a socially constructed reality. From this perspective, it is argued that the media, as major purveyors of information in contemporary society, play a central role in the construction process.

In Chapter 3, we will analyze how the relationship between the media and insurgent terrorism has been conceptualized by political and social analysts, law enforcement officials and news journalists. Of particular interest will be the perceived symbolic nature of insurgent terrorism and the strategic
importance of publicity to the strategy of terror-violence.

In Chapter 4, we use the consensus and conflict models of society to investigate the theoretical linkages between the media and insurgent terrorism. Emphasis will be placed on outlining the rival sets of assumptions or organizing principles embraced by these competing theoretical orientations and how they give rise to radically different "realities" of political terrorism; the role of the mass media in society; and the relationship between these two phenomena.

Part II of this thesis uses a case study approach to illustrate many of the views discussed in the preceding section. The case centers on the events surrounding the October or FLQ crisis of 1970 which were defined by most Canadians as acts of terrorism. At this time, a small group of ethnic-nationalists calling themselves the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) abducted two political figures in Montreal in an effort to promote Quebec independence.

Two chapters make up this section. In Chapter V, an attempt is made to reconstruct the FLQ crisis by chronicling, in considerable detail, the events surrounding the kidnappings of James Cross and Pierre Laporte, and the subsequent death of Mr. Laporte.

In Chapter VI, perceptions of the media's strategic and tactical role during the crisis are examined. Central to this examination are the views expressed by law enforcement officials, government leaders, media professionals and political
analysts. Most believed the media played a dynamic and central role in the hostage drama.

Included in this chapter is an illustration of how the conflict and consensus models provide alternative conceptions of the theoretical association between the media and terrorism. We illustrate this point by using each model to analyze Canadian press coverage of the crisis.
II. TERRORISM AS A CONSTRUCTED REALITY

Throughout the preceding chapter, the terms "terrorism", "terror-violence", "political terrorism", "state terrorism" and "insurgent terrorism" were used as though people have a common perception of what these words mean. These terms, however, are ambiguous. Political terrorism, while being the subject of intense scholarly interest and concern, has not been adequately defined. Moreover, students of terrorism have failed to clearly demarcate the conceptual and empirical parameters of their scope of inquiry. A cursory review of the pertinent literature would reveal that the concept describes a broad range of disparate violent acts and that similar events are often assigned opposing meanings. Consequently, what one person sees as political terrorism, another may view as freedom fighting or heroism.

An examination of the term's contemporary usage would further reveal that the problem of defining the concept "terrorism" is much more than a matter of semantics. Rather, it is a problem created by competing and conflicting ideological and value systems which, ultimately, give rise to radically different conceptions of "social reality." From this perspective, perceptions of terrorism can be viewed as specific formulations of the social world based on notions of "right and wrong", "good and bad" and "legitimacy and illegitimacy." In other words, moral and ideological beliefs move the definitional
boundaries of this concept. In pluralist society, then, conceptions of terrorism will vary. Young (1977) shares this view when he writes,

"...Terrorism shares with other value laden and frequently polemized political terms a certain indeterminacy. It would be unreasonable, therefore, to expect to isolate the legitimate boundaries of its use in a highly exact way if only because variations in use often reflect differing evaluations of the justifiability of certain acts (Young, 1977:287)."

This chapter examines the various "realities" of terrorism which have been constructed by Western political analysts. This examination is divided into four distinct, but interrelated sections. The first part, reviews many of the popular beliefs regarding the nature and scope of contemporary terrorism. The second section, focuses on scholarly conceptions of terrorism. This discussion will review various efforts to identify the "basic elements" of terrorism and attempts to construct a taxonomy of terrorist phenomena. Having outlined several basic types of terrorism, (it will be shown that liberal democratic conceptions of political terrorism fail to embrace the full range of acts which could be so defined.) In the final section of the chapter, it is argued that definitions of terrorism are best understood as examples of socially constructed reality. Within this framework, conceptions of terrorism are seen as subjective assessments of social phenomena. Moreover, the term "terrorism" is discussed as a pejorative label which is used by social groups to vilify and de-politicize threatening behaviour.
**Popular Beliefs About Terrorism**

"Conventional wisdom" about the nature and scope of contemporary terrorism appears to consist of several distinct beliefs. One popular belief is that the use of terrorism, by both governments and insurgent political groups, has increased over the last decade. With specific reference to insurgent terrorism, several quantitative studies point to both an escalation in the incidence of revolutionary terrorism throughout the world and also to a proliferation in the number of insurgent organizations dedicated to the use of terrorism. (Bassiony, 1982; 1981; Jenkins, 1982, 1981, 1978; Mickolus, 1979; Wilkinson, 1973).

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1 William Catton Jr. has suggested that the findings of these historical studies may be vitiated by cultural changes in what is regarded as threatening and unacceptable uses of coercive violence. He also claims that procedural changes in data collection can lead to incorrect inferences about the incidence of terrorism (Catton, 1978:711). Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, on the other hand, is of the opinion that changes in reporting practices would only affect the "token acts of violence." The more serious incidents, he argues, would not be misrepresented in the data. Based on this reasoning, he concludes that:

The use of terrorist tactics has increased during the last 12 years. Of that, there is no doubt. Although the overall level of terrorist activity oscillates from year to year, the trend is unmistakably upward. Quantitative analysis shows the increase to be genuine; it is not due to chance distribution of the numbers. And it is not the result of better reporting" (Jenkins, 1980:3).
Another popular conception about terrorism is that it involves acts which are extremely violent and highly destructive. Campaigns of terrorism, whether employed by a political regime or revolutionary group, are seen to invariably result in the mass destruction of human life and personal property. Several political observers have commented on the pernicious nature of state-sponsored terrorism (Corrado, 1983; Bassiouni, 1979:750; Del Olmo, 1975). Often cited in support of this view are the terroristic policies of several totalitarian regimes, such as Cambodia, Uganda and El Salvador. It is alleged that the repressive terror used by these nations resulted in the systematic slaughter of several million people. On a smaller scale, a number of nation states have been accused of employing more selective terrorist tactics, such as assassination and kidnapping against foreign enemies and domestic dissidents. Iranian and Israeli government agents, for example, are alleged to have executed their enemies throughout Europe.

While the violence associated with state instigated and state sanctioned terrorism is considered to be more pernicious, it is often the more publicized actions of insurgents that come to mind when people think of terrorism. Not unlike state terrorism, images of revolutionary terrorism are centered on its destructive and violent nature. However, (some political observers believe this form of terrorism poses less of a threat to human life and property than other types of criminal behaviour.) Brian Jenkins of the Rand Corporation expressed this
The world's terrorists have killed fewer persons in the last decade than are murdered every year in the United States; annual losses from shoplifting in the United States alone exceeds the total amount of property destroyed by terrorists (Jenkins, 1981a:4).

While many people associate revolutionary terrorism with human tragedy, some view it's destructive effects in more abstract terms. At this level, terrorism is seen as a serious threat to the social, political and economic order of nation states. Central to this view is the belief that the widespread fear and suspicion generated by protracted campaigns of terrorism effectively undermine the normative structure of society. In some cases, this may cause social institutions to weaken severely, leading eventually to the total collapse of social relations. The spectre of social disintegration is clearly evident in Martha Hutchinson's discussion of the effects of terrorism when she writes,  

2Knauss and Strickland provide a trenchant critique of the notion that total social chaos is, or would be, the eventual outcome of terrorism. They argue that social decay does not take place in any measurable or objective sense, but rather takes place "...retrospectively, ideologically, and in the minds of scholars who would ignore the newer forms of social behavior that replaced the 'collapsed' ones" (Knauss and Strickland, 1979:80). It is their contention that even in the face of protracted terrorism groups of people maintain levels of social life. (Knauss and Strickland, 1979).

Horowitz (1977) also challenges the notion that insurgent terrorism causes societies to collapse. He claims that in some instances, terrorist acts, or society's response to these acts, "...may serve to bind people against a common cause." So instead demoralizing populations and disintegrating societies, he claims, "sporadic acts of terror can...mobilize sentiments and strengthen the very system that the terrorists aim to destroy" (Horowitz, 1977:36). More is said about the integrative function of terrorism in Chapter IV.
Terrorism affects the social structure as well as the individual; it upsets the framework of precepts and images which members of society depend on and trust. Since one no longer knows what sort of behavior to expect from other members of society, the system is disoriented. The formerly coherent community dissolves into a mass of anomic individuals, each concerned only with personal survival. Terrorism destroys the solidarity, cooperation, and interdependence on which social functioning is based, and substitutes insecurity and distrust (Hutchinson, 1973:388).

Apprehension over contemporary terrorism appears to be amplified by the popular belief that modern technology has enhanced the coercive strength and destructive potential of terrorist movements (Pierre, 1978:37). Political analysts have noted, that the traditional terrorist arsenal of machine guns, time bombs and plastic explosives has been augmented by awesome weapons, such as guided missiles, biological and chemical agents and nuclear weapons. In addition, modern mass communication systems are seen to provide the terrorist with instant and global audiences for their actions. Meanwhile, aviation technology allows terrorists to travel with unprecedented speed across continents. Moreover, it permits them to strike almost anywhere in the world and then to escape, often, without detection.

(Technological advancement is also believed to have amplified the coercive power of contemporary terrorists.) It has done this by creating highly sensitive and extremely vulnerable targets, such as urban water systems, computer data banks, nuclear powered generating systems and super oil tankers. On the growing vulnerability of modern society to terrorist attacks, Catton writes,
Human societies have become much more interdependent, partly as a result of the technological progress that has enabled us to use commodities obtained from all corners of the world, and partly because modern communications enable us to witness events almost anywhere in the world as they happen or almost immediately thereafter. But this also means that human societies have become more vulnerable. There are more opportunities than ever before for kicking the system and trying to compel it to bestir itself. The scale on which blackmail can be practiced has been prodigiously enlarged (Catton, 1978:712).

Another component of the "conventional wisdom" on terrorism centers on the belief that a distinct pattern of combined and coordinated action is emerging among international terrorist organizations (Wolfe, 1977). Governments and insurgent groups which employ strategies of terror-violence are believed to be sharing tactical information, training facilities, military resources and political objectives. Reference is often made to the terrorist attack at Lod International Airport in Israel to illustrate the extent of this collaboration. The terrorist operation itself, was undertaken to advance the political efforts of the Palestinian Irredentist Movement. However, the three individuals who carried out the operation were members of the Japanese Red Army who were recruited and trained by North Korean agents, furnished with false papers, passports and financial support by West German terrorists, given final training in Syria and Lebanon, armed in Italy with Czechoslovakian weapons, and transported to their final destination by members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (McEwen and Sloan, 1979:14-15; Pierre, 1978:35; Wolfe, 1977:334; Johnson, 1977:49).
Another perceived aspect of this international cooperation relates to the involvement of the superpowers: the Soviet Union and the United States. Both countries accuse the other of directly or indirectly assisting nation states and political organizations in their use of terrorism by providing them with military, tactical and financial aid. For instance, U.S. political observers claim that the Soviet Union and its satellite countries, such as Cuba and Libya, are principally responsible for training and arming insurgents in several Central American countries. They are also accused of supporting the revolutionary government in Nicaragua which employs repressive terror as means of social control. Conversely, the Russians contend that the United States are providing military aid and economic assistance to several countries in this geo-political region (e.g. El Salvador and Honduras), which use repressive terror against dissident groups. They further claim that the United States provides similar support to counter-revolutionaries in Nicaragua, who employ terrorist and guerilla tactics against the Sandinista government. Given the implications of a direct confrontation between the two Superpowers, many firmly believe that international terrorism has become the new theatre on which Eastern and Western Bloc

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3 For an interesting discussion of American policy regarding international and domestic terrorism and U.S. support of state terrorism in El Salvador, see Grosscup, 1982; Taylor and Vanden, 1982. A rather biased account of Soviet involvement in international terrorism is provided by Livingstone, 1982:9-29. For a more "even" discussion of Soviet involvement in transnational terrorism, see (Jenkins, 1981b).
countries stage their Cold War confrontation. Wilkinson (1973) expresses this point by writing,

Then there is the fact that terrorist revolutionary and counter-revolutionary war becomes a surrogate for general war. Because the nuclear powers are constantly seeking to avoid involvement in a general nuclear war, or even escalating a 'limited' war to a 'nuclear threshold', terrorist and counter-revolutionary warfare has become an 'immoral alternative' to general war (Wilkinson, 1973:308).

Many people also consider terrorism to be an ineffective way of instituting social change (Hodgson, 1979; Wilkinson, 1979; Lacquer, 1976; Horowitz, 1973). Again this view seems to pertain to revolutionary, and not state-sponsored terrorism. Only in the specific socio-political context of colonial rule have terrorists campaigns been credited with helping to bringing about national independence. Paul Wilkinson encapsulates Western conceptions regarding the "success" of insurgent terrorism, when he writes,

As a weapon against well-established liberal democracies or against indigenous autocracies, terrorism has proved an almost total failure. Only in a small number of armed colonial independence struggles in the 1940's, 1950's, and early 1960's (mainly directed against British and French colonial administration) did terrorism prove effective in persuading the metropolitan publics and their governments that the costs of maintaining their military presence outweighed the costs of withdrawal (Wilkinson, 1979:105).
Given these perceptions of terrorism, it is not surprising that it has become a rapidly increasing area of interest and concern to political observers in many Western nations. As noted above, scholarly interest is reflected in the voluminous body of literature produced on the subject over the last decade. Although much has been written on the subject, considerable ambiguity exists among scholars regarding the precise meaning of "terrorism." As one student of political violence has noted,

...there is no satisfactory political definition of terror extant or forthcoming, there is similarly no common academic consensus as to the essence of terror and no common language with which to shape a model acceptable to political scientists or social psychologists (Bell, 1975:6).

In this section, we review several scholarly conceptions of terrorism. Primary focus is placed on what are claimed to be the "inherent" or "objective" attributes of terroristic phenomena. Several academic typologies of terrorism are also reviewed. What emerges from this discussion is that scholarly conceptions of terrorism embrace a broad range of violent phenomena which are seen to be inspired by a variety of motives and directed against a variety of targets. In a latter discussion, we draw on this review to illustrate the rather circumscribed meaning Western analysts assign to the term "terrorism."
The "Basic" Elements of Terrorism

Etymologists claim that contemporary usage of the word "terrorism" deviates markedly from its nascent meaning. The concept is derived from the Latin term *terre*, which originally meant to physically tremble. Later usage, however, associated it with an emotional state of extreme fear (Wilkinson, 1974:9; Hutchinson, 1973:383). The first appearance of terrorism in the English language corresponds with the equivalent French word *terrorisme*, which was used during the French Revolution to describe the Jacobin dictatorship and the "reign of terror" it instituted to maintain established social arrangements (Nettler, 1982:227; Fromkin, 1978:12-13; Wilkinson, 1974:9; Wilkinson, 1973:299). Defining the concept as essentially a psychological state of mind, however, made systematic documentation and analysis of terroristic phenomena highly problematic. So by default, the word has come to describe both a state of mind and the actions which are assumed to arouse this psychic state (Gurr, 1979:24).

Although most contemporary definitions of terrorism include references to both an act, and the emotional state created by this act, many analysts chose to emphasize, and even omit, one of these components in their conceptions of terrorism. For example, Walter Lacquer appears to focus exclusively on specific forms of violent acts when he defines political terrorism as, "...the systematic use of murder, injury and destruction, or the
threat of such acts towards achieving political ends" (Lacquer, 1977:79). Conversely, Paul Wilkinson appears to emphasize the psychological dimension when he writes, "political terrorism is essentially a psychological weapon...the overriding aim and rationale of such attacks is to frighten the many into surrendering to the demands of the few" (Wilkinson, 1978:2)." 

As noted above, however, the majority of students of political terrorism conceptualize the act and the state of mind as inextricably entwined. Moreover, they view these two elements in stimulus-response terms, with the violent act inducing an emotional state of terror (Thornton, 1964:71). This approach appears to be taken by the National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals in their report entitled Civil Disorders and Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as the National Task Force), which defines political terrorism as, "...violent criminal behaviour which is designed to generate fear in the community, or a substantial segment of it, for political purposes" (National Task Force, 1976:3) [emphasis added].

Some students of terrorism have gone beyond this simple binary conception of terrorist phenomena by arguing that an accurate definition must view terrorism as a process, consisting of several distinct elements. Walter (1964:248-249), for example, describes a "process of terror" which involves three

*Martha Hutchinson, in her analysis of the concept also appears to emphasize the psychological effects of terrorist behaviour (Hutchinson, 1973).
components, (1) an act or threat of violence, which (2) causes an emotional reaction, and (3) produces social effects. And Paust (1977:19) contends that a comprehensive awareness of the process of terrorism must include an understanding of "...what is happening to whom, where, when, how, why and with what outcomes and effects."

While there are marked differences in how social scientists conceptualize terrorism, several maintain that terrorist phenomena share at least three distinct attributes. First, terrorism always involves the use or threat of violent physical behaviour. Bassiouni recognizes this to be an inherent aspect of terrorism when he writes,

...strategies of terror-inspiring violence are invariably predicated on the commission of some act of violence against the safety or well-being of a person or against property. No matter what means are employed against such targets, in whatever context, the result is invariably harm to a person or to property (Bassiouni, 1979:747) [emphasis added].

Thornton (1964:75) makes a similar observation when he argues that "...it is inevitable that violence will play a characteristic role in terrorist activities. A nonviolent program could hardly qualify as terrorism" [emphasis added].

A second "characteristic" of terrorist acts centers on the deliberate and planned nature of these acts to generate fear. While almost an infinite variety of violent phenomena inspire terror, from armed robbery to large scale warfare, the fear associated with these events is often of incidental importance. For the terrorist, the arousal of fear is the intended effect of
committing a violent act and not simply its by-product. The National Task Force, for example, uses this criterion to differentiate between civil disorders and terrorism by noting that the fear elicited by acts of civil disorder is incidental, while the terror accompanying acts of terrorism is deliberate (National Task Force, 1976:1).

A third "attribute" of terrorism, is that the intense fear which is created by these violent acts is used as a coercive instrument by its perpetrators to achieve some power-related outcome. The immediate aim of terrorism is to frighten, and by frightening, to dominate and to control (Hacker 1980:145). Or as Paust has stated, terrorists attempt to use or threaten to use fear and anxiety as a means of coercing a target population "...into behaviour and attitudinal patterns sought in connection with a demanded power outcome" (Paust, 1977:22). In the case of government-sponsored terrorism, the intended power outcome centers on preserving the established authority or political structure. Insurgent terrorism, on the other hand, represents the attempt of the powerless to usurp this authority.

In addition to these three characteristics, many political observers conceptualize terroristic phenomenon as having several other distinct attributes. For instance, Wilkinson contends that acts of terrorism can be distinguished from other forms of violence because they are characterized by an indiscriminateness, unpredictability, arbitrariness, ruthless destructiveness and implicit amoral and antinomian nature.
(Wilkinson, 1977; 1974). In a similar vein, Gwynn Nettler claims that there are six "core attributes" of terrorism which serve to distinguish it from other forms of violence. The first centers on the willingness of terrorists to "consciously violate all conventions that might restrict their cruelty and killing." A second attribute of terrorists is that they regard their enemy to be anyone who does not side with them, even "innocent" men, women and children. Another characteristic of terrorist action, according to Nettler, is its simple economic rationale; you try to get the greatest possible return on the least amount of investment. A fourth attribute of terrorism is that it is undertaken for publicity. Nettler also believes that participation in the commission of terrorist acts is a form of "personal therapy for some psychologically destressed individuals." He also claims that the immediate aim of terrorists is to acquire power (Nettler, 1982:227-237).

Typological Constructions of Terrorism

Having identified the "core" elements or attributes of terrorist phenomena, many social scientists have gone on to construct very elaborate taxonomies of terrorism. A review of these typological constructions will highlight the complex and varied nature of scholarly conceptions of terrorism. It will further serve to illustrate the enormously broad range of human
behaviours that have been identified as terrorism.\textsuperscript{5}

Conceptions of terrorism discussed to this point, reflect only one general type of terrorism that has been constructed by students of political violence. Moreover, what we have considered are different types of political terrorism. These forms of political terrorism have included the terror instituted by nation states to inhibit opposition to its political authority and the violent activities of insurgent groups to usurp political power. Many taxonomies of terror-inspiring violence, however, identify two other general categories of terroristic behaviour: psychotic and criminal terrorism. In his book, of the same name, Frederick Hacker has colloquially referred to these three types of terrorism as "crusaders, criminals and crazies" (Hacker, 1976). Classification of terrorist acts into these three categories is based, primarily, on the explicit and implicit motives which are believed to have inspired these acts.

According to this typological schema, the category of psychotic terrorism embraces those terrorist activities which are committed by individuals who are perceived to be governed by psychopathological urges. These acts are usually characterized by observers as "irrational" and serving no utilitarian purpose.

Because the motivation and justification for this violent

\textsuperscript{5}It should be noted, that social scientists are quick to point out that their typologies of terrorism consist of "ideal" or "pure" types of terror-violence. Consequently, most terrorist activity are not seen to fall exclusively within one type, but rather overlap several conceptual categories of terrorism.
behaviour are incomprehensible, they are deemed to be the work of individuals suffering from some form of personality, mental or psychological disorder.

J. Bowyer Bell (1975), for instance, classifies as psychotic terror, threats and attempts on the lives of political figures. He has gone so far as to claim that, with few exceptions, "...all significant American assassination attempts have been by psychotics who rationalized their act with the language of politics" (Bell, 1975:11). If one accepts Bell's conception of psychotic terrorism, then, John Hinckely Jr.'s attempt to assassinate President Ronald Reagan may be viewed as a recent incidence of this form of terrorism.

Although most political analysts see psychotic terrorism as conceptually distinct from other categories of terrorism, such as political terrorism, Hacker (1980) has noted that conceptions of this form of terrorism are not devoid of political implications. Hacker points out that the term "crazy" is a psychiatric designation which provides an effective means of social control. It is a label which can be conferred upon any threatening behaviour and legitimizes the community's control over individuals under the guise of protective and therapeutic measure (Hacker, 1980:149). 6

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6Some analysts have argued that all manifestations of terror-violence are caused by some personality disorder or mental abnormality (Cooper, 1977; Pearce, 1977). For a critique of the mental disorder perspective, see Corrado, 1981.
Criminal terrorism is a second classification of terrorist violence. This conception of terrorism appears to be somewhat redundant, given that in most liberal democratic societies terrorist acts are, by definition, violations of legal proscriptions. Under this rubric, however, observers assign terrorist acts which are committed exclusively for self-aggrandizement. Kidnapping and extortion for personal gain are often cited as common manifestations of this type of terrorism.

A third conceptualized form of terror-violence, and the conception this thesis is particularly interested in, is that perceived to be political in nature. It is important to note, that while this form of terrorism has attracted the greatest amount of social scientific attention, very few analysts have explicated what they mean by the term "political." One observer, however, uses it to mean that the outcome sought by the terrorist is power-related (Bassiouni, 1975). Others appear to use the term with reference to violent acts that have been undertaken for some collective objective, rather than for personal interests. Paul Wilkinson, for instance, appears to use the concept in this manner when distinguishing between criminal and political terrorism.

Criminal individuals or groups resort to terrorising their victims with the sole object of selfish material gain or of eliminating a possible rival or informer. The vast majority of crimes are certainly not motivated by any social or political purpose. For the political terrorist proper, however, it is a sine qua non that the overriding objective and ultimate justification for terror is the furtherance of his political

There is an inherent problem, however, in classifying terrorism based on perceptions of underlying motivation. To the extent that people may hold different opinions about, and assign different motivation to human behaviour, the same violent act may receive different terrorist classifications. For example, popular conceptions of the crime of robbery see it as the threat of violent physical harm to coerce the victim into relinquishing his/her personal property. Depending on the motives imputed to this act, it can be classified as either psychotic, political or criminal terrorism. If this act is believed to have been perpetrated for personal enrichment, then, it may be classified as criminal terrorism. Conversely, if the observer considers it to have been carried out to effect some broader power-related outcome, then it may be seen to be an act of political terrorism. Belief that it was perpetrated by an mentally insane individual, may lead to yet a third terrorist classification. It may be perceived as a manifestation of psychotic terror-violence.

Aside from motivation, students of political violence have employed other criteria when conceptualizing differences between various types of terrorist activity. Bassiouni, for instance, distinguishes between criminal and political terrorism by examining the number of stages associated with the commission of these forms of terrorist violence. He contends that in criminal acts, the individual only seeks some personal benefit, and as such, the act is a single level operation. In contrast,
ideologically motivated acts of terrorism usually involve the following three stages; the primary stage which is the direct attack upon the target, the secondary stage which involves the dissemination of the ideological claim and the final stage which involves the achievement of the desired political outcome. (Bassiouni, 1979:753-754).

Another conceptual difference between these two forms of terrorism is developed by the National Task Force (1976). In their report, differentiation is made on the scope of fear necessary for the criminal and political terrorist to attain their respective goals. In the former case, the terrorist's objectives can be attained simply by instilling fear in the immediate or direct victim(s). On the other hand, the broader goals pursued by the political terrorist requires the generation of widespread terror. From this perspective, the National Task Force argues that political terrorism,

...has a similar purpose to general deterrence: the instant victim is less important than the overall effect on a particular group to whom the exemplary act is really addressed. Thus, terrorism, although it has its individual victims, is really an onslaught on society itself" (National Task Force, 1976:3).

The view that the primary target of politically motivated acts of terrorism in not the immediate victim, but a larger segment of the population, has lead many observers to conceptualize political terrorism in symbolic terms. Moreover, acts of political terrorism are seen as forms of violent symbolic communication. In this context, the use or threat of violence against a specific target is viewed as a
terror-inspiring message intended primarily for those who are watching. The idea that politically motivated acts of terrorism is a form of symbolic communication is intimated by May, when he writes,

The goal of terrorism is not to kill or to destroy property but to break the spirit of the opposition. A minister is assassinated; his successor takes warning. A policeman is killed; ten others tremble. High tension lines are sabotaged; the news sweeps the country. Terrorism seeks above all to create a sensation—within the ranks of the enemy, in public opinion and abroad (cited in May, 1974:278).

The point here, however, is that conceptual differences between political terrorism and other forms of terror-violence are often based on the perceived symbolic nature of political terrorism. The conception of political terrorism as a form of symbolic communication is explored in greater detail in the following chapter.

Conceptions of politically motivated terrorism are, themselves, complex and multi-dimensional. The complexity of these views is reflected in a plethora of different typological constructions of phenomena defined as political terrorism.

Most political analysts distinguish between two forms of political terrorism. One category embraces the terrorism employed by governments to preserve existing power relationships. Another variety circumscribes the terrorist activities of non-governmental forces attempting to usurp political authority. E.V. Walter, in a seminal discussion of political violence and terrorism, uses this binary classification when he divides political terrorism into a "seige
of terror" or the attempt to destroy the authority structure by creating extreme fear through systematic violence and a "regime of terror" or the terrorism invoked by those who already control the ordinary institutions of power (Walter, 1964:24). Thornton employs a similar two-fold typological scheme when he distinguishes between "enforcement" and "agitational" terror. According to Thornton, the former category describes the violence marshalled by those in power to enforce their position of authority. The latter, refers to the violence employed by insurgent groups to disrupt the existing order and gain political power (Thornton, 1964:72).

Although most classificatory systems of political terror-violence preserve the basic ruled-ruler dichotomy put forth by Walter and Thornton, many include a third type of power-related terrorism. Robert Moss, for example, identifies the following three varieties of political terrorism: repressive terror, defensive terror and offensive terror. Repressive terror and offensive terror, respectively, refer to state and non-state violence. Moss' third category, defensive terror, relates to the terrorist activities of private groups or individuals to defend the existing order from attack or change. Moss assigns to this category terroristic forms of vigilantism, or maintenance or establishment violence (Rosenbaum and Sederberg, 1976:26-29). From this perspective, Moss views much of the activity of American vigilante groups, such as the Klu Klux Klan, as manifestations of political terrorism. Similarly, the Esquadrão
da Morte ("Death Squad") in Brazil and the Anti-Communist Alliance in Argentina are seen to have engaged in defensive terrorism. One political observer has claimed that these non-state organizations are tolerated and even encouraged by their respective governments because their actions serve to maintain existing power relationships (Stohl, 1979:9).

Paul Wilkinson (1977) has also constructed a triadic typology of politically motivated terrorism. The constituent categories of political terrorism, according to his taxonomy are: revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism and repressive terrorism. Revolutionary terrorism, he contends, has the long term objective of effecting fundamental change to the socio-economic structure of a society. Repressive terrorism is viewed as the "reign of terror" used by nation states to suppress or constrain dissident thought and actions. His third category, sub-revolutionary terrorism, consists of terror-inspiring acts which are undertaken for political purposes other than a revolutionary transformation of society. More specifically, the purpose of this form of political terrorism is not to overthrow a regime, but rather to change its policies and actions.

Richard Schultz (1978) offers yet another three dimensional conceptualization of political terrorism. Substantively, Schultz's categories are very similar to those found in Wilkinson's typology. However, Schultz makes a nominal change to repressive terrorism, which he refers to as establishment terrorism. Schultz does, however, expand on Wilkinson's basic
schema by examining each category of political terrorism in relation to the following seven variables: causes, environment, goals, strategy, means, organization and participation. Schultz contends that the inclusion of these factors into a taxonomy of political terrorism provides a more precise framework from which this phenomenon can be analyzed.\(^7\)

To this point, three different conceptions of terroristic violence have been reviewed; psychotic, criminal and political. Of those acts which are identified as political terrorism, four further conceptions were presented; state, insurgent or revolutionary, sub-revolutionary and vigilante. But social scientific conceptions of insurgent and sub-revolutionary terrorism are also complex and multi-dimensional. We can examine these views by using still another triadic classificatory schema.

Once again, the primary criterion used to differentiate between various forms of anti-state terror-violence is the motive which is believed to have inspired these acts. One form of insurgent terrorism is that undertaken for ethnic or nationalistic purposes. Conceptions of this type of terror-violence include the terrorist activities of ethnically or racially distinct segments of a populace in an attempt to create an autonomous nation state for its members. The violent actions of the Basque Separatists in Spain and the Irish

\(^7\)For an illustration of how Schultz's typology has been used as an analytic framework to study the Palestinian Resistant Movement, see O'Neil, 1978.
Republican Army in Northern Ireland are presented as contemporary manifestations of nationalistic terrorism.

A second conception of insurgent terrorism centers on ideologically motivated terrorist violence. Motivation for this form of violence is believed to be found in the political ideas of the Fascist far right and the Marxist far left. Groups such as the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Red Brigades and the Japanese Red Army are perceived as revolutionary organizations which have their raison d'être in political ideals.

A third conception of anti-state terrorism involves the use of violence to impact a specific government policy or course of actions. Because the goals sought by issue-oriented terrorists are seen to be narrow in scope, it is believed that this form of terrorism produces low levels of destruction and disruption (Russell, et al., 1979:32). An example of this form of "low-level" terrorism might be found in the violent actions of political groups opposing current government policies regarding "pornography" in this country. Attempts to effect legislative changes in this area have included the destruction and threat of destruction of those businesses engaged in selling and leasing sexually explicit videos.8

8In November, 1982, a group calling itself the Wimmin's Fire Brigade claimed responsibility for the bombings of several video outlets in the Greater Vancouver area which rent "pornographic" material. While the immediate goal of this violent action was to close down the targeted video stores, it can be argued that their broader political objective was to force the federal government into taking a harder position on the issue of "pornography" (Province, November 24, 1982).
In addition to these multiple conceptualizations of terroristic violence, social scientists have also differentiated between terrorism that is national and transnational. Conceptions of international terrorism often include those terrorist incidents where the perpetrators or victims are foreign to the country where the act is committed. At a more general level, these conceptions can include all acts of violence with international repercussions. Some observers have admitted, however, that "...the line is often thin between terror which is essentially domestic and that possessing a clear international character" (Pierre, 1978:38).

Despite the problems in defining international terrorism, there is a clear transnational dimension to social scientific conceptions of "colonial" and "independence" terrorism. The former is seen to embrace the "reign of terror" implemented by imperialist nations to maintain control over a foreign territorial possession. In this same socio-political context, the terrorist activities that may be employed by segments of the indigenous population to "liberate" the country from foreign domination, is referred to as independence terrorism (Bonanate, 1978; Merari, 1978). These conceptions of terrorism embrace violent acts which appear to have repercussions that transcend national boundaries.

Many scholarly views of political terrorism consist of differentiations between this phenomenon and other forms of political violence. More specifically, attempts to describe the
nature of terrorist acts often do so with reference to guerrilla warfare. Generally speaking, terrorists are seen to operate in small cellular units and direct their violent actions against non-combattants. It is further believed that their strategic objective is to engender fear within a specific target population (Corrado, 1981:2; Price, 1977; Horowitz, 1973:148). Guerrilla warfare, on the other hand, is believed to be oriented more towards military objectives (Georges-Abeyie, 1979:318-319). It is also seen to consist of larger operational units and directed against uniformed combatants. In sharp contrast to the military strategy employed in guerrilla campaigns, terrorist groups are seen to avoid open and continuous confrontation with oppositional forces. Their tactics are perceived to be more clandestine and sporadic (Gurr, 1979:25; Corrado, 1979:192).

Recently, taxonomies of terrorism have been developed based on victimological criteria (Fattah, 1981; 1979). Rather than dividing phenomena identified as terroristic along a motivational dimension, per se, the classificatory schema of these studies focus more on the attributes of the victims and targets of terror-violence. Thus, distinctions are made between acts of terrorism that have individual victims and those which are directed against a group of people or an entire population.

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9For a more detailed analysis of terrorism in relation to other forms of political violence, see Wilkinson, 1977:31-34. Thorton (1964) examines terrorism as a component on an insurrectionary continuum. He contends that terror-violence occupies the first stage on this continuum, followed by guerrilla activity, followed by conventional warfare.
Closely related to these two categories are distinctions based on the manner in which the victim is, or the victims are, selected. More specifically, "the victims of individual terrorism are usually carefully selected, while mass terror is usually random and indiscriminate" (Fattah, 1981:19).

Classifications are also made between terrorist acts which involve direct confrontation between the terrorist and the victim(s) (e.g. kidnappings), and those where there is no "face-to-face" confrontation (e.g. bombing). In victimological typologies of terrorism, further distinctions are made with respect to the nature, accessibility, vulnerability and visibility of terrorist targets (Fattah, 1981).

From this extensive review, it would appear that conceptions of terrorism in the social scientific literature embrace a broad range of violent activities. Furthermore, this violence is seen to be inspired by a variety of motives and directed against a variety of targets. In the next section, we examine, more closely, the behaviour which is commonly defined as political terrorism by liberal democratic observers.

Liberal Democratic Conceptions of Terrorism

Liberal democratic scholars have been highly discriminant in the phenomena they tend to classify as terrorism. A cursory review of the pertinent social scientific literature would reveal that the term "terrorism" refers, almost exclusively, to
the violent acts of counter-state left-wing movements.

Noticeably absent from many Western conceptions of terrorism are the categories of terror-violence, referred to above, as regime terror and vigilantism or establishment terror. One political observer has remarked, that the exclusion of these two latter conceptions of terrorism by Western analysts has created the "myth" that political terrorism is the exclusive province of anti-governmental forces (Stohl, 1979:3). Grosscup (1982) refers to this same conceptual bias as the "ideology of terrorism."¹⁰

Empirical support for the notion that Western conceptions of political terrorism do not embrace the full range of activity that could be designated as terrorist is found in the work of Arblaster (1977). In his review of ten books which purport to address the topic of political terrorism, Arblaster found that the primary focus of these texts was revolutionary terror-violence. Because this scholarship examines only one facet of terrorism, Arblaster contends that academics not only present a distorted image of the phenomenon, but they also perpetuate the "myth" or "ideology" that political terrorism is the exclusive domain of non-state forces. Arblaster remarks regarding Paul Wilkinson's treatise, Political Terrorism serve to illustrate his contention.

¹⁰An example of a one-sided definition of political terrorism was put forth by the League of Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937) when it defined political terrorism as "All criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons, or a group of persons or the general public" (cited in Fattah, 1981:12) [emphasis added].
An author is, of course, entitled to limit his field of study in any way he likes, but it is misleading to offer as a study of "political terrorism" a book which, like so many others, turns a partially blind eye to the use of terror by the state and focuses nearly all its attention on the evidently less embarrassing subject of terror against the state (Arblaster, 1977:415) [emphasis added].

It should be noted, however, that not all forms of state violence are systematically excluded from Western conceptions of terrorism. Liberal democratic analysts have defined state-sponsored violence as terrorist when they have been perpetrated by totalitarian or communist governments. Philip Schlesinger shares this view, when he states that, "in the public discourse of the West, those who oppose established orders are terrorists, while state terrorism is a category virtually never employed, unless it refers to the communist bloc" (Schlesinger, 1981:80). Grosscup (1982) makes a similar point, when he writes,

> Adopting the "ideology of terrorism" has allowed the Reagan Administration to narrow the scope of the "terrorist problem" to non-state actors, except where the Soviet Union and its "surrogates" are involved. Only then is "state terrorism" considered part of the problem (Grosscup, 1982:47-48).

The point, here, is not that communist and totalitarian regimes do not engage in terrorist activity, rather that identical acts carried out by Western nations are seldom designated as terrorist by analysts in those countries. For example, while the U.S. Senate concluded that the American government had attempted on several occasions to assassinate foreign leaders, such as Fidel Castro (Jenkins, 1981:7), political observers appear adverse to speaking of these acts as
terroistic. Conversely, the assassination campaigns against political dissidents conducted by both the Iranian and Libyan governments, throughout Europe, are more widely seen as forms of terrorism by Western observers.

Western conceptions of the fractional conflict in Central America further illustrate how liberal democratic observers are reluctant to define American-backed violence as terrorism. It is interesting to note, that they do label as terrorist, qualitatively similar acts carried out by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

As noted earlier in this chapter, many believe that the two Superpowers are carrying out a form of "surrogate warfare" by providing massive economic and military aid to opposing sides in the political struggles taking place throughout the World, including Central America. So while the Americans are supporting the right-wing governments in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, and the anti-governmental forces in Nicaragua, the Soviets are buttressing the efforts of left-wing insurgents in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, and the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. (Although both sides in these struggles use similar tactics, paradoxically, it is only left-wing violence that appear to be systematically defined as terrorism by Western observers.)

Liberal conceptions of terrorism then, do not appear to envelope the full range of phenomena that have been designated as terroristic. More specifically, these views tend to focus on
the violence of insurgents and communist governments, while ignoring the violence of right-wing states and anti-governmental groups. In the next section, we examine this paradox from a social constructionist perspective. Using this model, it will be argued that there is nothing inherent or essential to certain forms of human behaviour which necessitate their designation as terrorism. In this sense, conceptions or definitions of political terrorism are seen to reflect subjective interpretations and moral assessments of social events. Because perceptions of terrorism are not based on objective or essential properties of phenomena, it is further suggested that multiple "realities" of terrorism are possible.

Terrorism as a Socially Constructed Reality

To understand how a certain act can be viewed as terrorist by some, and as "non-terroristic" by others, one must begin with an analytical framework that takes into account the subjective nature of "social reality." In this section, we use a social constructionist model to account for the "...variable modalities of meaning that attend terrorism" (Greisman, 1977).
Social Constructionism

The constructionist perspective, as it is used here, can best be described in terms of a fundamental dualism that is seen to characterize sociological thinking (Pfuhl, 1980:1-36; Morris, 1977:4-6; Farberman and Goode, 1973:1-5; Brittan, 1973:1-32). Underlying the dichotomous ways of doing sociology are polar ontological and epistemological conceptions of human behaviour and the social world.

At one end of this polarity is that sociological tradition referred to as the positivistic-naturalistic approach (Morris, 1977), the fact paradigm (Pfuhl, 1980), or the immanentistic view (Farberman and Goode, 1973). Central to this approach is the philosophical idea that phenomena have an inherent essence or objective meaning. More simply, this view holds that an "objective reality" exists independent of human cognition. The elements comprising this "objective" world are also believed to be ordered by causal forces. Those who share this ontological view further consider the scientific method as the appropriate way to discover, described and explain these uniformities.11

11According to Pfuhl (1980), the scientific method is predicated on four postulates or taken for granted beliefs called the "canons of the scientific method." These scientific postulates are, (1) the world exists, (2) the world is knowable, (3) the world is knowable through our senses, and (4) the elements comprising the world are related in terms of cause and effect (Pfuhl, 1980:6).
From this perspective, human behaviour is seen to have an objective or essential nature which can be studied scientifically. Moreover, it is seen to be "...no different from the subject matter of the natural or physical sciences in terms of its analysis and explanation" (Morris, 1977:5).

At the other end of the sociological continuum is the humanistic-culturalistic approach (Morris, 1977), the definitional paradigm (Pfuhl, 1980), the imputational view (Farberman and Goode, 1973) or the constructionist perspective.  

Fundamental to this sociological orientation is the ontological assumption that the social universe is without intrinsic meaning or objective character. (Moreover, social phenomena do not have meaning independent of human consciousness.) This does not mean, however, that the world does not exist apart from our perceptions of it. What it does suggest is that conceptions of "social reality" are created or manufactured by humans and reflect the imputation of meaning to, rather than an essential quality of, social phenomena. Or as Brittan has so aptly remarked, "Of course, the outside world exists independently of man as a social, yet its significance for man is one which he himself brings to it" (Brittan, 1973:16).

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This approach is closely related to a number of theoretical ideas and methods in sociology, such as symbolic interactionism, labeling theory, existential sociology, phenomenological sociology, verstehen and participant observation. For a brief overview of these theoretical ideas and a comparison between, among and within these schools of thought, see Morris, 1977; Douglas, 1984:9-12.
Closely related to this ontological view is the contention that human beings act or respond to things on the basis of the meanings that things have for them. The essential epistemological implication of this view is that human action can be apprehended only by examining people themselves and the subjective definitions they assign to things in their world. In other words, sociologists must attempt to see a social situation or social setting from the point of view of the social actor. Brittan shares this epistemological view when he states,

Sociology is basically an interpretive discipline... Interpretation is taken to mean the active commitment of the sociologist to the symbolic reconstruction of the actor's world (Brittan, 1973:25).

The view taken here, is that it is impossible to describe or tap the social world in a "neutral" or "objective" way. Moreover, any attempt by sociologists to describe or explain the social world ultimately entails the acceptance of certain aspects of "social reality" and the rejection of others. This is due, in large part, to the inability of human beings to separate "...cognition from emotion, description from evaluation and pure theory from practical interest" (Farberman and Goode, 1973:3). The essential corollary of this, is that all conceptions of "social reality" will reflect value judgments and, therefore, non-neutrality (Farberman and Goode, 1973:3).

Before using the constructionist framework to examine Western "realities" of terrorism, three related aspects of this sociological approach need to be briefly discussed.

"Nominalism", and its importance to the constructionist school
of thought will be discussed first. This is followed by a
cursory discussion of what constructions refer to as the
objectivation or reification of humanly constructed phenomena. A
third point discussed is the possibility of multiple conceptions
of "social reality."

As noted above, constructionists claim that the social
universe has no inherent or essential meaning. Nonetheless,
people are seen to make sense of this essentially meaningless
world by using concepts to identify and classify social
phenomena. Stated differently, things which are perceived to
have common elements are assigned a name. For instance, a
specific audible sound is designated as a musical note, such as
"C sharp." From the constructionist perspective, the name used
to classify a set of phenomena is essentially an "act of the
mind" or a human construct. Two things are meant by this
assertion. First, the name itself does not exist independent of
human consciousness. Second, a conceptual distinction has to be
made between the name and the phenomena that it is intended to
symbolize. Moreover, "C sharp" is not the audible sound itself.
The notion that there is no objective social world, only
subjective designations of it, is referred to as nominalism.¹³

The nominalistic position embraced by constructionists is
important for two related reasons. First, it encourages us to
consider the identification and classification of social

¹³This discussion of the nominalistic position in sociology has
drawn liberally from Pfuhl, 1980:15-16.
phenomena as essentially human enterprises. Concomitantly, it sensitizes us to the inextricability of values, beliefs and attitudes to conceptions of the social world.

One major consequence of assigning a name to something is that it serves to reify that thing. Reification is "...the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products--such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws or manifestations of divine will" (cited in Greisman, 1977:304). What is essentially subjective in nature then, takes on a phantom or artificial objectivity. This occurs, for instance, when a notational device, such as the name assigned to phenomena, is treated as something concrete or objective. In other words, it takes on an existence of its own (Pfuhl, 1980:28).

Berger and Luckman (1967) elaborate on the idea that people reify "social reality." They show that through the processes of externalization, objectivation and internalization the external social world is made into an objective and "real" entity. In this sense, the subjective nature of "social reality" is obfuscated. They make this point when they write,

Everyday life presents itself as a reality interpreted by men and subjectively meaningful to them as a coherent world....The world of everyday life is not only taken for granted as reality by the ordinary members of society in the subjectively meaningful conduct of their lives. It is a world that originates in their thoughts and actions, and is maintained as real by these (Berger and Luckman, 1967:111).

The significance of reification for our purpose is that it results in the name and phenomena becoming indistinguishable.
People overlook the fact that names are only symbolic representations of phenomena and not phenomena themselves. It leads people to react to the name and the symbolic meanings they assign to the name, instead of the phenomena it is supposed to represent.

Another aspect of the constructionist perspective we are interested in is the possibility of multiple reality constructions. As noted above, the manner in which symbols are defined and used by social actors ultimately create and maintain their conception of the social world. Because symbols or names are human constructions, they are inextricably entwined with moral, ideological and other human belief systems. In pluralist society, then, opposing meanings can be assigned to the same symbol or different symbols can be used to represent the same phenomena. In either situation, the failure to agree upon the precise meaning and appropriate use of a symbol, will give rise to multiple, and possibly, contradictory conceptions of "social reality."

Terrorism Within the Constructionist Perspective

From the constructionist perspective, conceptions of terrorism are more appropriately viewed as images rather than substance. That is, there is no particular social condition that is essentially or inherently terroristic, only perceptions of what is and is not terrorism. In this respect, the word
"terrorism" is a symbolic representation of those things people perceive as such. Moreover, it is an "act of the mind" or human construct that embraces a particular cognitive imagery of certain social phenomena.

Thus, social constructionist see the word "terrorism" as a name or label that serves to identify and classify social behaviour. Underlying this nominalistic view is the premise that the phenomena themselves are of secondary importance in relation to the social assessment of these phenomena. Accordingly, terroristic situations are not found to exist in the immutable or objective nature of social action. Rather, they are seen to emerge out of processes of social definition and social reaction. Howard Becker's classic statement regarding the subjective nature of deviance serves to illustrate this point.

Social groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance and by applying these rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application of rules and sanctions to an "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is behavior that people so label (Becker, 1963:9).

Horowitz, for instance, adopts a constructionist view of terrorism when he speaks of political terrorism, not in terms of an act, but as a labeling response to an act (Horowitz, 1973:15). M.C. Bassiouni makes a similar observation when he defines terrorism as "...a label affixed to certain unlawful acts of violence or to a strategy of unlawful terror-inspiring violence..." (Bassiouni, 1979:745) [emphasis added].
If one accepts the nominalist idea that the word "terrorism" is basically a label that is imposed on certain acts, then conceptions of terrorism must be seen as reflecting the symbolic meaning attending this label. Thus, different conceptions or "realities" of terrorism reflect different symbolic meanings or definitions of the term "terrorism." Since these meanings are human products, different conceptions of terrorism will invariably reflect varying, and possibly competing, moral and ideological beliefs. The word terrorism, probably more than any other term, is susceptible to contradictory meanings because of the intense opprobrium that is associated with the term.

Contemporary use of the term clearly demonstrates that when someone or something has been defined as terroristic, the observer has rendered an unfavourable judgment. The terrorist label, then, has a pejorative connotation. Because the designation is explicitly derogatory, it is not a label that is self-imposed, but rather is reserved for the actions of those on the other side of a political battle.

The pejorative connotation of the terrorist label takes a particular form in liberal democratic states. According to the political philosophy of these countries, violent political action against the state is, by definition, illegitimate forms of dissent and protest. Moreover, terror-violence directed against the state is perceived as a serious violation of the most essential constitutional rules governing political life.
Thus, terrorism in these countries is seen as the most serious crime imaginable. The idea that terrorism is, first and foremost, criminal behaviour is expressed by one liberal analyst when he writes,

Terrorism is undeniably criminal conduct, and to grant any political exception to offenders who have perpetrated indiscriminate death and destruction upon innocent third parties is a patent denial of the rule of law (Friedlander, 1976:243).

A similar view is reflected in the intransigent position of the current British government not to grant "political prisoner status" to convicted I.R.A. members in British penitentiaries. Denying these individuals this status serves to reaffirm the British notion that terrorism has no "legitimate" political basis and is exclusively criminal conduct.

In liberal states, then, labeling an act as terroristic confers an indelible criminal status upon the perpetrators of that act. An important corollary of this status is that it calls into play a specific set of response measures. Individuals who are designated as terrorists are effectively placed outside the legitimate political system, and as such, they are acted upon rather than interacted with. By perceiving terrorist as criminals, a liberal democratic government is also,

...unlikely to enter into negotiations with them or to see reform as a useful means of ending the incident; instead it will probably conceive as its proper course the placing of the violent under lock and key as soon as possible (Torrance, 1977:480).

As noted above, liberal democratic conceptions of terrorism embrace a very narrow range of phenomena that could potentially
be designated as terror-violence. From the constructivist perspective, this paradox reflects the imputation of specific moral and ideological meaning to the term, rather than some substantive or qualitative difference among social phenomena. It is only through these subjective meanings that liberal analysts are able to apply the term to the actions of insurgent movements and totalitarian or communist regimes, while ignoring its use to describe identical acts carried out by, and in the interests of, Western states.

To account for the particular moral meaning that attends the liberal democratic conception of terrorism, it is necessary to consider the broader issue of state legitimacy. Moreover, whether or not an act is defined as terrorism depends, in large part, upon how one views the legitimacy of the state which has either perpetrated the act, or against which the act is directed. The centrality of the legitimacy issue to the analysis of terrorism is made clear by Arblaster when he writes,

_Terrorism can only be understood in relation to the legitimacy of the state. It is therefore an indispensable obstacle to intelligent discussion of...terrorism to begin by assuming that the legitimacy of the state or states in question can be taken for granted (Arblaster, 1977:422)._  

Western images of terrorism are premised upon beliefs that posit as legitimate the actions and policies of democratically elected and right-wing governments. They are also centered on the liberal notion the state has the exclusive right to use coercive force. Thus, individual or non-state violence and the repressive actions of left-wing regimes tend to be condemned as
terrorism by Western political observers.

Greisman (1977) has elaborated on this theme by examining how reified perceptions of the state structure the social meanings people assign to terrorism. According to Greisman, reification of the state occurs when the abstract concept of "state" is given a concreteness or physical existence it does not have. When this happens the phenomena that this abstraction is intended to symbolize becomes transformed into something other than its fundamental nature: the relation between people (Greisman, 1977:314). Of particular importance to us, is that reification of the state significantly shapes how people perceive the actions of state agents. It does this, essentially, by conferring a distinct legitimacy to their actions. Greisman makes this point by writing,

In viewing the state as something besides a group of very human beings, all other actors in the political, military, or economic areas are robbed of their legitimacy while the most questionable deeds are committed in the reified name of fatherland or national security. There is a certain idolatry in this, and a predictable identification of the nation-state's guardians with supernatural powers (Greisman, 1977:314) [emphasis found in the original text].

Hence, reified perceptions of governments allow state actors to undertake action that could be defined as terrorism, while eschewing the terrorist label.

Greisman illustrates his position by comparing popular perceptions of state and non-state violence. Violent acts perpetrated by non-governmental forces, he contends, are seen as the product of deranged and psychotic individuals. Conversely,
the violent action of state officials is viewed as rational, logical and always in the "national interest." He also notes that the weaponry and tactics employed by individual terrorists are described by most people as "primitive" and carry the cultural meaning of "fighting dirty." On the other hand, government-sponsored violence is seen to be carried out by highly skilled experts using sophisticated and modern weapons (Greisman, 1977:307-310).

According to Greisman, these different conceptions of state and non-state action reflect, in large part, an aspect of reifying the state which leads people to identify more closely with the role of the government. In this respect, those people who reify the state tend to view themselves as victims when the authority structure is assailed. Similarly, identification with the state can also draw populations into a "...vicarious participation in government approved acts of violence." Both forms of audience participation, however, have a profound impact on the meaning of terrorism.

When people identify with the victim of a terrorist act, the act becomes terrorist. If they identify with the perpetrator, it becomes something more justified, plausible, or praiseworthy (Greisman, 1977:311).

Greisman's contention that identification with the perpetrator of a potentially terrorist act removes the terrorist designation does not apply solely to state-sponsored action. It also holds true for insurgents and the people who identify with their actions. Because these individuals often see themselves as victims of state repression, it is not surprising that they
regard as terroristic, force exercised by government agents.

Underlying this conception of terrorism are perceptions of the state which diametrically oppose the reified perceptions that inhere Western notions of terrorism. From the insurgent’s perspective, the state represents all that is vile in society. Its political apparatus is seen as repressive and its authority as illegitimate. Within this context, state-sponsored violence becomes terroristic, while anti-state violence assumes moral defensibility. Price makes this point when he writes,

The existing government of course claims a right to authority over the area, but the revolutionaries also claim that they represent a sovereign state in the process of formation. They thus feel that they have, in Weber’s words, a monopoly on legitimate violence which justifies their use of force against the established order (Price, 1977:54-55).

Competing perceptions of state legitimacy, then, produce competing "realities" of terrorism. Consequently, what liberal observers refer to as terrorism, others may view as "peoples armies" or "independence or liberation forces."

Because each terrorist situation is subject to alternative conceptualizations, the conflict in these situations does not take place only on a physical level, but also at a definitional level. More specifically, both sides of a terrorist conflict attempt to construct and promulgate a definition of the situation that serves to legitimate their own activities and discredits those of its opponents. Should insurgents succeed in having their definition accepted, then, their objectives and actions may be supported by other members of society.
Conversely, should reified perceptions of the state prevail, the insurgents would be defined as deserving of harsh and severe sanctions. Almost by definition, the side which has the greatest power will succeed in having their conception of legitimacy, and more importantly, their conception of terrorism become the predominant view.¹⁴

Western conceptions of terror-violence in the Middle East provides an illustration of this point. Prior to 1949, Arab domination in the region was reflected in the Western world's condemnation of the Zionist movement as terroristic. With the creation of the state of Israel, however, the geo-political structure of the region was transformed. One manifestation of this restructuring is the emergence of an alternative conception of the legitimate use of force, and of terrorism. How many Western political observers view Palestinian irredentism as illegitimate and its members as terrorists.

Summary

This chapter has examined several aspects of terrorism. The first section examined many of the popular beliefs that make up the conventional wisdom on the topic. Here, it was noted that contemporary terrorism is seen by most people as a serious and growing threat to human life and property and the stability of

¹⁴For an interesting illustration of how each side in a political conflict attempt to promulgate their own definition of social reality, see Bromley, et al., (1979).
national and transnational order.

A review of the social scientific conceptions of terrorism was also undertaken. One component of this review focused on scholarly perceptions of the "objective" attributes or characteristics of terroristic phenomena. Another component of this review, centered on the typological constructions of terrorism that appear in the social scientific literature. What emerged from this analysis was that a tremendous range of disparate violent acts have been designated, by scholars, as terrorism.

Having identified the manifold forms of behaviour that are seen to fall within the conceptual parameters of terrorism, it was observed that liberal democratic conceptions of terrorism appear to embrace a specific variety of behaviour. More specifically, Western definitions of terrorism tend to circumscribe the actions of left-wing insurgent organizations and communist regimes. What appears to be systematically excluded from these definitions are comparable acts carried out by liberal democratic governments and right-wing political movements.

In the final section of this chapter, we examined the paradox of Western meanings of terrorism using a constructionist framework. Here, it was argued that there is no essential or objective social condition that is terrorist, only the subjective assessment of situations as such. This lead to a consideration of the word "terrorism" as a label that serves to
discredit and vilify the acts, and the perpetrator(s) of the acts, it describes.

As a socially constructed "reality", it was further observed that all conceptions of terrorism are grounded in moral and ideological beliefs. With respect to Western definitions of terror-violence these beliefs reflect reified perceptions of the state. Within this reified framework, only government-sponsored violence is seen as legitimate. Consequently, only the violent action of non-state actors is perceived as terrorist by liberal observers.

If one accepts the idea that terrorism is a socially constructed reality, then the social components making up the construction process need to be considered. Without doubt one significant component in this process is the mass media. As the major purveyors of information in society, the mass media play a key role in public awareness of and public attitudes towards most political and social events. C. Wright Mills makes a similar observation when he writes,

Very little of what we think we know of the social realities of the world have we found out first hand. Most of the 'pictures in our heads' we have gained from these media - even to the point where we often do not really believe what we see before us until we read about it in the paper or hear about it on the radio. The media not only give us information; they give our very experiences. Our standards of credulity, our standards of reality, tend to be set by these media rather than by our own fragmentary experience (Mills, 1956:311).

Mills' statement holds especially true for reality constructions of terrorism. A great deal of our impressions about and attitudes towards terrorism are derived from the
media. Stated differently, media images of terrorist acts would appear to significantly influence public perceptions about the nature and dimensions of contemporary terrorism.

Since much of the reality we construct about terrorism is based on media information, it becomes necessary to examine more closely the nexus between the media and conceptions of terrorism. Such an examination forms the bases of the next two chapters.

We begin this analysis by reviewing how this relationship is presented in the social scientific literature. Chapter III, then, outlines the perceived strategic linkages between the media and insurgent terrorism. It also delineates many of the concerns and criticisms voiced by liberal observers regarding media coverage of terrorist events. Chapter IV examines the relationship between the media and insurgent terrorism at a theoretical level. Here, it will be argued that both the consensus and conflict models of society provide alternative ways to conceptualize this relationship.
There is a fundamental paradox in conceptions of political terrorism, especially as it is seen to relate to insurgency. This contradiction centers on the disparity between the perceived strategic goals and tactical methods of insurgent terrorists. More specifically, terrorist acts, in themselves, are seen to fall short of producing their intended socio-political impact.

As noted in the previous chapter, the strategy of terrorism is seen to involve the deliberate use, or threat, of violence as a means of creating overwhelming fear for coercive purposes. When it is used to effect a power-related outcome it is usually given the conceptual label of political terrorism. When the strategy is employed to usurp political power it is commonly referred to as insurgent or revolutionary terrorism.

Despite variations in their perceived long and short term objectives, most political analysts see the propagation of widespread fear as the immediate strategic goal of insurgent terrorism.

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1Terror-inspiring violence can be employed to achieve a diversity of political objectives. In the preceding chapter, three very general goals were discussed: terrorism used to preserve political power, terrorism used to usurp political power and terrorism designed to influence public opinion on specific political issues.
terrorists. In this sense, insurgent terrorists are seen to rely on intimidation, rather than direct violence as a means of effecting their political goals. As noted in the previous chapter, it is intimidatory because insurgent movements are, by definition, too small and too weak to engage in a direct and sustained military assault against either a general population or a government force. Accordingly, terrorist tactics are defined as sporadic, clandestine and limited in consequence and duration.

Given this definition of insurgent terrorism, it appears that these violent acts are, in themselves, inadequate, in terms of their immediate strategic goal of terrorizing a large population. To meet this objective, the actual social-psychological impact of these violent acts would have to be inflated beyond the direct victims, so it reaches the wider audience the terrorist is attempting to influence. Put another way, the strategy of insurgent terrorism appears to require that the actual impact of a violent act be extended or amplified.

Among the perceived short-term tactical objectives of revolutionary terrorists are: publicity for the terrorist movement, the winning of specific concessions, such as the release of imprisoned colleagues, the acquisition of vital resources, such as money and weapons, provoking the state into the use of repressive counter measures which would push people to support the terrorists, discredit the state by demonstrating that the government can no longer provide the framework necessary for a normal life, and the elimination of opposing forces (Alexander and Finger, 1979:110-111; Stohl, 1979:14; Thornton, 1964:82-83; Wilkinson, 1977:59; Wilkinson, 1979:109-111).
According to most political observers, the paradox of insurgent terrorism is overcome once it becomes a media event. More specifically, mass media coverage of a terrorist act is seen to amplify that act so its impact can transcend the immediate time and location in which it takes place. Thus, the media are seen to act as the intervening mechanism which makes it possible for an act of violence, which is limited in both duration and consequence, to impact the vast audience the insurgent terrorist so desperately wants to reach. In this context, mass communication is perceived as a vital component in the strategy of insurgent terrorism. Bassiouni comments on the strategic importance of the media for insurgent terrorism when he writes,

The basic vehicle relied upon by the ideologically motivated offender (terrorist) in achieving his or her objective (whether it is the tactical objective of the action itself or the strategic objective of disseminating the effect of the action or the claims of the actor) is the mass media. Because the mass media have the capacity to disseminate news about terror violence occurrences, it has also the ability to create the social impact desired by the perpetrator of such acts. In fact the ideologically motivated offender (terrorist) relies on that medium to accomplish the tactical, strategic and ultimate objectives intended by the commission of such acts (Bassiouni, 1979:759).

This chapter examines the strategic or operational relationship between the mass media and insurgent terrorism as it is presented and discussed in the social scientific and journalistic literature. Examination of these views is divided into three parts. The perceived importance of publicity to the strategy of insurgent terror-violence will be the focus of the
initial part of this chapter. Central to this discussion is the notion of insurgent terrorism as a form of violent symbolic communication.

The second section of this chapter reviews two distinct conceptualizations of the interaction between mass media and terrorism. More specifically, the instrumental and symbiotic conceptions of this relationship are outlined.

The final section examines many of the concerns and criticisms articulated by liberal analysts and law enforcement officials concerning media coverage of terrorist events. Several of the stated advantages of this coverage for the management of terrorist incidents are also noted. The perceived dilemma associated with preventing the media from reporting terrorist acts and some of the steps taken by the news media to resolve this "catch-22" situation are also examined.

The overview of social scientific and professional conceptions of the strategic or operational relationship between insurgent terrorism and the media provided in this chapter, forms the basis of a later investigation into the theoretical linkages between these two phenomena.

It should be noted, that while the media is seen as a central component in both state and non-state strategies of terror-violence, only the perceived interaction between insurgent terrorism and the media are examined in this thesis. The decision to restrict the scope of this discussion is not to suggest, however, that the relationship between state terrorism
and the media is of lesser importance. Governmental control and manipulation of communication systems during campaigns of state-sponsored terrorism are deserving of equal attention.

Limiting the scope of this thesis to anti-state terrorism, however, rests on two factors. First, it has been suggested that governments which employ terror-inspiring violence as a means of preserving extant power arrangements or effecting radical socio-political change tend to minimize the amount of publicity accorded their actions (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:2; Bassiouni, 1979:758). They do this principally by censoring the media.

In sharp contrast to the circumscribed role they are believed to play during campaigns of state terrorism, the mass media are seen to assume a major strategic and tactical position in insurgent terror-violence. Suffice to say at this point, that media attention is seen to be so crucial to the strategy of insurgent terrorism that revolutionary groups go so far as to choreograph their activities and deliberately draw media personnel into the terrorist drama as ways of achieving optimal media exposure for their actions. Hence, the notion that the media are more active in cases of insurgent terrorism was one factor for focusing exclusively on this form of political violence.

The second reason is more personal. It reflects the author's particular interest in a small group of ethnic-nationalists called the Front de Liberatin du Quebec (FLQ) which employed violent tactics to promote the independence
of Quebec. What is important to note, here, is that the violence perpetrated by this organization is perceived by many political observers as acts of insurgent terrorism. How this political group is believed to have used the media to further its political goals is examined in Part II of this thesis.

The Strategic Importance of the Media

The Symbolic Nature of Insurgent Terrorism

To fully comprehend the perceived importance of publicity to the strategy of terror-violence, it becomes necessary to elaborate on the symbolic nature of political terrorism. In the previous chapter it was noted that political observers often distinguish between criminal and political terrorism along a symbolic dimension. More specifically, criminal terrorists are seen to employ violence for the purpose of coercing concessions from their immediate victims. Fear that may be aroused within individuals who are not strategically part of the criminal terrorist's objective, is both unintended and superfluous. Political terrorists, on the other hand, deliberately use violence against a few to achieve an intended impact on a larger audience. From this perspective, an act of political terrorism is not undertaken for its effects on the immediate victim, but for its effects on third parties (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:58)

Stated differently, it is the audience, rather than the actual
victims of terror-violence that constitute the group that insurgent terrorists wish to impact (McEwen and Sloan, 1979:8-9; Alexander, 1978:112). This view is succinctly expressed by Greisman when he states,

Terrorist acts require an audience, the target is of secondary importance, i.e. those that see the target attacked will become terrorized and this is the real goal of terrorism (Greisman, 1977:305).

To the extent that a terrorist act is intended to have a meaning for those watching, it is said to be symbolic in nature. ³

Thornton's (1964) conceptual analysis of the multiple targets of political terrorism helps to bring the symbolic nature of terrorism into clearer focus. According to Thornton there are three distinct groups of people terrorists attempt to influence by their violent actions. One group consists of those individuals who, because of their direct involvement, are physically and emotionally victimized by an act of terror-violence. Included in this group would be the hostages of political kidnappings and the captives of building seizures and aircraft hijackings.

A second, and the primary target of terrorist acts, consists of those individuals who share a sense of relatedness with the immediate victims. This identification can be based on several factors, including kinship, race, religion, ethnicity

³Something is symbolic when it has a meaning that goes beyond the immediate situation and is understood by those who have learnt what that symbol means. Furthermore, a symbol can be anything that has been assigned a meaning and is used to communicate that meaning to others (e.g., words, numbers and gestures) (Henslin, 1975:105).
and religion. Individuals who share this affinity with the direct victims are seen as the "true" targets of terrorist actions. Collectively, they form the group that is intended to be terrorized by the implicit threat "you may be next."

Furthermore, these are the individuals from whom concessions are demanded.

Thorton refers to the third category of terrorist targets as the "resonant mass." This group embraces members of society who are cognizant of the terrorists' action but are not actually affected by, nor identify with the immediate victims of this action. Because widespread publicity is, in itself, a major goal sought by terrorist movements, reaching this larger target audience is often a primary strategic goal of insurgent terrorists. More will be said on this point below.

It should be noted, however, that Thorton's conceptual schema, like any attempt to demarcate the various categories of terrorist targets, is often difficult to apply to a terrorist situation. For instance, Thorton himself notes that in large-scale terrorist campaigns the identification group and the resonant mass are identical. According to Thorton, these situations often "...involve a large number of subgroups of the society, so that the whole resonant mass will feel increasingly engaged" (Thorton, 1964:79). Ochberg believes this to have been the case with respect to the South Moluccan hijackings in the Netherlands. He claims that not only were the direct victims of these acts terrorized, but so were their family members and the
rest of society because they were symbols of everyone in society (cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:79).

Because the violent acts of insurgent terrorists are intended to intimidate those who witness these acts, many political observers consider it more appropriate to view the actual victims of terrorism as symbolic instruments. From this perspective, the animate and inanimate targets of terror-violence are often seen to have a representative quality of the wider target population whose behaviour the terrorists are attempting to influence. Several analysts have recognized the instrumental role of the victim in the terrorist strategy, including Hacker, when he writes,

The victims most often condemned to a purely passive role are merely pawns in the terroristic game, extras in the terrorists' dramatic productions, used only instrumentally to help the terrorist to obtain their goals... (Hacker, 1980:147).

Catton makes a similar observation when he notes that, "the immediate victims are often not the objects of the terrorists' antagonism. They are pawns used merely as a means of checkmating more powerful entities elsewhere" (Catton, 1978:710).

It is of no surprise, then, that most of the insurgent activity that is defined as terrorism involve targets that are often perceived by the insurgents as symbols of an exploitative imperialist regime or as representative of a repressive organ of the state. Consequently, insurgent organizations throughout the world direct their violence against particular groups of people, such as top military, political and military figures (Russell,
et al., 1979:12). A case in point was the assassination of Lord Moyne in Cairo by members of the Stern gang, a pro-Zionist group, after World War II. A member of this organization later commented that "...he (Lord Moyne) was the symbol of British Empire in the Middle East, so our action was symbolic as well as political" (cited in Livingstone, 1982:60). Additionally, a cursory analysis of the destructive campaign waged by the FLQ during the 1960's and early 1970's would reveal that many of the targets of their actions were also symbolic in nature. They were intended to symbolize Anglophone domination in Quebec.4

Many observers have noted that the symbolic meaning of a terrorist act is often unclear. This ambiguity is created by the fact that the same act can have a different symbolic meaning for different people. A victim or target that has multiple symbolic meanings can lead to a misinterpretation of the terrorists' threat and possibly preclude the intended target population from receiving the terror-inspiring message. For instance, the victim of terrorist act may represent:

...one thing to the terrorist (e.g. capitalist exploiter), another to the media (well-respected businessman and philanthropist) and various things to different segments of the public (family father, church-goer, self-made man, etc.) (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:110-111).

When this happens, the intended target population may misinterpret or fail to receive the terrorists' symbolic message. It is believed, then, that the success of a terrorist

4A more detailed discussion of FLQ violence appears in Chapter V.
act is, in large part, predicated on the ability of the target audience to correctly interpret the symbolic meaning of that act.

Terrorism as a Violent Communication

Closely related to the conception of insurgent terrorism as a symbolic expression is the view that the strategy of terror-violence is a violent form of political communication (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981:274). From this perspective, terrorist acts are seen as messages that are intended to terrorize those who are watching or those to whom the acts have been communicated. Karber, for example, refers to terrorism in communicative terms when he defines it as the symbolic use of violence as a means of communication (Karber, 1971:528). In a similar vein, Catton speaks of terrorists as "...someone for whom the more conventional means of communication seem unavailable or ineffective" (Catton, 1978:705). Green echoes this view by claiming "...that the choice of victims made by insurgent terrorists is in the first instance a function of their publicity value, of the communicative potential" (Green, 1982:387).

The communicative nature of insurgent terrorism is often illustrated by comparing terrorist acts to more orthodox forms of communication. For instance, the most rudimentary model of communication is seen to consist of three components: (1) the
source or sender of a (2) message which is picked up by a (3) receiver. Political terrorism has also been conceptualized as a triadic communicative process, with the (1) terrorist acting as the transmitter of a (2) terror-inspiring message, which takes the form of a violent symbolic act, which has as its intended recipients, (3) the identification group and resonant mass (Karber, 1971:529; Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:15).

Publicity as a Necessary Component of Insurgent Terrorism

The conception of insurgent terrorism as symbolic communication underscores the belief that this form of political violence can only be "effective" if it is publicized. More specifically, if terrorists hope to successfully convey a terror-inspiring message to a target population that is not directly affected by their actions, then they must find a means of disseminating this message to this broader audience. In other words, terrorists must propagandize their actions if they hope to achieve their intended objectives.

Most political observers agree that, in contemporary society, the print and electronic media are the conduits which allow terrorists to reach their desired targets. Media coverage of a terrorist incident is seen to amplify this event so that people, who are not directly affected, are made aware of its occurrence. In this respect, the media are seen to "...stand between the terrorist and the true audience which he wishes to
reach, the audience to which his message of fear must be carried if his ulterior objective is to be attained" (Cooper, 1976:229). Deprived of widespread publicity, many political observers believe that acts of insurgent terrorism would remain obscure and inconspicuous acts of violence. Moreover, they would remain known only to those individuals in the immediate locality.

Unpublished terrorism, then, is "meaningless violence" (Hodgson, 1979:38), "a weapon of the weak" (Friedlander, 1976:241), and an "exercise in futility" (National Task Force, 1976:1). From this perspective, transmission of the message becomes even more important than the commission of the act. Or as Walter Lacquer has remarked, "The terrorist's act by itself is nothing. Publicity is all" (Lacquer, 1976:104).

The media's role during the abduction of Aldo Moro illustrates how media publicity is seen to amplify and magnify terrorist acts. According to Schmid and de Graaf (1982), the Italian media, in reporting the kidnapping, translated the physical violence against one individual into the psychological violence against millions. In this respect, the media transformed Moro's murder into thirteen million murders in the

\footnote{Cooper (1976:226) makes a similar point when he states that,}

The media is the indispensable carrier of the message. The transmission of that message in the form and manner dictated by the terrorist is a purpose scarcely less important to him than the accomplishment of the act which he desires to publicize.
eyes of the Italian people. Based on these observations Schmid and de Graaf conclude that,

Of all the terrorist uses of the media, this, the use of amplification and magnification by the media, is the most important one. It gives contemporary insurgent terrorism much of its power and, by implication, its raison d'etre (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:53).

To argue that the mass media perform an important strategic function for the insurgent terrorist does not imply that terrorist strategies would not exist without mass communications. While contemporary insurgent terrorists have benefited from the advent of mass communication networks, it has been argued that campaigns of terror-violence antedated the technological developments which made mass communication possible. Paul Wilkinson makes this point by noting that,

"...the terrorist mode has been with us from the earliest times. It is an historical fallacy to assert that modern terrorism owes its origins to television and the modern press" (Wilkinson, 1978:3). Wilkinson further contends that prior to the twentieth century, terrorist organizations relied on pamphlets, leaflets and books to publicize their grievances and frustrations. Word of mouth and newspaper reports were also effective means of conveying a terror-inspiring message to a target population.

While most observers appear to agree with Wilkinson's position, many believe that it would be absurd to deny that the

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6This view appears to be shared by several political analysts, including H.H.A. Cooper when he speaks of the media as the indispensable carrier of the terrorist message (Cooper, 1976:226).
publicity potential of contemporary terrorism has been greatly augmented by current communication technology. Communication satellites, television systems and mass circulating newspapers now make it possible for the insurgent terrorist to reach a worldwide audience. As Buckley notes, "if fear and intimidation are the terrorists' most immediate goal (communication) technology permits the achievement of these goals on a global scale" (Buckley, 1978:viii). In addition to expanding the scope of the audience, modern media technology also permits the public to actually witness the terrorist drama as it unfold. Given that the modern media have not only served to amplify the impact of a terrorist act, but have brought the target population closer to the terror-inspiring acts, it is not surprising that most observers agree with Lacquer's assertion that, "...the media are the terrorist's best friend" (Lacquer, 1976:104).

Terrorism as an Attempt to Access the Political Agenda

Aside from its strategic importance, many political observers claim that contemporary terrorist organizations have sought media attention as an end in itself. Moreover, advertisement or public recognition for the terrorists' cause is seen as one of the principal purposes underlying terror-violence. Some analysts have gone so far as to contend

\(^7\)For a comprehensive listing of various strategic uses of the media by insurgent terroristis, see Bassiouni, 1979:762.
that the public recognition gained by terrorists through media exposure is the most powerful single motivation for this phenomenon (Clutterbuck, 1982:166; cited in Stohl, 1979:14). This view is shared by McEwen and Sloan when they state that "...without the potential generated by the media many terrorist events would not happen in the first place" (McEwen and Sloan, 1979:15).

Terrorist acts that are undertaken expressly for the purpose of gaining media notoriety are seen by many observers as attempts to access the agenda of public discussion (Miller, 1979; Alexander, 1978). In this context, terrorists are seen to capitalize on the mass media's perceived ability to influence the salience of political issues. Central to this view is the belief that, as major purveyors of information in modern society, the media have the potential to significantly affect what people think about (McCombs and Shaw, 1972). Moreover, that concentrated media attention on social and political issues tends to confer the status of high public concern on these issues. The substance of media stories, then, become understood as the "pressing issue of the day" (Hall, et al., 1978:62). From this perspective, insurgent terrorists seek to have their actions publicized by the media in hopes of enhancing the salience of their political objectives.

According to many political observers the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is one terrorist movement which has been particularly successful in using media attention as a
vehicle for accessing the public agenda (Kelly and Mitchell, 1981). By securing worldwide media coverage for their violent actions, the PLO has succeeded in intensifying public awareness of the Palestinian issue. The Black September operation at the Munich Olympics, for instance, garnered tremendous media attention and thrust the issue to the forefront of public discussion. Livingstone expresses this view by stating,

In the aftermath of Munich, publicity transformed the Palestinian movement into a conscious and visible force to be reckoned with and kept the Palestinian issue at the center of the world stage, by contrast to other less media-wise revolutionary movements such as the Kurds in Iran, the Huks in the Philippines, and a variety of insurgent groups in Africa that have languished far from the glare of the television lights (Livingstone, 1982:61).

A public opinion survey conducted in the United States is cited in support of the notion that continuous media attention of the PLO has increased public awareness of this political organization. According to this study, 63 percent of the American public was aware of the PLO in January, 1976. One year earlier, the figure was 52 percent. The authors of this study attribute this increase to extensive media coverage afforded the PLO during the intervening period (cited in Alexander, 1978:104).

For some political observers, the tremendous media attention accorded the PLO was a key precipitating factor in the international community recognizing the Palestinian issue as a "legitimate" political problem. The appearance of Yassir Arafat, a major spokesperson for the PLO before the United Nations
General Assembly, reflects, in part, the movement's success in using publicity as a means of accessing the political agenda.

Aside from whether or not they succeeded in accessing the public agenda, a plethora of terrorist episodes, over the last decade, are perceived to have had publicity as their sole objective. Almost all of the terrorist activity of the PLO is seen in this light, particularly the Munich incident referred to above. At that time, eight members of Black September abducted, and later killed, eleven members of the Israeli Olympic team. Although several demands were made for the safe release of the hostages, many observers contend that publicity was the primary objective of this action.

The terrorists can have had no serious expectations of the Israeli government giving way, but some 500 million people all over the world watched the drama on television, relayed to their homes by satellite. Ninety-nine per cent of these viewers were probably disgusted but a large proportion of them may have had no knowledge at all of the Palestinian cause before this. That was specifically what the guerrillas aimed to change (cited in McEwen and Sloan, 1979:22).

Another terrorist incident which is believed to have had publicity as its central goal was the hijacking of a Transworld airliner by five Croatian Nationalists in 1976. Based on the conditions set by the hijackers for the safe release of the hostages and aircraft, many have concluded that the action was undertaken primarily to advertise Croatian separatism. One demand imposed by the hijackers centered on the publication of two propaganda tracts on the front page of five influential newspapers. Another involved the distribution of leaflets, by

While these incidents illustrate how media attention, in and of itself, has become a focal concern for some terrorist groups, the latter illustrates how terrorists have attempted to secure publicity by making media attention a condition in the bargaining process. Wilkinson recognizes the terrorist strategy of coercing media coverage for their actions when he writes,

Terrorists are so ardent in their desire for access to the media that they have sometimes attempted to set up their own broadcasting, or have demanded like the F.L.Q. in 1970, that they should have their manifesto broadcast as a condition for releasing their kidnap victims (Wilkinson, 1977:59).

The Arabs who seized the European headquarters of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Vienna, in 1975, used a similar strategy to coerce media attention for their actions. They made the broadcast of their communiques over radio a condition for the safe release of their captives.

In addition to terrorists extorting media attention, several analysts contend that insurgent movements skilfully time and plan their actions to produce optimal media publicity. In this sense, recent terrorist incidents are seen to have been meticulously choreographed and staged to gain the widest possible viewing audience. Because terrorism is seen to be choreographed for an audience, several commentators liken it to a form of theatre (Hodgson, 1979:38; Catton, 1978:712; Friedlander, 1976:241; Hickey, 1977:4).
Several different strategies have been employed to maximize media exposure of terrorist acts. In Northern Ireland, for example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), often time their bombing campaigns to coincide with the late afternoon rush hour. In addition to maximizing the destructive impact of their bombing strikes, this strategy is believed to be used by the IRA to increase the likelihood of their actions being mentioned on the early evening national news. Italian terrorists are seen to maximize media coverage by staging their campaigns on those days which preceed the highest circulation days of major newspapers (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:51). The six Arabs who siezed the Iranian Embassy in London selected that particular city to stage their actions, in part, because media coverage in London was believed to be "the best in the world" (Clutterbuck, 1981:135). Haam Abdul Khaalis, the leader of the Hanafi group which seized three buildings in Washington, D.C., ensured optimal media coverage by being highly discriminant when granting interviews. A hostage of the Hanafi siege reported that Khaalis refused a request to be interviewed by a Texas radio station after discovering it only had 20,000 watts by saying, "you are not worth talking to. I don't talk to radio stations with less than fifty thousand watts" (cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:98). Additionally, many observers believe that it was not the mere presence of Israeli athletes at Munich which prompted the Black September organization to stage their actions in that city at the time. Rather, it was the tremendous media coverage attending
Orchestrating terrorist action to achieve optimal audience attention is claimed to be a strategy well learned from the successful experience of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in liberating Algeria from French colonial rule. The FLN found it more effective to concentrate its campaign of terror-violence in the urban regions of the country where their actions would receive greater publicity. Abane Ramdane, the leader of the FLN rationalized this strategy by observing that it was better to kill one French person in Algiers where it would receive international media attention, than to kill ten of the enemy in the countryside, where no one would speak of it (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:19).

Conceptions of the Relationship Between Media and Terrorism

Two general views have emerged in the literature regarding the relationship between the mass media and insurgent terrorism. One view postulates an instrumental relationship between the media and terrorism, while another depicts this relationship as mutually advantageous or as symbiotic.

Instrumentalist Conception

From this perspective, the mass media are basically seen as a tool that is manipulated by terrorist to further their
interests. Put another way, there is a forced compliance on the part of the media to report the terrorists' actions. As noted above, this forced compliance often occurs when a condition for the cessation of further violence involves the broadcasting or publishing of a manifesto or communiqué. When terrorists are able to ensure publicity for their objectives in a way that is favourable to their political objectives, they are said to control the media (Livingstone, 1982:65).

Even in situations where the media are not forced to publicize terrorist actions, the media have been seen to allow themselves to become dependent on terrorist acts as a key news source. This media possession was evident in the events involving the abduction of Peter Lorenz by the Baader-Meinhoff gang in West Germany. The remarks made by a television editor close to the scene conveys the extent of this domination.

We just lost control of the medium. It was theirs...not ours...We shifted shows in order to meet their timetable...There is plenty of underworld crime on our screens, but up until now Kojak and Columbo were always in charge...Now it was the real thing, and it was the gangsters who wrote the script and programmed the mass media. We preferred to think that we were being 'flexible' but actually we were just helpless, as helpless as the police and the Bonn Government (cited in Clutterbuck, 1981:125-126).

Political observers who perceive the relationship in these terms, often speak of "media rape" or refer to the media as "handmaidens of terrorists" (Livingstone, 1982:65).
Symbiotic Conception

Several political analysts claim that the relationship between the media and terrorism is more complex than suggested by the instrumentalist position. Missing from this one-sided conceptualization is a consideration of the advantages and benefits associated with reporting terrorist acts accruing to the news media. Instead of viewing the advantages of this relationship flowing in unidirectional terms, as the instrumentalists do, many observers posit a "symbiotic" association between terrorism and the media (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982; Clutterbuck, 1982; Bassiouni, 1981; Hacker, 1980; Alexander, 1979; Catton, 1978; Cooper, 1976). These observers contend that a mutual dependency exists between the strategic objectives of political terrorism and the organizational exigencies of "successful" news reporting. In this sense, both the terrorist and the media are seen to provide each other with what it desperately needs: a large audience.

In short, there is a kind of "symbiosis" between terrorists and the media. Each provides something the other can use. It is as natural for the media to provide terrorist movements the publicity they seek (without being blackmailed into doing so) as it is for the terrorists to provide the media with the audience-exciting content they seek (Catton, 1978:713).

By examining the commercial nature of mass communication in detail, it will become more evident how the media benefit from reporting terrorist acts.
Many of the mass communication systems in Western capitalist states are business enterprises which sell products for profit. The commodity sold by the media is advertising space and time, usually to other businesses to promote their services or products. Because advertising rates are determined, primarily by the circulation or audience size, media agencies ultimately sell public attention to advertisers (Bassiouni, 1981:25). It follows that for media operations to be commercially viable they must offer a product which attracts a large percentage of any potential audience. According to Clutterbuck, audience attention is paramount to any media enterprise. In his view, "...the mass media in a free society are motivated by the need to attract an audience largely because the media stand or fall by selling advertising..." (Clutterbuck, 1982:166).

News information is one component of media programming that is used to gain public attention. Certain types of social and political events are more likely to be presented as news information because they are considered to be of interest to the majority of the reading or viewing public. Such information involves stories identified as "newsworthy."

While there are varying opinions regarding the definition of a newsworthy incident, there is general agreement that acts of terrorism generate tremendous public interest. The extreme newsworthy quality of these incidents is seen to stimulate audience interest and increase audience ratings (Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:115). Several scholars have noted the inherent
newsworthiness of political terrorism, albeit for different reasons. Bernard Johnpoll, for example, contends that terrorist activities are, by their nature, newsworthy because they "...deviate from the norm, they affect the lives of large segments of the population and they have considerable value as adventurous entertainment" (Johnpoll, 1977:158). According to Frances Adam, terrorist acts "...qualify as one of Galtung's vital components of newsworthiness—top nations and top people and negative events and negative people (as opposed to positive events and people) attract most audience interest" (Adam, 1976:248). Many analysts share the view that the drama and violence inherent acts of insurgent terrorism are its most newsworthy qualities (Knight, 1982:28; Groom, 1978:62; Cooper, 1976:229). According to Miller, Terrorist episodes, especially hostage situations, are made of the stuff that sells copy. They are dramatic and violent, and life hangs in the balance. The pendulum of decision swings back and forth; demand and counterdemand, give and take. There is a human interest element, the anxiety-ridden relatives waiting for fate to make its move. Whose loved ones will survive and whose will perish? (cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:83-84).  

*Aside from its inherent newsworthiness, other aspects of terrorism make it well suited to the specific needs of television news production. Neil Livingstone has noted that the nature of terroristic events closely conforms to a medium which is" highly visual and compact and with little time for exposition." He contends that unlike more complex and protracted forms of political violence, such as global conflicts, acts of terrorism share a number of characteristics which allow them to be easily grasped and understood via television news reports. According to Livingstone, terrorist acts are more compatible with the television medium because they usually have a beginning and an end, can be encompassed in a few minutes of air time, possess a large degree of drama, involve participants who are perceived by the viewing public as unambiguous, and are not so*
Because terrorism is viewed as having an inherent quality which promotes the commercial needs of a profit oriented communication system, it is not surprising that media personnel accord these acts tremendous attention.9

A related factor, competition, has also been cited as another organizational factor that almost ensures the media will report terrorist acts. More specifically, many analysts have queried whether media systems could afford not to report an event that is perfectly fashioned to their commercial imperative. This has been pointed out by Cooper, when he writes,

"Were one sector of the media to ignore something newsworthy, it is certain that another would be only too eager to pay it the proper amount of attention. Dramatic events, particularly on television command a premium for the audience reaction they are able to generate. Who can afford to be so ostrich-like in so competitive a world? (Cooper, 1976:229)."

For many political observers, insurgent terrorism and the media share a symbiotic or mutually advantageous association. On the one hand, mass media coverage of terrorist acts amplifies the terror-inspiring purposes of these acts by conveying the terrorist's message of fear to a mass audience. At the same time, the inherent newsworthiness of these events serves the media's commercial needs. An exaggerated view of this complex as to be unintelligible to those who tune in only briefly (Livingstone, 1982:62).

9 While the amount of media attention accorded terrorist acts in relation to other types of news stories has not been systematically researched, an historical study conducted by Johnpoll indicates that the subject of terrorism is receiving increasingly more coverage by the print media (Johnpoll, 1977:163).
interdependency is evident in the assertion that terrorism and the media "... would have to invent each other if they already didn't exist independently..." (Hacker, 1980:146).^{10}

The Problematic Nature of the Relationship

A major issue brought about by the perceived dependency of terrorism on the media is raised by those who morally oppose the use of terrorism to effect political change in liberal democratic society. For these individuals, the reporting of terrorist incidents by the media is seen as problematic because it inherently serves to further the terrorists' strategic goals. Moreover, not only is it seen to enhance public consciousness about terrorist groups, but it is also seen to amplify the climate of intimidation terrorists seek to create within a target population. Concern that the media are serving the terrorists' interests is expressed by Steven Rosenfeld of the Washington Post, when he states,

> We of the Western Press have yet to come to terms with international terror. If we thought about it more and understood its essence, we would probably stop writing about it, or we would write about it with a great deal more restraint (cited in Cooper, 1976:227).^{11}

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^{10}This statement is partially misleading in that it tends to suggest that terrorism would not exist independent of the media. As noted above, such a view is historically incorrect because it fails to consider forms of terror-violence that antedated modern communication technology.

^{11}Gerbner expresses a similar concern when he writes, Terror can only succeed if the act is conveyed to the audience whose behavior the terrorists are seeking to influence. The media, in conveying the
Another key aspect of the media's relationship with terrorism which is perceived as problematic centers on the highly controversial contention that extensive media coverage encourages further terrorism. Those who make this claim perceive the causal connection operating at two levels. At one level, media diffusion of terrorist incidents is believed to stimulate the social conditions conducive to terror-violence. At another level, it is seen to provide a model for potential terrorists to copy or emulate.

Central to the former position is the premise that extensive media coverage of terrorist acts brutalizes the normative structure of society. Moreover, media attention of this nature is seen to erode the public's sense of opprobrium towards this form of political violence. Put differently, prolonged exposure to terrorism, through the media, is believed to increase the audience's tolerance of this violent phenomenon. Public immunization and desensitization towards terrorism, then, reflects an erosion of the social controls opposing the use of violence in society. This, in turn, is seen to produce an increase in terror-violence for two reasons. First, it may be necessary for insurgents to engage in more terrorist activity to

11(cont'd) terror, are cooperating. This makes them accomplices. If terror were not conveyed by the media, this fear of victimization would not be so pervasive. The press is directly responsible (cited in Arlen, 1977:20).
compensate for deadened perceptions of violence. Second, more individuals may feel less inhibited to commit terrorist acts (Bassiouni, 1981:21; Livingstone, 1982:69).

Underlying this argument is the contention that the continual portrayal of violence by the media, has negative social effects. While the empirical literature concerning the media causing violence and anti-social behaviour hypothesis is prolific (Gerbner and Gross, 1975; Gerbner, 1972), it is inconclusive. One observer has characterized this relationship as complex and confusing,

...no simple cause-effect relationship between the portrayal of violence in the media and a given social response has so far been established (Schlesinger, 1981:89).

An additional dimension to the media causing terrorism hypothesis is that further acts of terrorism occur through a contagion or copycat effect. Because imitation is seen as a significant factor in the incidence of terrorist activity, many political analysts claim that, in the course of reporting terrorist events, the media stimulate others to perpetrate similar acts (Alexander, 1979:162; Alexander and Finger, 1978:69; Bassiouni, 1981:20; Livingstone, 1982:63-64; Wolfe, 1977:332; Hacker, 1980:146; National Task Force, 1976:23; Nieburg, 1969:30-31). Given that modern mass communication reaches hundreds of millions of people, it has been asserted that the reporting of terrorist events will inevitably provide the impetus for someone to carry out a terrorist act. The probabilities of this imitation effect have actually been
calculated,

Typical reporting of a terrorist event here in the United States might reach an audience of, say, conservatively, 40 million people. What's the chance that it may come to the attention of some borderline psychopath who may be stimulated to take part in some future episode?

If we were to consider that just one-tenth of one percent of the audience were suitable candidates, that would be 40,000 potential terrorists. If we took one thousandth of one percent, we still get 400. If we took one hundred thousandth of one percent, we still have the 4 that are necessary to carry out a typical terrorist episode (cited in McEwen and Sloan, 1979:22).

Proponents of the contagion hypothesis cite replications in the use of terrorist tactics by different organizations in support of their position. Wolfe (1977), for example, has argued that both the tactics of propaganda and direct action devised by the Tupameros of Uruguay have been emulated by terrorist movements throughout the world, including the FLQ in Canada, the Baader-Meinhoff in Germany, and the Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Weathermen in the United States. More specifically, he notes that the SLA demand for a multi-million dollar food handout throughout California by the Hearst Corporation in 1974, was calculated to have the same impact as the Tupameros "hunger commandos", who on Christmas Day, 1954, commandeered trucks from food stores and distributed their contents to the destitute of Uruguay (Wolfe, 1977:332).

Another case cited in support of the contagion hypothesis involves two "bodysnatching" incidents carried out by insurgent groups in Argentina and Burma. Several weeks after the Montoneros in Argentina abducted the body of General Pedro
Aramburu from his grave in exchange for the body of Eva Peron, Burmese terrorists removed the body of former United Nations General Secretary U Thant (Alexander, 1978:47).\textsuperscript{12}

While a variety of such incidents have been cited in support of the contagion hypothesis, it is clearly insufficient to confirm that media publicity leads to the duplication of terrorist acts. At best, there is only a loose correlation between media exposure of terrorist acts and replication of that behaviour. Even a major proponent of the contagion hypothesis, M.C. Bassiouni, has commented that political analysts have, in large part, speculated about media coverage and terrorism. "It's a speculation on which we have really no hard data... We don't really know what the correlation is" (cited in Chicago Sun-Times, 1977:36-37).

A related concern regarding media coverage of political terrorism centers on the belief that media reports tend to overplay the terrorist threat, thereby enhancing the terrorizing impact of these events. Distorting the threat, it is argued, could result in the public pressing for counter-productive governmental repression, such as media censorship, imposing martial law or outlawing opposition parties (Livingstone, 1982:69-70; Bassiouni, 1981:20; Alexander, 1976:164;)

\textsuperscript{12} Several other examples of media-fostered contagion can be found in Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:128-133).
Perhaps the most vocal critics of reporting terrorist events are law enforcement officials who claim that media coverage often impairs their ability to effectively respond to terrorist situations. Bassiouni (1982) has identified three specific aspects of media reporting which conflict with law enforcement operations. One area involves situations where the media publish information that is tactically useful to terrorists. During siege situations, the media have served as the intelligence arm of terrorists by providing them with information regarding police operations and maneuvers. This function is noted by Abraham Miller when he writes, "the media has served as the eyes and ears of terrorists and has inadvertently assisted them during the execution of operations" (cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:84). For instance, during the October, 1977 hijacking of a Lufthansa airliner, the hijackers were made aware, through media broadcast, that the pilot was passing intelligence information to the authorities through his normal radio transmissions (Alexander, 1978:106). During the 1974 hostage incident in the District of Columbia, the media informed the captors that a two-way mirror was being used by the police to monitor the situation. In both instances, media reports not only furnished the terrorists with important tactical information, but they also placed the hostages lives in greater jeopardy. In the Lufthansa hijacking, the disclosure of communication link between the pilot and state officials resulted in the execution of the pilot.
A second area of conflict between media reporting of terroristic events and police management relates to instances where media personnel have directly interfered with law enforcement operations. Overzealous journalists determined on making contact with the terrorists have adversely affected siege-management by tying up telephone lines, by asking inflammatory questions and by making inciteive remarks (Jones and Miller, 1979:71-72; Alexander, 1979:164-165). In the Hanafi Muslim seizure of the B'nai B'rith international headquarters in Washington, D.C., a radio broadcaster exacerbated the situation by inadvertently referring to the group responsible for the takeover as Black Muslims. Khaalis's family had been murdered by Black Muslims, and he threatened to kill one of the hostages in retaliation to the newsmen's remarks.13

A third area of conflict discussed by Bassiouni, relates to crowd control. Obtrusive media equipment used by remote broadcasting units not only interferes with the physical movement of police officers, but its presence invariably attacks a crowd. Having to contend with a large audience, compounds the management of siege situations by further taxing police resources.

Another potential problem resulting from excessive media coverage of terrorism relates to the affect media publicity can have on a terrorist's right to a fair trial. Adverse pretrial ---------------

13For a comprehensive listing of the kinds of problems created for law enforcement officials by the media during ongoing terrorist incidents, see Bassiouni, 1979:761.
publicity of individuals suspected of committing terrorist acts, makes prosecution of these individuals, according to "principles of justice", a very difficult process (Alexander and Finger, 1979:73).¹

For many analysts, it is not the reporting of a terrorist event, as such, which gives rise to concern, but rather the manner in which they are presented. More specifically, the media are seen to have a tendency of being one-sided in their presentation of terrorist incidents, with their bias invariably favouring the insurgent terrorist. While acts of terrorism are seldom publicized in a sympathetic light, the terrorists are often seen to be romanticized as modern day Robin Hoods (Livingstone, 1982:63-64; Cooper, 1976:228; cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:69-70, 88-89; Wolfe, 1977:336). According to Laffin, the PLO is one terrorist organization which has received favourable publicity from the Western Press.

¹The legal problems created by pre-trial publicity were the central issue in a case before the Canadian courts involving five individuals identified by the news media as "terrorists" in September, 1983. The charges in this case arose, in part, from the bombing of a British Columbia Hydro sub-station earlier that year. In what was dubbed "the Trial of the Squamish Five", defense lawyers argued that the style and manner in which the news media reported the story made it virtually impossible for the defendants to receive a fair trial. They claimed that the massive publicity preceding the trial, because of its nature in using pejorative phrases and in making invidious references to the defendants, adversely prejudiced potential jurors. In support of their argument, the defense presented findings of a public opinion survey which revealed that almost 60% of the respondents (and potential jurors) considered the five people accused of the dynamiting attack to be guilty (Globe and Mail, September 14, 1983; Vancouver Sun, September 17, 1983; "Trial of the Squamish Five", Open Road, 1983).
...the Fedayeen have had extraordinarily good publicity in the West—better than that given to Israel—being presented pretty much on their own terms as heroes and resistant fighters on the classical anti-Uazis pattern, a gallant few facing fearful odds. They are romanticized by the media in the U.S., Britain, and much of Europe to appear as idealistic daredevils and diehards (cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:88).

The assertion that the media favourably report insurgent terrorist is not, however, empirically supported. While research conducted in this area does not specifically examine media images of terrorism, it does suggest that the media coverage does not glorify terrorists or legitimate their actions (Paletz, et al., 1982a; Paletz, et al., 1982b; Barton and Gregg, 1982; Kelly and Mitchell, 1981; Epstein, 1977). As noted in the previous chapter, the terrorist designation is, itself, explicitly pejorative and derogatory. So when the label is used by the media to describe violent acts, it invariably presents these acts in a negative light. Furthermore, this conception of how the media reports terrorism fails to recognize that when liberal democratic states are confronted with a terrorist challenge, the media invariably serve to defend the established political order. Suffice to say at this point, that presenting insurgent activity in a positive vein would appear to be

\[15\] According to Epstein (1977), the American press present a very narrow view of the phenomena that could be described as terrorism. He contends that this bias is towards portraying acts that are hostile to U.S. supported regimes as terrorist. For an interesting discussion of how the American press have vilified the Revolutionary government of Iran, see Dorman, 1979. At a more general level, it has been claimed that much of the terrorism that appears on television is that perpetrated anti-state actors. What does not appear in television news reports is the repressive violence of those who wish to remain in power (Arlen, 1977:14).
antithetical to the media's social function of policing and controlling internal political dissent. More is said on this point in the next chapter.

While the media's role during terrorist incidents has been challenged on several grounds, several political analysts have commented on how the media assist in the management of ongoing terrorist incidents. For example, media coverage can be used as a bargaining tool when negotiating with terrorists (Bassiouni, 1982:131-132). Media reporters have also been effectively used as intermediaries between state officials and terrorists. Additionally, investigative journalism has provided law enforcement officials with vital tactical and intelligence information. For example, media research on the terrorist can assist negotiators in building a psychological profile of the individuals they are dealing with (Arlen, 1977:19-20). In some cases, media coverage can be the only source of information available regarding a terrorist event. This is illustrated in the seizure of the American Embassy in Iran. With the expulsion of Americans by the Revolutionary Government, including journalists, foreign media agencies became the only available information source for the American public (Bassiouni, 1981:31).

Another function performed by the media during terrorist events is the communication link it establishes between the authorities and the public. Since most people are not directly affected by a terrorist act, the media become a major source of information for the public regarding these events. By reporting
accurate information, the media serve to control the dissemination of rumors that could potentially distort perceptions of the threat posed by terrorists. In this respect, the media are seen as a "...stabilizer against the oscillation of panic to extreme reaction, because its informative function keeps people aware of what is going on" (cited in Alexander, 1979:110). Furthermore, an informed public is seen to be better prepared to confront terrorism by facilitating intelligent and rational discussion.

Media publicity of a terrorist event is further seen to benefit society because of the cathartic function it performs (Alexander, 1979(b):166). By permitting terrorists to publicize their grievances to a large audience, the media are acting as an outlet for individuals to vent their frustration and anger. (Widespread media coverage can also weaken the motivation of individuals who identify with terrorists and contemplate committing similar acts of terror-violence.)

Despite the many functional aspects of reporting terrorist acts, several analysts believe that the media should be prevented from serving the strategic goals of insurgent terrorists and interfering with the effective siege-management operations. The solutions to these problems, however, are seen to pose a critical dilemma regarding the role of the media in a democratic society and the protection of both lives and the integrity of the state. On the one hand, a free and unrestrained press is regarded as the foundation of the liberal democratic
system (Johnston, 1979). Freedom to access news events allows journalists to inform the public, and "...an informed public is a *sine qua non* of a democratic society" (Jones and Miller, 1979:72-72). Any attempt to inhibit the media as a strategy in combating terrorism would seriously endanger the liberal democratic process, and therefore, further the political interests of insurgent terrorists. Paul Wilkinson makes this point when he writes,

The curtailment of a free press would play directly in the hands of terrorists, being one more step towards the destruction of democracy (Wilkinson, 1978:6).

In addition to compromising a fundamental principle of democracy, attempts to censor the media from reporting terrorist events could also have several unintended repercussions. Denying terrorists access to the media may force insurgents to escalate the scale of violence so that their actions cannot be ignored (Bassiouni, 1982:138; Clutterbuck, 1982:167). Withholding accurate information about a terrorist event could also promote

16 In his much publicized *Minimuel of the Urban Guerilla*, Carlos Marighella points out that government suppression of the media is an important component in the strategy of insurgent terror-violence when writing,

In psychological warfare, the government is always at a disadvantage since it imposes censorship on the mass media and winds up in a defensive position by not allowing anything against it to filter through. At this point it becomes desperate, is involved in greater contradictions and loss of prestige, and loses time and energy in an exhausting effort at control which is subject to being broken at any moment (cited in Alexander, 1978:103).
exaggerated "word of mouth" rumors that might generate a level of fear which is greatly disproportionate to the actual threat posed (Bassiouni, 1982:167; Jaehnig, 1978:731).

(On the other hand, allowing the media to discharge their democratic responsibility, inherently, results in the amplification of the socio-political impact of a terrorist act.) Furthermore, allowing media personnel unrestrained and open access to terrorist situations may not only conflict with effective law enforcement operations, but it also may seriously jeopardize the lives and safety of hostages.\(^1\) The antagonistic values of an "open society" which are seen to produce this "catch-22" situation are made clear by McEwen and Sloan when they write,

We in the United States and other democratic societies feel that a free and dynamic press is vital to the success of our government. On the other hand, we want to control terrorism and criminal activity. The problem is, as far as the police and the press are concerned, that the legitimate roles of those two sectors are diametrically opposed. The enforcement community is required to try to control the situation, to try to manage it in the firmest possible way. On the other hand, the media are trying to do something very different. The media's job is to get in, to investigate, to open up, to explain, to make society aware of potential problem (McEwen and Sloan, 1979:23).

Given that government censorship and restraint of the media are repugnant to the principles of a "free and open society", liberal analysts maintain that the only solution to the problem

\(^1\)For a more detailed listing of the advantages and disadvantages associated with censoring or restricting the movement of the media during terrorist incidents, see Schmid and de Graaf, 1982:197.
is some form of "voluntary self restraint" by the news media when reporting terrorist incidents (Bassiouni, 1982: 141; cited in Alexander and Finger, 1979:62-63; Livingstone, 1982:72; Paust, 1978:673; Clutterbuck, 1982; National Task Force, 1976). Several news organizations which share this view have established their own standards and guidelines to regulate coverage of terrorist situations.¹⁸

In his review of these guidelines, Bassiouni (1982) notes that four basic recommendations have been put forth. First, journalists and reporters should adopt a flexible, case by case approach when determining the newsworthiness of an event. This decision should reflect balance, restraint and an avoidance of sensationalism. Second, the news media should avoid affording the terrorists an unedited platform by paraphrasing terrorist communiques. Third, media personnel should avoid direct participation in terrorist situations. And fourth, greater decision making control should be exercised by senior and news executives over reporting terrorist events, especially with regard to live broadcasts (Bassiouni, 1982:139-140).

¹⁸The Columbia Broadcasting System, The Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News, and United Press International are some of the news agencies which have adopted their own reporting guidelines.
Summary

This chapter has examined some of the scholarly and professional views regarding mass media and insurgent terrorism. From this examination, it becomes apparent that perceptions of this relationship are enormously complex. This complexity is reflected not only in fundamentally different conceptions of media involvement in the strategy of insurgent terrorism, but also in an array of assertions and counter-assertions of causal connections.

We noted in the first section of this chapter that insurgent terrorism, by definition, needs to be amplified if it is to have its intended impact. It was further observed, that the mass media are seen to inherently perform this important strategic function in the course of reporting terrorist actions. The perceived importance of media publicity in the terrorist strategy was exemplified when we considered the notion of terrorism as a form of violent symbolic communication.

Aside from being seen as a major component in the overall strategy of terrorism, media publicity was also discussed as a goal in itself. Central to this discussion was the view that terrorism is a tactic employed by insurgent movements to access the public agenda.

The following section presented two distinct conceptions of the association between the news media and insurgent terrorists. The first view considered, posits the media as an instrument or
tool of terrorists. Moreover, terrorists are seen to extort media attention for their violent acts, primarily through the imposition of media-related demands. The second framework examined, suggests that a symbiotic or mutually beneficial relationship exists between these two phenomena. From this perspective, each provides the other with what it desperately craves, a large viewing audience.

In the final section of this chapter we delineated some of the concerns and criticisms which liberal democratic observers and professionals have expressed regarding the media's role in relation to acts of insurgent terrorism. At a conceptual level, the media have come under fire because they are seen to promote the strategic objectives of the terrorists and because they are seen to encourage further incidents of terrorism. At an operational level, we noted that overzealous media personnel, in the course of reporting a story, have been accused of interfering with the effective management of ongoing terrorist incidents. The resolution of these problems is seen to raise a critical dilemma regarding the role of the media in an open society and the protection of human lives and the integrity of the state.

The overview undertaken in this chapter is intended to have sensitized the reader to the perceived strategical and tactical importance of media publicity for insurgent terrorists. It is also, however, intended to form the basis of a more abstract analysis. In the next chapter, two competing conceptual models
are considered as alternative ways of understanding the theoretical relationship between mass media and insurgent terrorism.
IV. THE THEORETICAL LINKAGES BETWEEN TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA

People do not make sense of the world around them by assigning unrelated and disparate meanings to objects and events in their social environment. Rather, there is marked consistency in the way that phenomena are perceived and explained. For example, the devout Christian and the agnostic scientist, while viewing the everyday world in radically different terms, tend to be consistent in the way that they each interpret and evaluate things. Moreover, the Christian is inclined to explain phenomena as the work of God, while the scientist will view these same events as the result of the "natural laws" which regulate the social and physical worlds.¹

What generates the consistency within social perspectives and also serves to produce their distinct outlook on the world, are the different sets of organizing principles that each embodies. Each perspective is composed of a group of logically interrelated principles which collectively serve as a basic framework from which to identify, classify and contextualize "reality." (Moreover, they structure observations and organize cognition in a way that is consistent with the overall framework.)

¹This discussion borrows heavily from Michalowski, 1977:18-21.
Scientific understanding of the social world must also be viewed in terms of certain organizing principles. At this level of inquiry, background frames of reference or general intellectual orientations are more commonly referred to as models or paradigms. Because each model circumscribes a unique set of organizing principles, they individually produce distinct ways of conceptualizing and theorizing about social phenomena.

Sociological theories of both mass communication and political terrorism, like all forms of sociological theorizing, are structured by the more general organizing principles found in models of society and man. It follows that any attempt to understand the conceptual relationship between the mass media and terrorism must commence with the broader intellectual frameworks which structure scientific interpretations of "social reality."

In this chapter, the conflict and consensus models of society are highlighted and discussed as alternative ways of interpreting and understanding how the mass media report incidents of insurgent terrorism. What emerges from this discussion is that, despite sharp conceptual and ideological differences, social theorists working within both theoretical traditions view the mass media as performing an important role in maintaining the extant social order. For those who adhere to the consensus view of society, the mass media disseminate a picture of the world that emerges out of and reflects the widespread agreement among social members regarding fundamental
values and key social rules. Moreover, they serve to reaffirm basic cultural values and strengthen the normative order by exposing to public view deviations from the group norm, then calling for public reaffirmation and application of the social norm (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1948:462).

From the conflict model, the mass media preserve the social status quo by reproducing a hegemonic ideology. Stated differently, the media present a version of "social reality" that legitimates and perpetuates existing hierarchical arrangements in society, and in so doing, they reinforce the structural position of the dominant or superordinate groups.

Although consensus and conflict theorists view mass communication as a social mechanism used to oppose and control subversive threats, they conceptualize this social control function in fundamentally different terms. What follows is a systematic explication of how consensus and conflict models lead to divergent interpretations of mass media reporting of insurgent terrorism. Before doing this, however, it is necessary to first elaborate on the nature of models and paradigms in the social sciences and the profound role they play in structuring sociological inquiry.
The Nature of Models and Paradigms

Like many concepts in the scientific literature, the term "model" is not clearly defined. Despite ambiguity, most uses of "model" in the sociological literature refer to the fundamental images a social theorist has about the social world he/she studies. A model, then, is a perspective or "mind-set" that leads sociologists to view social phenomena in a distinct way.

Key elements of what sociological models represent are what Alvin Gouldner refers to as "background and domain assumptions"; taken-for-granted beliefs about the nature of society and man (Gibbons, 1979:13; Gouldner, 1970:29-60). Domain assumptions might include, for example, dispositions to viewing human beings as rational or irrational; as good or evil and perceiving society as constantly changing or fundamentally stable.

The importance of domain assumptions for sociological analysis can not be overstated for they ultimately produce different ways of "doing sociology." Moreover, interrelated sets of domain assumptions serve as cognitive frameworks which structure how we conceptualize and understand "social reality." By emphasizing certain features of the social world and ignoring, or at least deemphasizing others, they direct and focus sociological interpretations and explanations of social phenomena. In this sense, "...models simultaneously 'illuminate' some aspects of the human condition and 'cast shadows' on others" (Pfuhl, 1980:4). This view is shared by Alex Inkeles.
when he writes,

Each sociologist carries in his head one or more "model" of society and man which greatly influence what he looks for, what he sees, and what he does with his observations by way of fitting them, along with other facts, into a larger scheme of explanation. In this respect the sociologist is not different from any other scientist. Every scientist holds some general conception of the realm in which he is working, some mental picture of "how it is put together and how it works" (Inkeles, 1964:28).

Another concept which is widely used by natural and social scientists when referring to competing "mind-sets" within a discipline is "paradigm." "Paradigm" is the central concept in Thomas Kuhn's classic treatise, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970), which proposes that scientific knowledge does not develop cumulatively, but rather advances through the radical transformation or revolution of ideas. Despite Kuhn's inconsistent and ambiguous use of the concept, 2 many sociologists define and use paradigm in terms closely resembling our definition of scientific model. George Ritzer, for example, speaks of paradigm "...as a fundamental image of the subject matter within a science... (which)... serves to define what should be studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked, and what rules should be followed in interpreting answers obtained" (Ritzer, 1975:7). And in his paradigmatic analysis of sociology, Robert Friedrichs defines "paradigm" as "a fundamental image a discipline has of its subject matter"

2 Margaret Masterman (1970) in her analysis of Kuhn's work, points out that Kuhn uses the concept of "paradigm" in at least twenty-one different ways.
It would appear, then, that both paradigm and model, as they relate to sociology, refer to the multiple ways social scientists construct and explain "social reality." To the extent that both concepts share this common point of reference, they will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis.\(^3\)

Because the organizing principles which comprise paradigms are, essentially, suppositions about the nature of man and society, they can be considered in terms of value and belief systems. What is important to note, is that this inherent subjectivity precludes any objective or scientific assessment of models. Unlike scientific theories which are made more or less plausible by empirical evidence, general images and basic assumptions about human behaviour and social existence do not lend themselves to empirical verification.\(^4\)

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\(^3\)Two additional points need to be made regarding the meaning of "paradigm" as it is used in this thesis. First, there are competing positions over the scope of a paradigm. Masterman (1970) has argued that paradigms apply to an entire discipline. Ritzer, on the other hand, contends that paradigms need not apply to a discipline as a whole, but that multiple paradigms can exist within one science (Ritzer, 1975:12). This thesis will adopt the latter position.

In addition, the term "paradigm" is solely intended to refer to the general images and basic assumptions underlying sociological theories. Use of the concept is not intended to suggest that science proceeds according to Kuhn's model.

\(^4\)Theories are made more or less plausible because they can never be verified or falsified in an absolute sense. Several aspects of the "scientific process" contribute to this uncertainty. First, a theory is never verified or falsified because it is indirectly tested. Hypotheses which are deduced from a theory are directly tested. There is, however, a major shortcoming in the logic of testing theory in this manner. A hypothesis may be rejected by an empirical test, but the theory itself may be valid. Conversely, the evidence may support a hypothesis, but the theory may be invalid. Second, hypotheses may never be falsified because of rival plausible explanations for why the
When models are seen as anchored in values, beliefs and assumptions, they can only be judged according to individual standards of what is "good" and "bad" and what "ought to be." Since morality is the fundamental criterion by which models are accepted or rejected, we cannot determine their empirical validity. No one model, then, can be more near the absolute truth, because at the metaphysical level, there are no absolutes.

A more appropriate way of viewing paradigms is in terms of heuristic devices that allow scholars to identify and order the general theoretical approaches within a discipline. With respect to sociology, these analyses point to the discipline as a multiple "paradigm" science.5 Philosophers and historians of sociology, however, are undecided on the nature and number of intellectual orientations that have guided sociological inquiry. Turner (1974), for example, claims that there are four sociological perspectives: the functional model, the conflict model, the interactionist model, and the role and exchange model. George Ritzer (1975) is of the view that there are three main divisions in sociology: the social-facts, social-definition

*(cont'd) evidence failed to support a hypothesis. Although theories and hypotheses can never be verified nor falsified, they "...certainly can and are made more or less plausible and the most plausible theory is the one for which we have the strongest evidential support" (Selltiz, et al., 1975:46-48).

5It should be noted that several scholars are of the opinion that only one theoretical perspective has dominated sociological inquiry. Kingsley Davis (1959), and more recently, Harold Fallding (1972) have argued that there is only one sociology and it is "functionalism."
and social-behaviour paradigms. Inkeles (1964:28-46) delineates six models of society which he contends form the main intellectual currents in sociology. These models are the evolutionary model, the organismic model or structural functionalism, the equilibrium model, the conflict model, the physical science model and the statistical or mathematical model.

Among the diverse ways in which sociology has been ordered, one common analytic approach has been to view the discipline in terms of two diametrically opposed paradigms: the consensus or functional model⁶ and the conflict or coercion model. While both serve as interpretive frameworks of the social world, each makes contrasting assumptions about, and each embraces fundamentally different imagery of, the nature of society and man.

Underlying these paradigmatic differences is the tendency for each model to focus on two disparate theoretical issues. Social scientists working within the functional paradigm, tend to concentrate on "what holds society together", while conflict theorists tend to focus on "what drives society on" (Dahrendorf, 1958a:170). Implicit to these questions are a priori conceptions about the nature of human existence that lead functionalists to focus on those mechanisms that maintain and preserve the existing social order and direct conflict theorists to emphasize

⁶In the sociological literature, this model is also referred to as the "stability-equilibrium", "order", "consensus" and "structural-functional" model. In this thesis, it will be referred to as the consensus or functional model.
those social forces that contribute to conflict and social change.

The extent to which these theoretical orientations differ is made evident when comparing each model with respect to the nature of social order and social change. Historically, those who have asked "what holds society together" have likened society to a physical "organism." In fact, contemporary functional analysis has its intellectual roots in the sociological "organicism" of Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and Emile Durkheim (Turner, 1974:15-27; Abrahamson, 1978:21-23). Drawing from the writings of these nineteenth century social theorists, contemporary functionalists conceptualize society as a biological organism or at least possessing organic characteristics. In its extreme form, this organismic imagery leads functionalist to view society as a bounded, self-maintaining and self-preserving system, with its natural state tending towards homeostasis and equilibrium. This conception of society does not suggest, however, that social disruptions or group conflict do not occur. Rather, it posits that they are sporadic and short-lived interruptions to the more enduring stability and order of social life.

According to consensus theorists, two aspects of society make social life possible; a functional interdependency among the various components of the social system and widespread

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*I am grateful to Dr. Vincent Sacco, Department of Criminology, S.F.U., for assisting me in the organization of the following discussion.
agreement regarding fundamental values and key social rules. As a self-maintaining system, society is seen to have certain basic needs or requisites that must be satisfied if it is to survive and if stability and equilibrium are to be maintained. As a "social system", society is seen to be composed of interrelated and interdependent components that function to meet these needs (Turner, 1974:17). Accordingly, consensus theorists tend to examine social and cultural items, such as social norms, social institutions and social values, in relation to the functional requisites of social subsystems and the social system as a whole (Chinoy, 1976:94-96).

Consensus theorists further assume that widespread agreement or consensus over basic social values and social norms leads to a harmonious and cohesive interrelationship between these various subsystems. Again, this is not to suggest that value differences between disparate social groups do not exist, but to argue that a basic morality is shared by all social members.

As noted above, social conflict within the consensus model is perceived to be a temporary disruption to an otherwise stable social existence. When these disruptions do take place, they sometimes serve as the impetus for social change. Because group conflict is an aberration rather than the norm, and because it is superficial rather than fundamental, social change is generally minor rather than radical and gradual rather than revolutionary.
In sharp contrast to the functionalist conception of society is the image of "social reality" constructed by social theorists who ask "what drives society on." While the functionalist model of society emphasizes universal consensus on prevailing values, social harmony and social stability, the conflict model gives primacy to social conflict, social change and coercion.

Based on the writings of Karl Marx and Georg Simmel, the conflict model posits society to be in a constant state of flux and variation. Social conflict is not only the central "reality" of society, but it is also the inexorable force that produces social change.\footnote{Structured inequalities with respect to power, status and wealth, in conjunction with disparate social groups that have distinct interests, beliefs, values and goals make conflict, tension and normative strain ubiquitous aspects of social life.}

From the conflict paradigm, social order is maintained not by shared agreement, but rather through constraint and coercion. The most important aspect of this coercive force is that it is invariably exercised by powerful and privileged groups in society to protect and promote their special interests. Coercive force, however, is not the primary mechanism for advancing these special interests. Ideological forces, operating at the level of

\begin{itemize}
\item Conflict need not always be a disruptive force in a society.
\item Several conflict theorists have emphasized the stabilizing and integrative functions of social conflict. See for example, Turner (1974:83-89); Coser (1956); van den Berghe (1973).
\end{itemize}
"taken-for-grantedness", are a more subtle way in which powerful groups exercise control over subordinate groups in society. Moreover, social institutions are seen to produce and disseminate an ideology which maintains and perpetuates the existing hierarchical order. Suffice it to say at this point, that what consensus theorists regard as normative agreement, conflict theorists conceptualize as hegemonic domination by the political elite.

Because conflict is the most dominant aspect of social life, conflict theorists regard its cessation as a departure from the norm. Its abatement, then, does not signify social equilibrium, but rather the ability of those who wield political power to control dissent. In order for a more equitable distribution of power to exist, subordinate social groups will have to effect radical changes to the structure of society.

From this general overview, it becomes apparent that the alternative conceptions of the social world presented by the functional and conflict models emerge from contrasting sets of domain assumptions. These competing sets of assumptions have been clearly set out by a number of social theorists. In his attempt to illustrate their conceptual differences, Ralph Dahrendorf (1958a) juxtaposes what can be considered as ideal types of the basic assumptions contained within the consensus and conflict models.
Conflicts are ubiquitous, and every society experiences social change and social conflict. These phenomena shape social structures and influence human behaviour. Functionalists and conflict theorists offer different perspectives on society, and these differences reflect broader assumptions about the nature of man and society.

Conflict Model
1. Every society is subjected at every moment to change: social change is ubiquitous.
2. Every society experiences at every moment social conflict: social conflict is ubiquitous.
3. Every element in a society contributes to its change.
4. Every society rests upon constraint of some of its members.

Functional Model
1. Every society is a relatively persisting configuration of elements.
2. Every society is a well-integrated configuration of elements.
3. Every element in a society contributes to its functioning.
4. Every society rests upon the consensus of its members.

More recently, Percy Cohen (1968) has extended Dahrendorf's four-fold listing of the functional and conflict models to include the following nine propositions.9

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9As mentioned above, models of sociological analysis embrace assumptions about the nature of society and man. While both Dahrendorf and Cohen delineate the respective assumptions conflict and functional theorists make about the nature of society, they fail to make clear how these theorists conceptualize the nature of human behaviour. According to Horton (1964) and Reasons and Perdue (1981), conflict theorists begin with a "positive" conception of man, one which views human behaviour as cooperative and collective. As one would expect, functionalists start with the opposing view, that human behaviour is naturally competitive, contentious, private and self-absorbed.
Conflict Model
1. Interests are the basic elements of social life.
2. Social life involves inducement and coercion.
3. Social life is necessarily divisive.
4. Social life generates opposition, exclusion, and hostility.
5. Social life generates structured conflict.
7. Social differentiation involves power.
8. Social systems are mal-integrated and beset by "contradictions."
9. Social systems tend to change.

Functional Model
1. Norms and values are the basic elements of social life.
2. Social life involves commitments.
3. Societies are necessarily cohesive.
4. Social life depends on solidarity.
5. Social life is based on reciprocity and cooperation.
6. Social systems rest on consensus.
7. Society recognizes legitimate authority.
8. Social systems are integrated.
9. Social systems tend to persist.

Polemics between conflict and functional theorists regarding which model provides the more accurate view of the social world has persisted for several decades. As mentioned above, the metaphysical nature of models does not allow either group to make scientific claims that their respective image is more isomorphic with "reality." This is not to suggest, however, that empirical referents cannot be found in the social world that either support or refute the general images presented by the conflict or functional models. It simply means that both sets of domain assumptions provide equally plausible ways of conceptualizing and understanding social phenomena. In other words, social "reality" can be constructed in more than one way, a point that is expressed by Ralph Dahrendorf when he writes,

As far as I can see, we need for the explanation of social problems both the equilibrium (functional) and the conflict models of society; and it may well be that, in a philosophical sense, society has two faces of equal
real: one of stability, harmony and consensus, and one of change, conflict and constraint (Dahrendorf, 1958b) [emphasis added].

Since assumptions cannot be confirmed nor disconfirmed by empirical evidence, commitment to one model over another generally reflects more diffuse ideological orientations. By ideology it is meant, "...a set of general and abstract beliefs or assumptions about the correct or proper state of things, particularly with respect to the moral order and political arrangements" (Miller, 1974:20). As a generalization, functionalism is considered to have a conservative bias. Because it conceptualizes society as tending towards stability and equilibrium, functionalism is assailed by conflict theorists as accepting existing social arrangements as the natural order of things.

The conflict approach, on the other hand, is generally favoured by those who advocate social change. Within the conflict model, (social transformation is seen as a natural and inevitable aspect of collective human existence.) Conflict theorists are also critical of hierarchical social arrangements and power differentials between social groups. They envision a more "egalitarian" society as the nature state of human existence. The ideological underpinnings of the consensus and conflict paradigms are made clear by Horton when he writes,

As a generalization, groups or individuals committed to the maintenance of the social status quo employ order (consensus) models of society....Dissident groups, striving to institutionalize new claims, favor a conflict analysis of society and an alienation theory of their own discontent (Horton, 1966:703).

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While conflict and functional theorists make opposing value judgments about "what is" or "what ought to be", it appears as though they both have a common interest in understanding the "functional" aspects of social phenomena. By this is meant, that they both share a theoretical interest in how social structures, social institutions and social processes function in relation to the social system. Where they seem to differ, however, is in their evaluation of the functional attributes of social phenomena (Davis, 1959). Therefore, what functionalists tend to perceive as having a positive effect, or as being eufunctional, the conflict theorists tend to see as having a negative impact, or as dysfunctional, and vice versa.

Although both theoretical approaches are, in a very general sense, interested in the functional aspects of social phenomena, the locus of functional analysis appears to differ within each model. Functionalists tend to describe the functional attributes of social phenomena in terms of society as a whole. Conflict theorists, on the other hand, tend to examine social artifacts in relation to the power structure of society and special group interests. As Chambliss notes, "Whether they are studying war, social class, or deviant behaviour, the functionalists typically ask what functions it serves; the conflict approach adds: for whom is it functional?" (Chambliss, 1973:5).

Having outlined the basic assumptions and tenets of both the functional and conflict perspectives, it now becomes possible to use these general theoretical frameworks to
understand the relationship between the mass media and political terrorism. What follows is an examination of how each model conceptualizes: (1) the functions and role of the mass media; (2) the nature of political terrorism; and (3) their theoretical interrelationship.

The Functions and Role of Mass Media

Functionalist View

Over the past four decades, the dominant leitmotif in media sociology has been functionalist (Daley, 1979:37; Wright, 1974:198). Generally speaking, sociologists have applied the functional paradigm in two distinct ways when studying the mass media. They have examined media functions either in terms of subjective motives and interpretations of individual users or in relation to "objective" consequences for society (Daley, 1979:38).  The former is referred to as the Uses and Gratification Approach because it focuses on the consumer or the user of media content. It views the members of the audience as consciously selecting media fare and describes the role of

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Anderson and Meyer (1975) have argued that functional analysis of the media also has a third strand, "the classic four functions approach." What these authors fail to do, however, is to make clear how this type of media research differs from the social systems approach. The position taken here is that the "classic four functions approach" is a variant of the social systems perspective.
communication systems in terms of fulfilling specific audience needs and desires (Anderson and Meyer, 1975:12). The second type of functional analysis closely parallels our earlier discussion of sociological functionalism. It examines the consequences of mass communications in relation to the needs of other social institutions and society as a whole.\textsuperscript{11} Because this thesis is concerned with the social functions of the mass communication at a systemic level, the present discussion will center on the second form of functional analysis.

Not unlike the more general theoretical approach, functional analysis of mass communication appears to be guided by an organismic conception of society. Media sociologists who maintain this view examine the life sustaining patterns of other living organisms and infer from these observations the basic communicative needs of human society. This approach is particularly evident in the work of Harold Lasswell (1960), who in presenting an early functional analysis of mass media, closely examines the biological equivalences between animal and human societies. Using this comparative approach, Lasswell

\textsuperscript{11}According to Charles Wright (1975), functional research of mass media is multi-dimensional. At the broadest level, functional theorists attempt to describe how the mass communication system, as a whole, impacts other social systems. At a lower level of analysis, the functional and dysfunctional aspects of a specific medium, such as television or radio, are considered for a social system. Another functional approach looks at the functional attributes of repeated and patterned operations within media organizations. The fourth type of functional analysis is conceptual in nature and examines the functional consequences of four media activities. This approach is commonly referred to as the "classic four function approach" and is discussed more thoroughly below.
contends that human societies have specific communicative needs and communication systems develop to satisfy these needs. Society's "communicative requirements" are made clear by Wilbur Schramm, when he writes,

Man has always needed something to watch over his environment and report to him on dangers and opportunities; something to circulate opinions and facts, help a group make decisions, and then circulate the decisions; something to help pass on the lore and wisdom and expectations of society to the new members of society; something to broaden trade and commerce. Primitive tribes assigned individuals to these tasks: watchmen, members of the tribal council, parents and later teachers, bards and jesters, and itinerant traders. In our society the jobs have grown too big for individuals, and are given chiefly to great organizations which we call mass media. (Schramm, 1960:115) [emphasis added].

This particular conception of society's communicative needs directly underscores the four functions approach in media research. Functionalists who use this approach generally see the mass media performing four basic functions and these functions perfectly correspond to the four societal needs embodied in Schramm's statement. These four functions are

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12The functionalist argument that social phenomena, like mass media, exist to meet the pressing needs of society is essentially a teleological assertion. It is teleological because social systems are believed to initiate and regulate the very structures and processes that are supposed to maintain them. What functionalists, like Lasswell, fail to do, however, is empirically document the causal relationship between a societal need and the existence of social matter. This failure reduces functional analysis to a tautology, in that, functional explanations cannot be disconfirmed because they define things in relation to themselves (Abrahamson, 1978:39). An example of this circular reasoning is provided by Jonathan Turner when he writes, "a surviving system is meeting its survival needs; the system under study is surviving; a sociocultural item is part of this system; therefore, it is likely that this item is meeting the systems needs" (Turner, 1974:26).
of the environment, (2) the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment, (3) the transmission of culture and social heritage from one generation to the next, and (4) entertainment of the mass audiences (Lasswell, 1960; Wright, 1975).13

By surveying the environment the mass media provide essential information to members of society. As major purveyors of news, they forewarn populations about imminent threats and dangers, such as extreme atmospheric conditions. The surveillance function also provides individuals with data and information that is vital for the economic and political systems in society.

The correlation function refers to the media's interpretive and evaluative role in contemporary society. By commenting on selective events in the social environment, the media provide individuals with ways of understanding and reacting to the social world.

As cultural transmitters, mass communications serve to communicate basic societal values and norms from one generation

13Although Charles Wright provides the most comprehensive analysis of these functions, his work is essentially an extension of Lasswell's discussion. It was Lasswell who first observed the surveillance, correlation and transmission functions of the mass media. Wright extended this listing to include entertainment. It should also be noted, that Wright (1975) in his book, Mass Communication: A Sociological Perspective, provides an alternative conception of these four functions. For Wright these are not functions, per se, but rather media activities. His functional analysis consists of examining the consequences of these activities for individuals, groups of individuals, societies and culture.
of individuals to the next. Because they extend the scope of collective experiences, the mass media also contribute to the cohesion and integration of the social system.

As a form of entertainment the mass media amuse and delight their audiences. In doing so, they provide individuals with a welcomed respite from their daily problems and concerns. People use the mass media, then, as a release mechanism from loneliness, anxiety, boredom, tension and personal troubles. In other words, it allows them to escape to a "fantasy world."

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1966) discuss two additional functions of the mass media; enforcement of social norms and status conferral. With respect to the former function, Lazarsfeld and Merton contend that in the course of surveying and correlating the environment, the mass media help to reaffirm the normative structure of society. By reporting and commenting on occurrences that are at variance with public morality, the mass media exerts pressure on each member of society to take a moral stand on normative transgressions. Individuals must either side with the non-conformist, and thus repudiate the group norm, or support the dominant moral framework. Thus, publicizing deviations sets into motion social forces that narrow the gap between "private attitudes" and "public morality." It calls for a single, rather that a dual morality. By publicly exposing normative violations, the mass media contribute to the enforcement and reaffirmation of group norms (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1966:499-501).
According to Lazarsfeld and Merton, the mass media also serve to confer status on individuals and groups. Recognition by the mass media indicates to audiences that certain behaviour and opinions are important enough to be singled out from the myriad of events and views that could potentially be reported. As Lazarsfeld and Merton observe, mass media audiences apparently subscribe to the circular belief: "If you really matter, you will be at the focus of mass attention and, if you are at the focus of mass attention, then surely you must really matter" (Lazarsfeld and Merton, 1966:498).

Underlying the four functions approach, and all other forms of functional research on the media, is the basic assumption that society is predicated on a moral consensus. Because society is usually not seen to have any major uncontrollable cultural or economic divisions, or major conflicts between social groups, functionalists generally view mass communications as serving the interests of the entire social system. Moreover, when the mass media survey and correlate the social environment, transmit social culture and entertain mass audiences they diffuse and propagate ideas, beliefs, values and norms which are collectively shared by social members.

Conflict View

Circumscribed within the conflict model is a radically different conception of how the mass media function. Starting
from the position that social groups are hierarchically ordered in terms of wealth, status and power, conflict theorists proceed to examine the mass media in relation to these structured inequalities. Primary emphasis is placed on the role played by mass communication in the processes of reproduction and legitimation (Murdock, 1975:28). From this perspective, mass communication systems are seen to present a particular version of "social reality" that legitimates and maintains the existing structural formation of society. In news information, editorial commentary and entertainment, by pictures and words, by statement and omission, the mass media are believed to disseminate a world view which reinforces and perpetuates the structural position of the dominant groups in society (Gitlin, 1980). More specifically, conflict theorists view mass communication systems as specializing in the production of "hegemonic ideology." To more fully comprehend this conception of the mass media, it becomes necessary to elaborate on the notion of "hegemony."

The seminal discussion of the concept of hegemony is found in the work of the Italian theorist, Antonio Gramsci, who used the term to refer to the way in which dominant groups in society maintain their position of power, not so much by the coercion of subordinant groups, but rather through mass consent to the established order. Moreover, he examined how a single ideology becomes the basis of social institutions and social relationships (Reasons and Perdue, 1981:69).
Hegemonic control is said to exist when dominant groups preserve their position of power by impressing an ideology which reflects their particular interests upon those they govern. In doing so, they are able to generate a consciousness or world view among subordinate groups that makes structural inequalities appear normal and legitimate. Ideological domination works, then, through "common sense" notions of the world, notions which serve to reinforce the "rightness" and "naturalness" of the social status quo. This is not to suggest, however, that ideological hegemony leads to an "incorrect" or "wrong" conception of things, but rather that it produces a way of knowing and thinking that is, essentially, uncritical (Knight, 1982). Gitlin provides a concise definition of Gramsci's concept when he writes,

...hegemony is a ruling class's (or alliance's) domination of subordinate classes and groups through the elaboration and penetration of ideology (ideas and assumptions) into their common sense and everyday practice; it is the systematic (but not necessarily or even usually deliberate) engineering of mass consent to the established order (Gitlin, 1980:253).

While conflict theorists regard most social institutions as performing a hegemonic function, cultural institutions like the mass media, are seen to specialize in the production of hegemonic ideology. They perform this function by structuring "...the ideological field within which subordinate classes 'live' and make sense of their subordination in such a way as to sustain the dominance of those ruling over them" (Hall, 1977:333). In other words, the mass media serve to develop a
social consciousness that perpetuates dominant power relationships.

The notion of hegemony leads conflict theorists to a conception of the mass media that is fundamentally different from that maintained by functional theorists. The extent of this conceptual difference is made evident by re-examining the above six functionalist functions of the mass media from the conflict perspective.

It was stated that functionalists see the mass media performing the key function of surveying the environment. In reporting events and issues in the social world, conflict theorists do not see the mass media as simply purveying news information, as functionalist do. Rather, they see them constructing a version of "social reality" which serves to reinforce the power relationships in society. Conflict theorists contend that news information does not embrace the full range of events and issues that could potentially be reported as news. Furthermore, what invariably constitutes the subject matter of media news information are events and issues which do not threaten the superordinate position of the politically powerful. This arises, in large part, because dominant groups in society share a privileged access to ideological institutions, such as mass communication. Consequently, the images and definitions of events and situations that are presented in news coverage will reflect the hegemonic ideology. More is said on this point below.
Within the functionalist framework, the mass media are also seen to correlate the environment. Conflict theorists view editorial analyses in the mass media as ideological prescriptions that tell people how they should interpret the world around them. Moreover, media evaluations and interpretations of the social world are essentially moral assessments that reflect a dominant ideology. In this respect, the opinions expressed by mass media journalists will serve to reinforce the established social order.

More important, however, is that editorial analysis serves to establish the limits of legitimate political and intellectual discourse. In the course of pointing out what is right and wrong, mass media commentary operates to reduce the development and propagation of ideas that are counter-hegemonic (Sallach, 1974:167). The corollary to this is that critical questions about the structure of society and dissenting political thought will find virtually no support in the mass media. What Tuchman writes about television news broadcasting might then be extended to the entire mass communications industry,

...American television perpetuates hememgoni; it adumbrates political and intellectual discourse. It not only buries dissent; it buries the possibility that new ideas emerge. The conditions under which the broadcasting industry flourishes makes a farce of the notion that the United States encourages a free marketplace of ideas (Tuchman, 1974:39).  

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14A similar view is shared by Chibnall when he writes, All the major media voices sound within a framework of legitimate discourse delineated by the mass parties of our parliamentary system. Opinions and world-views which occupy the margins of that system or fall outside it receive very litte representation.
This is not to suggest, however, that the mass media perpetuate hegemony by totally suppressing ideas that fall outside the scope of the dominant ideology. It means that when dissident views are discussed in the mass media, they will be systematically discredited and delegitimated as "...curious heresies or irrelevant eccentricities that serious and reasonable people dismiss as of no consequence" (Miliband, 1969:213).

Not unlike functionalists, conflict theorists see the mass media performing an important role in the encultuation processes. However, the cultural beliefs transmitted to new members in society are those which comprise a hegemonic ideology. In this respect, the mass media serve to transmit a set of beliefs and values that reinforce the existing social order. This conceptualization of the cultural function of the mass media is shared by Gerbner and Gross (1976) when they state that,

...television is the central cultural arm of American society. It is an agency of the established order and as such serves primarily to extend and maintain rather than to alter, threaten, or weaken conventional conceptions, beliefs, and behaviours. Its chief cultural function is to spread and stabilize social patterns, to cultivate not change but resistance to change. Television is a medium of the socialization of most people into standardized roles and behaviours. Its function is, in a word, enculturation (Gerbner and Gross, 1976:175).

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14(cont'd) indeed (Chibnall, 1977:3).
Conflict theorists also see entertainment in the mass media as perpetuating the hegemonic domination of superordinate groups. It performs this function by diverting people's attention away from more pressing social issues. Moreover, entertainment is seen to "narcoticize" large masses of the population by making them politically apathetic and inert.

Lazarsfeld and Merton (1966) discuss this effect as the "narcoticising dysfunction" of the mass media. They call this effect "dysfunctional" on the belief that it is not in the interests of society to have large masses of the population politically apathetic and inert. As functional theorists, Lazarsfeld and Merton fail to recognize, as conflict theorist do, that in a hierarchically ordered society, it is certainly in the interests of the dominant groups to have a large segment of the population politically unaware and indifferent. These mental states effectively mitigate against the emergence and propagation of subversive ideologies.

Not unlike the functionalist view, conflict theorists also see the mass media performing a vital function in reaffirming the normative boundaries in society. In contrast to the functionalist position, which views social norms as an embodiment of "collectively shared sentiments", conflict theorists conceptualize normative rules as reflecting the interests of dominant groups in society. So when the mass media help to map out normative boundaries, they ultimately serve to reinforce existing structural arrangements.
Conflict theorists also see the mass media as conferring a legitimate status upon individuals and issues. However, they see legitimacy conferred upon ideas and individual acts that conform with hegemonic beliefs. Actions and views that run counter to this ideology will be denied a legitimate status by the mass media.

While conflict theorists, in general, see the mass media as disseminating a world view that legitimates and perpetuates the established social order, they have put forth competing views as to why communications systems perform this hegemonic function. Two distinct positions have crystallized on this issue. One school of thought locates the primary source of control in forces external to the media, _per se_. From this perspective, the mass media are seen to be consciously manipulated by the economic and political elite in society. The effect of this manipulation is that a single version of "social reality" is diffused throughout society; one which legitimates and reinforces the existing power structure. Because social institutions, like the mass media, are seen to operate at the behest of this superordinate group or "ruling elite", this view is commonly referred to as the "Instrumentalist Position."

A second framework used to explicate the hegemonic function of mass communication, has as its locus, the more routine aspects of news and entertainment production. Rather than seeing the media reproducing the definitions of the powerful in crude conspiratorial terms, this approach draws attention to
organizational imperatives and professional news values to explain why the media do what they do.

What follows is an elaboration of both these explanatory frameworks.

Instrumentalist View

Within the instrumentalist framework, direct control over mass communication is exerted primarily from three sources: from those who own the mass media, from advertisers, and from the state. Collectively, these three forms of control ensure that the mass media perform a conservative function in society.

Primary control of mass communication is seen to rest with the corporate owners of media enterprises. In a "laissez-fair" capitalist system, ownership carries with it the right to make decisions. With respect to the communication industry, this means that owners make fundamental decisions concerning the content of news and entertainment programming and editorial policy.

Central to the instrumentalist argument is the monolithic structure of media ownership and control in North America. In both the United States and Canada, media ownership has reflected a more general economic trend towards the decline of competition and the growth of monopolies. The effect of this trend has left media control in the hands of a few large multinational corporations with interests in different media and other
business enterprises (Reasons and Perdue, 1981:53–69; Clement, 1975:287–324; Miliband, 1969:204; Porter, 462–481). Since the ideological orientation of the corporate elite is towards the maintenance of the social status quo, it would not be surprising to find these individuals exercise their control over the mass media in a conservative manner. (What this means then, is that conceptions of "social reality" presented by the media will invariably reflect the values and interests of the economically powerful, which invariably honour the existing political-economic system. The proposition that a "ruling class" control ideological institutions, like mass communication, was articulated by Karl Marx over a century ago when he wrote,

The ideas of the ruling class in every epoch, i.e. the class which is the ruling material force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production... (Marx, 1970:64).

Advertisers form a second group which exerts direct and indirect control over the media. Their power stems, in large part, from the symbiotic relationship that exists between corporate advertisers and the communication industry. Each is highly dependent on the other for their existence. Corporations rely on the media to generate consumers for their products and services, and the primary source of revenue for communication businesses is their viewing, listening or reading audiences.\(^\text{15}\)

At the very least, the media's dependency on advertising for

\(^\text{15}\)For a more extensive discussion of the commercial imperative of media communications, see Chapter III, pp.78–92.
their commercial viability assures that they will treat corporate interests with sympathetic understanding and accord them a high degree of indulgence (Miliband, 1969:207). A similar point is made by the Special Senate Report on Mass Media, when it notes that, "...the major source of...revenue (for mass media) is advertising, and the economics of advertising ultimately determine all other decisions basic to the operation of a newspaper or broadcasting station" (Davie, 1970:119).

Chambliss (1978) provides an illustration of the devastating consequences that can befall a media operation which makes decisions that run counter to the interests of its corporate advertisers. Chambliss' monograph examines, in part, "organized crime" in the city of Seattle. What is pertinent to this discussion is an incident involving a magazine which ran a story about "organized crime" and its infiltration into the political and economic systems in that city. Public disclosure of the close relationship between the legitimate business community and a criminal syndicate was, to say the least, antithetical to corporate interests in the city. Consequently, "...some major advertisers cancelled their advertisements...revenues declined...the business community attacked the magazine, and in the end the magazine went out of business (Chambliss, 1978:119).

A third source of control over the media is exercised by the state. Primarily through criminal legislation and regulatory agencies, governments establish the legal parameters within which communication systems operate.
While most liberal democracies venerate the idea of a free press, they invariably find the need to impose some form of legal circumscription upon the media. Justification for these laws usually take two forms. One centers on protecting the rights of individuals. The other defends the right of the state to deal with a subversive threat or a state of "national emergency." Included in the former category are those laws which prohibit the publication of a defamatory libel\textsuperscript{16}, obscene and pornographic material\textsuperscript{17} and hate propaganda\textsuperscript{18}.

In addition, many governments protect themselves against subversive threats by enacting legislation which prohibits the publication and circulation of seditious material.\textsuperscript{19} In Canada, for example, Section 60(4) of the \textit{Criminal Code} makes it an offence to publish or circulate "...any writing that advocates the use of, without authority of law, force as a means of accomplishing a governmental change...."

The government can also control the content and editorial policy of the mass media by invoking emergency measures during times of "national crisis." For instance, Section 3 of the \textit{War Measures Act} states that, during war, invasion, or insurrection,

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item See for example, Sections 262-279, inclusive, of \textit{Martin's Criminal Code} (1983).
\item Section 159.
\item Section 281.
\item For a comprehensive review of the criminal legislation enacted by nation states to control the media within their respective country, see Paust, 1978.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
real or apprehended, "...the powers of the Governor in Council shall extend to all matters coming within classes of subjects hereinafter enumerated..."

(a) censorship and the control and suppression of publications, writings, maps, plans, photographs, communications and means of communications.  

Governmental influence over the media takes on an added dimension in Canada because a vital component of the communication network in this country, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), is under public ownership. Because the directors of the CBC are appointed by and responsible to the federal government, the potential exists for indirect state manipulation of this media corporation.  

What is important to note, is that instrumental conflict theorists view the state as a managerial system designed to advance the interests of the "ruling elite." So when the Canadian government exercises its control over the communication industry, by either criminal legislation or governmental policy, it consciously promotes the interests of this powerful group.

Organizational Model

Recently, an alternative explanatory framework has emerged to account for the ideological role of mass communication. What

20More will be said on the impact that this piece of emergency legislation had on Canadian newspaper coverage during the October Crisis in Chapter VI.
prompted a re-conceptualization of this issue, is the failure of the instrumentalist position to consider the "relative autonomy" of media personnel from direct economic control (Hall, et al., 1978:57). This does not mean that corporate interests have little bearing on the media industry, but rather that decisions made at the corporate level do not always affect the day-to-day decisions made by media programmers and reporters. Because corporate control frequently does not extend to these lower levels of media activity, it is claimed by some media analysts that the instrumentalist view, in and of itself, does not adequately explain the hegemonic function of the mass media (Murdock, 1973:158). Tuchman emphasizes this point, with respect to the television industry, when she states,

...although decisions bearing the largest economic consequences are made at the highest corporate level of the networks, and although corporate officers make policy recommendations to subordinates and receive requests for guidance from them, decisions about content are made on every organizational level. Patterns of association between corporate executives and other elite groups do not provide a sufficient explanation for the content of programs. Rather, other factors contribute to the creation of appropriate television fare (Tuchman, 1974:28).

Many conflict theorists find these "other factors" in the more routine processes of producing news and entertainment programming (Knight, 1982; Gitlin, 1980; Hall, et al., 1978; Tuchman, 1978; 1974). More specifically, organizational imperatives and canons of professional journalism serve to structure the content of mass communication so that it embraces values and ideas which reaffirm, rather than challenge existing
patterns of power and privilege. (Nowhere in mass media is the
hegemonic impact of these internal forces more evident, than in
the production of news, where they contribute to the systematic
reproduction of hegemonic definitions of the social world.)

News production would be impossible if news agencies did
not develop special procedures to help them schedule and predict
newswork. Without these guidelines they would not only be
totally dependent on the emergence of newsworthy events for the
content of news reports, but they would be unable to routinely
process unexpected events into news information (Tuchman, 1974;
1973).

One strategy developed by journalists to alleviate the
incessant pressure of having to gather and process news events
is to "...position themselves so that they have access to
institutions which generate a useful volume of reportable
activity at regular intervals... (such as)...courts, sports
grounds and parliament..." (cited in Hall, et al., 1978:57). By
developing this practice, however, journalists make the news
media more accessible to the politically powerful and
bureaucratically organized (Knight, 1982:20). Because government
and corporate agencies become a primary source of news
information, the media systematically come to reproduce the
definitions of social reality held by the politically powerful.

A second element of news production germane to the issue of
hegemony and mass communication relates to the ideology of
professional journalism. More specifically, the operational
meanings of two key news values, "objectivity" and "newsworthy", contribute significantly to the hegemonic character of the news media.

According to professional standards of "objective" journalism, news reporting should be impartial and balanced. In practice, however, this means that news be presented in a politically neutral manner, with equal emphasis placed on both sides of a story, with fact being separated from opinion.

One way journalists conform to this rule is by "...ensuring that media statements are, whenever possible, grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from 'accredited sources'" (Hall, et al., 1978:58). What is important to note, however, is that these "accredited" sources, invariably include the formal representatives of powerful and well established institutions and professional experts (Knight, 1982:19). Consequently, statements and views which fall beyond the pale of "accreditation" will be systematically excluded from the content of news information. Tuchman has noted how this operationalization of objectivity effectively circumscribes the parameters of political discourse in the news media in favour of the established social order, by stating,

The insistence upon balance...minimizes the importance of those who challenge government authority. Balance means in practice that Republicans may rebut Democrats and vice versa, that established governmental and bureaucratic authorities may rebut the so-called "illegitimate" challenges of social movements. But these supposedly illegitimate challengers are never offered the opportunity to criticize governmental statements with the same frequency. Instead, reporters will search for a partisan critic, an "establishment critic" such as
a "maverick Senator" or for a "responsible spokesman" whom they have themselves created or promoted to a position of prominence (Tuchman, 1974:33)

Another component of the ideology of professional journalism which contributes to the hegemonic character of the news media, relates to the journalist's conception of "newsworthy." Although reporters have not agreed upon the definition of "newsworthy", they tend to view events that are extraordinary and controversial as potential news items. Of the myriad events which fall into this category, a certain class routinely receive news coverage; those which are a "...potential threat to and breakdown of the normal routines that characterize the mundane" (Knight, 1982:28). More specifically, news information is preoccupied with disruptive and destructive occurrences in the natural and social world. It focuses then, on what some media analysts refer to as "bad news" (The Glasgow University Media Group, 1976).

Crucial to this discussion, however, is the realization that the substance of "bad news" is determined by the dominant ideology. Moreover, things that threaten or deviate from what is considered "normal" or "natural" constitute the substance of "bad news." By identifying events as "bad news", the news media subtly reaffirm the value and beliefs which defined them as such. Graham Knight clarifies this point, when stating,

Functionally speaking, the ideological value of bad news lies in its ability to identify, in a relatively uncritical way, the forms which threats (sic) to the dominant ideology and its social order assumes. By expelling threats to the margins of the consensus those who deviate from its principles, bad news does make for good ideology: it reaffirms implicitly the normalness of
normality and the naturalness of nature. In this respect...bad news actually strengthens the consensus at a deeper level of taken-for-grantedness (Knight, 1982:29).

Two additional aspects of news production contribute to the ideological character of news information. These factors relate to the importance news agencies place upon "immediacy" and "actuality" when reporting news events (Knight, 1982:30). With respect to the former news value, speed is generally regarded as a crucial element in news reporting. This is due, in large part, to the commercial consequences of being "scooped", vis a vis lower audience ratings. The preoccupation with "actuality" intensifies viewer interest by allowing them to be there as the drama unfolds. Emphasis upon "actuality" is particularly evident in television news programming where the "eye-witness" news format has become extremely popular.

But in stressing both these aspects when reporting the news, journalists tend to play "...down the question of historical connectedness and development" (Knight, 1982:31). News is presented, for the most part, as a series of discrete and unrelated incidents. The fragmented and superficial conception of the world conveyed by the news media serves to protect the established social system by ensuring that the system is not seen as the cause of "bad news." What the news media fail to do, then, is to make the structure of the extant social order problematic.

Collectively, the strategies developed by journalists to cope with organizational pressures of constantly having to
gather and process news, plus the operationalization of such news values as "objectivity" and "newsworthy", plus special emphasis upon "immediacy" and "actuality" when presenting the news, result in the news media disseminating a hegemonic view of the social world. The practice of relying upon powerful bureaucratic agencies not only for their primary, but also "accredited" sources of information, leads to "...a systematically over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions" (Hall, et al., 1978:58). Add to this a professional conception of "newsworthy" that reflects the values and interests of the dominant ideology and a style of presenting the news which fails to critically examine the broader social and political forces underlying news events, it becomes possible to understand how the routine structure of news production leads to the reproduction of a hegemonic ideology.

The Nature of Political Terrorism

Functionalist View

While the functionalist model has an extensive application, it should be noted that insurgent terrorism, per se, has not been the focus of functional analysis. Despite this omission, it is possible to formulate a functionalist conception of political terrorism by extrapolating from the functionalist literature on
crime and deviance. This projection can be justified on the ground that the tactics employed by insurgent terrorists (e.g., kidnapping, murder, robbery, skyjacking) are, by definition, criminal behaviour in Western liberal democratic states.

A functionalist understanding of social phenomena, like political terrorism, consists of two distinct, but interrelated aspects. First, there is the conception of phenomena which reflects the more general organizing principles and assumptions embodied within the consensus model. Second, there is the application of the functionalist methodology to examine the functional attributes of phenomena in relation to other components of the social system and to society as a whole. Both of these aspects emerge when applying this paradigm to the study of political terrorism.

Although they are seldom articulated, several basic assumptions about the nature of criminal law are circumscribed within the functionalist model of crime and deviance. The first of these propositions is that the law reflects collectively held values in society. Since social systems are maintained by a consensus of values and beliefs, criminal statutes are seen as the codification of these widely held values. Moreover, laws embody those values and customs which are fundamental to preserving social order and stability, and as such, are in the best interests of society, in general, to protect (Michalowski, 1977; Chambliss, 1976).
A second assumption underlying the functionalist view of criminal law is that the rule of law protects all members of society, equally. Because they reflect "collectively shared sentiments", criminal statutes neither repress nor serve the special interests of particular individuals or groups (Michalowski, 1977:23).

A third proposition of functional criminology is that law violators represent a unique subgroup in society. Since the majority of individuals share a common conception of what is right and wrong, those who transgress moral dictates "...must share some element which distinguishes them from the law abiding majority" (Michalowski, 1977:23).

From the functionalist perspective, then, acts of political terrorism are seen as criminal because they violate widely shared values in society regarding legitimate forms of political protest and dissent. In all Western liberal states, the use of terrorism to effect political change, not only violates the fundamental belief that political change can only occur through the democratic processes, but its use also constitutes a contravention of universal principles protecting the life and property of individuals. Because their actions violate these collectively shared values, political terrorists are defined as criminals and punished according to prevailing legal customs.

Generally speaking, application of the functionalist model to the study of criminal behaviour, especially political terrorism, is somewhat paradoxical, in that it leads the analyst
to consider the functional attributes of highly destructive and violent behaviour. Ironically, acts that are intentionally undertaken to effect political change within a social system, are conceptualized by functional theorists, in terms of the contribution they make to the stability and continuity of that social order. Two conceptually distinct aspects of insurgent terrorism are seen to benefit society in this way. First, violent behaviour, irrespective of its illegal status, can be functional when it produces desirable social change and when it promotes social equilibrium by bringing social institutions closer in line with environmental changes. Second, the social process of conferring a criminal status upon acts of insurgent terrorism serves to reaffirm "collectively shared sentiments" among group members and establishes the normative boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable social conduct.

Both of these propositions are derived from the work of Emile Durkheim, who is regarded by most criminologists, as having propagated the idea that crime is functional for society. Durkheim asserted that criminal behaviour is a necessary prerequisite for social change and for society to repress criminality would be to create a social system that is virtually stagnant. The evolutive function of crime is expressed by Durkheim when he writes,

Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited extent....To make progress, individual originality must be able to express itself. In order that the originality of the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may find expression, it is necessary that the originality of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, shall
also be possible. One does not occur without the other (Durkheim, 1938:71).

What Durkheim and other functionalists contend then, is that social change is possible only when there is some form of normative experimentation. This occurs, for example, when individuals use law-violating behaviour to promulgate a morality that differs from existing value and belief systems. If this new ideology is shared by most social members, then non-conformist behaviour may aid in the social adaptation to these changes.

But in forcing adaptive change, crime also performs an important role in preserving social equilibrium. If there is a disjunction between the beliefs and values people hold and the structural and institutional make-up of society, crime may lead to changes which restore their balance and harmony. The basic social need of adapting to change, which may be expressed in criminal behaviour, is noted by Pierre van den Berghe when he writes,

Adjustive change of the social system, in response to exogeneous change, or to endogenous change in one of its parts, is a condition to the maintenance of equilibrium. Conversely, increasing disequilibrium or malintergration can result from stability, and inertia in certain elements of a society (e.g., the political systems) which fail to adjust to changes in other parts of the society (van den Berghe, 1973:47).

Within this context, acts of insurgent terrorism can be conceptualized as functional because they can be the catalysts for desired social change. Moreover, by forcing systemic changes they serve to restore equilibrium in society. Revolutionary violence that eliminates the imbalance between major components in society (e.g., the political systems and the ideological
superstructure) can lead to the emergence of a more integrated society (van den Berghe, 1973:48). Robert Merton has noted the potentially integrative function of insurgent terrorism when he writes,

In the history of every society, one supposes, some of its culture heroes eventually come to be regarded as heroic in part because they are held to have had the courage and the vision to challenge the beliefs and routines of their society. The rebel, revolutionary, non-conformist, heretic or renegade of an earlier day is often the culture hero of today. Moreover, the accumulations of dysfunctions in a social system is often the prelude to concerted social change that may bring the system closer to the values that enjoy the respect of members of the society (Merton, 1971:844).

Insurgent terrorism is also positively functional because of its criminal nature. Moreover, the stigmatization of certain behaviour as criminal has consequences which are favourable or functional, irrespective of the substance of that behaviour. So it is not the act, but rather the criminal status of the act which is seen to be eufunctional.

According to Durkheim, crime is socially defined phenomenon. It consists of those behavioural deviations that group members condemn because they depart markedly from widely shared values and beliefs. For Durkheim, criminal conduct is universally offensive to the "collective conscience of society", the communal sense of what is important and worth pursuing (Conklin, 1975). Because crime offends the moral sensibilities of members in the community, it serves to enhance social solidarity by uniting everyone against a common enemy, the law-violator.
Crime brings together upright consciences and concentrates them. We have only to notice what happens, particularly in a small town, when some moral scandal has just been committed. [People] stop each other on the street, they visit each other, they seek to come together to talk of the event and to wax indignant in common (Durkheim, 1933:102).

By pulling people together, crime helps group members to become aware of the values they have in common, which subsequently leads to a crystallization of these collective sentiments. In addition to reaffirming the moral solidarity among individuals, crime also defines and maintains the boundaries of acceptable social behaviour. Deviance clarifies normative rules which define for people what is right and what is wrong. In this respect, "the criminal serves as an identifying sign of the limits of permissible behavior" (Gibbons, 1979:183).

By demarcating the moral boundaries of a community, criminal behaviour also serves to maintain the cultural distinctiveness of that community. This intriguing aspect of crime has been put forth by Erikson, who contends that social groups exist in both a physical and cultural space, and cultural uniqueness is determined by cultural boundaries. In his study of witchcraft among sixteenth and seventeenth century Puritans in Massachusetts, Erikson demonstrates how deviance serves to identify these cultural limits. He notes that, "...deviant forms of behavior, by marking the outer edges of group life, give the inner structure its special character and thus supply the framework within which the people of the group develop an orderly sense of their own cultural identity" (Erikson, 1966:13).
Within the functionalist framework, insurgent terrorism, like other forms of criminal behaviour, may be seen as eufunctional for a social system. Because these acts violate criminal laws which reflect strongly held values and customs in society, they are universally condemned by group members. Moreover, the processes of conferring and responding to this criminal status, serve to reaffirm "collectively shared sentiments", establish normative boundaries and identify the cultural distinctiveness of a social community.

Conflict View

The organizing principles or assumptions embodied within the conflict model give rise to a fundamentally different conception of political terrorism than that found within the functionalist paradigm. Because there has been very little analysis of terrorism from the conflict perspective (Taylor, 1979), discussion of this alternative view must draw from the more general application of the model to the study of crime and criminal law. A conflict conception of terrorism will be inferred from the basic propositions underlying conflict criminological theories.

Foremost among these theoretical propositions is that criminal legislation emerges out of and reflects value antagonisms between competing social groups. This proposition
stems directly from the broader organizing principle that collective human existence is characterized by social discord among groups with disparate and competing values and interests. The functionalist's contention that criminal laws reflect widespread normative and moral consensus is flatly rejected by conflict theorists, who point to mere existence of law as indicative of value pluralism. They assert that "if there were complete consensus on a particular act, no one would have ever performed that act, and no law would have been passed against it" (Bernard, 1981:371).

More fundamental to the conflict conception of crime is the proposition that criminal law is fundamentally a political phenomenon. It is political in that its content and enforcement are directly related to the exercise of power in society. What is defined as crime then, is not determined by moral consensus as functionalists claim, but by the relative power of certain social groups to have their special interests and concerns translated into law.

Because there always exists an unequal distribution of political power between groups, criminal law and its administration are seen by conflict theorists to perpetuate this structured imbalance. Since the maintenance of political power is a concern shared by those who hold superordinate positions in society, and since criminal law is seen to reflect this group's interests, it follows that the content and enforcement of criminal statutes effectively preserves the extant power.
structure. This view is expressed by Michael Parenti when he writes,

The law is inevitably an outgrowth of the established order which produced it, and by its nature it serves the established interests far better than the unestablished ones. When discussing law and order, then, it is imperative to ask whose law and whose order we are talking about. While the courts, the security forces and the lawmakers claim to be protecting order as such, they really are protecting a particular kind of order, one that sustains the self-appointed, self-perpetuating oligarchs who rule most of our economic, technological, educational and social institutions (Parenti, 1977:167-168).

Perhaps the most effective way that superordinate groups preserve their position of political power is through their privileged access in defining criminal behaviour. Because of this privileged access, definitions of crime invariably consist of those actions which threaten or disrupt the political status quo. This point is made by John Lofland when he states that, "deviance is the name of the conflict game in which individuals or loosely organized small groups with little power are strongly feared by a well-organized, sizable minority or majority who have a large amount of power" (cited in Schur, 1980:12). From the conflict perspective, the criminalization of behaviour is seen to reflect the political struggle between those groups who have political power and are attempting to maintain it, and groups who do not have it and are struggling to obtain it.

For conflict theorists, acts are defined as criminal because it is in the interest of the politically powerful to define them in this way (Chambliss, 1976; Quinney, 1970). It is not the behaviour per se that is of paramount concern to the
conflict criminologist, but rather the imposition of the
criminal designation to that behaviour. More simply, it is not
the act, but a criminal definition assigned to it that makes it
a crime. This point is made by Richard Quinney when he notes
that, "persons and behaviour...become criminal because of the
formation and application of criminal definitions"
(Quinney, 1970:13).

Because crime is seen as the application of a definition,
it is argued that criminality can be more appropriately viewed
as a status that is conferred upon people who threaten the
interests of the politically powerful. This status carries with
it a social stigma that divests individuals of their social and
political privileges by effectively discrediting their actions.
Edwin Schur has noted the consequences of being "deviantized"
when he writes,

[It] is a process of social typing through which those
who, for whatever reason, feel threatened seek to avoid
the persons and negate the conditions they find
objectionable. To the extent it succeeds, this process
depersonalizes the offending individuals--who are
treated as mere instances of a discreditable category,
rather than as full human beings--thus imposing personal
stigma and providing a basis for collective
discrimination against them (Schur, 1980:4).

By delegitimating the actions of those it is assigned to, the
criminal status justifies the use of punitive measures against
the perpetrators of criminal acts and serves to legitimate the
mobilization of repressive measures to prevent and control
criminal behaviour.
Having discussed some of the basic propositions of conflict criminology, it is now possible to develop a conflict view of insurgent terrorism.

According to conflict theorists, all crime has a political dimension, in that the legal proscription of behaviour protects the interests of those groups who have the power to formulate and apply criminal legislation. Acts of insurgent terrorism reflect this political struggle more than conventional crime because they are both implicitly and explicitly political in nature. As mentioned in Chapter II, terrorist strategies involve the deliberate attempt to effect a political or power-related outcome, and insurgent terrorism is the attempt to usurp political power from the established political order.

What conflict theorists emphasize in their analysis of insurgent terrorism is that while the use of terrorism to attain political power may be disapproved of by a large segment of society, these acts are criminal because they are defined as such by the politically powerful groups. This belief stems from the conflict proposition that the determination of criminality emerges out of the struggle to maintain political power, with the powerful imposing their definition of crime upon those who disrupt or challenge the existing set of power relationships. It follows then, that a criminal status would be conferred upon those individuals who intentionally use violence to subvert the existing political structure.
Designating insurgent terrorists as criminals is seen by conflict theorists to promote the interests of those with power by perpetuating the social status quo. By conferring a criminal status upon insurgents, their actions and goals are effectively de-politicized and de-legitimated. Moreover, the label defines terror-inspiring acts so that their political nature is obfuscated. Because they are defined exclusively as criminal, the political authorities justify the implementation of the criminal justice apparatus to deal with subversive threats. And in "emergency" situations, where acts are defined as jeopardizing the social and political stability of society, defining agents legitimate the invocation of extraordinary measures to combat terrorism. Under these circumstances, legislators not only justify the expansion of police powers to search, seize, arrest and detain, but also the use of "counter-terrorism." What is of paramount concern for conflict theorists, however, is that the repressive measures used to deal with terrorism, in essence, serve to protect and preserve the existing power structure.

The Nature of Media Newscoverage of Insurgent Terrorism

To this point, the discussion has focused on the basic postulates found in the consensus and conflict models of society and the alternative conceptualizations they provide when applied to the study of both mass communications and political
terrorism. Having done so, it is now possible to formulate a consensus and conflict view of the relationship between these two phenomena. (The overriding task of this section, then, is to briefly examine how functional and conflict theorists conceptualize the social role of mass communications when reporting incidents of insurgent terrorism.)

**Functionalist View**

For consensus theorists the contents of media news coverage of terrorist events will reflect and reinforce the moral consensus that underscores social life. Moreover, in the course of surveying and correlating the social environment, the media will present an image of terrorism which reflects "collectively shared sentiments." The values called into play relate, in large part, to the use of violence as a vehicle for effecting political change in society and fundamental human and property rights. Because the very nature of terrorism is repugnant to these values, the substance of news information and the views expressed in editorial commentary will echo the moral outrage and profound indignation shared by all members of society.

Vilification of insurgent terrorism will be particularly evident among the media in liberal democracies. In these countries the use of force is the exclusive province of the state and, by definition, strategies of terrorism violate this basic precept of democratic rule. Terrorism, then, transcends
the parameters of acceptable political protest and dissent. Moreover, it falls beyond the prescribed framework for effecting political and social change. Accordingly, terrorism and those who advocate its use will be denied any form of legitimacy by the media.

Denigration and discreditation of insurgents and their actions will be dominant themes in media coverage of terrorist incidents. They accomplish this by vilifying terrorists as common criminals and treating their actions and goals as puerile and senseless. A "law and order" framework will invariably be used to present and discuss terrorist events. In this context, subversive organizations are rightly divested of any political significance.

Another way the media expresses society's opprobrium for terrorist activity is by depicting the perpetrators as a small and unique subgroup, who resort to destructive violence as a means of attaining personal goals. Media coverage, therefore, will tend to draw attention to the social and psychological differences between terrorists and other members of society. It will also emphasize that the political aspirations of insurgents are not reflective of the interests and goals of larger society.

Because acts of terrorism violate moral standards which have been codified into criminal legislation, the media will call for the full force of the state to bear upon insurgent groups. Implementation of the appropriate social control mechanisms will be supported as a means of protecting and
preserving the social system. And in "emergency" situations, where terrorist activity is defined as threatening the very stability and integrity of the social order, the media will express society's overwhelming support for the invocation of extraordinary, even repressive measures, to combat insurgent forces.

Conflict View

(From the conflict perspective, news coverage of insurgent terrorism will disseminate a view of these events that reflects and reinforces a hegemonic ideology. Moreover, the media will diffuse a conception of terrorists and terrorism that, ultimately, serves to defend and advance the interests of the politically powerful in society. While these definitions of terrorist behavior are presented as violations of consensually held values and norms, they "really" reflect the power of superordinate groups to structure everyday consciousness in a way that serves their particular concerns.

Because mass communication specialize in the reproduction of a hegemonic ideology, they systematically provide news information and commentary that legitimizes and perpetuates the social status quo. Ideas and actions which are incongruent with the dominant ideology are effectively discredited and de-legitimated. They are denigrated as a result of direct manipulation of media content by forces that represent corporate
interests and organizational exigencies and professional values which structure access to the media in favour of bureaucratically organized agencies. Collectively, these forces lead the mass media to disseminate a conception of "social reality" that reflects powerful interests.

It follows that acts which represent violent attempts to effect counter-hegemonic ideals will be the source of severe vituperation and vilification. The primary source of these disparaging views will be governmental and official authorities, such as the police and political representatives. What will be conspicuous by their absence are views which support politically dissident thought and action.

The mass media will effectively de-politicize and de-legitimate subversive elements by defining their actions as crime. By assigning a criminal status to these individuals they justify the implementation of punitive and repressive measures to manage and eradicate the terrorist threat. Although the justifications advanced for these actions are couched in terms which represent the interests of society as a whole, they ultimately legitimate the invocation of harsh social control mechanisms to preserve existing hierarchical arrangements.

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Summary

The consensus and conflict models of society have been outlined and discussed as competing theoretical frameworks from which to understand mass media coverage of insurgent terrorism. It was noted that both paradigms conceptualize the media as performing a social control function by reporting information and presenting commentary that favours the preservation of the established social order. However, they each explain this function in radically different terms.

For the consensus theorists, the mass media present an image of terrorism which emerges out of and reflects the widespread agreement among social members regarding fundamental values and basic social norms. Conflict theorists, on the other hand, interpret media imagery of terrorism as a depiction of "social reality" which reflects and reinforces the hegemonic control of politically powerful groups in society.

In the next chapter a case study is undertaken to illustrate how these two analytic models provide alternative ways of interpreting and understanding media coverage of insurgent terrorism. The events under review are commonly referred to as the "October Crisis" and involve the violent activities of a small group of ethnic nationalist in the province of Quebec during the last half of 1970. Precipitating this "crisis" was the kidnapping of James Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Montreal and the abduction and death of Pierre
Laporte, the Minister of Labour and Immigration by members of the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ). Canadian media coverage of these events will be examined from both the consensus and conflict models to illustrate how each paradigm embodies a distinct conception of "social reality."
V. Part II: THE FLQ CRISIS - A CASE STUDY

Introduction

In the preceding section, various conceptions of the relationship between the media and insurgent terrorism were examined. Part of this examination centered on perceptions of the media as key elements in the strategy of terrorism. Several of the perceived problems associated with this key role were outlined. We also considered the consensus and conflict models of society as alternative ways to conceptualize the theoretical linkages between terrorism and media. In this section, a case study approach is used to illustrate these linkages. The case involves the October or FLQ crisis of 1970. This set of events embraces the violent actions of a small group of ethnic-nationalists in the province of Quebec. What is important to note, is that most Canadians defined these acts as terrorism.

The October Crisis

Historically, Canadians have demonstrated a remarkable tendency for resolving political differences in a nonviolent manner. Accordingly, almost all attempts to effect or resist
Change to the country's power structure have taken place through the prescribed constitutional processes of parliamentary democracy. Despite this longstanding respect for legitimately constituted authority and the legitimate avenues of attaining this authority, some groups, and even the Canadian government itself, have used violence as a means of either preserving or transforming the structure of political decision-making in this country. For instance, the Metis uprisings in Manitoba in 1869 and in Saskatchewan in 1885, were violent attempts by the indigenous populations of Canada's western frontier to maintain their political autonomy in the face of a mass influx of English settlers.¹ In 1919, the state employed violent means to suppress attempts by organized labour in Winnipeg to increase the political power of workers in the province. With respect to the Winnipeg General Strike, two men were killed when the North West Mounted Police charged a crowd of strikers who had assembled to demonstrate against the imprisonment of their union leaders on charges of seditious conspiracy.²

A more recent, and perhaps the most infamous violent confrontation in Canadian political history, took place in the province of Quebec during the 1960's. At this time a small group of frustrated ethno-nationalists turned to violent tactics as a

¹Metis is the French word for "halfbreed" often used to describe children whose parents are white and Native Indian, especially French speaking men and Native women.

²For a more thorough discussion of these, and other instances of political violence in Canadian history, see Torrance, 1977; Szabo, 1976; Grossman, 1976.
means of publicizing and promoting Quebec independence. Between 1963 and 1970, the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) waged a series of violent campaigns with the objective of fomenting a larger Quebecois revolution against the perceived oppression and exploitation of Francophones in Quebec. The violent action of the FLQ were defined by most Canadians as terrorism.

Although this violence persisted for seven years, it was not until October, 1970, that the FLQ shocked the nation, and the entire world, by successfully abducting two political officials in Montreal. These abductions, plus a series of attending events, were perceived by the authorities as a state of "apprehended insurrection" in Quebec. On October 16, 1970, the federal cabinet in council, declared the War Measures Act operative. This emergency legislation, never before invoked in peacetime, outlawed the FLQ and severely curtailed the civil liberties of all Canadians by granting the police extraordinary powers of search, seizure and internment.

The intent of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with the socio-political dynamics of the October crisis. Much of this discussion is devoted to chronicling the violent activity which has been attributed to the FLQ. Although this overview spans the years between 1963 and 1970, primary focus is placed on the events surrounding the October crisis.
An Historical Overview of Quebec Separatism

Quebec's struggle for independence, and therefore the violent actions of the FLQ, cannot be understood without an historical perspective (Rioux, 1971). While unique social, political and cultural forces precipitated the outbreak of violent radical nationalism in the 1960's, the roots of Quebec separatism go deep into Canada's past. Since New France was surrendered to the English in 1763, there have been those who have resented the "colonial subjugation of Quebec" to Anglophones, and have advocated an autonomous Quebec state as the only viable means of preserving the Francophone way of life in a continent dominated by English culture.

While Quebec nationalism has, for the most part, remained dormant or at least unnoticed by most Canadians, it has, on occasion, erupted in violent political action. For instance, the fervent desire of French patriots, spirited by Louis-Joseph Papineau, to establish an independent Lower Canada (Quebec prior to Confederation), precipitated the rebellion against British rule in 1838. The Metis uprisings, mentioned above, can also be seen as a violent manifestation of French nationalism. In this instance, however, it was a Francophone population outside of Quebec which resorted to destructive action as a means of overcoming Anglophone domination. During the First and Second World Wars, Quebec nationalism was again ignited over the conscription issue. Many French nationalists fiercely opposed
compulsory military service on the grounds that Canada's war efforts were not directed to the defense of this country, per se, but rather to protecting the British Empire. These same anti-British sentiments underscored the political violence of the FLQ during the 1960's. 3

While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the numerous factors associated with these, and other instances, of violent French nationalism, there appears to be a common spark igniting violent ethnic conflict in this country. French Canadians have resorted to violence, invariably, out of anger and frustration over their subordinate position in Canadian society. Since the French were defeated by the English in the eighteenth century, they have continually faced restricted opportunities and enjoyed fewer privileges than Canada's other Charter members. Additionally, they have resented having little influence and control over decisions that significantly affect their material and cultural well-being (Rioux, 1971; Dumont, 1971). For some Francophones, violence was regarded as the only effective way to redress the social, political and economic imbalances between them and Anglo-Canadians.

Protection of linguistic and cultural rights in this country is one area where French subordination is particularly apparent. Although the Canadian Constitution speaks of a nation which is bilingual and bicultural in character, its provisions

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3 For a more comprehensive historical analysis of Quebec nationalism, see Rioux, 1971; Dumont, 1971; Cook, 1966; Brunet, 1973.
protecting French language and cultural rights have seldom been protected outside of Quebec. Consequently, Francophones outside of Quebec have had to contend with the inexorable threat of cultural assimilation. Even within Quebec itself, cultural absorption has, at times, been a major socio-political issue. This was especially the case in the post World War II period when the majority of immigrants entering the province and a growing number of young French Canadians adopted English as their primary language.

Underlying this demographic trend was the perception that the French culture was a barrier to social mobility and social status. During the fifties and sixties, employment and upward mobility in Quebec's corporate structure were often contingent upon fluency in the English language. Consequently, French Canadians as a whole, have been systematically denied the same economic and social opportunities as other ethnic groups in Canada. Even as a founding member of Canadian society, they have continually occupied a similar socio-economic level and have been relegated to the same unskilled, primary and agricultural occupations as non-British immigrants entering Canada. At the same time, Anglophones have been over-represented in executive, managerial and other professional positions in the Canadian social structure (Clement, 1975; Porter, 1974). These

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*It is important to note that since the Parti Quebecois has assumed power in Quebec, access to English instruction has become equally problematic in that province, as access to French instruction has been in other Canadian provinces.*

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disparities were documented by a major Royal Commission investigating the status of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada. It reported that,

Socially and economically, Francophones are in a far weaker position than Anglophones in the workplace. They are decidedly and consistently lower in average income levels, in schooling levels, in occupational scales, and in the ownership of industry (Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1969:5).

To draw attention to the cultural, social and economic disparities between the French and English populations in Canada, is not to suggest a direct cause and effect relationship between the subjugated position of the Francophone population in Canadian society and the outbreak of French nationalist violence. However, it would be unrealistic to believe that such inequalities could persist for hundreds of years without some form of violent dissident action. The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (1969:15) over simplifies this point when it writes,

The material advantages stemming from a high income are as obvious as they are sought after. Few indeed are those to whom money is a matter of indifference. It follows that, if there is a substantial disparity between the incomes of two groups, the less fortunate will generally have strong feelings of resentment and grievance. In most modern societies, serious income disparities figure among the prime "causes" of social unrest [emphasis added].

But for several proponents of Quebec independence, French nationalism is more than a matter of the social disparities between ethnic groups in this country. Rather, it centers on perceptions of economic and political subjugation. Rioux expresses this view when he states that, Quebec separatism
exists,

...because the majority of Quebec's inhabitants benefit only marginally from this country's industrial and commercial development, and because their culture is constantly menaced by the groups that dominate their country and economically and politically. Their language and culture suffer the fate reserved for a subjugated, colonized nation. (Rioux, 1971:7).

In addition to century-old feelings of deprivation and subjugation, other factors underscored the emergence of separatist violence in Quebec during the 1960's. More specifically, tremendous social, political and economic change taking place in the province, at that time, also contributed to the development and outbreak of violent radical nationalism. Pressures resulting from the modernization of Quebec after the Second World War served to transform the province's economic and political orientations, and more importantly, its cultural spirit. The processes of industrialization, urbanization and secularization collectively forced the quebecois to break out of a parochial lifestyle steeped in traditional, rural and religious values. In its place emerged a new social consciousness that reflected not only the needs of a secular and urban society, but also a growing ethnic awareness and confidence (Redlick, 1977:145-197).

One impact of this revitalized nationalism was the intensification of demands for greater Quebec autonomy. For instance, the Liberal party of Quebec during the early 1960's, under the banner of "maître chez nous" (approximately "masters in our own house"), pressed for increased financial resources
and greater control over certain areas of government activity, such as social welfare and education (Thompson, 1973: 15). In its extreme form, this renewed nationalism generated greater demands for the complete separation of Quebec from the rest of Canada.

For many French Canadians, however, the social and political changes which did take place during the 1960's were either too slow in occurring or too moderate. Widespread frustration and discontent once again surfaced in Quebec. These sentiments underscored the formation of a plethora of political parties dedicated to the ideal of a sovereign Quebec, and the outbreak of violent political action, including mass political protests and acts of "terrorism" (Redlick, 1977: 200).

While the separatist movement in Quebec, during the sixties, spawned a variety of political organizations committed to the independence of Quebec, the FLQ distinguished itself by advocating and using violence as a means of promoting this political goal. From 1963 to 1970, the letters "FLQ" became closely identified with all separatist violence in Quebec.

5 Included among these separatist organizations were the Laurentian Alliance, the Balliement Nationale, Rassemblement pour l'Independece Nationale, and the Mouvement pour Liberation Populaire (Redlick, 1977: 200).

6 Despite the emergence of various splinter groups, the name "FLQ" was used to refer to all the separatist organizations which used terror-violence in Quebec during the 1960's. Consequently, the FLQ often assumed responsibility for the violent actions of the Armee de Liberation du Quebec (ALQ) and the Armee Revolutionnaire du Quebec (ARQ) between 1963-1964 (Gellner, 1974: 70-72).
The antecedences of the FLQ are found in the Réseau de résistance (RR), a radical splinter group made up of former members of more legitimate separatist organizations. In 1963, half of the membership of the RR became disenchanted with the group's progress and broke away to form the FLQ. Their goal was "...to take immediate violent action against the forces blocking Quebec's independence with the expectation of arousing the Québécois community to revolutionary action and of terrifying the English-Canadians into relinquishing power" (Redlick, 1977:203). These individuals believed that violence could be used to provoke a repressive response by the established political order, thus making their actions appear more legitimate and the idea of armed revolution more acceptable to French Canadians. They also saw terror-violence as the necessary first step to a larger populist revolution. Their actions were "...intended to arouse in the Québécois an awareness that he had no longer to accept things as they were, and that he should not feel guilty if he broke away from his traditional pattern of lawfulness" (Morf, 1970:173).

At an organizational level, the FLQ had a very loose cellular structure. Each cell was comprised of two or more individuals, often operating independently of the other. What usually linked the various cells, albeit tenuously, were family ties and political and philosophical bonds.

During its seven year existence, the FLQ found its raison d'être in two distinct ideologies. Initially, its political
orientation was exclusively ethno-nationalistic with its primary aim the independence of Quebec. In 1964, however, the FLQ's approach to separatism assumed a Marxist orientation. This ideological addition, due primarily to the influence of Pierre Vallieres and Charles Gagnon, had a significant impact on both the FLQ's outlook and its actions. First, the FLQ no longer saw itself in terms of an ethno-centric nationalist group fighting for the independence of Quebec. Rather, they saw themselves as part of a global struggle against colonialism and capitalism. At this universal level, the FLQ identified itself with other left-wing revolutionary movements throughout the world, such as those in Algeria, Cuba and Central and South America. FLQ leaders hoped that this broader ideological base would increase their support by appealing to Quebec's working class.

A second impact of this ideological shift was that FLQ activity no longer symbolized Anglophone domination, per se, but rather capitalist exploitation. Consequently, the targets of FLQ bombings and robberies shifted from historical monuments, government buildings and military installations to English and French companies that exploited Quebec workers. In addition, the FLQ began to support the goals of workers, in general. They did this by participating in worker demonstrations and strike action and by denouncing capitalism in its publications (Redlick, 1977:208-212).

Although the FLQ waged a protracted campaign of violence in Quebec, it was not a sustained offensive. More specifically, it
was undertaken in "waves." Between 1963 and 1970, there were six distinct periods of violence, each ending with the apprehension, prosecution and incarceration of the FLQ members involved (Morf, 1970; Pelletier, 1971). While these "waves" varied in intensity and duration, they were characterized by a marked increase in the actual number and attempted incidents of bombing, arson, vandalism, robbery and kidnapping.8

As one reviews the record of the FLQ, it becomes apparent that the final two waves were the most active and destructive. Between 1963 and 1967, the FLQ planted thirty-five bombs, most of them low-powered, and half of which could be dismantled. During this same time period, eight hold-ups were attributed to the FLQ. In the following three years, fifty to sixty bombs of noticeably larger destructive capability were discovered, only one-quarter of which could be defused. The FLQ were also responsible for twenty-five robberies during the same three years (Pelletier, 1971:47). Collectively, the six waves of violence resulted in untold property damage and the death of seven individuals and physical injury to many others.

7Redlick contends that there were seven, rather than six waves of violence. She claims that analysts, such as Morf and Pelletier have neglected the wave of violence orchestrated by Georges Dubreil between 1967 and 1969 because it was not politically motivated. According to Redlick, Dubreil's random bombing of locations in Montreal during this period was the result of personal and psychological difficulties (Redlick, 1977: 218-219).

While the last two waves of violence were characterized by a spiralling of dynamite thefts and bomb explosions, it was also a period of reassessment for the FLQ. By late 1969, it was evident to FLQ members that their violent tactics had failed to awaken a revolutionary consciousness among French Canadians. In fact, there was mounting public antipathy towards the FLQ and the means it was employing to effect political and social change in the province.

One result of this retrospection was the adoption of kidnapping by the FLQ as a tool for increasing its political influence. On February 26, 1970 the Montreal Police became aware of the FLQ's intentions to execute a political kidnapping when they stopped a truck and found two men in possession of a large wicker basket and documents announcing the abduction of Moshe Golan, the Israeli consul and trade commissioner. Four months later, a police raid on a summer home in the Laurentians, lead to the discovery of a cache of firearms, dynamite and a communique listing the "irrevocable demands" for the release of Harrison Burgess, the U.S. Consul General in Montreal (Saywell, 1970:30-31).

Despite the fact that the police and the diplomatic community had been alerted to the FLQ's plans to abduct two foreign dignitaries, most foreign officials did not take special precautions.

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9Actually, the first FLQ kidnapping took place in 1965, when the ARQ abducted a police officer, who later escaped to testify against his abductors. According to Redlick (1977:207), this kidnapping had little purpose because of its poor planning and the absence of any ransom demands.
measures to avert the chance of a future abduction. While the
discovery of these documents did lead to a tightening of
security on the part of American officials, most "potential
objects of further kidnapping plots continued to live in a
carefree, relaxed atmosphere" (Morf, 1970:163). Failure to take
more stringent protective measures set the stage for Canada's
gravest peacetime drama; the October crisis.  

A Chronological Overview of the October Crisis

Although thirteen years have elapsed since the fall of
1970, Canadians have yet to fully piece together, and therefore,
fully understand, the events surrounding the October crisis.
Despite commissions of inquiry, scores of personal accounts from
people directly involved and a plethora of monographs and
articles produced by social scientists and investigative

10 Another event which contributed to the FLQ seriously
considering a political kidnapping to enhance its political
position in Quebec, was the provincial election held in April of
1970. Although the Liberal Party swept into office with a
resounding majority, it did so because the English population of
Quebec voted en masse for Robert Bourassa. Analyses of the voting
patterns revealed that the French vote was equally divided
between the Union Nationale, the Liberals and the Parti
Quebecois (PQ). It was the Anglophone vote, 20% of the
electorate, which proved to be decisive in shaping the outcome
of the election. "In every electoral district where the
English-speaking people were a significant minority, they tipped
the balance in favour of the Liberal Party" (Rioux, 1971:156).

What incensed separatists even further, however, was the
disproportionate number of electoral seats the PQ won, in
relation to its popular support. While the Liberal Party gained
72 seats in the National Assembly with 42% of the popular vote,
the PQ were elected in only seven electoral districts with 23%
journalists, several basic questions remain unanswered. For instance, what role did the federal government play during the crisis? Was the crisis orchestrated by the federal government to legitimate the use of repressive measures to purge Quebec of its independence movement and all left-wing political organizations? Still other mysteries surround the death of Pierre Laporte. Who killed him? How did he die? And did the government overreact to the FLQ? What was the factual basis for proclaiming a state of "apprehended insurrection" in Quebec and invoking the War Measures Act. And what was the actual destructive potential and membership strength of the FLQ?

Because these, and other basic questions remain unanswered, any attempt to re-construct the October crisis becomes problematic. The chronological overview of the FLQ crisis which is presented in this section, attempts to minimize this problem by focussing on events which most observers agree took place. These "points of congruence" are culled from a diversity of published material, including government (Wainstein, 1977), news (Canadian News Facts, 1970), and social scientific (Stewart, 1970; Pelletier, 1971; Haggart and Golden, 1971; Saywell, 1971; Gellner, 1974; Redlick, 1977; Vaillieres, 1977) sources. While this section draws attention to aspects of the FLQ crisis which most people agree on, several of the major discrepancies found in the literature are also noted and briefly discussed.
Monday, October 5

On this day, at 8:15 A.M., James Cross, the British Trade Commissioner, is abducted from his home in Montreal.

Establishing what is to be a pattern of communication for the coming weeks, an anonymous call to a Montreal radio station directs the authorities to a communiqué from the kidnappers. In this document the Liberation cell of the FLQ claim responsibility for Cross' abduction and set the following conditions for his safe release:

1. cessation of all police searches and arrests,
2. broadcast and publication of an FLQ political manifesto,
3. release of 23 "political prisoners",
4. air transportation for the "political prisoners" to either Algeria or Cuba,
5. reinstatement of the postal workers who were laid off in April,
6. a "voluntary" tax of $500,000 in gold bullion, and
7. disclosure of the FLQ member who led the police to the FLQ cell planning to kidnap U.S. consul general, Harrison Burgess in June.

Accompanying this list of demands are a detailed set of instructions describing how the terms of release are to be met. The captors also set a forty-eight hour deadline, or until
twelve o'clock noon, on October 7, for the authorities to satisfy the conditions for Cross's freedom.\footnote{It is interesting to note, that the contents of this communiqué, including the seven demands made for the release of James Cross are almost identical to those prepared for the attempted abduction of Harrison Burgess. For an English translation of all the FLQ communiques, see Saywell, 1971.}  

While six men will eventually be charged with kidnapping James Cross, the "actual" composition of the Liberation cell is still a contentious issue. Early accounts of the October crisis list those involved in the Cross Affair at five; Marc Carbonneau, Jacques Lanctot, Yves Langlois and Jacques and Louise Cosette-Trudel (Saywell, 1971; Gellner, 1977). A government inquiry into the October crisis, commissioned by the Parti Québécois in the late 1970’s and released in 1980, (The Duchaine Report) reports that at least seven people took part in the Cross kidnapping. Nigel Barry Hamer, the so-called sixth person, eventually entered guilty pleas to charges of conspiracy, kidnapping, forcible detention, and extortion relating to the Cross abduction in 1980 (Canadian News Facts, 1980, vol.14:2424). The seventh person, a woman, is supposedly known by the authorities, but has never been charged.

Within hours of the kidnapping, a command center is established in the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa, which serves as a communication link between the Canadian, Quebec and Montreal authorities. Two factors prompt Ottawa into taking a dominant role in this incident. First, Cross is a
foreign diplomat, and as such, his protection is the responsibility of the Canadian Government. Second, several of the demands made by the Liberation cell for the diplomat's freedom fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government. On the provincial scene, the Quebec cabinet holds a special three hour session to discuss the kidnapping.

On Monday, most government officials refuse to make public comments about the abduction. However, Mr. Choquette, Quebec's Minister of Justice, does read a prepared statement to the press summarizing the events which have taken place and the demands made by the FLQ. That afternoon, Mrs. Cross appeals to her husband's captors asking them to consider his poor health by drawing attention to the special medication he needs to control high blood pressure.

Tuesday, October 6

Despite demands to the contrary, police activity in Montreal intensifies. Several known and suspected members of the FLQ and other separatist organizations are placed under close surveillance. Every effort, however, is made to conceal the full extent of this action from the public and the FLQ.

The Quebec and federal cabinets meet, independently, to discuss the Cross kidnapping. After consulting with Premier Bourassa and British Prime Minister Heath, the Canadian government announces its position in a prepared statement read
by Mr. Sharp, the Minister of External Affairs. Sharp describes the terms set for Cross' release as "wholly unreasonable" and informs the kidnappers that "this set of demands will not be met." In limiting his remarks to "this set of demands", however, Mr. Sharp intimates to Cross' captors the government's willingness to begin negotiations regarding conditions that the government could meet. That evening, Premier Bourassa states that the Quebec government endorses the position taken by Ottawa.

Later that day, in their second communique, the Liberation cell responds to Sharp's statement. They caution the government not to take their first communique too lightly by writing,

In order to save the life of diplomat Cross, it would be wiser to meet our conditions than to make melodramatic appeals about the pills which J. Cross must take. Let it be clearly understood that when the time limit has passed we will not hesitate to liquidate J. Cross (Saywell, 1971:38-39).

Part of the captors' message also appeals to the media to make all communiques public and to "break the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the Liberation operations" (Saywell, 1971:39). Accompanying the communique is a personal letter from Cross to his wife reassuring her that his health is fine.

In Montreal, Robert Lemieux, the lawyer who has acted as defense counsel for several arrested FLQ members since 1968, attempts to contact the "political prisoners" mentioned in the first communique. By the end of the day, six jailed FLQ members sign documents indicating their willingness to accept asylum in
Wednesday, October 7

Despite the repeated warning in communique no. 2, police activity continues. In pre-dawn raids, several suspected FLQ members are arrested, but later released (Stewart, 1970:61; Canadian News Facts, 1970:vol.4:517).

As the noon deadline approaches, Mr. Choquette holds a press conference where he reiterates the government's willingness "to investigate all practical means out of this impasse." At this time the Minister of Justice for Quebec also delivers a forceful denouncement of the FLQ's use of kidnapping as a means of effecting their political objectives. He expresses this condemnation by referring to the abduction as "the most serious type of blackmail which exists" and adds that,

The people will realize that not only are these methods of an extremely serious nature but that they foreshadow a political system composed of odious totalitarianism, the destruction of social order which guarantees freedom, and the disappearance of lawful justice (Saywell, 1971:40).

The noon deadline passes without incident. The third communique from the Liberation cell is sent to the Cross home but is never made public (Saywell, 1971:41). In the afternoon, communique No. 4 arrives at radio station CKLM in Montreal. The

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It should be noted that in James Stewart's (1970:61) account of the FLQ crisis, Choquette's statement takes place on Tuesday, October 6. Saywell (1971), Canadian News Facts (1970) and Wainstein (1977) all place it on Wednesday morning, just before the noon deadline.
deadline established in the first communique is extended twenty-four hours, to noon, October 8. By this time, the authorities are to demonstrate their "good faith" by:

1. broadcasting the entire FLQ manifesto over Radio-Canada, and

Accompanying this message are two letters written by Cross, one which is addressed to his wife. Aside from reassuring that he is well and receiving his medication, Cross asks the government to respond favourably to the terms set by the FLQ and warns that "the FLQ are determined to achieve their demands."

In Ottawa, Mr. Sharp reads an official statement indicating the government's preparedness to broadcast the FLQ manifesto. He also calls upon the Liberation cell to name a mediator with whom the authorities could negotiate directly.

By this time several police and government officials have publicly censured the media's role in the kidnapping. They have charged that the manner in which the radio stations have handled the communiques has seriously hampered the investigative efforts of the police (Stewart, 1970:62).

Thursday, October 8

The second noon deadline passes without development. That afternoon, radio station CKLM in Montreal receives information regarding the location of the next FLQ communique. In this
document the Liberation cell extends the deadline twelve hours or until midnight. The authorities are also asked to specify which demands they consider unreasonable. Cross' abductors also reject, unequivocally, the request for a mediator by stating, "we will continue to establish our communications in our own way, avoiding the traps set by the fascist police" (Saywell, 1971:45).

During the day, further suspects are arrested and detained by the police. Law enforcement officials have already begun searching for Jacques Lanctot who has been identified from police photographs by Mrs. Cross. Also apparent at this early point in the crisis, is a build-up of military personnel in the Montreal area. As part of a "planned" military exercise, two hundred and fifty members of the Royal 22nd Regiment are transported to a military base outside of the city.

In Ottawa, postal officials meet with representatives of the Lapalme drivers who were laid off in the spring when the company's contract with the Post Office expired. A job offer as postal employees is rejected on the grounds that it would entail joining a different labour union. Reinstatement of these workers was one of the original demands made by the Liberation cell (Stewart, 1970:63).

That evening, the government accedes to one of the kidnappers' terms by having the FLQ manifesto read over the French radio and television arm of the Canadian Broadcasting
Corporation. The manifesto, essentially a Marxist diatribe against capitalism, denounces the exploitative and repressive nature of Quebec's economic, political and social systems. It calls upon the workers of Quebec to join with the FLQ in fighting for a free society by revolting against their oppressors.

The Front de Liberation du Quebec wants the total independence of all Quebecois, united in a free society, purged forever of the clique of voracious sharks, the patronizing "big bosses" and their henchmen who have made Quebec their hunting preserve for "cheap labour" and unscrupulous exploitation (Saywell, 1971:46).

Workers of Quebec start today to take back what is yours; take for yourselves what belongs to you (Saywell, 1971:50).

Friday, October 9

Once again the deadline passes without incident. That afternoon, Mr. Choquette, through a Montreal radio station, appeals to the kidnappers to delay any decision regarding Mr. Cross' life. He also requests a handwritten letter from Cross as proof that the diplomat is still alive and well. To ensure that the letter is authentic, Mr. Cross is to make mention of the fact that five days have lapsed since his abduction and state that he misses his wife.

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Although the Liberation cell respond with their sixth communique that afternoon, "it goes astray and is not found." That evening it is sent again, along with the seventh communique. In this message, the Liberation cell accuses the authorities of trying to buy time by not releasing the earlier communication document. They also make clear the conditions for Cross' release and set the fifth and final deadline at 6 P.M., the following day. According to the sixth communique, Cross' freedom rested on the fulfillment of two conditions:

1. the liberation of "consenting political prisoners" and their families to Cuba or Algeria, and
2. the immediate suspension of all searches, raids, arrests and tortures carried out by the fascist police forces (Saywell, 1971:51).

The communique also warns that Cross would be executed if the police discovered his whereabouts or attempted to intervene before his release. Cross' captors backed up this threat by stating that they "had enough dynamite to feel secure."

Accompanying this communique is the handwritten letter, requested by Mr. Choquette, confirming that Cross is alive and well.

That day, Premier Bourassa travels to New York to address the Wall Street business community. His visit is intended to promote the economic soundness of Quebec and to inspire investor confidence in the province. During Bourassa's absence, Pierre Laporte, a senior cabinet minister in the Quebec government,
assumes the position of acting-premier.

Saturday, October 6

That afternoon, Bourassa returns from New York. After extensive consultation with Ottawa, Justice Minister Choquette meets with the provincial cabinet to draft the governments' position regarding the most recent terms for Cross' release. Half an hour before the six o'clock deadline Choquette reads a prepared statement which is broadcast live on television and radio. He emphasizes the governments' commitment to correct social injustices, but denounces the use of violence as a means of effecting social reform. In the address, the Justice Minister recognizes the need for, and the right of political expression and calls upon the kidnappers to "contribute to a constructive and positive solution" of society's problems. He adds that the authorities cannot yield to the ransom demands because it would result in the end of the social order they are attempting to build. Mr. Choquette does, however, make a counter offer to Cross' abductors. He states that the federal government is prepared to offer the kidnappers safe passage to a foreign country. In the event that they would prefer to remain in Canada, Choquette promises all possible clemency before the courts.

Moments after Mr. Choquette's presents the governments' position, Pierre Laporte, the Minister of Labour and Immigration
is abducted in front of his home by four armed and hooded men. That evening, Montreal becomes the scene of a massive police dragnet. All the main traffic arteries in the city are blocked, automobiles are systematically searched and military guards are assigned to the homes of public officials.

Unknown to the authorities at this early time, is that a separate faction of the FLQ, the Chenier Financial cell, is responsible for Laporte's abduction. The principal members of the cell include: Francis Simard, Paul and Jacques Rose, and Bernard Lortie. Also unknown to the police, at this time, is that the two kidnappings are not part of a planned and concerted effort involving both cells. In fact, on October 5, the day Mr. Cross was abducted by the Liberation cell, the Rose brothers and Francis Simard were in Texas attempting to raise funds to purchase firearms for the FLQ. It was only after hearing of the Cross kidnapping and the governments' refusal to meet the demands imposed, that they decided to return to Montreal. They arrived three days later on Thursday morning, October 8. Their decision to return was, in part, predicated on the belief that a second abduction, involving a more prominent political figure, was necessary to force the governments to capitulate to the demands set by the Liberation cell.¹⁴

¹⁴A detailed account of the events leading up to and including the Laporte kidnapping, as told by Paul Rose, one of Laporte's abductors, is found in Saywell, 1971:55-58; also see Gellner, 1974:105-106.
Shortly after the second kidnapping, Premier Bourassa receives a threatening telephone message claiming it was him, rather than Laporte, the FLQ wanted to abduct. That evening, Bourassa, his family and his cabinet move into heavily guarded quarters in the Queen Elizabeth Hotel in Montreal. Troops of the Royal 22nd Regiment are mobilized and moved into the city.

Sunday, October 11

Early Sunday morning, another anonymous telephone call to radio station CKAC directs the authorities to the first communique from Laporte's kidnappers. Also found is the cabinet minister's National Assembly card. The message sets a 10 P.M. deadline for full compliance with the remaining six demands put forth by the Liberation cell. It warned that "any partial acceptance will be considered as a refusal." This document, signed by the Chenier Financial cell, is the first indication that two separate cells are responsible for the Cross and Laporte abductions.

Meanwhile, law enforcement officials continue to raid the homes and businesses of suspected FLQ supporters. Among those arrested and detained is Robert Lemieux. Later that day, he is jailed and his files are seized on charges of obstructing justice arising out of the Cross kidnapping.

At one o'clock, a second communique is received from the Chenier cell which reiterates their threat to execute Laporte at
10 P.M. should the authorities fail to respond favourably to their demands. Enclosed with this message is a short letter from Laporte to his wife stating that he is well and thinking of his family. He also mentions that "the important thing is that the authorities get moving" (Stewart, 1970:66).

Late that afternoon, a third communiqué from the Chenier cell is discovered. It contains Laporte's credit cards and an emotional letter written by the cabinet minister to Premier Bourassa pleading for his friend to save his life. In the letter he draws attention to his position as the last adult male in his family and the responsibilities he has towards his own family and his late brother's children. Laporte also alerts the premier about the seriousness of the present situation by writing,

We are in the presence of a well-organized escalation that will end only with the liberation of political prisoners. After me it will be a third, fourth, and a fifth. If all political men are protected they will strike elsewhere, in other classes of society. It would be as well to act now and thus avoid a bloodbath and useless panic (Stewart, 1970:66).

Throughout the day and evening, Bourassa consults with the government in Ottawa, his cabinet and the leaders of the provincial opposition parties in Quebec. Moments before the ten o'clock deadline, the premier reads a televised statement asking the FLQ to establish negotiations with the government over mechanisms that would ensure the safe release of the two hostages should the political prisoners be freed. In the course of delivering his statement, Bourassa makes an obvious concession to the kidnappers. For the first time during the
crisis, the imprisoned FLQ members are referred to as "political prisoners" by a government official.

Monday, October 12

Cross' captors are the first to respond to Bourassa's request for direct communication. In their eighth communiqué, discovered early Monday morning, the Liberation cell repeat their demands for safe conduct to Algeria or Cuba for consenting political prisoners and the suspension of all police activity in exchange for Cross' life. They also state that Robert Lemieux is to serve as the intermediary between the FLQ and the governments. A letter from Cross to Bourassa is also enclosed in the communiqué as evidence that Cross is alive and well. No new deadline is set.

Before mid-day, a message from the Chenier cell is found. It also informs the authorities that Robert Lemieux is to act as spokesperson for the FLQ. Laporte's abductors remain intransigent on their conditions for the minister's safe release by refusing to negotiate on the original demands put forth by the Liberation cell following Cross' kidnapping. An accompanying letter from Laporte to Bourassa again serves as proof that he is alive. Like the other FLQ cell, the Chenier cell does not set a new deadline.

Much of the ambiguity and confusion created by the disparate sets of demands is clarified in a follow-up communiqué
from the Chenier cell. It states that Cross would be released when the political prisoners are freed and police activity is halted. Laporte's freedom rested with complete fulfillment of the remaining six terms originally demanded for the release of Cross. This message is to be the last from the Chenier cell before the execution or release of Laporte.

Throughout the day military personnel and equipment are being transported into Ottawa and Montreal. Armed soldiers take up positions protecting foreign diplomats, federal and provincial officials and public buildings. In Quebec City, a communiqué signed by the Nelson cell of the FLQ is discovered. It threatens the abduction of a doctor if the medical specialists in the province do not end their strike action and return to work. Early that evening, Premier Bourassa announces corporate lawyer and Quebec Liberal party treasurer Robert Demers as the government's representative in negotiations with the FLQ. Later that night, Lemieux and Demers begin negotiation talks in Lemieux's jail cell.

Tuesday, October 13

Early in the day, Lemieux is arraigned on a charge of obstructing justice and released on his own recognizance. Negotiation talks between Lemieux and Demers continue in full earnest throughout Tuesday. Lemieux suggests that the political prisoners and the ransom money be held by the authorities in
Cuba or Algeria until the Canadian government reports that Cross and Laporte are safe. Demers proposes that one member from each of the cells be held as counter-hostages until the political prisoners are released, after which they would be permitted to join their colleagues in exile (Saywell, 1971:60).

Because Lemieux sees the scope of his role in the negotiation talks restricted to "working out the modalities of the six demands" and not to bargaining over new demands, he breaks off discussions with Demers. At a press conference, he announces, that in light of the governments' counter-proposal his mandate is over, and without a new mandate from the FLQ he could not meet with Demers again (Canadian News Facts, 1970:vol.4:518).

In Ottawa, the federal cabinet discusses urgent messages received from Montreal and Quebec concerning the "deteriorating" situation in Montreal. The cabinet also considers an appeal for extraordinary measures to augment the effectiveness of normal police powers to manage the kidnapping crisis. This appeal centers on complaints made by law enforcement officials throughout Quebec, that their resources are being taxed to the limit.

In the House of Commons, Robert Stanfield, the leader of the Opposition, presses Prime Minister Trudeau for assurance that he would not invoke emergency police powers without the consent of Parliament. Trudeau responds by saying that "...if such action were ever contemplated it would certainly be
discussed in the House of Commons. Whether it would be immediately before or immediately after would depend, of course..." (Saywell, 1971:78). Also in the nation's capital, the minister responsible for the post office and representatives for the former Lapalme truck drivers resumes talks regarding the reinstatement of the laid off workers.

In his daily newspaper column, Rene Levesque, the leader of the Parti Quebecois, exhorts the provincial government to comply with the demands set by the FLQ in order to save the lives of the two hostages. His commentary also criticizes the stand taken by the Bourassa administration claiming that it has been dictated by Ottawa. Levesque also pleads with the kidnappers to abandon their violent efforts and to work for Quebec independence through democratic mechanisms (Stewart, 1970:69).

Wednesday, October 14

In the late morning, the Liberation and Chenier cells issue a joint communiqué which answers Lemieux's request for a new mandate. First, the two cells unequivocally refuse the government's counter-proposal to have a member from each cell serve as a hostage, but they accept Lemieux's suggestion to have the political prisoners and ransom held by either the Cuban or Algerian government until Cross and Laporte are freed. Second, they seriously question the goodwill of the authorities, in light of the searches, raids and arrests being carried out by
the police. Third, they renew Lemieux's mandate by giving him carte blanche to negotiate. And fourth, they ask him to report publicly the results of further negotiations, after which they will communicate their position (Saywell, 1971:75).

Concerned that the Bourassa government is being dictated by Ottawa's hardline position, sixteen influential French Canadians meet to discuss what they believe is a serious intrusion on Quebec's social and political organization (Stewart, 1970:69). Included in this group are Claude Ryan, the editor of Le Devoir and Rene Levesque, the leader of the Parti Quebecois. In a joint statement read at a news conference Wednesday evening, these individuals call upon the Quebec government to negotiate with the FLQ in order to save the lives of Cross and Laporte. They also express bitter resentment over Ottawa's direct involvement in, and remarks made by Premier Robarts of Ontario about, an exclusively Quebec matter. Earlier that day, Robarts declared that the kidnapping situation in Montreal was tantamount to "total war" and "if thousands died in past wars, then the lives of the two hostages would be a small price to pay for law and order" (Canadian News Fact, 1970:vol.4:519).15

15The full text of this statement and a list of its signatories is found in Saywell, 1971:77-78.

16Not long after this joint statement was made public, it was suggested, primarily through the media, that government officials construed the actions of these prominent French Canadians as an attempt to remove Bourassa from office and replace him with a provisional administration in Quebec. According to an article first appearing in the Toronto Star on October 26, the Trudeau government was convinced that these individuals were moving to supplant the existing provincial government with their own interim administration (Saywell,
That evening, Lemieux, along with several other prominent members of Quebec's separatist movement address a student rally at the University of Montreal. He speaks in support of a general strike by university and college students.

Thursday, October 15

Because of the tense situation in Quebec, Prime Minister Trudeau cancels his planned visit to the Soviet Union, which was to begin Sunday. Also in Ottawa, discussions between representatives of the Post Office and the Lapalme truck drivers are postponed indefinitely.

That afternoon, Premier Bourassa complies with the request for outside assistance by both the Montreal and Quebec police forces. Under the civil power clause of the National Defense Act, the premier calls on the Canadian Army to assure "the safety of the people and public buildings" of Quebec (Canadian News Facts, 1970:519). Immediately after the request is made, more than one thousand armed soldiers take up positions in and around public buildings in Montreal, Quebec City and other strategic points in the province. Bourassa places both army and police personnel under the command of Maurice Saint-Pierre, the

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16 (cont'd) 1971:145-146). Apparently, these suspicions furthered the government's belief regarding the existence of a detailed revolutionary plan designed to bring Quebec under the rule of the FLQ (Gellner, 1974:115-116; Haggart and Golden, 1971:173). More is said on this alleged plan below.
Director of the Quebec Provincial police.

Throughout the day, Ottawa and Quebec work out their final reply to the kidnappers demands. At nine o'clock that evening Bourassa issues a short statement claiming the government will not comply with the terms put forth for the release of Cross and Laporte. In the address he asks that either the International Red Cross or the Cuban Consulate in Montreal serve as intermediary between the FLQ and the authorities. Although the government refuses to release all 23 "political prisoners", it does promise to release five jailed members of the FLQ who are eligible for parole. Finally, the kidnappers themselves are offered safe conduct out of Canada to the country of their choice. Their reply is demanded within six hours.

Robert Lemieux describes Bourassa's statement as an incredible mockery and asks the government to reconsider its position. He also states that, in light of the government's stance, his mandate is over. Later that night, Lemieux becomes a principal speaker at a mass rally in support of the FLQ held at the Montreal civic arena. Many of the two to three thousand people in attendance are students. Earlier that day student demonstrations forced the closure of several university and college campuses in the city.
Friday, October 16

The 3 a.m. deadline set by Bourassa passes without word from the FLQ. Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Trudeau receives three letters from the Premier of Quebec, Montreal civic leaders and the Director of police in Quebec formally asking the federal government to legislate extraordinary measures to control the subversive violence in Montreal. Having anticipated this request, the Governor-General in Council (the federal cabinet) proclaims the War Measures Act (WMA) at 4 o'clock that morning. Invoked only during both World Wars, this marks the first time that the WMA is proclaimed in time of peace.17

Using the sweeping authority conferred upon it under the WMA, the cabinet moves to outlaw the FLQ and other subversive movements in the country. Under Sections Three and Four, 

17 The WMA is emergency legislation empowering the federal cabinet to proclaim, rather arbitrarily, that a state of "war, invasion or insurrection, real or apprehended" exists in the country. Once this proclamation has been made, the cabinet can, without having to consult Parliament, enact laws which relate to "anything it deems necessary or advisable for the security, defence, peace, order and welfare of Canada." It also provides for the cabinet to prescribe penalties for any violations of the orders and regulations its may make under the Act, with any combination of fines up to $5,000 and five years imprisonment. The government must, however, inform Parliament of the proclamation at the earliest opportunity. Any ten members of the Commons or Senate can force debate and vote on the proclamation, with majorities in both the upper and lower chambers of government forcing the Act to be revoked (Canadian News Facts, 1970:525-526).
membership or association with the FLQ or any other organization that advocates the use of force or the commission of crime as a means of effecting governmental change becomes an indictable offence, including past membership. In addition, any action which might, in any way, promote or contribute favourably to such organizations, if only to speak in support of their goals or principles, is made an offence in Canada. Under the Act, the police are empowered to search premises and to arrest individuals without a warrant and to detain them for up to twenty-one days without charge and without setting a trial for ninety days.

Immediately after its proclamation, the Quebec and Montreal police forces stage a series of predawn raids throughout the province. Within hours, almost two hundred and fifty people, including Robert Lemieux, are arrested. Many of these people simply disappear, without friends or relatives being informed of there whereabouts. Over the next few days, more than four hundred individuals will be picked-up and jailed and hundreds of homes and offices will be searched and personal material confiscated.

Later that morning, Prime Minister Trudeau informs Parliament of his government's course of action and tables the orders and regulations it has made under the WMA. Although he expresses concern over the suspension of civil liberties in the country, the Prime Minister forcefully argues that the urgency of the situation in Quebec necessitated invocation of these
emergency measures.

...In recent years we have been forced to acknowledge the existence within Canada of a new and terrifying type of person one who in earlier times would have been described as an anarchist, but is now known as a violent revolutionary.

These persons allege that they are seeking social change through novel means. In fact they are seeking the destruction of the social order through clandestine and violent means.

Faced with such persons, and confronted with authoritative assessments of the seriousness of the risk to persons and property in the Montreal area the government had no responsible choice but to act as it did last night. Given the rapid deterioration of the situation as mentioned by Prime Minister Bourassa, and given the expiration of the time offered for the release of the hostages, it became obvious that the urgency of the situation demanded rapid action (Canadian News Facts, 1970:525).

In the debate which follows, opposition leader Robert Stanfield concurs with the Prime Minister that the situation in Quebec warrants the legislation of special measures. He contends, however, that the action taken by the government is far too excessive. T.C. Douglas, leader of the New Democratic Party, is more critical of the government's decision to invoke the WMA, stating that it has overreacted to the events in Montreal and "is using a sledgehammer to crack a peanut" (Canadian News Facts, 1970:525). Jean Marchand, one of the most influential French Canadians in the cabinet, defends the government's policy by outlining, what is believed to be, the impending threat posed by the FLQ. He describes the FLQ as armed terrorists with thousands of rifles and machineguns and enough

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18The entire text of Prime Minister Trudeau's statement in the House of Commons is found in Canadian News Facts, 1970:525-526.
dynamite to blow up the heart of Montreal. More distressing for Marchand is his belief that members of the FLQ have infiltrated key posts in Quebec society (Stewart, 1970:75). 19

That afternoon, Premier Bourassa accepts full responsibility for the decision to invoke the WMA. At a press conference, he explains that the primary reason underlying his government's request for these emergency measures rests on the belief that the current violence in Quebec is really part of a coordinated revolutionary scheme, led by the FLQ, to destroy the country. He states, that the two kidnappings represent the third stage of a four-point plan based on protracted and escalating violence. The first stage of this plan involves public demonstrations, followed by random bombings, then progressing to spectacular kidnappings. Bourassa claims that because selective assassinations and the risk of anarchy are part of the fourth and next stage of the FLQ's plan, it was necessary to act firmly and quickly (Saywell, 1971:92). 20

Friday evening in a televised address to the nation, Prime Minister Trudeau informs Canadians about the government's decision to proclaim the WMA. He admits that he finds the

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20 Speculation about this four-point plan was first made by Lucien Saulnier before a Special House of Commons Committee in November, 1969. For an interesting discussion of Saulnier's theory and the extent to which it influenced the government's decision to invoke the WMA, see Haggart and Golden, 1971:149-169.
measures distasteful, but claims that they are necessary if the
government is to "deal effectively with the nebulous, yet,
dangerous challenge to society represented by terrorist
organizations." Trudeau also declares that his government
adopted these harsh measures in order "...to make clear to
kidnappers, revolutionaries and assassins that in this country
laws are made and changed by the elected representatives of all
Canadians, not by a handful of self-styled dictators." (Canadian

Saturday, October 17

At ten in the morning, the Liberation cell, which is
holding James Cross, issues its tenth communique and a personal
letter from Cross to his wife. Both the letter and communique
are suppressed by the authorities and not made public. The
Liberation cell states that the death sentence against Cross has
been suspended indefinitely and that he would be executed only
if the police discovered his whereabouts. The document also
states that the fate of Mr. Laporte is being studied by the
Chenier cell and its decision would be known shortly.

21The complete text of Prime Minister Trudeau's statement is
found in Canadian News Facts, 1970:527-528.

22It has been suggested that the Liberation cell intended this
communique to serve as a signal to the other FLQ cell not to
kill Laporte. Because this document was not released to the
media, the Chenier group did not receive this message (Saywell,
Additionally, Cross' abductors call upon all other FLQ cells to undermine the intransigence of the "fascist authorities" by "going into action."

At 7 o'clock, an anonymous telephone caller informs radio station CKAC, that a "package" has been left at the St. Hubert military air field. Considered a hoax, no action is taken. Later, a second call is made repeating the message. A third call, at approximately 9:30, leads a radio reporter to the location of another FLQ document. This communiqué announces that,

In face of the arrogance of the federal government and its lackey Bourassa, in the face of their obvious bad faith, the FLQ has therefore decided to act. Pierre Laporte, minister of unemployment and assimilation, has been executed at 6:18 tonight by the Dieppe cell (Royal 22nd) (Saywell, 1971:101).

The message also informs the authorities that the body can be found in the trunk of a car at the St. Hubert airport. An hour later, the same reporter notifies the police that he has discovered the automobile used to abduct Laporte. Suspecting it to be wired with explosives, the bomb squad is summoned to open the trunk, a process that will extend into the next day.

Unaware of the events taking place at the St. Hubert airfield, Premier Bourassa makes another televised appeal to the FLQ kidnappers offering them asylum in Cuba should they decide to release their two hostages. He also informs both cells that the Cuban government has agreed to accept them on humanitarian grounds and the procedural arrangements have been worked out for the changeover.
Sunday, October 18

At about 12:30 Sunday morning, bomb experts finally open the trunk of the car discovered at St. Hubert and find the body of Pierre Laporte. Although the exact circumstances around his death are still unclear, it will be determined in the official autopsy, that Laporte died of asphyxiation. More specifically, his death was caused by a twisting force applied to the chain from behind his neck.²³ Laporte's body will lie in state, in Montreal, until the funeral ceremonies on Tuesday.

The news of Laporte's death reaches Ottawa immediately, but is accompanied by rumors that a second body has been found.

Sunday morning, in a brief and sombre statement, Prime Minister

²³Although more than thirteen years have elapsed, it has yet to be established who actually killed Pierre Laporte. According to the Duchaine Commission, Paul Rose, one of the members of the Chenier cell who was eventually convicted of murdering Laporte, was not present when the murder took place ("Rose Not at Laporte Killing, October Crisis Report Says," The Vancouver Sun, October 9, 1980:B3). In his provocative book ,The Assassination of Pierre Laporte, Pierre Vaillieres canvasses the possibility of Laporte being killed by the underworld, political opponents in the Liberal Party and the police. He ultimately concludes that the political authorities murdered Laporte as part of a carefully planned and staged event to destroy not the FLQ, but the Parti Quebeocois.

In addition to the mystery surrounding the killer(s) of Laporte, it is still unknown whether his death was intentional or accidental. According to the Duchaine report, Laporte's death was unintentional. The commission concluded that Laporte died as a result of the action taken by FLQ members trying to prevent him from escaping through a window and not some cold-blooded execution. Apparently, the force used in grabbing Laporte by the collar of his sweater (including his chain), was sufficient to cause his death (The Vancouver Sun, October 9, 1980:B3).
Trudeau expresses his shock and outrage over what has happened in Montreal. He describes Laporte's death as a "cruel and senseless act" carried out "by a band of murderers" (Saywell, 1971:103). Similar sentiments are echoed by Premier Bourassa later that afternoon. He claims that Laporte was a "victim of hatred, terrifying hatred that Quebecers have not experienced before." The Premier also reiterates his earlier offer of safe passage to Cuba to Cross' captors in exchange for their hostage (Stewart, 1970:77).

Rumours concerning Cross' execution are quickly dispelled when a reassuring letter is received from Cross latter that afternoon. Suspecting Paul Rose and Marc Carbonneau as principals in the kidnappings, police issue nation-wide warrants for their arrests.

At 11 o'clock that evening, Prime Minister Trudeau tells the nation, with stoical calm, that those responsible for Laporte's death,

...will be found and will be dealt with in the calm and dispassionate atmosphere of Canadian courts. The FLQ has sown the seeds of its own destruction. It has no mandate but terror, no policies but violence and no solutions but murder. Savagery is alien to Canadians; it always will be for collectively we will not tolerate it (Canadian News Facts, 1970:528).

Monday, October 19

Public assistance leads the police to the house where Pierre Laporte was held during his captivity. Among the evidence
discovered in the house are samples of Laporte's blood, fingerprints of known FLQ members and a pillow matching the one found with Laporte's body in the trunk of the car.

In Ottawa, the House of Commons overwhelmingly approves the WMA by a vote of 190 to 16. Only the New Democratic Party, save for four of its members who break ranks, vote against the emergency measures on the grounds that they seriously abrogate civil rights and freedoms in Canada.

October 21 - December 27

Over the next ten weeks, events leading to the conclusion of the Cross-Laporte Affair unfold rather slowly.

On October 27, police issue arrest warrants for three more FLQ members they suspect are responsible for the kidnappings and murder; Jacques Rose, Francis Simard and Bernard Lortie. Four days later, the authorities receive a joint communiqué from the Chenier, Liberation and Dieppe cells which is intended to "clarify several items of information regarding the ideas and intentions" of the FLQ (Saywell, 1971:121). No mention of Cross' release is made in the text of the communiqué. Accompanying this rhetorical tract, is a portion of Paul Rose's passport, bearing his photograph. Like all FLQ communiqués after the invocation of the WMA, this one is suppressed by the police.

In early November, the federal and provincial governments offer a reward totalling $150,000 for information leading to the
arrest and conviction of the kidnappers. On November 4, the
Liberation cell releases pictures of Cross playing cards while
sitting on a box of dynamite. Again no mention is made of Cross'
possible release. Two days later, police raid a Montreal
apartment where members of the Chenier cell have been hiding
since Laporte's death. The raid nets Bernard Lortie, but Jacques
and Paul Rose and Francis Simard, who are also in the apartment,
elude the police by hiding in a concealed compartment in the
closet. A communique sent a week later by the Chenier cell,
describes the escape and ridicules the authorities for allowing
it to take place. Three days after his arrest, Lortie appears
before a Coroner's inquest investigating Laporte's death. Here,
he recounts his involvement in the abduction, but claims that he
was not present when the cabinet minister was killed. He also
states that he has no personal knowledge of the Cross
kidnapping.

On November 21, another FLQ communique is sent to two
Montreal newspapers. Enclosed are two letters from James Cross.
One is addressed to his wife, the other to the authorities. The
communique itself, complains of government torture, searches,
arrests and censorship and calls upon the United Nations to act
as intermediary between the FLQ and the Canadian government.
Cross' letter assures "those who are interested (if there are
still some)" that he is in good health and being treated well
(Saywell, 1971:124). Spelling and grammatical errors in the
letter lead the police to surmise that it was dictated to Cross
by his captors.

Extensive police surveillance of suspected FLQ members results in the arrest of Louise and Jacques Cossette-Trudel on December 2. Later that day, police discover the apartment in North Montreal where Cross is being held. By morning security forces evacuate the building and cordon off the area to pedestrian and vehicular traffic. Realizing that they have been discovered, the kidnappers toss out a note offering to negotiate Cross' release. Jacques Lanctot, Yves Langlois and Marc Carbonneau finally accept passage to Cuba for themselves, the Cossette-Trudels and Lanctot's wife and child in exchange for the British diplomat. Cross is eventually released by Cuban officials, who are holding him at the Man and His World Pavilion at Expo 67, shortly after the military aircraft transporting the kidnappers arrives in Cuba.

On December 3, Royal assent is given to the Public Order Temporary Measures Act, legislation replacing the WMA. Although the new Act reduces the some of the powers granted under the old legislation, it continues to provide for search without warrant, detention without bail and arrest without charge. Overall, the regulations made under the Public Order Act follow closely those

24This pavilion was declared an extension of Cuban territory for purposes of resolving the kidnapping. For a more comprehensive review of the negotiations between the FLQ and the government climaxing in Cross' eventual release, see Canadian News Facts, 1970:553.
legislated under the WMA.25

Finally, on December 27, police raided, for the second time in three days, a farm house, in outside of Montreal. It has been under observation since October. In this second assault, Jacques and Paul Rose and Francis Simard surrendered to the authorities from a tunnel constructed under the furnace in the basement.

Summary

This chapter has provided a chronological overview of the October crisis of 1970. It has identified many aspects of the Cross-Laporte Affair which have been extensively documented in various literature.

Having outlined the FLQ crisis, it is now possible to examine more closely perceptions of the media's role during the hostage drama in the next chapter.

25 For a brief comparative analysis of the provisions made under the WMA and latter under the Public Order Act, see Canadian News Facts, 1970:537.
VI. THE MEDIA DURING THE PLQ CRISIS

When a political crisis\(^1\) affects an entire nation, it is often followed by a period of exegesis; a time when questions are raised and critical judgements made about the principal actors in the drama. Given that the PLQ crisis sent shock-waves all across the country, it should be of no surprise, then, that the political kidnappings in 1970 became the focus of intense discussion and examination.\(^2\)

One aspect of the Cross-Laporte abductions that has attracted considerable attention is the media's involvement in this set of events. Generating much of this interest is the fact that the media served as the primary purveyors of information on, and commentary about, the October crisis for most Canadians.

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\(^1\)The term "crisis" has been used in a number of disparate ways by social scientists. Daniel Latouche, however, provides a manageable definition of the concept which will be used in this thesis. According to Latouche a crisis situation exists when the following four elements are present: (1) a threat which is perceived to imperil the status quo; (2) a restricted period of time to formulate and implement a response to the threat; (3) an element of surprise in the action; and (4) an escalating level of risks which could lead to either an outbreak of violence or a breakdown in the political system (Latouche, 1972:374-375). A similar definition of "crisis" is found in Siegel, 1974:23-27. Moreover, both Latouche and Siegel contend that these four elements characterized the events surrounding the abductions of Cross and Laporte in October, 1970.

\(^2\)The PLQ crisis has persisted as a "hot" political issue, in large part, because of the uncertainty and mystery surrounding many aspects of the crisis. Several of the unanswered questions regarding the Cross-Laporte Affair were raised in the preceding chapter; see pp.169-170.
Additional interest has been created by the media's direct involvement in the dynamics of the FLQ kidnappings.

In this chapter, the role played by the media during the Cross-Laporte Affair is examined in relation to earlier conceptual and theoretical discussions about the relationship between the media and terrorism. More specifically, aspects of the FLQ crisis are used to illustrate perceptions of the media's association with terrorism which were outlined in Chapters III and IV. It should be noted, that this chapter is not intended as an empirical assessment of these perceptions. Rather, its sole purpose is illustrative.

This chapter consists of two distinct parts. In the first section, the assertion that the media assume a key strategic and tactical role during terrorist incidents is exemplified. Several media-related aspects of the FLQ crisis are used to illustrate how the communication system in Quebec can be perceived as a major player in the October drama and key element in the tactical strategies of both the kidnappers and the authorities.

The second part of this chapter illustrates how the consensus and conflict models of society provide alternative conceptions of the theoretical relationship between the media and terrorism. This illustration begins by providing a descriptive account of Canadian newspaper coverage of the October crisis. An analysis of this data, from both the consensus and conflict perspectives will illustrate how these models give rise to fundamentally different ways of interpreting
and understanding the theoretical role of the media during the FLQ crisis.

**Media as the Center of the Crisis**

It was noted in Chapter III of this thesis, that most political analysts regard media publicity as a key strategic goal of contemporary terrorists. Central to this contention is a conception of political terrorism as a form of violent symbolic communication. From this perspective, political terrorism is defined violence or the threat of violence which is used to achieve a power outcome from a target, other than those who are directly victimized. Stated differently, the primary target of a terrorist act is considered to be that segment of the population which is symbolically represented by the immediate victims or targets of these acts. Because these violent acts are seen to fall short of producing the intended social impact, politically motivated terrorists are believed to rely on the mass media as a conduit for transmitting their terror-inspiring message to the audience they wish to reach.

Based on the perception that terrorism needs publicity to be effective, many political analysts claim that contemporary insurgent terrorists carefully choreograph their actions and structure negotiations with the authorities, to ensure optimal media exposure and maximum audience attention. They also contend that the media, in the course of reporting terrorist events,
promote the terrorists' strategic objectives and encourage further acts of terror-violence. At an operational level, law enforcement officials complain that over-zealous media personnel often interfere with police efforts to effectively manage terrorist situations.

The October crisis of 1970 allows for an illustration of these general views regarding the media and terrorism. This is largely because the media served as the primary communication link between the principal actors in the Cross-Laporte Affair. In this sense, control of the communication system in Quebec can be seen as a critical tactical objective for both the PLQ and the authorities (Latouche, 1972:377).

The Strategic Importance of the Media For the FLQ

While the FLQ's ultimate political objective was the formation of an independent socialist Quebec state, one of their more immediate goals was the arousal of a revolutionary consciousness within the Quebecois community. As noted above, their violent tactics were intended to be exemplary in nature, demonstrating to Francophones that their fate was in their own hands and that they had the power to shape their destiny.

In this context, FLQ violence can be seen as a form symbolic communication. More specifically, FLQ bombing strikes, bank robberies, dynamite thefts and political kidnappings were constituent parts of a revolutionary message calling on
Francophones in Quebec to participate in the creation of an independent French state.

Because these violent acts, in themselves, fell short of reaching their wider audience, publicity would be perceived as an immediate strategic goal of the FLQ. In other words, without the amplification of their violent actions, the FLQ would have failed to achieve its intended publicity impact.

In this light, accessing and manipulating the media would be regarded as important tactical goals of the kidnappers. By maximizing the media's role in their strategy, the FLQ would gain widespread attention for their actions, but more importantly, they would have their revolutionary message reach its intended audience. According to one FLQ member, the success of staging a political abduction was contingent, in part, on the ability to manipulate media attention. This view appeared in the Victoire, the official voice of the FLQ, when it was claimed that,

...the kidnapping in due form of an important personage with ransom as the key...could have certain results, provided the personage in question was not harmed by his kidnappers and all publicity around this exploit was skilfully handled" (cited in Pelletier, 1970:110) [emphasis added].

If media involvement was a primary goal of the FLQ, then, much of their action can be construed as attempts to draw the media in Quebec into the center of the hostage drama. Two distinct aspects of the FLQ's position lend themselves to this interpretation. One relates to the kidnappers' use of the communication systems in Quebec, especially the radio medium, as
an intermediary between themselves and the governments. A second centers on specific media-related demands which were established as preconditions for the safe release of their hostages.

Throughout the crisis, the FLQ succeeded in imposing their strategy of communication upon the authorities by eschewing direct negotiations and having all communications between them and the authorities conducted through the media. As noted in the previous chapter, the kidnappers used two Montreal radio stations, CKAC and CKLM, as mail boxes for their communiqués. In fact, most messages sent by the FLQ were either discovered by staff members of these two radio stations, acting on instructions received from an anonymous telephone caller, or they were delivered directly to one of the stations, usually by a taxi driver. By directly involving the media in this way, the kidnappers were able to assume a dominant position in discussions with the authorities. Because they initiated and set the terms of dialogue throughout the crisis, the FLQ were able to create the impression, valid or not, that the governments were responding to their demands, and not vice versa (Latouche, 1972:378). The apparent success of this strategy is reflected in the fact that all FLQ communiqués, before the invocation of the WMA on October 16, were often published immediately and uncensored. More is said below on how the WMA affected media coverage of the crisis.

One immediate consequence of the FLQ's strategy to use two radio stations as depositories for their communiqués was, that
it catapulted the media into an intermediary role between the government and the kidnappers. Because the authorities could not negotiate directly with the FLQ they were forced to use the media as a communicative channel with the abductors. Many of the scheduled press conferences held by government spokespersons during the crisis were, essentially, official communiques to the two FLQ cells outlining the authorities' position regarding the kidnappers' demands.

Although the authorities were forced into communicating indirectly with the kidnappers, they did use the communication systems as a critical component in their strategy to handle the kidnapping crisis. Through the media, the government kept the FLQ "talking" in an effort to gain time in the negotiations and to learn more about Cross' and Laporte's abductors. This strategy rested on the belief that protracted discussions increased the likelihood of the FLQ making a mistake which would lead to the rescue of the two hostages (Latouche, 1972:378).

In addition to facilitating discussion with the FLQ, the media also furnished the government with an avenue to communicate with the hostages. For instance, on October 9 the authorities wanting some assurance that Cross was still alive, requested, through the media, that he personally write a prescribed letter. That letter was received the following day.

Aside from publicizing the FLQ's actions and communiques, the media also served as a channel of communications between the kidnappers and their intermediary, Robert Lemieux, and between
the Chenier and Liberation cells, themselves. While it was possible that the FLQ communicated directly with Lemieux, it was clearly evident that they provided him with explicit instructions and guidance through their publicized messages. At the same time, Lemieux was successfully communicating with his clients through the media. He accomplished this, primarily through press conferences which attracted extensive coverage by the electronic media. During these press conferences Lemieux was able to inform the kidnappers about the governments' actions and developments taking place at the negotiation table. A clear example of how the abductors and their spokesperson used the media to communicate with each other occurred on October 13, when talks between Robert Demers and Lemieux broke down. At this time, the FLQ negotiator stated he did not have a mandate to negotiate the conditions for the release of Cross and Laporte. In a news conference televised that evening, Lemieux informed the kidnappers of this development and requested instructions regarding his next course of action. In a joint communiqué sent the following day, both FLQ cells responded to Lemieux's request for a renewed mandate by instructing him that he had carte blanche to negotiate on their behalf.

In addition to the mode of communications they imposed upon the authorities, the FLQ also attempted to coerce media involvement in the crisis through the demands they established for the safe release of their hostages. Of the seven conditions initially set out for Cross' freedom, three specifically
implicated the media. For example, the FLQ's demand to have their political manifesto published and broadcasted required the direct involvement of both the print and electronic communication systems in Quebec. Not only was the manifesto to appear in full, on the front page of all major newspapers in the province, but it was also to be read and commented on by the "political prisoners" in a televised broadcast, lasting no less than thirty minutes and aired between 8:00 and 11:00 p.m. on the French arm of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.

The FLQ also attempted to draw the media into the crisis by demanding that at least two political reporters of two French Quebec newspapers accompany the released "political prisoners" on their trip to Cuba or Algeria. In their demand to have the dismissed Lapalme truck drivers reinstated, the FLQ also insisted that all meetings concerning this matter be held in public and in the presence of journalists.

In addition to coercing media involvement in the Cross-Laporte abductions, the abductors also attempted to solicit the assistance of Quebec journalists in publicizing FLQ messages. Anticipating the suppression of their communiques, the Liberation cell, in their second communiqué, contained an explicit appeal for news reporters to actively make public their communiques,

We call upon upon your cooperation as media agents to break the wall of silence that the fascist police have erected around the operation by systematically stealing all the communiques and our manifesto which were destined to the various information media. (Saywell, 1971: 36)
Government and Professional Criticism of the Media's Role

Given the principal role played by the Canadian news media in the crisis, it should not be surprising that the nature and scope of this involvement were subjects of extensive analysis and trenchant criticism, both during and after the events of 1970. While individuals within communication systems criticized the manner in which the media participated in the hostage drama, severest censure came from government and law enforcement officials who saw the media's actions as exacerbating the crisis situation. Four related, but slightly different aspects of the media's involvement formed the basis of this perception:

1. By providing "excessive" coverage of the FLQ's actions the media were playing into the terrorists' hands.

2. By abusing their role as intermediary between the kidnappers and the authorities, the two Montreal radio stations seriously impaired the governments' efforts to solve the Cross-Laporte abductions.

3. By broadcasting rumours the media contributed to the seriousness of the crisis.

4. By expressing views which dissented from government action, the media were undermining public support for government
policy, at a time when this support was most needed.  

From the point of view of the authorities, the extensive coverage afforded the hostage incidents by the media was exactly what the FLQ wanted. Because government officials saw exploitation of the media as the kidnappers’ primary strategic objective, they were quick to condemn the press for what they considered to be unrestrained and excessive attention for the FLQ’s actions. Illustrating the government’s critical view of the media during the crisis are the comments made by Prime Minister Trudeau to news reporters as he entered the House of Commons on October 13. The Prime Minister’s remarks concerning the role of the media during the crisis are in response to questions posed by Peter Reilly.

Reilly: ...You seem to be thinking, in your statement in the House this morning - you seemed to be saying that you thought the press had been less than responsible in its coverage of this story so far. Could you elaborate on that?

Trudeau: Not less than responsible. I was suggesting that they should perhaps use a bit more restraint which you’re not doing know - you’re going to make a big news item of this I am sure.

Reilly: Well, the papers - it is a big a news item.

Trudeau: Yes, but the main thing that the FLQ is trying to gain from this is a hell of a lot of publicity for the movement.

Reilly: A recognition.

Trudeau: Yes and I am suggesting that the more recognition you give to them the greater the victory is, and I’m not interested in giving them a victory (Saywell, 1971:72).

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3Points 2, 3 and 4 are drawn from Ayotte’s (1972) analysis of the media’s involvement during the October crisis.
Several observers expressed similar views about the FLQ's calculated use of the media appeared in the press during the October crisis. While most commentators did not go so far as to indict the media for allowing themselves to be manipulated by the FLQ, they did note the strategic importance of media publicity for the kidnappers. For example, Marshall McLuhan, in a letter to the Toronto Daily Star, argued that contemporary revolutionaries maintain a superordinate position over the authorities because they have a better idea of how to manipulate public opinion. McLuhan concluded by stating that "as long as the FLQ get coverage, it can win" (cited in Stewart, 1970:3). A similar view about the events in Montreal appeared in The Economist, "...once the hostage has been grabbed, the guerrillas know that television and the newspapers will do the work for them if they remain uncaught" (cited in Stewart, 1970:3).

In addition to the widespread publicity the media were affording the FLQ, government and law enforcement officials also leveled sharp criticism at Montreal radio stations CKAC and CKLM for acting in a manner which was not in the "public's best interests." The police, in particular, charged these radio stations with interfering in their attempts to deal with the kidnappings. More specifically, they claimed that the manner in which media personnel handled and copied FLQ documents seriously undermined their investigative efforts. For instance, the practice of allowing several people to handle the communiques before they were turned over to the police, often eliminated the
opportunity to uncover useful evidence, such as fingerprints. Incensing the authorities even more, was the policy of both radio stations to broadcast the FLQ's messages before their contents were known to government and law enforcement officials. According to the police, this practice not only guaranteed the FLQ the publicity they were after, but it also seriously restricted the authorities' flexibility in dealing with the kidnappers. Unauthorized publication of the FLQ's tracts by these radio stations, forced the authorities into a position where they could not ignore the kidnappers' demands. In other words, the governments could not "buy time" by acting as though they were unaware of the kidnappers' demands. Once the communiques were published, they were compelled to act. In addition, publication of the FLQ's communiques by the two Montreal radio stations effectively eliminated publicity, as a bargaining instrument that could be used by the authorities in negotiating for the safe release of Cross and Laporte.

The media were also criticized, both during and after the crisis, for their "less than responsible" handling of unsubstantiated and inflammatory rumours. Government officials and journalists, alike, argued that by disseminating unconfirmed information the media contributed immensely to the state of panic and insecurity during the FLQ crisis (Lapierre, 1970:11).

A clear example of how misreporting by the media served to amplify social apprehension over the crisis occurred on October 16, the day Mr. Laporte's body was found. At this time, several
television and radio stations announced that Mr. Cross had also been executed and his body located. It does not require much imagination to appreciate how the media's speculation about Cross' death intensified the suspense and horror created by Laporte's death. This information must have been especially terrifying, for both Cross and his family. The anxiety which was created by the publication of this rumor intensified throughout the day, until a reassuring letter was received from the British diplomat.

Even before this unfortunate incident, it was apparent to several commentators within the news industry, that media coverage of the kidnappings tended to be over-dramatic and exaggerated. For instance, as early as October 12, an editorial in the Toronto Telegram stated that media reports were conveying not only news information, but also hearsay, speculation and prejudice. The editorialist was particularly critical of the televised street interviews, which in his opinion, only served to publicize hysterical views of the crisis. On this point he wrote,

Then there were the street interviews, those instant views tossed out by the passerby. One rather wild-looking woman in Montreal predicted darkly: 'By the time winter comes, there will be blood running in the snow' (cited in Ayotte, 1972:85).

From the authorities' point of view, the broadcasting of such inflammatory opinions did little to counter the furor surrounding the kidnappings. Speculation by the media, according to state officials, tended to create the illusion that the
terrorists were stronger than they actually were. It was also seen to seriously undermine public confidence in the government. The "provisional government plot" theory, discussed in the previous chapter, is a case in point. What sparked the notion that a group of prominent Quebeckers were planning to replace the Bourassa administration was an article appearing in the Toronto Daily Star on Monday, October 26. While political officials did not publicly censure the media for printing the story, it was later discredited as a gross distortion of some very innocent telephone calls between several politicians, journalists, scholars, and labour leaders in Quebec (Ayotte, 1972:89-91).4

Elements of Canada's news media also came under fire for the opposition and criticism they mounted against government policies during the Cross-Laporte kidnappings. While the predominant position taken by the press appears to have been one of overwhelming support for the stand taken by political leaders, several journalists questioned and criticized the course of action taken by the various governments during the crisis. For those who supported the government's policies, media criticism of the governments' actions only served to undermine Canadian political unity, at a time when consensus was believed

4Claude Ryan, the editor of the Le Devoir during the October crisis, has stated that the provisional government story was planted in the press by some highly-placed individuals in Ottawa to destroy his credibility in English Canada. If he is correct, then this would partially explain why the government did not criticize the media for reporting this particular unsubstantiated rumour (Fournier, 1970:5).
to be most needed. Because they were seen as popularizing dissident opinions, the media were perceived as a threat to the integrity and stability of Canadian society. The Quebec newspaper *Le Devoir*, for instance, was severely rebuked for advocating an editorial position which differed from the governments' policies. From the outset, *Le Devoir* urged public officials to seek a negotiated solution to the kidnappings; a view which clearly ran counter to the "hardline" position taken by the authorities (*Fournier, 1970:5*).

Harsh criticism was especially directed against those journalists who denounced the government's decisions to call in the army, and later, to invoke the WMA, as means of combating the perceived terrorist threat in Montreal. In the heated exchange with news reporters in front of the House of Commons, cited above, the Prime Minister lashed out at those people, including those inside the media, who criticized his administration's decision to call in military personnel to protect public officials and buildings, by characterizing them as "bleeding hearts" and "weak-kneed people." "All I can say", he stated, "is go on and bleed. But it's more important to keep law and order in society than to be worried about weak-kneed people who don't like the looks of the army" (*cited in Saywell, 1971:73*).
The Theoretical Significance of Media Coverage of the Crisis

In addition to playing a major communicative role between the principals involved in the Cross-Laporte kidnappings, the mass media also served as the primary purveyor of news information for most Canadians during the October crisis. Thus, most people developed an awareness of, and formulated opinions about the events in Montreal, from reports and commentaries provided through the media. Stated differently, people's conceptions of the October crisis were significantly influenced by what they read in the newspapers, heard on the radio and saw on television.

In this section of the chapter, the theoretical significance of the media's informational role during the FLQ crisis is examined. More specifically, media news coverage of the Cross-Laporte kidnappings is analyzed using the consensus and conflict models outlined in Chapter IV. What emerges from this analysis is that each theoretical perspective provides a distinct way of understanding the "reality" which the English-language newspapers created of the October Crisis.

English Press Coverage of the FLQ Crisis

A composite profile of English-language newspaper coverage of the Cross-Laporte abductions is presented here. Data for this profile is derived primarily from a secondary source. Much of
the following discussion centers on a number of findings emerging out of a comprehensive study conducted by Arthur Siegel (1974) for his Phd. Dissertation titled, *Canadian Newspaper Coverage of the FLQ Crisis: A Study on the Impact of the Press on Politics*. While Siegel examined several interesting aspects of press coverage during the crisis, his primary focus is on his thematic analysis of news and editorial content of a

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5Siegel's study was an attempt to empirically assess the hypothesis, that different population clusters receive significantly different media accounts of the same political events. More specifically, he explored whether such variables as language, region and the size of community affected the political messages and ideas in Canadian newspaper coverage of the FLQ crisis. With respect to the first variable, Siegel described and compared the news and editorial content of the French and English press during the Cross-Laporte abductions along the following four dimensions; space used, geographic source of stories, personalities mentioned and themes emphasized.

Siegel's findings suggest that the French and English press systems, or at least those included in his sample of newspapers, presented significantly different accounts of the same political events. According to his study, they each perceived the crisis in different terms. Further differences were discovered in the issues they emphasized and in the scope of coverage they provided.

It should be noted, that this thesis deals exclusively with English-language press coverage of the October crisis. The decision to exclude the French press' version of the crisis from this discussion was based on two factors. First, the focus of this thesis is theoretical and not cultural. Concomitantly, the discussion and analysis of the English press coverage is specifically intended to illustrate how the consensus and conflict models provide alternative theoretical understandings of the relationship between the media and insurgent terrorism. Second, the author's elementary competence in the French language precluded him from examining French newspaper coverage of the crisis.

A detailed comparative analysis of the ideas and messages communicated by the French and English press systems during the October crisis appears in Chapters II, III and IV of Siegel's dissertation. An interesting discussion of the theoretical and political significance of the variations in English and French press coverage is found in Robinson (1975).
representative national sample of sixteen English newspapers published in 1970.6

In addition to Siegel's work, the author's own examination of four leading English newspapers is used to supplement and amplify several of Siegel's findings. This examination involved a close reading of all news stories and editorials appearing in the Vancouver Sun, the Winnipeg Free Press, the Toronto Globe and Mail and the Montreal Gazette. The time frame of this discussion embraces the first seventeen days of the crisis; from October 5 to October 17, inclusive.7

In order to more fully comprehend the composite picture of Canadian press coverage of the crisis which is outlined in this section, it becomes necessary to make some general remarks about two major components of newspaper content which forms the basis of this profile, namely news information and editorials.

While the news stories concerning the October events contained a variety of information, three general types of information appear to have been the most prevalent. First there

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6Siegel's total study sample consisted of 22 French and English newspapers, selected from a total of 116 papers published across Canada in October 1970. Out of the 22, the following 16 were English-language papers constituted the sample discussed in this chapter: Halifax Chronicle-Herald, Moncton Transcript, Montreal Star, Montreal Gazette, Quebec City Chronicle Telegraph, Sherbrooke Record, Toronto Daily Star, Toronto Globe and Mail, Ottawa Journal, Kitchener-Waterloo Record, Thunder Bay News-Chronicle, Edmonton Journal, Red Deer Advocate, Vancouver Sun, Victoria Colonist and the Prince Rupert Daily News. This list is compiled from Table I in Siegel's study (Siegel, 1974:42).

7Siegel contends that press coverage dropped off dramatically after Pierre Laporte's funeral on October 17 (Siegel, 1974:45).
was descriptive information about the events reported. For example, news stories breaking the Cross and Laporte abductions reported information such as the time and place of the kidnappings, the type of automobile and weapons used and descriptions of those who carried out the abductions.

Another major component of news stories, especially those dealing with political violence, are statements made by government leaders and law enforcement officials. A cursory reading of news stories during the October crisis would reveal that they included a considerable number of statements made by political officials, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, Premier Bourassa, Quebec Justice Minister Choquette and Mayor Drapeau.

Several of Siegel's research findings support this observation. In his analysis of personalities mentioned in press coverage, Siegel found that Trudeau and Bourassa, in conjunction with Laporte and Cross, were by far the most dominant figures cited (Siegel, 1974:55-57; 89-91). Siegel also discovered that of all the official remarks made by the Prime Minister and other government leaders and printed in the English press, 70% received front page attention (Siegel, 1974:75).

A third and less prevalent aspect of news reports, are the views and statements articulated by "experts" in fields related to the story reported. Because of the perceived gravity of the political kidnappings, expert views were highlighted in several special reports or background stories prepared by outside pundits. Many newspapers provided extensive "backgrounding" by
running pieces written by political and legal scholars on such matters as the theoretical underpinnings of terrorism, the ideology of the FLQ and the constitutionality of invoking the WMA. Not unlike editorials, these stories often analyze and contextualize various aspects of FLQ terrorism.

Editorials comprise the second basic component of press coverage which is thematically examined in this section. While the scope and intensity of the commentary varied, newspaper editors all across the country expressed strong views on a broad range of issues relating to the abductions of Cross and Laporte, including: terrorism, the FLQ, Quebec separatism and invocation of the WMA.

In his quantitative analysis of Canadian press coverage, Siegel found that the sixteen English newspapers in his study collectively published 219 editions during the seventeen day timeframe. Of the 71,098 column inches of space devoted to the FLQ crisis, Siegel (1974:73) found that 34% was prepared by regular staff, 28% was obtained from the Canadian Press News Service, 24% consisted of photographs, 4% to other news services such as Southam, United Press International and Reuters, and 3% each to editorials, letters and cartoons and other news sources, such as the New York Times, Gallup material and specially commissioned experts and syndicated columnists.

While each newspaper in Siegel's study provided extensive coverage of the crisis, the amount of news reportage and editorial analysis varied significantly with each paper. Based
on my own analysis of four leading newspapers published in the principal cities of four regions in the country, it appeared that a clear relationship existed between distance from the crisis and the extent of press coverage. More specifically, the Montreal Gazette, which was at the center of the crisis, provided the most extensive news coverage and editorial analysis, followed by the Toronto Globe and Mail, the Winnipeg Free Press and the Vancouver Sun. Siegel, in his more systematic study, also found that the most extensive coverage of the FLQ crisis was provided by the large newspapers in Quebec and Ontario." The stark differences in coverage among these newspapers was particularly evident during the most anxious moments of the crisis, the day following Laporte's abduction. At this time, the Montreal Gazette devoted five full pages the political kidnappings. At the other end of the country, the Vancouver Sun had this story sharing the front page with other domestic and international news items and appearing, intermittently, throughout the first section of paper.

In the course of devoting more coverage to the Cross-Laporte Affair, the two most eastern newspapers provided their respective readerships with a more comprehensive account of the occurrences in Montreal than the newspapers published in Winnipeg and Vancouver. While all four newspapers often reported similar descriptive information, the Gazette, Globe and Mail

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8 For a more comprehensive analysis of how distance may have affected press coverage of the October crisis, see Siegel, 1974:185-222).
and, to a lesser extent, the Free Press, tended to print the entire text of statements made by political officials and FLQ communiques. The Vancouver Sun, on the other hand, tended to publish excerpts. The two eastern newspapers also undertook more extensive analyzes, more often, on more diverse issues relating to the abductions. There were a greater number of "Special Reports", prepared by experts, and more extensive editorial commentary in both the Globe and Mail and Gazette. For instance, very few editorial statements about the kidnappings appeared in the Vancouver Sun's editorial section before October 17.

Meanwhile, both the Montreal and Toronto newspapers commented, almost daily, on the crisis.

In addition to pointing to significant variations in the scope and intensity of news and editorial coverage among English newspapers, Siegel's study also provides insight into the "reality" of the crisis that was constructed by the press. This insight emerges from Siegel's detailed thematic analysis of news and editorial coverage during the first seventeen days of the political kidnappings. Theme labels, such as manhunt, civil rights and negotiations were used to indicate the main thrust of news stories and editorial analyses.

With respect to news stories, Siegel rank ordered the importance of 32 news categories by calculating the mean number of times each theme received front page attention.  

Siegel's theme analysis included the following labels: Background, Canadian Reaction, Civil Rights, Colour-Human Interest, Communiques-letters, Economic, Entertainment, Federal Government Position, Historical, International Aspects,
His theme analysis of newspaper commentaries consisted of three steps. First, he delineated the issues most frequently raised and discussed in editorials. After this, he categorized the attitude expressed by the editorialist on each issue. Additionally, Siegel determined the base theme or the dominant view emphasized in each editorial.

According to Siegel, Manhunt was the most prominent theme of front page news coverage of the October crisis in the English-language press. More specifically, stories which dealt primarily with police efforts to apprehend the abductors and to free the hostages were highlighted most often on the front pages of the newspapers sampled. Closely related to the Manhunt theme were stories stressing Security and the WMA. The former news category included stories dealing primarily with the army's role in maintaining public security, while the latter embraced stories focusing on the the invocation of emergency legislation.

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10 For his theme analysis of editorials Siegel focused on the following 15 issues: Canadian Unity, Quebec Provincial Government, French Canadians, Terrorism, WMA, The Role of the Army in the Crisis, Civil Rights, Federal Government, Negotiations, Separatism, Social or Economic Injustices, PLQ, Mr. Cross, Mr. Laporte, the New Democratic Party (Siegel, 1974:58).

11 For a listing of the base theme classifications, see Siegel, 1974; Appendix F, p. 278.
and the extraordinary powers it conferred upon law enforcement officials to expand the Manhunt and to preserve law and order. Parliament and Federal Government were also predominant news themes in the English-language press. According to Siegel, this was due to the fact that the federal cabinet was directly responsible for invoking the WHA and calling upon the army to assume a peace keeping role during the crisis, and because it was the legislative branch of the federal government which was asked to respond and approve the executive's actions.

Negotiations and kidnapping were two additional categories of news information which received extensive front page attention. Stories which stressed the former theme either made demands for, speculated about or reported on the progress of negotiations between the authorities and the FLQ. The kidnapping theme appeared in stories which emphasized the demands and threats of the abductors.

When Siegel's focus shifted from front page attention to an analysis of the entire newspaper, he discovered that certain categories of news information were virtually absent in the English press. For instance, background stories about the crisis, that is, stories which examined the socio-political factors precipitating the FLQ's actions, were noticeable by their absence. Furthermore, news stories pertaining to the protest movement and civil rights themes did not appear with great frequency in the newspapers sampled. Consequently, the English-language press neither emphasized popular opposition to
the authorities' policies and actions, nor did they stress the threat to individuals liberties posed by the WMA and the activities of law enforcement officials.

Siegel's theme analysis of editorials illuminates, even more, the "reality" of the October crisis presented by the English press. Siegel's methodology, here, involved rank ordering the issues raised in editorials based on frequency of mention. Following this, he measured the attitude of the editorialist, in terms of support or hostility towards the issue discussed. On some issues, however, the measurement reflected the level of concern rather than an attitude, such as in the case when editorials discussed the welfare of the kidnap victims. What emerged from this examination was that a strong association existed between the Manhunt news category which was the most important in front page coverage of the Cross-Laporte kidnappings and the Law and Order theme which predominated editorial analyzes.

According to Siegel's findings Terrorism and the FLQ were the two most frequently discussed issues in editorials; appearing in 95% and 85%, respectively, of all the cases in the sample. In addition to receiving the most editorial coverage, these two issues elicited the greatest amount of censure from commentators. Strong opposition was expressed in 98% of the English editorials focusing on the topic of terrorism and in 95% of those commenting on the FLQ. For instance, the editor of the Montreal Gazette denigrated the FLQ and its use of organized
terror to effect social and political change in Quebec, by writing,

The FLQ has violated every precept of a free and civilized society. It has challenged, equally, duly elected authority and every decent human impulse. Let us rid ourselves of it as quickly as we can. It has no place in Quebec (Montreal Gazette, October 12, 1970:6).

Two days latter, the same newspaper vilified the FLQ by claiming,

...the prisoners in the terrorists demands in Quebec are not in jail for their political beliefs. Their political beliefs are the same as those of Rene Levesque and thousands of other separatists in that province. They are not in jail for those beliefs. They are in jail because they broke the law - robbed banks, stole, were involved in bombing incidents. They are criminals; and that is why they are behind bars (Montreal Gazette, October 14, 1970:37).

Similar sentiments were echoed in an editorial appearing in the Winnipeg Free Press which quoted the following remarks made by Mayor Drapeau concerning the FLQ's actions.

A worldwide spiritual network is directed against the forces of peace and order everywhere....It is not so much a conspiracy as the the existence of like minded kooks who read of each others exploits and try to emulate them (Winnipeg Free Press, October 7:16) [emphasis added].

And an editorial in the Vancouver Sun vituperated the FLQ and their "terrorist" actions by stating,

There is a great irrationality in the propaganda and tactics of the FLQ that brand these young men not as Quebec patriots but as political fanatics and criminal lunatics (Vancouver Sun, October 10, 1970:4).

The press' condemnation of the FLQ also included those individuals who sympathized and supported the group's actions.

In an editorial contrasting the two lawyers appointed as
negotiators in the hostage drama, the Montreal Gazette (October 13) presented a less than flattering image of the FLQ spokesperson in relation to his government counterpart. With respect to their physical appearances, the paper described Demers as "sporting sideburns on a boyish face." Lemieux, on the other hand, "lets his hair grow below his ears" and has a "poorly kept moustache" as another of his characteristic features. The editor also noted that Demers is the son of a judge and a corporate lawyer with a highly respectable Montreal law firm. Conversely, Lemieux is "flamboyant and an avowed separatist who has defended Quebec terrorists and is well known for his courtroom antics." The bias of the article becomes even more blatant when the characters of both men are contrasted: "Demers has been described as a very nice fellow, very honest...while some of the things said about Lemieux have been unprintable."

Also high on the interest agenda of the English press, but receiving extremely favourable editorial support, were issues pertaining to the Federal and Quebec Governments. These issues ranked third and sixth, respectively, in Siegel's study. Overall, the commentary concerning the governments' performance was overwhelmingly positive, with eight-six percent of the views favouring the way in which the federal and provincial authorities were managing the crisis. For instance, several commentaries expressed strong approval for the governments' "hardline" policy in dealing with the kidnappers by claiming
that social chaos would follow should the authorities accede to the FLQ's demands. This was the editorial position of the

Winnipeg Free Press when it argued that,

...should the governments concerned give way the dike would be breached, the flood upon us. As Quebec Justice Minister Jerome Choquette said on Saturday, "No society can expect that the decisions of its governments, or of its courts of law, can be questioned or can be erased by the use of blackmail exercised by a group because this signifies the end of all social order."

This is what the terrorists seek. It is what cannot be permitted to happen (Winnipeg Free Press, October 12, 1970:25).

Countenance for the federal and Quebec governments was also expressed in editorials which voiced confidence in the political and legal authorities to effectively deal with the crisis. This view was clearly presented in an editorial appearing in the

Montreal Gazette, the day following Cross' abduction. Commenting on the abduction, the editor wrote,

It is a crime that fills the community with helpless rage. There is nothing that the community as a whole can do at this point and private individuals, however wellmeaning, should not try to intervene. The skills of the police and the good sense and judgment of the responsible authorities have to be trusted (Montreal Gazette, October 6, 1970:6).

Support for government officials also manifested itself in editorials which adopted a compassionate view towards the difficult decisions confronting political officials. Such a view was expressed by a Gazette editorialist when he wrote,

It is not very often that it is necessary or even possible to feel compassion for Prime Minister Trudeau as he exercises his mandate, but none would envy him or the government of Quebec and the dilemma they face in dealing with terrorist kidnapping (Montreal Gazette, October 7, 1970:5).
In addition to ranking high in the frequency rating, Canadian Unity was an issue which received overwhelming editorial support in the English press. In every editorial which raised this issue, it was forcefully argued that the FLQ's actions would not undermine the integrity and stability of the nation. For instance, an editorial appearing in the Globe and Mail reassured Canadians that they were not divided on the political kidnappings claiming,

No politically responsible group or individual in Canada could regard this unhappy episode as anything but raw gangsterism. There is every sign that the repugnance felt in Vancouver is matched in Montreal, the net effect, in fact, may be more unifying than divisive (Globe and Mail, October 14, 1970:7).

The two kidnap victims, Mr. Cross and Mr. Laporte, also appeared as topics of editorial discussion, ranking fourth and seventh respectively, according to frequency of mention. In both cases, the main thrust of the commentary conveyed great concern about the fate of both men.

While the WMA and civil liberties were two additional aspects of the crisis emphasized in editorial coverage, attitudes towards each were diametrically opposed. Of the total commentary discussing the emergency legislation, over 90% strongly supported its invocation.12

12Although the government's decision of invoke the WMA was the focus of considerable editorial comment, it must be noted that the Act was proclaimed well past the midway point in the time-frame of Siegel's study, which meant that only a small proportion of the commentary on this issue was included in his analysis. Moreover, less than one week elapsed between Friday, October 16, the day the emergency legislation was proclaimed and Tuesday, October 22, the final day of the study. Because extensive editorial comment on the WMA appeared in the English
At the same time, English editorials demonstrated noticeably less concern for civil liberties. More specifically, of those editorials discussing the latter issue, 40% expressed antagonism towards individual rights, while over 30% conveyed indifference. The English press' attitudes towards these two issues appear in the following commentary which called upon the government to employ whatever powers it deemed necessary to eliminate the FLQ, even though they may be antithetical to the principles of democratic society.

The FLQ has placed itself beyond all limits of tolerance. It must be destroyed. The government should not hesitate to assume whatever powers it requires to accomplish this. Those powers will be, of necessity, arbitrary. They will be repugnant to a free society. But they will be far less repugnant than to continue defenceless against those who would destroy the democratic institutions which now shelter them (Montreal Gazette, October 12, 1970:6).

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(2 cont'd) press after October 22, Siegel's findings on this specific issue may be vitiated by an unrepresentative sample of newspapers. While the press demonstrated initial support for the government's decision to invoke the WMA, they may have assumed a more critical posture as the crisis continued. Peter Ayotte (1972) maintains this view when he writes,

The uncritical acceptance of government moves was to last but a short time, however. As time passed with little progress in the search for James Cross and his kidnappers and for the murderers of Pierre Laporte, doubts as to the necessity of the government's actions began to creep in. As the mounting evidence of abuses by police of the powers given them filtered in from Montreal, suspicion about the motives for those actions began to be seriously entertained. The governments of Montreal, Quebec and Canada became the targets of press criticism, as the latter began to analyze what had actually occurred and wondered if there really was a crisis after all (Ayotte, 1972:86).
Although low editorial interest was shown by the English-language press on the topics of Separation, Army and the New Democratic Party (NDP), very decided opinions were articulated on all three issues. The separatist movement in Quebec was clearly denounced in 84% of the editorials which raised the issue. An even more decisive view was expressed about the NDP. While only a small percentage of editorials, 7%, commented on the position taken by the NDP in Parliament, 92% of the commentary censured the party for not supporting the government's decision to invoke the War Measures Act.¹³ In sharp contrast, 93% of the editorials voiced extremely favourable judgment on the army's peace keeping role during the Cross-Laporte kidnappings.

More diverse views were expressed on the topics of Negotiations and French Canadians, which ranked tenth and twelfth, respectively, in terms of frequency of mention. With respect to the former, 42% of the commentary supported a negotiated settlement to the political abductions, while 34% opposed a compromise approach to resolving the crisis. Although the main thrust of editorial statements concerning French Canadians was mildly supportive, almost half were either indifferent or negative.

Often discussed in conjunction with the issue of French Canadians, were the social and economic injustices believed to

¹³It was noted in the previous chapter, that the House of Commons voted 190 to 16 in support of the government's motion, with all 16 dissenting votes cast by NDP members.
have precipitated FLQ "terrorism." While this issue ranked low in the frequency listing, with only 12% of the editorials raising it, 84% of those that did comment expressed concern.

Two additional aspects about the general nature of English editorial discussion of the October crisis emerge from Siegel's study. First, an overwhelming 95% of the commentary, reflected a national orientation in their outlook, rather than a regional or provincial viewpoint. English editorialists, then, tended to evaluate the ramifications of the Cross-Laporte abductions in terms of Canadians, in general. Second, Law and Order was the most predominant base theme of editorial content in the English press. Moreover, editorialists tended to discuss many of the issues outlined above, within a larger framework; one which emphasized respect for the rule of law and the democratic processes it symbolized. Two other predominant base themes of English commentary, were the WMA and Canadian politics.¹

Interpreting English Press Coverage of the October Crisis

It was suggested earlier, that the social world is not something which is objective and immutable. Rather, the same social phenomenon can be perceived and understood in disparate ways. In this section, an attempt is made to illustrate how the

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¹In total, there were 19 base themes used to classify editorials in Siegel's study. For a listing of the remaining 16, see Siegel, Appendix F, page 278.
consensus and conflict models provide alternative conceptualizations of English-language press coverage of the Cross-Laporte abductions. Because each theoretical model embraces different notions about the nature of social order and social change, they each assign different meaning to, and provide an alternative "reality" of, English newspaper coverage of the October crisis.

Consensus Interpretation

Within the consensus or functional framework, media news coverage of terrorist events is seen to reflect and reinforce collectively shared views and attitudes about terrorism. Given that there is overwhelming public condemnation towards terrorism in western nations, one would expect to find considerable anti-terrorist media coverage in these nations. In addition to focusing on society's indignation towards the use of terrorism, the communication media would also express public support for firm action by the authorities against terrorists.

English-language press coverage of the October crisis lends itself to this interpretation. As outlined above, almost every commentary discussing the FLQ, vilified this political organization and the methods it was employing to effect socio-political change in Quebec. This was accomplished, in part, by describing the kidnappers as "terrorists" and their actions as the work of "criminals", "fanatics", lunatics" and
"kooks." Denunciation of the FLQ also was expressed in decidedly negative presentations of their spokesperson, Robert Lemieux, and for the Quebec Separatist Movement, in general. It was further conveyed in their censure of individuals and groups which expressed hostility towards the governments' policies, such as the New Democratic Party. At the same time, the English press expressed tremendous support for the way in which the various governments were managing the crisis. We noted above, that in some cases, support for the governments' actions appeared as expressions of confidence, while at other times, it manifested itself in the form of sympathetic understanding.

We noted in an earlier discussion, that terrorist acts are viewed within the consensus model as criminal behaviour because they violate widely shared values in society. In this context, the FLQ's actions will be perceived as criminal because they violated fundamental precepts of Canadian democracy and universal principles protecting human life and property. Siegel's findings can serve to demonstrate this point. Several aspects of his study indicate that the English-language press viewed the FLQ's actions exclusively as criminal behaviour. For instance, Siegel's finding that Manhunt, Security and War Measures Act were the most prominent themes of front page news coverage illustrates how the media presented the kidnappings primarily within a Law and Order framework. According to Siegel, the Law and Order theme was also evident in the editorial commentary on to the crisis. This meant that the English press
tended to present and discuss the FLQ's actions primarily as violations of the rule of law in Canada and the democratic principles it represents.

The degree to which the English press perceived the FLQ as a criminal threat is reflected in their overwhelming support for the use of drastic emergency measures during the crisis, such as the governments' decision to call upon the army and to invoke the WMA. It can also be seen in the lack of concern they expressed over the implications of these drastic measures for civil liberties and human rights in this country.

It was also noted in an earlier discussion, that within the consensus model, the media serve an integrative function in society. They do this, in part, by exerting pressure upon group members to take a moral stand on normative transgressions. More specifically, they call for people to come together in common indignation. An illustration of this process is Siegel's finding that Canadian Unity was a dominant theme of editorial commentary about the crisis. By calling for a united response to the FLQ's actions, the media can be seen as reaffirming "collectively shared sentiments" regarding acceptable forms of political dissent and protest. In this respect, they served to reinforce the normative structure of Canadian society.

What is important to note, however, is that from the consensus framework, the content of English-language press coverage of the October crisis reflected the attitudes and values of Canadians, in general. In this sense, the press'
vituperation of the kidnappers and their support for the governments' actions mirrored the disgust and outrage shared by Canadians over the events taking place in Montreal.

Several public opinion polls taken at various points during, and after the crisis, suggest that most Canadians were united in their contempt for the FLQ and their support for the governments' management of the abductions, especially with respect to the invocation of the WMA. In a poll conducted by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion on Saturday, October 17, almost ninety percent of the five hundred and fifty-six adults surveyed either felt that the government's actions were not tough enough or about right (Gallup Poll; October 19, 1970). A later survey conducted by the same organization, suggests that this solid front of public support continued for several months after the WMA was invoked. Eighty-seven percent of the respondents in the study approved of the government's decision to bring in the WMA to handle the FLQ crisis. This support, however, was qualified. It was predicated on the condition the emergency legislation would be replaced by less drastic emergency measures (Gallup Poll, December 12, 1970).

Similar findings are reported by Sorrentino, et al., (1974) who gauged public attitudes towards several aspects of the October crisis, including attitudes towards the governments' actions before, during and after the crisis. This study

15This poll was taken at a point Saturday when Canadians were cognizant that the WMA had been proclaimed but unaware that Pierre Laporte had been killed.
concludes that the government received the greatest public support for its actions both during and immediately after the crisis. Support was observed to decline, however, in the post-crisis period.

Armstrong (1972) also found strong public support for the government's actions during the crisis. Through an examination of letters sent to the editors of major English newspapers across the country, she discovered that 76.5% approved of the governments' management of the Cross-Laporte Affair.

Collectively, these findings would seem to support a consensus interpretation of English-language press coverage of the crisis. However, the conflict model provides an alternative conceptualization of these data.

Conflict Interpretation

Within the conflict model, English press coverage of the October crisis demonstrates the media's key role in the processes of legitimation and reproduction. More specifically, the reality of the Cross-Laporte kidnappings presented by the English print media reflected a hegemonic ideology. As noted in an earlier discussion, hegemonic control exists when superordinate groups preserve their position of power by impressing a consciousness or world view upon subordinate groups which strengthens commitment to the "naturalness" and "rightness" of the established social order.
In this respect, English newspapers presented an image of the FLQ crisis which closely paralleled how most Canadians feel about the use of non-state violence in society. What is important to note, however, is that this conception of the political kidnappings was a reproduction of a hegemonic ideology. Moreover, it served to promote the interests of the politically powerful by reinforcing the "naturalness" of hierarchial arrangements in Canadian society.

Several aspects of news information and editorial commentary lend themselves to the conflict interpretation. For instance, the fact that the FLQ were described as "terrorists", "criminals", "kooks", "lunatics" and "fanatics" illustrates how social groups which challenge the social status quo are vilified and discredited. As noted in an earlier chapter, the terrorist designation, itself, is explicitly pejorative and effectively serves to de-politicize and de-legitimate the actions it is used to describe.

Siegel's finding that Law and Order was the predominant base theme of English-language press coverage further illustrates how the FLQ's actions were stripped of any political legitimacy. Within this framework, the FLQ's actions were presented and discussed as violations of fundamental democratic principles and challenges to the rule of law in this country. The primary effect of presenting the crisis in this light, was that it served to place this organization outside society. As outsiders, Canadian society more properly acted on the FLQ,
rather than interacted with the FLQ.

By discussing the crisis in this context, the English press legitimated the use of repressive measures against the FLQ. Because they were defined as threats to the social and political stability of society, the state was justified in implementing the criminal justice apparatus to deal with the FLQ. According to the conflict perspective, however, this course of action has significant ideological implications. Repressing manifestations of opposition to the established social order, in essence, serves the interests of the politically powerful in society by preserving the existing power structure.

The English press' support for the use of repressive measures to combat the FLQ, however, was more overt than their vilification of this group's members as terrorists. As noted above, overwhelming support was expressed by the English-language press for the governments' decision to use military personnel and to invoke the WMA during the crisis. In this respect, the news media promoted public support for the use of the most repressive measures every taken by a liberal democratic state during peace time. In doing so, they can be viewed as legitimating the use of draconian measures to crush an internal threat to existing hierarchical arrangements.

As noted in chapter IV, the conflict model circumscribes two explanatory frameworks for why the media disseminate a world view which legitimates and perpetuates the established social order. One framework considers the substantive content of the
media to be directly controlled and manipulated by the politically powerful in society. Another posits that the routine aspects of news production result in the media reproducing a hegemonic ideology. In this respect, both these explanatory frameworks can be used to account for why the English press reported and commented on the FLQ crisis the way they did.

Several aspects of the crisis can serve to illustrate media control during the crisis, especially by the government. The proclamation of the WMA, for example, had a profound impact on how the Canadian media reported and commented on the Cross-Laporte Affair. Although the censorship provisions of the emergency legislation were not invoked, the effect of the Act was the same (Ayotte, 1972: 87). Because the precise implications of the WMA for covering the crisis were never made clear, an insecurity and caution developed among media personnel throughout this country. The effect of this insecurity was believed to have been tantamount to self-imposed censorship (Robinson, 1977: 151; Ayotte, 1972: 87; Clift, 1970: 8; MacDonald, 1970: 8). The ideological implication of this self-censorship is that it prohibited journalists from making critical statements about the governments' management of the political kidnappings.

Another example of government control of the media during the crisis, involves the intimidatory practices of the police against journalists. This intimidation took several forms, including unmotivated harassment and arrests of media personnel and the destruction of professional equipment. In some
instances, journalists were incarcerated for several days, then released without being charged.16

A third illustration of government control of the media pertains specifically to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). It has been claimed that the policy of this publicly owned media system in covering the FLQ crisis was dictated by the federal government. Moreover, executives of the CBC were instructed by government leaders to avoid commentary and speculation about the crisis, especially with respect to the governments' actions (Wolfe, 1980:14). Another effect of this edict was the elimination or postponement of "potentially inflammable" programming. For instance, a documentary dealing with Lenin and the Russian Revolution which was to be aired by the CBC on October 13, was not shown until after Cross' safe release (Robinson, 1977:151).

One way in which this government edict was enforced was through the threat of suspension and dismissal. In fact, several members of Radio-Canada who challenged the governments' policies were fired for "insubordination" and for alleged "lack of objectivity" (Latouche, 1972:383).

There is also evidence suggesting that the owners of private communication media deliberately attempted to "de-politicize" or "sanitize" the views expressed by their respective personnel during the crisis. On several occasions,

16For a detailed listing of incidents involving police intimidation of journalists, see Content, May, 1971:5-11.
expressions or opinions which were hostile towards the
governments' management of the crisis were suppressed by top
news managers. And not unlike the public media, privately
owned communication systems rescheduled and even cancelled
"inflammatory" programming. For example, a two part episode of
Ironside was cancelled because the theme dealt with a
revolutionary working out of Montreal (Robinson, 1977:151).

Censorship in the private media can also be inferred from
the numerous firings and resignations which occurred during, and
shortly after, the crisis. For instance, fifteen journalists
with radio station CKAC in Montreal were fired in February,
1971, for their "less than responsible" conduct during the
kidnappings. It was noted in the previous chapter that this
radio station served as one of the principal mail boxes for FLQ
communiques during the hostage drama. During the crisis, itself,
Rod Dewar, an announcer with Montreal's major English-language
radio station, CJAD, resigned after his program was suspended
because he challenged the judiciousness of invoking the WMA. The
text of the statement issued by the management of CJAD,
regarding Dewar's resignation, is quoted at length to illustrate
two aspects of media control during the kidnappings. First, it
demonstrates how the WMA had the effect of censoring the media.
Second, it illustrates how media owners used this legislation to
control and suppress minority views during the crisis.

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17 For a listing of cases illustrating media censorship, see
Content, May, 1971.
The federal government... has imposed legislation which temporarily deprives us of many freedoms we have taken for granted. Along with all communications media, CJAC has lost some of its freedom to air divergent opinions. CJAD recognizes the need for such sweeping legislation and endorses it wholeheartedly. To the best of our ability, we will no longer air certain minority views while the present crisis exists. We do not wish to do anything to distress or confuse the listeners we are trying to serve in so many ways.

It is a time of sadness, as well as a time of concern, and CJAC will try to keep the public informed as events unfold and will also try to be a responsible and unifying voice in this great city. CJAC has always prided itself in airing a variety of freely-expressed opinions, but in the light of the current situation and legislation, we find it incompatible with the foregoing that Rod Dewar continue to express certain minority controversial views—and accordingly his program has been suspended for one week in order that it may be re-assessed (Content, 1970:9).

Another way to account for the media's hegemonic role during the crisis, is in terms of the routine structure of newswork and the values of professional journalism. As noted in a previous chapter, the strategies employed by journalists to cope with the organizational pressures of having to gather and process news information creates a systematic over-accessing to the media for those in powerful institutionalized positions. Because journalists come to rely on "accredited" representatives of institutionalized agencies, such as the police and government leaders as primary sources of information, the news media systematically disseminate a world view which reproduces a hegemonic ideology.

Illustrating this view is the finding that the opinions and statements of government leaders were primary sources of news information about the crisis in the English-language press.
Because the views expressed by political officials, such as Prime Minister Trudeau, Premier Bourassa and Justice Minister Choquette, formed the bases of news stories, the English-language newspapers perfunctorially constructed a version of the crisis which reflected the interests of the politically powerful in Canadian society.

Within the organizational model, standards of professional news reporting are also seen as an explanation for the prevalence of official statements in the press coverage of the crisis. More specifically, the manner in which the news value of "objectivity" is operationalized further ensures that mass communication systems will systematically present a view of the world which protects the social status quo. As noted in Chapter IV, impartiality and neutrality are considered as the primary characteristics of "objective" news reporting. Journalists believe they attain this professional standard by grounding news stories in authoritative statements from "accredited" sources. Invariably, these "accredited" sources include formal representatives of established institutions, such as members of parliament and law enforcement officials. Conversely, those individuals who fall beyond the pale of "accredited" authority are systematically denied access to the media. Professional conceptions of "objectivity", then, permitted established governmental and bureaucratic agencies to use the media during the crisis as a forum to demean the FLQ's actions. At the same time, they restricted the FLQ from using the media to
defend their actions and to criticize the government.

Within the conflict model, the media's perception of the FLQ as a highly "newsworthy" event is also seen to have ideological implications. As noted in an earlier discussion, acts of terrorism are regarded by most journalists as inherently "newsworthy" because of their destructive and disruptive nature. More generally, they are considered as "newsworthy" because they deviate from what is perceived to be "normal" and "natural" in society. In this respect, they are "bad news." But in presenting terrorist acts as deviations from normative standards, the media are seen to subtly reaffirm and strength the values and beliefs which defined them as such. In this sense, journalists' conceptions of "newsworthiness" are seen to reproduce a dominant ideology.

The extensive amount of media attention devoted to the FLQ crisis can serve to illustrate the perceived "newsworthiness" of terrorist events. It was noted, however, that the perceived "newsworthiness" of the crisis varied across the country. News coverage and editorial coverage appeared to decline as the distance from the crisis center increased. Thus, the media in Vancouver seem to have perceived the FLQ's actions as less "newsworthy" than the media in Montreal and Toronto.

Despite these variations, the English press' interest in the Cross-Laporte kidnappings can serve to illustrate how media conceptions of "newsworthy" center on "bad news." Moreover, these newspapers extensively reported and commented on these
events because political abductions deviate markedly from consensual notions of what is "right" and "wrong" in Canadian society. Because these moral standards are seen to reflect a hegemonic ideology, media definitions of the FLQ crisis as "newsworthy" can be interpreted as the reaffirmation of this hegemonic ideology.

English-language press coverage of the FLQ crisis can serve to illustrate, yet, another aspect of the media's hegemonic function in society. As noted in Chapter IV, what is omitted from media news reporting is also seen to have important ideological implications. What is seen to be systematically missing from news reports is a sense of historicism. Because "immediacy" and "actuality" are regarded as key components of successful news coverage, journalists invariably fail to present events within a larger socio-historical context. Moreover, these organizational pressures lead to the presentation of news information as a series of discrete and unrelated incidents. By presenting the news in this format, the media fail to relate world events to larger, macro-level variables. In this respect, they do not consider the structure of society as a precipitating factor of social problems.

According to Siegel, conspicuously absent from English press coverage of the FLQ crisis was a discussion of the social, economic and political factors underscoring the FLQ's actions. Accordingly, the kidnappings were not discussed in relation to notions of Anglophone domination and Francophone oppression in
Quebec. Failing to raise these wider issues meant that the structure of Canadian society was not considered to be problematic. From this perspective, it can be argued that English-language newspapers presented a conception of the crisis which protected and preserved the structural advantages of the politically powerful in this country. What the English press omitted to report about the crisis, then, can serve to illustrate how the media perform an ideological function in society.

Summary

This chapter has used a case study approach to illustrate several views discussed earlier in this thesis, regarding terrorism and the media. More specifically, the media's role during the FLQ crisis was examined in relation to its perceived strategic importance and its possible theoretical significance.

In the first section of this chapter, it was shown that the communication system in Quebec was a central component in the Cross-Laporte kidnappings. This reflects, in large part, the kidnappers' ability to force the media into the center of the hostage-drama. They accomplished this in two ways. One method centered on using the media, especially two radio stations in Montreal, as an intermediary between themselves, and the authorities. Another involved specific media-related demands in exchange for the safe release of their hostages.
The media's central role during the October crisis was further illustrated by examining how they facilitated communication between several principal actors in the hostage-drama. In addition to providing a communication link between the kidnappers, it was shown that the media were used by the authorities to communicate with the two kidnap victims. Additionally, the media served as a communication channel between the two FLQ cells and between the kidnappers and their spokesperson, Robert Lemieux.

At a conceptual level, it was noted that many political observers viewed the media as a key element in the FLQ's strategical objectives. Central to this view, however, is a conception of FLQ violence as a form of symbolic communication which was intended to arouse a revolutionary spirit among the Francophone population of Quebec. Because their violent acts, in themselves, failed to reach their intended social audience, amplification of these acts through media attention was considered as a primary strategic goal of the FLQ.

Some of the concerns and criticisms related to media coverage of terrorist events were also illustrated. This illustration centered on aspects of the Canadian news coverage of the political kidnappings which were perceived by government leaders and law enforcement officials as exacerbating the crisis situation.

The second section of this chapter illustrated how the concensus and conflict models provide alternative
conceptualizations of the theoretical linkages between terrorism and mass media. Based primarily on data gathered by Siegel (1974), a descriptive profile was presented of English press coverage of the October crisis. From the consensus perspective, these data were interpreted as a reflection of widespread moral agreement in the Canadian society. Within the conflict paradigm, this same set of information was conceptualized as the reproduction of a hegemonic ideology.
VII. CONCLUSION

The scope of this thesis has been broad. It has included an examination and illustration of various conceptions of the strategic and theoretical linkages between phenomena defined as terrorism and the mass media. This investigation, however, has been centered on a distinct ontological view. It was posited that social phenomena have no inherent or objective meaning. Rather, what is perceived as social reality is based on the subjective meanings people assign to things in their social world. Adopting this ontological framework, led to a consideration of conceptions of terrorism and conceptions of the interrelationship between terrorism and the media as examples of a constructed social reality. From this perspective, we were able to better understand multiple views of these phenomena.

We began this investigation with a conceptual analysis of terrorism. At that time, several popular beliefs about these phenomena were discussed. It was noted, that contemporary terrorism is perceived by most people as a major challenge to national and transnational order and a growing threat to human life and property.

While tremendous ambiguity surrounds its use in the social scientific literature, we observed that political analysts tend to assign three basic attributes to terrorist behaviour. First, terrorist acts are considered to be violent. Second, they are
seen to be perpetrated with the specific intent of generating fear within a target group. And finally, this fear is seen to be used for coercive purposes.

An attempt was also made to document the manifold forms of behaviour that have been identified as terrorist by students of political violence. A review of several typological constructions of terrorism revealed the considerable range and diversity of social acts which fall within the conceptual parameters of terrorism. It was further noted, that the central criterion used to classify various forms of terror-violence was motivation. Using this criterion, political observers have identified three very general types of terrorism: political, criminal, and psychotic. It was further noted that political analysts speak of four conceptually distinct categories of political terrorism: state terrorism, insurgent or revolutionary terrorism, sub-revolutionary terrorism, and defensive terrorism. Furthermore, three additional types of anti-state terrorism were delineated: ethnic-nationalist, ideological and, issue oriented.

This taxonomical overview served as a framework from which to demonstrate the rather circumscribed view of political terrorism shared by most Western observers. Moreover, of the vast range of activity that could be designated as terrorism, liberal democratic conceptions of this phenomena invariably center on the violent actions of left-wing insurgent groups and communist regimes. At the same time, what appear to be qualitatively similar acts by anti-left revolutionaries and
right-wing nation states are systematically excluded from Western definitions of terrorism.

A constructionist framework was developed to examine Western conceptions of terrorism. Within this analytic framework, perceptions of terrorism were considered as versions of a constructed social reality; that is they reflected a subjective assessment of violent behaviour. Moreover, the term "terrorism" was viewed as a label used by opposing forces in a political conflict to vilify and discredit the actions of the other side. In this context, it was noted that applications of the terrorist label reflected distinct ideological and moral beliefs. Western usage of the term was also seen to center on reified conceptions of the state, which posit as legitimate government-sanctioned and government-sponsored violence. Reification of the state in this manner was seen to have a profound impact on definitions of terrorism, in that it allows state actors to engage in what could be defined as terrorist behaviour, while eschewing the terrorist label. Conversely, reified perceptions of the state almost guarantee that anti-governmental forces will be classified as terrorism.

Conceptualizing terrorism as a constructed reality led us to think about the various social components of the construction process. It was suggested that the mass media play a key role in definitions of what is, and is not, defined as terrorism. As primary purveyors of information and commentary, mass communication systems significantly influence perceptions of
social reality. Because the media are often the only sources of information about terrorist incidents, it was suggested that the scope and nature of media coverage of these events can shape public awareness and conceptions of terrorism.

Having introduced the importance of mass media in relation to perceptions of terrorism, the analysis then turned to an extensive examination of the perceived strategic linkages between terrorism and the media. At this point, it was noted that a perceived paradox involving the strategic objectives and tactical means of terrorists, leads many political observers to view media publicity as a key component in the strategy of terrorism. Moreover, terrorist acts are, by definition, limited in duration and consequence. At the same time, terrorists are believed to commit these violent acts in order to impact a larger social group than the direct victims of their actions. It was noted, that several political observers perceive media publicity to serve as a the conduit between terrorists and their intended targets. In the course of publicizing terrorist events, the media are seen to amplify the socio-political impact of these acts to the level desired by the terrorists. In this context, they are perceived as transmitters of a terror-inspiring message.

The perceived importance of the media in the terrorist strategy was brought into cleared focus when we considered acts of terrorism as a form of violent symbolic communication. We noted here, that terrorist acts have been compared to more
orthodox modes of communications, consisting of a transmitter (the terrorist), the message (the terrorist threat that "you may be next") and the receiver (the target population).

In addition to its strategic importance, media publicity, in itself, was considered as an objective of terrorist action. Terrorism that was undertaken to publicize a political cause or goal was discussed as attempts to access the agenda of public discussion. It was noted that much of the violent activity of the Palestinian Liberation Organization has been seen in this light. We further observed that terrorist groups, such as the PLO, are believed to maximize audience attention for their cause by establishing specific media-related demands and by carefully staging and timing their actions.

Two distinct views of the strategic or operational relationship between terrorism and the media were presented; an instrumentalist view and a symbiotic view. Embraced within the former, is a conception of the media serving as tools or instruments of terrorists. This is seen to occur when the media are coerced by terrorists into publicizing a statement or manifesto and when the media allow themselves to be dominated or controlled by the news source of a terrorist story. We noted that the symbiotic conception of this relationship posits the terrorist and the media providing each other with what they desperately need: a large audience. Western media systems, it was observed, remain commercially viable enterprises by selling audience attention to advertisers. Terrorism is seen as the type
of story which conforms perfectly to the commercial needs of the media because it is "made of the stuff" which captures audience interest and increases audience ratings.

Despite any commercial benefits that may be derived from reporting acts of terrorism, most political analysts consider media involvement in terrorist situations as inherently problematic. Not only is media publicity seen to promote the strategic objectives of terrorists, but it is also seen to create the social conditions conducive to further acts of terrorism. Law enforcement officials, we noted, are especially critical of the media for interfering in their efforts to manage on-going terrorist incidents. Resolution of these perceived problems was seen to raise a fundamental dilemma involving the role of the press in an "open society", on one side, and the protection of life and the integrity of the state, on another.

After discussing various views of the strategic association between terrorism and the media, an examination was undertaken of the theoretical linkages between these phenomena. The consensus and conflict models of society were presented as competing interpretive frameworks from which to understand the nature and social consequences of media coverage of terrorist acts. Within the consensus model, media presentations of terrorism were seen to reflect widespread normative and moral agreement among social members regarding the use of terrorist actions as a method of effecting socio-political change. Because these acts are seen as violations of collectively held values,
media information and commentary about these events will echo a moral indignation and censure shared by society as a whole. In the course of expressing these consensually held views and calling for a collective response to terrorist acts, the media are seen to reaffirm and strengthen the normative order of group life.

Within the conflict paradigm, the media are seen to present a conception of terrorism which reproduces the hegemonic domination of powerful groups in society. Moreover, they construct and disseminate a version of social reality which legitimates the use of repressive measures against individuals who threaten established hierarchical arrangements. In this sense, the media are seen to promote the interests of the superordinate groups in society.

It was also noted that conflict theorists employ two distinct conceptual frameworks to explicate why the media perform a hegemonic function. One analytic approach posits the media to be directly and indirectly controlled by conservative forces, such as the state, advertisers and media owners. A second framework considers how routine processes of gathering and processing news information and professional journalistic values collectively make the media more accessible to politically powerful and bureaucratically organized institutions.

An examination of the media's central role during the FLQ crisis served to illustrate conceptions of the relationship between terrorism and the media. It was noted that the FLQ's
strategic objective can be seen as dependent on media amplification of their acts. In this context, the kidnappings carried out by the FLQ were considered as forms of violent symbolic communication intended to arouse a revolutionary consciousness in the Francophone population of Quebec. It was further noted that the FLQ attempted to secure media attention for their actions by establishing media-related demands for the safe release of their hostages and by using two Montreal radio stations as mailboxes for their communiques.

During the course of the crisis, we observed that the media served as a key communicative link between the kidnappers and the authorities, between the kidnappers and their spokesperson, and between the authorities and the kidnap victims. Further, it was noted that the manner in which the media discharged its responsibilities as the central component in the crisis was the subject of intense concern and criticism from both government and law enforcement officials. Central to these critical views were perceptions of the media "playing into the FLQ's hands" and the media interfering with police efforts to effectively manage the crisis.

Analysis of English-language press coverage of the FLQ crisis served to illustrate how the consensus and conflict models give rise to fundamentally different conceptualizations of the theoretical relationship between terrorism and the media. Within the consensus model, the news information and editorial commentary provided by these newspapers reflected normative
agreement in Canadian society regarding the use of extra-parliamentary means to effect socio-political change in this country. More specifically, the FLQ and their supporters were vilified and discredited by the English-language press because their violent actions violated widely held values venerating human life and the rule of law in this country.

From the conflict perspective English-language press presentation of the Cross-Laporte abductions served to legitimate the use of draconian measures to protect the established social order. Moreover, it reproduced a hegemonic ideology; a view of existing social arrangements as "natural" and "right." In this sense, the version of the crisis constructed and disseminated by English-language newspapers reflected and promoted the interests of superordinate groups in Canadian society.

While various conceptions of the linkages between terrorism and the media have been examined and illustrated, several aspects of this association were overlooked, and therefore, require further investigation. At the theoretical level, additional models or perspectives might be employed to develop alternative ways of understanding the theoretical relationship between the media and terrorism. For instance, a "Pluralist Model" might provide yet another conceptualization of the media's role during terrorist incidents.

Future research might also query the strategic and theoretical relationship between mass communication and
phomena defined as "state terrorism." Emphasis here, might be
to determine whether similar strategic linkages are seen to
eexist between "government terrorists" and "insurgent terrorists"
in relation to the media. The consensus and conflict models
might also be used as competing conceptual frameworks from which
construct a theoretical understanding of the relationship
between the media and state-sponsored terrorism.

With specific reference to the media's role during the
October crisis, future investigative efforts might examine, more
systematically, how various mediums reported the FLQ actions.
This thesis focused specifically on English-language press
coverage of the Cross-Laporte Affair. A more detailed analysis
of newspaper (including the French-language press), television
and radio coverage of these events might reveal significant
inter-medium differences. It might also show that the data
examined in this thesis varies markedly from the version of the
crisis presented by the Canadian news media, as a whole.
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