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POLITICAL TERRORISM: A CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

by

Eric Christopher Tompkins

B.A. Simon Fraser University, 1989

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the School
of
Criminology

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Political Terrorism: A Conceptual and Theoretical Framework

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ABSTRACT

The thesis presents a holistic examination of the antecedents of political terrorism. It begins with a conceptual analysis of political terrorism from which a definition and typology are constructed. Then it proceeds systematically to develop a theoretical framework which is elaborated through an in-depth analysis of substantive issues.

The concept and subsequent definition of political terrorism reveal a number of fundamental characteristics, namely: (1) the presence of extreme violence; (2) the communication to an audience distinct from the immediate victim; and (3) an intention to produce fear and anxiety in the targetted audience. Terrorism as both a clandestine strategy and a group activity were identified as secondary characteristics. Because of the potential vastness of the topic, the scope of the thesis is limited to anti-state and state terrorism from which two analytic models are explicated. Both models present specific propositions concerning structural preconditions, organizational dynamics, ideology and individual motivation within an historical context.

The variable conditions within which political terrorism is found make it difficult to advance widely generalizable assertions; however, from this thesis a number of conclusions can be made. Among them: (1) Political and economic oppression is a precondition of both state and anti-state
political terrorism; (2) The characteristics and dynamics of social organization can either promote or mitigate the likelihood that political terrorism will occur; and (3) Ideology plays a fundamental role in both justifying and facilitating political terrorism.
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INTRODUCTION

From the mid-1960s up to the early 1980s the world experienced a sharp rise in the incidence of terrorism directed against the state. This led to a dramatic increase in research devoted to understanding the causes of the problem as well as possible solutions. However, even with the wide variety of theoretical explanations, typologies, and quantitative studies, our understanding of the phenomenon remains fragmented. Furthermore, the focus has been overwhelmingly directed at terrorism perpetrated by opponents of the state. Despite irrefutable empirical evidence that terrorism committed by the state is far more prevalent than insurgent forms of terrorism, it has received far less attention than it deserves.

In general, a comprehensive understanding of terrorism has remained elusive because of the failure to address certain epistemological issues. These are: (1) the need to produce a clear, coherent concept of terrorism before proceeding towards theory development; (2) the importance of integrative theorizing - in other words, explanations that draw from macro-structural, organizational, and micro levels of analysis; (3) the importance of recognizing the dialectic relationship between state and anti-state terrorism; and (4) the lack of historical contextualization in much of the research.
Recognizing these problems, the intention of this thesis is to provide an integrative, theoretical framework for the study of political terrorism. Chapter One proceeds on the basis of two underlying assumptions. First, the development of a clear concept of political terrorism is essential before there can be significant theoretical progress. Second, terrorism is sui generis - that is, despite the enormous variability concerning the meaning of the term, it is possible to identify a fundamental set of attributes that are consistently found together that distinguish it from other forms of political violence. Once the term has been clearly defined, the field is narrowed further to include only state and anti-state terrorism. In this section these two types of terrorism are expressed in the form of a typology.

Chapter Two represents a shift from conceptual to theoretical analysis. It begins with an historical discussion and ends with two models explicating anti-state and state terrorism. In these two models the antecedents of political terrorism are categorized along three dimensions: macrostructural, organizational, and individual levels of analysis. Within this framework, economic development, government and anti-government organization, ideology, and rational motivation are discussed.

The international and historical dimensions of this thesis are inspired by the meta-theoretical work of Immanuel Wallerstein - in particular, his "world systems" approach. In
defending the logic of his framework, Wallerstein notes that the discipline of history, with its focus on particularistic events, can generally be described as idiographic in its orientation. On the other hand, social science, more often than not, has been concerned with establishing empirical generalizations. The assumption in the terrorism models, and the thesis in general, is that it is heuristically advantageous to integrate these two perspectives. As Wallerstein (1987:315) states:

[T]he optimal method is to pursue analysis within systemic frameworks, long enough in time and large enough in space to contain governing 'logics' which 'determine' the largest part of sequential reality, while simultaneously recognizing and taking into account that these systemic frameworks have beginnings and ends and are therefore not to be conceived of as 'eternal' phenomena.

This alludes to the epistemological tension between historical theorizing on the one hand, and formal deductive, propositional statements on the other. I take the position that unless one attempts to mediate between these two seemingly polarized approaches, our understanding of complex sociological phenomena such as terrorism remains impoverished.

With this in mind, the remaining chapters are intended as an analysis and elaboration of the theoretical claims introduced in the models. This is done through the examination of terrorism in a wide range of geographic and historical settings. More specifically, Chapter Three discusses how European colonialism and U.S. imperialism
established the historical context within which terrorism occurs.

In Chapter Four the relationship between ideas and terrorism is explored. Here it is posited that the nascent ideologies of the Enlightenment served to justify terrorist action both in an immediate sense and indirectly in a more convoluted sense. An example of the former is the "Terrors" which were employed during the aftermath of the French Revolution in the name of Rousseauist ideology (though heavily distorted). An example of the latter is the way that capitalist ideology along with Eurocentrism justified the subjugation and oppression of indigenous populations, resulting in violent anti-colonial campaigns. In many parts of the developing world these factors preconditioned the seemingly endless cycles of state and anti-state terrorism.

Chapter Five, which focuses on the contemporary period, begins with the development of bureaucratic state terrorism under Stalin and is followed with an analysis of the ascendance of Nazi terrorism. The focus then shifts to terrorism in Latin America - with a particular emphasis on the global structural context. The final discussion of this chapter examines the factors that contributed to the development of radical politics and terrorism in the United States during the 1960s. The importance of social and political organization in either enabling or constraining terrorist violence is highlighted throughout this chapter;
however, other factors such as economics and ideology are given equal weight.

Chapter Six addresses the crucial role that human motivation plays in the production of terrorism. Although much of the research is micro-analytic in its orientation, there is a tendency to view terrorism as psycho-pathological. The discussion in this chapter is both a critique of the deficiencies of this perspective and a defence of terrorism as rational action.

Because of the immense scope of this thesis, it was necessary to be extremely selective with regard to the choice of substantive content. Although terrorism can be found in many places throughout the world, much of the discussion is focused on terrorism in Latin America. This region was chosen mainly because many of the issues and events are familiar to the author; and, given the prevalence of terrorism (especially as a form of governance) in places such as El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru, this attention is certainly warranted. However, despite this limitation, the examples clearly demonstrate the interactive process illustrated in the terrorism models and adds support to the propositional statements. Moreover, the intention of this thesis is not to tell the whole story; rather it is to expand the social scientific understanding of terrorism within a coherent framework, while at the same time point to areas of future research and more in-depth investigation.

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To conclude, it must be mentioned that in many ways this thesis represents an elaboration of Dr. Ray Corrado's seminal theoretical work on terrorism. This contribution includes the broad analytic framework for the state and anti-state terrorism models, as well as many of the specific propositions therein.
1. According to Central Intelligence Agency statistics, between 1968 and 1980 there were 6,714 incidents worldwide (Micolus, 1983). Caution must be taken, however, when examining data from this source. In addition to inherent conceptual problems related to compiling this kind of data, the CIA had (and to some extent continues to have) a vested interest in overestimating the extent of the problem. Ted Gurr (1988a), on the other hand, has estimated 335 episodes and campaigns (obviously containing more specific incidents) between 1961 and 1970. Despite the methodological problems, all data sources support the contention that the number of terrorist acts was much higher during the 1960s and 70s than the periods before and after.

2. In fact this spawned the virtual creation of a terrorism research industry: governments sought coherent policies to deal with the perceived threats to government authority, while many academics were interested in developing theoretic explanations of a largely misunderstood phenomenon. It should be noted, however, that the two communities (state and academia) are not mutually exclusive. See Jane Hunter's (1991) article "The Terrorism Industry" in Covert Action Information Bulletin for a cogent analysis.

3. Although non-political forms of terrorism exist (for example, a criminal organization may employ terror tactics to further its financial interests), to include them would be theoretically unwieldy and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this analysis.
CHAPTER ONE
THE CONCEPT OF TERRORISM

The lack of conceptual precision and clarity concerning the scholarly analysis of terrorism is well recognized (see Crenshaw, 1981; Wardlaw, 1982; Wilkinson, 1987). Typically, the issue raises the following questions: How broad or narrow should a definition of terrorism be? What elements should be included, or excluded? And, given a particular definition of terrorism, what is the appropriate or most effective strategy for developing a theory? Recently, these problems have been addressed by Schmid and Jongman et al. in their second edition of Political Terrorism (1988), a guide to research in the field, and by Jack Gibbs in a paper titled "Conceptualization of terrorism" (1989).

In this chapter, these works are analyzed with the intention of developing a coherent and pragmatic definition. Once the concept of terrorism is clearly articulated, attention is turned towards developing a typology of political terrorism. Finally, a number of fundamental meta-theoretical issues are discussed.

Ontological Considerations

The term "terrorism" can have widely disparate meanings depending on who is using it. The United States government under both Ronald Reagan and George Bush (through the 1980s to
the present) routinely identified the violent actions of their adversaries (e.g., Libya, Iran) as terrorism while at the same time ignoring similar activities of their client states (Herman, 1982; Chomsky, 1986). Similarly, during the Oka crisis of 1990, a Liberal member of the Quebec National Assembly referred to the Mohawk Warriors as "terrorists" (York and Pinder, 1991:293). Supporters of the Mohawks, on the other hand, complained that the actions of the state (represented by the Surete du Quebec) amounted to terrorism (Picard, 1990). Given the subjective quality of the term, how is it possible to engage in a coherent, meaningful study of the phenomenon?

As Berger and Luckmann (1967) point out, the importance of constructed meaning must be recognized when analyzing social phenomenon. For example, this awareness can lead to a deeper appreciation of the relationship between social control, ideology and political communication. However, the author takes the position that beyond the realm of subjective interpretation and how this can influence social action, such a relativist perspective has severe limitations in terms of advancing our understanding of political terrorism. Despite the fundamental (and seemingly endless) disagreements concerning the meaning of the term, it is possible to identify within the social world a cluster of characteristics that transcends lexical and ideological boundaries. It follows,
then, that this "phenomenon" can be objectively conceptualized and defined as "terrorism."

**Definitional Criteria**

A useful starting point is to recognize the distinction between reportive and stipulative definitions (Hospers, 1965). Reportive definitions are the result of examining how a word is used. Typically, this involves an etymological analysis of how the concept is defined or used by recognized "experts" in the discipline where the concept is primarily found. In contrast, a stipulative definition is the product of subjective assertion.

Given the value of both approaches, a useful heuristic would be to employ a twofold process: (1) Initiate the analysis by evaluating reportive definitions; and (2) Introduce new elements into a definition provided they add clarity, coherence and precision.

A common problem in conceptual analysis concerns the scope of the definition. As Hospers (1965:65) asserts, the definition should be "neither too broad nor too narrow." For example, to define terrorism as "action intended to induce sharp fear and through that agency to effect a desired outcome in a conflict situation" (Duvall and Stohl, 1988:234) would be far too broad as it would include a wide range of activities - including domestic violence, and routine actions of police forces. Clearly, more defining characteristics are required.
An example of a definition that is too narrow is provided by the U.S. Department of Defense (1983:109):

... the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a revolutionary organization against individuals or property with the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or societies, often for political or ideological purposes.

This definition is inadequate in that it ignores actions of the state that can appropriately be labelled terrorism. It is somewhat ironic that the word "terror" originated in the aftermath of the French revolution and was associated with the extreme violence of the Jacobin and Thermidorian regimes (Stohl, 1988).

The scope of a definition has important implications for any discipline that develops its knowledge base from empirical research. If the definition is too encompassing - for example, if there is no distinction between the concept of terrorism and other forms of political violence - then it becomes difficult to operationalize. On the other hand, if it is too narrowly defined the researcher may overlook important features and relationships concerning the phenomenon being studied.

A related issue concerns the question: how many elements (or defining characteristics) are necessary to construct a good definition of terrorism? Clearly this is not something that is easily quantifiable; however, a pragmatic approach would be to apply a principle of ontological economy (or

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(Kham's Razor). Although this principle is normally applied to theoretical explanations, there is no reason why it cannot apply to the process of defining concepts (Sartori, 1984). Accordingly, complexity should be avoided if something can be defined sufficiently using fewer entities, or terms. It may be more productive to include some of the more complex issues related to a phenomenon in a theoretical discussion rather than in a definition. In some cases, it may be determined that these more complex properties are more appropriately categorized as accompanying characteristics.

Finally, in the process of attempting to add more precision to a definition there exists the possibility of creating an infinite regress. As Karl Popper (1965:279) pointed out: "... a definition can only reduce the meaning of the defined term to that of undefined terms." For example, suppose the words "political" and "violence" are employed as defining characteristics of political terrorism. Then, in order to clear up any ambiguities one is faced with having to define these new words - and on and on. This led Popper to conclude that it is a pointless academic exercise to define one's terms before intellectual discourse can proceed. However, if we follow this recommendation we risk the possibility of equivocation. If the meaning of a term is left implicit the consequences, in regard to developing testable propositions, could be highly confusing. For example, the word "political" has an enormous number of possible meanings.
One could ascribe to the view that every aspect of social life can be defined as political, as many Marxist scholars have (see for example, C.W. Mills, 1959). Or one could apply the vastly more narrow dictionary definition: matters directly concerning "government, the state or politics" (Webster's Dictionary, 1984).

A reasonable approach to this problem would entail some sort of compromise between the extreme of endlessly defining terms and leaving terms implicit. Particular attention could be given to clarifying the meaning of those terms that are highly variable in how they are currently defined or used.

A Critique of Two Current Definitions

Schmid and Jongman (1988) argue correctly that if the study of terrorism is to be a cumulative enterprise, it is important to have some agreement concerning concepts. Following this rationale, they engaged in a consultative process by sending questionnaires to 200 experts in the field (the response rate was high). The respondents were asked (1) to provide feedback on a previous definition, and (2) to provide their definition of terrorism. After reviewing the various comments and definitions of the respondents, they proposed the following definition:

Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi-)clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby - in contrast to assassination - the direct targets of violence are not
the main targets. The immediate human victims of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organization), (imperiled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought (28).

At the core of this definition is the notion that violence is used by "individual, group, or state actors" to produce fear ("anxiety-inspiring") in a target other than the immediate victim(s). Ignoring the label of "terrorism" for a moment, there is clearly an ontological justification for highlighting this tripartite relationship as a defining characteristic. As they note in their book, within the research community there is widespread agreement that some sort of phenomenon exists with persistent regularity that has this quality (this relationship is highlighted in figure 1.1). Moreover, this distinguishes it from many other forms of political violence such as assassinations and bombings (unless these actions have the effect of producing extreme fear in a third party).

There are, however, a number of serious weaknesses in the above definition. The length seems to indicate an overemphasis on including elements from existing, or reportive, conceptions (see Hospers 1965). Indeed, as Schmid and Jongman (1988) state: "[the definition is the] result of an attempt to accommodate comments and criticisms from the
research community" (28). Employing a reportive definition is worthwhile in that one can benefit from the contribution of other researchers. However, over reliance on this process can make it difficult to develop an original or revolutionary conception. As an example, consider for a moment how social conflict theory has expanded the concept of crime from one of officially designated deviance, to activities involving social harm and injustice (e.g, Schwendinger and Schwendinger 1970). By going beyond current or popular definitions, the result is a conception of crime that is less ideologically biased in favor of the interests of the state, as well as a clearer understanding of the relationship between the concepts of power and class interest.

In fairness, Schmid and Jongman avoid the problem of definitional conservatism by reviewing the suggestions provided by other researchers in order to ensure that they are empirically defensible. However, it is possible that this process has contributed to a definition that is overly complex, and bordering on obfuscation, thus diminishing the definition's analytic and theoretical utility.

In more specific terms, many of the properties of the definition are more appropriately categorized as accompanying characteristics. In the process of evaluating and reconstructing a conceptual definition it is essential to distinguish between defining and accompanying characteristics. As Hospers (1965:26) explains:
those characteristics without which the thing would not be labeled by a certain word are the characteristics which define that word - its defining characteristics. Those characteristics of a thing without which the word would still apply to it are its accompanying characteristics.

Thus with the concept of political terrorism, the notion of "political objective" could easily be categorized as a defining characteristic, while "the use of torture" can be described as an accompanying characteristic. Political terrorism can take place without torture (e.g., assassination, bombings); however, it can be argued that political objectives are a necessary component. Thus for Schmid and Jongman to include the types of perpetrators ("individual, group, or state actors") in the definition is unwarranted as the act of terrorism can take place with only one of the three characteristics present. In other words, they are not necessary or defining characteristics. A solution would be to place them either in separate definitions, or in a typology. Similarly, it can be argued that the motivational factors, "idiosyncratic, criminal, or political," are also accompanying characteristics and therefore add unnecessary complexity.

The lack of attention in discriminating between defining and accompanying characteristics is evident in much of the remainder of the definition (e.g., the last two sentences). An example of this is the inclusion of the terms "randomly" and "selectively" in reference to the type of target, as neither of these terms denotes a necessary property of
terrorism. More importantly, this part of the definition is deficient because of the lack of clarity and the prevalence of ambiguity. In the last sentence several types of targets (that is, the audience as opposed to the victim) are mentioned; however, it is unclear exactly what is meant by the stated relationships. Although one could assume that the "targets" of "terror", "demands", and "attention" are theoretically related to "intimidation, coercion or propaganda" (in that order), such an assumption is not entirely clear from the wording. In the interests of clarity it would be preferable to have such a statement embodied in a theoretical discussion.

Unlike the Schmid and Jongman (1988) approach - with its systematic and quantitative analysis of existing definitions - Gibbs' (1989) definition is largely discursive. Gibbs frames the issue in terms of what he posits are five essential questions bearing on the topic. These can be paraphrased as: (1) Is terrorism necessarily illegal? (2) Is terrorism necessarily undertaken to realize some particular goal? (3) How does terrorism necessarily differ from conventional military operations? (4) Is it necessarily the case that only opponents of the government engage in terrorism? (5) Is terrorism necessarily a distinctive strategy in the use of violence? In the following definition Gibbs attempts to answer these questions:
Terrorism is illegal violence or threatened violence directed against human or non-human objects, provided that it:

(1) was undertaken or ordered with a view to altering or maintaining at least one putative norm in at least one particular territorial unit or population;

(2) had secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine features that were expected by the participants to conceal their personal identity and/or their future location;

(3) was not undertaken or ordered to further the permanent defense of some area;

(4) was not conventional warfare and because of their concealed personal identity, concealment of their future location, their threats, and/or their spatial mobility, the participants perceived themselves as less vulnerable to conventional military action; and

(5) was perceived by the participants as contributing to the normative goal previously described (supra) by inculcating fear of violence in persons (perhaps an indefinite category of them) other than the immediate target of the actual or threatened violence and/or by publicizing some cause.

Although this definition can be criticized for being overly elaborate, it is more comprehensible than the Schmid and Jongman (1988) definition. There are a number of laudable features of the definition that are worth noting. Foremost, is the recognition that terrorism is employed as a method of communicating to a third party other than the immediate victim. Second, the inculcation of the fear of violence is an integral feature of this process. Third, it offers a clear delineation between terrorism and warfare by highlighting its
non-territorial quality. However, despite this there are some notable problems.

It should be pointed out that Gibbs avoids defining terrorism in political terms, preferring instead to employ the term "putative norm." Although it is not explicitly addressed in this paper, he implies that this term refers to "what ought to be" with regard to a "law, policy, arrangement, practice, institution, or shared belief" (331). Gibbs (1989) supports this approach by: (1) arguing that "the very term political terrorism suggests at least two types" (331); and (2) asserting that many terrorist acts are apolitical (e.g., commercial or economic). This is a valid point as there certainly are apolitical forms of terrorism; however, his assertion can lead one to lose sight of the fact that the most common expressions of terrorism involve politics. This is particularly apparent when one considers that in terms of scope and intensity, terrorism perpetrated or sponsored by governments is by far the more serious social problem. It is well documented that governments and their agents are responsible for the vast majority of terrorist violence worldwide. In Cambodia, for instance, during the Pol Pot era (1975 - 1980), approximately 300,000 people were killed by acts of state sponsored terrorism. In contrast, according to the C.I.A.'s global aggregate statistics, between the years 1968 and 1980 the total number of non-state terrorist incidents totalled 3,368 (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). Because
of the undeniable role of politics in these types of incidents and the prevalence of state-terrorism, it makes compelling sense to highlight politics in a conceptualization of terrorism.

Interestingly, Gibbs suggests that it may be more appropriate for state terrorism to be defined separately from a general definition: "... for theoretical reasons it may prove desirable to limit the proposed definition of terrorism... to non-state terrorism and to seek a quite different definition of state terrorism" (333). If this assertion is accepted, then his contention that political objectives should not be a defining characteristic of terrorism is more persuasive. There is, however, no clear reason why state terrorism, as well as other forms of terrorism (provided they have a political dimension), cannot be conceived of as sub-types within an overarching definition.

Gibbs argues that the central problem with extending the definition of terrorism to "state terrorism" concerns the difficulty in distinguishing between what are "normal" and routine law enforcement activities, and state violence. Moreover, state violence is often conducted with full public knowledge of the government's role, as was the case in Nazi Germany during the "Night of the Long Knives" in which Hitler publicly acknowledged responsibility. As Gibbs notes, examples like this, because they lack a "secretive, furtive, or clandestine feature," should not be categorized as
terrorism. On the other hand, the killings and torture committed by "death squads" could be classified as terrorism because of (among other things) the covert nature of their operations. What Gibbs seems to be inferring from this is that it is important to be discriminating when determining whether specific actions are examples of terrorism - a point well taken. What is somewhat puzzling is why Gibbs suggests that for theoretical reasons, state terrorism should be defined separately. Unfortunately, aside from noting the difficulty in identifying specific examples (a common problem for many sociological concepts), not much is provided in the way of elaboration or clear support for this assertion.

Another contentious aspect of Gibbs' definition concerns the claim that terrorism is necessarily illegal. Support for this assertion is based on the rationale that such a view is:

... consistent with most other definitions and also with this claim: most journalists, officials, and historians who label an action as terrorism evidently regard the action as illegal or criminal (331).

Gibbs' argument can be criticized on two grounds: First, empirical evidence suggests that within the research community there is very little support for defining terrorism as criminal. As Schmid and Jongman (1988) found in their research, only 6 per cent of the definitions they analyzed included a criminal component (based on a sample of 109 definitions). Secondly, even if one accepts that this assertion can be consensually supported it ignores the
relative quality of officially designated crime (see for example, Quinney, 1974). Whether an act is defined as criminal depends largely on the social and political context—something that is subject to changes over time and across legal jurisdictions. Whether it is legal or not has a tenuous relationship with the intrinsic qualities of the act, and tends to obscure our understanding of the phenomenon. This is true for many social activities that are from time to time criminalized—examples such as gambling, drug use, and prostitution should make this point amply clear.

Perhaps the shortcomings of defining terrorism as necessarily criminal are best illustrated by examining state-terrorism. Many governments throughout the world informally employ covert methods to terrorize their people. However, suppose that one of these governments decides that it is no longer necessary to operate secretly and decides to formalize its terror campaign through official decree. In the earlier situation the actions of the state would, according to Gibbs' definition, not be classified as terrorism, whereas in the latter instance they would, even though the substantive elements have not changed. An example of such a case can be found with the 1988 elections in El Salvador. Under Alfredo Cristiani, the ARENA party—well known for their hard line attitude towards dissidents and social reformers, and their involvement with various death squads—was elected to office (Felton, 1989). Soon after being instated, ARENA quickly took
control of the Army and initiated an official campaign of terrorism against any groups or individuals that opposed the government. To claim that the brutality of the Salvadorian government is not terrorism simply because it is officially sanctioned would be an injustice to the victims.

The Salvadorian example raises another interesting point. Rather than operating covertly and unofficially with the use of death squads, by expanding the Army's role the government chose to conduct their terror campaign openly and publicly, thus appearing to violate the "secretive, furtive, and/or clandestine" component of Gibbs' definition. However, the issue of redundancy aside, if one examines the government's actions in a broader context it is possible that this phrase is applicable. For obvious reasons the survival of a terrorist group depends on its ability to conduct its operations without being detected by the authorities. Although the government shows little concern that many Salvadorans are aware of the government's role in the torture, killings and disappearances of fellow civilians, the concealment of information is still an important factor. Given that the United States was a major supplier of military and economic assistance, it is in the Salvadorean governments interest that their involvement in terrorist activities does not become common currency among the American public. The success of this objective ensures the continued dominance of the oligarchy in Salvadorean politics, as well as the
continuation of state terrorism as a method of governance. With respect to a definition of terrorism, this example demonstrates that including a "secretive" characteristic is appropriate if applied broadly.

**Terrorism Defined**

From the above analysis I have devised the following conceptualization of terrorism (see Table 1.1). The characteristics which can be regarded as necessary conditions appear to form the conceptual core of terrorism, namely: 1) extreme violence; 2) political motivation; and 3) intention to cause extreme fear and anxiety in an audience that is distinct from the immediate victim of the violence.

There are important reasons to focus on terrorism that is specifically perpetrated for political reasons. This approach avoids conceptual problems inherent in Gibbs' (1989) "a-political" definition and Schmid and Jongman's (1988) "broad" definition (i.e., the inclusion of psychological and criminal components). Unfortunately, the nebulous quality of both these definitions renders them methodologically cumbersome due to the high degree of variability that would be present in theory construction. By devising a more parsimonious definition of terrorism this problem can be overcome. Second, as mentioned previously, political terrorism is the focus of this inquiry because in terms of cost in human lives and misery it is the most serious.
Unlike many abstract entities, such as those found in the field of mathematics, most conceptualizations of empirical phenomena are beset with definitional problems at their boundaries (see Hospers, 1965). Determining what characteristics define a triangle, for example, is a simple process - in order to qualify it must be a geometric figure with three angles and three sides. There can be no controversy concerning borderline cases. In the case of political terrorism, by applying the above defining characteristics the task of identifying specific instances is often a straightforward matter. However, what happens when a social phenomenon is routinely accompanied by a characteristic, but they fail to coincide in every instance? Would it be appropriate to exclude it from the conceptual definition simply because it is not a necessary quality?

It can be argued that this is the situation concerning the assertion that political terrorism has a secretive quality. As mentioned, by defining "secretive" in broad terms it is possible to include most empirical instances of state terrorism; however, there are times when the state openly terrorizes its people. Such was the case in Mexico City during the 1968 Olympics where the military opened fire on a crowd of student demonstrators, killing several hundred (Agee, 1976). Similarly, there can be little dispute that the vast majority of political terrorism is conducted by groups. Without the strategic and logistical support of an organized
group, it would be extremely difficult for an individual to implement and sustain a terror campaign of any consequence; however, a single, individually perpetrated act is conceivable. Both the "secretive" and "group" characteristics cannot be regarded as invariable qualities (i.e., they are not always present when terrorism occurs); however, because these characteristics can be located at the conceptual boundaries of political terrorism — meaning they are present often but not always — it is appropriate to include them in the conceptualization. Thus in Table 1.1 there is a distinction between primary (necessary) and secondary characteristics (accompanying but non-trivial).

Importantly, this definition is broad enough to encompass acts of state terrorism. The only difference, one that involves conceptual elaboration rather than distinction, is that the violent actions are committed by "legally" constituted governments. Therefore, the modus operandi of states employing terrorism is to maintain the status quo, unlike insurgent terrorists who aspire to achieve political power.

Now that the concept of political terrorism has been articulated, the next step is to elaborate the concept by developing a comprehensive typology of political terrorism.
A TYPOLOGY OF POLITICAL TERRORISM

Since the time of Aristotle, classification schemes have been recognized as a way of generating knowledge about the physical and social world. In terms of the latter, the importance of Max Weber's (1949) notion of "ideal-type" constructs cannot be overstated. According to Weber, as a method of inquiry, developing ideal-types (organized into typologies) makes objective and replicable analysis possible. Although social reality involves a complex interaction of forces, and thus defies easy categorization, a coherent typology can form the basis for model and theory development.

In the field of terrorism research there are a wide variety of typologies covering a broad range of issues (see Flemming and Stohl et al., 1988). The most common typologies focus on the characteristics of either the actors or perpetrators (Schmid and Jongman et al., 1988). In this regard, I have already alluded to one of the most fundamental typological divisions: between state and non-state terrorism. As indicated in Figure 1.2, these categories are elaborated further in hierarchical form with: (1) non-state terrorism broken down into single issue and anti-state terrorism as the two main branches; and (2) state terrorism divided into internal and external types. Single issue terrorism is included in this typology because of its often close proximity to state and anti-state terrorism (more on this below).
Non-State Terrorism

Single Issue Terrorism

A growing number of incidents, identified as "single issue terrorism," occur when a group of individuals is guided by a limited agenda (Schmid and de Graff, 1982; Gurr, 1988b). Examples include the destruction of research laboratories by animal rights activists, and industrial sabotage ("monkey wrenching") directed at corporations that are considered a threat to the eco-system. Although issue terrorists are often in direct conflict with the laws of the state, the strategy of many such groups is to target non-governmental organizations.

In the United States, racist vigilante groups such as the Ku Klux Klan have a long history of attacks against organizations advocating racial equality. More recently, racist groups such as the Aryan Nations and the Posse Comitatus, have engaged in acts of political violence against individuals and government authorities. So far the extent of political terrorism perpetrated by these organizations has been relatively small; however, because of their involvement in stockpiling weapons and paramilitary training, they pose a serious terrorist threat (Gurr, 1988b).

It should be noted that although single issue terrorism is not included in the "anti-state" category in this typology, in many cases it falls into a grey area - i.e., on the fringes of anti-state terrorism. For example, the fire-bombing of an abortion clinic can be considered part of a single issue
campaign; however, whether it is defined as an act against the state depends on who is funding the clinic (the government or private interests). Acts of industrial sabotage, such as the actions of the Squamish Five in British Columbia, are another example where distinctions are often blurred. The bombing of a B.C. Hydro sub-station clearly falls in the anti-state category, whereas the bombing of the Litton industries plant (a private corporation) does not. Finally, there are cases that illustrate a conceptual overlap between single issue terrorism and "informal" state terrorism (discussed below). The above mentioned activities of the Ku Klux Klan, which collaborated with the political authorities in parts of Alabama and Mississippi during the 1960s, provide a good example.

Anti-State Terrorism

Ideological

The "ideological" category is widely used in the field of terrorism research (Flemming and Stohl et al., 1988). The objective of groups that employ this form of terrorism is to radically transform the established institutions of a given society or country. To date, most of the terrorist typologies that emphasize political motivations of terrorist groups tend to focus on secular ideologies. Typically, many of them include categories of "left" oriented ideology (Russel and Miller, 1977; Shultz and Sloan, 1980). Many others, in
addition to distinguishing among left oriented groups, include
categories of right-wing terrorism (Burton, 1976; Milbank,
1976; Kumamoto, 1984). Unfortunately, very few theorists
have developed typologies that recognize the importance of
religious motivation as an explicit category of ideological
terrorism (see Johnson, 1977; Crozier, 1978 for exceptions).
Given the prevalence of religious based terrorism in recent
years (Rapoport, 1984) it is important to emphasize religion
on par with secular ideologies as a powerful motivator.

Secular

Non-state terrorism inspired by secular ideologies,
particularly those that can be categorized as left oriented
(e.g., Marxist-Leninism and anarchism), has diminished
significantly since the 1970s. In the United States, for
example, there has been a decline from 129 incidents in 1975
to 17 in 1986 (Gurr, 1988b). Similar trends can be found in
many other parts of the world (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1988). This form of ideological terrorism is
often associated with the student rebellions that occurred in
the United States and Western Europe during the 1960s and 70s.
The political objectives of these groups were strongly
influenced by radical theorists such as Marx and Bakunin, as
well as more contemporary theorists such as Franz Fanon, Mao
Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Marighella, Fidel Castro, and Herbert
Marcuse (Burton, 1975).
Religious terrorism occurs when religious scripture or doctrine can be identified as the fundamental motivating and unifying factor.

In the last ten years, religious violence in the Middle East has gained an enormous amount of media attention. Unfortunately, much of the commentary (when it goes beyond image making and "sound bites") reflects a Western ideological bias (Said, 1988). More sophisticated analysis focusing on the social and cultural norms and traditions is rare - even among researchers of terrorism. In this respect, R.C. Martin (1987) highlights the importance of ritual, symbol, and myth as pretexts for religious violence.

Martin argues that the Muslim doctrine of jihad is central to any explanation of Islamic terrorism. He points out that the concept of jihad invokes a broad semantic field that can provide a rationale for "holy war". As an Arabic verb, the term (specifically, jahada) denotes "striving in the path of God"; however, as a verbal noun it has two generally accepted meanings: The lesser jihad (striving through warfare), and the greater jihad (striving through peaceful means). It is the notion of the lesser jihad that is used to justify armed struggle and terrorist violence.

When this doctrine is viewed within the context of structural and historical antecedents the phenomenon of Islamic terrorism becomes more comprehensible. Many Islamic
fundamentalists consider the influence of Western culture to be a serious threat to the survival of their religious traditions and values. More specifically, European colonialism and its legacy of cultural and ideological hegemony have led to widespread bitterness and resentment among Muslims. For many fundamentalists the only alternative is to invoke a holy war (or lesser jihad).

However, these elements alone are usually not sufficient conditions to precipitate a violent jihad. Historically specific events, as well as political manipulation, can be decisive factors. The publication of Salman Rushdie's controversial novel *Satanic Verses* in 1988 provides a clear illustration. Rushdie's satirical depiction of Koranic text infuriated many Muslims as it was perceived as outrageously blasphemous. Before long the spiritual leader of Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini, declared a holy war against Rushdie, as well as against direct supporters of the book. In fact, the officially pronounced death sentence (in absentia) remains, despite the death of the Ayatollah in 1989. Some observers maintain that the jihad's declaration has as much to do with consolidating domestic political power as it does with religious doctrine. At the time, Iran was in the process of accepting a ceasefire in its war with Iraq which could have had the effect of diminishing Khomeini's authority. His gesture could be interpreted as an attempt to reassert himself as the pre-eminent defender of Islam (Phillips, 1989).
Ethnic-Nationalist Terrorism

A type of terrorism often associated with ethnic based secessionist movements is defined as ethnic nationalist terrorism. Discriminatory practices directed at an identifiable ethnic group can produce the bitterness and frustration that leads to political violence. These practices can involve religious freedom, educational policy, resource allocations, and political opportunities.

Perhaps the most prominent and resilient ethnic nationalist terrorist organization is the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Since the mid-19th century Irish republicans (i.e., those demanding Ireland's complete independence from Britain) have waged a campaign of violence against British political control and Protestant dominance.

Similar dynamics exist among the Sikh nationalist movement. Sikh separatists want the Indian government to allow for the creation of an independent Sikh state - known as Khalistan - in the Punjab area of northern India. With only approximately 13 million Sikhs (living primarily in the Punjab region and the Pakistani controlled sections of Kashmir), both moderate and extremist Sikh nationalists fear the gradual demise of Sikh religion and culture. Sikh nationalists are concerned that the enormous Hindu and Muslim populations, which together will soon approach the one billion figure, will place them in
a politically vulnerable position. This fear, combined with the perception that the National Parliament's cultural, economic, and resource policies toward the Punjab region are blatantly discriminatory, has led to widespread anger and resentment among the Sikh population (Leaf, 1985).

The event that convinced many of the extremists to adopt violent means, as opposed to the moderate strategy of electoral politics, was the Gandhi government's assault on the Golden Temple of Amritsar in June 1984. Operation Blue Star, as it was officially known, not only resulted in the deaths of many of the radical leaders, but it also claimed the lives of innocent pilgrims. Not surprisingly, both Sikh extremists and moderates considered the assault to be a sacrilegious act. Radicals vowed revenge against the Indian government which came four months later when Indira Gandhi was assassinated by two members of her personal security force. This was met with immediate reprisal as thousands of Sikhs were murdered in the streets by Hindus, while riots erupted in the northern and central states. These events further infuriated radical Sikhs who again vowed to continue assassinating the leaders involved with Operation Blue Star, while at the same time they promised to employ terrorism to disrupt the Indian economy (Mulgrew, 1988).

From this example it is possible to discern a pattern common to many countries that have a history of ethnic-nationalist conflict. First there is a perception within the
minority group that specific social, political, or economic injustices exist. This is followed by a sense of frustration over the inability to resolve those grievances through conventional non-violent means (Crenshaw, 1981). At some point the ongoing frustration reaches a critical mass whereby a smaller set of individuals are motivated to employ violence, often in the form of terrorism (Gurr, 1971). Typically, in these situations a violent repressive act by the state (as in the above example) can galvanize extremist groups and lead to an escalation of anti-state terrorism.

State Terrorism

With state terrorism it is useful to distinguish between terrorist campaigns and actions that occur predominantly within the geographic boundaries of the state (internal), and those that occur outside national boundaries (external) (Waugh, 1982). In the case of internal terrorism - sometimes referred to as domestic terrorism (Schmid and Jongman, 1988) - two further subdivisions can be made based on the proximity of control that the state has over the terrorist actions.

State terrorism is often committed by groups or individuals acting outside the formal state control apparatus. This type of terrorism can be appropriately labelled "regime-control terrorism," which is defined by Rosenbaum and Sederberg (1974) as "establishment violence to preserve the status quo at times when the formal system of rule enforcement
is viewed as ineffective or irrelevant." The definition of this category can be extended to include situations where state authorities, for geo-political reasons, find it more beneficial to promote (or tolerate) the violence of vigilante groups. In Latin America, for example, death squads are able to give the appearance of operating independently from the state, thereby maintaining the moral legitimacy of the incumbent regime. The gruesome murders carried out by government supported death squads are typically attributed to either "leftist guerrillas," or (when that explanation is unconvincing) "renegade factions within the military" (Chomsky, 1988b). Not surprisingly, government officials steadfastly refuse to admit any degree of complicity.

The other category of internal state terrorism involves formal social control agencies of the state. Examples include the terrorist violence perpetrated by the army, as well as by police and para-military agencies. Whether this type of violence should be labelled political terrorism is a contentious issue. Some scholars (such as Gibbs, 1989) note that including military operations within a concept of terrorism would be operationally untenable as the etiological distinctions between conventional warfare and other forms of terrorism become blurred. In addressing this problem, Sederberg (1989) proposes a distinction based on whether combatants or non-combatants are the targets of the violence. Accordingly, if combatants (e.g., military personnel) are
targetted, then it does not qualify as terrorism. Thus, in a situation where the military assassinate a member of an insurgent guerrilla organization, even though they may have acted covertly and intended to create extreme fear in a wider population, the act would not be described as terrorism.

The problem with such a distinction is that it excludes a large number of violent attacks that are widely accepted as acts of terrorism. Over the years the IRA has frequently been implicated in the killing of British soldiers - many of them off-duty. Should the killing of off-duty military personnel be considered non-terrorist? To avoid this kind of ambiguity it may be more useful to exclude violent actions that are part of a conventional military campaign - e.g., involving a struggle over territory.

The practice of state terrorism is not confined to enforcing social control within national boundaries. There are times when a country finds it politically advantageous to promote or engage in "international terrorism" - a term that has gained considerable currency in the media as a nefarious instrument of oppressive regimes. The term has been routinely applied by governments to further ideological objectives. The United States during the Reagan Administration, for example, consistently labelled political violence directed at Western targets, allegedly from a foreign source, as international terrorism. Invariably, this was accompanied with the suggestion that most (if not all) of the violence was the end
product of an elaborate terrorist network under the sponsorship of the Soviet Union (Sterling, 1980). Although the global conspiracy theory is clearly absurd - for one thing it fails to recognize the preeminence of ethnic nationalist aspirations which can lead to terrorism - there is no doubt that the former Soviet Union has been involved in international terrorist activities. During the occupation of Afghanistan, for example, there is evidence that the Soviet government often engaged in acts of terrorism directed at civilians (Amnesty International, 1987). What is interesting, however, is that during roughly the same period (1979 - 1980) the United States administration consistently denied any involvement in similar undertakings, especially in reference to its role in Latin America (Armstrong and Shenk, 1982).

Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. administration, and more specifically the C.I.A., was a key player in coordinating and perpetuating a covert war against the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. In order to protect what it considered to be its strategic and economic interests, a guerrilla force known as the CONTRAS was organized. Although their leaders, as well as supporters, insisted that the Sandinista military was the sole target of CONTRA attacks, evidence overwhelmingly points to a systematic and brutal campaign of terrorism directed primarily at civilians and health care workers. Many experts believe that the U.S. government chose to engage in this type of strategy - sometimes referred to as "low intensity warfare" -
because it results in fewer costs, both economically and politically, than a conventional military invasion (Chomsky, 1988b): economically because of the enormous expense associated with deploying and maintaining a military force, and politically because of the negative collateral effects, both domestically and within the international community. Importantly, because of the experience with Viet Nam, the United States administration was extremely reluctant to become entangled in another prolonged conflict involving direct military confrontation.

METATHEORETICAL ISSUES

In his paper, Gibbs (1989) goes beyond conceptual analysis and attempts to lay the groundwork for a comprehensive theory of terrorism. A successful substantive theory, he argues, depends on the recognition of empirical associations between different phenomena "especially one having explanatory implications" (235). Gibbs proceeds to discuss the merits of three explanatory mechanisms that he considers to have "major possibilities" in terms of theoretical development.

The first of these, labelled "strict causation," simply emphasizes what the name implies; i.e., in order to sufficiently explain a social phenomenon such as terrorism it is important to isolate causes. This is not much of a revelation; after all it is well recognized as a useful
heuristic given the adherence to accepted canons of social scientific research. The danger in proscribing this approach lies in the possibility of falling into positivist dogma, thus excluding other epistemologies. In fairness to Gibbs, the fact that other "mechanisms" are presented suggests that he recognizes this point.

In addition, Gibbs proposes that examining social reality in terms of "selective survival," a version of functionalism, can be theoretically productive. The standard criticism that functional analysis implies that the phenomenon being studied is necessary for the maintenance of the larger system is avoided by using the term "selective." Moreover, Gibbs' suggestion that explaining terrorism requires a recognition of "the purposive quality of human behavior" (the final explanatory mechanism) avoids another pitfall of functionalism: i.e., that it ignores human subjectivity (Burke, 1980).

Focusing upon purposiveness as the final explanatory mechanism is perhaps in some ways belabouring the obvious, after all any comprehensive social science theory must account for human agency (Giddens, 1976; 1984). However, its importance to the study of terrorism cannot be overstated. Subjective interpretation is a critical factor, particularly given the role of ideology in motivating an individual to employ violence to achieve a desired end (O'Sullivan, 1986; Rubenstein, 1987). This mechanism may not be that useful for
some types of psychological (or to use Schmid and Jongman's term "idiosyncratic") terrorism as many of the motivating factors are irrational and lack a purposive quality. This problem, however, is avoided if the theoretical inquiry is limited to specific types of "rational" terrorism such as those defined as politically motivated.

As well as proposing that a defensible sociological theory of terrorism may require a combination of the above strategic mechanisms, Gibbs suggests that the concept of control is an underlying common denominator of each of these approaches. The concept is further refined to focus on the notion of attempted control. From this he outlines a typology of human control which includes: self-control; proximate control; sequential control; and social control. There is little doubt that the attempt to control an adversary is an intrinsic element of many acts of terrorism (e.g., revolutionary terrorism); however, asserting that the concept, as explicated by Gibbs, has wide theoretical application raises an interesting question. Are terrorists always seeking control? With many single issue terrorists, for example, the modus operandi appears to be influence rather than control. This was the case with the Squamish Five in British Columbia who engaged in terrorism in order to influence specific political, social and economic changes (Sewell, 1983). Evidently, the idea of influence can be subsumed under the variants of human control that Gibbs outlines; unfortunately
this obscures the important distinctions between the terms. The concept of control has much to offer in clarifying our understanding of terrorism - Crelinsten (1987), for example, emphasizes the symbiotic relationship between the controllers and the controlled in the context of political violence.⁸

Although there are inherent problems with the explanatory mechanisms that Gibbs outlines, the most serious flaw concerns the failure to mention or allude to the value of other metatheoretical strategies. Moreover, the problem with Gibbs' methodological prescriptions appears to derive from the way that the issue is framed. Rather than beginning the process of theory construction with three distinct mechanisms, and then identifying a concept that threads them together (i.e., control), a more coherent approach requires an analysis of human action within a much broader framework - i.e., one that recognizes the epistemological value of economic, political, ideological, historical, and social analysis.

Most of all, such a theoretical framework should recognize the interaction of human agency and social structure. As Marx's (1963:15) familiar aphorism makes clear, "[h]uman beings make their own history, but not in circumstances of their own choosing." However, it is well recognized that the structure/agency dualism, as well as the further delineations of structure, are susceptible to crude reductionism (Ritzer, 1988); to avoid this, one should be cognizant of the complex interactive process that
characterizes social reality. For example, it would be shortsighted to assert, as several Marxist structuralists have done, that the study of history and society should be limited to "objective" political and economic structures.

At the other extreme, it would be equally mistaken to limit the explanation of insurgent terrorist activity to an analysis of psychological factors. In the 1970's a great deal of attention was given to the psychological profiles of the leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Group (e.g., Rasch, 1979); however, without recognizing structural factors - such as the influence of radical ideology, the dynamics of university socio-political organization, and party politics (Corrado and Evans, 1988) - our understanding of their actions is fragmented at best. It should be emphasized that although such empirical issues are conceptualized in terms of levels of abstraction, this approach, as Wallace (1969:45) has stated, "... is merely for analytic convenience, since variation in level is to be thought of as continuous and therefore multi-levelled."

Obviously, such an explanation of events would be incomplete without explicit recognition of the relationship between historical antecedents and present circumstances. At one time the historical aspects of a society were the primary concern of social theorists; however, throughout the first half of the twentieth century this concern was eclipsed by, among other things, the institutionalized division of academic
institutions, and the influence of positivist methodologies (Barnes, 1948). Eventually, this division was criticized as being too artificial and ultimately counterproductive (Burke, 1980; Canham and Boskoff, 1964; Mills, 1959). The rapprochement of sociology and history is a central theme of Wallerstein's (1987) "world systems" approach to sociological inquiry (this will be discussed in Chapter Two).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter began with a discussion of two important conceptualizations of terrorism. Through a process of dialectical criticism a clear and coherent definition of political terrorism was constructed. From this a typology of political terrorism, focusing on state and anti-state terrorism was presented. This was followed by a discussion of a number of theoretical issues that are fundamental to the process of theory development. In the next chapter, the above ideas are assembled into a coherent theoretical framework. First I will introduce some of the main historical-structural antecedents of political terrorism, and then separate models of anti-state and state terrorism are explicated.
Here he cites as an example Laqueur's (1987) contention that labor-management conflicts resulting in terrorist activities are non-political. The argument is persuasive if one accepts a narrow definition of "political"; however, even if this is the case it should not detract from the important, if not essential, relationship between politics and terrorism.

For example, Milbank (1976) distinguishes between anarchist and other "Marxist" based groups.

Given the fact that these authors were conducting their research before the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism and the associated violence became an important political force, this is understandable; however, even recently there has been little attention given to developing coherent typologies incorporating religion as a key element.

While it is important to distinguish conceptually between the ideologies of secular and religious terrorism, the term ideological is often synonymously with secular terrorism.

Ethnicity refers to any distinctive cultural attribute, such as race, religion, language, and custom.

This is also referred to as establishment terrorism (Schultz, 1978; Sederberg, 1989) or regime terrorism (Walters, 1969).


Crelinsten (1987:8) argues: "A non-truncated, unskewed, comprehensive study of political terrorism must analyse its use by both the controller and the controlled, even if it does not always go by the name of 'terrorism'. The terrorisms of controller and controlled - and the labels attached to them - are related aspects of a larger unit, the political life of a society."

See for example, Hindess and Hirst, (1975) and Thompson, (1978) for a critique of this perspective.
CHAPTER TWO

POLITICAL TERRORISM: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

While the previous chapter dealt primarily with conceptual matters, the objective of this chapter is to systematically organize the important antecedents of political terrorism into a general theoretical framework. The chapter proceeds algorithmically: that is, it begins with a broad historical overview beginning with the seventeenth century and continuing to the present. Presenting what is unavoidably a truncated account of world history has obvious drawbacks. Most notably, it is not able to capture historical relationships at a high level of specificity. This, however, is not the purpose of the overview; rather, it is to highlight the main historical themes, trends and structural forces that are most relevant to the issue of political terrorism. Hence, Figure 2.1 includes historical events and conflicts, economic modes, political organization, and ideology.

This is followed by two integrative, multi-level models which focus on: 1) anti-state terrorism; 2) state terrorism. In these models, specific assertion concerning the relationships between independent variables (e.g., economic, political, ideological, and micro-analytic factors) and the dependent variable (political terrorism) are presented in the form of propositions. Importantly, these models and the historical overview are intended as a theoretical foundation
for the substantive discussion in the remaining chapters.

**HISTORY, CONFLICT, AND TERRORISM**

As well as including specific causes, any holistic theory of terrorism must consider the broad sweep of history. For instance, many events that occurred two hundred years ago (e.g., the French Revolution) have had an important effect on the nature of revolutionary violence today. In this sense the past, even the distant past, conditions the present. In considering the causal relevance of the past, however, it is important to avoid hypostatization. Instead, history, in ontological terms, is best approached as a dynamic, interactive process; therefore, the structural antecedents of political terrorism presented in Figure 2.1 should be regarded not as distinct causes, but as interacting in concert with one another. These variables (or more accurately, sets of variables) are common to both anti-state and state terrorism.

Religious ideology, for example, has been used to justify both state persecution and repression (e.g., Iran under the Ayatollah Kohmeini) and political violence against the state (e.g., Sikh nationalists). It is interesting to note that despite the shift from religious to secular thought that began in the seventeenth century, religion has maintained its relevance as a social and political force.

The far reaching impact of secular ideology is important to recognize. Many of these ideological perspectives that
form the basis for social action were developed during the Enlightenment, perhaps the most decisive period in the history of ideas. Within this "community of discourse", as Robert Wuthnow (1989) describes it, various ideologies such as liberalism, conservatism, socialism, and capitalism were conceived and eventually established the political and economic preconditions from which political terrorism developed.

There is no doubt, for example, that the ideas of Adam Smith – more specifically, the book The Wealth of Nations (1976) first published in 1776 – provided an intellectual foundation for the inexorable expansion of industrial capitalism (which emerged in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in global terms is now the dominant economic system). This was an important factor in the systematic exploitation of indigenous populations by the European colonial powers and the United States, and more recently, corporate capitalism. Throughout this century, social tension developed in many of the regions where these antagonistic forces were present, and often resulted in deeply entrenched and violent civil conflict.

Colonial oppression led to the inception of Third World nationalism which fostered the popularity of anti-colonial movements. Nationalist ideologies, however, have their origins much earlier with the collapse of the Napoleonic
empire. Since then, they have merged with other political ideologies such as liberalism, Marxism and fascism.

While ideology is important in providing justification for political terrorism and other forms of political violence, it also serves as a blueprint for political organization - among both state authorities and powerful elites, and for those attempting to empower themselves from below. The gradual shift towards ideologies of individualism is expressed in substantive terms in the transformation from monarchist government to representative government. This was dramatically highlighted in the American and French revolutions - two events that symbolized to politically oppressed populations in the colonial world that political change was possible. If nationalist aspirations were blocked or frustrated, violent strategies involving guerrilla or terrorist campaigns often resulted.

As indicated in Figure 2.1, many colonial governments did not evolve into democratic states. Most of Latin America and the African sub-continent, and much of Asia, evolved instead into repressive authoritarian regimes, whose policies and practices contradict their frequent characterization as representative democracies. In addition to this, the decision by the European colonial powers to partition Africa (i.e., at the Conference of Berlin in 1885) without consideration for traditional tribal boundaries has left a legacy of factionalism, which has undermined progress towards
substantive democratization and has contributed to both state and anti-state terrorism.

It would be a mistake to conclude that historically the governments of the Third World have a monopoly on political repression. For instance, the change from monarchism to liberal democracy in the First World was not a smooth, linear progression. The ascendance of fascism in the first half of this century provides ample evidence for this observation. The state terrorist models developed from Nazism in particular, not to mention the totalitarian bureaucracy of Stalinism, served as prototypes for many authoritarian governments throughout the post-colonial world.

The end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War signalled a new era in global politics. In the United States during the late 40s and early 50s, McCarthyism functioned to eradicate almost all forms of political dissent. Anti-Communist crusades spread throughout the western hemisphere and were zealously embraced by the military governments of Latin America. The use of death squads and other paramilitary groups to enforce compliance is a manifestation of this phenomenon.

Many of the popular movements in Latin America and elsewhere in the Third World were inspired by the civil rights movement in the United States, which began as a campaign against black oppression in the southern states but soon diversified to encompass many other social causes. One of the
most dramatic developments was the student movement of the 1960s which, in addition to drawing from civil libertarian ideology, was strongly influenced by Marxism.

MODEL DEVELOPMENT

In this section the analysis proceeds from historical overview to the explication of state and anti-state terrorism models (Figures 2.2 and 2.3). However, it is important to clarify how the term "model" is used. Within the social sciences there is a high degree of vagueness and ambiguity concerning its application. Jonathan Turner (1987) distinguishes between "abstract-analytical" models, which are context-free representations of political power, economic development etc., and "empirical-causal" models, which present operationalized variables in quantifiable terms and can be applied to statistical analysis. The following models are of the abstract-analytical variety; however, this does not preclude the possibility of transforming them into empirical-causal models by constructing operational definitions of the variables being analyzed.

An important aspect of the two models is that they are general enough to allow wide application to different types of terrorist organizations, as well as to political and economic systems. Moreover, they are not confined to an historically specific analysis of phenomena within state boundaries. As Immanuel Wallerstein (1987:317) argues, it is important to
expand the unit of analysis by venturing beyond the state system and its cultural and governing structures.

In explaining state and anti-state terrorism many of the same factors are relevant. After all, according to the conceptualization presented in Chapter One, terrorism includes the same general characteristics, regardless of whether it is conducted by the state or against the state. Table 2.1 is provided to clarify this issue by indicating which variables are (1) part of the same phenomenon; (2) conceptually similar; (3) unique to anti-state terrorism; and (4) unique to state terrorism. In addition, it outlines the further categorization of conceptual variables into independent and intervening variables.

ANTI-STATE TERRORISM MODEL

Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in Figure 2.2 refers to political terrorism as defined in Chapter 1. The definition, however, is narrowed to encompass only terrorist actions that are perpetrated by groups acting against the state.

Independent Variables

1. Economic Mode This roughly corresponds to Marx's (1967:791) concept of "mode of production" which he defines
The specific economic form, in which unpaid surplus labour is pumped out of direct producers (and) determines the relationship of rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and in turn, reacts upon it as a determining element. Upon this, however, is founded the entire formation of the economic community which grows up out of the production of the production relations themselves, thereby simultaneously its specific political form.

The value of this conception is that it highlights the dialectic process whereby economic forms and social action reproduce one another. Marx, however, often employed the term in the context of his theory of historical materialism which in hindsight has dubious empirical support; therefore the construct "economic mode" does not embrace such theoretical overtones and refers instead to the general form of economic distribution and consumption in the country (or region) where political conflict is located.

Much of the macro-theoretical research on revolutionary action and insurgent terrorism focuses on whether the society is predominantly agrarian, industrial, or advanced industrial. Theorists such as Samuel Huntington (1968) maintain that in the absence of democratic norms and procedures, countries experiencing a rapid shift in economic development (e.g., from agrarian to industrial society) will inevitably experience civil unrest and terrorism. Ted Gurr (1970), whose theory is explored in Chapter Six, argues that economic development often leads to relative deprivation which in turn can result
in civil strife. Gurr's thesis is useful because it combines structural preconditions with social psychological mechanisms. In combination with other conceptual variables (e.g., economic, political, ideological, cultural, historical) it can offer valuable insight into the relationship between economic change and terrorism.

Proposition I: As the discrepancy between the economic goals and the means to achieve those goals increases, the likelihood of terrorism increases.

2. Distribution of Wealth In countries where there is marked disparity in the distribution of wealth - i.e., where small, powerful elites exercise control over property, capital, and resources - there tend to be insurgency organizations willing to use terrorism as a political strategy.

Proposition II: As the concentration of wealth increases, the likelihood of anti-state terrorism increases.

3. Economic Dependence Negative social conditions and domestic tensions are characteristic of many countries that have dependent economic systems. This is particularly evident when one examines the economic relationship between the Third World and the more affluent Western industrialized nations. With the emergence of industrial capitalism as a global
phenomenon, and the demise of the colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and Latin America (only to be supplanted by economic imperialism), it is apparent that international economic and political linkages have a direct bearing on the pervasiveness of underdevelopment. As Lopez and Stohl (1989:x) observe:

The extraction of natural resources by larger states, the prevalence of cash-crop over subsistence economies, and the penetration of the capital market by foreign investors who take advantage of cheap labour all were identified as factors that contributed to continuous cycles of poverty.

Coalitions of ruling elites have routinely employed repression to maintain their dominant political and economic position within this global relationship (O'Donnell, 1973). It should come as no surprise that such political and economic conditions can foster the development of insurgent violence.

Proposition III: Anti-state terrorism correlates positively with an increase in economic dependency.

4. Government Organization The type of terrorism, its source, scope, and intensity depend to a considerable extent on the structure of the prevailing political system. Economic and political oppression (and repression)² are characteristic of Third World authoritarian regimes, a factor that can result in an organized anti-state terrorism campaign (Hamilton, 1978).
Proposition IV(i): Third World countries with a history of political repression are likely to have sustained anti-state terrorist campaigns.

It is interesting to note that most of the research supports the contention that anti-state terrorism is more prevalent in First World democracies (Schmid and Jongman et al., 1988). Theorists such as Laqueur (1977) and Wilkinson (1977) argue that liberal-democracies, with their affluence and freedom, create favourable conditions for the development of terrorism. This is because it is easier to acquire and maintain financial support, and move freely throughout the population. The ascendance of revolutionary violence and terrorism in the United States and Western Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s supports this claim. This generalization, however, needs to be strongly qualified and located within an historical context. Currently anti-state terrorism in Canada and the United States is virtually non-existent, and in Europe the number of incidents is dramatically lower than in the 1960s and 70s. Historically specific antecedents such as a dramatic, repressive action by the state, or the presence and influence of counter-ideologies should be factored into any explanation.

Proposition IV(ii): In First World democracies anti-state terrorism will be greater than in Third World countries given
the presence of historically specific antecedents.

5. Counter-insurgency Measures  The way that the state is organized to respond to the threat of terrorism can act as an intervening variable by exerting either a mitigating or facilitating effect. Che Guevara (1969) recognized the power of the state when he warned against using terrorism as a revolutionary strategy, particularly as it was promoted by Marighela (1971). Provoking the state can lead to revolutionary failure, further political repression (i.e., state terrorism) and ultimately destruction of the source of anti-state terrorism altogether. This is precisely what happened to the Tupamaros in Uruguay, who, through well publicized acts of terrorism, alienated the previously sympathetic middle class, thus facilitating the development of a more authoritarian government than previously.

The relevant counter-insurgency measures fall into three broad categories:

a) Covert Measures  This refers to the surreptitious work of security and intelligence agencies, and can range from relatively moderate tactics such as informant programs and the dissemination of state propaganda, to more extreme measures such as assassination and torture (Jenkins, 1981; Freidlander, 1983).

b) Overt Measures  More effective domestic laws and international agreements can undermine the organizing
capabilities of terrorist groups, thus reducing their threat. In addition, measures such as hardening of potential targets, increased public surveillance, and the training of anti-terrorist squads can discourage terrorism.

c) **Acceding to Demands** According to Hyams (1974) giving in to terrorist demands through specific political reforms can eliminate the rationale for terrorism which will then diminish the level of terrorism.³

*Proposition V:* An efficacious counter terrorist strategy is negatively correlated with anti-state terrorism.

6. **Terrorist Organization** As discussed in Chapter 5, terrorist cell structures (which are usually found in urban environments) can facilitate group solidarity and security; however, the lack of organizational coherence and the inability to develop a common strategy ultimately make it difficult to conduct a sustained terrorist campaign. Although more complex, hierarchical organizations lack the same degree of security and are easier to infiltrate, they have several advantages. First, there is more effective and coordinated communication and leadership. Second, they are usually linked to a network of sympathizers, and in many cases are linked to legally constituted political parties.⁴ When there is broad public support for the objectives of the terrorist group (e.g., the Irish Republican Army) recruiting new members is
relatively easy, thus making it possible to sustain terrorist campaigns through successive generations.

Proposition VI: A hierarchical terrorist group structure combined with broad public support enhances the possibility of a sustained terrorist campaign.

7. Ethnicity As an antecedent of terrorism ethnic identification can be a powerful motivator. This variable is usually present in regions where terrorist violence has become deeply entrenched - such as Ireland, South Africa, and India. A history of concrete economic or political grievances within an identifiable ethnic minority discriminated against by a larger (or dominant as in the case of South Africa) population can precipitate terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981).

Proposition VII: A high level of ethnic solidarity together with a history of persecution, increases the possibility of a sustained terrorist campaign.

8. Ideology The vast majority of organized and sustained insurgent terrorist campaigns are inspired in some way by ideological doctrine. This applies equally to ethnic groups seeking national independence such as the IRA and the Kalistanis and revolutionary organizations such as the Red Army Faction and the Weather Underground. Even in situations
where specific individuals may be motivated by economic self interest, power, or the desire to belong to a group, organization leaders are usually motivated primarily by ideological principles.

Proposition VIII: A high level of ideological commitment among individuals who oppose the government enhances the possibility that there will be anti-state terrorism.

9. Rational Motives This conceptual variable is situated pivotally between the above macro-structural and organizational antecedents on the one hand and anti-state terrorism and other forms of political action on the other. That is, it acts as an intervening variable which can either facilitate or mitigate terrorist violence. Thus depending on the subjective interpretation and decision making process of the actor, political action can be expressed in a variety of ways. In general, it is possible to categorize these choices as (1) non-violent forms of action such as participating in elections and civil disobedience (e.g., hunger strikes); and (2) violent forms of action such as direct confrontation (e.g., rioting) and terrorism (see figure 2.2).

To better explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in converting thought into action, the field of decision making theory may be usefully applied. More specifically, various formulations of what is referred to as the "expected utility
model" (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1981) can be adapted to the process of choosing terrorism. In general terms this model suggests that an individual engages in terrorism because it is anticipated that there is a greater probability of achieving the desired outcome over the above mentioned alternatives. It must be emphasized that while this process may involve errors in reasoning (Nisbett and Ross, 1980), this does not imply that terrorists are afflicted with various types of mental disorders as is claimed in much of the literature on terrorism. As discussed in Chapter 6, the relationship is spurious at best.

Proposition IX: All other factors being equal, the greater the number of individuals who estimate that terrorism is more effective than alternatives in achieving a political objective, the greater the likelihood there will be terrorism.

10. Historical Dimensions
This category is divided into the following two sub-divisions: a) Historical Specificity; and b) Historical Trajectories.

a) Historical Specificity. Discretely definable historical events involving conflicts between dominant state powers and subordinate groups can promote insurgent activity as well as influence its nature and extent. While in many respects this is the most nebulous etiological category in this (and the
following) model as it can include a wide variety of actions with varying durations, it is possible to group such actions into two broad categories: (1) Direct. This includes situations in which both a repressive (or oppressive) action by the state and the oppositional response are contained within the same geo-political region; and (2) Indirect. This refers to situations where civil conflict in one geo-political region has a contagion effect on actions in another. The influence that the Vietnam War had in triggering insurgent violence in the United States is an example of the former, while the vicarious influence that the Black Civil Rights Movement had on the FLQ in the late 1960s is an illustration of the latter. Both categories allude to the interaction between historical events and ideology and motivation. The integration of these variables is illustrated in Chapter Five where the French and American revolutions, the Wars of Independence, and the Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions are discussed in terms of their historical continuity.

**Proposition X(i):** As the number of acts of state repression or oppression increases, the likelihood that insurgent activity will arise increases.

**Proposition X(ii):** civil conflict involving similar socio-political factors in one region is likely to produce civil conflict in another.
b) Historical Trajectories. History is more than a causal chain of specific events and discrete variables - it also involves process. This category includes significant periods such as The Reformation, The Enlightenment, and the Industrial Revolution. More generally, it encompasses the growth of industrial capitalism, the inception of nation states, and the evolution (and decline) of European colonialism. All of these sub-categories were significant factors - whether directly or indirectly - in the development of political terrorism. Importantly, because of the processual (as opposed to etiological) quality of this category it is not amenable to operational reduction; thus a propositional statement is not warranted.

STATE TERRORISM MODEL

Dependent Variable

This refers to political terrorism (as defined in Chapter One), but narrowed to include only those actions that are perpetrated, sponsored or facilitated by a state authority.

Independent Variables

1. Economic Mode In countries with advanced industrial economies the existence of a large, relatively affluent middle
class acts as a stabilizing force. In the absence of civil conflict and challenges to the status-quo, state authorities have few reasons to employ state terrorism, and thus historically there are very low levels of state terrorism. While conflicts over social, political, and economic policies are common, these are usually expressed through conventional political processes, and the legitimacy of the state itself is seldom questioned. When unconventional forms of opposition exist—more specifically, in the form of political violence as occurred in Western Europe during the 1960s and 70s—they invariably lack broad popular support and are rarely sustained for more than a few years. Therefore, the state and its policing agencies are less inclined to react with the same degree of brutality that one would find in many Third World countries. Conversely, in countries where there is a high level of economic oppression, popular based opposition movements are likely to emerge (which may include insurgent activity). This is routinely met with a harsh reaction from state authorities.

Proposition I: It is unlikely that state terror can be sustained in a country with an industrially advanced economy and a relatively large middle class.

2. Distribution of Wealth There is no doubt that capital and property are unevenly distributed in industrially advanced
countries. In Canada, for example, there has been a steady shift in the tax burden from corporate to individual taxpayers. From the early 1960s to the early 1990s corporate taxes have shrunk from 21.6 per cent to 15.4 percent of total federal tax revenues. Moreover, during the 1970s the average cost of living rose by 43 per cent, but the average incomes of people earning the minimum wage rose by only 20 per cent (National Council on Welfare, 1981; 1986).

Although the distribution of wealth in industrialized countries is increasingly inequitable the disparity in the Third World is much more evident. Brazil, for example, is a country with enormous wealth, yet there is a dramatic disparity between rich and poor. According to a recent study, over half the population have family incomes below the minimum wage (Chomsky, 1991). Economic misery can engender the development of organized popular dissent and in turn can provoke the government into repressive action.

Proposition II: As the concentration of capital increases in a given country, the likelihood that state terrorism will occur also increases.

3) Economic Dependence As with anti-state terrorism, the vicissitudes of the global economy are a vital component of this model. The relationship between monetarist economic doctrines and political repression is well documented
(Carleton 1989; Herman, 1986; Pion Berlin, 1983; Sheahan, 1980). This relationship, which is discussed in Chapter 5, is part of a trend that began in the Third World (and more specifically, Latin America) following World War II.

At the same time that Eastern Europe is moving to become integrated into the global capitalist economy, Latin America is embarking on reforms of its own. Or to put it more accurately, many of the countries in the region (e.g., Mexico, Brazil, Argentina) are adopting monetarist policies with renewed vigour. Proponents argue that these reforms are the key to Latin American prosperity. It follows that with a general increase in economic well being, there will be an increase in social stability, less political discontent and consequently less state repression.

This argument, which echoes the modernization thesis promoted in the 1950s and 60s, has been severely criticized for (a) not addressing the reality of structural dependency (Carleton, 1989); and (b) ignoring contradictory socio-economic indicators (Felix, 1990; Warnock, 1992). According to these authors, there are good reasons to believe that current fiscal reforms in Latin America - which in fact are designed to promote international economic dependency - will do little to improve oppressive living conditions. If anything, these measures will increase the level of misery and despair among the regions impoverished populations. From
these conditions widespread political dissent can develop (as it did in the 1960s and 70s) which all too often is met with state repression and terrorism.

Proposition III: State terrorism is more likely to occur in regions where there is a high level of economic dependency.

4. Government Organization Despite global economic and political restructuring, a cursory examination reveals that state terrorism in the Third World is far more prevalent than in the First World. Myanmar, Brazil, and Guatemala are examples of the most serious violators of human rights. According to Amnesty International (1991), governments in these and many other countries in the developing world routinely torture and execute political opponents. Although technically the form of government in many of these countries can be defined as "democratic", in substantive terms political control is usually maintained by various combinations of military elites, oligarchies, and corporate interests. Political instability, which in more extreme situations can lead to civil war, characterizes Third World governments. In contrast, liberal democratic governments (i.e., in the First World) are generally much more stable; therefore they rarely find it necessary to employ state terrorism as a method of governance.
Proposition IV(i): A country with well established democratic institutions is less likely to employ state terrorism.

In the absence of a broad range of stable political parties to identify or be involved with, significant numbers of people become alienated from the political process. This can lead to the formation of widespread dissent and to the development of insurgency organizations. State authorities may in turn choose to take extraordinary measures and resort to unconventional tactics such as terrorism in order to gain control of the situation.

Proposition IV(ii): State terrorism is less likely to occur in countries where there is a wide range of stable political parties.

5. International Opposition

All other factors held constant, repressive regimes that are isolated from international media attention are likely to continue their actions with impunity. Human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and World Watch (and its various branches), as well as the electronic and print media industry can influence public awareness, which can result in organized political action at the international level. In concrete terms this can take the form of economic
sanctions - for example, the United Nations effort to isolate South Africa from the global community. While this kind of strategy can have a mitigating effect on the actions of a state terrorist regime, more often than not the effort is inconsistently applied and, therefore, has at best a moderate effect in reducing the level and intensity of state terrorism. In addition, inconsistencies can be identified with respect to which countries become the target of moral outrage. For example, while Western media and political attention was focused on the conduct of Eastern European countries - and more recently on the repressive actions of Saddam Hussein - the government of Indonesia has been committing atrocities on a massive scale in East Timor (Briere and Devaney, 1990; McGehee, 1990).

Proposition V: International attention can have a mitigating effect on the level and intensity of state terrorism.

6. Ethnicity  Ethnicity is an important structural precondition of state terrorism. The colonial subjugation of indigenous populations in the nineteenth century and the civil conflicts in post-colonial Africa and Asia are among the more notable examples. Among these various cases, a similar dynamic seems to shape the development of both anti-state and state terrorism. State terrorist practices appear to be common in regions where: (1) there is a high degree of ethnic
differentiation; and (2) the different political communities have a strong ethnic identification.

Proposition VI: State terrorism is positively correlated with ethnic differentiation and identification.

7. Ideology The secular ideologies of nationalism, Marxism, fascism, and even capitalism have all been used in one form or another to justify state terrorism. The influence of religious ideology on state terrorism is the most geographically specific. Muslim fundamentalist regimes, such the Iranian government under the leadership of the Ayatollah Khomeini (1982 - 1989), provide the clearest examples of how religious doctrine can facilitate state terrorism. Whether terrorism is used as a method of governance depends on the extent to which government leaders and representatives are willing to employ violent means in the furtherance of an ideological objective. This issue is elaborated in the following discussion of rational motives.

Proposition VII: State terrorism is positively correlated with the degree of ideological commitment among the individuals who control or represent the government.
8. Rational Motives

To understand the relationship between individual motives and state terrorism it is useful to distinguish between two levels of state authority: 1) motives of the most powerful government leaders (e.g., presidents and generals); and 2) motives of individuals in subordinate positions within the state bureaucracy.

The specific mechanisms involved in the decision making process are similar for both state and anti-state terrorism. The essential difference, obviously, is that the range of political strategies to choose from is different and includes both repressive and non-repressive measures.

Duvall and Stohl (1989) have developed a general theory of state terrorism which is able to explain the motives of political leaders in advanced industrial countries, socialist countries, and underdeveloped countries. Like the decision making model referred to earlier, their model assumes that decisions are based on a rational calculation of relative costs and benefits. As they explain:

[The Model] consists of three main elements: (1) the benefits, personally defined, that the actor would get from some desired state of affairs; (2) the actor's belief about the probability with which the desired state of affairs would be brought about if the actor were to engage in a particular action; and (3) the actor's belief about the probable costs, or negative consequences, that it would have to bear as a result of its engaging in that action.

A concept of expected reward, or expected utility, is defined from these three elements. It is $U_i = p_iB - C_i$,
where $U_i$ is expected utility from engaging in action $i$, $B$ is the benefit gotten from the desired state of affairs, $p_i$ is the believed probability with which action $i$ will bring about the desired state of affairs, and $C_i$ is the believed probable cost from engaging in action $i$ (36-37).

The probability that a state will engage in terrorism (represented as $i$) increases when $U_i$ is greater than $U_j$ where $j$ represents all alternative actions, including inaction. In other words, if terrorism is believed to be a more effective means of governing, then the government must estimate that it is superior to alternative means of eliminating threats to the integrity of state rule.\(^6\)

By applying this model to the Pinochet government of Chile (1973 - 1989), which routinely employed state terrorism as a method of governance, it is possible to speculate that it had the option of responding to opposition with either inaction or various forms of acquiescence. However, two factors worked against these alternatives, and may have influenced the decision to employ state terrorism: (1) the regime and its policies were clearly supported by the U.S. administration, and by the multi-national corporations who were providing financial backing; and (2) acceding to opposition demands could have seriously undermined the dominant position of military and economic elites.

Proposition VIII(i): Terrorism is a chosen political strategy if it is perceived to be more effective than alternatives in
eliminating or reducing perceived or actual challenges to government authority.

Despite the criticism that it anthropomorphizes the state, Duvall and Stohl's model helps explain the decision of government leaders to utilize state terrorism. However, the model explains very little about state terrorism in the context of decision making among individuals who are much lower in the state hierarchy (i.e., members of police, military, and para-military groups). In this respect, we need to understand why people are willing to engage in acts of extreme brutality against other citizens.

It is conceivable that there are some individuals within state terrorist organizations who are in some way mentally disordered (e.g., anti-social personality disorder); but it is equally, if not more, plausible that the social and cultural context has more to do with this kind of violent behavior (see Chapter 6). The promotion of violence towards real or perceived enemies of the state is an integral part of the culture of militaristic organizations. Moreover, blind obedience to authority is inculcated within such command structures and can explain the decision to act. This can partly account for the willingness of death squad members — who are often current or former members of the police or military — to engage in acts of torture and murder against government opponents. 8
**Proposition VIII(ii):** State terrorism is more likely to occur in countries where military bureaucracies are a pervasive component of the political culture.

9. **Historical Dimension**

a) **Historical Specificity.** As with anti-state terrorism, historical events can trigger the use and escalation of state terrorism. In the early 1970s, for example, the Tupemaros in Uruguay and the Monteneros in Argentina engaged in campaigns to kidnap prominent individuals. These actions triggered brutal responses from both the Argentinean and Uruguayan governments, and ultimately led to military takeovers (Sloan, 1983). Similar to anti-state terrorism, the presence of widespread civil conflict - either within the state, or in the vicinity - is often accompanied by state terrorism. For example, during the invasion and occupation of Lebanon in 1982, the Israeli forces routinely employed terrorist tactics, including torture and executions (Herman, 1982).

**Proposition IX(i):** A dramatic event such as a direct (and serious) challenge to state authority increases the likelihood of state terrorism.

**Proposition IX(ii):** The more widespread the incidence of civil conflict, the higher the likelihood of state terrorism.
b) Historical Trajectories. This encompasses the same factors as discussed previously in the anti-state terrorism model.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter began with an overview of the important ideological, political, economic and historical factors, and was followed by two analytic models, focusing on anti-state and state terrorism respectively. Given the inherent complexity of social reality - more specifically, the widely disparate conditions under which terrorism takes place - any attempt at theory construction must be subject to numerous qualifications. Despite this, the two models of terrorism incorporate the most prominent etiological factors. This chapter is intended to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of the substantive issues presented in the chapters that follow.
FOOTNOTES

1. The events and conflicts depicted in the figure are among the more historically relevant. This should not be considered a comprehensive inventory.

2. It is useful to refer to the work of Stohl and Lopez (1984) who define oppression as "a situation where social and economic privileges are denied to whole classes of people regardless of whether they oppose the authorities," and repression as "the use of coercion or the threat of coercion against opponents or potential opponents in order to prevent or weaken their capacity to oppose the authorities and their policies" (7).

3. However, as Jerrold Post argues, "terrorists do not lightly cease being terrorists" (1987:316). He notes that the survival of the organization is often the highest priority. The Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) (translated as: Freedom for the Basque Homeland), for example, has had over eighty per cent of its objectives met, yet persists as a terrorist organization.


5. As a recent article in The Economist enthusiastically stated: reform in many of the countries "makes Thatcherism seem timid" (The Economist, April 18th 1992, p.11, "Latin America cheers up").

6. As Duvall and Stohl acknowledge, nothing precludes the application of this model to anti-state terrorism.

7. However, not all acts of state terrorism are conducted (or facilitated) by individuals who are either part of or closely allied with the police and military. State terrorism can be facilitated by individuals working in groups that are much more on the periphery of state authority. In Guatemala, for example, many of the campesinos (who are often the targets of state terrorism) are organized into civil defense units. The intention is to ensure that the rural opposition is not able to organize politically by keeping them divided. If individuals refuse to participate in these organizations they become potential targets of the military (see Americas Watch Report, 1991). Clearly, under such conditions the fear of not complying with the authorities' demands is a powerful motivator to
participate, even though it may be in conflict with other interests.
In recent years ethnic nationalist conflicts have erupted in virtually every region of the world. In Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as the former country of Yugoslavia (to name a few) ethnic rivalries have descended into civil war. This phenomenon is also a fundamental aspect of the terrorist violence in places as diverse as South Africa, India, Ireland, and Quebec. Given the variety of conditions and settings that one finds such conflicts, is it possible to identify patterns that can explain the terrorism found in these and other similar examples?

As Giddens (1987) asserts, the ascendancy of industrial capitalism and the formation of the nation state were the two key factors in the development of modern social history. While in general this claim is widely supported, in terms of the more specific analysis of terrorism and other forms of political violence - particularly in a global context - it is useful to shift attention to the political dimensions of colonialism and how it intersects with the evolution of industrial capitalism and nation building.¹

These issues are highlighted in this chapter which begins with the advent of European expansionism. This is followed with a discussion of how the ensuing colonial structures contributed to both intra-state rivalries and anti-colonial

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movements. Next the discussion focuses on the decline of colonialism and how it was replaced (in the western hemisphere at least) by neo-imperialism, or more specifically, United States hegemony. The final section on Ireland deals more specifically with the historical context of the relationship between political control and anti-state terrorist violence.

**EUROPEAN EXPANSIONISM**

By the time the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) was signed vast regions of the world had been conquered and partitioned by European state powers - although the boundaries were to change in the late nineteenth century. While most European countries were at one time or another involved in colonial expansion, it was clear that the main rivals were France, Spain and Great Britain.

Because of the prevailing Euro-centric ideology (discussed in Chapter Four) the European occupiers were able to justify the treatment of occupied populations as socially and intellectually inferior. The doctrine of Manifest Destiny, together with political ambition and personal greed, enabled the pillage and destruction of indigenous cultures because of religious and ideological zeal (Wright, 1992).²

During the seventeenth century, the economic relationship between the home country and its colony was regulated by the principles of mercantilism. Under this model the colony was exploited for its resources, and in exchange military
protection, government administration and consumer goods were provided. A key assumption of mercantilism was that a nation's economy could grow only at the expense of others; therefore trade with other countries and colonies was restricted (Wilson, 1965). Gradually, however, the system broke down as the colonies found it more practical to trade among themselves; consequently, many products were smuggled across colonial boundaries. Political opposition emanating from either the colonists or the subjugated population was often brutally suppressed (Parry, 1971).

The growth of industrial capitalism throughout the 1800s greatly enhanced the military and technological power of the European nations. This enabled them to extend their political control over vast territories with large indigenous populations. In Africa, where previously there had been commercial outposts, the European countries now sent troops, commercial agents, administrators, bureaucrats, and missionaries. Mercantilist practices were extended into these areas as their raw materials were exploited and their populations became markets for European industrial products (Blaut, 1989). These relationships changed as colonies gained their political independence; however, economic dependence has continued to the present.
Intra-State Conflict

Although the economics of mercantilism were clearly a predisposing factor that led to many conflicts between the European powers and their respective colonies, a more serious and lasting problem stems from the arbitrary nature of the political boundaries demarcating many of the colonies. This issue is graphically illustrated by colonial developments in Africa during the nineteenth century. In this regard, one of the most significant political events was the 1885 Conference of Berlin in which, except for Ethiopia and Liberia, the entire continent of Africa was parcelled up. The British established control over territories in the west, as well as almost all of eastern and southern Africa. France took over areas north and south of the Sahara; Germany acquired territories on the Atlantic coast and on the Indian Ocean; Portugal extended its colonies of Angola and Mozambique towards the interior; and Belgium was given control over part of the Congo (now Zaire).

The partitioning of Africa by European powers was done in the interests of political and economic expediency; more specifically, the main considerations in establishing the colonial boundaries were to: (1) minimize territorial disputes, thus ensuring the efficient development of commercial and industrial activities; and (2) maximize the material benefits of the home countries. Because the inhabitants of the regions were looked upon as a resource to
be exploited, no concern was given to the cultural and ethnic boundaries of the indigenous populations (Parry, 1971).

The legacy of partitioning is evident throughout the African continent. Tribal groups that had been traditional adversaries were forced to coexist and compete for economic resources and political power within the same geo-political entity. Therefore, it is not surprising that such competition has intensified the hostility among tribal groups, which in many cases has descended into violent confrontation.

Much of the civil strife in Central Africa can be attributed to the above factors. The bitter civil war in Sudan, which began in 1982, is a graphic example. The northern provinces are largely populated by Arab Muslims who effectively control the government to the exclusion of other tribal groups. Under the leadership of General Omer Hassan Ahmed Al Bashir, government forces have attempted to impose Islamic law on tribal groups in the southern provinces which are mainly black, Christian or animist. Despite financial backing from Iran (20 million US to buy tanks and other military hardware), the army has failed to defeat insurgent forces (Manthorpe, 1992b). The main opponent of the government, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), controls much of the countryside in southern and western Sudan, and represents a coalition of Dinka and Nuer tribal groups. Recently, thousands of refugees have fled southern Sudan where dozens of individuals have been tortured or

Tribal conflicts have also characterized much of the political violence in South Africa. Although discussions between the African National Congress (ANC) and the South African government have resulted in progress towards abolishing the apartheid system, the carnage in the black townships has escalated.

The factional violence is partly a consequence of the traditional rivalry between the militant Zulu people of Natal province and the ANC, dominated mainly by people of Xhosas descent. The Xhosas were originally from the Eastern Cape region and have been historical adversaries of the Zulus, though there was never a major war between them. The Zulus, led by Chief Buthelezi, have been organized into the Inkatha party which claims a membership of two million people. In anticipation of political restructuring, Buthelezi has attempted to extend his influence in the Transvaal region - a move that has been accompanied by ruthless acts of terrorism.

However, as the Boipatong massacre in June 1992 demonstrates, the violence is more than simply a result of tribal hostilities. In this incident rampaging Zulu warriors viciously slaughtered 42 residents with guns, knives and machetes. There is ample evidence to suggest that the South African security forces provided logistical support for this and other massacres (Manthorpe, 1992a; Tomaselli, 1991). Angered by the "divide and rule" strategy of the South
African government, the ANC suspended bilateral constitutional discussions and launched a nation wide campaign of civil disobedience.

The above examples reveal how the structure of colonialism is related to current tribal conflicts in the African sub-continent, and how the conflicts can be exploited by state interests. In addition to fostering tribal violence, colonialism has been a key factor in the ongoing conflicts between the dominant European powers and subjugated populations. As mentioned, advances in industrial technology during the nineteenth century made it possible for colonial powers to extend their control and authority over large populations.

Anti-colonial Conflict

In India between 1848 and 1856, the British under Lord Dalhousie engaged in an accelerated policy of colonial expansionism and western modernization which intensified resentment of British rule among traditional groups and Indian elites. In 1857 mutineers in the British army led a violent anti-colonial campaign that lasted several months. Known as the Sepoy Rebellion, the uprising was brutally suppressed by the British in 1858. The British response exacerbated widespread feelings of distrust between the British and the Indian population that continued into the present century (Eldridge, 1984).
Throughout the late 1800s and the early part of this century the vast and powerful European empires went through a period of steady decline. Countries such as India eventually gained full political independence. Nonetheless, in many parts of the world hegemonic control continued, albeit in a different context. Nowhere is this more evident than in Latin America, where for most of the last two hundred years rebellion and revolution have characterized the political transformations of the region.

LATIN AMERICA: THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONTROL

The interminable political instability in Latin America is impossible to understand unless it is explained in the context of colonial and post-colonial economic and political structures. Thus it is useful to begin this section by contrasting the relationship between the Latin American colonies and Spain and Portugal with the relationship between the American colonies and England.

Unlike Spain and Portugal, by the mid 1700s England had established a limited number of democratic institutions and allowed its colonies a large measure of political autonomy. Consequently, certain English colonies, such as Canada and Australia, had many years of experience with limited self-government preceding independence. In contrast, Spain and Portugal at the time of colonialization were absolute monarchies and had no experience with pluralistic
representative government. Therefore, aside from a few exceptions, colonial self-government was anathema to the Latin American colonial systems (Skidmore and Smith, 1984).

The effects of colonial policies on Latin American society have endured to a remarkable degree. One of the more persistent legacies concerns the predominance of a rigid class structure combined with a semi-feudal land tenure system. This ensured that wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of elite minorities, while the peasantry were forced to subsist on marginal lands. To complicate matters, most of Latin American society comprised the following ethnic divisions: whites, Indians, mestizos (mixed Indian and Spanish) and descendants of African slaves. An important division existed between whites born in Spain (peninsulares) and whites born in the New World (creoles) (Skidmore and Smith, 1984).

Historically, class and ethnic divisions contributed to numerous violent conflicts and were an important factor in the discontent over colonialism. One of these rivalries was between the European-born whites and the creole class. To ensure loyalty to the crown, the Spanish monarchy appointed only Spanish born whites to administrative positions within the colonies. Because many of the creoles had inherited substantial land holdings they acquired the social status of a "New World nobility." Understandably they were extremely resentful of being excluded from political power. Moreover,
there were long standing economic grievances due to the rigid form of mercantilism practised by Spain. A third issue which fuelled the struggle towards independence was the widely held resentment at the severe restraints on personal liberty, particularly among the lower classes (Humphreys and Lynch, 1965).

With the Wars of Independence (1808 - 1830) the Spanish and Portuguese empires came to an end. It would be misleading to characterize this struggle as simply a contest between colonial and Spanish forces. In South America, for example, royalist factions recruited their troops from all social classes while the allegiance of the creole class was divided; and in Mexico the patriots enlisted large numbers of Indians and mestizos. For this reason the Wars of Independence could just as easily be described as "civil wars". The many class and ethnic cleavages contributed to a legacy of bitterness, dissension, and factionalism. Not surprisingly, elite groups had no desire to relinquish power; thus the struggle for independence was prolonged and bloody and resulted in widespread physical and economic devastation5 (Skidmore and Smith, 1984).

**From European Colonialism to U.S. Imperialism**

At the same time that European colonialism in Latin America during the nineteenth century was declining, the United States was gradually becoming a significant
international power. The policy behind this newly acquired role is represented in the "Monroe Doctrine" promulgated by President James Monroe in 1823. In general terms, the Doctrine was a declaration by the United States against the economic and political expansion of European influence in the Western Hemisphere, and became a fundamental component of U.S.-Latin American policy into the next century (Ronning, 1970). It is more than coincidental that the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine paralleled dramatic increases in commercial investment and industrial development—especially in Mexico and the Caribbean.

The Doctrine was ostensibly proclaimed to secure the freedom of the United States by preserving Latin American independence; however, over the course of its development it took on new meanings and interpretations. In essence, it became the basis for rationalizing political and economic control over the region. In 1904, for example, President Theodore Roosevelt assumed the role of exclusive judge over the welfare of Latin America and declared that:

Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power (cited in Skidmore and Smith, 984:304).

This statement signified a transformation in the Doctrine from
its original passive character to an active one that sanctioned the imperialistic policies of the United States in Latin America.

By vigorously adopting the "Big Stick" interpretation of the Doctrine, Woodrow Wilson probably violated the sovereign rights of more Latin American countries than any other president. This blatantly paternalistic attitude led him to send warships to bombard the Mexican port of Veracruz; send marines to Nicaragua, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic; and launch a military expedition into Mexico to intervene in the internal affairs of that country. Convinced that he was helping the "backward" countries of Central America and the Caribbean, Wilson proclaimed a policy of nonrecognition of revolutionary governments. Latin American governments were not to be recognized unless they had been formed along constitutional lines. In his words, the intention was to "show those Latins how to elect good men" (cited in Skidmore and Smith, 1984:350). United States policy may have been designed to end revolutionary activity in Latin America; however, it ignored the fact that revolution was a consequence of structural forces within Latin American politics, and further, that it was often the only reliable safeguard against perpetual despotism. In practice, the bellicose policies arising from the Monroe Doctrine resulted in the perpetuation of unpopular and authoritarian regimes that otherwise would likely have fallen.
The way in which the Monroe Doctrine was interpreted and applied has led to vociferous criticism by many Latin American leaders and intellectuals. In 1903 the Brazilian writer Eduardo Prado argued that the Doctrine had provided a convenient justification for U.S. aggression in Latin America, citing as evidence the annexation of Texas. Following Prado, numerous critics such as Jose Rodo of Uruguay, Jose Marti of Cuba, Ruben Dario of Nicaragua, and Carlos Pereyra of Mexico portrayed the Doctrine as an insidious mechanism that was employed by the United States to serve the interests of "Yankee imperialism" (Quintanilla, 1943:156; see also Nerval, 1934). These views were shared by a considerable number of Latin Americans, contributed to a tradition of intellectual dissent and has provided inspiration for a wide range of social and revolutionary movements. Many such oppositional groups became key players in the politics of Latin America during the 1960s and 70s, and, as discussed in Chapter Five, governments in Latin America have typically reacted to these developments with extreme forms of state terrorism.

So far, this chapter has focused on the relationship between the economic and political core (e.g., Europe and the United States) and the periphery (e.g., Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America). Because of the oppressive character of this relationship it is not surprising that this has spawned the development of many national liberation movements in the Third World. In many cases this has led to extreme
forms of state repression. However, there are countries that experience a high degree of terrorist violence that are not located within the clearly demarcated core-periphery scheme. Ireland is one such country which, according to Wallerstein's (1974) epistemological framework, can be placed within the "semi-periphery." Although it is clearly not part of the Third World, in terms of terrorist violence Ireland is an example of a county that has many of the same characteristics.

IRISH TERRORISM

One of the more enduring legacies of colonial rule concerns the bitter confrontation between the British government and the Irish Republican Army. Irish ethnicity can explain the persistence of IRA terrorism which has been the basis for both recruitment and support from the general population. Another factor, perhaps equally important, is a widely held sense of historical injustice under British rule. This, combined with historically specific events, is important in explaining the seemingly intractable malaise in Northern Ireland.

Terrorist violence in Ireland has its origin in the 12th century with the English conquest in the 12th century and the subsequent lordship of Henry II. This occupation began the long tradition of colonial repression and violent nationalist resistance. During the reign of the Tudor monarchs the English Crown expanded its territorial control by
appropriating land for English subjects. Later, under Henry VIII, attempts were made to convert the largely Catholic population to Protestantism - a move that was strongly resisted by both native Irish Catholics and "Old English" settlers. Because of this, Catholicism became strongly associated with Gaelic Ireland and opposition to English rule. Throughout the seventeenth century Irish resistance continued with an Irish uprising against the Protestant regime of Charles I. The English, under Oliver Cromwell, reacted with an extremely vindictive and repressive campaign against Irish Catholics which was followed by widespread confiscation of Irish land. Near the end of the century, after the Battle of Boyne in 1690, a series of draconian laws were enacted that deprived Catholics of legal, social, political and economic power, and severely restricted their ability to practice their religion (Beckett, 1966). These events demonstrate that by the end of the seventeenth century the lines of conflict between Catholics and Protestants had become clearly established.

In addition to the continuous pattern of repressive events and legal persecution, economic factors are important to consider. Although Belfast and Dublin matured as industrial and commercial centres during the late eighteenth century (leading to the development of an urban middle class), British mercantilist policies continued to promote economic dependency. England became both a major competitor for the
Irish linen industry and the main market for Irish agricultural products. Thus the perception was created (mostly among the Irish middle class) that the regulations were unjust as they favoured English industry at the expense of the Irish industry (Corrado and Evans, 1988).

The growing British economic and political domination led to resentment and hostility among Irish Catholics. This materialized into a rebellion by a revolutionary republican organization called the United Irishmen which was promptly quashed by British forces. The English by enacting the 1801 Act of Union of Ireland and England - which abolished the Irish Parliament - consolidated their power. Many Protestants felt that their interests were better represented in a United Kingdom with a large Protestant minority than they would otherwise be as a small minority in an independent Ireland. The Irish Catholics, on the other hand, viewed the Act of Union as an imperialistic policy decision by the British; consequently, there were demands to re-establish the Irish Parliament (Beckett, 1966).

By the early 1800's considerable numbers of Catholics immigrated into the Belfast area. Between 1800 and 1830, the ratio of Protestants to Catholics decreased from ten to one to three to one (Rose, 1972). The Protestant working class perceived that their interests were threatened by the rapidly growing Catholic community.

The economic strain between Catholics and Protestants was
exacerbated by the Great Famine of the mid-1800s, an event which had a profound impact on Irish society. Between 1845 and 1849 one and a half million people left the country and an estimated 800,000 died (Edwards and Williams, 1957). Many Irish nationalists were deeply angered over what they perceived to be the British government's grossly inadequate relief efforts, and, more importantly, the policy of maintaining the same level of agricultural exports to England throughout the duration of the famine.

The Great Famine is undoubtably one of the most pivotal event in Irish history - particularly with respect to insurgent violence. The actions (and inactions) of the British, which left the Irish population bitter and frustrated, inspired a former parliamentarian named Smith O'Brien to form an ad hoc organization to fight British policies. O'Brien believed in equal status for both Protestants and Catholics, and advocated peaceful means to achieve this end; however, many of his followers favoured violence. Because of his political activism, a warrant was issued for his arrest. A squadron of police was sent to the village of Ballingarry where a skirmish known as the "battle of the Widow MacCormick's cabbage garden" ensued. O'Brien and his close companions managed to escape, some of them fleeing to France to form the Irish Republican Brotherhood, while the remainder departed to the United States to form an affiliate group known as the Fenian Brotherhood. Both groups vowed to
eventually return to Ireland to fight for independence through a campaign of guerrilla warfare. Due mainly to the counter-insurgency efforts of the police, the military objectives of the insurgents were largely unsuccessful. However, by the early 1900s they had evolved into an organization known as the Irish Volunteers, a group that was a direct precursor of the IRA (Bell, 1974).

The extreme and violent polarization of Irish politics is a key factor in explaining much of the terrorism that was to occur in the years to follow. Despite attempts to resolve the problem through peaceful political means, most notably the division of Ireland in 1921 into an Irish free state in the south and a British ruled Northern Ireland, the structural conditions facilitating terrorism have ensured its continued existence. British policies of economic discrimination and political repression have engendered a profound sense of historical injustice among many Irish Catholics. Given the systemic nature of the conflict, it is not surprising that some individuals choose terrorism as a means to redress those injustices.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has discussed the importance of European colonialism and U.S. imperialism in facilitating and sustaining both state and anti-state terrorism. More specifically, the relationship between mercantilism as an
early form of economic control and later colonial rebellions was examined. As well, discussion focused on the partitioning of the African continent by the major European powers and its relationship to the current political violence. Similarly, in the discussion of Latin America a number of structural factors were identified that have implications for the violent politics of this century. Importantly, as both the Spanish and Portuguese governments were absolute monarchies and had no experience with democratic principles, similar forms of governing and administration were transported to the colonies and continued through to the present era. In addition, the policies of U.S. governments towards Latin America, particularly since the Monroe Doctrine was pronounced in 1823, have been regarded by many Latin Americans as self-serving and paternalistic. This perception is substantiated by the U.S. history of military aggression against sovereign Latin American states, and has contributed to widespread criticism of both the policies of the United States and the many authoritarian regimes which have benefited from those policies. Finally, attention focused on how the ethnic-nationalist strife in Ireland is related to the perception that the Irish people have been the victims of discriminatory economic and political policies imposed by the British government.

From this discussion a number of recurring themes can be identified. At the most fundamental level, there exists a
vast power disparity between the controlling power and the controlled population, which is evident in the domination of economic resources, and oppressive political policies. Often, however, these are not sufficient determinants of political terrorism. What is usually required is a dramatic event or series of events, which invariably involve violent aggression by the dominant power and can provide the catalyst for political violence. The final theme alluded to in this chapter pertains to the sense of injustice experienced by many people living under oppressive regimes. This theme will be explored in Chapter Four which examines how the development of political ideologies has influenced the social reaction to repressive political and economic policies.
FOOTNOTES

1. The integrated study of colonialism as an historical trajectory invokes Wallerstein's (1974) "world system" theory, which, among other things, provides a spatial categorization of global power. In short, this scheme is broken down into: (1) The Core. This refers to the centre of political and economic power - or more specifically the European powers; (2) The Periphery. This comprises the former colonies which now make up most of the underdeveloped world (e.g., most of Latin America and Africa; and (3) The Semi-periphery. This category includes countries and regions such as Ireland, the Balkans, and Quebec. These distinctions, when integrated with historical inquiry (as Wallerstein recommends), provide a useful framework for the analysis of the relationship between controllers and controlled and how political violence can result.

2. Wright's book, Stolen Continents, is written mainly from the perspective of pre-colonial cultures in the Western Hemisphere (e.g., the Mayans, Incans, North American Natives), and documents the unrelenting destruction of their cultures. See also Miguel Leon-Portilla's book The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico, Boston. Beacon Press 1961.

3. John Rex (1973) developed a version of the "divide and rule" strategy in which he argues that racist ideologies combined with class struggle are reflected in the allocation of scarce resources. Although his theory focuses on the decaying inner cities of Britain it seems to apply equally to the broader geographic context in South Africa. The topic of ethnocentric ideology and its relationship to terrorism is explored in Chapter Four.


5. Importantly, the Spanish monarchs maintained a policy of non-recognition for many years following the Wars, and had ambitions to reassert control over some of their lost territories.

6. It is somewhat ironic that O'Brien was from a protestant family.

7. These events led to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), a group that was to evolve into the Ulster
Defence Association, the protestant counterpart of the IRA.
CHAPTER FOUR
IDEOLOGICAL ANTECEDENTS OF TERRORISM

This chapter examines two separate aspects of the relationship between ideology and terrorism in terms of: (1) the direct influence that specific action oriented ideologies have in motivating political action and terrorism; and (2) the indirect preconditioning influence of certain ideologies.

Because there are so many definition of ideology (some of them contradictory) it is important to first establish how the term is used. This is followed by an account of how the Eurocentric world view that gradually unfolded in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries facilitated the colonial subjugation of non-European cultures. From here the focus shifts to the ideas of the Enlightenment and the dramatic influence this period had on the nature of subsequent political action. These ideas are historically contiguous with the major political revolutions - i.e., the French, American, and Russian revolutions. Therefore, the importance of these events in preconditioning revolutionary violence (of which terrorism is a specific form) over time and space is discussed.

THE CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY

Since its inception in the late eighteenth century,¹ the term "ideology" has taken on a wide range of meanings and
interpretations. For example, it has been conceptualized narrowly (and conservatively) as idea systems that promote the subversion of liberal-capitalist institutions (e.g., Shils, 1968; Minogue, 1984); and broadly as a ubiquitous phenomenon that extends beyond specific sets of ideas to include intangible networks of power (e.g., Foucault, 1977). Because of this disparity the most useful definition is one that is very general in its constitutive elements. For this reason the definition provided by Plamenatz is a useful starting point. He refers to ideology as "a set of closely related beliefs, or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community" (1970:15).

While this general definition is useful in threading together the term's numerous and often conflicting connotations, its value in helping explain the relationship between ideas and terrorism is limited. Therefore, it is more useful to discuss the way that ideas, beliefs, and values are theoretically linked to the decision to commit terrorist violence. In this regard there are two sub-types of ideology that are most relevant.

First of all, ideology, whether it is religious or secular, functions as a structural precondition of political terrorism. In this context it is closely linked to the socio-political culture of a particular society. In this sense ideology has a universalizing and naturalizing effect on social life making the propositions contained therein appear
self-evident. Through a number of communicative mechanisms (e.g., the mass media) the interests of powerful groups are promoted and maintained (Herman and Chomsky, 1988), thus enabling them to carry out a specific agenda. For example, the colonial policies of genocide (particularly in the western hemisphere) were conditional on the Euro-centric world view. A more recent example of how this works can be found in the way that powerful interests in the United States during the Reagan era invoked the fear of communist invasion in order to promote and maintain a policy of political and economic destabilization against Nicaragua.

The second category of ideology refers more explicitly to a set of action oriented beliefs and values which have a clear political focus, and for the purpose of this thesis include violence within their propositional form. These are often contiguous with organizations such as political parties and movements. Examples include: fascism, anarchism (especially as espoused by Bakunin), Leninism, and the ideas of Marighela.

The practical viability of both types of ideology, whether they represent dominant or oppositional interests, requires some degree of legitimation. Without this, coherent political action (conventional or unconventional, violent or peaceful) would not be possible.

What needs to be understood, however, are the mechanisms through which ideology inculcates legitimating beliefs, values, and ideas. As John B. Thompson (1984:4) states, it is
useful to study "the ways in which meaning (and signification) serves to sustain relations of domination." Thus it is important to examine not only the material conditions of social life (e.g., economic oppression, political repression, etc.), but also the signifiers, utterances, and narratives where such ideas reside. The epistemological value of this latter semiological approach is evident when one examines the historical relationship between colonial subjugation and the European intellectual community. Moreover, ideological discourse was also a factor in the historical unfolding of the student movement and its relationship near the end to political terrorism (this is discussed in Chapter 5).

The continuum from material conditions to ideas to discursive expressions extends further into the decision making mechanisms that lead to violent action in general, and terrorism in particular. These psychological factors are integrated into both models (i.e., "rational motivation" variables) and are explored in more detail in the final chapter.

EUROCENTRISM: THE IDEOLOGY OF RACIAL AND CULTURAL DOMINATION

The promotion of racial and cultural superiority, combined with the paternalistic belief that it was the white race's moral duty to civilize the "inferior" races, were contributing factors in the colonial subjugation of indigenous people throughout the world. Racial ideology is also
structurally significant in that it justified European colonial and capitalist expansion on a global scale (Cox, 1970).

The portrayal of non-whites as culturally, biologically, and morally inferior has a long tradition in European thought. This is exemplified in the discourse of authors such as Rudyard Kipling who reinforced the contention that it was the mission of European whites to civilize and "cleanse" the non-European world. The following excerpt from Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden" written in 1899 makes this amply clear:

Take up the White Man's burden -  
Send Forth the best ye breed -  
Go bind your sons to exile  
To serve your captives' need;  
To wait in heavy harness  
On fluttered folk and wild -  
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,  
Half devil and half child.

The paternalism expressed in the above passage is the product of an intellectual orientation that is represented in disciplines as diverse as literature, history, anthropology, linguistics, and biology. Edward Said (1979), in his book *Orientalism*, argues that the authoritative knowledge produced by the European intellectual community served to perpetuate the belief that non-Europeans were innately inferior, thus facilitating policies of political domination.

The relationship between the ideas of intellectuals and the rationalization of political subjugation is evident when
one considers the influence of the biological sciences in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The Darwinian thesis of natural selection, in particular, had a direct and enduring influence on sociological theory, most notably the development of racial theory (Trilling, 1955). By the late nineteenth century the crude distinctions among races, cultures, and languages were being promoted by academics as ontological truths. Moreover, these distinctions were usually conceptualized hierarchically, with white European culture at the apex and non-European races and cultures assigned an inferior status (Greene, 1981).

Racial theory, together with the belief in the natural progress of civilization, the technical and economic superiority of industrial capitalism, and the destiny of white races, were important factors in the promotion of Europe's dominion over the rest of humanity. This world view provided moral justification for the violent oppression of many indigenous populations. For example, at the same time that the United States government was espousing its message of universal suffrage, in its relentless expansion westward it was able to articulate a policy of extreme brutality - at times involving genocide - towards Native Indians (Brown, 1970; Wright, 1992). Racial theory was also a key element of fascist ideology which developed in Europe in the 1920s and 30s. This will be covered in more detail in Chapter Five.

Euro-centric ideology, as well as the material conditions
of political and cultural domination that resulted, became a target of anti-colonial discontent and translated into the discourse of Third World counter-ideology (e.g., Fanon, 1968). Furthermore, this contributed to the ongoing dialectic of resistance and repression.

FROM IDEAS TO REVOLUTIONARY ACTION

As with the preceding discussion, to appreciate the importance of action oriented ideological constructs and their relationship to political terrorism it is essential to examine historical origins. More specifically, these ideologies have their genesis in the Enlightenment - a time that can best be described as the fountainhead of modern political thought. In this sense, this period presaged the explicit ideological doctrines that were to find expression in party politics by the end of the nineteenth century.

The Enlightenment

Perhaps the most influential forerunner of the Enlightenment - particularly in terms of the evolution of liberalism - was the seventeenth century British empiricist John Locke. His distrust of traditional political institutions and his promotion of "natural rights" is summed up in the following statement:

Whenever that end [i.e., natural rights] is manifestly neglected or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited and the power devolve into the hands of those
that gave it, who may place it anew where they think for their safety and security (1952:84).

It is easy to understand how the core idea expressed in this statement - that it is morally justifiable to use violence against rulers who govern unjustly - was a factor in the decision to take up arms among later opposition movements. In particular, Locke's views had an important influence on both the French and American revolution.

Influenced by Locke's liberalism, both Voltaire and Montesquieu believed that the ideals of individual freedom and social progress could be accomplished by reforming the Ancien Regime as opposed to dismantling it. Montesquieu's ideas in particular had a lasting impact on the organizational structure of pluralist democracy. One of his most important recommendations concerned the separation of powers within government - into the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary - as a check on despotism and inefficiency. Later, this idea was adopted, in modified form, by the writers of the United States Constitution and has served as a model for governments throughout the world (Bailyn, 1967).

In addition to the vociferous critiques of traditional political institutions, the eighteenth century was a time when traditional economic relationships and practices were being re-examined. The Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith through his book Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of
the Wealth of Nations (1976), had a profound and lasting impact on Western economic development. Smith argued that improvements in the human condition could best be achieved through the promotion of material growth and economic self-interest. The individual pursuit of wealth would stimulate economic production and resource development, which in turn would expand the marketplace and increase prosperity among the population (i.e., the "invisible hand") (Heilbroner and Thurow, 1987).

Smith was an outspoken critic of the restrictive policies of mercantilism. He believed that state control of commerce and the regulation of labour and production were anathema to the goal of national prosperity. The underlying assumption of mercantilism - namely, that goods and resources are in scarce supply - was also challenged. The natural world, as Smith perceived it, was an unlimited expanse of physical resources that demanded exploitation for the benefit of humankind. This idea is one of the fundamental assumptions upon which industrial capitalism is founded, and remained largely unchallenged prior to the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1980s (Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1990). More specifically, it was also a major factor in propelling the industrial expansion and resource exploitation of the developing world. Interestingly, the growth of industrial capitalism, together with a modified version of mercantilism (e.g., the practices of multinational cartels), has led to the
structural economic oppression and the protracted political violence that is endemic to most of the Third World. Throughout most of its history, for example, the United States government has been determined to maintain free-market economies in the Western Hemisphere, even if it means promoting and perpetuating violent state repression (Herman, 1982).

Although the major thrust of Enlightenment discourse focused on exalting the virtues of individualism, a notable exception can be found in the collectivist ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The key idea of Rousseau's political theory was that the common good should be determined by the collective "general will" of society, rather than by self interest. Obedience to this principle was an essential aspect of the social contract and the maintenance of human freedom. Rousseau went so far as to state (rather paradoxically) that anyone in conflict with the general will must be "forced to be free." Because of its amorphous quality, determining exactly what constitutes the general will in empirical terms is highly problematic and open to a wide range of interpretations (Chapman, 1968).

Rousseau believed that people are altruistic by nature and that it is the traditional institutions of society that corrupt and inhibit the development of moral virtues. He was especially critical of what he saw as the decadence of the Ancien Regime, and unless there was a dramatic restructuring
of all aspects of social life moral progress was not possible (Cassirer, 1989). As discussed below, Rousseau's pedagogical program, together with politically expedient interpretations of the concept of "general will," were central factors in the wholesale bloodletting that characterized the French Revolution.

The French Revolution

In many places the relationship between ideas and political action is often obscured or subordinated by other factors. This is clearly not the case with the French Revolution (1789-95) where the doctrines of Montesquieu and Rousseau defined the cognitive world of the revolutionaries. As Norman Hampson (1986:49) states:

As practising politicians they often took whatever action seemed appropriate to a particular tactical situation and then decorated it with a suitable ideological gloss. It is none the less true that their conception of their goals was derived from the works of the two theorists. To that extent, ideology helped to determine political choices as well as to justify those already made.

In the early years of the Revolution there was an attempt to accommodate Montesquieu's liberal pluralism (i.e., the view that good government should represent the competing interests of society) with Rousseau's belief that legitimate government must reflect the general will of society (i.e., what is best for society, and not necessarily what its individual members wanted). However, within a few years the leaders of the
Revolution found themselves inexorably drawn in the direction of Rousseau. What began as a set of principles designed to promote the common good became in practice an intellectual justification for state tyranny. Perhaps because of its nebulous quality, the general will became increasingly restricted to influential factions operating within the governing establishment. One of the most powerful of these factions was the Committee of Public Safety, which emerged out of the National Assembly in the later stages of the Revolution as a response to the perception that the state was in danger from external and internal threats. Under the direction of Maximilien de Robespierre, a member of the Jacobins (an extremist faction), the twelve member Committee set out to transform Rousseauist ideology into action; moreover, it became a vehicle for developing and directing terror as an instrument of the state. All opposition to the Committee's policies and directives was considered a transgression against the general will and was therefore immoral. If it had simply been a case of repressing dissent, the violence would likely have been less extensive. However, because Robespierre and other Rousseauists believed that the old regime had corrupted the entire French population, social engineering on a massive scale was required (Greer, 1951). Members of the aristocracy, for example, were summarily executed simply because they were aristocrats; further, since it was necessary to regenerate the entire society, Robespierre enacted a policy of compulsory
education whereby young children were taken from their parents and institutionalized until their twenty-first birthday.

A crucial point is that although Robespierre and the Committee resorted to physical force and terrorism as a method of enforcing compliance, such measures had never been advocated by Rousseau. Thus the French Revolution provides a clear illustration of the distortion between ideas and social practice. More specifically, it shows how ideology can be interpreted in such a way as to provide moral justification for the use of terrorism.

Marxism and Praxis

While the historical resilience of Rousseau's collectivist ideology must be recognized, more than any other political theorist the ideas of Karl Marx have had the most far reaching and lasting influence on revolutionary action and terrorism. As with Rousseauist ideology, Marxism has been interpreted, elaborated, and transformed to accommodate different political, social and cultural exigencies.

Historically, Lenin's contribution to the transformation and elaboration of Marxist thought is the most profound. In addition, the Third World revolutionary ideologies of Mao Tse Tung, Regis Debray, Che Guevara, and Carlos Marighela (to mention a few), as well as the politics of the New Left, have been inspired by Marxism (these ideas are discussed in Chapter 5). However, unanswered in the discussion so far is the
question why terrorist violence is a chosen strategy in the pursuit of revolutionary objectives. A partial explanation can be found by contrasting the ideas of Marx with his nemesis Bakunin.

**Anarchism**

Anarchists, like Marxists, believe the capitalist state is an oppressive, immoral institution that serves the economic interests of a privileged minority at the expense of the interests of the majority. What distinguishes anarchism from Marxism, however, is the premise that the abolition of the state is a necessary precondition for a free and just society (Pyziur, 1968).

This distinction is evident in the views of Bakunin, an early proponent of anarchist thought who was active in the 1870s. Bakunin rejected Marx's argument that the economic and political structures of industrial society must be captured and controlled by the proletariat in order to ensure the "withering away of the state." He claimed that even the most dedicated revolutionaries would inevitably succumb to the corrupting influence of power and privilege (Dolgoff, 1972). Accordingly, the objective of revolution was the complete annihilation of the state. As Rubenstein (1987:148) notes:

For Bakunin . . . revolutionary violence is not simply an ugly necessity, an instrument the lower classes must use to conquer state power; it is a liberating force, creative in direct proportion to its destructiveness, through which divided individuals and societies become
Bakunin and his followers believed in a natural tendency toward group solidarity and social harmony. Therefore, once the state was destroyed it would be replaced by the spontaneous formation of self-governing associations which would satisfy both economic and social needs.

Anarchism developed a following mainly in the countries of southern and eastern Europe; this was because in these regions the repressive tendencies of the state were most pronounced and traditions of communalism were strongest. During the Russian Revolution, for example, a peasant movement led by the anarchist Nestor Mahkno attempted to seize power in the Ukraine. A short lived experiment with anarchism occurred during the Spanish Civil War (1936 – 1939) in the region of Catalonia (Bookchin, 1977).

In addition to the obvious Marxist influences, anarchist ideology inspired many of the urban and rural terrorist groups of the 1960s and 1970s. Groups such as the Red Brigade, the Weather Underground, and the Baader-Meinhoff Gang all advocated the complete destruction of the state and its established institutions before a revolutionary society could emerge.

IDEOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE

The convergence of ideologies - whether it is Marxism and
Anarchism (e.g., the ideas of Marighela), or conservatism and capitalism (e.g., Thatcherism) - raises an important point. Although the ideologies presented in this thesis are often portrayed as conceptual entities, in practice there is a considerable amount of integration. This is illustrated in the following discussions of: (1) nationalism and its relevance in the Latin American Wars of Independence; and (2) liberation theology. Both ideologies have been associated with violent politics (including terrorism) - in the case of the former this relationship has often been explicit, while with the latter violent action is more peripheral.

Nationalism

The global resurgence of nationalism in recent years is one of the most noteworthy ideological developments. In practice it is often inseparable from an identification with one's ethnicity - as evident in both Irish and Quebecois nationalism. In this sense it has been a unifying factor in inspiring some groups and individuals to commit acts of terrorism (this has been previously discussed in Chapter One). However, as an ideological force nationalism - especially in the modern era - encompasses more than ethnicity. After all, neither Canadian nor U.S. nationalism, is in any way associated with a particular ethnic group. Thus nationalism could be broadly defined as an expression of a people's consciousness of shared history, language, and values
However, it could be argued that this ideological account fails to recognize the illusory character of nationalistic sentiments (Gramsci, 1971).

One of the first modern manifestations of nationalism developed in the aftermath of the French Revolution. Although the Revolution began as a struggle against the Ancien Regime, it ended as a war against foreign aggression (Hobsbawm, 1969). With Napoleon in power (1804 - 1814), the French empire expanded across Europe. National solidarity became a rallying cry as other nations fought back in opposition to French imperialism. Under the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the German states were united into a strong political entity (Waller, 1985). By the beginning of the 1900s, nationalism had become a powerful ideological force. In this century the rise of German, Italian and Spanish fascism was closely associated with an extreme expression of nationalist sentiments.

Throughout this century nationalism has developed into a powerful anti-colonial force. The Vietnam War, for example, originated as a confrontation between French colonial forces and Vietnamese nationalists (Kagan et al. 1987). Nationalism continues as a precondition of political violence in many parts of the world. It was a fundamental factor in the devolution of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian state.

*Revolution in Latin America*
Enlightenment liberalism, Marxist ideology, as well as the examples of the efficacy of the American and French revolutions, had a direct influence on national liberation movements of both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As Dunn (1972:232) argues:

Revolutions belong to a tradition of historical action in the strong sense that virtually all revolutions in the present century have imitated - or at least set out to imitate as best they could - other revolutions of an earlier date.

In Latin America, this tradition began with Simon Bolívar who led a military campaign to remove the colonial presence in South America and attempted to unite the region into one political entity.

Bolívar was well acquainted with Enlightenment thought - in particular, the ideas of Rousseau and Voltaire. Although he opposed the injustices inherent in colonial rule, he distrusted the masses, believing they were not educated enough to make sound political decisions. He reasoned, therefore, that representative government was not appropriate for the people of Latin America (Belaunde, 1967).

Factionalist politics frustrated Bolívar's attempt to unite Spanish South America; however, he was successful in overthrowing royalist forces throughout most of the region and was one of the key figures in precipitating the move from European imperialism towards full independence. Perhaps Bolívar's most important contribution to revolutionary
politics in Latin America can be measured in symbolic terms. Discontented Latin Americans perceived Bolivar as someone who was willing to take up arms in the name of social justice. In the minds of later generations of revolutionaries, especially during the twentieth century, he became revered as the "Liberator" of a continent (Marquez, 1991).

One such revolutionary was Augusto Sandino, an ardent Nicaraguan nationalist who in the late 1920s followed Bolivar's example by waging a guerrilla campaign against U.S. intervention and Nicaraguan collaborators. A decade earlier, the U.S. marines had been sent into Nicaragua to impose economic and social stability, and to protect American interests. Even after the U.S. Marines left the country, Sandino continued his campaign to remove what was considered to be a corrupt regime. Sandino was eventually murdered by the Nicaraguan National Guard, a creation of the U.S. government. It is worth noting that the head of the National Guard at the time was Anastasio Somoza Garcia, an ambitious and ruthless tyrant. Later, in 1937, Somoza became president, thus inaugurating the beginning the notorious Somoza family regime which was to last over forty years (Walker, 1991).

While the oligarchy and the emerging bourgeois class benefited under the Somozas, widespread corruption (particularly after the 1972 earthquake) ensured that the vast majority of the population remained destitute. Opposition to the status quo was met with repression, thus generating
further resentment and social unrest. The assassination of opposition leader Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in 1978 was enough to trigger nationwide uprisings resulting in civil war. By using guerrilla and terrorist tactics, the main insurgent group, the FSLN (which later became synonymous with the Sandinistas), overthrew the Somoza government and set up a broad based coalition government. Soon after taking office in 1979, the Sandinistas introduced a package of extensive social reforms in areas such as health care, education, and land tenure, within the framework of a mixed economy. Within a few years the Sandinistas' social and economic reforms were subverted by a C.I.A. sponsored destabilization campaign, and more importantly, a bloody "proxy" war (Petras, 1986). The brutal terrorist tactics of the Contras eventually contributed to the electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in 1990.

The Nicaraguan revolution, like its predecessor the Cuban revolution, was viewed by the Reagan Administration as a dangerous precedent. Allowing it to succeed would signal to opposition groups throughout Latin America that it was possible to change the material conditions of social life. Therefore, the United States were determined to expend enormous resources in order to defeat the Sandinistas. In an effort to generate the necessary domestic political support for the Contra war, the U.S. administration, pro-state intellectuals, and the mass media typically characterized the Sandinistas as totalitarian Marxists. In contrast, according
to right wing intellectuals, the United States was motivated by a highly principled ideal: the desire to "export democracy" to the developing world (see Herman and Chomsky, 1988 for a counter argument).

Liberation Theology

The Sandinista revolution, although strongly influenced by Marxist ideology, had a significant theological component. Many leaders within the Catholic Church, after having witnessed many of the atrocities inflicted on the Nicaraguan people, became outspoken critics of the Somoza regime. Because of his condemnation of the Somoza government, the Catholic theologian and poet Ernesto Cardinal was considered a dangerous enemy of the state. After having watched all of the buildings of his community burned to the ground in 1977, Cardinal decided to join the FSLN in the belief that non-violent struggle was hopeless in Nicaragua (Lernoux, 1982).

The sentiments expressed by Cardinal and other Catholic theologians were part of a wider ideological movement known as liberation theology, which had first gained prominence at the 1968 meeting of the Council of Latin American Bishops in Medellin, Colombia. According to the conference, Christ's mission on Earth was to "liberate all men (sic) from . . . hunger, oppression and ignorance . . . from the injustice and hatred which have their origin in human selfishness" (Gutierrez, 1973). The growth of liberation theology can also
be attributed to the Church's direct involvement, both pastorally and socially, workers, the peasantry and the poor in Latin America. This led to a critical awareness of the conditions of social, economic and political oppression. As Michael Dodson writes (1980:42):

In the early 1960's . . . as the Church seemed to be losing contact with the masses, particularly in the cities, bishops in many dioceses supported a plan for parish priests to take employment in factories and workshops in order to get closer to working people, [and] gain a better understanding of their needs. . . . For most worker-priests direct involvement was a profoundly unsettling experience. They soon realized that the Church was alienated from the poor, and they began to see religion and social order from a Marxian lens. Their church appeared as an agent of pacification and cooptation in the absence of any effort to change or draw attention to the real life situation of the poor and the structural causes of their plight.

Although most of the movement's leaders advocate a non-violent strategy for reform, there is considerable support for the view that violence is an acceptable response to violent oppression. At the Medellin Conference over 900 priests and bishops endorsed the following statement:

We cannot condemn an oppressed people when it finds itself obliged to use force to liberate itself . . . under no circumstance should the unjust violence of the oppressors, who maintain this odious system, be compared with the just violence of the oppressed (cited in Taylor, 1989).

Furthermore, the direct involvement of Church workers in social reform (e.g., developing health and educational programs) gave the peasantry, the working-class, and the poor
- many of whom had previously accepted their plight - a sense of autonomy over their own circumstances. This inevitably contributed to the growth of popular movements, and to demands for socioeconomic change and social justice.

The response of many of the governments in the region was predictably brutal and uncompromising. Over the last twenty years, bishops, priests, and church lay people have been the victims of state sponsored intimidation, torture, and killing. In El Salvador, the assassination of Archbishop Romero in March 1980 and the murder of four American women church workers later that year provide graphic examples. The El Salvador government had correctly perceived the influence of liberation theology as a threat to the status-quo, and considered it a national security problem. For example, a series of anonymous pamphlets circulating in the late 1970s had the words: "Be a patriot, kill a priest" (Lernoux, 1982:76).6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In order to understand the link between the material conditions of oppression and political terrorism it is important to examine ideology. Moreover, such an analysis must be historically contextualized. With this in mind, an understanding of the ideological underpinnings of European colonial expansion and the subjugation of non-Europeans is a useful starting point. Intellectual discourse designating the
European races as biologically and culturally superior made it possible to oppress and exploit (often violently) indigenous populations. This led dialectically to the growth of popular insurgent movements, and to the use of terrorism (by both governments and opposition groups) throughout much of the colonial (and later the post-colonial) world.

In broad historical terms, the source of much of the ideological ferment can be traced to the nascent ideologies of the Enlightenment. The political ideologies that were spawned during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dramatically influenced the major political upheavals and revolutions. The relationship, however, is not always straightforward - in practice, ideology becomes either modified or distorted. In the case of the French Revolution, we discussed how the ideological doctrine of Rousseau, one of the leading Enlightenment thinkers, became distorted in the interest of political expediency, and used to justify terrorism. Similar factors can be found in the development of the Russian Revolution (discussed in Chapter 5).

The convergence of different ideological formations was illustrated in the discussions of nationalism and liberation theology. An important point to underscore is the historical tenacity of nationalist ideology which was (and continues to be) a key variable in the anti-colonial rebellions and wars. Turning to Latin America, it was noted how nationalist ideology is sustained from one historical era to the next.
For example, Simon Bolivar became revered as a hero by many twentieth century advocates of national liberation. In fact the Sandinistas movement acquired its name from Augusto Sandino, the insurgent rebel of the 1920s and 30s (English, 1985).

The discussion of liberation theology emphasizes the transformative character of ideology. A hybrid of Christian doctrine and Marxist interpretation, liberation theology has advocated social justice for the poor and oppressed in Latin America. The more radical among its proponents accept political violence as a means to change the structural conditions of oppression.

Despite the pronouncements of liberal-capitalist ideologues such as Daniel Bell (1960) and Francis Fukuyama (1989) ideology continues to be an important political force - notably, as a precursor of terrorism and other forms of political violence. The protracted political conflicts associated with ethnic-nationalist terrorism - for example, in both Ireland and the Middle East - assure that it will be around for some time. As well, right-wing vigilante terrorism (involving neo-Nazi groups, and other racist organizations) has established roots throughout Europe and the United States (Ridgeway, 1991). Finally, despite the end of the Cold War, the violent ideological struggle for power and control between Third World insurgent movements and state authority continues.
1. The term was originated by Destutt de Tracy in 1795 to denote the study of ideas; however, within 50 years its meaning was transformed to refer to the ideas themselves.

2. These categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, capitalist ideology as an overarching system of ideas is often explicitly represented in the ideas of political parties (e.g., the conservative party).

3. In their book The German Ideology (1970) Marx and Engels recognize the importance of the relationship between language and consciousness (i.e., ideology) as indicated in the following statement: "From the start the 'spirit' is afflicted with the curse of being 'burdened' with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air sounds, in short, of language" (50-51). See also the seminal work of V.N. Voloshinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language (1973) for an integration of linguistic analysis and Marxist theory.

4. A form of anarchism that emerged within the European trade union movement is identified as syndico-anarchism (also referred to as socialist anarchism). This approach rests on the belief that small groups should have direct control over their political, economic, and social affairs. Recently, syndico-anarchism has gained popularity in response to the perception that government bureaucracies have become too impersonal and indifferent to the needs of individuals at the community level. Environmental, economic, and political concerns have been addressed through authors such as E.F. Schumaker and Murray Bookchin. Schumaker, for example, in his book Small Is Beautiful, states that decentralized, small scale technology is best suited to meet the needs of modern society. Moreover, he argues that because it is ultimately more efficient, this kind of economic model is much more compatible with the goal of sustaining the natural environment than classical economic models.

5. Near the end of his life Bolivar considered himself a failure. This is reflected in his reference to the revolutionary struggle as nothing more than "plowing the sea."

6. For a discussion of how liberation theology has influenced the Nicaraguan revolution see Fred Judson's article "The Church in Nicaragua" in Canadian Dimension March 1989, 17(1), pp. 9-10.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONTEMPORARY PERIOD

In chapters Two to Four the historical antecedents of political terrorism were examined by emphasizing economics, politics, and ideology. This chapter continues to analyze these factors as interactive antecedents; however, the role that social organization plays in the production of terrorism is highlighted. The focus is on the modern era beginning with the development of state terrorism in the Soviet Union. This is followed by a discussion of the ascendance of Nazism and the advent of state terrorism under the Third Reich. Both models of institutionalized terrorism (which have much in common) became enormously influential throughout the Third World. However, because it is beyond the scope of this chapter (and thesis) to examine the full extent of this influence, the focus is limited to the dynamics of state terrorism in Latin America. In the final section, attention shifts to conflict in the First World where the relationship between the student movement of the 1960s and political terrorism is explored.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET STATE TERRORISM

The term "terrorism" was originally used to refer to the Reign of Terror which occurred during the aftermath of the French Revolution (see Chapter Four). Historically, this
event marks one of the earliest manifestations of the systematic use of terrorism as an instrument of state rule; however, it was not until the reign of Joseph Stalin that state terrorism became a fully developed, routinized, bureaucratic method of governance. An important juncture in the development of Soviet state terrorism was the Bolshevik seizure of power in 1917 and the subsequent consolidation of power under Vladimir Lenin. Fearful of the threat from counter-revolutionary forces, he organized the Russian communist party, restructured the economy according to socialist principles, and established a secret police force known as the Cheka which became notorious for their ruthless and often brutal repression of political dissent. State terrorism under Lenin, however, was modest when compared to the wholesale bloodletting that took place under Stalin who became leader of the Communist Party following Lenin's death in 1927 (Conquest, 1973).

Once in power, Stalin's fundamental goal was to transform Soviet society into a formidable global industrial power. He envisaged this as the key to ensuring the future success of the Soviet Union as a communist state. Stalin's strategy for achieving this goal was to assert control over the major institutions of Soviet society: i.e., the Communist Party, government administration, and the military and police forces (Deutscher, 1967).

Not surprisingly, Stalin's political vision was met with
intense and widespread opposition from fellow party officials as well as millions of Soviets who had a vested interest in either the status quo (i.e., agrarian society) or a moderate version of a socialist revolution (Dallin and Breslauer, 1970). In 1928 Stalin embarked on a policy of state organized industrialization under a succession of five year plans. As well, he forced as many as 25,000,000 peasants to amalgamate into state run farms.

In order to ensure the success of these various endeavours, Stalin developed a vast state terror network directed by the secret police force known as the Cheka (which evolved into the KGB). Uncooperative peasants (or Kulaks) who resisted collectivization were routinely arrested, executed en masse, or transported to concentration camps (as many as 10,000,000 peasants may have perished during this period). In addition, Communist party leaders and industrial managers who fell out of favour with Stalin were subject to "show trials" where they were forced to admit to crimes against the state; as a result, they usually faced torture, execution, or a lengthy period in a Gulag (Conquest, 1973).

By the time of his death in 1952, Stalin had established political control over the countries of Eastern Europe, thereby creating a military and ideological buffer against any threat from Western Europe. Massive Soviet military presence and Soviet controlled secret police throughout the satellite countries replicated and institutionalized (in varying
degrees) the model of state terrorism practised in the Soviet Union. It also played an integral role, along with the military, in subduing the nationalistic rebellions that occurred in East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968).

THE EVOLUTION OF NAZI TERRORISM: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS

While state terrorism in the Soviet Union under Stalin can be viewed as representing a prototype for many communist countries, the Nazi model established in Germany during the 1930s became a precursor for the variety of state terrorism embraced by subsequent fascist regimes. As mentioned earlier, Nazism developed in Germany partly as a reaction to the Bolshevik revolution in Russia; however, it was also a response to threats to the traditional socio-economic order which were a consequence of both the industrial revolution and the global shift towards democracy. Thus an analysis of the development and structure of Nazi terrorism is an important prerequisite for understanding why similar models were adopted by numerous reactionary regimes throughout the Third World.

Historical Preconditions

The genesis of Nazi terrorism can be traced to the immediate aftermath of the World War I (1914 - 1918), which saw the collapse of the German economy and the disintegration of the social and political order. The humiliation of
national defeat following a war of unprecedented human and material destruction, together with economic instability, led many Germans to look for scapegoats to explain their malaise. The myth that the German state was subverted by "Jewish-Bolshevik" agitators became widely circulated. In addition, the Weimar Republic experienced a substantial erosion of its legitimacy. With the introduction of parliamentary government elite groups experienced a dilution of power. This contributed to economic turmoil and feelings of insecurity among the lower middle class. Relative economic disadvantage caused the latter group to become resentful towards the organized working class. In addition, the failure of the state to establish a monopoly over the use of force, together with the fragmentation of political authority, led to the emergence of dozens of armed "self defence" organizations (Waite, 1952).

The threat of Communist subversion and foreign incursion led the government to organize a volunteer force known as the "Free Corps." Most of the members were disaffected youth recruited mainly from the middle and lower classes. The motivation for engaging in Free Corps activities is revealed in the following quotation from Gerhard Rossbach, one of the organization's most notorious leaders:

It was the beautiful old Freeboot class of war and post-war times . . . organizing masses and losing them just as quickly, tossed this way and that just for the sake of our daily bread; gathering men about us and playing
soldiers with them; brawling and drinking, roaring and smashing windows—destroying and shattering what needs to be destroyed. Ruthless and inexorably hard. The abscess on the sick body of the nation must be cut open and squeezed until the clear red blood flows. And it must be left for a good long time till the body is purified (Waite, 1952: 51-52).

In 1920 the Free Corps were officially disbanded; however, their activities continued for several years. Organizationally, the Free Corps movement was significant in that it laid the groundwork for Nazi terrorism. Many of its members became role models within the youth movements of the 1920s, and eventually became leaders in the Third Reich. Moreover, the Free Corps represented a formative expression of fascist ideology. Its ethos was based on the following principles: a hierarchical organizational structure, a veneration for authoritarian leadership, a contempt for human rights, the cult of violence, and an extreme expression of nationalist sentiment (Waite, 1952).

Most of the terrorism of the Free Corps and its descendants was arbitrary and uncontrolled — despite its tacit approval and direction from the state. However, after the ascendancy of Adolf Hitler to the position of Chancellor of Germany in 1933, terrorism became much more systematic and formalized. Two factors led to this development: (1) legislation that freed the government from legal restraint and accountability; and (2) the appropriation of the police departments of the various German states by the SS and their consolidation into a powerful state police network (Noakes,
State terrorism was given a veneer of legitimacy by operating through an elaborate set of bureaucratic rules and regulations, thus facilitating its public acceptance.

**Ideology**

During his rise to power, Hitler was able to convince much of the public that Germany's humiliating defeat in World War I, and the subsequent economic chaos, was the result of a Jewish financial conspiracy. This xenophobia was expanded to include German Jews who had joined with Jews living in allied countries such as Britain, France, and the United States. Hitler argued further that Jews, together with communists, were again conspiring to destroy the German nation, and were behind the political immobility that characterized the newly established political system of Weimar Germany (Maltitz, 1973). Importantly, this political support was sustained through the duration of the Third Reich. Through what process was it possible to transmit such ideas?

An elaborate and ubiquitous network of communicative mechanisms forms the nexus between fascist ideology and the wholesale implementation of Nazi state terrorism. The instrumental value of symbols is an important aspect of such a system. As Wuthnow et al (1984:37) state, symbols have the capacity to inspire or give meaning to individual or collective activity, to delegitimate other activity, and to bring to bear the force of social control. In a word, symbols and symbol systems provide an important ordering
impulse to social affairs and to collective views of the world.

Thus the creation of distinctive Nazi iconography (i.e., uniforms, insignia) constituted an important part of the hegemonic process (Gramsci, 1971, 1977). These images were communicated through the mass media (e.g., newspapers and radio) and popular culture (e.g., cinema and theatre), which were under state control. This symbolism was intertwined with the discourse of racial and cultural superiority, the romanticization of German mythology, and the claim that Germany was destined to imperial greatness. Given the pervasiveness of such imagery, it is not surprising that many Germans were attracted to Nazi ideology - particularly the middle class who felt a loss of prestige and a reduced standard of living due to the economic chaos of the 1920s.

By the early years of World War II Nazi state propaganda had become a highly sophisticated process, particularly in the way symbolism was combined with technology. Albert Speer (1970), who was the minister of Armaments and Production (as well as a close confidant of Hitler), explained in his memoirs that the state's communication of Hitler's diplomatic and military conquests in the 1930s created an aura of invincibility and destiny to Nazi Germany. It was Speer who organized the "sight and sound" mass rallies, like the famous Nuremberg rally: through the synchronized use of public speaking systems, the omnipresence of uniformed officials,
evocative music, and ideological chants, attention was hypnotically focused on Hitler's imperialistic objectives.

Hitler's charisma, expressed through oratory, was a key factor in generating a fanatical commitment since he was able to articulate brilliantly and lucidly the major tenets of Nazi ideology. Each military victory was conveyed to the public as a visual and auditory spectacle of German heroism. Movie cameras captured the triumphant glory of German soldiers marching down the Champs Elysees in Paris, and the signing of the French surrender in 1940. The image of Germany's historical enemy surrendering provided a powerful personal vindication of Hitler, and provided evidence of the inevitability of a thousand year Third Reich (Shirer, 1960).

The affective appeal of the mythical imagery, national symbols, and persuasive rhetoric and discourse served to legitimate the politics of extreme state repression. This was especially true with respect to the brutal terror practices that were employed as the War expanded. Hitler continually stressed the idea that the enemy within Germany had to be uncovered and destroyed. In addition to homosexuals, Jews, gypsies, communists, and trade unionists, the enemy included anyone who disagreed with Nazism and Hitler's leadership during World War II (Mason, 1979). Importantly, the public became increasingly receptive to the politics of fear and intolerance. As Jeremy Noakes (1968:68) points out:

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Politics were seen in quasi-military terms involving a complete polarization between friends and enemies, who were considered to be at war with one another. In this political perspective there was no room for bargaining, compromise, or the coexistence of a plurality of political ideologies or parties. Political and ideological opponents were considered to have forfeited the right to be considered as fellow citizens and were regarded as enemies against whom the use of physical violence or even annihilation was entirely legitimate.

The perpetuation of Nazi ideology was essential to the government's implementation of the "final solution" which involved an elaborate network of concentration camps located mostly in Germany and Poland (Reitlinger, 1953). Millions of Jews (and other enemies of the state) living in Germany and the occupied countries were sent to the camps where they faced disease, starvation, and death. Given the sheer magnitude of its operation, the final solution represented an amazingly efficient organizational undertaking. As was the case in the Soviet Union under Stalin, the unprecedented scale of violence depended on the government's ability to exploit modern technology (e.g., mass transportation), the utilization of a complex legal-bureaucratic apparatus, and ultimately, the legitimation of authoritarian ideology.

THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF AUTHORITARIANISM

In the period following World War II state terrorism as a method of governance spread throughout the world. While the Stalinist model of state terrorism was adopted in varying degrees by the "communist" states of Eastern Europe, the Nazi
(or fascist) model was embraced by many Third World countries. The brutality of state terrorism in Stalinist inspired regimes (such as the former East Germany) was an important sociological phenomenon and is worthy of consideration. However, the influence of fascism - especially in terms of its techniques of government violence - became much more widespread on a global scale (Herman, 1982). In Latin America, for instance, it developed into an integral component of many governments.

THE DYNAMICS OF POLITICAL TERRORISM IN LATIN AMERICA

The executioner's face is well hidden.

- Bob Dylan

While the prevalence of terrorist violence in Latin America can be explained as a product of conflicting ideologies (e.g., authoritarianism vs. Marxism), such an explanation is incomplete unless it accounts for organizational dynamics and, perhaps more importantly, economic relationships. A key factor in this regard is the influence that modernization theory had on development policy in the Third World.

Modernization and Development: From Theory to Policy

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Theories of modernization and development, which became popular during the 1950s and 1960s, were for the most part grounded in the structural-functionalism of Talcott Parsons (1951). A theme common to most modernization theories is that societies can be classified as either traditional or modern (e.g., Lewis, 1949; Levy, 1952; Riggs, 1964), and that the adoption of modern industrial values is the key to social stability and economic prosperity (e.g., Rostow, 1960). The obvious implication of many such theories is that the United States represents the most highly developed modern society, while traditional societies (such as in Latin America) were inferior or backwards. Given the superior status assigned to modern western societies, as well as the presence of the Cold War, it is no surprise that modernization theory had a role in shaping U.S. foreign policy.  

The assumptions of modernization theory are reflected in the Alliance for Progress (AIP), a program developed in the 1960s to offset the political threat posed by the example of the socialist revolution in Cuban. The goals of the AIP were twofold: (1) to address the immediate basic needs of the masses - i.e., the endemic problems of hunger, illiteracy, and poor housing; and (2) to promote democratic reforms (Gil, 1971).

By the 1970s many countries of Latin America began to shift their economic strategy towards export oriented industrialization. Industrial activity became geared towards:
(1) the manufacture of consumer products, which are then sold predominantly to developed nations; and (2) the development of corporate agriculture. This shift in strategy - which is the current orthodoxy - must be understood in the context of the global economy and the essential role of multinational corporations. In addition to internationalizing their capital, transnational corporations (TNCs) have rationalized the production process on a global scale. Every element of the process is geographically located wherever the maximum amount of surplus value can be extracted. Hence, wage scales in many Third World countries (e.g., most of Latin America) offer the corporation a "competitive advantage." This development has resulted in the growth of "export processing zones," which are areas within national boundaries specifically set aside to promote commerce and investment (Nelson, 1989).

The Failure of Industrialization: The Road to Repression

Contrary to the predictions of modernization proponents, many of the benefits of industrial development failed to materialize. A 1982 World Bank survey estimated that approximately

40 percent of households in Latin America live in poverty, meaning that they cannot purchase the minimum basket of goods required for the satisfaction of their basic needs, and . . . 20 percent of all households live in destitution, meaning that they lack the means of buying even the food that would provide them with a minimally adequate diet (Altimir, 1982).
During the 1980s, living conditions in Latin America deteriorated dramatically - an outcome that can be directly attributed to the export of capital to the First World. Between 1982 and 1987 this amounted to approximately $250 billion, 25 times the total cost of the Alliance for Progress. The average per capita income in Argentina, for example, fell from $1,990 in 1980 to $1,630 in 1988. Mexico's GNP declined for seven years in a row. According to David Felix (1990), a specialist in Latin American economics, despite the continuing official optimism regarding the region's economic future, there are many reasons to be concerned:

For the region as a whole, output per head declined [in 1989] and is now about 9 percent lower than it was in 1980. In most of the debt-burdened countries urban real wages are 20 to 40 percent below 1980 levels; in some including Argentina, Uruguay, and Peru, they are even below 1970 levels. Official unemployment is considerably higher than it was before 1980, and the proportion of the work force engaged in the low paying "informal sector" - the chief safety net of the displaced - has risen much more (733).

Felix concludes that this deterioration can be attributed to a large extent to free-market restructuring.

According to modernization proponents, industrial development would eventually lead to the emergence of democratic institutions. However, during the 1970s the vast majority of Latin American countries experienced an erosion of civil liberties. Many of the governments of the region became increasingly repressive during this period which correlated with the shift towards export oriented industrialization.
This can be understood by examining the process of denationalization, one of the major consequences of TNC investment. Typically, when a TNC proceeds to locate in an underdeveloped country not only does it take over local businesses, but most of the capital it utilizes is locally generated (Stavrianos, 1981).

The exploitation of domestic capital increases the demand for money resulting in higher interest rates, therefore local businesses find it difficult to compete and survive. Moreover, once a TNC becomes established in a country it can demand concessions such as reductions in tariff protections given to domestic industries. While benefitting the corporation, the stripping of protections is extremely detrimental to local capital (Sigmund, 1984; Weinstein, 1984). Finally, because workers end up competing for wages on an international scale, the result is often an erosion of previous monetary gains.

The steady deterioration of living standards among the working class has had a major effect upon the nature of the political process: attempts by trade unions and other political interest groups to oppose government economic and social policies have been met with increased repression. Sheahan (1980) and Carleton (1989), for example, found that as countries pursue strategies of export-oriented industrialization, they experience much higher levels of repression.
This process was part of a trend that began shortly after World War II and has continued up to the present. Research by Pion-Berlin (1983), revealed that higher levels of state terrorism can be directly attributed to domestic policies oriented towards global economic dependency. His study, which focused on Argentina, analyzed the relationship between political repression and the recurrent shifts from reformist to orthodox economic doctrines. Advocates of the reformist doctrine argue that the government should take an active role in mitigating the effects of inflation and economic stagnation through the expansion of state spending and, if necessary, increasing the money supply. Proponents of the orthodox doctrine, on the other hand, argue from the perspective of laissez-faire economics which opposes government intervention and government support for social programs. The reformist policies of the Peronist government (1973 - 1976) precipitated an inflationary cycle in Argentina, which in turn led to a decline in international credit and investment, and a foreign exchange depletion. With the advice and support of the World Bank the government embarked on a program of orthodox stabilization. Widespread political opposition, mainly from organized labour, was met with increased state repression. By 1976 the escalating political turmoil had precipitated a military coup which led to an intensification of both orthodox/monetarist policies and state repression. As Pion-Berlin (1983:43) states, organized labour
became an obvious target for repression "since it [was] identified as the principal social force behind excessive government spending". The United States administration, because of its intensely "anticommunist" foreign policies, provided military training and technical assistance, which reinforced the government's determination to expand the use of terrorist violence.  

Modernization and Terrorism Under the New Global Order

Despite the past failure of modernization strategies in Latin America, they continue to find support among many politicians and policymakers. The recent efforts by the Mexican government to implement a North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and the United States provides an interesting example.

Under President Salinas, the Mexican government has been vigorously promoting NAFTA by claiming that it would attract more capital investment and create more employment and economic expansion resulting in the kind of prosperity that occurred in the Pacific-Rim countries such as Hong Kong and Malaysia (McQueen, 1990). The argument is made that the development that occurred in the First World - with the politically stabilizing effects of an affluent middle class - will occur in developing nations that embrace export-oriented trade and development policies. In supporting this claim, it is noted that the Mexican gross domestic product (GDP) has
risen an average of three percent each year between 1989 and 1991, and that the internal debt has been reduced from 25 percent of GDP to 18 percent. In addition, inflation has been reduced from 160 percent in 1987 to 18 percent in 1991 (The Economist, 1992).

While these indicators point to the development of a strong Mexican economy, a closer examination paints a more ominous picture. Policies of trade liberalization have resulted in the continued decline of exports as a percentage of GDP. The balance of trade has gone from an 8.4 billion surplus in 1987 to an 11.2 billion deficit in 1991. It is expected that in 1992 half of Mexico's imports will be financed by new foreign loans. These problems are exacerbated by unemployment and population growth. While 1,100,000 Mexicans enter the job market every year only 360,000 new jobs are being created. And, although the official unemployment rate is 3.2 percent of the active population (or less than one million people), independent economists estimate real unemployment at between 8 and 11 million people (Warnock, 1992; Barkin, 1992).

This more critical assessment leads to the conclusion that the Mexican economy, along with many other economies in Latin America, may be spiralling downward; therefore, it is conceivable that rising political opposition may lead to an escalation of state repression. There is, however, the possibility that with the end of the Cold War - in
particular, the collapse of the Soviet Union - the dynamic relationship between economic development and political repression in the region may change dramatically.

First of all, the oligarchy and military in Latin America can no longer invoke the threat of communist insurrection to justify their repressive actions (Carty, 1990; Marcella, 1990; Rosenberg, 1991). Second, changing patterns in international investment may be having an effect on the nature of state terrorism in the region. Many state terror regimes are viewed as unstable investment environments by multi-national corporations and financial institutions such as the World Bank. This is true of the relative political stability of newly industrialized countries (NICs) such as Brazil and Argentina, which until recently were state terror regimes (Parkinson, 1989). In these and other NICs in Latin America, economic diversification and growth has enhanced the possibility of gradual social development, thus mitigating domestic tensions.

In Latin America and many other Third World countries, however, there are sharp divisions across ethnic, cultural and ideological lines, in addition to an entrenched class of powerful elites, which historically have frustrated any progress towards political stability. These structural preconditions, combined with the dependency created by free-market policies (Frank, 1972; Baran, 1973; Sklair, 1991) - particularly in the less developed NICs - have the potential
to facilitate the creation of insurgency movements and state repression.

**Ideology and the Organizational Context: State Terrorism**

Throughout most of the history of post-colonial Latin America, economic elites have been able to maintain their position of privilege by controlling key political institutions, including the government administration, the police, and the military. As mentioned, beginning in the late 1960s, this control was achieved through increasingly brutal tactics. During this period, state terrorism developed into a highly institutionalized mode of governance. In this context, the purpose of terrorism was "[To] defeat the attempt by the organized peasantry and working class and burgeoning popular social movements from changing the ownership of property and distribution of wealth" (Petras, 1986:88).

In contrast to the more personalized dictatorships of the 1960s (such as the Argentinean government of Juan Peron), maintaining the status-quo was accomplished through the formation of what O'Donnell (1973) refers to as military-civilian technocracies. The oligarchies, in their attempts to modernize, were willing to form management coalitions with the military in order to control the political demands arising from groups negatively affected by industrialization policies.

These regimes, unlike their predecessors, expanded and intensified their use of state terrorism. Between the late
1960s and early 1980s government security forces and state sponsored "death squads" carried out thousands of political killings. In Guatemala, for example, 100,000 people have been killed by government forces since the U.S. sponsored military coup in 1954 (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983). The military government of Argentina (1976 - 1981) was responsible for more than 20,000 "disappearances" including over 1,000 pregnant women and hundreds of young children. In El Salvador, where there has been a protracted civil war since the early 1970s, over 40,000 deaths (mostly noncombatant civilians) have been attributed to government forces. Many of the victims of state terrorism had been tortured before being killed (Amnesty International, 1985; 1990).

How then is this form of institutionalized brutality maintained and promoted? The answer can be found in an examination of the crucial relationship between socio-political organization and ideology.

To a large extent, the use of terrorism by governments in Latin America is motivated by a shared ideology which provides a set of norms that sanctions the use of violence. By analyzing the pronouncements of a number of terrorist regimes, Lopez (1988:519) argues that a

conceptual construct called national security ideology has provided a logical and self-reinforcing mind set among Latin leaders that provides the justification for violence against one's own nationals.
The Latin American oligarchy and many military leaders (particularly within the academies) were impressed with the concept of the organic state, which suggests that the "traditional" integrity of the state, along with the political, cultural, social, and economic order, must be preserved at any cost (Lernoux, 1982). In other words, in the context of class interests, the end (preserving the status-quo) justifies the means used by the state (e.g., political intimidation, press censorship, terrorism). Political conflict is defined in global terms as a manichaean struggle between the forces of evil (i.e., communism) on the one hand and good (i.e., capitalism) on the other. The aphorism "if you're not for us, you're against us" is representative of the kind of bifurcated thinking that characterizes this perspective. Thus opponents to the regime - for example, those advocating land reforms and wider public control of the means of production (such as factories and businesses) - are regularly targeted as "communist" enemies of the state. This view is evident in an excerpt from a speech by Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan military leader who led the military coup of 1954:

Communism . . . has been completely destroyed by the force of arms. But communism still remains in the consciousness of some bad sons of our Guatemala. . . . The battle has begun, the hard battle that requires us to demand each citizen to be a soldier of anti-communism (cited in Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983:216)
Not surprisingly, national security ideology has its genesis in European fascism. A Latin American version of fascism developed in the 1930s when a number of military leaders, as well as certain elite groups, were attracted to Mussolini's concept of the corporate state. Referred to as "integralism" in South America, it was based on a rigid hierarchical structure in which people are categorized according to social class and productive function. Not only was the integralist corporate state easily adapted to Latin America's existing feudal order, it also accommodated the economic changes resulting from modernization. Theoretically, all sectors of society in a corporate state have equal representation; however, the model that evolved in Latin America ensured that the military, oligarchy, and industrialists maintained, and in some respects expanded, their control over the government and the economy (Lernoux, 1982). Integralism had its greatest impact in Brazil, Paraguay, Chile, and most importantly in Argentina.

**Ideology and the Organizational Context: Anti-state Terrorism**

Throughout the 1980s U.S. policymakers vigorously promoted the idea that political conflict in Latin America could be attributed to a worldwide communist conspiracy which was directed and controlled by the Soviet Union. However, despite the claims of authors such as Claire Sterling (1980),
there is little empirical support for such an account (Herman, 1982).

This, however, does not suggest that counter-ideologies have not been an important factor in precipitating anti-state terrorism. As alluded to in earlier chapters, many of the insurgent groups that formed during the 1970s and 80s were influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology. This is understandable given that this ideology, perhaps more than any other, places economic oppression and class conflict within a convincing theoretical framework and provides a coherent program for immediate and direct political action.

An additional factor was the vicarious influence of the Cuban revolution - an historical watershed in the politics of Latin America. The overthrow of the corrupt and authoritarian Batista regime by Castro's guerrilla forces in 1959 gave hope to many Latin Americans that genuine revolution was possible. By demonstrating the efficacy of armed struggle, the Cuban revolution inspired many radicals and dissidents to consider violent action as a method of achieving political objectives.

The dramatic increase in revolutionary activity that began in the 1960s and continued through the 1970s was profoundly influenced by the divergent revolutionary theories of Che Guevara, who promoted a rural strategy, and Carlos Marighela, who argued that the city should form the locus of revolutionary activity.
Guevara argued that the fundamental struggle involved organizing the peasantry. In such a model, the rural based guerrilla army forms the nucleus of the revolutionary vanguard which eventually captures power through military victories in a civil war. Terrorism, according to Guevara, had minimal value in such a campaign. Although he recognized that in specific situations it might have tactical value (e.g., the assassination of a brutal dictator), he asserted that as an end in itself it was self-defeating:

[T]errorism, a measure that is generally ineffective and indiscriminate in its effects, since it often makes victims of innocent people and destroys a large number of lives that would be valuable to the revolution... hinders all more or less legal or semi-clandestine contact with the masses and makes impossible unification for actions that will be necessary at a critical moment (Guevara, 1969:26)

The influence of the rural-based strategy diminished after the defeat of Guevara and his guerrillas in the Bolivian countryside (by the Bolivian army with the assistance of U.S. special forces). Many revolutionaries decided instead to shift their efforts to the cities. One of the leading theoreticians behind this strategy was a Brazilian, Carlos Marighela. He believed that the urban environment made it easier to organize the oppressed workers and avoid police detection. Unlike Guevara, who stressed the importance of consciousness raising among the peasants, Marighela's strategy was oriented towards violent action. In his Mini-Manual of
he argued that the use of terrorism is an essential aspect of the revolutionary struggle. For Marighela, the goal was

[T]o unleash, in urban and rural areas, a volume of revolutionary activity which will oblige the enemy to transform the country's political situation into a military one. Then discontent will spread to all social groups, and the military will be held exclusively responsible for failures (1971:46).

In organizational terms, Marighela advocated the formation of hierarchical structures with four to six persons in each cell. To avoid detection, only one person from each cell would have regular contact with a leader of another cell. Although security under such a system is enhanced, their relative isolation from the people that would be most sympathetic to their cause interfered with any systematic and popular organizing effort. This mitigated the likelihood of creating widespread discontent and revolutionary action.

Marighela's campaign to overthrow the Brazilian government ultimately failed. This can be attributed to three factors: (1) the inability to sustain an effective revolutionary organization; (2) the expansion of counterinsurgency measures (Gillespie, 1986; Sloan, 1983); and (3) financial and logistical support from the United States government through the C.I.A. (Agee, 1976). This example demonstrates that social organization is essential in explaining not only why anti-state terrorism occurs, but why it so often fails in achieving its objectives.
In the following, and final, section of this chapter, the discussion shifts to political terrorism in the First World. More specifically, the focus is on the United States during the 1960s: one of the most tumultuous periods in its history. As with the discussion of political terrorism in Latin America, the emphasis is on organizational dynamics, and their relationship to ideology, economics, and politics.

THE STUDENT MOVEMENT AND POLITICAL TERRORISM IN THE UNITED STATES

"We want the world and we want it now!"
- Jim Morrison

The United States of the 1960s was a time of extraordinary social and political upheaval. The zeitgeist was shaped by the civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, and the rapid development of a highly energized youth culture. At the centre of much of the turbulence was the student movement, which at various times became actively opposed to racial segregation, "establishment" politics, and U.S. foreign aggression. By the end of the decade, as the movement became more radicalized, a relatively small number of students chose terrorism as a political strategy. While attempts to explain the periods violent politics have typically narrowed the analysis to descriptive attributes of individual terrorists and their actions, a complete understanding of this issue must
examine student terrorism within the context of the movement as a whole. The important issue, then, is one of process: more specifically, what are the key factors that contribute to the radicalization of student activism - i.e., the evolution from the moderate politics of protest to revolutionary terrorism?

**Demographics**

Following World War II the United States experienced an unprecedented economic boom. While Western Europe and Japan were coping with the costly physical destruction that the war had inflicted, American industry was thriving. New factories were being built and old ones were back in production reducing unemployment to negligible proportions. The growing mood of confidence and security translated into a high demand for consumer goods (Lasch, 1979).

Economic prosperity and optimism concerning the future led to a dramatic increase in the U.S. birth rate. From 1945 to 1946 the rate jumped 19 per cent, then another 12 per cent the following year - and it continued to boom into the early 1960s (Landon, 1981). In 1960 young people constituted 13 percent of the total population, and in 1970 they had increased to 17 per cent (an increase of almost one-third). Researchers such as Gabriel Almond argue that this demographic
shift had a substantial impact on the rebelliousness of the 1960s:

[T]his demographic evidence suggests that for this generation there was a significant shortage of experienced older persons, and an oversupply of peers... Peer group socialization tends to accentuate the life cycle propensities of the particular age cohort involved. For adolescents this would mean the accentuation and proliferation of rebellious tendencies, enthusiasm, idealism, experimentalism (cited in Lipset, 1976:xxxv).

The large cohort of young people was also an important variable in the social organization of university and college campuses. By 1960 the United States was the first country in the history of the world to have more university students than people employed in agriculture (Viorst, 1979). The large numbers of students combined with the spatial characteristics of the university campus made it relatively easy to mobilize individuals who had common political interests. This partly explains the remarkable success of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), which became the organizational core of the student movement. In 1966 the SDS had grown in strength to 151 chapters in thirty seven states - although it should be noted that during these years it represented only a small fraction of the total student population.

The Ideological Context

During the post-World War II period, the "red scare" campaign of Senator McCarthy had succeeded in virtually destroying left-wing political opposition in the United
States. For example, in the late 1940s the American Communist party had as many as 80,000 members, but by 1956 membership had declined to a mere 5,000 or 6,000. Because of the unrelenting purges, the suspension of due process throughout the legal system, and most importantly, the sweeping definition of "communist subversion," even liberal and social democratic causes suffered (Howe and Coser, 1962). But by 1960 the influence of McCarthyism was beginning to fade and a "New Left" was emerging, mainly in the form of a student movement.

The ideological basis of the "movement" originated in the mid-1950s when serious non-fiction publications became widely circulated. Books dealing with philosophy, history, and sociology - many of them European - were eagerly read and studied by both university professors and students. More importantly, the theoretical ideas of Karl Marx and other radical scholars provided the catalyst for political action (Gitlin, 1987).

One of the most influential Marxist scholars was Herbert Marcuse, as it was mainly through his writings that the Frankfurt School's criticism of contemporary society became widely known in North America. Many students identified with the bleak political and cultural landscape described in his book *One Dimensional Man* (1966), which became a manifesto for many students. This book, which was first published in 1964, takes a uncompromisingly pessimistic view of advanced
industrial society. Marcuse argues that the capitalist state's exercise of political power has permeated virtually all aspects of contemporary society, including social interaction, politics, and economic activity. Moreover, technical-rationalism, which has become a dominant ideology, has the effect of stifling human creativity and ultimately functions to perpetuate the capitalist system.

According to Marcuse social reforms are incapable of liberating society from its alienated and oppressive condition; therefore the only solution is a complete revolution. Marcuse rejected the orthodox Marxist claim that the working class would act as the "vanguard" for revolutionary transformation. By striving primarily for material gains the working class had forfeited its role as an agent for revolutionary change, and in the process had become part of the oppressive order. For this reason, it is easy to see why Marcuse's ideas appealed to many people within the student movement. They saw themselves as the new "vanguard" capable of radically transforming the existing social order. This notion can also be found in the writings of C. Wright Mills, one of the earliest and most influential American Marxist theorists. In *The Sociological Imagination* (1959) Mills warned of the danger of uncritically accepting the idea that the proletariat was the primary agent of revolutionary change. Together with William Appleman Williams (a Marxist historian), he openly urged the
generation of young intellectuals and political activists to break with all of the codes of traditional radicalism, especially the doctrines according to which the working class was anointed with sacred historical powers, and the Bolshevik revolution was the transcendently significant event for the fate of the American Left (Aronowitz, 1984:26).

The Black Civil Rights Movement

In the early years, the student movement was less concerned with radical ideology than it was with the fundamental issue of civil rights (Oglesby, 1973). When it became clear that southern segregationists had no intention of acknowledging Supreme Court decisions protecting the civil rights of black people, many students felt that political action was necessary. Thus in 1960 the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) was formed with the objective of supporting the black civil rights movement by directly opposing segregationist practices. Their first action was to organize sit-ins and demonstrations in fifty four cities in nine states (Sale, 1973). In 1961, in an effort to challenge southern state laws that compelled blacks to sit in the back of public buses, the SNCC organized what became known as "freedom rides." Other campaigns, such as the drive to register black voters in the Mississippi delta, were often met with violent resistance from white racist groups.

Many of the students who worked with the SNCC became involved in the SDS, which by the mid-1960s was on the forefront of the anti-war movement. From their experiences
with the black civil rights movement they learned that (1) governments (and their supporters) are reluctant to accede power and authority without a fight; and (2) confrontational tactics could be used successfully to achieve political concessions.

**International Politics: Cuba and Vietnam**

The triumph of Castro's guerrilla movement over the corrupt Batista regime had special significance to student radicals. As Todd Gitlin (1987:122) observes:

Cuba was the revolutionary frontier, the not-yet-known. Here, apparently, was the model of a revolution led by students, not by a Communist Party - indeed, in many ways against it... On trips to Cuba in 1959, 1960, and 1961... [radical American students] mixed with Cuban students, identified with their esprit and their defiance of the Colossus of the North.

In addition, awareness of the fact that the Washington administration was actively supporting the pre-revolutionary Cuban government was a reflection of the growing interest in Third World politics - especially with regard to the morality of U.S. interventionist policies. This concern became acutely focused on the growing imbroglio in Vietnam, and became the single most important issue contributing to student activism.

Soon after President Kennedy was elected in 1960 the level of U.S. aid and military involvement in Vietnam increased significantly. In the first year of his administration the U.S. was paying nearly two million dollars
a day in an attempt to prop up the unpopular government of Ngo Dinh Diem. Kennedy also expanded the size of the military contingent from 2,000 at the end of 1961 to over 15,000 by the middle of 1963 (Brown, 1975).

Following the assassination of Kennedy in 1963, President Lyndon Johnson became president. This gave hope to many Americans for a quick resolution to the conflict and a subsequent de-escalation of U.S. involvement. Under Johnson, however, U.S. military presence expanded dramatically with no quick end in sight. By 1967 there were nearly 400,000 American troops stationed in Vietnam, up from 21,000 in 1964 (Patti, 1980). The United States dropped eight million tons of bombs on Indochina - four times what it dropped during World War II. The Johnson administration launched a massive bombing campaign on North Vietnam, destroying not only military targets, but dozens of hospitals and medical centres, and killing thousands of Vietnamese civilians. While operating under the direction of the CIA, the South Vietnamese government tortured and murdered as many as 40,000 political prisoners. U.S. casualties were high as well: by 1967, approximately 7,000 American troops had been killed and over 40,000 wounded (Karnow, 1984).

Student Organization: The SDS

The genesis of the anti-war movement (and indeed the organized student movement more generally) can be traced to
June 1962 when a group of radical student leaders from 59 campuses gathered at Port Huron, Michigan to form the SDS. At that meeting, the Port Huron Statement was adopted which, through its vociferous criticism of American society, established the philosophical basis for student activism. More to the point, the document emphasized the importance of human potential and the need to eliminate (without violence) the structural conditions of human oppression (Sale, 1973). These ideals served to inform the actions of student radicals in their participation in the civil rights movement, and later in their opposition to the War in Vietnam.

By the mid-1960s, a broad based anti-war movement emerged, led by the SDS together with other groups such as the Student Peace Union and the War Resisters League. The first major action occurred in 1965 when 20,000 demonstrators picketed the White House. The next three years saw huge anti-war demonstrations, parades, and rallies all across the country. The public outcry, and the growing dissent within his own party, prompted President Johnson to announce he would not seek reelection as president while pledging to curb the bombing of North Vietnam (Brown, 1975).

Many people within the movement (many of them formerly disaffected liberal democrats) were optimistic that with a new president there was a good chance of ending the War. They believed that progressive change could be accomplished by working within the system. However, many of the more
radically inclined people within the movement disagreed. In the spring of 1968, the SDS endorsed a policy of increased militancy. Soon after, the SDS led a rebellion at Columbia University to protest the university's authoritarianism and cooperation with the war effort. This act became particularly confrontational as hundreds of students occupied a number of campus buildings, resulting in the closure of the university for several weeks (Gitlin, 1987).

Later that year, an anti-war demonstration organized to coincide with the Chicago Democratic Convention became mired in violence. Although most of the demonstrators had gathered there for peaceful protest, some of them had anticipated a confrontation. Overreaction by the authorities (the police outnumbered demonstrators by at least three to one) resulted in dozens of young people being attacked, clubbed, and left bleeding. The brutality, which by most accounts was initiated by the police, reinforced the view of many activists that the state (and the elite interests it represented) was fundamentally opposed to changes in the status quo, and would inevitably respond to dissent and protest with violence (Sale, 1973). The perception of state intransigence convinced many student radicals to adopt a more defiant political posture.

The following year, when Richard Nixon became president, the momentum towards more militant politics within the student movement was clearly established. Nixon's policy of gradual troop withdrawal from Vietnam, which actually prolonged the
war for another four years, was met with widespread cynicism within the student movement. However, there was a distinct lack of unanimity concerning the appropriate direction that the movement should take. Despite their attraction to revolutionary politics, most student activists were not committed to violence as an appropriate tactic; a small determined minority, however, was willing to rationalize the need to move in this direction. For example, David Gilbert, one of the SDS's theorists, concluded that "the American working class was hopelessly integrated into capitalism's strategy for stabilization, and that terror was therefore legitimate" (Gitlin, 1987:382).

Political differences eventually led to factionalism within the SDS. At the final convention in 1969, approximately a third of the members became affiliated with a group known as the Progressive Labor Party (which ascribed to an orthodox Marxist-Leninist perspective); another third were split between the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) and the Weathermen; and the remainder comprised a number of unaffiliated chapters.

The most radical of these groups was the Weathermen which had an estimated 1,500 members (Gurr, 1988a). Recognizing that the prophesized revolution was not about to happen, they took it upon themselves to make it happen through tactics such as street fighting with police. They reasoned that if they instigated enough confrontations with representatives of the
"Establishment" small cadres of revolutionaries would spontaneously form and eventually seize power (Gitlin, 1981).

By 1970 the Weathermen had adopted a clandestine strategy and vowed to fight the government with guerrilla tactics - more specifically, with deliberate acts of violence against property. Although the majority of incidents that occurred during this time (conservatively estimated at 250 attempted and successful bombings between 1967 and 1970) were in all likelihood the work of freelancers, they were probably inspired by the Weathermen (Gitlin, 1987).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter focused on political terrorism in the twentieth century by considering some of the key economic, political, and ideological antecedents. These factors were explored within the context of social and political organization.

The chapter began with an examination of the way that Marxist-Leninist ideology in the Soviet Union was transformed under Stalin into a model of bureaucratic state terrorism. This was followed by an analysis of the antecedents of Nazi German state terrorism. In this regard a number of factors were particularly relevant: economic depression, the social organization of the "freebooters," the communication of fascist ideology, and the charismatic authority of Adolf Hitler. Although Nazi state terrorism was defeated with the
end of World War II, the model was adopted by neo-fascist regimes throughout much of the Third World.

Beginning in the 1960s and continuing through the 1980s, Latin American military governments together with economic elites have recognized the efficacy of state terrorism as a method of governance. Although the "Cold Warriors" of the 1970s and 80s attributed the political violence in Latin America to Soviet agitation, this explanation ignores the exigencies of the political economy and the dialectic between the controllers and the controlled. In general, state terrorism in Latin America was employed to defeat political opposition which arose as a response to ongoing economic and political oppression. Furthermore, although modernization policies were aimed at alleviating poverty and political instability, there is reason to believe that such initiatives have contributed to the problem. Whether increased global integration (e.g., NAFTA) in the post-Cold War era results in sustained economic development and prosperity in Latin America and therefore a reduction in political terrorism - is an open question. There are, however, reasons to be sceptical. It is conceivable that in the Third World a growing economic disparity will persist between the oligarchies and the poor. According to this scenario, the bleak economic and social conditions will continue to radicalize opposition groups, which in turn could trigger further state and anti-state terrorism.
Although economic variables (e.g., misery and oppression) appear to be a fundamental precondition of political terrorism in Latin America, the importance of ideology and social organization should not be minimized. This is evident in the comparative discussion of the revolutionary ideologies of Carlos Marighela and Che Guevara. All other factors being equal, whether terrorism succeeds or fails as a political strategy depends to a large extent on the characteristics of political organizations.

In the final discussion attention was focused on student rebellion in the United States. Similar to the experience in Latin America, economic factors, ideology, and social organization all contributed to the radicalization process. Moreover, in both examples terrorist action appears to have been a direct response to policies and actions of the state. However, what distinguished the two examples is that revolutionary activity in Latin America (and typically that of much of the Third World) occurred under conditions of severe economic deprivation, while the process of radicalization in the United States (and other First World nations) developed against the background of relative affluence.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Weimar government, at the time, could be described as a liberal-democracy.

3. For example, in 1949 United States President Truman announced the Point Four Programme which was designed to "aid the efforts of the people of economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and improve their living conditions" (Ohlin, 1970:25). As Ohlin points out, this policy direction (which was not entirely new) was not established out of purely humanitarian concerns.

4. Repression is defined as the "use of governmental coercion to control or eliminate actual or potential political opposition" (Duff and McCamant, 1976:184). Conceptually, this is very close to the definition of political terrorism (as employed by the state) provided in Chapter One. If anything, it is slightly broader in scope - i.e., conceivable it could contain violent actions against individual opponents of the state without intending to communicate a message to a third party - however, in practice it essentially applies to the same phenomenon. Therefore, political repression and state terrorism are treated here as rough equivalents.

5. The reformist doctrine is roughly equivalent to Keynesian economic theory, while the orthodox doctrine is similar to monetarist theory.

6. As Walden Bello (1991 - 1992) points out, the World Bank has long been involved in serving the interests of U.S. foreign policy, rather than promoting economic prosperity in the Third World. Between 1984 and 1991 approximately 155 billion dollars was transferred from impoverished and heavily indebted Third World countries to prosperous countries in the First World.

7. By 1979 government sponsored death squads were responsible for the disappearances of approximately 15,000 people (Amnesty International, 1979).

8. In addition, the fact that the U.S. government is focusing its efforts on fighting illegal drug operations in Latin America ensures that in many respects it will be business as usual.

9. This view was already well established within the doctrine of McCarthyism and was promoted by Clair Sterling in The Terror Network (1980). For a thorough critique of the claims made in this book see Herman and Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent (1988).

10. Many of Guevara's ideas concerning the importance of developing a revolutionary consciousness among the peasantry were elaborated in the more sophisticated

11. It should be noted that the factors leading to the development of ideological terrorism in the United States during the 1960s and 70s are in many ways generalizable to events in Germany, Italy and France during the same time period.

12. The Frankfurt School generally refers to the pro-Marxist (although anti-Soviet) theoretical work that emanated from the Institute of Social Research, established in Frankfurt Germany in 1923.
CHAPTER SIX
MICRO-ANALYTIC ANTECEDENTS OF TERRORISM

So far this thesis has focused on the following factors: economic forces, ideological constructs and organizational structures, within the context of historical events and processes. However, any explanation of political terrorism would be incomplete without accounting for human agency. As Anthony Giddens states (1987:85): "... social actors are knowledgeable agents, not merely the passive recipients of influences that irresistibly condition their conduct." Therefore, while terrorist action may be explained as a consequence of structural preconditions (such as economic oppression), a deeper understanding of the phenomenon requires an analysis of psychological mechanisms.

What is it that motivates an individual to choose terrorism as a means of achieving a political objective? Can it be attributed to mental pathology? Or does it make more sense to view terrorism as a rational response to social circumstances?

This chapter attempts to answer these questions by first exploring and critically analyzing a set of theories loosely defined as the "mental disorder" perspective. This is followed by two perspectives that locate terrorist actions within a normative context: (1) relative deprivation theory - a social psychological account that has been applied to
collective political violence; and (2) the rational actor thesis which focuses more specifically on the mechanisms of individual decision making.

**TERRORISM AND THE MENTAL DISORDER PERSPECTIVE**

The view that terrorists are mentally unbalanced is widely accepted and promoted by the mass media and government authorities (Stohl, 1988). It is a position that is also popular among many terrorism "experts" (Corrado, 1981). For these reasons it is important that the claims of this perspective be closely examined. In general, the research linking terrorism to mental disorders is premised on the theoretical assumptions of psychiatry and psychoanalysis.

Most mental disorder explanations of terrorism focus on early socialization experience, and are strongly influenced by Freud's (1953) analysis of psycho-sexual development. Gustav Morf (1970), for example, claims that his analysis of the Front de Liberation du Quebec (F.L.Q.) terrorists revealed that they had rejected paternal values. He maintains that normal affective qualities associated with emotional maturity are replaced by more instinctual drives involving sexual lust and the thirst for notoriety and power. This theme is expanded by Lawrence Z. Freedman (1983) who argues that terrorism is a manifestation of (1) the need to reaffirm self-esteem; (2) depersonalization; (3) the desire to establish intimacy; and (4) the belief in the magic of violence.

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Freud's influence is reflected in the claim made by a number theorists that there is a relationship between narcissism and terrorism. Christopher Lasch, for example, argues in his book *The Culture of Narcissism* (1979) that the generation of children growing up in the 1950s and 60s in advanced industrial societies were inculcated with values and norms that overemphasized individual ego satisfaction. Lasch maintains that problems concerning family life, education, and political power are directly related to the pursuit of individual gratification. Although Lasch does not discuss terrorism directly, it is implied that such behavior can be attributed to narcissistic tendencies.

According to Heinz Kohut (1983), while narcissism can have positive consequences - i.e., enhanced self-confidence, individual achievement, and stable emotional relationships - in many individuals it results in violent, destructive behavior. He argues that there are some narcissistic individuals who, after having experienced a defeat of their self-esteem, become intensely enraged and may have a desire to destroy the perceived cause of their humiliation. Violent aggression then is the reaction most likely to reestablish self-esteem.

The concept of thanatos (or death-wish) has been employed by a number of theorists to explain terrorism. Freud (1961) introduced the idea of thanatos partly to account for the unprecedented human carnage resulting from World War I. He
believed that there must be an unconscious instinctual drive to explain why millions of young men marched to almost inevitable death during the war.

Attempts have been made to apply the death-wish personality characteristic to explanations of terrorist behavior. This account received attention from theorists such as Cooper (1979) and Kellen (1979) soon after three major international events: (1) the alleged suicides of members of the Baader Meinhof Group in 1977; (2) the deaths of eleven IRA hunger strikers in 1976; and (3) an incident in 1972 involving an apparent suicide attack at the Lode airport in Israel by members of the Japanese Red Army.

Kellen states that death seeking or death confronting behavior functions to compensate for the depressive characteristic in the typical terrorist personality. This defect is overcome by dedicating oneself to thrill-seeking and extreme challenges embodied in the struggle for an ideal society. Cooper argues that those who engage in such activities require either a recklessness or indifference bordering on psychosis or an extraordinary degree of fanatical dedication. . . . those who undertake such missions can hardly entertain any realistic expectations of coming out alive (1979:21).

According to Cooper such individuals are clearly suffering from a sociopathic personality disorder.

Political terrorism has also been linked to sociopathy.
and other psychiatric disorders. Pearce (1977) claims that terrorists often show evidence of "superego lacuna" (a depressed superego) which allow them to commit vicious acts of violence without feeling any guilt or remorse. He argues that sociopaths are motivated to commit terrorism for two reasons: (1) involvement in a terrorist lifestyle can alleviate a sense of low personal worth; and (2) they feel a natural craving for the intense excitement that such an activity allows.

Psychological profiles have been widely used to establish a link between sociopathy and terrorism. Cooper (1977) refers to what he believes are two typical cases: the Nazi General Reinhard Heydrich (alias the "Butcher of Prague"), and Andreas Baader, the co-founder of the Baader-Meinhof Group. Heydrich was viewed with trepidation by fellow S.S. officers and senior Nazi officials who considered him unusually violent even by Nazi standards. On the other hand, many observers defined Baader as a dilettante or playboy who valued sexual exploits over political objectives. Despite these differences, Cooper concluded that terrorists provided the ideal roles for Heydrich and Baader to express their sociopathy. Moreover, Cooper argues that both were driven by sexual impulses involving either eccentric or promiscuous relationships. He notes that they were unable to form any genuine relationships with people and were especially exploitive of women.

Recently, during the Persian Gulf conflict, Jerrold Post (1991:26) used the biographical approach to construct a
psychological profile of Saddam Hussein. He claims that although Saddam Hussein is not clinically insane, he does show signs of "malignant narcissism," a personality disorder which is characterized by feelings of grandiosity, ruthlessness, cruel behavior, and paranoia. In a presentation to the U.S. Congress, Post argued that narcissism becomes malignant when it is combined with the conviction that extreme violence is justified in the interest of furthering one's goals.

A CRITIQUE OF MENTAL DISORDER RESEARCH INTO TERRORISM

The conceptual and methodological deficiencies of mental disorder theories have been widely discussed. Whether they are founded on the principles of psychoanalysis or psychiatry, many of the fundamental concepts of such theories have been criticized as being operationally vague and difficult to test (Nagel, 1961; Szasz, 1961; Rothblum et al., 1986). While it is important to be cognizant of these generic problems, the following discussion focuses on two specific issues that are particularly relevant to mental disorder theories of terrorism: (1) the quality of empirical evidence; and (2) the influence of cultural and ideological preconceptions in the interpretation of events.

A key problem associated with research linking narcissism with terrorism concerns the fact that much of it is drawn from case studies of adults who retrospectively construct the events of their past. However, it is interesting to note that
the methodology of Kohut is even less reliable than this. His explanations of terrorism were not based on case studies of actual terrorists; rather, he extrapolated from interviews with individuals whom he felt had expressed symptoms of narcissism. Moreover, the few clinical studies of terrorists that have been carried out contradict the narcissism thesis (Corrado, 1981).

This same criticism - the absence of clinical interviews with terrorists - applies to the alleged link between sociopathy and terrorism. Cooper (1977:256), who used biographical information as the primary data source, acknowledges this as a weakness in his own research when he states that "like all exercises in psycho-history, the present one suffers from the notable absence of that personal contact that helps to give clinical observation much of its authenticity."

The value of the biographical approach has also been criticized on the basis of the physical and cultural distance between researcher and subject (Goleman, 1990). This problem alludes to an ethnocentric tendency within the mental disorders perspective and is particularly evident in Jerrold Post's psychological profile of Saddam Hussein. The characteristics that Post cites as contributing to "malignant narcissism" (i.e., grandiosity, ruthlessness, cruel behavior, and paranoia) could easily be applied to respected political figures in the United States. Former U.S. president Richard
Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had a central role in the decision to bomb Cambodia in 1972, an act which resulted in the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. More recently, the U.S. led bombing of Iraq, which caused tens of thousands of deaths (Rogers, 1991), could be interpreted as a cruel, ruthless act cynically intended to further specific political goals; however, it is highly unlikely that the U.S. Congress would be willing to listen to an account of George Bush as a "narcissistic" terrorist. Post's research reveals more about the cultural and ideological milieu in which it is embedded than it does about the causes of terrorism.

The claim that terrorists are motivated by a death-wish is also highly problematic. Corrado (1981) questions both the cultural assumptions and the empirical evidence on which the research is based. It is not at all clear, he points out, that all of these incidents were actual suicides. And, in the cases where it seems obvious that suicide was a factor, does it automatically follow that the individuals involved were mentally disordered?

Although the Baader-Meinhoff deaths were officially reported as suicides by the West German authorities, a number of leftist organizations have speculated that they were in fact murdered. Even Wilfried Rasch (1979), the psychiatrist who spent a considerable amount of time interviewing members of the BMG, expressed doubt that suicide could explain their
sudden death. Secondly, attributing the suicidal attack of the Japanese Red Army to a pathological desire to kill oneself reflects an ethnocentric bias. The only terrorist to survive the attack calmly explained to the Israeli authorities that he was willing to die for a combination of cultural and political ideals which are largely unacceptable or incomprehensible to most people from Western societies, including many terrorism experts (Corrado, 1981).

Events surrounding the IRA hunger strike are open to wide interpretation depending on one's ideological orientation. Although there is little doubt that the deaths were self-inflicted (therefore suicide), it does not necessarily follow that mental pathology was a factor. From the perspective of IRA sympathizers, the prisoners' actions were rational - they had little choice but to launch a hunger strike after the British government had withdrawn political status for IRA prisoners (Corrado and Evans, 1988). This policy, incidentally, was designed to label them common criminals, thereby discrediting their political objectives.

From the above discussion it is clear that the validity of mental disorder theories of terrorism is highly questionable. The fact that this paradigm is widely accepted and promoted by government leaders reveals an important point about the struggle over political power. As Friedrich Hacker (1983:23) argues, it serves the economic and political interests of the state to have attention narrowly focused on
mental pathology:

By making the accusation of mental illness stick, everyone else is acquitted of guilt or participation. The social, legal, economic, and other bases of [insurgent] movements need no longer be considered.

Thus to preserve state power the use of violence directed towards insurgent groups becomes legitimized.

The remainder of this chapter continues to focus on micro-analytic antecedents of political terrorism by exploring both the relative deprivation thesis and the rational actor theory. Unlike the mental disorder perspective, these explanations assume that violent actions, including terrorism, are rational responses to social events and circumstances. While relative deprivation theory is concerned with structural strain (usually of an economic nature) and psychological mechanisms, the rational actor theory emphasizes the importance of ideology. All of these factors are notably absent from mental disorder theories.

FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION AND RELATIVE DEPRIVATION

The central proposition of frustration-aggression theory is straightforward: the inability to achieve a desired end creates frustration that can result in violent reactive forms of aggression. This psychological process has intuitive appeal; however, it is limited as an explanation of terrorism (and other forms of violence) because of the tenuous nature of
the alleged causal links. More specifically, not all frustration leads to aggression and not all aggression leads to violence (Dennen, 1977). For example, in some individuals frustration can result in withdrawing or becoming passive instead of aggressive. As well, aggression can be directed towards legitimate or non-violent behavior.

The frustration-aggression thesis has its foundation in the works of Dollard (1939), at the time a prominent Yale psychologist. It was first introduced to the field of political and social theory by James Davies (1962) who applied it to the Russian, French, and American revolutions. He argued that the gap between rising expectations and declining satisfactions generates frustration which leads to aggressive behavior. Later, the thesis was elaborated into a formalized and predictive theory by Ted Gurr in his book Why Men Rebel. Although frustration and aggression are central to Gurr's theory, the focal point is the concept of relative deprivation which he operationalizes as a "perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities" (1971:13). More specifically, political violence occurs when there is a difference between what people expect from society (e.g., economically and politically) and what the state appears capable of providing. Gurr argues that the greater the scope and intensity of the perceived deprivation, the greater the magnitude of civil violence.

The relative deprivation model is important in that it
goes beyond the one dimensional reductionism of most micro-level accounts of political violence and attempts to integrate structural factors. Moreover, unlike many micro-analytic accounts, which attribute political violence (including terrorism) to psychological pathology, Gurr considers such actions as rational decisions in a given macro-structural context.

It is easy to find examples that appear to substantiate the relative deprivation thesis. In the former Soviet Union, the reform policies of glasnost and perestroika led to the dramatic restructuring of the country's politics. In the past - particularly under Stalinism - vociferous political opposition would have been ruthlessly suppressed by the state's military and police. However, with the opening up of civil liberties and the devolution of the Soviet State, nationalist aspirations that had been dormant for decades once again found political expression. The growing desire for democratic expression and regional autonomy, along with the promise of a higher standard of living through the adoption of free-market economic policies, have raised expectations throughout many of the former Soviet Union's fifteen republics, as well as the satellite counties of Eastern Europe.

A similar dynamic can be found in China in the years and months leading up to the Tiananmen Square Massacre. Throughout the 1980s, Chinese society experienced a gradual
process of Westernization - the recognition of civil rights, capitalist production, and Western cultural values. However, many of the political activists were critical of the slow pace of reform. By the spring of 1989 this translated into a formidable opposition movement composed mainly of students and workers. Demands to speed up reforms intensified, and for several weeks large anti-government rallies were organized in Beijing's Tiananmen Square. The reform movements aspirations ended when the Chinese army marched in massacring hundreds of demonstrators in the process (Wong, 1989).

Although relative deprivation theory seems to apply to the above examples, as a general theory of political violence - or more specifically, as an explanation of political terrorism - its value is worth questioning. In addition to the inherent problems of the frustration-aggression thesis, theorists such as Paul Wilkinson (1977) and Martha Crenshaw (1981) argue that the concept is too operationally vague to explain terrorism adequately. To employ relative deprivation in the understanding of a terrorist incident requires an exhaustive analysis of cultural expectations and an assessment of tension created when satisfactions and expectations become blocked. For many critics, this methodological problem is so formidable that the concept has very limited theoretical utility. In addition, attempts to test relative deprivation in relation to terrorism have been largely unsuccessful (Schmid and Jongman, 1988). Even Gurr (1988) admitted that
his findings in the 1960s had little application to terrorism in the 1970s.

Vagueness is also a problem at the other end of the causal relationship. Gurr defines the dependent variable very broadly as political violence, referring to "all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies" (1970:21). Although Gurr includes terrorism within this overall definition, there is very little discussion of the phenomenon in his explication of relative deprivation. Gurr does not offer any explanation why terrorism is chosen as a political strategy over other forms of political violence.

While relative deprivation theory addresses civil rebellion in a general sense, the rational actor thesis (which is discussed next) deals specifically with the individual decision to choose terrorism over alternative political strategies.

THE RATIONAL ACTOR THESIS

The idea that the use of violence to achieve political objectives is based on rational motives was first introduced into social theory to explain the actions of peasant revolutionaries. Olson (1965), for example, posited a utilitarian model as a challenge to Freudian accounts of revolutionary violence espoused by a number of political
theorists in the 1920s. Later, Popkin (1979) applied a rational decision-making model to a study of peasant mobilization during the Vietnamese revolution. He argued that peasants engage in revolutionary violence because the expected utility is greater than if no action is taken.

Although terrorist action is a more specific form of revolutionary action, it is clear that the rational actor model is equally applicable to this form of violence. This can be illustrated by examining the volatile political climate in Russia beginning in the 1870s and culminating in the Russian revolution.

With the shift towards industrialization during the latter half of the nineteenth century a Russian working class began to form. The emergence of working class consciousness occurred at a time when democratic rebellions were sweeping Europe, hence many Russians began to demand substantial reforms to the political system. It became evident that the Czar was not interested in relinquishing his autocratic control when reformist demands - even from members of the aristocracy - were met with brutal repression. Under these circumstances, many people believed that violent revolutionary action was the only option available to bring about substantive political change in the Russian Empire. An organization known as the People's Will (i.e., the Narodniki) decided to transform these sentiments into action by assassinating Czar Alexander II and other political figures.
A few years later a second wave of terrorism led by the Combat Organization of the Socialist-Revolutionary party assassinated a number of government ministers and attacked members of the Russian bureaucracy (Avrich, 1978; Rubenstein, 1987).

Selective assassination of secret agents and government officials was considered a means of protecting the emerging revolutionary movement from the Russian state's brutal repression. Terrorist activity was also employed because it served to demonstrate to fellow revolutionaries and potential supporters that the Czarist autocracy was vulnerable to violent attack. Exposing the government's weaknesses served to inspire the revolutionary spirit which (it was hoped) would counteract the fear instilled by state terrorism.

Anti-state terrorism can be interpreted as a rational strategy because it forced the economically strained Czarist government to expend enormous scarce resources to counter the challenge from a handful of terrorists. As the state became increasingly desperate, it escalated its repressive actions killing many innocent Russians in the process. Consequently, support for the regime was lowered considerably and political instability increased. Thus, the cycle of anti-state terrorism and indiscriminate state terrorism paved the way for revolution.

It can be argued that in many cases a campaign of organized violence offers the only hope of overthrowing a repressive government. In addition to this many radicals
recognize that a strategy of terrorism can be highly efficacious. Compared to conventional and guerrilla warfare, the financial and human costs of engaging in a terrorist campaign are extremely low. Moreover, it is an effective method of gaining publicity. As one of the leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization argued:

... armed struggle was the only way to impose the Palestinian cause on world opinion and to rally our masses to the people's movement we were trying to create (Yiad, 1981:33).

Thus the intention of the 1972 Munich massacre and other dramatic acts of terrorism was to direct worldwide attention towards the plight of the Palestinians. Through the use of terrorist tactics, the PLO was attempting to show that adhering to the status quo would be costly: unless the problem was resolved to the satisfaction of Palestinians, the violence would continue.

Another rational component of terrorism is illustrated by the former PLO terrorist Leila Khaled (1973). When asked how she could justify murdering an innocent child held hostage by her during an airplane hijacking, she stated:

If we throw bombs, it is not our responsibility. You may care for the death of a child, but the whole world ignored the deaths of Palestinian children for twenty-two years. We are not responsible (cited in Sobel, 1975:3).

Khaled's motivation comes from her experiences working and living within the squalor of Palestinian refugee camps, and
witnessing first-hand the suffering of children who were victims of indiscriminate bombing.

Khaled and other Third World revolutionaries argue that it is hypocritical for people to condemn terrorism employed by oppressed minorities while ignoring the violent actions of the state which are far more extensive and brutal (Khaled, 1975). Palestinian activists, in particular, claim there is a cultural bias in the way that the issue is portrayed in the Western media (Said, 1988). As an example, they contend that while the actions of Palestinian guerrilla and terrorist groups are typically depicted as barbarous and irrational, the actions of Western countries - such as the bombing of Iraq - are considered rational and even heroic.

Whether the Palestinian's strategy has been effective is a debatable point. Clearly the Palestinian problem has received a considerable amount of international attention over the years. It is possible that such concern would not have been generated had it not been for the terrorist actions of extremists within the PLO (Peleg, 1988; Stohl, 1988). Although the PLO appear to be a long way from accomplishing their major objective - a homeland for the Palestinians - their failure in no way diminishes the argument that terrorism is ultimately a rational action.

Obviously, there is no reason why the rational actor theory cannot apply equally to state terrorism. Duvall and Stohl (1988, 1990) argue that for certain types of repressive
regimes, state terrorism is often the most efficient and rational strategy. By neutralizing the population through fear and intimidation, the government can focus its resources on identifying, apprehending, and eliminating political opposition. The numerous examples attesting to the efficacy and longevity of state terrorism (e.g., El Salvador, Guatemala, South Africa) support this point.

As discussed earlier in this chapter, although many social scientists and journalists selectively attribute the actions of famous political figures such as Saddam Hussein to mental pathology, it is important to examine the interpretive context of these assertions.

There is ample evidence in support of the view that the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait — and the subsequent unleashing of brutal terror tactics — was the result of rational decision making. This argument is made by economist Tom Naylor (1990) who has provided a detailed analysis of the key economic and political factors preceding the invasion. He points out that following the Iran-Iraq War the Iraqi government had accumulated a foreign debt of approximately 80 billion dollars. In a country that is almost completely dependent on oil earnings, which provide 95% of export revenues, this led to a serious fiscal crisis. In addition, because of a growing consumerist economy there was a perceived need to increase cash reserves — thus a policy of higher oil prices was desired. In contrast, Kuwait, with a small population in
relation to oil reserves (plus substantial foreign cash deposits), was among a minority of OPEC countries that favoured lower oil prices. This led to a policy of overproduction - much to the displeasure of the Iraqi government. Added to this were long standing historical grievances that began with the breakup of the Ottoman Empire and the decision by the British to turn Kuwait into a commercial protectorate of British India. This cut off Turkish Mesopotamia (which later became Iraq) from most of its access to the Persian Gulf. During the war the restricted access made it easier for Iran to block Iran's oil exports through the Gulf.

An important dimension to the conflict concerns the ethnic composition of the Kuwaiti population. The oil industry in Kuwait is controlled exclusively by a minority ethnic group from the Nejdi region (the eastern part of Saudi Arabia). However, the majority of the indigenous population is of Iraqi origin. Although they are technically Kuwaiti citizens, their socio-economic status is subordinate to that of the Nejdis. This fact had long been a source of tension between the Iraqi and Kuwaiti governments. At the bottom of the social hierarchy were the thousands of migrant Palestinians, Lebanese and Egyptians workers who comprised the majority of the population.

Because of these factors Saddam Hussien calculated that an invasion could reduce his country's strategic and economic
vulnerability while at the same time correcting an historical injustice. He reasoned that he could succeed in such a venture because of: (1) nationalistic support from the indigenous population of Iraqi descent and support from the disgruntled foreign population; (2) the capacity to engage in a formidable military operation; and (3) the perception that the United States and the foreign community in general would not get seriously involved.

As with many world leaders, Saddam Hussein has demonstrated a willingness to employ extremely ruthless and unscrupulous methods in achieving his political objectives. His use of terrorism (domestically and during the invasion and occupation of Kuwait) may even be considered morally reprehensible. However, it does not follow that Saddam Hussein's behavior can be explained as the product of an underlying mental pathology. As discussed earlier in this chapter, there is insufficient evidence in support of this view. Moreover, given the political and historical circumstances, the most plausible explanation is that the actions were rationally motivated.

The Free-Rider Problem

The free-rider problem raises an important criticism of rational actor theories — especially in terms of anti-state terrorism. It posits that the likelihood of participation in political activity that is in the interests of the individual
can be reduced by others taking action. Thus an individual may feel that terrorist action directed at the state may be the only avenue for achieving a given ideological objective; however, if other like minded individuals are engaged in terrorism, there is no need to act. Clearly, in addition to political interest, other mechanisms are needed to explain why some individuals act and others do not.

A possible solution to the free-rider problem can be found within the social psychological realm - more specifically, by examining the organizational context of terrorism and the role of the group in sustaining terrorism. Given the widely disparate social, economic, and ideological conditions under which terrorism occurs, empirical generalizations are difficult to make. Despite this, the research isolates two common themes. First, it appears that many individuals become part of a terrorist organization to satisfy affective needs not otherwise satisfied in the wider society (Crenshaw, 1981, 1985). For example, the desire to belong to a group or community can be a powerful incentive to become involved - particularly among individuals that are already on the margins of society. Second, once an individual becomes part of the group, the internal dynamics of the organization can serve to promote further acts of terrorism. (Russel and Miller, 1977; Clarke, 1983; Post, 1987). The psychological pressure to conform to group demands, the emotional dependency on the organization, and social isolation
from outside influences are among the factors that contribute to this process.

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS**

This chapter has examined political terrorism by examining three important micro-analytic perspectives: (1) theories of mental disorder; (2) relative deprivation theory; and (3) the rational actor thesis.

It was argued that research supporting a link between mental disorders and terrorism is conceptually and methodologically flawed. In addition to questionable empirical support, much of the research reflects an ethnocentric bias. While this form of psychologizing offers little insight into the actual causes of terrorist behavior, the attention it receives from government leaders reveals an important political function. If the pathological label is successfully applied to insurgent terrorists, there is no compelling reason for the state to find peaceful solutions to political conflicts. Furthermore, this could lead to the implementation of draconian measures which could enhance the likelihood of state terrorism.

From the discussion in this chapter it is clear that there is an important normative context to terrorist action. In this regard relative deprivation theory provides an explanation of civil strife (if not anti-state terrorism specifically) that presupposes rational decision making.
Although the explanation seems applicable to many situations and is able to explain large scale civil violence - for example, the political convulsions in Europe following the collapse of the Soviet empire - it does not address the specific decision to use terrorism as a political strategy.

Because of the serious flaws in the mental disorder perspective and the shortcomings of the relative deprivation theory, the rational actor thesis appears to offer the best explanation of terrorist behavior. Terrorists can best be understood as rational decision makers - despite the possibility that their actions are morally and tactically indefensible. Finally, although it is ultimately the individual who commits an act of terrorism, it is essential to avoid psychological reductionism. The cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the decision to employ terrorism must be examined within a much broader theoretical framework - one that conceptualizes macro-structural, organizational, and micro-analytic factors within an historical context. Providing such a framework has been the goal of this thesis.
1. A mental disorder is defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) as:

. . . a clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in a person and that is associated with present distress (a painful symptom) or disability (impairment in one or more areas of functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom (xxii).

2. A thorough review of all of these explanations is beyond the scope of this thesis - thus the following discussion provides an overview of some of the more widely circulated theories.

3. DSM-III-R uses the term "anti-social personality disorder" to describe what was previously referred to as either sociopathy or psychopathy. While the label has changed, it still refers to the same "disorder"; thus for the purpose of this discussion the various terms are used interchangeably.

4. According to an analysis of the Gulf War devastation by Paul Rogers (1991), casualty estimates range from a low of 65,000 to 100,000 (a Saudi military source) to a high of 100,000 to 200,000 (the Christian Science Monitor).

5. Similarly, most people in the West find it hard to understand the motivations of Shiite terrorists. Their actions have more to do with the religious belief, shared by millions of Muslims, that death in a holy war is rewarded by ascension to heaven, than with a willingness to die for personal reasons (Rapoport, 1987).
APPENDIX:

TABLES AND FIGURES
# Table 1.1

**Political Terrorism: A Conceptualization**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Characteristics</th>
<th>Secondary Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. An act of extreme violence.</td>
<td>4. The perpetrator(s) operate(s) in a secretive, clandestine manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. An intention to communicate a political message to an audience other than the immediate victim.</td>
<td>5. An organized group activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. An intention to produce extreme fear and anxiety in the audience.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2.1
State and Anti-state Terrorism: Breakdown of Conceptual Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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Figure 1.1

Political Terrorism: Communicative Aspects

AUDIENCE

PERPETRATOR

Violent Action

IMMEDIATE TARGET

AUDIENCE

Message

Message
Figure 1.2
A Typology of Political Terrorism

POLITICAL TERRORISM

NON-STATE TERRORISM

ANTI-STATE TERRORISM
  ETHNIC-NATIONALIST
  IDEOLOGICAL
    RELIGIOUS
    SECULAR

SINGLE ISSUE
  RADICAL LEFT
  RELIGIOUS RIGHT
  NEO-FASCIST

STATE TERRORISM

INTERNAL
  INFORMAL
    VIGILANTE
    DEATH SQUADS
  FORMAL
    POLICE
    MILITARY

EXTERNAL
Figure 2.1
History, Conflict, and Terrorism: Structural Antecedents

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Figure 2.2
Anti-State Terrorism Model

MACRO-STRUCTURAL

ORGANIZATIONAL

INDIVIDUAL

RATIONAL MOTIVES

HISTORY
- TRAJECTORIES
- SPECIFICITY

POLITICAL TERRORISM

ECONOMIC MODE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE
ETHNICITY

GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
COUNTER-INSURGENCY MEASURES
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

IDEOLOGY

Non-action
Conventional Politics
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