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Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

The Politics of Multiculturalism in Canada, 1963-1971

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Abstract

The policy of multiculturalism was implemented by the Liberal government under Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau to win ethnic votes for the Liberal party, and to counter the Quebec nationalists' demand for special status. Political activists among the third force vigorously lobbied the federal government for recognition of multiculturalism in the face of the rising Quebec nationalism. They feared that the federal government would recognize bilingualism and biculturalism, and ignore their demands for cultural recognition. The strong opposition to federal bilingualism in the West, and the Conservative party's successful bid to attract ethnic votes under Diefenbaker, had made the Liberal party more responsive to the demands of the third force. To improve the electoral fortunes of the Liberal party, and to defeat Quebec nationalism and separatism, Trudeau had to create a balance between Quebec's demand for bilingualism and biculturalism and the third force demand for multiculturalism. The compromise was multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.

The study applies a historical-political analysis with some references to a rational choice model to explain both the political motives of various individuals and forces engaged in the politics of multiculturalism, and the context in which they made choices. The first chapter is an introduction, and it explains the concepts and terms used in the study. The second chapter deals with the historical context in which the policy of
multiculturalism evolved. It analyses various political, historical, and demographic forces that provided an impetus for multiculturalism. Chapter three focuses on the politics of multiculturalism, and explores the strategy and tactics adopted by various political forces to obtain their goals. Chapter four deals with the political implementation of the policy of multiculturalism, at the federal level. It also includes a brief survey of critical literature on multiculturalism. The thesis concludes, in chapter five, that while other reasons may have existed, the main objective of Trudeau in introducing multiculturalism was to win ethnic votes, and to counter the demands of Quebec nationalists for special status.
Dedication:

To my mother, Darshan Kaur Purewal.
Acknowledgment

This study would not have been possible without the help of many people, and the author would like to express his thanks to those who gave him special assistance:

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And to my wife, Jeetender, who not only provided useful assistance throughout the writing stages but reminded me life involved more than work on a thesis.
Quotations:

Better hatred than the friendship of fools.
Better death than chronic illness.
Better to be killed than soul-destroying contempt.
Better abuse than praise undeserved.
[From *Naladiyar*]

To unriddle the world,
    one must take every chance;
Pay no heed to the obstacles,
    climb and- advance!
[ *Tajik Poetry*]
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study explores the politics behind the federal government's decision to implement a policy of multiculturalism in 1971. It seeks to identify the players, their interests, and their political activities during the policy formation years. Although various provinces had developed their own multicultural policies, in particular Alberta and Ontario which announced their policies before the federal government in 1971, this study will focus exclusively on the federal multiculturalism policy. It relies on a historical analysis to explain the motives of the forces involved in the politics of multiculturalism, their strategy and tactics, and the reasons for the government's adoption of the policy. From the time of the announcement of the establishment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism in 1963 to the actual announcement of the policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework" in 1971, a whole array of political forces, from different ethnic interest groups to the upper echelons of the government, were involved in putting multiculturalism on the government's agenda. These political forces were led by various individuals who had definite political interests at stake. In order to understand the political self-interest of these individuals, the study occasionally refers to a rational choice theory, which regards

1 Hereafter referred to as the B and B Commission.
politics as a particular set of institutions forming a process for amalgamating individual preferences into a collective choice of policy or outcome. However, without the study of various socio-historical factors during the period under discussion, the context in which choices were made by individuals would remain a puzzle. Such a situation would lead to a distorted vision of the topic under discussion.

THE POLICY OF MULTICULTURALISM

On October 8, 1971, the government of Canada announced the policy of "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." The new policy was the product of a decade old political activity aimed at creating a new symbolic order for Canada, which would recognize the new social and demographic reality of Canada. Acting on the recommendations of the B and B Commission's Book IV- Cultural Contribution of the Other Canadian, Prime Minister Trudeau announced in the House of Commons on that day that "the government has accepted all those recommendations of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism which are contained in Volume IV of its reports directed to federal departments and agencies." Furthermore, he told the House;


3 More detailed discussion on the B and B Commission is in chapters 2, 3 and 4.

4 House of Commons, Debates, October 8, 1971, p. 8545.
There cannot be one cultural policy for Canadians of British and French origin, another for the original peoples and yet a third for all others. For although there are two official languages, there is no official culture, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other. No citizen or group of citizens is other than Canadian, and all should be treated fairly. National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for that of others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence.5

Trudeau's policy announcement received enthusiastic support not only from his own party, but also from the Progressive Conservatives and the New Democrats in the House. The policy was an important vote winning device. Therefore, no party was willing to oppose it. The Liberals were trying to attract the votes of the non-British, non-French and non-Native ethnics.6 Both opposition parties were aware of the political impact of this morally sound policy. The numbers, concentrations, and electoral significance of the other Canadians, in both the Prairie provinces and immigrant-receiving cities, could not be ignored by the established parties.7 Keeping this in mind, each leader in the House welcomed the policy with eloquent words. Robert Stanfield, leader of the Opposition, greeted it by stating that "it is about time this government finally admitted that the

5 Ibid.

6 Hereafter referred to as the other Canadians, the third element, the minority ethnics, or the third force.

cultural identity of Canada is a pretty complex thing."8 David Lewis, the leader of the New Democratic Party, stated that "it is a deep appreciation of both aspects of our Canadian cultural life, official bilingualism and multiculturalism, that my party warmly supports the principles set forth this morning by the Prime Minister."9

Some of the mainstream Canadian media, however, viewed the new policy as a handout to the other Canadians. "Ethnic king for a day,"10 wrote Charles Lynch, a columnist for The Ottawa Citizen. In a front page headline, Montreal Gazette flashed "Ethnic groups win Ottawa's recognition."11 The Winnipeg Free Press's headline read, "Multiculturalism: PM outlines Ethnic aid."12 The Globe and Mail gave little space to the story in a report covering the tenth congress of the Ukrainian-Canadian Council held a day after the announcement of the policy of multiculturalism. While the editorial of The Ottawa Citizen greeted the new policy by stating that "Canada's multicultural society is not only a fact, but one that should be nourished,"13 its reporter, Ben Tierney presented quite a different picture in covering the story. "The federal government," he wrote, "is

8 House of Commons, Debates, op. cit., p. 8546.
9 Ibid.
10 The Ottawa Citizen, October 9, 1971, p. 7.
prepared to spend an unspecified amount of money to assist in keeping alive in Canada the ways of the old country."14 Various journalists did not view multiculturalism from the point of view of creating a new symbolic and cultural order for all Canadians, but they considered it an instrument to perpetuate the existing ethnic differences.

The symbolic order of any society is an important aspect of a political culture. Breton points out that the construction of a symbolic order entails first a system of ideas as to who we are as a people.15 This identity is represented in the multiplicity of symbols surrounding the rituals of public life, the functioning of institutions, and the public celebration of events, groups and individuals.16 Many sections of Canadian society were unhappy with the old symbolic order of Canada, which was mainly British in appearance and content. They demanded a new symbolic and cultural order, in which all Canadians could recognize themselves in the public institutions and ceremonies of the country. The demand for multiculturalism by the third force was an important step in that direction.

14 The Ottawa Citizen, October 9, 1971, p. 28.


16 Breton, Ibid.
The French-Canadians, like the third force, were also not satisfied with the old order. However, their vision of a new Canada was dualist-based on the notion of two founding races. Thus, their response was an outright rejection of the policy of multiculturalism. Their rejection was understandable, as the new policy had effectively "neutralized the special claims of French and Native Canadians."\(^1\) Claude Ryan, in a speech given at the Heritage Ontario Congress, stated that "if Canada is to have a future, this future will be based on the principle of equality of the two founding peoples."\(^2\) The content of the French-Canadian vision of Canadian symbolic order was based on the concept of "two founding nations." They were not willing to accept their position in Canada being reduced to the level of one of many ethnic groups as the policy of multiculturalism suggested. In a letter addressed to Prime Minister Trudeau, Robert Bourassa accused the federal government of going against "the mandate of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism as defined

\(^{17}\) Here, I have used the term French-Canadian only to describe the mainstream Quebec politicians, journalists, academics, etc., who were speaking on behalf of French Canadians. I do not suggest that every French-Canadian, or even every politician, journalist or academic, held similar views on the policy of multiculturalism.


by the government of Canada."

Furthermore, he rejected the federal government's approach to the principle of multiculturalism. He concluded that since the federal government assumed responsibility "for all the other cultures which are to be found in Canada, Quebec must take on within its own territory the role of prime defender of the French language and culture."

ETHNICITY AND CULTURE

Prime Minister Trudeau announced the policy of multiculturalism in fine moral terms. However, the concepts and terms, such as "ethnicity" and "culture", used by him and various others behind the policy presented new problems which were complex, to say the least. What did the government mean when it said, "although there are two official languages, there are no official cultures, nor does any ethnic group take precedence over any other." Can language be separated from culture or vice-versa? What is an ethnic group? Does it have outer boundaries to separate it from other groups within the society? These seemingly simple concepts and terms, used rather vaguely by the government, presented very complex problems in analysis and interpretation that the academics have been struggling to explain and define ever since the promulgation of the policy of multiculturalism.

Berry et al. pointed out "the existence of multiple


21 Ibid.
cultural or ethnic groups" as a precondition for plural society. Christensen defined multicultural society as having "several identifiable different cultural, ethnic or racial groups, each of which maintained a significant degree of cultural autonomy vis-a-vis the other groups." And all of them live "within the boundaries of the same political state." Christensen's definition includes "cultural, ethnic, and racial" groups in one category. Do ethnic groups exist which incorporate "cultural and racial" features, or is it an attempt to glue three different social groups into one. An ethnic group must have its own culture; it may be similar to many others or uniquely its own, and the group members must also have some racial features. Can there be just cultural groups without ethnicity or race; or can there be racial groups without ethnicity and culture? If all three terms are interchangeable, should then a society be called multi-cultural, multi-ethnic, or multi-racial?

The federal government's policy of multiculturalism did not clearly specify the meaning of culture. Berry et al. argue that culture "may refer to aspects of leisure, recreation and entertainment, on the one hand, and the way of life associated


24 Ibid.
with an entire people or society, on the other."25 The government policy, in funding and symbolic gestures, has focused more on the first aspect of culture defined by Berry et al. However, the B and B Commission's definition, in Book IV, includes the second aspect of culture. It defined culture "as a way of being, thinking and feeling. It is a driving force animating a significant group of individuals united by a common tongue and sharing the same customs, habits and experiences."26

The government's artificial separation of culture and language created the main problem in the cultural aspect of the policy of multiculturalism. Can we perceive a culture without a language? Various ethnic minorities objected to the framework of official bilingualism from the standpoint that multiculturalism without multilingualism was meaningless. The French-Canadians, on the other hand, objected to the government's position that Canada has no official culture. They were not satisfied with the recognition of French language minus French culture.

The government declared that Canada does not have an official culture. Thus, all ethnic groups were encouraged to maintain their cultural or ethnic identity. Anderson states that "the meaning of ethnic identity may be defined from the standpoint of the academic observer (objective definition) or


from that of the ethnic individual (subjective)."27 Racial features have been the primary focus to define certain groups, while "others have been identified primarily on the basis of their language, religion, and/or various folkways."28 Isajiw attributes the following qualities to an ethnic group: common ancestral origin, culture, religion, race and language.29 The B and B Commission pointed out that "what counts most in our concepts of an 'ethnic group' is not one's ethnic origin or even one's mother tongue, but one's sense of belonging to a group, and the group's collective will to exist."30 If individual sense of belonging to a group is an important variable, then no group can be considered a solid bloc. Anderson notes that "an individual member of the group may not identify with the group."31 He cites the case of Ukrainian Canadians. According to the 1971 census, there were 581,000 people of Ukrainian origin in Canada. Anderson contends that many authors will take this figure at its face value and consider it the Ukrainian Canadian ethnic group's total strength. However, the 1971 census also shows that approximately


28 Ibid., p. 7.


half are unable to speak the Ukrainian language, and less than a quarter use it as their first language at home; half no longer attend a Ukrainian orthodox or Catholic church, and half of married Ukrainian Canadians do not have Ukrainian spouses.32 Considering these figures, can we still say that the Ukrainian Canadian ethnic group was 581,000 strong in 1971? What about those members who do not identify themselves with the group anymore? The problem with the definition of ethnicity, according to Anderson, is who is defining whom. Furthermore, the dynamic and the static approaches may produce different definitions.  

INDIVIDUAL VS. COLLECTIVE RIGHTS

The classical liberal approach would view the policy of multiculturalism extending recognition to various ethnic groups as violation of the spirit of liberal democracy. The individual, under the new policy, had no personal identity except for his membership in this or that ethnic group. Many proponents of multiculturalism, however, feared the reverse. Trudeau was considered a die-hard liberal. He had been a supporter of individual rights in Quebec. Taking issue with Quebec nationalists over the language question, he stated, "I am afraid that excessive preoccupation with the future of the language has made certain people forget the future of the man speaking it."33

32 Ibid.

His opposition to Quebecois nationalism on the basis of such liberal principles aroused fears in the minds of those who were pushing for the recognition of the cultural diversity of Canada, and government support for the preservation of ethnic identities. Groenewold's (1975) pamphlet title eloquently expressed these concerns: Multiculturalism: Can Trudeau's Liberalism Tolerate it? He expressed concerns over Trudeau's national unity theme and the advocacy of individual freedoms.

Kymlicka notes that in ethnically diverse countries individuals "are incorporated into the state not 'universally' (i.e. each individual citizen stands in the same direct relationship to the state), but 'consociationally' (i.e. through membership in one or other of the cultural communities)."34 What has come under fire from some liberal circles is the concept of 'consociational' incorporation into the state. The collectivist approach to rights, they hold, would curtail individual rights. The individual forms the basic cell of the society, independent of any hereditary baggage, be it social or cultural. As a symbol of ultimate moral authority, he is to be respected as an equal by the government; thus each individual has equal rights and entitlements.35 The concept of cultural defence must not be used to deny or limit individual rights. "Even if cultural membership needs to be secured, why does that require anything other than a


35 Kymlicka, Ibid., p. 140.
colour-blind egalitarian distribution of resources and liberties?"36

This view of individual rights does not take into account that individuals are born into cultural and ethnic groups. If these groups, because of their minority status or for other reasons, are denied certain social, economic and political rights, the individuals comprising these groups suffer directly from such discrimination. Thus, they are unable to develop their individual personalities to enjoy "equal rights and resources." Weaver has rightly observed that such liberalism "fails to detect that choices are possible only under certain conditions."37 John Porter's study had demonstrated that same opportunities were not available to all Canadians to climb the social and corporate ladder irrespective of ethnic origins. In fact, the top steps of the ladder were occupied by Canadians of British descent. The individual rights of the other Canadians were not suffering in the domain of ethnic collectives, but from a social and economic order, which was vertical.

The report of the B and B Commission notes that "man is a thinking and sensitive being; severing him from his roots could destroy an aspect of his personality and deprive society of some of the values he can bring to it."38 The policy of

36 Ibid., p. 182.

37 Quoted in Ibid, p. 206.

Multiculturalism was in no way designed to hold the individuals in permanent "ethnic cages" as feared by some liberals. Trudeau stated in the House that "the individual's freedom would be hampered if he were locked for life within a particular cultural compartment by the accident of birth or language."39 Thus, the new policy of multiculturalism promised to give full scope to individual rights even within a seemingly collective rights approach.

MULTICULTURALISM IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Said and Simmons' (1976) sample of 132 states showed that only 12 (9.1 percent) can be considered ethnic-free.40 However, there are very few states which have properly managed ethnic relations within a democratic context. Historically in Canada, successive governments have also rejected cultural diversity as incompatible with the concept of nation-building and national identity.41 However, they did not stand alone in rejecting diversity.

The United States grew up believing that American society was a 'melting pot' in which immigrants of various ethnic backgrounds gave up their traditional cultures and embraced the

39 Canada, House of Commons, Debates, op. cit., p. 8545.


new American way of life. However, the studies on ethnicity, i.e. Glazer and Moynihan (1964), revealed a different picture of the society. These studies pointed out that the concept of a melting pot did not find its material base in American society. Ethnics did not melt into proto-American types, but remained Puerto-Ricans, Italians, Chinese, etc., even though they may have acquired certain American values. Thus, Glazer and Mohnihan concluded that "the notion that the intense and unprecedented mixture of ethnic and religious groups in American life was soon to blend into a homogeneous end product has outlived its usefulness and also its credibility." Similarly, a more recent study on Basque-Americans concluded that "despite the fact that Basques have resided in the United States since its inception, they have yet to assimilate fully." In light of the new reality, the recent American administrations have been adopting more and more multicultural policies in dealing with the cultural diversity of American society. The adoption of various affirmative action programs reflects the changed perception of American ethnic reality.

The governments of Australia and New Zealand have also adopted multicultural policies similar to the Canadian policy.


Immigration has been the basis of the statehood of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, and it is highly likely that they will "continue to rely upon immigration as the source of population growth and economic vitality." All three countries have had racist immigration policies and practiced assimilation to Anglo-Saxon culture. As in Canada, the post World War II immigration to Australia included a large number of non-British immigrants. This changed the ethnic composition of Australia from mainly British to multiethnic. It also meant a large number of votes for the party espousing multiculturalism. The Australian Labour Party and the Canadian Liberal Party adopted multicultural policies to attract ethnic votes in their bids to stay in power.

However, once adopted, no matter for what political objectives, the multicultural policies in Australia, Canada and New Zealand have created new environments for managing ethnic relations. Hudson notes that common patterns under multiculturalism have emerged in all three countries, including the need to

"(a) encourage peaceful race relations and intercultural exchange; (b) eliminate discrimination and promote national unity; (c) reduce social and economic disadvantages; (d) assist ethnic groups in the preservation of their identities; (e) educate the public regarding the merits of actual pluralism."

The adoption of multiculturalism has made Canada one of those democratic societies which have taken advantage of cultural

pluralism and ethnic revitalization as a bases for national identity and nation-building. Its primary role in the implementation of a multicultural policy has been gaining more and more recognition throughout the world. The expertise of Canadian Multicultural Directorate has been sought by countries such as Holland, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and even the United States.

THE MAJOR HYPOTHESIS OF THE STUDY

The major hypothesis of the study is that the policy of multiculturalism was announced by Trudeau for two political reasons: (i) to win votes for the Liberal Party, and (ii) its usefulness in fighting Quebec nationalism and separatism. The success of the Progressive Conservative party under Diefenbaker from 1957 to 1963 in attracting ethnic votes, and the subsequent decline of the Liberal party in the West in general, forced Trudeau to adopt strategies to save the Liberals from extinction in the West. The demand for recognition by the third element, which had a numerical strength in the Prairie provinces which no party could afford to ignore, was accepted by the Liberals under Trudeau in 1971, a year before the 1972 federal elections, in order to win support in the West and urban Canada, in


particular, and among the voters of the third force throughout the country, in general. It was also an important strategy to neutralize the claims of Quebec politicians for special status. Some authors have observed that the government brought in multiculturalism "only in order to have a counterpoise to French-Canadian aspirations."48

CHAPTER II

IMPETUS FOR MULTICULTURALISM

Throughout Canadian history, the British and French have been making special claims for themselves for the primary roles they played in colonizing the country. Voltaire observed that these "two nations are fighting a war over a few acres of snow on the edge of Canada, and they are spending more on that glorious war than the whole of Canada is worth." That war was finally won by the British. For the next two centuries, they became masters of more than a "few acres of snow" in North America, and the country was worth more than the cost of any number of wars waged to conquer it. Canada's richness and its leaders' decision to expand its population base to settle various parts of the country attracted people from all over the world. Their labour changed the face of Canada's economy, and their presence created a mosaic of different races and cultures. Canada became a truly pluralistic society.

In his comparative analysis of the values and institutions of the United States and Canada, Seymour Lipset observed that

1 Voltaire, Candide, Translated by Lowell Bair, Toronto: Bantam Books, 1959, p. 92.

2 It had been pluralistic from long before confederation. Besides the British, French, and natives, a small number of other ethnics had also settled in the country. In 1871, the British element constituted 60.55 per cent of the population, the French 31.07 per cent, the Germans 5.82 per cent, the Dutch 0.85 per cent, Russians 0.02 per cent, Scandinavians 0.05 per cent. Altogether the other Canadians constituted 8 per cent of the population. See Howard Palmer, ed. Immigration and the Rise of Multiculturalism. Vancouver: Copp-Clark, 1975, pp. 206-207.
"one of Canadians' important self-images is that their society is a 'mosaic'."3 This mosaic has been an important part of the Canadian political culture. Metaphorically, Canada was considered a "cultural mosaic" and the United States a "melting pot."4 From time to time, the British authorities adopted policies aimed at the assimilation of other ethnic groups, including the French. However, it never gave rise to an image of a proto-Canadian type, as was the case with the American ideal of a melting pot. Allan Smith notes that "the absence of a national type and the absence of a clear and specific national faith which all Canadians could profess, meant that there was nothing to which an immigrant could be required to assimilate."5 In contrast, the United States offered an ideology, a set of values, and a culture, which any immigrant could make his own.6

The absence of a proto-Canadian type did not deter some Canadian leaders from advocating Anglo-conformity. Speaking in the House of Commons on June 7, 1928, R.B. Bennet said:

We earnestly and sincerely believe that the civilization which we call the British civilization is the standard by which we must measure our own civilization; we must desire to assimilate those whom we bring to this country to that civilization (emphasis


6 Ibid., p. 253.
added), that standard of living, that regard for morality and law and the institutions of the country and to the ordered and regulated development of this country.7

Some British imperial loyalists, however, propagated Anglo-conformity in a rather contradictory manner. In 1919, the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire passed resolutions to propagate British ideals and institutions and to make new Canadians "one hundred percent British in language, thought, feeling and impulse." At the same meeting, they also passed a resolution protesting foreigners taking British names.8

It was against the background of these attitudes that the struggle for multiculturalism began in the sixties. A number of factors gave an impetus to the movement toward the official recognition of multiculturalism; among them: increased immigration, the American presence, the decline of the British empire, government's initiatives to reduce Canada's symbolic ties with England, and the Quebec independence movement.9 There is little doubt that these, and other factors, including the decolonization process internationally, and the civil rights movement of the sixties, played important roles in shaping the movement for multiculturalism. The present chapter will focus on


the following critical factors: immigration and the changing ethnic composition of the Canadian population; Quebec nationalism; and the B and B Commission.

POST WORLD WAR II IMMIGRATION AND THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN POPULATION

Canada is a nation of immigrants. The successive governments have relied on immigration to settle various parts of the country and to sustain growth in the economy. Prime Minister Mackenzie King summed-up the government position on immigration:

The government's long term program is based on the conviction that Canada needs population. A large population will help to develop our resources. By providing a large number of consumers, in other words a large domestic market, it will reduce the present dependence of Canada on the export of primary products.10

The White Paper on Immigration in 1966 echoed King's ideas on immigration. It stated that "the requirement for economic efficiency and progress is that manpower and immigration policies should be closely related parts of a single endeavour." Further, "a bigger population means increased domestic markets for our industries."11 The desire to expand the work force and domestic markets through immigration was not always colour blind. Canadian governments practiced systematic discrimination in the domain of immigration prior to the 1960s. Historian Howard Palmer notes that


The most desirable immigrants were British and American, followed by Western and northern Europeans, then other Europeans. Near the border of the pecking order were the pacifist religious sects— the Hutterites, Mennonites and Doukhobors. Last were Blacks and Asians.12

Along with the British and the French, significant concentrations of Germans, Dutch, and Scandinavians were present by 1900.13 By the end of nineteenth century, immigrants from Eastern Europe, mainly from Poland and the Ukraine, began to settle in Canada. Asian and African immigrants faced open discrimination at the hands of immigration authorities. Chinese immigrants, for example, were subjected to a head tax from 1885 to 1923. It was not until after 1962, when immigration regulations were changed to eliminate explicit discrimination on the basis of race or nationality, that the preponderance of English-speaking and European immigrants began to decline.14

Between 1945 and 1970, European countries were the largest sources of immigration to Canada. The decade of the seventies witnessed a decline in European immigration compared to the immigration from Asian countries. Since 1981, Asia has been the largest single source of new immigrants to Canada.15 The impact of a non-racial immigration policy began to show results in the


14 Ibid.

same decade (1960's). Whereas immigration from Asian countries constituted little over one percent of the total in the period of 1945-1950, it increased to more than 10 percent in the decade of 1961-1970. At the same time, immigration from Europe declined to 65 percent of the total in the period of 1961-1970, from more than 80 percent just after the second world war.

The post-war boom in the immigration from non-British sources changed the ethnic composition of Canada from overwhelmingly British and French to that of multicultural stock. By 1971, the proportion of people of non-British and non-French origin had increased from only eight percent in 1871, to twenty-six percent of the population. The proportion of the British element has continued its downward trend ever since 1871. In the census of 1871, the British constituted 60.55 percent of the Canadian population. Their numbers declined to 43.85 percent in 1961 and went up slightly to 44.62 percent in 1971. The French proportion has remained almost steady over the past century. In 1871, French Canadians were 31.01 percent of the population. In 1961, they were 30.38 percent of the population, taking another slight downward slide in 1971, when the percentage of the French speaking population was 28.65.

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16 Multicultural Canada, Ibid., p. 65.
17 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
Canadians were of non-British and non-French origin.

Given the numerical strength of the minority ethnic groups, many commentators began referring to it as a third force in Canadian society. This collectivity of all non-English and non-French ethnic groups found an early spokesman in Senator Paul Yuzyk, who, in a speech in the Senate on March 3, 1964, put forward the idea of a third force. He reminded Canadians that Canada had significantly changed since confederation. Furthermore, Canada was never a bicultural country as the terms and references of the B and B Commission had suggested. Said Senator Yuzyk:

In reality, Canada never was bicultural; the Indians and Eskimos have been with us throughout our history; the British group is multicultural—English, Scots, Irish, Welsh; and with the settling of other ethnic groups, which now make up almost one-third of the population, Canada has become multicultural in fact.

The third element was not only a force in itself as a large portion of the Canadian society, it had strong regional roots. It was the dominant force in Saskatchewan, with 53 percent, while the British and the French were only 40 percent and 7 percent of the province's population respectively. The third force formed the largest element in Alberta and Manitoba, with 49 percent and

20 It does not suggest that non-British and non-French ethnic groups were united in any umbrella group for a common purpose. Its only relevance is that it creates a category for non-British, non-French, and non-Native ethnic Canadians.


22 Paul Yuzyk, Maiden Speech, Debates of the Senate, March 3, 1964, p. 34.
48 percent respectively. In general, the third element formed about 50 percent of the population of the three prairie provinces, while it had the significant proportions in British Columbia of 35 percent, Ontario 30 percent and Nova Scotia 17 percent. 23

The overwhelming majority of the third force was not comprised of new immigrants but of second and third generation Canadians of non-British and non-French origin. They had known no other homeland than Canada. Their contribution in settling and building the West and other parts of Canada was in no way less than the contributions of British and French Canadians. They accepted Canadian laws and worked within the norms of British parliamentary system. The third element, however, was in no way united as a solid group. It consisted of not only dozens of different ethnic groups, but of people who had different aims, objectives and aspirations. The people of eastern European descent from the Prairies were now competing against the dominant Anglo-Saxon elite in political and economic spheres, while the Southern Europeans and the visible minority groups, as new immigrants, faced different problems. These different ethnic groups, however, tried to address some of their problems through some common platforms. They co-operated through the Canada Ethnic Press Federation, founded in 1940; the Canadian Folk Arts Council, founded in 1964 under the jurisdiction of the department of Citizenship; and the Canadian Citizenship Councils and their

23 Yuzyk, Ibid., pp. 28-29.
braches in various cities.24

DIEFENBAKER'S VICTORY

The victory of the Progressive Conservatives in the 1957 federal election was a significant event for the country as a whole as well as for the minority ethnic groups. For the first time in history, a non-English and non-French Canadian had become the prime minister of Canada.25 It was also the first time that the federal Tories had made a major breakthrough among ethnic voters.26 Prime Minister Diefenbaker opened the doors of the Conservative party to all races. The Tories began recruiting newcomers to the party. They also courted the leaders of the ethnic press associations. The party encouraged its candidates to cultivate what it called "ethnic co-operators" to do "undercover" work in ethnic groups.27 The ethnic composition of the party was now less British than before. In Prime Minister Diefenbaker's words:

From being an Ontario-based, Toronto - and Montreal- dominated, racially exclusive party, appealing mainly to those of British ancestry...the Conservative Party had opened its doors to encompass most if not all the races that comprised modern


25 John G. Diefenbaker was of German descent.


27 Ibid.
The Conservatives had not only recruited members from the third element, but they also nominated candidates from the minority ethnic groups. In the twenty-fourth Parliament, the Conservative contingent included representatives of eighteen different ethnic and racial groups, including a Chinese (Douglas Jung from Vancouver Centre) and a Lebanese (Ed Nassereden from Rosthern). Diefenbaker appointed Michael Starr, a Ukrainian Canadian, to his cabinet as Labour Minister, thus making him the first Canadian cabinet minister of East European descent.

While the Conservative government's efforts to recruit from the minority ethnics were praiseworthy, its Quebec base remained weak. Le Devoir had warned its readers before the December 1956 Conservative party's leadership convention that Diefenbaker would be unacceptable because he had never shown any sympathy for French Canada. As well as an anti-Catholic charge by French-Canadians linking Diefenbaker to Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's; Diefenbaker had passionately stood for conscription during World War II. When in power, he did little to appease the French. His naming of fifteen Royal Commissions involved the appointment


of 68 commissioners; all but 9 were English-speaking Canadians.32

What further infuriated the nationalists in Quebec was Diefenbaker's view of "one Canada", which rejected dualism. His attempt to introduce changes to 1961 census forms in which everyone could call himself a Canadian without mentioning his ethnic background invited a stormy protest from French Canadians. It is noted that "the one Canada Diefenbaker envisaged was a baptismal melting pot into which the Cherniaks, the Caccias, the Paproskis, the Cardinals, the Chretiens, the Guays, the Diefenbaker's and the Campbell-Bannermans were to be immersed, miraculously coming out un-hyphenated Canadians."33 In a meeting with 85 ethnic editors in 1961, Diefenbaker said:

Being of mixed origin myself, I know something, in my boyhood days in Saskatchewan, of the feeling that was all too apparent in many parts of Canada, that citizenship depended upon surnames, or even upon blood counts. It was then, as a boy on the empty Prairies, that I made the initial determination to eliminate this feeling that being a Canadian was a matter of name and blood.34

Diefenbaker was neither Anglo-Saxon nor was he identified with central Canadian financiers. This made it possible for farmers of European origin to flock, for the first time, to the Conservative banner.35 His record, however, in ethnic matters was mixed. The immigration policy of Diefenbaker's minister Ellen

Fairclough36, the first woman minister in Canadian history, alienated many new immigrants. She passed an Order-In-Council in 1961 narrowing the range of close relations who could be sponsored into Canada by non-British residents. This decision aroused a storm of protest, especially in Canada's Italian community. She rescinded the changes a few days later.37 The 1959-60 crackdown on illegal Chinese immigrants alienated the Chinese community. In general, immigration declined steadily during the Diefenbaker years, from 282,164 in 1957 to 71,689 in 1961, going slightly up in 1963 to 93,151.38 It shows that the Diefenbaker government was certainly not pro-immigration. However, it did vow to treat all Canadians as equal members of the society. In 1960, the Conservative government passed the Bill of Rights to protect the individual rights of all Canadians regardless of their ethnic origins. Further, in 1962, the government changed Canada's immigration regulations to remove almost all elements of discrimination.39

36 She served as a secretary of the United Empire Loyalists Association and an executive officer of the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire. She was counted as one of Diefenbaker's enemies in the caucus. Her pro-British stand on immigration caused embarrassment to Diefenbaker. She was demoted to the Post Office Portfolio on August 9, 1962 and lost her seat in 1963 election. See Peter Sturberg. Diefenbaker: Leadership Gained 1956-62. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975, p. 69, and Peter Newman, op. cit., p. 100.

37 Peter C. Newman, op. cit., p. 100.


39 Ibid., p. 174.
If any single factor was most responsible for shaking English-Canada's complacency about the plight of other Canadians, it was the rise of Quebec nationalism. It aided the movement for multiculturalism directly and indirectly, as we shall see later. The strength of the Francophones did not lie in numbers alone. The concentration in one province, where they formed the majority, was the solid basis of their strength. The French-Canadian history of survival is longer than that of any other immigrant group in Canada. The period of military defeat and forced assimilation ended with the Quebec Act of 1774. Canadiens were allowed to assume ecclesiastical and legal functions to service their own compatriots, but control of the colony's economic life was to be firmly in the hands of Anglophones, a situation which lasted till the 1960s.

From the standpoint of French-Canadians, the decade of the sixties was radical in the true sense of the word. Important social and economic changes had been taking place in Quebec since the 1930's. The post-war boom ushered Quebec into the family of modern industrial societies. Francophones worked more and more in modern industries, but the employers did not speak their language, giving birth to an expression in Quebec: "Capital

speaks English and labour speaks French."41 In a province where more than 80 percent of the population spoke French, English speakers earned more money than French speakers, even bilinguals.42 Entry into the corporate elite of Montreal was impossible without knowledge of the English language. Whereas the Duplessis regime defended Quebec's provincial autonomy in the wake of federal incursion, including unemployment insurance, family allowance, etc., it encouraged the intrusion of Anglo-Canadian and American capital into the provincial economy.43 Capital's language came along to dominate the province's life. This prompted fear of loss of identity among Quebecois. Rene Levesque called it "the gentle death of progressive assimilation and submersion in the English speaking sea."44

After the revolution in social and economic spheres in the post-war period, which transformed Quebec from an agrarian society to an industrial one, the dawn of the decade of the sixties witnessed the outbreak of a revolution "in the province's state of mind."45 The peaceful aspect of maitre chez nous began with the launching of the 'Quiet Revolution' by the newly elected


42 Ibid., pp. 57-58.

43 Ibid., p. 55.


government of Jean Lesage in 1960. Major modernizing reforms in education, limitations on the influence of the clergy, nationalization of the hydroelectric power industry, and the clear intimation of a still wider use of state powers to achieve French-Canadian aspirations began to create uneasiness in the rest of the country.46 A new middle class of university graduates with degrees in engineering, social sciences, and business administration emerged to challenge the English domination in Quebec. The speedy changes in the province were not radical or fast enough for many of the disgruntled youth and many within the Liberal government of Jean Lesage. A few desperados took to terrorism to enforce their points of view, and English Canada began to take serious note of the French problem. "In February 1963," writes Kenneth McNaught, "several bombing incidents severely shook what was left of Anglophone complacency in Montreal."47

The rising strength of the separatist and violent elements in Quebec forced the federal government to accommodate Quebec's demands. In the face of Diefenbaker's unyielding attitude, the Liberals under Lester Pearson began taking Quebec seriously, largely for electoral gains. On December 17, 1962, Pearson, in a speech in the House of Commons, gave formal recognition to the


concept of Canada as a bilingual and bicultural nation. He also spoke about acceptable and equal partnership between two founding races. Above all, he promised to establish a Royal Commission to examine the issue in detail.

The Liberals were returned to power in the 1963 federal election. Pearson moved quickly to address the issues of bilingualism and biculturalism by appointing the B and B Commission. However, the goodwill it generated was short lived. A period of constrained relations between the federal and Quebec governments set in. Jean Lesage's program for economic development of Quebec required huge expenditures and "herein lay the source of the conflict between Ottawa and Quebec City that was to dominate the first years of the Pearson administration."49

The program included a system of regional planning, nationalization of electrical energy, government assistance to new industries, and the accumulation of public funds for state enterprises.50 As the financial resources remained inadequate despite increased taxes and borrowing, the only source of more money remained the federal government. The situation was not different in other provinces. In the face of separatist violence, however, Quebec case assumed more importance.

48 Sandra Gwyn, "Multiculturalism: A Threat and a Promise," Saturday Night, LXXXIX (2) 1974, p. 16.


In response, Pearson developed a policy of "co-operative federalism." Many of its details were provided by Pearson's French-Canadian advisers—Maurice Lamontagne, Lionel Chevrier, and Guy Favreau. What resulted was a series of federal-provincial agreements, including various 'opting-out' agreements, that convinced Quebec City that "the federal government was sympathetic to their concerns." As a result of all this, by 1968 Quebec received 50 percent of personal income taxes collected in that province by the federal government compared to 17 percent in 1963. In the language and cultural domain, the B and B Commission addressed the issue in a way that pleased many in Quebec.

THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON BILINGUALISM AND BICULTURALISM AND THE THIRD FORCE

The Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism was established in 1963 under the joint chairmanship of Andre Laurendeau and Davidson Dunton "to inquire into and report upon the existing state of bilingualism and biculturalism in Canada.

51 Bruce Thordarson, 1974, op. cit., p. 148.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid., p. 153.
54 Two members, Professor Paul Wyczynski and Professor J.B. Rudnycky, appointed to the B and B Commission were members of the third force (one of Polish origin and the other a Ukrainian) who had migrated to Canada after World War II.
and to recommend what steps should be taken to develop the Canadian confederation on the basis of an equal partnership between the two founding races."55 It was the brainchild of Andre Laurendeau, the editor of *Le Devoir*, who wrote about the origin of the Commission in his diary:

In January 1962, with Diefenbaker in power, I suggested the creation of an exploratory commission on bilingualism and the participation of French Canadians in the federal civil service. The PM's answer was a straightforward "No"... (However) Michael Oliver, then president of NDP, had suggested that the scope of the study be broadened and later the NDP even "nominated" members to form the ideal commission among whom were Jean Marchand, Frank Scott, Jean-Louis Gagnon, and Andre Laurendeau.56

Diefenbaker had not only opposed the idea of such a commission while he was in power, but he also vigorously denounced the appointment of the B and B Commission by the Pearson government. He fought the concept of two nations every inch of the way from the appointment of the B and B Commission in 1963 "to the attempt to convert the Conservative party to this confederation heresy at its national leadership convention in 1967."57 The Liberal party, however, was determined to appease Quebec to win votes. In the 1962 federal election, when the Conservatives lost dearly in Quebec—winning only 14 seats—the Liberals, with 35 seats, could not cash in all the anti-Tory


votes, as Social Credit managed to win 26 seats in the province. A greater sympathy for French Canadian concerns brought more seats from Quebec for the Liberals in the 1963 federal election when they managed to get 47 seats compared with 8 for the Conservatives. Pearson's clear and forthright support of bilingualism in December 1962 was certainly one of the chief reasons why the Liberals gained more seats in Quebec than any other province in the 1963 election. However, Liberal support in the West remained weak. Allan MacEachen admitted that "in our efforts to rebuild the party after the 1958 defeat, we concentrated on Quebec and Ontario, the West became an afterthought."60

While the appointment of a Royal Commission with bilingual and bicultural mandate was a relief for many in Quebec, it brought a sharp reaction from the third force in Canada. They protested against the reference to "two cultures" and "two founding races." Such a division of Canadian society, it was thought, had relegated the non-British and non-French ethnic population of Canada to a secondary place. In the briefs and presentations of the other Canadians to the B and B Commission, notes Laurendeau, the impression was given that the Commission was actually creating a problem.61 Furthermore, most of them were

59 Ibid.
60 Bruce Thordarson, 1974, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
afraid that we wanted to force them to speak French. 62

The B and B Commission relied on briefs and presentations of individuals and groups. Minority ethnic associations presented a variety of briefs and research reports. These included an anthropological account of the social and economic life of the Italians of Montreal and Edmonton. Another study focused on the attitude of the Montreal Jewish community toward French Canadian nationalism and separatism. A study on voluntary organizations listed the membership, organization and activities of Canada's German, Ukrainian and Dutch ethnic associations. Essays on the cultural contribution of various communities, including the Ukrainians, Germans, Dutch, Chinese, Hungarians, Polish, Scandinavians, Negroes, and Jewish Canadians, focused on the history of their immigration to Canada, and on their social and cultural aspirations. 63

The controversy surrounding the B and B Commission was helping to awaken the members of the third force in Canada to press for equality in the social, political, economic, and symbolic life of Canada. The government had put the Commission to work with a view that Canada was British and French. In their briefs and presentations to the Commission, the elements of the third force, particularly in Western Canada, objected vigorously to such a view of Canada. They reminded the government that "the

62 Laurendeau, Ibid.

kind of Canada the B and B Commission was assigned to study is a Canada that does not exist anymore."64 Speaking against the Commission's reference to an "equal partnership of the two founding races," the Canadian Jewish Congress in its presentation to the preliminary hearings of B and B Commission pointed out that it implies a kind of racial superiority for the founding groups.65 The minority ethnic Canadians were fearful that if the Commission was allowed to continue with its terms of references, they would all be required to become something that they could not be—British or French.

French-Canadians and the third force had legitimate grievances against the country's dominant English elite, but now the victims were struggling not only against the Anglo-Saxon domination but also against each other. The French position was clear: no other group was entitled to the same position in the Canadian confederation as the French and English. They viewed confederation as an agreement between English Canada and French Canada. It was suggested that because other groups did not come to Canada to establish colonies, provinces or their political systems, they should not act in a way demanding equality on an equal basis, equal to that of the Quebecois.66 In a polite reply, Senator Paul Yuzyk reminded the French-Canadians that "the

64 Orest Kruhlak, Personal Interview, October 1, 1991.


66 Ibid., p. 10.
Ukrainians have brought under cultivation approximately 10 million acres of land on the prairies which is twice as much as the French-Canadians, who cultivated in Quebec in over three centuries some 5 million acres."67

For the third force, Canadian reality was not bicultural, it was multicultural. Prior to the 1960's, Canadian governments had faulted to address the issue of cultural pluralism in any systematic fashion.68 Now the government was finally addressing it, in a bias way. The new direction of the government offered little hope to the third element. It suggested that the English elite was ready to accommodate the concerns of the French-Canadians, but it was not willing to do the same for other Canadians. The third element was ready to concede that English and French be the official languages of Canada, however, "that was the only privilege that the British and the French were entitled to, otherwise all ethnic groups and all individuals should have equal rights in every respect; there must not be a second class citizenship, which could only spell trouble."69

The new historic reality presented two clear alternatives to the federal government. The rise of French nationalism made it difficult to ignore the French Canadian plight, especially in the


69 Paul Yuzyk, op. cit., p. 5.
face of the B and B Commission's reports and recommendations. In this respect, the government had a choice to extend official recognition to the "two founding races" theory by accepting bilingualism and biculturalism. However, the increased activism of the third element of Canadian society, in addition to their ever growing numerical strength, pushed the notion of multiculturalism on to the national agenda. The choice for the government, it seemed, was either to accept the claims of the French-Canadians for special status on the basis of bilingualism and biculturalism; or to promulgate a policy of multiculturalism. However, as Albert Weale notes, there is no reason, either in logic or in experience, to accept that political choices are essentially binary in this way.70 Other alternatives were available, which each side aspired to choose.

70 Albert Weale, op. cit., p. 200.
Commenting on Canadian identity, Northrop Frye wrote that "American students have been conditioned from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of one of world's great powers. Canadians are conditioned from infancy to think of themselves as citizens of a country of uncertain identity, a confusing past, and a hazardous future." The reasons for such a confused state of mind were many. In the sixties, they were reflected in the claims and counter claims of the chartered groups, the native Canadians and the third element about their status in Canadian society. Each element had its own identity; and a special claim based on it. Although the Anglo-Saxons dominated life in every sphere, others had made important headway in the social, cultural, political and economic life of Canada. However, the symbolic order of Canada remained predominantly British, and it needed timely renovation.

The first new important Canadian symbol was the newly adopted national flag, on which the maple leaf—rather than a combination of the union jack and the fleur-de-lis, as proposed


2 There were numerous native nations in the country, and the British element consisted of English, Scots, Welsh and the Irish. The third element represented every other ethnic group which was non-British, non-French and non-Native.
by some- is the only symbol. For national unity and prosperity, it was important for Canada to present an image with which every Canadian, regardless of ethnic or regional background, could associate his own private identity. Besides economic and material aspects, people have other needs and aspirations. They expect a certain degree of consistency between their private identities and the symbolic contents upheld by public authorities, which are embedded in the societal institutions and celebrated in public events.

Reginald Bibby, however, has expressed doubts that ethnically diverse Canada could develop a neutral symbolic order acceptable to every Canadian: "Is it possible to have any collective symbols that do not offend the cultural inclinations of some? Is it possible to have consensus on anything at a national level?" Bibby's cynicism is certainly justified in raising doubts about the possibility of agreeing to common symbols, but the images of one group's domination are far more dangerous than controversial common symbols. For example, the images of the Canadian head of state, the queen, have served to divide the country along ethnic lines instead of uniting it. French Canadians consider this a part and parcel of the Anglo-


Canadian domination. There is no doubt that the controversy surrounding the national flag was resolved in favour of a solution acceptable to most people across ethnic lines in a uniquely Canadian way. The new flag did not give a British or French image of Canada; it fostered a new Canadian identity in North America and the world. It showed that it was possible to create a symbolic order which was common to all Canadians by which all "individuals could recognize themselves in public institutions."6

Historically, under the unannounced policy of Anglo-conformity, cultural diversity "was rejected as incompatible with the concept of nation-building and national identity."7 National identity was equated with ethnic identity. For the new Canada, this was an outdated concept of nation-state. Groenewold argued that the fathers of confederation had in fact created a new political nationality which was based on the recognition of cultural diversity.8 The Political nationality could include all people in Canada without sacrificing their loyalties to their unique cultures. The creation of a society of undifferentiated atomic individuals, all of whom conform to the same type and same set of values, was not, as it never had been, a tenable ideal,

6 Raymond Breton, 1986, op. cit., p. 31.


either in Canada\textsuperscript{9} or elsewhere.

The idea of a political nationality based on cultural pluralism was the product of Trudeau's strategy to optimize outcomes from the set of all courses of action open to him at that time. The defeat of French nationalism and separatism was at the top of his agenda. Thus, he adopted a twin policy of bilingualism and multiculturalism, which neutralized the special claims of any ethnic group while accommodating certain demands of the French-Canadians. It was a compromise aimed at attracting votes from all sections of society. However, the subjective choice of this highest-ranked element was not entirely based on self-interest. There is no doubt that Trudeau was an idealist, but his policy was based on realism. He knew that idealism without political power was nothing but a dream. And political power, in a democracy, comes from the ballot box.

\textbf{THE LIBERAL AGENDA AND ETHNIC VOTES}

While the policy of multiculturalism was presented in moral terms, it was the political aspect of multiculturalism that played an important role in its final acceptance. The march toward multiculturalism started with the victory of the Conservatives in the 1957 federal election which had put the Liberals in opposition for the first time in more than two decades. The federal election of 1958 brought even more

\textsuperscript{9} Allan Smith, "Metaphor and Nationality in North America," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 264.
devastating results for the Liberals, as the Progressive Conservatives won 208 seats out of 265, compared with 49 for the Liberals. More significantly, the Conservatives managed to win 50 out of 75 seats in Quebec, where only a year earlier they had won only 9 seats. In the Prairie provinces, where the third element constituted a majority, the Conservatives won 47 out of 48 seats, while losing only one seat to the CCF in Saskatchewan. The Liberals could not win a single seat in the West in the 1958 federal election.

The Liberal party, faced with a serious defeat, was forced to adopt a new strategy to regain its lost electoral support. Simpson notes that the Liberals have demonstrated an uncanny ability to shift with changing winds, to lean to the left or to the right as occasion requires. They were operating to maximize their electoral chances and quickly seized upon Diefenbaker's failure to "comprehend the aspirations of contemporary French Canada." While Diefenbaker had demonstrated great understanding for the urgent "problems of the immigrants," he failed to "take into account the changed and charged climate of Quebec." The Liberals, under Pearson, were in a position to gain political

10 See Chapter II for statistics.


14 Ibid., pp. 193 and 283.
ground in Quebec at a time when the Conservative fortunes were dwindling. In the 1962 federal election, the Liberal strength did not grow in proportion to the Conservative loss, which was heavy. On the contrary, the Liberal share of the popular vote went down to 40 per cent from 46 per cent in 1958, even though the party managed to win 10 more seats, increasing its strength to 35 from 25 in 1958.15

Pearson adopted a co-operative approach to federalism in order to accommodate the demands of French Canadians. As a first step, he decided to adopt Andre Laurendeau's suggestion to establish a royal commission to investigate cultural and linguistic disparities between the Anglophones and the Francophones. In December, 1962, Pearson proposed this in Parliament, and scored an immediate success in French Canada.16 He adopted a conciliatory approach to defuse discontent within Quebec and advocated the recognition of the French language at the official level to achieve national unity. "Nothing," he wrote, "could be more important in my mind than an effort to make our French-speaking people feel that their language is an equal language in Canada."17

The conciliatory approach of the Liberals toward Quebec strengthened their electoral position in the province. They

15 Hugh Thorburn, 1991, op. cit., Appendix A.


managed to win 47 seats in the 1963 federal election, compared with only 8 for the Conservatives. In the next three elections, in 1965, 1968 and 1972, their strength remained constant at 56 seats. Soon after their 1963 election victory, the Liberals began the work of setting-up the B and B Commission. Pearson stated that "we had to do everything in our power to extend French culture and the French language throughout Canada."19

The Liberals also started recruiting prominent Quebec politicians to their camp. The trio- Marchand, Trudeau, and Pelletier- were recruited to boost the image of the party in the province. At the same time, Pearson's co-operative federalism approach convinced Lesage that Quebec could obtain its goals by co-operating with Ottawa.20 Pearson's conciliatory diplomatic approach toward Quebec came under fire from the opposition. Diefenbaker charged that "Pearson's 'co-operative federalism' became an excuse to surrender at every turn to the demands of a government in Quebec which regards every submission as a reason for still greater demands."21

Canada's ethnic minorities also viewed Pearson's concessions to Quebec with suspicion. They reacted angrily to Pearson's dualist conception of Canada by protesting against the terms of

18 Hugh G. Thorburn, 1991, op. cit., Appendix A.
reference of the B and B Commission. Pearson himself had realized that the Liberal government had indeed overlooked the concerns of the third element. He observed that "we failed to take adequately into account the sensitivities of the citizens from other cultural backgrounds and the problems of multiculturalism, indeed, a problem of multi-lingualism."23

The Liberal party could hardly ignore the concerns of the other Canadians in view of its electoral weakness in the West. In the 1963 federal elections, the Prairies, where multiculturalism had strong roots, held firm for Diefenbaker. Forty-one out of 95 Conservative MP's in 1963 came from the Prairies, while the Liberals had won only one out of 48 Prairie seats.25 The Liberal party had to appeal to the ethnic voters in this region to improve its electoral fortunes in the West. Observing the ethnic vote pattern in the Prairies, Wiseman states that the third force "represented the largest swing factor" which "helped elect and defeat parties."26 They had also leaned toward protest parties as the doors of the federal governing parties were not perceived as open to them. However, they had voted for

22 See Chapter II for more details.


24 Anre Laurendeau notes in his diary written during the B and B Commission that everywhere in the Prairies demand for multiculturalism was strong. op. cit.


the Liberals in Alberta from 1905 to 1921, and in Saskatchewan from 1905 to 1944, as the Liberals were considered the party of immigrants and Catholics.27 The federal elections of 1957 and 1958 brought a significant change when the ethnic vote swung to the side of the Conservatives under the leadership of John Diefenbaker.

Canada's minority ethnics were no longer content with being just the voters supporting this or that party in elections. Many had entered politics through the mainstream parties who enjoyed varied support among the Germans, Jews, and Ukrainians. During the 1950's and early 1960's, they actively sought political positions at municipal and provincial levels. At the provincial level, the Ukrainian, Jewish and Scandinavian MLAs began receiving cabinet posts in the 1950's.28 It was no longer easy to ignore the concerns of the third force, as they now had Senators, members of Parliament, members of legislative assemblies, mayors and councilors, prominent and wealthy business people, academics and public servants among their ranks. These people started lobbying for government support for official recognition of ethnic and cultural differences, contending that only by this means could equality be enhanced.29

BILINGUALISM OR MULTILINGUALISM

The interim report of the B and B Commission in 1965 declared that Canada, without being fully conscious of the fact, was passing through the greatest crisis in its history.30 In its main report in 1967, the Commission made several recommendations to deal with the crisis. Among other things, it recommended full recognition of French and English as the official languages of Canada at the federal level as well as in the provinces of Ontario, Quebec and New Brunswick.31

Prime Minister Lester Pearson had already started the process of bilingualism in the federal public service in 1966. But, acting on the recommendations of the Royal Commission, the Federal Parliament finally passed the Official Languages Act in July 1969. The Act declared English and French to be Canada's official languages; granted all citizens the right to communicate with the federal government, and work in the federal institutions in the language of their choice; and provided funds for second language education across Canada.32 This was the culmination of the process of bilingualism which had legally started with the British North America Act, 1867. Section 133 of the 1867 Act provided for the use of both languages in federal courts and parliament, and in the courts and the legislature of Quebec.

Diefenbaker had given one concession to Franchophones by

30 Kenneth McNaught, op. cit., p. 308.
31 Ibid., pp. 308-309.
32 Roger Gibbins, op. cit., p. 77.
allowing simultaneous translation in Parliament. However, both Pearson and Trudeau were strong advocates of official bilingualism. "Canada must become a truly bilingual country," wrote Trudeau, "in which the linguistic majority stops behaving as if it held special and exclusive rights, and accepts the country's federal nature with all its implications."33 He advocated the use of federal government powers to make French Canadians feel at home everywhere in Canada. By protecting the individual rights of French Canadians to government service in their own language, Trudeau intended to overcome the appeal of the narrower project of Quebec nationalism.34 The only rational action for him upon assuming the Prime Ministership was to make Canada officially bilingual. This action arose in an historically proper way, through "a proper kind of connection to desires, beliefs, and evidence."35 Trudeau advocated bilingualism long before he became Prime Minister and felt it was the logical conclusion to reforms begun during Pearson era. He knew that minority ethnics were willing to concede bilingualism as a special concession to French-Canadians so long as it was divorced from the idea of biculturalism. To Trudeau, the recognition of bilingualism at the official level was good


politics.

Most of English Canada welcomed the Official Languages Act as a necessary and appropriate response to the Quiet Revolution and to the growing independence movement in Quebec.36 However, bilingualism found its opponents in western Canada37, particularly among the third force. The thrust of the third force demand was for multiculturalism.38 However, there were advocates of multilingualism within the third force. For the government, it was practically impossible to extend recognition to every language. The minority ethnic Canadians were aware of the impractical nature of their demand for multilingualism. However, they used it as a bargain chip to achieve a desired outcome, i.e., the official recognition of multiculturalism.

Multilingualism would have created chaos in government services, as there were more than seventy ethnic groups living in Canada. If the proponents of multiculturalism were to ask for special status for some of Canada's minority languages, it would have split the ranks of the third force, thus creating ethnic feuds. Trudeau's crusade against French separatism demanded action to accommodate some of the genuine demands of Franchophones. The federal government had to show French

36 Roger Gibbins, op. cit., p. 78.
38 As noted in the previous chapter, Senator Paul Yuzyk had publicly spoken in favour of bilingualism. At the same time, he had declared that this is the only privilege the third force was ready to concede to English and French Canadians.
Canadians that the Quebec government was not the only spokesman for the French in Canada; that federal government was equally concerned about their problems, and was willing to provide solutions for them. Above all, it needed to present an image to French Canadians that Canada belonged to them as much as to the English. Trudeau chose to pursue bilingualism with vigour and Canada's minority ethnic politicians had to learn how to order their alternatives. They chose to retreat from the demand of multilingualism which could not be pursued seriously in the face of the political reality of the times.

During the late 60's, the rising tide of Quebec nationalism was attracting more attention from the federal government, and minority ethnic activists felt it was time to press their demands with renewed vigour. A simple applause for the findings and the recommendations of the B and B Commission would have legitimized the government's process of recognizing the "duality", which had started with the establishment of the Royal Commission in 1963. The third force knew that French Canadian nationalists were not entirely happy with the official recognition of the French language. They viewed this as a clever move by Trudeau to take the steam out of their movement for self-determination. Trudeau was an ardent opponent of Quebec nationalism and separatism. He did not want to give any appearance of bowing to their pressure. Like Diefenbaker in the early 60's, Trudeau desired to put "Quebec's ultranationalists and separatists in their place. This indeed was Trudeau's central purpose from the day he took the
oath of office."39 Unlike Diefenbaker, Trudeau was willing to
provide room at the national level for the demands of French
Canadians. He told French Canadians at the Liberal convention in
1968 that "masters in our own house we must be, but our house is
the whole of Canada."40 Speaking about his political mission,
Trudeau said:

Each man has his own reasons, I suppose, as driving forces, but
mine were two-fold: One was to make sure that Quebec wouldn't
leave Canada through separation, and the other was to make sure
that Canada wouldn't shove Quebec out through narrowmindedness.41

The centerpiece of Trudeau's attempted solution to keep
Quebec within Canada was the language policy. However, he was
aware of the opposition to the Official Languages Act in English
Canada, in general, and in the West, in particular. Thus, he
argued that the reason why Ottawa recognized French on an equal
footing with English was not because of the special status of
French Canadians within the confederation, as one of the two so-
called founding races, but because French Canadians were in a
position to break up the country. He wrote:

If there were six million people living in Canada whose tongue
was Ukrainian, it is likely that this language would establish
itself as forcefully as French. In terms of realpolitik, French
and English are equal in Canada because each of these linguistic
groups has the power to break the country. And this power cannot
yet be claimed by the Iroquois, the Eskimos, or the Ukrainians.42

41 Ibid., p. 311.
Trudeau's attempt to separate culture and language provided room for the third element to maneuver. It was possible for the minority ethnic Canadians to press for multiculturalism minus multilingualism. On the other hand, Trudeau hoped that multiculturalism would soften opposition to official bilingualism in the West. Some considered the official languages dualism as "a first stepping stone to multiculturalism because it asserted the important proposition that there was no single way to be Canadian."44

FROM BICULTURALISM TO MULTICULTURALISM

The original mandate of the B and B Commission, as the name suggested, included both bilingualism and biculturalism on its agenda. However, it was also mandated to take into account the cultural contributions of the other Canadians to the society, and to recommend measures that should be taken to safeguard those contributions. The first volume of the B and B Commission's report, which appeared in 1967, stated that Canadians who are "neither British nor French in origin are covered by our inquiry in two ways:

a) to the extent that they are integrated into English -or French speaking- society, all that is said of Anglophones or Franchophones applies to them; b) to the extent that they remain attached to their original language and culture, they belong to other ethnic groups, whose existence is definitely beneficial to


the country."45

Canada's minority ethnics were to be studied in the context of the dualist proposition of the Commission's terms of reference. The submissions of various ethnic groups to the B and B Commission demonstrated an increasing tendency "to echo the complaints and claims of French Canadians."46 In the early stages of the Commission's hearings, the third force identified itself with some of the concerns and complaints of the French Canadians. Their movement was inspired by the French Canadian struggle to become "masters of their own destiny." There were also signs of mutual co-operation at various levels. For example, Jean Lesage met with the Dominion executive of the Ukrainian Canadian Council (UCC) in 1965 to discuss some language issues. At the meeting, Lesage promised to have the Quebec Minister of Education investigate the advisability of providing classes in the Ukrainian language in those Montreal schools where Ukrainians were concentrated; in return, the UCC promised to use its influence to secure French language schools for French Canadians outside Quebec.47

The third force, however, viewed the theory of "two founding" races as a negation of their own position in Canada.

45 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Volume I, op cit., p. XXV.


47 Ibid., p. 88.
French Canadians distinguished themselves from other ethnic groups, but aspired to gain equal status with the English. Thus, they demanded special status based on "historical" claims. If Ottawa was to yield to such demand, the third force thought, English domination in Canada would be replaced by English-French domination. They had nothing to gain from such a compact. It was in their interest to demand that no particular group should hold special status, so they demanded equality for all Canadians regardless of their ethnic or linguistic background.

Prime Minister Trudeau added his voice to the concerns of the third force. He vigorously opposed the idea of 'special status' for Quebec and argued that the Quebec legislature had no right to speak on behalf of every French Canadian as nearly a million of them lived outside Quebec, and as over one million non-French lived in Quebec. Opposing the French Canadian attempts to define Canada in terms of ethnic collaboration between the English and the French, Trudeau wrote:

A state that defined its functions essentially in terms of ethnic attributes would inevitably become chauvinistic and intolerant. The state...must seek the general welfare of all its citizens regardless of sex, colour, religious beliefs or ethnic origin.48

He rejected the concept of two founding races and stated that such a notion was "dangerous in theory and groundless in fact."49 The concepts of state and of nation must be separated to make Canada a truly pluralistic society, he argued. "A truly

48 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, 1968, op. cit., p. 4
49 Ibid., p. 31.
democratic government," wrote Trudeau, "cannot be 'nationalist' because it must pursue the good of all its citizens, without prejudice to ethnic origin."50

The Liberal party under Trudeau won a solid majority in the federal election in 1968, winning 165 seats compared with 72 for the Conservatives. It had done far better in the West than in the previous election of 1965. It won a total of 31 seats of which 11 were won in the Prairies and 20 in B.C.51 The ethnic voters turned to the Liberal party in large numbers. The Clarke et al study points out that among the Eastern European voters 40 percent had voted for the Liberal party in 1965, and in the 1968 federal election, 62 percent of the Eastern Europeans voted for the Liberals. The same study also shows that in 1965, 41 percent of the Anglo-Saxon voters voted Liberal, which jumped to 49 percent in the 1968 federal election.52 The immigrants who had arrived in the post World War II period, and had settled in Central Canada, voted for the Liberals in high proportion. 82 percent of the Italian-Canadians, for example, voted for the Liberals in the 1965 federal election.53

The third element in the Prairies constituted 49 percent, 53 percent and 48 percent of the population of Alberta, Saskatchewan

50 Trudeau, Ibid., p. 169.
51 Hugh G. Thorburn, 1991, op. cit., Appendix A.
53 Ibid., p. 104.
and Manitoba respectively, and had flocked to the Conservative camp under Diefenbaker. The Liberal party under Pearson remained weak in the West. Pearson's eastern WASP background and pro-French stand could not capture the hearts of ethnic voters in the West.

Trudeau began in the late 60's taking the demand of the third force for multiculturalism seriously to improve the electoral fortunes of the Liberals in the West, and "in order to have a counterpoise to French-Canadian aspirations." Trudeau's indirect support for multiculturalism meant more state funding for various activities of the ethnic groups to unite the third force on a common platform to achieve their common objectives. The citizenship branch of the Secretary of State's department funded various conferences on the theme of multiculturalism, including the famous "Thinkers Conference on Cultural Rights" organized in Toronto in 1968 by Senator Paul Yuzyk, in which representatives of twenty different ethnic groups took part, and the 1968 "International Conference of Christians and Jews" held at York University. Government publications began publicizing the theme of the B and B Commission favouring the integration of other ethnics into Canadian society while maintaining their cultures. A monthly publication of the Canadian Citizenship Branch, Citizen, in its June, 1967 issue stated that

55 Jean Burnet and Howard Palmer, 1988, op. cit., p. 175.
56 Ibid., p. 224.
"integration, in contrast to assimilation encourages the newcomer in a society to retain what he regards as best in his own cultural background and traditions, with the expectation that he will contribute them to the enrichment of Canadian life."57 The 1970 campaign by the Ukrainian Canadian University Students Union for multiculturalism was also funded by the federal government.58

The renewed activism of the third force, in the wake of the extension of the mandate of the B and B Commission, which was to focus entirely on the other Canadians, showed that the major concession the minority ethnics were willing to allow French Canadians was the recognition of French as one of the two official languages of Canada. This was stated forcibly at every political platform available to them. They were in no mood to allow the imposition of biculturalism by the so-called founding nations of Canada. Canada was a multicultural society and every aspect of its life must reflect that reality.

The main purpose of organizing various forums and conferences by the third force was to tell the provincial and federal governments that the third element in Canada also had legitimate grievances which must be addressed during the on-going constitutional talks. Along with various politicians, some sections of Canada's business community started adding their voice to multiculturalism. The Royal Bank of Canada's Monthly


58 Raymond Breton, 1986, op. cit., p. 47.
Letter published an essay on human rights in its January 1968 issue. It stated:

It is essential that minorities be encouraged to take part in the common life of the community, whatever customs and cultures they wish to preserve among themselves (emphasis added), and that they be welcomed warmly by the majority.59

Some sections of Canadian press also started treating the idea of multiculturalism more favorably. The Telegram in its editorial on December 17, 1968, stated that "Canada owes ethnic groups free opportunity to sustain and perpetuate their respective cultures, but this cultural survival depends for the most part on voluntary effort."60 Leon Kosar wrote in the Chronicle Telegraph that two official languages are one thing, but to say that there are only two cultures in Canada is a complete negation of the Canadian fact.61 The Globe and Mail opposed the idea of official biculturalism by stating that it is "wrong for Canada."62 The editorial of The Colborne Tribune stated that "much is being written and spoken of these days on bilingualism and biculturalism, and quite often a third element in Canadian life is entirely ignored."63

English Canada did not have much to worry about the third element, as most non-British and non-French immigrants chose to

60 The Telegram, December 17, 1968.
learn English upon their arrival in Canada. It did not face any cultural threat from them. It was quite different with French Canadians. They knew that the ethnics of the third element chose to learn English not only in English Canada, but also in Quebec, particularly in Montreal. Thus, it viewed the third force as a natural ally of English Canada.64

French Canadians tried to assure the third force that the dualism that they advocated was restricted to the state level, while society would remain pluralistic. It was argued that biculturalism was in no way incompatible with a policy of encouraging other cultural groups to maintain their own identity. "Canada is principally and primarily a bilingual and bicultural society," stated Claude Ryan, "but it is also a multicultural society."65 Along with various others, Ryan argued that multiculturalism could be preserved through the voluntary efforts of community level organizations of various ethnic groups operating in an environment of individual liberties which the state would guarantee. French Canadians repeated at every instance that no other group in Canada, except the English, could claim equal status with the French. First, they argued that the French and English were far more numerous than any other single group; secondly, they claimed that French-English dualism

64 Learning English was practical for the immigrants and their children as it was dominant language in North America and the world, whereas French provided very few opportunities.

was deeply rooted in Canada's history; thirdly, they said that each of the two communities could claim that it formed a complete society by itself; and finally, they pointed out that each could destroy this country.66

This power to destroy was in the minds of most Canadians at the time of the rise of Quebec nationalism and separatism. The country was marching toward an uncertain future. Trudeau wanted to give the nation a new direction, and a new identity. The third element could play an important role in this venture. Clive Cardinal noted that in an era of narrow provincialism, separatism, and nationalism, "the ethnic element could serve Canada as an agent of harmony, and as a highly variegated contribution to Canadian identity."67 To counter the French separatist threat, a new Canadian identity had to evolve which was not British. The vision of a British dominated society was increasingly unrealistic for Canada68 and aroused resentment, not only among French Canadians but also among the third element. The bicultural image of Canada commanded respect among the French and English, but it was unacceptable to the other Canadians. Trudeau stated that "federalism is ultimately bound to fail if the nationalism it cultivates is unable to generate a national image

66 Ryan, Ibid., p. 122.


which has immensely more appeal than the regional ones."69 This nationalism had to take into consideration the findings of the B and B Commission's Book IV on the cultural contributions of the other Canadians.

BOOK IV OF THE B AND B COMMISSION
AND MULTICULTURALISM

In his study on minorities, Geoff Dench noted that the behaviour of minorities in 'open' societies can best be understood as attempts to minimize punishment from the majority.70 The minorities in Canada indeed attempted to minimize punishment from the British majority in various ways. One such way was to seek recognition in Canada's symbolic order— in the public sphere defining who Canadians are as a people, in public institutions, events and symbols— and to seek official support for their claims for equality. Their struggle was partially crowned with success when the B and B Commission presented its report on the "contributions made by the other groups to the cultural enrichment of Canada" in 1970.

The Commission examined the part played by the other Canadians in the country's history, and the contributions they made to Canadian life.71 Apart from the regional public hearings


71 Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Book IV, op. cit., p. XXV.
and briefs, the Commission examined various research studies and essays prepared by the scholars and staff hired by the Commission, and the studies done by various academics independently. The main focus of Book IV was to examine the patterns of integration of the other Canadians, as groups or individuals, into the life of the country. It gave a historical outline of the various phases of immigration to Canada, and considered the economic, political and social role of the other Canadians. Volume IV also reviewed their language patterns, their education system, their communications media, and their arts and letters.72

The Commission spoke in favour of preserving the cultural heritage of various ethnic groups in Canada. It stated that "in adopting its advantages and disadvantages, those whose origin is neither French nor British do not have to cast off or hide their own culture."73 In fact, the Commission listed the advantages of various cultures to the human growth of their members. It pointed out that "man is a thinking and sensitive being; severing him from his roots could destroy an aspect of his personality and deprive society of some of the values he can bring to it."74 The language of the Commission's report indicated the rise of a new era. The denial of the country's pluralistic nature was no longer fashionable.

A proposition of the Royal Commission's Book IV was that immigration creates the possibility of cultural diversity; secondly, the maintenance of diversity is psychologically necessary for the well-being of the individual; and finally, such diversity could be a valuable resource for society as a whole. The Commission made several recommendations for the preservation of cultural diversity, claiming that it would enhance the quality of life for Canadians. Book IV contained sixteen recommendations, of which eight were addressed specifically to the Federal Government or its agencies. Three dealt with matters under exclusive provincial jurisdiction. One of the recommendations urged federal financial aid to linguistically handicapped children in public schools. Another was concerned with the conditions for citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to stand for election to public office. One appealed to agencies at all three levels of government to provide support to cultural and research organizations. The remaining recommendations were addressed to Canadian Universities.

The new report of the B and B Commission helped counter the bicultural image of Canada being advocated by some sections of the society at that time. It gave moral and spiritual support to


the third force by reinvigorating their struggle for multiculturalism at a time when the nation's eyes were centered on Quebec during the October crisis. While the Commission's report and the financial support from federal agencies for their political activities pleased the activists of the third force, the nation's preoccupation with the French Canadian problem made them nervous. The federal government's cool reception of the report initially added to the fears of the other Canadians.

The Liberal government's single-minded pursuit of bilingualism was not popular in the West. However, after Trudeau's powerful handling of the FLQ crisis in October 1970, his personal popularity and that of his government soared spectacularly to nearly 60 percent. The Liberal government did not need to give any more concessions to anyone, especially to the other Canadians, to secure votes. Thus, multiculturalism took a back seat. The B and B Commission's Book IV collected dust for a full year before the government finally decided to act on its recommendations. It was not surprising, the government's popularity witnessed a steady decline in 1971. Trudeau's performance had left the public angry, disappointed and frustrated. New ways of attracting votes had to be discovered for the Liberal party's re-election bid. Multiculturalism was one such device which could make Trudeau popular, in the West in

particular, and among the ethnic voters in general.

At each stage of the struggle for their objectives, both the Prime Minister and the activists in the third force had to make choices to obtain their goals. Apart from its definite vote value, the demand of the third force was an important moral weapon in the hands of Trudeau. He could oppose the French nationalists by equating their plight with the plight of the third element in Canada. How could French Canadians press for special status while relegating fully one-third of the Canadian population to the position of second class citizenship? For the Anglophones, multiculturalism was no threat to their position. However, they were not in a mood to give any more concessions to the Quebecers. Thus, it was safe for Trudeau to pursue multiculturalism while opposing the demand for a special status for Quebec. Trudeau was able to maximize his political self-interest. At the same time, it was an important opportunity for the proponents of multiculturalism to make maximum political gains from the prevailing situation.

To act rationally simply means to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set.80 The government's first important decision was to put the B and B Commission's Book IV on the shelf, as it was still gauging the right kind of response on the basis of evidence available to it. At the time, there was no pressing political necessity to pursue a multicultural agenda.

Trudeau was acting out of self-interest but in a cautious manner. Through a series of meetings with ethnic groups, billed as "consultation dialogues," the Citizenship branch of the Department of State sought fresh approaches to the policy of multiculturalism. Disappointingly little emerged. As the protest from the third force became louder, and the popularity of Trudeau and his government started declining steadily, the Prime Minister decided to put his weight behind the official recognition of multiculturalism. Both sides were well aware that federal elections were approaching. The third force had a choice to wave a carrot of ethnic votes, and the Prime Minister had a chance to exploit the situation. Each wanted to maximize the chance of achieving its most favoured outcome, official multiculturalism for the former and votes for the latter in the face of dwindling electoral fortunes, particularly in the West.

Prime Minister Trudeau was invited to give a speech at the Ukrainian-Canadian Congress in Winnipeg. It was an important opportunity for the Prime Minister to make political capital by announcing a policy of multiculturalism at the Congress as the Ukrainian-Canadians, along with other Eastern Europeans, were at the forefront of the struggle of the third force. They also represented a sizable portion of the prairie votes. The government was in no mood to miss any opportunity to secure votes for the upcoming federal election. Thus, it announced its

intention to accept the recommendations contained in the B and B Commission's Book IV. A dozen or so drafts later, the outlines of multicultural policy were approved by the Cabinet on September 23, 1971. The official announcement was made in the House of Commons on October 8, 1971 by Prime Minister Trudeau, two days before he was scheduled to speak at the Congress of the Ukrainian-Canadian Council.

82 Gwyn, Ibid., p. 17.
CHAPTER IV
MULTICULTURALISM AS STATE POLICY

For Trudeau, the more effective formula for political self-interest was "multiculturalism within a bilingual framework." The centerpiece of Trudeau's strategy to fight ultranationalists and separatists in Quebec was his language policy through the passage of the federal Official Languages Act. Multiculturalism was a concession to diffuse opposition to bilingualism in the West and improve the Liberal party's electoral fortunes in the upcoming federal elections. It was an attempt to bring the other Canadians to the Liberal camp. As multiculturalism posed no threat to the position of English Canadians, it was considered an important vote asset in English Canada, without any backlash. Politically it was helpful to counter the French demand for special status. Indirectly, the policy had an important symbolic meaning to create a new political nationality which was neither British nor French. The choice of multiculturalism maximized the chance of achieving Trudeau's most favoured outcome—electoral victory—that "seemed most achievable in the circumstances in which it was placed." Every effort that could result in votes at a time of declining popularity was helpful to the re-election bid of the Liberals.

2 Albert Weale, op. cit., p. 197.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The new focus of multicultural politics was on the aims and objectives of the policy, as announced by the federal government. A bureaucrat in charge of multiculturalism pointed out that the aim of the new policy was "to get the people with the funny last names into the mainstream, on equal footing with the Macdonalds and the Cartiers." The Citizenship branch of the Department of the Secretary of State in its first annual report after the implementation of the policy observed that the objective of the multicultural program was "to encourage the development of a society in which individuals and groups have an equal chance to develop and express their cultural identity as an integral part of Canadian life." The bureaucrat and the department had two different views. The former gives the impression that the state was going to indulge in some kind of affirmative action program to help the third element, and the latter implied that the state was concerned only with helping the non-British, non-French and non-Native Canadians to preserve their cultural identity. Prime Minister Trudeau had the latter version in mind when he declared that "government will support and encourage the various cultures and ethnic groups that give structure and vitality to our society." In order to fulfill this objective, the government, he announced in the House, would provide support in the following

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3 Sandra Gwyn, "Multiculturalism: A Threat and a Promise," Saturday Night, LXXXIX (2) 1974, p. 15.

4 Canada. Secretary of State, Annual Report for the Year ending March 31st, 1972, p. 5.
four ways:

First, resources permitting, the government will seek to assist all Canadian cultural groups that have demonstrated a desire and effort to continue to develop a capacity to grow and contribute to Canada...

Second, the government will assist members of all cultural groups to overcome cultural barriers to full participation in Canadian society.

Third, the government will promote creative encounters and interchange among all Canadian cultural groups in the interest of national unity.

Fourth, the government will continue to assist immigrants to acquire at least one of Canada's official languages in order to become full participants in Canadian society.5

Thus, the main focus of the policy was the cultural life of Canada. There is no doubt that the maintenance of cultural identity was a high priority to a large segment of the population, but this was only one, albeit an important, aspect of the political agenda of the third force. A radical approach was needed to root out deep seated discrimination in the domains of economic and political life of Canada. In the new situation, even the various elements of the third force were not certain about their demands. Each segment faced a different set of problems. The well established Slavic population of the Prairies could not come to grips with the issues facing the newly migrant Europeans of Italian or Portuguese background, let alone understand the concerns of the visible minorities. The third force, which had kept a semblance of unity, prior to the implementation of multiculturalism, was not clear about its agenda in the new circumstances. Most people were satisfied with the official

recognition of multiculturalism. The question of its intent and meaning fell into the hands of academics and bureaucrats.

MULTICULTURALISM WITHIN A BILINGUAL FRAMEWORK

Trudeau wrote that "the advantages to the minority group (emphasis original) of staying integrated in the whole must on balance be greater than the gain to be reaped from separating."6 He was well aware that among all the minorities in Canada only the French had the numbers, regional strength, and motivation to separate. Thus, he adopted a new approach to federalism to keep Canada united with a strong centre. He was waving the carrot of incentives to the French to stay within the 'newly emerging' federation where they would not be treated as second class citizens, as had been the case previously. He was hoping that his policy of bilingualism would bring French Canadians to the federalist camp. He passionately believed that to concede to the idea that the government of Quebec had a special responsibility for the survival of Franchophone culture meant opening the door to "the ultimate victory of Quebec's tribal nationalists."7

The incentives to the French Canadians included not only the availability of federal services in their own language, but also job opportunities at the centre. He emphasised the reform of the federal government to serve each linguistic community (British


and French) in its own language. Laxer and Laxer observed that "Trudeau's new federalism turned on the proposition that the question of French-English relations could be reduced to an issue of language rights." The domain of Trudeau's language policy, however, was much broader. It meant federal jobs for Francophones in the bureaucracy and the upper echelons of the government. For educated French Canadians, the province of Quebec was not the only place to find careers, but opportunities were now open at the federal level to pursue their goals. This proposition was high on Trudeau's agenda.

However, as a political leader, he had to give certain concessions to other sections of society to maintain social harmony, and win votes. Thus, he announced the new policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework. Bilingualism, however, was to remain the cornerstone of Trudeau's attempted solution of the Quebec problem. However, he separated the question of culture from that of language. The only concession to Francophones was bilingualism not biculturalism. "For although there are two official languages," he stated in the House, "there is no official culture."

Trudeau also knew that multiculturalism was more acceptable to English Canada than granting special powers to Quebec in the name of biculturalism. The third force, on the other hand, could

8 Laxer and Laxer, Ibid., p. 181.

see the benefits to its own cause in Trudeau's self-serving aims. The new compromise—multiculturalism within a bilingual framework—served the interests of both parties. Prime Minister Trudeau brushed aside the special claims of French Canadians, and the third force gained equal recognition, at least, in the symbolic order of Canada. Such a compromise was based on the choices both parties faced at the time.

POLITICAL IMPLEMENTATION

Anderson and Frideres point out that a more general problem with multicultural policy is the lack of consistency, clarity and continuity in both its interpretation and administration.10 The immediate government step to implement the new policy, after the announcement in the House, was to set up an operational Multiculturalism Directorate within the Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State. A year later, in November, 1972, a junior Minister, the Minister of State for Multiculturalism, was appointed to implement the government's multicultural program. In 1973, the Department of the Secretary of State began to operate the federal Multicultural Grants Program. Under this program, grants were made to ethnic groups, immigrant organizations, and other groups which shared an interest in the aims of the multicultural program.11 Grants were


also made available for research into the history of various cultures, and into the use of non-official languages by Canadians. The program also funded the ethnic studies programs, teaching aids in support of the retention of non-official languages, ethnic theatre, literature, handicraft and folk art.12

An advisory body, the Canadian Consultative Council on Multiculturalism (later reconstituted as the Canadian Multiculturalism Council), was established to provide confidential advice to the Minister on Multicultural issues. Originally appointed in May, 1973, it submitted its first annual report to the Minister on December 14, 1974. The Council consisted of 101 persons drawn from forty-seven ethno-cultural backgrounds.13 Regular meetings of the national executive, and of the five regional councils (Atlantic, Quebec, Ontario, Prairies and British Columbia) were held during the year.

However, no official in the PCO or the PMO was ever appointed, or specifically designated, to ensure that the policy of multiculturalism was implemented "with an eye to the policy and planning initiatives of other government departments or federal cultural agencies."14 Such a state of affairs gave ammunition to the critics who charged that the Prime Minister was

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12 Secretary of State, Ibid.

13 Secretary of State, Annual Report for the Year Ending March 31st, 1975, p. 33.

not serious about implementing this policy. The steps taken to
implement the policy were inadequate and half-hearted. Besides
the lack of support from the Prime Minister's Office, it has been
observed that from the beginning, the Minister responsible for
multiculturalism had been a minister of state whose precise
relationship to the Secretary of State, in whose department the
Multiculturalism Directorate was located, had never been clear.15
The choice of the Minister appointed came under fire as he was a
very low profile Liberal.16 Thus, Trudeau's failure to put the
prestige of the Prime Minister's Office behind multiculturalism,
as he did behind bilingualism, ensured that "it would have no
status in cabinet, no legislative base, no commissioner in
Ottawa, and thus no sympathy in the bureaucracy (especially among
the Franchophones in the Department of the Secretary of State) or
in the PCO or PMO."17

In the department charts, the minister of state "floated
like a loosely connected dirigible to one side of the Secretary
of State, while the director was well hidden under secretary of
state, five assistant under-secreataries and layer of other
bureaucrats."18 The director of Multicultural Directorate was one
of twenty-one executive officers responsible to the assistant

15 Lupul, Ibid., p. 95.

16 Trudeau appointed Stanley Haidasz, a Polish-Canadian
physician who represented Toronto-Parkdale in the House of
Commons.


18 Ibid., p. 94.
under-secretary in charge of Citizenship and official languages; he was one of forty-seven executive officers (directors, chiefs, senior liaison officers, co-ordinators, senior advisors, deputies) responsible to the under-secretary through his five assistants. With a staff of between thirty-seven and forty-five, the directorate was barely visible in a department with 3214 members.19

Apart from the lack of political backing, the money alloted to multicultural programs was a drop in the bucket compared to the money spent on bilingual programs. The first and second annual reports of the Department of the Secretary of State in 1972 and 1973 did not specifically mention the amount spent solely on multicultural programs. It was listed under 'Citizen's Culture' in the citizenship branch of the Secretary of the State. Thus, the breakdown of dollars spent on specifically multicultural programs is a little difficult to calculate. In addition, there were other federal departments and agencies who allocated money for multiculturalism. However, there was no horizontal coordination, as the policies of various departments, including Manpower and Immigration, External Affairs, the CBC, and the Canada Council, affected the ethnic groups in special ways.20 The inter-departmental committee which was to review the impact of all federal departmental programmes on various

19 Lupul, Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 95.
ethnocultural groups was never established.21

In the year ending March 31st, 1972, the citizenship branch received a total of $16,312,619, of which less than three-quarters of a million were spent on multiculturalism.22 In the same year, the federal bilingualism program received the total of $78,352,072.23 In the fiscal year ending March 31st, 1973, the total amount received by the Citizenship Development branch, which operated multiculturalism, was $21,490,858, of which less than two million was spent on multiculturalism. At the same time, the government's program for bilingualism received $72,916,146.24 As noted above, other federal departments also spent money on certain aspects of multicultural programs, including transfer payments to provinces to promote multiculturalism in education. It is safe to say, however, that the funds expended on bilingualism were far more than those spent on multiculturalism. It is alleged that such a sharp contrast in funding was due to Trudeau's indifference to multiculturalism. Writers attribute this to Trudeau's vision, which they say was essentially dualistic. Thus, "Trudeau was incapable of reconciling the twin concepts of English-French dualism and ethnocultural

21 Lupul, Ibid.

22 Canada, Secretary of State, Annual Report for the year ending March 31st, 1972, p. 25.

23 Ibid.

24 Canada, Secretary of State, Annual Report for the year ending March 31st, 1973, p. 25.
pluralism."25

Others, however, reject such conclusions as baseless. It is asserted that the critics of Trudeau have always been confused by the amount of money official bilingualism received in comparison with that given to multiculturalism. They have never realized that most of the money for bilingualism has gone to all Canadians; it was not simply for French Canadians. On the other hand, the money spent on multiculturalism has been spent to address the concerns and conditions of a sub-section of the society, i.e., the minority ethnic groups. Whether there was enough money for that is entirely another question.26

If we were to consider the choices facing Trudeau at the time of the announcement of the policy, it would become clear why he chose to put more weight behind bilingualism than behind multiculturalism. At the top of his list was the strengthening of the federal structure to counter provincialism, in particular Quebec separatism. It was necessary to implement bilingualism with full force to achieve this goal. Multiculturalism was not on Trudeau's agenda; it was a vote-catching device for the Liberal party's declining fortunes in the West. The ethnic voters constituted a majority in the Prairie provinces. Many of them had flocked to the Conservative side under Diefenbaker. Even in the 1968 federal election, when Liberals did far better in the West than in 1965 or in earlier elections and the Conservatives


26 Orest Kruhlak, Personal Interview, October 1, 1991.
suffered heavy loses, the Prairie voters' turn to the Liberal camp was modest. The NDP gained from the Conservative loss in Saskatchewan, winning 6 out of 13 seats. In the 1965 federal election, the NDP had only won 3 Manitoba seats, while all its candidates lost in Saskatchewan. Alberta held firm for the Conservatives even in 1968, returning 15 Conservatives out of 19 seats in Parliament. The prospects for the Liberals were not bright for the 1972 federal election either. As Canadians watched in growing disbelief, noted one observer, Trudeau began his quest for re-election in an "almost languid procession across the country." The government's recognition of multiculturalism was enough for the Liberals to make public speeches among ethnic voters.

The times demanded a careful balance between the demands of French Canadians and the third element. By recognizing biculturalism, Trudeau would have strengthened the hands of Quebec nationalists, and angered the Anglophones and the third element. As he was channeling most of his energy into the Quebec question, he took multiculturalism more lightly. He acted as if the symbolic recognition of pluralism would be sufficient to attract ethnic votes. Once this much was achieved, he was convinced that the normal course of action would guide the policy further. Multiculturalism allocated recognition to the claims of ethnic groups, at the same time as it deprived Quebec

27 Hugh G. Thorburn, 1991, op. cit., Appendix A.
nationalists of "the legitimacy that a policy of biculturalism would have bestowed on their particular vision of Canadian pluralism."29

CRITICS

Historian Howard Palmer observed that the main difference between the B and B Commission's findings and the federal government's policy of multiculturalism was that whereas the Commission urged that the two societies willingly allow other groups to preserve and enrich, if they so desire, the cultural values they prize, the federal government was encouraging other groups to develop them.30 An article in Saturday Night noted that multiculturalism was "pluralism pushed as far, and may be further than it would go (sic)."31 Indeed, the article pointed out, the gamble was that the way to develop a national identity was to encourage all Canadians not only to look back with affection on earlier racial, linguistic, and cultural incarnations, but to forcefeed these at public expense.32 Some people perceived the government's decision to provide funding to various communities to maintain their culture was as a practical step to create ethnic enclaves in Canada.


30 Howard Palmer, "Canada: Multicultural or Bicultural?" Canadian Ethnic Studies, III (1) 1971, p. 112.

31 Sandra Gwyn, 1974, op. cit., p. 15.

32 Ibid.
Kelner and Kallen, in their study published in the *Journal of Comparative Sociology*, pointed out that "the thrust of both third force demands and the present multicultural policy seems to be on a strengthening of ties and communication within (emphasis original) ethnic groups, rather than between (emphasis original) them." They concluded that "the policy has clearly failed, as implemented so far, to provide a basis for the inter-ethnic solidarity crucial to the development of a distinctive Canadian national identity". The Anglo-conformist critics charged that the policy, as implemented, would lead to ghettoization. The only occasions for inter-ethnic communication were multicultural parades and multicultural shows, which the department financed, or academic conferences and studies. The critics called the former a song and dance approach. The criticism was justified, as the department was mainly involved in funding the folk arts of various ethnic communities. In the year 1974-1975, while the total funding for immigrant orientation, third language teaching aids grants, and multicultural centers was $1,538,108, the Multicultural Directorate gave 618 grants worth $2,258,701 to various ethno-cultural groups "to maintain and develop their


cultural traditions." However, if the government lacked any inter-ethnic communication approach, the critics were short of suggestions.

Some observers have pointed out that the song and dance approach adopted by the department has shown a lack of understanding of the spirit of the policy by the bureaucrats. Various ethnic groups in Canada had kept their languages and cultures throughout our history in spite of the lack of official funding. The only difference was that now these groups were using government resources provided by the newly created multicultural branch to do the same. In addition, the multicultural policy created more confidence among the minority ethnics that Canada also belonged to them. People become much more inward looking when they are denied opportunities outside their own ethnic or regional enclaves, and when they are pressured to assimilate. Lack of exposure typically breeds a more pervasive ethnocentrism. A policy of multiculturalism, on the other hand, facilitates a spirit of tolerance and the acceptance of different peoples on the part of the citizenry, as well as a general broadening of an individual's horizons and a more truly educated,

36 Secretary of State, Annual Report for the Year Ending March 31st, 1975, pp. 31-35.


38 Kit R. Christensen, "Multiculturalism and Uniculturalism: A Philosophical View," The American Review of Canadian Studies, XV (2) 1985, p. 207.
complete and healthy world view.39

EXCLUSION IN THE NAME OF INCLUSION

Raymond Breton points out that the main objective of the multicultural policy was the incorporation of the other ethnic groups in the cultural/symbolic fabric of Canadian society.40 This cultural fabric of Canada is also referred to as the mainstream culture. The critics41 point out that the term mainstream has been used to disguise Anglo-Saxon dominance. The question arises: "why is there always the assumption that ethnic groups somehow are outside the mainstream of Canadian society."42 Similar notions are advanced through the use of terms such as "ethnic" or "immigrant". Jorgen Dahlie observes that English and French, rather strangely, are not considered ethnics.43

The critics also charged that the multicultural policy was put in place to create an illusion in the minds of the non-

39 Christensen, Ibid., p. 208.


British and non-French Canadians that somehow they held a similar position in Canadian society to that of Anglo-Saxons and French. Dahlie and Fernando conclude that "multiculturalism was no more than compensation in the cultural domain for political and economic deprivations; it was a mechanism of exclusion in the guise of inclusion."44 Some critics of the policy regarded multiculturalism as the state's attempt to regulate the ethnic groups in order to achieve the social harmony needed by capital to maximize its profits. Karl Peter points out that "being fully aware that dominance is only enforceable as long as it is acknowledged through the compliance of those dominated, a modernized policy to elicit such compliance from the ethnic component had to be found."45 The policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework, according to Peter, was intended to serve three political purposes: first, bilingualism was an appeasement policy toward a revitalised Quebec, and a containment policy regarding its claim to political power; second, the policy of multiculturalism served as a device to legitimize the continued dominance of the ruling English speaking elite, and secure its position in society at a time when its position was threatened by Quebec's claim to political power on the one hand and by the economic and cultural vitality of ethnic groups on the other; and finally, multiculturalism was intended to buy off the compliance of ethnic groups, and thereby legitimize and justify

45 Karl Peter, 1981, op. cit., p. 64.
the Bilingual and Bicultural policy. The policy has also been criticized for its vagueness; the critics pointed out that it was open to as narrow an interpretation as a particular minister of state for multiculturalism cared to make.

The policy was implemented mainly to boost the Liberal party's electoral fortunes; however, it did produce some positive results after implementation. As Anderson and Frideres in their study on ethnicity in Canada stated that "not without an ample degree of caution, we would conclude that the position of ethnic minorities in Canada has been changing, generally for better." The policy of multiculturalism was an important step in the progressively changing position of minorities in Canada. For the first time in Canadian history, a minister was appointed to implement a policy which encouraged the minority ethnic groups to maintain their cultural identities. The Multicultural Directorate in the Department of the Secretary of State provided grants and assisted various cultural activities of the minorities. For academics, the opportunities to study ethnicity in Canadian society had never been better because of such agencies as the Canadian Ethnic Studies Advisory Committee, and such federally assisted organizations as the Canadian Ethnic Studies Association and its quarterly journal, *Canadian Ethnic Studies*. The times,

however, for the minorities in Canada in the post World War era had been changing generally for the better even without multiculturalism.
The politics of multiculturalism in Canada must be viewed in the context of electoral politics of the established federal political parties, in particular the Liberals and the Conservatives. In order to remain in power, Trudeau accepted multiculturalism within a bilingual framework in 1971, a year before the next federal election. Multiculturalism was promulgated by Trudeau to achieve two political objectives: to win ethnic votes, and to counter the claims of Quebec nationalists for special status for the province. No less a conclusion can be drawn from the foregoing pages.

The times had changed; the claims of the minority ethnic groups were now weighed against the claims of French-Canadians. However, the minority ethnic groups would not have been seen as a potential counterpoise to French-Canadians, if they had not been strong.1 Their numbers and their political activism were seen as sources of potential votes for the Liberals. By 1971, the third element constituted almost one-third of the Canadian population. The members of more established groups, such as Slavs, Germans, Scandinavians, and Jews, entered mainstream politics through the established political parties, particularly after world war II. It is observed that in the past, left-wing and Prairie protest parties were both more accessible and more supportive than the

1 Jean Burnet and Howard Palmer, 1988, op. cit., p. 224.
Conservatives and Liberals of the grievances and imported nationalisms of European immigrant communities. The Conservative party had a much worse record than the Liberals in this regard. It was closely associated with the British element. However, it started opening its doors to the other Canadians under Diefenbaker.

Diefenbaker's victory marked the beginning of a new era for the minority ethnic Canadians. Not only had one of their own had become the prime minister, but now the corridors of power were opened for people with different ethnic backgrounds at the federal level. Diefenbaker's condemnation of the treatment meted out to the Japanese-Canadians during World War II, the passage of the Bill of Rights, and his attempts to open the Conservative party to new Canadians, won many hearts among the third force. However, he showed little understanding of the aspirations of French Canadians, in general, and the demands of Quebec, in particular. For the Liberal party, it was a golden opportunity to make electoral headway in Quebec, as the Conservatives were on the decline. The Liberals under Pearson responded favorably to the demands of Franchophones, which led to the establishment of the B and B Commission. While there is little doubt that the Liberals were trying to make political capital in Quebec, the


3 The tendency to accept the demands of Quebec may have brought more votes to the Liberals in that province, but it was unpopular in English Canada, particularly in the West.
assumption of political self-interest alone, based on a rational choice model, does not entirely explain their moves toward French Canadians. The times were such that it was no longer possible for any federal government to act toward Quebec like Diefenbaker's Conservatives. Pearson's conciliatory approach was largely responsible for defusing growing discontent within Quebec.4

The rise of Quebec nationalism, and the subsequent establishment of the B and B Commission made English Canada more aware of the demands and aspirations of French Canadians, and helped ignite the fires of multiculturalism. The spokesmen of the third force reacted angrily to the terms of reference of the B and B Commission, which set out to study the dualist image of Canada. Through their presentations and briefs to the Commission, through various lobbying tactics, and through public meetings and conferences, the third force presented its case for multiculturalism against biculturalism. Summing up the mood in the Prairies during the B and B Commission's public hearings in the region, the Commission chairman, Andre Laurendeau wrote: "These Provinces have had delicate problems to solve because they were built by very different ethnic groups; they have managed to work out some kind of balance, and they are afraid biculturalism will threaten that balance."5

For the Liberals, Lester Pearson left a legacy of a weak

5 The Diary of Andre Laurendeau, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
West. In the 1965 federal election, only one Liberal candidate won a seat in the Prairies. The situation did improve for the party in the next election, largely due to new leadership, but only slightly. Trudeau started paying more attention to the demands of the third force to improve his electoral fortunes in the West, on the one hand, and to use the demands of the third force to counter Quebec's ultranationalists and separatists, on the other. In cultural sphere, he refused to define Canada in dualist terms. At the same time, he vigorously pursued bilingualism to create employment opportunities for the educated French youth at the federal level, and to provide government services in both official languages to make French Canadians feel at home everywhere in Canada. To please the third force, Trudeau extended the mandate of the B and B Commission to study the cultural contribution of the other Canadians in a separate volume, which came out in 1970 as Book IV.

The recommendations of the B and B Commission's Book IV gave further ammunition to the activists of the third force to press for multiculturalism. However, the government reaction was rather slow. It began applying the usual delaying tactics through "consultation" meetings with various ethnic groups. The Citizenship Branch of the Department of the Secretary of State started seeking "fresh approaches" on multiculturalism. At this time, the Liberal government's popularity, in the wake of FLQ crises, was very high. But, a decline soon set in. The public became angry and frustrated with the government. The Liberals
decided to act on multiculturalism to please the minority ethnic Canadians. The decision to accept multiculturalism as state policy arose purely out of the Liberal party's political self-interest to attract ethnic votes in the upcoming federal election of 1972.

The self-interest nature of this action was abundantly clear from the efforts of the government to implement multiculturalism after its announcement on October 8, 1971. Although it established a Multicultural Directorate within the Department of the Secretary of State to implement the new policy, the political backing necessary for such a new policy was lacking. Very little funding was made available for multiculturalism as compared with bilingualism, and the program suffered from lack of coordination among various federal agencies and departments. The minister of state for multiculturalism was appointed a year later, in 1972. The funding made available through multicultural grants gave more attention to the folk art tradition of various cultural groups, thus prompting critics to call it a 'song and dance' approach. Indeed, the first decade of multiculturalism policy was marked by an emphasis on the expression and development of ethnic culture and identity.

Studies on multiculturalism in Canada have generally focused on the post 1971 period. The period up to the official announcement of the policy (October 8, 1971) has attracted very little attention of the scholars. It is hoped that this study has shed light on the political process of multiculturalism
prior to its adoption as a state policy, and on the political motives of Pierre Trudeau to promulgate the policy of multiculturalism within a bilingual framework.
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