Spanish Phonologically-Null Subjects
in Tensed Complements of Verbs of Perception

by

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Phonologically-Null Subjects in Tense

Complements of Verbs of Perception

in Spanish

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April 6th, 1982

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This thesis examines the properties of phonologically-null anaphoric subjects of tensed complement of verbs of perception in Spanish:

(a) Vimos a María que (*ella) bailaba cueca.
    'We saw Maria that (*she) was dancing the Cueca.'
    (We saw Maria dancing the Cueca.)

(b) Vimos que (María) bailaba cueca.
    'We saw that (Maria) was dancing the Cueca.'

Chapter One reviews the arguments against the common source hypothesis of examples such as (a) and (b) already existing in the literature, and shows that they are not compelling. In the same Chapter, some very traditional transformational analyses in terms of Copying and Deletion Rules are examined, and they are shown to be inadequate on both empirical and theoretical grounds. In Chapter Two, it is argued that examples like (a) and (b) cannot be analysed as containing a Complex NP of any form. Chapter Three examines the possibility of accounting for the existence of (a) as an instance of the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha'. Two possibilities are examined, namely
WH-Movement and NP-Movement, and both are shown to be untenable.

Finally, in Chapter Four, the constructions under study are examined in the light of the Revised Extended Standard Theory, and it is concluded that examples such as (a) are base generated with the matrix object NP 'in situ' and a phonologically-null pronominal NP in the complement subject position, namely PRO. Given lexical properties of the matrix verb, such a structure is identified as a structure of 'obligatory control'. Syntactic evidence for the presence of PRO is given, and arguments for Subject Postposing as a device to escape the effects of the requirement that PRO cannot be governed are provided as an alternative to the assumption that case-marked PRO becomes an empty NP before entering Logical Form.

The analysis presented in this thesis constrains the distribution of PRO subjects to ungoverned S-Structure positions. This entails the strongest possible claim that can be made about this element: PRO is never governed, a most desirable property to have for an element whose distribution and properties must be predicted by Universal Grammar, since the language learner never hears it. Given the terms of the approach taken here, the non-structure preserving character of Subject Postposing in Spanish follows as a natural consequence of the interaction between the theorem that states that PRO is never governed—which is assumed to be invincible—and the terms of the Structure-Preserving Constraint.
I wish to dedicate this thesis to three beautiful persons: Jovita, my wife, and Jay and Amrita, my fellow students of syntax and very best friends from Hyderabad. The three of them were discriminated against and victimized on this campus and on the streets of this country. As usual, the reasons were ignorance and jealousy, and the incidents were both emotionally and intellectually disgusting.

I sincerely hope that this thesis will give them some compensatory pleasure.
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However, no matter how important all of the above is, there are four people that deserve full credit here. They are my wife, Jovita, and my three daughters, Sandra, Vicky, and Claudia: thanks for the hugs, your love, and the good expresso coffee in the morning, all of which kept me going under the pressure of writing this dissertation.
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When this thesis was originally conceived—more than a year and a half ago—, it was conceived within the general framework of Chomsky's 'Pisa Lectures' (1979b). While doing my research on the specific topic I chose, many interesting things were happening (and are continuing to happen) in Chomsky's framework. In the major centres of linguistic research, teams of senior practising linguists—who are in permanent communication—have been testing, sharpening, and extending Chomsky's fundamental insights. Chomsky himself has been revising his 'Pisa Lectures' for publication and incorporating the contributions, suggestions, arguments and counterarguments of his associates in the USA, France, Italy, and The Netherlands. The volume of unpublished material 'in preparation' or 'forthcoming' is simply enormous, and it is basically available to those that participate in the central research project. We, 'ordinary working grammarians', have to content ourselves with second-hand copies of 'already superseded versions', if we are ever lucky to get hold of them. Some of that material will never be available to the general linguistic community simply because still many authors have not been able to overcome the trauma of the fear of being proven wrong. This has some very deep roots in the history of our discipline.
It is most definitely true that when this thesis becomes available, many of the assumptions of the original 'Pisa Lectures' will have been superseded, discarded, modified, or replaced by new ones. Actually, this is a matter of fact already. However, if my approach is basically correct, and the new developments of the theory also are, there should be no substantial incompatibility between them. If those developments prove this thesis wrong and better explanations become available in the light of those developments, this thesis will have to remain confined to the context of the framework in which it was conceived and it will participate in the same shortcomings that such a framework might have. The risk does not frighten me because it is the natural risk that every scientific enterprise entails, and I will remain glad of having participated, with this contribution, in one of the most exciting periods of linguistic research.

Germán P. Westphal

Burnaby Mountain, July 1981.
This thesis is a study of the properties of phonologically-null anaphoric subjects, as found in tensed complement sentences of verbs of perception in Spanish:

(1) Ví a María que ___ bailaba cueca.

'1-saw Maria that ___ was-dancing the Cueca.'

(I saw Maria dancing the Cueca.)

The construction exemplified under (1) co-exists in the grammar of Spanish with that given below, and the two of them appear to be syntactically related:

(2) Ví que María bailaba cueca.

'1-saw that Maria was dancing the Cueca.'

In one instance we find VERB OF PERCEPTION + NP + TENSED SENTENCE [1], and in the other, VERB OF PERCEPTION + TENSED SENTENCE. This is possible with verbs of perception in general, and also with the causative 'dejar' (allow, permit). Both constructions share the same basic meaning (cf. Chapter One, however). Along with these two types of complements, verbs of perception can also take an infinitival or a gerundive complement:
Examples (1) and (3a)-(3b) have exactly the same meaning. However, I have nothing to say about the latter. Since the publication of Chomsky (1973), tensed sentences are no longer assumed to be transformationally related to their tenseless counterparts.

To my mind, the interesting construction is the one exemplified under (1) because of its apparent relation to that under (2), and because of the fact that it exhibits a phonologically-null anaphoric subject in complement subject position, inside of a tensed sentence. In order to justify my interest in this phenomenon, I would like to reproduce here the following quote from Chomsky (1980b:22-23):

"The investigation of properties of 'missing elements' is of particular interest for the study of mental representations. Their properties presumably are not derived by the language learner from actual expressions, since the elements in question are not physically present. Rather, they derive from properties of the system of grammar, and thus give
unique insight into the nature of the principles of grammar; i.e. they derive from the mind, rather than from experience. If our interest is the mind, not the organization of events in the external world, these elements are thus of unique interest."

That the anaphoric element in question must be phonologically-null is proven by the fact that no lexical NP can appear instead of it:

(5) a. Ví a María que ___ bailaba cueca.
    'I-saw Maria that ___ was-dancing the Cueca.'
    (I saw Maria dancing the Cueca.)

b. *Ví a María que ella bailaba Cueca.
    'I-saw Maria that she was-was dancing the Cueca.'

c. *Ví a María que María bailaba Cueca.
    'I-saw Maria that Maria was dancing the Cueca.'

The anaphoric gap observable in (5a) must be anaphoric to the matrix object. It cannot refer to the matrix subject or have another referent in the world:

(5) a. Juana vio a MARIAI que [___]i bailaba cueca.
    'Juana saw MARIAI that [___]i was-dancing the Cueca.'
b. *JUANAi vio a María que [___]i bailaba cueca.

'JUANAi saw Maria that [___]i was-dancing the Cueca.'

c. *Juana vio a María que (Pedro) bailaba cueca.

'Juana saw Maria that (Pedro) was-dancing the Cueca.'

The problem posed by examples such as (1) is also theoretically interesting because it appears to constitute evidence against the different formulations of the Tensed-S Condition of Chomsky (1973), namely the Tensed-S Condition itself, the Propositional Island Condition of Chomsky (1977b), and the Nominative Island Condition of Chomsky (1980a). All these versions of the Tensed-S Condition prohibit the existence of rules that relate a subject of a tensed sentence with another element outside of such a sentence, which is exactly the rule necessary to account for the existence of (1). However, some recent developments in the Extended Standard Theory appear to allow the existence of empty NPs as subjects of tensed sentences, provided that they are properly governed (cf. the Empty Category Principle of Chomsky (1979b), but the status of the complement subject in (1) is not at all clear: Is it really empty, or does it have features for person, number, etc., i.e. or is it an instance of the phonologically empty pronoun that Chomsky (1979b) has identified as PRO? Since we do not have direct access to mental representations of elements that we never 'hear', we cannot answer these questions without an adequate linguistic analysis. The purpose of this thesis is to provide such an analysis.
The thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter One, I review the analyses already existing in the literature, and I show that the arguments advanced against the one-source analysis of examples such as (1) and (2) are not compelling. In Chapter Two, I examine the 'Heavy-NP Analysis', and I show that examples such as (1) cannot be analysed as containing a Complex NP of any form. Chapter Three is specifically devoted to the 'Move Alpha' Analysis. Two possibilities are considered: that examples such as (1) arise via application of the rule of WH-Movement in a fashion similar to that of relative clauses, and—alternatively—that NP-Movement is involved. Both possibilities are rejected, mainly on theoretical grounds. Finally, in Chapter Four, I present the Control Analysis, which assumes that examples such as (1) are base generated with the object NP 'in situ' and a phonologically empty subject NP in the complement subject position, namely PRO. Since according to the theory, PRO cannot appear in governed positions at the S-Structure level, it is argued that Subject Postposing is the strategy that Spanish has in order to save the theorem that states that PRO is never governed. Since Subject Postposing is non-structure preserving in Spanish, the hypothesis that there is a direct interaction between principles of grammar that are invincible and constraints on the form of grammars is advanced. In this view, the violation of the Structure-Preserving Constraint is the cost of saving the principle that says that PRO is never governed, and such a violation ceases to be a mystery in the grammar of the language.
In addition, the thesis contains three appendices. In Appendix A, I examine the French analogue of the Spanish construction exemplified under (1), and I advance an analysis in terms of the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon'. The hypothesis is that French makes use of the otherwise empty phonological matrix /ki:/ in order to save both illegal traces and illegal PROs in subject position of tensed sentences, by means of inserting /ki:/ in the position of the illegal PRO or the illegal trace. In Appendix B, I advance the Interpretive ECP (Empty Category Principle), which is a revision of Chomsky's original ECP (1979b) motivated on the analysis of the French data discussed in Appendix A. Finally, in Appendix C, I compare the approach to phonologically-empty subjects presented in this thesis to that of Jaeggli (1980), and I show that our approach is superior to that of Jaeggli. Crucially, in our demonstration, we make use of the Interpretive ECP advanced in Appendix B.
FOOTNOTES: INTRODUCTION

[1] I am assuming here that the 'preposition a' is a case-marker, which is adjoined to the object NP. Cf. Chapter Three, footnote [7].
This Chapter is devoted to an examination of the analyses already existing in the literature. Its starting point is a critique of Suñer (1978), who claims that the constructions under study are not derived from a common source. In the first section of the Chapter, I review Suner's arguments against the 'Common Source Hypothesis' and I show that they are not compelling. In the second section, I discuss Suñer's distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect perception' and I suggest how such a distinction can be accounted for in the lexicon. Finally, in the third section, I summarily discuss the 'Copying and Deletion Analysis' of Sauer (1972) and Demonte (1977) and the 'Equi-NP Deletion Analysis' of Suñer (1978), and I show them to be both theoretically and empirically inadequate.


Suñer (1978: 111-115) contends that examples such as (a) and (b) below cannot be transformationally related: [1]
(1) a. [Oí/Escuché] [que Juan tocaba la guitarra].
    'I-heard [that Juan was playing the guitar].'

    b. [Oí/Escuché] a Juan [que ___ tocaba la guitarra].
    'I-heard Juan [that ___ was playing the guitar].'
    (I heard Juan playing the guitar.)

(2) a. Vio [que María estaba de regreso]. (Suñer #(2a))
    'He-saw [that Maria was back].'

    b. Vio a María [que ___ estaba de regreso]. (Suñer #(2b))
    'He-saw Maria [that ___ was back].'

The cornerstone of Suñer's argumentation is the observation that these examples are not exactly synonymous. In the case of the (a) examples, she distinguishes two possible readings: 'direct' and 'indirect perception', whereas in the case of the (b) examples, only 'direct [or actual] perception' is possible.

According to Suñer (1978:112), the (a) examples "do not necessarily imply 'direct perception'". In fact, in the case of (1a), 'oí' and 'escuché' (I heard) "could be paraphrased as 'me han dicho' (they have told me)". and in the case of (2a), 'ver' (see) has an epistemic sense, which is paraphrasable with 'entender' (understand) or 'darse cuenta' (realize). Hence, it is possible to say:
(3) [Oí/Escuché] [que María se ve linda en traje de baño].
   'I-heard [that María looks beautiful in a bathing suit].'

(4) Veo [que Juan silba bonito].
   'I-see [that Juan whistles beautifully].'

No actual ('direct') perception is possible in the case of these examples, as attested by the deviance of (5) and (6) below:

(5) *[Oí/Escuché] a María [que ___ se ve linda en traje de baño].
   'I-heard María [that ___ looks beautiful in a bathing suit].'

(6) *Veo a Juan [que ___ silba bonito].
   'I-see Juan [that ___ whistles beautifully].'

The only possible readings that (3) and (4) have are idiosyncratically determined by the corresponding matrix verbs.

Next, Suñer (1978) adds:

"the construction 'perception verb + object + que...' is restricted with regard to several processes as a natural consequence of its 'direct perception interpretation'" (Suñer (1978:113-114)),

and she advances the following subsidiary arguments, which are not really independent arguments, but a consequence of her
observation quoted above, as Suñer herself acknowledges:

(i) In the case of the (b) examples, "the time expressed by the tense of the 'que' clause must be simultaneous with that of the main verb":

(7) Lo vi [que ___ bailaba].

'I saw him [that ___ was dancing].'

(I saw him dancing.)

(8) *Lo vi [que ___ baila].

'I saw him [that ___ dances].'

"This restriction does not apply to 'perception verb + que...':

(9) Veo [que Juan vino].

'I-see [that Juan came].'

(ii) "The construction 'perception verb + object + que...' also exhibits restrictions with respect to accepting pseudo-modals like 'poder' (be able to, [can]) [cf. Klein (1968) for a justification of Suñer's term 'pseudo-modals', G.F.W.]":

(10) *Lo veo [que ___ puede levantarse a las 6]. (Suñer *(21b))

'I-see him [that ___ is able to get-up at 6].'
(11) *Veó [que Juan puede levantarse a las 6]. (Suñer #(22b))

'I-see [that Juan is able to get-up at 6].'

(iii) "Finally, this construction is ungrammatical whenever negation interferes with a direct perception reading":

(12) *Lo veo [que ___ no está aquí].

'I-see him [that ___ is not here].'

(13) Veo [que Juan no está aquí].

'I-see [that Juan is not here].'

(14) Lo vi [que ___ no estaba bien].

'I-saw him [that ___ was not well].'

According to Suñer (1978:115),

"[these restrictions] are corollaries of the thesis that 'perception verb + object + que...' can only be interpreted as actual perception. These restrictions do not apply to the 'perception verb + que...' construction."

On the basis of these considerations, she concludes that the structures in question "cannot originate from a common source"
(Suñer (1978:115)). Nevertheless, I contend that Suñer's central argument is flawed. The counter-argument goes as follows: First, it is correct that the construction 'verb of perception + que...' has two possible readings, i.e. 'direct' and 'indirect perception'. Second, it is also correct that the construction 'verb of perception + object + que...' has only one reading, namely that of 'direct perception'. Nevertheless, from these observations, the only possible logical conclusion is that the constructions 'verb of perception + que...' and 'verb of perception + object + que...' cannot be related with respect to the reading they do not share, i.e. that of 'indirect perception', but from this it does not necessarily follow that they cannot be related in the 'direct perception' reading, which they have in common. To my mind, this is the fundamental fallacy of Suñer's argumentation.

Furthermore, the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' perception, where the latter involves an extensional reading [2], has no parallel in terms of 'direct' and 'indirect causation' in the case of 'dejar' (allow, permit), contrary to Suñer's claim that "it is reasonable to assume that the conclusions reached with respect to perception verbs are also valid for the causative 'dejar'" (1978:108). Consider examples (15) and (16) below:

(15) Dejé [que (él) fuera al cine].
'I-permitted [that (he) go to the movies].'
(16) Lo dejé [que ____ fuera al cine].

'I-permitted him [that ____ go to the movies].'

The only difference observable here is one of focus [3]. Indeed, in (15) the focus is on the event, whereas in (16) the focus is on the subject of the complement clause, which is 'realized' as the object (clitic) of the matrix clause. No extensional reading parallel to that of (3) and (4) is possible in (15).

In fact, contrary to what has been observed by Suñer (1978:114-115) in the case of the structures 'verb of perception + que...' and 'verb of perception + object + que...' (cf. (i), (ii), and (iii) above), the structures 'dejar + que...' and 'dejar + object + que...' exhibit exactly the same grammatical behaviour with respect to the time referred to by the tenses of the matrix and the complement clause, and the ability of the latter to take pseudo-modals and negation.

Indeed, if the time expressed by the tense of the complement clause is prior to that referred to by the tense of the matrix, then both structures are ungrammatical when 'dejar' (allow, permit) is involved [4]:

(17) a. *Si dejo [que (tu) huyeras],

yo no sería carcelero respetable.
'If I permit (present) [that you escape (past)],
I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'

b. *Si te dejo [que ___ huyeras],
yo no sería carcelero respetable.

'If I permit (present) you [that ___ escape (past)],
I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'

This is due to the fact that deontic predicates like 'dejar' (allow, permit) always require that the time referred to by the verb form of their complement clauses be subsequent to the time referred to by the tense of the matrix (cf. Lyons (1977:823-31)). Thus, although the tenses of the matrix and the complement clauses in the examples below are both present, the former is present indicative, whereas the latter is present subjunctive. In these particular instances, the present subjunctive refers to a time which is subsequent to that referred to by the present indicative:

(18) a. Si dejo [que (tu) huyas],
yo no sería carcelero respetable.

'If I permit (prs. ind.) [that you escape (prs. subj.)],
I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'

(If I allow you to escape,
I wouldn't be a respectable guard.)
b. Si te dejo [que ___ huyas],
    yo no sería carcelero respetable.
    'If I permit (prs. ind.) you [that ___ escape (prs. subj.)],
    I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'
    (If I allow you to escape,
    I wouldn't be a respectable guard.)

Furthermore, although native speakers' intuitions vary with respect to the possibility of accepting pseudo-modals in the complement clause, the judgements are consistent. Thus, the examples below are both grammatical or ungrammatical, depending on particular idiolects:

(19) a. (*) Si dejo [que puedas huir],
    yo no sería carcelero respetable.
    'If I permit [that you-be-able to escape],
    I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'

b. (*) Si te dejo [que ___ puedas huir],
    yo no sería carcelero respetable.
    'If I-permit you [that ___ be able to escape],
    I wouldn't be a respectable guard.'

Finally, both structures accept negation in the complement clause:
(20) a. Dejé [que (tu) no hicieras la tarea],
en el entendido de que la vas a hacer mañana.
'I-permitted [that (you) did not do your homework],
in the understanding that you will do it tomorrow.'

b. Te dejé [que ___ no hicieras la tarea],
en el entendido de que la vas a hacer mañana.
'I-peritted you [that ___ did not do your homework],
in th understanding that you will do it tomorrow.

All this further supports my claim that Suñer's conclusion based on the distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect perception' cannot be generalized to the causative 'dejar' (allow, permit) because 'dejar' not only lacks an extensional reading parallel to that of 'indirect perception', but also because it behaves differently from perception verbs with respect to the time referred to by the tenses of the matrix and the complement clause, and the ability of the latter to accept pseudo-modal verbs and negation.

Therefore, it must be concluded that Suñer's argumentation against the common source of the structures 'verb of perception + que..' and 'verb of perception + object + que... ' does not actually hold, that her conclusion is not valid with respect to 'dejar'--even if we assume that the logic of her argument is correct-- , and that the problem of the apparent syntactic
relationship that the structures in question exhibit must be examined from a different perspective.

Nevertheless, the problem posed by the two readings of the construction 'verb of perception + que ...' remains, and it deserves--at least--a tentative solution here. In the following section, I will advance such a solution.

2.- A Lexical Approach to Extensional Readings.

If the 'non-perception' readings that verbs of perception have in the structure 'verb + que...' is idiosyncratically determined by the verb, as I have suggested above, then the solution to the problem they pose should be lexical and not syntactic.

Let us assume the theory of the lexicon developed in Hust (1976) and (1978). In this theory, related lexical items are listed under the same lexical entry, which has the form of a branching diagram. Consider (21) below:
(21) Partial Lexical Entry of 'read':

read

Common features

-[-written]

A

C

+[-written]

(read someone's
mind, etc.)

B

+V

D

+V

E

+NP

-[-human]

etc.

etc.
Lexical items in entries of this sort are related via two different devices, namely the precipitation mechanism and lexical redundancy rules. The precipitation mechanism brings down to each lexical item the phonological, semantic, and syntactic features that are common to all the dominated nodes. Lexical redundancy rules relate pairs such as 'read' and 'readable' (cf. Hust (1976) and (1978), and Westphal (1981) for details). Features like -_____[−written] mean that the lexical item in question cannot be inserted if the object NP is not 'written'. The feature +______NP indicates that the verb in question requires an object NP and the feature +______#, that no object is required, as in 'John read the book' and 'John can read', respectively.

For concreteness, consider the features under node D in (21). These features specify that 'read' is a verb that takes an object and a human subject. The precipitation mechanism brings down to this node all the features assumed to be listed in node A, and also that of node B, which specifies that the object of 'read' must be 'written'. In the case of node E, although no object is required, the understood object of 'read' is also understood as 'written', e.g. 'John can read'. Thus, it is not possible to interpret this example as 'John can read someone's mind' (cf. node C in (21)).

Given this much, we can assume that the lexical entry of 'ver' (see) would basically be as follows:
(22) Partial Lexical Entry of 'ver' (see):

```
ver
Common features

A

E
  + V
    - visible
    + [-vision]___
      / to perceive
        by the eye.

C
  + V
    + S'
      to understand,
      to come to know,
      to form a mental
      picture of, etc.

D E F

+ NP + # + S'
etc. etc. etc.
```
Essentially, this lexical entry says that *ver* (see) can enter, at least, in four different subcategorization conditions, i.e. those specified in nodes D, E, F, and C. These four subcategorization conditions are illustrated below:

(23) a. Pedro vio 'La Gioconda'. (cf. (22B & D))
    'Pedro saw 'La Gioconda'.'

b. #Pedro vio la sinceridad. (cf. (22B & D))
    'Pedro saw sincerity.'

c. #El ciego vio 'Guernica'. (cf. (22B & D))
    'The blind man saw 'Guernica'.'

(24) 'Ver es creer.' (cf. (22B & E))
    'Seeing is believing.'

(25) Vi que Juan bailaba cueca con María. (cf. (22B & F))
    'I-saw that Juan was dancing the Cueca with Maria.'
    (I saw Juan dancing the Cueca with Maria.)

(26) Veo que Juan no podía hacer el amor. (cf. (22C))
    'I-see that Juan could not make love.'
    (I understand Juan could not make love.)

Given a lexical entry like (22) and a theory like the EST, where it is assumed that both lexical insertion and semantic
interpretation are operative at the surface structure level (cf. Chomsky (1975:78-134), (1976:194-196), (1980a:3-5), and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), footnote 18 in particular [5]), the deviance of examples such as (27) is easily explainable:

(27) *Veo a Juan que ___ no podía hacer el amor.

'I-see Juan that ___ could not make love.'

Indeed, examples of this type pose no problem since 'ver' (see) with the meaning 'to understand', 'to come to know', 'to form a mental picture of' cannot be inserted in the environment +_____NP, but only in that of +_____S' [6]. Thus, (27) is uninterpretable in this particular reading. In the case of the other reading, i.e. 'to perceive by the eye', the structure is out because of the following three reasons that deal with the semantics of actual perception: First, someone’s ability to do something is not perceivable by the eye. Only the actual performance is. This rules out the presence of pseudo-modals in (27). Second, what has actually not happened is not perceivable by the eye either. Hence, the ungrammaticality of negation in (27). Third, and finally, what happens at a certain point in time is only visible at that particular point in time, not before or after. Hence, the ungrammaticality due to the non-simultaneous time reference of the tenses of the matrix and complement clauses in (27). The deviance of (27) is semantic, not syntactic. [7]
Thus, all the facts dealing with Suñer's 'indirect perception reading' can be accounted for in the semantic component provided the relevant selectional restrictions and strict subcategorization conditions are adequately specified in the lexical entries of the corresponding verbs.

Under these circumstances, Suñer (1978) is left without arguments against the 'Common Source Analysis'.

3.- The Copying and Deletion Analyses.

In this Section, I would like to discuss some very traditional transformational approaches to the problem posed by the structures under study. These approaches are in terms of copying and deletion rules. [8]

In principle, the following possibilities are available:

(i) THE COPYING AND DELETION ANALYSIS: The complement subject is copied onto the matrix object position and subsequently deleted. This is basically the approach of Demonte (1977), following a suggestion of Sauer (1972).
(ii) THE COPYING AND SUBJECT-PRONOUN DROP ANALYSIS: The complement subject is copied onto the matrix object position, pronominalized, and subsequently deleted by the Subject-Pronoun Deletion Rule.

(iii) THE EQUI-NP DELETION ANALYSIS: Both the matrix object and the complement subject are base generated 'in situ', and the latter is subsequently deleted under identity with the former. This is the approach of Suñer (1980).

Since analysis (ii) is a variant of (i) and both fail to be adequate on basically the same grounds, I will consider them together in 3.1.-

Subsection 3.2. is devoted to the discussion of analysis (iii).

3.1.- The Copying and Deletion Analyses.

Following Sauer (1972:101), Demonte (1977:205-207) claims that examples (a) and (b) below are syntactically related via a copying and deletion process:

---

Following Sauer (1972:101), Demonte (1977:205-207) claims that examples (a) and (b) below are syntactically related via a copying and deletion process:
(28) a. Yo vi [que Juan tocaba la guitarra].
    'I saw [that Juan was playing the guitar].'

    b. Yo vi a Juan [que ___ tocaba la guitarra].
    'I saw Juan [that ___ was playing the guitar].'
    (I saw Juan playing the guitar.)

(29) a. Yo dejé [que Juan tocara la guitarra].
    'I permitted [that Juan played the guitar].'

    b. Yo dejé a Juan [que ___ tocara la guitarra].
    'I permitted Juan [that ___ played the guitar.]
    (I permitted Juan to play the guitar.)

According to Demonte's approach (1977:205-207), all the phonological, syntactic, and semantic features of the complement subject in instances such as (28a) and (29a) are copied onto the matrix object position:

(30) *Yo vi a Juan [que Juan tocaba la guitarra].
    'I saw Juan [that Juan was playing the guitar].'

(31) *Yo dejé a Juan [que Juan tocara la guitarra].
    'I permitted Juan [that Juan played the guitar].'

Given shallow structures such as (30) and (31), the complement subject is supposed to be deleted by virtue of the same rule
that deletes complement subjects in examples such as the following: [9]

(32) a. Le mandé AL NIÑO [que EL NIÑO viniera]. (Suñer #(8))
    'I ordered THE BOY [that THE BOY come].'

    b. Le mandé AL NIÑO [que ___ viniera]. (Suñer #(8'))
    'I ordered the boy [that ___ come].'

Nevertheless, as Suñer (1980:111) rightly points out, the deletion part of Demonte's analysis fails to be empirically adequate since the deletion rule which is assumed to be operative in (32) is optional. If the rule does not apply, examples (30) and (31) are generated. Obviously, the wrong result.

Suñer's criticism also holds of the alternative analysis involving pronominalization and subsequent deletion of the complement subject by virtue of the classic Subject-Pronoun Deletion Rule assumed for Spanish, since this rule is also optional: [10]

(33) a. Cuando llegaste tú?
    'When did you arrive?'

    b. Cuando llegaste ___?
    'When did you arrive?'
Although Suñer's criticism holds for Demonte's original proposal, Demonte could presumably impose a special condition on her deletion rule, which I formulate as follows:

(34) Complement Subject Deletion Rule (after Demonte (1977)):

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
S.D. & X & NP_i & que & NP_i & Z \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\Rightarrow
\]

\[
S.C. & 1 & 2 & 3 & \emptyset & 5 \\
\]

CONDITIONS:

a. Optional, if X contains 'mandar' (order), etc.

b. Obligatory, if X contains a verb of perception.

In spite of the many reservations that one might have regarding the ad hoc conditions imposed on this rule, it does account for the data considered above.

Now that we have covered the empirical deficiency of Demonte's putative deletion rule, let us consider the possible terms of the copying rule invoked in her approach. Presumably, such a rule would look something like (35):
(35) Subject-onto-Object Copying Rule (after Demonte (1977)):

\[
\text{S.D.} \quad x \quad \text{V} \quad [_{NP} \triangle] \quad \text{que} \quad \begin{bmatrix}
\text{NP} \\
+\text{N} \\
\alpha \text{person} \\
\beta \text{number} \\
\text{etc.}
\end{bmatrix} \quad \text{z}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{cccccc}
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 & 6 \\
\end{array}
\]

\[
\text{S.C.} \quad 1 & 2 & \quad \begin{bmatrix}
\text{NP} \\
+\text{N} \\
\alpha \text{person} \\
\beta \text{number} \\
\text{etc.}
\end{bmatrix} \quad 4 & 5 & 6
\]

\[
\text{CONDITION: } 2 = \text{a verb of perception.}
\]

To be fair to Demonte (1977), I shall base my criticism on the literature available before the publication of her book.

First, both rules assumed in Demonte's approach, i.e. rules (34) and (35), are not possible rules of grammar because they violate the Tensed-S Condition of Chomsky (1973:238):
The Tensed S Condition (cf. Chomsky (1973:238)):

"No rule can involve X, Y in the structure

... X ... [α ... Y ... ] ... ,

where alpha is a tensed sentence."

Indeed, in both rules the complementizer 'que' (that) indicates the presence of a tensed-sentence boundary. Since in these rules the matrix object and the complement subject are to be correlated with X and Y in (36), and the rules in question involve these two terms over the tensed-S boundary, they violate the Tensed-S Condition.

Second, since clitics can also be involved in the constructions under study, as attested by the examples below, rule (35) would have to be modified in such a way that it would copy the complement subject NP onto the object clitic position. Under these conditions, the rule would additionally violate the Structure Preserving Constraint of Emonds (1976), which is also assumed to hold for copying rules (cf. Section 2.1., Chapter III, for further discussion):

(37) a. Yo lo vi [que ___ tocaba la guitarra].

'I saw him [that ___ was playing the guitar]."
b. Yo lo dejé [que ____ tocara la guitarra].
'I permitted him [that ____ played the guitar].'

Therefore, Demonte's proposal and the alternative approach involving rule (34) plus pronominalization and the classic Subject-Pronoun Deletion Rule assumed for Spanish are to be rejected both on empirical and theoretical grounds.

3.2.- The Equi-NP Deletion Type Analysis.

As an alternative to Demonte's approach, Suñer (1980) claimed that the structures under study are not transformationally related and that the deep structure of examples such as (38) is basically something like (39):

(38) a. Yo ví a JUAN [que ____ tocaba la guitarra].
'I saw JUAN [that ____ was playing the guitar].'

b. Yo dejé a JUAN [que ____ tocara la guitarra].
'I permitted JUAN [that ____ played the guitar].'

(39) a. *Yo ví a JUAN [que JUAN tocaba la guitarra].
'I saw JUAN [that JUAN was playing the guitar].'
b. *Yo dejé a JUAN [que JUAN tocara la guitarra].
   'I permitted JUAN [that JUAN played the guitar].'

In order to derive (38) from (39), Suñer (1980) proposed the following rule:

(40) The Equi-NP Deletion Type Rule (Suñer (1980:122)):

\[
\begin{array}{ccccc}
S.D. & X & NPi & que & NPi & Z \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 \\
\Rightarrow \\
S.C. & 1 & 2 & 3 & & 5 \\
\end{array}
\]

CONDITION: Obligatory if X contains a verb of perception.

Compare rules (34) and (40). Observe that the form of rule (40) is exactly like that of rule (34). Since this is the case, rule (40) is subject to the same criticism rule (34) is, namely that it violates the Tensed-S Condition of Chomsky (1973), cf. (36) above. But not only this, since Suñer has no means of guaranteeing that terms 2 and 4 of her rule are always coreferential, her approach leads to an unavoidable embarrassment: if terms 2 and 4 are not coreferential, the rule cannot apply and examples such as the following surface:
(41) a. *Yo vi a Juan que Pedro tocaba la guitarra.
   'I saw Juan that Pedro was playing the guitar.'

b. *Yo dejé a Pedro que Juan tocara la guitarra.
   'I permitted Pedro that Juan played the guitar.'

Consequently, it must be concluded that Suñer's approach is not only theoretically but empirically inadequate, and since her approach is unfixable, it follows that it is less appropriate than that of Demonte (1977).

4. Summary.

In this Chapter, I have shown that Suñer's (1978) conclusion that the structures 'verb of perception + que...' and 'verb of perception + object + que...' cannot be derived from a common source in their actual perception readings does not logically follow from the fact that the former construction has an extensional reading that the latter lacks. Furthermore, I have also shown that such a conclusion cannot be extended to the structures 'dejar + que...' and 'dejar + object + que...'--even assuming that Suñer's logic is correct--, simply because 'dejar'
(allow, permit) has no extensional reading parallel to those that verbs of perception have.

In an attempt to deal with the extensional readings that verbs of perception have, I also advanced a possible solution in the Lexicon, and I discussed the semantics of both 'direct' and 'indirect perception readings'.

Next, I examined some specific proposals already put forth in the literature in order to account for the existence of the structures under study. Those proposals involve the use of copying and deletion rules, and they have been advanced by Demonte (1977) and Suñer (1978). In both cases, I presented evidence that the corresponding analyses are not only empirically deficient, but also theoretically untenable.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE.

[1] The verbs 'oír' and 'escuchar' mean 'hear' and 'listen', respectively. However, I can use them quite interchangeably in my dialect:

(i) a. Escúchame con atención.
   b. Oyeme con atención.
 'Listen to me with attention.'


[3] By 'focus', I mean 'focus of attention on what is conversationally relevant from the speaker's point of view'. The notion is a pragmatic notion, and it is being used here for purely descriptive purposes. It has no syntactic significance at all.

[4] I am grateful to Brian E. Newton for pointing this out to me.

[5] Throughout all these papers, Chomsky has kept lexical insertion at the D-Structure level for execution purposes.

[6] However, John Knowles has pointed out to me that abstract nouns appear to be perfectly possible as objects of verbs of perception. Consider:

(i) El ciego por fin vio
    la imposibilidad de seguir ese camino.
 'The blind-man finally saw
 the impossibility of taking that road.'

The reading of 'ver' (see) in this example is certainly an epistemic reading.

[7] It could be argued that this distinction is not semantic, but pragmatic, since the following dialogue between two persons watching a football match on video tape is perfectly possible:

  SPEAKER A: - No viste que el portero salía
        y que por eso no hubo gol?

  SPEAKER B: - Pues, no...
The crucial apparent counter-example is line (a) of SPEAKER A, where we have a verb of perception in the future tense + an object NP + a complement sentence whose verb is in the past (imperfect tense). However, this is a question of analysis. Indeed, if line (a) is analysed as containing a relative clause, it is not a counter-example to my claim in the text. That it is indeed a relative clause is proven by the fact that a clitic is impossible in the relevant context:

SPEAKER A: - No viste que el portero salía y que por eso no hubo gol?

SPEAKER B: - Pues, no...

SPEAKER A: - Pasemoslo de nuevo, a cámara lenta, y (*lo) verás que salía.

[8] Although the recent EST literature appears to have abandoned copying rules, there seems to be some merit to them as a device to account for speech errors, if these are to be accounted for in a competence grammar (Richard C. DeArmond, personal communication):

(i) This is the book about which I was talking about.

However, at this point it is important to note that no speech errors such as (ii) occur in the constructions under study:

(ii) *Ví a María que {María/ella} bailaba cueca.
   'I saw Maria that {Maria/she} was dancing the Cueca.'

Under these conditions, it is highly dubious that a copying mechanism can be justified in order to account for the existence of the structures under study.

The status of some deletion rules, particularly that of 'deletions under identity' is also dubious in the framework (cf. Chomsky (1977b, footnote 61), Chomsky (1980a, footnote 6), and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:431)).

Nevertheless, these contentions cannot release us from being exhaustive in our study.

[9] Example (32), reproduced from Suñer (1978), is not exactly acceptable in my dialect.
[10] Provided that there is such a rule in the grammar of Spanish.
CHAPTER II:

THE HEAVY-NP ANALYSIS.

The structures under study appear to exhibit a heavy NP in object position [1]:

(1) Vi a Juan que ponía el libro debajo de la mesa.
   'I-saw Juan that was placing the book under the table.'
   (I saw Juan placing the book under the table.)

(2) Dejé a Juan que pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa.
   'I-permitted Juan that he-placed the book under the table.'
   (I permitted Juan to place the book under the table.)

In this view, such object NP can be considered either of the following: [2]

(3) A restrictive relative clause of the form

\[ \text{NP --NE-- S'} \]
(4) A 'factive-like' structure of the form

```
            NP
           /\  
          /   
         N    S'
        /         
       / (Det.)   
      /           
```

(5) A non-restrictive (i.e. parenthetical or appositive) relative clause.

These three different constructions are all attested in Spanish, as illustrated below:

(6) El profesor regañó a los alumnos que pusieron el libro debajo de la mesa.
    'The teacher reprimanded the students that placed the book under the table.'

(7) Juan no puede aceptar el hecho (de) que Pedro pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa.
    'Juan cannot accept the fact that Pedro placed the book under the table.'

(8) Pedro llamó a Juan, [que/quien] estaba lavando el auto en el patio.
    'Pedro called Juan, [that/who] was washing the car in the patio.'
In this Chapter, I will show that examples such as (1) and (2) do not exhibit any of the properties of (6), (7) and (8), and I will dismiss the Heavy-NP Analysis both on empirical and theoretical grounds.

1. The Complex NP Constraint, the Subjacency Condition, and the Coordinate Structure Constraint.

The first argument against the Heavy-NP Analysis is based on the Complex-NP Constraint, as subsumed under the terms of the Subjacency Condition. Reference to the Coordinate Structure Constraint is also made in this Section.

The Complex NP Constraint (CNPC) was originally proposed by Ross (1967:66-88):


"No element contained in a sentence dominated by a noun phrase with a lexical head noun may be moved out of that noun phrase by a transformation."
According to (9), no constituent may be reordered out of a sentence in structures of the form

(10)

\[
\text{NP} \\
\text{S'} \\
\text{NP} \\
+ \text{N} \\
+ \text{lex}
\]

or

(11)

\[
\text{NP} \\
\text{S'} \\
\text{NP} \\
\text{Det.} \\
\text{N} \\
+ \text{N} \\
+ \text{lex}
\]
The diagram under (11), which is not included in Ross' Dissertation, is also compatible with the formulation of the Complex-NP Constraint, as reproduced under (9), and it makes explicit that such a constraint on transformations is not only operative in structures like (3), but also in those like (5).[3]

Ross' Complex NP Constraint has been subsumed under the terms of the Subjacency Condition by Chomsky (1973). The version given in Chomsky (1977b) is reproduced below:

(12) The Subjacency Condition (cf. Chomsky (1977b:73))

"A cyclic rule cannot move a phrase from position \(Y\) to position \(X\) (or conversely) in [the structure]:

\[
... X ... [\alpha ... [\rho ... Y ... ] ... ] ... X ... ,
\]

where 'alpha' and 'beta' are cyclic nodes."

Basically, according to Chomsky (1977b:73), the cyclic nodes are \(S'\) and NP. (Cf. Chomsky (1977b), where it is argued that \(S''\) and \(S\) are also cyclic.)

The following diagram shows that the Complex-NP Constraint and the Subjacency Condition have an equivalent effect regarding the prohibition of extractions from structures such as (3) and (4):
In some of the recent literature, it has been argued that these conditions are not constraints on movement rules, but conditions on well formedness at the level of Logical Form (LF), cf. May (1977:168-171) and Jayaseelan (1980a) and (1980b:225-276). Chomsky (1980a:14) and (1980b:32) is conservative in this respect, and maintains that Subjacency, which subsumes the Complex NP-Constraint as shown in (13), is "a property of all movement rules" (1980b:32). Whatever the right answer to this is, the principle of grammar underlying the formulation of these conditions is operative in Spanish. In particular, according to the Complex-NP Constraint and Subjacency, no extraction from embedded sentences in examples such as (6) and (7) should produce a well formed surface structure, regardless of the level these conditions operate. This is attested by the ungrammaticality of (14a) and (15b), which are derived from the corresponding (b) examples via WH-Movement:
(14) a. *EN QUÉ LUGAR regañó el profesor

[ a los alumnos [ que pusieron el libro t ] ]?

'IN WHICH PLACE did the teacher reprimand

[ the students [ that placed the book t ] ]?'

b. El profesor regañó

[ a los alumnos [ que pusieron el libro EN QUÉ LUGAR ]]? 

'The teacher reprimanded

[ the students [ that placed the book IN WHICH PLACE ]]?'

(15) a. *EN QUÉ LUGAR no puede Juan aceptar

[ el hecho [ que Pedro pusiera el libro t ] ]?

'IN WHICH PLACE cannot Juan accept

[ the fact [ that Pedro placed the book t ] ]?'

b. Juan no puede aceptar

[ el hecho [ que Pedro pusiera el libro EN QUÉ LUGAR ]]? 

'Juan cannot accept

[the fact [that Pedro placed the book IN WHICH PLACE]]?'

If examples such as (1) and (2) indeed exhibit an object NP of the form (3) or (4), no extraction should be possible from the embedded sentence according to the terms of the Complex-NP Constraint and Subjacency. The fact that this prediction is not born out is attested by the grammaticality of examples (16a) and (17a), which are derived from the corresponding (b) examples, also via WH-Movement:
(16) a. EN CUAL ESTANTE viste a Juan [ que puso el libro t ]?

'IN WHICH BOOK-CASE did you see Juan [ that he-placed the book t ]?'

(In which book-case did you see Juan placing the book?)

b. Viste a Juan [ que puso el libro EN CUAL ESTANTE ]?

'You-saw Juan [ that he-placed the book IN WHICH BOOK-CASE ]?'

(You saw Juan placing the book in which book-case?)

(17) a. EN CUAL ESTANTE dejaste a Juan [ que pusiera el libro t ]?

'IN WHICH BOOK-CASE did you permit Juan [ that he-place the book t ]?'

(In which book-case did you permit Juan to place the book?)

b. Dejaste a Juan [ que pusiera el libro EN CUAL ESTANTE ]?

'You-permitted Juan [ that he-place the book IN WHICH BOOK-CASE ]?'

(You permitted Juan to place the book in which book-case?)

Thus, the grammaticality of examples (16a) and (17a) clearly shows that the NP in object position that they exhibit cannot be analysed as a complex noun phrase of the forms diagrammed under (3) or (4) since these examples do not obey the Complex-NP Constraint, as subsumed under the Subjacency Condition.
Let us now turn to the third possibility suggested above (cf. (5)), namely that examples such as (1) and (2) exhibit a non-restrictive, parenthetical, or appositive relative clause in object position.

This is quite an attractive alternative, considering that proper names can be heads of non-restrictive relative clauses, which is precisely the case of examples (1) and (2). [4]

The problem posed by this alternative view is complicated because its solution crucially depends on the analysis of non-restrictive relative clauses which is assumed. Emonds (1979) discusses two alternative hypotheses:

(18) The Subordinate Clause Hypothesis (SCH), defended by Smith (1964), Kuroda (1968), and Jackendoff (1977); and

(19) The Main Clause Hypothesis (MCH), defended by Ross (1967) and Emonds (1979) himself.

On the one hand, according to the Subordinate Clause Hypothesis, "an appositive clause forms a single constituent with the phrase it modifies" (Emonds (1979:212)). On the other hand, according to the Main Clause Hypothesis, "the appositive relative and the clause containing its antecedent are structurally like conjoined clauses" (Emonds (1979:233)).
Without entering in the controversy, in what follows I will show that in either case, examples such as (1) and (2) cannot be analysed as containing an appositive relative clause.

Let us first consider the Subordinate Clause Hypothesis. If an appositive clause indeed forms a single constituent with the phrase it modifies, then it is a complex NP of the form diagrammed under (3) or (4). In this case, the Complex-NP Constraint and Subjacency should be operative, and no extraction from the appositive clause should be possible. This is attested by the ungrammaticality of (20a), which—in the intended reading—is derived via WH-Movement from (20b):

(20) a. *¿QUÉ llamó Pedro
    [ a Juan [ {que/quien} estaba lavando t en el patio ]? 'WHAT did Pedro call
    [ Juan [ {that/who} was washing t in the patio ]?'

b. Pedro llamó
    [ a Juan [ {que/quien} estaba lavando QUÉ en el patio ]? 'Pedro called
    [ Juan [ {that/who} was washing WHAT in the patio ]?'

Nevertheless, under the terms of this analysis, it is not possible to consider the clause embedded in examples (1) and (2) an appositive relative since this clause does not obey the
restrictions illustrated in (20) (i.e. the Complex-NP Constraint and Subjacency), as is proven by the grammaticality of examples (16a) and (17a) above.

Consequently, the claim that the examples in question exhibit an appositive relative clause is not substantiated within the Subordinate Clause Hypothesis.

Finally, let us consider the problem from the viewpoint of the Main Clause Hypothesis. According to Emonds (1979), in this analysis, the appositive relative and the clause that contains its antecedent are just like conjoined clauses. If this is the case, the construction should be sensitive to the Coordinate Structure Constraint of Ross (1967:88-108):


"In a coordinate structure, no conjunct may be moved, nor may any element contained in a conjunct be moved out of that conjunct."

According to the Main Clause Hypothesis, appositive relative clauses such as (20b) are to be analysed as follows:
In this analysis, the ungrammaticality of (20a) is accounted for by the Coordinate Structure Constraint reproduced under (21):

As we have already seen above (cf. examples (16a) and (17a) in particular), examples such as (1) and (2) do not obey this restriction. Thus, they cannot be analysed as containing an
appositive relative clause under the terms of the Main Clause Hypothesis defended by Emonds (1979) either.

The fact that examples such as (1) and (2) do not obey the Complex – NP Constraint, as subsumed under the Subjacency Condition, nor the Coordinate Structure Constraint—under the terms of the analysis just discussed—constitutes strong theoretical evidence against the Heavy-NP Analysis that this Chapter is intended to examine.

2. - The Opacity Condition.

The third argument against the Heavy-NP Analysis is based on the Opacity Condition of Chomsky (1980a), formerly the Specified Subject Condition of Chomsky (1973) and Chomsky (1977b). This Condition has been subsumed under the terms of the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979b).

(24) The Opacity Condition (cf. Chomsky (1980a:10 & 13))

"If alpha is in the domain of the subject of beta, beta minimal, then alpha cannot be free in beta."
As reproduced under (24), the Opacity Condition requires some qualifications, which are given below (cf. Chomsky (1980a:10)):

(25) a. Alpha must be an anaphor: "Lexical NPs are not anaphors; PRO, trace, and reciprocals are anaphors."

b. Alpha is in the domain of beta if beta c-commands alpha (cf. (26), below).

c. In a configurational language such as English, the expression 'subject of beta' refers to the least embedded or most prominent NP in beta.

d. Alpha must be different from 'the subject of beta'.

e. Beta is NP or S', i.e. a cyclic node.

f. Beta is minimal if "beta is the least (smallest) such domain".

g. "An anaphor alpha is bound in beta if there is a category c-commanding it and coindexed with it in beta; otherwise, alpha is free in beta."
(26) The Command Condition (cf. Chomsky (1980a:10))

"Beta is said to c-command alpha if beta does not contain alpha (and therefore beta does not equal alpha) and alpha is dominated by the first branching category dominating beta." [5]

In short, given a structure such as

(27) ... [β...α... ]...

if alpha is an anaphor, and beta the smallest NP or S' that contains a subject that c-commands alpha, then alpha must be bound in beta, i.e. it must be coindexed with a category that c-commands it inside of the brackets labelled beta. [6]

Observe that, as it stands, the Opacity Condition imposes no binding restriction on alpha if alpha happens to be the subject of beta. According to this, the Opacity Condition allows the anaphoric gap (__) in subject position of the complement clause of (28) and (29) to be bound outside of such clause [7]:

(28) Vi a Pedro [que __ besaba a María].

'I-saw Pedro [that __ was kissing Maria].'

(I saw Pedro kissing Maria.)
(29) Dejé a Pedro [que ___ besara a María].
'I-permitted Pedro [that ___ he-kiss María].'
(I permitted Pedro to kiss María.)

Nevertheless, if alpha is not the subject of beta, then alpha cannot be free in beta:

(30) *Ví a María [que Pedro besaba ___].
'I-saw Maria [that Pedro was kissing ___].'

(31) *Dejé a María [que Pedro besara ___].
'I-permitted Maria [that Pedro kissed ___].'

Examples (28) and (29) are analogous to (1) and (2), and the ungrammaticality of (30) and (31) shows that, in this construction, only the subject of the complement clause can be coreferential with the matrix object. This is further attested by the ungrammaticality of (32) and (33), which involve the indirect object of the complement clause:

(32) *Ví a María [que Pedro le daba un beso ___].
'I-saw Maria [that Pedro was giving a kiss ___].'

(33) *Dejé a María [que Pedro le diera un beso ___].
'I-permitted Maria [that Pedro give a kiss ___].'
In light of these examples, it must be concluded that the construction exemplified in (1) and (2) is sensitive to the Opacity Condition of Chomsky (1980a).

Let us now compare the behaviour of this construction with that of relative clauses, with respect to the Opacity Condition.

In Spanish—just as in English—, the head of a relative clause, restrictive or appositive, can be coreferential with any argument of the complement clause:

(34) a. Hablé con el hombre [que ___ vino ayer].

'I-spoke with the man [that ___ came yesterday].'

b. Hablé con el hombre [que conociste ___ el otro día].

'I-spoke with the man [that you-met ___ the other day].'

c. Hablé con el hombre [que le diste el libro ___].

'I-spoke with the man [that you gave the book ___].'

(35) a. Hablé con María [que ___ es re-lesa].

'I-spoke with Maria [who ___ is very stupid].'

b. Hablé con María [a quien nadie quiere ___].

'I-spoke with Maria [whom nobody loves ___].'
In principle, examples (34a) and (35a) pose no problem in terms of the Opacity Condition since they involve the subject of the complement clause. Nevertheless, examples (34b), (34c), (35b), and (35c) exhibit an apparent violation of Opacity. Indeed, in the case of these examples, the anaphoric gap, i.e. alpha in the terminology of (24), is in the domain of the subject of the complement clause, nevertheless it appears to be bound outside of such clause, i.e. beta according to (24). Thus, relative clauses, both restrictive and non-restrictive, exhibit an apparent violation of the Opacity Condition [8]. If examples such as (1) and (2) were relative clauses, they should exhibit the same apparent violation. The fact that they do not, as already illustrated by the ungrammaticality of examples (30), (31), (32), and (33) above, constitutes clear evidence that their complement clauses cannot be analysed as relative clauses.

3.- The Obligatoriness of the Anaphoric Gap.

The argument in the last Section applies to relative clauses only, both restrictive and appositives. In this Section, I would like to advance one argument that applies to the third alternative suggested at the beginning of this Chapter, namely
the possibility of analysing examples such as (1) and (2) as having an object NP structurally similar to that of 'factive-like' constructions (cf. (4)). Example (7), reproduced here as (36), exhibits a direct object of this type:

(36) Juan no puede aceptar [el hecho [que Pedro pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa]].

'Juan cannot accept [the fact [that Pedro placed the book under the table]].'

Observe that the clause embedded in (36) exhibits no anaphoric gap: the arguments of the corresponding verb are all in 'argument position', and the head of such clause bears no grammatical relation to the embedded verb. Furthermore, the ungrammaticality of the phrases under (37) shows that complement clauses of this type never exhibit a gap anaphoric to their heads:

(37) a. *[el hecho [que ___ pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa]]

  '[the fact [that ___ placed the book under the table]]'

b. *[el hecho [que Pedro pusiera ___ debajo de la mesa]]

  '[the fact [that Pedro placed ___ under the table]]'

c. *[el hecho [que Pedro pusiera el libro ___]]

  '[the fact [that Pedro placed the book ___]]' [9]
As the reader is already aware, examples such as (1) and (2), reproduced here as (38) and (39), exhibit an anaphoric gap in the subject position of their complement clauses:

(38) Ví a Juan [que ___ ponía el libro debajo de la mesa].
    'I-saw Juan [that ___ was placing the book under the table.]
    (I saw Juan placing the book under the table.)

(39) Dejé a Juan [que ___ pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa].
    'I-permitted Juan [that ___ he-placed the book under the table.]
    (I permitted Juan to place the book under the table.)

Moreover, such anaphoric gap is obligatory, as attested by the ungrammaticality of the examples below:

(40) *Ví a Juan [que {Juan/el/Pedro} ponía el libro
    debajo de la mesa].
    'I saw Juan [that {Juan/he/Pedro} was placing the book
    under the table].'

(41) *Dejé a Juan [que {Juan/el/Pedro} pusiera el libro
    debajo de la mesa].
    'I permitted Juan [that {Juan/he/Pedro} placed the book
    under the table].'
Thus, examples such as (1) and (2) cannot be analysed as containing a 'factive-like' NP in object position. [10]

4.- Relative Pronouns, Intonation Patterns, and Head Restrictions.

In the case of relative clauses whose heads are [+ human], the complementizer can be filled in by 'que' or 'quien' (that/who). If the head of the relative clause bears the grammatical relation subject-of to the complement clause, then 'quien' cannot appear in restrictive relative clauses, but only in appositives:

(42) Hablé con el hombre [{que/*quien} ___ vino ayer].

'I-spoke with the man [{that/who} ___ came yesterday].'

(43) Hablé con María [{que/quien} ___ es re-lesa].

'I-spoke with María [{that/who} is very stupid].'

In the case of examples such as (1) and (2), only 'que' (that) can fill in the complementizer position: [11]
(44) Vi a Juan [ [que/*quien] ___ ponía el libro

debajo de la mesa].

'I-saw Juan [ [that/*who] ___ was placing the book

under the table].'

(45) Dejé a Juan [ [que/*quien] ___ pusiera el libro

debajo de la mesa].

'I-permitted Juan [ [that/*who] ___ placed the book

under the table].'

Thus, the distribution of 'que' and 'quien' in (44) and (45)
shows that these examples cannot be analysed as containing an
appositive relative, and it further suggests that they might
contain a restrictive relative clause since clauses of this type
cannot take 'quien' when the head is coreferential with the
subject of the complement clause. Moreover, the absence of
comma intonation in (44) and (45), which is obligatory in
appositives as shown below, provides additional support for the
restrictive relative clause analysis:

(46) a. Hablé con María, [ [que/quien] ___ es re-lesa].

b. * Hablé con María [ [que/quien] ___ es re-lesa].

'I-spoke with Maria [ [that/who] ___ is very stupid].'

The facts this far considered suggest that (44) and (45) cannot
be analysed as containing an appositive relative clause, but a
restrictive relative clause instead. Nevertheless, if this was the case, then we would be forced to the conclusion that proper names can be heads of restrictive relative clauses, which is not correct, since (46b) is ungrammatical without comma intonation.

Consequently, because of these considerations dealing with the distribution of relative pronouns, intonation patterns, and head restrictions, we are forced to contradictory conclusions.

In principle, there are two possibilities of solving the dilemma: (i) The restrictive relative clause analysis is right (and the appositive, wrong), or (ii) The appositive relative clause analysis is right (and the restrictive, wrong).

If we arbitrarily adopt the former hypothesis, then the fact that proper names can appear as heads of the complements immediately falsifies such hypothesis.

If we assume the latter to be correct, then the distribution of 'que' and 'quien' and the absence of comma intonation show that it is false.

From this, it follows that neither of the contradictory conclusions can be independently maintained, and since both cannot be maintained simultaneously, the only possible conclusion is that the analysis that leads to these contradictions must be rejected, i.e. the examples in question
cannot be analysed as containing a relative clause, either restrictive or appositive.

5. Further Head Restrictions.

In one of my exploratory papers dealing with the topic of this Dissertation (Westphal (1979)), I observe that in examples such as (1) and (2), the antecedent of the anaphoric gap in the complement sentence can be a clitic:

(47) Lo vi [que ___ ponía el libro debajo de la mesa].

'I-saw him [that ___ was placing the book
under the table].'

(I saw him placing the book under the table.)

(48) Lo dejé [que ___ pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa].

'I-permitted him [that ___ he-place the book
under the table].'

(I permitted him to place the book under the table.)

and that clitics are never heads of relative clauses or 'factive-like' constructions [12]:
(49) *El profesor quiere regañarLOs
[que ___ pusieron el libro debajo de la mesa].
'The teacher wants to reprimend them
[that ___ placed the book under the table].'

(50) *Pedro va a llamarLO,
[que ___ estaba lavando el auto en el patio].
'Pedro is going to call him,
[that ___ was washing the car in the patio].'

(51) *Juan no puede aceptarLO
[que Pedro pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa].
'Juan cannot accept it
[that Pedro placed the book under the table].'

These facts provide additional evidence against the Heavy-NP Analysis.

6.- Tense and Mood Restrictions.

As pointed out by Suñer (1978: 114 & 117), in examples such as (1) and (2) the time expressed by the tense of the complement clause must be simultaneous with that of the matrix. Compare (52)-(53) with (54)-(55):
(52) *Lo veo [que ___ viene]. (Suñer #(18a))
   'I-see him [that ___ is coming].'
   (I see him coming.)

(53) *Lo dejé [que ___ viniera].
   'I-permitted him [that ___ he-came (Imperf. Subj.)].'
   (I permitted him to come.)

(54) *Lo veo [que ___ [venía/iba a venir]]. (Suñer #(19a))
   'I-see him [that ___ [was coming/was going to come]].'

(55) *Lo dejaré [que ___ viniera].
   'I-will-permit him [that ___ he-came (Imperf. Subj.)].'

This restriction does not hold in the case of relative clauses
or 'factive-like' constructions:

(56) Ayer conocí a ese señor
    [que ___ tiene 20 hijos]. (Suñer #(34a))
    'Yesterday I-met that man
    [that ___ has 20 children].'

(57) Hable con María, [que/quien ___ es re-lesa].
    'I-spoke with Maria, [that/who ___ is very stupid].'
No acepto el hecho

[que Juan pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa].
'I do not accept the fact
[that Juan placed the book under the table].'

The simultaneity-of-time-expressed-by-tense restriction that holds in the case of examples such as (52) and (53) strongly militates against the Heavy-NP analysis since relative clauses and 'factive-like' constructions do not observe such a restriction as attested throughout examples (56)-(58).

But this is not the only restriction that holds on the form of the verbs involved in this construction. Indeed, when the matrix verb is 'dejar' (permit, allow), the verb of the complement clause must be in the subjunctive:

(59) (No) lo dejé [que ___ viniera].
'I (didn't) permit him [that ___ he-came (Imperf. Subj.)].'
(I (didn't) permit him to come.)

(60) *(No) lo dejé [que ___ venía].
'I (didn't) permit him [that ___ was coming (Imperf. Ind.)].'

When the matrix verb is a verb of perception, such as 'ver' (see), the verb of the complement can be either indicative or subjunctive, but if the verb of perception is not negated, the subjunctive is impossible:
(61) (No) lo ví [que ___ venía].
'I (didn't) see him [that ___ was coming (Imperf. Ind.)].'
(I (didn't) see him coming.)

(62) (No/*Ø) lo ví [que ___ viniera].
'I (didn't/*Ø) see him [that ___ was coming (Imperf. Subj.)].'
(I didn't see him coming.)

According to Hooper (1973), Hooper and Terrel (1974), Terrel (1976), and Klein (1974) and (1977), the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive is determined, in Spanish, by the semantics of the matrix verb and its interaction with negation, although not all the authors cited agree on what exactly the intervening semantic factors are and on how predicates are to be classified with respect to those factors (cf. Klein (1977) for a fair discussion).

In the case of relatives, the matrix verb plays no role in the choice of the mood of the verb of the complement clause. Indeed, according to Ramsey (1894, Section 23.12),

"After a relative pronoun referring to a person, thing or idea which is either unknown or not definitely known, the verb of the dependent clause is subjunctive":
(63) Quiero un guía [que ___ hable inglés]. (Ramsey)
'**I-want a guide [that ___ speaks (Pres. Subj.) English].**'

(64) *Quiero un guía [que ___ hable inglés].
'I-want a guide [that ___ speaks (Pres. Ind.) English].'

Otherwise, the indicative is required:

(65) Quiero al guía [que ___ hable inglés].
'I-want the guide [that ___ speaks (Pres. Ind.) English].'

(66) *Quiero al guía [que ___ hable inglés].
'I-want the guide [that ___ speaks (Pres. Subj.) English].'

The claim that the matrix verb plays no role in the choice of mood in examples (63)-(64) and (65)-(66) is substantiated by the fact that 'querer' (want) obligatorily requires that the verb of its (tensed) complement clause be in the subjunctive:

(67) (No) quiero [que vengas].
'I (don't) want [that you-come (Pres. Subj.)].'

(68) *(No) quiero [que vienes].
'I (don't) want [that you-come (Pres. Ind.)].'

Since the distribution of the indicative and the subjunctive mood in relative clauses seems to be determined as per the terms
of Ramsey's quote above, we would expect the same distribution in the complement clauses of examples such as (1) and (2) if indeed these were relative clauses. Nevertheless, the fact that this distribution of the indicative and subjunctive is idiosyncratically determined by the matrix verb, as examples (59)-(62) show, proves that such clauses cannot be analysed as relative clauses.

Consequently, the restrictions on tense and mood that examples like (1) and (2) exhibit do not allow us to analyse them as containing a relative clause in object position.

7.- Summary.

In this Chapter, I have presented six arguments against the Heavy-NP Analysis [13]. Specifically, I have shown that examples such as (1) and (2) cannot be analysed as containing a restrictive relative clause, an appositive relative clause, or a 'factive-like' construction in object position because they do not obey the following general restrictions that have been motivated on independent grounds:
(i) The Complex-NP Constraint of Ross (1967), as subsumed under the terms of the Subjacency Condition of Chomsky (1973).

(ii) The Coordinate Structure Constraint of Ross (1967), if Emonds' (1979) analysis of appositives is assumed.

These two conditions are observed by Heavy NPs containing complement clauses.

Furthermore, I have also shown that the construction exemplified in (1) and (2) strictly adheres to the Opacity Condition of Chomsky (1980a), formerly the Specified Subject Condition of Chomsky (1973), whereas relative clauses, restrictive or appositive, exhibit an apparent violation of this condition.

All this constitutes strong theoretical evidence against the Heavy-NP Analysis.

In addition, I have shown that the object NP of examples such as (1) and (2) cannot be analysed as a 'factive-like' construction because of the obligatoriness of the anaphoric gap that the complement clause exhibits, and I have given some specific arguments against the relative clause analysis based on the distribution of relative pronouns, intonation patterns, and head, tense, and mood restrictions.
In light of all this evidence, it must be concluded that examples such as (1) and (2) do not exhibit a Heavy NP in object position.
[1] Example (1) has the following two readings:
(i) I saw Juan who was placing the book under the table.
(ii) I saw Juan placing the book under the table.

The intended reading of (1) is that under (ii), as indicated in the translation given in parenthesis in the text. In the case of example (2), this ambiguity does not arise.

[2] I am using the term 'heavy NP' to refer to relative clauses, both restrictive and non-restrictive, as well as 'factive-like' constructions.

The analyses presented under (3) and (4) are the traditional analyses for restrictive relative clauses and 'factive-like' constructions.

[3] Note that the only requirement of (9) is that the sentence must be dominated by a noun phrase 'with a lexical head noun'. Thus, Ross' diagram reproduced under (10) does not exhaust the possibilities referred to in (9).


[5] The Command Condition was originally formulated by Langacker (1969:167). For other formulations, cf. Lasnik (1976), who points out "that command is not statable as a Boolean condition on analyzability [... and that] the theory of transformations would have to be considerably enriched for command to play a role in the statement of transformations" (Lasnik (1976, footnote (2))). Thus, a condition such as Capacity, whose applicability crucially depends on command, cannot be considered a condition on transformations, but one on Logical Form, as proposed by Chomsky (1980a:12).

[6] Note that the Opacity Condition makes central use of the notion 'subject-of', just as its earlier formulations did (cf. the Specified Subject Condition of Chomsky (1973:239) and Chomsky (1977b:74)). In Relational Grammar (RG), Grammatical Relations (GRs) are assumed to be non-definable and have been assigned the status of 'primitives of syntactic theory' (cf. Perlmutter and Postal (1978), Postal (1974), and Klokeid (1980)). In his "Aspects of the Theory of Syntax" (1965:71), Chomsky defined 'subject-of' (in English) as [NP, S]. More
recently, he seems to be suggesting that Grammatical Relations, specifically that of 'subject-of' is not definable, but 'characterizable' in different ways in different languages, e.g. as [NP, S] in the case of English and Romance (cf. Chomsky (1977b:75-76)).

If the Opacity Condition indeed is a principle of Universal Grammar (UG), "which we may assume to be given as a part of biological endowment" (Chomsky (1980a:2)), then Chomsky is forced to the conclusion that at least the Grammatical Relation 'subject-of' is also "given" or innate, and—in this sense—a primitive. However, it must be pointed out that given the terms of the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979b), the notion 'subject of' ceases to be central to the framework.

[7] Whether such a gap (___) is a trace, PRO, or the result of a deletion under identity is irrelevant here.

[8] In the standard analysis of relatives, WH-Movement is assured to be involved, i.e. a [-WH]-element is base generated in the position of the surface structure gap, the single rule 'move alpha' transports such element to CCOMP position, and the trace left behind by the moved element is coindexed with this element by convention. Thus, although such trace can appear in the domain of a subject—as in the case of (34b), (34c), (35b), and (35c)—, it is not free, but bound within the boundaries of the corresponding clause. Under the terms of this analysis, there is no violation of the Opacity Condition.

[9] Obviously, the deviance of the examples under (37) is due to the fact that the selectional restrictions of the embedded verb have been violated. If such selectional restrictions are satisfied, the strings are perfectly acceptable as shown in (i) and (ii), but in this case we are no longer dealing with 'factive-like' constructions, but plain relative clauses:

(i) [el hecho [que ___ me convenció]]
    '[the fact [that ___ convinced me]]'

(ii) [el hecho [que no puedo aceptar ___]]
    '[the fact [that I-cannot accept ___]]'

[10] Furthermore, in many dialects, the complement clause of this construction is optionally introduced by the preposition (complementizer?) 'de' (of):

(i) Juan no puede aceptar el hecho (de) que Pedro pusiera el libro debajo de la mesa.

This is never the case of examples such as (1) and (2):
These facts provide additional evidence in favour of the conclusion of this Section.

[11] Example (44) is grammatical if it is interpreted as containing an object NP plus an appositive clause.

[12] The same observation is made in Suñer (1978:116), published in 1980. However, María-Luisa Rivero has pointed out to me that examples such as (i) might be considered counterevidence against the claim in the text, unless they are analysed as pseudo-relatives:

(i) Los hay que cantan.
'There exist that sing.'

If they are indeed pseudo-relatives, then they are only apparent counter-examples, and no problem arises.

[13] Suñer (1978) has two additional arguments that are original with her alone:

a. "Restrictive relative clauses are not semantically compatible with unique entities":

(i) *Conozco a Juan que jugaba ajedrez. (Suñer #(31a))
'I-know Juan that was playing chess.'

"The construction with perception verbs, however, is not subject to this constraint":

(ii) Ví a Juan que jugaba ajedrez. (Suñer #(32a))
'I-saw Juan that was playing chess.'
(I saw Juan playing chess.)

b. "Relative clauses do not exhibit any restrictions with respect to pseudo-modals such as 'poder' (be able [can]), 'scler' (be used to)":

(iii) Me presentaron un guía que puede llevarnos al lugar exacto. (Suñer #(35a))
'They introduced me to a guide that can take us to the exact place.'

(iv) *Lc veo que puede levantarse a las 6. (Suñer #(21))
'I see him that he-can get up at 6.'
Cf. Sümer (1978:117-118) for the details of these arguments.

As pointed out in the text (cf. Sections 5 and 6), Sümer (1978) also observes that clitics cannot be heads of relative clauses (1978:116), and that the construction under study is sensitive to some tense restrictions that relative clauses are not sensitive to (1978:117). Finally, she points out that "relative pronouns may undertake a subject function [...] an object function [...] or an object of a preposition function[...], whereas the 'gue' after 'perception verb + object' is limited to the subject function only" (1978:117), but she fails to relate this observation to the relevant syntactic constraint, namely the Specified Subject Condition of Chomsky (1973), cf. my argument based on the Opacity Condition, Section 3 of this Chapter.
CHAPTER III:

THE 'MOVE ALPHA' ANALYSIS.

In Chapter One, I showed that Suñer's arguments against the common source analysis of examples (a) and (b) below do not actually hold with respect to the actual perception reading they share:

(1) a. Ví [que María bailaba cueca].
   'I-saw [that María was dancing the 'cueca'].'

   b. Ví a María [que ___ bailaba cueca].
   'I-saw María [that ___ was dancing the 'cueca'].'
   (I saw María dancing the 'cueca'.)

(2) a. Dejé [que María bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted [that María danced the 'cueca'].'

   b. Dejé a María [que ___ bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted María [that ___ danced the 'cueca'].'
   (I permitted María to dance the 'cueca'.)

Hence, it is possible to assume that the examples in question share a common deep structure and that the (b) examples are
transformationally related to the (a) examples via the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha' (cf. Chomsky (1980a:3-5)).

In accordance with trace theory, movement of the category alpha is supposed 'to leave behind' the category \[\alpha e\], which is coindexed with alpha by convention, as an effect of the movement rule itself (cf. Chomsky (1975:75), (1976:172), (1980a:4), and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:432-439)). In informal notation, \[\alpha e\] is currently represented as t (trace).

Under the terms of this approach, examples (1b) and (2b) would exhibit a trace in the position of the anaphoric gap of the complement clause:

(3) Ví a María [que t bailaba cueca]. (cf. (1b))
    'I-saw Maria [that t was dancing the 'cueca'].'
    (I saw Maria dancing the 'cueca'.)

(4) Dejé a María [que t bailara cueca]. (cf. (2b))
    'I-permitted Maria [that t danced the 'cueca'].'
    (I permitted Maria to dance the 'cueca'.)

In principle, two possibilities are available to justify the presence of the trace assumed in (3) and (4), namely that the moved element is a NP or a WH element. In this Chapter, I will examine these two alternative hypotheses and I will show that they are theoretically untenable.
1.- The 'Move WH' Analysis.

In this Section, I will assume—for the sake of the argument—that examples (b) below arise via application of the rule 'Move WH':

(5) a. Yo ví [que Juan tocaba la guitarra].
    'I saw [that Juan was playing the guitar].'

    b. Yo ví a Juan [que ___ tocaba la guitarra].
    'I saw Juan [that ___ was playing the guitar].
    (I saw Juan playing the guitar.)

(6) a. Yo dejé [que Juan tocara la guitarra].
    'I permitted [that Juan played the guitar].'

    b. Yo dejé a Juan [que ___ tocara la guitarra].
    'I permitted Juan [that ___ played the guitar].'
    (I permitted Juan to play the guitar.)

Under the terms of this analysis, examples (5b) and (6b) would be derived from structures like (7) and (8), in a fashion similar to that of relative clauses:
(7) Yo [ví [a Juan] [que WH-ELEMENT tocaba la guitarra]].
'I [saw [Juan] [that WH-ELEMENT was playing the guitar]].'

(8) Yo [dejé [a Juan] [que WH-ELEMENT tocara la guitarra]].
'I [permitted [Juan] [that WH-ELEMENT played the guitar]].

This analysis requires the following assumptions:

(9) a. The deep structures of examples (5b) and (6b) are (7) and (8), respectively, i.e. the matrix object is base generated 'in situ' and the surface structure anaphoric gap in the position of the complement subject corresponds to a WH element in deep structure.

   b. WH-Movement applies, i.e. the putative WH element in (7) and (8) is moved to COMP position, leaving a WH trace behind, and

   c. The WH element in COMP position is deleted under identity with the matrix object.

If this analysis is correct, it should meet the tests for WH-Movement proposed by Chomsky (1977b:86), according to whom the rule of WH-Movement has the general properties listed under (10):
(10) a. It leaves a gap.

b. Where there is bridge, there is an apparent violation of Subjacency, the Propositional Island Condition (PIC), and the Specified Subject Condition (SSC).

c. It observes the Complex-NP Constraint (CNPC).

d. It observes WH-Island Constraints.

According to Chomsky (1977b:86), where we find the configuration (10) in some system of data, we can explain it on the assumption that the configuration results from WH-Movement.

In this Section, I will examine the assumptions under (9) in the light of Chomsky's tests listed under (10), and I will show that the 'Move WH' analysis of examples such as (5b) and (6b) is untenable because the structures in question fail to pass the corresponding tests.

Although some of the conditions listed in (10) have been revised in the most recent literature, those revisions still incorporate the general principles underlying the formulations of Chomsky (1977b) and they do not affect the form of the arguments below. In other terms, the arguments that follow are perfectly
translatable into a framework that incorporates the revised versions of the conditions under (10).

The discussion that follows is contextualized in the framework of Chomsky (1977b).

1.1. - The Anaphoric Gap.

According to (10a), WH-Movement leaves a gap. In the standard analysis of relative clauses, WH-Movement is involved. The gap is indicated with a trace in the examples below. Such a gap is obligatory:

(11) a. This is [the man [that t came yesterday]].

b. Este es [el hombre [que t vino ayer]].

(12) a. *This is [the man [that [the mar/he] came yesterday]].

b. *Este es [el hombre [que [el hombre/el] vino ayer]].

The same gap is observable in the examples under study. Since WH-Movement is being assumed in this Section, such a gap is also indicated with a trace in the examples below:
(13) a. **Yo [vi [a Juan] [que t tocaba la guitarra]].**
   'I [saw [Juan] [that t was playing the guitar]].

   b. **Yo [dejé [a Juan] [que t tocara la guitarra]].**
   'I [permitted [Juan] [that t played the guitar]].

(14) a. *Yo [vi [a Juan] [que [Juan/el] tocaba la guitarra]].
   'I [saw [Juan] [that [Juan/he] was playing the guitar]].

   b. *Yo [deje [a Juan] [que [Juan/el] tocara la guitarra]].
   'I [permitted [Juan] [that [Juan/he] played the guitar]].'

Since the grammatical status of examples (11)-(12) and (13)-(14) is exactly parallel with respect to the existence of the anaphoric gap in the complement sentence, and examples (11) involve WH-Movement in the standard analysis, it can be assumed that the examples under (13) also involve WH-Movement. In other terms, the Spanish construction under study also exhibits a gap that can be assumed to arise via the application of the rule 'move WH'. If this is correct, then the structures in question should also pass the other tests listed in (10) above.
1.2. - The Apparent Violation of the Subjacency Condition.

Where there is a bridge [1], application of the rule 'move WH' appears to violate the Subjacency Condition, which is reproduced below for convenience:

(15) The Subjacency Condition (cf. Chomsky (1977b:73)):

"A cyclic rule cannot move a phrase from position $Y$ to position $X$ (or conversely) in [the structure]:

$$
\cdots X \cdots [\alpha^\prime \cdots [\beta \cdots Y \cdots ] \cdots ] \cdots X \cdots ,
$$

where alpha and beta are cyclic nodes."

The following examples illustrate the apparent violation of the Subjacency Condition:

(16) a. This is THE MAN [that John said [that Mary dreamt
[that t had kissed her]]].

b. Este es EL HOMBRE [que Juan dijo [que María soñó
[que t la había besado]]].
In (16), the head of the relative clause is to be correlated with \( X \) in (15) and the trace in the most embedded sentence, with \( Y \). Each bracket indicates the presence of a cyclic node, namely \( S' \).

Under the assumption that WH-Movement is a long-distance movement, examples (16a) and (16b) constitute a violation of (15). Nevertheless, there is no violation of such a condition if it is assumed that WH-Movement is successive cyclic. According to this assumption, the WH element is moved to COMP, and from COMP to COMP in each cycle, in an iterative fashion. If this is indeed the case, then the Subjacency Condition is observed. (Cf. Chomsky (1977b) for discussion.)

Let us now consider the Spanish data under study:

(17) a. *Yo ví a JUAN [que dijeron [que soñaron [que t tocaba la guitarra]]].
   'I saw Juan [that they-said [that they-dreamt [that t was playing the guitar]]].

b. *Yo dejé a JUAN [que dijeran [que soñaron [que t tocaba la guitarra]]].
   'I permitted JUAN [that they-said [that they-dreamt [that t played the guitar]]].
In examples (17), the matrix object is to be correlated with X in (15), and the trace in the most embedded sentence, with Y. Each bracket indicates the presence of the cyclic node S'.

Basically, the structures in (17) are parallel to those in (16) with respect to the position of the elements related and the number of intervening cyclic nodes.

If the structures in (17) were instances of WH-Movement, they should be grammatical, in the same way those under (16) are. The fact that they are not shows that WH-Movement cannot be involved in the constructions under study because they observe the Subjacency Condition.

1.3.- The Apparent Violation of the PIC.

--------------------

The Propositional Island Condition is a revised version of the Tensed-S Condition of Chomsky (1973) [2]:

(18) The Propositional Island Condition (PIC):

"No rule can involve X and Y where alpha is a finite clause (tensed-S) [in the structure]:"
Consider examples (11) and (13), reproduced here as (19) and (20):

(19) a. This is THE MAN [that t came yesterday].

b. Este es EL HOMBRE [que t vino ayer].

(20) a. Yo vi a JUAN [que t tocaba la guitarra].

'I saw JUAN [that t was playing the guitar].'

(I saw Juan playing the guitar.)

b. Yo dejé a JUAN [que t tocara la guitarra].

'I permitted JUAN [that t played the guitar].

(I permitted Juan to play the guitar.)

In both (19) and (20), the lexical elements in caps are to be correlated with \( X \) in (18), the trace in the complement sentence with \( Y \), and the S' bracket with alpha. Alpha is a tensed sentence. Under the assumption that WH-Movement into COMP is involved, both types of structures exhibit an apparent violation of the Propositional Island Condition, since the Propositional

\[
... X ... [\alpha ... Y ... ] ... X ...
\]

where \( Y \) is not in COMP." (Cf. Chomsky (1977b: 73-74, 85))
Island Condition explicitly allows rules to relate X and Y over a tensed S boundary if Y is in COMP.

Since the structures under (20) exhibit the same apparent violation of the Posititional Island Condition that those under (19) exhibit, and the former involve WH-Movement in the standard analysis, the latter can also be assumed to involve the same process.

1.4.- The Apparent Violation of the SSC.

The Specified Subject Condition was originally proposed in Chomsky (1973) [3]:

(21) The Specified Subject Condition (SSC):

"No rule can involve X and Y where alpha contains a specified subject, i.e. a subject not containing Y and not controlled by X [in the structure]:

\[ ... X \ldots [\alpha^{\ldots} Y \ldots ] \ldots X \ldots, \]

where Y is not in COMP." (Cf. Chomsky (1977b: 73-74, 85))
In the following examples, the head of the relative clause is to be correlated with X and the trace in the complement clause, with Y. Alpha is the complement sentence, which contains a specified subject, i.e. a subject that does not contain Y and is not anaphoric to X, the head of the relative:

(22) a. This is THE MAN [that Peter saw t].

   b. Este es EL HOMBRE [que Pedro vio t].

The structures in question exhibit an apparent violation of the Specified Subject Condition, but--again--no violation can be invoked under the assumption that the WH element is moved from the position of the trace to COMP.

If the structures under study in this thesis indeed involved WH-Movement, they should also exhibit the same apparent violation, i.e. they should be grammatical under the same conditions that those under (22) are, but they are not:

(23) a. *Yo vi a JUAN [que Pedro castigó t].
    'I saw JUAN [that Pedro punished t].'

   b. *Yo dejé a JUAN [que Pedro castigara t].
    'I permitted JUAN [that Pedro punished t].'
Consequently, they cannot be analysed as instances of WH-Movement.

1.5.- The Complex-NP Constraint.

WH-Movement observes the Complex-NP Constraint of Ross (1967), (cf. * (9), Chapter Two). Unfortunately, this is not testable in the case of the constructions under study, since the predicates in question can take the following complements only (infinitives aside):

(24) Verbs of Perception:

a. Verb of Perception + NP:
   Juan vio la película.
   'Juan saw the movie.'

b. Verb of Perception + S':
   Juan vio que Pedro tocaba la guitarra.
   'Juan saw that Pedro was playing the guitar.'

c. Verb of Perception + NP + S':
   Juan vic a Pedro que ___ tocaba la guitarra.
'Juan saw Pedro that ___ was playing the guitar.'
(Juan saw Pedro playing the guitar.)

(25) The Causative 'dejar' (allow, permit):

a. DEJAR + S':
Juan dejó que Pedro tocara la guitarra.
'Juan permitted that Pedro played the guitar.'

b. DEJAR + NP + S':
Juan dejó a Pedro que ___ tocara la guitarra.
'Juan permitted Pedro that ___ played the guitar.'
(Juan permitted Pedro to play the guitar.)

Neither verbs of perception nor the causative 'dejar' can take two complement NPs

(26) *Juan vio la película el libro.
'Juan saw the movie the book.'

(27) *Juan dejó a María a Pedro.
'Juan permitted Maria Pedro.'

Given these restrictions, the structures below are bound to be ungrammatical:
(28) *Yo vi [a Juan] [el hecho [que ...]].
    'I saw [Juan] [the fact [that ...]].'

(29) *Yo dejé [a Juan] [el hecho [que ...]].
    'I permitted [Juan] [the fact [that ...]].'

These are the only type of structures that would have served to test the WH-Movement hypothesis in the case of the constructions under study. Nevertheless, this is not critical since WH-Movement is supposed to pass all of Chomsky's tests listed under (10) above, and the constructions verb of perception or 'dejar' + NP + S' have already failed to pass the test of Subjacency and the Specified Subject Condition.

1.6. WH-Island Phenomena.

According to the terms of the analysis being examined in this section, examples such as (30) below are assumed to arise via WH-Movement, i.e. the anaphoric gap in the complement subject position is occupied by the trace left behind by a WH element that has been moved into COMP position by virtue of the rule 'move WH':
(30) a. Tú viste a Juan [que __ puso el libro EN CUAL ESTANTE]?  
'You saw Juan [that __ placed the book IN WHICH SHELF]?'

b. Tú dejaste a Juan [que __ pusiera el libro

       EN CUAL ESTANTE]?

'You permitted Juan [that __ placed the book

       IN WHICH SHELF]?'

Following Rivero (1980:381), I am assuming that WH-Movement into COMP adjoins the WH element to the right of the complementizer in Spanish:

(31) a. Tú viste a Juan [ [que WH] [ t puso el libro

       ↑_____] EN CUAL ESTANTE ] ]?

'You saw Juan [ [that WH] [ t placed the book

       ↑_____] IN WHICH SHELF ] ]?'

b. Tú dejaste a Juan [ [que WH] [ t pusiera el libro

       ↑_____] EN CUAL ESTANTE ] ]?

'You permitted Juan [ [that WH] [ t placed the book

       ↑_____] IN WHICH SHELF ] ]?'

If the analysis provided in (31) is indeed correct, no additional WH-Movement should be possible since according to Chomsky (1973:244-245) a WH-Phrase cannot be moved over a COMP that is already filled.
Consider the abbreviated structure given under (32):

(32) Dijo [ [que] [ le darían ¿Qué A QUIÉN ]]?

'He-said [ [that] [ they-would-give WHAT TO WHOM ]]?'

If WH-Movement applies in the first cycle, it can apply to either the direct or to the indirect object:

(33) a. Dijo [ [que ¿Qué] [ le darían t A QUIÉN ]]?

'He-said [ [that WHAT] [they-would-give t TO WHOM ]]?'

b. Dijo [ [que A QUIÉN] [ le darían ¿Qué t ]]?

'He-said [ [that TC WHOM] [ they-would-give WHAT t ]]?'

Once WH-Movement has applied as in (33), it cannot apply again in the first cycle:

(34) a. *Dijo [ [que ¿Qué A QUIÉN] [ le darían t t ]]?

'He-said [ [that WHAT TC WHOM] [they-would-give t t ]]?'

b. *Dijo [ [que A QUIÉN ¿Qué] [ le darían t t ]]?

'He-said [ [that TO WHOM WHAT] [they-would-give t t ]]?'

Given structures such as (33), WH-Movement can apply in the second cycle. If it does, it can only move the WH element in COMP, not the one that was not moved in the first cycle:
(35) a. QUÉ dijo [ [que t] [ le darían t a QUIÉN] ]?

"WHAT did-he-say [ [that t] [they-would give t TO WHOM] ]?"

d. A QUIÉN dijo [ [que t] [ le darían QUÉ t ] ]?

"TO WHOM did-he-say [ [that t] [they-would give WHAT t ]]?"

(36) a. *A QUIÉN dijo [ [que QUÉ] [ le darían t t ]]?

"TO WHOM did-he-say [ [that WHAT] [they-would-give t t ]]?"

d. *QUÉ dijo [ [que A QUIÉN] [le darían t t ]]?

"WHAT did-he-say [ [that TO WHOM] [they-would give t t ]]?"

Examples (36) are ungrammatical because they violate the Propositional Island Constraint (cf. (18) above) and the Superiority Condition of Chomsky (1973:246):

(37) The Superiority Condition (cf. Chomsky (1973:246)):

"No rule can involve X, Y in the structure

... X ... [α ... Z ... W Y Z ... ] ...,

where the rule applies ambiguously to Z and Y
and Z is superior to Y."
Since the WH elements in COMP position in (33) are structurally superior to the WH elements in the VP, WH-Movement cannot apply to the latter. Hence, examples like (36) are ruled out.

Once the innermost COMP is vacated in the second cycle, as in (35), the WH element in the VP cannot be moved to the innermost COMP because Strict Cyclicity would be violated:


"No rule can apply to a domain dominated by a cyclic node A in such a way as to affect solely a proper subdomain of A dominated by a node B which is also a cyclic node."

This covers all the possibilities of WH-Movement given structures such as (32) and proves that the Superiority Condition interacts with the Propositional Island Condition and the Strict Cycle Condition to rule out the relevant ungrammatical cases.

Let us now see how these same conditions apply in the case of the structures under study, given the analysis under (31). If WH-Movement was indeed involved, then the corresponding structures should also exhibit WH-Island Phenomena.
Consider (39) below:

(39) a. *Tú viste a Juan [ [(que) EN CUAL ESTANTE] [ t puso el libro t ] ]?
    'You-saw Juan [ [(that) IN WHICH SHELF] [ t placed the book t ] ]?'

b. *Tú dejaste a Juan [ [(que) EN CUAL ESTANTE] [ t pusiera el libro t ] ]?
    'You-permitted Juan [ [(that) IN WHICH SHELF] [ t placed the book t ] ]?'

These examples are ungrammatical, and their ungrammaticality can be attributed to the Conditions discussed above since under the terms of the analysis assumed in (31), the COMP position is already filled:

(40) a. *Tú viste a Juan [ [(que WH EN CUAL ESTANTE] [ t puso el libro t ] ]?

b. *Tú dejaste a Juan [ [(que WH EN CUAL ESTANTE] [ t puso el libro t ] ]?

Nevertheless, the ungrammaticality of examples (39) and (40) contrasts with the grammaticality of those under (41):
If WH-Movement was involved in the construction under study, examples such as (41) should also be ungrammatical because of the Superiority Condition, the Propositional Island Condition, and Strict Cyclicity, depending on which WH element is moved first and how. Let us consider the logical possibilities.

Basically, examples such as (41) are supposed to be derived from structures such as (42):

(41) a. EN CUAL ESTANTE viste a Juan que __ puso el libro?
   'IN WHICH SHELF did-you-see Juan that __ placed
   the book?'

   b. EN CUAL ESTANTE dejaste a Juan que __ pusiera el libro?
   'IN WHICH SHELF did-you-permit Juan that __ placed
   the book?'

(42) a. COMO viste a Juan [ [que][WH puso el libro
   EN CUAL ESTANTE] ]?
   'COMO you-saw Juan [ [that][WH placed the book
   IN WHICH SHELF] ]?'

   b. COMO dejaste a Juan [ [que][WH pusiera el libro
   EN CUAL ESTANTE] ]?
   'COMO you-permitted Juan [ [that][WH placed the book
   IN WHICH SHELF] ]?'
If the WH element in the complement subject position assumed in this analysis is moved into the innermost COMP in the first cycle, then the WH locative cannot be moved to that COMP in the same cycle because that COMP is already filled. This is the putative explanation for the ungrammaticality of (39).

In the second cycle, the WH locative cannot be moved directly to the outer COMP because this would violate the Superiority Condition and the Propositional Island Condition. Nevertheless, such a locative does appear in the position of the outer COMP in (41).

Instead, if the WH locative is moved first, in the first cycle, then there is an alternative putative explanation for the ungrammaticality of (39), namely the Superiority Condition, since the WH locative would be moved over a WH subject. Furthermore, the WH element in the complement subject position cannot be moved in the same cycle because the corresponding COMP is already filled.

In the second cycle, the WH locative in the innermost COMP can be moved to the outer COMP, but then the WH element in the complement subject position cannot be moved to the vacated COMP because this would violate Strict Cyclicity.

Either way, the proposed conditions predict that examples such as (41) should be ungrammatical under the assumption that there
is a WH element in the complement subject position. Nevertheless, they are not.

If we assume that no WH element is present in the complement subject position of (42), then the grammaticality of (41) follows in a natural way, but then we are left with no principled explanation for the ungrammaticality of (39).

Considering (i) that the proposed conditions do hold in Spanish as shown in the discussion of examples (32)-(36), (ii) that the assumption that there is a WH element in the complement subject position of the structures under study is not warranted by Subjacency and the Specified Subject Condition, and (iii) that the grammaticality of examples such as (41) shows that the structures under study do not exhibit WH-Island Phenomena, the ungrammaticality of (39) cannot be attributed to the relevant conditions. Presumably, such ungrammaticality is due to idiosyncratic properties of the matrix verbs, whose contextual features do not allow WH elements in the CCMP position of their complement sentences. [4]
2.- The 'Move NP' Analysis.

As we have seen in the last Section, the structures under study cannot be assumed to arise via WH-Movement. However, it is perfectly possible that they be analysed as instances of NP-Movement. This Section is devoted to an examination of such a possibility.

2.1.- The Structure Preserving Constraint.

Chomsky (1980a:4) claims that

"NP-Movement must be structure preserving in the sense of Emonds (1976) if well formed representations in LF [Logical Form, G.P.W.] are to be generated." [5]

According to this, if the structures under study arise via NP-Movement, such movement must be structure preserving.

Emonds (1976:3) gives the following definition of a structure preserving transformation:
(43) Structure-Preserving Transformation:

"A transformation [...] that introduces or substitutes a constituent C into a position in a phrase marker held by a node C is called 'structure preserving'."

In other terms,

"a transformational operation is structure preserving if it moves, copies, or inserts a node C into some position where C can be otherwise generated by the grammar" (Emonds (1976:3)).

Crucially, according to Emonds (1976), the nodes into which constituents are moved, copied, or inserted must be independently generated by the grammar. In Emonds' theory, such nodes are identified by the presence of the designated terminal element $\Delta$, and they are currently known as 'empty nodes'. [6]

Thus, for the structures under study to be derived in a structure preserving fashion, it is necessary to justify the presence of an empty matrix object NP, as in the dendrograms below: [7]
(44)

(S)
  /  \\  
(NP)  (VP)
    /   \\
   (V)  (NP)  (S')
     /   |   |
    que  María
   / \
(NP)  (VP)
    /   \\
   bailaba  cueca.
Iaria kailara cueca.

(45)
The justification for the phrase structure rules of Spanish to generate phrase markers of the form (44) and (45) is found in examples like (46):

\[(46)\]

Since the phrase structure rules of Spanish can independently generate phrase markers containing an object NP plus a complement clause, as attested by the existence of examples like (46), the NP-Movement indicated by the arrow in (44) and (45) can be motivated as a structure-preserving transformation. [8]

Nevertheless, this claim cannot be maintained when clitics are involved. Consider the examples below:
(47) a. Vi [que (ella) bailaba cueca].
   'I-saw [that (she) was dancing the 'cueca'].'

   b. La vi [que ____ bailaba cueca].
   'I-saw her [that ____ was dancing the 'cueca'].'
   (I saw her dancing the 'cueca'.)

(48) a. Dejej [que (ella) bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted [that (she) danced 'cueca'].'
   (I permitted her to dance the 'cueca'.)

   b. La dej [que ____ bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted her [that ____ danced the 'cueca'].'
   (I-permitted her to dance the 'cueca'.)

Indeed, since (syntactically) clitics are not NPs [9], the matrix object clitics in the (b) examples cannot originate in the complement subject position [10]. By the same token, the pronominal subject NP in the (a) examples cannot move into the matrix object clitic position without violating the Structure Preserving Constraint. Consequently, the existence of examples such as (9b) and (10b) cannot be accounted for by NP-Movement if the Structure Preserving Constraint is to be maintained [11].

Of course, it could be argued that in the case of examples (47b) and (48b) are indeed derived via NP-Movement, from subject to object position in a structure preserving fashion, and that only
cliticization is non-structure preserving. However, the literature is abundant in arguments against cliticization. (Cf. Rivas (1977), Strozer (1976), and—more recently—Jaeggli (1980).) [12]

Thus, the Structure Preserving Constraint provides well motivated theoretical evidence against a movement analysis of the structures under study.

2.2.- The Sub-Theory of Case, the Case-Inheritance Convention, and the Case-Conflict Prohibition.

The second argument against the NP-Movement Analysis is based on the Sub-Theory of Case developed by Chomsky (1979a), (1979b), and (1979c). (Cf. Koster (1979) for a summary of Chomsky (1979b))

Consider examples (49) and (50):

(49) a. Ví [que María bailaba cueca].
    'I-saw [that Maria was dancing the 'Cueca'].
(50) a. Dejé [que María bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted [that María danced the 'Cueca'].'

   b. Dejé a María [que ___ bailara cueca].
   'I-permitted María [that ___ danced the 'Cueca'].'

In the (a) examples, the NP 'María' is the subject of the tensed complement sentence, whereas in the (b) examples the same NP is the object of the matrix clause. This is attested by the fact that in the former case, such NP can be replaced by a subject pronoun (whose presence is optional at the surface level), and in the latter, it can be replaced by a direct object clitic:

(51) a. Ví [que (ella) bailaba cueca]. (cf. (49a))
   'I-saw [that (she) danced the 'Cueca'].'

   b. La ví [que ___ bailaba cueca]. (cf. (49b))
   'I-saw her [that ___ danced the 'Cueca'].'

(52) a. Dejé [que (ella) bailara cueca]. (cf. (50a))
   'I-permitted [that (she) danced the 'Cueca'].''
b. La dejé [que ___ bailara cueca]. (cf. (50b))
'I-permitted her [that ___ danced the 'Cueca']. '

According to Chomsky (1979b), subjects of tensed sentences are case-marked nominative, and objects objective. More specifically, the following rules apply (cf. Chomsky (1979b:9):

(53) a. NF ---> Nominative if governed by Tense. [13]
   b. NP ---> Objective if governed by -N.
   c. NP ---> Inherently case marked elsewhere, as determined by idiosyncratic properties of -N.
   d. N ---> genitive in [NP N X']. (English)

These rules require some qualifications:

(54) Government:

Alpha governs beta if alpha minimally c-commands beta and there is no S' or NP between alpha and beta. (Cf. Chomsky (1979b:6-7)) [14]

For alpha to be a governor, it must be a lexical category or tense: "NF does not govern, but N does. Similarly A [Adjective], P [Preposition], and V [Verb] govern, i.e. we have alpha = +/-N +/-V" (Chomsky (1979b:6)), as per the terms of the following correlations:
Lexical Categories (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:430)):

```
+ N           - N
+ V  Adjective  Verb
- V  Noun      Preposition
```

The 'case assigners' are tense and the -N categories in (55), i.e. verbs and prepositions (cf. Chomsky (1979b:3-4, 9-10)).

According to Chomsky (1979b:9), Case Assignment Rules such as those reproduced under (53) apply at the trace-enriched surface structure level, which he calls 'S-Structure'. Obviously, at this level some instances of alpha would remain caseless. Specifically, subjects of infinitives that remain in deep-structure position by default of the optional rule 'move alpha' (if exceptional case marking does not apply), and WH-Phrases in COMP position, which is ungoverned. Hence, Chomsky (1979b) proposes the Case Filter and the convention I term the 'Case-Inheritance Convention':

(56) The Case Filter:

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*[^N phonetic matrix], if NP has no Case. (1979b:4) [15]
```
(57) The Case-Inheritance Convention:

A lexical alpha inherits its case from the trace it ultimately controls. (1979b:9)

Given Case Assignment Rules such as (53), the Case Filter, and the Case-Inheritance Convention, the right predictions are made in the case of both NP and WH-Movement:

(58) a. *Parece [tú estar hasta la coronilla con la política].

*It seems [you to be up to the eyes with politics].

b. Tú pareces [t estar hasta la coronilla con la política].

You seem [t to be up to the eyes with politics].

(59) a. *A quién [dijiste [que t eludió su responsabilidad]]?

*Whom [did you say [t avoided his responsibility]]?

b. Quién [dijiste [que t eludió su responsabilidad]]?

Who [did you say [t avoided his responsibility]]?

In (58a), the optional rule 'move alpha' has not applied. Since the subject of the complement clause is not governed by tense, rule (53a) cannot apply, and the structure is out by the Case Filter.
In (59a), the WH-Phrase in COMP position is ungoverned. Thus, it cannot be assigned case in terms of government. It has been assigned objective case arbitrarily. The structure is out because the case it bears is not the one its trace has.

The corresponding (b) examples are grammatical because the Case Filter does not apply, and the Case-Inheritance Convention has been observed.

Nevertheless, one problem remains and this deals with the fact that given rules such as (53) and the Case Inheritance Convention, application of the rule 'move alpha' might lead to double case assignment, as in the examples below:

(60) a. *[Mary was written to t].
    b. *[Who [t was written to t]]?

The ungrammaticality of (60) has no explanation in a theory like the EST, where the single transformational rule 'move alpha' applies freely, unless the following convention is incorporated into the grammar, as part of the Sub-Theory of Case:

(61) The Case Conflict Prohibition:

"Case conflict is prohibited." (Cf. Chomsky (1979b:14))
Basically, this is the Sub-Theory of Case. Let us now see how it applies to examples (49b) and (50b), if analysed as instances of NP-Movement. The following is the relevant structure:

The matrix subject is assigned nominative case by rule (53a) because it is governed by tense, and so is the trace in the complement subject position. The matrix object is assigned objective case by rule (53b) because it is governed by the matrix verb.
According to trace theory, the matrix object is coindexed with its trace in the complement subject position, as an effect of the movement assumed. Since the trace is nominative, the matrix object should also be nominative by virtue of the Case Inheritance Convention. Furthermore, since the matrix object is objective by virtue of (53b), a case conflict should arise and the structure should be ungrammatical as predicted by the Case Conflict Prohibition. The fact that it is not strongly militates against the NP-Movement Analysis.

In other terms, the Sub-Theory of Case predicts that a movement analysis of the structure in question is impossible because if that were the case, the structure should be ungrammatical. The fact that it is not, shows that NP-Movement is not involved.

2.3.- The Empty Category Principle.

The Empty Category Principle (ECP) is one of the most interesting revisions introduced by Chomsky in the Extended Standard Theory, in the course of his lectures in Pisa (cf. Chomsky (1979b, Lecture III):
(63) The Empty Category Principle (ECP):

"[\text{n}^\text{e}] must be [properly] governed."  (1979b:44)

(64) Proper Government (cf. (54) and (55) above):

"Alpha properly governs beta iff alpha governs beta and

a. Alpha = [+/-N; +/-V] OR

b. Alpha is coindexed with beta."  (1979b:44)

According to Chomsky (1979b), languages such as Spanish and Italian have indices in the agreement (AG), and agreement governs [16]. This is Chomsky's explanation for the 'long distance WH-Movement' from subject position observable in these languages, and that English lacks:

(65) QUIÉN dijiste [ [que][ t llegó ayer]]?

WHO did-you-say [ [that][t arrived yesterday]]?

(66) a. *WHO did you say [ [that][t arrived yesterday]]?

b. WHO did you say [ [ t][t arrived yesterday]]?

The trace in (65), i.e. [\text{n}^\text{e}] in formal notation, is properly governed by AG, and the structure is grammatical, whereas the
trace in the English example (66a) is not properly governed, and the structure is out. Since English has no indices in the agreement, for the trace of WH-Movement from subject position to be properly governed, a 'governing' trace is obligatory in COMP. Under the terms of trace theory the trace in COMP position in (66b) is ccindexed with the trace in subject position, and under the terms of the Sub-Theory of Government, the former properly governs the latter. Hence, the difference in grammaticality between (66a) and (66b).

Let us now see how the Empty Category Principle applies to the analysis of the construction under study, assuming that Chomsky (1979b) is basically right with respect to AG Government in Spanish, and that the (t) examples below are derived via NP Movement:

(67) a. Escuché [que Juan tocaba la guitarra].

'I-heard [that Juan was playing the guitar].'

b. Escuché a Juan [que t tocaba la guitarra].

'I-heard Juan [that t was playing the guitar].'

(I heard Juan playing the guitar.)

(68) a. Dejé [que Juan tocara la guitarra].

'I-permitted [that Juan played the guitar].'
b. Dejé a Juan [que t tocara la guitarra].

'I-permitted Juan [that t played the guitar].

(I permitted Juan to play the guitar.)

If AG governs in Spanish, as Chomsky (1979b) claims, then the trace assumed in the complement subject position is properly governed, and the structures in question should be grammatical, as in fact they are. Thus, the Empty Category Principle appears to support the NP Movement analysis in the case of the (b) examples above. Basically, what this entails is that Subject-to-Object Raising is possible out of a tensed complement clause in Spanish.

If raising out of tensed clauses is indeed possible in Spanish, one would expect it to be a generalized phenomenon in the language if the same governing conditions are met, i.e. if the Empty Category Principle is observed. According to this, Subject-to-Subject Raising should also be possible out of tensed clauses.

The verb 'parecer' (seem) is a raising verb in Spanish (cf. Garcia-Pinto and Luján (1974)), as attested by the following examples:

(69) a. Parece [que Juan y María estan cansados de bailar cueca].

'It-seems [that Juan and María are tired of dancing the 'Cueca']."
b. Juan y María parecen [t estar cansados de bailar cueca].

'Juan and Maria seem [t to be tired of dancing the 
'Cueca'].

Nevertheless, Subject-to-Subject Raising is only possible out of an infinitival complement clause. Not of a tensed clause. Compare (69b) and (70) below:

(70) *Juan y María parecen [que t estan cansados de bailar]. [17]

'Juan and Maria seem [that t are tired of dancing].

Again, if AG governs in Spanish, then the trace in (70) is properly governed as per the terms of the Empty Category Principle, and the structure should be grammatical, but it is not.

Obviously, the putative raising out of tensed clauses is not a unified phenomenon in the language. Furthermore, the contradictory evidence here examined renders the Empty Category Principle absolutely superfluous. Indeed, if the raising analysis is to be maintained, then we would be forced to say that raising out of tensed clauses is possible in Spanish when the matrix verb is a verb of perception or the causative 'dejar', as predicted by the Empty Category Principle, but not when the matrix verb is 'parecer', contrary to what the same principle predicts. A contradiction of this sort is untenable, both on logical and theoretical grounds.
Since this contradiction arises as a result of the raising analysis assumed, and does not follow from the Empty Category Principle per se, but rather from its application to that analysis, the rational move is not to give up the principle, but the analysis.

2.4. - S' as an Absolute Boundary for Movement.

Chomsky (1979b:46) observes that "S' is an absolute boundary for movement".

As an illustrative example of what the consequences of this restriction are, consider the syntactic behaviour of 'believe' in English, which has the property of assigning 'exceptional case marking' according to Chomsky (1979a), (1979b), and (1979c):

(71) John believes (that) she is smart.

(72) John believes her to be smart.

In (71), the subject of the complement clause is nominative because it is governed by tense (cf. (53a)). The problem is (72), if there is no Subject-to-Object Raising, as Chomsky has
consistently maintained (cf. Chomsky (1973, footnotes 30 and 33), for example).

The Sub-Theory of Case basically says that for a verb to assign objective case to a certain NP, it must govern such NP, i.e. it must c-command such NP and there must not be an S' or another NP boundary between the verb and the NP to which objective case is to be assigned (cf. (53b) and (54) above). If these assumptions are correct, (71), and (72) are to be analysed as in (73) and (74), respectively:

(73) John believes [ (that) [ she is smart] ].

(74) John believes [ her to be smart ].

In other words, according to Chomsky, 'believe' is an S' deleting verb, and under the terms of this analysis, it can assign (exceptional) case to the subject of its infinitival complement, as in (74).

If S' is not deleted, the subject of the complement clause remains caseless and the structure is ungrammatical by the Case Filter (56):

(75) *John believes [ that [ (she/her) to be smart ] ].
Furthermore, under these conditions, passive cannot apply. Compare (76) and (77):

(76) *She is believed [ that [ t to be smart ] ].

(77) She is believed [ t to be smart ].

The difference in grammaticality between (76) and (77) follows from the restriction that S' is an absolute boundary for movement.

Let us now see whether this restriction holds in Spanish or not. As we have already seen above, 'parecer' is a raising verb in Spanish, just like English 'seem' is. Compare the examples below:

(78) a. Parece [ que [ Juan y María están cansados ] ]

b. It seems [ that [ Juan and Maria are tired ] ]

(79) a. Juan y María parecen [ t estar cansados ]

b. Juan and Maria seem [ t to be tired ]

(80) a. *Juan y María parecen [ que [ t estar cansados ] ].

b. *Juan and Maria seem [ that [ t to be tired ] ].
If 'parecer' and 'seem' do not delete S' as in (79), the structures are ungrammatical, as in (80), because the complement subject cannot be raised out of S' given the restriction that S' is an absolute boundary for movement. If the complement subject is not moved, then the structures are out by the Case Filter:

(81) a. *Parece [ (que) [ Juan y María estar cansados ] ].

          b. *It seems [ (that) [ Juan and Maria to be tired ] ].

Given these facts, it follows that S' is also an absolute boundary for movement in Spanish. If this is correct, then the examples below cannot be analysed as instances of NP Movement, with a trace in the complement subject position:

(82) Vi a María [ que [ (*t) bailaba cueca ] ].

(83) Deje a María [ que [ (*t) bailara cueca ] ].

Hence, the restriction that S' is an absolute boundary for movement provides additional theoretical evidence against a movement analysis of the examples in question.
2.5. - The Theta Criterion.

Chomsky (1980b) has made the claim that 'thematic relations', i.e. notions such as 'agent', 'goal', 'patient', 'theme', etc. are determined at the deep structure level by two factors: intrinsic lexical properties of lexical items which are heads of phrase categories, and grammatical functions such as subject, object, clausal complement, etc. Specifically, in Chomsky's view, particular lexical properties of the verb assign a certain theta (thematic) role to the object, and--analogously--properties of the verb phrase assign a theta role to the subject. Furthermore, Chomsky (1980b:16-17) requires that deep structures meet the Theta Criterion:

(84) The Theta Criterion (Chomsky (1980b:16-17)):

"Every theta role determined ultimately by the lexical entries in the D[eepl Structure must be filled by some lexical expression, and [...] each lexical expression must fill exactly one theta role, where we take a 'lexical expression' to be a major category (NP, S, etc.) that contains lexical elements and is not an 'idiom chunk'."
In this approach,

"... idioms apart, every element in the complement of VP is assigned a theta role (though there remain some problematic cases), but this is not true of subjects." (Chomsky (1980b:17))

Although Chomsky (1980b) does not say what the problematic cases are, we shall see below that the Theta Criterion cannot be maintained in its strong version—as Chomsky (1980b:17) himself contends--.

Assuming that the Theta Criterion is basically correct, the most important consequence of it is the following:

"movement must always be to a position to which no theta role is assigned, and [...] it must be initially from a position in D[ep] Structure to which a theta role is assigned." (Chomsky (1980b:30))

Indeed, if NP Movement in particular was possible to a position to which a theta role is assigned (and initially from positions to which no theta role is assigned), then 'thematic relations'
would have to be determined in the course of the derivation. This is certainly an undesirable complication.

Let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that the strong version of the Theta Criterion is correct. If it is true that a theta role is obligatorily assigned in VP (apart from idiom chunks), then there cannot be movement to a position within VP. According to this, the (a) examples below are to be analysed as in (b), not (c):

(85) a. Peter believes Mary to be right.

   b. Peter [believes [ [Mary] to be right].

   c. Peter [believes [Mary] [ [t] to be right],
      where [t] is the trace of 'Mary'.

(86) a. John persuaded Mary to go.

   b. John [persuaded [Mary] [ [__] to go],
      where 'Mary' is base generated as the matrix object,
      and [__] stands for the anaphoric gap in the complement
      subject position.

   c. John [persuaded [Mary] [ [t] to go],
      where [t] is the trace of 'Mary'.
Let us first consider the (c) analyses, which assume that Subject-to-Object Raising has taken place. In the case of sentence (85a), 'Mary' bears no thematic relation to the matrix verb 'believe'. The only theta role of 'Mary' is that of theme of the predicate of the complement clause. The complement clause is the theme of 'believe'. If it is true that every element in the complement of VP must bear a theta role with respect to the verb of such VP, then 'Mary' cannot be the object of 'believe', and the analysis under (85c) must be ruled out.

In the case of (86a), 'Mary' is the goal of 'persuade' and it is also interpreted as the agent of the embedded predicate. The complement clause is the theme. It follows that 'Mary' must be the object of 'persuade' at the deep structure level, and that the anaphoric gap in the complement clause cannot be a trace. Analysis (86c) is also ruled out.

Let us now consider the (b) analyses. In (85b), 'Mary' bears no grammatical relation to the matrix verb, and--therefore--it cannot bear any thematic relation with respect to that verb either. 'Mary' is the subject of the complement clause, and the theme of the corresponding predicate. The complement clause itself is the theme of 'believe'. This analysis is consistent with the Theta Criterion.

In the case of (86b), 'Mary' is the object of 'persuade' cf. Chomsky (1965:22-24) and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:439-444), for
example. As such, it is also its theme. The anaphoric gap in the complement clause, which is interpreted as being coreferential to the matrix object, bears the grammatical relation subject of the corresponding predicate, and as such, the thematic relation agent of 'to go'. The clausal complement bears the thematic relation of theme. This analysis is also consistent with the Theta Criterion.

Let us now see how the Theta Criterion applies to the Spanish data under study. The case of the examples involving 'dejar' (allow, permit) is clear cut, and analogous to that of English 'persuade' with respect to the theta roles involved: [18]

(87) a. Yo dejé a Juan que tocar la guitarra.
(I permitted Juan that play the guitar.)

b. Yo [dejé [a Juan] [que [__] tocar la guitarra]],
where 'Juan' is base generated as the matrix object, and [__] stands for the anaphoric gap in the complement subject position.

c. Yo [dejé [a Juan] [que [t] tocar la guitarra]],
where [t] is the trace of 'Juan'.

Analysis (49c) is out under the assumption that no movement is possible to a position within VP. But not only this, on one
hand, 'Juan' is to be interpreted as the goal of 'dejar' and, on the other, as agent of 'tocar la guitarra', via the putative trace in (49c). This is incompatible with the Theta Criterion, which is a condition on deep structures that explicitly requires that every theta role be filled by some lexical expression at that level. If analysis (49c) is adopted, the thematic relation that 'Juan' bears to the matrix verb would remain unassigned. Therefore, such analysis must be rejected.

Analysis (49b) assumes that 'Juan' is base generated in the matrix object position, where it is assigned the theta role theme in deep structure. The anaphoric gap in the complement clause, which is interpreted as coreferential with the matrix object, bears an independent thematic function, namely that of agent of 'tocar la guitarra'. The clause itself is theme. This analysis is compatible with the Theta Criterion.

The case of verbs of perception is "problematic" (to use the expression in the quote from Chomsky (1980b:17, above). Consider the example below:

(88) Yo ví a Juan que tocaba la guitarra.

'I saw Juan that was playing the guitar.'

(I saw Juan playing the guitar.)

The grammatical analysis of (88) is that under (89), where the matrix VP contains an object and a complement clause [19]:
(89) Yo [ví [a Juan] [que tocaba la guitarra]].

If 'Juan' is indeed the object, it should fill a thematic role as such, but it does not. Furthermore, neither 'Juan' nor the complement clause have an independent thematic function with respect to the matrix verb. Instead, in an intuitive but precise way, both 'Juan' and the complement clause bear the thematic function of theme, as indicated by the parenthesis below:

(90) Yo [ví [(a Juan) [que tocaba la guitarra]]].

Nevertheless, as we have already seen in Chapter Two, 'Juan' is not in construction with the complement clause, i.e. the matrix object and the complement clause are independent constituents. Thus, here we have an instance where grammatical relations do not correlate with thematic relations, and the Theta Criterion is apparently at stake. Nevertheless, this is only apparent, as we shall see.

The following is a possible analysis of (88):

(91) Yo [ví [a Juan] [que [t] tocaba la guitarra]],

where [t] is the trace of 'Juan'.

In (91), 'Juan' is to be interpreted as the agent of 'tocar la guitarra' via the putative trace in the complement sentence. As
we have already seen above, 'Juan' bears no independent thematic relation to the matrix verb, in spite of the fact that it is its object, but this does not mean that it has no thematic function at all: both 'Juan' and the complement clause are the theme, as represented in (90). From this perspective, the violation of the Theta Criterion is only apparent. If this approach is correct, then the analysis under (91) is ruled out by the Theta Criterion, and (88) should be analysed as in (92), in a fashion parallel to that of the example involving 'dejar' (allow, permit) above:

(92) Yo [vi [a Juan] [que [__] tocaba la guitarra]],

where 'Juan' is base generated as the matrix object, and [___] stands for the anaphoric gap in the complement subject position.

Although the evidence for this analysis is rather weak, (92) is not a true violation of the Theta Criterion since it is not the case that the matrix object has no theta role at all.

Alternatively, it is possible to say that the matrix object has no 'independent' theta role and that in this sense the structure under study does constitute a violation of the Theta Criterion. If this position is assumed, it does not necessarily follow that (91), with a trace in the position of the complement subject, is the right analysis, particularly when the arguments based on the Structure-Preserving Constraint, Case Assignment,
the Empty Category Principle, and S' as an Absolute Boundary for Movement are taken into account. Since all these other arguments are theoretically consistent and strongly militate against an analysis such as (91), the logical conclusion would be that the Theta Criterion is too strong as stated, a contention that Chomsky (1980b:17) shares. In this case, the Theta Criterion cannot be considered decisive and the analysis is to be justified or rejected on the basis of other evidence.

The evidence provided in the cited sections does not support the analysis under (91), which assumes that NP Movement is involved.

3.- Summary.

In Section One of this Chapter, I have shown that WH-Movement cannot be assumed to be involved in the structures under study because they do not pass all the tests for WH-Movement proposed by Chomsky (1977b:86). Specifically, they exhibit a true violation of the Surjacency Condition and the Specified Subject Condition and they do not exhibit WH-Island Phenomena. In Section Two, I have shown that the structures in question cannot be assumed to arise via NP-Movement because such assumption is not warranted by the Structure-Preserving Constraint, the
Sub-Theory of Case, the Empty Category Principle, the claim that $S'$ is an absolute boundary for movement, and the Theta Criterion. In light of this evidence, it must be concluded that the 'Move Alpha' analysis cannot be maintained, and that the explanation for the existence of the construction under study must be found elsewhere.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

[1] 'Bridge verbs' are those that allow WH-Movement, e.g.

(i) WHO did you say was sick?

(ii) QUIÉN dijiste que estaba enfermo?

An example of a non-bridge verb is whisper/susurrar

(iii) *WHO did you whisper was sick?

(iv) *QUIÉN susurraste que estaba enfermo?

[2] This condition has been revised several times in the literature, cf. the Nominative Island Condition of Chomsky (1980a).

[3] Chomsky (1980a) revised this condition as the Opacity Condition.

[4] Chomsky (1973) makes use of contextual features of lexical items (verbs in particular) to rule out examples such as the following:

(i) *Who does he wonder THAT John saw at the movies?

The verb 'wonder' requires a WH element in the COMP of the subordinate clause:

(ii) He wonders WHO John saw at the movies.

This is exactly the opposite of the case discussed in the text, where WH elements are disallowed in the complement clause.

[5] In Chomsky's view, this conclusion follows from the assumption that NPs must appear in 'argument position' in LF if this has basic properties of some variant of predicate calculus. (Cf. Chomsky (1980a:4))

[6] Empty nodes are either nodes not expanded by the phrase structure rules or nodes that are left empty by earlier transformations. Emonds' use of empty nodes has been criticized by Jayaseelan (1979), who argues that the Structure Preserving Constraint depends on an inconsistent use of empty nodes.
On one hand--Jayaseelan (1979) argues--empty nodes are to be ignored by semantic interpretation rules and selectional and strict subcategorization conditions in the case of lexical insertion, as in the case of Emonds' analysis of Extrapolation:

(i)

\[ \text{NP} \rightarrow \text{S} \rightarrow \text{M} \rightarrow \text{VP} \rightarrow \text{S} \]

\[ \text{for the house to be painted would irritate him} \]

On the other hand, empty nodes cannot be ignored by the same type of rules for some structures to receive adequate interpretation and lexical insertion to take place, as in the case of Emonds' analysis of the Agentless Passive:

(ii)

\[ \text{NP} \rightarrow \text{S} \rightarrow \text{VP} \rightarrow \text{NP} \]

\[ \text{defeat Germany} \]

Thus, Jayaseelan (1979) concludes, Emonds' use of empty nodes is inconsistent.

Nevertheless, Jayaseelan's first criticism is crucially based on Emonds' analysis of Extrapolation, Extrapolation from NP, and Heavy NP Shift. If Emonds' analyses of these particular processes is given up, and Extrapolation is assumed to be basic, with the 'extraposed sentence' under S' in the initial phrase marker—as Jayaseelan (1979) himself argues—then Jayaseelan's criticism no longer holds. The case of Heavy NP Shift is presumably stylistic.

Jayaseelan's second objection only holds if Emonds' use of empty nodes is contextualized in the standard theory—as it was originally intended—i.e. in a theory where lexical insertion and semantic interpretation takes place at the deep structure level. This criticism cannot be maintained in a theory that assumes that lexical insertion takes place after all transformations have applied (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977, footnote 18)), and that semantic interpretation is operative at the trace-enriched surface structure level (cf. Chomsky (1975:78-134), for example).
I am grateful to K. (Jay) Jayaseelan for some interesting discussions on this topic.


Whether Emonds' empty nodes are equivalent to \([\alpha e]\) or not (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:432) and Chomsky (1980a:4)) is a technicality that deserves some attention, although it is not crucial for my argument in the text. First, initially-empty nodes are different from traces because the latter are coindexed with their antecedents, whereas the former have no indices. Second, nodes that are emptied by earlier transformations are equivalent to traces with respect to indexation. Third, if PRO indeed has features as it is suggested in Chomsky (1979b), then both traces and empty nodes are different from PRO, but if PRO has no features, then empty nodes are equivalent to PRO.

[7] I am assuming here that the 'preposition a' is a case-marker, which is adjoined to the object NP. In this view, the resulting phrase is not a PP, but an NP. Cf. Jaeggli (1980:46-49) for discussion. Traditionally, such case marker is assumed to be inserted whenever the object NP is \([+\text{animate}]\) and \([+\text{specific}]\). However, the problem is more complex. Cf. the reference cited.

[8] Given the rule 'move NP' (as an instance of 'move alpha') and the restriction that NP movement must be structure preserving, no 'construction specific rule' needs to be stated in the grammar of particular languages. Ungrammatical outputs are supposed to be accounted for by general principles such as the (Relativized) A-over-A Principle, the Specified Subject Condition (Opacity), the Tensed Sentence Condition (Nominaive Island Condition, Empty Category Principle), the WH-Island Constraints, and the Principle of the Cycle, which includes Strict Cycliciry and Subjacency. (Cf. Chomsky (1977a) and (1977b), for example.)

[9] The claim that clitics are syntactically not NPs is substantiated by the fact that their distribution and movement properties are different from the distribution and movement properties that NPs have. For example, Subject NPs are sensitive to Subject-to-Subject Raising, whereas the 'subject clitic' SE—which appears in impersonal constructions—is not:

(i). a. Parece [que Juan ha llegado].
   'It seems [that Juan has arrived].'

   b. Juan parece [t haber llegado].
   'Juan seems [t to have arrived].'
c. *Parece [Juan haber llegado].
   '(It) seems [Juan to have arrived].'

(ii) a. Parece [que SE vive bien aquí].
   'It seems [that one lives well here].'

   b. *SE parece [t vivir bien aquí].
   'One seems [t to live well here].'

   c. Parece [vivirSE bien aquí].
   'One seems [to live well here].'

For twelve additional arguments showing that the clitic SE is not a nominal, cf. Contreras (1974:2-10). In particular, the following arguments hold of clitics in general:

First, clitics are never heads of relative clauses. NPs are.
(Cf. Section 5, Chapter Two of this thesis.)

Second, clitics can appear between the negative particle 'no' and the verb. NPs never appear in such a position:

(iii) (Yo) no lo lei.
   '(I) didn't read it.'

(iv) a. *(Yo) no el libro lei.
   b. (Yo) no lei el libro.
   'I didn't read the book.'

Third, NPs can be objects of prepositions. Clitics never are:

(v) a. [a Juan]
    [to Juan]

   b. [a mí]
    [to me]

(vi) *[a me]
    [to me]

[10] Spanish lacks a subject-clitic system parallel to that of French. Apparently, as indicated in footnote [9], the only Spanish clitic that has a subject function is SE—in the Impersonal SE Construction—. Cf. Contreras (1973), (1974), and (1976); Knowles (1974) and (1975); Otero (1972), (1973), (1976), and (1979); and Westphal (1979), (1980a), and (1980b) for some discussion.

Interestingly enough, SE cannot participate in the construction studied in this thesis:

(i) Escuché [que SE tocaba la guitarra en el cuarto del lado].
   'I-heard [that someone was playing the guitar next door].
The ungrammaticality of (ii) further supports the claim that clitic movement is not involved in the derivation of examples (9b) and (10b) in the text.

Cf. Westphal (1980a:57-100) for ten arguments showing that the NP associated with the complement verb in examples such as (i) is not the subject, in particular pp. 77-80 for an argument based on the construction studied in this thesis, which there I identify as 'Subject-to-Object Raising'—obviously a mistake under the terms of the analysis provided in Chapter Four below. (Nevertheless, the misanalysis does not affect the form of that argument since the point I make there deals with the fact that only the subject of the complement clause of verbs of perception can be related to the object of the same, as it is clear from the Opacity Condition (cf. Section 2, Chapter Two above).

[11] Alfaro (1979) claims that Subject-Verb Inversion and 'Pre-Sentential Transportation'—which includes placement of some adverbial phrases at the beginning of embedded clauses—are not structure preserving in Spanish. From this, she concludes that the Structure Preserving Constraint is too strong as stated. Regardless of the validity of Alfaro's analyses and argumentation, what is significant of Emonds's theory is that rules that change grammatical relations are indeed structure preserving. Cf. Chapter Five, for an explanation of the non-structure preserving character of Subject Postposing in Spanish.

[12] I am grateful to Maria-Luisa Riverc for pointing this out to me. One of the already classic arguments against cliticization is based on 'clitic doubling', e.g.

(i) Lo vi a él.
       'Him I-saw to him.'
       (I saw him.)

Since in examples such as (i) the clitic co-occurs with the direct object, the claim that the clitic originates as the object NP cannot be maintained. Another piece of evidence against cliticization is found in those instances where the clitic has no NP source, e.g. some idiomatic expressions such as 'arreglarse a LAS' (to manage):

(ii) Me LAS arreglé para venir.
       'To-me THEM-fm.pl. I-managed to come.'
       (I managed to come.)

(iii) *Me arregló (a) ELLAS para venir.
[13] According to Chomsky (1979b:6), tense government is almost a notation: "You could drop it by saying that nominative is a property of certain types of structures, namely tensed clauses".

[14] Recall that alpha c-commands beta if alpha does not contain beta (and therefore alpha does not equal beta) and beta is dominated by the first branching category dominating alpha (cf. (26), Chapter Two above).

According to Chomsky (1979b:6),

"Alpha minimally c-commands beta = def. alpha c-commands beta and there is no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma and gamma c-commands beta and not gamma c-commands alpha."

[15] The Case Filter is supposed to apply at the trace-enriched surface level, 'S-Structure' in Chomsky's terms.

[16] The following expansions are assumed for English and Romance:

(i) \( S' \rightarrow CCMP S \)

(ii) \( S \rightarrow NP \text{ INFL } VP \)

where "INFL is the inflectional system which contains +/-tense […] and AG (agreement) which contains the features person, number, gender, and case […]" (Chomsky (1979b:4)).

[17] In non-prescriptive Chilean Spanish examples such as the following are perfectly acceptable:

(i) \[ \text{paresíay-ke-htábay-máh-agurrío-ke-una-óh-tra} \]
   'You seemed that you were more bored than an oyster.'

Nevertheless, they are not systematic and appear to constitute a legitimate case of 'acceptable agrammaticality' (cf. Westphal (1980a) for discussion of this notion first advanced by Otero (1973)). Indeed, examples such as (i) are highly restricted to some colloquial expressions and they are not possible with all the forms of the paradigm:

(ii) \[ \text{*loh-číkoh-parésen-ke-kántan-tóo-el-día} \]
   'The children seem that they sing all the day.'

I am grateful to Heles Contreras for pointing this out to me.
The discussion on theta roles that follows is not substantiated or independent grounds. This is an unavoidable shortcoming of most discussions on the topic due to the absence of explicit cross-linguistic tests for thematic relations, as well as the absence of an explicit theory of the same. In most instances, we have to rely on our intuitive perception of thematic functions. This is most definitely an area in which explicit and testable claims are conspicuously absent from the literature.

That examples such as (51) are not relative clauses has already been demonstrated in Chapter One.
CHAPTER IV:

THE CONTROL ANALYSIS.

The Extended Standard Theory allows for the presence of three types of inaudibilia in subject position, at the S-Structure level [1]:

(1) The trace of NP-Movement:

   a. John seems [ t to be tired].

   b. Juan parece [ t estar cansado].

(2) The trace of WH-Movement:

   a. Who did you say [ t was tired]?

   b. Quién dijiste [que t estás cansado]?

(3) PRO:

   a. I promised [PRO to gc].

   b. Yo prometí [PRO ir].
The distribution of NP traces, WH traces, and PRO—which is a phonologically null pronoun—is determined by the theory.

In Chapter Three of this thesis, I showed that the examples below cannot be analysed as containing a trace in the position of the complement subject:

(4) Ví a María [que ___ bailaba cueca].
   'I-saw Maria [that ___ was dancing the Cueca].'
   (I saw Maria dancing the Cueca).

(5) Dejé a María [que ___ bailaba cueca].
   'I-permitted Maria [that ___ danced the Cueca].'
   (I permitted Maria to dance the Cueca).

Specifically, in Chapter Three I provided theoretical arguments showing that these examples cannot be transformationally derived via NP-Movement or WH-Movement.

If the overall approach provided by the Extended Standard Theory is basically correct, it follows that the anaphoric gap in (4) and (5) must be PRO—since it cannot be a trace. PRO typically appears in control structures such as (3), which is an instance of 'subject control', or in structures such as (6), which involves 'object control':

(6) a. I persuaded John [PRO to go to the movies with Mary].
Whether the PRO in complement subject position is controlled by the matrix subject or object is determined by the lexical properties of the matrix verb (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977: 439-444) and Chomsky (1980a:8)). Examples (3) and (6) illustrate these two possibilities.

Under the terms of the control analysis, structures such as (4) and (5) would involve object control over the subject of a tensed sentence, a situation which is not possible in English:

(7) a. *I saw Mary [(that) PRO was dancing].

        b. *I permitted Mary [(that) PRO danced].

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the adequacy of the control analysis and to discuss its implications for syntactic theory.

4.1. An Argument Based on Complementary Distribution.

This far, the conclusion that the structures under study are structures of obligatory control is supported by negative
evidence only. No positive evidence has been provided, and the entire argumentation has proceeded by elimination of other alternative analyses. Now that all available alternatives have been examined, I would like to advance one positive argument.

Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:441) claimed that PRO is in complementary distribution with traces and lexical NPs:

"PRO and lexical NPs. (including trace) are in complementary distribution in surface structures. Where we find PRO, we can find neither a lexical NP nor a trace, and conversely."

Thus, in control structures such as

(8) a. You persuaded Peter [PRO to go to the movies with Mary].

b. Tú persuadiste a Pedro [PRO ir al cine con María].

the anaphoric gap identified as PRO is incompatible with a lexical NP or a trace:

(9) a. *You persuaded Peter [John to go to the movies with Mary].

b. *Tú persuadiste a Pedro [Juan ir al cine con María].
(10) a. *WHO did you persuade Peter [ t to go to the movies with Mary]?

b. *QUÉEN persuadiste a Pedro [ t ir al cine con María]?

Nevertheless, the argument based on complementary distribution alone is not sufficient to establish the presence of PRO in a certain structure, since traces that arise via NP-Movement—for example—are also in complementary distribution with WH traces and lexical NPs:

(11) a. *WHO does John seem [ t to be tired]?

b. *QUÉEN parece Juan [ t estar cansado]?

(12) a. *John seems [Mary to be tired].

b. *Juan parece [María estar cansado(a)].

Therefore, the argument based on complementary distribution is only valid if it can be independently established that the anaphoric gap being examined cannot be a trace. I have shown this in Chapter Three, in relation to the structures under study. Consider the relevant examples again:
(13) Viste a María [que ___ bailaba cueca].

'You-saw Maria [that ___ was dancing the Cueca].'

(You saw Maria dancing the Cueca).

(14) Dejaste a María [que ___ bailara cueca].

'You-permitted Maria [that ___ danced the Cueca].'

'(You permitted Maria to dance the Cueca).

Let us assume that the anaphoric gap in the complement subject position is PRO. If this is the case, then the presence of a trace or a lexical NP in that position should be impossible. This is attested by the ungrammaticality of (15) and (16):

(15) a. *QUÉN viste a María [que t bailaba cueca]?

'WHO did-you-see Maria [that t was dancing the Cueca]?'

b. *Viste a María [que Pedro bailaba cueca].

'You saw Maria [that Pedro was dancing the Cueca].'

(16) a. *QUÉN dejaste a María [que t bailara cueca]?

'WHO did-you-permit Maria [that t danced the Cueca]?'

b. *Dejaste a María [que Pedro bailara cueca].

'You-permitted Maria [that Pedro danced the Cueca].'

Since we already know that the anaphoric gap in examples (13) and (14) is not occupied by a trace (cf. Chapter Three), the
impossibility of having a trace or a lexical NP as in (15) and (16) conclusively proves that we are dealing with an instance of PRO and that the structures in question are to be analysed as instances of object control over the subject of a tensed complement sentence. [3]

Now that a positive case for the Control Analysis has been made, let us see what its theoretical implications are.

4.2.- The Binding Conditions.

At the beginning of this Chapter, I made the statement that the distribution of NP traces, WH traces, and FRC is predicted by the theory. This statement needs to be substantiated. The relevant notions are the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979:16), which crucially interact with the Sub-Theory of Case summarized in Chapter Three of this thesis.

(17) The Binding Conditions (cf. Chomsky (1979:16)):

A.- If alpha is an anaphor (i.e. something lexically specified as needing an antecedent) or has no phonetic matrix (i.e. trace and PRO),
THEN (1) it is a variable

OR (2) it is bound in every governing category
(in particular in the minimal governing category if there is one).

B.- If NP is case-marked,

THEN (1) it is an anaphor (like 'each-other' that is going to be case-marked)

OR (2) it has to be [argument] free in every governing category.

C.- If alpha is pronominal (i.e. a pronoun or PRO),

THEN it is argument free in every minimal governing category.

As far as PRO is concerned, (17C) means that "PRO is always controlled from outside of its own S" (cf. Chomsky (1979b:16)).

These conditions make central use of the following notions:

(18) The notion of 'Variable' (cf. Chomsky (1979b: 13):
Variables are case-marked empty elements that are bound by an appropriate operator [e.g. the trace of WH-Movement].

(19) The Notion of 'Argument Bound' (cf. Chomsky (1979b: 16)):

"Alpha is bound (argument bound) iff alpha is an argument coindexed with a c-commanding argument [e.g. reflexives, G.F.W.]."

(20) The Notion of 'Governing Category' (cf. Chomsky (1979c: 51)):

"The governing category for alpha is the minimal category S, NP in which a governor for alpha appears—hence, the minimal S, NP in which alpha receives case, if it does receive case." [4]

Given the Binding Conditions reproduced under (17), the following theorems can be derived:

(21) If \([N\_P\_e]\) is case marked,
    then it is a variable.

(22) PRO is never governed.

Theorem (21) is derived as follows: If \([N\_P\_e]\) is case-marked, conditions (17A) and (17B) apply. According to condition (17B)
it is either a lexical anaphor (which it is not) or it is free (not argument bound) in every governing category. Condition (17A) states that everything that lacks a phonetic matrix is either a variable or is bound (argument bound) in every governing category. Since condition (17B) tells us that $\text{[Ne]}$ is free in every governing category, it follows that if case-marked, it must be a variable.

Theorem (22) is derived as follows: Assume that PRO is governed. If this is the case, there must be a minimal category in which it is governed. According to condition (17A), it must be argument bound in this governing category, but according to condition (17C) it must be free in this category. Since this is a contradiction, it follows that the assumption that PRO is governed does not hold. [5]

With these notions in mind, let us now look into the situation of the structures under study. Recall that in the last section, we concluded that the complement subject of examples (23) and (24) below had to be PRO:

(23) Yo vi a María [que PRO bailaba cueca].

'I saw Maria [that PRO was dancing the Cueca].'

(24) Yo dejé a María [que PRO bailara cueca].

'I permitted Maria [that PRO danced the Cueca].'
At the S-Structure level, these sentences can be assumed to have the following configuration, after free indexation has applied [6]:

(25)

Given (25), PRO is governed by INFL, which contains tense and the features alpha person, beta number, gamma gender, etc. Under these conditions, PRO is governed and case-marked nominative. This state of affairs is incompatible with the theorem that says that PRO is never governed (cf. (22) above).

The finding appears to be contradictory: on the one hand the theory predicts that the subject of the complement sentence in
(25) must be PRO; and, on the other, it says that it cannot be the case. The question is how to solve this dilemma in a consistent manner.

In the following section, I will examine Chomsky's approach to the problem posed by phonologically empty subjects in languages such as Spanish, in the framework of Chomsky (1979b).

4.3. - The Delete-Pronoun Rule of The Pisa Lectures.

The following are crucial properties of PRO, according to Chomsky (1979b):

(26) a. PRO is a phonologically null pronoun that contains features for person, number, gender, etc., like any other pronoun. [7]

b. PRO can be inserted wherever a full pronoun can be inserted and vice-versa.

c. PRO is never governed.

If PRO appears in a governed position at the level of Logical Form, then the structure is out by (26c). [8]
In the case of the complement sentence of examples (23) and (24) above, PRO is governed by INFL:

(27) 

\[ S' \]

\[ \text{COMP} \quad S \]

\[ \text{NPI} \quad \text{INFLi} \quad \text{VP} \]

\[ \text{PRO} \]

In order to deal with structures like (27), Chomsky (1979b:49) assumes the existence of the following rule, which is supposed to apply after Case Marking and Free Indexation:


\[ [\_N^\rho \alpha] \rightarrow [\_N^\rho e], \]

where \( \alpha = \text{PRO features} \).

According to this rule, PRO keeps its index but loses its features, with case among them. If there was a phonetic matrix, the rule would not be able to apply "because you never delete a phonetic matrix" (Chomsky (1979b:49)). The Delete-Pronoun Rule is supposed to be universal, and its purpose is to save the
principle that claims that PRO is never governed (case-marked).

[9]

Given the Delete-Pronoun Rule (28) and structures such as (27), this becomes (29):

(29)

\[ \cdots \quad S' \quad \cdots \]

\[ \text{COMP} \quad \text{S} \quad \text{VP} \]

\[ \text{NPI} \quad \text{INFLi} \quad \text{e} \]

In Chomsky's approach,

"you [can] have a case-marked PRO as long as the Delete-Pronoun Rule applies to it. Remember that the theory says that PRO cannot be governed, i.e. case-marked at LF [Logical Form], but of course there is nothing to stop PRO from being governed and case-marked previously. You could have a base-generated PRO which is governed and gets case and then undergoes the Delete-Pronoun Rule so that by the time it gets to LF it is not PRO anymore."

(Chomsky (1979b:49))
Crucially, for a language to permit structures like (29), it must have indices in the agreement, which is precisely the situation assumed by Chomsky (1979b) for languages like Spanish and Italian. Structures like (29) are impossible in English because English has no indices in the AG. This is consistent with the Empty Category Principle (cf. Section 2.3., Chapter Three). Since the Delete-Pronoun Rule also deletes whatever case feature FRC has been assigned by the Case Assignment Rules, the resulting empty NP is not case-marked, and therefore it is not a variable. Thus, all the Binding Conditions are satisfied.

Although Chomsky's approach appears to be theoretically consistent, it is not. The main difficulty with it arises when the interaction of the Delete-Pronoun Rule and the rules of construal that interpret structures of obligatory control is made explicit.

Since the Binding Conditions are operative at the level of LF, application of the Delete-Pronoun Rule in the syntax proper saves the principle that claims the PRO is never governed (case-marked) in LF. This is precisely what Chomsky (1979b) wants. Nevertheless, this is not the only consequence that this approach has. Indeed, if the Delete-Pronoun Rule applies in the syntax, then (30) also follows:

(30) Structures of obligatory control involving tensed sentences become uninterpretable.
According to Chomsky (1979b:14), a pronoun can be proximate or obviative. A pronoun is proximate if it is coindexed with an NP, and obviative if it is not.

As far as 'obligatory control' is concerned,

"[the relevant relations] are very much like the proximate interpretation of pronouns: That is the NP and the pronoun have to match in features just the way the NP and PRO have to match in features". (Chomsky (1979b:15))

This is clearly a question of semantic interpretation, since the syntax lacks the appropriate matching mechanisms. For the relevant mechanisms to be operative at the level of LF, PRO must be present in the structure.

There are two cases to be considered, namely the 'standard control' over subjects of infinitives, and control over subjects of tensed sentences. Let us deal with the 'standard' case first.

As pointed out in footnote [9] of this Chapter, the Delete-Pronoun Rule must be optional. If the rule applies in the case of PRO subjects of infinitives, the relevant structures are out by the Empty Category Principle because the resulting empty NP wouldn't be (properly) governed. If the rule does not
apply, then the Empty Category Principle does not rule the structure out, and it can receive adequate interpretation because PRO is there to meet whatever requirements proximate interpretation imposes. Therefore, the 'standard case of obligatory control' poses no problem, provided the Delete-Pronoun Rule is optional, as all syntactic rules of core grammar are supposed to be.

Let us now turn to the cases of control over subjects of tensed sentences, namely the cases of the type studied in this thesis. If PRO does not undergo the Delete-Pronoun Rule, then the structure is out at the level of LF because it is governed, and we have the theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed. If the Delete-Pronoun Rule applies, then PRO is no longer PRC. The resulting empty NP must be governed by INFL, as required by the Empty Category Principle. Nevertheless, under these conditions PRO is not available in the structure for it to receive proximate interpretation. What the structure exhibits instead is an empty NP which is co-indexed with INFL. Otherwise, it is not properly governed. Under the terms of free indexation, the empty NP may be coindexed with the relevant controlling element or not. It is up to the relevant rules of construal that relate anaphors and antecedents to decide whether the indexation is right or wrong depending on the properties of the matrix verb. This can be—and presumably is—a very mechanical procedure that checks whether the index of the matrix subject or the matrix object is the same as that of the complement subject or not,
depending on whether the matrix verb requires subject or object control. If the indices are different, the structure is ruled out as uninterpretable. If the indices are the same, proximate interpretation is not possible because the empty NP that appears instead of PRO lacks the necessary pronominal matrix.

In principle, there are two possible ways out of this problem. One way is to assume that the Delete-Proroun Rule does not apply in the syntax, but in LF, after the relevant rules of construal, and before the Binding Conditions. This approach would certainly save the theorem that states that PRO is never governed, and also allow for the proximate interpretation of PRO, provided that we are willing to have a rule that is not an interpretive rule in the interpretive component of the grammar.

Another possibility is to assume that the empty subject NP plays no role in the semantic interpretation of these structures, and that the control relation is established directly between the 'controller' and INFL. In this approach, INFL would be the 'controller'. This approach is very much in the spirit of what Chomsky said in the course of his lectures in Pisa (1979) in relation to INFL, namely that INFL is really PRO, since it has features for person, number, gender, and—something I have not mentioned before in this thesis—CASE. But Chomsky's remark cannot be taken literally, i.e. that INFL = PRO, because if that were the case, then all structures containing INFL in all languages of the world would be ruled out by the theorem that
states that PRO cannot have CASE at the level of LF. Besides INFL is not really PRO because it is not an NP. Therefore, it is highly dubious that INFL can act as the 'controller' in the cases under discussion.

In the following section, I will discuss a possible solution to this problem for the case of the structures that exhibit 'object control' over the subject of a tensed sentence.

4.4. - PRO-Movement into COMP.

Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the principle that says that PRO can never be governed in LF is inviolable and that Chomsky's Delete-Pronoun Rule is a spurious device in Spanish. If this is the case, then the following structure is not legitimate at the S-Structure level, immediately before it enters LF:
PRO cannot be governed. In (31) PRO is governed by INFL and case-marked rcminative.

If the principle that says that PRO is never governed is inviolable and it does form part of UG, then the language must have a way to save it in a natural way.

In the case of languages that have indices in the AG, the subject position is properly governed in the framework of Chomsky (1979b) (cf. the Empty Category Principle, Section 2.3., Chapter Three).
If the Delete-Pronoun Rule is a spurious device in Spanish, PRO cannot stay in subject position: it must move to an ungoverned position to avoid being assigned case at S-Structure. One such position is COMP. Let us assume that it moves to COMP by virtue of the following rule:

(32) PRO-Movement into COMP: [10]

Move PRO to COMP position in the structure

... X CCMF PRO INFL Y ...

Given the terms of rule (32), structures such as (33) become (34):

(33) [ [que] [PRO INFL X] ]

(34) [ [que - PRO] [ t INFL X] ]

In (34), PRO is coindexed with its trace by virtue of the movement itself. Once PRO-Movement into COMP has applied, the trace can be coindexed with INFL. If it is coindexed with inflection, the structure is legal because it meets the Empty Category Principle. If it is not, then the structure is out by virtue of the same principle. Since PRO is not governed, it does not receive case. Its trace receives case, but PRC does
not inherit such case by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention because it is not 'lexical', i.e. it has no phonological content. (Cf. #(57), Chapter Three.)

This approach saves the theorem that PRO is never governed, which is what we want, but since the principles of the theory are so tightly related, we are in trouble elsewhere: the principle that says that case-marked traces are variables is at stake. If case-marked traces are indeed variables, then we are in deep trouble because the trace in (34) is not bound by an appropriate operator. I shall return to this problem below. For the time being, the important thing is that the rule of PRO-Movement into COMP that I am assuming does the job of saving the principle that PRO is never governed. But not only this, the rule in question has an additional advantage. Indeed, if PRO-Movement into COMP is assumed in the case of the structures involving obligatory object control over the subject of a tensed sentence, then these can be interpreted in a form analogous to that of relative clauses.

PRO-Movement into COMP, it could be claimed, is a strategy that languages have in order to save the principle that PRO is never governed.

Under the terms of this proposal, the constructions under study would have the following structure at S-level:
(35) Yo vi a Maria [ [que PRO] [ t bailaba cueca]].
'I saw Maria [ [that PRO] [ t was dancing cueca]].'

(36) Yo deje a Maria [ [que PRO] [ t bailara cueca]].
'I permitted Maria [ [that PRO] [ t darced cueca]].'

Assuming that Spanish allows doubly-filled CCMFs with certain matrix verbs and that verbs of perception and the causative 'dejar' (allow, permit) fall into this category, (35) and (36) are perfectly feasible analyses.

Nevertheless, if Spanish has this option, there is no reason that a language like English should not have it. The following structure requires 'object control' in English:

(37) I persuaded John [ PRO to come].

The verb 'persuade' can also take an object NP plus a tensed sentence:

(38) I persuaded John [ [that] [ he should come]].

Since, in principle, PRO can be inserted wherever pronouns can be inserted, let us assume that PRO has been inserted in the complement subject position of the following structure:

(39) *I persuaded John [ [that] [PRO should come]].
If PRO stays put in (39), it is assigned nominative case because it is governed by INFL, and the structure is out by the theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed. Let us assume that it moves to COMP:

(40) *I persuaded John [ [PRO that] [ t should come]].

If we leave the problem posed by the case-marked trace aside --for the time being--, (40) is ungrammatical because it violates the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter, attributed by Chomsky (1979b) to David Pesetsky:

(41) The Doubly-Filled COMP Filter:

\[ *[\text{COMP}]_{\alpha \beta} \]

The Doubly-Filled COMP Filter applies in structures like the following [11]:

(42) a. *I wonder [ [WHAT that][Peter did t to Mary]].
    b. *WHO did you say [ [ t that][t was coming]]?

Since English has the option of not having a complementizer in COMP, examples (43) are grammatical because they do not violate the filter:
(43) a. I wonder [[WHAT][Peter did t to Mary]].

b. WHO did you say [[t][t was coming]]?

Since the trace in the complement subject position in (43b) is coindexed with the trace in COMP, it is properly governed and it satisfies the Empty Category Principle. [12]

Now, if our assumption about PRO-Movement into COMP is correct, then the following structure should be grammatical, but it is not:

(44) *I persuaded John [[PRO][t should come]].

But is the CCMP position really an ungoverned position in English? Kayne (1980) has argued that it is not and that the trace in examples such as (43a) must be case-marked. For that trace to be case-marked, it must be governed by the matrix verb. This is accomplished in a fashion similar to 'exceptional case-marking', as in the example below: [13]

(45) I believe [him to be smart].

If we adopt Kayne's proposal, then the trace in COMP position in the structure below is governed (and case-marked) by 'persuade':

(46) WHO did you persuade Mary [[t][PRO to kiss t]]?
If Kayne's approach is correct, then we have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (44): PRO is not in an ungoverned position. [14]

In the case of Spanish, we are claiming that PRO is moved to the right of the complementizer. That position is not governed by the matrix verb, and therefore the structures are legal. [15]

This far, we have been able to show that PRO-Movement into COMP is a possibility in Spanish, and also how the relevant English examples where PRO could potentially appear are to be ruled out under the assumption that PRO-Movement into COMP does exist.

Let us now consider what happens in the case of simple sentences in English. Consider the example below:

(47) [ [WHO] [did Mary kiss t] ]

WH-elements move to COMP in simple sentences in English. The COMP position is not governed by any matrix verb in (47). The WH-phrase in (47) is assigned case by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention, which states that lexical elements (i.e. those that have phonological content) inherit the case the traces they ultimately control have (cf. *(47)*, Chapter Three). The structure violates no principle of the theory, and it is a perfectly legal structure.
Now, if our assumption about PRO-Movement into COMP was correct, then (51) should be grammatical, but it is not:

(48) *[ [PRO] [ t kissed Peter] ].

In (48) PRO has been moved to COMP position. The trace left behind is properly governed because it is co-indexed with PRO, which minimally c-commands it. The Empty Category Principle is satisfied. PRO is ungoverned and caseless, nevertheless the structure is out. Chomsky's explanation for the ungrammaticality of (48) is the theorem that case-marked traces are variables, i.e. that they must be bound by an appropriate operator.

If Chomsky's theorem that says that case-marked traces are variables is correct, then PRO-Movement into COMP is not a feasible solution. However, if such an assumption is wrong--as I argue in Section 4.6.--there must be an alternative explanation for the impossibility of (48). I will return to this discussion below. In either case, PRO-Movement into COMP must be discarded given the ungrammatical status of examples such as (48).
4.5.- Subject Postposing in Spanish.

In this Section, I discuss first Chomsky's approach to Subject Postposing in languages such as Spanish (1979b), and I show it to be empirically inadequate. Next, I present my own approach to the problem, which claims that Subject Postposing is a strategy that Spanish has in order to save the principle that states that PRO is never governed. Such a strategy implies a certain cost in the grammar, namely the violation of the Structure Preserving Constraint of Emonds (1976). If we assume that the principles of UG are inviolable, and that there is a direct interaction between these principles and the constraints on the form of grammar, then the latter can be violated whenever a certain principle is at stake, provided that the language has the necessary mechanisms, e.g. indices in the AG.

4.5.1.- Subject Postposing plus PRO-Insertion and PRO-Deletion.

In the course of his lectures in Pisa (1979), Chomsky gave the following version of Subject Postposing in tensed sentences for languages with indices in the AG, cf. Spanish and Italian:
Subject Postposing (Chomsky (1979b:51)):

\[ N_5^{fe} \rightarrow V \rightarrow N_P \]

The abbreviated structure under (49) is the result of NP-Movement, an instance of the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha'.

Since the trace 'left-behind' by the postposed subject NP is governed by INFL, which contains tense, it is assigned nominative case, and the postposed subject receives its case by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention, which states that a lexical NP inherits its case from the trace it ultimately controls.

The following is Chomsky's discussion of (49):

"Now we want to get rid of the trace [because it is case-marked and since it is not bound by an appropriate operator, its presence in LF would violate the theorem that says that case-marked traces are variables]. But since it is not PRO, [the Delete-Pronoun Rule] cannot apply. But now we could conceivably say that there is a UNIVERSAL rule of PRO-Insertion, which is the analogue of Pronoun-Insertion which shows up in some languages, since we are going to have rules that introduce
things like 'il' in French and 'there' in English. Now that rule has the automatic variant of sticking in PRO. Of course, the resulting structure is out since PRO has nominative case. But recall we have the Delete-Pronoun Rule which will apply and you will derive [(49)]. [This structure] is OK as it stands in Italian [and Spanish] because the indexed NG." (Chomsky (1979b:50-51), emphasis and material in brackets mine, G.F.W.)

In his analysis of Subject Postposing, Chomsky (1979b) is making use of two devices, namely the Delete-Pronoun Rule—which is not exactly adequate in the cases of obligatory control discussed in Section 5.3.--, and a new rule: the PRO-Insertion Rule. Both are assumed to be universal.

Although Chomsky (1979b) does not elaborate on the form of the PRO-Insertion Rule, on the basis of what he says, we can assume that it is the inverse of the Delete-Pronoun Rule:

(50) The PRO-Insertion Rule (after Chomsky (1979:51-52)):

\[
[N_P e] \longrightarrow [N_P \alpha],
\]

where \(\alpha = \text{PRO features}\).
Although Chomsky (1979b) does not say, the PRO-Insertion Rule must be optional. Consider the example below:

(51) [ [WHO] [did Mary kiss [NP e] ]]?

In Chomsky's approach, WH-phrases are operators (quasi-quantifiers) and case-marked traces are variables. The trace of 'WHO' in (54) is case-marked objective because it is governed by the verb.

Let us assume that the PRO-Insertion Rule is obligatory. If this was the case, then it would have to apply in structures such as (51). The resulting output would be (52):

(52) [ [WHO] [did Mary kiss PRO ] ]?

Structures such as (52) are illegal because PRO is governed by the verb 'kiss' and therefore case-marked objective. This violates the theorem that states that PRO cannot be governed. Nevertheless, given (52), the Delete-Pronoun Rule can apply. This rule deletes all the features that PRO has, including whatever feature for case it bears. The result is a caseless empty NP. Such a caseless empty NP is perfectly legitimate according to the Empty Category Principle because it is governed by the verb, but now we have an operator, namely 'WHO', which is binding this caseless empty NP, which is not a variable as per Chomsky's definition of variable. Although the application of
the PRO-Insertion Rule and the Delete-Pronoun Rule have no empirical consequences in the case discussed, it follows that the PRO-Insertion Rule must be optional if the relation operator-variable is to be maintained in Chomsky's approach.

Now that we have made Chomsky's approach explicit, let us test its adequacy. Consider example (48) again, repeated here as (53):

(53) [ [PRO] [ t kissed Peter] ].

In (53), PRO is in CCOMP position, and it has been moved there by the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha', which informally reads 'move anything anywhere'. PRO is not governed. Its trace is governed and case-marked nominative. PRO does not inherit the case its trace bears because it is not 'lexical', i.e. it has no phonological content. According to Chomsky (1979b), the structure is out because the case-marked trace is not bound by an appropriate operator. Nevertheless, we have the PRO-Insertion Rule that Chomsky assumes in his discussion reproduced above. That rule is optional, as we have argued above. Since that rule can apply in the case of the case-marked trace left behind by Subject Postposing in Spanish (and Italian), there is no reason it should not apply in (53), which would become (54):

(54) [ [PROi] [ PROi kissed Peter] ].
The resulting output is illegal because the PRO element in subject position is governed and case-marked nominative, but given (54), the Delete-Pronoun Rule can apply, just like in the case of Subject Postposing—as discussed by Chomsky (1979b:51-52). If the Delete-Pronoun Rule applies in the case of (54), now we have a perfectly legal structure:

(55) [ [PROi] [ e kissed Peter] ].

Indeed, in the position of the subject, we have a caseless empty NP which satisfies the requirement imposed by the Empty Category Principle because it is properly governed by the PRO element in COMP via indexation, and the PRO element in COMP is ungoverned and caseless. The resulting structure violates none of the principles of grammar advanced this far by Chomsky, but happens to be ungrammatical.

A desperate attempt to save Chomsky's approach could be made along the following lines: the PRO element in COMP position does inherit case from its trace in (53)—contrary to what I have been assuming—, and therefore it is case-marked. But then we can play the 'delete-insert game' again: If it is indeed case-marked, then it is illegal. The Delete-Pronoun Rule comes along and empties PRO of its features, including case:

(56) [ [ e ] [ e kissed Peter] ].
The resulting structure, i.e. (56), would be out by the Empty Category Principle because the empty NP in COMP would be ungoverned, but then the PRO-Insertion Rule could stick PRO back:

(57) \[[PRO_i][e \text{ kissed Peter}]\].

The structure is perfectly legal, but helplessly ungrammatical.

The only solution to the problem is to assume that there is a rule that OBLIGATORILY deletes ungoverned and caseless empty NPs in COMP [16]. Indeed, assuming that the PRO element in COMP is case-marked via the Case-Inheritance Convention, the Delete-Pronoun Rule can empty such PRO of its features, turning it into a caseless empty NP, cf. (56). At this point of the derivation, the putative obligatory rule would have to apply, transforming (56) into (58):

(58) \[[\emptyset][e \text{ kissed Peter}]\].

The resulting output would be ruled out by the Empty Category Principle since the empty NP in (58) wouldn't be governed, and this would be the explanation for the ungrammaticality of (59):

(59) *Kissed Peter.
The only problem with such a rule of deletion in COMP is that it would have to be made obligatory. Indeed, if it were assumed to be optional, then the PRO-Insertion Rule could apply to (56), 'saving' the structure in spite of its ungrammatical status, as we have already discussed above.

Nevertheless, the assumption that certain rules are optional and certain others are obligatory is not permitted in the theory, which proclaims as a matter of principle that all syntactic rules of core-grammar are optional and unordered. If we want to maintain this principle, then the rule that deletes un gover ned and caseless empty NPs in COMP cannot be made obligatory.

What this discussion shows is that something must be wrong with Chomsky's approach. As far as we can tell, the problem arises when the interaction of the following theorems and rules is tested:

(60) If [\textit{NP}_{\text{e}}] is case-marked,  
then it is a variable. (Cf. #(21) above.)

(61) PRO is never governed. (Cf. #(22) above.)

(62) The Delete-Pronoun Rule. (Cf. #(28) above.)

(63) The PRO-Insertion Rule. (Cf. #(50) above.)
The theorems are very attractive from a purely theoretical point of view. The purpose of the rules is to save the theorems, and crucially the rules appear to be necessary when one considers phonologically-null subjects in languages such as Spanish. Nevertheless, when one consistently applies Chomsky's approach, the rules become obviously inadequate and the principles appear to be at stake.

The crucial cases are Subject Postposing—which leaves a case-marked trace behind—and PRO subjects in tensed sentences. In order to determine what exactly is wrong with Chomsky's approach, we have to investigate these two phenomena further.

In Chomsky's view (1979b), these two phenomena are unrelated. Both are possible because of the index in the agreement, but there is no direct connection between them. In what follows, I will characterize the properties of Subject Postposing in Spanish, and see whether there is any relationship between this particular phenomenon and that of phonologically-null subjects in tensed sentences.
4.5.2. The Non-Structure Preserving Character of Subject Postposing in Spanish.

Subject Postposing is not Structure Preserving in Spanish. This has been argued by Alfaro (1979), and I am not going to repeat her arguments here since the interesting question is not that, but rather Where does the Postposed Subject move?

In principle, there are at least five possibilities:

(64) The postposed subject

a. is moved to a position under VP.

b. is moved under S'.

c. is moved to a position under S.

d. is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of VP.

e. is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of S.

One way to look at this question is to consider purely empirical evidence, but this is problematic because there are just too many positions where the postposed subject can go:

(65) a. Entonces, EL PENTÁGONO nombró embajador a Killinger.

b. Entonces, nombró EL PENTÁGONO embajador a Killinger.

c. Entonces, nombró embajador EL PENTÁGONO a Killinger.
d. Entonces, nombró embajador a Killinger EL PENTÁGONO.

'Then, THE PENTAGON appointed Killinger ambassador.'

The variables to be taken into account are also multiple, e.g. intonation patterns, distribution of adverbs and adverbial phrases, and displaced objects and indirect objects. All this involves very delicate, contradictory, and controversial judgements of grammaticality. Because of these reasons, it is not surprising to find that studies along these lines are conspicuously absent from the literature.

The other approach that one might take is theoretically based, i.e. one can determine what the prediction of the theory is, and next verify such a prediction (or predictions) using empirical evidence. If the prediction of the theory is not incompatible with the facts, it can be assumed to be correct. I will follow this strategy.

Let us consider the first possibility listed under (69), i.e. that the postposed subject is moved to a position under VP. If one were to consider purely empirical evidence, then this is certainly a possibility: [17]

(66) a. Entonces, Juan mordió un bebe en la oreja.
    b. Entonces, mordió Juan un bebe en la oreja.
    c. Entonces, mordió un bebe en la oreja Juan.

'Then, Juan bit a baby on the ear.'
No theoretical difficulty arises if one considers structures involving intransitive verbs:

(67) a.

Indeed, if the postposed subject is under VP in (67b), then it is governed by the verb, but since the verb is intransitive, it does not assign case to it. The postposed subject NP inherits its case from its trace, i.e. it is nominative, not objective:
The problem arises when transitive verbs are considered, particularly those that can be used 'intransitively', e.g.

(69) a. Nadie mira.
    b. No mira nadie.
    c. *No mira a nadie.

'No one is watching.'

(69c) is ungrammatical in the reading given in the corresponding gloss. It can only mean that someone is watching no one; not that no one is watching.

Given the standard assumption that a transitive verb is a verb that occurs in the environment +______NP (cf. Chomsky (1965:64-106)), if (69b) had the following structure

(70)
then the NP under VP would be case-marked both nominative and objective.

Indeed, it would be case-marked nominative by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention, and objective because it is properly governed by a transitive verb. Since this is banned by the Case-Conflict Prohibition, we have to conclude that the postposed subject cannot be moved to a position under VP, and that if it ever appears between a transitive verb and its object (cf. (66b) above), it must have arrived at that position by virtue of a stylistic transformation. Stylistic transformations apply after S-Structures have been interpreted (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:431), for example), and they are only possible 'up-to-ambiguity' (cf. Chomsky (1965:126-127)).

Therefore, the assumption that the postposed subject is moved under VP is not warranted by the theory.

Let us now consider the second possibility listed under (64), namely that the postposed subject is moved under S'.

This is a possibility allowed by the theory. Consider the structure below:
The NP under S' is not properly governed because it is not c-commanded by its trace or INFL. Under these conditions, it is perfectly possible to assume that the postposed subject is moved to that position. Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence against this.

Right-Dislocated Structures appear under S' [18], and they are always separated from S by heavy 'comma intonation':

(72) a. Mi hermana vive en Fort Saint James.
    'My sister lives in Fort Saint James.'

    b. Vive en Fort Saint James, mi hermana!
    'Lives in Fort Saint James, my sister!'

This is not the case of postposed subjects:

(73) a. No vino nadie.
    'No one came.'

    b. *No virc, nadie!
    'No one came.'
Furthermore, subjects in Right-Dislocated position can co-occur with a pronominal subject under S:

(74) Ella vive en Fort Saint James, mi hermana!
    'She lives in Fort Saint James, my sister!'

Postposed subjects cannot:

(75) a. Juan no hizo nada.
    b. No hizo nada Juan.
    c. *El no hizo nada Juan.
        'Juan didn't do anything.'

Example (75c) is only possible if heavy 'comma intonation' is present:

(76) (?) El no hizo nada, Juan!
    'He didn't do anything, Juan!'

The fact that Right-Dislocated Subjects can co-occur with a pronominal subject under S strongly suggests that they are base-generated under S' (or S''), and that they do not arrive to that position via NP-Movement. Therefore, it is very unlikely that Subject Postposing, which is an instance of NP-Movement, would move the postposed subject to that position.
Since postposed subjects lack the properties that right-dislocated subjects have, it follows that they are not under S' (or S''), in spite of the fact that it is a possibility allowed by the theory.

Let us now see whether postposed subjects can be moved under S, which is the third possibility listed under (64) above.

Recall that I am assuming, along with Chomsky (1979b) that the expansion of S is as follows in Spanish:

\[(77) \quad S \rightarrow NP \quad INFL \quad VP\]

In Spanish, INFL properly governs the subject NP because it has indices in the AG.

If the postposed subject stays under S, then we have the S-Structure under (78), after movement and co-indexing, assuming that free indexation has correctly applied to both INFL and the NP directly dominated by S. The postposed subject NP is co-indexed with its trace by virtue of the movement itself:

\[(78)\]
Remember that cc-indexation is not sufficient for something to properly govern something else. Minimal c-command is also required. Let us review this notion:

(79) The Notion of 'Minimal C-Command' (cf. Chomsky (1979b:6)):

"Alpha minimally c-commands beta = def. alpha c-commands beta and there is no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma and gamma c-commands beta and not gamma c-commands alpha."

Let us correlate the terms used in the definition of minimal c-command with the elements that bear the same indices in (78):

(80)

```
S
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
<pre><code>|   |   |   |
| NPi | INFLi | VP | NPi |
|     |       |    |     |
| alpha | gamma | beta |
</code></pre>
```

What we are trying to determine is whether the postposed subject is properly governed. Therefore the postposed NP must be identified with beta. We have arbitrarily equated the trace and INFL with alpha and gamma, respectively. It could have been done the other way round, but this is irrelevant, since both the trace and INFL c-command the postposed subject, i.e. the first
branching node that dominates the trace and INFL also dominates the postposed subject and neither of these dominates the latter.

Let us take the trace, i.e. alpha. Alpha c-commands beta, and also c-commands gamma. Gamma c-commands beta, and also c-commands alpha, i.e. the postposed subject is properly governed by its trace.

If alpha and gamma are interchanged as in the structure below, the conclusion is the same, alpha properly governs beta.

(81)

```
  S
 /   \
 NPI  INFLi
 /     \
 beta  alpha
       \
        VP
         \
          NPI
```

Under these conditions, INFL—which contains tense—assigns nominative case to both the trace and the postposed subject, but the postposed subject is assigned nominative case twice: once by INFL, and once by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention. This is banned by the Case-Conflict Prohibition, even if the case assigned more than once happens to be the same.

If nominative case is not assigned in terms of government, but c-command only, as Chomsky (1979b:45) suggests, then we are also
in trouble because both the postposed subject and its trace are c-commanded by INFL.

Because of all these reasons, the postposed subject cannot be moved under $S$, immediately after VP.

Let us consider next option (d) listed under (64), namely that the postposed subject is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of VP. Now, the original VP is to be correlated with gamma. Either the trace or INFL can be correlated with alpha. The choice is irrelevant. Let us try INFL, this time:

(82)

```
S
   /\    \\
  NPi  INFLi   VP
     |     |
     e    VP   NPi
     alpha gamma beta
```

Alpha does not properly govern beta because there is a gamma, i.e. the original VP, that is c-commanded by alpha and which in turn c-commands beta but does not c-command alpha. Under these conditions, the postposed subject cannot be assigned nominative case. It must inherit its case from the trace.

Let us now look at the relation between INFL and the trace directly dominated by $S$: 

Alpha and beta c-command each other, but this time there is no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma and gamma c-commands beta and does not c-command alpha. Under these conditions, nominative case can be assigned to the trace directly dominated by $S$. The postposed subject cannot be assigned nominative case because it is not governed. It would inherit its case by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention, and the Case-Conflict Prohibition would not apply.

If we assume that the postposed subject is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of $VP$, no theoretical difficulty arises: it is in an ungoverned position. I have not been able to find any empirical evidence that would make this analysis inadequate. Therefore, it can be assumed to be correct.

Let us now consider the last possibility, namely that the postposed subject is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of $S$: 

---

The diagram above illustrates the relationship between the constituents $S$, $NPi$, $INFLi$, $VP$, and $gamma$. The tree structure shows how each constituent is nested within the others, with $beta$ and $alpha$ being the terminal nodes. The absence of a directed path from $alpha$ to $gamma$ and from $gamma$ to $beta$ indicates that they are not c-commanded by each other in this configuration.
Again, this is not a structure of proper government. The postposed subject is not c-commanded by either its trace or INFL. In principle, the postposed subject can be Chomsky-Adjoined to S.

Let us see what the relation between INFL and the trace is:

Alpha c-commands beta, but there is no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma and gamma c-commands beta but does not c-command alpha. Under these conditions nominative case can be
assigned to the trace, and the postposed subject would inherit it by virtue of the Case-Inheritance Convention.

In principle, both Chomsky-Adjunction to VP and Chomsky-Adjunction to S are adequate solutions.

If we adopt Chomsky's suggestion that nominative case is assigned to NP if c-commanded by tense (1979b:45), then we are left with Chomsky-Adjunction to S as the only possible solution because in (82), tense c-commands both the trace of the postposed subject and the postposed subject itself. This state of affairs is incompatible with the Case-Conflict Prohibition.

Nevertheless, the assignment of nominative case in terms of c-command alone has undesirable consequences elsewhere. Indeed, consider the following structure:

(86)

In (86), tense not only c-commands the subject NP, but also the object NP. Since the object NP is properly governed by the verb, it is case-marked objective. If we were to adopt nominative-case assignment in terms of the c-command relation,
then the object NP would be case-marked nominative also. This is banned by the Case-Conflict Prohibition. Therefore, nominative case cannot be assigned in terms of the c-command relation. Under these conditions, the alternative is to continue considering tense (INFL) a governor for the sake of Case Assignment, but not for Proper Government'. [19]

Under these circumstances, we have two possible positions where the postposed subject can go: it can be Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of S or to the right of VP. As far as I can tell, there is no empirical evidence that would enable us to make a choice. For the sake of this thesis, such a choice is not crucial. What is crucial is that those two positions are not base generated, but rather created in the transformational component, i.e. the Sub-Theories of Government and Case predict that Subject Postposing is not Structure Preserving in Spanish. This is a highly interesting correlation between what the theory predicts and what can be attested on purely empirical grounds (cf. Alfar (1979)).

However, no matter how interesting that such a correlation is, there is an even more interesting question that one can ask: Why should Spanish exhibit a violation of the Structure Preserving Constraint? That agreement allows such a violation is not an answer because the potential for a language to have a certain property is not a necessary condition for the violation
of a constraint that consistently holds in other instances. The following Section is devoted to an examination of this question.

4.5.3.- On the Interaction of Principles and Constraints.

If we conceive of UG as a system of general principles that are inviolable and a set of constraints on the form of grammars, then we can assume that these constraints can be violated under certain conditions. We certainly do not want to leave these conditions unspecified because such violations must be predictable. If languages were to violate constraints on the form of grammars at random, the language learner would be faced with a task that would be impossible to accomplish. Constraints on the form of grammars, we would like to say, can be violated only if necessary. Now the question arises, when would be such a violation necessary? The answer we would like to suggest is the following: if and only if a general principle of UG is at stake. If this is the case, then we have an explanation for the non-structure preserving character of Subject Postposing in Spanish. Indeed, the principle that is crucially at stake in Spanish is the theorem that PRO cannot be governed in LF. Consider the structure below:
This structure is illegal at the level of LF because PRO is governed and case-marked nominative. Since NP-Movement is optional, the syntactic component of the grammar of Spanish will eventually generate structures such as (87), but the relevant theorem will rule it out. The strategy that Spanish has to save the structure is Subject Postposing:

(88) a.

(87)

\[
S \rightarrow \text{NPI} \rightarrow \text{INFLi} \rightarrow \text{VP}
\]

(88) b.
These are the two possible positions where the postposed subject can go. There is no need for us to make a choice. Both positions are un gover ned. PRO is safe in any of them: it is not governed and caseless. Its trace is governed and case-marked nominative, but PRO does not inherit such case because it lacks a phonological matrix, i.e., it is not lexical in this sense. The principle that says that PRO cannot be governed is saved, but it is saved at a certain cost: the violation of the Structure Preserving Constraint. In this sense, the presence of PRO subjects in tensed sentences in languages such as Spanish is the marked case.

Before I finish this Section, I would like to return to the discussion of the structures whose study lead to this conclusion. Now, those structures can be analysed as follows, at the S-Structure level:

(89) a. Yo vi a María [que t bailaba PRO].
   'I saw Maria [that t was-dancing].'
   (I saw Maria dancing.)

b. Yo dejé a María [que t bailara PRO].
   'I permitted Maria [that t danced].'
   (I permitted Maria to dance.)

Since the structure is a structure of obligatory control, PRO must be present in LF for it to receive adequate proximate
interpretation. If PRO cannot receive proximate interpretation, the structure is out:

(90) a. *Yo ví a María [que t bailaban PRO].

b. *Yo dejé a María [que t bailaran PRO].

In both, (90a) and (90b) PRO is third person plural. It cannot receive proximate interpretation.

In (89) PRO can be assumed to be Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of $S$ or to the right of VP. It is in an ungoverned position and it is caseless. The interesting aspect of these constructions is that they are structures of obligatory control over the subject of a tensed sentence that is never phonologically realized, i.e. they constitute evidence that PRO can indeed occur in tensed sentences.

These structures are prima facie evidence that PRO had to be governed and case-marked nominative, but again it has been demonstrated that unanalysed data provide no insights into the form of grammar and cannot be used to prove or disprove a certain principle of grammar, as Chomsky has repeatedly said. Only well motivated analyses count. If this is indeed the case, then the reader might wonder, the analysis provided falsifies the claim that case-marked traces are variables, since, when PRO is moved to the postposed subject position, it leaves a
case-marked trace behind. The following Section is devoted to the discussion of this problem.

4.6.- Not All Case-Marked Traces are Variables.

In our analysis of Subject Postposing in Spanish, the postposed subject leaves a case-marked trace behind. This is prohibited according to Chomsky (1979b) because in that framework all case-marked traces are supposed to be variables, i.e. they must be bound by an appropriate operator in LF. Since the postposed subject is not an operator, i.e. it is not a WH-phrase or a quantifier, the 'operator-variable' relation does not exist in the case of Subject Postposing in Spanish. Presumably, we could arbitrarily assign an operator status to the postposed subject, marking it +WH, for example. However, this would have no other motivation but to save the claim that case-marked traces are variables. Under these circumstances, the reasonable question to ask is whether all case-marked traces are indeed variables or not. I contend that they are not. In order to prove my point, I would like to start this discussion with an extensive quotation from Chomsky (1977b):
"In Chomsky (1975c), I referred to trace as a terminal symbol. THAT WAS AN ERROR. It is not trace that is a terminal symbol but rather the variable introduced in the position of trace by the rules giving the meaning of such quantifiers as 'every' and 'who' (and also by the rule of Focus). [...] The error of identifying trace itself as the variable within the scope of the WH-quantifier [...] resulted from concentration on too narrow a class of WH-phrases. Thus, when we consider only such sentences as (32), the trace can be virtually identified with the variable:

(32) Who did Mary say that John kissed t

But the distinction becomes obvious when we consider more complex cases, such as (33), (34):

(33) Whose book did Mary read t

(34) Pictures of whom did Mary see t

HERE, TRACE MARKS THE POSITION FROM WHICH THE WH-PHRASE WAS MOVED, but the rule expanding the quantifier WH will have to yield the LFs (35), (36), respectively:
(35) for which X, X a person, Mary read [X's book]

(36) for which X, X a person, Mary saw [pictures of X]

Correspondingly, the correct LF for (32) should be

(37):

(37) for which X, X a person,

Mary said that John kissed [X]

The LF (37) has a terminal symbol, X, in the position of the NP source of 'who', BUT (32) HAS ONLY A TRACE, i.e., only the structure \([N_p.e]\), where 'i' is the index of 'who'.

THE RULE OF INTERPRETATION FOR WH-PHRASES MUST INTRODUCE THE EXPRESSIONS GIVEN IN BRACKETS IN (35)–(37) IN THE POSITION OF TRACE. We may take the rule to be essentially as follows:

(38) Given an S' of the form:

\[[\text{COMP-[wh-N']-[+WH]}]\[S \ldots t \ldots]\]

where t is the trace of [wh-N'], rewrite it as

\[[\text{COMP for which X, X an N'}]\[S \ldots [-X-] \ldots]\]

(Chomsky (1977b:83-84), emphasis mine, G.F.W.)
According to this, not all traces left behind by WH-Movement are necessarily variables. The variables are introduced in LF by Chomsky's Rule (38).

That this must also be so in the case of Spanish is proven by the existence of examples such as (90a), whose LF is given under (90b): [20]

(90) a. El libro de quién no has leído t?
    'The book of whom you-have-not read t?'

b. for which X, X a person,
    you-have-not read [the book of X]

The case-marked trace in (90a) is not a variable in LF. The variable must be introduced by Chomsky's Rule (38) reproduced above, as indicated in the representation given under (90b).

In Chomsky (1977b), an earlier error is acknowledged, but in Chomsky (1979b) the error is repeated when the claim that all case-marked traces are variables is made. Since the framework of Chomsky (1979b) fails to account for the cases discussed in Chomsky (1977b), namely Chomsky's examples (35)-(36), because of the assumption that all case-marked traces are variables, we must conclude that such assumption is incorrect [21]. It follows that any attempt to save such a claim, e.g. Chomsky's
'Delete-Proncun' and 'PRO-Insertion' rules, must be doomed to failure, as we have already demonstrated in 4.5.1.

If this is the case, then the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979b) should be revised. Interestingly enough, in one of his post-Pisa Lectures papers, Chomsky (1979c) gives the following version of the Binding Conditions:

(91) The Binding Conditions (cf. Chomsky (1979c:51)):

a. Anaphors must be bound in their governing category.
b. Pronominals must be free in their governing category.

Recall that a governing category for alpha is that category where alpha is assigned case.

This version of the Binding Conditions does not mention variables, except in a very indirect way by reference, in footnote 52, to the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979b), which are claimed to be 'more accurate'. Given the evidence discussed by Chomsky (1977b) that we have reproduced above, such claim to accuracy is certainly not warranted.

If the two Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979c) are sufficient, and if the question of variables is to be handled by virtue of Chomsky's Rule (38) above, then our problem is simplified: The
case-marked trace left behind by Subject-Postposing in Spanish is not a variable, and it will never be replaced by a variable in LF because the relevant structure does not meet the structural description of Chomsky's Rule (38).

In predicate calculus, if something is not a variable, it is a constant. The only requirement on constants is that they be equated with something else, which poses no problem in the case of Subject Postposing, since the trace left behind is coindexed with the postposed subject. Under these conditions, we can assume that the rule that interprets structures involving Subject Postposing in Spanish is basically as follows:

(92) Given an S of the form

\[ \text{[ } t \text{ INFL VP } \ldots \text{ NP } \ldots \text{ ]}, \text{ where } t \text{ is the trace of NP, rewrite it as} \]

\[ \text{[ } a \text{ INFL VP } \ldots \text{ ]}, \text{ where } 'a' = \text{ NP, i.e. where } 'a' \text{ is a constant that stands for NP.} \]

According to this, structures such as

(93) \[ [NP_e \text{ INFLi llegó JUANi ]} \]

\[ [NP_e \text{ INFLi arrived JUANi } ] \]

would have the following representation in LF:

(94) \[ 'a' llegó ], where 'a' = Juan.
If any requirement in terms of c-command is necessary to find (93) well formed in LF, then we always have the option of assuming that the postposed subject is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of VP, and that such a requirement is satisfied by INFL, but as far as predicate calculus is concerned, no c-command requirement is necessary.

Nothing else needs to be said about this, in this thesis.

Nevertheless, I would like to speculate on something else, namely Chomsky's motivation for assuming that case-marked traces were variables.

Given the overall context of Chomsky's discussions in Pisa (1979), I would say that his motivation for identifying case-marked traces with variables might have been the ungrammaticality of examples such as the following, where the trace left behind by NP-Movement is case-marked and properly governed:

(95) *Los chicos parecen que t estan cansados.

'The kids seem that t are tired.'

If we consider that the trace in (95) is a variable, then we can rule the structure out because the trace is not bound by an appropriate operator, at the level of LF. Nevertheless, this does not seem to be the relevant notion. Consider (96):
(96) *QUIÉNES parecen que t estan cansados?

'WHO-PL seem that t are tired?'

Since WH-Movement is optional, we can assume that the WH-phrase in (96) is in the matrix subject position. The trace left behind is properly governed by INFL and case-marked nominative, i.e. it is a variable in Chomsky's approach. As such, it is bound by an appropriate operator. Nevertheless, the structure is starred, but most importantly, there is nothing wrong with the readings of (95) and (96): they are perfectly interpretable. It follows that the star has nothing to do with variables or LF: the examples are out because of strictly syntactic reasons. One reason that can be invoked is the Case-Conflict Prohibition, which is not only necessary in the case of improper movement across the boundaries of tensed sentences, but also sentence internally: [23]

(97) *Mary was written to t.

Interestingly enough, the Case-Conflict Prohibition cannot apply in the case of Subject-Postposing in Spanish, as we have already seen in the last Section.

Nevertheless, in spite of the shortcomings that Chomsky's identification of case-marked traces with variables has, there is a basic insight in such approach, namely that only WH-phrases can be moved outside of S via the COMP of S'. Those phrases can
be '±wh' as in the case of questions, or '−wh' as in the case of relatives. Since the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha' informally reads 'move anything anywhere', then anything can go into COMP. One way to preclude that from happening is to claim that case-marked traces are variables and to assign quantifier status to WH--phrases. As we have already seen, this is not only problematic (cf. Chomsky's quote above) but rules out the possibility of a case-marked trace in the case of Spanish Postposing, and eventually leads to the postulation of ad-hoc rules that not only fail to explain anything, but also fail to be empirically adequate (cf. Chomsky's 'Delete-Pronoun' and 'PRO-Insertion' rules).

Now that we have identified exactly what the problem is, I would like to advance a solution to it, namely the following filter:

\[(98) \; *_{\text{COMP}} \{ \ldots \alpha \ldots \}, \text{ where alpha is foreign to COMP.} \]

Foreign elements to COMP are all those that are not a trace, a WH phrase, or, of course, a complementizer. Filter (98) also allows for the existence of empty COMPs, and any of the three exemplified below: [24]

\[(99) \; [ [\text{WHO}] \; \text{did Mary say} \; [ [\text{THAT}] \; \text{Peter mentioned} \; [ [\text{t}] \; \text{t would be here tonight} \; ]]])? \]
There is no need to stipulate that the trace in the most embedded subject position must be case-marked. If it is not, then the WH-phrase in the outer COMP has no case to inherit via the Case-Inheritance Convention and the structure is out by the Case Filter. That such a trace can be 'virtually identified with a variable in LF' is a completely different matter. The point is that that does not make the trace a variable. A trace is simply the position from which something has been moved out, to another position. Such a position can be case-marked or not, independently of whether the moved element is assigned case in its new position. This is regulated by the Sub-Theory of Case.

Let us now come back to example (48), already discussed as (53), and which I reproduce once more, this time as (100):

(100) [ [PRO] t kissed Peter ]

PRO has been moved to CCMP position by virtue of the rule of core grammar 'move alpha'. It is in an ungoverned position, and it is caseless because PRO is not lexical, i.e. it does not have a phonetic matrix, and therefore the Case-Inheritance Convention does not apply to it. The trace left behind is case-marked nominative and it is properly governed because PRO minimally c-commands the trace, and it is also co-indexed with it. Now we know that not all case-marked traces are necessarily variables, and therefore the 'operator-variable relation' cannot be invoked to rule (100) out, but PRO is neither a trace, a
WH-phrase, or a complementizer. PRO is 'foreign' to COMP, and filter (98) applies, ruling the structure out. Filter (98) would apply in all instances where CCMP exhibits a foreign element in it.

Finally, we have to account for the ungrammaticality of structures such as the following, which presumably would have been ruled out by the 'operator-variable relation' in the framework of Chomsky (1979b):

(101) *Mary to be written to t.

The trace in (101) is properly governed. The NP in subject position is in an ungoverned position. It inherits its case from the trace it ultimately controls. All conditions are satisfied, but the structure is hopelessly ungrammatical. If we could invoke the 'operator-variable relation', then we would have an immediate explanation for the ungrammaticality of (101). Nevertheless, we cannot do so because we have done away with such a relation in the case of syntactic structures. We are left with no apparent explanation for (101), but again the ungrammaticality of (101) does not have anything to do with the 'operator-variable relation'. (101) is ungrammatical because of the same reason the examples in (102) are, namely that simple sentences must be tensed:
(102) a. *PRO to be written to t.
    b. *PRO to write to Mary.
    c. *John to write to Mary.
    d. John wrote to Mary.

If examples (102a) and (102b) are tensed, then they are out because PRO is case-marked. However, the solution to this problem is not that simple. Consider the following example:

(103) *I expect Mary to be written to t.

The verb 'expect' is an S' deleting verb. S' deletion is optional. If S' is deleted, as in (104), then the matrix verb governs the complement subject NP and assigns case to it. The structure is cut by the Case-Conflict Prohibition:

(104) *I expect [Mary to be written to t].

Nevertheless, if S' is not deleted, as in (104) below, then we are left with no explanation for the ungrammaticality of the structure:

(105) *I expect [ [Mary to be written to t] ].

The complement subject is ungoverned. It inherits its case from the trace it ultimately controls, and the structure should be legal, but it is ungrammatical. This means that the explanation
for the ungrammaticality of examples such as this, must be found elsewhere.

The alternative explanation is that the argument structure of the -N categories in (105) is not satisfied, i.e. that the ungrammaticality of (105) is due to the same reason the following example is ungrammatical:

(106) *John placed on the table.

Indeed, in the case of (105) the verb complex 'to be written' requires a subject argument, and the transitive preposition 'to' an object argument [25]. There is only one NP, namely 'Mary', in the complement sentence. One NP cannot satisfy two different arguments. Hence, the structure is to be ruled out on these grounds.

In short, in this Section I have demonstrated the following: First, that not all case-marked traces are variables in LF. Second, that if case-marked traces not bound by WH-phrases are allowed, there is no need to resort to any special mechanism to 'do away' with the trace of Subject Postposing in languages such as Spanish. In addition, I have provided an account of the standard cases that could have justified to maintain the 'operator-variable relation', and I have advanced the formulation of a filter that rules out movement of 'foreign' elements into CCMF position. Such a filter incorporates
Chomsky's basic insight that only a limited set of elements can appear in such a position, and that if anything moves into that position, it must be a WH-phrase. Given Chomsky's rule that interprets WH traces and the filter in question, there is no need to maintain the non-motivated claim that case-marked traces are variables.

4.7.- Questions of Execution and Quibbles.

This far in this Chapter, we have established that examples such as (107) are structures of obligatory control over PRO subjects of tensed sentences:

(107) Yo ví a María que salía del cine.

' I saw Maria that was coming out of the theatre.'

(I saw Maria coming out of the theatre.)

We have also been able to establish the presence of PRO in the structure, and we have discussed Subject Postposing as one of the strategies that languages might have to exempt themselves from violating the theorem that states that PRO is never governed. The construction under examination appeared prima facie to violate such a theorem. However, given the terms of the analysis provided, the contrary holds, i.e. we have been
able to determine that such a theorem is one of the very best candidates for a principle of UG that we currently have.

The final purpose of this thesis, as it was originally conceived, was to test the adequacy of the principle in question. The finding is significant. In pursuing our objective, we have come across a number of different problems, both while pushing the proposed analysis, and while doing our research. Those problems are at the very heart of the Extended Standard Theory. Some of them are discussed in Appendix A, B, and C, and they have been relegated to that part of the thesis because they are not exactly central to the thesis per se. However, by the same token, we have been systematically ignoring certain other problems, or avoiding certain questions that deal with particular details of the constructions studied. This has been so because the purpose of this thesis was not to present a 'grammar' of verb of perception complementation in Spanish, or anything along those lines. The thesis deals with general principles of grammar, as they apply to the analysis of some crucial Spanish data, which involve perception verbs as matrix predicates. From this perspective, there are things that are central, and things that are marginal, depending on whether they play a role in the analysis or not.

Nevertheless, there are certain questions that are not marginal at all, and that do deserve a mention here. These questions deal with the execution of control. Indeed, once a case for
control over subjects of tensed complement sentences has been made, some interesting questions arise. For example, in the case of instances such as (107), PRO receives proximate interpretation. In other cases, where the matrix predicate is not a predicate that determines subject or object control, PRO receives obviative interpretation:

(108) a. Es bueno no olvidar nada.
    b. It's good not to forget anything.

In (108), PRO is 'arbitrary in reference'.

Depending on the control properties of the matrix verb, with infinitives we find both subject and object control:

(109) a. Yo prometí hacer mi tarea; y la hice!
    b. I promised to do my homework; and I did it!

(110) a. Yo obligué a Juan (a) hacer la tarea.
    b. I forced John to do his homework.

However, only object control appears to be attested over subjects of tensed sentences.

In addition, there appear to exist some instances where the controlee can be either PRO or a full lexical pronoun, although the grammatical judgements are not clear cut:
(111) a. Les mandé que vinieran.
'I-ordered them that they-come.'

b. *Les mandé que vinieras.
'I-ordered them that YOU-come.'

(112) a. ?Les mandé que ELLOS vinieran.
'I-ordered them that THEY come.'

b. *Les mandé que TÚ vinieras.
'I-ordered them that YOU come.'

If (112a) is indeed acceptable, then it contrasts with those cases where only PRO is possible:

(113) a. Me obligaron a que hiciera esto.

b. *Me obligaron a que YO hiciera esto.
'They forced me that I do this.'

And, of course, we have all the other instances involving control over subjects of infinitives with causative verbs in Romance:

(114) a. Hice arreglar el auto.
'I-made someone fix the car.'
b. Hice correr a Juan.
'I-made Juan run.'

And also, the problem posed by referential PROs, e.g.

(115) Ya llegaron.
'___ arrived-pl. already.'

In (115), PRO can refer to 'ellas' (they-fem), 'ellos' (they-masc), or 'ustedes' (you-pl), and just like the corresponding pronouns, PRO must have a referent.

This is a mention of just some of the problems--by all means not exhaustive—that deal with PRC. The list could be easily increased with quite a few other problematic examples, but all of them point to the same question: What are the relevant conditions for the different interpretations that PRC might have? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this thesis, and the sole study of these conditions is a topic for another dissertation.

As I have mentioned above, the solution to these problems crucially depends on the execution of control, the types of rules involved in proximate and obviative interpretation, their form, and the constraints they are subject to. For the time being, we are in the dark with respect to this.
4.8.- Summary.

In this Chapter, we have discussed the control analysis of the structures under study, and we have determined the presence of PRO as a controllee in tensed sentences. Given the terms of this finding, the theorem that says that PRO is never governed appeared to be at stake. We tested the adequacy of Chomsky's 'Delete-Proncun Rule' and 'PRO-Insertion Rule' (1979b), and we showed that they were empirically inadequate. As an alternative solution, we examined the possibility of having PRO-Movement into COMP, as a means to avoid that PRO be governed and case-marked nominative at the S-Structure level, and we also showed that this was not a feasible solution. Under these circumstances, we took a closer look at Subject Postposing in Spanish, and we noticed that in Chomsky's approach there was no connection between the presence of PRO in tensed sentences and Subject Postposing. Interestingly enough, Subject Postposing happens to be non-structure preserving in Spanish. With this observation in mind, we determined that the theory predicted exactly that: the postposed subject is Chomsky-adjointed either to the right of S or to the right of VP, i.e. it is moved to an ungoverned position. Once the existence of this position was attested in the case of lexical subjects, everything started to fall into place: Subject Postposing is the strategy that languages such as Spanish have in order to avoid that PRO
subjects of tensed sentences appear in a governed position at the S-Structure level. Since we did away with Chomsky's 'PRO-Insertion' and 'PRO-Deletion' rules, we were forced to give up the claim that all case-marked traces are variables given the fact that Subject Postposing does leave a case-marked trace behind. Since the principle that says that case-marked traces are variables appeared to be so central to the theory, we examined the adequacy of such a principle and we established, on completely different grounds, that not all case-marked traces are variables, contrary to what Chomsky (1979b) claims.

In our analysis of the Spanish data, the crucial properties that allow for the presence of PRO in tensed sentences are the indices in the agreement and Subject Postposing. AG governs in Spanish. This is the crucial property that allows not only for the presence of a governed trace in the case of Subject Postposing, but also for the apparent 'long distance WH-Movement' from subject position, which has been discussed by Chomsky (1979b) in the case of Italian.

Finally, in the last Section of the Chapter, we summarily pointed out a number of different problems dealing with the interpretation of PRO in both tensed and non-tensed sentences. The solution to those problems falls well beyond the scope of this dissertation and it crucially involves the formulation of
certain rules of interpretation whose form and interaction with other interpretive rules is currently a mystery, given the present stage of development of the theory.
[1] In the course of his lectures in Pisa (1979), Chomsky claimed that an (indexed) empty NP is also possible. This empty NP is supposed to arise via Chomsky's Delete-Pronoun Rule, which empties PRO of its features, including whatever feature for case it has been assigned. (Cf. Section 4.3. below.)

[2] In some dialects, the presence of the preposition (complementizer?) 'de' (of) is mandatory with 'persuadir' (persuade):

(i) Persuadí a Juan de ir al cine con María.
   'I persuaded Juan of to go to the movies with María.'
   (I persuaded Juan to go to the movies with María.)

This holds true of examples (6b), (8b), (9b), and (10b) in the text.

[3] Actually, in 4.5.2. below I am going to argue that the complement subject position of examples such as (13) and (14) is not occupied by PRO, but rather by the trace of it. Since where we find a trace of a certain element, no other trace or a lexical NP can be found (cf. examples (11) and (12) in the text), the argument based on complementary distribution holds even if not exactly FRC, but its trace is present in the complement subject position.

[4] This is a simplified version of the definition of 'governing category'. The formal version of it, originally given in Chomsky (1979b:8) reads as follows:

(i) The Notion of 'Governing Category':

"Alpha is a governing category for beta = def. there is some gamma such that gamma governs beta and alpha contains gamma."

(According to Chomsky, "a governing category for something is just some category that contains its governor.)

(ii) The Notion of 'Minimal Governing Category':

"Alpha is a minimal governing category for beta = def. alpha is a governing category which properly contains no governing category."

In both cases, alpha is to be understood as being NP and either
S or S'. Chomsky states that he is not sure about the latter, and decides on S for execution purposes.

[5] Although Chomsky (1979b) adds in parenthesis that PRO is never 'case marked' as a means to emphasize that PRO is never governed, the relevant notion is government and not case-marking.

[6] In the framework of Chomsky (1979b), two types of indexation are possible: ccindexation by movement, as an effect of the rule 'move alpha', and free indexation at the S-Structure level.

[7] In this sense, PRO is not lexical:

"...pronouns are lexical items, but PRO is not; thus the lexical items of the base are those that have phonetic content." (Chomsky (1979c:40))

If we think of PRO rather abstractly--as we should-- and if the properties of it are not learned in any inductive sense because the language learner never hears it, then PRO is not drawn from the actual lexicons of languages, but rather from the mind, as Chomsky (1980b:22-23) has discussed in relation to inaudibilia in general. From this perspective, PRO cannot be lexical at all.

[8] If a pronoun (or any lexical NP) occurs in an ungoverned position, then it does not receive case, and the structure is out by the Case Filter (cf. #(57), Chapter Three), unless the Case-Inheritance Convention can apply.

[9] According to Chomsky (1979b:49), the Delete-Pronoun Rule "applies everywhere". If we interpret this as 'obligatory application' then the approach is absolutely inadequate. Indeed, if the Delete-Pronoun Rule was obligatory, then structures such as (i) would become (ii):

(i) I persuaded him [ PRO to change his assumption].

(ii) I persuaded him [ e to change his assumption].

The empty subject NP in (ii), formerly PRO in (i), is in an ungoverned position, and the structure should be out according to the Empty Category Principle, which states that empty NPs must be governed. Under the assumption that the Delete-Pronoun Rule is obligatory, the sentences of the examples above would never be generated. It follows that the Delete Pronoun Rule must be optional. If it applies, (ii) is out by the Empty Category Principle, but if it does not, (i) is generated.
[10] I am assuming, along with Rivero (1980:381) that movement into COMP is to the right of the complementizer in Spanish. Since I want to restrict my discussion to PRO Movement from subject position in tensed sentences, I am also specifying the environment. The rule serves no other purpose, but this.

[11] Whether the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter is actually the only device which is operative here or not does not affect the form of the argument. Specifically, (42b) is also out because the structure in question violates the Empty Category Principle: the trace in the complement subject position is not properly governed. Indeed, for the trace in COMP to govern the trace in complement subject position, it must not only be coindexed with the latter, but also minimally c-command the latter:

(i) The Notion of 'Minimal C-Command' (cf. Chomsky (1979b:6)):

"Alpha minimally c-commands beta = def. alpha c-commands beta and there is no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma and gamma c-commands beta and not gamma c-commands alpha."

(ii) The Notion of 'C-Command' (cf. Chomsky (1980a:10)):

"Beta c-commands alpha if beta does not contain alpha (and therefore beta does not equal alpha) and alpha is dominated by the first branching category dominating beta."

Given these definitions, the trace in COMP in example (42b) in the text does not minimally c-command the trace in the complement subject position because it does not c-command it either. Indeed, the first branching node that dominates the trace in COMP is COMP itself, and COMP does not dominate the trace in subject position.

[12] Remember that for beta to be properly governed by alpha, it must be minimally c-commanded by alpha and alpha must be a member of the set \{V, P, N, A\} OR be co-indexed with beta. Cf. #(iii), footnote 19, this Chapter, where I repeat the notion of proper government already presented in #(63), Chapter Three.

Incidentally, in the informally circulated version of Chomsky's 'Pisa Lectures' the disjunctive 'or' is missing from the formulation of proper government. However, careful consideration of Chomsky's discussion indicates that the relevant conditions cannot be taken simultaneously. Consider:

(i) WHO did you say [ [that] Peter kissed t ]?

(ii) WHO did you say [ [ t ] t kissed Mary]?
In (i), the trace in object position is properly governed by the verb in spite of the fact that it is not co-indexed with it, or with anything else in its governing category. In (ii), the trace in COMP is supposed to be an NP, i.e. it is not a member of the set \{V, F, N, A\}. However, it properly governs the trace in complement subject position because it is co-indexed with the latter, as an effect of WH-Movement.

[13] I am not going to discuss Kayne's specific proposal here, which involves a rather complicated formulation of 'government'. The analogy with 'exceptional case marking' gives a sufficiently clear picture of his idea, I think. Cf. Appendix B for the relevant discussion.

[14] Kayne's proposal (1980) is an extension of Chomsky's notion of government. This extension was developed in the framework of Chomsky (1980a), and it carries on to the 'Pisa Lectures' (Chomsky (1979b)). Cf. Appendix B for discussion.

[15] If in Kayne's approach (1980) the verb does not govern the trace in COMP in (i):

(i) ... V ... [ [ t that] ... ]

it can hardly govern the trace in (ii):

(ii) ... V ... [ [ que t ] ... ]

Recall that I am following Rivero (1980) here, and that I am assuming, for the sake of the argument, that verbs of perception and the causative 'dejar' (allow, permit) can take doubly filled COMPs in Spanish. It follows that in this approach, PRO should be safe in COMP position in Spanish.

[16] Actually, Chomsky (1979b:40) has proposed a rule that deletes traces, i.e. empty NPs, in COMP. However, he crucially requires that such a rule be optional, since otherwise it would delete the trace in COMP in examples such as the following:

(i) WHO did Peter say [ [ t ] t was kissing John ]?

In Chomsky's approach (1979b), if such a trace is obligatorily deleted, then the one in complement subject position would be ungoverned, and the structure would never be generated because it would be blocked by the Empty Category Principle.

However, if Kayne's approach is adopted, the trace in COMP would be governed and case marked, and Chomsky's rule wouldn't be applicable.
Chomsky's motivation for proposing the rule that deletes caseless traces in COMP is the consideration of structures such as (ii):

(ii) WHO did John say [ [ t that] Mary kissed t ].

This structure wouldn't go through as is because of the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter.

[17] In some dialects, the case-marker 'a' is necessary in front of the object NP in examples such as (66b-c) in order to disambiguate the reading of the sentence. In this case, the relevant examples can only mean that the baby bit John's ear.

[18] I am assuming that right-dislocated structures appear under S', although it could be claimed that they are not under S', but rather under S''. If this is indeed the case, it does not really affect the form of the argument in the text since the point is that Subject-Postposing in Spanish lacks the properties that right-dislocated subjects have.

I am grateful to María-Lúisa Rivero for bringing the S'' possibility to my attention.

[19] In order to implement this, we have to distinguish between government in the case of Case-Assignment and Proper Government, in the case of the Empty Category Principle. Since according to Chomsky (1979b:6), nominative case assignment is a question of execution, we can solve the problem in the following terms:

(i) Case Assignment Rules (after Chomsky (1979b:9)):

a. NP ----> nominative if governed by INFL, containing Tense.

b. NP ----> objective if governed by -N.

c. NP ----> inherently case-marked elsewhere, as determined by idiosyncratic properties of -N.

d. N ----> genitive in an NP of the form

\[ NP^N X' \]

N.B.- Chomsky's original formulation of (ia) was 'if governed by Tense', but this poses a problem for c-command if INFL branches into TENSE and AG.

"Alpha governs beta iff alpha minimally c-commands beta."

(iii) The Notion of Proper Government (Chomsky (1979b:44)):

"Alpha properly governs beta iff alpha governs beta and
a. alpha = [+/-N, +/-V] OR
b. alpha is co-indexed with beta."

(iv) The Empty Category Principle:

[NP e] must be properly governed.

In this approach, INFL does not participate in the set of 'proper governors', unless it has indices in the AG.

The 'asymmetry' between government for the sake of case-assignment and proper government for the sake of the Empty Category Principle should not bother us. This asymmetry exists because subjects are not strictly subcategorized. The asymmetry is a natural consequence of this, and there is no point in trying to overcome it. Furthermore, INFL is not the only asymmetric governor here: nouns and adjectives also are because these do not assign case, although they count as proper governors for the sake of the Empty Category Principle.

Finally, Chomsky's suggestion that objective case can be assigned in terms of the strict subcategorization features of the verb (1979b:45) does not seem feasible to me. Consider:

(v) I believe [ him to be wrong ].

This structure involves S' deletion according to Chomsky (1979b). The complement subject is objective, but it does not occupy the position within VP that objects occupy. Therefore, objective case cannot be assigned by the strict subcategorization features of the matrix verb alone. The notion of government is crucial. Consider:

(vi) I believe [ [ he is wrong ] ].

Example (vi) shows that linearity is not sufficient for the matrix verb to assign objective case to the subject of the complement S. In (vi), the matrix verb does not govern such subject because of the empty COMP of S', which plays the role of
gamma in the definition of government. If $S'$ is deleted, then (vi) is out by the Case-Conflict Prohibition.

Incidentally, if Chomsky does not make INFL containing Tense a governor for the sake of Case Assignment, then his theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed is at stake:

(vii) *PRO is wrong.

[20] I am grateful to María-Luisa Rivero for bringing examples such as (30) to my attention.

[21] At this point it is interesting to note that not even all traces of WH-Movement are case marked. Consider:

(i) IN WHICH BOX did you say that he misplaced his copy of the paper 'On WH-Movement'?

The trace in (i) is formally an empty PP, not an empty NP, and PPs are not case-marked in Chomsky's Theory of Case Marking. It follows that such a trace cannot be a variable as per Chomsky's definition of variable (1979b).

[22] If rule (92) is assumed to involve movement, then we are left with an ungoverned trace in post-verbal position, i.e. in the position of the postposed subject. However, since such a trace does not enter into interpretation, it does not really matter whether it is properly governed or not according to the terms of our Interpretive Empty Category Principle. Cf. Appendix B.

[23] Another reason that can be invoked to rule out example (96) is the principle that states that $S'$ is an absolute boundary for movement. This principle can be invoked regardless of whether the corresponding WH-phrase is in the matrix subject or the matrix COMP position.

If example (96) is assumed to have a PRO in the matrix subject position and that the WH-phrase has been moved to COMP in the first cycle, and out to COMP in the second, then it is ungrammatical because of the same reason the following example is:

(i) *Parcen que quién es que están cansados.

'They-seem that who-pl. are tired-masc-pl.'

This example is ungrammatical because PRO is a referential expression, and as such, it needs to be assigned a theta role. Since it appears in subject position of 'parecer' (seem), both
in D- and S-Structure, it cannot be assigned a theta role, and the structure is out. Cf. Chomsky (1980b) for discussion.

[24] Given the existence of examples such as (i) below, it could be claimed that PPs should also be allowed in COMP:

(i) I know that in a few days it would rain t.

However, this is a question of analysis. In the first place, the fronted PP in the complement sentence of (i) cannot be in COMP given the terms of the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter. Second, movement into COMP is not to the right, but to the left of the complementizer in English. Third, if we adopt Chomsky's analysis of this type of structures (1977b:91-94), then the PP in question is not in COMP but in TOP position, under S''.

[25] By 'argument', I mean here the position that NPs occupy in the predicate structure of sentences.
CONCLUSIONS

The goal of this thesis was to determine the properties of phonologically-null subjects in tensed complement sentences of verbs of perception in Spanish. In order to accomplish this goal, it was first observed that two types of constructions appear to be related, namely VERB OF PERCEPTION + TENSED SENTENCE and VERB OF PERCEPTION + NP + TENSED SENTENCE. The interesting property of the latter construction is that it exhibits an obligatory anaphoric gap in complement subject position. Such a gap is coreferential with the matrix object.

The first three Chapters of the dissertation were devoted to an examination of different alternative analyses of the above mentioned constructions. Specifically, in Chapter One, I reviewed the analyses already existing in the literature. The starting point was a review of the arguments advanced by Suner (1978/80), who claims that the constructions in question are not syntactically related, and I showed that Suner's arguments are not compelling. Next, in the same Chapter, I briefly examined some very traditional approaches to the problem posed by those constructions, namely the 'Copying and Deletion Analysis' of Sauer (1972) and Demonte (1977), and the 'Equi-NP Deletion Analysis' of Suner (1978/80), and I showed that they are to be rejected on both empirical and theoretical grounds.
Chapter Two was devoted to an examination of what I call the 'Heavy NP Analysis'. Under the terms of this analysis, the construction VERB OF PERCEPTION + NP + TENSED SENTENCE can be assumed to contain a restrictive or a non-restrictive relative clause, or an NP of the type 'el hecho que' (the fact that) in object position. In each of these cases, I presented evidence that makes the analysis untenable.

In Chapter Three, I assumed a more contemporary approach, within the Extended Standard Theory, and I presented theoretically bound arguments against a movement analysis. Specifically, I presented evidence that the construction VERB OF PERCEPTION + NP + TENSED SENTENCE cannot be analysed as an instance of WH-Movement or NP-Movement, i.e. that the anaphoric gap observable in the complement subject position cannot be analysed as the trace of a WH element that has been moved to the internal COMP, or the trace of an NP that has been moved to the matrix object position.

Finally, in Chapter Four, I present the 'Control Analysis'. In this Chapter it is shown that the construction VERB OF PERCEPTION + NP + TENSED SENTENCE is an instance of object control over a PRO subject of a tensed sentence. Since according to the theory, PRO can only appear in ungoverned positions and the subject position of tensed sentences is a governed one, the finding appears to falsify the theorem that states that PRO is never governed in LF. Under these
circumstances, Chomsky's approach to phonologically-null subjects and subject postposing in languages like Spanish was examined. In particular, it was shown that Chomsky's rules of 'PRO-Deletion' and 'PRO-Insertion' (1979b) could not be maintained, that it is not the case that all case-marked traces are variables—contrary to Chomsky (1979b), but in agreement with Chomsky (1977b), and that subject postposing—a non-structure preserving instance of 'move alpha' in Spanish—is the strategy that the language has in order to save the theorem that states that PRO is never governed. The finding is significant since this is a most desirable property for PRO to have given the fact that the language learner never 'hears' it, and—consequently—it cannot be assumed that its properties are learned in any inductive way. Given the present stage of our knowledge, the theorem in question appears to be one of the very best candidates for a principle of universal grammar that we currently have.

Given the terms of the analysis presented, the other theoretically interesting conclusion that can be drawn is that there appears to be a direct interaction between certain general principles of grammar that can be assumed to be inviolable (e.g. that PRO is never governed (cf. Chomsky (1979b))) and general constraints on the form of grammars (e.g. the Structure-Preserving Constraint of Emords (1976)).
Under the terms of this assumption, which implies a hierarchical relation between inviolable principles of grammar and constraints on the form of the same, the violation of the Structure-Preserving Constraint in Spanish becomes a necessary condition for PRO to be ungoverned, and it is no longer a mysterious accident in the language. The crucial property that connects both subject postposing and phonologically-null subjects in Spanish is the highly inflected verb system, which allows proper government. This does not only give an account of the 'long distance WH-Movement' from subject position discussed by Chomsky (1979b), but also an account of subject postposing and phonologically null subjects. The three phenomena in question, which form part of the set of properties that languages like Spanish have, nicely fall together now, and they are no longer part of a descriptive list, but part of an explanation in terms of proper government and the interaction of the Structure-Preserving Constraint with the theorem that states that PRO is never governed.
APPENDIX A:

ON THE QUE/QUI PHENOMENON.

French has a very similar construction to that studied in this thesis:

(1)  a. J'ai vu Marie [qui sortait du cinéma].
     'I saw Marie ['qui' was-coming-out of the theatre].'
     (I saw Marie coming out of the theatre.)

     b. Je l'ai vue [qui sortait du cinéma].
     'I saw her ['qui' was-coming-out of the theatre].'
     (I saw her coming out of the theatre.)

Kayne (1975:126-129) has convincingly argued that this construction cannot be analysed as containing a relative clause. I am not going to repeat his arguments here.

This far, Kayne has proposed two possible analyses for this construction, namely the 'Equi-NP Deletion Analysis' (1975:126-129) and (1976:268-269), and the 'Control Analysis' (1978:7-9).
The 'Equi-NP Deletion Analysis' should not detain us here. It is to be rejected on the same grounds we rejected it in the case of the Spanish data (cf. Chapter One). However, the 'Control Analysis' poses a very interesting problem to our approach.

The problem is complicated, and it involves the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon', which has become a classic in contemporary French syntax. If a certain problem is a classic, it is so because no adequate solution has been found for it, and those that have been advanced remain controversial. I do not expect mine to be an exception to this.

The first thing to be established is the following: If the construction exemplified under (1) is indeed a structure of obligatory control, as Kayne (1978) has claimed, then PRO must be present in the structure when this enters LF, so that it can receive adequate proximate interpretation.

The following is a possible analysis of (1a) at the S-Structure level:

(2) J'ai vu Marie [ [qui] [PRO sortait du cinéma]].

'I saw Marie [ [qui] [PRO was-coming-out of the theatre]].'

The claim implicit in this analysis is that 'qui' is a complementizer. Since 'qui' is in complementary distribution
with 'que', this is not a very controversial claim \[1\].

Consider the following examples:

(3) *J' ai vu Marie [ [que] [PRO sortait du cinéma]].
   'I saw Marie [ [que] [PRO was-coming-out of the theatre]].'

(4) a. J'ai vu [ [que] [Marie sortait du cinéma]].
   'I saw [ [que] [Marie was-coming-out of the theatre]].'

   b. *J'ai vu [ [qui] [Marie sortait du cinéma]].
      'I saw [ [qui] [Marie was-coming-out of the theatre]].'

At this point, the important thing to note is that PRO in (2) is in a governed position, i.e. it is the subject of a tensed sentence, and it appears in the position where subjects of tensed sentences appear. This analysis is not compatible with our claim that PRO is never governed in LP. If our claim is correct, it follows that (2) cannot be the right analysis.

French does not exhibit phonologically null subjects or subject postposing in any manner comparable to Spanish because it has no indices in the AG (cf. Chomsky (1973b)):

(5) *Est arrivée.
   'She arrived.'
(6) a. Marie est arrivée.
   'Marie arrived.'

   'Arrived Marie.'

Therefore it is not possible to invoke Subject-Postposing as a strategy for PRO to escape being case-marked in French. [2]

If we assume that PRO is moved to COMP, then the structure is out by the filter that rules out 'foreign' elements in COMP, which we have advanced in Chapter Four.

In short, there appears to be no easy way out of the problem, and (2) seems to be the only possible analysis. This analysis—not the data per se—falsifies the claim that PRO is never governed.

At this point, the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon' deserves to be examined more carefully. This phenomenon manifests itself in the case of extractions from subject position:

(7) a. QUI crois-tu [ qui viendra le premier ]?
   'WHO do-you believe [ qui will-come first ]?'
   (Who do you believe will come first?)
b. *QUI crois-tu [ que viendra le premier ]?

'WHO do-you believe [ que will come first ]?'

(8) a. QUI crois-tu [ que Jean a photographié ]?

'WHO do-you believe [ que Jean has photographed ]?'

(Who do believe that Jean has photographed?)

b. *QUI crois-tu [ qui Jean a photographié ]?

'WHO do-you believe [ qui Jean has photographed ]?'

These examples are reproduced from Kayne (1976:268).

Examples (7) show that when a WH subject of a complement sentence has been moved out of it, 'qui' is obligatory, and examples (8), that when a non-subject is questioned, 'que' is obligatory. These facts have lead to the belief that 'que' and 'qui' appear in the same slot, and since 'que' is a complementizer, 'qui' should also be a complementizer. The same distribution is observable in the case of relative clauses. (Cf. Kayne (1976))

The mere presence of a WH-phrase in complement subject position does not trigger the presence of 'qui':

(9) a. Qui a dit [ que QUI est parti ]? (Cf. Kayne (1978,

'WHO said [ that WHO left ]?' footnote 18.)
Examples (7)-(9) clearly show that the presence of 'qui' in the complement sentence is directly related to extractions from their subject positions. Under these circumstances, one could conceivably claim that examples (1), i.e. those that Kayne (1978) has analysed as structures of object control, are instances of Subject-to-Object Raising or WH-Movement. I am not going to examine those possibilities here. In the case of the Spanish analogues, I have provided arguments against those possibilities, and as far as I can tell, there is no reason to believe that the theoretical arguments I have used in my demonstration do not hold in French.

In short, we are stuck with the 'Control Analysis' presented in (2), where PRO appears in an illegal position, contrary to what I have been claiming this far.

But this is not the only difficulty that the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon' poses in the framework of Chomsky (1979b). Let us consider example (7a) again:

(10) **QUI crois-tu [ qui viendra le premier ]?** (cf. (7a))

(WHO do you believe will come first?)
If we assume that 'qui' is in COMP position, then this example is to be analysed as follows:

(11) QUI crois-tu [ [ t qui] [ t viendra le premier] ]?

Since according to Chomsky (1979b) INFL does not govern in French [3], the trace in the complement subject position is not properly governed. The structure should be out by virtue of the Empty Category Principle, just like its English analogue is:

(12) *WHO do you believe [ [ t that] [ t will come first] ]?

However, (11) is perfectly grammatical. Only its analogue with 'que' in COMP position is not:

(13) *QUI crois-tu [ [ t que] [ t viendra le premier] ]?

Given these analyses and the difference in grammaticality between (11) and (13), Chomsky (1979b) would be forced to assume that French 'qui' is different from both French 'que' and English 'that', and that the two latter share a certain property that the former lacks, or vice versa. Let us say that such a property is a feature that complementizers might have or lack. Let us assume that such a feature is [-F1] in the case of 'qui', and [+F1] in the case of 'que' and 'that'. [-F1] in the case of 'qui' allows proper government over the trace in the complement.
subject position in (11), and [+F1] blocks the same in the case of 'that' and 'que' in (12) and (13), respectively. [4]

In principle, there is nothing wrong with this approach, but one would like to see a better motivated solution, e.g. one that can account not only for the distribution of 'que' and 'qui' in the case of WH-Movement, but also in the case of the structures involving control over the subject of a tensed complement sentence. If we adopt the solution a la Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), then we are in deep trouble with the principle that states that PRO cannot be governed, because in that case, PRO would not only be case-marked, but also properly governed. If we do not adopt Chomsky and Lasnik's solution, then we could make a weaker claim, namely that PRO can be case-marked, but it is never properly governed, but then we are in trouble with the un governed trace in the complement subject position of (11).

This is basically the dilemma: On the one hand we want to say that the above mentioned trace in (11) is properly governed; and, on the other, that PRO in (2) is not. If we only had these two choices, the consequences would be obvious, namely we would have to give up the claim that PRO is never governed, or the Empty Category Principle. We do not want to do either of that because both of them have nice properties, i.e. they make nice predictions about the form of grammars, as we have been showing throughout this thesis. Fortunately, these are not the only two choices we have, we can still do away with the analyses this far
presented, namely those under (2) and (11), because they lead to contradictory theoretical consequences. To do so implies to say that the entire approach to the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon' is wrong. If this is the case, then we have to come up with a solution that can solve the dilemma discussed above, and also account for the relevant data. Let us explore this possibility.

Consider (1a) again:

(14) J'ai vu Marie qui sortait du cinéma. (cf. (1a))

According to Kayne (1978:8), this example has the following underlying structure:

(15) J'ai vu Marie [ [que] [ [NP] sortait du cinéma] ].

In his analysis, Kayne (1978) is assuming the general framework of Chomsky (1980a)—which at the time was already being circulated amongst Chomsky's associates—.

In this framework, the Nominative Island Condition was central:

(16) The Nominative Island Condition (cf. Chomsky (1980a:36)):

"A nominative anaphor cannot be free in S'."
PRO was assumed to be an empty NP, without any pronominal features, and an anaphor. Therefore, (15) was an illegal structure in LF, as far as the Nominative Island Condition was concerned.

In order to derive (14) from (15), Kayne (1978) assumed the existence of the following rule:

(17) The 'QUE-Deletion/QUI-Insertion Rule' (cf. Kayne (1978:8))

\[
\begin{array}{cccc}
S.D. & X & QUE & NP & Y \\
1 & 2 & 3 & 4 \\
\rightarrow \\
S.C. & 1 & \emptyset & QUI & 4 \\
\end{array}
\]

This rule applies 'obligatorily up to recoverability', i.e.

"If the rule can apply without violating recoverability, then it must apply. If its application would violate recoverability, then it simply fails to apply. The convention necessary here is that the replacement of term 3 by 'qui' counts as 'recoverable' only if term 3 is null [empty, G-P-W.] and c-commanded by some phrase co-indexed with it." (Kayne (1978:8-9)) [5]
Thus, given a structure such as (15), the 'QUE-Deletion/QUI-Insertion Rule' was supposed to transform it into (18):

(18) J'ai vu MARIEi [ \(\emptyset\)[ QUIi sortait du cinéma].

In order to make his solution work, Kayne (1978) had to assume that the 'qui' in (18) was not an anaphor, since otherwise the structure would have been ruled out by the Nominative Island Condition.

In what follows, I would like to borrow Kayne's basic insight of his 'QUE-Deletion/QUI-Insertion Rule' and generalize it to the structures involving WH-Movement from complement subject positions.

First of all, I would like to do away with the deletion part of the rule. This part can be assumed to be a deletion rule proper, which would apply after the rules of construal. [6]

Such a deletion rule can be assumed to have the following form:

(19) The 'QUE-Deletion Rule' (OBLIGATORY):

que \longrightarrow \emptyset / \underline{\_\_\_} qui,

where 'qui' is not the interrogative pronoun (cf. (9a)).

The 'QUI-Insertion Rule' can be formulated as follows:
(20) The 'QUI-Insertion Rule' (OPTIONAL):

\[ \text{[NP} \text{alpha}] \rightarrow \text{[NP qui] / [\text{OMP(beta)-que}]_____... \]

where beta is co-indexed with NP,
or there is no beta, and alpha = PFO.

I am assuming that this rule applies at the S-Structure level, i.e., after the single rule of core grammar 'move alpha' has applied. It is a 'post-cyclic transformation', in standard terminology. Since we have the filter that stars COMPs containing 'foreign' elements, beta can only be a WH-phrase or the trace of one.

This rule inserts the phonological matrix /ki:/ into an empty NP or PFO, under the conditions stated in it. Given the requirement that beta be co-indexed with NP, it follows that the NP in subject position must be empty, since something can be co-indexed with something else in COMP only by virtue of movement into CCOMP. [7]

If PEC is present in the complement subject position, then the rule can only apply if there is no beta at all, i.e., the rule cannot apply if there is a WH-phrase or a trace in COMP.

Let us see how the rule works in the case of WH-Movement. Assume that (21) is the S-Structure of (22): [8]
(21) QUI crois-tu [ [ t - que] [ t viendra le premier] ]?

(22) QUI crois-tu [ $ \emptyset $ [ qui viendra le premier] ]?

In (21), we have a trace in COMP which is co-indexed with the trace in the complement subject position. The structural description of the rule is met. The rule is optional. If it does not apply, (21) goes into LF as is, and the Empty Category Principle rules it out because it has an ungoverned trace in the complement subject position. This is a perfectly desirable result because (21) is ungrammatical.

Now, let us take the same structure (21) and let us assume that the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' does apply. The output is (23):

(23) QUI crois-tu [ [ t - que] [ QUI viendra le premier] ]?

Now, there is no illegal trace in the complement subject position. Everything is legitimate in this respect. What we have instead is an NP with a phonological matrix, but no other features. Since it has a phonological matrix, it must be case-marked, and it is. [9]

The structure goes into LF, and the Empty Category Principle cannot apply to it because the trace is not empty. After the structure has been interpreted, the 'QUE-Deletion Rule' applies, and we obtain (22).
In this respect, it is important to note what Perlmutter (1971:101-102, footnote 2) had to say in relation to sentences such as (22):

"It is not clear how the relative pronoun 'qui' gets into the position after [the matrix verb] in these sentences."

Now, we have the mechanism, namely the 'QUI-Insertion Rule'; but not only this, we also have the motivation for the existence of such a rule: its purpose is to save a structure containing an illegal trace, that otherwise would have been starred by the Empty Category Principle. From this perspective, the so-called 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon' of French is turned into evidence for the Empty Category Principle.

Let us now see what happens when our 'QUI-Insertion Rule' interacts with Chomsky's rule that deletes caseless traces:

(24) The 'Uncase-Marked Trace Deletion Rule' (OPTIONAL):

\[ [NPe] \longrightarrow \emptyset, \text{ where } NPi \text{ is caseless.} \]

According to Chomsky (1979b:40), this rule applies "before the two branches of the grammar separate" (i.e. at the S-Structure level, and he requires it because of the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter (cf. footnote [16], Chapter Four). If this is the case,
then Chomsky's rule and our 'QUI-Insertion Rule' are in direct interaction. They are unordered, and optional.

Let us consider example (21) again, reproduced here as (25):

(25) QUI crois-tu [ [ t - que] [ t viendra le premier] ]?

If Chomsky's rule applies first, we obtain (26):

(26) *QUI crois-tu [ [ void - que] [ t viendra le premier] ]?

The 'QUI-Insertion Rule' cannot apply because (26) does not meet its structural description, i.e. the trace in the complement subject position is not co-indexed with anything in the corresponding COMP. This structure is out in LF by virtue of the Empty Category Principle because of the ungoverned trace in the complement subject position.

Nevertheless, if the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' applies first, then we obtain (23), repeated here as (27):

(27) QUI crois-tu [ [ t - que] [ QUI viendra le premier] ]?

Now Chomsky's rule can apply. If it does, the structure is legal, according to the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter. Otherwise, it is ruled out by the same.
The approach presented here extends itself to relative clauses in French, which observe the same alternation between 'que' and 'qui', depending on whether a non-subject, or a subject is relativised. [10]

Let us now see what happens in the structures that require obligatory control over the subject of a tensed sentence. Assume that (28) is the S-Structure of (29): [8]

(28) J'ai vu Marie [ [que] [ PRO sortait du cinéma] ]

(29) J'ai vu Marie [ [qui sortait du cinéma] ]

The structure under (28) meets the structural description of the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' since PRO appears immediately after 'que' and there is no other element in COMP. The rule may or may not apply. Assume that it does not, and that (29) goes into LF as is. The structure is ruled out because PRO is governed.

Let us consider (28) again. Assume that the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' does apply. The following structure is generated:

(30) J'ai vu Marie [ [que] [ QUI sortait du cinéma] ]

Now PRO has acquired a phonological matrix. It has to be case-marked. Otherwise the Case Filter would rule it out. To put it metaphorically, our undercover PRO is case-marked
nominative at the S-Structure level. The structure goes into LF. The theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed does not apply because it is unable to tell PPO apart from any other pronoun. Our undercover PRO is still PRO because it has all the relevant features, but it is also different from all other pronouns because the phonological matrix it has was acquired in the transformational component. In this sense, our undercover PRO is not strictly lexical, it is still the universal PRO, the one derived from the mind, and it is trying to get through LF without being noticed. Since it is disguised with a phonological matrix, it won't be noticed, and it succeeds. Since PRO is present in the structure, it can receive proximate interpretation. Indeed, if free indexation has applied properly, i.e. if the matrix object and the complement subject bear the same index, the relevant rules of construal come along. What these rules do is to check what the control properties of the matrix verb are, i.e. whether it requires subject or object control over the complement subject, and depending on this they verify whether controller and controllee bear the same indices. If they do not, they mark the structure as uninterpretable. If they do, they presumably verify whether the relevant features for person, number, gender, etc. match. If everything is to their satisfaction, the structure is declared interpretable.

Assuming that everything is to the satisfaction of LF, the rule of 'QUE-Deletion' comes along, and we obtain (29), i.e. the desired output. [11]
Before we discuss the interaction of the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' with WH-Movement in structures of obligatory control over PRO subjects of tensed sentences, let us see what happens in the case of infinitives (cf. footnote [1], this Appendix):

(31) a. Elle ne fait que chanter.

'She only does to sing.'

(31a) (She only sings.)

b. *Elle ne fait qui chanter.

Now the ungrammaticality of (31b) follows in a natural way. Indeed, if we assume that the S-Structure of the examples under (31) is (32), then the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' may or may not apply to it:

(32) Elle ne fait [ [que] [ PRO chanter ] ].

If the rule in question does not apply, we obtain (31a), which is perfectly legal because PRO is not governed. However, if the rule does apply, then we obtain (33):

(33) Elle ne fait [ [que] [ qui chanter ] ].

In (33), now we have a subject NP with phonological content. As such, it must be case marked, but it is not because it is not
governed by INFL containing tense. The Case Filter applies, and stars the structure. After 'QUE-Deletion', we obtain *(34):

(34) *Elle ne fait [ /qui chanter/]. (cf. (31b))

The right prediction is borne out.

But not only this, now we have a confirmation of what we implicitly have been saying all along: the 'qui' that arises via the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' is not a complementizer, but a noun phrase.

In short, since French does not have indices in the AG, it cannot resort to Subject Postposing to avoid that PRO be case-marked nominative in structures of obligatory control over subjects of tensed sentences. Since those structures are to be ruled out by the theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed, French makes use of this otherwise empty phonological matrix, namely /ki:/.

Such a phonological matrix is inserted into PRO, so that this acquires phonological content. Under these conditions, PRO has to be case-marked. The Case Filter must be satisfied, and the theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed cannot apply because in a way, PRO is no longer PRO, as already discussed above.

Let us now see what happens in the case of WH-Movement in structures of obligatory control over subjects of tensed
sentences. Consider the following ungrammatical example:

(35) *D'où est-ce que tu as vu Marie qui sortait?
    'Where-from have you seen Marie qui was-coming-out?'

The structure is a structure of obligatory control over the subject of a tensed sentence. Such a structure exhibits WH-Movement from the complement clause. According to our analysis, this structure should have the following form at the S-level, before the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' applies:

(36) D'où est-ce que tu as vu Marie

    [[ [ t que][ PRO sortait t ] ]]

Since there is a trace in COMP position, the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' cannot apply in spite of the fact that we have PRO in the complement subject position. The structure goes into LF as is and it is ruled out by the theorem that says that PRO cannot be governed. This far, so good. The right prediction is made because (36) is ungrammatical. However, remember that we have the rule that deletes uncase marked traces. Cf. (24) above. This is Chomsky's rule, not mine. As we have already discussed, Chomsky assumes that such a rule applies at the S-Structure level. Therefore, such a rule is in interaction with the 'QUI-Insertion Rule'. As we have already seen, nothing happens when the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' applies in the case of WH-Movement from subject position. However, problems arise when we have
structures such as (36). Indeed, if Chomsky's rule that deletes uncase-marked traces applies first, then we obtain (37):

(37) D'où est-ce que tu as vu Marie
     [ [ Ø que] [ PRO sortait t ] ]?

The structure under (37) meets the structural description of the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' because now there is nothing in CCMP, except for the complementizer 'que'. If the rule does not apply, the structure is out because PRO is governed. However, if the rule does apply, then we obtain (38) and eventually (39) after 'QUE-Deletion':

(38) D'où est-ce que tu as vu Marie
     [ [ que][ qui sortait t ] ]?

(39) *D'où est-ce que tu as vu Marie qui sortait? (cf. (35))

Example (39) is the wrong result.

This far, our approach has not only been proven empirically adequate, but also theoretically consistent. Under these circumstances, the reasonable assumption to make is that our approach is basically correct. Crucially, it starts producing the wrong results when the rules proposed here interact with Chomsky's rule that deletes uncase-marked traces simply because such a deletion rule is assumed to be operative at the
S-Structure level, which is not theoretically consistent. Indeed, according to Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:431-432) and Chomsky (1980a:3-6), Deletion Rules do not apply in the syntax proper, they apply in the 'Phonology', i.e. the left-hand side of the grammar (cf. the outline in footnote [2], this Chapter). Therefore, the presence of Chomsky's rule in the syntax proper is not warranted by the theory. If he needs such a rule because of the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter, then he can have it the 'Phonology', since Deletion Rules apply before Filters, anyways. So let us assume that Chomsky's rule that deletes uncase-marked traces is in the 'Phonology', which is the theoretically consistent assumption to make.

Now that we have placed Chomsky's rule in the right place, structures such as (37) will never be present at the S-Structure level. Under these conditions, examples like (39) will never surface.

However, structures such as the following will now enter LF:

(40) Who did Peter say [ [ t that] [Mary kissed t ] ]?

The trace in object position satisfies the Empty Category Principle because it is properly governed, but the trace in CCMF does not. Such a trace is not governed in anyone's account. If we are to be consistent—as we have been demanding from others—, structures such as (40) should be ungrammatical, but
they are not. We certainly do not want to delete such trace in the syntax proper because that is not theoretically consistent, as we have claimed above. The problem is the formulation of the Empty Category Principle. If such a Principle is a principle that is operative in LF, it should have an interpretive form, let us assume that this is the case, and let us reword it as follows:

(41) The Empty Category Principle (Interpretive Version):

If \[n^p e\] is not properly governed,
then \#NP (where \# means uninterpretable).

This formulation of the Empty Category Principle says that if an empty NP is not properly governed, then it is uninterpretable, i.e. it cannot be taken into account by the interpretive rules. Note that it does not say anything about the status of the sentence that contains an NP which is not properly governed, it simply says that such particular NP is \#NP.

Let us briefly review the standard cases involving WH-Movement first:

(42) WHO did Peter say [ [ t that] [Mary kissed t ]]? 

(43) *WHO did Peter say [ [ t that] [ t kissed John]]?
(44) WHO did Peter, say [ [ t ] [ t kissed John]]?

In (42), the trace in object position is properly governed. Therefore, the Interpretive ECP does not mark it # (uninterpretable). However, the trace in COMP is not properly governed. The Interpretive ECP applies and marks it #. What are the consequences of this? None. The reason is that such a trace in COMP does not play any role in any rule of semantic interpretation. Specifically, the rule that interprets sentences involving WH-Movement relates two elements only: the WH-phrase in COMP position and the trace inside of S. Since such a trace is not marked #, the rule can apply and we obtain the relevant reading.

In (43), both traces are not properly governed. Both of them are marked # by the Interpretive ECP. The trace in COMP does not enter in the structural description of the rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement, so it does not matter whether it is # or not, but the one in the complement subject position does enter into the structural description of such a rule. The rule cannot apply and, as a result, the entire structure is not interpretable.

Let us take the case of example (44) now. The trace in the complement subject position is properly governed because it is co-indexed with the trace in COMP, which minimally c-commands it. Therefore the Interpretive ECP does not apply to it. Now,
in order to determine the status of this trace with respect to proper government, the status of the trace in COMP must be taken into consideration. If such trace in COMP was not properly governed, then it would be marked # by the Interpretive ECP. If it is #, then it cannot be interpreted as a proper governor for the trace in complement subject position by the Interpretive ECP itself. Note that I am assuming the strongest possible version of the Interpretive ECP. In other terms, I am saying that if a certain empty NP is not properly governed, it cannot participate in any interpretation at all, not even the Interpretive ECP itself. Under these conditions, if the trace in CCOMP in example (44) is not properly governed, then the one in complement subject position is not either. Since the structure is perfectly acceptable, let us say then that the trace in CCOMP is indeed properly governed. Interestingly enough, this assumption appears to be supported by the facts. Indeed, Kayne (1980) has argued that the trace in COMP in examples such as (44) must be governed. I will return to this in Appendix B. So, let us assume—with Kayne (1980)—that such a trace is indeed properly governed. Under the terms of this assumption, the Interpretive ECP does not mark it #, and therefore it can operate as a proper governor for the trace in complement subject position, which cannot be mark # either. Since under these conditions the latter trace is properly governed, it can enter into semantic interpretation. In particular, it must be taken into consideration by the rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement.
Let us now see how all this works in the case of NP-Movement:

(45) The Whitecaps seem [ t to have been defeated t again].

We have two traces in (45). Both are properly governed, and therefore neither of them is marked # by the Interpretive ECP. They are to be taken into account by the rules of semantic interpretation. In particular, the trace in object position must be taken into account by the rules that interpret thematic roles of NPs in sentences.

These are basically the standard examples. Given the terms of the Interpretive ECP, there is no need to delete caseless traces in CChM.

In summary, in this Appendix, I have examined some French structures involving obligatory control over subjects of tensed sentences. Since French has no phonologically null subjects and no subject postposing in any fashion comparable to Spanish, the latter could not be invoked as a strategy for PRO to escape being governed at the S-Structure level. However, we observed that the so-called 'QUE/QUI-Phenomenon' manifested itself in two types of structures that involved the presence of illegal phonologically null elements, namely the trace of WH-Movement in complement subject position and PRO in structures of obligatory control over subjects of tensed sentences. Following up an analysis of Kayne (1978), we formulated a rule of
'QUI-Insertion'. This rule inserts the otherwise empty phonological matrix /ki:/ under the illegal trace of WH-Movement and the illegal PRO in the structures of control, saving the relevant constructions from being ruled out by the Empty Category Principle in LF. In this approach, the resulting NP has a phonological matrix, and as such it has to be case-marked. This was attested when some infinitival constructions were considered.

Finally, since the analysis here presented was crucially at stake when the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' interacted with Chomsky's rule that deletes urcase-marked traces, this was relegated to the 'Phonology', where all deletion rules are supposed to be according to the theory. This move forced us to give an interpretive version of the Empty Category Principle, so that structures containing ungoverned traces in COMP position are not ruled out in LF.

Appendix B is devoted to an examination of the Interpretive ECP.
[1] In his earlier research work, Kayne (1975: 128) and (1976: 270-271) suggested a rule that would turn the complementizer 'que' into 'qui' when immediately followed by the verb:


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>QUE</th>
<th>Y</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This proposal was theoretically consistent at the time since no trace was assumed to be present between 'que' and the verb in (i), and the structures involving control were analysed as instances of Equi-NP Deletion. The 'QUI-->QUI Rule' is not a feasible device in a theory that incorporates traces and assumes that PRO is present in control structures, although one can think of tricks to make it work, e.g. to include a term between 2 and 3 in the rule, and impose a condition on that term, namely that it can only be a trace or PRO.

However, the 'QUI-->QUI Rule' has at least two disadvantages. The first is that it affects the phonological matrix of the complementizer without phonological motivation, and therefore does violence to the lexical item in an unnatural way.

The second is that it fails to apply when the verb that follows 'que' (or PRO in the Extended Standard Theory) is an infinitive:

(ii) a. Elle ne fait que chanter.
    b. *Elle ne fait qui chanter.
     'She only does to sing.'
     (She only sings.)

Kayne (1976) is aware of the latter, and discusses two solutions. One in terms of the distinction between tensed and non-tensed sentences, and another in terms of absence versus presence of the subject NP at the time of application of his 'QUE-->QUI Rule'. Given either of these alternatives, the data can be accommodated within the analysis. However, there is no principled motivation for any of them, and the solutions fail to explain anything. They simply give an account of the data.

The shortcoming of Kayne's approach (1976) is not a shortcoming of the approach itself, but rather a shortcoming of the theory he was assuming.

The analysis I present below—which is not exactly original because I borrow the basic insight from Kayne (1978)—overcomes these difficulties in a natural way, as a consequence of the
present stage of development of the theory, which strongly suggests that the modifications recently introduced by Chomsky (1979b) are in the right direction (with the reservations noted this far).

[2] Cf. Kayne and Pollock (1978) for an analysis of 'Stylistic Inversion (of the Subject)' in French. Although 'Stylistic Inversion' occurs in embedded and non-embedded interrogatives, relatives, and in certain constructions where the subjunctive is obligatory, interestingly enough Kayne and Pollock (1978) argue that the actual postponing of the subject NP must be dissociated from the trigger. Their ('interim') solution is the following rule and filter (cf. Kayne and Pollock (1978: 616-617)):

(i) \[ NP \ X \rightarrow e \ 2 \ 1 \]
\[ 1 \ 2 \]

(ii) "Mark as ungrammatical any sentence containing an empty subject position not immediately preceded by the trigger \( [WH/\!\!\!\!F] \), [where \( WH \) is a WH-phrase or the trace of one, and \( \!\!\!\!F \) a feature that indicates subjunctive mood, G.F.W.]."

In their footnote 30, Kayne and Pollock (1978) declare that the filter is an 'interim solution' and that in Kayne and Pollock (in preparation), "this filter will be dispensed with entirely in favour of a rule of construal on LF, which will turn out [to account for a number of other things, G.F.W.]."

Kayne and Pollock (in preparation) is listed in the corresponding bibliography as 'Stylistic Inversion, Successive Cyclicity, Move NP and Logical Form', which according to the star footnote in Kayne and Pollock (1978) is an 'interim title'.

As far as I can tell, this paper is either still 'in preparation' or has never acquired any shape at all. Indeed, such a paper is not listed in Kayne's 'ECP Extensions' (Kayne (1981)), where one would expect substantial references to it since the rule reproduced above constitutes a blatant violation of the Empty Category Principle.

Since we do not know what Kayne and Pollock's 'final solution' is (or whether they actually have one), we can only discuss the one reproduced here.

As we have already pointed out, the rule of 'Stylistic Inversion' violates the Empty Category Principle (and also its former version, the Nominative Island Condition of Chomsky (1980), which Kayne and Pollock (1978) list in their bibliography as Chomsky (1978)). Since the inversion of the subject in fact exists in French and it leaves an ungoverned trace behind, it follows that the rule in question cannot be an instance of NP-Movement, contrary to what Kayne and Pollock
(1978) claim. The rule must be stylistic, i.e. it must apply after S-Structure.

If this is the case, as everything seems to indicate, then we are in trouble because filters apply before stylistic transformations apply (cf. Chomsky and Lasnik (1977: 431) and Chomsky (1980: 3)). Under these circumstances, Kayne and Pollock's filter reproduced under (ii) wouldn't be able to apply. One obvious possibility is to order stylistic transformations before filters, but then we are in trouble again, because Kayne and Pollock's filter makes reference to a trace in COMP, which can be immediately followed by 'que', i.e. it makes reference to [t que ], which is disallowed by the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter. This is contradictory in the organization of the grammar. Indeed, on the one hand, Kayne and Pollock's filter requires a complementizer of the form [ t que ], and on the other, the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter bars such structures.

The solution, it seems to me, is to consider 'Stylistic Inversion' stylistic and relegate the question of the filter to Semantic Interpretation II. Indeed, if we assume that the basic organization of the grammar is as in the following outline, then the problem vanishes:
(iii)

BASE

D-Structure

Move Alpha

S-Structure

'PHONOLOGY'

SEMITIC INT. I

1. a. Rules of Construal
2. Quantifier Interpretation et cetera.

PHONETIC REPS.

SEMITIC INT. II

SEMANTIC REPS.
This outline has been prepared taking into account Chomsky (1976:195-196), Chomsky (1979b), Chomsky (1980a:3-6), and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977:431-432). I am not going to repeat the general assumptions behind this model here. The only relevant aspect of it that requires emphasis here is that the structures that enter into Semantic Interpretation I, which determines LF, must meet the requirements imposed by the Empty Category Principle and 'inter alia'. However, there is no indication that the structures that enter Semantic Interpretation II, where purely linguistic knowledge interacts with other cognitive representations (e.g. pragmatics), must also satisfy those principles. If this is the case, then 'Stylistic Inversion' in French can be assumed to be stylistic, and Kayne and Pollock's cumbersome filter can be formulated as a language specific rule of interpretation operative in Semantic Interpretation II. Such a rule can simply read as follows:

(iv) Any tensed sentence of the following form

\[
[s \text{(COMP)} [ e \ldots ]]
\]

is uninterpretable unless its verb is in the subjunctive or its relevant LF has a variable in \ldots

This solution does not do any better than Kayne and Pollock's, but at least it is theoretically consistent.

[3] This is why French lacks phonologically null subjects and Stylistic Inversion' must be stylistic.


Chomsky and Lasnik's were assuming at the time that the so-called 'that - trace' filter was correct, and their problem was basically the difference in grammaticality below:

(i) ENGLISH: *[that] trace...
(ii) FRENCH: *[que] trace...
(iii) FRENCH: [qui] trace...

In order to account for these differences, they assumed that the complementizers 'that' and 'que' were different from the complementizer 'qui'. Cf. Postal (1980) for a devastating critique of this approach.

Pesetsky (undated:15-18) proposes a rule of 'COMP Contraction' to account for the 'QUE/QUI Phenomenon' in French Relatives:
(iv) a. *L'homme que viendra nous rendre visite...
   b. L'homme qui viendra nous rendre visite...
   'The man that will come pay us a visit...'

Pesetsky's rule is reproduced below:

\[(v) \text{[COMP } [WH1/TRACE1] \text{ que } ] \rightarrow \text{[COMP qui]}
\]
\[\text{/ } \rightarrow \text{[s X TRACE1 Y]}
\]
\[\text{+NOM}\]

Basically, what this rule does is to convert 'que' into 'qui' if COMP contains a WH-element or a trace which is coindexed with a trace case-marked nominative. Under the terms of this rule, the index of the WH-element or the trace in COMP is transferred to 'qui', i.e. 'qui' becomes a governor, according to the terms of the framework of Chomsky (1979b). However, as Pesetsky himself points out in his footnote 11, the existence of control structures such as those discussed in this Appendix constitutes evidence against his approach. One way out that he mentions is to assume that PRO moves to COMP in these structures, and that his rule could be reformulated as follows (relevant part only):

\[(vi) \text{[COMP } [WH1/TRACE1/PRO1] \text{ que } ] \rightarrow \text{[COMP qui]}
\]

However, Pesetsky's approach is subject to the following criticisms: First, his rule does violence to the phonological shape of the complementizer (cf. footnote [1], this Appendix). Second, his rule would have to delete PRO in COMP, so that the resulting 'qui' can properly govern the trace in complement subject position, i.e. the rule has to eliminate the branching COMP. Under these circumstances, PRO would not be available to receive adequate proximate interpretation in LF. Third, PRO-Movement into COMP has undesirable consequences in core-grammar, as we have already seen in Chapter Four.

[5] Kayne (1978) is assuming that co-indexing is via control, and that the rules of control apply before his 'QUE-Deletion/QUI-Insertion Rule'. However, this assumption is not warranted in the theory since the publication of Chomsky and Lasnik (1977), according to whom rules of control (construal) apply after all transformations have applied. Cf. the outline in footnote 2 above.

[6] In the Extended Standard Theory, Deletion Rules apply in the 'Phonology', i.e. in the left-hand side of the grammar, to use one of Chomsky's expressions (1979b). Cf. the outline in footnote 2 above.

[7] This rule will not interfere with 'Stylistic Inversion' even if we assume, in spite of everything said in footnote 16 above, that such a rule is an instance of NP-Movement because in
that case, the trace that 'Stylistic Inversion' would leave behind would not be co-indexed with anything in COMP:

(i) a. Qui a-t-elle dit qu'avait vu Paul?
   'WHOi did she say
   [ [that] [ TRACEj had seen TRACEi PAULj ] ]?'
   (Who did she say that Paul had seen.)

   b. *Qui a-t-elle dit qui avait vu Paul?

Example (ib) can only mean 'Who did she say had seen Paul?'

More interestingly, just as Kayne (1978) wanted, the rule of 'QUI-Insertion' proposed here does not legitimize improper L-Tous movement either because of the same reason:

(ii) a. Il faut que tout soit détruit.
   b. *Il faut tout que soit détruit.
   c. *Il faut tout qui soit détruit.
   'It is necessary that everything be destroyed.'

L-Tous Movement has left an ungoverned trace in subject position in (iib). Therefore, the structure is out by the Empty Category Principle. Such structure cannot be legitimized via 'QUI-Insertion' simply because the trace in subject position is not co-indexed with anything in COMP.

[8] Kayne (1976) has argued that 'que' must be present in COMP position in deep structure.

[9] Interestingly enough, now we have a case-marked trace that is not empty, and that—therefore—is not a variable as per Chomsky's definition of variable (1979b), which we have dismissed on other grounds.

That we have a non-empty trace might be thought to be a problem for the application of the rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement, but it is actually not. Indeed, according to Chomsky (1980a), for the correct application of such a rule, it is necessary to identify the traces of WH-Movement with a special notational device. The device he proposes is the feature +COMP, which is added to the trace by the same convention that co-indexes it with the moved element. According to this, traces of WH-Movement are formally identified as in (i)

```
(i)    NP_i+comp
      |    e
```

Since the 'QUI-Insertion Rule' inserts the phonological matrix /ki:/ in the place of 'e', which indicates 'empty', we obtain
Under these conditions, the rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement should have no difficulty in recognizing (ii) as a trace.

Furthermore, it should be pointed out that such a rule is an interpretive rule, and therefore it does not actually 'insert' variables in the place of traces. What it does is to take a certain syntactic structure and produce a predicate-calculus representation of it.

[10] I am not too sure whether this is a desirable result or not. If it is not, then a different mechanism would have to be proposed to account for the presence of 'qui' in the case of relatives involving subjects in French, and the relevant rules would have to be formulated in such a way that they do not interfere with each other. However, Pierre Trescases tells me that examples such as (i) are perfectly possible in colloquial French:

(i) Le garçon que Marie a dit qui devait venir est ici.
   'The boy that Marie has said 'qui' had to come is here.'

Although (i) is a non-preferred structure (others can be used instead), its grammatical status becomes clear cut when compared to the ungrammatical one of (ii), (iii), and (iv):

(ii) *Le garçon que Marie a dit que devait venir est ici.

(iii) *Le garçon qui Marie a dit que devait venir est ici.

(iv) *Le garçon qui Marie a dit qui devait venir est ici.

An approach different from the one assumed here would have to resort to a special mechanism in order to explain the presence of 'qui' in (i).

I am grateful to Terence McNamee and Pierre Trescases for helping me with the French data.

[11] Given the terms of the rules posited in this Section, i.e. the 'QUI-Insertion' and the 'QUE-Deletion' rules, they give place to massive overgeneration. Consider the following structure, for example:

(i) Jean a dit [ [que] [PRO est parti] ].
   'Jean has said [ [that] [PRO has left] ].'
The theory has no means to preclude the insertion of PRO in this structure. If the 'QUI-Insertion' and the 'QUE-Deletion' rules apply, as they eventually will, we derive (ii):

(ii) *Jean a dit qui est parti.

A simplistic solution would be to say that structures such as these are not structures of control, and therefore PRO cannot receive adequate interpretation, but then we have the Spanish data:

(iii) María dijo que se fue.
(Maria said that [he/she/you] left.)

In (iii), if the complement PRO subject is interpreted as 'she', it can refer back to 'Maria' or not, but most importantly, the sentence is not excluded as (ii) is.

Given the present stage of development of the theory, the only solution is to impose a condition on the 'qui' that arises via 'QUI-Insertion'. Let us say that such a condition is something like the following:

(iv) PRO+/ki:/ can only appear in control structures.

This is an account of the facts, and--therefore--it does not explain anything. However, it is a perfectly legitimate 'interim' solution that makes no promises. For the time being, it helps us to control the data, pending future research. Nevertheless, I do not wish to leave this question entirely open. It seems to me that the right place to look at is the area that deals with the conditions under which PRO can receive obviative interpretation, i.e. the conditions under which PRO is 'arbitrary in reference' according to Chomsky and Lasnik (1977). E.g.

(v) Do you know [ what [ PRO to do ]? ]

That is the case of PRO in (v) and (iv). What exactly those conditions are, we do not know, but we do know that they must allow for parametric variation, so that (ii) can be excluded. Presumably, the solution is in terms of the interaction of some rules of construal. Unfortunately, Kayne and Pollock have not yet released their study that deals with rules of construal (cf. Kayne and Pollock (1978, footnote 30)). It has taken them more than three years, but let us hope that when such a study comes out it will shed some light on the form of rules of construal. This will most definitely help to determine the conditions under which PRO can be interpreted.
APPENDIX B:

ON THE INTERPRETIVE ECP.

In Appendix A, we advanced an interpretive version of the Empty Category Principle, which we stated as follows:

(1) The Interpretive ECP:

If \( [_{NP}^e] \) is not properly governed, then \#NP.

The advantage of the Interpretive ECP is that it does away with the rule of trace deletion or trace erasure in COMP. This rule can be assumed to be in the 'Phonology', i.e. in the left-hand side of the grammar. This makes the entire theoretical approach internally consistent, and avoids the interference of the rule of trace deletion in COMP with that of 'QUI-Insertion' in French. But not only this, now the Empty Category Principle has definitely the form of a general condition on interpretability of empty NPs, at the level of LF.

In Appendix A, we also examined some standard examples involving both NP-Movement and WH-Movement, and we assumed that the trace that appears in COMP position in examples such as (2) must be
properly governed:

(2) WHO did you say [ [ t ][ t has kissed Mary]]?

However, no argument was advanced in support of this claim.

Also, since the interpretive version of the Empty Category Principle was motivated because we did away with trace deletion in the syntax proper, the move does not appear to be fully justified.

In what follows, I would like to discuss the question of proper government in COMP, and also to provide some external evidence in support of the Interpretive ECP.

1. Proper Government in COMP.

Let us first review Chomsky's notion of government (cf. #(54), Chapter Three). Remember that government is a purely configurational relation between two arbitrary elements in terms of minimal c-command, and that government is not equivalent to proper government. Government plays a role in case-assignment, whereas proper government—which makes use of the notion of government—is only relevant with respect to the Empty Category
Principle (cf. footnote [19], Chapter Four). With this distinction in mind, let us consider the notion of government once again:

(4) Chomsky's Notion of Government:

Alpha governs beta if alpha minimally c-commands beta and there is no S' or NP between alpha and beta. (Cf. Chomsky (1979b:6-7))

The reader is already familiar with the notion of minimal c-command, which we have discussed in Section 4.5.2, Chapter Four. However, we have not discussed Chomsky's reasons for claiming that S' and NP are absolute boundaries for government. Let us see what Chomsky's motivation is. Consider (5) and (6) below:

(5) a. I believe he is smart.
       b. I believe him to be smart.

(6) a. *I believe him is smart.
       b. *I believe he to be smart.

According to Chomsky (1979b) and (1979c), S' Deletion is involved in (5) and (6). In (5a), there is an S' boundary between the matrix verb and the complement subject. Therefore, such verb does not govern the subject. The subject is
nominative because it is governed by tense. It is not objective (cf. (6a)). In (5b), there is no $S'$ boundary between the matrix verb and the complement subject. The verb governs the subject and marks it objective. The subject is not nominative (cf. (6b)). This is basically the role of the $S'$ boundary in government.

Let us now consider the NP boundary:

(7) I saw John's pictures.

According to Chomsky (1979b), the following rule assigns genitive case in English:

(8) $N \rightarrow$ genitive in an NP of the form $[N^P N 'X']$

In (7), 'John' is genitive. It is not objective. Therefore, Chomsky assumes that (7) is to be analysed as follows:

(8) I [saw [ John's pictures ]],

where the innermost brackets are the NP boundaries. Under these conditions, the verb governs the entire NP, but not what is inside of it, and therefore it does not mark 'John' objective.

Because of these reasons, Chomsky (1979b) and (1979c) claims that $S'$ and NP are absolute boundaries for government. In
principle, I see no difficulties with the claim that NP is an absolute boundary for government, and therefore I am not going to discuss it here. However, the question of S' poses a minor difficulty, which I will attempt to overcome by claiming that it is not S' what precludes verb government in examples such as (5), but rather the presence versus absence of an unexpanded COMP, which is to be equated with gamma in the definition of minimal c-command (cf. (24) below). In this view, (5) is to be analysed as follows:

(9) I believe [ COMP [ he is smart ] ].

Since the rules of the base are optional in the theory, the presence versus absence of an unexpanded COMP is a perfectly legitimate possibility (cf. Chomsky (1979b)).

Let us first what our motivation for doing away with S' as an absolute boundary for government is.

Consider example (2) again:

(10) WHOi did you say [ [TRACEi][TRACEi has kissed Mary]]?

The trace in complement subject position is currently assumed to be properly governed by the trace in COMP.
In addition, we are also claiming that the trace in COMP should be properly governed for it to be a proper governor. If this were not the case, then the Interpretive ECT would mark such trace #. Under these conditions, such trace cannot serve as a governor for the trace in subject position, which would also be marked #. If the two relevant traces are marked #, then the entire structure cannot be interpreted by the rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement. Therefore, we want to say that both traces are properly governed, since the example is perfectly grammatical and perfectly interpretable.

This far we have been vaguely saying that this is to be accomplished along the lines of Kayne (1980), who revises and extends Chomsky's original notion of government (1980a). However, Kayne (1980) assumes the general framework of Chomsky (1980a), and—therefore—Kayne's proposal has no direct translation into the framework of the 'Pisa Lectures', that we are assuming. Let us see what exactly his proposal is. Consider the examples below:

(11) The only one [ [WHO] [she didn't claim

[ [ t ] [ t had anything wrong with him]]]].

(12) *The only person [ [WHO] [it's not essential

[ [ t ] [ t talk to her]]]] is Bill.
In both examples, the trace in subject position is assumed to be properly governed by the trace in COMP. Since the trace in CCMF is a proper governor, our Interpretive ECP requires that it be properly governed too. Let us assume that this is indeed the case, in spite of Chomsky's claim that S' is an absolute boundary for government. However, only example (11) is grammatical. (12) is not.

According to Kayne (1980), the relevant difference is case. In example (11), the trace in COMP is not only governed by the matrix verb, but also case-marked by the same. In the case of example (12), the trace in COMP is governed, but not case-marked.

This assumption is a very natural assumption to make since in (11) the matrix predicate is transitive, whereas that of (12) is intransitive. [1]

The first problem we have to confront is the following: How do we incorporate Kayne's insight into the framework of Chomsky (1979b)? My answer to this is the following revised version of proper government:

(12) The Notion of Proper Government:

Alpha properly governs beta iff alpha governs beta and
a. \( \alpha = [+/N, +/V] \) or

b. \( \alpha \) is BOTH CASE-MARKED AND co-indexed with \( \beta \).

The relevant revision appears in caps in (12), and it is really a very minor revision. Otherwise, the notion of proper government is exactly the same as that of Chomsky (1979b).

Now, under the terms of this revision, two possibilities are allowed, provided that we do not consider S' a boundary for government:

(13)

```
            --- VP
             
              V

          --- S'
            
           COMP

   --- S
   
  t

     --- NP
     
    INFL

                 --- VP
                              
                             t
```

(14)

```
            --- S
            
          NP\(i\)

     --- INFL\(i\)
     
    VP

                 --- VP
                              
                             t
```
Let us consider (13) first. The trace in COMP properly governs the trace in subject position only if the former is assigned case by the matrix verb, and both traces bear the same index. If the trace in COMP is not case-marked, our Interpretive ECP marks it #. Under these conditions, the same trace cannot be interpreted as a governor for the trace in subject position, and—as a consequence—this is not properly governed either and also gets marked #. Under these conditions, neither of the traces can enter into any rule of semantic interpretation, and the relevant structure does not receive a reading. Thus, we have an explanation for the ungrammaticality of (12).

In the case of (11), both traces are properly governed because the trace in COMP is governed by the matrix verb, which also has assigned case to it. Under these conditions, it can act as a proper governor for the trace in complement subject position since both traces bear the same index. Example (11) is perfectly grammatical.

Let us now consider the other possibility that we are claiming proper government allows, i.e. the case diagrammed under (14). This is the case of languages such as Spanish, which have indices in the agreement:

(15) QUIÉN dijiste [ [que - t] [ t llego]]?  
‘WHO did you say [ [that - t][ t arrived]]?
According to Chomsky (1979b), INFL is a bundle of features which contains tense and AG, and AG includes features for person, number, gender, and CASE. So, INFL includes CASE. Presumably, this is inherently nominative because of the presence of tense. So let us say that INFL is inherently case marked nominative in languages such as Spanish. Under these conditions, INFL can serve as a proper governor because it also has indices in the agreement in the case of Spanish. Hence, (15) is perfectly grammatical in Spanish. But, what about the trace in COMP? Well, the trace in COMP is not properly governed and caseless. It is marked # by the Empty Category Principle, and this is perfectly OK because such trace enters in no interpretation at all. The English gloss of (15) is ungrammatical because English does not have indices in the AG. Therefore, INFL is not a proper governor in English. (Cf. Chomsky (1979b) for discussion.)

Let us briefly review the notion of government. This notion is crucial to proper government, so let us see whether it is applicable to traces in COMP in English, under the assumption that S' is not an absolute boundary for government. The following is the relevant diagram:
This diagram is exactly parallel to the situation we have when a trace in subject position is governed by a trace in COMP:

And also exactly parallel to the one we have under the terms of 'exceptional case marking', i.e. in the case of examples such as 'I believe him to be sick':
Since the trace in CCMP is assumed to govern the trace in subject position in (17), and in the case of exceptional case-marking the verb is assumed to govern the subject NP in (18), it follows that the verb in (16) also governs the trace in COMP since the structures are configurationally analogous. However, there is something which is not exactly accurate in the definition of government. Consider:

(19)  
```
    A
   / \    /
alpha beta gamma
```

(19) is the representation of (16), (17), and (18) in terms of the elements that enter into the definition of minimal c-command, which plays a crucial role in government. Recall that alpha governs beta if and only if alpha minimally c-commands beta.
For alpha to minimally c-command beta, alpha must c-command beta and there must be no gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma, and gamma c-commands beta, and gamma does not c-command alpha.

Let us see what the situation in (19) is. Alpha c-commands beta. However, there is a gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma, gamma c-commands beta, and gamma does not c-command alpha. The minimal c-command condition is not satisfied by (19), since (19) stands for (16), (17), and (18), it follows that those structures do not meet the minimal c-command condition either. Although the situation looks very complicated, it is actually not and all that is required is a minor modification of the definition of c-command.

We obviously want to say that alpha minimally c-commands beta in (19) because that is what we need in the case of (16), (17), and (18). In order to sharpen the definition of minimal c-command we have to look at the cases we want to exclude. We certainly do not want INFL (or tense) to minimally c-command the object NP in a sentence. So, in (20), INFL should not govern the object NP:

(20)
The other structure we want to exclude as a structure of proper government is that of Subject Postposing in Spanish, assuming that the postposed subject is Chomsky-Adjoined to the right of VP. So, in (21), we do not want the postposed subject to be properly governed by its trace or INFL in Spanish:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
S \\
\text{NPi} & \text{INFLi} & \text{VP} \\
\text{e} & \text{VP} & \text{NPi}
\end{array}
\]

Finally, we do not want the matrix verb to assign objective case via 'exceptional case-marking', in the case of examples such as 'I believe he is wrong':

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\ldots \text{VP} \\
\text{V} & \text{S'} \\
\text{COMP} & \text{S} \\
\text{e} & \text{NP}
\end{array}
\]

As I have already mentioned above, I am assuming that in examples like 'I believe he is wrong' there is an unexpanded COMP, a possibility allowed by the theory.
We can summarize the situation of (20), (21), and (22) in the following tree-diagram:

(23)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
A \\
\alpha \\
\gamma \\
B \\
\beta
\end{array}
\]

Compare (19) and (23). The crucial difference is the position of gamma. If there is an INTERVENING gamma between alpha and beta, alpha does not minimally c-command beta. Otherwise, the contrary holds. Therefore, we can sharpen the definition of minimal c-command in the following terms:

(24) The Notion of Minimal C-Command:

Alpha minimally c-commands beta = def. alpha c-commands beta and there is no INTERVENING gamma such that alpha c-commands gamma, and gamma c-commands beta, and not gamma c-commands alpha.

Under the terms of this revision, it is not S' what blocks verb government in examples such as 'I believe he is wrong', but the presence of the un-expanded COMP that we are assuming (cf. (9) and (22) above). In this view, S' Deletion is replaced by
'Unexpanded-COMP Deletior', and we do not need to make S' an absolute boundary for government. [2]

Now that we have sharpened our definition, we can go back to our discussion of government in COMP:

The traces in (25) are co-indexed as an effect of WH-Movement. The trace in COMP is properly governed and case-marked by the matrix verb. Therefore, it is not marked # by the Interpretive ECP, and it can act as a proper governor for the trace in complement subject position. This trace is properly governed by the trace in COMP. Everything is to the satisfaction of the Interpretive ECP, and the structure can be interpreted.
Let us now consider structures such as (26)

Again, the relevant traces are co-indexed as an effect of the movement. The trace in COMP is properly governed and case-marked by the matrix verb, therefore it is not marked # by the Interpretive ECP. It can act as a potential proper governor for the trace in S. However, the trace in COMP does not minimally c-command the trace in S because it does not even c-command it. Indeed, the first branching node that dominates the trace in COMP is COMP itself, and COMP does not dominate the trace in S. Under these conditions, the trace in S is marked # by the Interpretive ECP, and the structure cannot be interpreted.
because the trace that crucially enters into the relevant rule is the trace in S, and not that in COMP. [3]

This far, we have been able to account for all the relevant data, and we have shown that the Interpretive ECP does the very same job that Chomsky's original ECP did. Now I would like to present an argument that crucially proves that the Interpretive ECP is superior to Chomsky's original formulation. The data is from Spanish, and the prove is substantiated on the basis of the so-called 'Nessuno Argument', which was first advanced by Luiggi Rizzi--using data from Italian--against Chomsky's ECP in an oral presentation in Nijmegen, The Netherlands (cf. Jaeggli (1980:222-224) for the relevant references).

2. The 'Nessuno Argument'.

Consider the following sentences from Spanish and their corresponding predicate-calculus type representations in LF:

(27) a. Yo NO quiero que venga NINGUNO!
     'I do not want anyone to come!'

    b. NEG (Ex) [Yo quiero [que venga x]]
(28) a. Yo NO quiero que NINGUNO venga!

'I do not want that no one comes!

b. NEG [Yo quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]

I am using 'E' for the existential quantifier here.

Sentences (27a) and (28a) mean something completely different, as indicated in the corresponding glosses and the representations in (b). The crucial case is that of the representation under (27b), where there is a variable which is not properly governed according to Chomsky's version of the Empty Category Principle. Indeed, (27a) exhibits Subject Postposing, and both Chomsky (1979b) and I claim that the postposed subject is moved to an ungoverned position. However, I claim that I can account for the interpretation of (27a) with my Interpretive ECP, whereas Chomsky (1979b) cannot.

Let us proceed to the demonstration.

Consider the example below first:

(29) Yo quiero que NO venga NINGUNO!

'I want that no one comes!

The example in (29) means basically the same as that under (27a). Both exhibit Subject Postposing. In my analysis of
Subject Postposing, the relevant structures are (30a) and (30b): 

(30) a. [Yo quiero [que [ TRACEi NO venga NINGUNOi]]]
    b. [Yo NO quiero [que [ TRACEi venga NINGUNOi]]]

Let us assume that (30b) is derived from (30a) by virtue of a stylistic transformation [4]. This is a perfectly legitimate assumption to make since according to the theory, S' is an absolute boundary for movement. So, let us assume that this is the case, and that the structure that gets interpreted in LF is not (30b), but that under (30a).

Let us assume further, more or less along the lines of Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980:222) [5], that the following are the relevant rules of the syntax of LF that participate in the interpretation of (30a):

(31) Adjoin NINGUNO to S,
    and delete the negative particle 'no' if there is one in S.

(32) Given the structure
    ... NINGUNOi [S ... TRACEi ... ] ...
   rewrite it as
    ... NEG (Ex) [S ... x ... ] ...

Let us assume further that the semantic representation of (30a) is basically something like (33):
The problem is how to arrive to the logical representation (33), given the syntactic structure under (30a). Let us apply our rules:

(34) a. [Yo quiero [que [TRACEi NO venga NINGUNOi]]] (Rule (31))
    ======>
  b. [Yo quiero [que NINGUNoi [TRACEi venga TRACEi]]]

Given a structure such as (34b), the Interpretive ECP applies. The trace in subject position is properly governed by agreement, but the trace in the postponed subject position is not properly governed. Therefore the Interpretive ECP marks it #, as in (35) below:

(35) [Yo quiero [que NINGUNOi [TRACEi venga #TRACEi]]]

The trace marked # cannot enter semantic interpretation. In particular, it cannot be taken into account by rule (32), but the trace in subject position can. Such a trace bears the same index NINGUNO bears because the two are related via movement. So, let us assume that rule (32) applies to (35). We obtain (36):

(36) [Yo quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]
(36) is exactly what we want, i.e. (36) is the predicate calculus type representation of (30a).

Let us now consider the case of (28), reproduced here as (37):

(37) a. Yo NO quiero que NINGUNO venga.
   'I do not want that none comes.'

b. NEG [Yo quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]

Given the terms of our rules, the derivation of (37b) is straightforward:

(38) a. [Yo NO quiero [que [NINGUNO venga]]] (Rule (31))
    ======
   b. [Yo NO quiero [que NINGUNOi [TRACEi venga]]] (Rule (32))
    ======
   c. [Yo NO quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]
    ======
   d. NEG [Yo quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]

The final representation under (38d) is presumably obtained by virtue of a rule that adjoins undeleted negative particles 'no' to S and changes them into NEG. This requires some rule ordering in LF so that this particular rule does not interfere with rule (31). This is a question that is not quite relevant
to our purposes. The important point is that given rules (31) and (32) and my version of the Interpretive ECP, I have no difficulties with the un governed trace of Subject Postposing.

Let us now see what Chomsky's problem is. Recall that in Chomsky's approach, Subject Postposing leaves a case-marked trace behind, and that such a trace is converted into an indexed empty NP by virtue of his rules of 'PRO-Deletion' and 'PRO-Insertion'. Also remember that his version of the Empty Category Principle completely disallows un governed traces at the level of LF. So, given the structure under (39a), which he is forced to assume in his analysis, we obtain (39b) after application of rule (31):

(39) a. [Yo quiero [que [ e; NO venga NINGUNOi]]]

======>

b. [Yo quiero [que NINGUNOi [ e;venga TRACFi]]]

According to Chomsky's version of the Empty Category Principle, the structure under (39b) is illegal in LF because it contains a trace which is not properly governed. Therefore, in his approach, the structure in question cannot be interpreted.

This is basically the form of the so-called 'Nessuno Argument', which holds against Chomsky's formulation of the Empty Category Principle, but not mine. Therefore, it must be concluded that
the Interpretive ECP is clearly superior to Chomsky's original version.

Since the so-called 'Nessuno Argument' is such a strong argument against Chomsky's ECP, Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980) immediately jumped into conclusions and proposed a completely different alternative theory. Appendix C of this thesis is devoted to an examination of such a theory, and there I am going to show that Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980) fails to account for a number of facts that I can account for. Specifically, I am going to show that Jaeggli (1980) fails to account for the relevant data involved in one of his very crucial arguments, namely the so-called 'Nessuno Argument'.


In this Appendix, I have made two points:

First, I have shown that traces in CCMF can operate as proper governors only if they are properly governed and case-marked by a matrix predicate, just as Kayne (1980) argued in a different framework, and I have incorporated Kayne's insight into a revised version of the definition of proper government. In order to do this, we had to give up the claim that S' is an
absolute boundary for government, and we presented an alternative analysis of 'exceptional case marking' in terms of presence versus absence of an un-expanded COMP. In the corresponding discussion, I have also shown how the Interpretive ECP can account for the relevant data.

Second, I have tested the Interpretive ECP against the analysis of the data used by Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980) in the so-called 'Nessuno Argument', and I have shown that my Interpretive ECP systematically succeeds in accounting for the relevant representations, whereas Chomsky's ECP systematically fails. Since the so-called 'Nessuno Argument' crucially disproves the adequacy of Chomsky's version of the Empty Category Principle, as Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980) discusses, by the same token it crucially proves the superiority of the Interpretive ECP.

In Appendix C, I will compare our approach to phonologically empty subjects in Spanish with that of Jaeggli (1980).
[1] The situation is analogous to that of Subject-to-Subject Raising:

(i) *It seems [John to be wrong].

(ii) John seems [ t to be wrong].

In example (i) the complement subject NP is properly governed by the matrix verb, but since the matrix verb is intransitive, it does not assign case to it. The structure is out by the Case Filter.

In (ii), the subject has been raised. Since it is in a tensed sentence, it is case-marked nominative. The trace left behind is not case-marked, but it is properly governed by the matrix verb. Hence, the structure does not violate the Empty Category Principle.

[2] Given the assumption that 'Un-expanded COMP Deletion' replaces Chomsky's S' Deletion, we can account for exactly the same range of data that Chomsky can account for. The only thing that we have to do is to read COMP Deletion where Chomsky claims that there is S' Deletion. (Cf. the discussion of examples (5) and (6) above.)

[3] Recall that Chomsky's rule that interprets structures involving WH-Movement reads as follows:

(i) Given an S' of the form

[COMP [wh-N']-[+WH]] [S ... t ... ],

where t is the trace of [wh-N'], rewrite it as:

[COMP for which x, x an N'], [S ... [-x-] ... ]

This rule does not make reference to traces in COMP.

Incidentally, given the terms of our discussion of examples (19) and (20) in the text, now we do not even need trace deletion or trace erasure in CCOMP. Example (20) is out in LF, and (19) is well formed at the same level. The only problem is (ii):

(ii) WHO did you say [ [t that][Mary kissed t] ].

The trace in COMP is properly governed in our approach, but it does not enter into the interpretation of the structure (cf. the rule reproduced under (i)). The only reason we would like
to delete it is because of the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter, but we can entirely dispense with the deletion of such trace if we reformulate the Doubly-Filled COMP Filter as follows:

(iii) The Doubly-Filled COMP Filter (Revised Version):

\[ \text{[[}\text{COMP alpha-beta}]\text{]}\]

where both alpha and beta have a phonological matrix.

This takes care of (iv):

(iv) a. *I wonder [ [WHAT-THAT] [Mary did t to Peter]]

b. I wonder [ [WHAT] [Mary did to Peter]]

[4] Note that I am discussing some specific Spanish data and that I am making no claim about English with respect to negative raising.

[5] These rules are actually more accurate than those used by Jaeggli [Rizzi] (1980). Cf. Appendix C, in particular the Section where I deal with the fallacy of the 'Nessuno Argument'.

Cf. Jaeggli (1980:221:224) where the rules involved in the interpretation of the sentences discussed in the text are both motivated and discussed.
APPENDIX C:

COMPARING TWO FRAMEWORKS.

This thesis was originally conceived within the general framework of Chomsky (1979b), more than a year and a half ago. However, when I had already completed my research work, and I was just about to start writing my last chapters, the MIT thesis of Jaeggli (1980) reached me.

In his dissertation, Jaeggli (1980) introduces some substantial modifications into the general framework of Chomsky (1979b), and he specifically discusses the presence of phonologically null subjects in Spanish. Although an extensive review of Jaeggli's work is well beyond the scope of this Appendix, I feel I cannot ignore the basics of his approach to phonologically-null subjects in Spanish, particularly when many of his claims are in direct contradiction to mine. The purpose of this Appendix is to offer what I think is a fair critique of Jaeggli's approach, which I henceforth will refer to as the 'Identificational Approach'.
1.- The Basics of the Identificational Approach.

The following are the basic principles and definitions of the Identificational Approach advanced by Jaeggli (1980):

(1) The Identificational Empty Category Principle:

\[ \text{[N} \epsilon \text{] must be properly IDENTIFIED. (Jaeggli (1980:255))} \]

(2) The Notion of Proper Identification (cf. Jaeggli (1980:254)):

"Beta is properly identified iff

(i) there is an alpha such that alpha identifies beta; and
(ii) beta is c-governed."

(3) The Notion of Identification (cf. Jaeggli (1980:254)):

"Alpha identifies beta iff

(i) alpha governs beta; and
(ii) alpha is co-superscripted with beta."

N.B.- In Jaeggli's approach, movement leaves a superscripted trace, in addition to the referential indices.

"Alpha c-governs beta iff
(i) alpha governs beta; and
(ii) alpha is a member of the set \{V, N, A, P, INFL\}.

(5) The Notion of Government (Jaeggli (1980:252)):

"Alpha governs beta iff
(i) alpha c-commands beta; and
(ii) beta, or the first branching category dominating beta, c-commands alpha."

N.B.- This definition of government is slightly different from that of Chomsky (1979b), which is formulated in terms of 'minimal c-command'. Jaeggli's version allows that the first NPi be a governor for NPi in the structure [NPi [S ... VP ... NPi]], i.e. a subject NPi can govern a postposed subject NPi in Spanish, for example. (Cf. Subject Postposing below.)

*[PRO, +CASE], if c-governed.

N.B. - According to this, Jaeggli (1980) allows for case-marked PROs only if they are not c-governed.

2. - The Implementation of the Identificational Approach.

In this Section, I would like to show how the Identificational Approach works in the standard cases of phonologically null subjects and subject postposing in Spanish, and in the case of WH-traces both in Spanish and English. Along with my exemplification, I will also provide some criticisms where I have found Jaeggli's approach to be flawed.

2.1. - PRO in Tensed Sentences.

First of all, according to Jaeggli (1980:230-231), one of the crucial differences between English and Spanish is that INFL is under S in English, and directly incorporated into the verb in
Spanish. According to him, there is no empirical evidence that can justify the existence of a rule of 'Affix Hopping' in Spanish, and I concur. However, this does not mean that there is no theoretical evidence for it. I will return to this point below. So, according to Jaeggli (1980), INFL does not c-govern the subject NP in Spanish, but it does in English.

In this view, we can potentially have:

(7) a. Come mucho.
   'He/She/You eat a lot.'

   ![Diagram](image)

(8) a. *Eats a lot.

   ![Diagram](image)
Example (7) is grammatical in Spanish because although PRO is case-marked nominative, it is not c-governed by INFL, or any other category of the set \{V, N, A, P\}. In English, however, (8) is ungrammatical because PRO is both case-marked and c-governed.

This far, Jaeggli’s approach can account for exactly the same cases I can account for. The difference between his approach and mine is that I have subject postposing in (7), and my approach explains why subject postposing is non-structure preserving in Spanish. However, Jaeggli appears to have one advantage over my approach, and this is his assumption about the position of INFL in Spanish. Let us deal with this question.

In Spanish, INFL contains tense. Tense appears between the thematic vowel and the personal endings in (9a-b), or it is incorporated into the ending itself, as in (9c):

(9) a. Canta-RE-MOS. 'We will sing.'

b. Cantá-BA-MOS. 'We used to sing.'

c. Canta-STE. 'You sang.'

... et cetera.

The feature \[+/-\text{tense}\] must enter into the strict subcategorization conditions of many predicates in Spanish, e.g.
(10) a. Yo les informé [que María llegaba a las 8].
   'I informed them [that María was-to-arrive at 8].'

b. *Yo les informé [PRO/María] llegar a las 8.

(11) a. Yo tengo que terminar esto ahora.
   'I have to finish this now.'

b. *Yo tengo que ella termine esto ahora.
   'I have that she finishes this now.'

As examples (10) show, 'informar' (inform) strictly subcategorizes a tensed complement sentence. It cannot take an infinitive. Of course, it could be argued that 'informar' is not a control verb, but this does not preclude the presence of PRO with an obviative interpretation in (10b). At the present stage of our knowledge, the only feasible solution is the subcategorization solution.

Since tense appears with INFL in Spanish according to Jaeggli (1980:230-231), he would be forced to extend the subcategorization theory to the verb under VP, across complementizers and subject NPs. Without an implementation of such a subcategorization theory, Jaeggli's approach remains questionable. Ours does not because we have INFL under S, and according to Chomsky (1979b:6), in configurations such as the following
there are direct connections between V and COMP and between CCMP and INFL. This certainly facilitates the approach to tense subcategorization. [1]

One possible way out for Jaeggli would be to say that the subcategorization conditions in terms of tense can be captured via the complementizer 'que', which according to Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) is the realization of tense in Spanish. However, this assumption is incorrect as example (11) clearly shows. Under these circumstances, both Jaeggli (1980) and Chomsky and Lasnik (1977) would be forced to say that there are two complementizers 'que' in Spanish, one which is marked [+tense], and another which is marked [-tense]. However, this approach has no explanatory power.

An alternative solution would be to say that tense is indeed under S in Spanish, but that the personal endings of the verb, i.e. AG, is directly incorporated into the verb. Nevertheless, this implies that there must be a rule, similar to that of 'Affix Hopping', which moves tense from its position under S to a position between the thematic vowel of the verb and the personal endings of the same (cf. examples (3a-b) above). This solution does not solve the problem at all, and only introduces complications in terms of such putative rule, since it would have to make reference not to V, but to thematic vowels and
personal endings in some instances, but not in others (cf. (9c)).

Therefore, it seems to me that Jaeggli's approach to INFL in Spanish encounters serious difficulties in terms of its execution within the theory.

Let us now see what reasons Jaeggli has in order to assume that certain PRO-subjects must be case-marked in Spanish. His point is that only case-marked PROs can act as resumptive pronouns. Consider:

(13) LOS ESTUDIANTES, acepto la sugerencia de María de que es imposible que ___ lleguen a tiempo!
'THE STUDENTS, I-accept Maria's suggestion that it is impossible that ___ arrive on time.'

(14) *LOS ESTUDIANTES, acepto la sugerencia de María de que es imposible ___ llegar a tiempo!
'THE STUDENTS, I-accept Maria's suggestion that it is impossible ___ to arrive on time.'

According to Rivero (1980), the left-dislocated phrase in (13) is to be base generated. A movement analysis is not possible because it would violate subjacency. (Cf. Rivero (1980) for details.)
Now, according to Jaeggli (1980:236-237), the difference in grammaticality between (13) and (14) is to be accounted for by the putative presence versus absence of a case-marked PRO.

However, this is not conclusive evidence at all, i.e. it does not show that PRO must be present in the position of the anaphoric gap indicated in (13). Indeed, since lexical NPs must be case-marked, it is necessary for them to be related to a case-marked position, so that they can inherit the relevant case, presumably by extension of the Case-Inheritance Convention. All this does not necessarily mean that PPO must appear in the position of the anaphoric gap in (13). Such a gap can be the trace of PRO, which is what we have in our analysis. In some other cases, the left dislocated phrase can be related to a clitic, as in (15) below:

(15) ESTOS LÍTROS, acepto la sugerencia de María de que nunca nadie LOS ha leído!

'THese books, I accept Maria's suggestion that nobody has ever read THEM.'

Indeed, if the presence of a case-marked PRO was a 'condition sine qua non' for the case assignment of left-dislocated phrases, (15) would be impossible in Jaeggli's approach because according to him there is a caseless PRO in the most embedded clause. Such PRO is possible there because the clitic 'los' has

Obviously, the rule that interprets left-dislocated structures must relate the left-dislocated phrase with a case-marked position. Such position can be a clitic, or a case-marked trace as we claim in the case of (13) according to the terms of our analysis. Therefore, Jaeggli's assumption that there MUST be a case-marked PPC in (13) is not substantiated. Since his claim constitutes a drastic revision of the framework of Chomsky (1979b), the burden of proof remains on Jaeggli's side.

From this point of view, the two approaches appear to be equally valid. However, I would say that mine is superior to that of Jaeggli because it makes a stronger claim about the properties of PRO, namely that PRO is never governed (case marked).

In short, Jaeggli's assumption that INFL is directly incorporated into the verb in Spanish encounters serious difficulties, and he has not demonstrated that there is an absolute need for allowing the presence of case-marked PROs in the theory.

Let us now see what Jaeggli (1980) has to say with respect to Subject Postposing in Spanish.
2.2. Subject Postposing plus PRO-Insertion Again.

Let us consider Chomsky's analysis of Subject Postposing again:

(16) [ e] TENSED-VERB ... NPI ...

Remember that Chomsky (1973b) required the 'PRO-Insertion Rule' and the 'PRO-Deletion Rule' to legalize the case-marked trace left behind by Subject Postposing in languages such as Spanish because according to him, case-marked traces are variables. We have already argued against those rules and we have also shown that not all case-marked traces are variables. However, Jaeggli (1980) is also convinced that all case-marked traces are variables, and therefore he needs to make use of Chomsky's rule of 'PRO-Insertion' [2]. Since he does not make use of 'PRO-Deletion', Jaeggli's approach does not run into the difficulties that Chomsky has, but this does not mean that it is flawless. Indeed, Jaeggli's analysis of the complement clause of (17a) is the one given under (17c), after 'PRO-Insertion' has applied:

(17) a. Yo quiero que coma él.
   b. Yo quiero [ que [ [NP₂ e] coma FLi]].
   c. Yo quiero [ que [ PRO₁ coma ELi]].
Now, according to Jaeggli (1980:308), PRO is only 'pronounceable', if it is case marked and it is c-governed. The realization of the 'pronounceable' PRO is a pronoun. In (17b), this is realized as 'el' because the postposed subject is both case-marked and c-governed. The PRO in subject position is not 'pronounceable' because it is not c-governed. Now, what this means is that the following example must be derived via a stylistic rule, since the subject position is not c-governed in Jaeggli's approach (cf. (4) and (7) above):

(18) Yo quiero [ que [ él coma ]].

However, the subject position would be occupied by PRO before such stylistic rule applies (cf. (17c)), in Jaeggli's approach. This means that he needs a rule of 'PRO-Deletion' in the 'Phonology', or that he is forced to analyse (18) along the following lines:

(19) a. Yo quiero [ que [ ELi PROi coma ]].

b. Yo quiero [ que [ PROi ELi coma ]].

Of course, since we know so little about stylistic rules, anything can be possible, but the two solutions to which Jaeggli would be forced do not appear to be very attractive. However, this is a minor point. The crucial point deals with the Theta Criterion.
According to Chomsky (1980b), PRO is a referential expression, i.e. it must fill in a theta role in the thematic structure of the predicate it is associated with. Remember that according to the Theta Criterion, each argument NP of a verb must satisfy a thematic function, and that EACH THEMATIC FUNCTION CAN BE SATISFIED BY ONE AND ONLY ONE ARGUMENT NP.

Jaeggli's analysis of (17a) given under (17c) constitutes a flagrant violation of Chomsky's Theta Criterion. Indeed, although theta roles are assigned at the D-Structure level according to Chomsky (1980b), they must be traceable back in LF. Since this is not possible in the case of the postposed subject in (17b) because its original position is occupied by PRC, and not a trace, Jaeggli (1980:244-245) is forced to assume a 'linking convention', so that the postposed subject can have a theta role in S-Structure, which is the one that enters into semantic interpretation. However, this means that there are two referential expressions that fill in the same theta role. This is prohibited by the Theta Criterion.

Furthermore, contrary to Jaeggli's allegations (1980:246), his approach does violate both the Binding Conditions of Chomsky (1979b) and (1979c). Indeed, one of those conditions states that if a certain NP is pronominal, i.e. a pronoun or PRO, it must be free in its minimal governing category, and by free, Chomsky means that the NP in question cannot be argument-bound. In (17b), PRO is not free: it is argument-bound by the
postposed subject. However, Jaeggli (1980:246) claims that the only argument position is that of PRO, and that the position where the postposed subject is is not an argument position. He is certainly correct on this account, but this does not make the postposed subject a non-subject. Therefore, I would say that Jaeggli's allegation is a weak way out of the problem.

Finally, I would like to point out an additional flaw in Jaeggli's approach to Subject Postposing. Consider the following examples:

(20) a. *Yo vi a María que comía queso María.
   'I saw Maria that was-eating cheese Maria.'

   b. Yo vi a María que comía queso.
      'I saw Maria that was eating cheese.'

This is a structure of object control over the subject of a tensed sentence. (20a) is ungrammatical because for it to receive adequate interpretation in LF, PRO must be present in it, as we have already argued. No lexical subject or trace of one is possible. Now, given the terms of Jaeggli's approach to Subject Postposing, (20) is to be analysed as (21):

(21) *Yo vi a MARIA [ que [ PRO comía queso MARIA]].
PPO is present in the structure, but this is hopelessly ungrammatical. One possible explanation would be to say that PPO is already co-indexed with the postposed subject, and that, therefore, it cannot be co-indexed with the matrix object, but this cannot be correct. Consider:

(22) I persuaded Peter [ PPO to be examined t by the doctor].

In (22), PPO is already co-indexed with the trace in object position, and it is also co-indexed with its controller, the matrix object. It follows that a restriction on co-indexation cannot be the explanation for the ungrammaticality of (21).

Furthermore, (21) violates no principle of grammar, and the three NPs involved can be assumed to have the same features, so that everything is consistent. Under these conditions, the only possible explanation is that Jaeggli's approach to Subject Postposing must be wrong.

Summing up: First, Jaeggli's account of 'pronounceable PROs', i.e. actual pronouns, runs into serious difficulties when pronouns appear in preverbal position. Second, his account of Subject Postposing is inconsistent with the Theta Criterion. Third, the same account of Subject Postposing fails to explain why it is not possible to have lexical subjects in postverbal position in structures of control over subjects of tensed sentences in Spanish.
Since none of these problems arises in my approach, this must be considered superior to that of Jaeggli (1980).

In the following section, I illustrate Jaeggli's approach to WH-Movement.

2.3.- WH-Movement from Postverbal Position.

Given the terms of Jaeggli's approach, all extractions from S must take place from postverbal position in Spanish. According to this, the (a) sentence below is to be analysed as in (b):

(23) a. Quién dijiste que llegó?
    'Who did you say that arrived'

b. [ [QUIÉN] [dijiste [[TRACE1-que] [PRO1 llegó TRACE1]]]]

In (23b), the trace in postverbal position in the complement sentence is c-governed by the verb, and it is also identified by PRO. Therefore, it meets the Identificational ECP. [3]

In the case of English, WH-Movement of subjects must take place from subject position:
(24) a. Who did you say was coming?

b. [[WHO1] did you say [[TRACE1] [TRACE1 INFL was coming]]]

The trace in complement subject position is c-governed by INFL, and it is properly identified by the trace in COMP.

If the complementizer 'that' was present in (24b), then the trace in COMP wouldn't be able to act as an identifier because the c-command requirement wouldn't be met. Under these conditions, the structure cannot be grammatical.

This is basically Jaeggli's approach to WH-Movement, and I do not have anything to say about it. The problem is not the analysis per se, but the motivation for the analysis, i.e. the arguments that have been put forth by Jaeggli in favour of his Identificational Approach.

3.- The Arguments for the Identificational Approach.

According to Jaeggli (1980:228) there are three arguments that justify his identificational approach. In this section, I will show that those arguments do not actually hold.
3.1.- Clitics Absorb Government.

The first argument that Jaeggli (1980:228) invokes is the fact that Spanish exhibits extractions from clitic doubled positions. Consider:

(25) A QUIENi le dieron un regalo TRACFi?
'WHOi did-they-give a present TRACFi?'

(26) a. *A QUIEN lo vieron TRACFi?
b. A QUIEN vieron TRACFi?
'WHO did-they-see TRACFi?'

When the clitic is present, extractions from indirect object position are possible, but extractions from direct object position are not. This is shown in examples (25) and (26a).

In order to explain this difference in grammaticality, Jaeggli (1980) assumes that clitics 'absorb government' in Spanish, and that direct objects are NPs, whereas indirect objects are PPs. In addition, he also assumes that the Empty Category Principle of Chomsky (1979)--which he later on revises as the Identificational ECP--holds of NPs only, just as we have been assuming throughout this thesis. [4]
Given the terms of this assumption, (26a) is an illegal structure according to Jaeggli (1980) because the empty NP or trace left behind is not governed by the verb (cf. Jaeggli (1980:82-83, 252-253), and therefore the structure is out by virtue of the Empty Category Principle. Since in the case of indirect objects we have a PP and not an NP, the structure under (25) is perfectly legal: the trace of a PP does not need to be governed.

Jaeggli's distinction between object NPs and indirect object PPs seems perfectly reasonable to me, and the explanation perfectly adequate. If the clitic in (26a) has 'absorbed government', it follows that the direct object position cannot be governed and case-marked, and therefore the structure should be out. In the case of (25), the indirect object is not an NP, and the structure is perfectly legal. The explanation that Jaeggli (1980) is giving, is basically an explanation that follows from Chomsky (1979b:47-48), and therefore it is consistent with everything in that framework.

However, what Jaeggli (1980:44-45) is trying to do is to build up a case for 'co-superscripting', which plays a crucial role in his notion of 'proper identification' (cf. (2) above). His claim is that verb government is executed through the subcategorization features of the same. In Jaeggli's approach, this is subject to a 'uniqueness principle', which allows only one element to be superscripted to a feature [+F] in a verb.
Let us take Jaeggli (1980) seriously, and let us see what exactly he is saying. Consider:

(27) Nosotros LC-1 LFIMCS (*el libro). 'We read it (the book).'

[+ F1]

In (27), the verb 'leer' (read) strictly subcategorizes a direct object. This is expressed in the feature [+F1]. The object clitic 'lo' is co-superscripted with such feature. Since co-superscripting is subject to Jaeggli's 'uniqueness principle', the same superscript cannot be assigned to the NP 'el libro' in (27). Therefore, its presence is ungrammatical.

[5]

By the same token, we can have (28)

(28) Nosotros (*lo) LFIMOS EL LIBRO-1

[+ F1]

Here, the object NP is co-superscripted with the feature [+F1] in the verb. The presence of the clitic is impossible.

Although Jaeggli (1980) does not discuss this variant, we have to assume that it is perfectly legitimate in his approach, since otherwise he would have to arbitrarily restrict co-superscripting to clitics, just in case there is one.
Let us now consider the following example from English:

(29) Who did you promise Mary [ [t] [ t was going to look after her children]]?

According to Jaeggli (1980:257-258), the trace in COMP must be governed by the matrix verb. This is Kayne's idea (1980). However, verb government of such a trace has no place in Jaeggli's approach. Indeed, the verb 'promise' in (29) can only take an (indirect) object NP ('Mary') and a complement sentence. It never subcategorizes anything in addition to this:

(30) You promised [Mary] [that Peter was going to be asleep] *(John/to John/for John/bananas).

According to this, 'promise' has two features that express these subcategorization conditions: [+F1] and [+F2]. In example (29), the NP 'Mary' can be assumed to be co-superscripted with [+F1], and the complement sentence, with [+F2]. Under these conditions, the trace in COMP cannot be governed because no feature in the verb is co-superscripted more than once with a certain element, according to Jaeggli himself.

One possible way out would be to say that the 'uniqueness principle' only holds when clitics are involved, but this is an arbitrary decision, as we have already pointed out above. The
point is that clitics do absorb government and this can be simply stated as follows:

(31) Clitics absorb government. [6]

This is the relevant generalization to be made. Its exact implementation in the grammar is a question of technical execution that does not concern us here. The important point is that now we know that it cannot be implemented via co-superscripting a la Jaeggli (1980). This leaves him without motivation for assuming co-superscripting in his identificational approach.

3.2. - Bare QPs in French.

The second argument is based on 'bare QPs' in French. Consider the following French examples reproduced from Kayne (1981), which Jaeggli (1980) cites as Kayne (1979):

(32) a. Jean n'a pas trouvé de livres.

'Jean has not found of books.'

b. *Jean a trouvé de livres.
(33) *De livres n'ont pas été trouvés (par Jean).
   'Of books have not been found (by Jean).'

According to Kayne (1981), the NP 'de livres' is to be analysed as in (34):

(34) \[ NP [ e ] de livres ], i.e. \[ NP[e]-de-\text{N'} \],

where the empty element is a QP.

(Cf. Kayne (1981) for details.)

His evidence for this analysis is the existence of sentences such as (35):

(35) Jean n'a pas trouvé [beaucoup de livres].
   'Jean has not found many of books.'

Further arguments for the analysis reproduced under (34) are provided in Kayne (1975:27-37).

According to Kayne (1981), the difference in grammaticality between (32a) and (33) is to be accounted for by the Empty Category Principle, which he assumes holds of all empty elements, contrary to what my version of Chomsky (1979b) reads, Jaeggli (1980) assumes, and I myself have been assuming throughout this thesis.
In Kayne's view, the empty element in (32) is governed by the verb and the structure is legal, whereas in (33) it is in an ungoverned position, and the structure is out.

However, Kayne (1981) claims, this does not explain the ungrammaticality of (32b) because in this particular instance, the empty element is also governed by the verb. What is missing in (32b) is the 'negative antecedent', or 'identifier' in Jaeggli's terminology.

This is the starting point for Jaeggli's argument in favour of his Identificational ECP. However, we must point out that Jaeggli is being inconsistent here because his assumption is that the ECP holds of empty NPs only. Specifically, as we have already pointed out, according to Jaeggli (1980) the ECP holds of traces that are NPs, not those traces that are PPs, for example. Under these circumstances, the French data and the analysis of the relevant examples cannot be considered evidence for Jaeggli's Identificational ECP, which is explicitly restricted to empty NPs (cf. (1) above), just like ours is (cf. the Interpretive ECP, Appendix B).
The third and last argument that Jaeggli (1980) invokes against Chomsky's ECP and in favour of his approach is the already familiar 'Nessuno Argument'. As we have already seen in Section 2. of Appendix E, such argument does hold against Chomsky's ECP, but not ours. However, the same argument is partially fallacious. Indeed, it is an argument against Chomsky (1979b), but a certain part of it—which Jaeggli avoids discussing—does not support Jaeggli's approach. Quite to the contrary: it shows that Jaeggli cannot be correct with respect to his Identificational ECP and his claim that all extractions are from postverbal position in Spanish.

Consider the example and relevant predicate-calculus representation that Jaeggli (1980) avoids discussing:

(36) a. Yo no quiero que NINGUNC venga.
    'I do not want that no one comes.'

    b. NEG [Yo quiero [que NEG (Ex) [ x venga]]]

The representation reproduced under (36a) is the one that Jaeggli gives, and we have to assume that such representation is exactly the one that he wants. Actually, that must be indeed
the case because (36b) is exactly the reading that (36a) has. However, observe the position of the variable in the most embedded sentence. Such variable is not properly identified according to Jaeggli's ECP because it is not governed by any member of the set \{V, N, A, P, INFL\}, in spite of the fact that it is co-indexed or superscripted with the variable that appears with the existential quantifier. Under these conditions, we must conclude that the so-called 'Nessuno Argument' does not only holds against Chomsky's version of the ECP, but also against that of Jaeggli.

Nevertheless, let us try to give Jaeggli a hand, and let us see what he would require to fix this inconsistency.

In the first place, given a structure such as (36a), he requires that the subject in preverbal position be moved to postverbal position in the syntax of LF. Let us grant him this:

(37) \[ \text{Yo NO quiero} [ \text{ que [ TRACE venga NINGUNO] } ] \]

Now Jaeggli has two problems. His first problem is the ungoverned trace left behind by subject postposing. This trace is also illegal in his approach because it is not properly identified. In order to remedy this, he would have to assume that his 'PRO-Insertion Rule' is also operative in the syntax of LF. Let us also grant him this:
The second problem is more clear now: (38) means exactly the same as (39):

(39) Yo NO quiero que venga NINGUNO.

'I do not want that anyone comes.'

This is the example that Jaeggli (1980) held against Chomsky (1979b) (cf. Appendix C). Its meaning is completely different from that of the example we started with, namely (36a). In order to accommodate the relevant reading, Jaeggli needs an additional assumption: that there is a rule that inserts the negative particle 'no' after the rule of subject postposing, just in case this happens to involve the negative subject 'ninguno'. Since we have already granted him the presence of two syntactic rules at the level of LF, we can certainly grant him a third:

(40) [Yo NO quiero que [PRO1 NO venga NINGUNO]]

Now, Jaeggli (1980) is ready to derive the relevant predicate calculus representation, after adjoining NINGUNO to S, deleting the negative particle 'no' that we have just inserted for him, and converting NINGUNO into the expression NEG (Ex):

(41) NEG [Yo quiero que NEG (Ex1) [PRO1 venga x1]]
The representation under (41) is equivalent to that under (36b). The desired result: the variable in postverbal position is 'properly identified' because it is both governed by the verb, and also superscripted with PRO. The Identificational ECP is finally met!

The cost of making it work is certainly enormous in terms of the rules that have to be assumed.

As we have already shown in Section 2. of Appendix B, we can derive the relevant predicate-calculus representations with a minimum of apparatus, and basically the same version of Chomsky's ECP. Our revision is minimal. Therefore, it follows that our Interpretive ECP is not only superior to Chomsky's version of the same, but also to that of Jaeggli (1980).

4.- Summary.

In this Appendix, I have compared the basics of the Identificational Approach of Jaeggli (1980) with that advanced in this thesis. I have first presented Jaggli's principles and definitions, and next I have shown that his approach is not adequately justified in the case of simplex Spanish sentences with phonologically null subjects, and that it fails in the case
of those sentences involving Subject Postposing. In the case of
the former, I have shown that Jaeggl's analysis of INFL in
Spanish encounters serious difficulties in order to account for
[+/-tense] subcategorization and that he has provided no
compelling evidence to support his claim that case-marked
PRO-subjects are indeed needed in the theory. In the case of
Subject Postposing, I have shown that his account of
'pronounceable PROs' runs into difficulties when we have subject
pronouns in pre-verbal position, that his account is
inconsistent with the Theta Criterion, and that the same account
fails in the case of control over subjects of tensed sentences.
Next, I have illustrated Jaeggl's approach to the standard
cases of WH-Movement, and I have discussed the three arguments
that he has in favour of his Identificational Approach. I have
reviewed the three arguments in question, and I have shown that
co-superscripting is not the adequate device to account for the
fact that clitics 'absorb government', that the phenomenon of
bare QPs in French is not evidence for Jaeggl's approach
and--finally--I have shown that an exhaustive consideration of
the data used in the so-called 'Nessuno Argument' is evidence
against Jaeggl's Identificational Approach.

Given the evidence presented in this Appendix, the relevant
conclusion is that Jaeggl (1980) is left without arguments that
can back up his theory, that such a theory is defective in the
case of Subject Postposing, and not adequately implemented and
justified in the case of phonologically null subjects.
Since the approach advanced in this thesis does not run into any of the above mentioned difficulties, it is to be preferred over that of Jaeggli (1980).
[1] Note that I am only saying that the connections between V and COMP and between COMP and INFL in (12) facilitate an implementation of a subcategorization theory that would eventually handle the facts discussed. Such a theory is currently unavailable. However, my point is that, in principle, there are ways to establish the necessary relations for tense subcategorization if we have INFL under S, but no connections appear to exist between COMP and embedded Vs.

[2] Actually, Jaeggli (1980) has an additional reason to make use of the 'PRC-Insertion Rule'. Indeed, given a structure such as the following

(i)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NPI} \\
\text{e} \\
\text{S} \\
\text{VP} \\
\text{NPI}
\end{array}
\]

the trace left behind by the postposed subject in Spanish is illegal in Jaeggli's approach because it does not satisfy his Identificational ECP. Under these circumstances, he needs to convert (i) into (ii):

(ii)

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{NPI} \\
\text{PRC} \\
\text{S} \\
\text{VP} \\
\text{NPI}
\end{array}
\]

[3] Although my presentation of Jaeggli's approach to WH-Movement is an oversimplification of the same, it does illustrate the point that he is trying to make in his dissertation. The interested reader can consult Jaeggli (1980:246-267) and his footnote 15, Chapter IV, for details.

Interestingly enough, Jaeggli (1980:267-287) attempts a reanalysis of some instances of WH-Movement in terms of PRO-Movement, e.g. relative clauses. However, his reanalysis is an embarrassment in the case of infinitival relatives. Consider:

(i) Yo tengo [[tres hijas][[que-PROi][PRO querer TRACEi]]]

'I have three daughters to love.'

In this example, the trace in object position is the trace of PRO in COMP, according to Jaeggli (1980). In principle, I have
no objections to (i). Nevertheless, the example under (ii) is ungrammatical:

(ii)*Yo tengo [[tres hijas] [[que-PROi] [TRACEi quererme]]]
'I have three daughters to love me.'

This example is ungrammatical because the trace of PRO, which appears in subject position of a tenseless sentence, is not governed in anyone's account. However, remember that Jaeggli (1980) has a rule that can insert PRO in the position of such a trace (cf. 2.2. of this Appendix). If such a rule applies as in (iii), the structure is perfectly legal in Jaeggli's approach. However, the grammatical judgement does not change...

(iii)*Yo tengo [[tres hijas] [[que-PPOi] [PROi quererme]]]

[4] This is actually what Chomsky lectured in Pisa (1979). However, Jaeggli (1980) reports that Chomsky has extended his ECP to all empty categories in his revised version of those lectures. Jaeggli (1980) argues against such a revision and his evidence is WH-Movement from indirect object position in Spanish. Cf. below.

[5] The reader might wonder what happens in the case of examples such as the following:

(i) Yo LC vi A EL.
'I saw him.'

(ii) Yo LAS vi A LAS CHICAS.
'I saw the girls.'

Example (i) is from standard Spanish, and (ii) is dialectal (River Plate Spanish). Jaeggli's solution is a marked use of the rule that inserts the case-marker 'a'.


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The son of Dr. Norberto M. Westphal and Magdalena Montt de Westphal, I was born in southern Chile 38 years ago. I grew up and learned how to read and write in the middle of the rain, the Copihues and the Chilcos. The Cerro Nieol and the Rio Valdivia were my spiritual habitat during childhood and adolescence. As a youth, my main concern was political: I wanted to change the world of social and economic injustice that surrounded me. A teacher by vocation, I received my formal training at the Universidad Austral de Chile, Isla Teja, where that big pond of water lilies is. Got married to Jovita Pelmar soon after graduation from high school, and worked my way through university by teaching in the evenings. When I received my professional degree, we already had three daughters: Sandra, Vicky, and Claudia. During the Allende years, I did my very best professional work. We were building a better world for everyone. Immediately after the fascist coup of 1973, I was jailed and fired from work. Spent two months in prison without charge. In 1974, I decided that it would be better to be a foreigner in a foreign country and not in my own, and I immigrated to Canada. Entered graduate school in 1976. Got my M.A. from this University in 1979, and now I have written this thesis. Some of my publications are listed in the bibliography. The Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada has awarded me a postdoctoral fellowship which I will hold at the Department of Linguistics of the University of British Columbia (1981-82). Starting September of 1982, I will be teaching Spanish and Linguistics at the Department of Foreign Languages of Indiana University of Pennsylvania.