NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR

INGE BAILEY

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE

ASEAN - The Nature of a Regional Organization for Development and Stability

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ

Simon Fraser University, B.C.

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADÉ POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE

M.A. (PolSc)

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADÉ

1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE

T.H. COHN

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

DATED/DATÉ 20 August 1981

SIGNED/SIGNÉ

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ

Apt. 312, 269 W. 4th St.

North Vancouver, B.C.

V7M 4H8
NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECEUE

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4
ASEAN - THE NATURE OF A REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
FOR DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY

by

Inge Sons Bailey
(Erste Juristische Staatsprüfung, Land Berlin 1963)
(Zweite Juristische Staatsprüfung, Land Berlin 1968)

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Political Science

Inge Sons Bailey 1981
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
August 1981

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

Name: Inge Sons Bailey
Degree: Master of Arts
Title of Thesis: ASEAN - The Nature of a Regional Organization for Development and Stability

Examining Committee:

Chairman: Alberto Ciria
T.H. Cohn
Senior Supervisor

F.Q. Quo

K. Okuda
External Examiner
Associate Professor
Département of Economics
Simon Fraser University

Date Approved: August 4, 1981
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes, may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Dissertation:

ASEAN - The Nature of a Regional Organization for Development and Stability

Author:

_INGE BAILEY_

(signature)

(name)

20 August 1981

(date)
ABSTRACT

The thesis examines the nature of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN - from its inception in 1967 to its evident consolidation by 1979. It endeavours to show that, despite ASEAN's initial claim to be a non-political organization, its role in international relations was determined by its primarily political nature. Regional cooperation in ASEAN served goals of political stability as well as socio-economic development. The political nature of ASEAN is understood as that essence of its identity which results from the members' communal preference for certain basic values over others, values which are not wholly explained in terms of functional objectives such as economic growth or amelioration of social conditions.

The examination focusses on ASEAN's interrelationships with its Southeast Asian environment and on the close linkage between socio-economic and political issues in the ASEAN context. It is preceded by a general introduction (Chapter 1) and by background information (Chapters 2 and 3) necessary to appreciate the fundamental principles underlying ASEAN's seemingly inconsistent direction and nature during its early years. These contextual features are introduced through an overview of the histories and significance to ASEAN of two antecedent organizations: the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo (Chapter 2). An outline of the history, structure, and identity of ASEAN (Chapter 3) highlights the Association's development in two distinct but continuous phases: formation (1967-1976) and consolidation (1976-1979), and addresses the question of regional as compared to Southeast Asian
cooperation.

The principal arguments for determining the nature of ASEAN as that of a primarily political organization are drawn from an investigation of the perceptions of the five most salient powers in the ASEAN environment: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and communist Vietnam (Chapter 4). Largely as a result of their non-ASEAN interests and international relations in Southeast Asia, most of these powers focussed their perceptions of ASEAN on political issues. For Japan, economic issues outweighed, but did not exclude, political perceptions of ASEAN.

The understanding in ASEAN's environment of its primarily political nature conflicted with the Association's initial claim to be a non-political organization for socio-economic cooperation alone. The investigation of ASEAN's projected image and underlying self-image (Chapter 5) explains the apparent contradiction to be one of rhetoric rather than substance. It shows that for ASEAN during both phases the closely interrelated objectives of socio-economic development and political stability were dominated by political concerns. In reality ASEAN's self-image was largely congruent with the perceptions in its environment of its primarily political nature.

The Conclusion (Chapter 6) discusses the linkages between the political divisiveness in ASEAN's environment and ASEAN's initially perceived need to de-emphasize its political nature; between ASEAN's own consolidation and its increasingly self-confident admission to political cooperation during its second phase; and between the political nature of ASEAN and its success as a viable regional organization. It points out...
the potential relevance of ASEAN to some of the models developed in political science theory with respect to international organization.

Research sources and materials comprise the scholarly literature; documents, papers, and publications issued by the secretariats of ASEAN; newspapers and news periodicals; and interviews conducted with ASEAN and other government officials of the member states and with other persons having special knowledge of the organization. Much of these materials was collected during field research in Southeast Asia in 1978, 1979, and 1980.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The assistance of the Senior Supervisor, Prof. Dr. T.H. Cohn, and of Prof Dr. F.Q. Quo in the preparation of this thesis is gratefully acknowledged, as is the cooperation of Moira Gort and Maureen McIlroy.

I wish to thank my husband, Peter H. Bailey, whose work in Southeast Asia provided the initial stimulus for my interest in ASEAN and the opportunities for field research, for his suggestions, comments, travel companionship, and unfailing interest and support throughout several years of thesis discussions.

With particular gratitude I acknowledge the cooperation and assistance of all friends and interview partners in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, especially those in the secretariats of ASEAN in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. They provided invaluable information; they shared their knowledge, their time, and their dedication with me; and they imparted some of the "ASEAN spirit of cordiality" that has brought five countries in Southeast Asia closer together. To them, and to the peoples of Southeast Asia, this thesis is dedicated.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPROVAL ......................................................................................... ii
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................ vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS ....................................................................... vii
LIST OF FIGURES .............................................................................. x

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................ 1
  Subject and Purpose of Enquiry ....................................................... 1
  Scope and Contexts of Enquiry ....................................................... 5
  Focus of Examination ....................................................................... 9
  Conclusions .................................................................................. 13
  Methodology ................................................................................ 15
  NOTES .......................................................................................... 19

Chapter 2
REGIONAL ORGANIZATION AND THE ANTECEDENTS TO ASEAN .... 21
  Setting and Working Definitions ................................................... 21
  Southeast Asia .............................................................................. 21
  Region and Regional Organization ............................................... 22
  Antecedents to ASEAN ................................................................. 26
    Other Cooperative Ventures ....................................................... 26
    ASA .......................................................................................... 28
    Maphilindo .............................................................................. 40
  NOTES ........................................................................................ 52

Chapter 3
THE ASEAN ORGANIZATION ......................................................... 61
  History ....................................................................................... 61
  Formation ................................................................................... 61
  Consolidation ............................................................................... 68
  Structure .................................................................................... 78
  Identity ....................................................................................... 84
  NOTES ........................................................................................ 95
Activities ................................................................. 240
The Kuala Lumpur Declaration ................................... 240
Committees .................................................................. 243
Dialogues ..................................................................... 245
Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Activities .. 246
Internal and External Appraisals of ASEAN ................. 248
Politicization or the New Focus on Economic Cooperation 254
Summits ..................................................................... 254
Summit Follow-up ....................................................... 260
Other Activities .......................................................... 262
ASEAN's Dual Purposes .............................................. 266
Development and Stability .......................................... 268
The Reality of Development: Goals and Achievements ..... 268
Development ............................................................... 268
Achievements .............................................................. 275
The Politics of Development ......................................... 279
The ASEAN Rationale ................................................ 279
Political Aspects of Development ................................. 281
Status and Options ..................................................... 282
Interdependence ........................................................ 284
Resilience ................................................................. 286
The Self-Image and Nature of ASEAN ....................... 289
NOTES ........................................................................ 291

Chapter 6
CONCLUSION ................................................................ 302
NOTES ........................................................................ 314

APPENDICES .................................................................. 316
APPENDIX 1  The Bangkok Declaration .......................... 317
APPENDIX 2  The Kuala Lumpur Declaration .................. 321
APPENDIX 3  Declaration of ASEAN Concord ................ 324
APPENDIX 4  Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia .......................... 331

SOURCES CONSULTED ............................................... 338
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. ASEAN Logo .......................................................... 7
Figure 2. ASEAN Organization Chart ........................................... 79
Figure 3. GDP Growth Rates (%) ............................................... 276
Figure 4. Per Capita GDP Growth Rates (%) ................................. 277
Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis undertakes to analyze and identify the essential nature of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN - from its formation in 1967 to the end of 1978. ASEAN is an international organization created by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand for regional cooperation on a broad basis. Its existence has affected many political, economic, social, cultural, and other relationships in Southeast Asia. It actively participates in international relations as a unit, and its role is likely to grow in the future. Quite possibly ASEAN represents the most significant contribution in several decades to international efforts at ensuring some means of peace, stability, and development in a traditionally contentious, unstable, underdeveloped part of the world. ASEAN is not as well known and understood as its actual prominence in international relations in Southeast Asia, and its potential significance for the future of that area, would merit.

Subject and Purpose of Enquiry

The enquiry into the nature of ASEAN, and the answers to be derived from it, will contribute towards a better understanding of the Association's present and future role. The key to understanding its significance lies in its early years. In accordance with its own claim,
the Association at first was widely assessed by non-ASEAN powers, organizations, and individuals — its environment — according to economic criteria; its apparent lack of achievements in the past is not easily reconciled with its political importance evident in more recent years. The thesis centres on the proposition that ASEAN was, in fact, created, initially evolved, and was perceived by other participants in international relations as an essentially political organization, and that in its political nature lies the principal reason for both its success and, ironically, its stated intention to emphasize non-political goals. This proposition is examined through analyses of ASEAN's interrelationships with its environment. The examination, in serving to identify the nature of the Association, also helps to resolve apparent discrepancies between ASEAN rhetoric and substance, and to explain the significance of the nature of ASEAN for both its past obscurity and its present vitality.

The need for a better understanding of the role of ASEAN is evident from the fact that fourteen years after its creation, its very existence and survival still puzzle many, especially non-ASEAN, scholars and other observers. The formation and early performance of the Association had given rise to more pessimistic than optimistic expectations. For nearly a decade after its inception, ASEAN was not widely known in Southeast Asia, and hardly at all beyond. To outsiders, its specific purposes and objectives remained ill-defined, its progress questionable, and its viability uncertain. Its emergence from obscurity in the late 1970s seemed to be that of a suddenly mature and flourishing entity, whose activities range from a public condemnation of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia to the
formation of an ASEAN Finance Corporation, from appeals to the United Nations on behalf of refugees in Southeast Asia to sponsorship of an ASEAN essay competition. It is difficult to discern a central focus in ASEAN's objectives.

This difficulty has been a major cause of misunderstandings in its environment of the Association's viability, its importance as a regional organization, and its role in international relations. Another cause of such misunderstandings has been an apparent discrepancy between ASEAN's projected self-image and its perception by outsiders. The Association initially presented itself to others explicitly as a grouping devoted solely to non-political cooperation for purposes of promoting economic growth in the member countries and the socio-economic well-being of their populations. Yet for its entire formative period from 1967 to about 1976, and to some extent even afterwards its activities, insofar as they were visible at all, seemed to produce few tangible results in these fields. ASEAN frequently claimed in public that it was not a political organization; yet political criteria appeared to play a large role in the perceptions of most powers in its environment. These contradictions were compounded by others. At the same time that ASEAN strove for recognition of its identity as a significant entity participating in international relations, it deliberately sought to be left out of political issues by trying to channel public attention towards its stated goals of socio-economic development. At the same time that some non-ASEAN observers dismissed the organization as ineffective, others saw its very existence as a major achievement in Southeast Asian regionalism.
Some non-ASEAN, and especially Western, scholars appeared to regard the Association as insignificant because of its perceived failure to live up to its claims of promoting socio-economic development. Also, their views of ASEAN were often influenced by a precipitate readiness to measure its success or failure by criteria derived from the development of the European Economic Community (EEC) - a comparison by which ASEAN's activities in the first decade were easily judged to be minimal, and its prospects dismal. However, the fact that ASEAN has flourished rather than foundered, suggests that these criteria were inadequate properly to appraise its significance. Some political powers - especially Vietnam and China - accorded ASEAN distinctly greater significance than its record as an organization for economic cooperation could explain. Their perceptions, and also much of ASEAN's actual public self-portrayal suggest political factors as being focal to an understanding of the Association. It becomes apparent that perceptions, projections, misconceptions, and misrepresentations governing the obscure years of ASEAN need to be examined if its nature is to be clarified and its role to be better understood.

The difficulties and discrepancies mentioned revolve around the question of whether ASEAN was a political or a non-political organization. A working definition is needed that permits distinction between political and other aspects of ASEAN, to clarify in what sense the terms 'political' and 'politics' are employed in the thesis. As a grouping of nation-states joined in an international organization for cooperation towards shared objectives, ASEAN is a community whose members seek to secure, through collective decision-making and by peaceful means, their
common preferences for certain values over others. All of these are termed 'political' values unless their meaning can be satisfactorily explained in terms of specific functional categories such as economic, cultural, or educational fields. The term 'politics' is applied to the choice, promotion or protection of communally preferred, basic values. Clearly economic, social, cultural, or other functional categories are termed non-political.

Scope and Contexts of Enquiry

The examination presented in the thesis is preceded by two mainly descriptive chapters, which offer overviews of background and organizational features that are necessary to an understanding of the nature of ASEAN. The Association is rooted in the conditions under which it came into being and initially evolved, and many of its characteristics can only be properly appreciated by looking beyond ASEAN itself. Chapter 2 outlines basic features of its Southeast Asian setting, as well as the histories of two organizations that had previously joined certain of the ASEAN members together in efforts at regional cooperation: the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. This chapter also offers working definitions for the terms 'region' and 'regional' as used throughout the thesis, restricting these terms to the ASEAN area. Chapter 3 gives an overview of ASEAN history, structure, and identity including the question of accession by other states.

The analysis following in Chapters 4 and 5 is delimited by a time frame and by a selection of specific relationships of ASEAN. In linking
ASEAN's present to its past, it was found useful to focus on a twelve-year period spanning approximately from its inception in 1967 to the end of 1978, in some instances reaching into 1979. The end point was chosen for both substantive reasons, which are set out next in some detail, and for methodological reasons, which are given later.

By 1979 ASEAN had proven not only its viability but also its relevance to international relations. It had found for itself a place in Southeast Asia that promises to be both permanent and prominent; in the future, the Association is likely to pursue its increasingly important role with more candour than in the past. To the members the organization had clearly become so important that the cost to them of letting it fail would have far exceeded the sacrifices required to maintain and strengthen it. ASEAN's self-confidence as to its continuing and expanding role is expressed in the 1979 construction of an ASEAN Secretariat building (in Jakarta); in the adoption of an ASEAN logo, which symbolizes strength in unity, solidarity, friendship, and regional peace (see following page for figure and full explanation); and also in the fact that since about 1979 the acronym 'ASEAN' has officially been replaced by 'asean' — an indication that the Association no longer feels the need to emphasize its name in capital letters.

ASEAN's significance after 1978 is demonstrated in its initiatives concerning the refugee problem in Southeast Asia and the armed conflicts between Vietnam and Cambodia, and Vietnam and China, all of which erupted in 1979. Both China and Vietnam sought ASEAN support for their respective positions in the conflicts over Cambodia. Part of the 1979 UN Security
THE ASEAN LOGO

The design of the ASEAN Logo represents a bundle of rice stalks, coloured brown, with the word "asean" at the bottom. These elements are imposed on a yellow base within a blue circle.

The Logo symbolises the solidarity of ASEAN and its commitment to work together for the aspiration and prosperity of its peoples. It also portrays ASEAN’s adherence to the concept of regional peace and stability within the global context.

Colour Explanation

The three colours of the ASEAN Logo are brown, yellow and blue. Brown symbolises strength and stability, yellow represents prosperity, and blue symbolises friendship.
Council debate on peace in Southeast Asia was based on an ASEAN draft resolution resulting from earlier ASEAN statements on this issue. ASEAN also formally requested the UN General Assembly to place the situation in Cambodia on its agenda for the 1979 meeting, and sponsored the Assembly resolution. 5

Other examples of ASEAN's confirmed role are Japan's donation of a Yen 5 billion Cultural Fund to ASEAN represented by its Secretariat, and Japan's agreement to form an ASEAN-Japan Development Corporation in which the ASEAN Finance Corporation is to be the equal partner of Japan; India's wish to enter into a formal dialogue with ASEAN, and her belief that there will emerge a USA-China-ASEAN alliance in Asia; and the elevation of relations between ASEAN and the EEC to ministerial level as initiated with a November 1978 Foreign Ministers Meeting. 5

Also by 1979, in the ASEAN member countries a regional consciousness had begun to take hold not only with government and ASEAN officials, but in the populations as a result of trade fairs, cultural exchanges, ASEAN non-governmental organizations, ASEAN package tours and liberalization of visa requirements, publicity surrounding ASEAN events at the top level, and other efforts to reach the people. At the end of 1978 ASEAN had been operating for about three years in full public view, which it had not done previously. This period is sufficient to appraise organizational directions evident during ASEAN's second phase, and relate them to initially apparent features of the Association.
Focus of Examination

Certain specific relationships of ASEAN were selected for examination. As an association of five states ASEAN conducts itself as a separate entity with respect to its members as well as with respect to external, non-ASEAN units. It projects an image and maintains relations in both directions. The thesis focusses on ASEAN's relations with, perceptions by, and self-presentation to its environment. It was felt that for an evaluation of ASEAN's essential character the organizational image as perceived by and shown to outsiders would be most revealing. ASEAN was created to serve various purposes in Southeast Asia, not only among its members. By its very existence it addressed its environment. By interacting with its environment it generated most of the evidence on which an evaluation of its nature can be based: ASEAN activities, statements and documents, and also appraisals by insiders and outsiders.

A focus on intra-ASEAN matters would have encountered major problems with respect to information and interpretation. Information about purely internal ASEAN actions and considerations, while certainly valuable for a complete picture of the organization's self-image, is far less readily accessible to a researcher from outside ASEAN than are materials concerning ASEAN's interaction with its environment. There are several reasons for this. From its inception ASEAN had adopted generally informal modes of operation; the earliest committees were repeatedly admonished that they should at least keep minutes of their meetings. The documentation that did result from ASEAN operations was usually retained in any one of the five national secretariats and was not systematically
collected until after the establishment of a central secretariat in 1976. Publication of documents and publicity in general were deliberately kept to a minimum; the reasons for this are given in Chapter 3. Available or accessible information on intra-ASEAN perceptions of its role and nature had to be considered incomplete, and thus an intra-ASEAN focus in the examination would not have been conducive to a proper understanding of ASEAN's nature.

Moreover, it seemed presumptuous to undertake an assessment of the Association primarily from a purportedly inside point of view. ASEAN is an organization in Southeast Asia. The Association and its members are represented by men and women whose perceptions, beliefs, priorities, and ways of thinking are very different from those prevalent in the industrialized Western world, to which the author belongs. Specifically Southeast Asian precepts about regionalism and institutionalized cooperation, about the proper way of doing things together and of judging their results, have been incorporated into ASEAN. The author has gained some understanding of these elements from a not entirely Western point of view, through living experience in several of the ASEAN countries and through many interviews with ASEAN and other national government officials of member states. Nevertheless her views remain those of an outsider. These limitations contributed to the selection of emphasis in the examination.

Chapter 4 discusses perceptions of ASEAN by external powers. In the ASEAN environment, the great number of participants made a selection from among them necessary. ASEAN shares international relations not only with
other, non-member states in Southeast Asia such as Burma and Vietnam but also with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, the United States (USA), the Soviet Union (USSR), most countries of Western Europe (individually and also through the EEC), Australia, New Zealand, and many others. Among these the examination focusses on the USA, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Vietnam. For the years 1967 to 1978 these are considered the most influential and significant powers in the environment of ASEAN. Consequently their perceptions of ASEAN are regarded as most strongly indicative of the role, and thus of the essential nature of the Association. The examination seeks to establish the principal factors from which their perceptions of ASEAN were derived, and to categorize those perceptions as political or non-political.

Apart from their direct relations with ASEAN all five selected states have, of course, relations among each other, many aspects of which bear strongly upon their positions with respect to ASEAN. In fact, their interrelationships form the most important elements in the background and environment in which ASEAN is rooted. Predominant features and objectives of ASEAN, and thus its fundamental nature, are interwoven with conditions, events, issues, and relations in which ASEAN itself has no part, or only a very minor one. Insofar as consideration of non-ASEAN relations and underlying interests is indispensable to an understanding of the five powers' attitudes towards ASEAN, the examination includes an outline or an investigation of those other relations. For example, discussion of the American position necessarily touches on issues in which the USA is one of several interested participants interacting at the global, East Asian, or Southeast Asian level: the place of China and Japan in international
relations; containment policies with respect to China or the Soviet Union; the struggle between North and South Vietnam from 1954 to 1975. These issues are again taken up in other sections of the chapter in the contexts of other powers' positions towards ASEAN. From the conclusions reached about each of the five powers' perceptions of ASEAN an overall conclusion is drawn for an evaluation of how ASEAN was perceived in its environment.

Chapter 5 addresses the question of how ASEAN presented itself to its environment. It examines the image and self-image of ASEAN on the basis of organizational statements, activities, and objectives. Particular attention is given to the following issues: apparent discrepancies between the Association's self-presentation and its image as perceived by others, and between its public and its true self-image; continuity or discontinuity in organizational direction before and after 1976; identification of intermediate and ultimate goals; ASEAN's understanding of socio-economic development; and ASEAN's concept of resilience.

The analysis in this chapter relies in part on the basic documents issued by ASEAN. It also utilizes intra-ASEAN material specifically addressed to the public such as press releases and speeches, or compiled for use in ASEAN or for distribution to interested individuals, for instance, topical papers available from the ASEAN Secretariat. The examination includes activities and statements with an intra-ASEAN focus insofar as they complement, clarify, confirm, or contradict public actions or messages in a significant manner. For just as
"it makes ... little sense to base one's attitude toward the United Nations upon one's appraisal of the purposes proclaimed in its Charter ...,

it makes little sense to found one's appraisal of ASEAN on its stated objectives only. Nevertheless, public statements are an important indicator of self-understanding as well as a yardstick for actions. Since the organization faces both inward and outward, ancillary to public actions its non-public statements and activities provide a further means for assessing its true nature. The findings and evaluations are drawn together in an appraisal of the Association's basic understanding of its own character, for which its stand in the United Nations regarding the Cambodia issue is seen as an especially meaningful illustration.

Conclusions

It is found that the majority of the powers discussed in Chapter 4 based perceptions of ASEAN on political issues and on a political role for the Association. For Japan, both economic and political factors are seen to be important, with the balance tilting towards Japan's evaluation of ASEAN as a primarily economic organization. Japan and Vietnam partly excepted, the perceptions of powers in ASEAN's environment are found to have been based mainly on non-ASEAN relationships at the global level, in which political interests and issues predominated over others and set the framework for relations in Southeast Asia. In Japan's perspective, her global relationships are found to be significant, but not necessarily more so than relationships in Asia and Southeast Asia. For Vietnam, the focus on Southeast Asia meant, at the same time, a focus on political interests and issues. Overall it is concluded that ASEAN was perceived in its
environment as a primarily political organization.

The analysis in Chapter 5 suggests that ASEAN's concern with peace, stability, and development provides guiding principles for an understanding of its self-image. The examination of ASEAN's projected image and underlying self-image leads to the conclusion that, despite much conflicting and contradictory rhetoric, ASEAN had in fact an undivided perception of itself. This self-perception was one of an organization for which socio-economic and political aims are meshed into an overall, primarily political objective of fostering peace and stability through development. In effect, then, external and internal perceptions of ASEAN's nature are congruent rather than divergent. The analysis further leads to the conclusion that ASEAN rhetoric, flexibility, and adherence to consensus principles obscured — in part deliberately obscured — the organization's political features, which nevertheless were essential to its viability and development.

The Conclusion in Chapter 6 compares the results and processes of the overall evaluations made by the ASEAN environment and by ASEAN itself. It relates both divergent and congruent features in the two overall appraisals to ASEAN's environment, and sets out the relationship between ASEAN's essential nature and its ability to contribute to development and stability in Southeast Asia. Finally, the Conclusion points out how the ASEAN example may be relevant to theoretical concepts or models concerning international organization.
Methodology

Research on the topic of the thesis was first stimulated by the author's residence in 1975 and 1976 in Thailand, where the daily press provided a significant source of information on ASEAN. When systematic academic research was begun in Vancouver in early 1978, scholarly publications about the organization were found to be scarce and mostly recent. With respect to publications of non-Asian origin, this situation has not changed much in the three years since. A work such as Wilson's The Neutralization of Southeast Asia is one of the small number of books so far written that give ASEAN more than passing attention. There is some mention of ASEAN in publications focusing on Southeast Asia or Asia, for example Pye's work Southeast Asia's Political Systems or the volume by Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia. Scholarly articles in journals with a specifically Asian, Pacific, or Southeast Asian emphasis were found to be more frequent though by no means abundant, especially for the early years of ASEAN. Much of the material used in this thesis was collected by the author in Southeast Asia during residence and travel from 1975 to 1976, and in 1978, 1979, and 1980. It is derived from a variety of sources, among which interviews, ASEAN publications, and press reports are the most significant. The principal opportunity for field research arose in 1978. Between early May and September, the author lived for two months in Sulawesi, Indonesia, and travelled in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia visiting the national secretariats of ASEAN as well as the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. The Department of Political Science at Simon Fraser University assisted in the preparation of these visits by providing letters of introduction to the Canadian High Commissions and Embassies in
the ASEAN countries.

At each of the secretariats visited several interviews were conducted with ASEAN officials from different sections. A prepared list of questions was used; these centred on establishing what ASEAN staff saw as the organization's principal past achievements, future goals (short- and long-term), and essential purposes; how staff assessed internal cohesion and external relevance of the Association; and whether they felt political issues as compared to socio-economic issues to be more, less, or equally significant for an interpretation of ASEAN's objectives and nature. Many officials requested that they not be individually identified in the thesis. Thus, where views or conclusions presented are based on verbal information from within secretariats of ASEAN, the source is given only as "interview" or "interviews."

These interviews provided a wealth of inside information and understanding. Without exception, the officials gave most generously of their time and knowledge, as did many other government officials and private persons knowledgeable about ASEAN: academic research fellows and officers as well as library staff at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore; Embassy officials in various Canadian and German embassies in Southeast Asia; and personal friends in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia in their official or private capacities. Also in 1978, interviews were conducted in Washington, D.C. with a senior official of the Philippine Embassy (a former ASEAN official); in New York with the Singapore Ambassador to the United Nations; and in the Federal Republic of Germany with staffs of the
Institute of Asian Studies and with the Managing Director of the East Asia Society, both private institutions located in Hamburg.

Printed or mimeographed information was obtained from the national secretariats visited and from the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta. These materials comprise ASEAN documents, topical papers, speeches, and various publications combining all of these with additional, official ASEAN information. Scholarly publications became accessible or available, for example, in the libraries of universities in ASEAN countries and in the library of ISEAS, and also through the Select Bookstore in Singapore, whose manager takes a special interest in ASEAN. In Hamburg, both institutions visited provided relevant publications.

Reports on ASEAN in the daily and other press were collected from 1976; especially, of course, during periods of travel and residence in Southeast Asia. Four publications were found to be particularly useful: The Bangkok Post and The Straits Times (Singapore) - both daily press -; and Asiaweek and the Far Eastern Economic Review. The last two are weekly periodicals published in Hong Kong but available in all ASEAN countries. Among the four, the Far Eastern Economic Review is most readily available outside Asia and has been used most extensively; it is cited as FEER.

Academic research was essentially completed, and the first draft of the thesis written in Vancouver by early 1979. During the following two years, residence in Africa and extended travel prevented the author from gaining more than sporadic access to relevant research sources and materials. However, in 1979 and 1980 travel in Southeast Asia and Hong Kong provided opportunities for further field research, which included
some second and third visits to secretariats of ASEAN; an interview with a Philippine official at the Office of the Director-General of ASEAN in Manila; and informal visits to several offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta, and Hong Kong. Substantial revisions were subsequently made in the drafts of Chapters 4 and 5, taking into account major events that occurred during 1979, such as Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia and China's invasion of Vietnam, as well as ASEAN's highly visible role regarding the situation in Cambodia.

The author's extensive exposure to in-house ASEAN optimism and enthusiasm involved both risks and rewards. It occasionally seemed advisable to take one or the other interview statement about ASEAN plans and projects with a grain of salt. This need was, however, far outweighed by the benefits of seeing the organization at work and thus gaining insights more realistic than the pessimism of those who would compare ASEAN to the EEC and dismiss the Association as ineffective. Since 1979, the role of ASEAN in international relations has become so prominent that its political as well as economic relevance, and its viability, clearly are no longer in doubt. For the preceding years information gathered in 1979 and 1980 convinced the author that earlier questions and conclusions regarding the essential nature of ASEAN and the continuity of its direction could still be considered valid.
NOTES

1See Bernard K. Gordon, Toward Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy, with a Foreword by Kenneth T. Young (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969); hereafter cited as Disengagement. Much of the second half of this work is devoted to a discussion of Southeast Asian regionalism, and offers a detailed, highly favourable appraisal of ASEAN that is exceptional for a 1969 publication. See particularly pp. 119-127.


"... Politics consists of the more or less incomplete control of human behaviour through voluntary compliance in combination with threats of probable enforcement. In its essence, politics is based on the interplay of habits of cooperation as modified by threats."

While Deutsch focusses on processes, Couloumbis and Wolfe also emphasize values by defining politics as

"the attempt to regulate the conflicting needs and demands of large numbers of people in order to perpetuate a relatively just and harmonious society"


4Keesing's Contemporary Archives: Record of National and International Current Affairs with Continually Updated Indexes (London: Keesing's Publications Longman Group Limited), 2 May 1980, p. 30221-A (United Nations); p. 30222 (Kampuchea); "President Soeharto at the 12th Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN, June 28, 1979, Bali" [opening address], ASEAN Journal 3 (December 1979):4-5; and the following mimeographed releases from ASEAN: Statement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on Escalation of the Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, Jakarta, 9 January 1979 and Joint
Press Statement issued at the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Bangkok, 12-13 January 1979 (reprinted as No. 3/79 and No. 2/79 ASEAN News, Office of the Director-General, ASEAN-Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs); Joint Statement issued at the Special Meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Bangkok, January 12-13, 1979; Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Bangkok, 20 February 1979 and Joint Communiqué, Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 30 June 1979 (reprinted as No. 29/2522 and No.83/2522, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Thailand], Press Release).


9 See Jorgensen-Dahl, in Pacific Community 7.
Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is generally understood as being the area that comprises Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The names of the nine countries as given here are used throughout the thesis, except where a lack of distinction between Vietnam and North or South Vietnam, Malaya and Malaysia, or Cambodia and Kampuchea might lead to misunderstandings. The area encompassing the nine countries exhibits great diversity in topographical features; historically significant influences from outside; ideological orientations; and ethnic, linguistic, religious, cultural, and social characteristics among the populations. Heterogeneity exists not only among, but also within many countries in Southeast Asia.

The creation of ASEAN has resulted in a special bond among five of the nine states, even though in and among these five multiple diversities are no less pervasive than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Each of the five members of ASEAN has, of course, relations not only with the other four members but also numerous ties with states and organizations outside ASEAN. Moreover, the Association itself is only one of many institutions
which simultaneously pursue, or previously pursued, cooperative undertakings in Southeast Asia. ASEAN is neither a homogeneous entity, nor a self-contained unit, nor a wholly unique venture. It is necessary, then, to look at its setting in order to understand the Association itself. A summary of salient factors in this setting also will provide working definitions for the terms 'region', 'regional', and 'regional organization'. These terms are frequently used in ASEAN documents and statements, and their scope is not always clear. The ASEAN countries constitute only part of the area generally called Southeast Asia, but they seem to refer, sometimes to the entire area, sometimes to themselves as being a region.

Region and Regional Organization

In most of the relevant scholarly literature Southeast Asia is called a region. The criteria employed by political scientists for the identification of an area as a region vary considerably, ranging from physical to administrative and institutional to socio-cultural features that permit one to regard a given part of the world as a more or less cohesive entity, in which the component parts are more closely related with each other than each is with its non-regional environment.

It is doubtful that by any of the widely used criteria Southeast Asia can be identified as a region. The nine countries from Burma to the Philippines comprise mainland and archipelagic states; they are divided by mountain ranges and oceans; the influences of animism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity created different socio-cultural and spiritual patterns; the colonial period generated separate orientations towards
Spain, the Netherlands, Britain, France, and the USA; governmental and economic systems are based on divergent attitudes towards socialism, democracy, authoritarian (military) rules, or communism. The entire area is far more characterized by diversity of features than by their commonality, and no geographical boundary naturally encloses the nine to the exclusion of others. The term "Southeast Asia" itself reflects Western rather than Asian perceptions. The term and its application to the nine countries have become customary only since the Allied armed forces introduced both during World War II. To the inhabitants of Southeast Asia the term has limited meaning compared to the significance of ethnic or national criteria of self-identification (Burmese, Thai, Vietnamese, and so on). From the viewpoint of major countries in Asia - China, Japan - "Southeast Asia" lies to the south and west. There are insufficient common bonds of ethnic origin, culture, social system, religion, or national institutions that could overcome the natural divisions created by geography and history. Yet even scholars from countries in Southeast Asia have come to acknowledge the existence of "Southeast Asia" as a whole.

Essentially the same features of diversity characterize the area of the five ASEAN states. On the other hand, both Southeast Asia as a whole and the ASEAN part of Southeast Asia also exhibit remarkable similarities among the constituent countries with respect to climate, geography, culture, social structures, or ancient political systems. The terms 'region' and 'regional' are applied here to the ASEAN community, because this will facilitate its distinction from the whole of Southeast Asia, and because for the area of the five ASEAN states, the existence of the Association has introduced a strong element of commonality of perceptions.
and purposes. There now does exist within ASEAN more of a basis for perceiving this area as a cohesive, closely interrelated entity than there exists in all of Southeast Asia. In addition, this use of terminology conforms best to that of ASEAN, which frequently refers to itself as a regional organization, an organization for regional cooperation, or an organization inspired by regionalism. The same perceptions and the same terminology were put forth by the two organizations which preceded ASEAN and which are addressed in the subsequent section on antecedents to ASEAN.

The concepts of regional organization, regional cooperation, and regionalism are most frequently discussed in political science in contexts of international relations, international organization, and regional integration. All of these contexts are applicable to ASEAN. As a community of sovereign states joined in a single institution having hierarchical and functional characteristics - however well- or ill-defined - , ASEAN is an international grouping that participates as a unit in relations with other powers, organizations, and entities. Chapter 4 will discuss the most significant of those international relations. Regional integration may be a less obviously applicable concept with respect to ASEAN. If it is understood as a goal or a situation characterized by the displacement of national decision-making in economic, social, administrative, and especially political fields by decision-making through a supra-national agency, then for ASEAN regional integration would appear to be, at best, a long-term, vague possibility. If, however, integration is understood as
"the attainment, within a territory, of a "sense of community" and of institutions and practices strong and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population," then ASEAN clearly is a grouping well on its way to integration on a regional scale. Regional organization has geographical characteristics, which distinguish regional from other, especially global, international organization, and institutional characteristics that separate regional cooperation from regional organization.

The use of 'regional' terminology in this thesis, then, is as follows: regionalism, is understood as the spirit that generates regional cooperation and organization, causing the cooperants to think in terms of the region as a whole rather than its parts. Regional cooperation, is seen as all concerted action in a region for some regional purpose. Institutionalization, and thus transformation into regional organization, may manifest itself in various ways through charter documents, financial commitments, decision-making and administrative hierarchies, conventions, publications, or the conclusion of agreements and treaties. Regional organization thus consists of institutionalized cooperation among entities for which their own origins in one region dominate the framework of association, their activities centre on the region of origin, and their cooperation results from, and in turn creates, an interrelatedness among them. The principal criteria are regional membership and objectives - locals concerned with their local interests; and these criteria are underscored, for ASEAN, by the fact that it resulted from regional initiative. By these criteria ASEAN clearly is a regional organization. ASA and Maphilindo fall into the same category.
Antecedents to ASEAN

Other Cooperative Ventures

When ASEAN came into being, there already were, or had been, in Southeast Asia many other endeavours to tackle Southeast Asian problems and goals through international organization and cooperation. They ranged from military alliances to financial institutions to general- or special-purpose development organizations. Some of these efforts were based on global international organizations such as the United Nations, its Specialized Agencies, and the World Bank, whose memberships were global and to which Southeast Asia was but one of their areas of concern. Others encompassed Southeast Asia as part of an Asian origin and orientation, as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC). Still others such as the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA), joining states based in three continents for the benefit of Malaysia and Singapore, focussed on cooperation for a purpose that was specifically limited to Southeast Asia, even though the membership was not. There also existed numerous special-purpose, Southeast Asia-based ventures - for example, English language training, fisheries development, or the Asian Institute of Technology (AIT) -, some of which had originated with large-scale operations such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), but later became independently institutionalized. To the considerable number and variety of organizations, institutions, or ventures somehow cooperatively engaged in Southeast Asia could also be added the Mekong Project, an international undertaking to regulate the
Mekong river for improved land and water use.\textsuperscript{11}

Many of these cooperative activities and organizations had some relevance to ASEAN either through its members' involvement with them, or through its own organizational purpose of regional cooperation. They thus were part of the network of relations through which ASEAN became tied into influences and concerns far exceeding its own scope. Of all these other ventures the most relevant to ASEAN were two organizations whose origins and purposes had been exclusively regional: the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and an association between Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Maphilindo). Each of these had been created among some, but not all, of the states that later became members of ASEAN. These two and ASEAN differ from all other international cooperative endeavours in Southeast Asia in that they were, or are, the only purely indigenous organizations in the area, created without initiative from outside and composed of only Southeast Asian members. The indigenous quality of ASEAN is seen as highly significant by its leaders, by non-ASEAN powers, and by much of the relevant literature,\textsuperscript{12} because it lends a new and unique aspect to international organization and cooperation in Southeast Asia; an exceptional feature, acknowledged by those who consider all of Southeast Asia a region. The foundation and direction of ASEAN were in many ways shaped by the experiences its members had gained in ASA and Maphilindo. The histories of these two organizations shed much light on the principles, processes, and values by which ASEAN is governed.
The Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was formed in 1961 among Malaya, Thailand, and the Philippines. It joined together three states which shared few common characteristics among any two of them.

The peoples of Thailand and Malaya are of distinctly different ethnic stock and follow different religious and cultural patterns. The population in Thailand is basically homogeneous; and a strong Buddhist tradition, to which about 90% of the people adhere, permeates Thai society. In Malaya, the fact that the Malay segment of the population is not much larger than the Chinese segment creates serious tensions, and a significant Indian group of about 10% adds to the ethnic heterogeneity. Islam, the religion of the Malay group but not that of the other two groups, is also the state religion.

The political organization in each country results from different historical developments. Thailand had been an independent, more or less effectively centralized nation-state since the 13th century. Its political leadership and its population had long been proudly aware of their national history as a free people: "Thai" means free. The country had been the only one in Southeast Asia to escape colonization, though not all of its impacts. Its absolute monarchy had been transformed in 1932 into a constitutional monarchy, but the royal family continued to represent a strongly perceived focus of national unity. In Malaya, the colonial period had resulted in an orientation towards England and the British Commonwealth. Independent since 1957, Malaya was a federated kingdom under a king elected by and from the sultans, who continued to
rule the states in the Malay peninsula that formed the federation.

Domestic politics in Thailand until and at the time of ASA was largely concerned with intra-elite attempts to secure political power for one or another military grouping, while in Malaya domestic politics focussed on the tensions created by ethnic, economic, and political rivalries among the disparate groups in the population. The problem of national unity in Malaya was compounded by the facts that the Chinese merchants and town-dwellers were generally more prosperous than the Malay farmers, and that the Chinese were widely suspected of harbouring political loyalties for the People's Republic of China (PRC). In foreign politics, Thailand was preoccupied with averting its alleged fate of being the first domino to fall before a communist expansion in Southeast Asia beyond the area of former Indochina. Under successive military governments - in 1961 a dictatorship headed by Field Marshal Sarit - Thailand had come to be considered by many to be the staunchest ally of the USA in Southeast Asia, strongly committed to American policy in the area. Malaya, on the other hand, had been one of the first and most dedicated members of the non-aligned movement after its inception in 1955.

The third member of ASA seemed to have no more in common with its co-associates than did these with each other. The Philippines is geographically removed from Thailand and Malaya by about 1,500 miles (approximate distances between capitals) and encompasses an archipelago of over 7,000 islands. During more than three centuries of Spanish colonial rule and also during the subsequent fifty years of rule by the USA (1892 - 1946), the Philippines had been oriented eastward, rather than towards
Southeast Asia to the west. The Christian religion introduced by Spain in all but the southern, Muslim part of the southernmost island of Mindanao further separated the Philippines from salient socio-cultural mainstreams in Southeast Asia. The Philippine system of national political institutions formally followed the American pattern of democracy. Domestic politics dealt mainly with insurgency in the Islamic provinces, and in foreign policy the Philippines was closely allied with the USA; this latter feature, at least, was shared with Thailand.

Differences as great as those outlined above for these three states also existed among other states in Southeast Asia. Regionalism thus was not a concept that easily suggested itself to political leaders in Southeast Asia. A further obstacle to regionalism was the fact that, as a legacy of the colonial period, the Southeast Asian states had far closer bonds and relations with their respective 'homelands' than with each other. This applied to economic ties as well as to political concepts and also, to some extent, to the cultural orientations of Southeast Asian elites, who received their higher education in Europe or in the USA.

Before the rise of regionalism in Southeast Asia, the political leaders in the area barely knew each other. Meetings and exchanges of opinion were extremely rare; national policies for international relations were devised and pursued primarily on the basis of the relationship between each state in Southeast Asia and its principal outside partner. In the case of Thailand and the Philippines these relationships centred on the USA; in the case of Malaya, on Britain.

A final point needs to be made with regard to the difficulties in
conceiving of regional organization in Southeast Asia. ASA was devised at a time when political thinking the world over was still dominated by the view that nation-states represent the natural participants in international relations. In the Third World, most countries had only recently gained the status of independent states and, in many cases, were preoccupied with the creation of national unity. This applied to all ASEAN states except Thailand, though to varying degrees. Indonesia had attained statehood only by fighting and defying the Dutch, who for several years after World War II had tried to reestablish their pre-war colonial rule. Malaya had become a sovereign state only in 1957. The Philippines, while having gained formal independence from the USA relatively easily and early (1946), faced internal problems of national disunity with respect to Muslim dissidents, and external difficulties in asserting its real independence from American financial aid and American policy-making. In many other new states of the Third World parallel problems were at least equally salient.

Statehood and nationhood, two basic factors in determining a country's ability to participate successfully in international relations, were attributes not readily set aside in the interest of regionalism even by the old powers in Europe. For countries that had just begun to enjoy participation in international relations by virtue of their new sovereignty, the concept of a larger-than-national unit such as a regional organization did not easily suggest itself. The ASA members may have had less reason than many other Third World countries to feel particularly strongly about their status as independent states, since Thailand had never lost it and in Malaya and the Philippines the former colonial...
powers had cooperated in the transition to independence rather than resisted it. This may indeed be one of the reasons why in Southeast Asia the idea of regional organization originated with the ASA members.

Another reason appears to lie in sheer historical coincidence, which brought the right men together at the right time. In each of the ASA countries, prominent political leaders of the late 1950s and early 1960s held deep convictions that some form of regional cooperation was needed in addition to national efforts, to help Southeast Asian states deal with development, communism, the intrusion of outsiders in the region, and with the growing economic presence of Japan. All of these issues were seen in the ASA states as national problems the solution of which exceeded the capabilities of each individual country.

The earliest and most persistent advocate of regional cooperation was Tunku Abdul Rahman, the first Prime Minister of independent Malaya. Together with Thanat Khoman, then Foreign Minister of Thailand, he initiated the exchanges of ideas on new models of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Included in these exchanges was Carlos Garcia, then President of the Philippines, whose strong belief in regionalism was shared by his later successor Diosdado Macapagal. For the Philippines, one incentive for regional cooperation in a Southeast Asian framework may also have been the opportunity to alter its image of being an appendage of the USA in Asia, or a satellite of the USA. But there is no reason to cast doubt on the sincerity of the commitment of Philippine political leaders to the idea of regionalism and to regional cooperation in ASA.

The formation of ASA was thoroughly prepared by Rahman, Thanat, and
Garcia together with specially appointed staff. Invitations were issued during the negotiating stage to all other states in Southeast Asia except North Vietnam, to join in the deliberations. For reasons discussed below in connection with Maphilindo, Rahman and Thanat were especially eager to have Indonesia participate in the regional endeavour. Indonesia, however, declined the invitation, as did all the other states.\textsuperscript{23} The final resolution that launched ASA among the three participants was deliberately confined to issues and statements on which all three had been able to agree not only in rhetoric but also in substance.

The Bangkok Declaration of 31 July 1961\textsuperscript{24} showed many features that recurs six years later at the formation of ASEAN, both in an organizational and in a substantive context. The Declaration provided for national secretariats, annual ministerial meetings of foreign ministers, a special group (Joint Working Party) for the coordination between, and preparation of, ministerial meetings, and for functional committees.\textsuperscript{25} The goals of ASA stressed social, economic, cultural, technical, and scientific cooperation in the spirit of goodneighbourliness and were carefully formulated so as to avoid evidently political connotations. Except for an introductory reference to the ideals of peace and freedom and a concluding remark about contributions to the work of existing international organizations and agencies, there is barely a hint in the "aims and purposes of the Association"\textsuperscript{26} that the top political executives of the ASA states had other than non-political reasons for their desire to form a regional organization for closer cooperation among their states.

The final item of the Declaration, however, clearly connotes that
the political situation in Southeast Asia was, indeed, a factor in the creation of ASA. The closing statement asserts

"that this Association is in no way connected with any outside power or power bloc and is directed against no other country...."

The last part of this statement was an allusion to the absence of an invitation to North Vietnam to participate in ASA. The only country in Southeast Asia initially not envisaged as a potential member of ASA was then the only communist country in the area - a clearly politically relevant circumstance. The first part of the statement referred to the fact that all three members of ASA belonged to large-scale defense alliances directed against potential communist aggression: Thailand and the Philippines were members of SEATO; Malaya was a member in successive Anglo-Australian defense schemes set up mainly for its (and Singapore's) benefit.27 Thailand and the Philippines were the principal objects in Southeast Asia of communist allegations that they served imperialist purposes of the USA; they wanted to emphasize that the new organization was not related to SEATO. Malaya was anxious to avoid any identification which might have linked it, through its co-associates in ASA, to SEATO, especially since through support for the non-aligned movement it was striving to extricate itself from the friend-or-foe thinking that then dominated the world with respect to alliances and ideologies. But in trying to avoid politics, the three ASA countries clearly addressed it. Even if they had merely desired to express their peaceful intentions towards the international community, the statement quoted above clearly carried political connotations in the Southeast Asia of 1961.

The tangible achievements of ASA are not spectacular. There is no
record of ASA projects. Initial recommendations for ambitious ventures such as an ASA airline, an ASA shipping line, a common market, or a voting bloc in the UN soon gave way to the recognition that ASA should concentrate on modest and specific objectives, especially in the economic field. The organization was deliberately turned inward, focusing on the development of an internal atmosphere of understanding and agreement. This process soon encountered great difficulties, because relations between Malaya and the Philippines deteriorated to the point that in 1963 diplomatic relations were severed and tripartite cooperation in ASA ceased. The reasons for the animosity between the two ASA members went back well before the creation of the organization. They involved the process of the formation of the Federation of Malaysia, and especially the Sabah dispute. These issues illustrate the depth of alienation that existed between countries in Southeast Asia, and posed serious obstacles to meaningful regional cooperation.

The two conflicts were interrelated. In the early 1960s, Malaya sought to effect a federal union with Singapore and with Sabah and Sarawak, the two main areas (Brunei is a third) in North Borneo that have Muslim Malay populations and were then under British control. The rest of Borneo had formerly been held by the Dutch and had become part of Indonesia under the name of Kalimantan. Sarawak had been ceded to Britain by the last Raja (an Englishman) after World War II. Sabah was a British colony. The Philippines maintained that Sabah had come under British rule in violation of the rights of the Sultans of Sulu (Sulu is one of the larger islands of the Philippines); had been held by colonial force and not by right; and had reverted to the Philippines as the heir of the...
Sultans of Sulu when Britain abandoned sovereignty over both areas in North Borneo in 1963. Malaya took the position that it was the rightful successor to Britain in both Sarawak and Sabah. The two positions were succinctly summarized in the fact that Malaya (and later Malaysia) consistently refused to recognize a Philippine "claim to" Sabah as legitimate.29

The transformation of Malaya into the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 brought into the open a conflict which had been smoldering for several years. The government in Kuala Lumpur spared no effort to establish its rights to rule in both Sarawak and Sabah as being in accordance with historical truth and also with the wishes of the people in North Borneo. The Philippines contested both Malaya/Malaysia's right and the Malayan interpretation of the wishes of the people, and sought to capitalize on local political dissent with Malayan authority, which existed in both provinces for reasons largely unrelated to the international dispute.30

Soon after the creation of ASA in 1961, the Sabah problem had also caused the Philippines to draw closer to Indonesia, whose opposition to the formation of the Federation of Malaysia is discussed later in the context of Maphilindo.

Despite the severity of the Sabah conflict, which continued to plague relations between Malaysia and the Philippines until the late 1970s, each of the antagonists was interested in preserving ASA. Each continued to cooperate bilaterally with Thailand on ASA matters; ASA staffs were retained, and all three member states maintained that the organization would soon be reactivated.31 This did not occur, however,
until 1966. By then several major changes had taken place in Southeast Asia that influenced the usefulness of the ASA concept:

(1) Singapore in 1965 separated from the Federation of Malaysia, to which it had belonged since 1963. The separation helped to stabilize the Federation, as it substantially altered the ratio of Malay to Chinese residents in Malaysia in favour of Malays. It also removed Malaysia's international responsibility for the political distrust and economic envy felt in much of Southeast Asia towards the state "across the causeway" at the tip of the Malaysian peninsula. Singapore's independence also created a new actor in international relations in Southeast Asia. (2) By the mid-1960s, the fighting between North and South Vietnam had begun strongly to affect political priorities in the non-communist countries in Southeast Asia with respect to their allegiances and futures; they drew closer to each other as the probability of a communist victory and the threat of Vietnamese expansionism and aggression seemed to increase. (3) In the Philippines, a change of government had led to a less intransigent position on the Sabah question; in November 1965 Ferdinand Marcos, who as a senator under Macapagal had opposed the Philippine claim to Sabah, became President. (4) In Indonesia the Sukarno regime, which had violently attacked the Federation of Malaysia, was replaced by the Soeharto government in 1965, and previous Philippine identification with Indonesia's hostile attitude against Malaysia lost its foundation.

In the new configuration of actors and events Malaysia and the Philippines, aided by the mediation of Thanat Khoman, overcame their difficulties to a sufficient degree to resume direct relations, and in
1966 ASA formally continued its operations with a ministerial meeting. By then, however, the three-country concept no longer corresponded to the perceptions of political leaders in Southeast Asia, particularly since Indonesia had meanwhile shown interest in regional cooperation through Maphilindo. The larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations was being discussed, and shortly after the formation of ASEAN in 1967, ASA was dissolved and its projects, such as existed, were handed over to ASEAN together with the funds that had been contributed to ASA.33

The achievements of ASA are not easily perceived. For half the time of its existence the organization lay dormant, and during the other half it mainly endeavoured to organize itself. The seeming ineffectiveness has led some observers of Southeast Asia to declare ASA a failure, similar to that of Maphilindo (see below). Others, however, and some of the states in Southeast Asia view ASA as one of the cornerstones in the development of a regional consciousness in Southeast Asia and as the nucleus of ASEAN.34 The former ASA members naturally lean towards the second understanding, while Indonesia tends to agree with the first.

In spite of the meagre record of tangible achievements, it is justified to credit ASA with a good measure of success. It was no small matter that ASA did exist without outside initiatives and support and that, despite the severity of the Sabah dispute, the organization survived the break of diplomatic ties between Malaysia and the Philippines; indeed, it is likely that the existence of ASA encouraged the reconciliation of Malaysia and the Philippines. In view of the alienation that characterized relations among political leaders and their positions in Southeast Asia in
the 1950s and early 1960s, the significance of ASA for the atmosphere and attitudes in regional relations should not be underestimated. ASA's institutionalized machinery provided channels of communication and consensus-building which had not previously existed, and of which the member states made use both at the highest political level and at lower levels of the bureaucracies. This in turn strengthened incipient orientations towards regional commitments and turned the ASA members away from the separate loyalties to outside powers, especially former colonial powers, which had characterized the post-war era.

The existence of ASA was important in several further respects. Despite the wording of the founding declaration of 1961, ASA had some political foundations and goals. One illustration of this is its role with regard to the Malaysia-Philippines conflict, in which the institutional bond (and the personal contacts at the highest institutional level) helped to restore international relations between states that had been divided by an issue involving status, power, and possession of territory. Other examples can be found in statements from Southeast Asian political leaders during the formative stage of ASA; statements which left no doubt that communism and the involvement of Southeast Asia in disputes among outside political powers were major concerns of ASA members and were closely related to the creation of the organization. These statements further indicate that socio-economic development was being seen in ASA as a means to achieve regional cohesion, self-reliance, and stability.35

The conviction that economic cooperation and development should form the principal areas of ASA efforts reflected two fundamental realizations:
(1) that in the Southeast Asian environment, modest and practical undertakings promised more success than sweeping and idealistic schemes and (2) that economic issues were crucial to the solution of pressing problems in Southeast Asia. Both these realizations later constituted vital elements in the formation and direction of ASEAN. Thus, the assessment that ASA was terminated not because of failure, but because of its success in preparing the ground for ASEAN, seems more appropriate than a dismissal of the organization as ineffective.

Maphilindo

While ASA was inactive, its two members hostile to each other over the Malaysia-Borneo issue joined in a new regional organization with Indonesia, the third party to the same dispute. Indonesia had previously shown little interest in regionalism and had occasionally denounced ASA as an ignominious Western-inspired creation. In 1963, at the height of their several conflicts Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia formed the association called Maphilindo. It was clearly intended to serve as a means of influencing, perhaps resolving, the conflicts among its members. This purpose it completely failed to achieve.

Indonesia's hostility towards Malaysia related mainly, but not exclusively to the North Borneo issue. President Sukarno maintained that the entire island of Kalimantan was Indonesian territory; that the inclusion of the two northern provinces in a Federation of Malaysia constituted an act of neo-colonialism on the part of Malaya, inimical and threatening to Indonesian national integrity; that the Federation of Malaysia was devoid of historical, legal, moral, or any other
justification for its existence and that, therefore, Malaysia was a political non-entity against which a crusade under the battle cry "crush Malaysia" was perfectly legitimate. 39

Indonesia's hostility seemed out of proportion to the issue at hand. North Borneo is rich in valuable timber resources; Indonesia was fiercely protective of its national independence and status; also, perhaps, Sukarno was a temperamental and power-hungry politician. But these circumstances hardly explain the outright aggression by Indonesia against Malaysia—which intensified after the formation of Maphilindo—over a territory insignificant in size, population, and wealth in comparison to the whole of Indonesia. Perhaps, as a historian has suggested, some of the roots of the antagonism lay in the war period, when Japan tried to detach Sumatra from Indonesia and combine it with Malaya in a new state—a plan which had readily found acceptance among political leaders in Malaya, many of whom were the same that directed national affairs in the 1960s. 40 Other possible reasons include Sukarno's strong anti-Western views (to which Malaysia's close ties with Britain did not conform); the attempt to divert domestic attention from existing, severe economic problems; and above all a tendency in the political leadership under Sukarno to promote an international role for Indonesia that bordered on imperialism: Indonesia reached not only for all of Kalimantan, but also for the western half of Papua New Guinea (West Irian) and for Portuguese Timor. These last two territories are not even part of Southeast Asia; they are more appropriately perceived in the context of Australia.

The intensity of the 1963 conflict seemed all the more striking in
view of the close ethnic, cultural, religious, and personal ties between the Malaysian and the Indonesian people. The Indonesian attitude also appeared inconsistent with the country's emphasis on the principles for peaceful international relations adopted at the first non-aligned conference in Bandung in 1955, of which Indonesia had been the host and a founding member. These factors, however, were overridden by the causes of conflict between Malaysia and Indonesia, among which Indonesia's leadership aspirations and also its perceptions of China and the Chinese were particularly significant. In view of its size and population—then about 130 million, the fifth most populous country in the world—Indonesia can hardly fail to view itself as a natural leader among states in Southeast Asia. Indonesian political leaders of the post-Sukarno era often object to such an assumption. But Sukarno's foreign politics certainly exhibited farflung leadership aspirations. Malaysia was a much more forceful political entity than Malaya had been, and thus Malaysia could challenge Indonesian leadership in Southeast Asia far more effectively if it so desired. The union of Sabah and Sarawak with peninsular Malaysia doubled the territory of Malaya. It did not, as one would tend to assume, increase the Malay segment of the total Malaysian population over the Chinese segment, because in the North Borneo areas the Malay inhabitants were outnumbered by Chinese, Indian, and other residents. But the achievement of the federal union enhanced the position of the government in Kuala Lumpur both in a national and an international context.

Another source of conflict lay in the deep misgivings held in Indonesia about the strong Chinese element in Malaysia. There were
economic as well as political reasons for this. Economically, Indonesia was one of the least advanced countries in Southeast Asia. Its stage of overall development contrasted sharply with the levels of technical and industrial modernity, general income, and standards of living of Chinese Singapore or Chinese-dominated Penang. Singapore demonstrated Chinese economic success to every country in Southeast Asia. In Indonesia, the very small Chinese segment in the population (less than 3%) controlled a hugely disproportionate part of the economy. National propaganda in Indonesia fanned the resentment of the indigenous population against a foreign economic superiority achieved, allegedly, at the expense of the less fortunate or less devious Indonesians. Politically, Indonesia in the early 1960s was closely allied with the Soviet Union, which furnished arms, advisors, and aid. Indonesia had long seen itself threatened primarily by China, an attitude shared by many of the states in Southeast Asia. In the entire area the attitudes towards the PRC carried over into the attitudes towards the Chinese residents, and in the, then Moscow-oriented, Indonesian leadership this effect was particularly strong. The large Chinese segment of the population in Malaysia was perceived as not only economically, but also politically threatening. Thus many factors combined to generate the hostility that sealed the fate of Maphilindo almost before the organization was created.

During the first half of 1963, largely as a result of Thai mediation, President Sukarno of Indonesia, Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia, and President Macapagal of the Philippines met repeatedly to thrash out their differences and to discuss the role of regional cooperation and regional organization in the future of Southeast Asia. Yet Maphilindo was
conceived in haste. In June 1963, a tripartite Foreign Ministers Conference in Manila had produced the Manila Accord. This agreement was partly based on an earlier proposal by the Philippine President for a "Greater Malay Confederation" (the Macapagal Plan), devised principally to forestall the incorporation of the North Borneo territories into Malaysia. Only a few weeks later, during a summit conference of the three heads of state in Manila from 31 July to 5 August 1963, the Manila Declaration was signed announcing the formation of Maphilindo. In this declaration, the Indonesian imprint showed much more forcefully than in the Manila Accord. Simultaneously with the Manila Declaration the heads of state signed a Joint Statement, which referred the Borneo problem to the investigation of a UN mission.47

The organizational machinery outlined in the Manila agreements was similar in some respects to that of ASA. In Maphilindo, however, in addition to national secretariats and annual foreign ministers meetings, summit meetings were to underscore the significance attached to the decision-making level in the new organization. Financial commitments were neither mentioned nor later undertaken. The only organizational activities that ever took place were summit meetings (1963, 1964, and 1965) and foreign ministers meetings (1963, 1964, and 1966). None of these actually instituted concrete measures of cooperation or resolved problems among the members of Maphilindo.48

In the agreements, the political content outweighs the organizational content. All three Manila documents contain emphatic statements about racial and cultural fraternal ties among the three signatory states; the
historical significance of the meetings; the common dedication to lasting peace, security, national freedom; the pacific settlement of all differences; and a number of other basic political ideals. The documents strongly suggest that the Manila meetings were held in an idealistic spirit of reconciliation, in which an overwhelming vision of a better future world made everyday political reality appear a manageable problem. Except for the Joint Statement, which provided terms of reference for the UN mission concerning North Borneo, the declarations left the implementation of the ideals expressed for future specification.

Political reality soon overtook the ideals. Almost immediately after the August 1963 meeting, Indonesia and Malaysia again hurled insults and accusations at each other. Within weeks of the Manila summit "konfrontasi," Sukarno's explicit politics of confrontation with Malaysia, escalated into shooting along the border in Kalimantan, guerrilla and military combat, the invasion of peninsular Malaysia by Indonesian soldiers, and the severance of diplomatic relations. The hostility ceased only as the political leadership in Indonesia changed in a gradual process from October 1965 to March 1967.

This change was the result of an abortive coup d'etat in September 1965. The coup attempt is often portrayed as a bid by the communist party of Indonesia (PKI) to seize control of the country. According to some sources, the PKI was strongly supported - perhaps prompted - by some military groups, who sought to force Sukarno to step up Indonesia's alignment with the leftist goals of the PKI against the anti-communist majority in the politicized military. The PKI, or factions in it, had
previously developed pro-Peking leanings, even though Sukarno's own
orientation towards Moscow continued to prevail. The army foiled the coup
attempt and took the government into its own hands. In the aftermath of
the coup, the PKI was completely shattered. According to varying
estimates, several hundred thousand, perhaps as many as one million
people, mainly alleged communists, were killed. The PKI never recovered
from the blow. The Indonesian-Soviet link ended abruptly, as did the thaw
in Sino-Indonesian relations of the late Sukarno era. The accusations
against Chinese communists, who were said to have had a hand in the coup
attempt, influence the Indonesian attitude towards the PRC to this day.
The experience of the coup attempt strengthened Indonesia's commitment to
politics of self-reliance and rejection of close involvement with any
major foreign power.

Sukarno was deeply implicated in the coup attempt, and over the
ensuing eighteen months was eased from all positions of power. Although
the new President, General Soeharto, and the new Foreign Minister, Adam
Malik, as well as other prominent politicians did not share Sukarno's
attitude towards Malaysia,\(^{51}\) Indonesian confrontation politics was
reversed only gradually. Until well into the summer of 1966, leading
Indonesians were in disagreement over whether the confrontation with
Malaysia should be continued or discontinued. Sukarno's return to power
was still considered a possibility in early 1967.\(^{52}\) However, as Soeharto
consolidated his position during 1966 and as Malik gained the political
elbowroom to pursue his long-standing belief in regionalism, confrontation
politics against Malaysia was replaced by one of cooperation in a
regional framework. Rather than attempt to revitalize the concept of
Maphilindo, Indonesia entered into the negotiations which led to the formation of ASEAN in 1967.

Probably Maphilindo never was a viable creation. It reflected the unrealistic expectation that a regional organization, then a novelty in Southeast Asia, could be the sole framework and prerequisite for, rather than the result of, the achievement of shared persuasions. Certainly sustained cooperation among the units of an organization will of itself generate or enhance common beliefs. But it cannot take effect without at least a basis of shared ideas; organization alone cannot engender, or substitute for, its substantive purpose: the joint pursuit of common goals. Equally unrealistic—in view of the deep conflicts among members of Maphilindo—were the stated overambitious goals of forging a union of hearts, minds, and political purposes.

Although the language of all three Manila agreements is clearly inspired by Indonesia, the true commitment of the other two members was perhaps greater. Indonesia's subsequent behaviour indicates that it did not take Maphilindo very seriously. Sukarno saw Maphilindo primarily as a means to advance Indonesian political interests and convictions, and viewed ASA as a rival organization. For Malaysia and the Philippines, ASA already provided an organizational framework for cooperation; a framework which both members considered too important to let it be destroyed even by the Sabah dispute. Their commitments to ASA were certainly stronger than their commitments to Maphilindo.

The assessment that Maphilindo was an unsuccessful undertaking is virtually unanimous among Southeast Asians and outsiders. Yet the
organization marked an important stage in the development of regional organization in Southeast Asia, and in particular in the development that led to ASEAN. The mere fact of Indonesia's participation in a regional organization was significant. It is difficult to conceive of long-term, successful regional organization in Southeast Asia without Indonesia's participation. Regardless of the validity of assertions that Indonesia does, or does not, seek a regional leadership role, the country is simply too large, too populous, and too active in international politics to be considered peripheral to Southeast Asian events. Despite the evident shortcomings and lack of achievement of Maphilindo, Indonesia's participation in it reflected a new regional awareness on its part, and a new chance for the other states in Southeast Asia to advance their concept of regional organization. Moreover, to those who viewed potential Indonesian aspirations to regional leadership with apprehension, a regional organization including Indonesia represented the best opportunity to harness such aspirations to common, regional interests. To those who viewed potential Vietnamese leadership aspirations in Southeast Asia with — probably far greater — apprehension, an organizational partnership with Indonesia could serve as a reassuring factor in relations between communist and non-communist states, since Indonesia's own importance as a political power in Southeast Asia made it unlikely that Vietnam would be able to dominate such relations.

Even more significant than Indonesian membership in Maphilindo may have been the simple fact that through the Maphilindo meetings, Indonesian political leaders became personally acquainted with their Malaysian and Philippine counterparts, and all came to know their respective views and
problems better than ever before. As mentioned earlier, direct consultations and exchanges of views among Southeast Asian states had been almost totally lacking before the 1960s. The organizationally inspired meetings among foreign ministers, heads of state, and other officials changed this situation. These altered the atmosphere between and among states more profoundly than can perhaps be appreciated from a distance.

To the political leaders of three states involved in severe conflicts, the Maphilindo meetings provided the first opportunities to assess each other's positions on the basis of more than diplomatic messages or fiery public statements, and thus to readjust their perceptions of each other's political convictions and priorities. The contacts among those involved in the Maphilindo meetings certainly contributed to the subsequent understanding among the ASEAN members of their national and regional problems, and also contributed to the evolving understanding about the benefits of regional cooperation as well as to a more rational treatment of the Malaysian question.

From a point of view attuned to the processes of western politics based on and in democratic systems and high-technology communications, the significance here attached to a few personal encounters in the framework of an inoperative regional organization may seem exaggerated. But Southeast Asian politics is largely elite politics. The perceptions of political leaders, who are all members of the national elites, determine the salient issues in, and the policies of, the individual countries. Consequently, personal acquaintance and communication among political leaders have far greater significance for the political attitudes of the states in Southeast Asia, and for their international relations, than
might be the case in Western states. This is all the more true with respect to the then novel concept of regionalism in international relations. Regionalism and regional organization in Southeast Asia were not then - and are hardly now - popular phenomena; they are the expression of the beliefs and efforts of a handful of elite politicians or scholars. Maphilindo, ASA, and ASEAN came to exist and floundered, or succeeded, because a few elite representatives from the participating countries were unable or able, as the case may be, to harmonize their perceptions of their countries' interests. For this reason the actual contacts among the members of an otherwise unsuccessful organization were so valuable.

Two facets of the Maphilindo documents remain to be emphasized. Both reveal the handwriting of Indonesia, and both have implications for ASEAN. First, the Joint Statement in its conclusion notes agreement:

"that foreign bases - temporary in nature - should not be allowed to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence of any of the three countries. In accordance with the principle enunciated in the Bandung Declaration, the three countries will abstain from the use of arrangements of collective defense to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers."56

This reflects Indonesia's strong stand for non-alignment, disengagement, self-reliance, and also national integrity. Much of the political thinking behind this statement later became incorporated into the ASEAN approaches to issues such as peace and non-interference in Southeast Asia.

Second, the Manila Declaration provided for "frequent and regular consultations at all levels to be known as Mushawarah Maphilindo."57 Mushawarah is an Indonesian and Malay term and an Indonesian concept. In
conjunction with "mufakat," a concept suggesting unanimity as the proper
goal of negotiations, mushawarah refers to the spirit, conduct, and
outcome of negotiations. It summarizes a conciliatory, consensual mode as
well as atmosphere, connoting the intent to avoid confrontation; to
compromise; to help each other maintain dignity (to save face) - if
necessary by shelving controversial issues until some later time; to toss
problems about until some consensus emerges. The translation as "close
consultations" in the Manila Joint Statement reflects only a small part
of the meaning. Mushawarah later became a key characteristic of the
methods and procedures in ASEAN cooperation. Even though Maphilindo did
not demonstrate much of the significance of mushawarah, the first
contractual pledges to it are notable.

The first efforts at regional organization initiated with ASA and
Maphilindo were crucial to the subsequent ASEAN undertaking. It is very
doubtful that ASEAN would have succeeded without the experiences gained
through the two organizations that preceded it. The role of ASEAN as a
participant in relations in Southeast Asia has proceeded far beyond that
of its precursors. In order to relate this role to the essential nature
of the organization from its inception, it is necessary to outline the
development of ASEAN so that key features of its history, structure, and
identity may be seen. This outline is presented in the next chapter.
NOTES

Note: Page number references for ASEAN documents and papers are to the publication 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), unless otherwise specified.


emphasizes geographical contiguity within outer limits determined by an arbitrary - maximum distance between key points (capitals in states). Cantori and Spiegel stress intensity of relations among proximate, though not necessarily contiguous units. Dahlberg (passim) advocates a "configurative" or "ecological" approach, centring on perceptual categories such as cultural elements, types of authority, or basic legal patterns in preference to criteria derived from jurisdictions, policies, or political attitudes. Russett discusses a wide variety of categorizations of regions emphasizing, among other criteria, geographical contiguity, social and cultural homogeneity or compatibility, and features conducive to integration (see his overview, p. 10, p. 11). A particularly concise summary of widely employed criteria and attendant problems of identifying a region is found in A. LeRoy Bennett, *International Organizations: Principles and Issues*, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1980), pp. 366-367.


4This statement is based mainly on the author's personal opinion derived from conversation with people in Southeast Asia. Implicit confirmation can be found, for instance in, Barbara Howell and Leon Howell, comp., *Southeast Asians Speak Out: Hope & Despair in Many Lands* (New York: Friendship Press, Inc., 1975), passim. For Chinese, Indian, and Arab perceptions of regional entities in ancient Southeast Asia, see Tate, p. 8.

5This is evident from publications from the area which treat "Southeast Asia" as one entity, such as a work by Chia Lin Sien, T.G. McGee, et al., *South-East Asia: A Systematic Geography*, ed. R.D. Hill (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1979).


8Karl W. Deutsch, Sidney A. Burrell, et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of*


The entire fourth volume of Michael Haas' compendium of documents is concerned with regional organizations in Southeast Asia.


In this section on ASA, the name Malaya is used throughout except for the Federation of Malaysia, and events that occurred after the Federation of Malaysia had clearly been established.

For ethnic groups, see: G. Coedes, The Making of Southeast Asia, transl. H.M. Wright (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 22-26; Tate, pp. 6-7, 27, 37; Cady, Southeast Asia, pp. 14-20. For the influences of Islam and Buddhism: Coedes, pp. 50-70; Tate, pp. 10-12,

The Thai date their political existence as an independent nation-state from the foundation of the kingdom of Sukhothai in 1238. Early examples of Thailand's manoeuvering among foreign influences are described in Coedes, pp. 158-159 and Maurice Collis, Siamese White (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1965), passim.


Mindanao is the southernmost of the major Philippine islands. There are numerous small islands further south in the Sulu Archipelago off the east coast of Sabah.

For reasons of linguistic convenience, the term 'Third World' is used throughout the thesis as interchangeable with 'developing countries',
even though the latter implies a reference to socio-economic conditions and the former is often associated with political, especially non-alignment attitudes and issues.

21 Gordon, *Disengagement*, pp. 73-91, 95, 113.

22 Tunku, Tengku, and Datu are hereditary titles; conferred titles are Datuk, Tun, and Tan Sri. It is customary to prefix names by the proper title. See Bruce Ross-Larson, *The Politics of Federalism: Syed Kechik in East Malaysia* (Singapore: Bruce Ross-Larson, 1976), Preface, pp. viii-ix.


25 Ibid., Introductory Note, p. 1232, p. 1233. The ministerial meetings convened in 1961, 1963, 1966, and 1967. The principal committees dealt with economics, science and technology, and technical cooperation and research. A joint fund was established from $1 million contributions of each ASA member.


28 Ibid., Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1233; Gordon, *Dimensions*, pp. 173-179; Idem, *Disengagement*, p. 98 n. 10, p. 100. In this last work, Gordon also cites a joint research programme on seasnake venom (p. 103).


30 Ross-Larson, passim.

The author expresses high regard for Thanat's political astuteness and negotiating skills. He reports a remark from the Philippine Vice-President in 1963 to the effect that Thanat was "our ASA Ambassador."


Idem, Disengagement, p. 111.

Malaysia was then still Malaya; the process of the formation of
the Federation of Malaysia overlapped with the establishment of Maphilindo
overlapped with the establishment of Maphilindo in 1963. In the Maphilindo
documents the name 'Federation of Malaya' is still properly used.

39For example, see: Leifer, Dilemmas, pp. 140-142; Lyon, War and
Peace, p. 157; Cady, Southeast Asia, pp. 164-171, 280-284; Nuechterlein in
Asian Survey, 810-811. A detailed review is given in Gordon, Dimensions,
pp. 68-119.

40FitzGerald, p. 345<sup>1</sup> pp. 337-338.

41In both countries, Islam is a strong feature of social and
political life. The official languages Bahasa Malaysia and Bahasa
Indonesia are nearly identical and are continually being synchronized.
This process was further advanced in 1977 than is suggested by David A.
Andelman, "Indonesia, Malaysia Seek Common Tongue," The New York Sunday
Times, 18 September 1977. For personal ties among prominent politicians in
both countries, see Gordon, Disengagement, p. 113 p. 35, p. 118 n. 42.

42The principles are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and
sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs,
equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. See: Kahin, The
national Indonesian set of five principles (Panca Sila) is distantly
related to those of Bandung; see George McTurnan Kahin, ed., Governments
and Politics of Southeast Asia, 2nd ed., prepared under the Auspices of
the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University (Ithaca: Cornell University
Politics in Southeast Asia," in Pacific Affairs 35 (Spring 1962):3-10
(5-6); Herbert Feith and Alan Smith, "Indonesia," in Southeast Asia:
Documents of Political Development and Change, ed. Roger M. Smith (Ithaca:


44Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 160.

45Shee Poon-Kim, Sinophobia, passim. Using population figures for
1973, the author reports that about 3% Chinese in Indonesia dominated
about 70% of the country's small and middle size sectors of the economy
(p. 1).

46Cady, Southeast Asia, pp. 276-279; Nuechterlein, in Asian Survey,
810-811.

47Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV: Chapter IX, Documents
4001 (pp. 1261-1263: Manila Accord), 4002 (p. 1264: Manila Declaration),
4003 (pp. 1265-1267: Joint Statement); Ibid., Introductory Note, p. 1234;
48 Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1236.

49 Gordon, Dimensions, pp. 68-119; Lyon, War and Peace, pp. 183-188.


51 Gordon, Disengagement, pp. 112-113 and Ibid., n. 25, pp. 118-119 n. 42; Lyon, War and Peace, pp. 187-188. Lyon stresses the roles that Adam Malik and Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie played in pre-Soeharto efforts to make peace between Indonesia and Malaysia. Ghazali was then Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs and in the 1970s became Home Minister. Malik after many years as Foreign Minister became Ambassador to Japan in 1978.

52 Gordon, Disengagement, pp. 113-114 n. 29.

53 Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1236; Lyon, War and Peace, p. 157; Gordon, Dimensions, pp. 103-104 and Ibid., nos. 103, 104.

54 For instance, see: Gordon, Disengagement, pp. 111-112; Lyon, War and Peace, pp. 43, 154-158; Leifer, Dilemmas, pp. 138-139, 143-145; Wilson, pp. 182-183; Indorf, p. 4; Lange, p. 505; Schubert, p. 444; Shee Poon-Kim, in Asian Survey, 754; Cady, Southeast Asia, p. 121, p. 452; ASEAN - Indonesia, A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) [speech] by Boni Ray Siagian, Head Public Relations Division, ASEAN - Indonesia: May 1, 1978 [at the Jakarta International Airport] Halim Perdanakusuma, Jakarta, Indonesia (Jakarta: ASEAN - Indonesia, 1978), (mimeographed).

55 For social background data on some of the political leaders in Southeast Asia, see Edward Baum and Felix Gagliano, Chief Executives in Black Africa and Southeast Asia: A Descriptive Analysis of Social Background Characteristics. Papers in International Studies: Africa Series No. 29 - Africa Program, 1976; Southeast Asia Series No. 39 - Southeast Asia Program, 1976 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, Center for International Studies, 1976), passim.

56 Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Document 4003 (pp. 1266-1267).

57 Ibid., Document 4002 (p. 1264).

In an interview in Washington, D.C. in autumn 1978, a former ASEAN official from the Philippines commented on the ASEAN way of conducting negotiations. Emphasizing that he did not speak Indonesian, he explicitly referred to "mushawarah" as an integral part of, and a proud achievement in, regionalism in Southeast Asia.
Chapter 3

THE ASEAN ORGANIZATION

History

The history of ASEAN shows two distinct stages in the development of the organization. These stages are punctuated by a 1976 meeting of the heads of government in ASEAN, which divides the history into a pre-summit and a post-summit period. The distinction does not imply discontinuity between the two stages. Rather, it signifies different emphases in ASEAN on the foci, levels, and intensity of cooperation. The pre-summit years may be summarily characterized as the formative period, the post-summit years as the period of consolidation.

Formation

For nearly two years before the actual formation of ASEAN, its prospective members deliberated on the form and objectives of a new regional organization. In each of the five countries, different national priorities are likely to have shaped different perceptions of the reasons for regional cooperation. All five, however, were agreed on the desirability of a fresh start in a framework that would take into account the events of 1965 and 1966. Thailand and Malaysia had long been champions of regional cooperation. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Foreign Minister Rajaratnam continued to support regionalism and the idea of regional organization after Singapore's separation from
Malaysia. To the Philippines, participation in regional ventures continued
to be an important means of establishing itself as part of Southeast
Asia.\(^1\) The new political leaders in Indonesia were determined to detach,
the country from its previous image as an aggressive power, and the shift
in focus in Indonesian politics under Soeharto from foreign policy to
economic development\(^2\) was favourable to the trend towards regional
cooperation.

Without diminishing recognition of the dedication of other political
leaders in the ASEAN countries, the greatest credit for achieving the
formation of ASEAN must go to Thanat Khoman (Thailand) and Adam Malik
(Indonesia). Indonesia had been reluctant to enter negotiations about
future regional cooperation on a basis that would make it appear to ask
for membership in ASA (or its successor), an organization Indonesia had
opposed.\(^3\) Thanat's diplomatic skills enabled Indonesia to uphold its
position that it was participating in a new beginning in regional
cooperation. Thanat was also, instrumental in reconciling Malaysian,
Philippine, and Indonesian attitudes towards each other. His negotiating
skills, his and Malik's dedication to the cause of regionalism, and their
efforts towards the creation of ASEAN are acknowledged in many
publications on Southeast Asian affairs.

The prospective members of ASEAN endeavoured in vain to include
Burma and Cambodia in the negotiations. Their participation was desirable
not only because they were part of Southeast Asia. Their status as
non-aligned states would also have silenced allegations that the five were
plotting an anti-communist, Western-supported alliance. But neither Burma
nor Cambodia felt sufficiently assured that their participation would not compromise their neutral positions amidst the contending forces in Southeast Asia. After numerous informal meetings variously including all or some of the future ASEAN states, the five reached a basic consensus that the new organization should combine the pragmatic and functional features of ASA with some of the idealistic and enthusiastic characteristics of Maphilindo, but that the former would have to be emphasized. Initially some of the prospective ASEAN members had wished to retain the acronym ASA for the new organization, because in major languages in the ASEAN countries 'asa' connotes the meaning of 'hope'. The old acronym was eventually rejected, however, so as to avoid identification of the new with the previous organization and with the aura of failure which ASA had from the points of view of some of the ASEAN members. Several proposals for the framework of the new venture were thoroughly debated before ASEAN took shape. The final draft that became the founding instrument of ASEAN thus reflected not only a compromise among five national sets of perceptions, but a basic consensus about the needs and desires common to all five.

The agreement that formally launched the Association of Southeast Asian Nations - ASEAN - on 8 August 1967 is known as the ASEAN Declaration or the Bangkok Declaration. As had been the case with the declaration that established ASA, the ASEAN Declaration was not signed by heads of government, nor ratified by national representative bodies of the member states, but signed by the Foreign Ministers. Outside observers - not the ASEAN members themselves - seemed to find it remarkable that an agreement which was, in effect, an international treaty should have rested
solely on the signatures of the Foreign Ministers. The reasons for this procedure are rarely discussed in ASEAN. It may be that some of the heads of government in ASEAN initially wished to avoid public or formal responsibility for a venture whose success was by no means ensured. Most likely, however, the procedure simply mirrored the informal style in which the ASEAN deliberations had been conducted; the ASA example may have been seen as satisfactory evidence that signatory responsibility at the ministerial level would adequately ensure the functioning of the organization. For nearly nine years, the Bangkok Declaration remained the only ASEAN document comparable to a charter. The pragmatic ASEAN members evidently considered it a sufficient foundation for the operation of the Association until 1976.

The principles and purposes of cooperation set forth in the ASEAN Declaration encompassed a wide range of motives, general aims, ways and means for their achievement, and specific areas identified for joint activities. Insofar as they shed light on the nature of ASEAN and its role in Southeast Asia, these principles and purposes are examined in Chapters 4 and 5. The organizational machinery outlined in the Declaration was similar to that of ASA (see below: Structure). The Declaration did not provide for financial commitments, but in 1969 the Foreign Ministers agreed on the establishment of a $5 million ASEAN Fund through five equal contributions.

During the first eight years of its existence the Association did not attract much attention. The machinery was duly established, and committees began to proliferate. They generated numerous proposals,
recommendations, plans, and projects for joint action, but few results became visible that seemed to have a noticeable impact on either the life of the organization or the life of the people in the region. Project requirements were laid down by the heads of the National Secretariats (see below: Structure) during their first meeting in 1968. However, since every suggestion for organizational activity (such as a meeting) was termed a project, the early ASEAN records abounded with project proposals and so-called project implementations. Organizational activity focussed on modest, short-term projects yielding quick results and requiring minimum financing. Most 'projects' took the form of studies in fields of economic and cultural cooperation. The first specific issues addressed in ASEAN were reflected in the responsibilities assigned to the first committees: food and agriculture, civil air transport; communications, air traffic, and meteorology; and shipping.

The committee concerns were initially chosen not only for their salience among nationally felt needs, but also for their propensity for not generating major disagreements among the ASEAN members. From the start, ASEAN cooperation was predicated on the principle of consensus. This meant that, certainly during the first years, the common denominator for cooperative ventures was often found only at a modest level of action or at a low level of importance of problems. In order to create and maintain an atmosphere favourable to the development of intra-ASEAN understanding, mutual trust, and consensus the ASEAN members sought little publicity for their organization in the mass media, even those of their own countries. For the same reason, ASEAN proceedings were kept informal, ASEAN staffs small (this also had financial reasons), and ASEAN records
of meetings and activities confidential. It was felt that intra-ASEAN cohesion was at first too fragile to expose ASEAN performance to public scrutiny and critique. Another reason for ASEAN's concern with confidentiality was that many records and papers dealt with economic issues in which the public knowledge of data, proposed strategies, or internal divisiveness could have been detrimental to the interests of the ASEAN members. This concern was as valid ten years later as it was at first. For example, ASEAN members are strongly affected by, but little consulted in, decisions of the Far Eastern Freight Conference, a body that controls most of the carriers, their routes and schedules, and also the freight rates in commercial shipping in Southeast Asia. ASEAN efforts to arrive at a joint stand against dictates of this conference would not have benefitted from public knowledge of conceivable intra-ASEAN differences of opinion.

The pattern of modest activity range and low visibility showed a few exceptions. For instance, in 1969 ASEAN commissioned a comprehensive UN study of the needs and potential for economic cooperation in ASEAN. The study involved several UN agencies - ECAFE, UNCTAD, and FAO - a large amount of money - about $1 million out of the ASEAN Fund -, and large-scale, long-range projections. Upon completion of the study in 1972, however, ASEAN classified the UN report as confidential. Not until the second phase of ASEAN did the UN recommendations seem to be seriously considered for selective implementation. A second exception to ASEAN's low profile was the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971, which announced an ASEAN proposal for international recognition of Southeast Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. This declaration is of
considerable significance to the image and self-image of ASEAN and is discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. In general, however, ASEAN kept its attention focussed inward and its visible activities modest.

As a consequence of the low ASEAN profile, the organization's existence during the initial years went largely unnoticed beyond those individuals and governments that were directly involved in, or affected by, ASEAN operations. This effect was compounded by the fact that each member state continued to pursue its national interests and policies far more emphatically and far more publicly than its contribution to ASEAN cooperation. National interests and policies were often divergent. For much of the early period of ASEAN, each member was at odds with at least one of the other member states. In 1968 the Malaysian-Philippine conflict over Sabah broke out again. Indonesia and Malaysia continued to be wary of Singapore's economic success, which left the other ASEAN nations far behind, and of the alleged leanings of Singapore Chinese towards the Chinese homeland in the PRC. Thailand and Malaysia each had to cope with unrest and insurgency along their common border, and relations between the two were often strained. Thailand and the Philippines generated misgivings in the other three countries because they were closely identified with the US war effort in Vietnam.15

The intra-ASEAN tensions initially did not bode well for the future of the new organization. It was thus understandable that at first most of the outside world took little more than passing note of ASEAN, expecting it to bog down, as had its antecedents. During the early years the other participants in international relations in Southeast Asia generally
afforded ASEAN the same overall attitude - positive or negative - that characterized their bilateral relations with certain ASEAN member countries, relations in which the existence of ASEAN appeared to play a minor role. 16

Consolidation

The second phase in the development of ASEAN was ushered in by the first meeting of heads of government in ASEAN in February 1976 in Bali. The Bali summit changed the profile of the Association both in the ASEAN self-perception and in the perceptions of others. The meeting received more regional and international attention than any previous ASEAN activity. The peak of publicity surrounding the meeting itself naturally levelled off afterward. But ASEAN remained more visible, and the environment more attentive to it, than before.

The reasons behind this change of profile and the significance of the Bali summit can only be fully understood in the light of the goals and purposes of ASEAN as they relate to the Southeast Asian and the international environment. The summit meeting was not only a colourful gathering of Presidents and Prime Ministers; its substance had been conceived, planned, and prepared well before February 1976. To outsiders a link between the outcome of the struggle over South Vietnam, on the one hand, and ASEAN's seemingly sudden activity, on the other hand, was obvious. The speeches by the summit participants struck a different keynote: they stressed that after eight years of internal consensus-building, the Association had attained a firm foundation on which to base a more active role; a role that would enable ASEAN to
consolidate its previous achievements with regard to regional understanding, cohesion, and joint approaches to common problems and to their solutions.\textsuperscript{17} What this meant in terms of specific goals and achievements will be discussed in Chapter 5. For this overview of \textit{ASEAN} history it is sufficient to note that the Bali summit constituted something like a watershed in the life of the organization.

The summit resulted in several important agreements and organizational innovations. A Declaration of \textit{ASEAN} Concord and a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast \textit{Asia}\textsuperscript{18} - hereafter referred to as the Concord and the Treaty - were signed which, together with the \textit{Bangkok} Declaration of 1967, formed a tripartite basic instrument for the Association. The 1976 agreements did not claim to change the basic direction of \textit{ASEAN}, but they explicitly enlarged and specified its scope. For example, the Treaty contains a section on the pacific settlement of disputes,\textsuperscript{19} an issue which had previously been excluded from the framework of the Association. For \textit{ASEAN} it was important because it signified that Malaysia and the Philippines had finally overcome their differences over the Sabah issue (for which the Philippines had not earlier been prepared to forego other means of settlement) in the interest of intra-\textit{ASEAN} harmony. Another example can be found in the Concord, which spells out a "programme of action as framework for \textit{ASEAN} cooperation"\textsuperscript{20} outlining various future undertakings in much detail, and directives for the implementation of the programme. The \textit{Bangkok} Declaration had been far more general.

An organizational change was introduced with an Agreement on the
Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, also concluded at the Bali summit. This agreement added a central executive body to the existing national secretariats and other machinery. Since the existence of a Secretariat is seen by some as a crucial indicator of the efficiency and modernity of an international organization, the introduction and role of the ASEAN Secretariat merit special attention.

The question of a central secretariat had been discussed almost from the inception of ASEAN, but during the first years the members had found that their differences of opinion over its desirability and preferred type were stronger than the organizational need for its establishment. The differences revolved around two main issues: the functions, and the location of an ASEAN Secretariat. In ASEAN, both issues are related. The members' positions on both questions derive not only from their perceptions of organizational needs, but also from their national priorities. The eventual solution of the entire issue is an illustration of the ASEAN mode of operation through patience, consensus-building and compromise.

The Philippines advocated a central secretariat as early as 1968 and implicitly suggested Manila as the location. The other ASEAN members seemed to have viewed this primarily as being an expression of intent to establish firmly, Philippine identity as a Southeast Asian country and member of the Association. This motive and the limited needs of ASEAN during the early years for elaborate machinery did not seem to warrant raising the inevitable controversy of whether an ASEAN Secretariat should have merely administrative or also decision-making functions. The first
choice would have meant adding another level to an already adequate administrative hierarchy. Most members felt, therefore, that the issue would gravitate towards the second choice - decision-making functions - simply through the creation of a central secretariat; most did not favour such a development, because they felt that a functionally important secretariat would encourage Indonesia to seek to host and eventually dominate it. This was assumed to be not in the interest of ASEAN itself and of most of its members. ASEAN was founded on the premise that it served, above all, the national interests of its members and that national concerns quite naturally had priority in the decisions involving ASEAN. This premise is clearly apparent from the history and structure of ASEAN; it was also openly expressed by ASEAN officials.23 Since the national interests in the five member states did not always coincide, domination of the organization by any one member would seriously have affected the very foundations of ASEAN.

When the issue of a central secretariat came up again in 1973, the unease toward an Indonesian emergence as leader in ASEAN had either receded as a result of experiences already gained through cooperation, or the prospect was viewed with greater equanimity than during the first years. A central secretariat was increasingly felt to be necessary due to the expansion of ASEAN activities. In 1973 Indonesia offered Jakarta as the site for the ASEAN Secretariat, "provided that there was no such offer from other ASEAN member countries."24 The Philippines, pointing to its older claims, countered with an extremely generous offer of providing facilities and assuming funding and staffing responsibilities in Manila. It was widely said that President Marcos desired the prestige of hosting
the ASEAN Secretariat and wished to refute a tacit understanding, should such exist, that Indonesia might represent the natural physical focal point in the Association. The other three members gradually convinced the Philippines that Indonesia's salient position in the region could not be ignored; eventually the Philippines withdrew its offer "in deference to the wishes of Indonesia and in the interest of regional unity and harmony," and even refrained from the anticipated request that, in exchange for yielding on the point of the location of the Secretariat, the first Secretary General be nominated by the Philippines. The ASEAN Secretariat was established in Jakarta in 1976 and General Hartono Rekso Dharsono of Indonesia became the first Secretary General.

The position of the Secretary General was considered important enough by the ASEAN members to be filled only from among prominent, distinguished national nominees of high professional standing. An individual's acceptability as an ASEAN official depended not only on his public position regarding organizational matters, but also his attitude with respect to national policy issues. Dharsono, the first Secretary General, was relieved of his office in February 1978, shortly before the expiration of his term, because his public critique of specific domestic policies in Indonesia had made him unacceptable not only in the eyes of his own government, but also to some other ASEAN member states. It was felt that his involvement in national Indonesian affairs was incompatible with his office in an international organization. This ASEAN view of the position of the Secretary General suggested that the role of the Secretariat would perhaps not remain as modest within the ASEAN hierarchy as it was conceived. Dharsono was the Secretary General of the ASEAN
Secretariat, not of ASEAN. But the incumbent of this office was evidently seen as a prominent public figure who had to be above national controversies.

The 1976 Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat defined the functions of the office as purely administrative. This decision settled, for the time being, the issue of the functions of a central secretariat. At that time most members of ASEAN strongly endorsed this limitation, and it is possible that only because of the restriction of functions agreement on the establishment of the Secretariat, in Indonesia, could at that time be reached. Subsequently for some members a change of attitude seemed to evolve. Indonesia always considered the limitation unsatisfactory; Umaryadi Njotowijono, the second Indonesian Secretary General, went on record as calling the ASEAN Secretariat "a postman collecting and distributing letters." The limitation to administrative matters evidently reduced the significance of the Secretariat in the context of organizational development. Its creation was certainly not negligible as an indicator of ASEAN growth, ASEAN cohesion, and ASEAN resolve to consolidate its achievements. But it did not result in a delegation of authority to a supra-national agency; decision-making continued to rest at the national level. For an assessment of whether ASEAN was efficient or important, and whether it had an identity separate from the aggregate of its members, the existence of the ASEAN Secretariat could provide only an ancillary criterion.

As further organizational measures the Bali summit initiated a thorough overhaul of the ASEAN committee structure, which had largely
grown out of ad hoc needs into a partially overlapping tangle of responsibilities. In addition, the heads of government set guidelines for increased lateral coordination and cooperation at the ministerial level. Prior to the summit, ASEAN ministerial meetings of other than the Foreign Ministers had been extremely rare and the ad hoc reflection of individual issues rather than a reflection of systematic cooperation within the ASEAN framework. The limited decentralization of national responsibilities for ASEAN progress, away from the sole focus on the Foreign Ministers, was perhaps the most important organizational change since the beginning of ASEAN, because it signified that organizational achievement could now be based on a broader range of lateral contacts within ASEAN. The summit meeting particularly emphasized the role of the Economic Ministers in ASEAN, and from 1976 on their role expanded considerably. Already in 1975 the summit preparation for Bali had been conducted primarily by the national Economic and Planning Ministers and their Senior Officials. At the summit, the heads of government instructed the Economic Ministers to meet and consult with each other and to implement a large part of the programme of action outlined in the Concord. The record of Economic Ministers Meetings after Bali and the ASEAN record of the second summit meeting seventeen months after the first, indicate that the Economic Ministers pursued their assigned tasks with dedication and efficiency (see Chapter 5, Summit Follow-Up).

The heads of government in ASEAN met for the second summit early in August of 1977 in Kuala Lumpur. They reviewed the progress made since the Bali summit; they devoted particular attention to the reports of the Economic Ministers. Other than a Preferential Trade Agreement
outlining various modest steps towards the increase and liberalization of intra-ASEAN trade, the Kuala Lumpur summit did not immediately result in documents or organizational innovations of major significance. But it took place in a context which greatly enhanced its importance to the development of ASEAN.

One aspect of this context was that the Kuala Lumpur summit coincided with the tenth anniversary of the formation of ASEAN. The occasion gave the meeting a publicity which the second summit might otherwise not have attained. ASEAN confidently presented itself as a vigorous organization whose firm foundations and viability were beyond doubt. The ASEAN leaders conducted their gathering in an atmosphere of proud celebration. They used the occasion to integrate their reviews of the Bali and post-Bali achievements into an appraisal of the first decade of ASEAN. They portrayed the more recent ASEAN vitality as the natural evolutionary consequence of an initial phase of quiet preparation. Both the Bali summit and the combination of events in 1977 also led observers from within and without the region to undertake ten-year or post-summit reviews of ASEAN. These reflected a variety of attitudes ranging from enthusiasm to surprise, pessimism, and anxiety over the ability of the Association to sustain the new surge of energy. Whatever the essence of such evaluations by scholars, journalists and politicians, their increasing number and variety of origin showed that outside awareness of ASEAN had begun to grow. The second summit clearly accelerated the process of widespread international recognition of ASEAN that was initiated with the first summit.
The context of the Kuala Lumpur summit was also notable in another respect. Immediately after the meeting, the ASEAN heads of government met with the Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand in separate sessions. All meetings were the first at heads-of-government level. Those with Australia and New Zealand constituted essentially — though not exclusively — a continuation of prior instances of cooperation geared to economic development in ASEAN. The meeting with Japan, however, went far beyond such a purpose. It reflected a marked self-assurance on the part of ASEAN as well as a high degree of significance attached by both ASEAN and Japan to their relations, and it affirmed for the first time Japan's official acknowledgment of ASEAN as an organizational entity.

Japan had been eager to be invited to the summit proper but had been asked to confer with the Southeast Asian leaders after their summit. The meeting involved an impressive array of political and economic leaders on both sides, and it covered the entire background and future of relations between ASEAN and Japan. After the meeting with ASEAN, the Prime Minister of Japan held bilateral talks with Malaysia, Burma, and the other four ASEAN countries in their respective capitals and, during his last stop in Manila, outlined Japan's proposed future role in Southeast Asia in a comprehensive "blueprint" speech that became known as "the Fukuda Doctrine." The second of three principles affirmed by Fukuda in his Manila speech singled out "Japan's positive co-operation with ASEAN as equal partners;" in addition, Japan pledged considerably increased development aid to ASEAN.

In the eyes of ASEAN leaders and officials, the summits and the
subsequent years demonstrated that ASEAN idealism, patience, and mushawarah had paid off in the evolution from the first to the second phase of organizational development. The second phase was seen as having begun very successfully with a new measure of recognition, activity, and effectiveness. By the end of 1978 a third summit meeting was planned for 1979. Since the first two summits, ASEAN stepped up its efforts to achieve, in a more efficient organizational framework, concrete results on specific issues that would affect the well-being of the populations in the member countries and in Southeast Asia. ASEAN also began to tackle the problem of making itself known to the regional populations. In this effort, the regional press assumed an important role. The frequency and the extent of coverage of ASEAN events in regionally available news media increased markedly during the post-summit years. As mentioned earlier, a similar trend became apparent in extra-regional publications.

In mid-1977 the first Secretary General of the ASEAN Secretariat summarized the development of the organization by stating that "more has been achieved in various fields during the past two years than was achieved in the first eight years of ASEAN." This statement is generally regarded as accurate, except that the implied critique of the initial years should not be understood as belittling the important achievement of intra-ASEAN consensus-building. At least since the summits, all ASEAN members were convinced that the organization had definitely and visibly passed the point of conceivable failure, and that the "ASEAN spirit of cordiality," which had been invoked for years in every ASEAN agreement, press release, or communiqué had become a reality. ASEAN officials interviewed in 1978 and after, without exception expressed deep.
satisfaction with the general atmosphere of friendship and goodwill in ASEAN; they pointed out that, on both ASEAN and other issues, frequent informal consultation prior to position-taking on significant matters affecting the member countries, had become a matter of course. Also without exception the officials stated their conviction that all governments in ASEAN since 1967 had been firmly committed to the organization. It was especially stressed that after each change of government in a member country the new representatives had immediately reiterated their country's continued support for ASEAN. The development of the organizational framework further supports the ASEAN affirmation that since the summits regional cooperation was well on its way to consolidation.

**Structure**

The following overview of the ASEAN structure sets out the basic components of the ASEAN machinery as it existed after the summits and before 1979. The organizational innovations introduced at the summits left most of the original structure formally intact, so that it seems unnecessary to describe separately the earlier machinery. The organizational framework must be expected to be continuously reviewed and revised as ongoing activities reveal either weaknesses or scope for further improvements. An organization chart as derived by the author from the information available from ASEAN is given on the following page.

The Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government was instituted by the Bali summit as the highest authority in the Association. It convenes at
Figure 2.
ASEAN Organization Chart
irregular intervals according to perceived need and determines the
direction of ASEAN.

Policy making has rested, from 1967 to 1976 solely and since then
principally, with the Foreign Ministers, through their annual Ministerial
Meeting. This meeting sets policy guidelines; coordinates and reviews all
ASEAN activities; channels approved policies and programmes to the
appropriate bodies in ASEAN for implementation; and except only summit
meeting agreements, is the source of all final decisions. Until 1976
questions of international relations were usually the subject of special
meetings, one of which resulted in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971.

Between Ministerial Meetings the Standing Committee coordinates
activities, handles routine and especially urgent decisions, and liaises
between the Foreign Ministers and the committees. It convenes, as does
the Ministerial Meeting, in the capitals of the member states on a
rotational basis. It is composed of the Foreign Minister of the
respective country hosting the Ministerial Meeting, and the Ambassadors of
the ASEAN states to the host country.

Meetings of Ministers other than the Foreign Ministers were
instituted in five areas by the end of 1978: Economics, Labour, Social
Welfare, Education, and Information. Only the Economic Ministers had by
then been given some limited decision-making authority.

The National Secretariats in each member country are part of the
national Ministries of Foreign Affairs, usually at the department or
division level; in some cases (for instance, Malaysia) as part of the
division dealing with economic matters within the Foreign Ministry. The Directors-General heading the National Secretariats are the senior officials in charge of all ASEAN activity in their respective countries. As a group they coordinate activities between the Standing Committee and the other committees. The staffs of the National Secretariats work in functional subdivisions (e.g., economic affairs, cultural affairs). Since about 1977 they were beginning to be occupied with ASEAN tasks only, whereas previously they had often had to divide their attention between ASEAN and national concerns in their given subject fields. The combination of functions relating to different and, at times, conflicting interests was perhaps not always beneficial to ASEAN progress. On the other hand, it is likely that the resulting constant alertness of secretariat staffs to both organizational and national concerns contributed to realism and pragmatism among ASEAN idealists, who might otherwise have been induced by regional visions to overlook the harsh facts of national realities.41

The ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta became operational in mid-1976 as the central administrative organ for the implementation of ASEAN projects and activities. Staff is recruited from all member countries and assigned to three Bureaus (Economics; Science and Technology; Social and Cultural Affairs) headed by Directors and supported by Officers for Foreign Trade and Economic Relations; Administration; Public Information; and an Assistant to the Secretary General. The ASEAN Secretariat is responsible to the Standing Committee and the Ministerial Meeting; it is the official liaison body for formal communication in ASEAN as well as for communication between ASEAN and other organizations or governments. The functional and hierarchical relationship between the ASEAN Secretariat and
The Standing Committee was not fully resolved by the end of 1978 (see below).

The various original Committees — permanent, special, and ad hoc — were streamlined after 1976 into nine permanent Committees of Senior Officials responsible to the national ministers in their respective area or areas of competence. There are five Economic Committees: Trade and Tourism; Industry, Minerals and Energy; Finance and Banking; Food, Agriculture and Forestry; and Transport and Communications. The other four are charged with tasks in Social Development; Culture and Information; Science and Technology; and Budget insofar as it concerns the ASEAN Fund and the ASEAN Secretariat. Special committees still exist; among them, those in Brussels charged with ASEAN – EEC consultations are especially important (ASEAN Brussels Committee – ABC, established 1972; ASEAN – EEC Joint Study Group – JSG, established 1975). Other special committees include, for example, the ASEAN Geneva Committee (AGC) for contacts with UNCTAD and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – GATT — and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochina States (ACCRIS).

A large number of subcommittees and non-governmental organizations testifies to the many specific concerns of, and lateral relations within, ASEAN. A list of private organizations compiled by the ASEAN Secretariat in late 1977 or early 1978 enumerates 27 different associations, councils, circles, federations and confederations (and a college of surgeons), which were all specifically formed as ASEAN groups. They unite, for example, Women of Jakarta, Port Authorities, motion picture producers, Japan
Alumni, journalists, shipowners, and many others. The Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry provides an umbrella for eleven different industry clubs. These, and the federations related to shipping are particularly significant among the non-governmental organizations.

Despite the post-summit improvements in ASEAN structure, there remained overlap and duplication within the machinery; the vertical channels of communication were cumbersome, and apart from private groupings lateral relations were only beginning to be established. The informal mode of communication and the capability of officials working in the national secretariats and in the ASEAN Secretariat, ensured a high degree of internal efficiency, but it was to some extent an achievement in spite of the machinery. The question of relationship between the ASEAN central and national secretariats remained unresolved, as did relationships between the ASEAN Secretariat and other bodies in the hierarchy, such as the Standing Committee. Until the end of 1978, the functions of the ASEAN Secretariat were clearly limited to administrative tasks. Were this limitation to be abolished, major realignments in the existing structure would become necessary. The ASEAN Secretariat already encroached upon the role of the Standing Committee to communicate between itself (the ASEAN Secretariat) and the Ministerial Meeting, and upon the role of the group of national Directors-General to communicate between the Standing Committee and other committees.

Those members of ASEAN, Malaysia and Singapore in particular, that did not favour a decision-making function for the ASEAN Secretariat were eager to see the original roles of the Standing Committee and the Meeting
of Directors-General preserved. Indonesia and also Thailand were the main proponents of a larger role for the ASEAN Secretariat, while the Philippines appeared open to either direction of organizational development.45 In all probability, mushawarah and the ASEAN spirit of cordiality will ensure the continuity of the present structure until such a time when formal changes would occur to acknowledge existing, rather than to introduce new, organizational patterns.

Identity

The organizational structure of ASEAN raises the question whether ASEAN has, in fact, an organizational identity or whether it is a multinational club with only an administrative centre. The issue of an ASEAN identity also raises the question whether the five original members view their organization as a closed-shop operation or whether — from a membership aspect — the Association has a Southeast Asian rather than a regional dimension.46

The ASEAN structure does not appear to support the assumption that ASEAN is indeed the entity separate and distinct from its members which its treatment in this thesis implies. There is no body in ASEAN that could overrule, in the interest of organizational aims, potentially divisive tendencies from within. Such tendencies continue to exist despite the ASEAN commitment among the political leaders and the real ASEAN enthusiasm among the staff. National interests such as those underlying the Sabah conflict, and especially economic interests at times exercise a centrifugal effect on cohesion in the Association. Most of the intra-ASEAN
disputes in economic matters arise from conditions in national economies that are not likely to change much in the near future, such as the disparity of levels of development in Singapore and Indonesia, or the competitive rather than complementary sectors of the economies in all of the ASEAN countries except Singapore.

The existence of the Association has not diminished the activities of the member states as individual actors in economic and other fields, though the significance of conflicting national interests in member countries is sometimes overrated by those who try to assess the degree of ASEAN cohesion. For instance, as a major element in the economic programme of action launched at the Bali summit, ASEAN announced that it would institute five industrial projects as the first step towards regional complementarity and economy of scale, and each of the members chose one project to be implemented on a basis of shared financing, responsibilities, and benefits. There resulted numerous disputes over the desirability of the original selection of projects, none of which had proceeded beyond the stage of feasibility studies by the end of 1978. The apparent lack of consensus in ASEAN on the specifics of the industrial projects was frequently interpreted outside ASEAN as a demonstration of intra-organizational weakness, while in ASEAN the understanding prevails that a general commitment to the idea of complementation projects had been firmly made in Bali, and that discussion of specifics could in no sense jeopardize the existing consensus on the principle.

The ASEAN members clearly wish the organization to be perceived as an entity. One indication of this is simply the existence and persistence
of the Association. The members would hardly have spent most of the early years on internal consensus-building, had they not intended ASEAN to appear and to be recognized as a single unit. In the post-summit years it became much more evident that ASEAN saw itself, and was seen by a growing number of states, organizations, and individuals as an organizational entity. Another indicator is provided by the Southeast Asian press, which throughout the years 1967 to 1979 constituted a major source of information about ASEAN. It treated the organization as a distinct unit in which five states represented the constituent members, but not the whole of the Association itself. Again, this portrayal became increasingly evident in subsequent years.

A third indicator can be found in the conduct of international relations between ASEAN and governments or organizations outside ASEAN. The negotiations with Japan, Australia and New Zealand after the Kuala Lumpur summit, and also the so-called dialogues are prime examples. The term 'dialogues' refers to the framework for formal bilateral relations instituted by ASEAN since the early 1970s between itself and various non-ASEAN states and organizations. At the end of 1978 dialogues existed with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the USA, Canada, the EEC, and UN organizations. Each dialogue is handled by one ASEAN member representing the Association. In substance, the dialogues address primarily economic cooperation and development assistance. But the fact that meetings are held in the dialogue framework, i.e., as bilateral meetings, is rightly seen in ASEAN as proof that the outside world acknowledges the organizational reality of ASEAN.
ASEAN has, and is perceived as having, its own organizational identity. The five member states are being viewed as a unit of some kind, for which "ASEAN" provides the framework and the explanation. Although in view of the organizational structure of ASEAN the logic behind such a view might be faulty, the reality of ASEAN's identity separate from that of its members cannot be, and could at no time be denied. From its inception, ASEAN was something essentially different from the aggregate of its members, or a multinational collective. It was an irritatingly undefined entity, but it was an entity. ASEAN had and has to be treated as an independent actor in its international environment.

Perhaps the most prominent aspect of the ASEAN identity is the understanding and consensus among its five original members. All basic ASEAN documents, however, contain either direct or reference clauses concerning the accession of other states in Southeast Asia. An examination of the scope of ASEAN is thus useful towards an understanding of what the organizational entity represents, and how its current membership provides a frame of reference for perception of ASEAN from without.

In the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, the ASEAN members declared the Association

"open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles, and purposes."

In the preamble to the Concord of 1976, the members "reaffirm their commitment to the Declarations of ... Bangkok..." The 1976 Treaty states that the Association "shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia."51
As mentioned earlier, during the negotiating stage before the formation of ASEAN the five participants had wanted Burma and Cambodia to join the new organization. Burma would probably still be welcomed more readily than any other state. For Thailand, much of whose western border is shared with Burma, joint membership in ASEAN with Burma might prove reassuring in view of Thailand's pervasive problems with border unrest, and it would open new channels of communication between the neighbours. Perhaps more importantly, however, Burma's staunch adherence to the principles of non-alignment would boost ASEAN efforts to present itself as a grouping that cannot be labelled 'pro' or 'anti' with respect to any given ideology. Cautious attempts to induce Burma to leave its isolationist stance were being made from time to time by the ASEAN members. Burma appeared to watch the Association closely; in 1977, some statements by Burmese political leaders indicated that membership in ASEAN might eventually be considered.52

With respect to Cambodia, the situation in Southeast Asia has, of course, changed profoundly since 1967. As a result of the fighting in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s, and as a result of insurgency from within and attacks from without, Cambodia fell more and more into domestic chaos and under the influence of communist forces (see Chapter 4). The question of whether ASEAN is still open for accession by other states in Southeast Asia, as the basic documents assert, centres on the relationship of ASEAN with the communist countries in Southeast Asia and particularly on that with Vietnam. Throughout ASEAN's existence communist Vietnam has been the most powerful state in Southeast Asia. It commands a weapons arsenal, military experience, and ideology which all combined give
it a position of apparent strength surpassing that of any other country in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN leaders in 1967 had thought it possible, and by 1976/77 virtually certain that Hanoi would bring all of former Indochina under its control. Communist Vietnam therefore was, and remained, the crucial factor in assessing the ASEAN attitude towards the accession of other states in Southeast Asia to the Association.

The public stance of ASEAN is that the invitation remained as open as it was in 1967. In the deliberations preceding the formation of ASEAN, only selected states had been invited to participate, but the accession clause in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 had clearly been addressed to all states in the area. This approach differed from that previously adopted in the creation of ASA, when all states in Southeast Asia except North Vietnam had been asked to consult with the three signatory states, but none had been offered membership once ASA was formed. The pointed exclusion of communist North Vietnam was not repeated in connection with ASEAN. Up to 1977 ASEAN extended invitations to the states in Southeast Asia to attend as guests the annual Ministerial Meetings, and until 1973 Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam were variously present at some of these meetings. In 1977 communist Vietnam was formally, although unsuccessfully, invited to attend the second ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur. For ASEAN, the invitation was an important gesture to demonstrate its continuing openness to all its neighbours in Southeast Asia.

Yet it must be questioned whether ASEAN would really have been prepared, at any time, to accept communist Vietnam or any of the other
states that turned communist, as a member of the organization. In 1967, the non-communist orientation of all five founding members of ASEAN and their close links with capitalist economies were the grouping's most evident features. With the development of intra-ASEAN cohesion, this common denominator among the five grew even more pronounced, since all ASEAN cooperation serves the goals apparent from the four basic ASEAN documents: to preserve and secure the freedom of national choices with respect to the ways of life in the member countries (see Chapter 5). Although ASEAN has always taken care to emphasize that it is not an anti-alliance of any kind, the principles on which it was founded are so closely related to non-communist, non-socialist patterns of national existence that it is difficult to see how a communist country could fulfill the accession requirement of subscribing to ASEAN principles. Does this mean, then, that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations has become the Association of non-communist nations in Southeast Asia?

Many people in the ASEAN countries unequivocally oppose an expansion of ASEAN and especially an inclusion of communist states. In a 1977 Singapore series of radio lectures occasioned by ASEAN's tenth anniversary, a prominent political scientist from Singapore received a question from his audience as to why Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam were not invited to join ASEAN. The lecturer explicitly rephrased the question in order to explain "why the other Southeast Asian states are not invited to join ASEAN" and said:

"It is true that ASEAN represents the biggest bloc of non-communist countries in Southeast Asia. As for the other Southeast Asian states, you will find that countries like Burma have expressed very little interest in ASEAN. This leaves us with the Indochinese states. Would it be in ASEAN's interest to
include them as members? I believe that for a regional organization to function, there must be certain common interests and ideals that bind the participating members together. The ASEAN countries have more or less the same political-economic structures; they are non-communist, their economies are relatively open, and there is a fair amount of common understanding among themselves of their longer term needs. But what about the Indochinese states? To begin with, are they interested? Even if they are, it is doubtful that they would come in right now. In any case, at the moment it is difficult to see how their entry would be of any benefit to ASEAN. If we are serious about ASEAN as a regional organization that would help to further socio-economic growth in the area, then, for the time being, it is important that the membership be restricted to the present five member states. Expansion of the organization at the moment would only impede its progress.57

A statement such as this suggests that ASEAN views itself as a regional rather than a Southeast Asian venture. But it is important to note the emphasis on "for the time being." Perhaps excepting the case of Burma, the above statement probably summarized accurately the prevailing attitudes in ASEAN at the time.58 Some ASEAN officials will concede privately that a request from communist Vietnam would have been, and would be, acutely embarrassing to the Association.59 However, such attitudes need not be regarded as final nor the official ASEAN position as hypocritical. As ASEAN began and developed with a good measure of pragmatism, it may well prove able to adjust to future developments in its environment without dogmatic rigour. Since none of the communist states has ever applied for membership, and since conditions in Southeast Asia make it unlikely that any will do so in the near future, ASEAN sees no reason to retract its general invitation in order to resolve a hypothetical problem.60

This attitude is characteristic of the overall approach in ASEAN to
questions touching on its organizational identity: The Association is confident that its idealism and consensus about principles will enable it to handle pragmatically specific issues as and when they arise. In principle, ASEAN does not limit its scope to the region encompassing the five original members. In the same radio lecture referred to above, immediately following the lecturer's quoted statement, the chairman of the radio series gave his own, more flexible views on the question of ASEAN membership and scope as follows:

"The critical point ... is that nations come together because there is a common interest ... the question is whether they can put their house in order and make ASEAN work. If it works it is possible some other people might come along knocking on [ASEAN's] doors and asking, would you let us in into the nice things that you have got going. So it is possible that ASEAN might grow in membership with time, like for example how EEC has grown. And then the question would be whom does ASEAN want to take? It would then be up to the founding members. They have not stated that they will not take others in. It is possible that as time passes things will change in Laos, in Kampuchea and in Vietnam. In the meantime, it is not a question of them and us, or Indochinese states versus ASEAN. It is a question of the ASEAN group trying to put its house in order first ... In this sense, it is not impossible that the time will come when there will be close rapport between the two groups or even membership of ASEAN by these three nations. We will have to wait and see. But the doors of ASEAN are certainly not closed. Nobody is talking in terms of lines being firmly drawn between this or that particular group."51

These quotations indicate two complementary aspects of ASEAN identity. ASEAN embodies consensus and cohesion among its five original members, but also is openminded about future participants. It has an inward, regional focus and an outward, wider-than-regional perspective. It firmly adheres to the principles laid down in its basic documents; but reserves the right to interpret them as necessary for its own continuity and for changes in its environment.
The accession clauses in the ASEAN agreements have prompted several other countries to express interest in membership or associated status. In comparison to the potential issue of accession by communist states in Southeast Asia, the enquiries which ASEAN has actually received seemed less problematic; but they, too, would affect the ASEAN identity. Soon after the formation of ASEAN, India had suggested her admission as a member. Since by no definition of the area India could be called a state "in the South-East Asian Region" as stipulated in the Bangkok Declaration, ASEAN had been able to ward off India's membership without offense. There were other reasons, however, for considering India's participation undesirable: her status as a large Asian power aspiring to commensurate influence; her close relationship with the Soviet Union; her pursuit of a nuclear capability; her immense problems of economic development. In addition, India's close relationship with the Soviet Union made India a partisan in the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and China's support for Pakistan in the enmities between India and Pakistan led to a clearly hostile relationship between the PRC and India. Had ASEAN associated itself with India, it would have found it far more difficult to keep open the options for future accommodation with China, and to pursue its goal of non-involvement in the political conflicts between actors in its environment. For ASEAN, the sum of conditions with respect to India was altogether too formidable to fit into the Association's concept of regional cooperation. 62

Since the ASEAN summits, India has approached ASEAN for the establishment of a dialogue; Sri Lanka, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea have shown interest in some form of participation in ASEAN cooperation. 63
Brunei, of course, is clearly a part of Southeast Asia. But for its own volition to retain the status of a British colony until mid-1978, Brunei would have been a natural choice for an original ASEAN member. Brunei, being one of the most prosperous states in Asia and closely attuned to Western economic and political ways, probably would present ASEAN with few problems that could not be accommodated in the present pattern of regional cooperation. Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea are both outside the conventional concept of Southeast Asia. If they became members, their special relations with India and Australia, respectively, would probably compel ASEAN to reassess and adapt its present relations with a number of outside states. In addition, both Sri Lanka and Papua New Guinea are presently at stages of socio-economic development in which their abilities to contribute to ASEAN cooperation might be less than their needs to benefit from existing cooperative activities. ASEAN itself has not reached a level at which it could extend a helping hand to less developed countries outside its own membership.

ASEAN has not discouraged the enquiries by Brunei, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea. For the present, however, admission to membership does not appear to be seriously considered. The question of some kind of associated status has been entered on the ASEAN agenda, but seems to be treated from a long-range perspective. For the time being, ASEAN clearly identifies itself as the community of its founding members.

The following two chapters examine the essential nature of ASEAN for the years 1967 to the end of 1978, from the points of view held in the ASEAN environment, and those manifest in ASEAN's self-presentation. The
perceptions of the five most important powers outside ASEAN are addressed in the next chapter.

NOTES

Note: Page number references for ASEAN documents and papers are to the publication *10 Years ASEAN* (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), unless otherwise specified.

1 The attitude that this was one of the principal reasons for the Philippine's membership in ASEAN was expressed in several interviews in 1978.

2 See Wilson, pp. 49-50; Cady, *Southeast Asia*, pp. 291-296; Pye, pp. 60-61. Many Indonesians appear to favour the change. In a conversation with an official of the Provincial Government in Palu, Central Sulawesi, the official turned to the portraits of Suharto and Malik behind his desk and said with obvious satisfaction: "The President, he thinks only about development. Before, it was always politics; now, only development." Remarks made by other government officials and private citizens in Java and Sulawesi had the same keynote.


It is interesting to compare Indonesian, Malaysian, and ASEAN accounts of the background of ASEAN and its relation to ASA. The paper of the national secretariat ASEAN - Indonesia *A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia (ASEAN)* presents ASA as defunct by 1966 and ASEAN as a new beginning. The summary by ASEAN - Malaysia (Formation of ASEAN) affirms that ASEAN "is a direct offshoot of ASA. It is composed of the three ASA Nations with the addition of Indonesia and Singapore...." The version of the ASEAN Secretariat (History and Background to the Formation of ASEAN) diplomatically acknowledges the merits and shortcomings of several regional organizations and states that "ASA created an aspiration and paved the way to the birth of ASEAN" and that ASEAN "marked a breakthrough in the quest for Southeast Asian regional co-operation."

4 Conversation (1978) with a Thai official and participant in the 1967 Bangkok meeting that formally constituted ASEAN. Lyon, *War and Peace*
(p. 154) also mentions the meaning of 'asa' as 'hope' in the Thai and Malay languages.

5Gordon, Disengagement, pp. 113-116; Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1237.

6Appendix 1; Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Document 5001 (pp. 1259-1271).

7Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 17 December 1969 (mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 252-254). The agreement was concluded at the Third Ministerial Meeting, see: Joint Communiqué, The Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 16-17 December 1969 (reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 269-270), section 7.

8See Indorf, pp. 21-34 and pp. 44-48: "The ASEAN Modus Operandi: The Project Approach or Progress by Number."

9ASEAN Secretariat, Activities and Achievements in the Economic Field, January 1978 (mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 32-43; Idem, The Association of South-East Asian Nations: Its Aims, Activities and Achievements, Speech by the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat at the South East Asian Cultural Week in Tuebingen, West Germany (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, October 1977, mimeographed). For project requirements, see Indorf, p. 22 and ibid., n. 24; Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1239.

10See the final section of Chapter 2 on mushawarah and ibid., n. 58.

11Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume I, Introduction (n.p. [p.6]). During interviews in 1978, the inaccessibility of ASEAN records was much deplored by ASEAN officials and others. The Public Relations Officer of the ASEAN Secretariat expected the policy of keeping records confidential to change only very gradually.

12Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), now operating under the name Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).

13See ASEAN Secretariat, Activities and Achievements in the Economic Field. The report of the UN team is variously cited as Report of a UN Team on ASEAN Economic Cooperation and as United Nations, Economic Cooperation among Member Countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations. Hanisch (p. 41) refers to the Journal of Development Planning,
Volume 7 (1974); Indorf (p. 28 and Ibid., n. 31) to an undated publication in London by Metcalfe, Cooper & Hepburn Ltd. See Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Introductory Note, p. 1240 and Ibid., Document 5002 (pp. 1272-1275) for the United Nations Memorandum of Understanding on Assistance to the Association of South East Asian Nations on Economic Cooperation (n.d.; [circa 1969]), which contains terms of reference for the UN team.

14 Appendix 2; Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume IV, Chapter IX, Document 5010 (pp. 1282-1283).


16 A concise summary of ASEAN's reception in the international community is found in Jorgensen-Dahl, in Pacific Community 8, passim.

17 See the summit speeches as rendered in Pretzell, ASEAN, pp. 31-41; Seah Chee Meow, in A Decade of ASEAN (p. 6); "ASEAN's Progress in Ten Years," ASEAN Journal 2 (New Series), 10th Anniversary Commemorative Issue prepared by the Office of the Director-General, ASEAN - Singapore. (Singapore: The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1977): 13-14 (14). The Far Eastern Economic Review gave extensive coverage to the summit meeting, critically assessing its rhetoric and substance. Virtually every issue during 1976 carried articles on, or references to, the Bali summit. Particularly useful are the issues of 30 January, 5 March, and 12 March 1976.

18 Appendices 3 and 4. These documents are reprinted in various collections of records compiled in the ASEAN countries, for instance, in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 111-116 (Concord), pp. 118-123 (Treaty) and in other publications from the region, for example: The Indonesian Quarterly 4 (No. 2, 3, 4), Special Issue 1976 (Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 1976), pp. 110-121.

19 Treaty, Chapter IV, Articles 13-17.

20 Concord, "... And do hereby adopt the following programme of action ..."

Claude, pp. 191-192.

Interviews, 1978. In one of the national secretariats, an official reacted to a related question with evident surprise that anyone might even conceive of national interests not taking precedence over others. See also Indorf, pp. 4-5.


Joint Communiqué, The Seventh ASEAN (Ministerial) Meeting, 7-9 May 1974 (reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 278-280, section 8; Indorf, pp. 39-40. In the weeks prior to the Bali summit in 1976, The Bangkok Post carried several articles on the subject of the location of the Secretariat. It was also mentioned repeatedly in interviews in 1978.


Interviews, 1979. All ASEAN officials were very outspoken on the topic, revealing distinctly different but in each case firm positions.

"Outgoing ASEAN Chief Hits at Set-Up," The Bangkok Post, July 1975.


Final Communiqué, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government, Kuala Lumpur. More than half of the 54-section communiqué is devoted to
economic cooperation (sections 11-29); much of the part dealing with
External Relations (sections 30-38) also addresses economic cooperation.

31 Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangements, 24 February
1977 (mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of
Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 44-60). The Agreement was concluded by
the Foreign Ministers in Manila. It includes an Annex 1: Rules of Origin
and a list of the First Batch of Trade Concessions Exchanged among ASEAN
Countries covering 71 commodities.

32 Reprints of summit speeches and concurrent press commentary are
found in ASEAN II: Eine Dokumentation zur Gipfelkonferenz von Kuala Lumpur
(4-5.8.1977), Red./Bearb. Klaus-Albrecht Pretzell. Aktueller
Informationsdienst Asien, Sonderausgabe (Hamburg: Institut fuer
Asienkunde, Dokumentationsleitstelle Asien, 1977), Pressedokumentation
ASEAN II: A Documentation Concerning the Kuala Lumpur Summit (4-5 August
Service, Special Issue (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, Asia
Documentation Centre, 1977), Press Reviews, pp. 78-163 (hereafter cited
as ASEAN II). The ASEAN self-presentation at the summit is clearly
reflected in the 1978 radio lectures collected in A Decade of ASEAN, ed.
Kernial Singh Sandhu. Radio Talks Series 20 (Singapore: Educational
during the second half of 1977 also carried reports and assessments of the
Kuala Lumpur summit.

33 For instance, see: Harold Crouch, "Southeast Asia in 1977: A
Political Overview," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1978 (Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1978), pp. 3-14; Lau Teik Soon, "ASEAN and
the Bali Summit," in Pacific Community 7 (July 1976): 536-550 (547-550);
Shee Poon-Kim, in Asian Survey, 754-755; Mansbach, passim; Oscar-M. Rojo,
"The Promise of Stability in Southeast Asia," The Globe and Mail
(Toronto), 24 October 1977, Third Section; "Can ASEAN Service Peace?"
Asiaweek, 20 January 1978, pp. 10-11; and the following articles in FEER:
Issue of 12 August 1977: Rodney Tasker, "Stocktaking at ASEAN," pp. 8-9;
K. Das, "Summit with All the Trappings," pp. 8-9; Stephen Barber,
"Assurances from the White House," pp. 10-13; issue of 19 August 1977:
Rodney Tasker, "Enter the Japanese," pp. 20-27; Anthony Rowley, "ASEAN
Takes the Cue," pp. 27-29; issue of 26 August 1977: Denzil Peiris,

34 Joint Statement, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the
Prime Minister of Australia, Kuala Lumpur, 7 August 1977; Joint Statement,
Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of New
Zealand, Kuala Lumpur, 8 August 1977 (both mimeographed; reprinted in
10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978),
pp. 204-207 (Australia), pp. 216-218 (New Zealand). See also this
Chapter 1: Identity; Chapter 4, Summary of External Perceptions of ASEAN;
Chapter 5, Dialogues.
Joint Statement, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of Japan, Kuala Lumpur, 7 August 1977 (mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 209-214). The fact that Japan had desired to be invited to the summit itself was mentioned in several interviews in 1978. A few interview statements from ASEAN officials seemed to carry an undertone of satisfaction that the ASEAN schedule for a post-summit meeting had prevailed.


It was held in Bali in June 1979.

"Dharsono on ASEAN," FEER, 24 June 1977, p. 17 (Interview).

Interviews, 1978; Koh and Lau, pp. 115-116; Derek Davies and Denzil Peiris, "ASEAN: Cooperation Is the Name of the Game," FEER, 18 February 1977, pp. 25-28 (quoting the Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo (p. 25).

The importance of continuous review and revision of the ASEAN machinery was emphasized by officials in all ASEAN secretariats during interviews in 1978 and 1980. It is also addressed in the final section of the Concord, Adopted Programme of Action, F.2. A detailed review of the structure of ASEAN prior to 1976 is found in Indorf, pp. 21-34 and pp. 45-54. The overview presented here is based mainly on a paper issued by the ASEAN Secretariat, The Structure of ASEAN (mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 17-22), which dates from late 1977 or early 1978.

The dual responsibilities of ASEAN staff were welcomed in some and
deplored in other national secretariats of ASEAN during interviews.

42 Some of these allocations of responsibilities to the committees are slightly different from those described in the paper *The Structure of ASEAN*; they are given here as derived from the more recent ASEAN - Indonesia paper *A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia* (ASEAN) dated May 1978, and from an interview in ASEAN - Malaysia in 1978.

43 The Brussels Committees (ABC and JSG) were for some time subordinate to a third body, the Special-Coordinating Committee of ASEAN Nations (SCCAN). This was abolished some time after the Kuala Lumpur summit in order to reduce duplication of effort (interviews, 1978), but it is still listed in most publications on ASEAN as the principal committee dealing with ASEAN - EEC relations. For ACCRIS, see Chapter 5, Committees.


46 For the question of identity, it is interesting that there is no provision in ASEAN documents for the withdrawal of a member from the Association. As far as can be ascertained, this question has not been officially addressed in ASEAN. No reference to its ever having been raised is found in the documents, papers, or statements available to the author, nor was it mentioned in interviews.


50 The responsibilities are as follows: Indonesia: Japan, EEC; Malaysia: Australia and West Asia including the Middle East; Philippines:

The relevance of the dialogue framework as an indicator of ASEAN status is especially apparent from the ASEAN - USA dialogue. After the first meeting in September 1977, the press statement noted that it "was an important occasion which added a new dimension to a long experience of friendly cooperation and fruitful bilateral relationships."

Joint Press Release, First Meeting of the ASEAN - United States Dialogue, Manila, 8-10 September 1977 (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, mimeographed).

51 Bangkok Declaration, "Do hereby declare ... Fourth ..."; Concord, preamble, section 1; Treaty, Article 18.


53 The third meeting in 1969 was attended by Laos, and South Vietnam, the fourth in 1971 by the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) and South Vietnam, the sixth in 1973 by Laos and the Khmer Republic. See Joint Communiques, Third, Fourth, and Sixth Ministerial Meetings (reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 269-270 (p. 269), 270-272 (p. 270), 275-277 (p. 275), respectively.)


55 The Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN Declaration), The Kuala Lumpur Declaration, Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.

57 Seah Chee Meow, in A Decade of ASEAN, pp. 8-9.


60 Interviews, 1978.

61 Chairman during the discussion following the lecture by Seah Chee Meow, in A Decade of ASEAN, p. 9.


63 Interviews, 1978 and 1979, especially at ASEAN - Malaysia. In 1978, Bangladesh was also mentioned.


65 According to Pretzell, "ASEAN: Fuenf Laender - und mehr?" (pp. 23-24), the issue of expanded membership in ASEAN had already been closed before Sri Lanka applied to the Association. Interviews did not confirm such an assessment of finality.
Chapter 4
EXTERNAL POWERS AND ASEAN: RELATIONS, REACTIONS, AND PERCEPTIONS

Scope and Definitions

This chapter addresses the relationships between ASEAN and the USA, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Vietnam in order to establish these powers' perceptions of ASEAN. The examination necessarily includes a discussion of the five powers' non-ASEAN relations so as to put their perceptions of ASEAN into proper perspective. From their individual reactions and positions, conclusions will be drawn for the overall prevailing perception in the ASEAN environment of the nature of the Association.

The term 'powers' is used as interchangeable with the terms 'forces', 'influences', 'actors', 'states', or 'units' to denote the participants in international relations. All participants that are not ASEAN or one of its member states are called external or outside powers. This does not imply that Vietnam is regarded as an outsider to Southeast Asia, or that ASEAN and Southeast Asia are regarded as synonymous. With respect to ASEAN and Southeast Asia, the distinction is made by employing the term 'region' for ASEAN and 'area' for Southeast Asia. With respect to Southeast Asian powers, a distinction is made only as and when needed to set Vietnam off from the other powers, in order to acknowledge the fact that Vietnam, although an actor external to ASEAN, is not an
outsider to Southeast Asia.

Of the five states whose relations with ASEAN are considered here, all but Vietnam are subsequently termed 'great powers' or 'major powers', even though their significance in international relations is of different scope and rests on different types of strength. The USA, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan are all powers whose active and direct influence in international relations extends far beyond the area of their own territories and immediate surroundings. The USA and the Soviet Union are clearly global powers; their nuclear potential also justifies their identification as superpowers. China's role as a great power may derive not so much from her military or economic strength on a global scale as from her physical features; being one of the largest, and the most populous country on earth and a potentially overpowering presence in Asia, China is unquestionably of major importance in international relations at the global level, and most particularly in ASEAN's environment. With respect to Asia in general and Southeast Asia in particular, the significance of China can hardly be overrated. Japan's position as a major power rests on a different foundation than those of the other three great powers. It results not from political factors, but from economic strength, thus setting Japan apart - at the Southeast Asian as well as at the global level - from the other three great powers considered here. This difference, however, is less significant in the context of ASEAN than the fact that Japan is a very influential participant in international relations; her relationship with ASEAN is of outstanding importance to the Association.
The Position of the USA

The Early Years: Great Powers and Great Issues

The USA appeared to take little notice of the arrival of ASEAN on the international scene in Southeast Asia. For the first years of ASEAN's existence, indicators of external awareness and recognition of the Association are infrequent, and there is no evidence to suggest that the USA felt particularly strongly about ASEAN in any way. This apparent lack of interest on the part of the USA characterized the relationship between herself and ASEAN for nearly all of the first decade of ASEAN. It is thus difficult to assess the USA's initial perception of the Association. It is reasonable to assume that the USA generally approved of ASEAN's intent, expressed in the Bangkok Declaration, to cooperate for social and economic purposes, for peace and progress. It may also be assumed that the USA felt more positive than negative towards a grouping of states whose economies and political systems were more closely fashioned after, and tied into, Western models than others. These assumptions are supported by the summary assessments offered in scholarly publications that date from ASEAN's more recent years. But such feelings on the part of the USA add up to no more than an overall attitude of benevolent indifference; they provide no clues as to whether the USA saw ASEAN as an economic, a political, or simply an unimportant organization.

For ASEAN, on the other hand, the USA was a very important factor in its environment. During ASEAN's formative years the USA was a powerful presence in Southeast Asia. Her involvement there, particularly in South
and North Vietnam, was at its peak during the years of ASEAN's conception and formation; her influence on the political situation in Southeast Asia was probably greater than that of any other power. ASEAN's own existence and aspirations could not be divorced from the environment. Thus ASEAN, despite its deliberately low profile during the early years, sought bilateral external recognition from those states or units (such as the EEC) which it considered relevant to its own aims. In the series of dialogues, the USA lagged behind most other partners of ASEAN; a fact much deplored by ASEAN officials. In fact, ASEAN had reason to expect to be noticed by the USA: two of its members - the Philippines and Thailand - were particularly closely associated with the USA; many of ASEAN's goals aligned with Western hopes for Third World development, peace, freedom, or stability; and ASEAN joined together practically all of Western-oriented Southeast Asia.

If, despite the American preoccupation with Southeast Asia in the 1960s and early 1970s, ASEAN failed to capture much US attention, the reasons for this failure may reveal clues as to how the USA perceived ASEAN. Clearly, during the period addressed here the USA was concentrating on other relationships in Southeast Asia than that with ASEAN. Recognition of these other relationships is essential to an understanding of US concerns with respect to the immediate environment of ASEAN. An outline of the American involvement in Southeast Asia will show what these concerns were, and how they were connected with US interests originating and reaching beyond the area. The American perception of ASEAN may then be fitted into the overall picture of US relations in Southeast Asia.
US Involvement in Southeast Asia

Under the definition of Southeast Asia adopted here, the involvement of the USA in Southeast Asia goes back before 1892, in which year she succeeded Spain as the colonial power in the Philippines. That colonial relationship, however, had ended before the concept of Southeast Asia gained currency, and the relationship had no major import in the post-World War II engagement of the USA in mainland Southeast Asia. A close relationship between the USA and the Philippines has continued to exist, but it has not been the principal inducement for the USA to engage herself a thousand miles further west. The Allied defeat of Japan in World War II generated new ties between the USA and Southeast Asian countries — especially Thailand — that had been occupied by Japan, but none of these relationships led to a special US engagement until the early 1950s.

The next Southeast Asian country in which the USA had a particular interest, was South Vietnam. The USA had been a participant at the 1954 Geneva Conference which ended the first Vietnam war (against the French colonial power), partitioned Vietnam, and established the independence of both parts of Vietnam as well as that of Laos and Cambodia. Even before 1954 the USA, through the French armed forces, had channelled military assistance to South Vietnam in support of its resistance against communist North Vietnam's incursions and against domestic dissident groups. When the French left Indochina, the USA took over the training and outfitting of the South Vietnamese forces. In the second Vietnam war — subsequently termed the Vietnam war —, which evolved out of North Vietnam's struggle
for domination over all of Vietnam (and also out of the disaffection of numerous factions within South Vietnam with the US-supported government), American materiel and personnel were sent to South Vietnam in ever increasing quantities and numbers to help the South Vietnamese governments survive. The American involvement with both parts of Vietnam became so deep that in the late 1960s the Vietnam war seemed to be a war between North Vietnam and the USA rather than between North and South Vietnam; to many Americans at that time 'Southeast Asia' was virtually synonymous with 'Vietnam'. In addition to the military engagement, the USA involved herself directly in South Vietnamese politics by attempting to influence the installation or maintenance of various presidents or premiers at the head of the government in Saigon.

The hostile relationship of the USA with North Vietnam was, naturally, the other side of the coin in the US engagement in Southeast Asia. The USA helped South Vietnam resist North Vietnam because she shared her Southeast Asian protege's conviction that North Vietnam, driven by its communist ideology, was out to conquer and dominate as much of Southeast Asia as possible. In view of this conviction the USA was also concerned about Laos and Cambodia; however, the two small countries received far less attention from the USA than did South Vietnam. They were not militarily significant. Their traditional political systems, run by royal families, perhaps did not seem to merit the same US support as the allegedly democratic Republic of South Vietnam. The respective leaderships in Laos and Cambodia were not inclined to ally their countries clearly with the Western world; Laos was striving for international recognition of its neutrality, and Cambodia's Prince
Sihanouk in the 1960s performed brilliantly in fence-sitting wherever fences existed in Southeast Asia, trying to achieve by practical politics what Laos was trying to achieve by international declaration.

The USA did engage herself temporarily for Laos. At the transition of the Eisenhower to the Kennedy Administration (1961/62) it was widely held in the US government that Laos was the linchpin in the American interests in Southeast Asia. At the 1961/62 Geneva Conference on Laos, which endeavoured to arrive at an internationally binding settlement of Laos' position between the contending forces in Southeast Asia through a declaration on the neutrality of Laos, the USA practically assumed the leadership of the Western world in the negotiations with, essentially, the Soviet Union. But the USA did not accept, nor abide by, the outcome of the conference. Laos for her was a side issue, over which she did not let herself become as involved as she did with South Vietnam and subsequently with Thailand.

Almost simultaneously with the beginning of direct US assistance to South Vietnam, the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was formed in the summer of 1954. It joined the USA together with Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand. SEATO was a large-scale defense alliance viewed by the USA as a counterpart to NATO, the anti-communist North Atlantic Treaty Organization for Western Europe. Ostensibly SEATO was an instrument designed to protect smaller states in Southeast Asia against aggression. It is noteworthy that only two of the eight signatories to the treaty were Southeast Asian states and that South Vietnam, which actually did suffer aggression and did
receive direct military support in its struggle against communism, was not a member of SEATO. This situation was a consequence of the 1954 Geneva Conference agreements, which had prohibited any of the newly created states in Indochina from becoming members of large-scale defense alliances. A protocol signed concurrently with the Manila Treaty (which created SEATO) pledged the SEATO members to support South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia against aggression. SEATO itself joined principally non-Southeast Asian powers for a Southeast Asian purpose. It is also noteworthy that the creation of SEATO was due largely to US rather than Southeast Asian insistence upon the need for such an organization.  

After the SEATO agreement US military bases in the Philippines were strengthened, and bases in Thailand were subsequently established. The American relationship with Thailand grew very close under successive Thai military governments, who shared the American view that — except for South Vietnam — of all the Western-oriented states in Southeast Asia, Thailand was most immediately endangered by presumed communist expansionism. This view was readily understandable. Thailand lies at the heart of mainland Southeast Asia. It is geographically separated from Vietnam only by the territories of Laos and Cambodia, whose abilities to withstand an expansionist North Vietnam have been negligible. Thailand's own military capability was no match for a determined aggressor. Thus the American war effort in support of South Vietnam's independence was clearly in Thailand's own interest. The establishment and use of US military bases in Thailand met with little resistance from the Thai governments until the early 1970s, particularly since the American presence in Thailand also brought a substantial influx of much-needed military and
economic assistance.

The remaining states in Southeast Asia did not have comparably close relations with the USA, since neither their own interests nor those of the USA seemed to warrant special US involvement. Burma, Malaya/Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia all handled their own problems without special US engagement. Although Singapore after its separation from Malaysia in 1965 acquired a reputation as a hawk in the Vietnam War, this reputation was not accompanied by an outright position as a US treaty ally as in the case of Thailand and the Philippines.

This outline of American involvement in Southeast Asia must be complemented by a glance at East Asia if the USA's relations and interests in Southeast Asia are to be fully understood. In East Asia the USA was, and remains, heavily engaged in Japan and South Korea. These two special relationships predate those of the USA in Southeast Asia (excepting that with the Philippines), and some of their components have direct connections with, and particular implications for, US involvement in Southeast Asia.

The USA concluded defense treaties with both East Asian countries in 1951. Her concern with Japan goes back, of course, to World War II, when Japan had posed a major threat to American military security.\(^1\) That threat had been removed with Japan's surrender and renunciation of substantial rearmament. In exchange for the latter, the USA assumed ultimate responsibility for the security of Japan under the American nuclear umbrella. The same ultimate protection covers South Korea, where the USA also maintains sizeable troops of her own.\(^2\) The immediate source
of the American, Japanese, and South Korean security concern is communist North Korea. Prior to and during the Korean War (1950-1953) the USA was as involved in East Asia as she later became in Southeast Asia, sending American troops to help her protege fight a communist aggressor. The American intervention in Korea not only preserved South Korea's independence, but also safeguarded Japan against losing her closest non-communist neighbour.

However, Japan means much more to the USA than an indirect security concern. Japan's phenomenal post-war evolution into an economic world power has created very strong mutual economic interests between her and the USA, and Japan is by far the closest associate of the USA in all of Asia. As a result of her relationship with Japan, the USA cannot help but be concerned also with Japanese interests in, for instance, South Korea's capitalist economy; Southeast Asian markets and commodities (e.g., oil, rubber, timber, tin, sugar); or the free passage of Middle East oil tankers through the Straits of Malacca. Because of Japan's unique reliance on economic power as the basis for her role in international relations, and because of her lack of self-sufficiency in materials and markets, Japan's international interests are particularly diverse. Southeast Asia plays a considerable role in those interests. And because the relationship with Japan is vital to the USA, she has to adopt Japan's vital non-US interests as indirect concerns of her own: despite her modest own economic interests in Southeast Asia, and despite the fact that US security interests would not seem to account for a particularly deep involvement on behalf of states in Southeast Asia.
The above outline shows that numerous connections exist between the USA's involvement in various countries in Southeast Asia as well as between those involvements and US engagement in East Asia. It also indicates the more evident one of two common denominators that united the individual steps leading to the deep entanglement of the USA in Southeast Asia at the time of ASEAN's formation: communism. Except for the Philippines and Japan, communism was a major force that pulled the USA into East and Southeast Asia; and even with respect to those two countries, communism certainly perpetuated and intensified the American involvement in Asia.

A second, less obvious common denominator underlying the steps that led the USA into Southeast Asia, is suggested by Gordon in his work *Towards Disengagement in Asia: A Strategy for American Foreign Policy*. Gordon argues that from the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, until and including the US involvement in Vietnam, the USA has had a fundamental, national interest in the existence of a multipolar power structure in East Asia. This interest, according to Gordon, derives from the global strategic importance of Asia to US preferences for peaceful patterns of international relations among balanced centres of power; and it creates a basic objective in US foreign policy with respect to, in effect, China and Japan: to prevent either - or any other major power - from gaining a position of hegemony that might force the USA into a situation of bipolar confrontation in Asia. In this context, Gordon views Southeast Asia as being of special relevance to the USA, as a natural sphere of interest and influence for China and as an economically significant sphere of interest for Japan. In tracing US political actions
concerning East Asia throughout the first half of his book, Gordon cites a number of official US statements and documents that render his argument plausible, and support his interpretation of the relevance to the USA of regionalism in Southeast Asia: to contribute to multipolarity in Asia; thus to counteract attempts, by whichever single power, to achieve dominance; and thus to complement US interests on a global scale as well as in Asia.

If Gordon's interpretation is correct, then the objectives of the USA and China with respect to Southeast Asia would be remarkably parallel (for China, see below: Nanyang and Other Interests). Even more importantly, communism would then appear to be a surface phenomenon among the causes that drew the USA into Southeast Asia. If a non-communist Japan dominating East or Southeast Asia before and during World War II was as unacceptable to the USA as a non-communist China would have been, had she aspired to dominance in Asia, then such a US view, if made explicit, would have been remarkably similar to the views of countries in Southeast Asia (see below: China and Containment). The fact that China was perceived by the USA to pursue aspirations to dominance only after she became the PRC, quite possibly obscured the truly basic US interest with respect to East and Southeast Asia, and perhaps caused communism to be afforded a primary significance which it did not, in fact, possess.

Gordon maintains that American politicians and scholars throughout the 20th century frequently did not clearly recognize, or not clearly state, the fundamental US interest in multipolarity in East Asia. Certainly during the first two decades after World War II, for the USA
politics in East Asia - as in Europe - appeared to centre on the issue, not of power concentration per se, but of power concentration in communist hands. The war in Korea and the beginning of the US involvement in Vietnam clearly suggested this, and the 'domino theory' confirmed it with respect to Southeast Asia. The following discussion centres on communism as the more evident fundamental concern of the USA in Southeast Asia.

After World War II, in the Western world the main danger of communism was seen to lie not so much in the ideology as in its expansion through military conquest of territory. Consequently, the Western response to communism focussed not so much on democracy - the counter-ideology - as on the check to communist expansion by military means: containment. Containment was the strategy applied to the problem of communism in Southeast Asia. The source of the problem, however, lay outside Southeast Asia with the Soviet Union and especially with China - or that was how the problem was perceived. Accordingly, the scope of the strategy went beyond Southeast Asia to the global level in US international relations. This level commanded top priority in the USA's attention to her relations in Southeast Asia, and from the global level the Southeast Asian relations derived their significance, ranking, and nature.

China and Containment

The communist takeover in mainland China in 1949 was the key event in America's post-war direct engagement in Southeast Asia. It seems improbable that the USA would have taken Japan under her wings, defended South Korea, initiated SEATO, fought North Vietnam, or acknowledged a
responsibility for Laos, had mainland China not turned communist just as the Cold War in Europe was getting underway. Communism was then an international, unified force. Its embrace by the People's Republic of China meant that henceforth Moscow had a loyal follower in Asia, who would carry the ideology into its own sphere of influence, and whose very existence thus vastly augmented the threat of communism to the "free world." The 30-year pact concluded in 1950 between Mao Zedong and Stalin underscored the commitment of China to the ideology and, presumably, the policies of the Soviet Union.

The equation of communism with a threat to freedom was axiomatic to the USA. Equally axiomatic were her belief that she was the globally responsible champion and defender of freedom, and her conviction that the spread of communism had to be checked wherever it was encountered. These axioms were summarized under the term "containment policy," which constituted the principal guideline for US international relations in Southeast Asia during the 1950s and much of the 1960s.

Although the containment policy originated out of a global issue and from a clearcut pattern of polarized forces - freedom versus communism - , it soon acquired a special reference to Asia and most particularly China. This shift in emphasis began almost immediately after the Korean war; according to some scholars, even in the early 1950s to the USA containment meant, principally, containment of the PRC, to which North Vietnam was generally regarded as proxy. This focus on China probably agreed with the perceptions of most countries in Southeast Asia as to the origin of a threat to their independence. The USSR was far, whereas China.
was near, and apprehensions in Southeast Asia about domination by the huge Asian neighbour country were as old as the history of states in Southeast Asia. There was an interesting difference in emphasis in the common perception of the USA and Southeast Asian countries of China as a threat: for the USA it was a communist China, while for the Thai, Malay, or South Vietnamese it was China, be it communist or not. From a historical perspective in Southeast Asia, China's communist ideology merely added a new impetus to old aspirations of China to exercise her influence on smaller countries within her sphere of interest (see below: The Position of China). To the USA China's conversion to communism appeared to be the constituent element of a Chinese threat.

The USA's focus on the PRC in connection with the containment policy had a decisive impact on the American approach to relations both in Southeast Asia and at the global level. This approach was indicative of the order of priorities in which the USA ranked issues, powers, and political means (e.g., diplomacy or military force) in her interests in Southeast Asia. In that order of priorities ASEAN occupied a very minor, but nevertheless an identifiable position.

As long as the communist brotherhood presented itself as a unified international force, the US focus on China did not necessarily contradict the underlying tenets of the containment concept: that the world was essentially bipolar and that the conflict between freedom and communism, whatever its local manifestations, was primarily the concern and responsibility of the global powers USA and USSR. If China, or North Korea, or North Vietnam was only Moscow's representative in Asia, then
containment of China, or North Korea, or North Vietnam meant containment of international communism. Consequently, the relationships of the USA at the global level were the most important ones to her. This meant concentration on the Soviet Union. US involvement with other states over communism should therefore have been secondary to the global relationship, in which only the superpowers really mattered.

The US focus on containment of China seemed to blur the theoretically clearcut lines. If, as containment in this restricted sense suggested, the main communist danger emanated from China and if, as the gradual passing of the Cold War in Europe around the turn of the 1950s to the 1960s suggested, the USSR was after all amenable to mutual accommodation: was not the USSR the lesser of several communist evils, rather than their protagonist? Containment of China did not seem possible without a certain community of purpose between the superpowers. The Soviet Union was the far more familiar adversary for the USA; an experienced partner in international relations; a country profoundly impressed with the horrors of war, and governed by men influenced by European history and culture. The PRC, on the other hand, was an unknown and unpredictable threat. She had never been integrated into global international relations; Western knowledge of her domestic features, concerns, priorities, and goals was scant. It was obvious that she would not continue to be content with the role of a spectator in international politics. Her designs with respect to Southeast Asia seemed indicated by her support for communist movements in, for instance, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and both parts of Vietnam. Her future behaviour on the global international scene could only be an object of nervous speculation. In Europe in the 1950s a widely
circulated witticism captured the direction of such speculation: optimists, it said, were studying the Russian language; pessimists were studying Chinese. The PRC’s emergence as a politically relevant actor may well have prompted the USA to consider whether cooperation with the USSR would not be wiser than confrontation.

The Sino-Soviet split around 1959/60 both clarified and complicated US international relations. It established the PRC as a clearly separate object of containment politics. It also established the PRC as a clearly separate actor in international politics. Both facts had significant results for the US approach in her relations in Southeast Asia.

Peking’s emancipation from Moscow complicated US international relations, because it added a new component to global relationships, which were already becoming more complex with Japan’s and the EEC’s incipient rise to global significance, the refusal of France to sacrifice individualistic politics to European or Western unity, and Cuba’s play with Moscow’s fire in the American backyard. Even though militarily the PRC was no match for the superpowers, she was simply too huge and populous to be anything less than a global factor if and when she chose to enter international relations. From the US point of view the addition of a presumably hostile, aggressive, unpredictable participant to the global political game opened up a host of new potential coalitions and conflicts among the players. This suggested a difficult future after a decade of fairly straightforward global problems (communism), participants (the superpowers), and power resources (arms). In addition, the PRC could be expected to assert herself in Southeast Asia as the natural,
close-at-hand supporter of dissident movements, communist or otherwise, in the various states. For the USA this meant that she now had to buttress her allies in Southeast Asia against two competing communist seductions rather than one.

On the other hand, Peking's emancipation from Moscow firmly identified the PRC as the perceived principal threat to world peace. This clarified the previously hazy distinction between a Chinese threat and a communist threat. Both the USA and the USSR concurred in this perception of China, especially since neither incipient border clashes between China and the Soviet Union, nor China's efforts to acquire a nuclear capability pointed towards peaceful self-containment of China. 24 The Sino-Soviet split thus contributed to the USA's reassessment of, and focus on, her relations with the Soviet Union. Throughout most of the 1960s the democratic and the communist superpower together with their respective allies jointly endeavoured to maintain an international order in which the PRC would be encircled and contained.

The Sino-Soviet split did not immediately change US bilateral relations in Southeast Asia nor her respective attitudes towards North and South Vietnam. It made China more visible as the main source of support to North Vietnam, even though both the PRC and the USSR continued to assist Hanoi throughout the war. The Soviet Union emerged as the principal supporter only after about 1965, when the PRC concentrated on domestic problems in connection with the Cultural Revolution. 25 The Sino-Soviet rivalry gave North Vietnam the opportunity to accept help from each of these competing sources; consequently, continued American
assistance to South Vietnam appeared more urgent than ever. The USA's engagement in South Vietnam increased by leaps and bounds during the 1960s.

It seems possible that as a result of her fixation on China and her preoccupation with the Vietnam war the USA failed to appreciate, in time, important elements in the political and military situation in Southeast Asia. For example, the USA evidently underestimated the determination and ability of North Vietnam to win the war. She probably overestimated the extent of North Vietnam's ideological dependence on either Peking or Moscow, and the significance of ideological compared to national, or simply hegemonistic motives in Hanoi's expansionism. She also seemed to lag well behind Southeast Asian states (e.g., Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia) in the recognition that policing or armed intervention by outside powers was no longer an adequate response to problems in Southeast Asia. Most importantly, the USA apparently realized too late that after Korea containment simply did not work.

The USA had embarked on the containment policy with a global ideological mission. Homing in on China and Southeast Asia, the USA substituted a particular for a general concern. Drawing close to the Soviet Union in her own effort to contain China, the USA seemed to dismiss Soviet communism as irrelevant to Southeast Asia. As it turned out, the Soviet Union eventually gained a firm foothold in Southeast Asia through Vietnam - moreover a reunited Vietnam -, and Hanoi communism, strengthened by US war materiel, extends over all of former Indochina. The USA has no military, and a much reduced political, presence in
Southeast Asia. In retrospect, to the Soviet Union the containment policy in its application to Asia must have appeared as one of the best political ideas that ever originated in the Western world.

From a Western point of view the containment policy missed its objective perhaps because it perpetuated outdated notions. The view of a bipolar world which had given rise to the concept of containment, had become unrealistic in an environment where the communist and the anti-communist superpower jointly endeavoured to control a third power. Yet until about 1967 the USA presented her engagement in Vietnam, and the issue at stake in Southeast Asia as a contest between the forces of freedom and the forces of communism. Her need to find a moral justification for politics in which Southeast Asia was used as a battleground for a global demarkation of imported conflicting ideologies, obscured the fact that in political and military reality, China was the least active of the three communist forces involved in the expansion of communism in Southeast Asia.

The containment policy directed against China had been laid to rest by the USA almost before ASEAN was formed. The ASEAN Declaration was signed in August 1967. In October 1967, Richard Nixon published his views on "Asia after Viet Nam" in Foreign Affairs, signalling the new direction which the USA's foreign policy in and for Asia would take soon after. In 1968 Nixon became President of the USA; he made the improvement of US relations with the PRC one of his most prominent - and successful - objectives. Nevertheless, the containment concept had great relevance to the USA's perceptions of ASEAN. Its elements - US preoccupation with
globally relevant powers - and its application - US preoccupation with the Vietnam war - continued to dominate America's attention in Southeast Asia throughout ASEAN's formative years.

The Place of ASEAN in US Interests in Southeast Asia

In America's hierarchical order of priorities in Southeast Asia, the issue of communism versus freedom linked all her relationships at the Southeast Asian level to those in East Asia, and both to those at the global level, from which the lesser ones derived their relevance and their character. With the possible exception of the Philippines, the individual states in Southeast Asia, their national characteristics, problems, and goals mattered to the USA mainly insofar as they impinged upon her larger concerns. In Southeast Asia, the USA treated as important ideology and its defense or defeat by, essentially, military means. Thus, SEATO; thus, Vietnam; thus, also, for instance, the lack of a particular US interest in Indonesia and Burma, which held themselves aloof from the American crusade against communism in Southeast Asia.

Ideology and the power to make a particular ideology prevail clearly constitute basic elements in whatever may be called 'political' in international relations. The US relationships with the USSR and with China are first and foremost political in nature. Other topics that may also play a role in the USA's position towards the USSR and China - trade and commerce, scientific and cultural exchange, development - pale before the political question of whether the communist powers have the intent and the means to endanger American interests in preserving the ways of life of free societies. Because the global relationships set the framework for
the USA's involvement in Southeast Asia, her interests and relations there were equally political in nature — perhaps even more so, since none of the Southeast Asian states in its own right was of major economic, cultural, or otherwise non-political importance to the USA.

Although for the ASEAN countries the USA is the second largest single trading partner — after Japan, whose export and import shares are about one third larger than those of the USA28), for the USA Southeast Asia accounts for only a very small portion of her economic interests. At about the time of ASEAN's formation, US trade with all ASEAN members, Burma, Taiwan, South Korea, and South Vietnam combined represented about 5% of American trade volume.29 In 1974, ASEAN had less than a 3% share in world trade,30 and could only have been of major economic interest to the USA as a supplier of vital commodities, a few of which dominate the exports from the region: natural rubber, palm oil, tin metal, foods, timber, and oil. These, and the structure of the ASEAN economies as a whole give the region its economic complementarity and importance for Japan, but not for the USA. Even for the ASEAN states the USA is an important, but not an all-important economic partner. The Asia Yearbook 1980 gives the following figures (for the years to 1976) for the US share in ASEAN trade: Indonesia 22%, Malaysia 14%, Philippines 27%, Singapore 14%, Thailand 12%.31 ASEAN trade as a percentage of US trade thus is of peripheral interest to the USA.

In aid and investment, the USA has many other obligations and opportunities, for instance in Latin America. Moreover, in Southeast Asia throughout ASEAN's existence aid for development has been strongly
influenced by political considerations, especially the perceived need to fortify certain states against the communist threat emanating from others. \textsuperscript{32} Thus, apart from political, and especially military and strategic concerns, there simply was not much else to create a particular interest for the USA in Southeast Asia.

America's approach to the area was strongly influenced by a belief that the global powers - either the two superpowers or a very small club of the select few - determined the global international order among themselves, thereby setting the framework for the relations with, and of, all lesser powers at sub-global levels. This belief constitutes part of a set of traditional perceptions about international relations which in the theory of political science has been summarized as the balance-of-power concept. \textsuperscript{33} The postwar polarization of the communist and the anti-communist world had easily fitted into this concept. Another component of the balance-of-power concept is the assumption that conflict is the main characteristic of international relations, which are thus primarily concerned with peace and war, and hence with security. Consequently, the balance-of-power concept emphasizes coercion, or the threat of coercion, through military means, which makes military resources the primary criterion of power and military force the ultimate means of conflict resolution.

The American entry into Southeast Asia occurred at a time and under conditions that gave no cause to question the validity of balance-of-power notions. The USA's entanglement in the actual fighting in Vietnam probably reinforced, perhaps unduly perpetuated, those notions. Their emphasis on
eminently political factors in international relations, as well as the Vietnam war itself, certainly directed the USA's perceptions of her relations in Southeast Asia towards political criteria.

The overall political focus of the USA in the area also applies to ASEAN. Nothing suggests that the USA perceived ASEAN under aspects different from those governing all her other perceptions and relations in Southeast Asia. But there are several indicators that the USA, insofar as she took ASEAN into account at all, saw the Association specifically as a political entity. The fact that this entity seemed at first to be not very important to the USA did not mean that it was viewed as non-political; it simply meant that ASEAN did not much contribute to, or jeopardize, the pursuit of US interests in Southeast Asia.

According to Gordon, US foreign policy since 1965 has specifically and explicitly encouraged regionalism in Southeast Asia, as a result of a distinct shift in American perceptions of how best to promote multipolarity in Asia, and also because of the perceived value of regional cooperation for economic development. Gordon cites several speeches and addresses given between 1965 and 1967 by President Johnson and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Walt Rostow, to illustrate his point; he also stresses US support - financial and political - for the Asian Development Bank (ADB) as well as for other cooperative ventures such as the Southeast Asian Ministerial Conferences on Higher Education and on Transportation. In his very thorough discussion of ASA and ASEAN, which includes numerous references to public as well as interview statements by Southeast Asian officials, no specific
US statement is mentioned that might indicate particular US appreciation of these organizations for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. In the organizations addressed by Gordon, Japan played a significant role, thus linking Southeast Asia, through her participation, to the USA's wider concerns; ASA and ASEAN had no such direct appeal for the USA.

Despite her apparent initial indifference to ASEAN the USA was, of course, aware of the Association's existence. The most outstanding feature about ASEAN was that all of its members rejected the communist ideology in their own national contexts. ASEAN was very insistent that with respect to its external relations this attitude be understood as non-communist and not as anti-communist. But for most of the ASEAN environment this was perhaps too subtle a distinction for the times. In an area dominated by the issue of communism, the grouping of five explicitly non-communist countries in a venture for closer cooperation was in itself an eminently political event. In addition, even though the Association itself was averse to being regarded as committed in the political struggles in Southeast Asia, the member states did not seem to be. Thailand and the Philippines were not only SEATO members, but clearly sided with the USA in the Vietnam war. Malaysia and Singapore belonged to defense alliances in which Britain, Australia, and New Zealand were the main members. All four countries devoted considerable efforts to the suppression of communist insurgency or opposition within their national political systems. In Indonesia, Sukarno's downfall in 1965/66 had led to a break with communism on the part of the governing authorities, and to fierce persecution of true or alleged communists. Indonesia did not turn pro-USA as a result, but it certainly was officially anti-communist in
its national policies. These national orientations of the ASEAN member states could not help but have an impact on the USA's perceptions of ASEAN as a whole.

A second important feature of ASEAN was its unequivocal rejection of military cooperation as a field of organizational activity. ASEAN also denied the existence of political cooperation within the organizational framework, claiming that economic, social, cultural, and similar cooperation were its sole intent (see Chapter 5). The validity of the latter claim could be questioned, since the Bangkok Declaration contains numerous references to clearly political concerns: peace, freedom, stability, security, foreign bases, national independence. But with respect to military cooperation ASEAN scrupulously practised what it preached. Military cooperation, be it between or among ASEAN states, or between ASEAN members and outside states, was a strictly national matter; ASEAN would have nothing to do with it. With a consistency not always apparent in other early statements and activities, both ASEAN and its members refrained from involving the organization in military matters.38

The frequent emphatic denial that ASEAN was concerned with military cooperation indicates, however, how readily the Association could be perceived as having, or aspiring to, military relevance in Southeast Asia. It matters little whether the USA herself had such a perception. As long as she was willing to look after peace and freedom in Southeast Asia herself, and as long as ASEAN did not interfere with its members' bilateral or multilateral relations involving military cooperation, ASEAN's non-military posture had no significant effect on US interests in
Southeast Asia. But the prominence of that posture suggested to every power in the ASEAN environment that the Association was profoundly concerned with its political image. This could only contribute to the USA's perception of all her Southeast Asian relations as essentially political.

Such a perception was reinforced when in late 1971 ASEAN produced the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, in which it committed itself to promote "the recognition of, and respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers ..." 39

The subject of the Declaration was obviously not unrelated to the Vietnam war. The Declaration itself contains few elements not already included in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. However, with the Kuala Lumpur Declaration ASEAN extricated fundamental political issues from the mesh of concerns that characterizes the Bangkok Declaration, and presented them to the non-ASEAN world in a solemn statement of organizational objective.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration was neither very specific nor very successful. Most of its key terms (such as Southeast Asia, neutrality, interference) permit widely divergent interpretations, and even today peace, freedom and neutrality are not especially salient features of Southeast Asia. But as an ASEAN statement the proposal was repeated over and over again. The phrase "peace, freedom and neutrality" soon became something like an ASEAN hallmark. It greatly enhanced external awareness of ASEAN and facilitated its identification as an entity. Throughout the Association's formative period the Kuala Lumpur Declaration remained the only major organizational statement (except for the constituent Bangkok
document) that was not merely a press release, conference minutes, or committee report, but was specifically and formally made to express an ASEAN position. This singular exception addressed the same political questions that lay at the foundation of the USA’s involvement in Southeast Asia.

Moreover, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration emphasized a particular aspect of ASEAN’s set of beliefs which was becoming increasingly congruent with the USA’s own view of her role in Southeast Asia after 1967: the disapproval of "interference by outside Powers." ASEAN had always, in principle, objected to "all foreign bases" and to "external interference in any form or manifestation." In the Kuala Lumpur Declaration the Association made it quite clear that it considered outside interference the main cause of existing problems in Southeast Asia and the key obstacle to making the area a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. The Declaration reiterated and emphasized ASEAN’s conviction that the states in Southeast Asia, themselves, had the right and the responsibility to determine their national destinies. ASEAN took no specific action to back up its conviction, for instance through representations to the USA about her involvement in Vietnam, or through pressure on its own members to terminate their military alliances with the USA in SEATO. But ASEAN restated its attitude at a time when the USA was moving towards a complete reassessment of her presence in Southeast Asia; towards the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam; and towards the 1973 Paris Peace Agreement concerning Vietnam. In the early 1970s, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as a whole and ASEAN’s explicit critique of outside interference in Southeast Asia represented political statements that could
not fail to influence the USA's perception of the nature of ASEAN.

The indicators mentioned above point towards a conclusion that the USA saw ASEAN as a purely political organization. Such a conclusion would neglect several other important facts. First, the Bangkok Declaration does not mention political cooperation as a field of organizational activity. Although the preamble and the "aims and purposes of the Association" include a number of references to clearly political topics - such as "security from external interference" (preamble, section 4) or "regional peace and stability" (declaration, Second, item 2) - the specific listing of projected areas of cooperation (declaration, Second, items 3-7) nowhere even hints at political collaboration. Second, ASEAN throughout its early years steadfastly maintained in public that it was strictly an association for economic and social development. The terms 'development' or 'socio-economic development' were used by ASEAN, and are here understood, as encompassing all the areas of cooperation explicitly enumerated in the Bangkok Declaration. Third, ASEAN certainly pursued activities in those areas. For example, its committees studied problems relating to food, shipping, or air traffic; the commissioning of the UN study showed concern with economic cooperation; and in the dialogues with developed countries the EEC was one of the earliest and most important partners of ASEAN. There could be no doubt that ASEAN did, indeed, intend to promote cooperation among its members with a view to progress, prosperity, and socio-economic development. Thus any perception of ASEAN as a solely political organization would have been unmindful of conspicuous elements in its character. There is no reason to assume that the USA held such a distorted view.

132
While the USA was surely aware of ASEAN's non-political features, these could not, however, outweigh the political ones. It must be noted that most of the Association's attention during the early years was turned inward; that ASEAN treated many of its internal operations as confidential matters; and that the ASEAN commitment to development appeared to centre on intra-ASEAN activities, while political topics in Southeast Asia tended to become publicized. The steady plodding of ASEAN committees was far less visible externally than were speeches and statements about great power interference in Southeast Asia. In addition and finally, even ASEAN's development orientation could suggest certain political connotations to the USA. The American involvement in Thailand, for instance, showed that the USA saw a connection between socio-economic living conditions and political stability. In Thailand the USA provided substantial economic development assistance along with her military aid, much of the former being devoted to rural development schemes in the border provinces where the population seemed particularly susceptible to communist insurgency activities.43

In summary, it would appear from the perceptions of the USA regarding Southeast Asia, the ASEAN member states, and her own interests that ASEAN during its early years was characterized far more by political than by other features. Although the USA certainly did not overlook ASEAN's economic, social, and cultural orientations, these shaped the USA's perceptions to a distinctly lesser degree than the Association's intimate interconnection with the great political issues and tensions in Southeast Asia. It is therefore concluded that the USA initially perceived ASEAN as a predominantly, though not exclusively, political organization.
The Later Years: Change and Continuity in the ASEAN – USA Relationship

The beginning of ASEAN's consolidation is marked by the Bali summit in February 1976. At the end of the three-year span (1976-1978) that is here considered as the later period in ASEAN – US relations, many of the factors that had influenced the USA's early perceptions of issues and powers in Southeast Asia had undergone remarkable changes. The issues and relationships of the early years had evolved into a new pattern, in which both the USA's position and ASEAN's relevance to it need to be redefined.

The American involvement in Vietnam was over. The 1973 Paris Peace Agreement had ended the USA's participation in the armed struggle between North and South Vietnam. The last US officials had left South Vietnam in the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, as the city was taken by North Vietnamese forces. In the final extension of North Vietnam's rule over all of Vietnam and of its control over Laos and most of Cambodia, the USA was a distant spectator. In Thailand, the government in 1975 had requested that the USA advance the already scheduled withdrawal of American troops; by late March 1976 the US bases in Thailand were closed down or handed over for Thai use, and by the end of July 1976, the last US troops had left Thailand. The Philippines in 1975 had begun to demand a complete transfer of control over the US bases there, and Subic Bay naval base and Clark Field air base were retained under American control only after protracted discussions over Philippine sovereignty, Southeast Asian self-determination, and an increase of US payments for the use of the bases. In mainland Southeast Asia no American military presence remained. SEATO had long before ceased to be an operative organization.
It was formally disbanded in 1976, although the underlying Manila Treaty itself was not repudiated. 45

Concomitant with these developments the position of the USA towards her principal partners in global international relations had greatly changed. The pivotal factor in this change was, of course, China's emergence into an international role, and her new relationship with the USA. China at the end of the 1970s seemed to be fast replacing the Soviet Union as the USA's associate in the global political game. The USA had begun to reconsider her position towards the PRC at about the time of ASEAN's foundation, and in the following ten years appeared to move from containment to companionship. The change in the American perception of China had propitiously coincided with China's readiness, after her seclusion during the later years of the Cultural Revolution, to take up a peaceful role in international relations. The fear of the USA that China was out to conquer Asia gave way to the more sober assessments that (1) China could simply not be excluded from international politics; (2) in view of China's enmity to the Soviet Union her priorities were most likely to focus on her own security and thus on creating friends for herself; and (3) her intentions with respect to Southeast Asia would, therefore, probably not lean towards conflict but rather towards preventing any one power from achieving hegemony in the area.

The new American perception of China quickly produced tangible results. In July 1971 Henry Kissinger (then Security Advisor to President Nixon) had gone to Peking as Special US Envoy. In February 1972 Nixon had visited China. Within seven years the new relationship had prospered so
much that full diplomatic relations were instituted as of 1 January 1979.
Chinese Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping's visit to the USA in February 1979
illustrated the atmosphere of near euphoria which appeared to characterize
the US attitude in the late 1970s towards the new friendship with the
PRC.46

As China won international stature the Soviet Union lost ground. The
good relationship with the USA favoured China's image as a responsible
member of the international community, while the image of the Soviet
Union deteriorated. This was not necessarily a process of loss
Corresponding to China's gain,47 but rather a consequence of the USSR's
own behaviour in international relations. In the late 1970s, the USSR was
widely perceived as the principal international troublemaker fomenting,
for example, unrest or civil war in Angola and Afghanistan; building up a
naval presence in the Indian Ocean; attempting to steer the Third World
movement of non-aligned nations towards a pro-Moscow bias with the aid of
Cuba and Laos; frustrating progress in the negotiations with the USA on
strategic arms limitation (SALT); and even as Vietnam was extending its
regimen over all of Indochina despite a global outcry of indignation over
its aggression against Cambodia, effecting an ever closer association with
Vietnam.48

Neither the USA nor, of course, the Soviet Union wished to revive
the containment concept with the USSR as the new target. But in effect
the position of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1970s was not
dissimilar to the earlier position of China. There was one major and
ironic difference: China after the Sino-Soviet split and before the
opening of the US relationship had been completely isolated, and the international order had been determined without her; the Soviet Union now was still very much a global power with a voice in the club that settled the international order, but in global relations she had only one potential associate: the USA, her first and foremost opponent in ideology. The USA could still be counted upon to be receptive and responsive to indications of goodwill on the part of the Soviet Union, because this was a characteristic germane to the American people and their political system. The other globally relevant powers (China, Japan, Western Europe) were either clearly in opposition to the USSR, or unlikely to outdo the USA in advances of goodwill towards the Soviet Union.

The new set of relations at the global level meant that the great powers' partners at lesser levels - e.g., in Southeast Asia - acquired more options as well as greater significance in those relations, and at the same time more freedom in their relations among themselves. These tendencies are reflected in the later relationship between the USA and ASEAN, for which it is instructive to consider the several changes in US attitude towards Southeast Asia that ensued, during ASEAN's later years. These changes are apparent from a succession of "doctrines" named after Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter. The Nixon Doctrine, of course, originated in the formative years of ASEAN, but its major impact on the USA - ASEAN relationship occurred during the period of ASEAN's consolidation.

The Nixon Doctrine, announced in mid-1969, marked the transition in the USA from thinking in terms of friend or foe to a policy that included
China in the global decision-making process. This was one of its several basic and interrelated principles. Another basic principle was that in the future the USA would involve herself in conflicts between other parties directly, and especially in defense commitments, only where her own vital interests were concerned. This amounted to a renunciation of the USA's worldwide guardian role, and in the concomitant reassessment of US vital interests Southeast Asia was no longer deemed vital. The first exemplification of this principle was the policy of "Vietnamization" - the gradual re-transfer from US to South Vietnamese armed forces and authorities, of the responsibilities for South Vietnam's self-defense and domestic order. According to the Nixon Doctrine, American interests in Southeast Asia were adequately protected from an offshore position.

In actual fact, following the Vietnam war the USA seemed to have withdrawn from Southeast Asia not only her armed forces but also her attention. For several years after the American disengagement in Vietnam, most of the ASEAN member states found even a residual US interest in Southeast Asia difficult to perceive. They felt that the USA had really written Southeast Asia off and was making only half-hearted efforts to assure them to the contrary. Although Thailand and the Philippines spoke out against US bases on their territories, US indifference to the future of Southeast Asia was not what they had sought to achieve.

In 1976 President Ford declared ASEAN to be the cornerstone of his policy for Asia, which was also termed the Pacific Doctrine. This was an evolution from the Nixon principles. It referred to Southeast Asia mainly as a secondary element in the USA's broader interests in and
around the Pacific and Indian Oceans; a local component in a new global US strategy for a balance among the major powers in the world. At first glance this American attitude appears to correspond to the ASEAN desire to see Southeast Asia removed from the immediate attention of the great powers. But ASEAN was not advocating the unilateral dissociation of only the Western global power from Southeast Asia when both China, as almost a neighbour, and the USSR, in Vietnam, were evidently there to stay. Therefore, the relegation of Southeast Asia to a minor component in the USA's geopolitical outlook did not coincide with the preferences in ASEAN, and the accentuation of ASEAN in the Pacific Doctrine was seen as largely rhetorical. It is interesting to note that the milestones in ASEAN's own development into a cohesive, active entity - the 1976 and 1977 summits - were set during the period of the USA's distinct remoteness from Southeast Asian concerns.

Despite the reservations of ASEAN about US bases on the territories of member states, the ASEAN members were more or less in agreement that they wished to see the USA maintain a strong political interest as well as a military visibility in their environment. This attitude, consistently favoured by Singapore and mostly by Indonesia, had by late 1977 become the unanimous ASEAN position. Under President Carter the USA made several special efforts, through public statements and goodwill tours of US officials, to convince the governments in ASEAN of the continued American interest in Southeast Asia, stressing that the USA was an Asian and Pacific power as well as a Western and Atlantic one, and that she remained concerned with the area not only for the sake of Japan, but for her own sake. This emphasis indicated the further evolution during
Carter's presidency of the previous doctrines. The USA now claimed that her concern with, or for, Southeast Asia was not merely derived from her other, primary relationships - such as that with Japan, which had just proclaimed ASEAN the core of her future relations in Southeast Asia through the Fukuda Doctrine -, but that US concern with the area was direct and genuine.

ASEAN reacted to these US efforts as a unit, and with reserve. It considered American assurances largely rhetorical as long as US official recognition of ASEAN as an organization was not forthcoming. This did not happen until September 1977, when the first meeting in the ASEAN - USA dialogue took place. Even after the formal recognition of ASEAN by virtue of the dialogue, the US was faced with almost contemptuous criticism from ASEAN leaders for unconvincing behaviour towards those Southeast Asian forces that, in the ASEAN view, continued to support American interests by striving to maintain some peace and stability in Southeast Asia. ASEAN felt that the USA, in failing to attach proper significance to the Association, failed to recognize her continuing responsibilities towards the ASEAN member countries and their efforts - individually and through ASEAN - to preserve their own political and social systems amidst external pressures; efforts which to ASEAN merited more decisive American endorsement than they received. This critique became particularly acute when both the USA and Japan offered large-scale reconstruction aid to Vietnam. ASEAN feared that this might divert aid resources from its own development efforts and add economic to military advantage in Vietnam.

For the USA the real breakthrough in perception regarding ASEAN came
with the goodwill tour of US Vice-President Mondale in May 1978 to the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. \(^{56}\) These visits were considered by all involved to be ASEAN- rather than country-oriented, and both sides viewed them as the first substantial acknowledgement of ASEAN's importance. After the Mondale tour the second meeting in the ASEAN - USA dialogue took place in mid-1978. At US request, this meeting was held at the ministerial level which ASEAN had previously unsuccessfully sought to establish. \(^{57}\) In substance the dialogue addresses primarily questions of economic cooperation. By the end of 1978 these questions were still in the earliest stages of exploration. However, the Mondale tour and the second dialogue meeting clearly enhanced US credibility in the view of ASEAN with respect to US interest in Southeast Asia. The USA also showed continued willingness to help upgrade the national defense capabilities of ASEAN member states, both through regular arms sales and through "security assistance" programmes. \(^{58}\) Although ASEAN insisted that military matters were not an organizational concern, it nevertheless regarded US support for national defense programmes of member states as evidence that the USA recognized the need in Southeast Asia to maintain a credible military deterrent to Hanoi expansionism. For ASEAN such a need had always been linked to its own vision of a peaceful, progressive, free region upholding basic values that deserved US support.

Towards the end of the period 1976-1978, the USA had apparently come to view ASEAN as a welcome chance for herself to remain interested but noninvolved in Southeast Asia. \(^{59}\) The existence of ASEAN makes it much easier for the USA to consider her own interests in the preservation of free societies and in an acceptable balance of forces adequately
safeguarded in Southeast Asia without her own active interference or intervention. In this sense, ASEAN is indeed a cornerstone in the Pacific Doctrine. The USA seemed to have resigned herself to the prospect that all of former Indochina would fall under complete Vietnamese control, and had perhaps come to perceive ASEAN as a suitable counterweight to the communist part of Southeast Asia. Such a perception could not realistically be based on the ASEAN members' national or combined military resources; they were clearly inferior to those of Vietnam and, more importantly, an emphasis on military strength in connection with ASEAN would have disregarded the pervasive non-militant character of the organization. Rather, the greater awareness of the USA with regard to ASEAN resulted from her own more distant position towards Southeast Asia, where ASEAN had grown into an increasingly cohesive grouping, whose non-communist orientation promised to help preserve a plurality of social, economic, and political systems in Southeast Asia.

US Perceptions of ASEAN - Conclusion

In both stages of ASEAN, the USA's perception of the Association was substantially influenced by her approach to Southeast Asia as a factor in her global relationships. In the new pattern of global relations that evolved during ASEAN's second phase, Southeast Asia played a less central role for the USA than before. At the same time, within the limits of that role ASEAN came to play a more prominent part, precisely because the USA relinquished her direct management in Southeast Asia without entirely relinquishing her interests. This more prominent role for ASEAN only became possible, however, after ASEAN itself had outgrown its
first stage of organizational development.

The influence of ASEAN on the shaping of its relationship with the USA was always minor compared to the influence of factors external to ASEAN. The plural links between events at the ASEAN, Southeast Asian, East Asian and global level that had characterized ASEAN-USA relations during the early years of the Association, continued to exist throughout the second phase of ASEAN. As a result the USA's later perception of the Association continued to be that of a grouping whose existence, objectives, and activities mattered primarily in a political context. As in the earlier stage of ASEAN, there was little to suggest other contexts to the USA. ASEAN activities with respect to economic, social, and other non-political goals up to the end of 1978 produced virtually no tangible, externally visible results that might have affected the USA. The dialogue had barely got under way, and both the USA and ASEAN had evidently seen it not only as an economic undertaking, but had also attached considerable political importance to it. The ASEAN relationship with Japan, with respect to the USA was a political rather than an economic matter. Thus it must be concluded that the USA, when she began to take ASEAN seriously, did so largely in connection with the political perceptions that governed her entire approach to Southeast Asia.

Those perceptions focussed on issues and relationships that were entirely political in nature. There is thus no reason to assume that for the USA the character of ASEAN as a political phenomenon had changed. Rather, ASEAN's consolidation confirmed the significance of its political features. These became also more clearly visible during the later years,
when ASEAN explicitly addressed political cooperation in the 1976 Concord; openly discussed political topics at the 1976 and 1977 summits; and arrived at an official ASEAN policy with regard to the desirability of a strong US presence in Southeast Asia. Through these developments ASEAN certainly offset any impression that the USA might have derived from the dialogue meetings of ASEAN's being mainly an economic grouping. Insofar as there was change in the USA's perception of ASEAN during the later years, the change emphasized rather than de-emphasized the Association's political significance. Thus from the viewpoint of the USA ASEAN, during the entire period from 1967 to the end of 1978, appeared predominantly, though not exclusively, as a political organization.

**The Position of the Soviet Union**

**Framework of Soviet Interests in Southeast Asia**

It is apparent from the above discussion of US international relations that the position of the USSR in Southeast Asia, East Asia and at the global level was in many ways tied to that of the USA. At the time of ASEAN's formation, the Vietnam war dominated the scene in Southeast Asia not only for the USA, but also for the Soviet Union, who had just begun to bind North Vietnam closer to herself through military and economic aid. The direct fighting of US troops against the North Vietnamese, which had escalated since 1962, was then nearing its peak and provided the USSR with the opportunity to portray herself as the supporter of a small nation in a war of liberation against the superpower USA; a posture that clearly enhanced the reputation of the Soviet Union.
with Third World countries. At the same time, Soviet assistance to North Vietnam did not really damage Soviet-US relations, to which China was of much greater significance than Vietnam. As shown above, the Sino-Soviet split had initially benefitted the Soviet Union in her international relations. China's seclusion during the Cultural Revolution, especially from about 1966 to 1969, contributed to making the USSR's overall position relatively secure during the 1960s. Being secure it could, for the time being, remain fairly inconspicuous in Asia: Richard Nixon in his 1967 article published in Foreign Affairs predicted that after the Vietnam war the international order in Asia would be shaped by the "four giants" India, Japan, China, and USA; he saw the Soviet Union as a primarily European power looking westward.

The USSR saw herself differently. Her claim to being an Asian power as well as a European one, was perhaps not as clearly stated in the 1960s as in the 1970s, when China's new role in global politics made a more explicit assertion of the Soviet claim necessary. But it was an indispensable component in the Soviet Union's position as a world power; a position in which an overriding Soviet concern with security represented the fundamental cause, and an emancipated China the principal challenge.

During the first two or three years of ASEAN's existence the situation seemed relatively easy for the Soviet Union under the American 'containment of China' concept which, it must be remembered, was not really called into question until the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in mid-1969, and appeared to be revoked rather suddenly after Kissinger's first, secret visit to Peking in 1971. But with China's
opening to the international community the weights among the leading political actors in the global international game began to shift soon after ASEAN's formation. ASEAN was formed in 1967. Before Kissinger went to Peking in 1971, China had already been signalling to the USA her readiness to open a relationship, and the USA had eagerly seized it. Given the difference in status and power between the USSR and China, the latter was not then an actor in global politics comparable in influence to the USSR with respect to relations with the USA, or with respect to political weight throughout the world. China had very little impact on politics in Africa or Latin America, and could not be expected to take a role in European politics equal to that of the USSR. But with regard to the partnership of political powers at the very top of the global level, the entry of China into international politics diminished the role of the Soviet Union as the only supreme partner of the USA, and China's influence could be expected to expand in other relationships as soon as that with the USA was established. Thus, even at the turn of the 1960s to the 1970s, the global position of the USSR was no longer as unchallenged as it had been before. The Soviet Union's concern with security and, in that context, with her status as a world power and with China, is essential to an understanding of the Soviet attitude towards Southeast Asia and ASEAN.

For the Soviet Union, as for old Russia, historical experience has created the perceived need to distrust all other countries not manifestly weaker than herself, and to ensure her own strength, especially in military terms, in order to prevent aggression. The perception of being surrounded by potential enemies is reinforced by ideology.
Marxism-Leninism positions capitalism against communism as basically incompatible, hostile forces, so that regardless of temporary accommodation with the USA the latter remains essentially an enemy. The split in the international communist movement further intensified the Soviet notion that the USSR had to guard herself against powerful, or potentially powerful, adversaries. The concern with security underlies all foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and this concern combined with a proselytizing ideology shapes the self-image of the USSR: she has to attain, maintain, and enhance the position of a world power, whose interests and status cannot be disregarded in any part of the globe, and whose voice carries decisive weight in discussions about the international order.

As long as international communism was a single movement led by Moscow, the primary obstacle to Soviet interests was the ideological opponent USA, and the main arena for power contests was Europe. After the Sino-Soviet split Asia could no longer be left to China's influence. In fact, the PRC came to be perceived by the USSR as the principal enemy and the main threat to Russia's own security. That threat perhaps abated, but did not disappear during China's preoccupation with internal strife in the 1960s. The Soviet fear of Chinese aggression was very real; it grew as border skirmishes between the two countries escalated from 1969 on. In addition, the Chinese threat to Soviet security went further: tacit or open collusion between China and the USA might encourage China in her allegedly aggressive designs against the USSR; or China in collaboration with the USA and her followers (notably Japan and Western Europe) might strive to turn the containment policy against the USSR - a prospect which
readily revived historical fears of encirclement and aggression in the Soviet Union. Moreover, the opening of China to the USA threatened not only to encroach upon the status of the USSR as the principal counterpart of the USA in world politics, but even to limit decisively Soviet policy options: in collaboration with China, Japan, and Western Europe the USA might be able to determine the global international order without the Soviet Union.66

From the status of the USSR as a world power and from the focus of her concerns on security it follows that for her the triangular relationship between herself, China, and the USA was the only really important one. Because of China, the Asian giant, the USSR had to emphasize her position as an Asian power. Because of China, the perceived security hazard, the Soviet Union had to maintain reasonably good relations with the USA. The Soviet engagement in Southeast Asia illustrated both these needs. It also exemplified how Soviet relations at the global level influence the directions and contents of those at other levels.

Initial Soviet support for North Vietnam followed naturally from the ideological postulate that the stabilization and advance of communist forces in the world be furthered. When China's attention was distracted by internal problems in the late 1960s, the Soviet Union filled the space that became available, and thus ensured her own anchorage in the southeastern part of Asia. The USSR never wavered in her support for North Vietnam, even when the latter's attempts from 1978 on to subjugate Cambodia brought her worldwide - and especially Third World - castigation
and a near-confrontation with China, who openly supported Cambodia. But the Soviet Union never let her endorsement of North Vietnam imperil her global interests. Throughout the Vietnam war the USSR avoided a direct confrontation with the USA; in the Vietnam-Cambodia struggle she did not let herself be provoked into direct conflict with China, but rather sanctioned Vietnam's expansionism by branding China as the ally of the murderous Khmer Rouge regime that prevailed in Cambodia from 1975 to 1978.

For the USSR - as for the USA - interests and relations in Southeast Asia thus were subordinate to those in a global context. This meant that Southeast Asia mattered to the Soviet Union primarily for political reasons. She had virtually no economic interests in Southeast Asia. In economic terms, North Vietnam was a distinct liability, because Soviet aid to her protege unilaterally benefitted the latter. No indirect concern with Southeast Asia comparable to that of the USA on account of Japan, interposed between Soviet goals at the global and those at the Southeast Asian level. The relationship itself between the USSR and Japan created no particular obligations or claims on either side with respect to Southeast Asia. Apart from regular trade and commerce, the mutual economic interests in that relationship centred on a prospect that Japan might be invited to assist the Soviet Union in the development of Siberia, but this prospect did not materialize, largely because the two countries were at odds over the possession of four small southern Kurile islands which the Soviet Union had occupied in the course of World War II and refused to return to Japan. As this issue touched national sensitivities about sovereignty and security in both countries, it
strongly politicized the bilateral relationship, but this had nothing to do with Southeast Asia. In East Asia, of course, Japan had a potential role as either an associate of the Soviet Union against China, or vice versa. This potential was brought into sharp focus with the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty in 1978 (see below: The Position of China), and it probably was not without influence on Soviet considerations about attracting Japan's interest in the Siberia project. But the China aspect of the Soviet-Japan relationship did not involve Southeast Asia directly, and it only confirmed that Soviet relations in all of Asia took their meaning from Soviet global interests.

The Soviet Attitude towards ASEAN

The Principle

The Soviet Union was slightly more outspoken than the USA in her reaction to ASEAN. Thus it is easier to assess her perception of the Association, even though she never acknowledged ASEAN as an organizational entity in bilateral negotiations. From the first, the USSR in unison with other communist powers (initially including China) denounced ASEAN as a tool of US imperialism, a follow-up of SEATO, a Western-inspired alliance against the forces of liberation and genuine independence in Southeast Asia. ASEAN did not fit well into the framework of Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, for several reasons.

First, the Soviet Union clearly interpreted ASEAN's self-portrayal as a non-communist grouping as anti-communism. In the Southeast Asian environment of the late 1960s this was hardly surprising; the time and
place were not suited for subtle distinctions. Also, the Soviet Union was a country led by old men used to thinking in terms of alliances against an enemy rather than in terms of cooperation for general, equal mutual benefit; the ASEAN grouping, claiming to be neither pro-West nor anti-communist, yet being something different from the non-aligned movement, cannot have been readily understandable to Soviet leaders. The same characteristics that made ASEAN generally acceptable to the USA constituted sufficient cause for the USSR to disapprove of it. Whether as a perceived anti-communist or as a non-communist grouping, ASEAN presented an ideological alternative to the persuasion of Moscow's friends in Southeast Asia, and an impediment to the spread of communism in the area. The USSR could not be expected to welcome this any more than she had welcomed the anti-communist, or non-communist, orientations of the individual ASEAN member states.

Another reason for Soviet hostility may have been that ASEAN partially filled a power vacuum which might otherwise have been there for the Soviet Union to fill.73 It came about with the British, and soon after the American, military disengagement from Southeast Asia. During the mid-1960s, Britain had found that she could not continue to carry the economic burden of her defense commitments in Southeast Asia (affecting Malaysia and Singapore), and had decided in July 1967 that by the mid-1970s she would withdraw from all military bases "east of Suez." In an announcement in January 1968 the target date was suddenly moved up to 1971.74 As for the USA, in early 1969 the gradual decrease of troops in Southeast Asia was already beginning to take shape under the policy of Vietnamization.75 The Soviet Union may well have endeavoured to fill the
space which the removal of Western power promised to leave – not necessarily by crude substitution of her own armed forces for the departing ones, but by offering herself as the protector of smaller states, or by assuming a policing role in the area. The association of the ASEAN states partly frustrated such opportunities; it encouraged them to turn away from seeking great-power alliances and strengthened their separate abilities to perceive, and resist, potential outside designs for the future of Southeast Asia.

This characteristic of ASEAN, which is one of its core features, also affected a further aspect of the Soviet approach to ASEAN. The Soviet Union has traditionally preferred to conduct international relations in a bilateral state-to-state framework. The most likely reason for this is an attitude of divide-and-rule; in bilateral relations, most countries are distinctly less powerful and more susceptible to pressures than the Soviet Union. In Malaysia or Thailand, for instance, domestic insurgencies and national beliefs in non-alignment (Malaysia) or in diplomatic manoeuvring (Thailand) make the governments vulnerable to external influences. Individually they might be more amenable to great-power pressures than they are as co-associates of the most outspoken advocates of a strong American presence in Southeast Asia, Singapore and Indonesia.

The fourth reason for the Soviet Union's hostility towards ASEAN was directly related to her attitude towards China. Soviet politics in Southeast Asia were largely an extension of Soviet global politics centred on isolation of China. In Southeast Asia, China's inescapable presence
gave her a distinct advantage over the USSR in a rivalry for influence in the area. Opening of the dialogue between the USA and China increased that advantage, because the new favourable US perception of China could be expected to filter down to those Southeast Asian states that enjoyed good relations with the USA. For the Soviet Union it was clearly desirable that ASEAN states share the Soviet view of the Chinese threat. ASEAN, however, was geared to being on good terms with all powers; to accommodation rather than confrontation; and to steering clear of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. ASEAN was promoting peace, progress, and good-neighbourliness in the hope that, if ASEAN demonstrated its inoffensiveness, everyone would leave it alone. This attitude clearly did not exclude future good relations with China, and thus could not be welcome to the Soviet Union.

Soviet animosity towards ASEAN abated, however, whenever the USSR saw an opportunity to use ASEAN for her own purposes. The 1969 Soviet scheme of collective security in Asia is an example of the way in which the Soviet Union tried to fit ASEAN into her own broader interests.

The Soviet Proposal for Collective Security in Asia

In July 1969 the Soviet Union launched a vague proposal for "a system of collective security in Asia." It was to include the Asian states from India to Japan and the USSR herself; on various subsequent occasions membership or association of the USA, Afghanistan, Iran, Nepal, and Turkey was also mentioned. The objectives, meaning, and contents of the proposal were never clearly spelled out. Soviet references to the scheme highlighted the following particulars: it was to be an economic
and political rather than a military arrangement; it was to be compatible with existing cooperative or defense schemes; it was to make all previous associations and alliances unnecessary, particularly those in Southeast Asia; it was to tie in with questions of armament limitation, nuclear non-proliferation, US influence and military presence in Asia, national self-determination, territorial integrity and non-aggression; it was to extend the benefits of the "European model" of security to Asia.

The USSR pursued the proposal mainly in bilateral talks with those prospective members she judged particularly close friends (e.g., India) or pivotal to the political situation in Asia (e.g., Japan), or both (e.g., Vietnam). In 1969 she made a special effort to court the ASEAN states, prominently among them Malaysia, who was then promoting its original proposal for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia that later emerged as the ASEAN Kuala Lumpur Declaration. Malaysia and also Thailand showed some initial interest in the Soviet scheme but soon turned it down, as did most of the other prospective members. The reason for the almost universal rejection of the proposed collective security scheme was its equally near-universal interpretation as a Soviet attempt to construct an anti-China alliance, with military overtones, in Asia. China immediately branded it as such. Most of the Asian, and certainly the ASEAN states seemed to share China's perception and declined either to let the USSR replace the USA as big brother in Asia, or to jeopardize their chances of eventually coming to terms with China. The USSR then ceased to woo the ASEAN states and resumed her hostility to ASEAN itself.
The second occasion for the Soviet Union to relent towards ASEAN occurred with the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration. It caused the USSR to bring forth the collective security scheme again and to emphasize that the two proposals were really directed at the same goals: peace, stability, security, self-determination, and so on. At that time "neutrality" in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was still widely understood to mean, perhaps, great-power guarantees of Southeast Asia's neutrality; an interpretation which ASEAN has since rejected. Thus it was possible for the Soviet Union to acclaim the ASEAN proposal as representing a step in the same direction as the collective security scheme, and to infuse the ASEAN terminology concerning outside interference with her own understanding of the need to check China's influence in Asia. When ASEAN's promotion of its own proposal showed that the Association saw it as essentially incongruent with the Soviet scheme, the Soviet Union once more returned to her former animosity against ASEAN. In 1970, for instance, she criticized the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) for supporting ASEAN, on the grounds that ASEAN did not limit its activities to the clearly functional aims (economic or cultural cooperation, and the like) that ECAFE was authorized to promote. In early 1977 (i.e., after the Bali and before the Kuala Lumpur summit), the Soviet Party newspaper Pravda attacked ASEAN for "taking steps to standardize their weapons" and for letting "imperialist powers" attempt to transform ASEAN into a military bloc.

The collective security scheme was occasionally resurrected, without further specification, throughout the 1970s; it never lost its underlying suggestion of being directed against China. It made no headway in Asia,
and the USSR did not present it to ASEAN members again as a basis for talks about common interests.

**Soviet Adjustment to the Presence of ASEAN**

A new phase in the Soviet-ASEAN relationship began after the second ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1977. This meeting of heads of state in ASEAN was much publicized in the regional media and attracted considerable attention beyond the region, as evidenced by the several post-summit conferences between ASEAN and Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. Many of the summit speeches and press releases reiterated, among other topics, the fundamental ASEAN dedication to the principles of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. The Soviet Union took this opportunity to express outright approval of the stated ASEAN desire for peace in Southeast Asia, while at the same time warning that ASEAN was embarking on a "road of military alliance" and playing into the hands of US imperialism. Given its record of internal and external peacefulness, ASEAN had little difficulty refuting such allegations. Subsequently the USSR - and temporarily also Vietnam - shifted her line of attack against ASEAN: in 1978, she began to portray the Association as a grouping misled and subverted by sinister American, Chinese, and Japanese designs for the future of Asia; misguided by forces which prevented ASEAN from recognizing those who truly wished it well. Thus after the second summit, when the Association had evidently established itself as a unit adhering to certain specific principles of its own (such as those embodied in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration), the Soviet Union gradually seemed to realize that open attacks on ASEAN or attempts to displace the ASEAN peace proposal with
her own scheme, would not bear fruition; instead, she seemed to accept what she could not alter, seeking new ways to turn it to her own advantage.

Her advantage, of course, remained bound up with China's position. The highs and lows in the Soviet attitude towards ASEAN appeared to correspond closely to the Soviet perception of how intimately ASEAN was associated with the USA (and Japan), and how useful ASEAN might prove as a check against the ascendency and influence of the PRC. In late 1978 a Singaporean diplomat remarked to this author on external attempts to align the Association with larger interests, and on how everyone counselled ASEAN to beware of everyone else - the Soviets warned against the Chinese, he said, the Chinese against the Soviets, and the Japanese against both. In commenting on the change in Soviet attitude during 1978, he called it "a most remarkable development" showing distinct signs of cooperative intent; even though an explicit Soviet recognition of ASEAN as an entity was not expected for quite some time, according to his remarks there clearly was a new direction evident in the Soviet attitude. One indication of this new attitude was the 1978 visit of Soviet Vice-Premier Firyubin to several ASEAN countries, which the Association understood as a goodwill mission following that of Ženg Sary (Cambodia) and competing with the subsequent visit by Deng Xiaoping.90

The Soviet flexibility in attitude towards ASEAN indicated that the USSR was beginning to accept the Association as an element of undeniable significance in the area. Southeast Asia was one of the arenas in which the Soviet Union wished to assert her position as an Asian power. As one
pillar in the "Asian Quadrilateral" consisting of herself, China, Japan, and the USA, the USSR had no choice but to take into account any and all of the units in the area that might affect the outcomes of the rivalry between herself and China. If individual ASEAN states seemed perhaps irrelevant in that respect, an entity representing five countries, over 240 million people, and more than half of Southeast Asia was obviously no longer irrelevant.

Soviet Perceptions of ASEAN - Conclusion

The global context and the specific type of Soviet interests in Southeast Asia leave no doubt that to the Soviet Union ASEAN is of purely political significance. Her clearly negative reaction to ASEAN, and the occasions and reasons for which the hostility relented, confirm such an appraisal. The Soviet Union has even less reason than the USA to view ASEAN in other than political contexts; ASEAN's features regarding economic, social, and cultural cooperation give the Soviet Union little cause to let her attention be diverted from her overall approach to her international relations, which globally as well as in Asia centre on political issues.

The USSR has very little interest, directly or indirectly, in the economic potential of ASEAN. Regional resources are not vital to her. While it is conceivable that the denial of those resources to others might be of considerable interest to the Soviet Union, for the period discussed here there is little indication that this question played a significant role in the USSR's approach and attitudes. Moreover, China was not then indicating particular interest in, or dependence on, the
resources potential of the region. The Soviet Union would not have been in a position to block Japan's or the USA's access to the area. For the USA, this potential was of limited direct interest, and the economic interests of Japan were, for the Soviet Union, a political rather than an economic issue. Thus ASEAN did not control economic factors which, as such, were of special interest to the USSR. Neither did ASEAN contribute to, or make demands on, Soviet economic interests. ASEAN efforts at regional cooperation for socio-economic development mean little in economic terms to the Soviet Union. She has no significant share in the responsibility professed in the Western world of industrialized states for Third World development; thus ASEAN development neither decreases or increases economic demands placed on her. The relevance of ASEAN development to the Soviet Union lies in its potential effect on economic grievances in the populations that could be exploited by communist propaganda in order to further the communist cause in the region.

As as partner in trade and commerce, ASEAN is also insignificant to the USSR. It is difficult to give even approximate figures for this (e.g., import and export in dollars or percentages of total), because most publications register ASEAN exchanges with non-Western countries as "trade with socialist economies" without distinguishing between the Soviet Union and other socialist partners. It is clear, however, that all ASEAN trade with socialist economies represents only a small portion of total ASEAN trade. On the basis of an average for the period 1971 to 1975, ASEAN trade with socialist economies excluding China has been identified as 2.6% of ASEAN exports and 3.7% of ASEAN imports, including China as 3.3% (imports) and 6.3% (exports), respectively.
and exports favour the industrialized Western countries and especially Japan (see below). There is some indication that towards the end of the 1970s the Soviet Union, meeting with a desire in ASEAN to diversify in order to reduce economic dependence on Japan, quietly stepped up efforts to increase her trade with ASEAN countries, as did China. It may be assumed that the Soviet interests behind these efforts, are as much political as economic in nature. It is also possible that there is a link between these efforts and the change in Soviet attitude towards ASEAN since 1978. The possibility of a Sino-Soviet competition in ASEAN in the economic field is carefully noted in the ASEAN secretariats, but as of late 1978 neither the Soviet Union nor China seemed to have achieved any spectacular gains.

In summary, the Soviet perception of ASEAN is virtually entirely derived from political interests, principally those originating at the global and, to a much lesser extent, the Southeast Asian level. Insofar as ASEAN is at all important to the USSR, it is because of its identity as a perceived anti-communist grouping, its potential to affect the outcome of Sino-Soviet rivalry, and its effect of placing one large obstacle in Vietnam's path of expansion rather than several small ones. For the Soviet Union, ASEAN has virtually no non-political dimension of interest.
The Position of China

Nanyang and Other Interests

China's involvement in Southeast Asia is older by millennia than that of any other great power. It is important to understand China's historical approach to that involvement, because for her Southeast Asia is more than an arena in which to pursue a global strategy conducive to her great power status. It is an area in which history and proximity give China's international relations a separate and different dimension, and also a much greater propensity to exert, or seek to exert, influence on the political situation. This separate and different dimension suggests that China's perception of ASEAN may not simply be a function of the Sino-Soviet conflict, or of great-power aspirations to make an ideology prevail, but that it may encompass features of ASEAN which are irrelevant to, or unrecognized by, the superpowers.

Much of the area here termed Southeast Asia has traditionally been considered by China her natural sphere of interest and influence under the concept of 'Nanyang'. Nanyang means "the Southern Seas" and refers, among many other things, to the lands and waters beyond China's maritime borders, where there existed historical relations between imperial China and the various kingdoms that waxed and waned and warred among each other in the territories today occupied by Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia, and other modern states. Many of these relations were characterized by Chinese suzerainty rather than full domination. In Vietnam, especially in the northern part, China's political influence and
cultural penetration dominated for a thousand years from the first century B.C., but in most other areas her interest went no further than to establish a somewhat abstract supremacy over lesser states, and to prevent any one of them from rising to a position of hegemony. Nanyang also carries a reference to the Chinese people living outside China, the 'overseas Chinese'; the Chinese university in Singapore, for instance, is named Nanyang University. In the recent past the age-old concept of nanyang has at times evoked in Southeast Asia concerns over the possibility of hegemony by the PRC in the area - an indication that the PRC is assumed still to consider Southeast Asia her natural sphere of interest and influence, but to have more forceful ambitions now that formal suzerainty is no longer feasible in her relations with sovereign states in the area.

Today China has, of course, a much larger role in international relations than one relating to Southeast Asia. Her position as a globally relevant power of primary significance to the USSR and the USA is evident from the above discussion of these two powers' positions in Southeast Asia. Throughout ASEAN's existence China and the Soviet Union were antagonists in their bilateral relationship, rivals in their relations with others, and mutually fearful of aggression. During the years of the containment policy, and probably well into the period of her new relationship with the USA, the PRC was as concerned about Soviet designs to attack or isolate her as the Soviet Union was about the PRC. The development of the US relationship mitigated these fears for the PRC. It improved her global position with respect to the Soviet-Union, and it also contributed to the development of a cordial relationship between
China and Japan, which in turn affects both Sino-Soviet rivalry and ASEAN.

When China became tied into global international politics, the interests in Southeast and East Asia of her partners at the global level naturally began to influence China's own interests. Thus to China, Southeast Asia now represents not only Nanyang; her traditional interests there have been interrelated with — perhaps overlaid by — larger issues. The toehold of the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia, through Vietnam, has inevitably affected China's perception of how important the area is to her. Her support for Cambodia illustrates both her new and her old concerns and the interrelationship between them.

Throughout the 1960s Cambodia under Sihanouk had tried to follow a policy of non-alignment by balancing the influences of China, the USSR, and the USA, but had been unable to cope with growing popular unrest arising out of economic problems, incursions by both North and South Vietnamese forces, and the operations of several other, usually communist-supported groups in the country, among them the pro-Maoist Khmer Rouge dissidents. In 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown and the government under former vice-premier General Lon Nol proclaimed the Khmer Republic. When the Vietnam war spilled over into Cambodia, guerrilla activities and government counteractivities, especially against Vietnamese forces (both North and South) increased greatly and continued throughout the Vietnam war. Sihanouk in exile drew closer to China than to the USSR, even though both he and the Lon Nol government continued to maintain relations with Peking as well as Moscow. The Peking-supported Khmer Rouge took over.
control of more and more of the countryside in Cambodia as the government lost its hold even in the capital. After attempts to establish dictatorial control through emergency rule in Phnom Penh, the Lon Nol government finally collapsed. In 1975, within a few days of North Vietnam's takeover of Saigon, the rule in Cambodia fell entirely into the hands of the Khmer Rouge, who installed the Pol Pot regime as the formal representative of Democratic Kampuchea, as the country was then called. During the next three years its governmental, administrative, economic, and social systems virtually disintegrated. Yet Peking held fast in its support of Cambodia, where the only alternative to the existing rule of terror appeared to be a Hanoi-communist takeover.

For China, such a takeover meant two things: (1) Moscow's influence in Southeast Asia would expand, a result clearly undesirable in view of the Sino-Soviet rivalry. Thus it naturally suited China to regard the opponent of Moscow's friend in Southeast Asia as her own ally. Similar basic attitudes of regarding the enemy's enemy as a friend had also prevailed in imperial China. (2) Vietnam would strengthen its position to a point of hegemony in former Indochina, and perhaps in Southeast Asia. Possibly this was an even more undesirable consequence from China's point of view, because it violated ancient principles in China's attitude towards Southeast Asian powers. Such hegemony would be all the more unacceptable to China since it would be exercised by Vietnam: a country with a deep and longstanding resentment against its ancient rulers, and a country now aligned with China's principal enemy, the USSR. At the end of 1978, China's invasion of Vietnam (February 1979) in retaliation for Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia (January 1979) was only a few weeks away.
China explicitly gave her reasons for the expedition as "teaching Vietnam a lesson" and preventing Vietnam from realizing hegemonistic intentions in Southeast Asia.100

A second illustration of the mixture of new and old, global and Asian concerns in China's approach to international relations is her 1978 peace and friendship treaty with Japan. When China entered global politics in the 1970s, Japan was already a major power and the principal Asian partner of the USA. Japan had been deeply shocked by the American advances to China in 1971 and 1972, about which she had been neither consulted nor informed until the announcement of Nixon's visit to Peking. Japan shared with other countries in Asia the anxiety that China might try to dominate her Asian environment. China, for her part, had suffered Japanese aggression and partial occupation from 1931 until 1945101 and had no particularly friendly feelings for Japan. In addition, Japan's foreign policy with respect to Nationalist China (Taiwan) had long stood in the way of her relationship with the PRC. Japan in 1952 had signed a peace treaty with Nationalist China and had subsequently maintained diplomatic relations with Taipei, thus precluding official political relations with Peking. The pro-Taiwan posture was felt by many businessmen, and some political leaders, in Japan to be a regrettable necessity arising out of the perceived need to avoid a deviation from US foreign policy regarding the PRC and Taiwan.102 In 1964, Japan had voted in the UN General Assembly to make the entry of the PRC into the United Nations an "important question" (i.e., requiring a two-thirds majority of Assembly votes); not until 1971 did the PRC replace Taiwan in the UN as the accredited and sole legitimate representative of China.103 The
political relationship between the PRC and Japan was improved and eventually formalized only after the USA had reversed her own former position towards communist China under President Nixon.

In the Sino-Soviet conflict Japan had attempted to remain noncommittal as long as her image as an economic rather than political power would permit; but in view of her special relationship with the USA, and eager not to fall behind others in conciliatory posture towards China, Japan found herself being courted by both communist rivals. While the Soviet Union held out the prospect of joint ventures for the development of Siberia, China offered Japan a long-term friendship treaty. Considering the past problems between China and Japan, this was a remarkable gesture of goodwill; China would perhaps have had reason to expect Japan to take the first step towards a new, improved relationship. Instead, she was prepared to give before she took, whereas the Soviet Union's offer of economic cooperation with Japan simply disregarded Japanese political sensitivities over the issue of the Kurile islands.

The treaty offered by China to Japan contained the so-called anti-hegemony clause, an explicit condemnation of all efforts, by any single power, to establish a hegemonial sphere of influence anywhere in Asia. The Soviet Union saw this, with good reason, as a reference to herself and strongly opposed Japan's accepting it as part of the treaty. Japan - and many other powers - had the same understanding of the clause; China's insistence on it for years prevented the conclusion of the treaty with Japan. In February 1978, however, China and Japan signed an eight-year, $2 billion trade agreement. In October of the same year, the
treaty was ratified, with the controversial hegemony clause intact. In effect, Japan had chosen the Chinese side in the Sino-Soviet rivalry — although Japanese political leaders maintained that they had done nothing more than to conclude an overdue peace treaty with one power, while continuing to maintain good relations with the other, the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty was widely understood to signify a shift in Japanese foreign policy from equidistance to choosing sides. Certainly both China and the USSR understood it as such.

For China this meant not only scoring a victory over the Soviet Union in the global game. It also meant working through the anti-hegemony clause towards her old goal, again, of keeping the powers in Asia from upsetting a balance among themselves that conformed with China's interests. Lastly, it meant that Japan's goodwill towards China might be expected to carry some weight with the Southeast Asian states with which Japan had particularly close relations, the ASEAN states. It was reasonable to expect that the smaller states in Southeast Asia, who had especially close relations with Japan and had previously kept their distance from China, would feel that if Japan (and the USA) had cordial relations with China, their own attitudes might deserve reappraisal in favour of China. Overall, then, the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty amounted to a substantial political gain for the PRC, and much improved China's position with respect to international relations in Asia.

China's ideological interests run like an undercurrent through all her other interests in Southeast Asia. While the desire to spread Maoism
is not much in evidence in China's relations with, for example, Japan or the USA, in Southeast Asia it is clearly a component of China's attitude towards international relations. The PRC has always supported communist party, guerrilla, or dissident groups in countries such as Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, or Indonesia. The development of better relations with Southeast Asian states in the mid- and late 1970s in many cases caused China to emphasize a distinction between government-to-government relations and party-to-party relations. Her claim that the government in Peking cannot be held responsible for party actions makes it easier for China to pursue, at the same time, both her changing interests at the formal level of relations (where communist proselytism is usually not welcome), and her continuing ideological motive to advance Chinese communism throughout Southeast Asia.

The ongoing support for subversive movements is one of the main reasons for widespread distrust in Southeast Asia of China's intentions. Another, not unrelated reason is the commonly held belief - largely correct - that many overseas Chinese in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asian states feel strong loyalty to and respect for the PRC. Both the belief and the loyalty go back to the centuries-old concept that there is only one China; a concept under which the Chinese people have come to regard a single unified country of China as the only normal state of affairs, in which every Chinese wished to participate as a matter of course. The historical allegiance to 'one China' has been transferred by most to the PRC. Since the mid-1970s the government in Peking, in an effort to smooth the way to better relations in Southeast Asia, has admonished the overseas Chinese to regard themselves as loyal citizens of
their adopted countries. Yet the vague fear of a fifth column operating in non-communist states lingers on (especially in Indonesia) and adds to equally persistent anxieties about China's sheer size, her communist ideology, and her potential to cause Southeast Asian states to become engulfed in the Sino-Soviet conflict.106

It is apparent that China's interests in Southeast Asia are more complex than those of the USA or the USSR. They are not simply derived from China's global strategy, nor are they merely a function of her communist persuasion. But except, perhaps, for the element of ethnic and national loyalties, the principal concerns of China in Southeast Asia are closely related to her global interests, in which the enmity to the Soviet Union plays the most prominent role. This configuration is exemplified in all its components by the position of China towards ASEAN.

China's Attitude towards ASEAN

China's initial reaction to ASEAN was as hostile as that of the USSR. In 1967, China was still isolated from the international community. As concerned as the USSR with her security, China denounced ASEAN as "part of the U.S.-Soviet anti-China ring," "a criminal design" that was "jointly instigated by the Soviet revisionists and U.S. imperialists."107 This rhetoric reflected Chinese fears of encirclement far more than the expansionist ideological drive which was then assumed to pervade China's foreign policy objectives in Southeast Asia.

The Chinese attitude towards ASEAN had been predetermined by China's negative attitude towards individual ASEAN countries (Thailand, Malaysia,
the Philippines) because of their memberships in military alliances directed against communism in Asia. The two remaining ASEAN members gave China no cause to view the Association more favourably. Singapore had separated from Malaysia only two years prior to the formation of ASEAN and was intent on establishing its own distinct identity as a state of Singaporeans rather than Chinese; also, Singapore consistently and vocally favoured American presence in Southeast Asia. Indonesia had suspended relations with China in 1967 following the demise of Sukarno after the 1965 coup attempt. The new political leaders in Indonesia believed the attempted coup to have been engineered, or at least strongly supported, by the communist party of Indonesia (PKI), which they held had been leaning in part or as a whole towards the PRC. The new Indonesian government headed by General Soeharto made it quite clear that it viewed the PRC as a far greater threat than the Soviet Union. Thus to China ASEAN represented a grouping in which all member states were unfriendly to her.

With China's entry into world politics, however, came a reassessment of her relations with Southeast Asian states. ASEAN was one of the first beneficiaries of the new, self-confident Chinese approach to foreign relations. During 1971 and 1972, China had not only received the American President as a guest — who had taken the first step in the official exchange —; she had also retaken her place in the United Nations; and ASEAN had produced the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. In the eyes of the political leaders in Peking, the Declaration may well have appeared laudable not only on its own merits, but also because it presented an alternative to the Soviet proposal for a collective security scheme.
ASEAN's refusal to identify its own proposal with the Soviet suggestion must have favourably reflected on the organization itself in Peking's appraisal. China openly supported the ASEAN proposal for a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia, and as early as 1972 publicly acknowledged ASEAN as a well-intentioned group and as an organizational entity.\textsuperscript{110}

It seems that ASEAN profited from the thaw in Sino-American relations, on the one hand, as well as from the deterioration in Sino-Soviet relations, on the other. The China-USA relationship made it easier for the ASEAN members to come to terms with China, and for China to accept the entity of states generally inclined towards Western rather than communist ways. The China-USSR conflict increased ASEAN's usefulness to China, because it made a demarkation between Vietnam (or Vietnam and its followers) and the rest of Southeast Asia desirable for the PRC.

China remained steadfast in her acknowledgement of ASEAN as a worthy regional undertaking, even though her encouragement of communist groups in the ASEAN countries at the party-to-party level was scaled down only in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{111} There is no institutionalized framework of cooperation comparable to the dialogues in ASEAN - China relations; economically this would not be of much interest to ASEAN, and recognition of the Association itself was achieved without it. ASEAN has noted Chinese public endorsement with gratification. Support for ASEAN goals and principles from the most important new actor in Southeast Asia could only enhance the significance and standing of the Association.

China's firm backing of ASEAN was a prominent element in intra-ASEAN
discussions about the normalization of diplomatic relations between the
PRC and ASEAN member states. Since the early 1970s the ASEAN states
endeavoured within the organizational framework to achieve a common stand
on this important question. Consensus was not achieved by the end of
1978, except for the agreement to continue treating the issue in an ASEAN
as well as in a national context. Malaysia was the first, and for a time
only, ASEAN country eager to open relations with the PRC. For Indonesia
the memory of 1965 could not be overcome within a few years. Singapore
has frequently declared that it would be the last ASEAN member to
institute formal relations with the PRC - after Indonesia. This policy
was reiterated even during the remarkable two-week official visit, in
November 1980, of a six-member cabinet delegation led by Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew to China. The visit took place just before general elections
in Singapore, which confirmed the Lee government in power. The talks
between Lee and Chairman Hua Guofeng covered regional and international
political developments, including the situation in Cambodia, on which Lee
presented the ASEAN policy position. The other three ASEAN members
established formal relations with China within a short period of each
other's initiatives: Malaysia in May 1974; the Philippines in June 1975;
Thailand in July 1975.

The Thai move was particularly significant for ASEAN. It occurred
after a series of major political events in Southeast Asia between April
and July 1975, such as the fall of Saigon to North Vietnam; the
recognition by all ASEAN countries of the new, pro-Peking regime under
Pol Pot in Cambodia; the Thai request that the American bases be given
up; the Thai and Philippine proposal to phase out SEATO. Thai-Chinese
relations were formally opened during a visit to Peking in July 1975 of then Thai Premier Kukrit Pramoj, one of the most highly skilled and respected politicians in Southeast Asia (whose Foreign Minister was Thanat Khoman, one of the architects of ASEAN). From the extensive media coverage of Kukrit's visit it is evident that the visit served as a framework for comprehensive discussions between China and ASEAN of the political situation in Southeast Asia. Kukrit, who had scheduled Peking as the mid-stop between visits to Thailand's four ASEAN partners, clearly acted as the ASEAN spokesman in Peking. His visit underscored the fact that ASEAN was reacting to political changes in the area as a united group.

China's attitude towards ASEAN had a marked impact on the relevance of ASEAN in Southeast Asia, as well as on the role of China both in and beyond the area. Whatever ASEAN's precise objectives, its relevance as a unit distinct from its members obviously depended on external recognition and internal cohesion. The question of relations between ASEAN states and China illustrated the growth of cohesion in ASEAN. After three of the member states instituted diplomatic relations, the establishment of not only friendly, but also formal relations between China and all of ASEAN was only a question of time, and no longer one of principle. The Association served as an umbrella which facilitated the decisions of Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and under which these three continued to urge Singapore and Indonesia to overcome their reservations. Relations with China thus became one of the important issues on which ASEAN solidarity could, and did, provide support to member states as they sought to respond to the new pattern of conditions in their environment.
Moreover, this issue showed that agreement within the Association had become very important to its members even if its results did not coincide with positions that might appear desirable in a member state's relationship with an external ally. Thailand and the Philippines — the closest allies of the USA among the ASEAN states — had previously recognized the Taiwan government. When they established relations with the PRC, they severed their diplomatic ties with Taiwan, nearly four years before the USA dropped Taiwan in favour of the PRC. Thereby, in effect, all of ASEAN came to share the position that there could be only one China and that the PRC represented it. This clearly earned ASEAN goodwill from the PRC. For example, during Kukrit's visit to Peking the topics of communist insurgency and of the overseas Chinese in ASEAN countries had been brought up. With respect to both issues, China's more accommodating attitude and behaviour in the late 1970s was not unrelated to the good relations enjoyed by ASEAN with the PRC.

In the China-Vietnam conflict ASEAN inevitably emerged as an entity on the same side as China. The uniform position of the ASEAN states towards Cambodia, and their common needs to cope with the influx of refugees from Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam in effect committed ASEAN to a strongly anti-Hanoi stand. Until the end of 1978, none of the ASEAN states had withdrawn its formal recognition of the Cambodian Pol Pot regime, whose power base and power centre were the Khmer Rouge. China's active support for Cambodia created an alignment of her position with that in ASEAN which perhaps was not entirely welcome to the Association, but was unavoidable. For China it certainly was welcome. In late 1978 — several months before the direct confrontation between Vietnam and China —
Deng Xiaoping outlined the following scenario to reporters of the Far Eastern Economic Review: Cambodia would be further weakened by civil war and starvation; then Vietnam would completely overrun Cambodia and demonstrate by its rule what type of regime it was; and then would be the "time for ASEAN to play an important role in solving the problem." Deng could hardly have referred to a military role of ASEAN. But his approval of the Association's stand towards Cambodia and Vietnam was evident.

As regards the refugees, most of them owed their unfortunate status directly to Vietnam — either to warfare instigated by Vietnam, or to social and economic upheavals that accompanied the extension of Vietnam's rule over former Indochina. The ASEAN states gave virtually all of them first asylum. The two largest groups among the refugees were the ethnic Chinese and the Cambodians. Thus the refugees constituted another concern in the Southeast Asian context shared by ASEAN and China.

With respect to the Sino-Soviet conflict, ASEAN attempted to avoid taking sides. This effort was facilitated by the organization's emphasis on goodneighbourliness with all; on Southeast Asia as its sphere of concern rather than wider international relations; and on economic cooperation as its avowed principal activity. But the involvement of both China and the USSR in Southeast Asia hardly permitted ASEAN to keep a distance, let alone equidistance from the communist rivals. By the end of 1978 ASEAN had taken a long step towards China simply by its stand towards Vietnam. The immediate influence of ASEAN on Sino-Soviet relations was negligible. But China had to appreciate ASEAN's existence and attitude.
as conducive to her own goals in Southeast Asia and also in the conflict with the USSR. ASEAN, by associating much of the old Chinese Nanyang sphere under concepts acceptable to the PRC, reduced the need for China to devote fragmented attention to a number of states in the area. ASEAN's unequivocal rejection of Soviet efforts to isolate China internationally signified substantial support for the Chinese contention that peaceful states had nothing to fear from the PRC. If the Soviet Union could try to use ASEAN as an instrument to check China's influence in Southeast Asia, then China could do likewise and apparently with better results, since ASEAN and Chinese perceptions of problems in Southeast Asia seemed to be more congruent than ASEAN and Soviet perceptions.

China's Perceptions of ASEAN - Conclusion

Although China's interests in Southeast Asia were not merely derived from her position in global international relations, because of the Sino-Soviet conflict her global interests came to overshadow the more traditional and more limited concerns China might pursue in Southeast Asia. For the PRC as for the superpowers, involvement in the area could not be separated from broader relations. Thus China's approach to Southeast Asia was determined by political considerations just as much as was the case for the USA and the USSR. The significance of Nanyang to China was always political. The fact that Nanyang became interlocked with Southeast Asian, East Asian, and global relations reinforced, rather than detracted from, its salient political dimension. As a result, China's perception of ASEAN focussed on the Association's political relevance no less than did the perceptions of the superpowers.
China's early and consistent support of ASEAN would indicate that she was perhaps more astute than other great powers in recognizing ASEAN's potential value as a stabilizing force in Southeast Asia amidst the various competitions for ideological and military power. Without this potential, ASEAN would probably have remained a factor of, at best, secondary importance to China, entirely receding before China's bilateral relationships at all levels, including her relationship with Cambodia. Even as it was, ASEAN's relevance to China was largely a function of China's relations with the USSR, Vietnam, the USA, and the ASEAN member states. These were relations unquestionably dominated by political factors, which thus also governed China's attitude towards ASEAN.

The economic potential of the Association was not of particular interest to China. Mutual stakes in trade and commerce were very minor compared to economic relations with other countries; on a 1971-1975 average, China's share in ASEAN trade was a mere 0.7% for exports and 2.6% for imports. The incipient trend towards increasing these stakes, as noted above in connection with the Soviet Union, had obvious political implications besides the economic ones for both ASEAN and China. ASEAN could contribute little to China's high-priority modernization programme announced in 1978, which required investment, technology, and assistance from the most advanced industrialized countries. In effect, then, despite China's more ancient and more complex role in Southeast Asia, her overall perception of ASEAN was not very different from that of the USA and the Soviet Union. ASEAN mattered because of China's involvement in larger issues, and it was seen preponderantly as a politically relevant organization.
At the end of 1978, it seemed likely that for China the appreciation of ASEAN as a political factor would intensify more, and more quickly, than for the superpowers. While the USSR still hesitated to acknowledge ASEAN's organizational entity, and the USA saw Japan rather than ASEAN as a growing political influence in the area, China had already begun to credit ASEAN openly with a specifically political role in Southeast Asia. Being closer to the Southeast Asian scene and a truly Asian power, China perhaps was more perceptive in her appraisal of the organization than the other great powers. ASEAN's role is largely dependent on how much the great powers treat Southeast Asia as their own immediate business. If the USA kept an offshore position, and if China's goals went no further than the prevention of hegemony by other powers—a question which only China could answer—then that left the Soviet Union. Her ability to make Southeast Asia her own business was tied to her hold on Vietnam. Although in late 1978 Vietnam concluded a friendship treaty with the USSR and became a member of COMECON, many Asians believe that sooner or later Vietnam will reassert its independence of the Soviet Union. China from historical experience could probably appreciate Vietnam's disinclination to subjugation particularly well. A more independent Vietnam as the representative of all of former Indochina would find in ASEAN its natural counterpart in Southeast Asia. Thus China's endorsement of ASEAN indicated not only the Association's usefulness in Chinese and Soviet efforts to check each other's influences in Southeast Asia, but also an anticipation of future political developments involving the Southeast Asian units. In either scenario, for China the political role of ASEAN outweighed all others.
The Position of Japan

Economic Preeminence and Power

Japan is the most important partner of ASEAN countries in trade, aid, and investment. Until the end of 1978, most of the relations in these fields were handled on a bilateral basis between Japan and the individual member states, because ASEAN had not yet developed the organizational machinery necessary to deal with the implementation - as distinguished from negotiations about policy or specific problem issues - of economic relations. In this section, therefore, the term ASEAN refers to the organization itself as well as to the aggregate of the five members; its meaning is specified where the distinction is relevant.

Japan is one of the leading economic powers in the world and far outdistances any other single country in her impact on ASEAN economies. The Japanese share in ASEAN trade is larger by about one third than that of the USA, and about twice as high as ASEAN's share in Japanese trade. For example, in 1974/75 Japan provided 25% of all ASEAN imports and took 30% of its exports, while in the opposite direction the figures were only 11% and 10%, respectively.\(^1\) The overall average of Japan's share in ASEAN trade for the years 1971 to 1975 was 26.6% for exports, 23.5% for imports as compared to 18% for exports and 14.9% for imports with respect to the USA. In 1977, the ASEAN share in Japan's trade was still only about 10% total (9% exports, 12% imports).\(^1\) It is evident that economically ASEAN needs Japan more than Japan needs ASEAN. However, for
specific commodities, many of them essential, the balance is more favourable to ASEAN. In 1975, ASEAN provided 12% of Japan's imports of crude oil; over one third each of sugar, copper, animal and vegetable fats; over 30% of bauxite; 30% of timber (in dollars, 45% in volume); and 98% of natural rubber. The figures were much the same for 1977, except that oil imports from ASEAN had risen to 16%. Although the total ASEAN share in world trade for 1975 was only about 13% (a respectable increase from 3% in 1974), the ASEAN region annually accounts for about 80% of world exports in natural rubber, palm oil, and tin, and a high proportion of some other raw materials, for which Japan is a nearby and willing recipient.

The ASEAN share of total Japanese foreign assistance has long topped that of other recipients. Since 1972, about two thirds of all Japanese foreign aid has gone to Asia, where the ASEAN countries have been the principal beneficiaries, and their share has steadily grown. The principal recipient among the ASEAN countries is Indonesia; outside ASEAN, major beneficiaries of Japanese development assistance are Bangladesh, Burma, India, and Pakistan, and also South Korea. According to Fukuda's 1977 Manila speech (the "Fukuda Doctrine"), ASEAN together with Burma was to receive half of all Japanese official development aid over the subsequent five-year period.

ASEAN provides an attractive investment outlet for Japanese funds as the region continues to show economic growth rates well in excess of those in most other areas of the world. Investment, much of it through private industry, is mostly in the manufacturing sectors; it totalled
approximately $3.5 billion in 1977, being well over half of total private Japanese investment. The entire situation between ASEAN and Japan has been characterized as the "10, 20, 25, and 40% relationship" - 10% being the ASEAN share in Japanese trade, 20% ASEAN's share in Japanese private investment (over several years before 1977), 25% Japan's share in ASEAN trade, and 40% being the ASEAN share in Japanese overseas bilateral aid. 129

Japan's preeminent position with respect to the ASEAN economies is readily understandable. The ASEAN countries need the skills, financial resources, markets, and goods of the industrialized world. Since Japan is geographically closer than either the USA or Europe, transport costs, a serious problem in most economies in Southeast Asia, can be kept at their lowest if Japan is the favoured economic partner. 130 The ASEAN countries realize that they need the Japanese economic engagement. However, the extent and the manner of this engagement generate very mixed feelings among ASEAN members. When the organization was created its founders had not concealed that the ever growing and increasingly important economic power of Japan was not altogether welcomed. They had viewed ASEAN as an instrument that would help the individual members to reduce their economic dependence on Japan. 131 In the ASEAN states this dependence not only caused resentment against Japanese money power, but also revived memories of Japan's earlier involvement in Southeast Asia. The complaint was not infrequent that after Japan's rise to economic power, she tried to achieve through economic means what she had failed to achieve by military means in World War II: complete domination of Southeast Asia.
In World War II, Japan overran and occupied all of Southeast Asia. Although her conquests greatly contributed to the decolonization process in the area, and although Japan provided a much-admired example that an Asian country could actually be as powerful as, or even more powerful than, a Western colonial power, the Japanese occupation generated bitter resentment in the conquered territories. It was often brutal and more often oblivious to the economic needs and social and cultural sensitivities of the people, and it clearly aimed at total Japanese supremacy. Japan had then been propagating three slogans: in an "Asia for the Asiatics," Japan would be "the leader, the protector, and the light of Asia," and the entire area would become a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." These objectives were wholly centred on Japan's interests and dominance.

The term 'Co-Prosperity Sphere' acquired a connotation of ruthlessness, of sinister, deceitful, egocentric Japanese designs. Its occasional post-war usage in connection with the economic impact of Japan on Southeast Asia revealed the depth of resentment against dependence on Japan and against Japanese business practices, which were often viewed as unethical, egocentric, and incompatible with perceptions of fairness in Southeast Asia. In the region the author repeatedly heard and read accusations concerning Japanese investment or development projects in ASEAN countries, which were said to be directed towards economic ventures that benefitted Japan at the expense of the much poorer host country. Instances were recounted in which a Japan-sponsored development project absorbed scarce national capital in the establishment of a joint venture; wrecked an existing labour structure by the temporary demands of a
labour-intensive undertaking; was found to be useful only if materials or semi-finished goods were first imported from Japan; produced results for which only the Japanese market was attractive; and folded after a few years. The regional press vigorously condemns such instances, and Japan's economic control of ASEAN economies in general.133

Such critiques do not, of course, do justice to the picture of Japanese relations with ASEAN countries. But Japan's singleminded concentration on economic advantage characterized these relations as much as her relations with other countries. For Japan, economic strength is the main power resource in her international relations. Until about the end of the second ASEAN period here considered, Japan clearly rejected a strong political role for herself in favour of an economic one. She tried to stay out of political problems such as the Sino-Soviet rivalry, the Vietnam-China conflict, or the refugee exodus from Indochina. But Japan became a major world power after World War II precisely because of her economic strength, and is considered one of the prime examples in political reality for the concept that is summarized under the term 'interdependence'.

The concept of interdependence evolved in the theory of political science134 in the 1970s, when economic issues became more and more prominent in global politics, rendering inadequate explanations of international relations in which military resources, territorial size, ideology, or traditional great-power status had provided the main components. One of the empirical bases of the concept of global interdependence is the observation that since World War II many international
relations were being decisively shaped by economic goals and means far more frequently than in the past. This observation has led some authors to postulate that the essence of interdependence be understood as the merger of economic and political issues in international relations.135 Japan’s impact on those relations or, for instance, the impact of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) illustrates how interests and powers formerly not considered decisive have come to play a large role in international relations, and how issues formerly not considered of political importance have come to affect both domestic authorities and the relations between states. Japan’s economic potential became politically significant because economic problems increasingly claimed the attention of governments, and because factors such as raw materials, currency exchange rates, export surpluses, and restrictive trade practices became recognized as effective levers in bargaining for the realization of political interests.

Although economic considerations have played a role in world politics for centuries — colonialism, for example, was largely a consequence of economic interests —, the immediate, profound, and worldwide effect of economic levers on political outcomes is a relatively recent phenomenon. It has made the term ‘interdependence’ very popular. The statement that the world is, or is increasingly becoming, interdependent can today be found in many analyses of international relations by political scientists as well as by practising politicians, and it seems to occur especially frequently with reference to Japan and to Southeast Asia.136
Japan, having acquired political clout through economic strength, in the second half of the 1970s found herself subject to pressures, particularly from the USA, to assume political responsibilities commensurate with her status as an economic superpower. A more prominent Japanese role in the political field seemed especially appropriate in Southeast Asia, where it would not only relieve the USA of some of the Southeast Asian demands for US interest - Japan might be considered a proxy - but would also protect Japan's own interests in continued access to the economic potential of the area. For Japan, economic and political issues indeed merge in many respects. Consequently, since 1977/78 Japan endeavoured to develop not only economic strategies for her approach to Southeast Asia, but also a comprehensive conceptual blueprint for her future role in the area and in the ASEAN region.

This blueprint was delivered by Japan's then Prime Minister Fukuda in the 1977 Manila speech that became known as the Fukuda Doctrine. The Manila speech, among other things, affirmed Japan's role as that of a power dedicated to pacifism, peace and prosperity, and Japan's continuing commitment to the development and peace of Southeast Asia; a commitment to be supported by further large-scale economic assistance. It singled out ASEAN - both the region and the organization - as representing the cornerstones in Japan's policy, cooperation, and goodwill in Southeast Asia, and the ASEAN members as the foremost beneficiary of Japanese aid. In the love-hate relationship between ASEAN and Japan, part of the problem had been that the cause for ASEAN discontent with Japan was inextricably meshed with the only remedy Japan had offered: money. Given Japan's character as a great economic power, the emphasis on economic
matters as a measure of Japan's priorities was natural; however, for the first time during ASEAN's existence money did not appear to supersede all other considerations in Japan's approach to relations in Southeast Asia.

Japan's Initial Attitude towards ASEAN

The creation of ASEAN did not at first excite great enthusiasm in Japan, partly because of the Association's undisguised intent to help its members curb Japan's powerful role in their economies. Like the USSR, Japan traditionally preferred to deal with other countries on a bilateral basis. Japan was reluctant to acknowledge a non-Japanese conglomeration of associates with the common goal of presenting a stronger negotiating partner to an economic giant with "questionable business morals."

To achieve this goal ASEAN had, of course, to reach a stage of internal solidarity that would lend weight to its claim of organizational unity. Japan was second only to China in recognizing ASEAN's basic cohesion and strength in spite of its apparent early ineffectiveness. Since 1973 meetings on specific economic issues were held in a dialogue framework, signifying that Japan had realized the reality of ASEAN as a unit.

A prominent issue on which Japan had occasion to perceive ASEAN as an effectively functioning unit was that of synthetic rubber production. In the early 1970s Malaysia's natural rubber industry, a major export earner, was seriously affected by Japan's expanding production and exports of synthetic rubber. Malaysia endeavoured in vain to persuade Japan to curb her competitiveness, and after several years of frustrating bilateral trade talks enlisted ASEAN help on the issue. The Synthetic Rubber Forum was established between Japan and ASEAN in November 1973, and eventually
(1977) the pressure of ASEAN achieved what Malaysia alone had been unable to bring about: Japan cut back her competition by reducing synthetic rubber production. In addition, Japan agreed to extend technical and economic assistance to ASEAN natural rubber development through the establishment of the ASEAN Tyre and Testing Laboratories in Malaysia, and through the Thai Rubber Research Centre. ASEAN counted the synthetic rubber agreement as one of its distinct successes and as proof of the organization's growing stature in the eyes of powerful outsiders.

The early institution of the dialogue framework probably facilitated both acceptance in ASEAN of Japan's leading economic role in the region, and Japan's acceptance of greater self-assertiveness on the part of her regional business partners. Such mutual adjustment was clearly beneficial to both sides. For the ASEAN countries it would be irrational to reject the advantages realizable from Japan's proximity, her superior technology, economic performance, financial and managerial capabilities, and markets. For Japan it would be unreasonable to deny that ASEAN was important to her: a region rich in raw materials and commanding the oil tanker passage from the Indian to the Pacific Ocean; a combined total of 240 million people representing markets, labour forces, and investment opportunities; and an organization aiming to strengthen five economies with which Japan was doing business. 'Interdependence' became a much-used word both with ASEAN and with Japan. The early relationship with Japan was certainly the closest among ASEAN's dialogue relationships, and was subsequently broadened and consolidated ahead of all others.
Consolidation of Interdependence between ASEAN and Japan

During ASEAN's period of consolidation, the dialogue with Japan evolved into the ASEAN-Japan Forum, which was institutionalized in March 1977 as a formal basis for consultations about areas of cooperation. Its scope was more comprehensive than that of the dialogue, covering not only specific issues but a broad range of subjects such as industrial development; food and agricultural production; stabilization of commodity prices and export earnings (a particularly pressing topic to ASEAN); improved access to Japanese markets for ASEAN products; technology transfer; the investment climate; and others.142

The ASEAN-Japan relationship received a decisive stimulus from, and in connection with, the second ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur in 1977. The summit not only marked a more systematic ASEAN approach to economic cooperation and development; it also served as a platform for ASEAN leaders to emphasize ASEAN's concern with the political future of Southeast Asia; and it served as the immediate context in which Japan announced the Fukuda Doctrine. In the post-summit meeting of ASEAN heads of government and the Prime Minister of Japan it was agreed to expand ASEAN-Japan cooperation in such a way that it would contribute to ASEAN's self-reliance, economic resilience, and internal solidarity. From Japan's firm commitment to ASEAN resulted the donation of the Yen 5 billion Cultural Fund and the promise to extend more than $1 billion in financial assistance to the five ASEAN industrial projects that had been announced at the Bali summit.143 The implementation of the promise was subject to the results of feasibility studies. Intra-ASEAN agreement on
specifics of the projects was slow in being achieved; Singapore in late 1978 started up its diesel engine project on a national rather than an ASEAN basis. But the Japanese commitment in principle was frequently reiterated as proof that Japan intended to continue her prominent role in ASEAN development, and that role as part of her commitment to the Fukuda Doctrine. By the end of 1978 it had become apparent that Japan was beginning to attach greater importance to ASEAN as a unit than to her bilateral relations with the ASEAN members.

This shift in Japan's attitude is significant both in an economic and in a political context. Ventures such as the Cultural Fund and assistance for regional industrial projects provide an outlet for Japanese capital to be channelled into undertakings that are wholly acceptable to the recipient. They also tie ASEAN even more firmly into the capitalist economies of the Western world of which Japan is a part. The consolidation of ASEAN gave a new dimension to Japan's relations in Southeast Asia, as evidenced by the Fukuda Doctrine and by the 1977 ASEAN - Japan meeting in Kuala Lumpur. In that meeting, political leaders and political issues were no less prominent than economic experts and economic topics. ASEAN made it easier for Japan to assume political responsibilities in Southeast Asia, because it represented a solid core of countries with which Japan could expect to come to an understanding on political issues that affected her. ASEAN's explicit admission since 1976 to the political aspects of regional cooperation permitted both ASEAN and Japan to agree publicly that political issues in Southeast Asia (such as the actions of Vietnam and China with respect to Cambodia) were significant to both of them, and that their relationship had to include
consultations on these issues if it was to grow into the firm bond of cooperation that both professed to desire.

Some of Japan's first ventures into political behaviour with respect to ASEAN were only moderately successful; Japan's unsolicited message to the USA in 1977 that ASEAN wished for a strong US presence in the area was not well-received in ASEAN, and her offer, also in 1977, to act as mediator between ASEAN and Indochinese countries did not lead to discernible results. But after 1977 there could be no question that Japan was beginning to outgrow her purely economic relationship with ASEAN. Japan may not yet be prepared to assume a major, clearly political role in global international relations, where her focus on economic issues has served her well during the post-war years. But with respect to Southeast Asia, that focus has already given way to the acknowledgement that Japan has political as well as economic interests and responsibilities. Such an acknowledgement attests to the importance of Southeast Asia in Japan's international relations. It is evident from the close relationship between ASEAN and Japan, from the Fukuda Doctrine, and from Japanese offers of aid and mediation to the communist countries in Southeast Asia. It is also evident from the fact that since the mid-1960s several newly elected Prime Ministers of Japan have paid early, and often important, foreign visits to states in Southeast Asia, in some cases even before travelling to the USA.
Japan's Perceptions of ASEAN - Conclusion

Given the admixture of economic and political interests in Japan's foreign relations, the ASEAN - Japan relationship cannot be placed under a convenient label of one or the other; it includes both features. Japan's perception of ASEAN has changed with the political changes in Southeast Asia and with the evolution of ASEAN. The economic and development component in ASEAN's pursuits has more direct relevance to Japan than to the other great powers, but it does not entirely govern Japan's perceptions of the Association. In a purely economic context, Japan's support for ASEAN unity and ASEAN development efforts is not necessarily needed to ensure Japan's influence on the economies of the region and her access to its resources. Certainly economic development in the ASEAN region also benefits ASEAN's principal external economic partner. But benefits thus gained would not necessarily outweigh the economic advantages which Japan might reap from her relations with individual ASEAN members. Given the ASEAN ability to strengthen the region's position in negotiations with Japan, one might expect Japan, because of her economic interests, to favour a weak regional organization.

However, in Japan's peculiar situation of being a major political power because of her economic power, her fundamental interests actually induce Japan to favour ASEAN strength and cohesion. The very same unity in ASEAN which challenges Japan's power in economic dealings with ASEAN members, also enhances the prospect that there will continue to be a region in Southeast Asia whose economic and political orientations meet with Japan's preferences. Moreover, the economic opportunities in both the
ASEAN region and in Southeast Asia would be far less attractive to Japan without a framework of political stability. ASEAN has already demonstrated that its internal goodwill has removed much of the regional instability that derived from conflicts among its members. Its commitment to peace and good neighbourliness further contributes to stability, as does its commitment to strengthen its members' resistance to threats from without (Vietnam) or within (insurgency).

Although economic considerations are obviously salient in the ASEAN - Japan relationship, Japan's perception of ASEAN thus also encompasses the political relevance of the organization. In the economic context the ASEAN region is important to Japan on its own merits. In the political context, Japan's attitude towards ASEAN (both the region and the organization) is a result of her own interests at the Southeast Asian level, as well as her close association with the USA. The growing attention among Japan's political leaders to ASEAN as an outstanding element in Japan's role in Southeast Asia indicates that, in fact, Japan may already have come to recognize ASEAN more as a political entity than an economic organization. But Japan's international relations are so heavily influenced by economic factors that the 1977 emphasis on politics may shift again if and when ASEAN acquires a more forceful identity as a single economic bargainer representing its 240 million people. Even though the political dimension is not likely to disappear in ASEAN - Japan relations, economics probably will continue to play an outstanding part for both sides.

As long as Japan's role in Southeast Asia is linked to major
political issues in international relations, she cannot fail to view ASEAN as a political as well as an economic organization. During ASEAN's early years the economic element seemed to predominate; in ASEAN's second phase its political nature appeared to come to the forefront; whether one or the other feature will eventually prevail - and if so, which one - depends as much on ASEAN's own direction as on the role Japan will assume in international politics in general and in Southeast Asia in particular. For the years 1967 to 1978 it is concluded that overall the balance tilted towards Japan's perception of ASEAN as a primarily economic organization, whose political relevance was incidental to its economic significance. Japan recognized the political relevance of ASEAN only during the last two or three years considered here, while ASEAN's economic role had been acknowledged well before, and continued to be significant even after political considerations entered strongly into the ASEAN - Japan relationship.

The Position of Vietnam

Basic Configuration

Actors and Issues

'Vietnam' here stands for the principal indigenous communist power in Southeast Asia. The attitude of former South Vietnam towards ASEAN was never of much significance and is not discussed here. For the period after the reunification of North and South Vietnam in 1976, 'Vietnam' refers to the entire united country under the control of Hanoi. The
positions of Laos and Cambodia with respect to ASEAN are not addressed separately. Laos since 1975 has been practically a satellite of Vietnam; its communist government is fully aligned with Hanoi and Moscow. A 25-year friendship treaty between Laos and Vietnam was signed in July 1978. Neither before nor after the communist takeover in Laos did the country exercise direct influence on ASEAN's relations in Southeast Asia.

The situation in Cambodia has been outlined above in connection with China's relations. Despite its involvement in the various conflicts in Southeast Asia, Cambodia is a pawn rather than a leading actor in those conflicts, and its perception of ASEAN is of limited import compared to the perceptions of Vietnam or China.

Vietnam was the driving force in Southeast Asia behind the two dominant issues in the area throughout ASEAN's existence: communism and expansionism. Regardless of which one, or which ones, of the great powers supported or opposed Vietnam in its drive to extend its power, in the relationships of the great powers with Vietnam these two issues were paramount. On both issues Vietnam, while acting as a local proxy for or against the great powers, also pursued its own goals. Since before the creation of ASEAN and certainly up to late 1978, Vietnam was not simply either a Peking or a Moscow satellite. Vietnam fought the USA not because of the latter's global conflict with the Soviet Union, but because it aimed to conquer South Vietnam. It took control over Laos not in order to advance Moscow's position in Southeast Asia, but as a step towards an "Indochina Federation" dominated by Vietnam. Its conflict with China over Cambodia resulted from the same desire to establish its own regime in all of Indochina, not from instigation by Moscow to take on China as a
Soviet proxy. Thus the basic issue in Vietnam's actions and reactions in Southeast Asia was its own ideology, not those of the great powers. Ideology was one of the main motives for its expansionism, but the pursuit of power was another.

Southeast Asian states have always regarded Vietnam communism as a separate force in the area, and Vietnam expansionism as being an original feature of the regime in Hanoi rather than one generated by Moscow. This view was apparently shared by China. Even though her opposition to Vietnam over Cambodia was obviously related to the Sino-Soviet rivalry, China's reference to hegemonistic tendencies on the part of Vietnam suggested that she considered Hanoi expansionism a separate source of concern in Southeast Asia.

Vietnam itself, therefore, was at the core of the conflicts in Southeast Asia during ASEAN's existence. This meant that the issues behind these conflicts remained essentially the same before and after the Vietnam war even as participating actors changed, or modified their involvement. It also meant that in Southeast Asia the powers that stood in the way of Vietnam, were its natural opponents, largely irrespective of their alliance with, or aloofness from, outside powers. None of the ASEAN states could be expected to align with Vietnam on the issue of communist or Vietnamese domination in Southeast Asia. Moreover, none of them could be expected to remove itself from the Southeast Asian arena as perhaps the great powers might. ASEAN itself, for all its emphasis on being non-communist rather than anti-communist, clearly did not wish to see the expansion of any brand of communism, or the hegemony of any single power,
in Southeast Asia. Its formation accentuated the fact that there existed in the area two incompatible sets of interests, each of them indigenous to Southeast Asia and therefore probably more lasting than the interests of outside powers.

Perspectives and Positions

For Vietnam, ASEAN embodied the opposition to its own goals in Southeast Asia more clearly than for the great powers. By strengthening its members through intra-ASEAN solidarity, the Association helped to impede Vietnam's expansionist progress at least with respect to countries that had not formerly been part of Indochina, and most particularly with respect to Thailand. To some extent, ASEAN owed its very existence to Vietnam. When ASEAN was formed, political leaders in the region foresaw that the USA might be unable, or unwilling, to continue indefinitely her direct military protection of states in Southeast Asia; that they must therefore find other means of protecting themselves; that North Vietnam might quite possibly win the war and eventually extend its power as far as possible in Southeast Asia. They had also felt that they should themselves discourage continued involvement of the great powers in the area and should strive for solidarity among themselves as a means to counter the influences of disruptive forces.

ASEAN maintained officially that its formation had no immediate connection with the events of the Vietnam war and that the organization was not founded as a counterweight to communism in Southeast Asia, nor as a substitute for diminishing US protection. Certainly Vietnam was not the only reason behind the creation of ASEAN; both the history of regionalism
in Southeast Asia and the broad spectrum of ASEAN goals expressed in the 1967 Bangkok Declaration refute such an assumption. But it would be unreasonable to believe that the most significant events, relations, and prospects in Southeast Asia at the time of ASEAN's formation should not have had a major impact on the perceptions and considerations of the political leaders in five non-communist states in the area. It would be equally unreasonable to believe that the jointly perceived external threat of Vietnamese expansionism was not a strong incentive for the ASEAN members to overcome internal dissension in the interest of organizational solidarity.

Vietnam's attitude towards ASEAN was only in part, perhaps not even primarily, derived from its own or ASEAN's relations with the great powers. It was natural and inevitable for Vietnam in 1967 to announce ASEAN because several of its members permitted their territories to be used in the American war effort. But when the USA in 1973 ceased to fight Vietnam directly, it made little difference as far as Vietnam's rejection of ASEAN was concerned. When, after ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the Soviet Union mitigated her opposition to ASEAN long enough to establish whether the ASEAN peace proposal could be tied in with her collective security scheme, there was no discernible effect on Vietnam's own negative attitude towards ASEAN.

From Vietnam's perspective the relevance of ASEAN to its own aims was obvious. Vietnam, its perception unobstructed by global or East Asian issues, recognized at once that ASEAN could become important in Southeast Asia, and that its success would create a new political obstacle for
Vietnam. This explains why Vietnam opposed ASEAN from the very beginning, never formally acknowledged it as an organizational entity, and sustained its negative attitude largely independent of the attitude of the great powers.

During all of ASEAN's first period, Vietnam exhibited profound hostility to the organization. The general attitude was that ASEAN was "a product of the US aggressive and interventionalist policy." In 1974, Vietnam refused to attend the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Thailand on the grounds that it could not accept an invitation from a country that had "sent its troops to fight as mercenaries for the US and let the latter use Thai territory as a base for its aggression against Vietnam and Indochina as a whole." An unauthorized 1975 article printed as a "document" in the Journal of Contemporary Asia and from its style and content likely to be of Hanoi origin, asserts that

"Suharto's regime initiated the founding of ASEAN ... with the purpose to achieve the aims which the SEATO has failed to accomplish, i.e. to suppress the national liberation movements in the regions and to "contain China". The ASEAN project is the materialization of the "Nixon Doctrine" in Southeast Asia...."

The same attitude and rhetoric continued until the Bali summit.

Vietnam shared with the Soviet Union and initially with China the understanding that ASEAN's non-communist orientation amounted to anti-communism. It naturally extended its hostility against Thailand and the Philippines, the US allies in the Vietnam war, to the Association. According to Vietnam, ASEAN was nothing but a camouflaged military setup; an offshoot of, or successor to, SEATO; a hypocritical band of US imperialist followers, whose rhetoric about great-power interference in
Southeast Asia was belied by the presence of foreign troops in the member countries. The issue of foreign bases was one of the key targets in the attacks of all communist states in Southeast Asia (as well as China) against ASEAN. Their existence was held by Vietnam to be incompatible with genuine independence, freedom, or peaceful intentions. This is one of the reasons why the Kuala Lumpur Declaration at first had virtually no effect on Vietnam's attitude towards ASEAN. It was considered a piece of rhetoric as long as the USA retained her military bases in Thailand and the Philippines. This position became particularly clear at the 1976 non-aligned conference in Colombo in connection with ASEAN's submission of its peace proposal for adoption.154

After the end of the Vietnam war, Vietnam continued to insist that the abolition of foreign bases must serve as the principal indicator of how sincere ASEAN was in its verbal promotion of good neighbourly relations, peace, and neutrality in Southeast Asia. Much the same terms as those chosen by ASEAN emerged in the principles for foreign relations which Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia put forth since 1975. Cambodia in 1975 named "independence, peace, neutrality and non-alignment" as its guiding principles. Laos in 1976 announced that it would pursue "peace, national independence, democracy, and social progress." Vietnam, also in 1976, emphasized peace, independence and neutrality and made it clear that neutrality was to be measured mainly against the absence or presence of foreign military bases on Southeast Asian soil.155 By the time ASEAN had actually reduced (though, in the Philippines, not eliminated) conditions impeding neutrality and non-interference (foreign bases, great-power alliances), Vietnam had begun to introduce these conditions in Indochina.
through its relationship with the USSR.

Similar to the situation at the time of ASEAN's formation, its consolidation from 1976 on was preceded and surrounded by external events in which Vietnam played a large role. North Vietnam had captured Saigon in April 1975. Preparations for the Bali summit began in the summer of 1975. At the February 1976 summit, the first in ASEAN, the Thai Prime Minister said in his opening address:

"... this is the first time that the five of us [the heads of state] have gathered together. We do so not in response to a crisis ..."\(^{156}\)

The statement was as much a concession that ASEAN was doing just that, as were the references in other summit speeches to significant political changes in Southeast Asia. Although ASEAN officially negated a link between the consolidation of Vietnam in Indochina and its own consolidation, such a link was generally believed to exist, and this was occasionally admitted in unofficial statements from within ASEAN.\(^{157}\) It would indeed have been a demonstration of ASEAN's irrelevance, had the events of 1975 in Vietnam not caused the organization to reappraise its own role. It is quite possible that the Bali summit would have taken place, sooner or later, even without the external stimulus provided by Vietnam, because the Association had outgrown its first stage of quiet internal development. But the consolidation of Vietnam's power in 1975 certainly propelled ASEAN into action.

Vietnam could not fail to appreciate this connection between its own goals and ASEAN's new vigour. It is not surprising that Vietnam's victory over the USA and the takeover in South Vietnam did not immediately change
its animosity towards ASEAN. When Hanoi did subsequently and temporarily relent, this was not necessarily because of a new perception of ASEAN. Rather, in Vietnam's efforts to consolidate its own position in Southeast Asia through - at first - non-coercive means, the immediate Vietnamese goals conflicted less acutely with ASEAN's principles than they had done during the active expansionist stage. Each of the subsequent thaws in ASEAN - Vietnam relations seemed to last only as long as a move towards ASEAN did not disagree with Vietnam's other priorities.

Temporary Thaws in Vietnam's Attitude towards ASEAN

Although the consolidation of ASEAN could hardly be welcome to Vietnam, the Bali summit elicited less acerbic reactions from Hanoi than previous ASEAN activities had done. Vietnam was then preoccupied with the process of reunification and with its post-war need of reconstruction; its position as the superior military power in Southeast Asia was unchallenged. ASEAN took the moderation in tone from Hanoi as a sign that Vietnam was finally coming to accept ASEAN's offer of friendship with all states as sincere and the existence of the organization as a fact of life in Southeast Asia. In July 1976, the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam, Phan Hien, visited several ASEAN countries on an apparent goodwill mission. Although he stressed Vietnam's refusal to acknowledge ASEAN itself by returning to a non-ASEAN airport after each stop in an ASEAN country, his visits were generally understood to constitute an ASEAN tour.

Discussions during his visits dealt with the professed desire of Vietnam to find a modus vivendi with ASEAN states after the end of the war in Vietnam. Phan Hien especially undertook to explain the meaning of
Vietnam's new principles for foreign relations to those ASEAN states which Vietnam considered least intransigent, notably Malaysia. Malaysia took pains to emphasize the common ground in the Vietnamese principles and the ASEAN proposal for peace, freedom and neutrality. The visitor from Hanoi reciprocated by claiming that the Vietnamese pursuit of "peace, independence and neutrality" differed from the ASEAN desire for peace, freedom and neutrality only in terminology, and that Vietnam had substituted 'independence' for 'freedom' because the latter had been such a misused term during the Cold War. In Thailand, Phan Hien's visit resulted in the conclusion of an agreement on non-political matters, and in a joint communique stressing "peace, independence, and neutrality" in Southeast Asia. ASEAN was beginning to hope that Vietnam would be more amenable to mutual accommodation in view of its task of reconstruction, in which ASEAN saw a potential helping role for itself, perhaps through its 1973 special ASEAN Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochinese States (ACCRIS).

Much of the goodwill generated by Phan Hien's tour evaporated a few months later during the September 1976 meeting of non-aligned nations in Colombo. At the meeting, Malaysia submitted the 1971 ASEAN proposal for the establishment of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia as an ASEAN draft resolution for adoption by the meeting. Fierce opposition from Laos, seconded by Vietnam, centred on the identity of ASEAN as the sponsor and led to a Laotian draft amendment, supported by Vietnam, which referred to the post-Vietnam war situation in terms of communist ideology, which in turn was unacceptable to ASEAN. Eventually, neither the ASEAN nor the Laos proposal found the necessary consensus
among the delegates. Oddly, Laos at the end of 1977 informed some of the ASEAN states that it was not against the ASEAN efforts to bring about a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in Southeast Asia. During 1977, Vietnam was widely understood to be as hostile to ASEAN (and its peace proposal) as ever, an indication of which was its refusal to attend the Kuala Lumpur summit and the concomitant assertion that ASEAN was largely a military front for Western interests; occasionally, Vietnam echoed the new Soviet line that the ASEAN states were misguided victims of great-power politics. Some journalists' and scholars' views are that Vietnam actually initiated this policy line, and the USSR took it up after Vietnam.

The show of goodwill from Vietnam was repeated in early 1978, when a Vietnamese delegation led by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong visited all ASEAN countries except Singapore. In the same year Vietnam floated a rather vague suggestion for a new regional cooperation scheme that was to include all nine states in Southeast Asia, and from which the alleged anti-communist bias of ASEAN would be eliminated. Vietnam continued calling for the dissolution of ASEAN, but found increasingly favourable comments for the principle of regional cooperation, and unmistakably sought improved bilateral relations with the ASEAN member states. At the same time, the Soviet Union had relaxed her attitude towards ASEAN.

The developments in the ASEAN relationship with Vietnam elicited strong hopes in ASEAN for future accommodation with communist Indochina. Malaysia described discussions with Vietnam on peace and security in Southeast Asia as encouraging and a positive step in the right direction.
Singapore's then Foreign Minister Rajaratnam, whose reservations about communist expansionist powers were well known, concluded from the talks with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Vietnam in the summer of 1978 that there was evolving—something like a "live-and-let-live attitude" between ASEAN and Vietnam. 166

By November of the same year hopes were dashed again. Vietnam joined COMECON and signed the friendship treaty with the Soviet Union, thus letting itself be drawn deeply into the Soviet orbit. It seems quite possible that Vietnam had actually desired to improve its relations in Southeast Asia in connection with an overall attempt, during 1977 and 1978, to secure Western help for its urgent needs of reconstruction and economic assistance, and had turned to the Soviet Union only when all efforts to move the Western world had failed. 167 With the apparently firm grip of Moscow on Hanoi; the beginning of Vietnam's attacks on Cambodia; the flood of refugees disgorged by that complex struggle; and the tightening of Hanoi's screws in former South Vietnam, the attitude of Vietnam towards ASEAN reverted to hostility. The basic configuration asserted itself once again.

Vietnam's Perceptions of ASEAN — Conclusion

In the Vietnam perception of ASEAN there was not much room for other than political considerations. This held true for both periods of ASEAN between 1967 and 1978. At the end of 1978, all indications were that this situation would not change in the near future and that Vietnam's attitude would tend to harden rather than mellow. The Cambodian crisis and the refugee problem subsequently led ASEAN to assert both its
opposition to Vietnam's actions and its own role as a political unit more clearly than ever before, as evident from ASEAN's formal statements and its appeals to the UN concerning both issues. For Vietnam, ASEAN was never of much interest except as a political organization: an adversary in principle; perhaps temporarily a counterpart to itself, each staying on its side of an invisible demarcation line between two blocs in Southeast Asia; but always an organization relevant because of, and with respect to, politics.

Summary of External Perceptions of ASEAN

In the relationships between ASEAN and the five most important external powers their attitudes towards ASEAN appeared to be influenced more by their relations among themselves than by ASEAN. For most of the external powers, their positions towards ASEAN were dominated by interests to which ASEAN was an incidental rather than a primary factor. For three of the great powers - USA, USSR, and China - relations with ASEAN were clearly a function of their global relations. For Japan, the same held only partly true, since her unique concentration on economic interests made her global relationships not necessarily more important to her than others which also affected her vital economic interests. However, in view of the Fukuda Doctrine, in view of Japan's special relationship with the USA, and in view of the Sino-Japanese friendship treaty the ASEAN - Japan relationship had also to be seen, at least in part, as derived from Japanese relations going beyond ASEAN. The relationship between ASEAN and Vietnam centred on Southeast Asia and largely on issues originating directly with the two opponents. Although it was strongly influenced by
the relations of both parties with the great powers, these did not constitute the prime determinants in the ASEAN - Vietnam relationship.

The external powers' perceptions of ASEAN as a new entity in Southeast Asia were evidently related to their proximity and their approaches to the issues that caused their engagements in the area. Vietnam, the indigenous actor, led all the other powers in its immediate and certain evaluation of ASEAN as a politically relevant organization. The last of the five to acknowledge ASEAN as a unit and as relevant in international relations in Southeast Asia was the superpower USA, at first directly involved in the area and then hardly at all; while her initial engagement predetermined her perception of ASEAN as a political undertaking, her global status and later also her remoteness from Southeast Asia led her to perceive the Association as unimportant. The other superpower's reaction to ASEAN came earlier and was more pronounced only because the Soviet Union, seeking her own advantage in Southeast Asia, was more sensitive to the potential of allies and enemies of sub-global status, to further or hinder Soviet interests. China and Japan, both Asian powers with some non-global interests in the area but without a desire to rule, at a fairly early stage perceived the relevance of the Association to their respective goals, and acknowledged it.

The three communist powers perceived ASEAN almost entirely in a political context. For the USA, ASEAN's non-political features played a minor role compared to ASEAN's political characteristics; however, with the evolution of the dialogue the economic role might come to grow in the perception of the USA. On the other hand, depending on the way in which
the USA under successive political leaderships is going to view her own role with respect to Southeast Asia, ASEAN's potential of representing a political influence in the area (a deterrent for Vietnam; an ally for Japan; a buffer between China and Vietnam) might come more to the forefront. For Japan, ASEAN's political features were less prominent than its orientation towards economic cooperation and development, but were also notable. Thus three of the five salient external powers saw the Association as an almost exclusively political organization; a fourth perceived it predominantly as political; and the last had an understanding of ASEAN in which political elements were far from negligible. During the years 1967 to 1979, the predominant perception of ASEAN by the most important participants in international relations in Southeast Asia was that of an organization whose political nature distinctly outweighed other features.

This overall appraisal might perhaps have been different had it included ASEAN's relations with, for instance, Australia and New Zealand, or the EEC. In the ASEAN - Australia and the ASEAN - New Zealand dialogues, economic matters were clearly primary, and in the ASEAN - EEC dialogue they were entirely dominant. In the perception of these external units, and especially for the early years of ASEAN, non-political features of ASEAN unquestionably outweighed the political ones. However, these external powers were peripheral rather than decisive forces in Southeast Asia. Their perceptions of ASEAN were those of units less concerned with the central issues in the area than were the great powers and Vietnam. In addition, certainly Australia and New Zealand saw ASEAN also as a political, though hardly primarily political, organization. Both countries
had strong political interests in the stability of the Pacific area. Australia had at various times promoted her own schemes for a Pacific community for cooperation, in which ASEAN played a distinct and clearly political part as a core region of peace, stability, and Western orientation. The post-summit conferences in 1977 between ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand included, though they did not centre on, political issues (see Chapter 5, Summits).

The perceptions of additional powers in the ASEAN environment cannot invalidate the conclusions drawn above from the perceptions of the five principal external powers. For the overall appraisal of how ASEAN was perceived in its environment, the inclusion of peripheral powers in the investigation might add some highlights, but it would not substantially alter the conclusion drawn from the five separate evaluations: that ASEAN was perceived as a predominantly political organization.

The following chapter will examine the manner in which ASEAN presented itself to its environment, and from this examination conclusions will be drawn for the Association's own perception of its role and functions.
NOTES

Note: Page number references for ASEAN documents and papers are to the publication *10 Years ASEAN* (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), unless otherwise specified.


2Interviews, 1978. It was emphasized repeatedly that for ASEAN the existence of satisfactory bilateral relations between the USA and ASEAN members could not displace the desirability of an explicit ASEAN - USA relationship, and that the latter had been unduly delayed through the attitude of the USA. The reference in the Joint Communiqué issued after the first meeting in the ASEAN - USA dialogue (see Chapter 3, note 50) to the addition of "a new dimension" to the existing relationships, pointedly underscored this ASEAN position. The same statement in the Joint Communiqué continues as follows:

> "Both sides welcomed the addition of the United States to the expanding linkage of cooperative endeavours between ASEAN and the developed world."

At least for ASEAN, this also expressed the attitude that US recognition had been overdue.

3The diplomatic skills of the Thai leadership had served the country well with respect to World War II and its aftermath, and contributed much to the later close relationship with the USA. Under the Japanese occupation, the Thai government headed by (later Field Marshall) Phibun Songkram had cautiously cooperated with the Japanese, who in 1944 tried to force Thailand to declare war on the USA. The Thai Ambassador in Washington, Seni Pramoj (a charter member of the Democrat Party, and one of the three founders of the anti-Japanese Free Thai Movement), informed the US government of his receipt of the declaration of war, but locked it in his office desk and refused to deliver it, claiming that it was not representative of the will of the Thai people. His own government did not recall him. After the war, when Britain demanded Thai reparations, the USA supported the Thai position (presented by Seni) that Thailand had not been at war with the allied forces, and Britain eventually had to back down. Cady (Southeast Asia, p. 580) gives a brief account of these events.

Kalb and Abel, pp. 103-104.


For the American involvement in South Vietnamese domestic politics, see Cady, History, pp. 319-358, 524-531, 539-553:

Kalb and Abel, p. 107.

Nuechterlein, in Asian Survey 9, p. 810; Kalb and Abel, pp. 118-119.

Michael Haas, Basic Documents, Volume I, Chapter II, Introductory Note, p. 223, p. 229; Ibid., Documents 3004 (pp. 267-269), 3006 (pp. 270-271), 3007 (pp. 274-275); Ralph N. Clough, East Asia and U.S. Security (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), pp. 10-11; Lyon, in International Journal; passim; Kalb and Abel, pp. 72-73, 90-93.

This statement is not meant to imply that before World War II the USA was not concerned with Japan. See the discussion of Gordon's suggestion regarding multipolarity in East Asia, at the end of this subsection in the text.


Clough, pp. 38-43; Mansbach, pp. 122-123. However, the US involvement in Vietnam was explicitly based on the view prevalent in the Eisenhower Administration that the military commitment of the USA in Southeast Asia arose from US national interest (Kalb and Abel, p. 104-105, p. 112).

Gordon, Disengagement, pp. 1-91. The references to official US statements in this context are scattered throughout the first six chapters of this work, and are often cited indirectly from evaluations by other scholars of US policies and actions. Direct and relevant references are found, for example, on pp. 36, 39, 40, 45, 53, 60.

For US support for Asian and especially Southeast Asian regionalism as a factor conducive to multipolarity, see note 34 below.


See Chapter 2, n. 17.

This term summarized the atmosphere and conditions of confrontation between the USA and the USSR especially during the 1950s, in which mutual antagonism was so severe that, except for the actual use
of weapons, it resembled a state of war between communist and anti-communist forces.


20Kalb and Abel, p. 60.

21Ibid., pp. 57-59 (on the evolution of the containment policy), p. 70 and p. 107 (on the axiom of a worldwide, monolithic communist conspiracy against freedom, and on its link with the Vietnam struggle), pp. 55-107 (on examination of the policy); Clough, pp. 5-18.

22This resulted from the conviction, expressed particularly by John Foster Dulles that Europe had been made reasonably secure with NATO and the inclusion of West Germany in it, and that a similar line of containment was needed in Asia. See Kalb and Abel, pp. 72-73.

23The same attitude still persists in Southeast Asia, as discussed by Derek Davies, "Shadow of the Kremlin," FEER, 24 August 1979, pp. 20-22, esp. p. 20.


26See Mansbach, p. 122. Clough (p. 18, p. 27) makes the same point about an unduly retained political concept with respect to the containment policy. Couloumbíris and Wolfe (p. 210) suggest that warfare over fundamental values indicates the disintegration of a balance-of-power system. The Vietnam war renders this suggestion plausible, at least as far as the USA is concerned.


28See below: The Position of Japan.


"Disengagement," pp. 60-62, 67-71, 86-87, 90. See also Nye, pp. 188-189, who mentions US support for regionalism in Asia, especially during the Johnson Administration, and gives three reasons: to create a non-Chinese pole of power; to decrease the American burden (presumably of peace-keeping and of development assistance); and to create "a better Southeast Asia [which is] less likely to produce a series of Vietnams...."


Ibid., p. 61 and Ibid., n. 3, p. 73.


ASEAN - Indonesia, A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia
Appendix 2, declaration, first item. See below: Chapter 5, Statements.

Bangkok Declaration (Appendix 1), preamble, sections 5 and 4.

See Wilson, p. 24: "The fundamental goal ... to prevent big-power interference in Southeast Asia." This emphasis on externally created problems seemed to imply an attitude that home-made troubles in ASEAN countries, of which there were and are many, could be managed. For internal problems, see Mansbach, pp. 127-132; Yuwono Sudarsono, "Problems of Internal Stability in the ASEAN Countries," in Asia and the Western Pacific: Towards a New International Order, ed. Hedley Bull, with a Preface by T.B. Millar and an Introduction by Hedley Bull. Nelson in Association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1975), pp. 77-86 (passim).

Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), cited here from excerpts reprinted in TIME, 8 October 1979, Special Section, pp. 43-57 (pp. 52, 55-57).


1969, pp. 248-249. The fate of SEATO seems to validate a point made by Couloumbis and Wolfe. They point out that after the end of the Korean War, the United Nations had abandoned the concept of collective security through large-scale military alliances as a suitable approach to problems of peace, war, and stability, and they infer from this that the time for such alliances was past. SEATO, which was created shortly after the Korean War as a military alliance with a widely dispersed membership, was never really active in its statutory functions. Very early on, SEATO activities shifted to various socio-economic and general development assistance operations, many of which were subsequently independently institutionalized and survived the demise of SEATO.


Moscow's attempts to influence the non-aligned movement through Laos and Cuba were especially evident at the 1976 Colombo and the 1979 Havana meetings; see Denzil Peiris, "Moscow Stirs the Pot," FEER, 3 September 1976, p. 10; Robert Manning, "The Havana Bomb Fails to Explode," FEER, 14 September 1979, pp. 12-13 (p. 12); Mohan Ram, "Sticking to the Guidelines," FEER, 30 May 1980, p. 36; "Non-Alignment Veers Left,"


52 Weatherbee, pp. 409, 410, p. 411 n. 7, p. 412; Wanandi, p. 784; Crouch, pp. 9-10; Derek Davies, "The Message to Carter: 'Yanks, Come Home'," FEER, 17 June 1977, pp. 8-10 (p. 8); Richard Nations and K. Das, "The Season of Goodwill," FEER, 23 December 1977, pp. 10-12 (p. 12). However, when in 1977 Japan was reported in the regional press to have transmitted a request from ASEAN to the USA for continued American presence in Southeast Asia, there was a flat denial from ASEAN that such a request existed, and an outburst of indignation over Japan's assumption of the role of unsolicited go-between. See Stephen Barber, "Carter's Teach-in for Fukuda," FEER, 1 April 1977, pp. 15-16 (p. 15); K. Das, "Penang Talk-in Puts Leaders in the Picture," FEER, 15 April 1977, pp. 19-20 (p. 20); Rodney Tasker, "Fukuda and the ASEAN Embroglio," FEER, 22 April 1977, pp. 28-29.


ASEAN view that the dialogue implies the political recognition of the Association is expressed in all reports cited above, and is the core of a public statement of July 1978 by the Philippines' Foreign Secretary Carlos Romulo see FBIS Daily Report, Asia & the Pacific, 24 July 1978 - Philippines.


57 Interviews, 1978, and the reports in FBIS cited in note 54 above.


59 Interviews, 1978. An official at the Canadian Embassy in Bangkok quoted an unidentified Thai political leader as having described ASEAN as "the non-involvement chance" for the USA.

60 Nixon, p. 119.


62 Sopiee, p. 136.

63 This is especially apparent from the discussions of the Soviet proposal for a system of collective security in Asia. In the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, several Soviet leaders pointed out in response to the worldwide criticism that "[but Afghanistan] is right on our own borders," as if this constituted a self-evident need for the USSR to involve herself in the affairs of the neighbouring country ("Proximity and Self-Interest," TIME, 3 March 1980, p. 28).


65Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 26 April-3 May 1969, pp. 23313-23314-A.


70Mackintosh, p. 59.


74 Nuechterlein, in Asian Survey 8, 806; Sophiee, p. 135.

75 Kissinger, as rendered in TIME, Special Section, 8 October 1979, p. 44; Cady, History, pp. 577-614.


79 Marian Kirsch, p. 467; Malakhovsky, passim.


exception to the bilateral efforts was a 1969 Soviet draft resolution on the merits of regional security systems in various parts of the world, submitted to the UN General Assembly (Marian Kirsch, pp. 466-467).


84 This interpretation is given by virtually all authors cited in notes 77-83 above, and particularly explicitly by Horelick, in Pacific Affairs, pp. 276-277; Wannafi, p. 772; van der Kroef, in Pacific Affairs, pp. 158-159; Mackintosh, pp. 53-57.

85 Wilson, p. 34; Mansbach, p. 121; Simon, in World Politics, p. 542 and Ibid., n. 52, p. 549.

86 On alleged congruence between the Soviet and the ASEAN schemes: Malakhovsky, passim; Wilson, p. 113; Horelick, in Pacific Affairs, pp. 278-279; van der Kroef, in Pacific Affairs, pp. 160-161; Jorgensen-Dahl, in Pacific Community 8, p. 416. On the Soviet understanding that the ASEAN proposal would be useful towards checking China: Weatherbee, p. 412; Wilson, pp. 113-114.


Weatherbee, p. 412. See also Facts on File, 5 March 1977, p. 145 D3 for an indication of this turn or propaganda.

Interview with T.T.B. Koh, Singapore Ambassador to the UN. For the Soviet visit to ASEAN states, see Davies, in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 17.


See Wong, in Asia Survey, passim; John Wong, "Trade Between the ASEAN Region and China," in Economic Problems & Prospects in ASEAN Countries, eds. Saw Swee-Hock and Lee Soo Ann (Singapore: Singapore University Press for the Applied Research Corporation, 1977), pp. 149-161, passim; Wanandi, p. 772; Yakubovsky, passim. The last two authors address specifically the USSR.

"ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1978, pp. 70-74 (Table 3, ASEAN: Direction of Trade, p. 71).

See Wong, in Asia Survey. Interviews in 1978 in several national secretariats of ASEAN and also with the author-Wong in 1979 confirmed that the trend was noted as continuing.


FitzGerald, p. 311.


Jackson, passim; for the breakdown of all order in Cambodia, the article by Kamm in The New York Times Magazine (note 68 above) is particularly instructive.

101 FitzGerald, pp. 229-239.


107 Jorgensen-Dahl, in Pacific Community 8, p. 418. In 1967, four days after the establishment of ASEAN, China attacked the new organization as an "out-and-out counter-revolutionary alliance against China, communism and the people" and as "another instrument for United States imperialists and Soviet modern revisionists in their pursuit of neocolonialism in Asia" (Facts on File, 7-13 September 1967, p. 376 B2).


109 A vivid illustration of such an attitude is given in the 1977 "Commentary by Hsinhua Correspondent," passim. In 1974, on the occasion of the Malaysian Prime Minister's visit to Peking, Chou-en Lai had explicitly
praised ASEAN for its peace proposal (Facts on File, 15 June 1974, p. 484 Bl.) This attitude continued through the following years; see Facts on File, 24 November 1978, p. 894 B2-C2.


112 Wilson, pp. 183-184; Sopiee, p. 149.

113 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 3 April 1981, pp. 30789A-30790 (p. 30790). This was Lee's second visit to the PRC, the first one having taken place in 1976, ("Relationships," in Asia Yearbook 1977, p. 55.


116 Ibid., 15-21 September 1975, pp. 27334-27336. The Kukrit visit is covered in great detail in this report.

117 Ibid., p. 27333.

118 Ibid., pp. 27335-27336 for the topic of insurgency. The question of the overseas Chinese is addressed by Rau, pp. 232, 233-234.


120 Except for those who arrived in Hong Kong, where the government claimed with justifiable pride that it turned none away (regional press and interviews at several offices of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, summer 1980).
121"ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1978, pp. 70-74 (Table 3, ASEAN: Direction of Trade, p. 71).

122See "Visionary of a New China," TIME, 1 January 1979, pp. 4-6, 10-12.

123Davies, in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 20.

124Wong, The ASEAN Economies, p. 17 (Table 8); Simon, in Asian Survey, p. 680.


128The two-thirds figure is provided by Kernial Singh Sandhu and Eileen P. Tang, "Introduction," in Japan as an Economic Power and Its Implications for Southeast Asia, eds. Kernial Singh Sandhu and Eileen P. Tang. Papers Presented at a Conference Organized by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore: Singapore University Press for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Studies, n.d. [circa 1975]), pp. ix-xix (pp. xiii,xv). The authors give this figure for Southeast Asia's share in Japan assistance. This is not in accordance with other publications, in which about 60% or two-thirds is given for Asia, including the other countries mentioned. See The Oriental Economist, The Oriental Economist's Japan Economic Yearbook 1980/81 (Tokyo: Nihonbashi,

According to Davies (in *Asia Yearbook* 1978, p. 22) ASEAN accounts for about 40% of Japanese aid. This placed ASEAN "at the top of the aid list" (Tracy Dahlby, "Reassuring Noises from Tokyo: Japanese Officials Insist that It Is ASEAN — and not China — that Commands Top Priority in Their Policy Calculations," in *FEER*, 7 December 1979, pp. 81-82 (p. 81). For the Manila speech by Fukuda, see Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, 14 October 1977, p. 28615-A.-28616 (p. 28616).

For growth rates, see Chapter 5, Figures 3 and 4. The investment figures are taken from Davies, in *Asia Yearbook* 1978, pp. 21-22, as is the quote on the "10, 20, 25, and 40% relationship." A good overview is given by Helmut Laumer, *Japan's wirtschaftliche Verflechtung mit Suedostasien. Mitteilungen des Instituts fuer Asienkunde Nummer 83* (Hamburg: Institut fuer Asienkunde, 1977) [Economic Interdependence between Japan and Southeast Asia, Reports, Institute of Asian Affairs, Number 83 (Hamburg: Institute of Asian Affairs, 1977)], passim.

This factor was particularly emphasized in interviews, 1978, at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.

Gordon, *Disengagement*, pp. 73-91, 95, 113. The statement reported on page 174 above could be found in the press as well as in interviews, 1978.


The entire volume by Keohane and Nye deals with this concept. See also: Couloumbis and Wolfe, pp. 3-12, 301-319; Schubert, p. 428; Adam Malik, "Towards an Asian Asia," *FEER*, 25 September 1971, pp. 31-33 (p. 31).

Couloumbis and Wolfe, p. 305. Keohane and Nye also mention military and ecological interdependence (pp. 3-4; p. 8, p. 10).

For example, see: Keohane and Nye, p. 3; Couloumbis and Wolfe,
See Quo, passim. Clough (p. 3) maintains that with the Nixon Doctrine the USA had crossed the bridge to suggesting a larger military role for Japan as part of the larger political one. For increased emphasis on military concerns in Japan, see John Lewis, "A Hard Look at the Real World," FEER, 3 August 1979, pp. 15-16; "Japanese Troops in US War Exercise," The Straits Times (Singapore), 29 August 1979, p. 3.

A summary of the main points is given in Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 14 October 1977, p. 28616.


Interviews, 1978; the synthetic rubber issue is covered in the ASEAN Secretariat paper, ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations (p. 225). The success of ASEAN in pressuring Japan into a reduction of her synthetic rubber production is also noted in "ASEAN Economics," Asia Yearbook 1977 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review Limited, 1977), pp. 75-80 (p. 78). The Joint Communique of the Seventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (1974) notes that "the ASEAN joint approach to Japan ... had resulted in obtaining the Japanese Government's agreement to exercise a restraining influence on the Japanese synthetic rubber industry, so that it will not jeopardize the economies of ASEAN countries" (section 13, p. 280).

Ibid. (pp. 225-226); [Wong,] "ASEAN Economics," in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 85.

For the Cultural Fund, see Chapter 1, n. 5. On the industrial projects, Chapter 3, Identity, and the following: Joint Press Communique, issued after the Bali summit (10 Years ASEAN, pp. 146-147), section 10 iii; Final Communique, issued after the Kuala Lumpur summit (10 Years

144 [Wong,] "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 83.

145 Yano, pp. 63-64.


147 See Tracy Dahlby, "Reassuring Noises from Tokyo," in FEER, 7 December 1979, pp. 81-82. Some ASEAN observers seem to find an ASEAN - Japan relationship centring on economic issues distinctly preferable; see the assessment of various ASEAN - Japan meetings by David SyCip, "Getting into Focus," Asiaweek, 14 September 1979, p. 41.


151 "Neutralisation of Southeast Asia," in Journal of Contemporary Asia 2 (1972):122-123. This article is a "document" reprint from the North Vietnamese newspaper Nhan Dan of 1 December 1971. In addressing "the line clashing with US policy" evident from ASEAN's Kuala Lumpur Declaration, the article does not retract the summary categorization of ASEAN.


154 See below: Temporary Thaws in Vietnam's Attitude towards ASEAN; see also n. 161 below.


156 Pretzell, ASEAN, p. 39.

157 Interviews, 1978. See also Lau, p. 548; Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 6-12 October 1975, p. 27376-C.

158 "US Cannot Reverse Revolutionary Trend in South-East Asia," passim.

159 "Relationships," in Asia Yearbook 1977, p. 54; Harvey Stockwin,


162 Michael Richardson, Ibid.


168 See Chapter 5, Dialogues. The three relationships are addressed in the paper compiled by the ASEAN Secretariat, "ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations: section ASEAN - Australia (pp. 221-223), section ASEAN - New Zealand (pp. 227-228), section ASEAN - EEC (pp. 224-225).
Chapter 5

IMAGE AND SELF-IMAGE

Throughout the early years and to some extent during its second phase, ASEAN claimed to be a non-political organization devoted to socio-economic cooperation alone. Yet in its environment it was perceived principally as being relevant in a political context. This chapter will discuss how this apparent contradiction was inherent in ASEAN's own projection of an organizational image, while in substance the seemingly contradictory features were facets of an undivided self-image, and that ASEAN was well aware of this.

During ASEAN's formative period its low profile yielded relatively few instances of externally visible activity from which inferences concerning its true nature could be drawn. The examination will first turn to the basic documents and other statements from within ASEAN. It will then address organizational actions that were directed at, or perceivable in, the ASEAN environment, and lastly will consider some of the internal and external appraisals that were made of the earlier years on later occasions.

For the second phase the examination will mainly address the summits, attendant statements and activities, and actions resulting from the summits. It will also seek to relate organizational directions evident in the second stage to those in the first stage. For both periods, it will be necessary to return to statements and actions that were already
introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. Also for both periods, the examination utilizes intra-ASEAN sources to a greater extent than do previous chapters. The final section deals with the interrelation between socio-economic development and political stability in ASEAN.

A Non-Political Organization?

Statements

The Bangkok Declaration

The Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN Declaration) of 1967 spells out the aims and purposes of ASEAN in seven sections. The declaration enumerates the following specific areas for collaboration and mutual assistance: economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative fields (declaration, section 3); training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical, and administrative spheres (section 4); agriculture and industries, trade (including international commodity trade), transportation and communication facilities, and raising the living standards of the people (section 5). It further pledges ASEAN to promote Southeast Asian studies (section 6) and to cooperate closely with other international and regional organizations having similar aims and purposes (section 7).

Intertwined with the enumeration of areas of cooperation, both the preamble and the declaration of intent express the desire of the ASEAN members to promote broad aims: "regional solidarity" (preamble, section
"peace, progress and prosperity in the region" (ibid., section 2); "the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being" (ibid., section 3); "peaceful and progressive national development" (ibid., section 4); "a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian nations" (declaration, section 1); "regional peace and stability" (ibid., section 2); and the exploration of "all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves" (ibid., section 7).

The admixture of motives, goals, and purposes and of general and specific matters is characteristically summarized in the first item under the declaration of intent ("aims and purposes"): "To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundations for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian nations." In a grand sweep, the opening and closing statements of the Bangkok Declaration encompass ASEAN's concerns with respect to the past, present, and future: "Mindful of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among the countries of South East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation" the founders of ASEAN declare "that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity."

It is evident from these quotations that ASEAN did not propose to limit its concerns to those areas of cooperation that are explicitly enumerated in the Bangkok Declaration, and that it felt its pledge to
regional cooperation to be somehow related to peace, freedom, stability, or self-determination. These are political values in that they express basic communal preferences in ASEAN for certain ways of life over others. This applies obviously to 'peace' and 'freedom', but also to 'stability' unless it is qualified as 'social stability' (as in section 4 of the preamble). Many of the phrases in the Declaration reveal how intimately ASEAN saw its intra-organizational cooperation for socio-economic purposes, and its vision of a harmonious, prosperous future linked to results and conditions and hopes that took their meaning from political values such as peace. The concern with political issues is especially clear with reference to outside interference and foreign bases. In a poignant echo of the 1963 Manila Declaration (the agreement that established Maphilindo), the members of a purportedly apolitical organization affirm

"that all foreign bases are temporary and ... are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development"

(preamble, section 5). The preceding statement in the preamble (section 4) is equally reminiscent of the Maphilindo document, and at the same time contains the core of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971: the ASEAN members vow

"to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities ...."

It must be stressed that the majority of political references in the Bangkok Declaration occurs in the preamble; the organization's stated intent to cooperate in certain areas addresses mainly economic, social,
and other functional matters that ASEAN claimed to be its sole scope. The expression of political motivations, opinions, or hopes in the founding instrument does not in itself invalidate that claim. It only indicates that ASEAN first introduced itself to the international community as an organization with mixed concerns and objectives.

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration

The only other major statement from ASEAN during its formative period was the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November 1971. Its significance for the perceptions of the external powers of ASEAN is discussed in Chapter 4, where it was concluded that the Declaration contributed notably to external perceptions of ASEAN as a political organization. ASEAN itself considered the formulation and promotion of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration its major tangible achievement during the early years. In view of this acknowledgement, the Declaration merits special attention as an indicator of the Association's self-image.

The Declaration was agreed to and signed by the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN states during a special Ministerial Meeting that had been convened outside the schedule of regular meetings, solely for that purpose. After a lengthy preamble, the Declaration itself consists of only two short statements. In the first, the ASEAN members assert their determination

"to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and respect for, Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;"  
in the second they state
"that South East Asian countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation with would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship."

The preamble addresses almost exclusively political matters such as international tension and lasting peace (section 2), sovereignty, territorial integrity, and threat or use of force (section 3), independence (sections 5 and 6), nuclear-free zones (section 7), and stability (sections 7, 9, and 11).

The overall political character of the Declaration is not in question. However, even in the context of such purely political matters as the threat or use of force, or nuclear-free zones, ASEAN found occasion to reiterate its other concerns through explicit or implicit references to the Bangkok Declaration. The preamble to the stated commitment to peace, freedom and neutrality stresses the merits of regional cooperation "in the economic, social and cultural fields in [ASEAN]" (section 1), and in section 9 it quotes in its entirety section 4 of the Bangkok Declaration, which refers to "strengthening the economic and social stability of the region." In its final section (11) the preamble to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration emphasizes the peoples' desire for "the conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their economic and social well-being." Thus in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration the combination of ASEAN concerns is again evident, even though the balance between political and other issues is shifted far towards the former. ASEAN's promotion of the Declaration will be outlined below in connection with organizational activities.
The Arab-Israeli Declaration

In a curiously inconspicuous declaration of 1973 on an unspecified occasion ASEAN, represented by Indonesia, "deemed it necessary" to proclaim the ASEAN position in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This declaration expresses a very strong stand of ASEAN against Israel and in favour of the Palestinian cause. It is likely that the Islamic countries in ASEAN (Malaysia and Indonesia) instigated this declaration, but it was issued as an ASEAN position statement. It is reproduced in only one of the numerous collections of ASEAN documents compiled in ASEAN in the late 1970s, and no reference to it was found in the literature on the Association. Whatever ASEAN's reasons for formulating the declaration, or for not drawing public attention to it afterwards, its exclusively political character is particularly evident.

Joint Communiqués and Press Releases

The annual Ministerial Meetings resulted in communiqués or press releases which give instructive overviews of ASEAN business. These official statements were not, of course, classified as confidential, but neither is there much indication that they were readily accessible outside the ASEAN national secretariats during the early years. Until the ASEAN Secretariat began to collect and publish ASEAN documents, the communiqués seem to have been available only at source in mimeographed form, and do not appear to have been widely used for external appraisals of ASEAN's activities. Their contents reinforce the doubt raised by the Bangkok and the Kuala Lumpur Declarations that ASEAN's public self-portrayal as an organization solely for socio-economic cooperation really reflected its
true self-image.

The communiques carefully recorded non-political topics of discussion during Ministerial Meetings. The Foreign Ministers noted, for example: progress in the areas identified by the scope of the first committees (e.g., food supply and production; air transport; shipping; tourism; mass media services) and pursued in meetings or studies (2nd and 3rd Meeting); recommendations in connection with the 1974 UN study on ASEAN economic cooperation (5th Meeting); the creation of the Special Committee of ASEAN Central Banks and Monetary Authorities, and the "indiscriminate expansion of the synthetic rubber industry by Japan" (6th Meeting); trade liberalization, the establishment of an ASEAN Products Display Centre, and a project for an ASEAN Consumers Protection Agency (7th Meeting); progress in consultations with the EEC (7th and 8th Meetings) and other dialogue partners, and the establishment of various ASEAN non-governmental organizations (8th Meeting). Formal agreements resulting from deliberations in committees were treated as proof of ASEAN's preoccupation with cultural, social, and other non-political matters. Also emphasized were scientific research projects, and the Meeting of Heads of Scientific Documentation and Information Services of ASEAN Member Countries, which was institutionalized in 1970. Cooperation in all these fields certainly existed, and was far from unimportant. To some of the ASEAN members - notably Singapore and the Philippines - economic cooperation was an outstanding attraction of the organization. The joint communiques grew longer with each meeting and noted a rapidly increasing number and variety of specific economic,
technical, and other functional projects, programmes, agreements, or achievements. But they also abounded with strikingly unambiguous references to clearly political matters. Noted are, for instance:

a reaffirmation of "collective will to attain stability and peace in the region" (2nd Meeting); the resumption of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the Philippines, and the recognition "that a strong political, as a vital precondition of ASEAN regional cooperation, should be continuously developed ..." (3rd Meeting); an address by President Marcos deploiring that "countries in the region had been the helpless victims of world powers in their ideological power play" (4th Meeting); a review of "significant world events and ... important changes ... in the relations among the major powers" (5th Meeting [1972, two months after Nixon's visit to China]); the need to develop "a strong political as a vital precondition of ASEAN regional cooperation" (6th Meeting); a reminder by President Soeharto that ASEAN "... did not serve the interest nor execute the policy of whatever outside power," and satisfaction over "the joint and collective approach that ASEAN has taken in regional and international forums" (7th Meeting); the "first prospect" for the peoples of Southeast Asia "to create and establish for themselves a new world of peace free from foreign domination and influence" (8th Meeting [1975]).

These documents thus underscore the fact that ASEAN did indeed attend to both economic and political issues. It is difficult to believe that ASEAN leaders, who without exception were seasoned politicians, should not have realized this. In 1978 the author had the opportunity to interview a Philippine Foreign Office Secretary, a former ASEAN official,
on this point. For almost nine years, he said with a smile, the Foreign Ministers (emphasis in his statement) held the ASEAN meetings - and could one really expect the Foreign Ministers not to talk about the political issues that affected their countries?

Activities

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration

Considering ASEAN's view of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as being its major achievement during the early years, one would expect ASEAN to have devoted considerable effort to its promotion. However, apart from the successful drive to weld the phrase "peace, freedom and neutrality" firmly to its image, ASEAN's pursuit of the proposal was not as vigorous as the emphasis on its importance might suggest. One reason for this was the lack of consensus among the members on the precise meaning of the Declaration and on the best way to implement it. Many of its concepts were so broad and ambiguous (for example, neutrality, freedom) that they gave rise to a great number of different interpretations both within and without the Association. In 1972 ASEAN instituted a Committee of Officials on Neutralization, later called the Committee on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), which was charged with harmonizing the views in ASEAN about the implications and the implementation of the Declaration. The committee produced a number of "definitions," duly adopted by ASEAN, regarding the interpretation of the Declaration; most of these were broad explanations and descriptions of a state of desirable political conditions rather than clarifications regarding the precise
Agreement about the essential common goals expressed in the Declaration existed all along among the ASEAN members: they desired an end to war, coercion, and conflict in Southeast Asia; they wanted to be able to pursue their own national or regional policy choices concerning their basic preferences for certain ways of life as nation-states; and they desired to ensure that such choices were mutually respected by all participants in international relations in the area. Towards these goals ASEAN offered goodwill and non-offensive behaviour to all states and peoples. Perceiving its goals to be interdependent with the problem of external involvement in Southeast Asia, and its own concerns and relations to be interdependent with national, Southeast Asian and global issues and relations, ASEAN presented itself as the initiator of a fresh approach to international relations in Southeast Asia: it offered to be the first to break out of the old circle of traditional balance-of-power politics that had for so long dominated the area.

The fact that ASEAN placed such great importance on the Kuala Lumpur Declaration indicates that its offer of goodwill, coupled with the request to be left to its own choices, touches on ASEAN’s most fundamental concerns: peace, non-coercion, stability, self-determination. Stability in this context meant a framework of conditions and relations that would not be disrupted by war, aggression, threats or upheavals, or any form of strife from without or within; a framework that would permit ASEAN to rely on, or at least to expect, continuity in an acceptably
balanced state of affairs in Southeast Asia. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration illustrates the Association's tendency to focus its attention as well as its self-presentation, on shared broad beliefs in cooperation for the common good, while the manner of pursuit of these beliefs is left to pragmatic adaption to circumstances.

The ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) Committee continued to exist to monitor the progress of the proposal for peace, freedom and neutrality. It was particularly active in preparation of the 1976 Bali summit, when it reached the conclusion that bilateral relations with Vietnam justified the hope that Indochina would eventually agree to discuss the substance of the proposal.19 There was no ASEAN attempt to gain formal UN recognition of the proposal. In 1975 the proposal was submitted as an ASEAN draft resolution to the Algiers conference of non-aligned nations, where it was adopted.20 The negative results of its submission to the non-aligned conference in 1976 in Colombo have already been mentioned in Chapter 4 in the context of Vietnam's position towards ASEAN.

By mid-1976, ASEAN appeared to have decided that the time was not propitious to promote the proposal actively; attention focussed on its long-term objective. In connection with the second summit in 1977, the Foreign Ministers voiced this attitude to the press. In late 1978, a Singapore diplomat stated privately to the author that ASEAN felt the proposal should first be negotiated with the non-ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia, and that ASEAN considered it more appropriate not to press for international acceptance of a scheme to which some of the
"regional" countries affected by it had not yet agreed. Although the proposal was by no means laid aside, it apparently suited ASEAN better to pursue its realization with varying degrees of fervour according to the perceived mood in the international community for or against acceptance. Aware of the opposition of some countries in the area to ASEAN as the sponsor of the Declaration, ASEAN viewed the general promotion of an atmosphere of friendly, inoffensive, cooperative attitudes as important groundwork for the future, more important than formal recognition of the Declaration itself. It was satisfied to leave the specifics and formalities until such time as might be propitious for more decisive action.

However great the discrepancies might seem to be between ASEAN's claim that it was a non-political organization, and its emphasis on the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, and also those between that emphasis and the actual promotion - this purely political undertaking clearly indicates that ASEAN saw itself as an organization vitally concerned with political problems.

**Committees**

From the official statements of the Ministerial Meetings it is apparent that a large part of ASEAN effort during the early years was devoted to committee work and institutionalization of specific task forces with respect to economic, social, and other non-political fields. These activities were principally intra-ASEAN endeavours, of which little became visible unless they affected external participants, as in the dialogues. The permanent committees were concerned only with matters coming under the
areas of cooperation that are listed in the Bangkok Declaration, as were most of the ad hoc and special committees. Typical of the areas covered by the latter two categories were, for example, the committees of Senior Officials on Sugar, Senior Officials on Synthetic Rubber, Senior Trade Officials on the Multilateral Trade Negotiations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and committees on finance and tourism (these two later became permanent). Among the earliest special or ad hoc committees were the ASEAN Ad Hoc Committee on Science and Technology (1970; later permanent), the ASEAN Brussels Committee (1972) for EEC consultations, and the 1973 ASEAN Coordinating Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indochina States (ACCRIS), which was established by a special Foreign Ministers Meeting "to look into the background of the Paris Agreement on Ending War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and the subsequent start of a cease fire in the areas."23

In addition to committees, specific projects such as a regional Climatic Atlas and Compendium of Climatic Statistics, and formal intra-ASEAN agreements indicate the types of issues addressed during the early years. The first formal agreements, both concluded in 1969, covered the establishment of an ASEAN Fund and the promotion of cooperation in mass media and cultural activities. The number and variety of topics dealt with by one or the other working group in ASEAN was remarkable and represented a solid background for the ASEAN claim that its endeavours were, indeed, directed towards socio-economic and other non-political fields of cooperation. In most cases tangible effects of such endeavours were not achieved during the first stage of ASEAN; however, initiatives were started up and wheels set in motion.

244
Dialogues

More visible than most of the committee work were the dialogues. They serve as the framework for particularly close economic cooperation, largely for development purposes between ASEAN and selected industrialized countries or international organizations; they focus on utilization of special technical, financial or other capabilities of ASEAN partners. During the first phase of ASEAN the dialogues with Japan (1973), Australia (1974), and New Zealand (1975) were instituted. The Japan dialogue later evolved into the ASEAN - Japan Forum established in 1977, as mentioned earlier. Preliminary meetings that resulted in institutionalization during ASEAN's second phase were held in 1975 with Canada and the USA (both dialogues began in 1977). The dialogue between ASEAN and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) started in 1976.

In the cases of Canada, New Zealand, and the USA the first initiatives apparently originated with these countries rather than with ASEAN. Canada offered a programme of development assistance to ASEAN; New Zealand proposed to promote and strengthen friendly relations; the USA suggested consultations on economic policy issues other than questions of aid. From the manner in which those approaches were noted in the communiques after the respective year's Ministerial Meetings, it is apparent that the Canadian offer was received with appreciation, while the American suggestion met with marked reservation.

With respect to the EEC, perhaps the most important dialogue partner except for Japan, the institutionalization of relations preceded all others. It began with the 1972 Special Coordinating Committee of ASEAN
(the Brussels Committee) and was reinforced with the 1975 Joint Study Group. In 1974 the Foreign Ministers in their annual meeting noted with satisfaction

"the success of the Association in obtaining from the E.E.C. the recognition of ASEAN as one region and the preferential access of certain commodities into E.E.C. markets ..."

References to past, present or future EEC cooperation are prominent in all communiques of the Ministerial Meetings since 1973 (6th Meeting). Of particular significance in the ASEAN - EEC dialogue are questions of trade preference, long-term investment, stabilization of export prices, buffer stocks for raw materials, and lateral contacts between the private sectors. 29

The significance to ASEAN of the dialogues centres clearly on those areas of cooperation that are listed in the Bangkok Declaration; most particularly on economic cooperation.

Non-Governmental Organizations and Other Activities

Among ASEAN activities in the early years must be listed not only those in which the organization itself was an actor or participant, but also those for which it generated interest or provided a framework. The long list of non-governmental organizations has already been mentioned in Chapter 3. Though some of these organizations were founded only after the first stage of ASEAN, they will not be treated separately in the following section. The significance of these organizations is that they gradually build up intra-ASEAN connections among private individuals and organizations and thus help to construct a basis of regional consciousness separate from that of the bureaucratic structure. The stimulus for all of
these private organizations originally came from ASEAN itself. The Association explicitly recognizes the contribution of the private sector to the realization of organizational objectives, projects, and programmes. It provides technical or administrative assistance when necessary to launch an interested group, and it requests registration with any one of its own secretariats of a group that wishes to use the ASEAN designation.

The wide variety of subjects covered by non-governmental organizations is a good indicator of the broad spectrum of areas in which ASEAN awareness has been created. For a number of the groups, their special fields of concern readily suggest not only intra-ASEAN, but also external contacts, in which their designation as an ASEAN group contributes to spreading awareness and recognition of ASEAN itself. This applies, for instance, to the ASEAN Tours and Travel Association (ASEANTTA), the ASEAN Council of Petroleum Cooperation (ASCOPE), the ASEAN Bankers' Association, the industry clubs joined in the Confederation of ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI), and the Federation of ASEAN Shippers' Council (FASC) and the Federation of ASEAN Shipowners Association (FASA). These last two are particularly significant as they cooperate closely with ASEAN itself in developing strategies to reduce dependence in ASEAN on the Far Eastern Freight Conference.

Lastly, the role of ASEAN itself in connection with its members' bilateral relations with the PRC must be mentioned. The Association is not a participant in those relations. Nevertheless, ASEAN views itself as being of considerable importance to the development of relations between
its members and China. On this significant issue the organizational framework induces the members to strive for consensus. At the same time, the cordial relations between the PRC and ASEAN as a whole permit Indonesia and Singapore to take their own time in overcoming their reluctance to establish formal relations. While ASEAN support for private organizations relates essentially to fields of socio-economic cooperation, its role with respect to relations with China is clearly connected to political issues.

Overall, then, ASEAN's actions mirror its statements in that they cover political as well as non-political areas. The latter are mainly, but not exclusively addressed in intra-ASEAN cooperation. The former are mainly, but not exclusively treated in a public manner. For the self-image of ASEAN both are important. The claim that ASEAN had nothing to do with politics was untenable.

Internal and External Appraisals of ASEAN

The position that "ASEAN is not a regional cooperation in the political field" was upheld in public on many occasions. A typical example of ASEAN's official self-evaluation for its early years can be found in a 1975 publication of ASEAN documents and addresses compiled by the ASEAN Secretariat, in which Carlos Romulo is on record as follows about ASEAN:

"In its initial phases, the major emphasis has been on programs involving technical cooperation. However, ASEAN has also embarked on activities in socio-cultural fields, science and technology, agriculture, mass media communications, tourism, shipping and telecommunications."
the Formation of ASEAN, restates the official version that ASEAN

"was conceived as a regional organization for economic, social and cultural co-operation." 33

Within ASEAN, this was not always accepted. In the 1977 Singapore radio series on the Association that was mentioned in Chapter 3, the question concerning the accession of other states to ASEAN was put as follows:

"The leaders of ASEAN have always claimed that ASEAN is a non-political association; it is purely for economic development of the region. If this is so, why, I am wondering, are Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam not invited to join ASEAN? ..." 38

This clearly shows that some of the ASEAN public had doubts about the official claim. The ASEAN paper History and Background to the Formation of ASEAN was itself not entirely consistent with its summary assessment. Stating that the organization aimed at

"a sense of regional identity as the basis for a prosperous and peaceful community of Southeast Asian Nations," 37 it then devoted a lengthy paragraph to Southeast Asia's political development and strategic location; to the Cold War and global power politics; and to Southeast Asian regionalism as a consequence of these factors. The paper also set forth various ASEAN efforts "to secure more durable peace and stability in the region" through, for instance, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration; the ACCRIS Committee; the "attempt to normalize relations with China," and the intra-ASEAN "increasing degree of political cohesion." 38 Another paper compiled by the national secretariat of Indonesia summed up the reasons for ASEAN's formation, and its purpose, as "one aim ... to bring peace and harmony to our region ..." 39

While many outside observers of ASEAN accepted the organization's
official version of its nature, others did not. In most of the scholarly and journalistic publications that addressed ASEAN, the organization was treated in connection with political issues and particularly explicitly in a framework of security issues in Southeast Asia. In view of the history of ASEAN, its stated concerns with peace and stability, and in view of the interdependence between ASEAN goals and environmental influences, it is understandable that a connection between ASEAN and security should have been readily made.

In the Southeast Asia of the late 1960s and early 1970s the equation of political with security matters was frequently assumed, both within and without ASEAN. From its inception the Association had been regarded by external powers (and attacked by communist ones) as a potential substitute for the declining organization of SEATO, or as a Western-inspired endeavour to help fight communism in Southeast Asia. ASEAN had no wish to be thus identified. Irrespective of the nature of ASEAN's specific aims and purposes, the organization was not intended by its founders to reinforce contemporary perceptions of a world divided into friend or foe, West or East. The desire to break out of that pattern and to work towards harmonious relations with all nations, was amply evident from the Bangkok and the Kuala Lumpur Declarations and from the invitations extended until 1977 to the other states in Southeast Asia to attend ASEAN meetings.

The scrupulous avoidance of military cooperation as an organizational activity had the same background. Even though initially perhaps not all ASEAN members rejected the potential development of
military cooperation for the future, the members then were definitively, unanimously, and consistently agreed on the advisability of renouncing military cooperation in the ASEAN framework. Cooperation among some members in areas of border insurgencies (Thailand and Malaysia; Malaysia and Indonesia), or cooperation in military exercises was strictly bilateral or trilateral. Later, the ASEAN countries even began to standardize to some extent their weapons systems. But there was no ASEAN military cooperation.

According to a 1976 interview statement by Thai Foreign Minister Pichai Rattakul, "ASEAN was set up with no concern whatsoever about security matters." From the context of the interview it is evident that Pichai was denying not only the existence of security concerns of ASEAN, but of ASEAN political objectives altogether. It cannot be assumed that ASEAN really believed what its spokesmen proclaimed. It is far more likely that initially ASEAN found it expedient to emphasize the non-political aspects of cooperation, which were real enough, over the political ones, which were also quite real. During the early years the perceptions in ASEAN of the environment's sensitivity to security and military issues strongly affected the Association's self-presentation. ASEAN's characteristics as presented to its environment were indicative of their objective importance in ASEAN's self-perception, but their perception by external powers also had an impact on the Association's presentation of itself. The reactions of external powers to the very creation of ASEAN made it obvious that security considerations and other clearly political criteria were generally being applied to determine the attitudes of others to the organization, and also they made it obvious
that security cooperation was widely expected to form one aspect of

ASEAN.

Given the reciprocal effects between ASEAN's perception by, and
self-presentation to, its environment it was not surprising that ASEAN
should have made every effort to deflect attention from military and
security matters. Its denial of political objectives altogether results
from the realization that its hope for portraying itself effectively as a
non-offensive grouping lay with its insistence on non-offensive concerns
such as the development of social, cultural, and economic ties among the
members. Thus the assumption of an equation between military and political
matters, and connections that could be made - and were readily made -
between ASEAN and security, were precisely the reasons for ASEAN to deny
that it had political purposes at all.

In a context of military security and other political issues in
Southeast Asia, Mansbach has described ASEAN as a "security community."44
Following the definition introduced by Deutsch with respect to the study
of international organization, the term 'security-community' is generally
understood to mean "a group of people which has become "integrated","45
i.e., which has attained, on the basis of institutions, practices, and
common persuasions, dependable expectations of peaceful change through
non-violent resolution of social problems. A security-community, according
to Deutsch,

"is one in which there is real assurance that the members of
that community will not fight each other physically, but will
settle their disputes in some other way."46

While this description fits ASEAN well (see Chapter 6), it is not
congruent with Mansbach's use of the term "security community" for ASEAN, which implies an understanding of ASEAN as a community seeking security in, or from, its environment through associating together against external pressures. An application of the term as used by Mansbach would, however, not be without justification, despite ASEAN's rejection of military cooperation. The Association was indeed what Mansbach suggests: a grouping created to help its members retain or improve their security, a goal to which were linked their preferences for certain, self-determined patterns of national identity.

One aspect of those patterns was peaceful behaviour (internally and externally); another was the improvement of socio-economic conditions. For both, ASEAN strength—founded on internal cohesion and unity was essential. Cohesion could be achieved by focusing on a common external enemy, or by patiently laying a foundation of internal understanding in a mosaic of small endeavours and achievements. The first would not have been easily reconcilable with ASEAN's basic approach to international relations. Choosing the second, and emphasizing the least offensive reasons for building its own strength—who could object to improving the living conditions of the people?—, ASEAN nevertheless realized very well that its own success might conflict with desires in its environment to intrude upon ASEAN self-determination. The realization was precisely the reason for de-emphasizing it.

The apparent contradiction between external perceptions of ASEAN as a political venture and ASEAN's projected self-image as an economic development undertaking thus arose from a discrepancy between the public
and the real self-image of the Association. In reality, economic and political elements were both inherent in ASEAN's self-perception, and ASEAN was well aware of it. During the early years an open admission of this fact would have been unwise. This attitude changed during the period of consolidation.

**Politicization or the New Focus on Economic Cooperation**

With the second phase of ASEAN the goals and purposes of the Association seemed to undergo a twofold shift in emphasis. Statements from ASEAN about its direction after the first summit, if taken at face value, even contradicted earlier pronouncements. Yet ASEAN maintained that the early years had served to prepare the ground for its direction and activities in the consolidation stage.

**Summits**

In the 1976 Treaty and the concurrent Concord, political cooperation was explicitly written into the basic ASEAN documents as one of the areas for future activity. This was said to enlarge the scope of previous cooperation, and to give the Association a new thrust in its aims. At the same time, ASEAN leaders declared that now the Association was turning to economic cooperation in earnest, and that the focus on economic matters was the significant new element in the consolidation phase of ASEAN. The paradox in these statements arose, to some extent, from the portrayal of each field - politics or economics - as the main new feature of ASEAN cooperation. But it also derived from implications which an allegedly new ASEAN direction has for the old direction. If
ASEAN was now turning to economic cooperation, what had its former focus been? And if political cooperation was the truly new ASEAN feature, did not this mean that ASEAN had indeed previously been an organization for economic cooperation, as it had claimed, and was now becoming something else?

The summit-meetings in 1976 and 1977 were themselves political events in that they brought together the heads of state in ASEAN. The invitation to Vietnam in 1977 underscored that the ASEAN leaders met not only to discuss economic questions, even though both summits were prepared primarily by the top economic officials in ASEAN. For the Kuala Lumpur summit, the three subsequent meetings with foreign delegations from Japan, Australia, and New Zealand - delegations led by the respective Prime Ministers - were also strong indicators that ASEAN intended to, and did, present itself as an organization concerned with political issues. On the other hand, much of the summit substance related to economic matters. The meetings, the basic documents produced at the Bali summit, and many of the speeches given in 1976 and 1977 by ASEAN leaders emphasized the political as well as the economic aspect.

The Concord is unambiguous in its concern with political matters. The ASEAN members "undertake to ... expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political field" (preamble, section 3). This introduction was an open admission that political cooperation had existed before the Bali summit. The concern with intra-ASEAN as well as external political relations is extensively spelled out in the declarations following the preamble. All objectives and principles in
ASEAN cooperation are placed in a framework of "the pursuit of political stability" ("do hereby declare...," section 1). The "programme of action" for the realization of ASEAN principles and goals places political cooperation at the head of a comprehensive blueprint for future cooperation (Adopted programme of action, A. Political). Organizational developments such as the institution of the Meeting of Heads of Government and the improvement of ASEAN machinery, are explicitly named as steps in the seven-point political programme of action (A.1, A.5). Three of the remaining items in the same section relate to intra-ASEAN issues, which were thereby designated as political in nature (A.2, A.3, A.6). The last two items refer to external international relations of ASEAN, namely to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration (A.4) and to the "strengthening of political solidarity" by continuing efforts to develop internal unity as the basis for common actions (A.7). Well removed from the section on political cooperation, the programme of action (E. Security) contains a one-sentence statement about "continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis" in security matters. Even though this reference to security issues only reiterates a well-known ASEAN position, it is remarkable that it should have appeared in the Concord at all, since prior to 1976 ASEAN had rarely conceded that security was even mentioned at ASEAN meetings.

The Treaty is prefaced by a preamble which is solely devoted to concerns of peace or conflict among nations. The conclusion of the Treaty is noted in the Concord (Adopted programme of action, A. Political, item 2) as one of the instances of political cooperation in ASEAN. The Treaty deals with issues of international relations, peace, and stability in fourteen of its twenty articles. The core of the Treaty is Chapter IV.
Concerning the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (Articles 13-17), which puts at the disposal of the ASEAN members formal and informal procedures for the settlement of disagreements, and contractually obliges them to "have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising" and to "refrain from the threat or use of force ... especially [in] disputes likely to disturb regional peace and regional peace and harmony" (Article 13). Article 17 encourages parties to a dispute to strive for a settlement through "friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Chapter [sic] of the United Nations." 50

The open treatment of political cooperation in the two new basic documents of ASEAN was an expression of increased ASEAN self-assurance. The speeches by ASEAN leaders at the Bali summit revealed that the leaders made no effort to de-emphasize the political dimension of ASEAN cooperation. They traced the development of the Association in the contexts of survival, the question of a military pact, and sovereignty (Indonesia); the strategic location of Southeast Asia in relation to great-power interests, and the politics of confrontation (Malaysia); detente and independence "in a superpower world of missiles and rockets" (Singapore); the Vietnam war and external aggression (Philippines); and the significance of the Kuala Lumpur Declaration as "a manifestation of an impressive degree of collective political will and cohesiveness" (Thailand). 51

The host of the Bali summit, President Soeharto of Indonesia, in his opening address repeated a summary of ASEAN development which was also frequently stressed by ASEAN officials in interviews given to the
author in 1978: "The fundamental basis of ASEAN's cooperation is the political will."\textsuperscript{52} That the political will in ASEAN meant not only the resolve to make economic cooperation for development work, but also extended to matters involving international relations and peace in the region and in Southeast Asia, is amply stated in summit speeches and documents. An Indonesian press commentary after the Bali summit concluded that political cooperation had been "legalized,"\textsuperscript{53} an opinion which the speeches show to be an accurate reflection of intra-ASEAN feeling. The 1977 Kuala Lumpur summit continued the same trend of open discussion of political issues, as is evident, for instance, from the Final Communiqué (sections 5-10) and also from the Joint Statement issued after the ASEAN-Japan meeting (sections 3, 4, 15-17).

The quality of continuity rather than innovation in political cooperation in ASEAN was underscored by the manner in which the second phase of ASEAN evolved out of the first. ASEAN leaders and officials frequently stressed, in their reviews of the early years, that concrete instances of cooperation were initially given less attention than were political relationships among the ASEAN members. Outside critics of ASEAN's seemingly meagre performance during the first years were reminded that those years served to build internal consensus and an organizational entity, while the Bali summit, at which political cooperation was written into basic ASEAN documents, marked the beginning of systematic and specific cooperation.

But if the summits, basic documents, and speeches emphasized political cooperation, they also stressed economic cooperation. In this
respect also, ASEAN claimed continuity in its basic direction. The speeches highlighted, and elaborated on, various new projects and plans for intensified economic cooperation that were written into the summit documents. Activities in the field of economic cooperation began to move ahead at a much faster pace than before the summits. Attention to political cooperation notwithstanding, the summits and especially ASEAN activities between 1976 and 1978 seemed to centre on economic matters.

The 1976 Concord declares the "elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy [to be] a primary concern of member states" (declaration, section 3). It identifies and specifies the areas for cooperation more clearly than before. The programme of action adopted devotes more space to economic matters than to all others put together. Under "B. Economic" the programme commissions, and commits, the Economic Ministers to focus on basic development needs: food, energy, employment, resource utilization, essential commodity production (B.1, B.2) and on basic development strategies: joint approaches to international economic issues, and coordination and expansion of intra-ASEAN trade and industry (B.3, B.4). Within this broad framework, the programme of action specifically lists numerous aims and procedures as guidelines for the Economic Ministers, who are explicitly charged with monitoring implementation of the programme (B.5 (ii)). The Ministers are also instructed to develop additional recommendations (B.5 (i)) and to work towards a harmonization of national development plans and policies on a regional scale (B.5 (iii)).

The focus on basic development needs and strategies is reiterated in
the Treaty, Articles 6 and 7 identify economic growth, social justice, mutual assistance, and the raising of living standards of the people as the primary objectives of ASEAN economic cooperation.

Summit Follow-up

Soon after the summit, important formal agreements were concluded in some priority areas specified, such as emergency sharing of basic food and energy resources (rice and oil); a joint US$100 million standby credit facility (embodied in the so-called Swap Arrangement) for the temporary relief of international liquidity problems of member countries; and Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTA) for a number of commodities.\textsuperscript{54}

The PTA was considered particularly important, since it reflected a systematic effort to facilitate and increase intra-ASEAN trade, which suffers from the lack of complementarity in ASEAN economies; in 1972, the Ministerial Meeting had noted a decline of intra-ASEAN trade due to similarity of exports.\textsuperscript{55} Despite the cumbersome product-by-product approach to the PTA, the total number of commodities subject to trade preferences increased from an initial 71 in 1977, to 1326 in early 1979, and by the end of 1979 to 2327.\textsuperscript{56} The achievements in this specific instance were seen as significant because early external appraisals of ASEAN had frequently pointed to the low volume of intra-ASEAN trade as an indicator of ASEAN's non-viability, and to the absence of tangible results of economic cooperation as proof that the organization was not really achieving much. Progress regarding preferential trade arrangements was seen in ASEAN as a refutation of such appraisals. On a percentage basis of ASEAN trade, intra-ASEAN trade remains low at about 15% for most of
the 1970s. However, the Preferential Trade Arrangements generated an annual turnover which, according to some sources, is more than four times higher than had initially been expected (US$700 million as compared to US$150 million).57

In the treatment of economic cooperation in the Concord and the Treaty, as well as in the conclusion of individual agreements, perhaps the most important aspects were the recurring emphases on two complementary ASEAN attitudes: a primary focus on intra-ASEAN potential for economic growth, and a joint approach to external factors affecting ASEAN economies. The first aimed at combining markets, resources, institutions, or planning capabilities; the second aimed at dealing as a unit with global economic problems, with international trade, development assistance, and foreign investment.

The role of the Economic Ministers in ASEAN had been singled out at and after the summits as being especially significant to the Association's progress. As a result, ASEAN meetings of Economic Ministers, which had begun informally in 1975, were institutionalized and subsequently held with greater frequency than meetings of any other group of ministers. Other groups were Labour Ministers, who met in April 1975 and May 1977; Ministers of Education (meeting in December 1977) and Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare (meeting in July 1977 in preparation for the second summit).58 The preeminence of economic issues was also indicated by the transfer of limited decision-making authority to the Economic Ministers Meeting after the second summit, an organizational development that was considered highly significant in view of the fact
that previously only the Foreign Ministers had had such authority.

Other Activities

Apart from the numerous activities directly initiated or spurred by the summits, some other events and achievements stand out, in the ASEAN view, during the consolidation stage. Progress in the dialogues was mentioned earlier. In the field of communications, ASEAN accepted Indonesia's offer to utilize the Indonesian satellite PALAPA as the regional satellite communications base. Also, a submarine cable network linking all five countries was started with the Philippines-Singapore segment completed in 1978; at the rate of one additional segment per year, completion of the entire project was scheduled for 1983. In a region stretching over 4,500 kilometres from west to east and over 3,000 kilometres from north to south, with more than 7,000 Philippine and more than 13,000 Indonesian islands, it is readily apparent how important communications are to countries that wish to develop closer ties.

Another outstanding event was the first conference on business and industrial cooperation held in Brussels in April 1977 as a result of the ASEAN-EEC relationship. The conference brought together officials and private sector representatives from both regions and was seen on both sides as a great success. It was considered by ASEAN a major step in creating in Europe a broader awareness of the ASEAN regional concept, and also in establishing contacts at the company and industry levels. Beyond that it generated interest in Japan, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand as well as in Europe. A second conference of the same kind was held in Jakarta in February 1978.
Towards the end of the period of ASEAN considered here, the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia and the refugee problem in Southeast Asia began to overshadow other ASEAN concerns. The ASEAN self-presentation in this context left no doubt that ASEAN felt no longer constrained by earlier reservations about acting publicly as a political unit. In four separate public statements issued in early January and in February 1979, the ASEAN Standing Committee and a Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers addressed themselves exclusively to these political matters; in mid-1979, the regular Ministerial Meeting devoted most of its Joint Communiqué for the Twelfth Meeting to the same issues. With respect to both the Standing Committee and the regular Ministerial Meeting, this was the first time in ASEAN history that the organization had presented itself so clearly and outspokenly to the international community as an organization for political cooperation.

On issues involving Cambodia, ASEAN conducted itself particularly clearly and actively as a unit with political concerns. It had consistently backed the Pol Pot regime as the rightful representative of Democratic Kampuchea in the meetings of the non-aligned group and in the United Nations. In the 1979 and 1980 sessions of the UN General Assembly, ASEAN mounted successful initiatives to secure the accreditation by the Assembly of that government and to prevent a recognition of the Hanoi-imposed Heng Samrin regime. Also, ASEAN vigorously pursued initiatives to place the entire Cambodia problem before the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. The statements of the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee of 9 January and 20 February 1979, and the Joint Statement of the 12-13 January 1979 Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign
Ministers (see Chapter 1), were officially transmitted as ASEAN statements to the President of the Security Council and the UN Secretary General UN with requests for circulation as documents of the Security Council, and with strong endorsements of efforts by other states to hold a Security Council debate on the issue. The Security Council, in acknowledging these communications, officially noted that the Joint Statement of the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers had

"expressed determination to demonstrate the solidarity and cohesiveness of ASEAN in the face of the current threat to peace" in Southeast Asia.

During the debate, all members of ASEAN requested invitations to the sessions and made statements. When, in February 1979 (after China's invasion of Vietnam), the original topic of the Security Council debate (Cambodia) was broadened into an agenda item "The situation in South-East Asia and its implications for international peace and security," ASEAN in the session on 15 March 1979 submitted its draft resolution calling upon "all parties to cease hostilities forthwith" and "withdraw their forces to their own countries" (S/13162, 13 March 1979). The submission was acknowledged as a "five-Power draft resolution" and voted upon; while thirteen of the fifteen Council members voted in favour, the negative vote of the USSR (joined by Czechoslovakia) prevented its adoption.

In the General Assembly, ASEAN was more successful. By letter of 17 August 1979 ASEAN requested the inclusion of an item "The Situation in Kampuchea" in the agenda of the 1979 session, attaching an "Explanatory Memorandum" and requesting its circulation as an official Assembly document. In this memorandum ASEAN reiterated its calls for peace and withdrawal of armed forces, deplored the failure in the Security Council
of the "constructive proposals of ASEAN to restore peace and stability in
the area," and stated that the situation "poses a threat to the peace and
security of the ASEAN member States and of the whole region."68 A draft
resolution submitted by ASEAN and twenty-one other states69 addressing
both the armed conflicts and the refugee problem with respect to Cambodia
was adopted by the General Assembly in November 1979.70

ASEAN followed up on the issues in 1980 by calling for an early
implementation of the resolution, and by sponsoring another General
Assembly Resolution (of 22 October 1980) that called for an international
conference early in 1981, to be convened in order to bring about the
complete withdrawal of foreign armed forces from Cambodia as well as
elections under UN supervision.71

In view of these initiatives in the UN, there could be no doubt
that ASEAN had fully accepted a political role and wished to be perceived
as a unit in the international debate over political issues in Southeast
Asia. At the same time, ASEAN had also begun to emphasize its
organizational unity in the UN in other contexts of fundamental
significance: in the 1978 session of the General Assembly, in connection
with the mandate of the UN Committee on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order, Philippine Foreign Secretary Romulo
explicitly spoke "on behalf of the member States of the Association of
South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)..."72
ASEAN's Dual Purposes

During ASEAN's second phase, its concerns and activities continued to address both economic and political issues. It seems that the attitude of ASEAN towards its own goals was the same in 1978 and 1979 as it was in 1967; it was only expressed more openly. Continuing to pursue internal cohesion through cooperation on a broad basis, ASEAN aimed at securing the benefits which the initial period had brought. These benefits could not appropriately be measured in quantitative increases in intra-regional trade or travel, which later may prove to be more suitable indicators of regional cohesion. But the emergence of ASEAN during the second period as a viable organization showed that cohesion had indeed grown, as had internal solidarity. From ASEAN's point of view, benefits had indeed accrued from cooperation during the first stage, whatever the precise objectives of cooperation. The Association apparently saw no break in its direction before and after the transition from formation to consolidation. The seemingly conflicting emphases on both economic and political cooperation express a relaxed attitude towards self-imposed restraints or divergent national priorities rather than the absence of a whole self-image in the organization.

As ASEAN saw itself, both features - economic cooperation and political cooperation - were related to each other, and each could at different times be chosen to be emphasized in public as the principal characteristic of the organization. Economic cooperation, while undoubtedly highly significant, could not divert ASEAN's attention from political matters. During a period of relative political quietude in the
region and in Southeast Asia— as from mid-1976 to mid-1978 —ASEAN was able to devote itself to the fields of cooperation specified in the Bangkok Declaration and the summit documents. But when issues came up that seriously affected relations in ASEAN's political environment (the change in relationship between the USA and China; the takeover of South Vietnam by North Vietnam; the Vietnam-Cambodia war), ASEAN attended to such matters before all else and usually emerged from the situation with new impulses for organizational progress. Until 1979 most substantial ASEAN development appeared to be stimulated by political rather than economic factors. Yet political problems never really interrupted ASEAN's patient internal progress of consensus-building and assembling the pieces in the mosaic of economic, social, and other non-political cooperation.

ASEAN officials in interviews with the author seemed to adopt highly individualistic positions concerning initial motives, goals, and purposes of the Association. The spectrum of evaluations encountered ranged from the reply "of course ASEAN was always politically motivated" to the answer "politics had very little to do with it." Such statements did not necessarily echo familiar national positions about the principal purpose of the Association, such as the Philippines' and Singapore's emphasis on economic cooperation, or Thailand's and Malaysia's concern with a stable framework for international relations in Southeast Asia. The ASEAN officials' perceptions also appeared to be influenced by an individual's attention to certain aspects of organizational activity. For instance, someone in the economic division of a national secretariat might see the main cause for the Association's existence in the improvement of patterns of trade, commerce, or industry, while an official in a department of
social affairs might point to the development of communications or to family planning, and one in a public relations or a policy coordinating division might emphasize the chance to make the Southeast Asian voice heard in international fora.\(^7\) In the variety of responses, however, there appeared a common keynote: that ASEAN was concerned with good neighbourly relations in Southeast Asia, and with development in the ASEAN countries. This keynote repeated the dual set of issues addressed in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967. The final section in this chapter will discuss the interrelation between these two foci in ASEAN's self-perception.

**Development and Stability**

The Reality of Development: Goals and Achievements

**Development**

The Bangkok Declaration, the Concord, and the Treaty refer to a variety of conditions and objectives that all form aspects of regional cooperation for which ASEAN was founded: progress, prosperity, social justice, economic well-being, economic and social stability, economic growth, social progress, cultural development, the welfare of the peoples; the elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy, improvement of living standards, social development,\(^7\) population growth, greater utilization of agriculture and industries, expansion of trade, improvement of economic infrastructure. Numerous written and verbal statements from ASEAN have paraphrased these topics under the summary heading of 'development' or development needs.
'Development' is a multifaceted term. Essentially it means an unfoldment, a step-by-step process of progressing from one state or set of conditions to another. In the context of 'developing' countries, it has become associated with a wide variety of facts, valuations, beliefs, and concepts. It may have to do with income levels, production methods, governmental systems, human dignity, equality, or a classification of states as more, less, or least advanced on some vaguely outlined road leading into a hazy distance towards 'progress'. It may refer to conditions, processes, results, responsibilities, or a combination of all of these. The ASEAN goal of development can best be understood by looking at the principal conditions to which ASEAN seeks to apply development, and those it wishes to achieve through development. These two sets of conditions characterize the terminal points between which the process, or sum of processes, of development in ASEAN is intended to take place.

The development concerns addressed in the ASEAN basic documents are representative of features regarded as indicators of a need for development in many Third World countries: a high ratio of rural population as compared to urban; high birth rates and high infant mortality; educational demands exceeding the capabilities of existing facilities; a wide (and often widening) income gap between small elites and the majority of the people; inadequate irrigation, transportation, and infrastructure facilities; severe lack of industrial equipment, technological expertise, and capital investment; inadequate national budgeting and planning; dependence on foreign aid; dependence on a few export commodities subject to price instabilities on the world market or to protectionist measures in the developed countries.
The ASEAN countries rank as developing countries in the categorizations of the UN, the World Bank, ADB, and the industrialized countries represented in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Among the ASEAN countries, Singapore leaves the others far behind in per capita income, level of industrialization, efficiency of social services, and many other indicators of the general state of 'development'. Elsewhere in the ASEAN region, especially in parts of Indonesia, per capita income does not, or not much, exceed the level which the UN designates as one of "absolute poverty." This was assumed, for the mid-1970s, to exist where per capita income did not exceed US$200 per annum. The reliability of per capita income figures may be questionable for countries in which basic data are often inadequate or unavailable; also, low per capita income is certainly not the only appropriate indicator of development needs. But there exist sufficiently strong relationships between per capita income and satisfaction of basic human needs (food, shelter, health, education) to assume that in a country with a very low per capita income, a large proportion of the population is living under conditions inimical to human well-being, human dignity and self-fulfillment. The emphasis in the 1976 ASEAN Concord, for instance, on the elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy shows that ASEAN itself regards basic conditions in the living standards of the people as inadequate.

For the industrialized city-state of Singapore questions of economic survival of the individual and basic human needs have receded before problems such as the integration of young people into society, the maintenance of a technological lead over other countries in the area, and so forth.
the adjustment of cultural group outlooks to the postulates of national unity. In ASEAN, national perceptions of the other four members dominate the Association's understanding of development. The organization has adopted not only the members' national standards for identifying development needs, but also their priorities among those needs. As long as there exist poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy, these conditions bear most immediately upon the understanding in ASEAN of development needs. Expansion of trade, improvement of infrastructure, and modernization of industry are not development goals in themselves, but methods for improving the lives of the people.

In the overall ASEAN view, the conditions at the starting point of development can be summarized as a lack of the people's well-being. Correspondingly, the end point of development in ASEAN is the solution to the problem: the improvement of the well-being of the people. This involves both economic (material) and social factors for human well-being, in an order of priorities that conforms to the concept of development objectives in many countries.

The criterion of material well-being applied to the fact of widespread existing poverty led many governments and organizations, in developed and developing countries alike, to equate development with economic growth, industrialization, and modernization following Western models. The examples of European and North American countries and that of Japan after World War II seemed to demonstrate beyond doubt that industrialization and economic growth were the key factors in advancing a country to a general state of material well-being for the population, and that social
well-being would somehow result from economic well-being. The validity of this approach was taken for granted for several decades; it came to underlie the development policies of most developing nations, the ASEAN countries not excepted. There is no question that the ASEAN understanding of development needs and goals conforms to a model in which material well-being and social protection — in that order — provide the principal criteria for assessing the achievement, or lack, of development.

There is, however, considerable uneasiness in ASEAN countries about such a development model. Just as socio-economic well-being may be understood differently in different societies and cultures, so development may mean different things to different people; it may not be adequately represented by economic achievements, which thus may lose their assumed validity as globally applicable yardsticks of development. Occasionally, the concept of development focusing on economic criteria has been criticized simply because of its derivation from the standards of the industrialized Western world, which has been accused of having caused underdevelopment to exist through colonization and exploitation. A more pertinent problem is the fact that in many developing countries the cultural, social, or ideological values attached to the Western model of development — such as urbanization, small families, democracy, separation of state and church — have not necessarily been adopted with material standards. Other values (for instance, religious precepts) may give priority to non-economic criteria for assessing a people's well-being, and thus may draw into question the validity of the entire development approach.
The problem is addressed from various angles in a publication from within ASEAN entitled Questioning Development in Southeast Asia. The book presents Southeast Asian views on development articulated by a regional study group. All contributions to the volume reflect the conviction that there exist pressing development needs in Southeast Asia and that development is a responsibility of governments. But the suggestions on the right kind of development centre on social and cultural rather than on economic issues, and the contributors seriously question that development, as currently understood and promoted in ASEAN, will actually achieve that state of well-being for the people which is ASEAN's professed objective.

Uneasiness with development concepts focussing on economic growth models and material improvements is also noticeable in the developed world that generated such models, and with them the universal yardstick for distinguishing between developed and developing countries. It is beginning to be realized that a telescopic view of "the developing countries" as a homogeneous collective plagued by the same basic inadequacies, does not do justice to the complexity of development needs in individual nations; indeed, in many localized areas. This realization is well expressed in the annual report for 1977/78 of the German East Asia Society:

"In view of the increasing differentiation in the Third World, global analyses of development policy needs and of the respective situations in the states of the Third World appear to become more and more problematic. Global strategies thus become more and more questionable. Before this background the instrumentarium of development policy also needs to be differentiated."
The questions raised within and without ASEAN about the direction and methods of development have not changed ASEAN's commitment to seeking, first and foremost, the improvement of material living conditions for the populations in the region, through economic growth and especially through industrialization. ASEAN has adopted its members' continuing commitment to industrialization as a key factor in economic development. One reason for this adherence to traditional concepts may be that "questioning development" is a recent phenomenon, which ASEAN may feel it has no time to explore in view of the perceived urgency of development in the material sense, and in view of Western models of success. Another reason may be that the global consensus on the validity of material standards for measuring development indicates, perhaps, that material well-being corresponds to basic human needs rather than to specifically Western values, so that there would be no need to question development with an economic focus.

In the blend of social and economic conditions seen as undesirable or desirable in the ASEAN countries, ASEAN has made the material well-being of the people its first objective. Social justice, also much named in ASEAN speeches and documents, is a supporting factor to round out human well-being. It becomes a main goal only after economic conditions have already created a certain level of material well-being, as in Singapore; until then, it is at best an instrument to advance economic well-being. Development in ASEAN means improving the living conditions of the populations, resulting in an enhanced state of their socio-economic well-being that is characterized mainly by material benefits.
Achievements

The economic growth rates presented in the tables on the following two pages show that the ASEAN economies have generally performed well in the 1970s. Especially in the late 1970s the ASEAN economies did better than most of those in the industrialized world or in other developing countries. However, such figures do not indicate to what extent, if any, the majority of the people actually experienced an improvement in their standards of living (given the uneven distribution of national wealth typical of developing countries, this might be questionable). Even more significantly, the figures do not reveal to what extent, if any, economic cooperation in ASEAN contributed to the achievements of the five national economies. The fluctuations evident in both tables seem to be more readily explicable in global and national than in regional terms. For instance, the exceptionally high percentages for 1973 cannot have resulted to any meaningful degree from ASEAN cooperation, which at that time was hardly beginning to turn to concrete economic activities. The worldwide recession brought about by the rise in oil prices which was initiated by OPEC in late 1973, is clearly reflected in the 1974 and 1975 slowdown of growth as compared to 1973. The recovery in the late 1970s, as well as the still impressive average for 1970 to 1977, is more likely the result of factors such as Indonesia's own oil exports, Malaysia's sound, well-organized national economy and planning system, and Singapore's position as an entrepot and a tourist market. Concrete measures of meaningful economic cooperation in ASEAN that could have acted as stimuli to the national economies can hardly be found, even in the planning stage, for the period up to the summits.
Figure 3.

GDP Growth Rates (%)  
(Table 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:**  "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1978, p. 71 (Table 2) for 1972-1976;  "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1980, p. 83 (Table: Performance of ASEAN Economies) for the last three columns.
Figure 4.

Per Capita GDP Growth Rates (%)

(Table 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE:** [Wong] "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 84
(Table: Performance of ASEAN Economies).
Until the end of 1978, ASEAN cooperation had produced very few results that directly affected, let alone ameliorated, the lives of the people. Most of its endeavours that aimed at contributing to a perceptible improvement of the people's living standards—trade liberalization, dialogue benefits, communications, emergency commodity sharing—were only initiated during the second phase of ASEAN. They thus had hardly had occasion actually to strengthen national economies or to make life in ASEAN countries better in tangible ways. The types, scope, and pace of ASEAN activities during the first period could not have contributed much to member countries' economic performance or their national social and economic development plans. ASEAN emphasis on regional cooperation in the socio-economic field as an instrument for stepping-up development, although frequently expressed, had not yet been translated into major achievements.

What ASEAN did achieve was to ensure its own viability. It established itself as an internally cohesive, externally respected unit, and then it began to set economic wheels in motion. ASEAN deliberately put its own organizational strength first and actual development tasks second. It felt that in order for the organization to be able to further development in the member countries, there must first be an organization that would survive pressures from without as well as divisive tendencies from within. At the outset, ASEAN was faced with the formidable task of harmonizing the often divergent national interests of its members. National development priorities, strategies, and methods were not topics that all members could easily agree upon, even though they agreed that development in general was one of ASEAN's main objectives; and that it
arose out of the same conditions that generated ASEAN's concern with peace, freedom, non-interference, and stability.

The Politics of Development

The ASEAN Rationale

The founders of ASEAN had been convinced that regional cooperation was an essential instrument for development in their respective countries, and that national development was an essential instrument for overcoming Southeast Asia's long history as a centre of conflicts. They had regarded development as one of the key links in a cause-and-effect chain stretching from individual human needs to international peace - or its absence.

The argument for development in and through ASEAN was first made by Tunku Abdul Rahman, one of the founding fathers of the Association. It may be summarized as follows: The ASEAN countries were being destabilized from within by poverty, social injustice and insurgency, the latter being fuelled by external forces. Development would eliminate, or at least reduce, the forces of unrest that fed on the people's discontent with existing conditions. Development would thus generate stability in the ASEAN countries, and stability would contribute to peace among the ASEAN nations. Stability and peace in ASEAN would contribute to international peace on a larger scale by reducing the causes for interference, and thus the causes for conflict imported or aggravated by outsiders. Stability and peace would in turn create the conditions necessary for further development. Because of the magnitude and urgency of national development
problems, regional cooperation was needed to accelerate development.85

The ASEAN documents and the summit speeches show that this argument has been accepted in ASEAN as obviously and continuously valid. The Bangkok Declaration intermingles references to cooperation, stability, social and economic well-being, peace, prosperity, freedom, development, and security in an inseparable mesh. The Concord, "in the pursuit of political stability" notes the elimination of poverty, hunger and so on as a primary concern of member states, who "shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development ...." and it flatly states that the "stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security ...."86 In the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to "collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundations for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia.87

The summit speeches in Bali and Kuala Lumpur without exception accentuated economic development and social justice as the best means to achieve regional stability, because they would minimize the opportunities for regional insurgencies and insurrection as well as for outside interference.88

This ASEAN rationale shows certain affinities to the argument offered by Nye for "peace in parts." Nye suggests that regional organizations on a micro-regional scale and functional level - mainly for economic cooperation - may result in establishing islands of peace in parts of an unpeaceful world.89 Although Nye does not treat ASEAN as an example for his model, the organization in many respects fits his image
of a regional endeavour acting through functional goals towards, lastly, political ends. ASEAN, however, has incorporated these further, political goals into its stated, non-political objectives: if regional socio-economic cooperation contributes to development, development to ASEAN stability, and ASEAN stability to international peace, then development is a means towards political ends. ASEAN has clearly identified stability and peace as goals to which it wishes to contribute through its participation in international relations. Thus ASEAN rationale in itself renders regional cooperation for development a factor of political significance.

Yet development in ASEAN cannot simply be said to be nothing but a political device. There is no reason to disbelieve the sincerity of the numerous ASEAN statements about the Association's "primary concern" with improving the well-being of the people, statements which suggest that cooperation for development in ASEAN has a humanitarian aspect that is not necessarily subservient to ulterior objectives, but may in itself be a goal to be served by stability and peace. In order to determine the degree of political significance in ASEAN's concern with development, it is useful to take a closer look at the way in which politics and development are interrelated, and at the way in which ASEAN interprets this interrelation.

Political Aspects of Development

The author holds that the issue of development necessarily has a political dimension. The view that development cannot be separated from politics is based on three main factors, of which the first applies
generally to developing countries; the second characterizes most international relations; and the third is a particularly prominent feature in ASEAN. All three factors play a vital role in the ASEAN belief that development and stability are intimately related and mutually dependent.

Status and Options

The first reason for considering development an inherently political issue is that development — or underdevelopment — both as a fact and as a concept, have significant implications for a country's status in the international community, and for its policy options in an international as well as in a national context. This relates development to the basic, communally held values that represent political issues. The very perception and self-perception of a country as developing (underdeveloped) or developed contains an assessment of political relevance.

In an international context, the categorization of a country as developing or developed has considerable influence on its relations with other countries. This is illustrated, for example, in the origins of the non-aligned movement; in the so-called North-South dialogue between rich and poor countries over the latter's opportunities to share more equally in global wealth in the future; in the occasional attempts of development aid donor countries to tie questions of economic assistance to human rights issues in recipient states; and also in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation — the developed countries having nuclear weapons clearly do not wish to entrust the power potential of nuclear arms to most developing states. International relations have much to do with status and power, and these are partially a function of the degree of development.
that permits or inhibits a political unit to utilize its resources effectively, in order to make its own wishes prevail in international relations.

In a domestic context, the existence and scale of basic problems that classify a country as developing, are reflections of an existing authoritative allocation of values, as are decisions to budget or not budget for certain development needs. The state of development also influences the exercise of domestic authority in that, for instance, widespread poverty or high birthrates usually predetermine the national internal policy choices of a ruling group, because such choices may bear on its ability to hold on to power. Development may be pursued as a means of stabilizing a particular government through reduction of popular discontent, in which case it clearly acquires a political dimension - regardless of whether such an effort succeeds.

With the adoption of development as an organizational concern, ASEAN has assumed a responsibility and with it its political shadings that is primarily carried by and expected of the member states' national governments. Development issues have come to be recognized as proper concerns of governments both in developing and in developed countries; for governments, the very recognition of a certain set of conditions as underdevelopment creates the recognition of a corresponding need for development - the necessity of development is as axiomatic as, for instance, the necessity of national unity or sovereignty. Few governments will be found to declare that development, either at home or elsewhere, is none of their business. Thus development has a strong political
component simply because it serves as one basic criterion in national as well as in international decision-making.

Interdependence

The second argument for the political significance of development derives from the political significance of economic issues. Despite the frequent emphasis on social aspects of development needs, and on social criteria for development achievement (equality, justice, participation in public affairs), economic issues are still at the core of development thinking and practice throughout the world. This is likely to remain so, because human well-being is decisively shaped by economic well-being.

Economic matters have come more and more to be regarded as priority issues in government activities; as eminently influential with respect to political decisions. In the Western world, conferences of political leaders seem to be called no less frequently for discussions of international economic problems than for other reasons. The impact of economics on politics (and vice versa) obtains for developed, but even more for developing countries. A clear division of the two fields into separate compartments often is not possible, especially in poor countries where economic issues frequently mesh with fundamental questions and problems relating to development. The attainment of independence in former colonies has helped to create the issue of economic development as a political problem. It has multiplied the number of people and governments that are aware of the gap in living standards between the developed and the developing nations, and who demand that something be done about it. It has also given the developing countries the political leverage —
sovereignty—to use their economic resources (raw materials; markets; cheap labour) as bargaining or pressure tools in their relations with developed countries. This leverage has been greatly strengthened by the global realization that much of the natural resources of the world is non-renewable in quality and finite in quantity, and that many of those that are vital to the interests of the developed countries happen to be found in the developing countries. The possession or command of such resources has thus become a political instrument in reshaping international relations, as the creation and policies of OPEC and the North-South dialogue show.

In a context of domestic politics, in many democratically governed states the success or failure of governments to stay in power is heavily dependent on the voters' evaluation of governmental influence on economic issues. In those developing countries which have authoritarian governments, the military forces in or behind a particular ruling group may render the relevance of economic issues to political performance less visible. But often the military men reserve for their direct control the ministries of economics, industry, trade and commerce, finance, agriculture, or rural development. A number of military governments in Thailand, for instance, has followed such a pattern. For all national governments in ASEAN, the ministries related to economic issues and the bodies for national development planning are among the most important public authorities.

The topics of discussion at the ASEAN summits; the agreements signed in connection with the summits; or the composition of the team of
officials at the ASEAN - Japan meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 1977, underscore the point that, to a large extent, economic and development problems, strategies, and policies rank high on the priority lists of governments in the ASEAN states. Such ranking as well as a mesh of economic and development issues is widespread in countries of the Third World. If economic and development matters can control a large proportion of the attention of the political leaderships, then the political component in economic and development issues is obviously prominent.

Resilience

In ASEAN, the political significance of development has a third cause. It is not a uniquely ASEAN cause, but it is particularly evident in the ASEAN region, and it validates the ASEAN rationale for development.

The existing inadequacies in the living conditions of the people (underdevelopment) make the populations in ASEAN, especially the minority and fringe groups, receptive to suggestions that their governments are not doing right by them. From there it is only one step to the suggestion that a different elite, a different form of government, national economic system, or national ideology, might better meet people's expectations of well-being. The existing ethnic, social, economic and religious diversities in the populations in ASEAN generate instances of discontent and unrest, both within and among the ASEAN states. The communist movements in every ASEAN country feed on such instances in order to advance their cause of ideological persuasion, which otherwise might have very little relevance to internal problems in ASEAN. The ASEAN leaders
are rightly convinced that the problems of underdevelopment are directly related to problems of insurgency and civil unrest and that some of these are related to communist ideologies. They believe that the improvement of material living standards and more social justice will better enable the people in ASEAN to resist the lure of communist or other disruptive forces from within the region, and that cooperation for development will draw the ASEAN states together into a closely knit community, thus enabling individual members better to resist threats, aggression, or interference from without. This belief is embodied in ASEAN's understanding and pursuit of resilience.

The term and concept of resilience were introduced into ASEAN by Indonesia, and ASEAN has gradually come to adopt 'resilience' at the national and regional level as a fundamental objective of its own existence and endeavours. In general usage, the term means elasticity; an ability to rebound. In ASEAN usage, resilience is the ability of a nation, a people, a state, or a group of states to stand on its own feet in the international environment, and to provide such domestic social, economic, and political conditions of life as to make its people happy. Resilience centres on self-reliance. Its domestic significance is intimately linked to the intrusion of external forces, which national or regional resilience is designed to frustrate. Resilience is both an end in itself, and a means to pull the carpet out from under the feet of those who would exploit domestic dissatisfaction with the obtaining state of affairs for purposes of subversion, aggression, or interference. Djuwandono has said about it:
"National resilience is a comprehensive concept, comprising all the aspects of national life, including that of defense and security, as an integral and inseparable element... regional resilience of the ASEAN... [should] cover all the vital aspects of national and regional life affecting the continued existence and welfare in the widest sense of the word... resilience [implies] the principle of self-reliance, without undue reliance on foreign powers."93

A 1977 ASEAN symposium on national resilience defined the concept as follows:

"National resilience is the dynamic condition of a nation, including tenacity and sturdiness, which enables it to develop national strength to cope with all challenges, threats, obstructions and disturbances coming from outside - as well as from within the country - directly endangering the national existence and the struggle for national goals."94

After the Bali summit, a press commentary from Indonesia summed up the two essential ingredients of resilience as "the people and democracy" and "social-economic development."95 Other Indonesian statements have noted the military component of resilience, and there are also spiritual, cultural, and status-oriented elements to the concept, since it reflects the ability of a nation, a state, or a group of states to be proud and sure of itself. Resilience thus encompasses the specific aims of socio-economic and political cooperation, of development and strength, of national and regional well-being, of good relations within ASEAN and between ASEAN and its environment. It is a multifaceted concept, characteristically "ASEAN" in that it is broad enough to permit a variety of associations and emphases, yet sufficiently unambiguous in its basic meaning to express a common ideal shared by all members. ASEAN has chosen resilience as one of the concepts which it wishes to see perceived as a summary description of organizational features complementing others such as peace, freedom and neutrality, mushawarah, and the ASEAN spirit of
Resilience to ASEAN is clearly a political concept. In the ASEAN rationale, development is the key to resilience, and resilience is the key concept in the particular ASEAN blend of economic and political goals which the organization has pursued since its creation, and the ultimate objectives of which are peace, stability, and self-determination.

Development thus becomes a means to the political end of preserving the particular way of life that characterizes the ASEAN countries in Southeast Asia, illustrating the preferred choices of the ASEAN community with respect to their region: non-communist, non-aggressive, self-determined ways of life. This means that development is not a socio-economic end in itself for ASEAN; its principal purpose is to serve towards political ends culminating in peace, stability, and self-determination. The urgency and prominence of development as an ASEAN goal derive from the interrelation between development on the one hand, and stability and peace, on the other, as the essential preconditions to ensure self-determination.

The Self-Image and Nature of ASEAN

In view of the ASEAN rationale for development; the links between economics and politics as well as those between economics and development; and in view of the ASEAN commitment to resilience through development, it must be concluded that in the ASEAN self-perception development is a factor of primarily political relevance. This conclusion should not suggest any intent on the part of the author to negate or depreciate
humanitarian efforts and objectives in ASEAN regional cooperation for
development. These are real, and their being enveloped in political
motivations does not alter the value of development as effecting greater
well-being for the people. The political significance of development in
ASEAN is important because it bears on the self-perception of ASEAN as
well as on the apparent discrepancy between ASEAN's early
self-presentation and its perception by external powers.

The political dimension was inherent in the ASEAN understanding of
development from its very beginning. It explains why ASEAN could maintain
that there had been no break in its direction in the first and second
phase, and why initially the attainment of organizational cohesion and
strength had been so important that it superseded all other activities,
even those professed to be the sole concern of the Association. The
meaning of development in ASEAN confirms and underscores that ASEAN had
always seen itself as a political organization with, also, socio-economic
goals — and not as an economic organization with secondary political
goals.

This order of priorities had shaped all ASEAN activities from the
organization's inception. ASEAN had been fully aware, but had not openly
said so, that its own ability to contribute to development and thus to
stability in Southeast Asia required, first, its own development into a
stable political unit. This original self-perception of ASEAN may change
if and when cooperation in the Association really generates a strong
regional economic entity whose trade, industry, market, investment, or
other potential can yield actual benefits for the well-being of the

290
people. For the years 1967 to 1979 this was not how ASEAN perceived its real significance; in essence, it was the political dimension that mattered during those years. The rationale behind ASEAN's objectives was consistent, even if the rhetoric and the public self-image did not always seem to be. Where the public image and the real self-perception showed discrepancies, the explanation could usually be found in the ASEAN environment, in which the Association found not only the main reason for its very existence, but also the need for it to be, first and foremost, a political organization.

NOTES

Note: Page number references for ASEAN documents and papers are to the publication 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), unless otherwise specified.

1Appendix 1.

2The reference to "regional" objectives in ASEAN documents or statements is not necessarily congruent with the use of the terms 'region' and 'regional' in this thesis, nor is it necessarily consistent in scope. ASEAN appears to use the term both for the Association's community itself and for the Southeast Asian area. Usually the context in ASEAN documents and statements permits a sufficiently clear interpretation of what is meant. Regional economic cooperation, for instance, usually applies to ASEAN; regional peace and stability apply to all of Southeast Asia.

3Emphasis added.

4Appendix 2.

5ASEAN Secretariat, History and Background to the Formation of ASEAN. At the 1976 Colombo conference of non-aligned nations, Malik stated that the ASEAN proposal was "an issue of no compromise for Indonesia" (Denzil Peiris, "Battle over ASEAN's Peace Zone," FEER, 3 September 1976, pp. 13-14 (p. 14)).
Thailand, where shortly before the meeting a tightening of military rule had removed Thanat Khoman from his position as Foreign Minister, was represented by a Special Envoy of the National Executive Council.

The Joint Communiqués for the First through Tenth Ministerial Meetings are reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN, pp. 266-291. For the Second through Eighth Meetings, they are also reprinted in Facts on ASEAN, comp. ASEAN - Malaysia (n.pl., n.d. [Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ASEAN - Malaysia 1977 or 1978]), pp. 77-95.

Joint Communiqués, Second through Sixth Meetings (pp. 266-277).

Joint Communiqués, Seventh and Eighth Meetings (pp. 278-283).

Institutionalization of economic, cultural and technical cooperation is reflected, for instance, in the Agreement for the Promotion of Mass Media and Cultural Activities, December 1969; the Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, March 1971; the Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Aircraft in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents, April 1972 (all mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 76-78, 242-246, 248-251, respectively). For cooperation in the field of science, see ASEAN Secretariat, Activities and Achievements in Science and Technology, n.d. ([1977 or 1978], mimeographed; reprinted as Development and Achievements in Science and Technology in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 61-67).


In ASEAN, the organization or its activities are sometimes referred to as being "a cooperation" in various fields. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the official ASEAN language, English, is a second language to all members. If it is deliberate usage, it would suggest an interesting concept for summarizing an institution and the sum total of its actions, internal relations, atmosphere and modes of operation.

See note 13.

Joint Communiqués, Second through Eighth Ministerial Meetings (pp. 266-283).

For interpretations, for instance see: Wilson, pp. 3-13, 25-28, 30-34, 36; van der Kroef, in Asian Affairs, p. 152, p. 154; Mansbach, p. 130, p. 154; Marvin C. Ott, The Neutralization of Southeast Asia: An
Analysis of the Malaysian/ASEAN Proposal. Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series No. 33 (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University, 1974), passim; M. Ghazali bin Shafie, "The Neutralisation of Southeast Asia," in Pacific Community 3 (October 1971):110-117 (passim). The most widely accepted interpretations centre on non-actions: non-involvement, non-aggression, non-interference, non-alignment, non-alliance. Numerous others can be found in issues of the FEER, ranging from "counter-balancing by opposite force" and "exemption from the sphere of hostilities" (T.J.S. George, "The Neutralisation Stakes," FEER, 11 December 1971, pp. 18-20) to "a plot to destroy liberation movements" (Denzil Peiris, "Battle over ASEAN's Peace Zone," FEER, 3 September 1976, pp. 13-14, quoting Laos at the Colombo conference of non-aligned nations.

For summaries of attitudes in ASEAN, see Wilson, pp. 47-85; Melchor, p. 423; Weatherbee, p. 411; "Relationships," Asia Yearbook 1977, pp. 54-56.


17 Wilson, pp. 30-32.

18 See page 150 and Chapter 4, note 73 above.

19 Michael Richardson, "How the Five See Indochina," FEER, 30 December 1977, pp. 7-8 (p. 8); Business Times [Singapore], 9 July 1977, as rendered in Pretzel (ASEAN II, p. 136).


the proposal was stressed in interviews in 1978 in the national secretariats; it is also apparent from the Concord (preamble, section 1) and the Treaty (preamble, section 3).

22 The classification as special or ad hoc varies in different publications from ASEAN offices.

23 ASEAN Secretariat, The Structure of ASEAN, section "The Permanent, Special, and Ad Hoc Committees ... Other Ad Hoc Committees" (p. 19; see Chapter 3, note 40).

24 ASEAN Secretariat, Developments and Achievements in Science and Technology (p. 63).

25 Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 17 December 1969; Agreement for the Promotion of Mass Media and Cultural Activities, 17 December 1969. For both, see Joint Communique, Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, 16-17 December 1969 (pp. 269-270), section 7 (p. 270).

26 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations, section ASEAN - Japan (pp. 225-226), section ASEAN - Australia (pp. 221-223), section ASEAN - New Zealand (pp. 227-228).

27 Ibid., section ASEAN - Canada (pp. 223-224), section ASEAN - USA (p. 228), section ASEAN - UNDP (pp. 228-229). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is one of the UN Specialized Agencies.

28 See Joint Communique, Eighth Ministerial Meeting, 13-15 May 1975 (pp. 281-283), section 9 (p. 282) for Canada; Joint Communique, Tenth Ministerial Meeting, 5-8 July 1977 (pp. 289-291), sections 6 and 20 (p. 289, p. 291) for the USA.

29 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations (pp. 224-225); Joint Communique, Seventh Ministerial Meeting, 7-9 May 1974 (pp. 278-280), section 12 (p. 279).

30 Joint Communique, Eighth Ministerial Meeting, 13-15 May 1975 (pp. 281-283), section 16 (p. 283); Joint Communique, Ninth Ministerial Meeting, 24-26 June 1976 (pp. 284-285), section 19 (p. 286).


32 For instance see, Joint Communique, Ninth Ministerial Meeting, section 14 (p. 286).

33 Mohamed, p. 22.

35 p. 9.

36 Seah Chee Meow, in *A Decade of ASEAN*, p. 8.

37 p. 9.

38 p. 9, p. 11.

39 *ASEAN - Indonesia, A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia (ASEAN).* Emphasis in the original.

40 Hanisch, p. 39; Jorgensen-Dahl, in *Pacific Community* 7, p. 525; Melchor, p. 425; "The Bitter Feud Goes on," *TIME*, 14 May 1979, pp. 22-23. The article in *TIME* holds that "until the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN had addressed itself ... to economic problems" (p. 22). In view of the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration and the 1976 Concord and Treaty, this is an amazing statement.

41 Lyon, in *International Journal*, p. 39, pp. 43-44; Caldwell, pp. 41-43, 60-62; Moertopo, p. 27, p. 29.


44 Mansbach, p. 116.

45 Deutsch, Burrell, et al., p. 5.

46 Ibid.


48 Appendices 3 and 4.

49 See the summit speeches rendered in Pretzell, *ASEAN* (pp. 31-41) and Idem, *ASEAN II* (pp. 146-148).
In the Joint Communiqué issued after the Seventh Ministerial Meeting in 1974, the Foreign Ministers agreed that ASEAN, having completed its first stage and presently entering its second stage of cooperation, should now embark on a more substantial and meaningful economic collaboration (section 10, p. 279).

This core section of the Treaty had nearly jeopardized the entire Bali summit. Both the Philippines and Malaysia had had reservations about contractual obligations which they felt might affect the pursuit of national interests relating to the Sabah issue, even though Tun Abdul Razak of Malaysia— who died shortly before the summit— had been a fervent advocate of an ASEAN agreement on the pacific settlement of disputes. The conclusion of the Treaty was achieved partly in honour of Razak. When at the 1977 summit President Marcos indicated that the Philippines would "take steps" to drop the Sabah claim, this was widely noted as a demonstration that intra-ASEAN political solidarity had overcome old animosities. See "Sabah Gesture Brings Applause," Business Times [Singapore], 5 August 1977, as rendered in Pretzell, ASEAN II, p. 146; Rodney Tasker, "Slow Going on Sabah," FEER, 12 May 1978, pp. 28-30.

See Pretzell, ASEAN, pp. 32-39.

Ibid., p. 32.


ASEAN Secretariat, Activities and Achievements in the Economic Field (p. 40), ASEAN Swap Arrangement, 5 August 1977, and Agreement on Preferential Trade Arrangements, 24 February 1977 (both mimeographed; reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978), pp. 174-179 and pp. 44-60, respectively).

Joint Communiqué, Fifth Ministerial Meeting, 13-14 April 1972 (pp. 273-274), section 5 (p. 273).

The first batch of 71 items was included in the original agreement on PTAs (pp. 55-60). For the increases, see Susumu Awanohara, "A Positive Rate of Exchange," FEER, 7 December 1979, pp. 73-74.

"ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1978, p. 71 and Ibid., Table 3; [Wong] "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1979, p. 85; "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1980, pp. 82-84 (p. 84 and Ibid., Table: Performance of ASEAN Economies).

Joint Press Releases, Statements and Communiques, reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN (Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978):
Economic Ministers, First through Fifth Meetings, November 1975, March 1976, January 1977, June 1977, and September 1977 (pp. 293-306); Labour Ministers, First and Second Meetings (pp. 307-311); Ministers of Education, First Meeting (pp. 314-315); Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare (pp. 312-313).

59 ASEAN Secretariat, Activities and Achievements in the Economic Field (p. 43); Interviews, 1978 and 1980.

60 ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations, section ASEAN - EEC (pp. 224-225, esp. p. 225); Interviews, 1979.

61 See Chapter 1, note 4.

62 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 2 May 1980, p. 30221 (for the 1979 Assembly); Ibid., 22 May 1980, p. 30869 (for the 1980 Assembly). In a joint statement of December 1979 the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, after agreeing that Malaysia as ASEAN representative should indicate to Vietnam that it was prepared to have talks, publicly reiterated their reservations about the Pol Pot government but affirmed that they were not prepared to recognize the Heng Samrin regime, because this would mean approving foreign military intervention. A similar statement about continuing recognition of the government of Democratic Kampuchea was issued in June 1980; see Ibid., 23 January 1981, pp. 30669-A.-30677 (p. 30673, p. 30674). For the 1979 non-aligned summit in Havana and also for the 1979 UN General Assembly, see K. Das, "All Set for the Propaganda Game: ASEAN's Strategy for the Summit Includes Some Tough Statements on the Kampuchea Issue," FEER, 31 August 1979, pp. 22-23.


66 Ibid., pp. 48-49.


68 Ibid., p. 2.

69 Ibid., pp. 3-4, Documents A/34/L.13, A/34/L.13/Rev.1,


Interviews, 1978. In one national secretariat, one of the major achievements of ASEAN was described as "now people will listen" to the region in international relations. See also Adam Malik, "Towards an Asian Asia," FEER, 25 September 1971; pp. 31-33, esp. p. 31.

Concord, Adopted programme of action, C. Social, section 1: "...with emphasis on the well-being of the low-income group and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration."


For the first of the three problems mentioned, see Nancy Chng, "The Alienated and the Aggressive: Youth in Modern Singapore," in Questioning Development in Southeast Asia, ed. Nancy Chng, with a Foreword by William Lim Siew Wai (Singapore: Select Books (PTE) Ltd. on Behalf of
Southeast Asia Study Group, 1977), pp. 63-75 (passim). The other two problems received extensive coverage in the Singapore daily press in the summer of 1979, when Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew gave several major speeches on Singapore's future directions of development.


Questioning Development in Southeast Asia, ed. Nancy Chng, with a Foreword by William Lim Siew Wai (Singapore: Select Books (PTE) Ltd. on Behalf of Southeast Asia Study Group, 1977).

Ostasiatischer Verein e.V., Ostasien - Suedasien - Suedostasien: Bericht 1977/78 [East Asia Society, Reg., East Asia - South Asia - Southeast Asia: Report 1977/78] (Hamburg: Ostasiatischer Verein e.V. [1978]). The quotation is taken from a section entitled Deutsche Entwicklungspolitik und Entwicklungshilfeleistungen in Ostasien [German Development Policy and Development Assistance in East Asia], p. 47; translation provided by the author.

The Society, a private institution founded about a century ago, is attentive to, and knowledgeable about, development and developing countries. It has a high reputation with the Federal Government in Germany. According to a statement made by the Managing Director in an interview given to the author in 1978, everyone in the government or in private industry wishing to obtain information relevant to development assistance in the ASEAN region sooner or later comes knocking at the doors of the Society for background and current information.

See "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1977, p. 78, for the ASEAN members' pursuit of industrialization. Many of the speeches at both summits and many items in the communiques of Ministerial Meetings place strong emphasis on industrial expansion and cooperation as a principal component in ASEAN's efforts to promote progress and development. Indonesian press comments after the Bali summit were summed up by Rosihan Anwar, a correspondent of Asiaweek, in the conclusion that "one of the main aspirations of the ASEAN countries is, of course, industrialization" (The Straits Times [Singapore], 4 March 1976, as rendered in Pretzell, ASEAN, p. 47. For an excellent presentation of Singapore's advocacy of 'modernization', see S. Rajaratnam, "Dyason Memorial Lectures: I New Themes for Asia, II South-East Asia in Transition, III Singapore Solution," in Australian Outlook 27 (December 1973):243-261 (passim).
84 "ASEAN Economies," in Asia Yearbook 1980, pp. 82-84 (pp. 82-83).


86 Concord, "Do hereby declare ..." sections 3 and 1.

87 Treaty, Article 6. Emphases added.


89 Yee, pp. 10-18. With respect to openly political alliances on a regional basis, the question of whether they prevent, contribute, or are indifferent to war and peace (see Couloumbis and Wolfe, p. 9), remains open. It seems possible that, had ASEAN initially and openly declared that it would promote military cooperation against threats from without its region, this would have raised the level of political tensions in Southeast Asia even higher. On the other hand, it is also possible that this would only have confirmed opinions which were held in some of the communist countries about ASEAN regardless of ASEAN declarations.


91 See Chapter 1, n. 3.

92 Adam Malik, "Towards an Asian Asia," FEER, 25 September 1971, pp. 31-33 (p. 32); Moertopo, p. 28, p. 31; van der Kroef, in Asian Affairs, p. 152; Wanandi, p. 785; Shad Poon-Kim, in Asian Survey, p. 756; Opening Speeches of the ASEAN Heads of Government at the Kuala Lumpur summit, as rendered in Pretzell, ASEAN II, p. 146.

95 "What is Ahead after the Bali Summit," Indonesia Times, 26 February 1976, as rendered in Pretzell, ASEAN, p. 48.

96 See pages 49 and 76 above. The "ASEAN spirit of cordiality," despite its propensity to generate apologetic smiles from ASEAN officials for its recurrence in print, is certainly real. The author particularly recalls an interview at ASEAN - Indonesia in 1978, during which the senior official interviewed received several telephone calls from ASEAN colleagues in other member countries and spontaneously said: "You see? That is the ASEAN spirit at work. Now we simply talk to each other when we have problems."
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION

The histories of the antecedents to ASEAN and of ASEAN itself show that it was the first viable regional organization in an area characterized by multiple diversities, conflicts, and interdependent interests. For the first time in the post-colonial era a durable stabilizing element of indigenous regionalism was introduced into Southeast Asia with the formation of ASEAN. It initiated a process of rapprochement among the ASEAN member countries which may in time transform the ASEAN part of Southeast Asia into a region whose internal unity is more significant than its heterogeneity.

The creation, direction, and identity of the Association were decisively influenced by the interrelations of the ASEAN region with its Southeast Asian environment, which in turn was variously interconnected with the larger Asian and global environment, through the involvement of major world powers in Southeast Asia. The Association represents an attempt to change existing patterns of international relations in the area. These had been dominated by conflicts involving states in Southeast Asia as well as outside powers, which were drawn into the area largely through their special ties with individual states. The involvement of outsiders resulted from their own conflicting ideologies, aspirations to power, or economic interests; and it had caused Southeast Asia to become an arena for global balance-of-power politics.
The external relations of ASEAN with the five most salient powers in its environment were largely shaped by the relations of those powers among themselves. For each of the external powers their perceptions of ASEAN were determined by interests to whose origin and pursuit ASEAN was an incidental rather than a central factor. The three communist powers USSR, China, and Vietnam perceived ASEAN as a purely political organization. For the USA the political features of ASEAN far outweighed others. Japan’s perception of ASEAN centred on economic factors, but during the second period of ASEAN it was also shaped to a substantial degree by political considerations about the role of Japan in Southeast Asia.

From the separate perceptions of ASEAN by the five powers which most influenced the ASEAN environment, it is concluded that the predominance of political perceptions is indicative of the essential character of the Association. Even though the external powers’ perceptions focussed on their own rather than on ASEAN interests and objectives, the role which they thus allocated to ASEAN amidst other relations in Southeast Asia reflected the primary significance of the Association to its environment. This significance in turn could not avoid reflecting, and again bearing upon, the true nature of the Association as a political entity.

In the self-perception of ASEAN, political and socio-economic features were inextricably meshed. In its self-presentation through documents, statements, and activities ASEAN, variously and sometimes contradictorily, displayed component parts of its self-image as wholly
predominant organizational characteristics. Since the ultimate objectives of the Association centred on political issues, and since socio-economic development in ASEAN has strong political implications, in ASEAN's self-image its political features were the truly dominant ones. The conclusion that ASEAN represented primarily a political organization applies to the formative period as well as to the period of consolidation. Insofar as ASEAN attempted, especially during the early years, to establish its public image as that of a non-political organization, these attempts are seen not as indicative of an inherently contradictory or inconsistent self-image, but rather as deliberate efforts to opt out of the political divisiveness in its environment so that it might better pursue its organizational aims. The ASEAN self-image is regarded as an affirmative indicator of the political nature of the Association.

The perceptions in the ASEAN environment and the true self-perception of ASEAN of its essential nature were thus far more congruent than at first glance they appeared to be. Externally and internally ASEAN was seen predominantly as a political organization. The external states made their assessments of ASEAN on the basis of their own, extra-ASEAN interests, which mostly centred on power - either the affirmation of their own or the negation of others' in Southeast Asia. ASEAN also based its self-image on its own interests, focussing on internal development and stability as initial steps towards self-determination. ASEAN, having no wish to impose its own beliefs on others, rejected power for its own sake but sought to attain sufficient strength (resilience) to resist encroachments upon its self-determination.
However, for ASEAN its internal interests took most of their meaning from the same environment whose operative mechanisms the Association was trying to escape. Because of the interdependence existing between ASEAN and its environment, and because of the derivation of ASEAN's aims and purposes from conditions shaped by environmental influences, it was inevitable that external and internal perceptions of the nature of ASEAN should coincide.

The coincidence is one of effect rather than one of process of reasoning. For ASEAN the issue of development was more central and more closely related to its political nature than external powers appeared to appreciate. For ASEAN, its socio-economic concerns were an integral part of its political concerns. Cooperation in non-political areas fostered its objective of creating a politically strong unit, and vice versa; the dual orientations represented not alternatives, but rather mutually sustaining elements in ASEAN's self-understanding. Most of the external powers did not seem to grasp the full extent to which ASEAN was, indeed, serious about socio-economic cooperation as a means to achieve political stability. ASEAN's apparent delay in getting on with the job of economic integration, and the lack of tangible evidence, during the first decade, of meaningful ASEAN activities conducive to socio-economic improvements in the region, suggested to the ASEAN environment not Asian patience in the pursuit of long-term, mixed economic and political aims, but rather an inability to achieve economic goals.

Thus the external powers understood ASEAN's professed objectives in non-political fields as ends in themselves and gave them less attention than they deserved as a means towards political objectives. Except for
Japan, whose own interests centred on economics, ASEAN's significance to the external powers rested on its being a non-communist, i.e., a politically relevant grouping. Appraising ASEAN mainly on the basis of their own, non-ASEAN interests as politically relevant, most of the external powers (probably excepting Japan during ASEAN's second phase) arrived at their perceptions of the Association by a conceptual shortcut that bypassed one of ASEAN's most important features: the integration of socio-economic into political objectives. In their own preoccupation with issues of ideology and power, they appeared to assume that ASEAN's essentially political nature derived from the same concerns, whereas to ASEAN the basic issues were peace, stability, and self-determination - issues unquestionably linked, but not identical, to those of ideology and power.

Given its constituent elements, ASEAN never really had the option to be a non-political organization. In choosing to

"accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours ... in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian Nations"

(Bangkok Declaration, aims and purposes, section 1), the ASEAN members committed the organization to a role which had to be primarily political if it was to be effective. Only by accepting such a role could ASEAN grow into a cohesive, stable regional unit capable of contributing to prosperity and peace in Southeast Asia. For both periods considered here, the actions and statements of ASEAN show that the Association had accepted such a role. Its activities did not support the initial claim that ASEAN was a non-political organization. Insofar as actions were
directed towards economic, social, cultural, and other functional objectives, they either had significant implications for the concurrent political objectives of ASEAN (for instance, the dialogues or the 1976 economic programme of action), or their relevance to ASEAN was clearly minor compared to other, distinctly political activities (for instance, promotion of non-governmental organizations as compared to the Kuala Lumpur Declaration).

From ASEAN's inception and throughout the years considered here, its nature as a political organization formed the essential and constant basis for its ability to act as a regional unit. Perhaps only after the second summit did the Association's capability become visible to "strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South East Asian nations" - in other words, to make actual contributions to development and stability. This capability grew out of the preceding years, during which the creation and evolution of ASEAN as a primarily political organization corresponded to the opportunities and needs for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Political concerns brought and held the members together; political needs began to transform organizational rhetoric into action so that regional unity and organizational strength might mutually reinforce each other.

In the Southeast Asian environment of the late 1960s and the 1970s ASEAN's political nature probably was its greatest asset. The peacefulness and stability of the region, rather than a proven ASEAN record of economic or social achievements, were helpful in attracting the external attention, respect, and capital which are all indispensable if ASEAN is
to realize its enormous goals. The core of these goals was the same in
1967 as in 1978 and beyond: for the Association to contribute to
development, peace, and stability in the region so as to achieve regional
self-determination; for the region to contribute to stability, peace, and
self-determination in Southeast Asia.

The ASEAN experience raises interesting questions with regard to
theories of international organization and international relations. In the
search for theoretical suggestions for solutions to the same basic
problems of mankind which ASEAN endeavours to tackle in its region, many
political scientists have concluded that the nation-state is a poor
instrument for - perhaps even an obstacle to - the achievement of a
peaceful and just world order. They have turned to international
organization for different models and concepts of how political
communities might find better mechanisms for dealing with fundamental
issues such as peace and war, human misery and development. Many
international organizations, for example the United Nations, the EEC,
NATO, LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association), or OAU (Organization
of African Unity) have been studied in this context. Where ASEAN is
addressed in the theoretical literature, it has been classified as an
economic (functional) organization,¹ or mentioned in a context of
political conflicts,² or simply treated as an undefined entity for
unspecified cooperation.³ Bennett specifically distinguishes between
multi-purpose and functional organizations, identifying the former as
"those whose broad aims and activities reach across the lines
that divide political and military matters from those generally
classified as economic and social,"⁴
and identifying ASEAN with the latter. Yet, as has been shown throughout
this thesis, the economic and social goals of ASEAN are not its only concerns, and do not fully represent the significance of the organization.

In many respects ASEAN seems to fit almost ideally the postulates of the functionalist model of international organization. This model centres on the pursuit of cooperative solutions to economic and social problems as an initial step towards eliminating the causes of conflict and war among political communities. It advocates for communities to put aside political conflicts and to focus on a series of concrete, practical steps in non-controversial fields such as social or economic (functional) improvement of the human condition; and it holds that such activity will create ever expanding patterns of cooperative interaction as well as a broad basis of common values across national boundaries, patterns and values which will eventually inhibit or eliminate traditional habits of conflict or competition. ASEAN has both preached and practised similar beliefs in its dedication to building a mosaic of small agreements, and in its rationale for socio-economic development. Internal relations in the ASEAN region, which less than a generation ago were distinctly unpeaceful, today are clearly illustrative of Nye's concept of "peace in parts" or, as another author has put it, "peace by pieces."

However, in other respects the ASEAN experience does not appear to validate fundamental assumptions underlying the theory of functionalism. According to the theoretical model, functional international organization leaves politics aside and concerns itself only with the non-controversial instances of non-political cooperation until such time when cross-national interaction has generated such a strong basis of agreement that
cooperation and consensus will, of themselves, "spill over" into the political arena.  

ASEAN has never really believed in the separability of political and functional problems, its initial rhetoric notwithstanding. Its growth in cohesion has not followed the suggestion of the theory that functional cooperation leads to political consensus; rather, ASEAN has profited from a more or less reverse mechanism, or has endeavoured to promote cooperation in both non-political and political instances simultaneously, or alternately, as need and opportunity permitted. It certainly has not been able to leave politics aside, and has not tried to do so except in its initial rhetoric. Given the politicized relations of ASEAN internally (e.g., between Indonesia and Singapore, or between Indonesia and Malaysia) as well as externally, and given the political dimensions of development, functionalism does not seem to do full justice to the realities of an international organization among developing countries in Southeast Asia.  

Another basic assumption underlying this theory is that consensus-building across national boundaries through non-political cooperation will eventually lead to integration, first economically and later politically. Integration in this context means the ultimate transfer of institutionalized authority and also of popular loyalties to a larger-than-national unit, and thus the abolition, through obsolescence, of nation-state decision-making or setting of common values. It is very doubtful that ASEAN envisages such a future for itself. In its present stage, even the first steps towards economic integration (e.g., a customs union or a common market) are a long way down the road; they are
certainly not planned in a concrete manner comparable to the objectives and schedules of the EEC. A political union between the five member states of ASEAN, if contemplated at all, is not a goal that could be identified from ASEAN's present definition of its purposes and nature. Thus, while some of ASEAN's main features do, indeed, fit the functionalist model, others — and equally important ones — do not.

A similar partial fit seems to hold true for the neo-functionalist theory of international organization. This theory seeks to overcome the problem attendant to functionalism of the alleged but questionable separability of political and non-political concerns in international relations. It assumes that in real-life problems both types of concerns coincide and must be tackled simultaneously. In this respect, neo-functionalism seems to provide a better model for ASEAN than does functionalism. However, it also asserts that effective problem-solving in functional fields can only be undertaken through any international organization that has institutionalized, real decision-making authority in a supra-national body; authority transferred from the nation-state level to the supra-national level.

Until now, ASEAN has operated without such machinery and delegation of authority, and it does not seem to be eager to establish an autonomous (i.e., not controlled by the national governments) mechanism of any kind. Perhaps ASEAN's slow and very modest progress in concrete socio-economic problem-solving proves the neo-functionalist's point that a supra-national agency is necessary. On the other hand, ASEAN operates in a setting and in the face of problems for which different criteria, methods, and
standards of effectiveness may have to be established. ASEAN's way of selecting, prioritizing, and addressing its own problems in its own way may prove that mechanisms such as a supra-national agency are not generally indispensable.

ASEAN actually has expanded both its concrete activities and the sense of community among its members, thus calling to mind the neo-functionalist belief that an organizational authority, once established, will gradually and naturally extend its scope and increasingly attract loyalties from the populations in the member states of the organization. But ASEAN is doing so on the basis of joint rather than hierarchic operation, and apparently without aiming for the eventual undermining of the nation-state that is a basic postulate common to both functionalist and neo-functionalist theory. For those in the ASEAN populations who are aware of the Association, national and regional allegiances seem to coexist rather than compete with each other.

A third approach to international organization of interest with respect to ASEAN is Deutsch's concept of security-community. The internal relations of ASEAN have developed towards an atmosphere and a network of interaction in which the conflicts of the past seem largely conquered, and reliable expectations of peaceful behaviour seem relatively securely established. However, it would be necessary to examine in much detail both the various sub-concepts underlying Deutsch's approach (such as integration; sense of community; peaceful change), and ASEAN's own development, before this summary appraisal could be validated and before it could be assumed that ASEAN actually fits Deutsch's category of a
"pluralistic security-community." If such a fit were established, it would perhaps permit more accurate predictions, as to ASEAN's probable future role in Southeast Asia than can presently be made.

An investigation into the applicability of Deutsch's concept might also assist ASEAN in striving for particular conditions found, in other contexts, to have been conducive to the progress of a security-community, or it might assist ASEAN in avoiding future pitfalls on the road to regional cohesion. For instance, in his study of the North Atlantic area, Deutsch offers a number of conclusions about essential, helpful, and counterproductive conditions that may affect the attainment and the durability of a security-community. Some of these conclusions could be compiled into a veritable warning list for states trying to draw closer together; for instance his conclusion about the disintegrative condition of "excessive military commitments," or about "a substantial increase in political participation on the part of populations ... which previously had been politically passive." Although Deutsch names these conditions as problems primarily concerning an "amalgamated" security-community (which ASEAN clearly is not), they might well prove to be of considerable relevance to ASEAN, for which the issue of military cooperation may one day become inescapable, and in which large parts of the populations are as yet - but surely not forever - politically passive.

Since ASEAN only now beginning to become widely known beyond its own region, it has rarely been included in studies concerned with the theory of international organization. The applicability to ASEAN of models and concepts of international organization still awaits exploration.
Further study of ASEAN can both benefit from, and enrich, the theoretical literature on regional organization.

NOTES

1Bennett, p. 375.


4Bennett, p. 374.


7See Claude, p. 381.

8Bennett, p. 307.

9See Claude, pp. 384, 388.

10Bennett, p. 307; Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 7.

11Lindberg and Scheingold, p. 7.

12Ibid.

13See Chapter 5, Internal and External Appraisals of ASEAN.


15Ibid., pp. 46-69.

16Ibid., pp. 59-61.

17Ibid., pp. 61-62.
APPENDIX 1

The Bangkok Declaration

8 August 1967
THE ASEAN DECLARATION
(BANGKOK DECLARATION)

The Presidium Minister for Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, the Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Singapore and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand:

MINDFUL of the existence of mutual interests and common problems among countries of South-East Asia and convinced of the need to strengthen further the existing bonds of regional solidarity and cooperation;

DESIRING to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote regional cooperation in South-East Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region;

CONSCIOUS that in an increasingly interdependent world, the cherished ideals of peace, freedom, social justice and economic well-being are best attained by fostering good understanding, good neighbourliness and meaningful cooperation among the countries of the region already bound together by ties of history and culture;

CONSIDERING that the countries of South-East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

AFFIRMING that all foreign bases are temporary and remain only with the expressed concurrence of the countries concerned and are not intended to be used directly or indirectly to subvert the national independence and freedom of States in the area or prejudice the orderly processes of their national development;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

FIRST, the establishment of an Association for Regional Cooperation among the countries of South-East Asia to be known as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

SECOND, that the aims and purposes of the Association shall be:

1. To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through joint endeavours in the spirit of equality and partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of South-East Asian Nations;

2. To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter;
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields;

4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional, technical and administrative spheres;

5. To collaborate more effectively for the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade, including the study of the problems of international commodity trade, the improvement of their transportation and communication facilities and the raising of the living standards of their peoples;

6. To promote South-East Asian studies;

7. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among themselves.

THIRD, that to carry out these aims and purposes, the following machinery shall be established:

(a). Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required;

(b). A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other member countries, to carry out on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers;

(c). Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects;

(d). A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other Committee as may hereafter be established.

FOURTH, that the Association is open for participation to all States in the South-East Asian Region subscribing to the aforementioned aims, principles and purposes.

FIFTH, that the Association represents the collective will of the nations of South-East Asia to bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their people and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.
Done in Bangkok on the Eight Day of August in the Year One Thousand Nine Hundred and Sixty-Seven.

FOR INDONESIA

(ADAM MALIK)
Presidium Minister of Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FOR MALAYSIA

(TUN-ABDUL RAZAK)
Deputy Prime Minister
Minister of Defence and Minister of National Development

FOR THE PHILIPPINES

(NARCISO RAMOS)
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

FOR SINGAPORE

(S. RAJARATNAM)
Minister of Foreign Affairs

FOR THAILAND

(THANAT KHOMAN)
Minister of Foreign Affairs
APPENDIX 2

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration

27 November 1971
ZONE OF PEACE, FREEDOM AND NEUTRALITY
DECLARATION
(KUALA LUMPUR DECLARATION)

WE the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and the Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand.

FIRMLY believing in the merits of regional cooperation which has drawn our countries to cooperate together in the economic, social and cultural fields in the Association of South East Asian Nations;

DESIRIOUS of bringing about a relaxation of international tension and of achieving a lasting peace in South East Asia;

INSPIRED by the worthy aims and objectives of the United Nations, in particular by the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states abstention from threat or use of force, peaceful settlement of international disputes, equal rights and self-determination and non-interference in the affairs of States;

BELIEVING in the continuing validity of the "Declaration of the Promotion of World Peace and Cooperation" of the Bandung Conference of 1955 which, among others, enunciates the principles by which States coexist peacefully;

RECOGNIZING the right of every state, large or small, to lead its national existence free from outside interference in its internal affairs as this interference will adversely affect its freedom independence and integrity;

DEDICATED to the maintenance of peace, freedom and independence unimpaired;

BELIEVING in the need to meet present challenge and new developments by cooperating with all peace and freedom loving nations, both within and outside the region, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

COGNIZANT of the significant trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones, as in the "Treaty for Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America" and the Lusaka Declaration proclaiming Africa a nuclear-free zone, for the purpose of promoting world peace and security by reducing the areas of international conflicts and tensions;

REITERATING our commitment to the principle in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967, "that the countries of South East Asia share a
primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the
region and ensuring their peaceful and progressive national development, and that
they are determined to ensure their stability and security from external interference
in any form of manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accord-
ance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples;

AGREEING that the neutralization of South East Asia is a desirable objective
and that we should explore ways and means of bringing about its realization, and

CONVINCED that the time is propitious for joint action to give effective
expression to the deeply felt desire of the peoples of South East Asia to ensure the
conditions of peace and stability indispensable to their independence and their
economic and social well-being;

DO HEREBY STATE

(1) that Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand are
determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure the recognition of, and
respect for, South East Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers;

(2) that South East Asia countries should make concerted efforts to broaden the areas of cooperation which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Done at Kuala Lumpur on Saturday, the 27th of November 1971

On behalf of the Republic of Indonesia

(ADAM MALIK)
Minister for Foreign Affairs

On behalf of Malaysia

(TUN ABDUL RAZAK BIN HUSSEN)
Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

On behalf of the Republic of the Philippines

(CARLOS P. ROMULO)
Secretary of Foreign Affairs

On behalf of the Republic of Singapore

RAJARATNAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

On behalf of the Kingdom of Thailand

(THANAT KHOMAN)
Special Envoy of the National Executive Council

323
Declaration of ASEAN Concord

24 February 1976
DECLARATION OF ASEAN CONCORD

A COMMON BOND EXISTING AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS.

The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,

REAFIRM their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur, and the Charter of the United Nations;

ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of member states,

UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;

DO HEREBY DECLARE:

ASEAN cooperation shall take into account, among others, the following objectives and principles in the pursuit of political stability:

1. The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.

2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take active steps for the early establishment of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.

3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concern of member states. They shall therefore intensify cooperation in economic and social development, with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the living standards of their peoples.

4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in distress.

5. Member states shall take cooperative action in their national and regional development programmes, utilizing as far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN region to broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.

6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences.
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to the promotion of peaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit.

8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all efforts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on the basis of mutually advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of self-determination, sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.

AND DO HEREBY ADOPT

The following programme of action as a framework for ASEAN cooperation:

A. Political

1. Meeting of the Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary.


3. Settlement of intra-regional disputes by peaceful means as soon as possible.

4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition of and respect for the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible.

5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen political cooperation.

6. Study on how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN Extradition Treaty.

7. Strengthening of political solidarity by promoting the harmonization of views, coordinating position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.

B. Economic

1. Cooperation on Basic Commodities, particularly Food and Energy

(i) Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the individual country's needs in critical circumstances, and priority to the acquisition of exports from member states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and energy.
(ii) Member states shall also intensify cooperation in the production of basic commodities particularly food and energy in the individual member states of the region.

2. Industrial Cooperation

(i) Member states shall cooperate to establish large-scale ASEAN industrial plants, particularly to meet regional requirements of essential commodities.

(ii) Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the member states, contribute to the increase of food production, increase foreign exchange earnings or save foreign exchange and create employment.

3. Cooperation in Trade

(i) Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to further development and to safeguard and increase their foreign exchange earnings and reserves.

(ii) Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time appropriate through rounds of negotiations subject to the unanimous agreement of member states.

(iii) The expansion of trade among member states shall be facilitated through cooperation on basic commodities, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in ASEAN industrial projects.

(iv) Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to improve access to markets outside ASEAN for their raw material and finished products by seeking the elimination of all trade barriers in those markets, developing new usage for these products and in adopting common approaches and actions in dealing with regional groupings and individual economic powers.

(v) Such efforts shall also lead to cooperation in the field of technology and production methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export products, as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversifying exports.
4. Joint Approach to International Commodity Problems and Other World Economic Problems

(i) The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority basis in joint approaches to international commodity problems and other world economic problems such as the reform of international trading system, the reform of international monetary system and transfer of real resources, in the United Nations and other relevant multilateral fora, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

(ii) Member states shall give priority to the stabilisation and increase of export earning of those commodities produced and exported by them through commodity agreements including bufferstock schemes and other means.

5. Machinery for Economic Cooperation

Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed necessary in order to:

(i) formulate recommendations for the consideration of Governments of member states for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation;

(ii) review the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation;

(iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonising regional development; and

(iv) perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the Member Governments.

c. Social

1. Cooperation in the field of social development, with emphasis on the well being of the low-income group and of the rural population, through the expansion of opportunities for productive employment with fair remuneration.

2. Support for the active involvement of all sectors and levels of the ASEAN communities, particularly the women and youth, in development efforts.
3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of population growth in the ASEAN region and where possible, formulation of new strategies in collaboration with appropriate international agencies.

4. Intensification of cooperation among member states as well as with the relevant international bodies in the prevention and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the illegal trafficking of drugs.

d. Cultural and Information

1. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states.

2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers, artists and mass media representatives to enable them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship.

3. Promotion of Southeast Asian studies through closer collaboration among national institutes.

E. Security

Continuation of cooperation on a non-ASEAN basis between the member states in security matters in accordance with their mutual needs and interests.

f. Improvement of ASEAN machinery

1. Signing of the Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat.

2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its effectiveness.

3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN.

DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.
For the Republic of Indonesia
S. Oe Harto, President

For Malaysia
Datuk Haji Onn, Prime Minister

For the Republic of the Philippines
Ferdinand E. Marcos, President

For the Republic of Singapore
Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister

For the Kingdom of Thailand
Kukrit Pramoj, Prime Minister
APPENDIX 4

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia
24 February 1976
TREATY OF AMITY AND COOPERATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

PREAMBLE

The High Contracting Parties;

CONSCIOUS of the existing ties of history, geography and culture, which have bound their peoples together;

ANXIOUS to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law and enhancing regional resilience in their relations;

DESIRING to enhance peace, friendship and mutual cooperation on matters affecting Southeast Asia consistent with the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Ten Principles adopted by the Asian-African Conference in Bandung on 25 April 1955, the Declaration of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, and the Declaration signed in Kuala Lumpur on 27 November 1971;

CONVINCED that the settlement of differences or disputes between their countries should be regulated by rational, effective and sufficiently flexible procedures, avoiding negative attitudes which might endanger or hinder cooperation;

BELIEVING in the need for cooperation with all peace-loving nations, both within and outside Southeast Asia, in the furtherance of world peace, stability and harmony;

SOLEMNLY AGREE to enter into a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as follows:

CHAPTER 1
PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

Article 1

The purpose of this Treaty is to promote perpetual peace, everlasting amity and cooperation among their peoples which would contribute to their strength, solidarity and closer relationship.

Article 2

In their relations with one another, the High Contracting Parties shall be guided by the following fundamental principles:

1. Mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations;
b. The right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or coercion;

c. Non-interference in the internal affairs of one another;

d. Settlement of differences or disputes by peaceful means;

e. Renunciation of the threat or use of force;

f. Effective cooperation among themselves.

CHAPTER II
AMITY

Article 3

In pursuance of the purpose of this Treaty the High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to develop and strengthen the traditional, cultural and historical ties of friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation which bind them together and shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed under this Treaty. In order to promote closer understanding among them, the High Contracting Parties shall encourage and facilitate contact and intercourse among their peoples.

CHAPTER III
COOPERATION

Article 4

The High Contracting Parties shall promote active cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields as well as in matters of common ideals and aspiration of international peace and stability in the region and all other matters of common interest.

Article 5

Pursuant to Article 4 the High Contracting Parties shall exert their maximum efforts multilaterally as well as bilaterally on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit.

Article 6

The High Contracting Parties shall collaborate for the acceleration of the economic growth in the region in order to strengthen the foundation for a prosperous and peaceful community of nations in Southeast Asia. To this end, they shall promote the greater utilization of their agriculture and industries, the expansion of their trade and the improvement of their economic infrastructure for the mutual benefit of their peoples. In this regard, they shall continue to explore all avenues for close and beneficial cooperation with other States as well as international and regional organisations outside the region.
Article 7

The High Contracting Parties, in order to achieve social justice and to raise the standards of living of the peoples of the region, shall intensify economic cooperation. For this purpose, they shall adopt appropriate regional strategies for economic development and mutual assistance.

Article 8

The High Contracting Parties shall strive to achieve the closest cooperation on the widest scale and shall seek to provide assistance to one another in the form of training and research facilities in the social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields.

Article 9

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to foster cooperation in the furtherance of the cause of peace, harmony and stability in the region. To this end, the High Contracting Parties shall maintain regular contacts and consultations with one another on international and regional matters with a view to coordinating their views, actions and policies.

Article 10

Each High Contracting Party shall not in any manner or form participate in any activity which shall constitute a threat to the political and economic stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of another High Contracting Party.

Article 11

The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour to strengthen their respective national resilience in their political, economic, socio-cultural as well as security fields in conformity with their respective ideals and aspirations, free from external interference as well as internal subversive activities in order to preserve their respective national identities.

Article 12

The High Contracting Parties in their efforts to achieve regional prosperity and security, shall endeavour to cooperate in all fields for the promotion of regional resilience, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation and solidarity which will constitute the foundation for a strong and viable community of nations in Southeast Asia.
Article 13

The High Contracting Parties shall have the determination and good faith to prevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting them shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall at all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly negotiations.

Article 14

To settle disputes through regional processes, the High Contracting Parties shall constitute, as a continuing body, a High Council comprising a Representative at ministerial level from each of the High Contracting Parties to take cognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb regional peace and harmony.

Article 15

In the event no solution is reached through direct negotiations, the High Council shall take cognizance of the dispute or the situation and shall recommend to the parties in dispute appropriate means of settlement such as good offices, mediation, inquiry or conciliation. The High Council may however offer its good offices, or upon agreement of the parties in dispute, constitute itself into a committee of mediation, inquiry or conciliation. When deemed necessary, the High Council shall recommend appropriate measures for the prevention of a deterioration of the dispute or the situation.

Article 16

The foregoing provision of this Chapter shall not apply to a dispute unless all the parties to the dispute agree to their application to that dispute. However, this shall not preclude the other High Contracting Parties not party to the dispute from offering all possible assistance to settle the said dispute. Parties to the dispute should be well disposed towards such offers of assistance.

Article 17

Nothing in this Treaty shall preclude recourse to the modes of peaceful settlement contained in Article 33 (1) of the Charter of the United Nations. The High Contracting Parties which are parties to a dispute should be encouraged to take initiatives to solve it by friendly negotiations before resorting to the other procedures provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

CHAPTER V
GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 18

This Treaty shall be signed by the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of
Thailand. It shall be ratified in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each signatory State.

It shall be open for accession by other States in Southeast Asia.

**Article 19**

This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification with the Governments of the signatory States which are designated Depositories of this Treaty and of the instruments of ratification or accession.

**Article 20**

This Treaty is drawn up in the official languages of the High Contracting Parties, all of which are equally authoritative. There shall be an agreed common translation of the texts in the English language. Any divergent interpretation of the common text shall be settled by negotiation.

IN FAITH THEREOF the High Contracting Parties have signed the Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.

DONE at Denpasar, Bali, this twenty-fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy-six.

For the Republic of Indonesia

Soeharto,  
President

For Malaysia

Datuk Hussein Onn,  
Prime Minister
Untuk Republik Filipina
Bagi Pihak Republik Filipina
Para sa Republika ng Pilipinas
For The Republic of the Philippines

President
Ferdinand E. Marcos

Untuk Republik Singapura
Bagi Pihak Republik Singapura
Para sa Republika ng Singapore
For the Republic of Singapore

Prime Minister
Lee Kuan Yew

Untuk Kerajaan Thailand
Bagi Pihak Thailand
Para sa Kaharian ng Thailand
For the Kingdom of Thailand

Prime Minister
Kukrit Pramoj
SOURCES CONSULTED

BOOKS AND PAPERS


**CONTRIBUTIONS TO BOOKS**


Siemers, Guenter. "Japan und die ASEAN: Eine neue "gemeinsame Wohlstandssphaere"?" [Japan and ASEAN: A New "Co-Prosperity Sphere"?]


ARTICLES IN JOURNALS


"President Soeharto at the 12th Ministerial Meeting of ASEAN, June 28, 1979, Bali." ASEAN Journal 3 (December 1979):4-5.


**NEWS PERIODICALS AND NEWSPAPERS**


"Sonoda: ASEAN Headed towards Political Unity." The New Straits Times (Malaysia), 17 August 1979, p. 8.


Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Stuttgart), 20 July 1979, 1 October 1979.


_____.


ASEAN DOCUMENTS, PAPERS; AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Note: Most of the publications listed in this section are available in mimeographed form from the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta and are reprinted in 10 Years ASEAN. Unless otherwise specified, all page number references below are to this publication.

Treaties and Declarations

The Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN Declaration), 8 August 1967 (pp. 14-16).

The Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 27 November 1971 (pp. 240-241).


Declaration of ASEAN Concord: A Common Bond Existing Among the Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 24 February 1976 (pp. 111-116).

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 24 February 1976 (pp. 118-123).
Agreements

Agreement for the Establishment of a Fund for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 17 December 1969 (pp. 252-254).

Agreement for the Promotion of Mass Media and Cultural Activities, 17 December 1969 (pp. 76-78).

Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-Scheduled Air Services among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 13 March 1971 (pp. 242-246).

Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Aircraft in Distress and Rescue of Survivors of Aircraft Accidents, 14 April 1972 (pp. 248-251).

Agreement on the Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, 24 February 1976 (pp. 125-132).

Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangements, 24 February 1977 (pp. 44-60).

ASEAN Swap Arrangement, 5 August 1977 (pp. 174-179).

Communiques and Press Statements

Joint Communiques, First through Tenth ASEAN Ministerial Meetings (pp. 266-291).

Joint Press Releases, Statements, and Communiques, First through Fifth Meetings of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (pp. 293-306).

Joint Communiques, First and Second Meetings of ASEAN Labour Ministers (pp. 307-311).

Joint Communique, First Meeting of ASEAN Ministers of Education (pp. 314-315).

Joint Communique, Meeting of ASEAN Ministers Responsible for Social Welfare (pp. 312-313).

Final Communique, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government, Kuala Lumpur, 4-5 August 1977 (pp. 194-202).

Joint Statement, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of Japan, Kuala Lumpur, 7 August 1977 (pp. 209-214).

Joint Statement, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of Australia, Kuala Lumpur, 7 August 1977 (pp. 204-207).

Joint Statement, Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Kuala Lumpur, 8 August 1977 (pp. 216-218).


Statement of the Indonesian Foreign Minister as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee on Escalation of the Armed Conflict between Vietnam and Kampuchea, Jakarta, 9 January 1979 (reprinted as No. 3/79 ASEAN News, Office of the Director-General, ASEAN - Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Thailand]).

Joint Press Statement issued at the Special Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Bangkok, 12-13 January 1979 (reprinted as No. 2/79 ASEAN News, Office of the Director-General, ASEAN - Thailand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Thailand]).


Statement by the Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Bangkok, 20 February 1979 (reprinted as No. 29/2522, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Thailand], Press Release).

Joint Communiqué, Twelfth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Bali, Indonesia, 30 June 1979 (reprinted as No. 83/2522, Department of Information, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Thailand], Press Release.)
Other Publications


ASEAN - Indonesia, A Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia (ASEAN) [speech] by Boni Ray Siagian, Head Public Relations Division, ASEAN - Indonesia: May 1, 1978, [at the Jakarta International Airport] Halim Perdanakusuma, Jakarta, Indonesia; Jakarta: ASEAN - Indonesia, 1978 (mimeographed).


ASEAN Secretariat. Activities and Achievements in the Economic Field (pp. 2-9).

ASEAN Secretariat. Developments and Achievements in Science and Technology (pp. 61-67).

ASEAN Secretariat. ASEAN Relations with Third Countries, Group of Countries and International Organizations (pp. 220-229).

ASEAN Secretariat. The Association of South-East Asian Nations: Its Aims, Activities and Achievements. Speech by the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat at the South East Asian Cultural Week in Tuebingen, West Germany. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, October 1977 (mimeographed).

ASEAN Secretariat. History and Background to the Formation of ASEAN (pp. 9-12).

ASEAN Secretariat. List of ASEAN Non-Governmental/Private Organizations (p. 239).

ASEAN Secretariat. The Structure of ASEAN (pp. 17-22).

ASEAN Secretariat, comp. ASEAN Treaties, Agreements, Joint Communiques. N.pl., n.publ., n.d. [Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 1977 or 1978].
10 Years ASEAN, With a Message from the Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat, Umarjadi Njotowijono. Jakarta: Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 1978.

OTHER SOURCES CONSULTED


361
Interviews were conducted as follows:

May 1978:  
ASEAN - Thailand, ASEAN - Malaysia,  
ASEAN - Singapore, ASEAN - Indonesia,  
ASEAN Secretariat;  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore)

July 1978:  
ASEAN - Thailand

August 1978:  
Institute of Asian Affairs (Hamburg),  
East Asia Society (Hamburg)

October 1978:  
H.E. T.T.B. Koh, Ambassador of the  
Republic of Singapore to the  
United Nations (New York);  
Mr. Jose Fernandez, First Secretary,  
Embassy of the Republic of the  
Philippines in the USA (Washington, D.C.)

August 1979:  
ASEAN - Malaysia, ASEAN - Singapore;  
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies;  
ASEAN - Secretariat

August 1980:  
ASEAN - Philippines.