THE DEMONOLOGY OF INSTINCT:
ALLEGORY AND SETTING IN H. G. WELLS'
THE ISLAND OF DR. MOREAU

by

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APP RQVAL

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THE DEMONOLOGY OF INSTINCT: ALLEGORY AND SETTING IN H.G. WELLS' THE ISLAND OF DOCTOR MOREAU

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The term "scientific romance", which H. G. Wells coined to describe his early science fiction novels contains within it a contradiction. It stresses science, a method of patient observation and accurate description; yet there is an equal stress on romance, on the magical and irrational. There is, in short, a conflict within the scientific romances between reason and emotion that is reflected in the term itself.

Nor is this the single common feature among the novels. In all of them the hero is a typical or representative man, and the settings of all the novels tend to be strange, barely accessible islands in time or space. Wells uses the settings to isolate either single societies or single individuals, usually the hero. The island is used both as a paradigm of a social organization and as a paradigm of the essential isolation of any member of society.

Moreover, Wells' romances all tend towards satire. His technique in projecting these satires involves the creation of isolated worlds (islands) parallel to our own, which in their completeness reflect on the shortcomings of the society contemporary with the author.

The method I have chosen to elucidate these common features and to show their inter-relationships is a psychological investigation of the Wellsian scientist-
hero. The essential argument, therefore, is that in limning out a picture of his society—and Wells' pose of social critic and commentator is consistent throughout the scientific romances—more especially in drawing a satiric, utopian or anti-utopian version of his society, Wells is necessarily involved in a psychological delineation and exploration over which he has little conscious control.

The romances then, each tell a different version of the same story. In The Island of Dr. Moreau Wells' manipulation of the setting as an anti-utopia (an arena) illuminates his use of it, in other romances, as a utopia (an island). Moreover, in the Preface to the 1924 reprint of the work Wells admits to a specific allegorical intention, that the operations of the doctor are an allegory of the processes of evolution by which humans have been 'rough-hewn' from out their animal origins. These are the aspects of the novel to which the title of the present essay points: setting, allegory, and Wells' image of evolution.
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I. Introduction

When, several years ago, I re-read H. G. Wells' *The Time Machine* and *The Island of Dr. Moreau* I was surprised by how different they seemed from my first, adolescent experience of them. Partly, I suppose, the difference was in me, I was older, more critical. Yet the feelings I experienced reading them were much the same. On reading others of Wells' "scientific romances" (this is the term he uses for them),¹ and reading carefully, critically, in order to explain to myself my reactions to the works, I formulated two related assumptions. It is on one of

¹I cannot trace the exact origin of this term, though Ingvild Baknem in his encyclopedic *H. G. Wells and his Critics* (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1962) and Bernard Bergonzi in his *The Early H. G. Wells* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 32-3, list a possible source for the term, from a scientific popularizer of the 1880's and 90's, C. H. Hinton, who during that time published a series of pamphlets collected under the title *Scientific Romances* (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1884). Though there is no evidence that Wells read Hinton's volume, as Bergonzi shows he had indeed come into contact with at least one of its essays, "What is the fourth dimension?" The earliest use of the term by Wells himself referring to his own work (that I have seen) is in a letter to Arnold Bennett (19 August 1901), which may be found in Harris Wilson (Ed.) *Arnold Bennett and H. G. Wells* (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1960), p. 60, where Wells says he sees he is "doomed to write 'scientific' romances and short stories for you creatures of the mob, and [that] my novels must be my private dissipation." Wells' use of quotation marks here indicates that, so far as he was concerned, the term was not original with him. Nevertheless, the juxtaposition of logic and emotion which the term implies accords well with Wells' description of his state of mind while writing the romances. On this see Wells, Preface to *The Country of the Blind* (London: Nelson, n. d. [1910-11]), p. iv.
these that the present essay is based.

First, it seemed that all the novels were, in a sense, psychological and second, that each of them told the same story from a different perspective. I imagined the seven novels to myself as a kind of crystal; rigidly structured, yet multifaceted, and, turned in one's hand against a light the successive faces show, to even a casual perception, different and changing patterns.

How are the two assumptions related? Dealing with the second first, it can be recast as a statement about the formal properties of the works, that is, that so far as his science fictions are concerned, Wells is (like the contemporary Robert A. Heinlein) a formula writer. The formulaic assumption may be related to the assumptions that the novels are psychological by saying that the manifest similarities among the novels point to latent similarities, that along with the formula apparent in the surface content there is at work a formula of emotional significance to the author. While some of these latent contents derive (or so it has seemed to Wells' biographers)2 from emotional conflicts in the author's "self", all of the novels self-consciously address "social questions" of one kind or another. Thus it is possible that Wells in these romances

mediates emotional conflicts that were—and perhaps still are—both a result and a determinant of the way in which we live our lives. In other words, Wells' conflicts are not purely his own private possessions, but may equally be considered to fall within the public domain.

The investigation which grew from this starting point has since then covered a good deal of ground, and looks to cover a great deal more before any satisfactory conclusions may be drawn. It has become apparent that I cannot at this point present a whole interpretation of Wells' science fictions. I have chosen therefore, to present this pilot study, an examination of one of the novels, together with a brief overview of the reasons for the study and some tentative conclusions on the dichotomy between nature and culture in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau. The present paper may be thought of as a description of the current state of the larger project, which, when completed, will present in each chapter an analysis of that feature of Wells' paradigm most apparent in a particular work. I have also embedded in the text a continuing series of references to Wells' earlier novel, The Time Machine, in order to suggest how the two stories may be viewed as differing fictional embodiments of the same concerns.

First, however, it will be necessary to limn out in a little more detail some of what follows from the initial assumptions. The protagonists, for example, of all the novels,
seem to be deliberately pictured as representative members of Wells' society, and the settings themselves (most often islands isolated either in time or space) just as deliberately imagined as an inverted or distorted version of Wells' contemporary social reality. If I hope to delimit paradigmatic emotional or psychological conflicts within the novels, the obvious avenue of approach is through the hero who represents his society. The choice of method for such an approach is equally obvious, through the paradigmatic psychology of Freud, produced roughly contemporaneously with Wells' novels and in a related cultural milieu.

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3 Critics have long noted the marked similarities between the author Wells and many of his characters, the general assumption being that such a lack of distinguishing is evidence of slipshod methods of composition. Thus it is interesting that exactly the opposite should be the case with Prendick, the Time Traveller, and the narrator of The War of the Worlds, that is, that far from being scarcely disguised versions of the very particular Wells they should be created as generalized, representative characters. On autobiographical elements in Wells see Raknem op cit., and Gloria G. Fromm, "Through the Novelist's Looking Glass", in Bernard Bergonzi (Ed.), H. G. Wells: A Collection of Critical Essays, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall [Spectrum], 1970), pp. 157-77, reprinted from Kenyon Review 31 (1969).

4 On occasion, however, notably in dealing with Prendick and the Leopard Man, I also use Jung's version of Freudian psychology.

5 By milieu I mean in general those elements of European bourgeois liberal culture that adopted and extended the scientific thought of the period, with particular emphasis on the thought of Darwin and his popularizers. Though, unlike Freud, Wells cannot be claimed as an original scientific thinker, or as one who extended Darwinian concepts, he certainly adopted them (from "Darwin's Bulldog", T. H. Huxley) and dramatized, in his romances, some of the concepts inherent in Darwinist thinking. Wells also satirized, in When The Sleeper
What Freud hoped was a universally valid description was nevertheless produced in a particular time and place, in a particular intellectual "climate", and it is to that particular time and place that Wells also addressed his fiction. In the case of *Moreau*, paralleling Wells' story with Freud's topography of the psyche in this fashion shows that they may be used to "explain" one another, that their authors share some common attitudes, or phobias, though perhaps phobia is too strong a term.

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II. Wells' Self-Commentary

What did Wells himself say about the production of his scientific romances? His comments are neither very numerous nor very detailed. Several Prefaces to reprinted editions of the various romances, the Prefaces to the individual volumes of The Atlantic Edition of the Complete Works and some incidental remarks and interviews constitute almost the whole of his remarks on the subject.¹ As a whole this commentary is marked by Wells' division of his life into two parts, two roles really, which may be called the Young Writer, and the Maturer Prophet. The Mature Wells tended to see his science fictions, where not actually worthless, as at least a possible threat to his role as agitator for utopia. The work of the Young Wells is obviously unsympathetic to utopian hopes and so the Elder Wells subtly denigrates it, generally commenting only on the more obvious aspects of the novels, anatomizing their faults without giving an equal analysis to their virtues. An added disingenuousness

results from the distance in time between the two figures, in some cases more than thirty years. Wells says himself, of re-reading *The Time Machine*, that he now "can no more touch it or change it than if it were the work of an entirely different person. He...finds it hard and 'clever' and youthful. And--what is rather odd, he thinks--a little unsympathetic. He is left doubting...whether if the Time Machine were a sufficiently practicable method of transport for such a meeting, the H. G. Wells of 1894 and the H. G. Wells of 1922 would get on very well together."² In the *Atlantic* Preface to *The Sleeper Awakes* he says that "that young man of thirty-one is already too remote for me to attempt any drastic reconstruction of his work".³

The most detailed commentary closest in time to the actual production of the scientific romances is Wells' Introduction to the 1910 collection, *The Country of the Blind, and Other Stories*, though even there, what Wells calls his "obituary manner" effectively drowns any substantive criticism. The Introduction is important mainly for the following passages on Wells' compositional method; bear in mind that most of the stories in the volume are romances of one kind or another.

There was a time when life bubbled with short stories; they were always coming to the surface of my mind, and it is no deliberate change of will that has thus restricted my production...It was my friend Mr. C. L.____________

Hind who set the spring going, he urged me to write short stories...and persuaded me by his simple and buoyant conviction that I could do what he desired...I set myself to the experiment of inventing moving and interesting things that could be given vividly in the little space of eight or ten...pages...and for a time I found it a very entertaining pursuit indeed. Mr. Hind's indicating finger had shown that, taking almost anything as a starting point and letting my thoughts play with it, there would presently come out of the darkness, in a manner quite inexplicable, some absurd or vivid little incident more or less relevant to the initial nucleus. Little men in canoes would come floating out of nothingness, incubating the eggs of prehistoric monsters unawares; violent conflicts would break out amidst the flower-beds of suburban gardens; I would discover that I was peering into remote and mysterious worlds ruled by an order logical indeed but other than our common sanity.

As Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie have suggested in their biography of Wells, this method of composition was similar to dreaming. "By this means" they say, "Wells produced stories which were rich in symbolism, and dreamlike in their structure. They had the same sudden shifts of locale and even viewpoint, the bizarre events erupting into the familiar, and even the inconsequential endings which are characteristic of dreams." From my own point of view, an equally noteworthy feature of Wells' statement is its contradictory assertions.

On the one hand Wells presents himself as an extraordinarily sensitive and suggestible young man. He reinforces this impression later in the same Introduction,

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claiming that hostile "a priori" criticism created an artificial
distinction between the anecdote and the short story, and that
this dried up the sources of his story-telling.

The short story was Maupassant; the anecdote was
damnable... The recession of enthusiasm for this compact,
amusing form is closely associated in my mind with that
discouraging imputation. One felt hopelessly open to a
paralysing and unanswerable charge, and one's ease and
happiness in the garden of one's fancies was more and
more marred by the dread of it. It crept into one's
mind, a distress as vague and inexpugnable as a sea fog
on a spring morning, and presently one shivered and
wanted to go indoors... 6

Even in a non-fictional setting, images characteristic of his
romances occur to Wells as representative of emotions associated
with the creation of those romances; as in several of the
romances, notably The Time Machine, he expresses himself in an
imaged polarity, the garden invaded by dread, the bright day
darkened.

Yet on the other hand (in the first extract) he claims that
he "set himself to the experiment of inventing moving and
interesting things", implying that the stories were created in
the same fashion as a scientist constructs an experiment. Wells
attempts to disown the role of his consciousness in these
experiments by postulating the "darkness" or "nothingness" (from
which the tales "bubble up to the surface" of his mind) as dimly
described but nevertheless objective realities, "remote and
mysterious worlds"; he is merely transcribing an outer scene.

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6Wells, Country, p. vii.
Interestingly enough, the position Wells here claims for himself corresponds to the initial position often given to his heroes. Like him they begin by simply observing the action, as if through a window—becoming by the same token a window through which the reader observes the action—and end by aligning themselves with one or another side of the inevitable conflict. Action in the scientific romances nearly always involves violent conflict, and frequently opposes men and monsters.

The contradictions in Wells' statement may be viewed as a crossing of intellectual and emotional purposes. Though I have so far only dealt with the intellectual aspects of Wells' romances there is no doubt that the constructed fictions have a vivid and immediate emotional impact upon the reader. The first extract above strongly implies that Wells' "experiments" were conducted on the materials most accessible to him, his own emotions, and it is possible to extrude from this a further implication, that the act of restructuring those materials resulted in a species of allegorical fiction; the stories exhibit "an amusing possibility of the mind". The romances embody then, in a latent form, Wells' efforts to understand the workings of his own, or rather his heroes' mind.

In all the romances, madness is a danger the hero must face and sometimes, as in Moreau, must suffer. The allegory in Wells' romances is not so much in their "scientific" content, which is manipulated to expose a conflict (animal man vs. rational man),
as in the conflict itself. The hero cannot avoid internalizing this conflict yet still struggles to keep it external to his "self". This applies especially to Moreau, though because it is written, like most of the scientific romances, in the first person, Prendick's struggle is sometimes difficult to see.

To the end of elucidating the allegory I have regarded it as not primarily or merely a poetic tool ("poetic" in this case including prose within its purview) but as essentially an intellectual tool, a way of thinking rather than a variety of perceptual experience. I have regarded it too, not as an essentially denotative form, imparting an explicitly didactive "message", but more as a connotative mode, in this particular case as a psychomachia. While the first type imports meaning in the form of a goal (a heavenly city, for example), the second seeks meaning within a process. If both deal with the life of the mind, the first tells the reader what portions of that mind to exalt or discard, the second only inquires as to the relative strengths of those portions. As a mode of writing allegory demands reflection, order and clarity, qualities that none have doubted Wells' scientific education and journalistic experience served to heighten. Moreover, those who in the past have used allegory (Dante, Spenser, Bunyan) have been only secondarily writers and primarily thinkers and men of affairs. Exactly so would I characterize Wells. His characters tend to become representative types and his situations tend towards ideological
demonstrations. His fiction, in other words, no matter how superficially fantastic, insists on a strong connection to the "real" world of the reader. His tales are the servants of ideas, and as the Young Writer turned into the Maturer Prophet, he sacrificed more and more often the poetry to the ideas. Wells became a much more public figure, fulminating against contemporary evils in his novels, through the daily press and through his brief but spectacular membership in the Fabian Society. But as W. Warren Wagar has noted, in his *H. G. Wells and the World State*, Wells failed signally as a prophet, and had his greatest success as a writer of science fictions. As such he is still very much "current" and marketable, the romances still feelingly expressing the contradictory states of mind induced in us all by having to live in a world in thrall to mechanistic definitions of itself.

Hopefully, by pointing out the contrariety of Wells' attitudes I do not need to belabour the obvious psychological constructions that may be put on his words. The scientific romances are psychological novels in that they transcribe, filtered through Wells' historical, class, and personal backgrounds, states of conflict within their heroes by

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7W. Warren Wagar, *H. G. Wells and the World State* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 245-69, "The Prophet as Failure". See also entries under "Wells" in any *Books In Print*; they are nearly all either science fictions, or social comedies, ie, *Kipps, Mr. Polly*, etc.
projecting those states into an external and rigidly limited arena, what I called above an "island". Within this arena the elements of the conflicts, like the personae of allegories, are free to work out their relations, resolve their mutual tensions. But free only to the extent that the author does not use them (the conflicts) for ideological demonstrations. It is the imposition of just such a framework that robs the later chapters of Wells' (1908) The War in the Air of much of their interest; the narrative ebbs and is perfunctorily closed off, and long passages of sociological speculation are inserted to locate the tale in its "historical" setting.

Was Wells himself aware of any possible psychological interpretations of his works? There is little evidence on this point one way or the other but I doubt very strongly that he was. Later, it is true, he seems to have familiarized himself, if not with the actual works of Freud and Jung, then at least with the outlines of their theories. He even goes so far, in his Experiment in Autobiography (1934), as to elaborate on his own (Jungian) personae and their relations to his life and work.8 In the same book, speaking of his adolescent growing sexual awareness, he is at pains to reject Freud's theories on what can only be called racist grounds.9

8Wells, Ex. Aut., p. 9.
9Ibid., pp. 55-6.
In the first extract above too, the way in which he speaks of the short story writing period of his life, as if he found the whole business a little beyond him and slightly bewildering, suggests that the sources of his creativity still remained largely hidden from him. There is no real evidence in the Autobiography either, that Wells ever undertook an analysis of his own emotions, though he continuously reappraised his intellectual positions.

My personal reasons for undertaking this study may, I think, be germane to it; they are easy to enumerate, and they can be used to introduce some final remarks on the figure of the later Wells. I have been since the age of eight years a reader (though never a "fan") of science fiction. I come from a class background very similar to Wells', and too, from the same part of England—East Sussex and Kent. Some of Wells' most beautiful (and for me most evocative) passages are his descriptions of the sweltering summer countryside, of scenes that were not much different in the middle 1950's than they were in the late 1890's. The dialect of Wells' villagers is essentially similar to that which I grew up speaking and hearing 'til my later schooling changed both my eyes and my ears. When I happened on the word "sawney", for instance, in Wells' The Wonderful Visit, it stared back at me from the page, prompting a sharp jolt of recognition, for I don't know how many times my wiser elders
called me a "sawney yungun". There have been moments too, when pursuing my enquiries I have wondered about my own less accessible motivations. The choice of a subject of study and the method of approach surely implicates the student. If my claims have any validity (I have thought) then in unravelling the conflicts of Wells and his fictional creations I am in a sense also unravelling some of the fictions and conflicts I (and perhaps many others) involve ourselves in.

For many reasons then I have been and still am attracted to Wells' books, and specially to his science fictions, even though a more detailed reading in his life and times and other writings has eroded somewhat my tendency to venerate him simply because of his unique status in the field of science fiction.

Indeed, building from this last, some science fiction readers have encouraged one another to take Wells' narrative pose of Olympian detachment and his prophetic stance at face value.¹⁰ As for his prophecies, the acme of this tendency is found in his Mind At The End of its Tether, and in a note (inserted when it was reprinted in 1944) added to the Preface of

¹⁰By this I mean simply his tendency to write often as if looking down from a great height on the actions he describes, the classic position of the "scientific" observer, believing himself uninvolved in those actions. This stance is best seen in Wells' The War in the Air (London: George Bell, 1908).
Yet my studies of Wells have served to intensify my sense of him as the science fiction writer, for the more such works I read the more convinced I have become that in the years Wells was writing his science fictions (1894-1901) he produced a virtual compendium of the themes which, until quite recently, other writers in the field have rather succeeded in elaborating than in surpassing. Even the "New Wave" writers of the late 1960's are in their satire and social criticism no less than in their imaginative fervour, often anticipated by Wells. On the opposite side of science fiction (ideologically speaking) such a conservative writer as the late C. S. Lewis expresses admiration for Wells' science fictions and speaks of reading them with evident enjoyment. Lewis' own novel, Out Of The Silent Planet, is clearly indebted to a close reading of Wells' The First Men In The Moon. Yet in his later novel, That Hideous Strength, Lewis with evident relish caricatures the Prophet Wells as the

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11Wells, War in the Air (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1941, 1967). The complete context of the passage is Wells' reprinting here the Preface to the Collins (1921) edition of the novel, where he says, in part, "Is there nothing to add...? Nothing except my epitaph. That, when the time comes, will manifestly have to be: 'I told you so; you damned fools.' (The italics are mine.)"

hollow, babbling tool of demonic forces.

The implicit distinction made by Lewis corresponds to that made between the earlier and the later Wells. The two almost mutually exclusive figures of Wells that Lewis presents, liking one and as heartily disliking the other, may almost be said to be emblems for attitudes towards the future; it will be horrible, but no, it will be exhilarating. This interpretive possibility is open to Lewis because the two Wellses were first identified by Wells himself and linked to two sets of writings, the generally pessimistic and poetic romances and the generally optimistic and intellectual utopias. In fact, however, the cleavage is not nearly so sharp as this kind of manipulation of emblematic figures suggests; the first Wells blends insensibly into the second. In the later books, for example, though there is a gradual subordination of the projected fantasy to a projected "actuality" there is no sudden choking off of the brilliant imagination that had illuminated the worlds of the earlier works.

But as I hope later to be able to show, even the romances have strongly utopian tendencies.

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Roger Bowen, in his "Experiments in Statement" (Simon Fraser Univ., unpublished thesis, 1968), chose to examine from among Wells' works, not only Moreau, but also The Croquet Player (1936), and Mr. Blettsworthy on Rampole Island (1928); "in this respect" he says, "the last two texts--largely ignored by commentators--are deliberately put before the reader for fresh consideration as evidence that Wells' creative spirit did not necessarily die on dates specified by normative critics" (ii). I agree with Mr. Bowen, though with an increasing sense of
Robert M. Philmus, in his theoretical book on science fiction, *Into The Unknown*, claims that Wells' works shifted from public to private myths. Wells himself believed that he had made exactly the opposite transit, from personal fantasies to objective, or necessary dreams, even though it is clear that the projected actuality of the later utopias is ultimately no less fantastic than that of Moreau's Beast Men.

In a profound sense, Wells' sociology (like his evolutionary theory) was imaginative as in important respects his imagination was sociological. To adduce only one example, in his first romance, *The Time Machine*, the two foci of the action—the future and the present—are partially social and reflect upon one another as mirrors placed on either side of the

14 (cont'd) swimming against the tide. See also Wagar, op cit., chap. 6.

15 Robert M. Philmus, *Into The Unknown: The Evolution of Science Fiction from Francis Goodwin to H. G. Wells* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1970), pp. 31-6. Philmus develops this distinction by contrasting the works of Wells to those of Verne. Wells' myths, he says, beginning as private, in the course of composition became public by "displacing and...commenting upon the historical condition of man" (33) Verne's vision, on the contrary, is exclusive and private, "an introverted version of man seeking self-enclosure" (34). The trouble with the distinction is that both tendencies may be found in the works of both men; each writer tends to include the opposite 'position' with his own. Philmus includes a quotation from Roland Barthes' article on Verne (in *Mythologies*, English edition, p. 90) which describes, with uncanny precision, the position of Wells' Time Traveller. Philmus' concepts of private and public myths, and of the ways in which these two can interact, is thus subject to significant distortion, and he offers the reader no way of maintaining at all times a clear distinction between the two kinds of myth.
mysterious Time Traveller, who is deeply implicated in the processes he "objectively" observes in these mirrors. Both modes, the sociological and the imaginative, are descriptive, in that in neither is there any methodology beyond Wells' own hopes and fears, and both modes tend to be apocalyptic. Wells' sociological and prophetic novels are by no means severed cleanly from their roots in his earlier scientific romances. Though "objectivity" dominates these later novels almost to the point of becoming their entire subject matter, and the logical sleight-of-hand practised earlier is discarded in favour of a more "real" method, at bottom the works are all still emotional responses to felt situations, no matter how gaily decked out these responses may be in sociological rationalizations. The title of Susan Sontag's incisive article on science fiction films applies forcefully to the forms of Wells' imagination for his truly was an "imagination of disaster".16

III. The Island [i]

The particular disaster Wells deals with in *The Island of Dr. Moreau* is experienced by a single individual, Edward Prendick, the narrator of the novel. Yet through Prendick's inability to escape the horrors he experiences on Moreau's island, Wells widens the scope of the disaster. The condition of the Beast Folk on the island is thus recreated as an allegory of the condition of all humans in society. As a setting, however, the island itself embodies meaning, and this may most easily be approached by a brief examination of *The Time Machine*. In this earlier novel Wells both fragments and centralizes the characters. On the one hand the Morlocks and the Eloi represent (divergent) aspects of a culture, but on the other, not only are the characters in a sense versions of one another, but all also revolve about that culture, which is considered as a controlling authority, defining their possible interactions. The fragmentation of the characters is of equal importance with their redistribution over a landscape that mimics their atrophied aspects. The Morlocks are associated with an underworld, the Eloi with a garden. Together, these elements may be thought of as an island. Indeed, in the fourth draft of *The Time Machine*, one of the framing characters calls the world of
the future "a little island in time and a little island in space... out of all the oceans of space, and a few thousands of years of eternity."¹ The settings of Wells' scientific romances may in most cases be defined as "a little island in time or space", or both,² which acts to isolate the hero from his own "real" society.

One of the meanings of the island then, is that it may be considered a sign of the romance hero's alienation. Culture alienates him from a "natural" state, and his sense of this incompleteness will not allow him to whole-heartedly participate in the culture. Whether the hero desires unification with his specific culture is a separate question, though I should note that in his science fiction, and in his novels written in the early years of the present century, *M. P. Polly*, *Tono Bungay*,


²Wells' *The War of the Worlds* appears to subvert this assertion but a moment's reflection will establish that in fact it does not. In the most literal sense, the "island" of that novel is England, which is described consistently as a kind of garden. Wells draws a distinct parallel too, between England and Tasmania, another island victim of colonial ambitions.
Wells has his heroes emphatically reject their ties to society.  

In his later writings Wells shifts from romance to utopia so that instead of representing a society of one isolated individual, as in Moreau, the island comes to stand for one isolated society. With this change comes a shift in the variety and direction of alienation, a change partly imposed by the formal limits within which Wells chose to work. The alienation is still present, but superficially much subdued, as a projected future society itself assumes heroic proportions, conferring in turn a like status on its interchangeable citizen units. In place of the hero exiled from his culture Wells shows a utopian society latent within our own, but exiled from it. In a reversal of the usual science fiction situation, where the present is a haven from a threatening otherworld, in Wells the present has paradoxically been marooned from its own best future. 

By rhetorically dissolving the individual into his corporate envelope the problem of alienation is by-passed. But it is not resolved. The representative of the present remains an outsider absolutely. Because of this separation, irony must be sacrificed, for no other interaction other than absolute credence is possible between utopians and outsiders. Ambiguity renounced for contrast, the validity of the commentary on each

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side is significantly impaired. The utopian is completely at one with his or her society, the outsider completely at odds with his. Neither side is capable of carrying conviction.

For the outsider, alienation exists in a much more acute form than for the alienated heroes of the romances, no present resolution of alienation being deemed likely and, therefore, no heroic action being admissible; alienation becomes paralysis. The outsider, a framing character, is necessarily the sole avenue of identification for Wells' readers and thus they too can only invisibly view the utopians and their happiness, can never participate in it. This splitting off of the future from the present clearly cannot resolve the problem of alienation. Attempting without hope to become the future, the present exists merely as a contradiction of that cynosure. The intensive utopia must be located in an extensive contemporary frame, but because of this it requires an almost magical act to bridge the chasm that lies between them; or at least, intervention by powers outside the scope of human understanding, warps in time, supernatural comets, or the release of the bestial qualities in humans, these triggering Armageddon, the frequent prelude to the establishment of the Wellsian utopia. The sojourner finds, instead of an arena, a true island, a good place instead of (as in the romances) an evil one; but he still remains an outcast, a wanderer and a stranger in a strange land. The utopian tale thus serves only one of Wells' purposes well, and that is to
emphasize the seriousness of contemporary social problems for his readers, which, past a certain point (in the 1930's) they rejected, because of the tales' failure both as tales and as tracts. Unadorned moral outrage is seldom convincing, especially when its ostensible ameliorating object, the future, remains perpetually out of our reach. One feels when reading the reviews of these later works, moreover, that in even so short a time as a life lived—short for Wells, that is, who characteristically thought in terms of aeons—an irony had been worked on Wells; his "future" was now very much deja vu, his readers had heard it all before, it was ancient history.

When, after his return to his present, the Time Traveller resolved to continue his journeying, he may have been prompted by his realization that he was at the last out of step with his culture. He tells his peers a "parable" of its problematic nature. "Take it as a lie" he says, "—or a prophecy. Say I dreamed it in the workshop. Consider I have been speculating upon the destinies of our race, until I have hatched this fiction. Treat my assertion of its truth as a mere stroke of art to enhance its interest."* They reject his formulation as a lie, and this leads him to a self-imposed exile, back into some other

time. For Prendick, the hero of The Island of Dr. Moreau, no such resolution is possible, for though his adventures occur in an arena distant from the "real" society, they nevertheless occur in real time, and to that society the hero, if indeed he ever left it, must return.
IV. Prendick observes the Beast Folk

An analysis of characterization in The Time Machine reveals a clear polarization in the central narrative of racial characters each associated with specific physical locations, the Morlocks with the underworld, the Eloi with the upper world. Once again in The Island of Dr. Moreau there are two races, the Beast Folk and the humans, and once again, a symbiotic relationship is postulated between the two. But to leave the description in this state is to gloss over difficulties the comparison presents, for there is not immediately apparent in Moreau so clear a polarization as there is in The Time Machine. Nor are there other extant versions of the text to help give the investigation an initial direction, though the novel went through at least two drafts. The only textual variants are those introduced in the Atlantic text of 1922, and these are mostly unimportant. 

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1Letter from Wells to A. T. Simmons (Feb.-Mar., 1895) quoted in Geoffrey West, H. G. Wells (New York: Norton, 1930), p. 97. "I began the beggar again from the first page and set him up quite different and much better. Since then I've hacked him about a good deal. He's far from ship-shape yet." Wells seems to be jocularly describing his vivisection of the text.

2The major textual variant is the dropping of the "Introduction" to the MS written by Prendick's nephew, and the effect of this excision is only to deprive the reader of the location of Noble's Island, and the knowledge of Prendick's death.
Although the Beast Folk are labelled individually merely as (for instance) the Leopard Man, the Hyena-Swine, Ocelot Man or Swine Men, named that is by species in precisely the same fashion as the characters in the frame tale of The Time Machine are identified by their occupations, their narrative function in The Island of Dr. Moreau seems to be quite different. They share the island with the humans and with them share two important and related traits, being capable of reason, or capable of bestiality. In fact one of the Beast People has a name, M'Ling, and acts throughout the novel as not essentially different than the more fully human characters, Prendick, Montgomery and Moreau; identifying himself with these, M'Ling eventually dies with them. The thinness of the characterization of the professionals in The Time Machine is not manifest in quite the same fashion in Moreau. The Beast Folk, besides in some cases showing the rudimentary character necessary for dramatic interactions with the humans, possess as well a strange kind of selfness, which, though difficult to define, is closely related to their sometime human characteristics.

It was a kind of glade made in the forest by a fall... Before me, squatting together upon the fungoid ruins of a huge fallen tree, and still unaware of my approach, were three grotesque human figures. One was evidently a female. The other two were men. They were naked, save for swatheings of scarlet cloth about their middles, and their skins were of a dull pinkish drab colour, such as I had seen in no savages before. They had fat heavy chinless faces, retreating foreheads, and scant bristly hair upon their heads...
They were talking, or at least one of the other men was talking to the other two, and all three had been too closely interested to heed the rustling of my approach. The speaker's words came thick and sloppy, though I could not distinguish what he said.

As Prendick continues to observe the gibbering and dancing of these unusual savages, he suddenly perceives clearly for the first time what it was that had offended me, what had given me the two inconsistent and conflicting impressions of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest familiarity. The three creatures engaged in this mysterious rite were human in shape, and yet human beings with the strangest air about them of some familiar animal (46).

Though not as strong, the disgust Prendick feels recalls Gulliver's distaste for the Yahoos. Prendick rejects any sympathy with the pathetic Beast Folk, choosing to remain in this instance an unseen observer. "I turned as noiselessly as possible, and becoming every now and then rigid with the fear of being discovered as a branch cracked of a leaf rustled, I pushed back the bushes" (47).

Clearly, an as yet unarticulated bond yokes humans and Beast Folk together. Yet the reader's observer, Prendick, persists in regarding the Beast Folk as, for the most part, mere animals, and otherwise only as monsters, potential dangers to his security. At several points Prendick is forced to concede

3 I am using the text of the first edition of Wells' The Island of Dr. Moreau, in a paperback form (London: Pan, 1975, reprinted from Heinemann, 1896), p. 46. All further references to the novel will be by page number, within the body of the essay. I have chosen the Pan paperback because it is widely available and because it preserves the 1896 Heinemann text.
the human-ness of the Beast Folk, as for instance when he says that he "never before saw an animal try to think" (75), but not until he is alone with them on the island will he grant them an equal status with himself, and that unwillingly. Since he still will not allow them human status, this means that he "degrades" himself to the level of animal. After his rescue Prendick says that he "may have caught something of the natural wildness of my companions" (140).

In his refusal to allow his knowledge to dilute his emotional preferences he is very like the Time Traveller. In his more obvious personal disintegration, however, he more closely resembles Gulliver, ending like him in a condition close to insanity; and as in Swift's Travels, the reader must finally (unless already suffering under similar conditions) separate himself from the tale's speaking voice, detach himself from that insanity. The reader's rejection of Prendick parallels Prendick's rejection of his fellow-men, and for similar reasons. Prendick rejects the beastliness of his fellows, which he unreasonably persists in perceiving gleaming through their human disguises.

I look about me at my fellow men. And I go in fear. I

*Wells Wells notes his indebtedness to Swift in the At. Ed. Preface (V. II) to Moreau, where he says "the influence of Swift is very apparent in it" (ix); and in the Preface to Seven Famous Novels he says of his first three scientific romances that they are "all...consciously grim, under the influence of Swift's tradition" (ix).
see faces keen and bright, others dull or dangerous...[but] none that have the calm authority of a reasonable soul. I feel as though the animal was surging up through them; that presently the degradation of the Islanders will be played over again on a larger scale. I know this is an illusion, that these seeming men and women are indeed men and women, men and women forever, perfectly reasonable creatures, full of human desires and tender solicitude, emancipated from instinct...Yet I shrink from them, from their curious glances, their inquiries and assistance, and long to be away from them and alone (140).  

Prendick's refusal to be reasonable, his refusal to see "seeming men and women [as] indeed men and women" is itself, so far as those others are concerned, a type of beastliness. "Unnatural as it seems," he says, "with my return to mankind came, instead of that confidence and sympathy I had expected, a strange enhancement of the anxiety and dread I had experienced during my stay on the island. No one would believe me, I was almost as queer to men as I had been to the Beast People" (140). When the reader rejects Prendick's vision of his fellow citizens as like the Beast Folk, this places the reader in the same position as those men and women, and in the same position as the Beast Folk. The difficulty in showing the strange selfness of the Beast Folk results from the limitations imposed upon the tale by the use of a first-person narrator. Until the denouement the reader must largely share Prendick's assessments of the Beast Folk, and only later, if at all, revaluate their relative humanity or lack of

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5Compare Gulliver's Travels, Book 4, chapters XI and XII, with Moreau, chapter 22, "The Man Alone".
it. The reader is still free, like Prendick (or even the author) to refuse a recognition of the humanity of the Beast Folk, which of necessity would involve a recognition of his own animality. But the possibility nevertheless exists, and it exists for Prendick early in the novel.

Indeed, this process of a simultaneous recognition of the humanity of the Beast Folk and a refusal to concede them this status, is at the bottom of Prendick’s confusion about what Moreau is actually doing. He suspects (in fact the exact opposite of the truth) that Moreau is releasing the bestial in men rather than tapping a humanity in the beasts (72-3). Afraid for himself, Prendick panics, is hunted down like an animal, but eventually is convinced of the truth. Though Prendick still disapproves of Moreau’s project, it becomes, for the time being, a little more acceptable to his feelings. He later discovers, however, that it makes no difference which way Moreau’s knife cuts.

Throughout the novel then, Prendick attempts to articulate a polarity he perceives between humans and Beast Folk, treating the latter as mere animals. From his own observations though, it seems that the opposition, the polarity, is rather to be located between those characteristics that are essentially human and those that constitute what Prendick calls "a swinish taint, the unmistakable mark of the beast" (46). The falseness of Prendick’s dichotomy is finally shown at the novel’s end, when
his own selfness, and that of his "fellows" becomes as problematic as that of the Beast Folk.
V. Prendick's Eyes and Ears

Through Prendick's particular self-assertions, and more generally through the presentation of noises, usually noises breaking in on his attempts to understand what is going on around him, the romance emphasizes sound over sight. To pay attention, therefore, only to the strongly imaged portions of the book, which are often pauses or breaks in the flow of the action, is misleading. The novel, like all Wells' scientific romances, does have some intensely visual scenes, but in many cases in Moreau the more vivid descriptions—with a class of exceptions—are presented in a way that suggests to me, at any rate, the taking of a breath of air after one has been confined in the narrative for a long while. Alternatively, they are also used to set off small sections of the landscape which catch Prendick's eye whilst he maneuvers to and from more important business. In chapter nine, for instance, driven out of doors by the cries of the vivisected puma and "scarcely heeding whither" he goes, Prendick quickly has his first encounter with the renegade Leopard Man. In between these two events, however, he rests momentarily in a leafy shade. "The place was a pleasant one. The rivulet was hidden by the luxuriant vegetation of the banks, save at one point, where I caught a triangular patch of
its glittering water. On the farther side I saw, through a
bluish haze, a tangle of trees and creepers, and above these
again, the luminous blue of the sky. Here and there a splash of
white or crimson marked the blooming of some trailing epiphyte.
I let my eyes wander over the scene awhile" (43).

The very infrequency of such passages, for they are a small
portion in the total of the work, and their shortness, generally
only one or two paragraphs, implies that Prendick too thinks of
them as breaks from his real concerns and perhaps too as
necessary to the readers' conviction of the rationality of his
memoir. Interestingly, it is to such outer scenes that Prendick
turns upon his recall to civilization when he can no longer
support human company. "I see few strangers", he says, "and have
but a small household. My days I devote to reading and to
experiments in chemistry, and I spend many of the clear nights
in the study of astronomy. There is, though I do not know how
there is or why there is, a sense of infinite peace in the
glittering hosts of heaven. There it must be, I think, in the
vast and eternal laws of matter, and not in the daily cares and

1 The structure of chapter nine reflects this use of brief visual
descriptions as transitions or bridges between more important
chunks of narrative. A survey of individual paragraphs shows 33
devoted to actions, and only 7 devoted to descriptions, these
latter being disposed into four links between six actions. Three
of the bridges are one paragraph long, one is four paragraphs
long, two of the actions abut directly. I should note that the
forty paragraphs, with few exceptions, are of nearly uniform
length.
troubles of men, that whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and hope" (141-2). Notice how quickly Prendick moves from particular statements to general; in the terms of the Ape Man, Prendick is rejecting "little thinks", "the same everyday interests of life" (132), for elusive "big things", metaphysics, or as Prendick pejoratively terms it, " gabble about names that meant nothing".

For Wells' purposes, another function of these passages suggests itself. They provide him with opportunities for occasional, highly effective contrasts, in that they present things familiar to the reader--usually natural scenes and events--juxtaposed with things bizarre and unfamiliar, such as the several hunts. They also constitute an implicit though submerged claim that yes, such things (as the events of the narrative) are indeed possible in Nature, a claim Moreau himself reinforces: "The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature" (81). The Nature Moreau envisions is, like himself, cruel and bound up in laws which have nothing to do with human wishes and desires, the very antithesis of the more commonplace notion of Nature as the provider of beautiful scenes and moral truths. The contrast then, is the vehicle of what Bernard Bergonzzi has called Wells' desire to pater le bourgeois. One might almost say that the shock itself is used to convince the reader of the tale's reality.
The two characteristics of the passages, brevity and rarity,\(^2\) can also give occasional passages an emotional prominence, as in Prendick's brief elegy for Moreau.

Then I shut the door, locked it, and went into the enclosure where Moreau lay beside his latest victims...his massive face, calm even after his terrible death, and with the hard eyes open, staring at the dead white moon above. I sat down upon the edge of the sink, and, with my eyes upon that ghastly pile of silvery light and ominous shadows, began to turn over plans in my mind...

Behind me lay the yard, vividly black and white in the moonlight, and the pile of wood and faggots on which Moreau and his mutilated victims lay upon one another. They seemed to be gripping one another in one last revengeful grapple. His wounds gaped black as night, and the blood that had dripped lay in black patches on the sand (118).

I say elegy because the passage evokes elements common to elegaic laments, lacking only Prendick's mourning; though of course, Prendick is more a rational than an emotional figure. Montgomery, more emotional than rational, holds a beastly wake on the beach, a raucous "bank holiday", the noise of which interrupts Prendick's elegy where I have indicated an elipsis. In Prendick's threnody there is too a suggestion that Nature mourns the deceased, the dead eyes reflecting the dead moon, the wounds black as night, or at the least there is a juxtaposition of Moreau and the animals (transitory) with Nature and death (permanence), a contrast that is itself characteristic of elegy.

\(^2\)I mark only twenty such passages in the novel, on pp. 17, 22, 31-2, 43, 48, 49-50, 50, 61, 63, 70-1, 88, 97, 108, 117-8, 118, 120, 121, 123, 139, 141. This amounts to roughly four pages out of one hundred and thirty-three, or three percent of the text.
It reflects ironically too on Moreau's earlier self-identification with Nature for in death he goes back to Nature. Already in the passage the dead are collectively dissolved into a play of silvery light and shadows. This suggests too, that like the other descriptive pieces, which move the reader from immediate events to natural processes and things more stably present, sunsets, stars, the sea, a function of the passage is to locate the events within the natural process. Of course, in any romance, not many such descriptive pieces nor many of great length will be found, since the extension of them would subvert the narrative, shifting the reader's interest away from the human to the cosmic point of view. I sense too in this passage a nostalgic sense of loss, even if it is only the loss of an authority figure which Prendick says elsewhere he "distrusted and dreaded" (74). This loss, akin to a feeling of helplessness, a feeling Prendick experiences on several occasions, is also conveyed through the repeated depiction of Moreau and his victims as a heap of black and white shadows.

3Philmus and Hughes (Eds.), op cit., in their Introduction discuss Wells' intermingling of these two points of view in his scientific romances (pp. 6-7). "The tension between [the two views]...is greatest in The Time Machine. Thereafter...Wells gradually comes to place increasing emphasis on the efficacy of human effort" (7). See also Wells' discussion of the two points of view in his "Scepticism of the Instrument", a lecture delivered to the Oxford Philosophical Society, 8 Nov. 1903, reprinted (with slight changes) in Mind, XIII (1904), pp. 379-93.
Note too that phrases such as "my eyes wandered over the scene for a while", which recur in these descriptive contexts, also help form the impression of our observer, Prendick, as one who must concentrate before a scene can make a visual impression on him. "[My] eye has had no training in details..." he says, "and unhappily I cannot sketch" (89). This is not to say that he is lacking in imagination, quite the reverse; in fact, he considers himself to be blighted with imagination. As Montgomery says, Prendick is "always fearing and fancying" (116-7), and Prendick himself notes his tendency to "tangle [myself in] mystification and suspicion" (40), and says that he has an "unfortunate imagination" (109). Moreau too at one point roundly curses Prendick's "confounded imagination, which has wasted the better part of my day" (75). The relative lack of vivid description thus correlates with Prendick's introspective tendency, the outer scenery impressing itself on him only fitfully. Compared to, say, The First Men in the Moon, or The War in the Air, Moreau is singularly lacking in the extended and vivid panoramas which form the narrative cores of most of the scientific romances. Edwin Prendick's tone of voice, his moral and emotional stance as, in the Wellsian sense a more than usually psychologically real character, accordingly deserves careful attention.

A survey of the novel indicates that the "missing" scenery is made up for by descriptions of noise, in particular by
vocalizations, the yelping, howling, shouting and screaming that appears on nearly every page. The effect of this is to reduce yet again the distance between men and animals, undercutting Prendick's more self-conscious attempts to maintain the segregation. Indeed, his situation is not unlike the Time Traveller's in that he identifies himself with "humanity" and despises the Beast Folk, even though he has no special love for the other individual humans on the island. Similarly, the Time Traveller does not particularly admire the Eloi, but definitely despises the Morlocks. "I will confess that then" says Prendick, "and indeed always, I distrusted and dreaded Moreau. But Montgomery was a man I felt I understood" (74). The bridging of the gap between men and beasts reaches its zenith in the transformation, directly after Prendick's first clear look at the Beast Folk in chapter nine, of "The Crying of the Puma" (chapter eight) into "The Crying of the Man" (chapter ten). It is of interest too, that immediately prior to his hearing the cry of "a human being in torment!" (55), Prendick, still drowsy, attempts "to clamber out of the hammock, which, very politely, anticipating my intention, twisted round and deposited me upon all fours on the floor" (54), precisely like an animal.

Noises, in the early chapters especially (two, three and five), also help to create an atmosphere of confusion and disintegration. In chapter two, essentially the record of a conversation between Prendick and Montgomery, their talk is
continually interrupted by snarls and growls, human and animal intermixed. "I heard him [Montgomery] in evident controversy with someone, who seemed to talk gibberish in response" (13). The dirtiness of the schooner *Ipecacuanha* (17, 19) and the irrationality of Davis, its red-haired drunken master, again reinforce the impression of a society unable to hold itself together, its elements being too much at odds with one another.

The clumsiness of the humans, as well as their propensity for unreason, is stressed. In the following passage it is actively contrasted with the natural rhythmicity of the dogs as they attack Montgomery's servant, the unfortunate M'Ling.

The black-faced man, howling in a singular voice, rolled about under the feet of the dogs. No one attempted to help him. The brutes did their best to worry him, butting their muzzles at him. There was a quick dance of their lithe grey bodies over the prostrate figure. The sailors foward shouted to them as if it was an admirable sport. Montgomery gave an angry exclamation and went striding foward down the deck. I followed him (18).

It may be argued that, as a Beast-Man, M'Ling cannot be contrasted to the animals as effectively as a human might. But if the clumsiness of the Beast People, what they have lost, is emphasized, so too does Wells draw attention to the incapacities

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*Ipecac is a plant used as an emetic drug, that is, it induces vomiting. "The silly ass who owns her—he's captain too, named Davis", says Montgomery, "calls the thing the *Ipecacuanha*—of all the silly infernal names, though when there's much of a sea without any wind she certainly acts according" (13). That is, when there is a heavy swell, but the ship is otherwise becalmed, Montgomery gets seasick.*
of the humans, what they cannot hang onto; and in any event the net result is the same. Paraphrasing Prendick one might say that the very clumsiness of the Beast Folk is the "taint of manishness, the mark of the human upon them." A principal effect of such statements is to puncture assumed human dignity. Thus the despairing cruelty inherent in Prendick's assertion that it is not so much that others suffer which bothers him as all the screaming and carrying on--"had I known [that all the pain in the world] was in the next room, and had it been dumb, I believe...I could have stood it well enough" (42)--is Wells' qualification of Prendick's more overtly moral and sentimental utterances; one might say it betrays a certain ethical clumsiness.

The humans can sometimes see this puncturing humourously, as in Prendick's being tumbled out of his hammock, but most often they do not, and seem merely "silly asses". Only Moreau is exempt and as I shall show, this is because he excludes himself, by choice, from humanity. The deflation appears most grossly in Davis, the drunken skipper, in the difference between what he is and what he claims to be: "I'm the law here, I tell you--the law and the prophets" (20). It is at work too in Prendick's sometimes fatuous assertions and statements. Offered some medicinal liquor by Moreau Prendick says, "The brandy I did not touch for I have been an abstainer from my birth" (34). Notice that this is an extravagant claim for the powers of will and
reason, one Prendick makes often, though it becomes increasingly harder for him to support it in himself.⁵

To some extent Prendick is psychologically a "real" character and thus is at times invisible to himself, unable to see his own fatuity or even the narrowness, for example, of his initial assessment of Montgomery; he cannot quite grasp "the singularity of an educated man living on this unknown little island and...the extraordinary nature of his luggage" (23).⁶ Yet he is at times capable of (limited) introspection, and at least able to report incidents unflattering to himself, as for instance Montgomery's opinion that he (Prendick) is a "logic-chopping, chalky-faced saint of an atheist", a "solemn prig...a silly ass" (116).⁷ Prendick acts, like all the heroes of the scientific romances, as a seeing eye who only gradually, rationally, pieces together the true nature of the island arena. But even more does Prendick act as a socially conditioned auditor, frequently hidden as he observes the action, through

⁵See also pp. 20-1 where Prendick "prevents a fight" by drawing down the captain's wrath upon himself. He also calls himself there "a mild-tempered man", a statement hard to reconcile with his later plans to kill the Beast People. See pp. 124-5, the encounter with the Hyena-Swine, and note this on p. 136. "I had half a mind to make a massacre of them--to build traps or fight them with my knife. Had I possessed sufficient cartridges, I should not have hesitated to begin the killing."

⁶That is, the animals, cargo of the Ipecacuanha.

⁷At this point in the novel--nearly the end--the reader's assessment likely parallels Montgomery's.
his reporting trying to impose on the materials the voice of normative authority. Wells needs, therefore, to suggest in his characterization only sufficient individuality to make Prendick credibly "a private gentleman" (7) of some means, a rentier who might go on a world tour, or take "to natural history as a relief from the dullness of my comfortable independence" (13). Thus, even those utterances which mark him as a psychologically real character are in fact only expressions of the values typical to Prendick's class, reasonableness within certain limits, and a tight rein on the expression of emotion.

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8I wondered whether or not Wells modelled Prendick's circumstances, distinct from his "character", on those of Darwin, who was also comfortably independent, also an amateur biologist, and whose world tour on the HMS Beagle was undertaken partly to prevent his sinking into the habits of dissipation common to younger sons of his class. Ironcally, Darwin's father was at first against his son's going on the voyage, calling it a 'wild idea'. See Gavin DeBeer (Ed.) Charles Darwin and Thomas Henry Huxley: Autobiographies (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1974), pp. 31, 33, 40 for Darwin's life at Cambridge prior to the voyage, and see also Nora Barlow (Ed.) Darwin and Henslow...Letters, 1831-1860 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1967), letters 2-8, for the circumstances surrounding the voyage. As for Darwin's "means" these were provided by his father, who became, through shrewd investments, a very wealthy man (Barlow, p. 14).

9See John Bowle, The Imperial Achievement (London: Secker and Warburg, 1974), p. 302: "[This] high intellectual tradition...became diluted in the raw post-Arnold public schools, with their oddly puritanical narrow and games-ridden outlook, hypertrophied by a narrow curriculum and Anglican provincial prejudice. They often turned the image of the British Administrator into one quite uncharacteristic of the uninhibited and often magnetic characters who had made...the Empire that the Late Victorian and Edwardian schools would help to lose." (Note that in this context Mr. Bowle's word "games" means organized team sports.) Alan Sandison, in his The Wheel of Empire (New
Here too the particular shades into the general, the psychologically real into the representative. Prendick's studying under T. H. Huxley (33), his status as an amateur biologist, may be used to account for his commitment to accurate observation, just as the Time Traveller's status as scientist accounts for his observing and theorizing about the nature of the future world. Though Prendick's "eye has...no training in details" (89), his eyes nevertheless catalogue bits of his surroundings as his scientific training has taught him to do (31-2, 88, 93).  

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9 (cont'd) York: St. Martin's Press, 1967), p. 15, says this of the English public schools after c. 1870. "What we get is an insistence on... firmness of character, strength of will, sense of duty, reserves of fortitude..." And again, p. 16, speaking more specifically of the public school cult of the "bloods" (the athletes), Sandison says the characteristics of this cult included "the worship of athletic prowess, chauvinistic loyalty, sanctified tradition, contempt for the intellectual, the suppression of feeling and sympathy; and the cultivation of a certain hauteur." While some of this does not apply to Prendick, still he would be a recognizable product of the system, someone Wells could copy from life. Sandison continues; "Some admitted the narrowness of the English public-school man's horizon, but it was usually heavily qualified by their insistence that he had at least learned to obey and, by consequence, to command, and would come out well in difficult circumstances." Prendick certainly does do his best.  

10 Especially in his geological descriptions, pp. 61, 70, 118, and in his ability to discern the various blends of animals out of which Moreau has made the individual Beast Folk.
VI. Prendick and the Leopard Man

One other point remains to be made about the visual element in the novel and its relation to Prendick's seeing and hearing for the reader. Apart from the necessary scene-painting, already noted, the work's most vividly rendered descriptions nearly all concern the Beast People. Usually, Prendick is shocked (when viewing the Beast Folk) by what may be called a field/ground effect\(^1\) as his perceptions tremble on the edge of granting the Beast Folk the full humanity he never will consciously accord them. This gives his relations with them an hysterical cast, similar to the Time Traveller's relations with the Eloi and the Morlocks; and with this comparison in mind, it is interesting to reflect on Prendick's stated reasons for shooting the Leopard Man.

Having chased that unfortunate "into a corner of the island" (101) from which he cannot escape, Prendick is finally the member of the hunting pack who first comes upon him.

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\(^1\)The most familiar field/ground diagram is that which depicts either a white goblet on a black ground, or two profiles in silhouette. The important point is that the diagram is a **gestalt**, a totality, not two separate objects. It is simply our perceptual inadequacy that makes us separate the **gestalt** into its components, our propensity for creating either/or situations.
It may seem a strange contradiction in me—I cannot explain the fact—but now, seeing the creature there in a perfectly animal attitude, with the light gleaming in its eyes, and its imperfectly human face distorted with terror, I realized again the fact of its humanity. In another moment one of its pursuers would see it, and it would be overpowered and captured, to experience once more the horrible tortures of the enclosure. Abruptly I slipped out my revolver, aimed between its terror-struck eyes, and fired (102).

Prendick is in the cant phrase, "putting the creature out of its misery", relieving it of what he apprehends will be "horrible tortures" by giving it a quick and merciful death. This humane act, however, implies his own identification with the Leopard Man's sufferings. Though rationally he "cannot explain the fact" he knows emotionally that he is akin to the creature and is aware simultaneously that this "may seem a strange contradiction in me". Neither, presumably, can he explain the related assertion that in that instant "I realized again the fact of its humanity" (emphasis added). Save only in this one instance Prendick denies the human-ness of the Beast Folk, or, at best allows it the status of travesty, yet here the assertion is made of a renegade, a scapegoat, one who is the island's emblem of unrestrained passion.²

²Though I doubt that Wells was aware of it, there being no evidence either way, the Leopard is thus used, allegorically, by Dante in the first Canto of his Inferno. While it is clear that the Leopard bars "Dante's" passage through the dark wood of the world, there seems to be some disagreement among the commentators as to the precise allegorical significance of the Leopard. The dispute is made more complex by a secondary dispute, whether the word lonza is the Florentine dialect feminine of leopard, or whether it refers to a lonza, a
From his own emotional point of view, Prendick is murdering a man in whom accrue all the negative traits of Prendick's own self; specifically, the hysteria and irrationality which, though they are aspects of his personality, Prendick nevertheless perceives as threatening to his self-image as the voice of normative authority.

The killing is also Prendick's own version of the similar desire Moreau expresses to quash once for all the animality of his creations. "But I will conquer yet", says Moreau. "Each time I dip a living creature into a bath of burning pain, I say, 'This time I will burn out all the animal, this time I will make a rational creature of my own'" (84). As with Prendick, the animality is clearly a trait of Moreau's self, an irrationality which he associates with a slackening of rational control. Moreau denies, however, having uncanny experiences similar to those Prendick has with the Leopard Man. "These creatures of mine seemed strange or uncanny to you as you began to observe them, but to me, just after I make them, they seem to be indisputably human beings. It's afterwards as I observe them that the persuasion fades. First one animal trait, then another, creeps to the surface and stares out at me" (84). His

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2 (cont'd) composite creature found in medieval bestiaries, the offspring of an unnatural mating between a leopard and a lion. See Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, translated with a commentary by Charles S. Singleton (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1970), V. 1, Inferno, Pt. 2, Commentary, pp. 10-11.
attribution of the feeling to Prendick, implicitly denying it in himself, seems to me as suspect as his claim the he no longer feels sympathetic pains (81), a claim he supports with an aggressive masochism, thrusting a penknife into his thigh to prove his superiority to mere pain (80). As the passages cited above show, however, he does share with Prendick a similar uncertainty, whether the Beast Folk are truly human or not.

To return to Prendick, consider too that only moments before coming upon the Leopard Man he was running with the pack of Beast People and actively identifying with them. "The whole crowd seemed to swing round in the direction of the glint of fire, and I, too, was swung around by the magnetism of the moment. In another second I was running, one of a tumultuous shouting crowd, in pursuit of the escaping Leopard Man" (100). The double identification with both the hunters and the hunted is less curious than it at first appears, when one recalls that this entire sequence of events is being here played out for the third time, and that it has twice happened that Prendick was the hunted (chapters nine, twelve and thirteen). It is hardly surprising then that as the "act of mercy" is upon him Prendick should feel an uncanny connection between himself and the Leopard Man. The admission of the creature's humanity is thus

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3Note also, lower down on p. 100, speaking of the hunters, "we went through [the undergrowth] ... in a crowd together, fronds flicking into our faces, ropy creepers catching us under the chin, or gripping our ankles..." (100-01: emphasis added).
easily made since it is here with a bullet also easily controlled. I think it justified then, to regard the appearances of the Leopard Man as, for Prendick, a sort of doubling (autoscopy), especially considering the earlier encounter between the two.

I have noted above the relative lack of vividly visualized scenes in the novel, but to describe this critically as a lack is in a sense misleading. What actually exists on this level is a visual correlative to the Babel of sounds, a blurred impression of sights glimpsed through a welter of foliage, "a tangle of trees and creepers" (43). In Prendick's uncertainty,

"Autoscopy" is a clinical term referring to the experience of seeing oneself outside oneself as an autonomous individual, and can be either extremely frightening, or excessively mundane. See Martin Tropp, Mary Shelley's Monster (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1976) chapter one, notes, on Shelley's autoscopy, and for related clinical articles.

Without anticipating the argument which follows too much, further evidence that the vision is autoscopic may be found in the tendency of the characters, no less than incidents and locations in the novel, to be doubled, as in the simultaneous centralization and fragmentation of characters in Wells' The Time Machine. The forces producing this phenomenon are operative in Moreau too. Consider these remarks from Robert Rogers' The Double in Literature (Wayne State Univ. Press, 1970), p. 14. "If autoscopy and decomposition are not the same, they are at least so similar that they may be treated mutatis mutandis, as identical, and in fact a recent psychiatric study of the double by Todd and Dewhurst utilizes a mixture of clinical and literary models without apology." Thus I think it quite proper to use what is essentially a clinical term in this primarily literary discourse. Rogers also links the phenomenon of literary doubling (doubling, decomposition and fragmentation he uses as synonymous terms) with Angus Fletcher's discussion, in his Allegory: The Theory of a Symbolic Mode (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1964), of sub-character generation in allegory, p. 16 and pp. 138-60.
where "everything was so strange about me" (35), aggravated by his identification with the pains suffered by the puma (42), his imagination sets to work on these confusing patterns of light and shade. "The thicket about me became altered to my imagination. Every shadow became something more than a shadow, became an ambush, every rustle became a threat. Invisible things seemed to be watching me" (45).\(^5\) Having earlier, in a "state midway between dozing and waking" (43) spotted the Leopard Man, now, in a highly nervous state, Prendick notices a creature stalking him, whose path is "parallel with my course" (45), walking when he walks and stopping when he stops.

I pushed through a tangle of tall white-flowered bushes, and saw him twenty yards beyond, looking over his shoulder at me and hesitating. I advanced a step or two looking steadfastly into his eyes.

"Who are you?" I said.

He tried to meet my gaze.

"No!" he said suddenly, and, turning, went bounding away from me through the undergrowth. Then he turned and stared at me again. His eyes shone brightly out of the dusk under the trees.

My heart was in my mouth, but I felt my only chance was bluff, and walked steadily towards him. He turned again and vanished into the dusk. Once more I thought I caught the glint of his eyes, and that was all (47-8).

Both the visual and aural confusion are corollaries to Prendick's frequently confused and dream-like state of mind. Faced with the events of the novel Prendick's reasonable stance is revealed as a denial of the irrational in himself, and as my

\(^5\)Compare the reactions of the Time Traveller in Bleiler, op cit., p. 303.
argument has so far tried to establish, he becomes reason
detached from nature, an overdeveloped rationality. If this is
so then it follows that his unbalanced state of mind is exactly
the one in which to expect what in allegory is called (by Angus
Fletcher) the generation of sub-characters of the hero, and
what here I would call the release of a hostile nature, hence
again, the shadow side of Prendick's self. Extending this use of
Jung's terminology I would also say that the Leopard Man is a
projection of Prendick's, this being "the expulsion of a
subjective content into an object", the result of "the archaic

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6Angus Fletcher, op cit., p. 195. See also p. 193: "Much of the
literary interest in metamorphoses comes from the idea of
liberation or imprisonment that it conveys; it continually turns
humans into their bestial equivalents somewhere on the scale of
the Great Chain, or frees them to live as humans, with free
will." Or consider this, p. 221n., on allegory in romances: "it
does more than creep in around the edges of romance, it is the
very life blood of the type, since, without archetypal
simplifications of character, romance would have no other raison
d'etre but as it is, romance is the natural, popular medium for
allegorical expression..." Fletcher's reference to "archetypal
simplifications of character" stems from his following Frye's
defining of romance (in his Anatomy) specifically through its
approach to characterization. Fletcher also notes that in
allegory, when "plots and subplots are combined in certain ways,
the effect of interplay between them is a causal one, and when
major characters 'generate' subcharacters, fractions of
themselves, these fractions have peculiar causal interrelations.
The dramatis personae in allegorical fictions will not have to
interact plausibly, or according to probability, as long as they
interact with a certain logical necessity. This necessity in
turn appears...to take on a magical force. The agents of
allegory can help, hurt, change and otherwise affect one another
'as if by magic'" (182). I would say that it is a valid
procedure to assume that the same holds good for generated as
for fragmented subcharacters. Thus too, the relations between
the Time Traveller and the Morlocks and Eloi.
identity...of subject and object...The term...therefore signifies a state of identity that has become noticeable, an object of criticism." This mechanism explains too Prendick's empathetic identification with the Leopard Man in the instant before he shoots the beast. Distinguishing further between active and passive projection, Jung notes that active projection is "an essential component of the act of empathy" and is "also an act of judgement." That is, Prendick's empathetic realization of the Leopard Man's humanity is a self-judgement he can in no other circumstances approach. This process by which the subject distinguishes himself from himself "plays a prominent role in paranoia, which usually ends in the total isolation of the subject"; which is indeed Prendick's fate.

If the Leopard Man is a recipient of, or in fact a projection of Prendick's shadow side, an instinctual criticism of his hyper-rationalism, a certain hostility of each to the other is to be expected. This appears in an attempted recognition when Prendick's attempts to force a "reasonable" confrontation ("Who are you?") results in the Leopard Man's refusal of the terms ("No!") without substituting his own ("he...went bounding away from me through the undergrowth").

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8Ibid., 784/458.
Only after the recognition is refused will the Leopard Man actually attack Prendick, to be turned back by the latter's vigorous counter-attack, or rather, his acceptance of the shadow's terms for the encounter. There is a clear suggestion here that whatever the mystery is on the island, it will not easily yield to a rational solution. Even Moreau's "explanation" (chapter 14) deals mostly with his surgical-hypnotic operations, the physical genesis of the Beast Folk, and though it is clear that he has to a large degree shaped their culture, he does not acknowledge this and is vague as to its arising and maintenance.
VII. The Uncanny Nature of Events for Prendick and the Reader

This interpretation of the relation between Prendick and the Leopard Man is analytically useful in another way, for it coincides with Freud's definition of the uncanny as "that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and long familiar":¹ in many cases, the "familiar and old-established" are infantile contents of the mind which have "become alienated from it...through the process of repression":² thus the uncanny often is "a return of this repressed content",³ in this case Prendick's denial of the irrational and animal side of his nature. Recall too, Prendick's assertion on seeing some of the Beast People dancing in a woodland glade, that the sight impressed him as one "of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest familiarity" (46).

²Ibid., p. 241.
³Ibid., p. 249. "[An] uncanny experience occurs either when infantile complexes which have been repressed are once more revived by some impression, or when primitive beliefs which have been surmounted seem once more to be confirmed." There is some crossover between these two factors, since for Freud childhood is the time when, in modern humans, "primitive" thought structures and beliefs are unquestioningly accepted.
Though the Leopard Man is a focus of the feeling, all Prendick's relations with the Beast Folk are tainted with this sense of the uncanny. Uncanny characteristics appear too in Prendick's vision of M'Ling leaning over the taffrail of the Ipecacuanha.

It looked over its shoulder quickly with my movement, then looked away again... The thing came to me as stark inhumanity. That black figure, with its eyes of fire, struck down through all my adult thoughts and feelings, and for a moment the forgotten horrors of childhood came back to my mind. The the effect passed as it had come... a figure of no particular importance... hung over the taffrail... (24-5).

Freud also notes that "the factor of the repetition of the same thing" can provoke uncanny sensations, so that while Prendick's sense of the uncanny is primarily stimulated by his encounters with the Beast Folk, the readers' is stimulated, by this too no doubt, but also by the massive repetition of incidents and details throughout the novel.

The M'Ling incident just quoted is a doubling, nearly exactly, of Prendick's encounter with the Leopard Man, which is itself repeated twice, and humourously redoubled in Prendick's meeting with the Ape Man (59-60), who regards himself as Prendick's equal. They are, says the Ape Man, two of the same kind, both having five fingers. In each of these encounters too, the uncanny sense is triggered by the beast's eyes locking with Prendick's as it glances at him over its shoulder. With M'Ling the "eyes of fire" recall "the forgotten horrors of childhood",
and with the Leopard Man Prendick spontaneously is put in mind of "a schoolboy expedient against big dogs" (50), which he uses to temporarily defeat it. Why such thoughts should recur in this context is not explained by Prendick, though it meshes well with Freud's notion that uncanny feelings may be provoked by the return of repressed infantile beliefs and feelings. The authority claimed by Davis--"I am the law and the prophets" (20)--is exactly the same as that actually exercised by Moreau. The ship could be seen as a doubling of the island's society, and it is possible to see Moreau as "intoxicated" with his own powers. Interestingly, the punishment Davis threatens to inflict on M'Ling is only what Moreau has already done; "If he comes this end of the ship again I'll cut his insides out, I tell you. Cut out his blasted insides! Who are you to tell me what I'm to do?" (20). Note too that the language of authority doubles as the language of rebellion. Desiring to rid himself of a potential trouble-maker, Prendick forces a confrontation between himself and the Hyena-Swine. "I was perhaps a dozen seconds collecting myself. Then I cried: 'Salute! Bow down!' His teeth flashed upon me in a snarl. 'Who are you, that I should...' Perhaps a little too spasmodically, I drew my revolver, aimed, and quickly fired" (125). The hunting of Prendick, twice, is repeated in the hunting of the Leopard Man, and in two of the three incidents the hunts are precipitated by a visit of Moreau to the village of the Beast Folk, are in fact instigated by
Moreau for his own purposes. The disaster that precipitates the collapse of the island's society is a double of the disaster that ended Moreau's investigations in England, in each case a flayed victim of his having escaped from his laboratory. In the one instance Moreau is animalistically "howled out of the country" (38) and in the other he is actually killed by the Beast People. Montgomery too is an outcast from society (or so he calls himself), a victim, and he implies that he was exiled for committing one of the large class of "victimless" crimes, that is, guilty of a breach of morality. Indeed, legally speaking, Moreau had committed no crime either.  

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*Prendick's nephew dates the action of the tale from February 1887 to January 1888 and Montgomery asserts that he and Moreau have spent a decade on the island (115). This dates Moreau's flight from England to c. 1876. In "real" historical time, during that year and several previous there was a great flurry of activity on the part of the Society for the Protection of Animals Liable to Vivisection (founded 1875) which culminated in a Royal Commission (July-December 1875) and the passage of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 (British Government Documents [hereafter BGD], 1876 (168), I, p. 523). The Royal Commission, whose membership included Huxley, and which summoned Darwin and Lister--along with an inordinate number of clergymen--as witnesses, noted in its summing up (BGD, 1876 (C. 1397), XLI, pp. 277ff.) that "a very strong feeling has been excited in the country, within the last two or three years, on this subject" (284). By dating Moreau's flight to the passage of the new law, Wells again extends the novel into the world of the reader. The law provided for the licensing and inspection by the Home Office, of institutions and individuals practise animal experimentation. It is debateable whether someone such as Moreau is supposed to be would have been licensed, since, in the opinion of the Commission, the main questions of the issue all revolved about pain, and the use of anaesthetics. Wells' views on vivisection (at least his views in 1927) may be found in Vincent Brome Six Studies in Quarrelling (London: Cresset Press, 1958), pp. 21-6; the quarrel was with Shaw.
Only the "conscience of the nation" (38) was outraged, not its laws. Prendick is twice cast away in a small open boat, at the mercy of chance and the elements, and at the book's end he once again, voluntarily, commits himself to the ocean. The tendency to repetition in the descriptive passages has already been noted, as has the frequently hidden stance of the narrator and his continuing uncertainty as to what is animal (purely) and human (purely). From whatever perspective the tale is viewed it has uncanny effects and the doubling Freud speaks of as provoking one's perception of the uncanny here seems to be a phenomenon related to, perhaps even of the same kind, as the repetition which may also contribute to uncanny sensations.

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5In his discussion of doubling in "The Uncanny", Freud, working from the tales of E. T. A. Hoffman, speaks mostly of automata taking the role of the hero's double. In the case of Moreau the same doubt that attaches to Hoffman's "dolls", whether or not they are human, is easily transferred to the Beast Folk.
VIII. Moreau compared to The Time Machine

At this point in the argument I feel I ought to stop for a moment and try to assess its progress so far. The most obvious fact is that from a consideration of Prendick's "character" I have detoured considerably into explorations of narrative structure and texture; these seem to be confused and dreamlike, in a word, to be uncanny. Indeed, in support of the dream-like state of the narrative I can cite no less an authority than Wells himself. In the Preface to the 1933 omnibus edition of his scientific romances he says, "They are all fantasies; they do not aim to project a serious possibility; they aim indeed only at the same amount of conviction as one gets in a good gripping dream. They have to hold the reader by art and illusion and not by proof and argument, and the moment he closes the cover and reflects he wakes up to their impossibility."¹ The equation of "dream and fantasy" to "art and illusion" may be accidental, but it is resonant with suggestion, as is the inference that reading the tales is like being asleep, one is not fully conscious and afterwards one "wakes up". Then too, the statement deals only with the novels considered unreal as plots. That dream may have its own reasons unknown to reason, what Angus Fletcher calls the

¹Wells, Scientific Romances, p. vii.
magical causation of allegory,² is a possibility Wells here neither confirms nor denies. He does say, however, that "the fantastic element, the strange property or the strange world, is used only to throw up and intensify our natural reactions of wonder, fear, perplexity."³ In other words, the fantastic is as much a subject as the hero, representative nineteenth century Man. The Island of Dr. Moreau is thus clearly based on a "model" similar to that of The Time Machine, but the distinctions which are so clear in the earlier text are here all collapsed into one another. In dealing with the later novel one feels in one's analysis as much uncertainty as a Prendick blundering his way through the undergrowth of Noble's Island.

A further major difference between the two is the fate of their heroes. While both are faced with mysteries which threaten their emotional integrity, the Time Traveller at the last maintains a firmer grip on himself than does Prendick. Neither Prendick nor the Traveller "solve" their mysteries (or even resolve them) since neither is prepared to fully acknowledge that the mysteries belong to their psyches. But the Traveller's regaining of his time machine signals a renewed ability to distance the problem, even as the pessimistic apocalypse which follows his escape validates such a solution. Having journeyed

²Fletcher, op cit., p. 182.
³Wells, Scientific Romances, p. vii.
to the end of time the Traveller knows that all possible decisions and choices and actions have the same end: death. If he wishes to then, the Traveller may easily avoid any self-realizations which his sojourn in the world of 802,701 AD has offered him. Failing to convince his contemporaries of the truth of his vision the Traveller again uses the time machine to distance himself from the problems their refusal might create. Then too, the Morlocks and Eloi, though clearly the "descendants" of the Traveller are yet physically distinct enough from him to be perceived as an external problem. The Traveller's tale too is set in a wholly fantastic landscape, again allowing distancing. Prendick's setting, however, is a naturalistically rendered Pacific island and this proves much more difficult to escape from. Not only is Prendick unable to distance himself in space from the problem—for the Beast folk roam freely over the whole island—he is therefore equally unable to escape the pressures contingent upon living with the now human, now animal Beast Folk. His eventual "escape" to civilization only aggravates his condition.

I would go out into the streets to fight with my delusion, and prowling women would mew after me, furtive craving men glance jealously at me, weary pale workers go coughing by me...like wounded deer dripping blood...I would turn aside, into some chapel, and even there, such was my disturbance, it seemed the preacher gibbered Big Thinks even as the Ape Man had done... Particularly nauseous were the blank expressionless faces of people in trains and omnibuses; they seemed no more my fellow creatures than dead bodies would be...And even it seemed that I, too, was not a reasonable creature, but only an
animal with some strange disorder...that sent it to
wander alone like a sheep stricken with the gid (141)."  

There is another, technical reason that Prendick is more
shackled to the inscrutable problem of self, in that the functions
of the Time Traveller (and the professional group of which he is
a leading member) are split in the later novel between Prendick
and Moreau. True, Prendick has some scientific training, but as
Moreau disparagingly remarks, while he himself has been seeking
"this world's Maker" through vivisection, "you, I understand,
have been collecting butterflies" (80-1). The mechanical
competence of the Traveller, his drive for mastery--knowledge as
power--and his sadism are apportioned to Moreau, while his
hysteria, and the limited viewpoint of the professionals fall to
Prendick's lot. Yet it is precisely those limitations which make
the story, which frame it. Who could doubt that, told from
Moreau's point of view the whole tale would be as mundane and
matter-of-fact as chapter fourteen, "Doctor Moreau Explains"? Like the Traveller, Moreau shows himself aware of a mysterious
dimension to his endeavours, but he rejects any intimate
connection with it; his explanation recalls, both in his
monologuing and in Prendick's questions and observations, the

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*This passage has a double on p. 91: "I would see one of the
clumsy bovine creatures who worked the launch...and find myself
asking, trying hard to recall, how he differed from some really
human yokel trudging home from his labours; or I would meet the
Fox-Bear Woman's vulpine, shifty face, strangely human in its
speculative cunning, and even imagine I had met it before in
some city by-way."
after-dinner debate of The Time Machine.

Prendick shares with the professionals of that novel a tendency to want to leave well enough alone. About Montgomery's past misdemeanours, for example, he is "sensible of a growing curiosity" (22) only in so far as Montgomery encourages investigation; when he is rebuffed, Prendick quickly rationalizes the situation, finally declaring, "to tell the truth, I was not curious to learn what might have driven a young medical student out of London. I have an imagination" (24). Nor is Prendick as "intelligent" as the Traveller in unravelling the mystery. Though within hours of his landing on the island he realizes that Montgomery's "luggage" is the raw material for the experiments of the "notorious vivisector" Moreau (39), still he manages to convince himself that the doctor is transforming men into animals. However, this might be more charitably ascribed to Prendick's similarity to the Traveller, both refusing to allow knowledge to blunt their emotional preferences. If for the scientist-hero knowledge is power, or mystery, then knowledge being subordinate to these emotionally charged goals would make the animal side of his nature even more ferocious; rationality, far from being a defense against irrationality, only aggravates it, feeds it with power and makes it harder to control. Hence too the paradox that though Prendick and the Time Traveller know what is going on, they are still impotent, unable to do anything about it.
IX. The Character of Montgomery

Given this, it is easy to see that Montgomery too is little more than a sketchy imitation of a character, developed as much as need be in the opening chapters and thereafter exhibiting, not so much traits as affinities. The method Wells uses to fill out Montgomery's character is more assertive than dramatic, that is, not shown in action but developed directly from narrative statements. These assertions come chiefly from Prendick, and even where Montgomery himself makes assertions that may be taken to indicate character, these are generally given in dialogue with Prendick, often in response to a similar assertion from the latter. "I told him my name, Edwin Prendick, and how I had taken

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I don't think that Montgomery's drunkenness qualifies as a character trait. It would be more accurate to say that it indicates a possibility of character that is never fully developed in the narrative. That is, it says to the reader, here is a man who has problems enough to take to drink. These problems are hinted at, for example his student misdemeanours, but never stated.

As to the mysterious nature of those misdemeanours, a number of clues point to a tentative solution. Montgomery speaks of Moreau's having "got me off" (40), which sounds as though Montgomery was arrested for his having "lost my head for ten minutes on a foggy night" (24). Since it is hardly likely he would have been arrested for drinking, or for hiring a prostitute--and note that he later speaks of his "shabby vice--a blunder--I didn't know any better" (115)--and since in the At. Ed. Preface to Moreau (ix) Wells refers to the trial of Oscar Wilde, it seems possible that Montgomery's is more a "moral" than a legal offense, a homosexual "crime".
to natural history as a relief from the dullness of my comfortable independence. He seemed interested in this. 'I've done some science myself--I did my Biology at University College--getting out the ovary of the earthworm and the radula of the snail and all that. But go on, go on--tell me about the boat.'" (13). This is an example, somewhat diluted, of a kind of characterization which I would call the leap-frog method. An assertion is made of one character, his or her personal history, or a statement of likes and dislikes, and this is then altered and applied to a second complementary or contrasting character. Thus each character is grounded on the other and neither need be extensively defined by "motivating" factors. The alterations may be, as is the case with Prendick and Montgomery, quite slight, intending to establish a similarity of backgrounds or interests held in common, or it may establish quite a large variation, in which case the character building proceeds from contrast.²

²From the writing point of view such a method is extremely economical, especially if the plot and narrative of any particular work are thought of (by the author) as more important than the delineation of "personalities".

A curious example of the method may be found in Willa Cather's Death Comes For The Archbishop, where the characters of Latour and Vaillant are developed in precisely this manner and are actively contrasted with one another. Latour is thin, well-spoken and has fine aesthetic sensibilities, whereas Vaillant is short and stout, blunt in manner and has the aesthetic sensibilities of a stone. I call this a curious example because the book has no real plot or narrative and is suppositiously a drama of personality, even though the "personalities" are manifestly flat. The two clerics are, I think, meant together to form one complete "Man of God", thus
Preridick's assertions about Montgomery's character are of several kinds, though they of course all share the intention of defining it for the reader. In the first kind, the statements are used to provide Montgomery with a set of reactions, so as to fill in potential blanks in given scenes. Consider, for instance, Montgomery's squabble with Davis, in the course of which Preridick observes, "I think Montgomery might have left him then-seeing the brute was drunk. But he only turned a shade paler, and followed the captain to the bulwarks...I could see that Montgomery had one of those slow pertinacious tempers that will warm day after day to white heat and never again cool to forgiveness, and I saw too that this quarrel had been some time growing" (19). A sharp observation, one that makes the sudden eruption of tempers more believable, except that Wells never again makes anything of it, though by ratiocination the reader might. The captain is in a sense, as I said above, a double of Moreau, and Montgomery here is shown in outright rebellion against such authority. He is also shown as passionate, but

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2 (cont'd) their ideological locations supercede all other concerns. See also David and Mary-Anne Stouck, "Hagiographical Style in Willa Cather's Death Comes For The Archbishop", Univ. of Toronto Quarterly, 41 (1972), pp. 263-87.

3 In the At. Ed. (V. II) text of Moreau, p. 15, Wells changed this to "I could see that Montgomery had an ugly temper, and I saw too that this quarrel had been some time growing." Though the phrasing is toned down, the inconsistency, of Preridick's mere ability to speak on the subject of Montgomery's character, remains.
consciously reining in his passions. It would be possible, on these bases to assert that Montgomery, like Prendick, is an habitually repressed character. But to say so would be to rely too much on my own inferences rather than on Wells' statements. The assertion then, is primarily useful in heightening the drama of the encounter between Montgomery and the captain. A similar assertion is made about Montgomery's drunkenness which, though it has credibility, is again mostly useful in precipitating the final catastrophe, the burning of the boats that forces Prendick's imprisonment on the island.

A second kind of assertion Prendick makes is used to suggest Montgomery's close alliance to the central mystery of the novel. From the reader's point of view, it seems unlikely that the novel could contain more than one mystery. Once the air of mystery is invoked, and associated with Montgomery, any other events not immediately explicable become for the reader both additions to the mysterious atmosphere and clues towards the unravelling of the puzzle. Montgomery is allied to a mystery while both he and Prendick are still shipboard, before the dimensions of the riddle have been even hinted. As the two talk "on the quarter-deck" (22) Prendick says "[all] the time the strangeness of him was shaping itself in my mind, and as I

4See n. 1, present chapter.

5Exactly the same argument could be made about the Time Traveller's unravelling of the mystery of The Time Machine.
talked I peered at his odd, pallid face in the dim light of the binacle behind me. Then I looked out at the darkling sea, where in the dimness his little island was hidden" (23). Thinking next of the cargo of animals, and of M'Ling, Prendick adds, these "threw a haze of mystery around the man. They laid hold of my imagination and hampered my tongue."

Closely related to this deliberate mystification is the way in which Montgomery's saving Prendick's life is ascribed (by Montgomery) to "Chance...just chance...If I'd been jaded that day, or hadn't like your face, well--; it's a curious question where you would have been now" (23). Chance suggests events happening outside the control of humans. It does not suggest that events are totally causeless, simply that the causes cannot be grasped, either by common sense, or by Prendick's reasonings. It therefore again allies Montgomery to the novel's mystery.

Montgomery's attitude towards Moreau is, like Prendick's, one of dislike. When the animals are off-loaded Moreau says '"I'm itching to get to work again--with this new stuff'...His eyes grew brighter. 'I daresay you are', said Montgomery, in anything but a cordial tone" (35). The complement of this dislike is precisely what one would expect, a sympathy with Moreau's victims, the animals about to be transformed. A few minutes after the altercation with Moreau, Prendick hears, "through the locked door [to the enclosure] the noise of the staghounds, which had now been brought up from the beach. They
were not barking, but sniffing and growling in a curious fashion. I could hear the rapid patter of their feet, and Montgomery's voice soothing them" (37). This sympathy extends to meddling in the affairs of the Beast Folk, to which both Moreau and Prendick testify. In his "explanation" Moreau tells Prendick that "There is a kind of travesty of humanity over there. Montgomery knows about it, for he interferes in their affairs. He has trained one or two of them to our service. He's ashamed of it, but I believe he half-likes some of these beasts...They only sicken me with a sense of failure" (85). A short while after this interview Prendick says "I fancied even then that he [Montgomery] had a sneaking kindness for some of these metamorphosed brutes, a vicious sympathy with some of their ways..." (90). This "fancy" within a short time hardens into a certainty. "My first friendship with Montgomery did not increase. His long separation from humanity, his secret vice of drunkenness, his evident sympathy with the Beast-People, tainted him to me. Several times I let him go alone among them. I avoided intercourse with them in every possible way" (106).  

Yet during this same period, as habit deadens his first terrified reaction to the vivisection of the animals and he

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6One wonders how Prendick could possibly prevent Montgomery from going among the Beast Folk, since the latter has been doing so for years, and totally alone. It occurs to me to suspect that Prendick is here emphasizing his own being left alone when Montgomery walks with the Beasts.
loses, like Montgomery, "every feeling but dislike and abhorence for these infamous experiments of Moreau's" (106), Prendick in fact comes more in action to resemble Montgomery, though he himself seems not to recognize this. After the death of Moreau, Montgomery, whom Prendick describes at this point as "almost sober", begins to speculate on (essentially) the implications of the narrative itself.

'This silly ass of a world,' he said. 'What a muddle it all is! I haven't had any life. I wonder when it's going to begin. Sixteen years being bullied by nurses and schoolmasters at their own sweet will, five in London grinding hard at medicine--bad food, shabby lodgings, shabby clothes, shabby vice--a blunder--I didn't know any better--and hustled off to this beastly island. Ten years here! What's it all for Prendick? Are we bubbles blown by a baby?'

It was hard to deal with such ravings.'

But given Montgomery's affinity to the Beast Folk, and their close similarity to humans generally, I think it fair to claim that the statement is only a more particular version of Prendick's earlier generalized depiction of the lot of the Beast Folk.

The indications given here of Montgomery's social class, though slight, tend to confirm his similarity to Prendick. Like Prendick a son of the bourgeoisie, he is provided in youth (c. 1852-60) with nurses, later (1860-72) with schooling, and later still (1872-77) with money enough to go to medical school. Montgomery's seemingly contradictory statements, "bad food, shabby lodgings", etc., may be interpreted either as an emotionally coloured memory correlated with "shabby vice", that is, with the memory of the vice degrading the other components of the memory, or as an erruption into the narrative of Wells' own experiences as a student at London University (1884-87). See Wells, Ex. Aut., chapter five, and the MacKenzie, op cit., chapter four.
A strange persuasion came upon me that...I had here the whole balance of human life in miniature, the whole interplay of instinct, reason, and fate, in its simplest form...I had not thought before of the pain and trouble that came to these poor victims after they had passed from Moreau's hands. I had shivered only at the days of actual torment in the enclosure. But now that seemed to be the lesser part. Before, they had been beasts, their instincts fitly adapted to their surroundings, and as happy as living things may be. Now they stumbled in the shackles of humanity, lived in a fear that never died, fretted by a law they could not understand; their mock-human existence began in agony, was one long internal struggle, one long dread of Moreau—and for what? It was the wantonness that stirred me (103-4).

The rising note of hysteria discernible in the last two sentences becomes even more pronounced when Prendick considers Moreau's apparent lack of motivation, and he recapitulates the condition of the Beast Folk in stronger terms. "I must confess," he then adds, "I lost faith in the sanity of the world when I saw it suffering the painful disorder of this island" (104). Building from this Prendick then inflates his explanation to still grander proportions, in the process implicitly exculpating Moreau;

A blind fate, a vast pitiless mechanism seemed to cut and shape the fabric of existence, and I, Moreau (by his passion for research), Montgomery (by his passion for drink), the Beast People, with their instincts and mental restrictions, were torn and crushed, ruthlessly, inevitably, amid the infinite complexities of its incessant wheels (104-5).

This is only to pose as a question, at greater length and more philosophically, Montgomery's exact intuition, "Are we bubbles
This is what I meant by Montgomery's tendency to exhibit, from the reader's point of view, not so much actual traits as affinities. To the extent that they are doubles, the denominators for the affinity of Montgomery and Prendick to one another are their similar class and education backgrounds, and their ambivalent attitudes to Moreau and his works; Moreau himself reinforces this last similarity (82, 83). On the one hand the experiments fill them with disgust, yet on the other they are quite prepared to ignore the sadism if it is adequately concealed. When this is impractical, both are equally willing to take up pistol and whip and, under the plea of necessity, preserve the power structure that places born humans over the made ones.

Where Prendick and Montgomery diverge is in their attitudes toward the Beast People. While Montgomery is perfectly willing to mix with them, going so far as to train "one or two of them to... service" (85), Prendick attempts to maintain a rigid apartheid, and while he "distrusts and dreads" Moreau, acts himself as a similar kind of authority. I would say then that Prendick and Montgomery show affinity for one another, Prendick

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*It's worth noting, I think, that Prendick's bout of philosophizing immediately follows his murder of the Leopard Man, thus, the inflated rhetoric has a possible secondary effect of excusing any residual blame that may attach to this action, ie, "It's not me, it's the way of the world".

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leaning more to the authoritarian rationalism of Moreau, Montgomery toward the more loosely bound community of the Beast Folk.
X. The Character of Moreau

In purely physical terms Moreau is present in the novel much less than Montgomery and yet his presence pervades the entire work. Even after his death his influence, largely through Prendick's hastily constructed theology, continues to be felt. The amount of control Moreau exercises over Montgomery, whom he has also in a sense transformed (from a disgraced medical student to Moreau's amanuensis and "one with a whip") is very great. "He was almost sober" Prendick says of Montgomery a few hours after the doctor's death, "but greatly disturbed in his mind. He had been strangely under the influence of Moreau's personality. I do not think it had even occurred to him that Moreau could die... he talked vaguely, answered my questions crookedly, wandered into general questions" (115). Moreau's influence over the Beast Folk is best exemplified in the Law which he uses to control them, but the Law Itself, merely "a long list of prohibitions" (65), is not so interesting as the assertion of the power that buttresses it:

"His is the House of Pain."
"His is the Hand that makes."
"His is the Hand that wounds."
"His is the Hand that heals."

The image of the awesome hand appears in two other Wells stories of this period, "The Plattner Story" and "Under The Knife". In both the appearance has religious overtones, and in

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...'His is the Lightning Flash,' we sang, 'His is the deep salt sea.'

A horrible fancy came into my head that Moreau had infected their dwarfed brains with a deification of himself... 'His are the stars in the sky.' (55-6)

In the theocratic society of the Beast Folk, the social order is perceived as fixed and natural, determined by the creator (Moreau), and as Prendick correctly observes, Moreau's power over the Beast Folk is from their point of view godlike, he is both creator and upholder of the social and natural orders. Yet even Montgomery, who shares to some extent in this divine status, never believes, not that Moreau might die—for like all men he must—but that Moreau can die; the difference is crucial since it means that Montgomery too allows Moreau the power of a god. It is possible to say, therefore, that Moreau's presence pervades the novel because he is its "author", and as the inhabitants of the island are wholly his creation—"in each Moreau...blended this animal with that" (134)—so they may be thought of as extensions of him, and hence nearly all the events on the narrative level lead back to him, whether or not he is present at any given event.

At the heart of the narrative is Moreau's chapter of "explanation", which motivates the story by creating the doctor, but which supplies no motivation for his actions. In this way

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1 (cont'd)"Plattner", possibly satiric overtones too. The tale may be read as "a caricature of the Puritan hereafter" (Mason Harris, lecture on Moreau, SFU, March 1979.)
Moreau is not, like Montgomery, simply allied to the central mystery of the novel, but is that mystery; or at any rate is so representative of that mystery as to be easily mistaken for it. Prendick's attempts to fix on a motivation for Moreau are not (for himself) finally satisfactory and it is hinted that it is this lack of explanation at the activating centre of all the novel's consequences, the "wantonness" of things, which ultimately unbalances Prendick's mind. His last precarious sanity is only possible through passivity, abasing himself before "the vast and eternal laws of matter...[for] there it must be, I think...that whatever is more than animal within us must find its solace and its hope" (141-2). Yet this posture is at bottom no different than Moreau's self-identification with nature (81). There seems no way for Prendick to circumvent this contradiction of an unmoved first mover, except to note its existence.

For the reader, some other possibilities remain. The explanatory terms attached by Prendick to his horror-struck realization of the doctor's "wantonness", that the doctor is driven by "curiosity", are suggestive and substantially in agreement with Moreau's own explanation, that he is driven on by his "intellectual passions", by "the strange colourless delight of these intellectual desires" (81); Prendick calls Moreau "mad, aimless", "driven", and "irresponsible", his objects "unintelligible" (104). This leads to an interpretation of
Moreau's character as that of a man obsessed or even insane, so consumed by one aspect of his possible nature that he is unbalanced. But though there is little doubt that Wells wishes to present Moreau as obsessed, it is doubtful that this is the sum of the characterization.

On most occasions the doctor speaks perfectly good sense, as can be deduced from Wells' having compounded Moreau's curious "explanation" out of the only slightly amended texts of two of his own articles of scientific journalism, speculations on the limits of surgical manipulation and the evolutionary "function" of pain. Moreau's explanation of "moral education", for example, as "an artificial modification and perversion of instinct...pugnacity [being] trained into courageous self-sacrifice, and suppressed sexuality into religious emotion" (79) is a direct quote from one of the articles and, though differently worded the same thought appears in a later magazine.

\[2^\text{H. G. Wells, "The Limits of Individual Plasticity" and "The Province of Pain", both in Philmus and Hughes (Eds.), op cit, respectively pp. 36-9 and pp. 194-9. "Plasticity" first appeared in the Saturday Review, 79 (19 Jan. 1895), pp. 89-90, and "Pain" in Science and Art, 8 (Feb. 1894), pp. 58-9. Both are contemporary with the writing of Moreau, for which see West, op cit., pp. 96-7. "By the time the first installment [of The Time Machine] appeared he was already at work upon...The Island of Dr. Moreau." The MacKenzie, op cit., p. 107, date the first draft to after Wells had left Sevenoaks, which together with Wells' statements in Ex. Aut., pp. 436-7, suggests a terminus a quo of September 1894.}\n
\[3^\text{"Plasticity", Philmus and Hughes, p. 39.}\]
article, "Human Evolution, An Artificial Process". There, distinguishing two factors in human evolution, the natural and the artificial, Wells claims that "what we call Morality becomes the padding of suggested emotional habits necessary to keep the round Palaeolithic savage in the square hole of the civilized state. And Sin is the conflict of the two factors... [This] new view... provides a novel definition of Education, which obviously should be the careful and systematic manufacture of the artificial in man." Moreau's being allowed sentiments shared by Wells in all seriousness with a large magazine audience rather reduces the possibility of his using those same sentiments to characterize Moreau as insane.

The other statements Moreau makes about himself are not much less ambiguous, for instance his claim to have a strongly religious cast of mind and his claiming to possess an ideal sanity. There may be a more plausible explanation for Moreau's actions but it is hidden to a large extent from Prendick and may therefore only be approached obliquely by the reader.

In context these statements act to impress upon the reader

4Ibid., p. 217. Article reprinted from Fortnightly Review, n.s. 60 (Oct. 1896), pp. 590-95. This article was the first of two parts, the second of which, "Morals and Civilization", FR, n.s. 61 (Feb. 1897), pp. 263-68, figures in a minor way in Wells' The War of the Worlds.

5Moreau links these claims: "I am a religious man, Prendick, as every sane man must be", and he says that his entire work has been a search for the laws of "this world's maker" (81).
and Prendick a sense of Moreau's general competency: "Presently" says Prendick, as Moreau convinces him of the folly of his actions, "I found myself hot with shame at out mutual positions" (76). This quality, together with the general air of power attributed to Moreau through the use of such epithets as "massive", "concise", "resolute", "broad-shouldered", "powerfully built...with a fine forehead", "an expression of pugnacious resolution", reinforces his authority.

Moreau's status as controlling authority also explains why the Beast people remain human, not only after he has left off direct surgical manipulation of them, but also after he dies. Arbitrary authority, vested in Moreau, rather than any personality indwelling in the Beast Folk themselves, is the major binding force of the community of Beast People. That authority once gone, the community begins to erode away. It is a moot point, however, whether the erosion is a result of the withdrawal of authority, or whether it is caused by Prendick's tardy and incomplete attempts to reassert authority. For Prendick, as for Moreau, the self-ness of the Beast Folk can only be bestial. The day after Moreau's "explanation", Prendick speaks with Montgomery on this subject. "In particular, I was urgent to know how these inhuman monsters were kept from falling

The doctor seems skilled in his manipulation of this particular emotion, in the animals (83, 98-9), in Prendick, supra, and in his capitalizing on Montgomery's youthful "blunder" (40, 115).
upon Moreau and Montgomery, and from rending one another" (87); Moreau himself has earlier told Prendick that he "sees through" all the culture of the Beast People, sees "into their very souls, and [sees] there nothing but the souls of beasts, beasts that perish—anger, and the lusts to live and gratify themselves" (85). Prendick has focussed on this, apparently ignoring Moreau's following statement that they are "odd [and] complex, like everything else alive. There is a kind of upward striving in them..." (85). Pearing their assertions of independence (123-30), Prendick nips in the bud—with a "manly lie" (130)—the beginings of their individuation.

At the beginning of chapter twenty-one, "The reversion of the Beast Folk", Prendick awakes to find himself alone with the Dog Man, who promptly brings him up to date on events. The other Beast Folk, says the Dog Man,

are mad. They are fools...They say, 'The Master is dead; the Other with the Whip is dead. That Other who walked in the Sea is—as we are. We have no Master, no Whips, no House of Pain any more. There is an end. We love the Law, and will keep it; but there is no pain, no Master, no Whips for ever again!'" (128-9).

Prendick's apprehensions are further increased, when, walking over to them "[none] about the fire attempted to salute me" (130). Acting on his earlier belief, that Moreau "had infected their dwarfed brains with a...deification of himself" (65), Prendick tells the Beast Folk that Moreau, though invisible, still watches them and that the "Master and the House of Pain
will come again. Woe be to him who breaks the Law!" (130). Making sure that the Beast Folk are aware of his power to wound them with his hatchet, Prendick answers doubts which they raise. "In the course of about an hour I had really convinced several of the Beast Folk of the truth of my assertions, and talked most of the others into a dubious state" (130). The desire of the Beast Folk to keep the Law even though Moreau is "gone" marks the start of possibly a more human existence. By attempting to resurrect the authority of Moreau in himself via a concocted religion, Prendick may assure the eventual degeneration of the Beast Folk into mere beasts.

The theology which Prendick improvises after Moreau's death, therefore, is not far from the true state of affairs. If the authority wielded by Moreau could be kept active, then Prendick's claims, that he is the Master (129), that "Even now he [Moreau] watches us...even now he listens above..." (130), would be the truth. However, Prendick misses his opportunity; "Had I kept my courage up to the level of the dawn [123-5], had I not allowed it to ebb away in solitary thought, I might have grasped the vacant sceptre of Moreau, and ruled over the Beast People" (127). In terms of my previous argument, that the characters exhibit affinities rather than traits, I would say that the postulation of Moreau as the novel's central authority mostly removes the contradictions I found earlier in his apparent absence of motivation, the accumulation of actions that
still does not account for his actions. As such an authority he would not show any affinities since he (and affinity to him) defines the interactions of all the others.  

A last point in analysing Moreau remains, one already touched upon briefly in chapter five of the present paper, his exaltation of pure rationality. As part of his "explanation" Moreau says more (than I have yet examined) about himself, and more too about the nature of the universe. When he calls himself "a religious man" and says that he has "sought the laws of this world's maker all my life" (80), the two sets of explanation overlap, as they do again a few sentences later. "To this day" he says, "I have never troubled about the ethics of the matter. The study of Nature makes a man at last as remorseless as Nature" (81). Thus it seems that the origin of Moreau's god-like authority lies in his own self-identification "with this world's maker", with god.

Functionally, therefore, Moreau acts, as a character, like the unstated but clearly visible structuring notion in The Time Machine, the common centre to which all the characters in that novel tumble. This centre of gravity may be thought of as a notion of a culture of doers, men of action, professionals. These later appear, scarcely altered, as the technocrats who usher in the millenium in Wells' various later utopias. The Time Traveller is the epitome of this culture and, for the purposes of the story, representative nineteenth century man. Thus, though the professionals are bound to reject his tale because it subverts their value structure, nevertheless it develops clearly from that same value structure. In Moreau the doctor is therefore the centre of the novel's valorization.

This is only an implicit claim on Moreau's part, and seems to work thus: "I seek the world's Maker, Nature's Creator and
The process goes so far as to enable Moreau to claim that he no longer compassionates for his victims at all. Become as remorseless as nature he is become nothing but natural law, pure rationality totally divorced from animality. "The thing before you is no longer an animal, a fellow-creature, but a problem. Sympathetic pain—all I know of it I remember as a thing I used to suffer from years ago" (81). Indeed, throughout his "physiological lecture" (76), Moreau repeatedly stresses his own emancipation from pains and pleasures: "The store men and women set on pleasure and pain, Prendick, is the mark of the beast upon them, the mark of the beast from which they came...[and] they are for us, only so long as we wriggle in the dust" (81). Though in this rarefied condition he is free to pursue his experimental course, his very concept of the human ironically guarantees the failure of his quest. Admitting that human beings still show "the marks of the beast", he yet wishes to create humans who have this essential component "burned out" of them.

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8 (cont'd) Upholder; I imitate his natural processes; I have become thereby as remorseless as Nature; the Maker operates according to his own Laws and if I as a Maker also operate according to those Laws then I am like the Maker; in fact, within the boundaries of my island, I am Nature." It seems unlikely that, absorbed in his work, Moreau consciously recognizes this process of rationalization, but rather simply operates as if it were fact, which emotionally of course, it is. Notice too that, following the line of thought a little further, the distinction between "this world's maker" as creator and Moreau as sub-creator may be erased if the products of the two become indistinguishable; hence Moreau's emphasis on the necessity of aesthetic conviction which his "humans" must produce in him before he will acknowledge them as truly human.
Of his first man he says, "It remembered me and was terrified beyond imagination...The more I looked at it the clumsier it seemed, until at last I put the monster out of its misery" (81-2). Remembering its painful origins, the creature is unable to move beyond these memories and accordingly can never achieve Moreau's ideal of transcendence.

I assume here that Moreau's quest is other than what he states. Though he says that "[what] I wanted--it was the only thing I wanted--[was] to find out the extreme limit of plasticity in a living shape" (81), what in fact he pursues is an idealized human image. He speaks elsewhere of certain animals being better than others for "man-making" (82) and of "cravings instincts [and] desires that harm humanity... anger, hate, or fear" (84), which he is powerless to nullify in the process of creating his humans. "But I will conquer yet" he says. "Each time I dip a living creature into a bath of burning pain, I say, This time I will burn out all the animal, this time I will make a rational creature of my own" (84). The ideal is to alienate the creature from its own animal origins by massive doses of "therapeutic" pain (even creative pain) and this must fail for "it remembered me, and was terrified". The use of pain,
which Moreau understands only through old memories, actually strengthens that "something I cannot touch, somewhere—-I cannot determine where—in the seat of the emotions...a strange hidden reservoir [that will] burst suddenly and inundate the whole creature with anger, hate, or fear" (84). 11

Divorced from emotion himself, Moreau can only deal with it in his creations through the imposition of a rigid code of laws. He denies complicity in having formulated the Law, possibly because, being a series of prohibitions of "acts of folly", "the maddest, most impossible and most indecent things one could well imagine" (65), it recognizes the power of that which he attempts to eradicate. 12 Moreau's emphatic sadism, his desires to master and possess, link him to the Time Traveller, and show clearly that the ideal human he seeks to create is a double of himself, one who will be emancipated from animality, from pleasures and pains alike. This is what I meant when I said earlier that

11 It is noteworthy that in a conversation with Prendick and Montgomery, the Ape Man reveals what apparently have been dinned into the Beast Folk as traits quintessentially human, that "You [Montgomery] never bleed nor weep. The Master does not bleed or weep" (94). In its immediate context the point is that Prendick, having done both these things, must be a Beast Folk, or so the Ape Man reasons. In a wider, critical context, the point is that Moreau's definition of humanity is a denial of fleshly reality—perhaps related, through their shared sadism, to the Time Traveller's flesh revulsion—and a denial of the emotions; the absence of which two things would result in an extremely repressed kind of human being.

12 This is a truism of historical studies, that where one finds abundant and repeated prohibition of a certain act, say, usury, the "crime" is endemic.
Moreau by choice excludes himself from humanity. His self-identification with god, with the "laws" of nature, is at bottom identical with his claim not to feel emotion, though in so far as he takes pleasure in his work (35, 81) and feels the lesser pain of repeated failure to realize his ambition (84), his claims are a sham. His misapprehension of himself reflects the confusion that exists elsewhere in the narrative, and feeds into the major crux of the novel; what is distinctively human, what is distinctively animal? If one can for a moment accept that Wells intended Moreau to appear unbalanced, obsessive, then his lack of motivation and the irrationality that exists in him without any lessening of rational control again add to this fundamental ambiguity. In the end, Moreau's ruthless search for the means to create "a rational creature of my own" is pursued as violently as anything the humans may have to fear from the Beast Folk bursting the bounds of the Law. The apotheosis of reason here results in a regime even more bestial than instinctual violence, for it must deny its own true, brutal nature in order to maintain its integrity.
XI. Allegory and the Beast Folk

Since, in one connection or another, nearly everything I intended to say about the Beast People has already been said, the chance here to analyse their collective character also affords an opportunity to recall some stages in my line of argument. To begin with, I said that the Beast People share with the humans a capability either for reason or bestiality and too have a kind of self-ness, related to their human characteristics. It was, I found, difficult to justify these perceptions by recourse to specific quotations and for that reason I called the bond between humans and Beast Folk an unarticulated one. A closer examination of the texture of the narrative, however, shows that Wells' chosen techniques, emphasizing noise, aural confusion, and reducing the visual component to a "green confusion", correlates with Prendick's frequently confused and dream-like state of mind, and operates to reduce the distance Prendick assumes exists between Beast People and humans. This gap narrows to vanishing in Prendick's encounters with the Leopard Man, and in analysing those encounters I defined that perception of the strange self-ness of the Beast Folk as a field/ground effect. This effect exists not only for Prendick, but also for the reader and bears a close
resemblance to Freud's definition of the uncanny. Some of the most important characteristics of the uncanny are, the appearance of doubles (autoscopy), "the repetition of the same thing", and the "repressed which returns."¹ These characteristics are present in Prendick's encounters with the Leopard Man, who is his shadow double, the darker side of his self released by Prendick's denial of his own animality; this process, I found, closely resembles the generation from the hero of the sub-characters of an allegory.

An examination of the novel in this light showed, throughout the work, a massive doubling of incidents and details. The doubling, if it is at all consciously done, acts functionally to blur the distinction between humans and animals. (Recall that as he shoots the Leopard Man, Prendick says he "realized...the fact of its humanity", the only context in which the Beast Folk's humanity is allowed by Prendick the status of fact.) This indistinctness is an insistent counterpoint to Prendick's contrary assertions, and the disjunction I felt between Prendick's commentary and the events of the story forced a realization that the Beast Folk are a manifest clue within the text to the whole latent structure of doubling.

It is in the field/ground effect too that the reader first begins to suspect that Prendick perhaps protests too much. I

have already cited several passages which show that in situations where it is possible for Prendick's emotions to usurp the reasonableness he values more highly, and for his emotions to control his behaviour in spite of his better intentions, they invariably do so. This he calls his imagination, his tendency to "mystification and suspicion" (40). In just such a situation, Prendick's first witnessing of the saying of the Law, a situation charged, moreover, by Prendick's mistaken belief that Moreau is hunting him to take him back to the "House of Pain", Prendick says this; "A kind of rhythmic fervour fell on all of us; we gabbled and swayed faster and faster, repeating this amazing law. Superficially, the contagion of these brute men was upon me, but deep down within me, laughter and disgust struggled together" (65). It is not clear whether the "laughter and disgust" echoing up from inside Prendick originates in his "real" (rational) self that despises and draws back from these hideous creatures, or comes from his "real" (animal) self which scorns and hates the Law itself. The immediate conditions surrounding this event do not clarify this, except to the extent that they are suggestively like those other occasions when Prendick's shadow side appears. Just before the passage above he says, "I could have imagined I was already dead and in another world", and just after says that "I could have fancied it [the
scene] was a dream" (65). This kind of statement tends to arouse the reader's suspicions of Prendergast's competency as observer, thus releasing the reader to reconstruct other connections between the Beast Folk and the humans. One ends up creating a range; starting from such degenerate Beast Folk as the Leopard Man, one moves next to the Beast Folk in general, then to Montgomery, to Prendergast and finally to Moreau, as if each grew out of the one previous and were indeed a developmental stage, an evolutionary way station.

Now the concept of the double, Freud notes in that same essay on "The Uncanny",

can receive fresh meaning from the later stages of the ego's development. A special agency is slowly formed there which is able to stand over against the rest of the ego, which has the function of observing and criticizing the self and of exercising a censorship within the mind and which we become aware of as our conscience. In the pathological case of delusions of being watched, this mental agency becomes isolated, dissociated from the ego, and discernable to the physician's eye. The fact that an agency of this kind exists, which is able to treat the rest of the ego like an object, the fact, that is, that man is capable of self-observation, renders it possible to invest the old idea of the double with a new meaning...  

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Interestingly, these same persuasions precede the events of the main narrative itself. Just as the Tippecachuana comes to his rescue, Prendergast says, "I had a persuasion I was dead and...thought what a jest it was they should come too late...to find me in my body", and after he has been hauled on board, he sees the face of M'Ling, thinking it is "a nightmare" (11).

3Freud, "The Uncanny", SE, V. XVII, p. 235. See also chapter five of the present paper, n. 7, 8, for Jung's comments on the possibility that such a dissociated portion of the ego in observing may either exercise judgement or be an act of self-criticism. While Freud does not specifically articulate the
The presence of doubling in the novel accounts for my hesitation in treating the characters as if they were, or were intended to be, psychologically real. In this connection consider, for instance, that the statement made by Prendick that Montgomery possesses a slow-burning but (once ignited) an unquenchably fiery temper (19), may indicate a repressed nature and may be related (as I said) to his fear and hatred of Moreau, in so far as these may be demonstrable; but there are really insufficient grounds to vindicate such assertions, since they must rest on so meagre a textual basis. In Moreau as in his other scientific romances Wells lends the characters, even the major ones, individuality sufficient only to give the tales impetus. For these reasons then, I approach the characters in functional terms rather than trying to consider fine and (really) incalculable shades of realism in their presentation. My analysis, therefore, places more importance on affinities than on qualities. To so proceed, locating the characters in relation to one another, defining the roles they seem to fill in a larger, trans-personal scheme, a characterology, is in effect to reconstruct the novel as an allegory. Given the possibilities which Freud's "fresh meaning" opens out, to so proceed is in

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3 (cont'd) possibility of super-ego doubling it is clearly one that may legitimately be developed from such statements as these.
effect to postulate within the tale a psychic allegory, a psychomachia.  

The "special agency" which Freud mentions is an early (1919) formulation of that concept he later called the super-ego. In the 1938 essay, "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis", he describes it at some length. It arises, he says, out of the ego itself, as ego similarly arises out of the id, and carries out there the functions previously performed for the child by its parents: "it observes the ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken. We call this agency the super-ego and are aware of it in its judicial functions as our conscience." But in performing these functions the super-ego acquires added power. "It is a remarkable thing that the super-ego often displays a severity for which no model has been provided by the

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4The way in which I have developed this notion is of course my responsibility, but the suggestion stems from M. Harris, "Science Fiction as the Dream and Nightmare of Progress" (Part 2), West Coast Review, V. X, 1 (June 1975), pp. 22, 23. See also William Bellamy, The Novels of Wells, Bennett and Galsworthy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), p. 50, where he makes a similar claim for Wells' The Time Machine, and ibid., p. 68.

5Freud, (1938) "An Outline of Psycho-Analysis" (London: Hogarth Press, 1969), trans. and ed. by James Strachey, V. 35 in The International Psycho-Analytical Library. Volumes in this series hereafter cited as, Freud, (date) title, IPL, V. number, publication date. The IPL text is in this case, as in most others, identical to that of SE. "Outline" is in SE, V. XXIII, pp. 139-207.

5Ibid., pp. 62-3.
real parents, and moreover that it calls the ego to account not only for its deeds but equally for its thoughts and unexecuted intentions, of which the super-ego seems to have knowledge." The origin of this unwonted severity may be clarified by reference to Freud's comments in the (1917) *Introductory Lectures*, where he says that the super-ego (or ego ideal as he then termed it) is created "with the intention of re-establishing the self-satisfaction which was attached to primary infantile narcissism." In other words, the super-ego allows the organism to feel pleasure (a pleasure similar to that previously experienced in gratifying instinctual desires) in the successful circumvention of instinctual desires. The severity of the super-ego results from the child's repression of hostility towards the parent. Turning this hostility inwards, the ego unavoidably acts to satisfy the destructive impulse. In this way a cathexis is formed from id through super-ego to ego, which latter is treated as an object. It is in this sense that the super-ego is a double for the id, and it is this too which accounts for the ability of the super-ego to unite with the id

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and "make common cause against the hard-pressed ego."10 But such a condition is already pathological since "[in] normal, stable states...the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego, because they work together harmoniously."11 This split state can lead to a further fragmentation of the ego, with the critical faculties becoming reconstituted outside the ego as a shadow double.12

An examination of the novel shows that the figure who most clearly corresponds to that of the super-ego is Moreau, the creator of the Beast Folk, their punishing father and, through the agency of the Law, the voice of their (collective)

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11Ibid., p. 22.

12Freud, Introductory Lectures, SE, V. XVI, pp. 428-9: "...there actually exists in the ego an agency which unceasingly observes, criticizes and compares, and in that way sets itself over against the other part of the ego. We believe, therefore, that the patient is betraying a truth to us which is not yet sufficiently appreciated when he complains that he is spied upon and observed at every step he takes and that every one of his thoughts is reported and criticized. His only mistake is in regarding this uncomfortable power as something alien to him and placing it outside himself. He senses an agency holding sway in his ego which measures his actual ego and each of its activities by an ideal ego that he has created for himself in the course of his development. We believe, too, that this creation was made with the intention of re-establishing the self-satisfaction which was attached to primary infantile narcissism, but which since then has suffered so many disturbances and mortifications...when in delusions of observation it [the ideal ego] becomes split up it reveals to us its origin from the influence of parents, educators and the social environment--from an identification with some of these figures." See also Freud, Ego and Id, p. 49.
conscience. As the earlier, detailed examination of Moreau as the central authority of the novel showed, he is, in the minds of the Beast Folk and Montgomery, no less than in his own estimation, a literal god. "I can see through it all" he says, "see into their very souls, and see there nothing but the souls of beasts, beasts that perish--anger, and the lusts to live and gratify themselves" (85). The ability to see into souls and perceive therein "thoughts and unexecuted intentions", which the Beast Folk also evidently believe Moreau capable of, is a characteristic of the super-ego. More importantly, it is characteristic of the image of the prohibiting father and punishing god, both or either of which may form component parts of the super-ego. In his (1913) Totem and Taboo, Freud traces in the development of religion the attempts of men to reduce Oedipal tensions, those same tensions from which ultimately arose the super-ego, noting that "at bottom, God is nothing other than an exalted father." In the (1923) The Ego and the Id, speaking of the "ego-ideal", Freud expresses this thought still more lucidly; "even ordinary normal morality has a harshly restraining, cruelly prohibitive quality. It is from this indeed, that the conception arises of an inexorable higher being

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13 Freud, (1913-14) "Totem and Taboo", SE, V. XIII, p. 147. See also Freud, (1914) "On Schoolboy Psychology", in the same V. p. 243ff.
who metes out punishment." Similarly, the severity that the super-ego often exhibits, fueled by energies cathexed from the id, correlates closely with Moreau's peculiarly ascetic sadism, which encompasses both his work with the scalpel and his creation and manipulation of the Law which centres on himself.

A super-ego can only come into existence in relation to an ego, and this role is fulfilled by the Beast Folk. As I noted above, the splitting of ego from super-ego denotes an abnormal condition, and a consideration of the characteristics of the Beast Folk confirms this, living as they do in perpetual dread of breaking the Law, and in dread of their own resurgent desire to do exactly that. In *Ego and Id* Freud claims that the ego is "the actual seat of anxiety" and that it is "threatened by dangers from three directions", 15

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14Freud, (1923) *The Ego and the Id*, SE, V. XIX, p. 54. See also Freud, (1922) "A Seventeenth Century Demonological Neurosis", same V., pp. 69-105, especially this, on p. 85-6, where God and Satan are compared: "...we know that God is a father-substitute; or, more exactly, that he is an exalted father; or yet again, that he is a copy of a father as he is seen and exalted in childhood—by individuals in their own childhood and by mankind in its prehistory as the father of the primal horde...If the benevolent and righteous is a substitute for [the son's] father, it is not to be wondered at that his hostile attitude to his father, too, which is one of hating and fearing him and of making complaints against him, should have come to expression in the creation of Satan. Thus the father, it seems, is the individual prototype of both God and the Devil."

15Freud, *Ibid.*, p. 57. Note also that while Freud says, in (1938) "Outline", *IPI*, V. 35, p. 22, that in "normal, stable states...the super-ego is not distinguished from the ego, because they work together harmoniously", and that the splitting of the two, necessarily involving a weakening of the ego, is a
from the demands of the id, from those of external reality, and from the super-ego. The Beast People's conflict with "external reality" is reflected in their only partly successful attempts to initiate a culture, swaddling themselves in the cloth Moreau supplies, making "rough vessels of lava and wood" (63), building themselves "dens", and, though their "hovels are rather better than those of the Kanaka's" (82-3), living a generally wretched existence. Their major conflict, however, and that which generates the greatest anxiety comes from their being capable of either reason or bestiality, their battles against super-ego or against id.

Their hesitant individuation is suborned from the start by the Law and their own instincts, in much the same way that the child's immature ego is forced to and fails "to deal with tasks which it could cope with later on with the utmost ease", 16 in dealing that is, with Oedipal conflicts, wherein instinctual and cultural challenges to the organism's individuation meet and combine. "No human individual is spared such traumatic

15 (cont'd) pathological condition (29), in Ego and Id he often speaks as if a type of this split condition were itself normal, as for instance p. 35, where super-ego differentiation attains the status of (almost) biological necessity. This makes it difficult to determine whether in fact Freud regards the condition as pathological, especially since the basis of the differentiation, and the basis too of any neurosis (an Oedipal complex with attendant traumas) happens to all men (42).

experiences; none escapes the repressions to which they give rise."

For Wells' Beast Folk, as for Freud's Man, the result is neurosis, "which involve[s] permanent restrictions on [their] further development." In the shape of the Law the Beast Folk internalize Moreau's repression of themselves, even though the "Sayer of the Law" knows that that Law is as evil as the evil it seeks to abate.

'Evil are the punishments [he says] of those who break the Law. None escape.'

'None escape,' said the Beast Folk, glancing furtively at each other...

'None escape,' said the grey creature in the corner.

'None escape,' said the Beast People, looking askance at one another...

'For everyone the want that is bad,' said the grey Sayer of the Law...

'None escape,' said the men in the doorway...

'None escape,' said the Ape Man, scratching his calf.

'None escape,' said the little pink sloth creature.

'Punishment is sharp and sure. Therefore learn the Law. Say the words!' (66-7)

The behaviour of the Beast Folk described here, and elsewhere, as "furtive", "abject", "looking askance", reinforces this impression of them as anxiety-ridden and neurotic. It is slightly unsettling too, that Wells should pinpoint as a source of their anxiety a conviction in the Beast People of original

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18 *Ibid*.

19 Though of course there is no intimation that he recognizes that he knows this, which closedness is quite in keeping with his role here of a particle of a psychic part.
"For everyone the want that is bad"—and that he ties this closely to their furtive, or neurotic, behaviour. In Freud too neurosis is in a sense equivalent to original sin, the result of unavoidable conflicts one's ego has with one's instincts. It stems both from the nature of Freud's Man and society, and in Freud as in Wells, "none escape" this kind of psychic deformation.20 Freud insists that neurosis is inescapable. In the Introductory Lectures (1917), in fact, he says that these kinds of conflict "may perhaps only occur in human beings, and on that account neurosis may, generally speaking, constitute their prerogative over the animals." 21 In short, being human means that neurosis is unavoidable and unavoidably flaws every one of our natures.

20 In theological terms man fell as a result of disobedience to god; he failed to mediate between obedience to the serpent, who urged self-assertion, and obedience to god, who demanded self-abnegation. In psycho-analytic terms man is a "fallen" creature in so far as he suffers conflicts—and hence has formed repressions—as a result of unsuccessfully mediating between the demands of reality (or super-ego forces as they are embodied in society) and his instinctual demands; is fallen then, in so far as he is neurotic.

XII. Allegory and a dreaming Prendick

While there is an undoubted correspondence between Freud's ego and the collective character of the Beast Folk, it would be more correct I think, to call them an immature ego-id, that is, an immature ego, and one kept so by Moreau's fierce repression. In other words, it would be a mistake to seek a point-by-point comparison of the texts of Wells and Freud; it is enough merely to establish a strong parallelism.

Having done this, it is easy to see that the allegory as so far reconstructed, though I have given it a psychoanalytic gloss, is in fact very little different than other allegories in the European tradition whose concerns also centre around problems generated by the perception of a divided consciousness, of a radical discontinuity in experience. "[The] bellum intestinum" notes C. S. Lewis in his Allegory of Love, "is the root of all allegory",¹ and this war stems from a consciousness of divided will, which means "necessarily to turn the mind in upon itself."² Though he does not explain why—beyond ascribing it to a kind of zeitgeist—Lewis notes that this consciousness

²Ibid., p. 60.
appears in the European tradition in Roman imperial times,\textsuperscript{3} and is related to the experience of temptation, a cognizance of a failure to be moral.\textsuperscript{4}

So pervasive through time is this experience, that even eighteen centuries later, Freud frequently resorts to allegory and parable to explain his perception of the neurotic, divided consciousness. On one such occasion, comparing an ego and its neuroses to an Arab riding a camel along a precipice, and representing the appearance of a conflict as a lion blocking the narrow path, Freud says the rider "saw no way out...But the animal thought otherwise...[and] took one leap with his rider into the abyss." Freud then appends a "moral" to the effect that "dealing with a conflict by forming symptoms [ie, leaping into the abyss] is after all an automatic process which cannot prove adequate to the demands of life, and in which the subject has abandoned the use of his best and highest powers. If there were a choice, it would be preferable to go down in an honourable struggle with fate."\textsuperscript{5} This is what the analyst facilitates, an honourable struggle. Though Freud lessens the extent to which a

\textsuperscript{3}See also Sandison, \textit{op cit.}, p. 62 on imperialism and personal relations.

\textsuperscript{4}Lewis, \textit{op cit.}, pp. 59-61. Lewis' formulation raises a number of problems, not the least of which is his use of Aristotle as a normative formulation of classic Greek thought. On Aristotle see Felix Grayeff's critical assessment in his book, \textit{Aristotle and his School} (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1974).

\textsuperscript{5}Freud, (1917) \textit{Introductory Lectures}, SE, V. XVI, p. 385.
division in consciousness may be accurately available to perception, nevertheless, in speaking thus of the (potentially) neurotic state which is allegory's foundation and fundamental subject, Freud too remains within the allegorical tradition. Considered as an allegory then, Wells' tale is very little different from many more traditional examples of the form. Considered, for the reader as a kind of explanation or exposure of the divided consciousness, it seems to parallel Freud's attempted total explanation in that it too places the root of the conflict in biology, in animal instincts still operating forcefully in our mental lives.

In his 1896 essay, "Human Evolution, An Artificial Process", Wells again attaches theological terms to his explanation and, representing human biological inheritance as a "Palaeolithic savage", he opposes to him "civilized Man" and says, "Sin is the conflict of [these] two factors,—as I have tried to convey in my Island of Doctor Moreau." Speaking more directly of Moreau, in the Preface to the 1924 Atlantic Edition of the novel, he again mixes allegory and religion. "It is a theological grotesque...the response of an imaginative mind to

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6The Editors of SE, however, list this passage and all such in the General Index (V. XXIV) under the heading "Analogies", and they ignore the allegorical quality of the psychic agencies, id, ego and super-ego, altogether.

7Wells, "Human Evolution", in Philmus and Hughes (Eds.), op cit., p. 217, reprinted from Fortnightly Review, n.s. 60 (Oct. 1896), pp. 590-95.
the reminder that Humanity is but animal rough-hewn to a reasonable shape and in perpetual internal conflict between instinct and injunction. This story embodies this ideal but apart from this embodiment it has no allegorical quality." As I have tried briefly to demonstrate, such an "internal conflict" is the essence of allegory; in so far too as Freud's writings are not so much rigorously scientific as insightful observations, his formulations may be thought of as allegorical.

But an allegory which sees the Beast Folk as an immature ego-id, one more or less stably maintained by the predations of Moreau, who in turn becomes a hypertrophied super-ego, is an allegory which cannot very effectively deal with either the perceiving consciousness, Prendick, or with Montgomery, his curious double. The best that may be done is to array the characters along that developmental line I hypothesized earlier. This also shows how closely related Prendick and Montgomery are, and demonstrates how the allegory encompasses them, first, by postulating more complicated, hence more psychologically real characters for them, and second, by postulating that each leans more towards one end of the array than the other. In the main though, these two stand outside the structure because they seem to the reader more like persons within everyday experience. Thus

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Wells, _At_, Ed., V. II, p. ix. The interesting thing about the first sentence is its echo of Hamlet's "There's a divinity that shapes our ends;/ Rough-hew them how we will" (V, 2, ll. 10-11).
they can only stand within the allegory by alliance to one or
the other extreme, Moreau or the Beast Folk. This is partly what
I meant by saying these two characters were defined by their
affinities; Moreau I exempt from affinities and this also
applies, implicitly, to the Beast People, who form the other
half of the novel's most visible contrast.

Now the reason why Prendick sorts so problematically within
this framework is that, in true scientific fashion as the
observer of the island universe, he exempts himself as much as
he possibly can from participation in that which he observes,
its society. From the beginning he distrusts and avoids Moreau,
he very quickly cuts himself off from Montgomery, and in the
end--after a brief fling at "ruling" them--absolutely prohibits
himself any intercourse with the Beast Folk. As an observer
Prendick, like the Time Traveller, seeks to explain to the
reader the scenes he also describes, and at its rhetorical
climax his explanation passes over into allegory. "I must
confess" he says, "I lost faith in the sanity of the world when
I saw it suffering the painful disorder of this island" (104:
italics added). The intention may only be to locate the island
in the world, but the effect (especially when read with the
paragraphs which bracket the statement) is to make the island
into the world, to make it an allegory of the world. Where
Prendick had believed the world safely ordered and harmonious he
now sees that if it has any order then this proceeds from an
irresponsible, indeed a mad deity, from the violent conflict of
tensed opposites equally brutalizing and alike immovable.

Prendick thus observes only those allegorical portions to
which Wells' later comments also direct the reader: The Island
is "a theological grotesque", it deals with the "perpetual
internal conflict between instinct and injunction."
But just as
the Time Traveller's hysteria implicates him in the processes he
"objectively" observes and describes, revealing aspects of his
self he strives not to recognize, so too the divided
consciousness which Prendick observes in the others' exists in
himself, notwithstanding his insistence that the problem is
external to him.

The identification of the Beast Folk with the ego alone
cannot survive under these conditions. Developing, therefore,
from the first level of the allegory, wherein the id--Prendick's
"passion" (104-5)--could be perceived functioning in all the
characters, is a second level of allegory, equally a
psychomachia, which consigns almost all the functions of the id
to the Beast Folk. Where the first stems from Prendick's
perception of the island, the second stems from the reader's
gradual perception of Prendick's observations and explanations
and their lack of fittedness to one another and to his own
position as narrator. This is actually to put into operation

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9 Observed by him in the Beast Folk mostly, but also to some
extent in Moreau and Montgomery.
that process I spoke of earlier, whereby the reader must finally separate himself or herself from the tale's speaking voice. The explanation which Moreau provides, therefore, can only sharpen Prendick's "morbid state" (104), since it validates the bizarre field-ground perception (84) upon which Prendick bases his simultaneous recognition of the dual character of the Beast People and refusal to recognize them in himself. The day following his interview with Moreau Prendick says, "I awoke early, Moreau's explanation stood before my mind clear and definite, from the moment of my awakening...[and it] filled me with a vague uncertainty...that was far worse than any fear" (87). This is what I meant when I said above that it can make no difference to Prendick, except emotionally, in which direction the knife of Moreau's explanation cuts since the basic perception is correct; men are but animals rough-hewn to a reasonable shape.

If I say then that the Beast Folk, for Prendick, become equivalent to the power of the id, the next questions must be, what does Prendick conceive the animality of the Beast Folk to be, what is his attitude towards it? Again, these questions have already been largely answered in my earlier argument. Prendick's quest for the "calm authority of a reasonable soul" is the obverse of his fear of animality, of unrestrained passion. His relationship to the Leopard Man is an emblem of this confrontation with the animal in himself and his relationship
with Montgomery shadows forth a potential human self, an
accommodation possible had Prendick not restrained his "passion".
He despises Montgomery precisely because he, not once but
continually, "gives in" to animality, consorts with and
practises it. Prendick's passion is by no means simple, but is
rather made up of a cluster of related things; his childhood
memories, feelings of terror, of hysterical passion, of
helplessness, his visions of the Beast People—most often an
eye-to-eye contact—these things are several times bundled
together. Significant too is Prendick's position of hidden or
unnoticed observer, this too being a frequent experience of
children in an adult world. That Prendick should associate
helplessness with memories of childhood (29) is not so
surprising, but that a vision of M'LING should also jog such
memories perhaps is.

I shrugged my shoulders and turned away. Over the
taffrail leant a silent black figure, watching the
stars. It was Montgomery's strange attendant. It looked
over its shoulder quickly with my movement, then looked
away again.

It may seem a little thing to you, perhaps, but it
came like a sudden blow to me. The only light near us
was a lantern at the wheel. The creature's face was
turned for one brief instant out of the dimness of the
stern towards this illumination, and I saw that the eyes
that glanced at me shone with a pale green light.

I did not know then that a reddish luminosity, at
least, is not uncommon in human eyes. The thing came to
me as stark inhumanity. That black figure, with its eyes
of fire, struck down through all my adult thoughts and
feelings, and for a moment the forgotten horrors of
childhood came back to my mind. Then the effect passed
as it had come. An uncouth black figure of a man, a
figure of no particular importance, hung over the
taffrail against the starlight, and I found Montgomery was speaking to me (24-5).

Notice that, ironically, M'Ling is looking at the stars, indulging himself in the only activity in which, much later, the unbalanced Prendick finds "a sense of infinite peace and protection" (141), but note also that the vision does not simply recall his childhood to mind, but recalls specifically "the forgotten horrors of childhood", the "return of the repressed". The vision's being compared to "a sudden blow" suggests again a child's-eye-view of the world, where "punishment is sharp and sure" and one must "therefore learn the Law" (67). Moreau's vision of the world, which he imposes on the Beast Folk, and which Prendick accepts, considered as a system of inflexible and largely incomprehensible prohibitions, might also with justice be called childish.

This re-emergence of childish terrors accounts for Prendick's feeling of having "seen" M'Ling somewhere before, that he had "already encountered exactly the features and gestures that now amazed me. Afterwards it occurred to me that probably I had seen him as I was lifted aboard, and that scarcely satisfied my suspicion of a previous acquaintance. Yet how one could have set eyes upon so singular a face and have forgotten the precise occasion passed my imagination" (17). This is another version of the field/ground effect, "of utter strangeness and yet of the strangest familiarity" (46), and a
doubling too of Prendick's uncanny encounters with the Leopard Man. Recall, in the first of those encounters, that it is Prendick's unbidden memory of "a schoolboy expedient against big dogs" (50) which saves him from a mauling.

In the field-ground effects then, Prendick recognizes not merely his self peering out from under the animal veil, but recognizes his childish self, which he naturally associates with both unrestrained passion and the adult squelching of such instinctual expression. The situation is made more complex by his standing on each side of the recognition simultaneously as the punishing father and as the chastized child, the murder of the Leopard Man being as well a self-punishment. Childish traits appear too in Prendick's "objective" descriptions of the Beast Folk. In this respect, the sloth-creature—who has no recorded name, though it has a distinct individuality—is particularly interesting, since it is described as "a dim pinkish thing, looking more like a flayed child than anything else in the world" (63) and is almost entirely wordless. After the final catastrophe says Prendick, "[the] little pink sloth creature displayed an odd affection for me, and took to following me about" (132). It is this beast who informs Prendick of the murder of his "canine friend", the Dog Man (135). The prohibitions which the Law enjoins too relate largely to abstention from infantile pleasures, not to go on all fours, not to suck up drink. No doubt the "maddest, most impossible, and
most indecent things one could well imagine" (65) as laws, include bowel control and correct choice of sexual objects, two primary goals of the process whereby children are differentiated into adults. As the Beast Folk revert, therefore, they lose those abilities which are not so much specifically human as specifically adult, language, upright carriage, continence, sublimation.

The relation of the other characters to Prendick, considered as aspects of himself, fragmented and redistributed over the island landscape, shows clear parallels to the respective positions of Morlocks and Eloi, and the Time Traveller. Again, there are two major locations in the novel, the House of Pain set up on a hill and the hovels of the Beast Folk, hidden down in a gloomy gulley, upper and lower regions tangentially related—if we consider the island as a kind of parabolic colonial venture—to upper and lower classes, whites and natives. It could be too that the Beast Folk represent for Prendick, as the Morlocks and the Eloi represent for the Traveller, an incomplete sexuality which he hysterically rejects not because he has grown beyond its limitations but because he remains frozen at exactly that point in his development. The first level of the allegory (instinct versus injunction) may also be read into The Time Machine, such that the Morlocks and Eloi together make up an id figure, the former embodying the
destructive principle, the latter embodying Eros. In this reading the Time Traveller would be assigned the role of combined ego-super-ego, a relatively healthy state; and a look at the novel shows that he is in fact much more successful than Prendick in maintaining, at the last, his emotional equilibrium, deserting the present for "the manhood of the race" (TTM, 335). Prendick's relations with the Beast Folk too show a minor parallel to those of the Traveller with the Eloi, the latter's ambiguous "miniature flirtation" with Weena being recalled in Prendick's ambiguous notation that "the quasi-human intimacy I had permitted myself with some of them in the first months of my loneliness became a horror to recall" (133). In short, the relation of the two novels to one another is that they tell, roughly, the same story, expose the same problem. As the Time Traveller's feeling, upon his return from the future, that it is the present that is the dreamlike reality, is matched by Prendick's beastly visions in London, so the Traveller's directions to his audience—"take it as a lie or a prophecy, or say I dreamed it in my workshop"—may be applied to Prendick's tale.

10 This is only a tentative identification and should in no way be considered a substitute for a full discussion of The Time Machine, and the possibility of identifications being developed relative to the framework of such a discussion. I should also note at this point that Freud's theory of the instincts, and the opposed principles of destructiveness and Eros, is for me the weakest part of his total work, since it explains too much too easily.
Taking it as Prendick's dream it is of interest to note the following passage in Freud's (1900) Interpretation of Dreams, which seems to sum up several of the possibilities I have explored here. "Wild beasts", says Freud, "are as a rule employed by the dream-work to represent passionate impulses of which the dreamer is afraid, whether they are his own or those of other people... It might be said that the wild beasts are used to represent the libido, a force often dreaded by the ego and combatted by means of repression. It often happens too, that the dreamer separates off his neurosis, his 'sick personality', from himself and depicts it as an independent person."\(^{11}\)

Taking the tale as Prendick's prophecy, the truth of its import may be gauged by the strength of the responses of Prendick's first auditors, who judge it a mad lie (139-40), and by the overwhelmingly hostile responses of Wells' reviewers, who judged it an obscene and blasphemous libel on nature both human and divine. They were, moreover, genuinely puzzled why Wells should want to indulge himself in (so they considered it) such wanton gruesomeness.\(^{12}\)

\(^{11}\)Freud, Dreams, SE, V. V, p. 410. This passage was added to Dreams by Freud in the 1919 edition. See also Jung, op cit., 175/109, on demons: "from the psychological point of view demons are nothing other than inturders from the unconscious complexes into the continuity of the conscious process... It is... precisely the fantastic element that becomes associated in the unconscious with the repressed functions."

\(^{12}\)Anonymous review of Moreau in The Times, 17 June 1896, p. 17: "...we feel bound... to give a word of warning to the
One suspects that in this their attitude is close to Prendick's, that they could have supported themselves well enough occupying the room next to all the pain in the universe, given it be only dumb. The apparent shock produced by the book betrays some of the reviewers into interestingly ambiguous statements. Two reviewers connect the horrors of the novel to some supposed "horrors" of sexuality\(^\text{13}\) and another says that "[this] curious fantasy...is intrinsically horrible. The impressions [it

\(^{12}\) (cont'd) unsuspecting who would shrink from the loathsome and repulsive. This novel is the strongest example we have met of the perverse quest after anything in any shape that is freshly sensational...The ghastly fancies are likely to haunt and cling, and so the book should be kept out of the way of young people and avoided by all who have good taste, good feeling, or feeble nerves." See also Patrick Parrinder (Ed.), H. G. Wells: The Critical Heritage (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972), p. 44, review by Chalmers Mitchell in Saturday Review (81), 11 April 1896, pp. 368-9: "...the author, during the inception of his story, like his own creatures, has tasted blood. The usurious interest began when the author, not content with the horror inevitable in his idea, and yet congruous with the fine work he has given us hitherto, sought out revolting details with the zeal of a sanitary inspector probing a crowded graveyard."

\(^{13}\) Parrinder, op cit., p. 50, citing an unsigned review in Speaker (13), 18 April 1896, pp. 429-30: "We should have thought it impossible for any work of fiction to surpass in gruesome horror some of the recent problem-novels relating to the great sexual question which have been recently published, if we had not read The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells. Having read it, we are bound to admit that there are still lower depths of nastiness, and still cruder manifestations of fantastic imbecility than any attained by the ladies who have been so much with us in recent years." Parrinder also cites, p. 52, an unsigned review in Athenaeum, 9 May 1896, pp. 615-16, by Basil Williams, who notes that though some have tried to excuse the book on the grounds that it would tend to help suppress vivisection, "from that point of view...[it] would be about as valuable...as a pornological story in suppressing immorality."
engenders] should not be put to the test of analysis or reflection. As it is, they grip the mind with a painful interest and a fearful curiosity." The reviewer senses the emotional charge at the heart of the narrative and fears that to lay in any train toward it would be dangerous. I would say that this is indeed the nature of Prendick's "prophecy" in that the events of the main narrative reveal a truth about humanity Prendick cannot assimilate, though the materials for assimilation are present. Like him, the reviewers reject the radical therapy the novel can offer. The visions in London, coupled with Prendick's earlier reflections on the Law, constitute the core of the revelation and in those visions the allegory extends the novel into the world of the reader. This may go some way towards explaining the reactions of critics for whom Wells' ostensible theme (men frequently act like brutes) was no real novelty.

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1 Parrinder, op cit., p. 48, citing an unsigned review in Manchester Guardian, 14 April 1896, p. 4.
XIII. The Island [ii]

I noted earlier that the island might representatively house either one (isolated) society or a society of one isolated individual. In unravelling the allegory in Moreau, it is possible to assign to the various units of the one society on the island the roles and functions of agencies presumed operative in any one psyche, thus, collapsing the distinction. The island, therefore, represents both these potentialities at once, Man, and Man's Society. This was to be expected if as I said, the characters represent a fragmentation of the hero's self, the constituent portions of which he has the greatest difficulty in coming to terms with. While I have given the latter meaning pride of place, it is only an implicit subject; Wells' explicit subject and his constant concern, through all his working life, was Man's Society, whether in the fantastic guise of romance or the drab homespun of naturalism. One of the reasons the romance hero experiences such difficulties may be traced to his attempt to preserve as an ideally whole self only one of those fragments, his rationality. This too seems to be echoed in the setting, which provides, usually through polarization, a geographic division of livable regions, only one of which the hero chooses as his dwelling place, though he
intuits that his choice is somehow eccentric.

Though the island contains distinctly separated regions, yet it is a whole and easily perceived as such. The setting, therefore I have called both arena and island, reflecting these two potentials, division and unification. While arena suggests the hero's self-conflict, island implies a unity and centrality available to the hero but which he cannot achieve. Could he achieve it, of course, the result would be the creation of a utopia, a state whose energies are directed towards the definition of those social circumstances in which the ideally constituted individual may flourish. I said earlier that Moreau acts as a structuring notion1 and said too that his pursuit was of an ideal human image, a double of himself. The Beast Folk he creates are in fact very human, but the reader is easily fooled into thinking of them primarily as beasts simply because they do not measure up to Moreau's (or Prendick's) standards of humanity. Moreau's desire to quash animality is identical with a desire to make a new and better kind of human being and this is a utopian enterprise, defining the ideal constitution of a human. The enterprise, however, is based on the concept of nature as a system of inflexible laws, the apotheosis of reason, an exaltation of one limited human value, albeit one Moreau

1Similar to the notion of a culture of "doers" around which Wells structured The Time Machine; see also chapter ten, n. 8 of the present paper.
possesses to an extraordinarily high degree. In this Moreau shows himself to be a very Victorian gentleman, for as Houghton says in his The Victorian Frame of Mind, the Victorians were "in general committed to the concept of absolute law", whether derived from "ancient philosophy and medieval theology" or from "modern...scientific thought, reaching out from the physical order to discover the analogous laws of moral, social, and mental life." The structuring notion at the heart of Moreau too, in so far as it is utopian, is also contemporaneous, and being framed in "present" time the tension between the "real" and projected societies (that is, between London and Noble's Island) is much greater, the consequences for Prendick more dire than those suffered by the Time Traveller.

This interplay between individual and social meanings is also reflected in the minor settings of the novel, the three-man longboat, the schooner Ipecacuanha, the House of Pain, and the island after Moreau's death. In all of these small societies are depicted and in all Wells shows the inability of the society to hold itself together. There is a consistent tendency for the constituent units to fly apart, visible even in Prendick himself in his long lonely sojourn on the island. This tendency to disintegration, however, is to be expected if one considers

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Prendick a typological character, a representative late Victorian individual, given the disintegration prevailing everywhere else in the novel. Thus, though when interpreting the allegory I saw the island as mind—or if you prefer, as nature, or the id, from which evolution differentiated the psychic agencies—it is apparent that it could just as well be seen as a society, and that just as a personality may be described as if it were a small society, so one may dissect a society in terms of its projected ideal personality.

In the archipelago of Wells' scientific romances, few of the isles are utopian, "blessed" as the drunken Davis says. Indeed, the fuller context of Davis' statement—"I've done with this blessed island for evermore amen! I've had enough of it" (27)—shows that the evocation of the insulae fortunae is intentionally ironic. In European literature generally, the isolated island may be thought of as a development of the walled off, paradisical garden, but in Wells' scientific romances, the setting's isolation only succeeds in bringing to the fore its anti-utopian, demonic potential. The setting slowly disintegrates into an inferno, a possibility emphasize in Moreau by the volcanic nature of the island and by its vibrating "[now] and then [to] a faint quiver of earthquake" (88). Even the provincially English, garden-like landscape of The War of the Worlds has concealed within itself an inferno, one revealed by the pillaging Martians, who afterwards seed the exposed
natural landscape with their own exotic fauna. The hero of that novel, like both Prendick and the Time Traveller, must speedily adapt himself to the exotic landscape, and in this process of acclimatization, which is also a realization of his own estrangement from the setting, the hero becomes aware that the exoticism is both the suggestion and the appearance of a mystery concealed beneath the surface patterns of the island's social interactions. The unwinding of the mystery, which the hero feels impelled to undertake, is of course also the revelation of his own conflict, and thus is matched by an increasing disintegration of the hero, which again runs parallel to the disintegration, or provoking of a violent crisis within the island's society. In The War of the Worlds the crisis takes over almost the entire subject of the book; the setting as arena shows that the utopia of the scientific romances is in general inverted. The hero's being cast away on the island shows that his supposed maturity is still open to question. Gaining at last this minimum of self-knowledge, the solution of both Prendick and the Time Traveller is to disentangle themselves, to withdraw to contemplate "the glittering hosts of heaven" (141).

It is possible then to distinguish in The Island of Dr. Moreau a four-fold allegory, though none of these "meanings" exists independently of the others, nor at all very distinctly, but in fact all are collapsed into one another. It may be thought of firstly as (in Wells' terms) " a theological
grotesque" with Moreau standing in for the Christian god in his aspect of saviour. Moreau gives the animals (sinners) a perverse salvation (human characteristics). Prendick acts out the role of Peter by first denying Moreau, then later accepting him. Prendick also tries to take over Moreau's authority, tries to become the leader of the brethren, by reconstituting Moreau's death as a parodic assumption prefiguring a resurrection and last judgment. It may be thought of secondly as a scientific allegory, with Moreau as the personification of whatever shaping force in evolution has rough hewn men from out their animal origins. The extent to which these two levels of the allegory interpenetrate shows how great an extent, for Wells as for his teacher, Huxley, the content of their ostensibly despised religion flowed back into the mould of their scientific thought. It may be thirdly psychological, in that Prendick's possible assimilated maturity is foreshadowed in his conflicts with the various "characters" on the island, who here represent the parts of his psyche, and it may be fourthly cultural, in that Prendick's conflicts—as a representative late Victorian Man—are representative of those found in many if not most individuals in his culture. These two latter levels of the allegory, again, interpenetrate to a high degree.
XIV. Darwinian Evolution in Freud and Wells

What emerges here is that in a sense, the texts of Freud and Wells are convergent. They meet not only in terms of their descriptions of a representative late Victorian "Man", but also in their choice of rhetorical strategies, adaptations of the allegorical method. The convergence may be most clearly seen, however, in their uses of Darwinian biology, which underpins the methodologies of both texts. Evolution is taken by both Freud and Wells, first as a fact, and second as implying that the human achievement (culture) is at the mercy of the unstable forces which first created it (nature). The representative of that potentially dangerous nature in humans is, for Freud, the id, which is one's biological inheritance, the animal side of humanity, the substratum of pure instincts shared by human and animal alike.1 The "higher" animals, indeed, must share with humanity a closely similar mental organization. Thus it is

possible to reconstruct a developmental line of mental organization beginning with the "lower" animals, passing on through the "higher" and reaching its terminus in Man. In this schema, the more evolved an animal is the more humanized it becomes and the more submerged its id becomes. Evolution is therefore equated with an increasing tendency to dispense with the id, or, since this is not really possible, to restrict its "approaches to motility", effectively suppressing it. Education repeats this evolutionary process, ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny. Humans are slotted into their respective cultural settings by the redirection of id demands, in other words, by sublimation.

In Wells' novel, this is the function of Moreau's Law, to suppress the animal component in the Beast Folk, to suppress their infantile traits. Complete adherence to and introjection of Moreau's Law represents the victory of education over instinct. Yet the need for the very existence of the Law represents the incompleteness of the process by which the Folk are extracted from the Beasts. The Beast Folks' fear of Moreau,

Freud (1923), The Ego and the Id, SE, V. XIX, p. 17.

Freud (1913), Totem and Taboo, SE, V XIII, p. 97. See also Freud (1929), Civilization and its Discontents, IPL 17, pp. 17, 71.

Freud (1938), "Outline", IPL 35, p. 42. The concept is one of Freud's main theoretical underpinnings and references to it may be found throughout his works. It derives originally from Haeckel.
which he cultivates, keeps them moreover, dependent on him, so that their socialization and individuation remains uncompleted. The opposition between the instinctual cravings of the childish 

Beast Folk and the culture which the patriarchal Moreau imposes upon them—a culture made up almost entirely of negations—is thus made unusually sharp and clear-cut. Notice too that Wells not only presents this opposition between "culture" and "nature" (as does Freud) as an internal, mental process, but that eventually Prendick suffers as much from it as the Beast Folk.

For both Freud and Wells then, the human personality can establish itself only by constantly maintaining a barrier of repression against the "lower", or less evolved parts of itself. What this amounts to is, as historian Leszek Kolakowski has said, a system that may be fairly described as embodying a belief in the "demonology of instinct". It asserts that the "primitive" parts of the psyche, hostile and opposed like a sullen class of servitors to the "higher" mind, must somehow be controlled if an individual is to function either for its self-benefit or as a member of a social unit.

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6Freud (1932), "My Contact with Joseph Popper-Lynkeus", SE, V. XXII, p. 221; "For our mind, that precious instrument by whose means we maintain ourselves in life, is no peacefully self-contained unity. It is rather to be compared with a modern State in which a mob, eager for enjoyment and destruction, has
In the Freudian model of personality then, no less than in Wells' allegory, endo-psychic relations are pictured as somewhat precarious. The model assumes that in shifting alliances power groups manipulate sensations, both external and internal, each in order to better its position at the expense of the others in a kind of psychic Hobbesian war of each against all.

The primary Freudian model, therefore, is already politicized and this accounts for the ease with which, in his later writings, Freud is able to extrude such a compelling sociology, or rather, a group psychology, from his original model of the personality. Really it is a development of the familiar metaphor of the body politic, first internalized to model the human personality and later retrieved to model a pessimistic sociology. Just as in Wells' novel, so in Freud, the allegory of endo-psychic relations also serves to model the relationships of individuals to their broader social context, and the hostility genetically implanted in each individual characterizes and "explains" these social relations. The

"(cont'd) to be held down by a prudent superior class." The passages immediately following, too lengthy to be quoted here, extend the ramifications of the statement; the mob equals the instincts. At the close of the essay, after calling Popper a "simple-minded, great man", Freud says that he "reflected much over the rights of the individual which he [Popper] advocated and to which I should have [sic] gladly added my support had I not been restrained by the thought that neither the processes of Nature nor the aims of human society quite justified such a claim" (224). The sullen servitors are also implied in others of Freud's uses of the state metaphor.
relationship of the ruled to their rulers is already mapped in detail in the description of the relations between psychic agencies.

It should be noted, of course, that these formulations though examined here in the works of Freud and Wells, are the common stock-in-trade of late nineteenth century thought, no less in their adoption of Darwinian beliefs than in their pessimistic attitude toward those beliefs. The older belief in God-directed beneficent nature vanishes with Darwin's explosion of intentionality; in its place is a reaffirmation of natural law, without a guiding intelligence but having nevertheless the capacity to make itself. Hence the creation of nature as a sovereign force, extremely powerful and absolutely implacable.

Against this both Freud and Wells, at one with many of their contemporaries, oppose ego, or will. Freud's psychology aims at the strengthening of the ego and therefore it cannot help but see the untrammeled instincts as threatening. Prendick's identification of the totality of human-ness and self-hood with abstract reason is a response to a similarly perceived threat.

As Prendick discovers with the Beast Folk, however, bridling the instincts only makes them the more clamorous in their demands for self-expression, makes them into imps of destruction. If one believes too that one has evolved, but that the natural beast is still active within, then both one's
society and one's personal situation seem not only tenuous achievements but also liable to collapse, and for reasons totally outside the control of either oneself or one's society. The mortal blow Darwinism dealt the institutions of religion consisted in its (largely successful) attempts to disperse the components of a structure within which law and desire, and control of one's proximate fate, were recognized and validated. Huxley's famous lecture on "Evolution and Ethics"7 is nothing less than an effort to reassemble the scattered body of Christian ethics by an act of the will alone; as before, humanity's ultimate fate remains out of its hands, but through willed ethical action, says Huxley, at least a decent social order may be battled away from nature, some small garden in the wilderness may be maintained.8 Just so is Prendick's life back in England based on an effort of the will. He attains an incomplete salvation through self-identification with cosmic unalterable law only by rigid exclusion from human contacts. In this, interestingly, Prendick says he is "mightily helped" by having told his tale ("confided my case" is how he puts it) "to a strangely able man...a mental specialist" (140). His


8 The metaphor is from Huxley's "Prologomena" to the essay, also in V. IX, pp. 1-45. The two parts were issued together in 1894 as a booklet.
specialist and he—and perhaps Wells had heard of the Viennese alienist's "talking cure"—band together to placate the demons.

Considered as a "demonology of instinct", Freud's scientific psychology may be said (again in Kolakowski's words) to have attempted to forge "the moral idiosyncrasies of the Victorian age into an eternal law of civilization." In this he concurs with Jung's acerbic comment that "in keeping with the spirit of the age [Freud] restricted himself to the investigation of instinctive mechanisms and...narrowed the picture of man to the wholeness of an essentially 'bourgeois' collective person."'

Both authors believe, then, that they are describing the essential, universal Man. Yet given the fact of closely parallel descriptions it seems far easier to assume that in an attempt to locate the pathology of their own times both in fact allegorize the Man of their contemporary, shared culture.

Perhaps too, through similar rhetorical strategies, each author hopes to locate his own portion of that pathology, or rather, define a stance for himself in relation to it. In so doing, of course, possible attitudes for each member of their

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9Ibid., pp. 52-3. There are problems with Kolakowski's argument. One, for example is that it often seems to verge on mere character assassination, and another is that it remains determinedly unaware that some of its terms could not have been constituted save in a post-Freudian world.

10Jung, op cit., 967/546.

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respective audiences are tested for fitness. What exactly is the relation of these individual authors to the generalized Man, of the culture, that radically divided creature who bulks so large in their investigations into his twin status, first as animal, then as citizen? In Freud's case my command of the sources is not certain enough to do anything more than offer a tentative observation that Freud's Man interiorizes politics and uses the impossibility of a stable politics of self-knowledge to support a prior belief in the dominance of his animal instincts.

For both Freud and Wells, the 1890's were an emotionally turbulent time, their lives not "settling down" until after the turn of the century when public acclaim assured each of continued success. In Wells' case the conflict mediated through his science-fiction novels were, intellectually, developed from his schooling at the Normal School of Science in South Kensington (1884-87). From Wells' biographies, his own and those by Lovat Dickinson and by Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, it seems clear that the conflict rested on assumptions, ways of seeing the world, which Wells never closely examined except in his romances; and it rests in particular on an exaggerated notion of Man's innate qualities as tending towards destruction.

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The status of his romances as fictions thus enabled Wells to come to grips with his troubled emotional life without the necessity of applying their shadowed assimilations immediately to himself. In the end he chose not to confront himself but simply to alter the relative weight of the terms; society is the root cause of Man's sorrows, therefore, change it, make a technocratic utopia and a regenerated Man will naturally follow.

The alteration of society, however, proved a harder task than either Wells or his contemporaries—who were for a time captivated by his visions—ever to have imagined when he first set this as his aim with the publication of Anticipations in 1901. Yet that it was an impossible task should not really have surprised Wells, for as his own The War of the Worlds (1898) had claimed, technological power, logically achieved through science, does not alter Man's innately destructive tendencies but merely amplifies their effects. In his later works Wells achieves the utopian state by first allowing animality wedded to technology full scope; armageddon occurs, followed by apocalypse: the bad old world is destroyed in a rain of fire and all the bad old leaders with it. Left to pick up the pieces are the technocrats. The negative consequences of science and technology having been tried and found wanting, logically speaking nothing is left but to try and implement the positive consequences; enter, stage right, the millennial kingdom.
If all this seems to have a biblical ring it is because the pattern of the apocalypse and millennium is drawn from Christian eschatological hopes and visions of the Day of Judgement.  

Fundamentally, Wells' is a Christian vision, though not Christian in an orthodox sense. The belief in Man's innate destructiveness has its roots, in Wells, in a Calvinist conviction of the ineradicability of original sin, which Wells apparently learned from his mother. Wells' mother not only taught him the elements of the creed (together with his letters

\[\text{12}\text{Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2nd. revised ed., 1970), pp. 20-21. The pattern, says Cohn, is one common to both the Jewish and Christian traditions, and the particular pattern in Wells is dated to roughly 165 BC, the time of the writing of the Book of Daniel. In the middle ages, the particular site of Cohn's study, such millenial expectations flourished primarily among the working classes and outside the orthodox channels of belief. During the Reformation versions of these millennial fantasies acquired the status, within some of the new sects, of orthodoxy. Wells absorbed the fantasies through his mother's teachings, on which see following note.}\]

\[\text{13}\text{Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie, op cit., p. 23: "She [Sarah Wells] came from a family of Ulster Protestants, given to a strain of belief much more severe than the body of the Anglican church in England and more inclined to a fundamentalist view of revealed religion." No independent authority is given for this statement but the MacKenzieys also note (23-4) that Wells' having read Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress, and having too various other Low Church theological works available to him accounts for (at the least) his evident familiarity with the apocalyptic tradition, especially when added to his mother's teachings. Wells himself says that his mother's religion was Low Church, and I was disposed to find, even in my tender years, Low Church theology a little too stiff for me..." (Exa. Aut., p. 23). The Low Church branch of the Church of England is identified with the Evangelicals of the late eighteenth century, who tended to be Calvinistic.}\]
and numbers) but inspired his whole upbringing with a religious atmosphere. Wells had great difficulty in breaking free both from this and his mother's well-intentioned efforts to "place" him in various drapery emporia. From his *Experiment in Autobiography* (1934) it is clear that questions of salvation and damnation--and these are Calvinist concerns--vexed him a great deal, until about 1882, when he experienced what might be called a "counter-illumination".

It was in the course of a revivalist mission and I had been persuaded to go with one of the costume room assistants who played elder sister to me. The theme was the extraordinary merit of Our Saviour's sacrifice and the horror and torment of hell from which he had saved the elect. The preacher had a fluting voice and a faintly foreign accent, a fine impassioned white face, burning eyes and self-conscious hands. He was enjoying himself thoroughly. He spared us nothing of hell's dreadfulness...For a little while his accomplished volubility carried me with him and then my mind broke into amazement and contempt. This was my old childish nightmare of God and the wheel; this was the sort of thing to scare ten year olds.

I looked at the intent faces about me, at the quiet gravity of my friend and again at this gesticulating voluble figure in the pulpit, earnest, intensely earnest—for his effect. Did this actor believe a word of the preposterous monstrosities he was pouring out? ...What was the clue to the manifest deep satisfaction, the fearful satisfaction of the believers about me? What had got hold of them?

...A real fear of Christianity assailed me. It was not a joke; it was nothing funny as the freethinker pretended. It was something immensely formidable. It was a tremendous human fact. We, the still congregation, were spread over the floor, not one of us daring to cry out against this fellow's threats. Most of us in some grotesque way seemed to like the dreadful stuff."

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The threat of hell was being used to discipline, exactly as Wells' mother had use it upon young Bertie. Unlike his elder sister (Possy, who had died in 1864, aged nine, two years before Bertie's birth), "a prodigy of Early Piety", I was indeed [said Wells] a prodigy of Early Impiety. I was scared by Hell, I did not at first question the existence of Our Father, but no fear or terror could prevent my feeling that his All Seeing Eye was that of an Old Sneak and that the Atonement for which I had to be so grateful was either an imposture, a sham trick of self-immolation, or a crazy nightmare...There was a time when I believed in the story and scheme of salvation, so far as I could understand it, just as there was a time when I believed there was a Devil, but there was never a time when I did not heartily detest the whole business.

I feared Hell dreadfully for some time...But one night I had a dream of Hell so preposterous that it blasted that undesirable resort out of my mind for ever. In an old number of Chambers Journal I had read of the punishment of breaking a man on the wheel. The horror of it got into my dreams and there was Our Father in a particularly malignant phase, busy basting a poor broken sinner rotating slowly over a fire built under the wheel...That dream pursued me into the daytime. Never had I hated God so intensely. 15

Yet Wells' mother had also, curiously, withheld this Hell from him. He notes that in an old devotional book in the house, Sturm's Reflections,

[there] was a picture...obliterated with stamp paper, and so provoking investigation. What had mother been hiding from me? By holding the page up to the light I discovered the censored illustration represented hell-fire; devil, pitchfork and damned, all complete and drawn with great gusto.16

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15 Ibid., p. 45.
16 Ibid., p. 29.
There is a complex overlapping of affirmation and denial in all this that indicates an almost obsessive quality in Wells' religious questionings. His mother frightened him with hell (it was "good enough", he says, "to scare me and prevent me calling either of my [elder] brothers fools, until I was eleven or twelve..."17), yet she also sought, wordlessly, to protect him from it, thus increasing his sense of its terribleness. He reports a nightmare so horrifying that it passes over into absurdity, again a process of affirmation and denial. He claims too that because of this dream, "suddenly the light broke through to me and I knew this God was a lie."18 Yet five years later he was still vexed enough by fears of damnation to need, emotionally speaking, a second closely similar "illumination". In each case Wells reports a profound terror, first of God (whom he "hated...intensely"), later of the persuasiveness of God's agents. In the later conversion experience Wells feels himself to be suddenly isolated from everyone around him, they believing and he not. The peculiar subjective intensity of that experience, of being saved from religion whilst all around him were still condemned to suffer it, is an echo in reverse of a Calvinistic emphasis on the unbridgeable gulf that divides the elect from the damned.

17Ibid., p. 45.
18Ibid., p. 45.
In most forms of Christian belief original sin may be, if not expunged, then at least diminished in regard to oneself by cultivating virtue and eschewing sin. Some versions of Calvinism, however, anneal Calvin's mystical doctrine of the elect into a spiritual caste system, with only the elect saved, the rest ineluctably damned and no act, good or bad, capable of altering one's fate.¹⁹

This doctrine, or a version of it, was the one Wells learned as a child and it had important consequences for his later beliefs, no less than for the structure of his writings. The Calvinistic structure of damnation appears again in Wells' evolutionary thinking, and in his recipes for social amelioration. Those who create the future, the technocrats, are analogous to the elect. It is thus morally of no consequence that it was they who first placed the machineries of death in the hands of the damned, they remain the elect, the saving remnant. The others, those still shackled to the Palaeolithic savage within themselves, these are the damned, and the proof of this lies in their use of the powers lent them by the elect. These latter then, are identified as those who have forsworn their earthly inheritance, having identified themselves as evolved beings, those who have dispensed with or effectively

¹⁹This particular variant of Calvinism stems from one of Calvin's followers, Beza, whose version of the faith was enshrined in the decision of the Synod of Dort (1618-19) that Christ had died only for the elect.
suppressed their animal instincts. In his 1895 articles, "Human Evolution" and "Morals and Civilization", Wells goes so far as to identify original sin with an intuition on the part of theologians of the genuine and original split in Man's nature, that between his animal and his civic selves. One would expect, therefore, as the corollary to this evolutionary election, the depiction of prehistoric humans as bloodthirsty savages, and this is in fact how Wells draws them. This is as true, moreover, of his scientific romances as it is of his Outline of History (1920), where the Neanderthals are portrayed, in text and with lurid accompanying pictures, as far more tigerish than apelike. In his later The Croquet Player (1936), a tale with which Wells hoped to recapture the spirit of the early romances, an evil spirit which possesses some of the characters is traced to archeologists having disturbed the graves of ancient savages. This sets the spirits free to wander

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20 Wells, The Outline of History (London: George Newnes, 1920), chapter nine, pp. 46-52. Wells was not responsible for all the illustrations, some of which were supplied by the publisher, but he presumably exercised editorial control over the weekly parts of the work as they were issued. See also Appendix A.

21 Anthony West, "H. G. Wells", in Principles and Persuasions (London: Eyre and Spotiswoode, 1958), reprinted in Bergonzi (Ed.), op cit., p. 23: "At the close of his life, from The Croquet Player onwards, he was trying to recapture the spirit in which he had written The Island of Dr. Moreau, and what haunted him, and made him exceedingly unhappy, was a tragic sense that he had returned to the real source of what could have been his strength too late." Authority for the statement is conversation with Wells, c. 1937-43.
the modern world, wreaking psychic havoc, inducing in the victims a paranoid fear and, in the worst cases, a total paralysis of action. Appropriately enough, one of the first to suffer is a Calvinistic minister whose parish is called Cainsmarsh.

Wells' writings then show an ambivalent relation to the creature he conceives of as essentially human ("Man"), and thus an ambivalent relation to his self. On the one hand this Man is full of sin, damned, powerless and the victim of personified forces who care nothing for him; yet on the other hand he is elect, immaculate, more powerful than any other creature, the controller of those forces and of his own destiny. The romances were, in general, produced more under the influence of the first of these attitudes, the utopias mostly under the influence of the second. Christianity taught Wells these two attitudes and he rejected both, neither allowing him any genuine self-respect, as he makes clear in his Autobiography.22

22See Wells, Ex. Aut., pp. 149-53, "A Question of Conscience", dealing with Wells' coerced confirmation as a communicant in the Church of England; "[The] wound to my private honour smarted for a long time..." (151). Note here too the passages previously cited on Wells' two 'counter-illuminations' and this related passage on p. 126; "It seemed to me much more important to know whether or no I was immortal than whether or no I was to make a satisfactory shop assistant. It might be a terrible thing to be out of a crib on the Thames Embankment but it would be a far more terrible thing to be out of a crib forever in the windy spaces of nothingness... I would lie quite still in my bed invoking the Unknown to 'Speak now. Give me a sign.'" As this last indicates the two attitudes are in Wells closely linked. For this reason there are present in many of the romances
Science, and a diffuse notion of socialism as scientific materialism, revalidated both attitudes, the one as the evolutionary past and the other as a vision of the future; between these two stools fell the uneasy, uncomfortable, and distinctly personal present. The precariousness of Man's spiritual existence, moving towards salvation but always slipping back towards perdition, was identified with the tenuous prehensile grasp of evolutionary Man on civic virtue.

Like his teacher, Huxley, Wells believed that violent and immoral behaviours were to a great extent innate in human beings. Against these anarchistic tendencies both counterposed the necessity of the inculcation of civility. More than anything else, Wells took from his mentor Huxley the notion that civility, for Man, depended upon the assertion of will. The universal Man of both Freud and Wells, though generated by quite different personal circumstances, still are located in the same space, that defined by the intersection of family relations with the ruling (or most powerful) ideology of their times, Darwinian biology. Freud's Man was partly defined in terms of Freud's "revolt" against his father and in terms of those parts of the world which, to the young Sigmund, it seemed had been

22 (cont'd) utopian elements, and in the utopias there are present—though usually marginalized to the "past"—disharmonious and destructive elements.
conclusively appropriated by Jacob Freud.\textsuperscript{23} Freud's Man seems far more able to use reason, to reach a rational equilibrium, but Freud does not postulate this achievement (maturity) as the necessary or even as the most desirable human state, and one gets the sense that, even if attained, the state may only be maintained by a strenuous effort of the will. Maturity is a possession, something one may acquire, and this often only in despite of what one is. Similarly, Wells' Man, though to a great extent a product of his scientific schooling, was defined in terms of those aspects of the world's apocalyptic reality which Sarah Wells had appropriated. This she achieved by using the threat of hellfire to discipline young Bertie while at the same time, by concealing from him its worst features, making both the threat and her power to control it infinitely more credible. But whatever the ultimate sources of Wells' belief, there is no doubt that in \textit{Moreau}, no less than in the other romances, the forces of destruction and unreason are drawn very powerfully, being frequently stronger than even the iron will of the protagonist--in this case Dr. Moreau himself--and that the forces available to reason are shown to be brittle and easily dispersed.

\textsuperscript{23}On this see Carl E. Schorske, \textit{op cit.}
Appendix A: Savage Ancestors in Wells

The illustrations in his *Outline of History* over which Wells did exercise control were those drawn by Frank Horrabin, whom Wells several times invited to his house, Easton Glebe. The MacKenzie note, *op cit*, p. 321, that Horrabin, "illustrator, map-maker and general factotum, spent several days at a time down at Easton Glebe." Horrabin's illustrations are not so wildly out of style with those supplied by the publisher Newnes, that one may not speculate Horrabin had a hand in choosing the illustrations, with Wells' approval, from the publisher's files, and in generally overseeing the visual "look" of the parts as each was issued from the press.

Interesting in this connection is Wells' short story, "The Grisly Folk" (*Storyteller Magazine*, April 1921, reprinted in *Selected Short Stories*, Penguin 1958 from Ernest Benn 1927). In the 1890's Wells evidently believed that Modern Man descended from "the blood-drinking, hairy savages of the Age of Unpolished Stone" (*Time Machine*, Epilogue). By the time he came to write *Outline* in 1919, however, new archeological evidence made this view untenable, and so in both factual and fictional versions--and the first two thousand words of "Grisly Folk" reads like a rejected draft from chapter nine of *Outline*--Wells carefully notes that there is no hereditary link between modern humans and the Neanderthalers. Yet this only serves to sharpen
the opposition between the two, and the tone of both writings stokes rather than banks the suspicion of a link between the two "races". Then too, if the "true men" are the more evolved, did they not of necessity have to pass through a Neanderthal-like stage? In "Grisly Folk" the recovery of the past, in the opening frame of the tale, was cause for optimism, but by the time Wells came to write The Croquet Player (1936), the happy glow surrounding the publication of Outline was totally dissipated and the ancestors of Modern Man are once again the "cave man, the ancestral ape, the ancestral brute... (whose) resurrected savageries are breathing now and thrusting everywhere" (p. 64). More on The Croquet Player will be found in chapter fourteen of the present essay.
Bibliography

The bibliography is intended to help the reader pursue questions which the main text might raise and is accordingly divided, for ease of reference, into subject areas. With one exception, in each area I have followed the usual practice and alphabetized the entries. Some of the works listed might easily fit into two (or more) subject areas, but rather than list them twice, I have, not altogether arbitrarily, assigned such works to their major area. More detailed information on the particular uses made of works should be sought in the footnotes.

1: Biographies and related articles

Since my assertion of a convergence in the texts of Freud and Wells rests on biographical data, and since this is the "point" to which the essay moves, biographies and articles of biographical interest form the first subject area. To avoid multiplying sub-headings, I have also included here biographical material on Darwin, which data is the subject of a speculation in chapter three, note eight.


2: Books by Wells

Between 1924 and 1926 Wells issued a subscribers edition of his writings to that time, The Atlantic Edition of the Complete Works of H. G. Wells (New York: Scribners). The Atlantic Edition cannot really be considered as complete, for Wells continued to write for another twenty years, nor (so far as the scientific romances are concerned) can it be considered definitive, since the historical basis of my argument demands texts from the 1890's, rather than revised versions of those texts from the 1920's. The Edition is interesting mainly because of the Prefaces Wells placed in each volume, and the light these throw on the romances. Where this Prefatory statement is particularly interesting I have noted the volume number the work occupies in the Atlantic Edition sequence. Others of Wells' works which contain informative or interesting prefaces are noted thus; "Preface by Wells".


II omits 'Introduction' by Prendick's nephew; reprints inconsistent, some following H., some At. Ed.


-----, The Scientific Romances of H. G. Wells (London: Gollancz, 1933). Published in US by Knopf as Seven Famous Novels; Preface by Wells.


-----, The War in the Air, and particularly how Mr. Bert Smallways fared while it lasted (London: George Bell, 1908). Includes illustrations from magazine serialization of the novel.

3: Articles by Wells

The current major source for Wells' articles of scientific journalism is the collection made by editors Robert M. Philmus and David Y. Hughes in their book, H. G. Wells: Early Writings in Science and Science Fiction (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1975), and it is from this book that most of the articles I cite are drawn. I have accordingly listed the original place and date of publication of each article, and followed this by noting its position in Philmus and Hughes.


4: Critical Studies on Wells

The listing that follows is not a complete file of all the books and articles on Wells' scientific romances, nor need it be, for nearly all the books listed contain lengthy bibliographies. In addition, bibliographies will be found in the biographies by West, and by Norman and Jeanne MacKenzie listed in section one of this bibliography.


Harris, Mason, "Science Fiction as the Dream and Nightmare of Progress", West Coast Review, three parts:

part 1; WCR 9-4 (April 1975), pp. 3-9,
part 2; WCR 10-1 (June 1975), pp. 19-26,
part 3; WCR 10-4 (April 1976), pp. 3-10.


5: Critical Studies of a general nature

This section was created mainly to avoid too great a number of sub-headings. Besides gathering in various works mentioned in the footnotes, it includes works on allegory, and one literary psychoanalytic study.


Sontag, Susan, "The Imagination of Disaster", in *Against Interpretation* (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 1966), pp. 120-144.

Stouk, David and Mary-Anne, "Hagiographical Style in Willa Cather's Death Comes for the Archbishop", *Univ. of Toronto Quarterly* 41 (1972), pp. 263-87.
6: Other works consulted: psychological

There are two major sources for the works of Freud—what this section largely consists of—which really resolve into one, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (24 vols.), translated and edited by James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud and assisted by Alix Strachey and Alan Tyson, published by Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis (London, 1953-1968). The second "source" is the International Psycho-Analytic Library, a series of volumes edited by M. Masud R. Khan, also issued jointly by Hogarth and the Institute, consisting of various of Freud's essays, each separately bound. The texts of these are (usually) identical to SE, the only difference being in pagination.

Because Freud's ideas altered throughout his life I have followed here the practise of the Editors of SE and listed his works chronologically. Each essay is followed by a notation of the volume of SE in which it appears.


------- (1900), The Interpretation of Dreams, SE, V. I's IV & V.
------- (1912-13), Totem and Taboo, SE, V. XIII, pp. 1-162.
------- (1914), "On Schoolboy Psychology", SE, V. XIII, pp. 239-end.
------- (1916-17), Introductory Lectures on PsychoAnalysis, SE,
V.'s XV & XVI; continuously paginated.

------- (1919), "The 'Uncanny'", SE, V. XVII, pp. 218-56.


------- (1923), The Ego and the Id, SE, V. XIX, pp. 3-66.


------- (1932), New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, SE, V. XXII, pp. 3-182. Lectures numbered consecutively with those of 1917.

------- (1938), An Outline of Psycho-Analysis, IPI 35; see also SE V. XXIII, pp. 141-207.


7: Other works consulted: general


Cohn, Norman, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millenarians and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (New
Huxley, T. H., "Evolution and Ethics" in V. IX of The Collected Works of Thomas Henry Huxley (New York: Greenwood Press, 1963, reprinted from New York: Appleton, 1902). This appears to be a facsimile reproduction of the original edition; the essay was first published in 1893, and with the "Prolegomena" in the following year.

