NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Yuwa Wong

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: Ethnicity and State Policy: The Canadian Case

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRAGE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADÉ: 1981

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: Dr. Heribert Adam

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

April 23, 1981

DATED/DATÉ: SIGNED/SIGNÉ.

PERMANENT ADDRESS/RÉSIDENCE FIXÉ: 3253 W. Pt. Grey Rd.

Vancouver, B.C.

V6K 1B3
NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4
ETHNICITY AND STATE POLICY: THE CANADIAN CASE

by

Yuwa Wong

B.A. Trent University, 1975,
M.A. Simon Fraser University, 1978

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

© Yuwa Wong 1981
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
February 1981
All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
Approval

Name: Yuwa Wong
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Title of thesis: Ethnicity and State Policy: The Canadian Case

Examining Committee:
  Chairperson: Dr. Karl Peter

  Herbert Adam
  Senior Supervisor

  Hamish Dickie-Clark

  John Whitworth

  Jorgen Dahlie
  External Examiner
  Chairman, Dept. of Educational Foundations
  University of British Columbia

Date Approved: April 7, 1981
I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend
my thesis, project or extended essay (the title of which is shown below)
to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or
single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the
library of any other university, or other educational institution, on
its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission
for multiple copying of this work for scholarly purposes may be granted
by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying
or publication of this work for financial gain shall not be allowed
without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

Ethnicity and State Policy: The Canadian Case

Author:

(Yuan Hong)

(name)

April 23, 1981

(date)
ABSTRACT

This thesis is concerned with the phenomenon of ethnicity, specifically the nature of ethnic relations and conflicts. In the course of the historical and theoretical examination of the process of the formation of ethnic relations, the role of the state has emerged as a pivotal factor. The area of state policy is viewed as the arena in which various structural and ideological factors come to a head. Hence, the role and functions of the state and the formulation of the relevant state policies represent a critical dimension in the general picture of ethnic relations. Within the Canadian context the immigration policy and the policy of multiculturalism are critically examined.

The thesis is divided into three parts. In the first part a theoretical perspective is established in regard to the analysis of ethnicity. Primordialism and circumstantialism, which represent the two opposite extremes of the theoretical spectrum, are critically reviewed. It is then argued that the concept of ethnic mobilization, which captures the most dynamic core elements of ethnic relations, should be adopted as the most appropriate analytical tool. In the second part a history of Canadian immigration is outlined and relevant state policies highlighted. In conjunction, a theoretical analysis of the role and functions of the state is provided. Within this matrix the
present policy of multiculturalism is critically examined. In the final part a model of national integration is adopted for the purpose of bringing into focus the various elements and factors that are analysed throughout the thesis. An overall view of the Canadian situation is then developed.

The conclusion is that while ethnic stratification in Canada is not severe, the general awareness of ethnicity has been on the rise, and the policy of multiculturalism fails in several important respects to address the serious questions of the cultural, economic and social equality and mobility of the ethnics. The policy is viewed at best as an evasion of such serious questions with the net effect of preserving the status quo. Hence, as an official state policy, it is totally inadequate to meet the challenge of the future growth and development of the Canadian society.
This thesis is dedicated to Mary-Joanne.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Professors H. Adam, H. Dickie-Clark and J. Whitworth for their guidance and patience during the research and writing of this thesis. Thanks are also due Barbara L. Barnett for her tireless efforts in the typing and numerous time consuming revisions of the manuscript.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Approval ................................................................. ii
Abstract ........................................................................ iii
Dedication ....................................................................... v
Acknowledgements ........................................................ vi
List of Tables ................................................................. viii

## PART I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE ........................................ 1

### CHAPTER ONE
Ethnicity -- Social-Political Approach ......................... 2

### CHAPTER TWO
Ethnic Mobilization: socio-historical factors .............. 23

### CHAPTER THREE
Ethnic Mobilization -- Group and socio-psychological factors ........................................ 57

## PART II: CANADIAN ETHNIC RELATIONS ......................... 83

### CHAPTER FOUR
Canadian Immigration Policy and Ethnic Relations .... 84

### CHAPTER FIVE
The Role and Functions of the State in Advanced Capitalism ........................................ 106

### CHAPTER SIX
Multiculturalism as State Policy ................................ 142

## PART III: CONCLUSION ....................................................... 165

### CHAPTER SEVEN
National Integration -- Ideals and Reality ................. 166

Bibliography ................................................................... 201
LIST OF TABLES

Table I: Ethnic Composition of the Canadian Population .... 84
Table II: Canadian Immigration, 1962-1967, Professional
and Technical Workers ........................................... 59
Table III: Annual Number of Immigrants, Canada .............. 99
Table IV: Japanese, Chinese and East Indian Immigrants to Canada 1941-74 ................................................. 100
Table V: Length of the Immigrants' Residence in Canada ..... 157
Table VI: Occupational Dissimilarity of Ethnic Groups
From Total Male Labor Force for 1931, 1951,
and 1961 ................................................................. 191
Table VII: Occupational Dissimilarity of Ethnic Groups
From Total Labor Force, 1971 ................................. 192
PART I: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
CHAPTER ONE

Ethnicity -- Social-Political Approach

In their introduction to *Ethnicity -- Theory and Experience* (Glazer and Moynihan, 1975), Glazer and Moynihan argue that there has emerged a social category—ethnicity—which is as significant for the understanding of the world today as that of social class. The new usage of the term ethnicity denotes something more than just minority or marginal groups which are expected to be assimilated and disappear. Ethnicity refers to the phenomenon of groups in a society which are characterized by a distinct sense of difference owing to culture and descent. They further speculate that perhaps such group formations are due to some deep-felt human needs that are always present but have been focused on by recent political and social developments in many countries in the world today. Hence, Isaacs' descriptive account of "the world breaking into its bits and pieces, bursting like big and little stars from exploding galaxies" (Issacs, 1975) is an account of the rise of ethnicity in the political arena as a major force in the shaping and reshaping of political unity and social structures.

Ethnicity is to be perceived as "new" for the following reasons. The first is the empirical fact that the extent, scale, and intensity of ethnic conflicts in the world today is almost
unprecedented. Isaacs' account demonstrates empirically that the rise of ethnicity and ethnic conflicts is a phenomenon that cuts across geographic, political and ideological, as well as economic boundaries. Both the capitalist and communist countries have to deal with ethnic problems. Neither the myth of utopia in communist ideology nor the liberal doctrine of modern democracy can replace the seemingly primitive ethnic attachment. Ethnicity as an organizing principle has contributed to conflicts such as civil wars, wars between states, terrorism, radical movements, etc. in countries with different degrees of economic and industrial development. From the most backward countries in the third world to Western European countries, ethnic conflicts and mobilizations are present and developing with different degrees of intensity.

The second reason is based on the fact that there is something in common among all ethnic conflicts. It can readily be seen that the focal points of ethnic conflicts vary and they can be racial, religious, linguistic or regional in nature; and yet they all seem to have this common characteristic that they are organized in pursuit of, directly or indirectly, economic and political interest. And in this sense ethnic groups function as interest groups.

Glazer and Moynihan (1975) suggest two different but related explanations that account for this development. The first is the development of welfare states in the advanced
economies of the world and the rise of "socialist" states in underdeveloped countries. Both the welfare states and socialist states are especially responsive to ethnic demands and claims. They call this phenomenon the "strategic efficacy of ethnicity" which refers to the actual and potential efficiency of making claims on the distribution of resources and wealth in modern states.

The second explanation is that while men are not equal, neither are ethnic groups. Different ethnic groups, due to their respective cultural and historical backgrounds, have different norms and values. Such norms and values would condition the respective degrees of success that they can achieve in a given, common circumstances. Some ethnic groups do better than others in the pursuit of positions of power and dominance in a given concrete historical situation. More and more ethnic groups have found themselves in such a position of competition with other groups since the colonization of the third world by European powers. Organized movements of people from one continent to another to meet the demands for labor are not infrequent and economic forces have also led to mass migration of peoples with a speed that is historically unprecedented. As a result inter-ethnic group contact intensifies and while some groups succeed in the competition for power and dominance, others fail. The reason, as stated earlier, is that ethnic groups bring different norms to bear on common circumstances which in turn
entail that they meet with different levels of success. Hence, inequality in terms of economic advantages and distribution of power, is drawn along ethnic lines.

The third reason is that ethnicity does not arise simply and exclusively out of the concern of the pursuit of material interest. Indeed, ethnicity is an effective means of advancing material interests precisely because it involves more than just material interests. Here we come upon the notion of basic group identity. Harold Isaacs' treatment of basic group identity is in the tradition of the so-called primordialism which deals with factors as immediate as the human body—its shapes, colors, odors; people's names and birthplaces; as well as language and culture. It is my opinion that this narrow primordialist interpretation is often inadequate and part of the problem is that many group identities with claims of primordial ties were created in relatively recent times.

The concept of primordialism needs to be redefined and I shall return to this question later on. What needs to be clarified at this point is that ethnicity provides not only the "strategic efficacy" as an organizational principle but also a sense of identity, a sense of belonging; in Isaacs' term, the "House of Mumbi". Glazer and Moynihan even go so far as to say that ethnicity provides the ideology for group mobilization. In contrast to this groups mobilized solely on the basis of class interest tend to fail to provide their members with adequate
psychological comfort and a sense of belonging. This is a controversial point but the fact remains that the so-called strategic efficacy of ethnicity is in part due to its appeal as an ideology.

This discussion of the rise of ethnicity implies an understanding of ethnicity that is, in Glacier and Moynihan's words:

"...[waverinq] between what we may call 'primordialist': men are divided thus and so, the reasons for their division are deep in history and experience, .... and what we may call 'circumstantialists': 'we are doubtful of any such basic divisions and look to specific and immediate circumstances to explain why groups maintain their identity ...'" (1975:64).

In order to solidify this interpretation of ethnicity, I would like to argue that both the circumstantialists' and primordialists' arguments are untenable when taken by themselves. An examination of the positions at these two extremes is in order.

It seems to me that one of the most representative circumstantialist arguments is the orthodox Marxist position. It can briefly be summarized as follows. Ethnic differences are relics of the past and the advent of capitalism has converted whole populations into classes—the capitalist and the proletariat. Ethnic conflict is to be seen strictly as class conflict in disguise and ethnic antagonism can either be interpreted as class antagonism when the two ethnic groups involved have different economic status, i.e., one is a dominant
capitalist group and the other a suppressed and exploited group; or it can be interpreted as a manifestation of false consciousness if both groups in conflict are subordinate groups.

In the first case it is really a case of class conflict although the economic cleavage coincides with the ethnic cleavage. In the latter case the proletarians have failed to see the real target of their struggle—the capitalists—and vent their anger at their brother workers. What follows from this interpretation is that ethnic differences would fade away as people begin to gain class consciousness. Furthermore, ethnic differences and antagonisms would simply disappear in a classless society, e.g., a socialist state. This orthodox Marxist interpretation of ethnicity can be summed up as a twofold one. Firstly, ethnic conflicts are derivatives of class conflicts. Secondly, ethnic antagonism, if it occurs among subordinate and exploited groups, is due to the false consciousness of these groups as a result of which they fail to realize their common class enemy—the capitalists. And of course, the capitalists would naturally encourage and manipulate this inter-group antagonism to their own advantage.

It is my belief that such an interpretation is not only too simplistic, but is also mechanical in its economic determinism. A criticism of this position can be formulated on both theoretical and empirical grounds. At the theoretical level, ethnicity can be shown to have a dynamic and momentum of its
own. In capitalist economies "class struggle" as conducted by labor unions has taken on a less ideological approach and the unions act as pressure groups with the right to strike as their bargaining power in the pursuit of material interests. Ethnic groups and organizations, as described by Isaacs, Glazer and Moynihan, have an appeal that is beyond calculated material interests. The so-called strategic efficacy of ethnicity reflects the fact that, on the one hand, the need for basic group identity is a deep rooted one and on the other hand, ethnic solidarity can fulfill such a need in a more satisfactory way.

At an empirical level, we have witnessed the persistence and increased significance of ethnic conflicts in the presumably classless societies in communist countries. If ethnic conflict is really a derivative of class conflict then the disappearance of ethnic conflict should be a natural consequence of the establishment of a classless society. Yet, insofar as there is information available about these societies, the contrary seems to be true. This is a dilemma reflected in the discrepancies between Marxist revolutionary strategy and ideology. Lenin (1969) was aware of the potential and strategic importance of ethnic sentiments as expressed in the form of nationalism. His view on this question was a pragmatic one and hence strategically practical but ideologically ambivalent. Nationalism was seen as a force to be used for revolutionary
purposes whenever and wherever possible, even if it was a result of false-consciousness of the masses. But once the revolutionary purposes have been served, the continued existence of nationalism, especially when cast in the role of a movement against the centralized authority and the "dictatorship of the proletariat," becomes intolerable.

In other words, Lenin's treatment of nationalism recognizes the utility of ethnic sentiments but does not legitimize them within the revolutionary structure. In the final analysis, Marxist ideology with its preponderant class analysis cannot explain adequately the survival (and in some cases the revival) of ethnic sentiments and mobilization in the modern era. It is from this perspective that the primordialist critique has to be taken seriously. However, it does not follow from this criticism that the Marxist interpretation is to be rejected entirely. The economic factor is an important one and what I am suggesting here is that simple-minded economic determinism should be avoided.

An example of a more sophisticated approach in which the economic and structural factors are integrated with the ethnic, the cultural, and the historical factors is Edna Bonacich's analysis of the split labor market. (Bonacich, 1972). Bonacich attempts to account for the apparent anomaly in which there are two antithetical forms of ethnic antagonism: exclusion movement and caste systems. By exclusion movement she means that one
dominant ethnic group attempts to keep other ethnic groups out of the labor market so as to prevent competition. Consequently the dominant group with its monopoly of the labor market can better bargain with capital for higher wages. The caste system arrangement exists when cheap labor in the form of subordinate ethnic groups is already present and cannot be kept out of the labor market. Through the use of the caste system arrangement, the dominant group can exclude cheap labor from certain types of work so as to preserve a monopoly in the better-paid segments of the labor market. Thus, ethnic antagonism results from economic structures of the society and particularly, from the split labor market. When the labor market is split along ethnic lines, with several groups of workers commanding different wages, then fierce competition occurs between these groups. Capital would naturally use the cheapest labor available and hence such competition would result in the lowering of the price of labor.

However, the minimal price of labor differs among different ethnic groups. It is at this point that the analysis of cultural and historical factors becomes important. The price of labor of a specific ethnic group is conditioned by the resources available to the group as well as the motives of the group members for entering the labor market. The living standard of the ethnic group, the information regarding the labor market available to group members, the political power wielded by them contribute to what they consider to be the minimal price of
their labor. Furthermore, if the motive of the workers is to engage in temporary employment in a new labor market and return home with the money earned, then they are more willing to put up with undesirable working conditions and more reluctant to get involved in labor disputes and strike actions.

Historically speaking, the European colonization of the third world precipitated migrations of peoples and different ethnic groups found themselves competing in different labor markets. The competitive power of a specific ethnic group is further conditioned by the values and norms prevalent in the cultural background of the group in question. As Glacier and Moynihan have pointed out, inequality exists among ethnic groups due to their respective competitive power which in turn is determined by their different cultural and historical situations. Given such inequality, a dominant group would emerge in a national context. The reason why a specific dominant group gains its ascendancy varies. It can be the numerical majority of the group and hence its political power such as the white protestants of Anglo-Saxon descent in North America. Or it can be the technological, economic, and hence political power wielded by the group such as the Afrikaners in South Africa. Whatever the reason, dominant groups do emerge and either exclusion movement or caste system arrangement or some kind of combination of both are used by the dominant ethnic groups to prevent competition. Given the nature of such competition among
ethnic groups, ethnic conflicts and antagonism are the logical consequences.

Bonacich's analysis of the split labor market as a structural account of ethnic antagonism is an example of what I would like to call "circumstantialism redefined." The structural factors are understood in conjunction with cultural, historical, and ideological ones, the last being an explicit and logical system of ideas which purports to explain the world, and the result is a richer and deeper insight into the nature of ethnic antagonism. Before I move into a discussion of this mode of analysis, I would like to examine the other extreme of the spectrum, that is, primordialism.

Primordialism argues that there are basic and fundamental divisions among people that are deeply rooted in their histories and culture. It is argued that there is such a thing as basic identity which a person acquires at birth. It is composed of so-called primordial affinities and attachments which can in turn be understood as varieties of skin colors and physical characteristics, names and language, history and origin, religion, nationality and so on. A more radical form of primordialism is the attempt to ground such primordial affinities and sentiments in the biological nature of man. An example of such a theory is to be found in Pierre Van den Berghe's "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological Perspective." (P. Van den Berghe, 1978).
P. Van den Berghe attempts to subsume the concepts of race and ethnicity "under a more comprehensive theoretical umbrella derived from sociobiology." Sociobiology, according to him, is "little else than a more theoretically grounded, and less descriptive brand of ethology informed by behaviour genetics." (1978:12) And the most basic question asked by sociobiology is, Van den Berghe states, identical to that asked by sociology, namely, why are animals social? From this point of departure sociobiology delineates the "genetic mechanism" for animal sociality which is the notion of "kin selection." "Kin selection" is the means through which animals can behave cooperatively and enhance each other's fitness (the notion of inclusive fitness) for survival. In this sense, animals are nepotistic, preferring kin over non-kin and furthermore, this can be a conscious as well as an unconscious attitude.

Given this framework, one can see how race and ethnicity can be interpreted as human modes of sociality and this notion of sociality can in turn be accounted for by the concept of kin selection. However, Van den Berghe points out that "it is also clear that kin selection does not explain all of human sociality." (1978:20) Two additional bases of human sociality are provided: reciprocity and coercion. Reciprocity is understood as the process of cooperation for mutual benefit and it can take place between kin as well as non-kin. Coercion is the use of brute force for the benefit of the group, Van den
Berghe also indicates that in human society reciprocity and coercion play a much more complex and important role than in any other species. All these three principles of sociality: kin selection, reciprocity, coercion, are present in the organization of human societies but as a society becomes larger and more complex, the importance of reciprocity and coercion becomes greater.

Van den Berghe suggests that based on these considerations a theory can be constructed "in the most undogmatic fashion that human behaviour is the product of a long process of adaptive evolution that involved the complex interplay of genotypical, ecological and cultural factors." (1978:24) This theory would be "reductionist, evolutionist, and materialist." The explanation of race (social race) and ethnicity can be construed in terms of kinship relations and hence ethnic sentiments are manifestations of kinship selection. That is to say that race and ethnicity as modes of human sociality are to be accounted for by the principle of kin selection.

At this point, Van den Berghe introduces a distinction between two types of collectivities. Type I is the kind of human collectivities that are organized on racial, caste, and ethnic grounds. Type II consists of varied associations such as trade unions, political parties, professional bodies, and so on. When fitted into the larger framework of the three principles of sociality as outlined above, type I is based on the principle of
kin selection and type II is based on the principles of reciprocity and in particular instances, of coercion. The underlying organizing force for collectivities of type II is that of interest. The principle of reciprocity denotes that people cooperate because of mutual benefits. That is to say that a common interest is recognized by the people (of different groups) involved and to that end they cooperate. The notion of interest here should be construed in its most general sense as promoting the chances or the potential for survival (or for survival with a certain quality that is deemed as inviolable) of the groups in question.

My criticism of Van den Berqhe's thesis is a twofold one. Since Van den Berqhe puts forth his thesis in the form of a theory—a "reductionist, evolutionist and materialist" theory—I would like to first examine the structure of such a theory. Let this be called "formal criticism." This leads to the second aspect of my criticism since I consider what is criticized on the level of the formal structure of the theory a mere symptom of a deeper problem. And hence this second aspect of my criticism is a discussion of the actual content of the theory.

Formal criticism: as a theory which purports to explain race and ethnicity, sociobiology a la Van den Berqhe is a vacuous one. The structure of the theory is as follows. Race and ethnicity are modes of human sociality. Sociality is in turn explained in terms of the principles of kin selection,
reciprocity, and coercion. As a theory, its explanatory power should be judged in terms of its ability to explain phenomena by their reduction to a covering law. But the covering law in this case has three separate parts, namely, the three principles as mentioned above. Under what condition each of these three principles should be invoked is largely, in Van den Bergh's formulation, an unanswered question. That is to say the reductionist part of the theory is vacuous since it is not clear how the reduction is to take place. But as I mentioned earlier this weakness is merely a symptom of something deeper and I will attempt to elaborate on this next.

Discussion of content: as to the question of how the three principles of sociality are related, Van den Bergh hints that it is a question of evolutionary history in which the principle of kin selection is gradually replaced by the principles of reciprocity and coercion. But the question is of course what has caused such a change. It seems to me that one can attribute the historical--evolutionary rise of the principles of reciprocity and coercion to cultural factors. But how can these cultural factors be explained from a sociobiological perspective? Perhaps these cultural factors are to be accounted for sociobiologically, i.e., back to the principle of kin selection. But this renders the entire argument circular. To retreat back to evolutionary history and cultural factors is question begging if one wants to apply a sociobiological theory.
This problem can be further highlighted by Van den Berghe's distinction between type I and type II of collectivities. Type I is organized on the basis of kin selection, i.e., sociobiologically based, and it is supposed to promote the interest of survival. Type II is based on the question of mutual benefit, and significantly, benefit perceived as such by the people involved. It is easy to see that when pressed these two types can be shown to be incompatible. Both types of collectivities purport to achieve the same end—interest of survival. However, while type I is motivated by an interest that is biologically and genetically based, and as pointed out by Van den Berghe, need not be a conscious process; type II is motivated by an interest that is a perceived one. That is to say the interest of mutual benefit is recognized as such by the people involved. With the change of the concrete historical and social conditions, what was once perceived as beneficial can now be seen as harmful. In other words, type II collectivities are organized in the context of concrete historical-social conditions as well as people's perception of them, and the interactions between them are dynamical and contingent upon the above mentioned factors.

In contrast to type II, type I appears to be static and unchangeable since it is bio-technically based. And in fact there is ample evidence indicating that type I collectivities can become hindrances to the organization of type II
collectivities. If the interest of survival is a concept that has to be understood in relation to the concrete historical, economic, and social conditions of the time, then the sociobiologically based notion of interest (which is static) not only cannot take into account the ever-changing fortunes of the increasingly complex human societies, it can even be detrimental to the achievement of its purported goal, survival in general.

A more moderate account of primordialism is Clifford Geertz's discussion in The Integrative Revolution—Primordial sentiments and civil politics in the new states. (Geertz, 1963). Geertz studies the persistent force of primordial attachments and the role it plays in civil politics in the new states that have emerged since the World War II such as India, states in Indochina and Africa. Geertz describes primordial attachment as:

"...one that stems from the 'givens'—or more precisely, as culture is inevitably involved in such matters, the assumed 'givens'—of social existence: immediate contiguity and kin connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom, and so on, are seen to have an ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness, in and of themselves." (1963: 76)

Juxtaposed to such primordial attachments is the need for an overarching loyalty to the civil state in order for national unity to be possible. The allegiance to the civil state is maintained to varying degrees by the governmental use of police power and ideological persuasion. In the civil politics of the
so-called new states where the concept of an overarching national unity is often arbitrary and without a long standing history while the populations consist of peoples from many different cultural and linguistic backgrounds, such primordial attachments usually form the bases of political organizations and vehicles of expressions of discontent. As Geertz points out, it is difficult to reduce such ethnic solidarities to a larger civil order because political modernization tends to activate rather than quiet them. However, Geertz is, as I interpret him, not suggesting that there is some intrinsic incompatibility between ethnically based primordial sentiments and civil order. He is quick to point out that:

"...primordialism and civil sentiments are not ranged in direct and implicitly evolutionary opposition to one another...Their marked tendency to interfere with one another in the new states stems not from any natural and irremovable antipathy between them but rather from dislocations arising from the differing patterns of change intrinsic to each of them as they respond to the disequilibrating forces of the mid-twentieth century." (1963:83) (my italics).

Primordial and civil sentiments, then, are seen to interact with each other in a concrete historical context. The use of primordial sentiments for political ends in the civil politics of the new states indicates the states' inability to attract an overarching allegiance to national unity. This in turn points to the fragile and arbitrary nature of the political reality of these states. In this way primordialism has to be understood within the concrete context of the political and social
structures of the situation in question. Primordial attachment is a force only when it is needed as a force and as a principle of organization. And this need stems from a set of given political and social structures which can be said to have given rise to the significance of primordial attachment. Ethnicity, then, cannot be accounted for simply by so-called primordialism. The structural factors have to be seen as integral parts of any meaningful analysis of ethnicity.

An important function of primordial sentiment is its role in constituting what is known as the basic group identity. Geertz's study as outlined above points to the fact that the civil orders of these new nations fail to provide a sense of identity for their populations as wholes. National unity remains an elusive dream as long as the various ethnic groups retreat to their primordial attachment for a sense of belonging, of identity. Here we have touched upon the psychological aspect of ethnicity. The question of identity and personality is a complex one and I do not wish to go into a detailed discussion of it here. The psychological aspect of ethnicity is introduced here as a rejoinder to the argument that ethnicity can be understood strictly from the perspective of primordialism. A social psychological account of ethnic mobilization can be provided in terms of collective anxiety about the future, dreams of restoring a glorified past, failure to understand present miseries, and in the midst of all these the individual's
insecurity about his role in the society. It is often in an environment in which the individual fails to achieve self esteem and a clear sense of personal identity in the face of anxiety and uncertainty about the future that the individual latches onto his immediately available and gratuitous ethnic identity.

In other words, it is a case in which an individual fails to carve out an identity that is based on his individual achievement and consequently falls back on the gratuitous ethnic identity that is a given by virtue of his primordial ties. If this is true, what follows is that individually achieved identity would supercede one's primordial ties and provide a new and genuine identity for the individual in question. Therefore the answers to questions such as why people lose faith, why people seek prophets, and why certain people are immune to agitation organized on ethnic grounds are to be found in terms of forms of socialization that individuals undergo and consequently their respective ability to cope with anxiety and to form their own identities. In light of this, the position that primordial ties and attachment constitute ethnicity directly is rendered untenable. As I have mentioned earlier the question of personality and identity formation is a complex one and I shall return to it in a later context.

At this point I would like to propose that ethnicity is to be understood in terms of a dual process in which both circumstantialism and primordialism are re-defined. On the
societal level, modes of production and economic and political structures are to be integrated with the cultural history and the prevalent ideologies of the groups in question. On the individual level economic and ethnic stratification, actual as well as perceived, is to be understood in relation to the process of identity formation, personality and the interrelations of group identities. This integrated approach ethnicity permits the analysis of ethnicity in terms of the potential or actual development of political culture. Ethnic mobilization will be analysed in terms of the dynamics of the formation of such a political culture.
CHAPTER TWO

Ethnic Mobilization: socio-historical factors

By "ethnic mobilization" I mean the process through which an ethnic group comes to develop a clear sense of its identity in the given sociopolitical context and achieve a level of organization and ideologization whereby collective actions can be undertaken with a centralized leadership for specific political purposes. Often this means that particularistic interests are formed into a common cause embraced by most of the group members. In their struggle they maintain their group cohesion and demand sacrifice in the name of their common ethnic bond, be it racial, linguistic, religious or regional (or any combination of these) in nature.

It seems to me that an analysis of such a process can be approached at two distinct, though clearly related levels. At the structural level a number of objective factors need to be analysed. The history and cultural traditions of the society, the dominant mode of production in the economy, the political system and the comparative strength and ecologies of the ethnic groups in question are some such factors. Each of these require careful exploration and examination of their interrelationships.

The central question to be answered here is how do ethnic groups' interests become politicized and why do ethnic
antagonisms and conflicts emerge? At the more individual and subjective level the foci are the formation of group identities, forces underlying group cohesion and disintegration, and the role of psychological elements in the rise of ethnic consciousness. The important questions are how does a mobilizing ethnic group bridge its intra-group conflicts? And what is the nature of the psychological mechanisms that are instrumental in the shaping of ethnocentrism and racism?

The conditions governing the mobilization of a particular ethnic group are historically specific and no simple formula can be derived that is applicable in all cases. What is intended here is merely an attempt to outline at a very general level the conditions for ethnic mobilization formulated with respect to the broad division of the structural and the group and psychological factors mentioned above. In this chapter I want to provide a description of the set of conditions for mobilization at the structural and historical level and in the next chapter the set of conditions at the group and individual-psychological level will be discussed.

The conceptualization of plural societies, it seems to me, provides an adequate starting point for our discussion. It is within the context of a plural society that different ethnic groups encounter one another in virtue of some external forces, be they economic or political, that bring them together. And, as I shall argue later, the cultural attributes of these ethnic
groups are molded and structured and at times new ones are created because of the interactions between them. Therefore, in order to understand the general conditions for ethnic mobilization, we have to understand the very environment within which it occurs. The development of the concept of plural society is the first step toward such an understanding.

The concept of plural society was first introduced by Furnivall (1948). He developed the theory of plural societies based on his observation of colonial tropical societies, specifically the Dutch East Indies in south-east Asia. He pointed out that in a plural society:

"Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling." (1949:208)

Thus in a plural society there are a number of ethnic groups living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit. There is a division of labor along ethnic lines. According to Furnivall, three distinguishing features can be identified. (1) The society as a whole comprises separate ethnic groups. (2) Each group is an aggregate of individuals rather than an organic whole. (3) As individuals their social life is incomplete. In his formulation, Furnivall sees economic forces as playing a crucial role in a plural society. The meeting of these ethnic groups is not voluntary but imposed by the colonial power or by force of economic circumstances and their union
cannot be dissolved without the whole society relapsing into anarchy. Hence, the relationships between these different ethnic groups are characterized by dissensus and inherent instability. The lack of a common social will causes the incompleteness of the individual social life.

M.G. Smith (1969:2) develops this somewhat limited concept of plural society and raises it to a level of generality that extends beyond its colonial origin. In his universalization of the concept in which it is demonstrated that a great number of societies other than the tropical colonial ones show pluralistic features, Smith emphasizes the role of cultural and ethnic pluralism. Cultural and ethnic pluralism is seen as of primary importance in the formation of social and structural cleavages in the plural society. Cultural attributes and ethnicity are considered, in this perspective, as immutable givens, the accommodation of which leads to the segmentation of the society.

In his criticism of Smith, Kuper (1974:240-1) argues that this formulation ignores, on the one hand the significance of cross-cutting relationships that can be developed across ethnic cleavages and, on the other hand, it is insensitive to the possibility of bonds of common interest forming on the basis of class situation. There is no doubt that both Kuper's points are correct but beyond his criticism a far more serious objection can be raised. It seems to me that not only are cultural and ethnic attributes not immutable, but they can be shown to be
products of interactions of such groups in changing circumstances.

Charsley (1974) has concluded, in his study of the formation of ethnic groups in Uganda, that having a common culture is not a necessary condition. Take for example the importation of African slaves to the southern United States. These slaves came from diverse backgrounds—different peoples from different regions of Africa speaking different languages. They did not come from a common cultural background in the strict sense of the term. And in fact these enslaved Africans considered themselves as belonging to different cultural and ethnic backgrounds. But due to the process of their incorporation in the society of the southern United States they were perceived as a homogeneous group—the black African slaves—and in time they did evolve into an ethnic group with a distinct common ethnic identity. The emphasis on immutability of cultural and ethnic attributes has the danger of being a-historical in its approach and smacks of extreme primordialism.

Kuper's own conclusion is that:

"What is common to these conceptions of cultural society and of pluralism is that they have come to be applied to any society that is politically unitary through being under a single, supreme political authority, or that has a unitary organization in relation to the outside world by any other structural criteria, but is internally made up of racially or ethnically or culturally diverse groups who maintain distinguishable ways of life." (1974:243)
At the conceptual level, Smith argues that the origin of a plural society can be traced to what he calls the basis of "differential incorporation" of ethnic groups. By the term "differential incorporation" he means that an ethnic group is incorporated in a subordinate state into a society in which there is a hierarchical structure of ethnic relations, with a dominant group controlling the central political power and having greater access to sources of status and wealth. Historically the situation of colonialism and slavery are classic examples. In his discussion of the conditions of pluralism Kuper (1969:14) points out explicitly that the nature of differential incorporation of a specific ethnic group is directly related to the historical background and context in which the ethnic group is incorporated.

There are several major historical trends of incorporation through which various forms of ethnic relations are brought into existence. The colonial expansion of the European powers and the subsequent colonization of what is now called the third world created a great number of plural societies with a variety of social and political structures. The importation of slaves to North and South America in turn brought into existence plural societies of a different kind. Further, in a number of European societies and in Canada, pluralistic features are manifested to differing degrees, due to the historical migration of peoples of different ethnic groups and movement of indentured labor. More
recently, immigrants from the third world countries have added another dimension to the pluralistic nature of these developed societies.

Kuper's analysis (1969) of the plural societies in the colonial setting focuses on the question of political power. In the post-conquest and settlement period the subsequent process of differential incorporation is maintained by the political domination of the subordinate groups. He points out that race and ethnicity only become social categories, and racial and ethnic relations only become hierarchical, through the manner in which racial and ethnic differences are elaborated as a principle of organization and association in political and other institutions. It is these associated factors which give race and ethnicity independent significance. Economic position is only one of the associated factors and not necessarily the most crucial one.

In contradistinction to the Marxist position, Kuper argues that differential political incorporation of ethnic groups is the basis upon which the superstructure of economic, educational and bureaucratic institutions is built. This original inequality of political power ramifies throughout the institutions of the society. Hence, economic institutions are regarded as part of this superstructure. It is on this basis that Kuper, in his discussion of racial revolutions, maintains that the primary objective of the minority groups in such struggles is to change
the structure of political domination. The relationship to the means of production are thus seen as determined by the political relations between these groups.

Therefore, the historical dimension is to be delineated in terms of the social relations between ethnic groups developed over the years which are elaborations of the original differential incorporation. This process of elaboration is diffuse, having ramifications throughout the rest of the society. The struggle between ethnic groups takes on the form of a struggle over the terms of incorporation, that is, their respective shares of political power. Under such circumstances status and power politics are important instruments for mobilization and at times, Kuper believes, they may even overshadow economic grievances. Class factors do enter into ethnic conflicts at different levels, but only as a secondary factor and an intervening variable in the hierarchical structure of ethnic relations.

While Kuper's criticism of Smith's overemphasis of the immutability of cultural attributes is valid, it is my view that he has in turn over-emphasized the importance of the role of the political factor. Put more precisely, it is the fact of his singling out of the political factor as the base structure that I see as unwarranted. There is no doubt that the political domination of the subordinate groups makes economic exploitation possible and hence it is in the interest of the dominant group
to strengthen the mechanism of political domination and, as Kuper puts it, its ramification throughout the rest of the institutions of the society. It is also clear that the actual form of political domination may take on an existence of its own, acquiring a kind of functional autonomy, so much so that it may in time obstruct rather than serve the changing economic needs of the society. But to give it an entirely separate existence as Kuper has done by conceptualizing it as the base structure is to risk the danger of reifying it.

The political structure of a society is intimately connected with its economic reality and I would argue that there is a continuing dialectical interaction between the two. The politicians and policy-makers are not blind to the economic imperatives that they are constantly confronted with and there is no long term benefit for them in maintaining a system of political domination for its own sake. Even in South Africa where racialism is the norm and political domination of the Africans in the form of apartheid an established reality, the economic imperatives of industrialization are having a far reaching and continuing effect on the structure of racial stratification. It has been argued (see R. Adam, 1971, for an explication of this point in a detailed analysis of the South African situation.) that the ruling section of the Afrikaners should be seen as a pragmatic oligarchy which is sensitive to the changing economic needs of their society. Of course, the
relation between the dominant whites and the oppressed blacks is dialectic in nature. And it is on this basis that Adam suggests that the growing white economic dependency on political subordinates is perhaps the only realistic base on which the latter can pressure the whites into making substantial concessions.

At the conceptual level we can argue that the political system of a society is the mechanism through which essential institutions of the society are shaped, maintained and developed to meet internal needs and external challenges. Failure to do so brings about the demise of the society as a polity. The economic factor is a central part of the social reality to which the political structure of the society is closely linked. They act upon each other, adjusting to each other's needs and being in turn molded by each other. Therefore, an analysis of plural society has to consider both the realities of political domination and economic structures and modes of exploitation. The following paragraphs are brief descriptions of the major settings of plural societies founded on the juxtaposition of different social, cultural, economic and historical conditions.

Colonialism—when used in reference to the European conquest of what is today known as the third world—began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This process of conquest and exploitation of the land and native populations developed
principally in three areas of the world. In tropical America the Spanish established colonies in the highlands of Mesoamerica and the Andes. The British, the Dutch, and to a lesser extent the Portuguese conquered much of south-east Asia. Their colonial power stretched from India to Indochina and Indonesia. The conquest of Africa came later, in the nineteenth century, but the European powers engulfed nearly all of the continent in a relatively short span of time. The Dutch, the French and the British founded privately owned but state-sponsored trading firms with shipping lines and in cooperation with the colonial governments they formed the ruling oligarchies in their respective colonies.

In the colonial societies the social hierarchy and relations across the color lines were rigid and distant and were governed by etiquettes of dominance and subordination. The brutality of conquest, the severity of exploitation and domination were rationalized through a complex ideology. Colonial expansion was interpreted as a necessary "civilizing mission" to bring Christianity and civilization to the barbaric and backward natives. The European's technological superiority was taken to be a proof of their cultural superiority and hence provided a justification of continued domination.

The exploitation of the colonies involved not only the controlling of trade but more importantly the exploitation of native labor. The need to organize production of raw materials
was accelerated by the expanding capitalistic development of the late eighteenth century Europe. The Industrial Revolution added momentum to this whole process by generating a demand for new raw materials. There were basically two ways to secure labor supplies in the colonies. There were the colonies where native labor supplies were in abundance and hence the labor force could be recruited locally. There were other colonies that needed to import slaves or indentured laborers because there were not enough natives to supply labor demand or the natives were deemed to be unsuitable.

The institution of slavery led to a whole new phase of development with far reaching consequences and ramifications. What these two types of labor supply have in common is the use of coercion in securing and controlling the native laborers. Other than the direct use of brute force, a complex scheme of ideological indoctrination was also used to ensure that the native population would remain docile and reliable. They were taught to believe in and accept their "inferiority." In general the whole of colonial society was characterized by double standards—in systems of justice, of privileges, and of behaviour. The European conquerors formed a ruling aristocracy enjoying high standards of living, exclusive access to legal and political power and status, while the natives had to suffer discriminatory practices that were imposed on them. They formed a population that was legally and politically disenfranchised.
A second major factor in the formation of forms of plural society was the slave trade and the institutionalization of slavery in the American colonies. The estimated number of slaves imported to the Americas between 1500 and 1850 is around fifteen million. (van den Berghe, 1980) The slaves were obtained mostly from the west coast of Africa. The West African societies were populated densely enough to sustain the drain of manpower, and since their locations were the nearest source of labor acclimatized to the tropics they became the logical choice as the source of slaves. A transatlantic trade cycle was thus operated with slaves as a major commodity. Slaves were shipped from west Africa to the Americas where they were sold. Tropical crops were purchased there and brought back to Europe. After the tropical crops were sold manufactured European goods were purchased. They were then shipped to west Africa where they were traded for slaves. In this process tremendous profits were made.

At the height of the slave trade and when the system of plantation slavery in the Americas was at its peak, which was between the years of 1701 and 1810, British North America imported about three hundred and fifty thousand slaves, roughly three thousand a year. In comparison, during the same time period the Spanish colonies imported an estimated five hundred and eighty thousand; the British Caribbean one million and four hundred thousand; the French Caribbean one million three hundred and fifty thousand; the Dutch islands four hundred and sixty
thousand; and Brazil one million nine hundred thousand. (van den Berghe, 1980) The slave trade in the southern United States was very marginal in comparison.

There were basically two forms of slave labor exploitation: the so-called domestic slavery and chattel slavery. (Rex, 1970). Chattel slavery refers to the systematic use and exploitation of slave labor in large scale capitalistic production as in mining and raw material production in South America and to a lesser degree the plantation economy in the southern United States. It is characterized by its large scale and complex organization of labor in the production of commodities for export. By contrast domestic slavery is typical of small scale exploitation of slave labor in predominantly pre-capitalistic societies and modes of production.

Slavery as a form of forced labor with its concomitant legal exclusion from political participation and civil rights constitutes one of the most oppressive forms of ethnic relations. In the process of being captured and shipped overseas the slaves experienced the most horrifying shock of being uprooted abruptly from their homeland and forcibly transposed to an alien environment. John Rex (1970), in tracing the historical development of colonial societies, cites the fact that from the time an African was captured to the time when he was settled in the Americas as a slave he had gone through a series of six shocks. There was the shock of capture, the shock of the march to
the sea, the shock of being sold, the shock of the voyage, the shock of resale to a master which usually entailed the breaking up of all ethnic and familial ties, and finally there was the shock of the new environment and climate. In addition it has to be remembered that two thirds of the captured Africans died on the way to America. The very brutality and violence used in such a process have left their imprints on the subsequent development of these societies.

Different regions in the Americas where the institution of slavery was established provided different socio-political and environmental conditions for its growth. The situation in Brazil was drastically different from that in the southern United States. These are very complex situational factors affecting the formation of a specific slavery society. They can briefly be summed up into three broad categories. The first category concerns environmental and working conditions in general. The type of work, such as mining, plantation, etc., and the conditions of housing, food and so on affected the slave's day to day life. The second category consists of social conditions which determined important factors of socialization such as the kind of family structure that the slave was allowed to maintain, the form of religious life that he practised voluntarily or as a result of forced conversion. These conditions directly affected the slave's socialization process and hence the subsequent development of his cultural life. Finally, the colonial
authority's policies concerning the slave's access to freedom and citizenship ultimately determined the fate of the slave in his quest for freedom and a better life. (Van den Bergh, 1980).

In regard to this last set of factors, the situation of Brazilian and Caribbean slaves differed substantially from that of slaves in the southern United States. In the southern United States, manumission was a virtual impossibility while in Brazil and the Caribbean it was considerably easier to obtain. (Hox, 1970). The consequence of this important difference can be seen in the radically different characteristics of racial and ethnic relations in the southern United States and Brazil and the Caribbean respectively. While the deeply entrenched racial prejudice and tensions in the southern United States are well documented, the inter-ethnic and racial relations in Brazil and the Caribbean are relatively benign and in some instances class cleavages are deemed to be more important than ethnic cleavages.

In general, slave societies are distinguished by the brutality and violence used in their very creation and the scope and intensity of the suffering of the victims. It has been remarked that one of the most frightening and destructive aspects of slavery was the total uprooting from all of one's ethnic ties and relations and the destruction of one's culture. The slaves suffered this fate and its consequences are still evident in such societies today.
The concept of the "middleman minority" (Bonacich, 1972, 1973; Hechter, 1976) has been formulated in reference to those ethnic groups that are found to occupy a similar position in the social structure around the world in different plural societies. They form a unique dimension of the racial and ethnic relations in these societies. Some examples are the Jews in Europe, Chinese in southeast Asia, Armenians in Turkey, Syrians in west Africa, Parsis in India and Japanese and Greeks in the United States. The factor common to all these groups is the economic role they play. They do not occupy the low-status positions in the society like most other ethnic minorities. They tend to pursue trade and commerce as their mainlines of occupation but also other typically "middleman" occupations such as labor contractors and so on.

A typical setting for middleman minorities is a colonial system in which the ruling colonial masters find themselves incapable, either due to the lack of numbers or skills, of filling a broad middle range of occupations. A third group, the so-called middleman minority, is then brought in to fill the gap. The middleman minority as a group can be characterized by its ability to accumulate capital through thrift and collective efforts. They tend to prefer occupations that can easily be liquidated or transported such as farming crops that have rapid turnover or in skilled trades and craftsmanship. Their occupational characteristic then is liquidity.
Bonacich, among others, has argued that this characteristic is due to the middleman minority's "future orientation" and their status as "sojourners." This interpretation treats the middleman minorities as immigrants who do not plan to settle permanently. They are thrifty because their prime objective is to make and save enough money for them to return to their homeland to start a better life. Hence they are willing to suffer short term deprivation for long term goals. Their social characteristics are also interpreted as consequences of this general orientation toward a homeland. Their residential segregation, preservation of their cultures and languages and lack of social interaction with the host society are all seen as derived from their sojourning nature.

This interpretation has been seriously challenged. A number of the assumptions built into this "sojourning" interpretation are revealed as unwarranted upon closer scrutiny. A more realistic assessment of these middleman minorities' social and economic characteristics would indicate that they evolved out of the the group members' status-insecurity and anxiety about persecution and deportation. In other words, the middleman minorities do not usually have much of a choice in what they are allowed to do in the host society where institutionalized racial and ethnic persecutions are practised.

The conflict between the middleman minorities and the host society is both economically based and socially
institutionalized.

This conflict can be analysed in terms of three sets of antagonistic relations. The middleman group conflicts with their clientele, the business community, and labor. The conflict with their clientele is seen as part of the inevitable conflict of interest between buyer and seller, renter and landlord. Due to the nature of most of the professions held by members of the middleman minorities, they appear to the indigenes to be profiting from the control of the economic life lines of the community. Secondly, the conflict with the business community of the settled population is caused by the middleman groups' competitive capacity. They are willing to suffer short term deprivation for long term gains and hence they are in a position to offer lower prices for the sake of getting business and accept smaller profit margins. Their competitive ability is further enhanced by their efficient organization and intimate ethnic ties and cooperations. Thirdly, there is the conflict with labor. Bonacich made this point in her analysis of the split labor market as discussed in the previous chapter. The labor market is split between cheap labor as represented by the middleman minorities and the higher priced labor of the local workers. Here a distinction has to be made between middleman minority workers who come into conflict with the higher priced local labor and the self-employed middleman minorities who are treated as "pariah capitalist" who are in conflict with their.
clientele and the indigenous business interests.

The stereotypical accusations that are heaped upon the middleman minorities are that they are disloyal to their host countries, they drain the resource of the host society because they send money back to their homeland, and that they have no interests in the host society beyond the goal of making as much money as possible. They are in general considered to be unassimilable and threatening to the host society. Of course, as is argued above, these middleman minorities' characteristics are caused by, rather than the causes of, discriminatory government measures against them: prohibiting them to own land, restricting them from moving into certain occupations, revoking their business licenses, and so on. Institutionalized racialism and ethnic persecutions are the underlying factors that force the middleman minorities to develop the kind of characteristics that they have in order to survive in face of adverse conditions.

The situation of the middleman minorities is probably the most perilous and vulnerable of all subordinate ethnic groups. They are the ideal scapegoats. They are often defined as alien and hence not protected by any of the social and political institutions of the host society. As pariah capitalists they are wealthy enough to be envied by the masses and to make their persecution profitable to the authorities. They are excluded from politics and civil society and are tolerated only as long as they serve a need.
Another form of plural society to be discussed in this broad categorization is consociational democracy. (Lijphart, 1977; Nordlinger, 1972) According to Lijphart, consociational democracy can be defined in terms of both the segmental cleavages typical of a plural society and the political cooperation of the segmental elites. Examples of this form of plural society are Switzerland and Belgium in western Europe, Yugoslavia in eastern Europe, Malaysia in Asia, and to a certain degree Canada in North America. The characteristic features of consociational democracy are: 1. a grand coalition which involves the cooperation of the elites from all significant segments of the plural society; 2. mutual veto or concurrent majority rule which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests; 3. proportionality, which serves as the principal standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; 4. a regional autonomy which allows each segment to run its own internal affairs.

Consociationalism is a descriptive concept. Attempts to develop it as a prescriptive one must necessarily take account of the difficulty of implementing a consociational political system on the ever-changing soil of political cultures each of which has a unique social history that may or may not prove to be receptive to it. In other words, consociational democracy evolves out of specific socio-historical contexts and hence
instances of its success have to be understood in terms of the total situation. Lijphart points out that there are inherent disadvantages in consociationalism. A grand coalition government often means weak opposition and thus brings into question the very nature of this form of democracy itself. The practice of mutual veto is conducive to the growth of immobilism. The government becomes unnecessarily conservative with the result that the status quo is often maintained at all cost. The institutions needed for segmental autonomy require a very expensive kind of government and further reduces the flexibility of the system. The practice of proportionality in political representation, civil service appointments etc. hampers the implementation of the principle of meritocracy. All these are the built-in limitations of consociationalism as a form of democracy.

A consociational political system is seen as a better alternative to open conflict. It is considered to be a form of democracy that recognizes group rights above the rights of the individuals and therefore also forms an alternative to the Westminster model of the one man one vote democracy. It is generally considered as more appropriate in an ethnically divided plural society. As pointed out earlier, certain socio-historical conditions are needed as prerequisites for consociationalism. Prior tradition of elite accommodation, multiple balance of power, the presence of cross-cutting
clevages among different groups are some such conditions. A more crucial underlying factor seems to be an expanding economy where growth provides the instrumental rewards for the co-opted ethnic groups. As soon as economic growth declines inter-ethnic relations tend to become more competitive and thus threaten to undermine the very foundation of consociationalism.

Finally, immigrant minorities in the urban centres of North America and western Europe constitute quite a different dimension in the discussion of plural societies. There are a number of factors uniquely pertaining to this dimension that need to be pointed out. North American and western European societies are democratic in their political systems and their official ideologies espouse, to varying degrees, directly or indirectly, some versions of liberalism. Generally speaking it is the prevalent form of political culture in these societies. However, the vast majority of the immigrants have encountered prejudice and discriminatory treatment of all kinds and eruptions of racist riots and persecutions dot the socio-historical landscape. Due to their numerical weakness and socio-economic handicaps the immigrant groups do not pose any real threats to the dominant groups and hence the cause of this form of inter-group antagonism can only be discovered by employing a more psychologically oriented approach. One special immigrant group, the so-called visible minorities, requires more
detailed study. They are mostly immigrants from third world countries and they experience more intense discrimination and racialist prosecution. This is a topic that will be examined in greater depth in later chapters.

Ethnic mobilization begins with the explicit formation and politicization of ethnic identity. Obviously, a very important aspect of ethnic identity is highly subjective and this will be the subject matter of the next chapter. The task here is for us to outline the objective structural conditions of ethnic mobilization. The following is an attempt to outline the characteristics of ethnic mobilization in the third world countries in the post-colonial era.

Cynthia Enloe (1973:7) argues that the development of an ethnic group refers primarily to its capacity to mobilize to meet perceived external demands, threats and aggression. Therefore, the relation between the ethnic group in question and the surrounding society is of crucial importance. When threats are perceived as coming from the outside society and when their imposition is considered intolerable, ethnic mobilization is given much needed momentum. Since ethnic groups are essentially defined by their cultural attributes which tie collections of people together by common bonds, the salient aspects of ethnic identity are always elaborated in cultural terms such as language, religion and kinship.
External threats are often political measures that seem to threaten to undermine the group's cultural traditions, although in reality considerations of material interests are often involved. Crawford Young (1976) describes the trend of nation building in the newly independent countries in the third world as exhibiting this form of state directed aggression, directly as well as indirectly, against their ethnic minority groups. This is an important intervening factor which is connected with the above background discussion. The pluralistic nature of these societies conflicts with the centralizing effect of nation building and hence the stage for ethnic mobilization is set.

Young points out that:

"We need, then, to examine more closely [the state's] cast-iron grid superimposed upon the culturally diverse populace of the third world... Its reality-shaping power is exercised in multiple ways: fixation of boundaries, orientation of the communication system, patterning of economic activity, containment of population movement, parameter-setting for political conflict." (1976:66)

Two of the major properties of a modern state are territoriality and sovereignty. In the third world the territorial divisions are a legacy inherited from imperial partitions and their history of colonization. In other words their creation and maintenance are arbitrary and inconstant, without taking into account the nature of the origins and ethnic diversities of the population. Sovereignty however implies means the supreme power of the state over the population contained within its frontiers. This discrepancy between a diversified
population and the centralized sovereignty of the state is further highlighted by the effort to conceive the state as coterminous with the "nation" whereas the concept of nation is taken to mean a community of people who feel that they belong together, sharing the same identity and a common destiny for the future. Since this normative model of statehood calls for the coincidence of state and nation, the central governments of modern states naturally attempt to command the affective attachment of the population as a basis for legitimacy. The power that they exercise is perceived as a natural endowment of statehood—and the agencies of the state seem to win legitimation and popular support for the exercise of such power.

Young identifies three major sets of factors which have intensified the normative power of the modern state. They are (1) the expected expansion of the role of the state; (2) the continuing accumulation of state power which increases its capabilities to control and affect its population, and hence sharpen the disparities between the central state and subordinate socio-political zones such as minority ethnic groups; (3) the tendency of the international system to reinforce and maintain the existing state system.

The first set of factors, which Young calls the "development syndrome," comprises a number of issues. The expanding role of the state calls for an active sense of membership in the national community. The state attempts, to the
best of its ability, to secure and establish the structure of authority so as to obtain voluntary and willing compliance. To this end, the state, directly or indirectly and to varying degrees, controls the distribution of wealth and resources and in so doing extends its influence to the entire social system. The most brutally obvious form of this development can be seen in the increase in scale and scope of the instruments of coercion. Mention of coercion leads to consideration of the second set of factors which includes the increasing importance of the role of armed forces in the developing countries. Young quotes numerous examples of African states where the armed forces are constantly on the increase. When assessed realistically it becomes clear that typically the armed forces in such countries are inadequate for national defense but sufficient as tools for internal control. Control of the armed forces permits the dominant elites to maintain their near monopoly of scarce resources and the military provides a career alternative for ambitious individuals who have no other avenues to be upwardly mobile in the absence of a modern economy.

Given the existence of inequality between ethnic groups this trend of centralization of power in the form of the modern state has far-reaching consequences. Insofar as there are structural inequalities between the ethnic minorities and the dominant groups and also insofar as such inequalities are
incorporated into and legitimated by the establishment of the central authority of the state, there develops a dialectical process of the arousal of ethnic consciousness and antagonism. When the ethnically related economic infrastructure, created previously due to historical circumstances, becomes subject to control and reorganization by the central government, ethnic and economic cleavages are shifted and intensified.

State policies which limit ethnic minorities to certain specific occupations or the revoking of business licenses for example, further isolate the ethnic groups through the imposition of structural barriers. The establishment of transnational communication networks heightens the awareness of the disparity between groups which is seen correctly as having been arranged and legitimized at the level of central government. Hence, in the eyes of the ethnic minorities, such measures are perceived as polity-oriented benefits. Newspapers and journals provide a sense of unity but at the same time serve as channels for the spreading of grievances. Furthermore, state controlled television and radio are effective tools for propagandizing official views and policies, but they also present the government and its leaders as highly visible culprits responsible for the sufferings of the suppressed groups. Finally, the factors of the global system of states ensures that foreign aid and so on are funnelled directly to the states which often never reaches the real areas of need. This in
turn heightens the existing and perceived disparities and adds fuel to ethnic ferment. A long term result is that ethnic minorities come to realize that they have to seek autonomy, to aspire to something akin to statehood, before any international bodies will pay attention to their grievances and demands. This lays the groundwork for secessionist movements and sometimes for civil wars.

The state of affairs which Young depicts in the third world countries is paralleled elsewhere. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the actual and potential ethnic conflicts in industrialized Western democratic societies and communist countries are identical to those in the third world. However, it appears that in the developed countries the same structural discrepancy outlined above also exists and it should be seen as an important underlying cause of ethnic mobilization. The trend of ascendency of statehood and state power has to be considered in terms of its dialectical relations with ethnic minorities that find themselves in the paths of this expanding centralization movement. The question of state power and its relation to ethnic mobilization will be analysed in greater detail in a later context.

Another dimension to be considered is that of the factors that determine the group's built-in potential. Since the ties that bind an ethnic group are cultural, linguistic, religious and often regional in nature, it is relevant to ask to what
extent such ties lend themselves to the politicization of the group and to what extent they retard it. One of the key indicators is the degree of group cohesion maintained by the given ethnic and cultural attributes. Different cultural traditions may provide different degrees of efficacy for mobilization.

The saliency of ethnic identity in the form of symbols is a good example of this point. In a situation in which a cultural symbol is clearly established and widely shared by all members of the ethnic group, a perceived threat to the continuing existence of this symbol of identity is likely to arouse the group and cement their solidarity. Of course, the structural inequality discussed above would to a large extent remove possibilities for individual members' mobility. Insofar as assimilation is an unlikely alternative, grievances and feelings of discontent will take on a collective form, and thus further enhance group solidarity.

In this sense, cultural tradition and their effects upon the maintenance and promotion of group cohesion is a decisive factor in the group's potential in mobilization. This is not a return to the primordialists' position of the primacy of cultural attributes. This discussion of the effects of cultural traditions has to be seen correctly as taking place within the context of ethnic mobilization. That is to say objective conditions for mobilization are already present. And in fact new
ethnic and cultural identities and their related symbols could be created as a result of this process of interaction.

Other factors which must be taken into consideration include the resources available to the mobilizing ethnic group. The relative strength of the ethnic group in terms of the size of the population, natural and economic resources within its control, geographic concentration of its members and its organizational ability when contrasted with that of the outside society are all crucial to its potential development. When a minority group's numbers are insignificant in comparison to those of the dominant group, real and effective mobilization is unlikely. If the ethnic group does not control a significant portion of the resources of the society, then it is difficult for it to sustain a prolonged struggle. Further, if the ethnic group members are not concentrated in one region but dispersed, like the North American Indians, then mobilization is unlikely to occur. Outside intervention or the lack of it is also important in a certain stage of ethnic mobilization and in the ensuing struggles.

The factor of the ethnic group's organizational ability deserves special attention. Typically, a group of educated, articulate spokesmen emerge as leaders in the mobilization process. To what extent they can formulate an ideology pertaining to the struggle of their people and to what extent such an ideology is accepted and embraced by the people at large
determine in part the final outcome of the mobilization. The role of the leaders in this process will be discussed in some detail in the next chapter which concentrates on the phenomena and processes of group dynamics.

In summary I have argued in this chapter that the structural factors affecting ethnic mobilization are to be found firstly in the historical-economic dimension of the settings of plural societies. The political domination of ethnic minorities and the perpetuation of inequality as established through, in Kuper's terms, the original differential incorporation, are significant factors in ethnic mobilization. Secondly, the global trend of nation building as described by Crawford Young acts as an important intervening factor in generating a sense of ethnic identity and potential mobilization. Thirdly, the specific conditions governing the existence of an ethnic group are crucial factors in determining its political mobilization and the outcome of this process. In this light, cultural traditions can be seen as occupying an important role in the politicization of the group.

One last point that I would like to make here concerns the ideologization of ethnic identity. I would like to stipulate that ethnic mobilization can be said to have reached a point of complete or near complete politicization when there is a convergence of ethnic identity and ideology. In the process of politicization the subjective elements of ethnic identity, such
as the basic questions of what are we as a people? what distinguishes us from others? why are we here? what are our cultural traditions? why are such traditions important to us? where are we heading as a people? and so on must be articulated and answered. If an ideology is developed to answer such questions—that is to say when there is a coherent formulation by the leaders of the history of the ethnic group, explanation of its present sufferings, the necessity as well as the possibility of liberation and who are the outside enemies obstructing this course—then the ethnic group in question is well politicized and mobilization is underway. Political culture is politicized and ideologized ethnic identity. A more detailed discussion of the process of ideologization of ethnic identity will be presented in the next chapter.
Notes

1. The term "differential incorporation" and its polar contrast "universal incorporation" are used by M.G. Smith in his later formulation (1969: 13) of the concepts of pluralism and plural society which are considerably more flexible than his previous ones. Cultural, social, and structural pluralism are differentiated in the later version.

CHAPTER THREE

Ethnic Mobilization--Group and socio-psychological factors

The general societal atmosphere which is most conducive to ethnic mobilization is described by Van den Berghe (1977) as a situation of competitive race relations. Van de Berghe distinguishes two ideal types of race relations situation: the paternalistic and the competitive. The paternalistic type of race relations is characterized by an agricultural, pastoral or handicraft economy with an intermediate level of differentiation in the division of labor. The labor force typically consists of an unspecialized, servile peasantry. The division of labor is drawn along racial and ethnic lines with slaves, indentured laborers, serfs or recruited native labor performing the heavy manual tasks. The ruling group is usually made up of a small minority of the population, relatively homogeneous in social status, forming an aristocracy. For the slaves, serfs or the laborers spatial mobility is limited; they are attached either to the land or to their masters. The form of government found in paternalistic society is mostly aristocratic or oligarchic. The paternalistic attitudes and stereotypes are integral parts of the societal system of values while a rigid system of racial and ethnic stratification is maintained. There is no mobility between the upper ruling group and the subordinate group.
Race relations in this paternalistic type are stable and the subordinate group has internalized its subservient status while the ruling group's attitude is that of a benevolent despot. The members of the subordinate group are treated like immature children. They need to be disciplined but they are not primarily perceived as dangerous, rather, they are variously seen as merely fun-loving, lazy or impulsive. Roles and mannerisms adopted by the ruling and subordinate groups toward each other are sharply defined and interactions between the two are conducted with elaborate etiquette. In this master and slave relation the slave is loved if he knows his place but is hated with intense violence if he dares to rebel. The kind of social upheaval in societies of this type often takes the form of slave rebellion with revivalistic or messianic coloration. The ruling group's reaction is often like that of an indignant parent meting out righteous punishment to his misguided children. Van de Berghhe contends that the ideal type of paternalistic race relations is incompatible with a manufacturing economy and with large scale industrial capitalism. Given the structure of modern industrial capitalistic society a polar opposite to the paternalistic type—the competitive type of race relations—is found.

The ideal type of competitive race relations is characterized by a complex division of labor as required by a differentiated manufacturing economy where there is a high
degree of urbanization. The labor force is by and large skilled and technical competence and efficiency are the important criteria of selection and employment. One crucial consequence of this economic structure is that the rigid racial and ethnic division of labor based on ascriptive status cannot be maintained without seriously hampering the economy. However, it does not follow that industrialization automatically eliminates racial and ethnic stratification.

Herbert Blumer (1965) has argued persuasively that industrialization and the traditional racial alignment act on each other and their interaction is influenced by the setting in which it occurs. The setting—the given social and political institutions of the society—would change, as the interaction between the economic and racial factors develops. The structure of the managerial policy, Blumer argues, is not an independent factor governed solely by a detached rational preoccupation with efficiency and competence, but it is subject to the views and expectations of those who constitute the personnel of industry and of those with whom the industry has to deal, and to the social climate in general.

Hence in industrialized or industrializing societies, racial and ethnic selection in the division of labor is not completely absent. The rigid barriers imposed by racial and ethnic stratification may have to tilt toward a vertical position thus allowing more class differentiation within racial
and ethnic groups. The racial and ethnic elements and the imperatives of an industrial economy are constantly acting upon, and modifying, each other. While social mobility is hampered by traditional racial prejudice, economic needs might force the loosening of the barriers of racial and ethnic stratification. Due to this continual interaction, instead of the integrated value system of the paternalistic type, there is much ideological conflict and the value system of the society is a divided and continuously changing one.

The form of government found in this competitive type is usually a partial democracy where minority groups are excluded by different means, including the use of extra-legal sanctions against them. There are strong sentiments of ambiguity, tension, mutual prejudice, suspicion, hatred and antagonism between groups. Competition for status, for jobs, for wealth or the threat of such competition is central to the patterns of race and ethnic relations. Expressions of aggression come from both the dominant and the minority groups. Minorities are stereotyped as aggressive, dirty, sexually indulgent, animalistic and dangerous, among other characteristics. The dominant group in turn is stereotyped as overbearing, bullying and brutal. The relation between groups is generally maintained at a level of dangerous tension and incidents with the slightest racial overtones may trigger off inter-group violence and riots.
Van de Berghe's characterizations of these two types of race relations are intended to be ideal types. However, a general trend can be detected, in both Western societies and the third world countries, of movement from the paternalistic type to the competitive type, with many gradations in between. Hence, this scheme can be seen as diachronic and evolutionary although, as pointed out by Van de Berghe, there is no necessary evolution from one type to another. It is in this diachronic and evolutionary sense that we can see the competitive type of race relations as part of the societal conditions that are conducive to ethnic mobilization.

One immediate consequence of ethnic competition is the sharpening and sometimes redefining of ethnic group boundaries. Levine and Campbell (1972) in their very detailed and systematic discussion of ethnocentrism point out that ethnic group boundaries are by no means always clear and unambiguous. An ethnic group is variously seen as a speech community, a breeding population, a social system, etc. Furthermore, the boundary of a specific ethnic group cannot be articulated without taking into account the larger social environment within which the group is situated. In the situation of ethnic competition a sharp group boundary becomes a necessity. It is important to know the difference between "us" and "them". Groups that were previously unclear about which side of the boundary that they fell on are forced to define themselves unambiguously. Levine and Campbell
argue that a sharp group boundary provides the group with better functional efficiency and as such the group is more likely to be successful in coordinated projects such as military operations. This is not simply due to its military organization but also because of more effective civilian mobilization in support of the military and political goals. Thus, the establishment of sharp ethnic boundaries and effective forms of coordination under central leadership is the first step toward total mobilization.

Simultaneous with this process of the sharpening of group boundaries is the emergence of a dialectical relation between the perception of outside threat and the formulation and articulation of a sense of relative deprivation. Part of the implication of the forming of a sharp ethnic boundary is that the mobility of the members of the ethnic group in the society at large is somehow limited and this limitation is perceived by the group members to be such that only collective actions by the group as a whole can change it. This is a reaction on the part of the ethnic group to the uneven distribution of social, economic and political resources in the different ethnic segments of the society.

Insofar as there are barriers to individual mobility defined in terms of race or ethnicity and as long as the individual cannot "pass" from one to the other, then the individual's ethnic background is either an asset or a
liability. It is an asset if the individual is identified as belonging to the dominant group and it is a liability if the individual is identified as belonging to the minority, especially so if the minority is a visible one. This creates a situation where the ambitious individual members of the minority group are constantly frustrated in their attempts to achieve a greater share of power and status. They are thrown back, so to speak, to their ethnicity because the path of their individual mobility is blocked. In such a situation there emerges a group of leaders who can articulate the relative deprivation suffered by the ethnic minorities and in so doing mobilize the group for political actions. The concept of relative deprivation and the emergence of ethnic elites require some detailed discussion.

The enlargement of the social horizon beyond the individual's ethnic group boundary and the intensification of interactions through urbanization and improved communications networks are some of the factors that alter the social and self perceptions of some members of the ethnic group and provide them with new and salient reference groups other than those within their own ethnic background. These individuals are typically persons who have travelled beyond their homeland, have been educated and have seen the social and political institutions of the outside society in a broaden perspective.

They are members of a new group, professionals and intelligentsia who are also the victims of the stratified
society. Due to their education and professional training their expectations are higher than they would be otherwise and hence when their ambitions are curbed by racial and ethnic barriers the resulting frustration tends to be deeper and more bitter. Further, because of their exposure to the outside society they have new reference groups on the basis of which they can articulate with new precision and criteria their relatively disadvantageous positions and deprivation. Such individuals perceive that their task is to bring home the message, so to speak, to arouse the people to action. They seek to change their people's ignorant content into informed discontent; to paint a promising picture of the future and to juxtapose this picture with their present sufferings and the injustice done to them by the outside society; to inject pride into their ethnic identity and heritage; to re-educate the people about their cultural uniqueness, their historical virtue. The presence of mass communication networks and urbanization much facilitates the performance of these tasks by the ethnic elites.

A number of factors may affect the degree of success that the ethnic elites can achieve. The social distance between the elites and the people is decisive. If the elites are perceived to have been changed by their new education and exposure their views could be discarded by the traditionalists as irrelevant, incorrect, or self-serving. In this context the elites' ability to exploit the cultural traditions and historical past of the
people is crucial. They have to don the appearance of the defenders of cultural and ethnic traditions and they have to have the ability to convince the people that their vision of the future is a realistic and feasible one so that their demand for sacrifice is justified. They have to arouse the people with ethnic sentiments and show them that they all share a common fate. The group's ethnic identity is articulated through a vision of their destiny as a people with historical purposes in the given concrete social context. In other words, ethnicity is politicized through a coherent ideology outlining explicit political goals. The relations between the ethnic elites and the people have far-reaching consequences for mobilization, and specifically for group cohesion and structure.

From the writings of Georg Simmel, Coser (1956) has generated a number of theoretical propositions about the functions of social conflict and its subsequent impact on group mobilization and structures. The working definition of social conflict adopted here is "a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals." (Coser, 1956:8) Insights derived from Coser's analysis can shed a great deal of light on ethnic mobilization at the level of group dynamics. Within this general framework there are four major areas that I want to focus on. The first is the question of the development and maintenance of group cohesion in a
situation of conflict. The second concerns the impact of conflict on group structures. The relation between internal and external conflicts is the third focus. Finally, the very important question of the distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflict will be discussed in detail. Of course, in applying Coser's formulations of group dynamics in our analysis the term "group" refers specifically to ethnic groups.

Coser points out that intergroup conflict sets the boundaries between groups. We have already touched upon this point. Coser emphasizes, however, that one of the factors involved in the setting of boundaries is the strengthening of group consciousness and awareness of separateness. In ethnic mobilization the development of ethnic identity then is concomitant with the setting and sharpening of ethnic boundaries. Group cohesion is understood as involving a number of intervening variables: the strengthening of group consciousness in terms of the development of ethnic identity, the degree of internal consensus about this identity which in turn hinges on the relation between the ethnic elites and the people and the degree of successful exploitation of cultural and ethnic traditions for mobilization. We have mentioned this point earlier and I would like to pursue it further in the context of group structures and dynamics.

It is generally assumed that intergroup conflict or the threat of it would lead to the mobilization of the group and
hence increases group cohesion. But this is not a simple formula that can be applied in all cases. If the internal structure of the group is such that there is very little value consensus then external pressures might actually break up the group instead of promoting cohesion. If there is enough value consensus for mobilization to proceed, the actual form that group cohesion takes remains problematic.

Coser argues that if the internal group cohesion is weak to begin with, pressures from outside conflict then cause extreme centralization and rigid differentiation of the leadership and group structure. Centralization and differentiation of leadership and group structure are necessary for mobilization but they themselves are factors that are often independent of the conflict situation itself. The degree of centralization and the resulting rigidity of differentiation are due primarily to the nature of the group prior to the conflict situation. In groups where there is high value consensus, mobilization does not necessarily result in high centralization and rigid differentiation. They are results of overcompensation in cases where the group's value consensus is low to begin with.

This consideration is a significant one because the specific nature of the promotion and maintenance of group cohesion affects the development of the struggle in the long run. It is in this context that the role of the ethnic elites, their degree of success in the exploitation of ethnic and
cultural tradition in mobilization, and such more intangible factors as the strength of ethnic ties are decisive in the development of group cohesion and solidarity.

The second focus is closely related to the first. Groups engaged in continued conflicts and struggle with the outside tend to be intolerant within. The more intense the conflict the more unacceptable are expressions of dissent from within. To the ethnic group in question the goal of ethnic unity overrides all other concerns and this fact engenders a number of consequences. The intense strengthening of cohesion might exclude certain elements from the group which are ethnically as "pure" and traditional as others but which are excluded because they are deemed to be not conducive to mobilization and struggle.

Thus, as a result of ethnic mobilization, the very criteria of ethnic groups are re-defined. Ethnicity is streamlined, so to speak, with the kind of ethnic elements that may hamper the struggle discarded. This streamlining of ethnicity could backfire when the situation has developed to a point where it is to the advantage of the ethnic group to broaden its front to incorporate other groups. The rigidity of the internal structure might render such a re-alignment with new allies difficult, especially when group cohesion is maintained by strong and yet narrowly defined ethnic ties. Another development is that in the strengthening of group identity higher personality involvement of the group members is demanded. In other words, demands for
individual sacrifices are justified when the struggle involves total commitment from group members. As we will show later this factor of total personality involvement has important effects on the development of the so-called nonrealistic conflict.

In conjunction with the above two themes is the consideration that the intensity of the external conflict might enable the mobilizing group, with centralized structure to sustain internal strains due to dissent by stifling all internal conflicts. But in the situation of a prolonged conflict the high degree of group cohesion maintained at such a price may prove to be too costly. Group cohesion and solidarity cannot be maintained indefinitely by the suppression of internal dissent and conflicts.

Coser argues that genuine group solidarity exists when the internal structure of the group allows expressions of dissent to surface as they occur. When group members have been led to suppress hostile feelings for the sake of unity and cohesion, internal conflicts would tend to be sharper and more violent when they finally explode. For leaders of the mobilizing ethnic group the question is whether the ethnic ties and structure of the group are flexible enough to accommodate dissent and disagreements on the one hand, yet solid enough to maintain a sufficient degree of unity on the other. This is a situation where the ethnic elites have to tread a careful balance in achieving unity as well as solidarity. One major consequence
resulting from tight and rigid internal group structure and intense propaganda about the threat and danger of the cutgroup as devices for mobilization is the development of nonrealistic conflicts. This brings us to the fourth and the most important focus of our discussion.

The distinction between realistic and nonrealistic conflicts can be briefly stated in the following way. In every society or social system with the sole exception of the ideal utopia there always exists the possibility for a group or groups of people, organizing themselves on the bases of class interests, common ethnic or racial backgrounds, or a number of other principles of organization, to raise conflicting claims to scarce resources, status and power. The existing norm of social values and systems of role and resource allocation can always be challenged and they will always be objects of contention to some degree.

Realistic conflicts arise when groups of people clash because of their differing values and their perception of the injustice of the system. Insofar as such conflicts are caused by the incompatibility of material interests and values, the struggle is only a means towards an end. The object toward which the conflict is directed is the cause of the frustration of a certain group's specific demands and once this object is removed there is no need for the conflict to continue. In other words the conflict can be resolved when the antagonists can perceive
that there are other alternatives by which they can achieve the same end without the need for violent struggle.

In contrast to realistic conflicts, nonrealistic conflicts arise from personality deprivation and frustration stemming from the socialization process. This kind of conflict develops exclusively from aggressive impulses which seek an object upon which the aggression can be vented. The choice of the object can be seen as totally accidental since it is not the object but the aggressive impulse itself that is the cause of the conflict. Insofar as nonrealistic conflict is not directed toward the attainment of a specific result then continual conflict is the only choice for the releasing of tension and aggression. In this way there exists no functional alternative to conflict but only alternatives as to the choice of the object of aggression.

Coser contends that even in realistic conflict situations there may exist elements of nonrealistic conflict sentiments. This is most likely in situations where there are no adequate means for the carrying out of the struggle. The accompanying nonrealistic conflict sentiments would further deflect the issue from its real source. Take for example a fringe ethnic minority group which is so weak in number and relative strength that mobilization for ethnic competition is practically a hopeless cause, then the sentiments against the dominant group might develop into an irrational hatred of the outgroup per se. In other words, the distinction between realistic and nonrealistic
conflicts is not always cut and dried. In reality, the two are often inextricably intertwined. In cases of nonrealistic conflicts there could be some underlying elements of realistic conflicts. Differences in ethnic characteristics between groups lend themselves to the stereotyping of the outgroups as also do the traditional ethnocentric sentiments which themselves facilitate mobilization and promote greater ingroup cohesion and unity.

Therefore it can be argued that in ethnic mobilization the danger of developing nonrealistic conflict sentiments is very great indeed. Ethnic and racial prejudice are ready made tools for the propagandistic and agitative psychological mobilization of the people. Insofar as individuals have little faith in their own identity and future and insofar as the propagandistic kind of psychological mobilization offers a "greater" identity for them: a sense of ethnic belonging, a sense of security, then they will willingly and happily embrace their "greater" identity even if it involves a high degree of ethnocentrism. They will accept without question the "explanation" of their suffering as caused by the designated object—the scapegoat—upon which they will collectively vent their anger and aggression. A classic example of such nonrealistic conflict sentiments is anti-Semitism. Except in cases where there are clear realistic conflicts of material interests and values between the Jewish and other groups, anti-Semitism is primarily a means for the
frustrated individuals to release their aggression against the Jews, a culturally and historically convenient scapegoat.

The phenomenon of aggression in nonrealistic conflicts is closely related to the question of personality structure. There are a number of psychoanalytically related theories which purport to explain the prejudiced personality. The two most important ones are the frustration-aggression-displacement theory and the theory of authoritarian personality, which are briefly discussed below.

John Dollard in his classic study of the "Southern Town" (1937) concludes his discussion by the formulation of the frustration-aggression mechanism through which he attempts to explain the racial prejudice which he has amply documented in his work. He suggests that one should begin with the emotional life of each individual since racial prejudice is an emotional fact. The personal history of every individual, from early childhood to adult life, is full of frustrating experiences. There are constant needs for one to renounce the impulse of instincts and there are always all kinds of cultural and social norms governing one's behavior so much so that the character of a grown-up person is a record of frustration and impulse renounced.

G.W. Allport in his definitive study of prejudice (1954) identified four sources of frustration. The first is the constitutional and personal kind which has primarily to do with
personal matters such as poor health, low intelligence and so on. The second is the kind of frustration that is derived from within the family. The third kind comes from the immediate working and living environment of the individual. Failure in competition in work, in school or in social life is a major source of frustration. The last source of frustrations come from the wider societal context. By this Allport means the general cultural and social milieu in which there are structures and standards of values and status that one is supposed to conform to. Unsuccessful attempts to live up to such cultural and social standards can be highly frustrating.

Dollard's final formulation involves three key concepts. The first one is the existence of general aggression which is derived from reactions to frustration. The second concept denotes the necessity of a social and cultural pattern which isolates within the society a group which can be used as the object of the general aggression of the society at large. Usually it is a defenseless group like the Jews in Nazi Germany. The third concept is that the object of racial prejudice has to be identifiable in some way. Certainly the blacks in the southern United States form a highly visible group. However, in the case of the Jews in Germany where they were not a visible group, they were forced to wear a yellow star for their identification.
Allport elaborates this formulation by introducing the concept of displacement. Racial prejudice results when the experienced inner frustration is expressed through aggression directed not toward the real cause of the frustration, but towards the socially and culturally available outgroups which serve as scapegoats. Allport also points out that aggression is not always displaced. Certain individuals under certain circumstances will be aggressive toward the real source of frustrations. The kind of people that would displace their aggression onto some scapegoats are deficient in their ego strength and are unable either to face up to their own shortcomings or to challenge the real source of their frustrations. Juxtaposing both Dollard and Allport, the final formulation is that first frustrations generate aggression, then secondly aggression is displaced upon the relatively defenseless scapegoats, and finally the displaced hostility is justified by stereotyping or racist theories of various kinds. Of course, as we have noted above in the discussion of nonrealistic conflicts, displacement of aggression does not fully relieve the feeling of frustration simply because the real cause of frustration remains untouched.

The theory of the authoritarian personality is developed by T. Adorno, et al. (1950). This theory elaborates the linkages between the prejudiced personality as measured by the P-scale and four sets of factors: a) general attitudes towards
sociopolitical structures, b) general modes of thinking, specifically in terms of the rigidity of thinking patterns, c) child-rearing practices, and d) the family structure as it relates to childhood development.

A prejudiced person tends to have the following attitudes toward sociopolitical structures and relationships. He has an emotional need for unconditional submission to authority and desires the polity to be ruled by a powerful, autocratic leader to whom he would give total allegiance and unquestioning obedience. He tends to believe that obedience and respect for authority are ultimate values to be followed. His reaction to deviant behavior tends to be extreme and violent and he perceives the society in general as potentially anarchic and immoral if no powerful leader takes control. He is preoccupied with power, tends to see all relations in terms of the strong-weak, dominant-submissive pattern.

Authoritarian thinking can be characterized as lacking in introspective insights; and typically involving beliefs in such things as the mystical, unseen powers that control individual fate and destiny; rigid categories are employed and there is a tendency to believe in oversimplified explanations of complex events and hence intolerance is manifested toward ambiguous phenomena. These two sets of factors are elaborated as causally related to factors in child-rearing practices and family structure.
The authoritarian personality typically has experienced in childhood a father figure who is stern and punitive, and a great deal of physical punishment administered by both parents. In terms of family structure it is typically a situation in which husband-wife, parent-child relations are organized in rigid hierarchical orders with the idealization of the father as the powerful figure who is feared, hated, as well as beloved. The authoritarian personality is thus analysed in terms of the causal relations between certain attitudinal characteristics and certain specific familial background and child-rearing practices. The basic insights derived from this analysis are extremely useful in the understanding of the psychological factors involved in nonrealistic conflict. However, a valid incorporation of the psychological literature in the study of ethnic mobilization has to beware of the essentially a-historical nature of these analyses and they have to be constantly juxtaposed with concrete socio-historical factors.

To return to the theme of nonrealistic conflicts we can now explain, given the above explication of the scapegoat theory and the authoritarian personality theory, the special emotional appeal that racism and extreme forms of ethnocentrism can exert. However, as stated earlier, the development of a prejudiced outlook cannot be entirely accounted for by psychoanalytically related theories. The prevalent social norms and the kind of conditions under which the individual tends to conform to such
noms are also decisive socio-cultural factors affecting the development of the prejudiced personality. In this context we have to examine Thomas Pettigrew's insights in the matter.

Pettigrew (1958) suggests that a broad and satisfactory theory of racial prejudice requires careful consideration and analysis involving both the personality and the socio-cultural variables. Two studies were undertaken, one in South Africa and one in the southern United States, employing three scales and a number of background items. In the South African case the three scales used are the P-scale, measuring authoritarianism; C-scale, measuring the degree of conformity to the prevalent social mores and the A-scale, which measures anti-African attitudes. In the case of the southern United States the scales are P-scale, measuring authoritarianism, A-S-scale which measures anti-semitism and the M-scale which measures anti-negro prejudice.

A non-random sample of 627 undergraduates at the University of Natal in South Africa was tested. This body of students consisted of both English and Afrikaner students. While there is no significant difference shown on their respective scores on the P-scale, Afrikaner students score higher on the conformity scale as well as the scale of anti-African attitudes.

In interpreting these data, Pettigrew argues that the variables which reflect the dominant norms and mores of the white society are extremely important. The Afrikaner students
who were born in Africa, who identify with the Nationalist Party, who are upwardly mobile and have been molded by the traditional conservatism of the Africander society are especially responsive and conforming to the prevalent anti-African social norms. They tend, as a result, regardless of their personality structure, to be intolerant of Africans. The study in the southern United States shows similar results.

The group of southerners who manifested attitudes of conformism were also more intolerant of blacks. The groups of southerners who deviated from the prevalent social norms in the southern States tended to be less anti-negro. These results were obtained between the two groups of southerners, while there is no significant difference in the personality structures registered among them.

In his conclusion Pettigrew suggests that the susceptibility to conform may be an unusually important psychological component of prejudice in regions like South Africa and the southern United States, where cultural and social norms positively sanction intolerance. The two studies demonstrate that there are high correlations between sociocultural factors which reflect the prevalent norms and mores of the society and racial prejudice. In South Africa, factors such as place of birth, political party preference, upward mobility, and ethnic group membership and in the southern United States such factors as sexual attitude, church
attendance, social mobility, political party identification, military service and education are of crucial importance. They could affect the "conformity tendency" on the individual in different ways, depending in part on his socio-economic position in relation to the rest of the society.

In conjunction with this conformity factor, the historically imbedded traditions of racial prejudice as reflected by the prevalent social norms and mores account for the scope and intensity of racial hostility. The factor of susceptibility to conform is seen as affected by both the personality factor such as authoritarian personality and the sociocultural factors as discussed above. Therefore, in conclusion we can argue that a satisfactory account of racial prejudice and the momentum behind the propagandistic kind of psychological mobilization would have to include inputs from theories of personality structures as well as the question of sociocultural factors affecting both the individual and the social norms and mores.

One final comment on the nonrealistic elements in ethnic mobilization is that the momentum acquired from such psychological mobilization does not, as we have already noted above, have functional alternatives and this entails some undesirable consequences. The actual conflict between ethnic groups might develop to a point where a no win situation is established and where it is more desirable for all parties
involved to seek alternative political means to end the conflict. As far as realistic conflicts are concerned this search for means of resolution of conflict is always possible. But the psychological elements of nonrealistic conflict has a kind of functional autonomy that cannot be stopped that easily. A history of hatred and fear of a specific group cannot be erased overnight. If such sentiments are sufficiently strong and deep-rooted, especially when they are integrated into the prevalent social institutions and systems of norms and values, they could cause unnecessary prolongation of conflict and violence. And under certain circumstances such as when religious and moral sentiment are involved the conflict would reach an unresolvable stalemate and hence become "intractable."\(^3\) The interrelations between realistic and nonrealistic conflicts are crucial to the efficacy of ethnic mobilization on the one hand and to the possibility of conflict resolution on the other.
Notes

1. The structure of Coser's "theory" has been seriously criticized. See Keith Dixon, *Sociological Theory*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1973. But this need not concern us here. It can be argued that in spite of the deficiency in its structure as a scientific theory, Coser's formulation still provides useful insights. And the important point is that they are not adopted here as "theoretic" postulates.

2. For a detailed discussion of agitation and the agitator see Lowenthal's *Prophets of Deceit*, 1949, Pacific Books, California.

PART II: CANADIAN ETHNIC RELATIONS
CHAPTER FOUR
Canadian Immigration Policy and Ethnic Relations

The composition of the Canadian population in terms of ethnic groups is seen in the following table.

Table I
Ethnic Composition of the Canadian Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>1901</th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1978 (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austrian</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech and Slovak</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>0.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>2.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.95</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1.07</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavian</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asians</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Indians</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and Inuits</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.55</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>15.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>26.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>30.1</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English</strong></td>
<td>55.5</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>French</strong></td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Statistics Canada, 1979)
In this chapter it will be argued that ethnic groups in Canada can be divided into three categories. The first category consists of the two charter groups: The English and the French. They make up the vast majority of the population. Although the inequality between the French Canadians and the English Canadians has been much discussed and often French Canadians do perceive themselves as an oppressed minority, it would be a mistake to regard the French Canadians as just one of the ethnic minorities. Other than the fact that they are one of the two charter groups, there are other conditions which distinguish them from other ethnic minorities. Their number is substantial. In terms of the percentage of the total population it has dropped slightly in recent years but historically their high birth rate has maintained their position as the second largest group in Canada.

In spite of the highly sensational title of a widely read book by Pierre Vallieres, White Negroes of America (1968), the analogy drawn between French Canadians and the Blacks in the United States is largely false. French Canadians have enjoyed high status and power both inside as well as outside the province of Quebec. Canada has had three French prime ministers. The post of the premier of the province of Quebec has always been held by a French Canadian. Unlike Blacks south of the
border, the concentration of French Canadians in the province of Quebec provides them with a territorial base and they are politically dominant in the province. It cannot be denied that French nationalism has been on the rise. With the victory of the Parti Québécois in the Quebec provincial election in 1976 and their narrow defeat in the 1980 referendum for a mandate to negotiate a status of "sovereignty association," French nationalism has become the greatest challenge yet to the confederation of Canada. The point to be made here is merely that French Canadians constitute an ethnic group though as a minority in relation to the English, which is different from other ethnic minorities for the reasons outlined above. Along with the English Canadians they should be considered as one of the two dominant groups in Canada.

The second category is made up of ethnic groups of European ancestry but of non-English and non-French origins. Included are Canadians of German, Italian, Ukranian, Dutch and Northern European ancestries. Members of ethnic groups in this category may encounter linguistic and cultural barriers upon their arrival in Canada but they have tended to adapt relatively easily to the dominant Canadian Anglo culture and their assimilation into the mainstream of the society is virtually complete within the second generation. Insofar as some of the first generation immigrants still speak with an accent they are an "audible minority," but otherwise physically indistinguishable
from other Canadians.

In contrast to the above two categories is a third category -- the visible minorities. Members of the ethnic groups that fall into this category are visibly different from Canadians of the Caucasian phenotype. They are the Native Indians and Inuit, Blacks, Chinese, Japanese, and other Asians. These ethnic groups have historically had a rather different experience from others in their assimilation, or the lack of it, into Canadian society. As minorities they have suffered unequal treatment and deprivation in varying degrees and until quite recently most of them were denied rights of full citizenship. (See P.E. Roy, 1981) It is largely to this category of visible minorities that attention will be directed in analysing and understanding the Canadian ethnic phenomenon.

There are constant attempts in official and semi-official publications and statements to regard all ethnic groups other than the English and French as a "third element" or a "third force" (John Porter, 1975). This is to lump together groups of the second and third categories as outlined above and hence obliterate the differences between the visible and non-visible minorities. It will be argued here that such a distinction is an important one in the analysis of Canadian ethnic relations. The discriminatory practices that were imposed on the visible minorities have been very well documented in historical as well as sociological literatures. (Winks, 1971; Norris, 1971; Morton,
1974: Ferguson, 1975; Huttonback, 1976; Elliot, 1979; Goldstein and Bienvenue, 1980; Hitz, 1980). One dominant theme that emerges in a survey of the literature is that the discriminatory nature of the Canadian immigration policy (up until 1962) has been instrumental in shaping the Canadian ethnic stratification system. The so called "entrance status" of the immigrant group, (Porter, 1965; Breton, Burnet, Hartman and Isajiw, 1977), which largely determines the group's opportunity for mobility and advancement is in turn affected by the immigration policy in effect at the time.

A simple survey of the history of Canadian immigration would point to the fact that the so-called visible minorities suffered severely due to various discriminatory treatments originating with the immigration policy itself. The subsequent social and economic disadvantages that such groups encountered in their attempts to establish themselves in Canadian society can be seen as related to the official and semi-official policies and regulations that govern and limit their life chances. Hence, an in-depth analysis of Canadian ethnic relations with special focus on the visible minorities has to deal with the history of immigration itself, specifically in the areas of the formulation of immigration policies. The different factors that are ultimately responsible for the development of an immigration policy need to be discussed so as to uncover the dynamics: social, economic, as well as political, which
inevitably contribute to the subsequent development of Canadian ethnic relations.

The history of Canadian immigration can be divided into four distinct phases. The first phase began in 1896 and lasted until 1901 when Sir Clifford Sifton, as the Minister of the Interior, brought out his immigration policy with the purpose of getting the prairies settled with farmers. The second phase lasted from 1901 to the outbreak of World War I. The influx of immigrants was stopped by the war and the level of immigration did not begin to rise until the 1920's. This is the beginning of the third phase. The level of immigration dropped again due to the Depression of the 1930's and World War II. The fourth phase began after the war and has continued to the present with a number of major policy changes. In each of these four phases different immigration policies were formulated and put into effect, which in turn affected both the level of influx and the composition of immigrants. The changes in the criteria for admission as spelled out in the different policies reflect the changes in the manpower needs of the Canadian economy, the political priorities of the government, and more importantly, the changes in Canadian racial and ethnic ideologies.

The following is a brief description of the four phases of the history of Canadian immigration. Historical details will be kept to a minimum in the present discussion. (For details see Corbett, 1956; Green, 1976). The purpose here is to attempt to
highlight the critical points of policy shifts and reformulations so as to identify the sometimes not so obvious structure of immigration policy development. The fourth phase, beginning after the World War II, will be analysed in greater detail because it was during this phase that the Canadian immigration policy underwent some very radical changes with far-reaching consequences.

With the passage of the Immigration Act of 1869, the right to control admission of immigrants was shifted from the British to the Canadian government. Immigration before 1901 was predominantly from the British Isles. The French and the British were the two charter groups and in 1871 only eight percent of the population was of ethnic origins other than British, French, or native Indians.³ The first group of non-white immigrants was the Chinese who came north from California to British Columbia to pan gold and work in the coal mines. More Chinese immigrants came with the building of the Canadian Pacific Railroad in the 1880's. Japanese immigration to British Columbia had also begun around 1885. Most of them were poverty-stricken farmers and fishermen, seeking economic opportunities in British Columbia. (Krauter and Davies, 1878:60). East Indians also constituted a small part of the early non-white immigration. (Peruguson, 1575). By 1901, there were approximately 17,000 Chinese, 4,700 Japanese, and 1,700 East Indians residing in British Columbia.
During the second phase of immigration, Sir Clifford Sifton's policy of "settling the west" had achieved its goal. In this period roughly three million immigrants arrived from Europe. Of these immigrants over one and a quarter million came from the United Kingdom, and about one million from the United States. (Corbett, 1956). Among those whose ethnic origins were neither British nor French, the Germans were by far the majority along with a substantial number of Dutch and Scandinavians.

There was also the beginning of an influx of immigrants from central and eastern Europe -- Ukrainians, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Russians. While this massive immigration from Europe was going on, more severely restriction policies were introduced to curtail non-white immigration of Asians. The first federal head tax of fifty dollars on incoming Chinese was introduced in 1885. This was increased to one hundred dollars in 1901 and to five hundred dollars in 1903. The tax was paid as a condition of entry. The Komagata Maru incident, (Ferguson, 1975) which occurred in 1914, provided dramatic evidence of the government's determination to end non-white immigration.

The third phase of immigration to Canada began after the interruption of World War I and lasted until the Depression. World War I cut off European immigration to Canada and in the years immediately after the war it remained low due to post-war readjustment. By 1923, another wave of increase in immigration was in progress. The Canadian government established a list of
"preferred" and "non-preferred" countries from which to select immigrants which virtually excluded the Chinese, and severely limited other Asians.

European immigrants of neither British nor French origins increased dramatically. By 1931 they constituted about eighteen percent of the population. (Corbett, 1956). Other than Ukrainians, Poles, Russians and Scandinavians; new ethnic groups such as Italians, and religious groups such as the German Mennonites had also begun to arrive. During this period, over twenty thousand Jewish immigrants had also settled in Canada, most of them in urban centres. At the same time the anti-non-white immigration campaign urged even tighter restriction against Asian immigrants. The 1908 "Gentlemen's agreement" with the Japanese government was revised in 1928 to limit the entry of Japanese to one hundred and fifty persons a year. The policy of restriction against non-white immigration was so successful that the census of 1941 showed a decrease of the Canadian Asian population to seventy-four thousand from the 1931 census of eighty-five thousand. The decrease was especially marked among the Chinese which reflected the dying out of the original immigrant group. Due to the fact that they were predominantly male, natural increase was severely limited. lacking replacement through immigration, their numbers began to shrink. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1923 was so effective that between 1923 and 1947 when the Act was repealed, only forty-four
Chinese entered the country legally.

During World War II, Japanese Canadians experienced severe discrimination and persecution. (Krauter and Davies, 1978). After Canada entered the war, the government took actions rapidly against the Japanese Canadians. In British Columbia, their fishing boats were impounded, newspapers closed. An order-in-council (P.C. 365) was issued on January 16, 1942, authorizing the evacuation of Japanese Canadians from the west coast. Their property such as fishing boats and gear was confiscated and sold to white fishermen at remarkably low prices. They were settled into internment camps and some were put to work in the sugar beet fields in Alberta, others toiled on road building projects. This treatment of Japanese Canadians cannot be justified on the ground that Canada was at war with Japan. Canada's major enemy was Germany. Nearly all the Canadian military forces were operating in the European theatre. There was no suggestion that German Canadians should be evacuated and interned. In contrast to their Canadian counterparts, Japanese Americans in Hawaii, who constituted thirty-eight percent of the population comparing to the two point seven percent in British Columbia, were never evacuated or interned. Racial animosity obviously had a large part to play in the decision to evacuate and intern the Japanese Canadians in British Columbia. (For further details see Sunahara, 1981)
Substantial immigration to Canada resumed soon after the end of World War II. By 1961, approximately two million immigrants had arrived in Canada. The ethnic origins of the immigrants, other than British, were predominantly Italian, German, Dutch, Polish, and Jewish. Those of British origin constituted about one-third of the total. As mentioned earlier, this is the phase when important changes in the immigration policy took place.

Freda Hawkins, in her discussion of Canadian immigration, suggests that the post-war immigration should be divided into three periods. (1972:76). The first period is the beginning of this new phase of immigration. It began in 1946 and was highlighted by Mackenzie King's famous statement on immigration policy in 1947, the creation of the Department of Citizenship and Immigration in 1950, and ended with the defeat of the St. Laurent government in 1957. The second period, stretching from 1957 to 1963, coincided with Diefenbaker's Conservative administration. It was a period of economic slowdown and increasing unemployment. It was in this context that major efforts in self examination and re-evaluation in the public service and areas of public policy, including the immigration policy, took place. The third period which lasts from 1963 to the present, has been characterized by the development of an overall manpower strategy for Canada. Rapid growth in the Canadian economy brought about new demands for manpower, but not
of the traditional kind. The increasing need for skilled labor and professionals, in conjunction with a combination of other social and political factors, was the driving momentum behind the development of a new immigration policy which takes into account the manpower needs of the Canadian economy as well as being ethnically and racially non-discriminatory. This policy has subsequently left an indelible imprint on the nature of Canadian ethnic relations and contributed to the emergence of the policy of multiculturalism. It is this period of such important changes that will be the focal point of discussion.

The Canadian immigration policy development in the first period is best illustrated by the then Prime Minister MacKenzie King's statement announced in May, 1947:

The [immigration] policy of the government is to foster the growth of the population of Canada by the encouragement of immigration... The fear has been expressed that immigration would lead to a reduction of the standard of living. This need not be the case. If immigration is properly planned, the result will be the reverse... With regard to the selection of immigrants, much has been said about discrimination. I wish to make it quite clear that Canada is perfectly within her rights in selecting the persons whom we regard as desirable future citizens. It is not a 'fundamental human right' of any alien to enter Canada. It is a privilege. It is a matter of domestic policy.

This statement was a well calculated one. Three different strands of ideas can be identified. First, immigration was regarded as important for population growth. Second, immigration was perceived, if properly planned, as capable of bringing about greater economic growth. Third, the insistence that immigration
had to be selective because the government had to take into account the "absorptive capacity" of the Canadian population so that its "present" character would not be distorted. (Hawkins, 1972:92).

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration was created in 1950. A new Immigration Act was tabled and passed in parliament in 1952. The admission policy as specified by this Act defined which group of people could come into Canada from each foreign country. Countries were divided into five categories, applicants from each of which were selected according to different set of criteria. The five categories were defined geographically but the racial and ethnic bias had been clearly written into the geographic divisions. For example, the first category includes British subjects born or naturalized in the United Kingdom, New Zealand, or South Africa; and citizens of Ireland, U.S.A., and of France. People from this category were automatically admitted. The fifth category, however, specifies that citizens of all countries other than those included in the first four categories (which leaves mainly the Chinese and Japanese) may immigrate if they are direct relatives; husband and wives, children under twenty-one years of age, father over sixty-five, mother over sixty, of Canadian citizens. Accordingly the restriction against non-white immigration was maintained, albeit indirectly, and justified by unqualified arguments about differences in climatic conditions,
customs, habits, modes of life, and the assimilability of prospective immigrants.

The second period commenced with Diefenbaker's Conservative government in 1957. By then it had become apparent that the Immigration Act of 1952 was inadequate in several important ways. A very large backlog of applications, mostly of the prospective sponsored immigrants, had piled up in the European offices. The lack of skilled manpower was felt by the economy while unemployment rose in 1957 and intensified in 1958. This was a paradoxical situation which indicated important structural changes occurring in the economy at the time. Unemployment was high but mostly in sectors of the unskilled and at the same time there was a shortage of skilled labor. (Hawkins, 1972:127). This brought about a new awareness of the economy's manpower needs and a shift toward encouraging the employment-creating kind of immigration.

In 1960, Ellen Fairclough, the minister of Citizenship and Immigration, announced that:

The key to our immigration policy will be the consistent application of proper selection standards designed to bring the best possible settlers to Canada. I am sure all Canadians agree that once these standards are established they should be applied consistently to all who seek admission to this country."

These new standards, as specified in the 1962 immigration regulations, explicitly established skill as the main criterion in the selection of unsponsored immigrants. These same
regulations also removed racial discrimination as the main feature of Canada's immigration policy. This change represented a new official conception of the persons who were to be regarded as the "best possible settlers" for Canada. Instead of the previous racialist ideology of cultural traits, skin colors, and questions of assimilability; the "best possible settlers" were to be judged in terms of their skills and qualifications. Two main reasons can be discerned for such a critical shift of policy. The first is the above mentioned fact of Canada's new and changing manpower needs. The second and more important reason is that the traditional source of immigrants such as the United Kingdom and northern Europe could no longer provide the amount of skilled immigrants that Canada needed. The growing post-war European economy not only raised the European standard of living and hence curbed incentives for emigration, but it also raised the local demands for skilled manpower. The new immigration regulations of 1962 opened up new areas, notably in third world countries, where skilled manpower could be acquired.

Table II indicates the changing composition of immigrant occupations between the years of 1962 to 1967. In almost all of the professional categories their percentage increases steadily. Although the increase in terms of percentage points may appear to be small, the total numbers of immigrants increased quite substantially over these years as illustrated by Table III. The total number of immigrants in 1967 was about three times that of
1962. Table IV shows the dramatic increase of Japanese, Chinese, and East Indian immigrants, especially in the period 1966-70.

**Table II**

**Canadian Immigration, 1962-1967.**

*Professional and Technical Workers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Immigrants with occupations</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>49.8</td>
<td>50.5</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional &amp; technical</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Scientists</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians &amp; Surgeons</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional nurses</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: United Nations Institute for Training and Research, A17294, New York, Nov. 5, 1968)

**Table III**

**Annual Number of Immigrants, Canada**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70,005</td>
<td>79,049</td>
<td>102,356</td>
<td>121,159</td>
<td>165,986</td>
<td>214,258</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Statistics Canada, 1978)

These immigrants were admitted, (other than those under the sponsored category), under the new standards established by the 1962 immigration regulations in which skill and qualification are the major criteria. Therefore, these increases not only

99
indicate the desire of these people to immigrate but also that they possess skills and training which are beneficial to the Canadian economy.

The third period under discussion opened with Prime Minister Pearson's Liberal government in 1963. As quoted in Hawkins (1972:140), the Economic Council reported that: "more recently, since 1961, the economy appears to have entered a third phase in which a degree of reduction in unemployment has been achieved, productivity gains have been improved, balance of payment strains have been eased." It was in such a climate of economic recovery and growth, according to Hawkins, that there was a take-over of the Canadian government by new technologies of planning (1972:150). While policy-making in immigration remained largely a bureaucratic prerogative, rational planning
was gaining momentum in every sector of the public service. Hawkins points out that during this period reports of the Senate Committee on Manpower and Employment, the Glassco Commission, the annual reviews of the Economic Council of Canada had appeared one after another, researched and prepared by specialist advisors who were keenly aware of new needs and priorities. (1972:152).

Prime Minister Pearson announced on December 17, 1965, that a new Department of Manpower would be created whose responsibilities would include immigration. The subsequent creation of the new Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966 marked the official recognition that immigration was to serve manpower policy and development. The three separate criteria of MacKenzie King's conception of immigration: immigration for population growth, immigration for economic growth, and selective immigration for the preservation of Canada's cultural and racial character were now replaced by the single criterion of immigration for economic and manpower needs. The implications of this re-definition have far-reaching ideological as well as practical consequences. It was clearly implied in MacKenzie King's conception of immigration and the Immigration Act of 1952 that the anglo-cultural dominance was not only accepted as a given but was perceived as potentially threatened by alien cultures. Hence, it was part of the prerogatives of the immigration policy to protect this Anglo
cultural dominance. In this sense, the Canadian immigration policy also served as the official cultural policy.

With the new immigration regulations of 1962 and the creation of the Department of Manpower and Immigration in 1966, the function of the immigration policy has been re-defined as explicitly serving the needs of the economy. This represents a radical departure from the previous position of immigration policy as cultural policy. The ideological underpinning of this transition is that the "purity" of the Anglo-cultural character, and by implication the racial-character, should no longer be upheld as the officially recognized cultural character of Canada. There are obviously many reasons for such an ideological transition. Other than the economic one as analysed above, the growth of French Canadian nationalism seems to be an important factor. The net effect of such a transition, however, was to leave an ideological vacuum as to what the Canadian cultural policy should be. The growth of the ideology of multiculturalism can be seen as directly linked to this development.

At a more practical level, the so called visible minorities have grown in size and by 1971 they comprised (other than the native Indians) a total of roughly one point two five percent of the Canadian population and close to two percent in 1976. As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter that they are frequently regarded simply as part of the "third element" in the Canadian ethnic composition. The problem which arises from this...
conception is that an official cultural policy might fail to take into account conditions and problems specific to the visible minorities. This is a question that needs to be pursued in greater detail in a later context.

The connection between ethnic relations formation in Canada and her immigration policy is self-evident in the above discussion. The immigration policy does not only specify who are to be allowed to come into the country but the conditions under which they can enter. When the immigration policy is also used as the cultural policy, as was the case in Canada up until 1962, the importance of the policy on the subsequent development of ethnic relations is that much more pronounced. If this linkage between state policies on immigration and culture and the formation of ethnic relations can be established, and so far it has been argued that such a linkage exists and is pivotal, then it is necessary to examine not only state policy formulation in general but also the role and functions of the state. When the nature of the state, and specifically its ability to effect changes in the society at large through implementation of specific policies, is made clear; then a detailed discussion of the dynamics between state policy and ethnic relations would be more systematic and evaluations of particular policies possible. This clarification of the role and functions of the state is the task of the next chapter.
Notes

1. Native Indians and Inuits are in a category of their own because of their past and the present marginal role that they occupy. (See W. Dyck, 1981) But as visible minorities they can be grouped together with other visible minorities.

2. Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV.

3. Ibid.


5. For details see Canada's Immigration Policy.


7. The assessment system of the policy is divided into two parts. The first part consists of long term criteria: a) education (maximum of 20 points); b) personal assessment, (15 points); c) occupational demands (15 points); d) occupational skill (10 points); e) age (10 points for applicants under thirty-five). The second part consists of short-term criteria: f) arranged employment or designated occupation (10 points); g) knowledge of English and French (10 points); h) relatives in Canada (5 points); i) employment opportunities in areas of destination (5 points). An applicant who scores over fifty points stands a good chance to be admitted. This assessment system for admission is still in effect today though slightly modified. More emphasis is put on the specific kind of job which the applicant is qualified for that is not and probably cannot be filled in the immediate future by a Canadian. Coordination between the Department of Manpower and Immigration and the provincial governments further facilitate a clear estimate of the specific manpower admission. The applicant's skill and educational attainment coupled with occupational need in Canada represent the key to admission.

8. The rules for admission of immigrants to Canada are found in two places. One is the Immigration Act, an Act of Parliament, which is subject to orders-in-council by the annual sessions of Parliament. The other is the orders-in-council prohibiting the entry of persons whom they
consider undesirable. According to D.C. Corbett (1957), changing an order-in-council can be the business of a few moments. The draft order will usually come from officials in the Immigration Branch, and will be presented in the Cabinet by the Minister. The decision to change order-in-council may have originated with the Minister, in the Cabinet, or in the ranks of departmental officials. Those who make the decisions may have been influenced by representatives from members of the public, members of Parliament, officials of other departments of government, or representatives of other governments.
CHAPTER FIVE

The Role and Functions of the State in Advanced Capitalism

In order to understand the specific relations between the state and ethnic minorities (especially between the impact of certain state policies and ethnic mobilization), in a given society, the role and functions of the state are the crucial factors that need to be clarified. The focus here is upon certain aspects of the conceptualization of the state in advanced capitalist societies (of which Canada is one).

There are several features that distinguish advanced capitalism from the earlier stage of liberal or competitive capitalism. The emergence of multinational corporations, the development and application of technology in production which in turn requires an increasingly skilled labor force, the monopolization and manipulation of the markets are some such features. Yet the most important and central of all these phenomena is the qualitatively expanded role which the state has assumed in the direction of the economy.

David Wolfe (1977) argues that there are two important events that have contributed much to the transition from competitive capitalism to advanced capitalism. They are the Great Depression of the 1930's and the massive economic mobilizations undertaken by the various states during World War
II. The Great Depression resulted from the breakdown of the competitive market, both international and domestic, and subsequently the state had to assume a larger role in directing and stimulating national economies. The tremendous success of economic mobilizations during World War II demonstrated the states' ability to manage the economy. State directed wartime investment played a central role in bringing about the new waves of prosperity after the war. State intervention in the national economy has since become the norm rather than the exception. The political, economic, and social consequences of this development are immense and far-reaching. Its effect on ethnic relations in advanced capitalistic societies needs to be explored in detail.

The relation between the formation of ethnic relations and the relevant state policy (such as the immigration policy in Canada up to 1962) is obvious given the presentation in the last chapter. The role of state policy in the molding and shaping of ethnic relations in a given plural society is of central importance. In the various historical settings of plural societies such as the colonial expansion, slave trade, middleman minorities and the more contemporary phenomenon of immigrants in the industrial western and north American societies; the rules and regulations set up and maintained by the central authority (be it the colonial government or the state in a democratic society) affect to the last detail the life chances of all the ethnic groups.
From the ethnic groups' initial admission to a given society to the facilities as well as barriers for their socio-economic advancement and mobility, the central authority of the state obviously holds the key to the final decision that affects this entire process. If this important role of the state with respect to ethnic relations formation can be established then a second and more crucial question that needs to be clarified is what are the factors that influence and ultimately determine the process of state policy development?

It is in this sense that the area of state policy development can be viewed as the arena in which various structural and ideological factors come to a head. Such factors include for example the manpower and labor requirements of the economy at a given time as well as the concomitant cultural and racial ideology of the dominant groups. The question of how the state deals with these significant considerations points to a more fundamental question regarding the role and functions of the state. Clarification of the latter question would provide the necessary informations for the analysis of state policies in general and of those in regard to ethnic relations in particular. A successful delineation of the priorities of the state would enable the analyst to ascertain the importance the state would assign to the accommodation of some given ethnic groups at a given time. The state assigned priority of accommodation (or the denial of it) to a specific ethnic group is
In turn dialectically related to the very process of the group's mobilization itself. Therefore, the clarification of the priorities of the state (and in this case the state in advanced capitalism) is the focal point upon which the questions of ethnic relations formation, the mobilization and de-mobilization of ethnic groups and the possibility of the integration of these groups structurally, culturally and politically are hinged. The following is a selective and critical examination of the literature in an attempt to clarify this important issue.

Before we can proceed to discuss the role and functions of the state, we have to make clear exactly what constitutes the state. There is a basic consensus, even among theorists and scholars who hold very different views about the nature of the state, that the state is a complex of institutions of which the central government is but one. The institutions of the state also include the bureaucracy (the civil service, public corporations, central banks, regulatory commissions, etc.), the military and the police, the judiciary, the representative assemblies, and what Ralph Miliband (1969) calls the "sub-central levels" of government such as the provincial and municipal governmental and bureaucratic institutions. Therefore, the state is not to be identified with the more narrow concept of the government.

Among the various theoretical conceptualizations of the role and functions of the state two opposing camps can readily
be identified. The liberal-pluralist camp, whose leading figure is Robert A. Dahl, argues that in a democratic society the role of the state is that of an arbiter. Decision making is characterized by a bargaining process among various interest or pressure groups, depending on the context of their involvement. Hence, the society is divided by a great number of cross-cutting cleavages but lacks fundamental and permanent lines of division.

...the vast apparatus that grew up to administer the affairs of the American welfare state is a decentralized bargaining bureaucracy. This is merely another way of saying that the bureaucracy has become a part of what earlier I called the "normal" American political process...Thus the making of governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great minorities united upon certain matters of basic policy. It is the steady appeasement of relatively small groups. (Dahl, 1956:61)

A number of assumptions are implicit in this formulation. It assumes that the state bureaucracy is a neutral organization carrying out its duties in a disinterested manner. It also assumes that the various interest and pressure groups compete on a more or less equal footing. Although Dahl does not deny that there exist elites in different areas, these elites are seen as lacking in the necessary cohesion that could turn them into a ruling class. In fact, there are competitions among the elites representing different interests and this phenomenon in itself is a guarantee that the ruling power in the society is diffused and decentralized. In other words, the state is susceptible to conflicting pressures representing different areas of interest and consequently cannot be biased toward specific groups. The
role of the state, then, is to accommodate and reconcile all these conflicting interests and pressures.

Diametrically opposed to this liberal-pluralist picture of the state is the orthodox Marxist position. In the *Communist Manifesto*, Marx called the state the "executive of the bourgeoisie." The state is seen as the outcome of irreconcilable class antagonisms in society. These antagonisms, embodied in the form of classes with conflicting interests, can only be kept under control and the society be stabilized by a power which functions to fulfill the role of the keeper of social order. This power, which serves as an instrument in the hands of the dominant classes, is the state. Hence, the state is understood as an instrument of class domination, its purpose is to legalize and perpetuate the social order which is an order of class oppression and exploitation.

Ralph Miliband (1969), in his discussion of the state in capitalist society, challenges the liberal-pluralist conception of the state while at the same time modifying the orthodox Marxist position in order to account for the new phenomena that have emerged in advanced capitalism. Miliband's thesis consists of several component parts. He studies the relationships between the economic elites, the state elites and the state system. Then he analyzes the purpose and role of the state in the setting of advanced capitalism. His conclusion is that competition between different interest groups in advanced capitalist societies is
imperfect and this is in turn due to the structural inequality perpetuated by the capitalistic mode of production. Let us examine this line of reasoning in some detail.

One of the features of advanced capitalism is the development of the managerial sector. The propertied class has to rely increasingly on a class of highly trained, highly skilled managers and directors to run the complex business of modern capitalistic production (Burnham, 1960; D. Bell, 1973). This class of professionals has assumed an increasingly important role in the planning and decision making process and yet they do not, in general, own the means of production. This phenomenon has led the liberal-pluralists to argue that members of the propertied class no longer rule their own business empires. Miliband’s contention is that the successful entrepreneurs, managers, and professionals of working class origins are assimilated into the propertied class, both in their life style and in their outlook. And in fact, most of them become members of the propertied class through business opportunities and their high salaries.

A similar trend can be detected in the recruitment and formation of the state elites. It cannot be denied that some very bright and able young men and women who rose to assume prominent positions in the state bureaucracy are of working class origins but the process of embourgeoisement is evident here. By “embourgeoisement” Miliband means the integration of
the working class into the system through higher purchasing power, welfare state measures and unionization but of course, the degree of such integration varies from country to country. Furthermore, Miliband argues, in terms of social origins, education and class situation, the group of people who command top positions in the state system have largely been drawn from the business and propertied class and the professional levels of the middle class. Hence, there is evidence to suggest that the business and propertied class occupies a dominant role in the state system, including the bureaucracy, while the rising professional class is increasingly co-opted into the propertied class.

According to Miliband, the role of the state as reflected in the politics of advanced capitalism has centered on the debates and controversies stemming from different conceptions of how to run the same economic system - the capitalist mode of production, - and not about radically different systems. The capitalist context is accepted as beyond question and this basic premise is of absolute importance in shaping the governments' policies and decisions about any specific issues and problems that it confronts. The needs of civil society are by and large identified with the needs of the system of capitalist production and consequently what is put forward by the government as the "national interest" is in fact capitalist interest.
Given this understanding of the role of government, and the state system in general, Miliband concedes that the business and propertied class in advanced capitalism has never reached the status of a "governing class" comparable to the pre-industrial aristocratic and land-owning classes. It is also quite clear that the economic elites would never reach such a position. However, the point is that they do not need to. The relative distance between the state elites and the economic elites turns out to be of immense advantage to the promotion and perpetuation of capitalist production in the long run. The business and propertied class in advanced capitalism is by no means homogeneous in its social composition or in its immediate economic interests. The different short-term interests of the various groups often conflict and the state is needed to manage and reconcile such conflicts. In order for the state to accomplish this task, it needs a degree of independence from the dominant groups and class. Hence, the state has a degree of relative autonomy in its functions. This notion of relative autonomy is a fundamental departure from the orthodox Marxist concept that the state is an instrument of oppression in the hand of the ruling class. It is a notion that we will return to in our later discussion.

Miliband's criticism of the liberal-pluralist position, given the above conception of the social composition and relations of various elites and classes, is that there is
imperfect competition in advanced capitalist societies. He contends that what is wrong with the pluralist - democratic theory is not its insistence on the fact of competition but its claim that the different interest groups, notably capital and labor, compete on an equal footing. The relatively autonomous position of the state enables it to serve the common interest of the business and propertied class better and more efficiently. From a long term perspective the economic elites' interests are the same, namely, the perpetuation and growth of profit-oriented capitalist production. Hence the state can best protect and promote the dominant economic interests by distancing itself from the parochial and short term interests of the various fractions of the business class.

In other words, the state is really promoting the interests of capital. In contrast to the cohesive long term interest of the dominant economic elites, the labor interests, as represented by trade union movements, are characterized by division. Trade unions have always been divided from one another in terms of the skills of their members, particular functions in the industry, and by regional, ethnic and racial factors. This further weakens the pressure that the labor force as a whole can bring to bear on the state.

Miliband's thesis thus consists of two major elements. The first is that the state is in a position of relative autonomy from which it can better protect and direct the long-term
economic interests of the dominant classes. The second is that the notion of equal competition between different interest and pressure groups with the state as the impartial arbiter is a liberal-pluralist myth. This position is representative of a significant number of theorists who have perceived the inadequacy of the crude Marxist conceptualization of the state while rejecting the liberal-pluralist alternative.

Leo Panitch (1977), in writing about the role and nature of the Canadian state, argues along the same line as Miliband. Dennis Olsen (1977, 1980), in his studies of the Canadian state elites, provides some empirical evidence in support of Miliband's thesis. He shows that the state elites of Canada are mostly recruited from the middle class rather than the "grand bourgeoisie." But he adds that very often as a result of their political involvement these state elites wind up being members of the dominant economic class. The close relationship between the economic elites and the state elites is borne out by the fact that 27 percent of the members of the federal cabinet have had, or will have, business or corporate involvement and appointments. The ethnic background of the state elites is predominantly British and French, reflecting the two dominant ethnic groups in Canada. We will return in a later context to the analysis of the Canadian state and the Canadian ethnic structure. For the meantime it is sufficient to note that Miliband's is by no means a unique position.
The function of the state, according to this approach, is a twofold one. In the perpetuation and promotion of capitalist production and growth, the state performs an important function in the process of capital accumulation. The basic contradiction of the increasingly socialized nature of capitalist production and the private appropriation of the surplus value - the profit - is maintained by the state. The prospect of the continuation of capitalist production in spite of this contradiction is strengthened by the second function of the state-legitimation. Miliband's description of the legitimation function of the state focuses on the ideological aspect. He argues that capitalist political socialization involves massive indoctrination. By political socialization Miliband means the process of the engineering of consent and of acceptance of the status quo in a capitalist society. It is not portrayed as a deliberate and explicit form of propaganda or "brainwashing". But it is indirectly through the state's intervention in almost every aspect of the economic life of the society that it promotes an ideological trend of conservative consensus. A number of factors work in its favor. The working class remains "immature" and depoliticized. The national sentiment and various forms of patriotism always work as major allies of the conservative forces and they are frequently used in defence of the established order. The religious and educational establishments, including the universities, are seen as primarily promoting
conformity. Above all there is the influence of business on the mass media and on the very process of political socialization itself.

Miliband suggests that the business class attempts to persuade the society to accept the policies that it advocates as part of the natural order of things and in so doing it urges acceptance of the economic system of which it forms a central part. It extols the belief in free enterprise and promises rewards for individual ingenuity and entrepreneurial skills. All these factors and agencies, diverse as they may be, combine to legitimate the order and values of the capitalist system, and even when they speak of reforms, these essentially involve adaptation to, and improvement of, capitalist society.

It can be argued that Miliband does not go beyond a social description of the legitimizing function of the state. Such a description raises just as many questions as it answers. The answers to such questions as "what are the structural conditions that have made legitimation necessary" and "why is it successful" are, as Miliband admits, by no means clear in his presentation. Satisfactory answers to such question would have to be sought in a more in-depth structural analysis of advanced capitalism.

A more economic-oriented analysis of the accumulation and legitimation functions of the state is provided by James O'Connor (1973). He bases his analysis on a study that he calls
"An Anatomy of American State Capitalism". He suggests that economic activities in modern American society may be classified into two groups: industries organized by private capital - the private sector; and industries organized by the state - the public sector. The private sector can be sub-divided into two parts: the competitive industries and the monopolistic industries.

In the competitive industries the productivity of workers is generally low due to the absence of advanced technology. The scale of production is small and tends to be labor-intensive. Examples of competitive industries are restaurants, grocery stores, service stations, branches of trades etc. There is also a tendency toward overcrowding because it is relatively easy to set up business. As a result the market demand tends to be unstable due to fluctuating supplies. This in turn causes irregular labor needs. Wages are kept low because of such irregularities in both the product markets and the labor markets. Consequently the labor movement is relatively underdeveloped. The labor force in the competitive industries consists mostly of unskilled or semi-skilled workers, members of ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups.

The monopolistic industries, which employ a third of the U.S. work force, are predominant in manufacturing and mining. Due to the high capital requirements entry to monopoly industries is difficult. Intense application of technology in
the production process and market control and analysis eliminate by and large the irregularities of the product and labor market that are common in the competitive industries. Hence, the demand for labor is relatively stable and work is in general available on a full time, year round basis. Also because of the complexity of modern technology and work processes a high proportion of employees are of the white collar, technical, and administrative kind. The blue collar workers are relatively well organized in their labor union movement.

The third major sector of the economy is the state industry. It can again be differentiated into two categories: production of goods and services organized by the state and production organized by industries under contract with the state. Examples of the first category include education, welfare, health care and other services; and examples of the second category are production of military equipment and supplies, highway construction, etc. It is observed that productivity in the state sector is relatively low. In the second category state contractors are not under pressure from the market because they are producing under government contracts. In the first category the factor of profit approximation simply does not exist. The demand for labor in the state sector is in general stable although it is subject to political shifts and changing budgetary priorities. The stability of employment, labor immobility, and the substantial
size of production are all conducive to the organization and growth of labor unions in the state industries.

The development of state industries is concomitant with the development of state intervention in the economy. Other than the two historical events, the Great Depression and the economic mobilizations during the World War II, there is a third structural factor that is a more fundamental cause of this development, as capitalist production increases in its scale and intensity it becomes more dependent on science and technology, specialized and skilled labor and so on. To meet these demands, new and expanded educational institutions, programs for scientific research and development, improvement and expansion of systems of transportation are needed. In other words, a whole new network of infrastructure is required for advanced capitalist production. Only the state can meet such demands.

In this context, O'Connor identifies two different kinds of state expenditures. The first kind, the social capital expenditure, is required for private capital accumulations. There are two sub-categories to social capital expenditure. The social constant capital which is the capital used to increase the productivity of labor power through the development and maintenance of infrastructures such as building of highways, airports, and the financing of research and development. The social variable capital is used to lower the reproduction cost of labor through health care, education, and so on. The second
kind of state expenditure is what O'Connor calls the social expenses expenditure. These expenditures, such as the maintenance of the welfare system, are designed to foster social harmony and stability.

In O'Connor's study of the development of the state industries a deeper relation between accumulation and legitimation is revealed. The development and maintenance system is not only designed for the purpose of legitimation, it is also crucial to the working of the economy as a whole. This relation is embedded within the intricate structural connections between the competitive sector, the monopoly sector, and the state sector of industries.

As we have seen above, in order to facilitate development in business and industries, primarily in the monopoly sector, the state has undertaken the task of providing the necessary infrastructures for advanced capitalist production. This is called the social capital expenditure. While the social capital expenditure mainly benefits the industries in the monopoly sector, its cost is shared by the society as a whole through taxation. The social capital expenditures enable the monopoly industries to increase productivity through a combination of advances in technology and corresponding reductions in employment. Often the result is that the growth of the output exceeds the growth of the purchasing power in the economy as a whole. This may in turn require the state to maintain a welfare
system through social expenses expenditures as discussed above
to increase the purchasing power without increasing
productivity. Hence, surplus population - the unemployed - is
maintained by the state which in turn provide the necessary
purchasing power to keep up the level of demand that maintains
production. Seen in this light the accumulation and legitimation
functions are two sides of the same coin, and one cannot do
without the other. O'Connor's conclusion is that the fiscal
crisis of the state develops as state expenditures tend to
outstrip revenues.

There are three closely interrelated concepts developed by
this approach regarding the role and functions of the state.
They are the accumulation and legitimation functions and the
relative autonomy of the state. This relative autonomy is deemed
necessary for the state to serve the long-term common interest
of the capitalist class as a whole. This line of approach, as
mentioned earlier, attempts to modify the crude Marxist concept
of the state as simply an instrument serving the bourgeoisie
while at the same time refuting the liberal-pluralist concept of
the state as an impartial arbiter.

In Miliband's analysis the focus is on the sociological
description of the relation between the state and the class
structure of the society. O'Connor develops a position that
focuses more on the economic conditions under which the state
performs its functions. The underlying contention is that the
state is, in the final analysis, an instrument - albeit a sophisticated one - serving the long-term common interest of the bourgeoisie. It is with this understanding that the status of relative autonomy is granted to the state. It is precisely because of the state's role in the service of capitalism, according to these theorists, that it needs to "legitimate" its authority over the society. The function of legitimation, at the ideological level, is to mystify the capitalist mode of production as the natural order of things and to depoliticize the oppressed classes. At the economic level, social welfare programs are used to boost the general purchasing power which maintains market stability.

There is no question that to a very significant extent the analyses and contentions put forth by the proponents of this approach are valid. What remains problematic is the underlying assumption held by these theorists that the state, in spite of its relative autonomy, remains a tool in the hands of the capitalist class. It is my view that the concepts of accumulation and legitimation express a particularistic perspective on the state and hence capture only part of the truth. The state's functions, in this perspective, are reduced to a very basic economic level and they are conceived only in relation to the system of capitalist production. In this way, the ghost of a crude economic determinism is resurrected. The tremendous rise in the general living standard due to state
directed economic development (reduced to the concept of accumulation) is ignored in this discussion and so is the comprehensive social coverage of basic vital needs (reduced to the concept of legitimization) which is made possible by the rise in productivity. The development of the infrastructures for advanced capitalist production no doubt benefits the big industries and corporations, but the ordinary citizens are also recipients of the benefits from better transportation systems, better school systems and so on.

The explanation given by Miliband of the "immaturity" of the working class is a combination of the time worn notion of false consciousness and the success of bourgeois ideological indoctrination. Perhaps a simpler answer lies in the greatly improved living standard of the working class (at least among the organized and unionized sectors). The process of "bourgeoisement" can be seen in a different light as social mobility. I do not mean to argue that the naive notions of liberty and equal opportunity for all are true. On the contrary, as was stated earlier, I believe that the concepts of accumulation and legitimization are both valid. My contention is that they have managed to capture only part of the truth and the basic reason for this is an overemphasis on economic determinism. The consequence is that the state is seen as only relatively autonomous. A more comprehensive picture of the state needs to be drawn.
There are many variants in the Marxist analysis of the state. In his critical examination of the Marxist literature on this subject, Mouzelis (1980) argues that most of the analyses fall into a reductionist mold. He points out that:

Marxism's lasting contribution to the methodology of the social sciences are a) its holistic orientation—its unwillingness to examine social phenomena in a compartmentalized fashion; and b) its portrayal of collective agents in a dialectical relation to their social environment... (Mouzelis, 1980:173)

According to Mouzelis, the strong emphasis on the primacy of the economic sphere and the innumerable attempts by Marxist theorists to elaborate this primacy have led to various reductionist tendencies which dilute the holistic character of Marxist thought. Mouzelis outlines four types of reductionism in the Marxist theory of the capitalist state. They are characterized as 1) the types of reductionism which imply an agent-agent relationship; 2) those implying an agent-structure relationship; 3) those implying a structure-structure relationship; and finally 4) those implying a structure-agent relationship. This typology of reductionism can be further categorized into two groups—the voluntaristic types which include 1 and 2 and the structuralistic types which include 3 and 4.

In the voluntaristic variants of reductionism, the linkage between the economic and the political is analysed in terms of actions, strategies, or practices of agents from these two
spheres, they are seen as shaping and controlling political institutions and processes in a more or less deliberate manner. In the structuralistic variants, agents-actors are no longer central to the analysis. The focus is on systemic concepts such as functional requirements, structural constraints, tendential laws and contradictions.

The agent-agent reductionism is characteristic of the kind of theory which claims that the state elites are invariably subjected to the pressures of the bourgeoisie. The class-state relation is then viewed as a relation between two groups of agents, the economic group and the political group, with the latter serving as the passive instruments of the first.

Mouzelis argues that Miliband's writings at times come close to this type of reductionism although Miliband does provide empirical evidence to support his claim that the political elites are linked closely to the economic elites and are often in their service. What is characteristic of the so-called "vulgar" Marxism (to which Miliband's writings certainly do not belong) is that the political practices are reduced, in an a priori fashion, to economic practices.

Agent-structure reductionism is a different version of instrumental voluntarism. The emphasis here is that the state as an instrument is analysed in terms of its institutional structure rather than its personnel. The control of the bourgeoisie over the political practices is seen as the
institutional framework which itself will ensure that state personnel, irrespective of their class background and interest group connection, will generate policy to safeguard bourgeois interests.

In the structure-structure variants of reductionism, all institutional features of the political system are interpreted as reducible to the economic structural constraints. In other words, they are the products of the capitalistic mode of production. Large scale intervention and the growth of the welfare state are seen as the long-term reproduction requirement of advanced capitalism.

The structure-agent types of reductionism explain political practices in similar structural terms as those used in the structure-structure types. Political practices are construed as the direct effect of the social class origins of these agents and whenever they do not seem to be so: (when political practices appear to be founded on allegiances other than economic ones), the ethnic or regional basis of such practices are dismissed as epiphenomenal. Concepts such as "false consciousness" are invoked to explain them away.

In his concluding remarks, Mouzelis states that these four types of reductionism have the net effect of neutralizing the most fruitful aspects of the Marxist framework: its holistic and dialectical character. In all these reductionist variants the collective agents are portrayed as either omnipotent, as in the
voluntary types, or as mere "effects" of structural determinations, as in the structuralist types. (Mouzelis, 1980: 184). Hence, it can be concluded that in order for the concept of "relative autonomy" (of the political sphere) to be genuinely meaningful, it has to be defined in a non-reductionist manner. It is from this point of departure that we shall pursue, though not necessarily and entirely from a marxist perspective, the further elaboration of the concept of relative autonomy.

Claus Offe (1972) in his discussion of the political authority of the state agrees with Miliband and O'Connor that it is naive to assume that the state authority is equally and directly responsive to claims of all different interest groups in the society. On the other hand he argues that the search for a monopolistic "ruling class" in modern capitalist societies has not produced any enlightening results. Yet, contrary to Miliband and O'Connor he does not simply refine the orthodox Marxist position with the highly selective and particularistic concepts of accumulation and legitimation. He proposes a new set of criteria for the analysis of political administrative actions. This involves three fundamental system problems and it is Offe's contention that the management of these problems has become the overriding objective of the state.

The first problem concerns economic stability. This includes the questions of full employment and economic growth. A whole host of issues is involved here. Expert and competent
decisions have to be made concerning incentives for the realization of capital, opportunity for investment, compensation for the lack of opportunity to invest or losses in investment and so on. In advanced capitalism the realization of private capital is politically mediated to the last detail. This is so precisely because economic growth and stability is crucial to maintaining the continued stability of the system as a whole.

This formulation is a fundamental departure from any of the various versions of economic determinism. Political power and action are no longer seen as belonging to a realm apart from the domain of commodity production and exchange. They have become the very medium of the latter. The state's active intervention and regulation are necessary to ensure the governability of the society as a whole. The realm of politics and the realm of economics are intertwined into a complex network the explicit function and purpose of which is the maintenance of economic, and hence, social stability.

The second problem is a compound one. Foreign policy, foreign trade and military policy are the key issues here. Problems of this kind arise because of the economy. The existence of multinational corporations brings about the need to integrate international diplomacy with international trade and the organization of military apparatus and policy. Overseas resource extraction and supplies raises the question of geopolitical spheres of influence. This set of internationally
oriented factors has direct bearing on the stability of the domestic economy. Thus the role of the state is decisive in the establishment of the desired international order and the international state system in turn reinforces the importance of the state's role.

The third problem concerns the question of mass loyalty. The goal here is to achieve the internal integration of the society while keeping conflicts between different interest groups within the framework of the political system. Offe states explicitly that the concept of mass loyalty marks a point of departure from the traditional concept of legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy, Offe argues, implies the use of different means to promote an acceptance on the part of the masses of the given order. The concept of mass loyalty has gone beyond any claims of legitimation. The system itself no longer requires to be legitimated. What is needed instead is to discipline and structure all conflicts so that they can be channelled through and accommodated by the political system. In the course of this process, integrative symbols and ideologies are attached to them. In other words, the state's actions and policy conflicts are defined and disciplined in such a way that they can be resolved or accommodated.

For example, it is at least theoretically conceivable that an individual citizen can take the federal government to court through the existing legal channels. Of course, it does not
follow that the system is capable of accommodating all conflicts, especially the potentially uncontrollable radical ones. In the case of the latter forceful suppression is used. Such actions of suppression are taken, however, not openly to protect the system itself, but are undertaken in the name of civil society as a whole in self-defense against deviant and subversive elements.

The successful handling of these three sets of problems constitutes the "objective imperatives" of the state. And the vastly expanded role of the state in advanced capitalism is alone capable of dealing with them. Within the parameters of these three sets of problems, two relationships emerge. The first is that there is a close connection between the three problems and imbalance in one area tends to develop to the other two. The second is that due to their interdependent nature efforts to redress the balance in one problem area may in turn affect the balance in other areas. Hence the task of the state is to manage these problem areas not individually but as a whole. The role of the state, then, according to Offe, is that:

"The principal function of a political system of the type investigated may be described as cautious crisis management and long-term avoidance strategy." (Offe, 1972:99) When characterized as such the state can only be fully functional when it is in a position to react with great flexibility to continually changing challenges that arise in the total system.
Priorities are to be defined and re-defined depending on the actual circumstances. In order for this flexible responsiveness to be realized, Offe suggests, an effective independence of the state from any dominant classes or influential power groups and independence from any one single doctrine are the indispensable condition.

Approaching this question from a very different perspective, Theda Skocpol (1979) has reached a similar conclusion. In her studies of states and social revolutions in which the dynamics and underlying social and structural conditions for the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions are explored at length, she has derived a set of theoretical postulates about state power and its relation to revolutionary transformation. In her very detailed historical analysis of these three major social revolutions, Skocpol argues that state power cannot be understood simply as an instrument of class domination, nor can changes in the state structures be explained solely in terms of class conflicts.

It is pointed out that in the above mentioned revolutionary situations the occurrence of the revolutions and nature of the new regimes that emerged from the conflicts depended upon the given structures of state organizations and their autonomous and dynamic relations to the domestic classes and political forces, as well as their relations to other states abroad. The outcome of these three revolutions were strengthened states, more
centralized, bureaucratic, and autonomously powerful at home and abroad. An important factor that Skocpol stresses is that states as administrative entities are embedded in a militarized international states system. This concurs with Offe's emphasis on the increasingly important international role assumed by the state.

The focus of Skocpol's analysis is by no means identical to Offe's. Neither the historical setting nor the stages of capitalistic development of the French, Russian, and Chinese societies at the times of the revolutions can be considered as of the advanced capitalistic mode. But the value of Skocpol's studies lies in the theoretical framework which she employs in the analysis of the state. She emphasizes the structural perspective which highlights the objective relationships and conflicts among variously situated groups and nations, rather than the more subjective factors of outlooks and ideologies. However, it is within the framework of this structural perspective that the autonomous role of the state is seen as of crucial importance. Skocpol suggests that a successful structural analysis has to focus on state organizations and their relations to both the international environment and to domestic classes and economic conditions. The development of the state machineries as complexes of institutions existing with their own sets of priorities and functions in the network of an international states system figures significantly in this
If a conclusion regarding the autonomy of the state can thus be drawn, what are some of the consequences for our understanding of the state's ability to affect formations of the domestic class relations, ethnic relations, and other groups relations? To return to Offe, his suggestion is that the new set of contradictions that arises in advance capitalism can no longer be interpreted strictly as "class antagonism". In place of class antagonism and class inequality is a new kind of structural inequality that is created due to the priorities and emphases imposed by the state in crisis management. There are problem areas that have no serious consequences for the stability of the system as a whole although these problems might not be any less serious in intensity than others. There is in effect a hierarchy of priorities in which the most attention is paid to those problems and issues that have the most far-reaching consequences and impact upon social stability. Hence, there is a disparity created by this structural mechanism of the priorities of state intervention between various problem areas and spheres of needs.

Some of the problem areas that are considered of top priority are identified as continual economic growth, sufficient market demand, maintenance of foreign trade relations, military crisis avoidance and so on. Areas and institutions that are marginal to the mainstream of life are by and large ignored.
Examples of some of these are certain areas of education, housing, and marginal ethnic minorities. This disparity appears that much more serious when one considers the discrepancy between the possible level of technical and social progress and the actually institutionalized level as directed by the state.

Offe argues forcefully that in place of the vertical pattern of social inequality the notion of "situational groupings" (1972:148), which emphasizes disparity between vital areas, would better describe the reality of advanced capitalism.

There are groups that are exposed to situationally dependent deprivation and frustration which is in turn caused by the state directed hierarchy of priorities. Since this disparity is politically determined, the major lines of conflicts are no longer drawn between classes but between vital areas and "situational groupings". Given this formulation, the concept of direct coercion is now seen as inadequate. The repressiveness of the state lies in the fact that there are many genuine needs and demands from certain groups and areas of the society that are denied access to the political decision-making process. The functions of the state, as governed by the criteria of stability and mass loyalty, are structurally restricted in its ability to accommodate demands and needs. To the extent that the state is restricted to interventionist activities aimed at maintaining stability, the by-product of structural disparity is unavoidable.
The question of ethnic minorities in relation to the state has now to be explored in the light of the above discussion of the role and functions of the state. The key factors to be considered are the autonomy of the state in pursuit of its objectives of economic growth, maintenance of international relationships and order, and mass loyalty. The priority that the state would assign to a given ethnic minority within its social-political system is then to be determined by the interrelations between the ethnic minority and these three sets of criteria. This entails a whole host of questions. What role does the ethnic minority play in relation to economic growth, especially in terms of supplies of labor? What would be the international repercussions, if there are any, of specific policies toward a given minority? What are the prevalent social sentiment, and ideology about the state's treatment of minority groups as reflected in the social psychology of the given society? And finally, what are the interconnections between these different considerations? The strength and the degree of mobilization of the ethnic minorities in question are decisive factors in the final determination of the answers to each of these questions.

Finally, I would like to end this chapter with a brief discussion of the Canadian state. There seems to be a basic agreement among sociologists and political scientists who write on the subject of modern capitalistic state that the trend of
development in such states is toward increasing centralization of the state power at the expense of subcentral institutions. (Miliband, 1969; O'Connor, 1973; Poulantzas, 1972;) The peculiar characteristic of the Canadian state, in contrast to other western capitalistic states, is its relatively decentralized federalism. There are historical and economic roots for this Canadian phenomenon. This is not the place to delve into the historical details of the formation of the Dominion and federal-provincial relations. But there are a number of structural factors that can be briefly outlined which may serve as a background to later discussions.

The first factor is the nature of the Canadian economy itself. In spite of recent development in secondary and tertiary industries the Canadian economy is still basically consists of resource extraction and staples production. Due to this preponderance of primary industry different regions have developed differently simply because of their respective geographies and resource endowment. As a consequence there is marked regional economic specialization. The priorities and common interests of a given province are defined by the needs and interests of the predominant industry(ies) of that province and as such they may not always be in accord with those of the other provinces. This regional segmentation is further accentuated by the fact that some aspects of the inter-provincial relations resemble those between a supplier and
a consumer. For instance, the more developed manufacturing industries of Eastern Canada require the energy supplied by the Western provinces. Hence the interests of Ontario and Quebec in keeping oil prices low contradict Alberta's interests as an oil supplier. This brings us to the closely related factor of the historical development of such inter-provincial relations.

It has been argued that the Dominion was formed as an amalgam of British colonies within which emerged a quasi-colonial relationship between regions with Eastern Canada as the dominant partner. (Panitch, 1977; Stevenson, 1977.) A more recent additional factor in furthering this process of segmentation is the more active role assumed by the provincial governments in economic affairs. This has created competition between the provincial governments for American investment. Often the provincial governments act as the representatives and spokesmen for their respective regional bourgeoisie, promoting and defending their interests. The federal government then is often perceived as composed of mandarins in Ottawa who are insensitive to and ignorant of the needs and reality of the provinces.

The growth of the provincial governments has been documented by Garth Stevenson (1977). He has recorded that by 1974 the provinces and municipalities together spent more than the federal government. The growth of the provincial governments and their increasing share of the total state expenditure
reflects the increasing number of state functionaries that have emerged at the provincial level, and indirectly the fact that the modernized provincial governments are a far more effective instrument for the promotion of regional economic interests. The increasing provincial income and expenditure contributes greatly to the conflict between the provinces and Ottawa. Many individuals in a given province tend to see more direct and immediate benefit to themselves in the activities of the provincial government than those in Ottawa, however important the latter may be. Stevenson concludes that:

Canada ... is a system reflecting the fragmented and regionalized nature of the economy, in which clear jurisdictional boundaries are absent, in which the provincial states strive constantly to expand their freedom of action, in which priorities at the center are established only after negotiation with the provincial states, and in which Ottawa acts as the instrument of one or more provincial states as often as it acts independently. (Stevenson, 1977:86)

However, it does not follow from this discussion that the federal government is totally unresponsive to the demands and needs of the Canadian economy. What has been argued is that the provincial governments are more concerned with their regional needs and development. And given the nature of the Canadian economy as a major supplier of natural resources with a branch plant industry developed through American investment - the combination of which produces regionally based economic systems with different priorities and interests - the provincial governments thus assume a central role in the development of
such regional economies. But insofar as there are industries and firms that conduct intensive research and development, and which aspire to sell products in overseas markets, the federal government is much better equipped than any provincial government to promote and defend their interests. Some examples of this type of industry are the Canadian Development Corporation (best known for its CANDU nuclear reactor), Export Development Corporation, and the Canadian International Development Agency. However, they constitute a rather small minority sector in the Canadian economy.

This brief sketch of these socio-economic factors, combined with the above discussion of Canadian immigration, give the background for an analysis of the Canadian state policies concerning immigration on the one hand and as means of ethnic conflict regulation and management on the other.
CHAPTER SIX

Multiculturalism as State Policy

The policy of multiculturalism was derived from Book IV of
the Royal Commission's Report on Bilingualism and Biculturalism.

The terms of reference of the Commission asked the commissioners
to:

...inquire into and report upon the existing state of
bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada and to
recommend what steps should be taken to develop the
Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal
partnership between the two founding races, taking into
account the contribution to, by other ethnic groups, the
cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that
should be taken to safeguard that contribution. (The
terms of reference, Royal Commission on Bilingualism and
Biculturalism).

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was
created by the federal government in 1963. It took the
commission six years of research and public consultations before
a report and recommendations were submitted to the government
for policy consideration. There are six volumes in the
Commission's report. The first volume deals with the official
languages of Canada, recognizing both English and French as the
official languages. (The second volume is concerned with the
relation between education and the use of English and French,
and especially with the issue of minority language rights. In
the third volume the use of English and French in the work world
is explored. Correlations between the use of French and English
and the corresponding socio-economic status in both the public and private sectors are formulated and investigated. The role of the other ethnic groups is discussed in the fourth volume and the policy derived from its recommendations is known as "multiculturalism" - the subject for further analysis in this chapter. Volume five and six conclude the report by discussing the roles of the federal government and ethnic organizations in the language issue.

As stated in the Commission's terms of reference, the central task of the Commission is to investigate the enormous problems arising from French Canadian's disenchantment with their cultural and socio-economic status. The failure of English Canadians to perceive this collective feeling of deprivation has further aggravated the situation, especially when confronted with rising expectations on the part of French Canadians. Events in the 70's, culminating in the Quebec referendum, have underscored the seriousness of the issue. What needs to be made clear here is that the Commission's task in the mid-1960's was to report to the government the existing situation and problems and recommend courses of action that would satisfy the French Canadians and thus defuse the potential explosiveness of the issue. In 1969, the federal government accepted the recommendations of the Commission on the status of English and French in federal matters - the adoption of the Official Languages Act. Under the auspices of the Official Languages Act,
bilingualism became the official language policy. However, a different policy was adopted two years later regarding cultural matters. This is the policy of multiculturalism based on the recommendations given in Book IV of the Royal Commission's report.

One unmistakable background factor that provided the momentum for the rise of multiculturalism was the new immigration policy as outlined in the White paper of 1966 and the rapidly changing ethnic composition of the Canadian population. As discussed earlier in the chapter on immigration, the new policy urged the importance of selecting immigrants according to their education and skills. This new policy was a response, at least in part, to the high rate of economic development in Canada since World War II. The manpower need for this economic development changed from unskilled and manual laborers and farmers to skilled technicians and professionals. During the 60's, highly qualified immigrants who came to Canada were entering a rapidly expanding labor market where their skills were in demand and where few Canadians were competing for the vacant employment.

One of the consequences of this change in immigration regulations was a significant shift in the areas from which immigrants were coming and in their ethnic composition. There was a dramatic rise in immigration from Asian countries and persons from such countries constituted more than twenty-three
percent of the landed immigrants in 1973 and 1974. Concomitant with this phenomenon was a drop in the percentage of immigrants of British origin. Although the overall picture of the Canadian population in terms of ethnic origins remained largely unchanged with Anglo-Canadians as the dominant group, the increase of the size of ethnic groups of non-British and non-French origins has been substantial. The culminating effect of all of the above factors was that ethnicity has become an important consideration, along with the question of the French Canadians, in the process of policy formulation.

On October 8, 1971, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau announced in the House of Commons the new policy which he called "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." In his announcement he stated that:

...the government has accepted all those recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which are contained in Volume IV of its reports directed to federal departments and agencies. Honorable members will recall that the subject of this volume is the contribution by other ethnic groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada and the measures that should be taken to safeguard that contribution"....For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or groups of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly. ....adherence to one's ethnic group is influenced so much by one's origin or mother tongue as by one's sense of belonging to the group, and by what the Commission calls the group's 'collective will to exist'. The government shares this belief.

A policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework commends itself to the government as the most suitable means of assuring the cultural freedom of Canadians.
In implementing (this) policy, the government will provide support in four ways: 1. resource permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada, and a clear need for assistance, the small and weak groups no less than the strong and highly organized; 2. the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society; 3. The government will promote creative encounter and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity; 4. The government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society. (House of Commons Debate, Oct. 8, 1971).

The reaction to this announcement from other politicians was that of strong approval. The opposition leader, Mr. Robert Stanfield's response in the House of Commons was that: "I am sure this declaration by the government of the principle of preserving and enhancing the many cultural traditions which exist within our country will be most welcome." (House of Commons Debate, Oct. 8, 1971). Two facts stood out as significant indicators of the rise in prominence of ethnicity in the considerations of policy makers. The first was the consensus evident among politicians in their positive responses to the announcement of the policy of multiculturalism. The second was the governments' ready adoption of the Royal Commissions' recommendations.

V.S. Wilson (1971), in an analysis of the role of Royal Commissions and Task Forces in policy making, points out that in general recommendations submitted to the government by
Commissioners are not taken seriously. The commission is more often used to defer decisions and at the same time "demonstrate" to the general public the government's concern for improved policy-making. When the government does react swiftly to the commission's recommendations, it means there are sufficient pressures put upon the political executives to create a need for the government to act upon or solve the specific problems in question. Furthermore, it also indicates that the recommendations are sufficiently harmless and non-controversial in regard to the status quo. This is an issue that we will return to in a later context.

In any event, the government's ready acceptance of the Royal Commission's recommendations does not mean that the recommendations are necessarily sound or that they fit in the "grand design" of the government's overall policy. The reality of the policy-making process tends more to be both instrumentalist and incrementalist. In general, there are three prime considerations for policy-makers. The first is to proceed as much as possible on the basis of existing policies in spite of the fact that it means ruling out important value alternatives. Secondly, the policy has to appeal to as broad a segment of the public as possible since popularity is of crucial significance to any government most of the time. Thirdly, governmental responses to problems and crises have to take into account the question of feasibility in political and operation
Given these circumscribing factors in the process of policy making, the government's ready adoption of the Royal Commission's recommendations on multiculturalism and the positive response from other political leaders indicated that there was a real recognition of ethnicity, ideologically and otherwise, in the Canadian political reality. And, of course, this emergence of ethnicity was conditioned and preceded by the French-English relations and hence the policy of multiculturalism was formulated within the framework of bilingualism. In so doing the government was attempting to maintain a difficult balance between the French Canadians' suspicions and sometimes even hostile reaction to the policy and the general electoral support that was expected from all other ethnic groups. The multicultural programs initiated by the policy were modest at the beginning. One and one half million dollars was allocated for grants given to ethnic organizations to help them preserve and promote their cultures in the first year. But by 1973 the budget had increased to ten million dollars and a cabinet minister was appointed to supervise exclusively the policy of multiculturalism.

There are sixteen recommendations given in Book IV of the Royal Commission's report. Before we proceed to discuss the policy of multiculturalism in the more general framework of state policy analysis and ethnic relations, I would like to
examine these recommendations and the programs initiated by the government under the auspice of this policy in terms of their implications for and repercussions in Canadian society in general and ethnic relations in particular.

The sixteen recommendations can be grouped into four categories. The first and second recommendations deal with human rights legislation, they aim at "prohibiting discrimination because of race, creed, color, nationality, ancestry, or place of origin"; and establish rights of citizenship for all Canadians. Recommendations three to seven are concerned with education in the two official languages and advanced instruction in languages other than French and English, and in related cultural subjects, at the university level. Recommendations eight to thirteen involve the use of the media to promote ethnic, or ethnically related, programs on radio, television, and films that are produced by the National Film Board. The use of languages other than French and English in such programs and productions is also encouraged. Recommendations fourteen to sixteen urge governments at all levels to support and finance ethnic organizations to preserve and promote their cultures. The Canadian Folk Arts council and the National Museum of Man are named as principal sponsors for such efforts. (See Book IV, Royal Commission on Bilinqualism and Biculturalism)

These four categories of recommendations thus encompass the issues of the rights of the individual in Canadian society:
education in and the use of the two official languages with some accommodation for other languages; the recognition of ethnic groups in media use and programming; and finally, government funding in support of ethnic organizations. The most immediate and significant impact of the policy of multiculturalism lies in the last category of the recommendations. Recommendations of the first category are concerned with human rights in general and do not address themselves directly to ethnic groups. The second and third categories of recommendations have to do with utilizing educational and media institutions in the promotion of cultural education and programs which affect ethnic groups and ethnic relations only indirectly—the effects of which would take a long time before being felt. The funding of ethnic organizations, however, contributes directly to the revival of many defunct or semi-defunct ethnic organizations, motivates the formation of new ones and in general brings to the surface an "ethnic consciousness" that had been a best kept undercurrent in Canadian society. As mentioned earlier, about one and one half million dollars was made available in the first year as grants given to ethnic groups and organizations and this figure swelled rapidly to ten million dollars in a matter of two years. Under such circumstances multicultural programs thrived and as a state policy multiculturalism had taken root.

What are the major implications of the policy of multiculturalism for the development of ethnic relations in
Canada? Four broad areas of implications can be identified. First, there is the ambiguity between culture as history and culture as lifestyle. Second, the policy's implications regarding ethnic stratification and chances of mobility, as well as intergroup relations need to be explored. Third, there is the question of whether a revival of ethnic identity and consciousness is conducive to the promotion of natural unity. Finally, there is the question of the visible minorities which, as I have argued before, form a distinct category in the ethnic composition of Canada. What kind of effect the policy of multiculturalism has on them needs to be clarified.

John Porter (1972, 1975) in discussing the question of Canadian ethnic pluralism, addressed himself to what he perceived as a dilemma implicit in the policy of multiculturalism. It is the conceptual ambiguity between treating culture as involving a historical legacy of artifacts, folklores, cuisines, music, crafts and so on; and treating culture as a way of life. When treated as history, culture can be enjoyed and shared by different people their ethnic origins notwithstanding. There is nothing to prevent a Japanese Canadian learning how to play bagpipes or a Ukrainian learning Native Indian Arts.

However, culture is identified with the ethnic group in the policy of multiculturalism. Funds are channelled to ethnic organizations and groups. Consequently culture is unwittingly
bound to the ethnic group which is a descent group and hence necessarily exclusive. And in Porter's words, the multicultural programs tend to become "multi-unicultural ones". Porter further identified two undesirable consequences. Given the unequal socio-economic status of different ethnic groups, a state policy that promotes cultural diversity through ethnic groups would tend to reinforce the existing state of ethnic stratification. The second consequence is that the goal of the protection of individual rights is subsumed under the umbrella of group rights. This constitutes a radical departure from the liberal ideology of individual achievement and universal judgements. It seems to me that Porter's first point has to be considered within the larger perspective of the urban environment of a post-industrial culture of science and technology. The role and persistence of ethnic stratification in the face of the dynamics of post-industrial capitalist development deserves further investigation and discussion. Both these points have a more direct bearing on the dilemma of multiculturalism and it leads to the next controversial area of this policy - the relations between the individuals and the ethnic groups and the question of ethnic stratification.

The individual members of ethnic groups are victims of this dilemma. In order to achieve upward mobility they have to acquire the necessary skills and training that would enable them to fit into the Canadian society. The ability of the individual, then,
becomes the necessary criterion that conditions his social mobility. In this sense the principles of meritocracy are in direct contradiction to group claims and collective representation. If the individual is encouraged to seek his identity through identification with the descent group he may run the risk of incapacitating himself in the larger arena of social competition. If we can believe that the principle of meritocracy has any effect at all, he is invariably treated as an individual and not a member of a particular group, except in instances where affirmative actions or the so-called "positive discrimination" are instituted.

This dilemma of individual aspirations versus group membership has a deeper root that can be located in one of the assumptions of the policy of multiculturalism. It was assumed both in the Prime Minister's announcement and in Book IV of the Royal Commission's report, that if an individual is to be open in his or her ethnic attitudes, and have respect for other groups, he or she must have confidence in his or her own cultural traditions. This is why Prime Minister Trudeau in his announcement argued that the policy of multiculturalism would protect the "cultural freedom of Canadians" which would in turn bring about a more harmonious state of ethnic relations. If this assumption is true, then the above dilemma between the individual and his group simply does not exist. The self-confidence of the individual is now assumed to be not only
compatible with but also depends on his/her confidence in his/her cultural background. Hence, there need not be a dilemma between the two at all.

However, in a recent study of multiculturalism and ethnic attitudes in Canada, John Berry, Rudolf Kalin, and Donald Taylor (1980) have shown that this assumption is simply unwarranted. The survey conducted by John Berry et al. consisted of three stages. In the first, three hundred and seventy-four census enumeration areas were chosen. And then two thousand eight hundred and forty-four households were selected. Finally two thousand six hundred and twenty-eight eligible persons were involved. The survey sample's basic demographic, ethnic, and socio-economic status characteristics closely approximated the characteristics of the Canadian population as shown in the 1971 census. Without going into the details of the survey, it should be noted that four attitude domains were examined. The first dealt with Canadians' attitudes toward ethnic groups. The second domain included attitudes of Canadians toward cultural diversity in general and multicultural programs in particular. The third studied attitudes toward immigration. The fourth domain covered ethnic prejudice and discrimination.

Data derived from this survey showed quite conclusively that the "multicultural assumption" which states that confidence in one's own group identity is a prerequisite for accepting others' is empirically false. There was a high correlation
between those who were most socio-economically secured and those who were most tolerant toward "other ethnic" groups. Those who demonstrated a high degree of positive own group evaluation also scored high on the scale of authoritarian personality and ethnocentrism. Hence, it is quite clear that tolerance and acceptance of cultural diversity have to do with confidence and security of one's individual identity, and not the "positive own group evaluation" as assumed in the policy.

Given this finding of the positive correlation between tolerance and acceptance of cultural diversity and security (socio-economically) of one's individual identity and the negative correlation between tolerance and acceptance of cultural diversity and positive own groups evaluation; a number of consequences can be derived regarding the question of ethnic stratification. It would appear obvious that the profile of an individual who is most willing to accept cultural diversity and other ethnic groups is one who is also most secure about his/her own socio-economic position. That is to say his/her sense of self-confidence lies primarily in his/her individual achievement rather than in ethnic group identification. In fact, since socio-economic achievement means social mobility, then the tolerant and open-minded individual is typically one who enjoys real or expected social mobility and economic advancement. Contrary to this profile of the tolerant and open-minded individual is the one who identifies strongly with his/her
ethnic group and is also intolerant of other ethnic groups. This strong sense of positive own group identification and evaluation is further linked, as suggested by Pettigrew in his study of the southern United States and South Africa (1958), to the individual's low or perceived lack of socio-economic mobility.

Other than the attitudinal aspect, the objective conditions for social mobility and ethnic stratification in the context of an industrialized society are analysed by J.G. Reitz (1980) in his discussion of job opportunity and mobility of ethnic groups in Canada. In his study of recent Chinese immigrants (1980:86) who are largely professionals, businessmen and clerical workers, Reitz reports that they have very little association with Chinatown except using it as a buffer-zone during the post-immigration period. This is correlated with their relatively high degree of socio-economic mobility due to their professional training. The Chinese are fifth in the proportion of professionals, preceded only by the British, Dutch, German and French. (Reitz, 1980:87). The following table juxtaposes the length of the immigrants' residence in Canada, levels of education, job status and mean income of four groups of immigrants: North Europeans, East Europeans, South Europeans, and the Chinese.
### Table V

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ethnic Origins</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>East</td>
<td>South</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent in Each</td>
<td></td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
<td>Europeans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>generational group:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult Immigrants</td>
<td>44.7</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Childhood Immigrants</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Generation</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Generation</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Years of</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Job Status</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>44.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Income</td>
<td>$12,900</td>
<td>$12,700</td>
<td>$11,500</td>
<td>$12,700</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In-group interaction</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.33</td>
<td>-0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Identification</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.38</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Table 4.6, Table 5.6, Table 7.8; Beitz, 1980)

It is quite clear from Table V that both the South Europeans and the Chinese consist largely of recent immigrants. The Chinese as a group are better educated, enjoy higher job status and income and hence are more upwardly mobile. More significantly, these factors are correlated with a considerably
lower rate of ingroup interaction and ethnic identification than the South Europeans. (The fact that the Chinese are better educated may indicate a situation where as visible minorities they have to be better qualified in order to be able to compete with others.)

Such findings lead Reitz to comment that "social processes in industrial society operate to reduce economic and/or cultural bases of ethnic cohesion greatly over time." (1980:143). Viewed in this light the policy of multiculturalism with its emphasis on the cultural and ethnic backgrounds and associations, does seem to act to reinforce, as Porter has pointed out, the existing state of ethnic stratification rather than to aid ethnic individual's socio-economic mobility.

The third controversial area concerns the issue of whether the strengthening of ethnic organization is a divisive or unifying factor in relation to the unity of the Canadian society at large. One revealing piece of information is provided by Jean Burnet (1975), when she discusses the relation of multiculturalism and immigration. According to Burnet some of the ethnic groups whose spokesmen pressed most enthusiastically for a policy of multiculturalism were predominantly Canadian born and have had few new immigrants in recent years. An outstanding example are the Ukrainians of whom eighty-two percent were Canadian born in 1971. In contrast the Italians, of whom only forty-six percent were Canadian born, have shown little
public interest in multiculturalism. Their major concern is with the question of immigration and its related problems.

The situation then is an ironical one. The more established ethnic groups, most of the members of which are Canadian born and are most likely culturally "Canadianized", have realized the potential benefit of a policy of multiculturalism. They have "rediscovered" their ethnicity, so to speak, so that they can benefit from it. This view is supported by Reitz (1980:228) when he argues that the upwardly mobile east Europeans use the policy of multiculturalism to help them gain political recognition. Meanwhile the new ethnic immigrants find themselves in situations where they have to acculturate themselves to fit into the Canadian society. Their ethnicity is a liability rather than an asset. Thus, they are indifferent to the policy of multiculturalism which purports to protect and benefit them. To be able to "fit in", is one of the elements crucial to their socio-economic well being in this new country. Multiculturalism is a luxury that they cannot afford.

If this is the case, then the net effect of the policy might have the undesirable consequence of promoting divisiveness insofar as it confers group rights and claims to ethnic organizations. The kind of ethnic organizations that have pressed for benefits from the policy of multiculturalism are the more established and highly acculturated ones. Ethnic group representations and claims for them have become stepping stones
to demanding a greater share of political power. This could mean effectively a promotion of a "re-tribalization" of people which is by no means conducive to the maintaining and furtherance of national unity.

Finally, there is the question of the visible minorities and the issue of race and racism. In the policy of multiculturalism all ethnic groups other than the British and French are referred to simply as "the other ethnic groups". In official statements and announcements they are collectively called the "third element". As I have attempted to demonstrate in the discussion of the history of Canadian immigration, the visible minorities form a distinct category in the Canadian ethnic composition and pertaining to this are a host of specific issues. The policy of multiculturalism ignores this difference, and in so doing the issue of race is not acknowledged.

The consequences of the move are varied. It can be argued that the policy would lead to public acceptance of differences among people. However, does this mean all differences, including those called racial ones? Multiculturalism emphasizes cultural differences. It is by no means clear whether the so-called racial differences fit automatically into the multicultural framework. This question is complicated further by the fact that an increasing percentage of new immigrants, since the passing of the immigration policy of 1966 which lifted the color bar in the selection and admission of immigrants, are members of the
visible minorities. (Dahlie, 1981:2) Concomitant with this rise in the influx of colored immigrants has been a rise in their educational level and professional status. This is in turn caused by the point system of the immigration policy which places greater emphasis on education and skill. As a result it is no longer the unskilled and manual workers, as in the traditional pattern, who are threatened by immigration. Middle class professionals are now becoming aware of the competition, real and imaginary, coming from this new generation of immigrants.

According to John Berry et al., there is evidence that race, in the sense of physical differences, is employed as an important element in Canadians' perception of other groups although this perception may not necessarily be of a discriminatory nature. Racialist attitudes, according to the Gallup polls for 1975, are by no means insignificant. (See K. Moodley, 1981:15) It is in this context that one can argue that the policy of multiculturalism, while not touching upon the issue of race, has also failed to take into account problems related to visible minorities. With this in mind, Porter's argument about individual rights as the universal and fundamental concern becomes more poignant. The equality of groups does not automatically lead to the equality of individuals. The protection of group rights is a very different matter from the protection of individual rights and in fact the
former could very well have consequences that are contradictory to the attaining of the latter.

In the case of the visible minorities the essentially particularistic group rights are simply inadequate to protect them from prejudice and discrimination. If equality and human rights are the ultimate goals, then a policy like multiculturalism, in its formal recognition of ethnic groups, is at best a short term expedient. And there is an inherent danger in its institutionalization. It might lead us farther away, rather than closer to, its purported goals.

Other than the four broad implications discussed above, a more general picture of Canadians' attitude toward multiculturalism can be obtained from some of the results of the survey conducted by John Berry et al. They recorded that after close to a decade since the announcement of the policy, only one fifth of the people interviewed had any knowledge of it. The degree of acceptance of multicultural programs varied according to the nature of the programs. Folk festivals and community programs enjoyed a high popularity while radio and television shows broadcast in languages other than French or English were met with some degree of rejection. Teaching languages other than French and English in regular school programs was also very unfavorably received. There were some indications that Canadians' reactions range from indifferent to favorable when multicultural programs do not affect them directly. But when the
programs have more direct implications, such as in education, they tend to reject them.

As reported earlier in the survey, individuals' feelings about their own security and socio-economic states were positively associated with their acceptance of immigrants, multicultural programs and ideologies. Feelings of security were negatively related to discrimination against immigrants, degree of ethnocentrism, and the evaluation of one's own group. Evidence also suggested that Native Indians occupy a special position in the attitudes of Canadians which can best be described as "marginal". The authors concluded that although to a certain degree the policy of multiculturalism seems to promote attitudes of mutual acceptance, it is not clear that the policy has any significant impact on the actual intergroup relations. The influence of the policy, at a superficial level, tends to gloss over real conflicts that exist between groups, while on the other hand it alienates the French Canadians who tend to perceive multiculturalism as representing a shift away from bilingualism and biculturalism.

The role of state policy in terms of the formation and development of ethnic relations in post-industrial, democratic societies needs to be analysed at a more general and theoretical level. Such an analysis would have to bring together elements and perspectives drawn from structural analyses in the social science in conjunction with insights derived from
socio-psychological studies. It is by means of such an inter-disciplinary approach that a study of Canadian ethnicity in general and the policy of multiculturalism in particular can be at once made fruitful and open-ended. A preliminary attempt at such an approach will be the task of the next chapter.
PART III: CONCLUSION
CHAPTER SEVEN

National Integration - Ideals and Reality

The rise of the policy of multiculturalism came about at a critical point of juncture. The introduction of the immigration policy of 1967 has affected and will continue to affect the ethnic composition of immigrants. The growth of French Canadian Nationalism since the "quiet revolution" of the sixties has reached new heights in the seventies culminating in the Quebec Referendum on May 22, 1980. The outcome of the referendum does not automatically signify the decline of French nationalism. Rather, it should be seen as a milestone which promised future developments that are yet to come. The development of the economy has been shifting, since the end of World War II, toward a more significant growth in the secondary and tertiary industries where a skilled and well educated labor force has become a major manpower need. Coupled with the rise of liberal ideology which regards racial and ethnic discrimination as incompatible with democratic ideals, these factors created a convergence of pressures which the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework was meant to accommodate.

The role and functions of the state in post-industrial, democratic societies; as discussed above, are governed, in the process of policy-making, by the criteria of social stability,
The state policies in general are effective tools in crisis avoidance and management. However, the long term objective of the state in regard to ethnic and cultural diversity, as an ideal type, is to integrate the society into a single, all pervasive, economic, political and cultural entity. Michael Hechter (1971:25) argues that such a process of integration is crucial to the establishment of the legitimacy of the state in a plural society. The state is granted legitimacy by the ethnic groups when they perceive their societal membership in terms of rights, privileges and power sharing as satisfactory. In such a case, ethnicity would cease to be a determinant of the political behavior of the groups. Hechter provides such a model of national integration in developed, ethnically heterogeneous societies. The policy of multiculturalism, then, can be better analysed and evaluated, at this macro-theoretic level, against the background of national integration.

Hechter defines the concept of national integration as a process by which a society characterized by sectional economies, politics and cultures is transformed into one which comprises a single economic, political and cultural structure. This concept of "national society", however, does not take into account the analytically distinct question of class stratification. Therefore, this model of national integration is more concerned
as "cultural assimilation," and if they are homogeneous, culture. This same process is referred to by M. Coecon (1964:77) as the dominant cultural integration can be attempted. Through the process of interaction, there are two distinct processes through which cultural values, although different, do not elaborate on this, it seems to be that there are two different processes through which cultural common access to the identification with national symbols and are replaced by a national identity as a result, providing often interactions of the cultural differences, rhetoric identities processes which lead to the acceptance of the social meaning of the concept of cultural interaction. Interaction, structuration interaction, and political interaction separated into three closely related dimensions: cultural and structurally inferior and, in the case of important groups, structurally superior. The second is comprised of ethnic groups that are numerically inferior, territorially superior. The second is comprised numerically (although not always the case as in South Africa), the first consists of a core of a dominant group, which is further characterized by the existence of two collectivities: structural interaction, rhetoric interaction in developed societies can at a developed stage, the prominent feature of which is ethnic with problems related to the so-called plural societies, albeit
as culturally identical to members of the dominant group, then the process of acculturation is said to be successful. In this case the national symbols and values are those of the dominant groups. In the process of assimilation, various groups interact to create a new cultural identity that is embraced by all. This is similar to the "melting pot" idea where out of the cauldron of interaction among ethnics from all groups at all levels a homogeneous mass culture emerges which, as a result, has largely eroded ethnic variety.

In reality, any successful cultural integration would fall in somewhere between these two ideal types. Insofar as there is a dominant culture, it does not yield its dominant status automatically or completely. Even under the ideal condition of absolute equality, due to the status discrepancy that has existed in the past, the conditioned reflex of respect for the dominant cultural traits such as accents, behavioral patterns, etc. would remain for long periods of time. On the other hand, the subordinate cultures would leave their marks, so to speak, as they are acculturated. Part of their cultural traits would persist and establish themselves in the resultant culture. However, the phenomenon of cultural integration, when it does occur, is closely related to and often results from changes in a variety of socio-economic factors. This brings us to the second dimension of national integration - structural integration.
Structural integration includes various developments of the socio-economic kind which bring about increasing equality of regional incomes and more equal distribution of wealth among different ethnic groups as well as social classes. Some of the indicators given by Hechter which measure the extent of this mode of integration are the degrees of differentiation among ethnic groups in terms of income and occupations, infant mortality rate, degrees of urbanization, literacy, and economic power.

The third dimension - political integration, is very much determined by the extent cultural and structural integration attained. It is, according to Hechter, largely voluntaristic and hence is a subjective process. It refers to the different group's perception of the situation. Political integration is said to be successful when ethnicity ceases to be a determinant of the political behavior of groups, whether electoral or extra-parliamentary. In this sense the state acquires a base for legitimacy because members of the ethnic groups are satisfied with their societal membership. This is a highly subjective process because the sense of satisfaction with one's societal membership does not always correspond with the objective situation. Dissatisfaction may occur when obvious acts of discrimination are committed against members of a certain ethnic group. It may also occur when members of the same group begin to re-define their situation despite little objective change. This
reassessment is largely subjective and is closely related to the notion of relative deprivation.

These three analytically distinct processes are combined to form the model of national integration. The interrelations between the three make it obvious that if both the processes of cultural and structural integration are successful, political integration would be a certainty. However, it does not follow from it that political integration is impossible without some degree of success of the former two. The subordinate groups may be content with their objective situation in spite of gross inequalities. This can be achieved because of the relative low level of ethnic mobilization coupled with skillful exercises of controlled coercion on the one hand and ideological persuasion on the other. The difficulty in the assessment of political integration lies in its highly subjective character. It requires a careful juxtaposition of structural analysis and researches in the field of social psychology. This is a theme that we will return to in a later context.

So far we have described the model of national integration as provided by Hechter. But it remains a model, and by itself it is a-historical and hence not very useful in the explanation of the dynamic of ethnic mobilization in developed societies. The focal point lies in the largely unexplored area where the development of capitalism and ethnic stratification overlap. In order to overcome this theoretical hiatus, Hechter advocates an
approach which emphasizes the patterns of core-periphery relations and uneven development in the growth process of capitalism. This approach argues that while capitalist growth and modernization may exacerbate or even create ethnic diversions and inequality, the so-called "archaic" or "primordial" aspects of race and ethnicity are not necessarily incompatible with capitalist development. In fact, it may even be the case that ethnic stratification, in the form of the core-periphery relations, is fundamental to this development.

This approach which is formulated under the theoretic guidance of "internal colonialism" (Hechter, 1975), gives rise to the conceptualization of "cultural divisions of labor" (Hechter, 1978).

In the labor market of industrial societies, the so-called core-periphery relations are analyzed in terms of two distinct sectors: a core sector composed of relatively high-paying jobs with good working conditions and employment stability, and a peripheral sector composed of low-paying jobs with poor working conditions and chronic instability of employment. Cultural divisions of labor occur when culturally marked groups (ethnic groups) are over or underrepresented in certain occupational structures characterized by the core-periphery relations.

The extent and intensity of the cultural divisions of labor vary with respect to the degrees of hierarchy and segmentation in the structure of the divisions. The notion of hierarchy...
refers to stratification in the occupational structure with its concomitant status differentiation. Segmentation denotes the ways in which certain ethnic groups are clustered in particular occupational niches. The combined effect of a hierarchical occupational structure and an ethnically segmented labor force creates the phenomenon of "occupational specialization of groups". Certain aspects of this phenomenon have been discussed in terms of a "split labor market" and "middleman minority". (Bonacich, 1972, 1973). Bonacich's discussions provide useful data in support of Hechter's formulation.

The problem in the present context is the clarification of the role of cultural divisions of labor in the relations between ethnic mobilization and capitalist development. In this respect the proper orientation is to examine the manpower needs in capitalist development and the relations between the forms of labor supply and the formation of ethnic relations in the industrial context. For the search for cheap labor supply is essential. In an ethnically heterogeneous society, industrial development tends to be uneven regionally. Consequently relatively advanced groups and less advanced groups are created. Due to this initially fortuitous advantage, the more advanced groups would solidify and even institutionalize a structure of unequal distribution of wealth and power to ensure that their superior positions are protected. Part of this process involves the allocation of social roles such that those roles commonly
defined as having high status are reserved for its members. Hence, individuals from the less advanced groups are denied access to these roles.

This structural differentiation of wealth, power, and social status in turn contributes to the development of cultural differences between groups. Cultural and ethnic traits are given social meanings pertaining to the positions occupied by the groups in question. Ethnic identity is thus accentuated by and to a significant extent identified with social status.

Underlying this entire process is of course the question of labor supply. The less advanced groups, the periphery, are drawn to the core because employers in the more developed areas need their manpower or because there is no employment in the periphery. This is due to two main reasons. The first is that there is simply an insufficient labor supply and it has to be imported. In the case of Canada different waves of immigration represented different kinds of manpower needs in the Canadian history of capitalist development.

The second reason is that the labor force drawn from the periphery tends to be cheap. This influx of cheap labor also has the effect of undercutting the more established labor force of the core. Hence, ethnic hostility supercedes the commonality of class between workers from the core and those from the periphery. Ethnic hostility and conflicts understood from this perspective have less to do with the so called primordial
sentiments than real competition and material interests. In the case of large scale immigration, such as in Canada, the growth of cultural divisions of labor is determined by a complex of factors.

Among such factors are the availability of opportunities at the time of the group's entry, the immigrants' general level of skill, the kinship and social structure and organizations in the country of origin, and last but not least the policies addressed toward particular immigrant groups by the state or organized labor. The weight of each of these factors in affecting the growth of cultural division of labor, as has been argued, is mediated and ultimately determined by the relevant state policies.

Ethnic mobilization in capitalist development, then, can be measured in terms of the intensity of cultural divisions of labor. As mentioned earlier, hierarchy and segmentation are the two indicators of the extent to which cultural divisions of labor have developed. The degrees to which groups are differentially stratified in the occupational structure is described by the concept of hierarchy; while the extent of occupational specialization of these groups is indicated by the levels of segmentation. Obviously these two indicators are very closely related and they can better be understood by juxtaposing them with the opposing conception of meritocracy.
Meritocracy is the idealized image of capitalist industrialism where race and ethnicity are irrelevant to the individual's life chances and the sole criterion for the individuals' social and economic mobility is his skills and ability. In such a situation, the occupational structure of the society, as pointed out by Hechter, is neither hierarchical nor segmental. However, in a society where ethnic hierarchy and segmentation exist, ethnic hostility exists in direct proportion to the level of hierarchy and the solidarity of the groups is developed in accordance to their degrees of segmentation. Hierarchy and segmentation, then are the two requirements of group formation based on ethnicity rather than class. Cultural divisions of labor, and the corresponding ethnic cleavages are hence the underlying factors of ethnic mobilization in capitalist development.

This formulation points to a characteristic relation between class and ethnic identities. Insofar as cultural divisions of labor exist social interactions would tend to occur within ethnic groups and between classes. This would in turn promote ethnic identity because the individual's ethnic background is more important for the determination of his life chances. In situations where cultural divisions of labor are non-existent or on the decline, class identity for the individual would become salient and he is more likely to be class rather than ethnically conscious. Conceptualized as such
class and ethnicity seem to be antithetical principles of social organization. When social cleavages are basically ethnic in nature, class divisions within ethnic groups tend to be muted. However, when ethnic cleavages are compounded by class differences, ethnic conflicts can be expected to be more violent. In this sense, as principles of stratification and domination, class and ethnicity often reinforce each other although they tend to compete as principles of social organization.

What is the role of the state in this development? The priorities of the state at any given time are obviously related to the specific socio-economic conditions of the society at that time. As a semi-autonomous macro-structure, the state's ability to manipulate and control the demands, needs, and challenges from sectors of both the dominant core and the subordinate periphery depends on what means are available for the state to bring about a reasonable level of social stability and economic growth. This in turn is structurally related to the specific stage of the capitalist development that the society is experiencing. We would be in a better position to understand the state's ability to affect the formation of ethnic relations once this complex mechanism is clarified. More importantly, the possibility and scope of state directed social reforms can also be examined.
In a study of the relations between race (and ethnicity) and state in capitalist development, Stanley B. Greenberg (1980) examines the stages through which state actions and policies affect the formation of race and ethnic relations and how they are to be understood within the matrix of capitalist development. Greenberg has investigated and documented the attitudes and behavior of three racial or ethnically dominant groups—farmers, businessmen, and workers—in the four settings of South Africa, Alabama, Israel, and Northern Ireland. These three groups' attitudes and behavior in the defense of their class interests are analyzed with reference to their activities in the particular points or periods in capitalist development and their connections with the growth of the state racial apparatus.

With data drawn from the four areas where state-directed racial orders had been or still are in operation, Greenberg identifies two distinct stages of development. In its initial stage, capitalist growth, along with wage labor, factories, and cities, brings a period of intensification of racial and ethnic discrimination. All of the three dominant groups have much to gain from a well-defined racial and ethnic order structured and supervised by the state. The farmers and landowners are ensured of their labor supplies when laborers drawn from the subordinate groups are deprived of the mobility and competitive power, real as well as potential, in an otherwise free labor market.
Businessmen in the primary and extractive industries can rely on the framework of racial and ethnic domination for the securing of a cheap labor force that is divided and can easily be controlled. A repressive racial order also enables the artisan unions to protect their monopoly of certain skills and thereby exclude subordinate workers from privileged sections of the occupational structure. By the same token the industrial unions can protect their areas of employment from competition.

Concomitant with these trends of development capitalistic growth also brings the elaboration of the state organizations and bureaucracies, in general and the state racial apparatus in particular. This involves the strengthening of means of coercion such as the armies, the police forces, and the growth of government staffs and bureaucrats the functions of which are necessary for racial domination. This growth of the functions of the state and its increasing importance in the enforcement of racial domination does not mean that the "vulgar" Marxists' argument about the state as an instrument of the dominant class is correct. The state organizations and apparatus represent more than a simple convergence of the dominant groups' interests. As has been argued before, these processes of elaboration and growth of the state bureaucracies and mechanism of domination inevitably develop their own momentum and areas of autonomous actions.
The second stage that Greenberg identifies is called "crisis of hegemony". It is characterized by new forces that have arisen in the course of capitalist development which call into question the framework of racial domination. Some of the structural factors involved in this qualitative transformation are the increasing prominence of the secondary and tertiary manufacturing industries and commerce; the beginning of ethnic mobilization of the subordinate groups; and the changing international climate which is becoming uncomfortable with, if not hostile to, the persistence of racial and ethnic oppression and domination.

The development of secondary and tertiary industries has far reaching repercussions in the business sectors as well as in the labor market. The growth of manufacturing industries and capital-intensive production creates pressures against the rigid order of racial domination. A skilled labor force and efficient use of human resource are crucial to the growth of productivity and hence profit-making. Thus, the dominant business interests now find the racial and ethnic barriers incompatible with their long term goals and objectives. Similar trends can be detected in the groups of commercial farmers and industrial workers. As farmers move toward mechanization and wage labor and as industrial workers' unions became established in the upper reaches of the job hierarchy, the framework of racial domination is no longer seen as crucial to the protection of their material
interests. Even in the domain of primary industries such as mining, mechanization and the diversification of investment move them to a point where the ability to control and secure cheap and unskilled labor is less important and even irrelevant.

The major concern for all sectors involved is the task of creating and maintaining a stable society and political framework which allow the peaceful reproduction of the capitalist relations of production with the prospects of growth and prosperity. However, this process is complicated by the fact that these different dominant sectors are affected by growth and post-industrial conditions at different rates. They do not always act in unison and in fact their uneven development usually puts them at odds with one another at any given point in time. The international climate of racial and ethnic relations, on the other hand, looms large on the horizon as the questions of credit, market and trade acquire a central importance for the well-being of the economy.

This international climate, however, becomes significant only as a result of domestic instability to which international opinion and interests react. The state has to take all these into account when it attempts to meet the prerogatives of economic growth and social stability. It is under such circumstances that the factor of ethnic mobilization of the subordinate groups becomes significant. It has the immediate effect of raising the cost of continuing repression while at the
same time the benefits derived from such repression are declining. Furthermore, there are structural factors that facilitate the process of ethnic mobilization itself. Generally there are increased opportunities for education which result from the economic need to secure supplies of skilled workers and technicians. This has the unintended consequence of heightening the sense of relative deprivation in those of the subordinate population who are thus educated. These people, with the articulation of their grievances, can organize the masses and draw public attention to the inequalities that they suffer. This challenge from the subordinate groups brings out the uncertainty and disunity of the dominant section and thereby hastens the "crisis of hegemony".

Greenberg's conclusion is that capitalist development first brought a period of intensification which created orders of racial and ethnic domination and yet at the same time planted the seeds of potential disunity in the dominant section and momentum for the mobilization of the subordinate groups and competing ideologies. In the second stage of the crisis of hegemony all these contradictory elements erupt into open conflicts which in the long run undermine the oppressive order of racial domination. The role of the state at this juncture become pivotal.

The independent role of the state is now the focal point of the whole picture. The ability of the state executives to
successfully recognize and put forth solutions to the problem of racial and ethnic domination is the condition of mass loyalty and stability for economic growth. The state has to attempt to lend an ethical quality to intergroup relations in which the subordinate population can at least be enlisted and integrated into its own subordination. For a society organized along the line of racial order, it means the dismantling, or at least the de-emphasizing of the racial categories and racial character of the state. In this process, it is my contention that the most crucial factors lie in the autonomous and highly subjective dimension of political integration in general and racial ideologies in particular.

One of the aspects of the period of intensification as described by Greenberg is the ideological development of racial domination. Although the emergence of a racial ideology can be traced to the structural roots of the class forces that have helped in the shaping of the original ideas, it, like the growth of state bureaucracies, soon acquires an autonomous role as one of the major factors in affecting the psyche of the society. Social beliefs and traditions require time to develop and take root in peoples' minds and similarly they do not vanish away overnight. Insofar as they are alive and well they would in turn affect the dimensions of social and structural relations and hence the prospects for change. It is in this sense that the dimension of ideology is autonomous from its historical and
structural roots. From the perspective of the model of national integration, this amounts to attempting political integration without adequate cultural and structural integration. In other words, ethnicity is to be depoliticized and demobilized beginning at the level of ideology.

The highly subjective character of political integration is due to the fact that people's perception of the social reality is not a direct and value-neutral process. The same social reality can be perceived as natural and perfectly acceptable by one group of people and rejected as grossly unfair and morally outrageous by another group, even when both groups are located in identical socio-economic positions. The cause of such a difference lies in their respective senses of social injustice and standards of condemnation.

The sense of injustice and standard of condemnation are in turn embedded within the larger framework of the cultural and psychological environment of the group or society in question. Successful state actions sanctioning against or in approval of a certain state of affairs in the long run would provide an additional sense of legitimacy because of the very authority of the state itself. Purely functional policies can be colored by moral overtones over time and acquire extra persuasive power. Conversely, dysfunctional rules and regulations can be kept operative because they have become part of the tradition. State actions are especially effective in this ineffable realm of
cultural traditions and beliefs because of the states' inherent authority and legitimacy. However, the states' authority and legitimacy, as pointed out by Hechter, are also limited by the degree of political integration that it has achieved in the civil society. This limitation is much more obvious in racially and ethnically heterogeneous societies.

Is this formulation between the states' authority and legitimacy and prospects of political integration a tautological one? Prima facie, the answer seems to be affirmative. However, this would only be the case if we ignore the other dimensions of cultural and structural integration. State policy does not only affect the question of political integration but more significantly its consequences extend directly to affect the cultural and structural relations of the society.

With respect to structural inequalities, the state has its own distinct interests in regards to subordinate groups. Although both the state and the dominant groups have common interests in keeping the subordinate groups in place, the state's own fundamental interest in maintaining stability and order may lead it to enforce concessions to subordinate groups' demands. This is especially so in periods of crises. Furthermore, these concessions may be made even at the expense of the interests of the dominant groups and may generate ideological and political conflicts. With respect to cultural matters, concessions can be made with greater ease because no immediate
material interests are involved. Therefore, the relation between the scope and limitation of state actions in affecting change and the degree of political integration is seen as interdependent, while any change that occurs in either one of the two would inevitably affect the other dimensions of cultural and structural integration. This is merely another way of stating the interdependent nature of the three dimensions in the model of national integration in respect to the role of the psychological aspect of social and ethnic mobilization.

A number of propositions can be derived from this discussion. (1) In racially and ethnically heterogeneous societies it is to a large extent due to the actions of the state that racial orders and domination are made possible; and similarly state actions can implement equality and reform as alternatives to open conflicts. (2) To this end of equality and reform state policies can and have to aim at achieving political integration in the absence of adequate cultural and structural integration. (3) Policies implemented in regard to political integration will affect, directly and indirectly, in the long run, the dimensions of cultural and structural integration. (4) The question of psychological mobilization is an important intervening variable in determining the efficacy of state policies. (5) The importance of 4 is more evident in democratic societies where means of mass coercion are not readily available as realistic policy alternatives.
When the Canadian situation is examined in the light of the above discussion, a number of factors specific to Canada can be identified. In terms of racial and ethnic stratification the Canadian state has never developed into a racist one with an explicit racial order of domination as described by Greenberg. However, there is a long history of racial discrimination and at the level of provincial governments, e.g., British Columbia, explicitly racist legislation has been enacted against Asian Canadian. At the level of the federal government, there was the policy of the evacuation of Japanese Canadian during World War II which amounted to a program of systematic persecution. There is also the question of Native Indians whose plight and sufferings are well publicized.

Yet, despite obvious cases of racial discrimination and persecution, racial and ethnic stratification in Canada has never been, comparatively speaking, severe in its intensity or well-defined in its categories. This is in part due to the above mentioned fact that the Canadian state had never developed into an explicitly racist one. And it is also attributable to the multiplicity of ethnic groups present in Canada which is further accentuated by the French-English duality. No simple division between dominant and subordinate groups can be made. Hence, the concept of the core-periphery relation is a very complex one, if applicable at all, in the Canadian reality.
When the early settlers took the land away from the Native Indians, they did not, or at least failed to, enslave them as a major source of labor supply. Labor supplies came in the form of immigration. The immigrants' levels of skill combined with the opportunities that were available to them at the time afforded them varying degrees of social mobility. For certain ethnic groups, cultural assimilation occurred very quickly and others met with great resistance. Cultural diversity, in spite of its recent rise in publicity, has traditionally been part of the Canadian reality.

With respect to ethnic structural differentiation in Canada, two studies stand out as the most authoritative. Both Porter (1965) and Clement (1975) have documented the correlation between ethnicity and class. The very title of Porter's book, *The Vertical Mosaic*, reveals his premise that ethnicity has been a principle component of class formation in Canada. The theme of the book is that there exists a reciprocal relationship between ethnicity and class beginning with the initial "entrance status" of immigrant groups. The salience of ethnicity in the process of class formation has given rise to the descriptive concept of the "mosaic" in place of the "melting pot". Further, Porter argues that the social mobility of the group is limited by and structured around its ethnic characteristics. In fact, Porter perceives this as the "distinguishing features of the United States and Canadian society at the level of social
psychology as well as that of social structure". (Porter, 1965:70).

Clement focuses, on the other hand, on the structure of the elites in Canadian society. In his discussion of the Canadian corporate elite, he points out that ethnic groups other than French and English have virtually no representation at all. They constitute about only one point three percent of the elite while accounting for over twenty-five percent of the population. Clement's conclusion is that the Canadian economic elite is characterized by English dominance.

Both of these studies, while valid from their given perspectives, do not reflect adequately the whole picture of this dimension of Canadian reality. Clement's study does not encompass the entire spectrum of the occupational structure. His sample of economic elites comprised seven hundred and sixty people and seven hundred and seventy-five people in the years of 1951 and 1972 respectively. In other words he has concentrated on the very tip of the hierarchy and by itself his study says very little about the general state of ethnic segmentation and hierarchy of the occupational structure. The overall intensity of the cultural divisions of labor has not been measured.

If Clement's study thus cannot be relied upon for a proper evaluation of cultural divisions of labor in Canada, neither can Porter's thesis of the vertical mosaic be taken at face value. The descriptive aspect of the vertical mosaic concept is no
doubt correct insofar as there is an important relation between ethnicity and class. But a more developmentally oriented approach is needed to explore the dynamics of cultural divisions of labor over long periods of time so as to ascertain shifting trends and their implications.

A recent study by Gordon Darroch (1979) does provide precisely such a comparative and developmentally oriented examination. More significantly, Darroch utilizes Porter's original tabular data as provided in The Vertical Mosaic but gives a new interpretation to them. From Porter's data Darroch calculates the indices of dissimilarity for each of the ethnic groups between its occupational distribution and that of the total labor force. The index of dissimilarity indicates the proportion of one population which would have to become redistributed in order to match the occupational distribution of the comparison population. Constructed in such a manner, the index of dissimilarity measures quite directly the intensity of cultural divisions of labor. Table VI provides, for each of Porter's data, indices of dissimilarity for each ethnic group.

With the exception of the French and Native Indians, there is a general decline of dissimilarity throughout the years. Of course, the persistence of the high indices for the Native Indians in comparison with the substantial reduction for East Europeans and other European groups is by itself revealing. A more recent tabulation shows a further reduction of the degrees.
of cultural divisions of labor in general.

Table VI

Occupational Dissimilarity of Ethnic Groups, from total male labor force for 1931, 1951, and 1961. (From Porter, 1965)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Dissimilarity Indexes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East European</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian and Inuit</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean (X)</td>
<td>27.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Table 2, Darroch, 1979).

Table VII shows a slight rise for the British and French and a substantial increase for Italians and Jews. Asians show a rather significant drop which is now below that of Italians. The Native Indians' index remains extraordinarily high. The addition of new ethnic categories (Hungarian, Mennonite, Polish, Ukrainian) no doubt affects the indices but the mean is lowered to thirteen point nine from fourteen point three two of 1961. This represents a reduction by half in a span of thirty years. This may not be very significant by itself but one has to
remember that immigration continued to rise during this period

Table VII

Occupational Dissimilarity of Ethnic Groups from Total Labor Force, 1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Dissimilarity Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>26.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jew</td>
<td>29.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polish</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scandinavian</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukrainian</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native Indian</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean (X)</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Table 3, Darroch, 1979)

of time and an increasing proportion of immigrants were from third world countries. The dynamics behind this reduction of cultural divisions of labor are obviously the post-industrial development of the economy, but it also reflects to a certain extent the effect of liberal ideology. It is of course difficult to measure the role of the subjective racial and ethnic perceptions and discrimination in the cultural divisions of labor. But, it seems to me that we can safely assume that the
effect of liberal ideology is connected with the systematic reduction in ethnic occupational differentiation.

The index of dissimilarity by itself does not indicate whether the groups are dissimilar in a privileged or under-privileged way. This short-coming can easily be remedied by considering studies (Porter, 1965; Goldlust and Richmond, 1973; Reitz, 1980) which report quite unambiguously that the north and west Europeans are over-represented in higher income and status categories (and Jews singularly in the high income category), and south Europeans, Blacks and Native Indians are over-represented in the lower income and status categories.

A more important point, however, is brought out when Darroch compares the mean of ethnic occupational dissimilarity with the mean of regional occupational dissimilarity in Canada. The mean index of all eleven areas (ten provinces and the Northwest Territories) is twelve point seven, lower than the mean of ethnic occupation dissimilarity by one percent. An even more dramatic comparison is with the index of women's occupational dissimilarity which is twenty-eight percent. It is higher than all other ethnic groups, according to the 1971 data, with the exception of the Jews and Native Indians.

This discussion provides grounds for at least two tentative conclusions. The first is that the degree of cultural divisions of labor in Canada is not as intense as assumed by major theorists (Porter, 1965; Clement, 1975) writing on the topic. As
measured by the index of dissimilarity, ethnicity is but one of the major determinants of occupational stratification. The regional dissimilarity index is comparable to that of ethnicity while women's dissimilarity index is twice as high. A second conclusion is that there is a very definite trend indicating the decline of cultural divisions of labor as indicated by the continual reduction of the index of dissimilarity. Hence, if the degree of cultural divisions of labor affects directly the solidarity of ethnic groups, as suggested by Hechter, then ethnicity as an effective focus of group mobilization in Canada is weakening rather than growing.

With respect to existing conditions of cultural and structural integration in Canada, it is my conclusion that although the conditions are by no means positively conducive to national integration, neither are they insurmountable obstacles to it. The reality of a long history of cultural diversity and the French-English duality, and the moderate level of ethnic structural differentiation combine to create a favorable platform for political integration. But the policy of multiculturalism as discussed in detail above is a very uninspired and timid policy considering the possibilities that are available. It did not go beyond the confining and necessarily exclusive concept of ethnic group. It amounted to a formal recognition of ethnic groups, which came after the announcement of the official languages Act the purpose of which
was to give formal recognition to French Canadians for their dominant status.

Multiculturalism was thus another step in the process of appeasement. This formal recognition of ethnic groups by itself would not further integrate them into Canadian society. As argued above, it would achieve, if anything, the opposite. At the same time it also has the effect of alienating the French Canadians. Judged from this perspective, the policy of multiculturalism is a policy that was put forth as an attempt to accommodate various real or perceived pressures without any long-term vision. Typically it was designed to tread in the middle of the road fashion, the political safe path of pleasing all parties concerned. It is very possible that it will end up pleasing nobody. Its immediate effect is the revival of ethnic organizations the aims and purposes of which are more likely to have divisive rather than unifying consequences.

Another important aspect that the policy of multiculturalism, as a manoeuvre in political integration, has failed to take into account is the case of the visible minorities. Racism, obviously, is not dead in Canada, nor is her history untainted by it. The policy's recognition and promotion of cultures through ethnic groups does nothing to alleviate it. Racism as an ideology not only can survive and thrive under multiculturalism but the policy could easily lend itself to be a platform for a new form of racist ideology. As John Porter has
pointed out, "if 'races' have been evaluated as inferior and superior, so can culture be". (Porter, 1975:36) The high visibility of the colored immigrants and Native Indian groups, in conjunction with their generally low socio-economic status, is extremely vulnerable to attacks of this form.

A more recent criticism of the policy of multiculturalism is the view that it is a policy designed to "de-politicize" ethnicity. The question of depoliticization, however, has to be examined in a more careful manner. The critic's assumption is that depoliticization is inherently bad. It is perceived as a means of political intimidation whereby the subordinate groups are forced and/or enticed into submission.

My contention here is that both the concepts of politicization (or mobilization) and depoliticization have in themselves positive as well as negative aspects. If ethnicity is depoliticized through coercive means imposed by the authority of the state, then the consequences are undeniably negative. It amounts to the suppression of the subordinate groups such that they have no choice but to accept their subordination. However, if depoliticization is achieved through active promotion and implementation of the principle of meritocracy through which individuals are judged by their abilities and not their ethnic backgrounds; then, given adequate structural conditions, depoliticization is not only desirable but inevitable. As a principle of organization ethnicity would be rendered obsolete.
Such a state of affairs is indeed the ideal of national integration.

With respect to the politicization of ethnicity, the positive effect is that ethnic inequality is brought to the fore of the political arena as an issue. It would force the political authority either to make the necessary concession and accommodations or risk open conflicts. The negative aspects, however, are that instead of individual’s rights, the rights of groups claims are made the issues. Given the ultimate goal of the rights and equality of individuals, this represents a detour with no guarantee that such a goal would be attained. The immediate effects would most likely be further ethnic segmentation in the society and possibly ethnic hostilities of all kinds. This last point is rendered more serious when one considers the many negative effects of psychological persuasions, including racist ideologies, that are the inevitable by-products of intense mobilization. It could even bring about, as suggested above, a disguising of racist ideologies in terms of the supposed superiority and inferiority of cultures.

Seen in this light, the net effect of the policy of multiculturalism can be described as largely ineffectual but with unsettling long term consequences. Upon close examination there is no evidence to suggest that the policy was implemented with the intention of depoliticizing ethnicity through coercive
means. However, depoliticization, when understood in its positive aspects, could well be a large part of the aim of the government in integrating Canadians of all ethnic origins and backgrounds. In this, the policy is ineffectual. Yet, in the process of granting formal recognition to ethnic groups and organizations, the negative aspects of politicization could have been set in motion. From the viewpoint of the national integration model, the policy is a very ineffectual and uninspired exercise in political integration.

The final dilemma lies within the ethnic minorities themselves. Their ethnicity has become, in an industrialized democratic society like Canada, a liability as well as an asset. Insofar as ethnic stratification persists, the individual's life chances are restricted by his ethnicity. Hence his ethnicity is a liability. In order to struggle for greater equality, some form of ethnic mobilization is a necessary expedient. In this sense his ethnicity could become an asset. However, the immediate consequence is a heightening of group identity at the expense of individual identity. Other than the many unfortunate by-products of the psychological aspect of mobilization such as ethnocentrism and intergroup hostility, it also represents a regressive step in regard to the final goal of individual rights and equality. There is no iron-clad guarantee that ethnic power struggles can be de-mobilized once the objective conditions of greater equality are obtained. It is especially difficult
considering the psychological and ideological elements that are involved. They tend to persist as they acquire an autonomous dimension of their own. Can the short term expediency of group rights and claims replace the final goal of equal opportunity of individual's life chances? Can ethnic mobilization in the long run bring about better conditions for national integration? Answers to these questions point to the core of this dilemma which is that ethnicity is but one of the many principles of social organization. As one such principle it has inherently certain advantages and disadvantages. It is not primordial because it has acquired its explicit forms in the dynamics of class formation. Neither is it simply circumstantial because it has an efficacy and emotional appeal that is of a kind of its own. The phenomena of the waning and waxing of ethnic consciousness reflect the changing strength of the various social pressures, structural as well as ideological, and with the authority of the state as an important intervening factor; in the shaping and re-shaping of ethnic stratification and hence individual ethnic's life chances.
Notes

1. Michael Hechter (1978), in a study which surveys the interrelations between degrees of ethnic and class endogamy, ethnic and class exogamy, ethnic exogamy and class endogamy, ethnic endogamy and class exogamy, of sixteen ethnic groups in the United States, comes to the conclusion that the relationship between class and ethnic identities among these groups is to a significant degree a competitive one.

2. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion of this aspect of ethnic mobilization.

3. This is a term that I have borrowed from Barrington Moore Jr. See Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt, Chapter 13.

4. Throughout this discussion the term "state" refers specifically to states in democratic societies.

5. For very good documentation on the subject see Racism and Empire, by R.A. Huttonback.

6. See Karl Peter's "The Myth of Multiculturalism and other Political Fables", a paper presented at the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association Conference, Vancouver, B.C., Oct. 11, 1979. His view is that the Royal Commission's "final recommendation...contained measures to establish linguistic and cultural forms of partnership and equality but refrained from trusting the political power structure." The theme of his argument revolves around the contention that "ethnic individuals could only advance at a pace very much tied to the advancement of the ethnic group to which they belong." Hence, Peter concludes that "ethnic group emancipation is the principle means by which the life changes of individual ethnics is enhanced." This argument is at best an incomplete one. The crucial question is what does "ethnic group emancipation" involve? If the advancement of the individual ethnic is indeed tied to the advancement of the group as a whole, then are we reneging on the principle of meritocracy and universal judgements of the individual? How can we reconcile this seemingly regressive step with the avowed goal of individual equality and rights? These questions are left entirely unanswered in Peter's paper.


1977.


Dahlie, Jorgen and Tissa Fernando, eds., Ethnicity, Power and


________. "Ethnicity and Industrialization: On the Proliferation of the Cultural Divisions of Labor,"


Nordlinger, E.A. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1972.


_________. "History and Present State of Ethnic Studies in Canada, in Identities, ed. by W. Isajiw, Toronto: Peter


