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HEIDEGGER'S ANALYSIS OF TRUTH IN BEING AND TIME

by

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B.A. (Hons.), Simon Fraser University, 1989

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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Heidegger's Analysis of Truth in Being and Time

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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I discuss Heidegger's view of truth in *Being and Time* contrasting it with the traditional theories such as correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories (although Heidegger's own account is similar to certain modern coherence-pragmatist theories such as Davidson's). Heidegger argues that the dominant traditional theories of truth depend on an ontology originating in ancient Greece that does not adequately capture the nature of human existence and its relevance to truth. I also discuss Heidegger's own ontology, centered on his conception of "Dasein," arguing that it provides a more adequate and fundamental account of human existence. Finally, I discuss the view of truth emerging from Heidegger's ontology. For Heidegger we discover truths about entities within the world, but we are not ourselves such "entities." The truths we discover are not absolute, however; they are relative to what he describes as the "disclosure" of the world, a paradigm-creating series of events determining the way the world is understood. Any theory of truth, for Heidegger, depends on activity and he uses this thesis, articulated as "being-in-the-world" in *Being and Time*, to criticize the tendency of the traditional theories of truth to emphasize passive representation, subject/object metaphysics, and the search for absolutes.
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INTRODUCTION

In this thesis, I attempt to explicate Heidegger's conception of truth as it appears in sections 43 and 44 of *Being and Time*. My aim is primarily exegetical rather than critical. Heidegger's concern in *Being and Time* is not with epistemological theories of justification regarding whether we can know what is true, nor is he concerned with genealogical theories of knowledge regarding how we come to know what is true. Rather, his concern is with the ontological foundations of truth itself. The relevant question, therefore, is not: given the truth that p, what justification could be provided for X's belief that p is true? Nor is it the question: given the truth that p, how did X come to believe that p is true? Rather, the relevant questions are: what conditions must be satisfied in order for there to be such a thing as truth or knowledge? Are these conditions absolute? What sorts of entities, if any, are suitable bearers of truth? What is the ontological status of such truth bearers? What conditions identify the things we ordinarily call true (such as propositions, judgements, and beliefs) -- correspondence with objective reality (e.g., facts or states of affairs); internal coherence among, for example, judgements, beliefs, or practices; usefulness in or consequences for our everyday lives; or something altogether different?
To answer these questions our focus must be on ontology rather than on epistemology; Heidegger believes ontology determines how we understand ourselves, the world, and the relationship between ourselves and the world. Thus, ontology determines how we understand such key concepts as truth, knowledge, and reality; ontology explains the origins of these concepts in our deepest understanding of the nature of reality. Indeed, Heidegger believes the epistemological enterprise as a whole (i.e., the assumption that it is intelligible to ask whether and how we can know anything at all) grows out of our commitment to a specific ontology. If he is correct, then, although epistemology and ontology are dialectically interdependent, investigations into the nature of the ontology of truth in Western philosophy are logically prior to epistemological enquiry: all questions about justification and knowledge acquisition will already presuppose some understanding of our own nature, of the nature of the world, and of our mode of access to the world inherent in this particular ontology. Furthermore, Heidegger believes the ontology enabling us to make sense of epistemological issues also underlies all traditional theories of truth. Thus, any investigation into the nature of truth must also begin with ontology.

According to the ontology of truth assumed by most Western philosophers, Heidegger argues, the world has an objective structure that is "present," in the sense of
independent of human interpretation or activity. Human beings represent (or "re-present") this structure in propositions, mental images, beliefs, or theories. This vaguely dualistic metaphysical picture makes it possible for us to see truth as a relation between our representations of the world and the world as it is in itself, and to see philosophy as the discipline whose job it is to describe the nature of this relation. To see how Heidegger supports the claim that traditional theories of truth rely on this ontology, let us consider the traditionally dominant types of theories: correspondence theories, pragmatic theories, and coherence theories.

According to correspondence theories, truth is a relation between something representational (such as a proposition, mental image, judgement, or even a theory) and an objective, independent reality (objects, facts, and states of affairs as they are in themselves). According to early versions of pragmatic theories, such as those offered by William James and the early John Dewey, truth is a relation between something mental or intentional (such as an idea, belief, or hypothesis) and its consequences or uses in an objectively real world. Thus correspondence theories and early pragmatic theories rely on the ontological distinction between representations of reality and reality itself (or between the mental and the physical). Indeed, without this distinction these theories would be unintelligible, since there would not be two kinds
of things that could either correspond or fail to correspond or, in the case of pragmatic theories, one type of entity whose truth is dependent on its consequences for another type of entity.

Heidegger believes classical (idealistic) coherence theories also rely on this distinction, though it is less obvious how they do so. Classical coherence theories make truth a relation among various tokens of one type of representation -- for example, logical consistency (or mutual support) among all propositions, all mental images, all ideas, or all theories -- without making reference to an independent, objective world. An obvious objection to coherence theories is they lead to the counter-intuitive conclusion that a proposition, for example, "about" an objective fact may be "true" (i.e., meet the test of coherence) without there actually being any such objective fact. Heidegger's objection, however, is more subtle. It is that coherence theories depend on the existence of at least one side of the traditional representation/reality distinction. That is, while coherence theories avoid the need to account for any connection between representations and reality, they still rely upon there being a self-contained realm of representation by means of which truth is defined and reality characterized. Our common-sense intuition that truth must be tied to the objective world simply reintroduces the other half of the underlying ontology, namely the assumption that there is an
objectively real and mind-independent world that truth is about. Coherence theories, then, reject the need for linkage between representations and reality, while holding onto the idea of agreement among representations as the best characterization of truth, whatever the connection between experience and reality.

With both coherence and correspondence theories, then, we have true representations (propositions, beliefs, judgements, theories), and in both cases the question of truth concerns the relationship either among representations (coherence) or between representations and objective reality (correspondence). The main difference between the two is simply that for coherence theories the relation exists between tokens of one type of entity while for correspondence theories the relation exists between tokens of two types of entities. Therefore, both coherence and correspondence theorists must ask the same question: what is the nature of this truth-relation? For Heidegger, then, coherence and correspondence theories share the same ontology: both involve a relation between things, and both understand the nature of that relation as something to be discovered.

Heidegger's own view is that correspondence, pragmatic, and coherence theories of truth are "privative" or derived from a deeper, more "primordial" understanding of truth, an understanding devoid of the ontological distinctions and commitments underlying traditional
conceptions of truth. Following Heidegger, I will call this more fundamental understanding of truth "truth as disclosure." It is a sense of truth closely connected with what Heidegger calls "the being of entities" because the being of entities (how entities are as opposed to what entities are) is what is disclosed by human activity.

According to Heidegger, disclosure is the activity of producing underlying frameworks, ontologies, and root metaphors. The framework underlying the Western world-view is that the world has an objective structure, independent of human activity and interpretation. This underlying framework has led variously to the ontologies of materialism (the view that reality consists entirely of properties inhering in portions of extended matter), idealism (the view that reality consists entirely of non-extended ideal or mental entities), and dualism (the view that reality consists of a combination of mental entities and physical entities). While these ontologies differ in detail, all three share the view that reality consists of static, occurrent things unaltered in their fundamental nature by human activity and interpretation: objects are always physical entities; thoughts and beliefs are always mental entities; reality always consists exclusively of one, exclusively of the other, or of a combination of the two. The root metaphor emerging from our underlying framework casts knowing as a type of "beholding": the view that knowledge is gained primarily by autonomous,
individual representers engaging in detached observation or contemplation of reality. The underlying framework, out of which various ontologies and root metaphors grow, allows entities to emerge as entities of a certain sort -- in the predominant modern view of reality, as self-contained, material things governed by abstract causal principles -- and so makes it possible to discover how things are in the world by discerning the principles underlying the structure and behavior of these occurrent things.

Discovering how things are in the world involves ascribing some determination to entities through providing descriptions of them based on the overall framework and intelligible only within the overall framework. Science, for example, is a mechanism of discovery, describing reality in terms of mass, energy, molecular structure, causal laws, etc., expressed in certain mathematical formulae. This description relies on the disclosure of entities as isolable, substantial, quantifiable things. Heidegger maintains that traditional theories of truth are also mechanisms of discovery made possible by the disclosure of the world as an objectively structured reality consisting of occurrent things. Thus, while traditional theories of truth may make interesting and important contributions to our understanding of how things are in the world, they are nevertheless supervenient, theoretical constructs presupposing the specific disclosure of the world that makes such modes of discovery possible.
In his own discussion of truth, Heidegger attempts to disclose the nature of traditional theories as mechanisms of discovery based on a disclosure. That is, Heidegger does not himself present a theory of truth. Rather, he attempts to outline the origins and limitations of traditional theories of truth, arguing that they cannot characterize reality at its deepest level, and so have no valid claim to absolute authority. He argues further that all theory is rooted in interpretation, and so the concept of truth should be seen as evolutionary and hermeneutical, rather than as fixed or absolute.

Heidegger maintains that our understanding of truth as correspondence is based on a momentous disclosure, centered on the early Greek notion of *aletheia*. While the Greek word "*aletheia*" is ordinarily translated as "truth," Heidegger maintains that *aletheia* did not originally mean what we mean by "truth." Rather, for the pre-Socratics, it meant the "unhiddenness" of entities or the "clearing" within which entities "showed themselves." *Aletheia*, Heidegger argues, contained no distinction between the knower and the known, and hence no distinction between representations and reality. The notion of truth as correspondence arose out of the Parmenidean/Platonic ontological distinction between universal and particular, and, later on, the Aristotelian grammatical distinction between subject and predicate that was built into the earlier distinction. As a result of these distinctions,
truth came to be associated with revealing the general attributes of particular entities (i.e., discovering universality in particulars) and with a beholding subject who accomplishes this revealing through some mode of representation (i.e., characterizing universality in particulars). Thus, while Aristotle never speaks of representations and Plato does so only fleetingly, they nevertheless made the fundamental distinctions out of which the view of knowledge as representation and the view of truth as correspondence were to emerge. After Plato and Aristotle, accuracy of mental or linguistic representation gradually became the hallmark of truth.

In chapter three of this thesis, I discuss the derivation of truth from aletheia and contrast Heidegger's notion of disclosure with the traditional view of truth as correspondence. Little time is spent discussing the details or various formulations of the classical theories of truth, not because they are uninteresting or unimportant but because, once again, Heidegger believes that all such theories share the same fundamental characteristic, namely, the ontological separation of representation and reality. Coherence and pragmatic theories of truth will be mentioned only in passing because, as Bernd Magnus points out in Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy:

Heidegger would probably collapse all such distinctions [as those between correspondence, coherence, and pragmatic theories of truth] as derivative. He is not unaware of possible
objections which could be raised by historians of philosophy. It is simply that Heidegger uses the concept of agreement, ..., in a broader sense, which includes all kinds of "agreement"; idea to thing, thing to consistently related ideas, and ideas to their verifiable (or discernible) consequences.

For the most part, then, in this thesis only the phrase "correspondence theory" will be used. This should, however, be understood to include all the other traditional theories of truth as well.

As we have seen, Heidegger traces the origins of our fundamental framework back to ancient Greece. Because he believes that this framework has largely determined the subsequent history of Western philosophy, he finds it necessary to approach his conception of truth via a discussion of the origins of traditional ontology. In other words, because Heidegger believes that our philosophical interests and commitments are determined, or at least greatly influenced, by the tradition we have inherited from our ancestors, he says it is necessary to understand the ontology of this tradition before any real progress can be made on questions concerning the nature of reality or the nature of truth as they have been discussed within it. In giving an example of the profound influence of the traditional framework on our world-view, Heidegger says the Parmenidean interpretation of Being as objectively determinate reality was adopted by Plato and Aristotle and "has, in its essentials, travelled the path that leads through the Disputationes metaphysicae of Suarez
to the 'metaphysics' and transcendental philosophy of modern times" [22]. Such an interpretation, once original and controversial, has become an integral part of our own world-view.

Furthermore, Heidegger notes that when a world-view becomes firmly entrenched, as ours undoubtedly has, certain possibilities of thought are precluded. One set of beliefs, even if a variable set, takes on the character of virtual self-evidence and becomes the foundation for our understanding of the world and ourselves. He says that "the ontology which has thus arisen [from the Greek interpretation of Being] has deteriorated to a tradition in which it gets reduced to something self-evident -- merely material for reworking" [22]. As a result, we neglect to question the assumptions behind the "foundations" of our knowledge, and so are repeatedly stuck with the problems that grow out of our world-view, problems which remain unsolvable from within our set of presuppositions. Heidegger asks, "Is it accidental that no headway has been made with this problem [of correspondence] in over two thousand years?" [216-7].

Because Heidegger believes the entrenchment of a world-view precludes original possibilities of thought, he says it is necessary to "destroy" the tradition of ontology before any new metaphors can take hold. To destroy the tradition, in Heidegger's sense, is to loosen the hold it has over us, to come to understand it as the source of our
philosophical viewpoint, and to recapture some of its original "positive possibilities" [22] now lost to us. Heidegger believes that if we are able to do this, we will be able to make explicit at least some of the presuppositions implicit in our ontological commitments, begin to free ourselves from the grip of subject/object ontology, and ultimately to understand correspondence theories of truth as mechanisms of discovery.

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger goes beyond the destruction of the tradition. He also presents a positive, alternative ontology -- that of being-in-the-world -- which, he says, is more primitive and fundamental than the metaphysics of subjects and objects. This primitive sense of being, centered on activity and action, is still with us, though it has been obscured by the conception of Being as that which is "present" to the mind (or, more recently, as the objective reality described by science). This conception of Being has been the predominant metaphysics since Plato first began the separation of reality into the two parts of knower (subject) and known (object).

Heidegger's basic premise is that Dasein (roughly human being or human activity) is essentially interpretive of itself and the world. Dasein and world are interdefined by Dasein's activities and each is dependent on the other for its being. It is because traditional philosophers have been working within the Platonic/Aristotelian disclosure that Dasein has interpreted itself as an occurrent thing (a
self-contained mental substance, a mind/body, a rational animal, etc.) and has interpreted the world as a domain of occurrent objects. Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy* is perhaps the most transparent example of the interpretation of Being to which Heidegger objects. Indeed, in *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*, Charles Guignon casts *Being and Time* primarily as a reaction against Cartesianism. The ontology of being-in-the-world may then be seen as an alternative to or even necessary precondition for the emergence of subject/object metaphysics.

Perhaps the best way to introduce the ontology of being-in-the-world is to discuss Heidegger's rejection of the traditional notion that knowledge about the world can be attained best (or only) through disengaged contemplation, by assuming a detached theoretical attitude. As Hubert Dreyfus says in his recent study of *Being and Time*:

From Plato's theoretical dialectic, which turns the mind away from the everyday world of "shadows," to Descartes's preparation for philosophy by shutting himself up in a warm room where he is free from involvement and passion, to Hume's strange analytical discoveries in his study, which he forgets when he goes out to play billiards, philosophers have supposed that only by withdrawing from everyday practical concerns before describing things and people can they discover how things really are.

Heidegger's objection to this view is three-fold. First, he maintains the very notion of attaining a
theoretical attitude presupposes that the world has an objective structure that can be observed or studied as it is in itself. That is, it presupposes that one can detach or disengage human activity and interpretation from the world and still be left with an intelligible, structured reality to study. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing that the world has a structure only in relation to human concerns, activities, and interpretations; the identity of entities within the world is a function of their place in an over-arching framework of purposive, meaningful activity. For Heidegger, it does not make sense to speak of the structure of the world independent of the determinations conferred on it through human disclosure. Indeed, for Heidegger, the very notion that the world has a structure "in itself" is intelligible only within the framework of traditional ontology.

Secondly, Heidegger rejects the implicit assumption that human beings are self-contained individuals or subjects of thought and experience who can be detached from the world in which they ordinarily reside. Heidegger traces this modern, subjectivist view to Descartes' "invention" of the mind as the mechanism for grasping universals. This invention transformed the universal/particular distinction of the Greeks and Scholastics into subject/object metaphysics; both distinctions are implicit in the Greek disclosure of truth.
as discovery. In his study of Being and Time, Charles Guignon says:

[With Descartes] the subject becomes the center around which all other entities revolve as "objects" of experience: the self is the "subjectum" -- that which is "thrown under" and underlies beings....What makes a person unique is now seen as the hidden, private riches of his innermost mental realm....[What emerges] is a picture of the inner self as completely self-defining, with no essential bonds to anything else in the cosmos.\(^1\)

Heidegger argues, against the tradition, that the shared, public "we-world" always takes precedence over any "inner" realm of experience or private grasp of meaning or truth. For Heidegger, individuals always exist within, and are defined by, a common institutional framework of roles, and norms of behavior and equipment use.\(^2\)

[The individual is always] contextualized in equipmental contexts, in a culture, and in history. These contexts define the self without residue -- the Cartesian mind as a center of experiences divides out without remainder. What makes us unique as individuals is not an "internal space" or substantial self distinct from our roles in the world....In this way [Heidegger] attempts to retrieve from oblivion an earlier understanding of the self as inextricably woven into the wider context of a community and a cosmos.\(^3\)

Heidegger does not deny that we can experience ourselves as conscious subjects relating to objects via intentional states, but he maintains that this is a derived and intermittent condition, presupposing a much more fundamental involvement in a shared, public world. Our
ability to understand ourselves as conscious subjects is dependent on our familiarity with a specific disclosure of the world. And, disclosure is a communal or global activity, not an individual, subjective process of thought, judgement, or representation. Thus, Heidegger may be called an anti-individualist; in his view there is no private, individual self distinct from or more fundamental than the public roles one assumes in the everyday public world.

Finally, Heidegger rejects the view, implicit in the theoretical attitude, that our primary mode of access to the world is in the form of beholding independent reality with the eye or the mind. Heidegger argues that our most fundamental way of being is characterized by activity and involvement with the world, by concern for and interaction with the entities we encounter in our daily lives, not by detached observation and contemplation. This interaction is governed by a network of tacit, communal rules of use and interpretation that make up the public, social world. The most primitive of these rules are pre-intentional, pre-linguistic norms of behavior and use, giving us a pre-theoretical understanding of what entities are and how they behave which must always already be in place before it is possible for us to gain theoretical knowledge about them. Understanding is activity-based; it is more primitive than subjective contemplation and theoretical thinking. Heidegger says:
All sight [or insight for that matter] is grounded primarily in understanding....
"Intuition" and "thinking" are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological "intuition of essences" is grounded in existential understanding. [147]

Another way of putting this point is to say that one must, at some level, always, already understand what one is looking for before it is possible actually to look for it or to know whether one has found it. Because understanding, unlike intuition and thinking, is pre-intentional and pre-linguistic, it involves a far deeper interconnection between Dasein and world than that allowed by beholding. For this reason, Heidegger argues that beholding cannot be the fundamental characterization of our understanding of the world.

The picture emerging from these considerations is one in which human beings and the rest of the world are, through the communal activity of being-in-the-world, essentially interdependent and mutually defining, rather than divided into ontological categories based on ontological type-distinctions such as consciousness/matter, form/content, and universal/particular.

Although it will be necessary to make brief excursions into other sections of Being and Time, this thesis considers particularly those sections explicitly devoted to the nature of reality and the nature of truth: section 43 "Dasein, worldhood, and reality" and section 44 "Dasein,
disclosedness, and truth." The structure of these two sections is roughly as follows.

**SECTION 43: DASEIN, WORLDHOOD, AND REALITY**

Heidegger begins by pointing out that philosophers have traditionally interpreted Being in terms of entities within the world and construed entities within the world as occurrent things: isolated, substantial objects, located in space/time with no teleological connection to that space/time. Substantiality has thus become the primary characteristic of "reality."

**Section 43(a):**

The question of what reality signifies has been confused with the question of the existence of the external world. This has happened because reality has traditionally been taken to consist of occurrent things and because it has long been held that reality can best be understood through objective observation and contemplation. However, if we begin with the assumption that the world consists of occurrent objects, go on to ask epistemological questions, and use the method characterized as beholding to answer these questions, we will discover that the only thing certain is indeed something "inner." Thus the need to prove the existence of the "external" world arises.

Even Kant fell prey to this problem: he called it the "scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general" that there is still no cogent proof for the existence of things "outside of us" which would do away with skepticism.
Heidegger maintains, however, that the real scandal of philosophy is not that such a proof has yet to be given, "but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again" [205]. The demand for such proofs arises only because the character of the being who requests proofs and does the proving has not been properly understood.

Traditional attempts to determine the nature of reality have gone awry because they have focused on epistemological issues (i.e., whether and how Dasein can have access to reality) while leaving the ontological presuppositions upon which epistemology is based unquestioned.

Section 43(b):

The term "reality" stands for the being of entities occurrent within the world. Thus, an analysis of reality is possible only if the phenomenon of "within the worldness" is clarified first. But, the phenomenon of the world is a basic constituent of being-in-the-world. Thus, an analysis of reality is possible only in connection with an ontological analysis of being-in-the-world.

Nevertheless, positive contributions have been made by philosophers who have attempted to analyze reality without reference to any explicit ontological basis. For example, Dilthey and Scheler have noted that reality is given primarily in resistance to impulse and will, not in thinking or apprehending. Heidegger notes that in any experience of resistance or willing something must already
have been disclosed as what one's will is out for. Thus, in any experience of resistance to will Dasein finds itself already amidst a totality on involvements, already in a disclosed world. Experiences of resistance, therefore, do not disclose the world for the first time; they presuppose that the world has been disclosed already.

Section 43(c):

Because representing is just another way of being-in-the-world, attempts to work out an analysis of reality cannot be based on representing but must be traced to being-in-the-world. That is, representing is a mechanism of discovery, an activity based on the Platonic/Aristotelian disclosure of the world. Disclosure is related to Dasein's most fundamental activities and involvement with the world.

SECTION 44: DASEIN, DISCLOSEDNESS, AND TRUTH

Heidegger points out that in early Greek philosophy truth was understood to have a fundamental connection with being; it was not made a theme for theories of judgement or knowledge as it is today. Heidegger stresses the connection between truth and being and, in doing so, shows how our modern notion of truth as correspondence is derived from a more fundamental notion of truth.

Section 44(a):

The most difficult question facing adherents of correspondence theories is how something representational
can correspond to objective reality. Rather than trying to
answer this question, Heidegger maintains that the question
has already been distorted by the ontologically unclarified
separation of representations and reality. In approaching
the question of truth from the standpoint of traditional
metaphysics, we not only begin at an impasse, we presuppose
the very thing at issue: we presuppose that truth is a
relation between representations and reality.

Heidegger says that assertions are not
representations; they are tools for calling attention to
relevant aspects of a situation occurring within an already
disclosed world. To say that an assertion is true
signifies that it uncovers the thing it is about in the
"how" of its being, relative to a disclosure. The entities
that are uncovered are true "in a second sense." The being
who does the uncovering, Dasein, is true in a more
fundamental sense.

Section 44(b):

Truth as correspondence has come to be seen as basic
rather than derived from a more primordial notion of truth
because the two terms involved in the correspondence
relation -- assertions (or judgements) and objects (or
states of affairs) -- have themselves come to be seen as
basic rather than derived from discourse (or telling) and
equipment respectively. Heidegger says that discourse
begins essentially to those beings who disclose the world.

Discourse is a way of uncovering entities within the world,
but it is also a way of conveying how entities within the world have been uncovered. Discourse of the latter sort usually takes the form of assertion. In this way, assertions become tools for passing on information about entities within the world. But, because entities within the world have been taken to be occurrent things and because these things are what assertions are about, assertions themselves come to be seen as occurrent, as tokens of representation. Thus, truth comes to be seen as an occurrent relation between occurrent things.

Section 44(c):

Because truth, in its deepest sense, is referred back to the being or activity of Dasein, there is truth only in so far as Dasein is and for so long as Dasein is. This does not mean that truth is subjective. The world is, in every case, already disclosed for individual Dasein.

In all of this we have presupposed that there is truth. But this is nothing like an idle or groundless presupposition on our part. Rather, we must presuppose that there is truth because we posses the sort of being whose activities disclose the world and discover entities within the world. It is only on the basis of there being such a being as Dasein that anything like presupposing is possible and the being of such beings guarantees the existence of truth.
The thesis itself is divided into three chapters.

CHAPTER ONE

Chapter one contains an account of Heidegger's "destruction" of the history of metaphysics. The first section traces the development of subject/object metaphysics from Parmenides to Descartes. The second section contains a brief discussion of Heidegger's objections to Cartesianism and introduces two aspects of Heidegger's proposed alternative. Section three, entitled "The Occurrent and the Available," explores Heidegger's contention that entities within the world are defined in terms of human purposes, rather than in terms of abstract physical properties. The fourth section contains a brief discussion of Heidegger's view of language and the connection between language and metaphysics.

CHAPTER TWO

The bulk of chapter two is devoted to a discussion of being-in-the-world. This is divided into three sections: the nature of Dasein (the being who is in the world), the notion of being-in (a contrast between the "in" of spatial inclusion and the "in" of non-spatial involvement), and the notion of the world (a contrast between traditional definitions and Heidegger's technical sense of "world"). These three sections are followed by a section on "care": Heidegger's characterization of Dasein as being-in-the-
world. The final section of chapter two is devoted to a discussion of the nature of reality as understood in science.

CHAPTER THREE

Chapter three deals directly with Heidegger's conception of truth and is divided into six sections. The first section deals with the shift that occurred in Plato and Aristotle from the pre-Socratic notion of aletheia to the modern notion of truth as correspondence. The second section deals with some of Heidegger's objections to traditional theories of truth and with Heidegger's attempt to clarify the notion of agreement. In the third section, I discuss the nature of assertion and Heidegger's notion of truth as uncovering. The fourth section contains a discussion of truth as disclosure -- Heidegger's more fundamental notion of truth -- and the notion of being "in the truth and the untruth." Fifth is a discussion of assertion, and the shift that occurred from uncovering to agreement. And finally, there is a discussion of the nature of truth and the presupposition that there is truth.
NOTES FOR THE INTRODUCTION


\(^2\)See: William James, *Pragmatism* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975) 97-104. James says, for example, "True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify." James also says true ideas are those that are "useful," that "work," that "pay," or that "help us to deal...with either the reality or its belongings."

See also: John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Enlarged Edition (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1965) 156. Dewey says, for example, "If [ideas, meanings, conceptions, notions, theories, systems] succeed in their office, they are reliable, sound, valid, good, true. If they fail to clear up confusion, to eliminate defects, if they increase confusion, uncertainty and evil when they are acted upon they are false.... The hypothesis that works is the true one."

\(^3\)Many of the points Heidegger uses to criticize traditional versions of coherence and pragmatic theories of truth cannot be used to criticize more recent versions of these theories such as those formulated by Donald Davidson and the later John Dewey.

"The German word translated as "primordial" by Macquarrie and Robinson is "ursprunglich." Because Heidegger clearly believes there are degrees of ursprunglich, a better translation may be "fundamental" or "primitive." I will substitute one of these terms where it is appropriate.

The German word translated as "disclose" by Macquarrie and Robinson is "erschliessen." This is contrasted with "entdecken" translated as "discover" or "uncover." Discovery pertains to entities within the world; disclosure pertains to the world itself.

Following Hubert Dreyfus, I will translate the german term "vorhanden" as "occurrent." ("Vorhanden" is translated as "present-at-hand" by Macquarrie and Robinson.) This term refers to entities whose primary characteristic is substantiality -- the static, independent objects of Cartesian enquiry. I will translate the german term "zuhanden" as "available." ("Zuhanden" is translated as "ready-to-hand" by Macquarrie and Robinson.) This term
refers to entities whose primary characteristic is useability -- the context-dependent equipment Heidegger takes to be basic. See section 1.2 for a discussion of the occurrent and the available.


8The term "Being" (with a capital "B") will be used to refer to the traditional conception according to which Being is occurrent. "Being" should be understood as a noun. The term "being" (with a small "b") will be used to refer to Heidegger's conception of being as activity-based. Here, "being" is a gerund.

9I use the phrase "subject/object ontology" to refer roughly to the metaphysics underlying traditional theories of truth and knowledge. Thus, "subject/object ontology" should be understood to include all dualistic schemas -- the Platonic ideal/real, the Cartesian mind/body, and all other versions of the representation/reality distinction such as mental image/reality, language/world, etc.


12Guignon, 17-8.

13See chapter 2.2 of this thesis for a discussion of equipment use.

14Guignon, 19.
CHAPTER ONE
HEIDEGGER AND REALISM

Heidegger believes subject/object metaphysics originated in ancient Greece through a re-interpretation of certain key concepts. This re-interpretation created a new world-view: one that has dominated our concepts of knowledge, truth, reality, and selfhood since Plato. Because subject/object metaphysics is the basic metaphysics of the West, it will be necessary to outline its origins and to discuss some of Heidegger's objections to it before going on to discuss the alternative ontology of being-in-the-world.

1.1: THE ORIGINS OF SUBJECT/OBJECT METAPHYSICS

Heidegger says that subject/object metaphysics began explicitly with Parmenides and was firmly entrenched by Plato and Aristotle [100]. For his part, Parmenides was the first to raise the general question about the nature of Being (i.e., the ultimate nature of reality). To characterize Being, Parmenides drew a contrast between "the way of seeming" and "the way of truth." The way of seeming was identified with the beliefs of mortals who wrongly suppose that things exist at some times and not at others (i.e., that change is real) and that some things contain less Being than others (i.e., that there are differences between things). The way of truth, on
the other hand, was identified with the divine. The way of truth tells us that the object of thought and knowledge exists and must exist. Real Being is eternal, ungenerated, and indestructible. No distinctions can be made in it; it does not move or change; it does not admit of degrees or qualitative differences. Parmenides concluded that mortals are wrong to assume that Being is many (i.e., that change and difference are fundamental characteristics of Being) based on the information conveyed to them by the senses (the way of seeming) when reason (the way of truth) tells us that Being is one and unchanging.

Parmenides' influence on Plato was direct and profound. As David Furley says in his article, "Parmenides of Elea":

Plato inherited from Parmenides the belief that the object of knowledge must exist and must be found by the mind (reason) and not by the senses. He agreed that the object of knowledge is not something abstracted from the data of sense perception but a being of a different and superior order.¹

In Plato, the objects of knowledge are, of course, the Platonic forms, which have all of the characteristics ascribed to Being by Parmenides; they were eternal, uncreated, and unchanging. In the early and middle dialogues, the Platonic forms were conceived along the lines of arithmetical and geometrical objects, and so they provided Plato with eternal objects sought through
the art of dialectic, directly comparable to the objects (truths) sought by arithmetic and geometry. In his dualistic ontology, Plato contrasted the forms with constantly changing, sensible particulars, which were said to owe their structure to their participation in the forms.

Plato's theory of forms provided an explanation of how human beings could understand universal concepts such as Wisdom or Virtue and identify imperfect particular instances of them in the sensible world. It accounted for our ability to make sense of definitions, standards, and paradigms, of immutable things (such as numbers), of how one concept, distinct from relativistic, local beliefs, could apply to an indefinite number of particulars, and of universality in judgement. Universals also provided Plato with a foundation for knowledge because they met Parmenides' test for Being.

With Plato, the human faculty capable of grasping universal concepts -- hypostatized into the forms -- became the mind, distinct from and "higher than" the body. As Richard Rorty notes in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, "Even Aristotle, who spent his life pouring cold water on the metaphysical extravagances of his predecessors, suggests that there probably is something to the notion that the intellect is 'separable' [from the body], even though nothing else about the soul is." But the Greek mind was not yet the familiar
(Cartesian) inner realm of consciousness and certainty.
In "Why Isn't the Mind-Body Problem Ancient," Wallace Matson suggests that the Greeks had no way to divide the events of the inner realm from the events of the external world.

The Greeks did not lack a concept of mind, even of a mind separable from the body. But from Homer to Aristotle, the line between mind and body, when drawn at all, was drawn so as to put the processes of sense perception on the body side...."Sensation" was introduced into philosophy precisely to make it possible to speak of a conscious state without committing oneself as to the nature or even existence of external stimuli.¹

One of Descartes' major contributions to philosophy was to sharpen up and reposition what had been a vague distinction between mind and body. In this way, Descartes invented the distinction in its modern sense. The novelty in Descartes' treatment of the distinction lay in the notion of a unified, inner space that accounted for sensation and perception, the grasp of universals, the idea of God, moods, thought, and all the rest of what we now call mental. Rorty says:

Once Descartes had invented that "precise sense" of "feeling" in which it was "no other than thinking," we began to lose touch with the Aristotelian distinction between reason-as-grasp-of-universals and the living body which takes care of sensation and motion. A new mind-body distinction was required -- the one which we call that "between consciousness and what is not conscious."²
It is difficult to say with certainty why Descartes repositioned the line between the mental and the physical. It is probable, however, that he was attempting to provide a foundation of indubitable truths that could justify the discoveries of science as absolute truths about nature, rather than describing scientific discoveries as mere heuristic devices for fallible humans, as Galileo was forced to do. When Descartes found himself unable to doubt that he was in pain when he could still doubt that \(2 + 2 = 4\), he moved sensations, moods, and the like into the realm of the mental because they seemed to have an air of certainty even more fundamental than the truths of mathematics and physics. Once mind was no longer synonymous with the faculty of reason (i.e., for Descartes the mind was also conscious), something other than the ability to grasp universals had to serve as a mark of the mental. Descartes chose indubitability as the essential mark of consciousness and the demarcation he based on it has remained more or less intact: philosophers still argue within the parameters established by Descartes even in their almost universally declared rejection of Cartesian metaphysics.

I turn now to a brief discussion of the development of the object side of subject/object metaphysics. For Plato, the objects of knowledge had to be definite, real, and unchanging. And, because they were unchanging, the objects of knowledge also had to be immaterial and
universal; truth had to be Parmenidean. Plato settled on the (immaterial) forms as the true objects of knowledge because the sensible world, as Heraclitus had pointed out, was in a state of constant flux. Plato's metaphysics, however, is notoriously problematic; the difficulties in it center on the relation between universals and particulars, between form and matter. How do particulars participate in or resemble the forms? How can Parmenides' one and Heraclitus' constant flux be synthesized? Plato's philosophy left a chasm between the forms and sensible objects, between universal concepts and concrete particulars. And, because particulars were held to be pale imitations of the forms, the sensible world was deprived of most of its reality and meaning.

The early philosophical works of Plato's more down-to-earth pupil, Aristotle, may be seen as an attempt to rectify this situation. Aristotle rejected the transcendence of the forms but retained the Platonic view that knowledge (at least scientific and metaphysical knowledge) was of the universal and real. The job of philosophy was then to find a way to retain the permanence and universality of the objects of knowledge without relying on metaphysically distinct forms. Aristotle did this by developing his concept of Essence and locating essences in sensible particulars, identifying the object of knowledge with the visible form of sensible objects themselves. Some of the Platonic
forms were transformed into biological categories (e.g., genus, Animal; species, Man), immanent in particulars and essential to their development. Other Platonic forms were transformed into metaphysical categories (e.g., quality, quantity, number), characteristic of and essential to all sensible particulars. Essence and substance, rather than the sort of universal truths characteristic of mathematical abstraction, became the central concepts in Aristotle's philosophy. Indeed, in Book VII of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle suggests that essence determines identity. He says: "The question as to the Being of a being is the question as to its essence."

At times, however, Aristotle links the notion of essence so closely to the notion of substance that they are virtually indistinguishable. For example, in chapter five of the *Categories*, Aristotle calls the essences or natures of particulars "secondary substances." The history of philosophy since Aristotle is filled with attempts at distinguishing the material (or physical) from the formal (or structural) aspects of substances.

By the time of Descartes (or, at least, in Descartes) there is essentially no difference between essence and substance: thought (broadly construed) is the sole essential attribute of mental substance (mind) and extension is the sole essential attribute of physical substance (matter). But Descartes does not explain what
a substance is apart from its essential property, except to say that is the existence of an essence (and that God is the only substance for which existence is essential). Mind is thought; matter is spatio-temporal extension. By making extension the sole essential property of physical substance, Descartes succeeded in purging the physical world of the spiritualistic and teleological dimensions, surviving in Christian theology from Plato's and Aristotle's accounts, thus rendering the physical world an appropriate object of a new kind of study: one focussing on the essences of things as described by the laws of mechanical motion. The division between mental and physical was complete. As Rorty puts it, "It was more like a distinction between two worlds than like a distinction between two sides, or even parts, of a human being."

The details of Cartesian dualism have changed, but the metaphysical contention that there is an unbridgeable gap between the mental and the physical -- that individuals are primarily subjects of experience, trapped in private, inner worlds and that the entities around us are primarily isolated bits of extended matter in which accidental properties inhere -- remains. It is this view that Heidegger seeks to "destroy."
1.2: HEIDEGGER’S OBJECTIONS TO CARTESIANISM

According to Charles Guignon, Descartes’ philosophy is an attempt to find a foundation for scientific inquiry, and should be seen as an attempt to overcome the wave of skepticism and relativism that swept through sixteenth century Europe.

The revolutionary advances in science and technology, new discoveries abroad, abrupt shifts in demographic patterns, the breakdown of traditional political and economic structures...[all] proved to be incomprehensible within the traditional framework of medieval thought. Most significant among these dislocations was the protest launched by Luther in 1517. Luther challenged the authority of the Church and the traditional conception of reason, insisting on the absolute authority of individual conscience in interpreting Scripture. As a result of these sudden transitions, the traditional standards for knowledge had been undermined by the beginning of the seventeenth century, and there was no longer any universally binding criterion that could provide assurance of beliefs in science, morality, or religion.

By the early seventeenth century, the traditional understanding of the universe as a teleologically ordered structure of symbols containing the story of human salvation, and made intelligible to man by divine revelation, had lost its authority in intellectual circles. The collapse of the medieval framework, together with the absence of any obvious alternative, led to an unprecedented rise in religious and moral relativism and skepticism. Even the most cherished
beliefs, the fundamental tenets of Christianity, were subjected to doubt.

Descartes proceeded by means of a method of investigation that would lead to certain and indubitable truths: truths uncolored by any presuppositions or cultural prejudices, upon which we could rebuild an edifice of true beliefs. (The Parmenidean/Platonic conception of truth survives in Descartes conception.) To this end, again like Parmenides and Plato, Descartes resolved to disengage himself from active involvement with the world, to set aside all cares and passions, and to be an unbiased spectator of all that passed before him. It was only after assuring himself that he had indeed achieved the standpoint of pure objectivity, of the dispassionate, rational observer that Descartes began his investigation into the sources of understanding and universal truths about particulars.

According to Heidegger, however, Descartes' attempt to reach a purely objective standpoint was itself laden with tacit philosophical presuppositions. In disengaging himself from active involvement with the world, setting aside all cares and passions, resolving to be a spectator rather than an actor, Descartes cut himself off from the world he wished to know by retreating into the realm of pure thought. Because he conceived of himself as an isolated subject whose task it was to investigate the nature of the objects around him with scientific
objectivity, what he could know about those objects concerned their abstract physical properties and not their sensible features.\textsuperscript{10} Heidegger maintains that Descartes' apparently (by now to us) innocuous starting point distorted the actual epistemological situation of the enquiring subject. Indeed, Heidegger goes further than this, arguing that the very notion of attaining a completely objective view of the world must be brought into question.

Descartes' conviction that a purely objective standpoint for the discovery of universal truths could be attained was based on presuppositions, inherited from the ancient Greeks, committing him to a picture of the world as an independently structured reality represented by subjects in thought and experience. The first of these presuppositions grew out of the Parmenidean interpretation of Being. According to this interpretation, the true objects of knowledge are unchanging with respect to their defining characteristics; they have an objective structure that can be grasped by the mind (the source of the "pure light of reason" championed by the Enlightenment). Even though modern accounts of substance (such as Descartes' and Locke's) differed from those given by the ancient Greeks, they retained the principle of an objectively distinct reality represented by knowing subjects who grasped the universal laws of science and metaphysics.
This conception of reality guarantees the existence of absolute truths about the world that can, in principle, be discovered by human (or divine) reason and that, when discovered, can provide a foundation for knowledge. According to Heidegger, however, science, Cartesian rationalism, Platonic dualism, Aristotelian essentialism, and Christianity do not confirm the view that the world has an objective structure so much as they presuppose it. The structure is said to be "projected" onto nature in such a way that only those aspects of nature conforming to it are allowed to show up. Nature is then defined in terms of the features picked out by the projection. Furthermore, for Heidegger, the world is not, as most of the philosophical tradition and scientific community have taken it to be, a collection of ready-made objects whose independently determinate essences await our discovery. Rather, it is a sphere of significance constituted by human concerns and activities -- of which science is only one. This sphere, what Heidegger calls a "world," is dependent on those concerns and activities for its being or reality. I discuss these points in greater detail in chapter two.

The second presupposition Heidegger identifies involves Descartes' reliance on the scientific method of investigation. Heidegger believes this method grew out of the Parmenidean/Platonic fascination with theoretical abstractness. It is the idea that the universe is
ultimately understandable, that there discoverable, universal principles underlying the profusion of phenomena. We are urged to observe the phenomena before us, to reflect critically upon the source of our beliefs in the underlying elements of reality, and to devise certain universal criteria of correctness for those beliefs. Guignon calls this unitizing and generalizing.

The first component of the ideal method, unitizing, begins by regarding reality as dissolved into basic units. The concern of unitizing is to find the discrete, simple "bits" that make up the world....The second component...involves a process of generalizing. The goal of generalizing is to find regular, orderly relations among the units arrived at by unitizing, in order to show how they are combined into the organized whole of nature.11

The method of unitizing and generalizing presupposes that entities can be decontextualized -- taken from their places in specific situations -- and understood as interchangeable bits of matter governed by universal causal laws. Heidegger believes this method of investigation to be based, in part, on the subject/predicate model of language that originated with Aristotle, but was to a high degree implicit in Plato.

On this model the paradigmatic unit of meaning is the simple predication in which the subject term refers to or picks out some object in the world and the predicate term ascribes some property to it. This picture of language leads us to see the world as made up of so many self-identical things with attributes -- the substance/accident ontology.12
Heidegger's attack on this method is two-fold. First he develops an alternative to the scientific/Cartesian view that reality consists of discrete, isolable bits of matter. On Heidegger's view the identity of an entity is not, as it was for Descartes, a function of the properties (size, shape, color, etc.) the entity possesses, but a function of the role it plays in a system of rule-governed, purposive activity. On this view the question "what is it?" is often equivalent to the question "what is it for?," a question that can be answered only from within a wider context of use. I discuss this in greater detail in section 1.3.

Second, Heidegger argues that the subject/predicate model of language is derived from a more general use of language to point out or call attention to certain aspects of an already meaningful situation. On this view sentences are not molecular structures built up out of atomic elements; words do not get their meanings by referring to entities or properties. For Heidegger, language is a unified whole rather than as a composite built up out of discrete elements. The meanings of words and the grammatical structure of sentences is grounded in the practices of a community. Dreyfus rightly says:

On Heidegger's phenomenological account words as used in everyday talking do not get their meaning from anywhere. Once one has been socialized into a community's practices, as
long as one dwells in those practices rather than taking a detached point of view, words are simply heard and seen as meaningful.\textsuperscript{13}

I discuss Heidegger's view of language in greater detail in section 1.4.

To sum up, Heidegger argues that if we begin with the same ontological presuppositions Descartes began with (i.e., the presupposition that the world has an objective structure whose underlying principles can be grasped by the mind, and that this structured is captured by the subject/predicate model of language) and go on to formulate epistemological questions critically (i.e. in keeping with the method of unitizing and generalizing), as Descartes did, then what we will find "as proximally and solely certain is [indeed] something merely 'inner'" [206]. In other words, if we adopt the two ontological presuppositions mentioned above, we will eventually reach the same skeptical conclusions Descartes (ought to have) reached. For this reason, Heidegger believes we can escape skeptical conclusions only by questioning Descartes' initial starting point. To this end, Heidegger urges us to set aside our common sense view of reality and examine our everyday way of being.

1.3: THE OCCURRENT AND THE AVAILABLE

Descartes began his investigation with the presupposition that the world consists of static, occurrent objects located in space. On this view the
identity of an entity is a function of its physical properties and is independent of its relation to other entities. Heidegger rejects this view, arguing that the identity of an entity is a function of the role it plays in a context of activity, a function of its "place" in a referential network organized in terms of human purposes.

For Heidegger our everyday world is characterized by a bewildering variety of activities. We are involved in day to day tasks, concerned with the completion of our projects, absorbed in the multitude of mundane undertakings which constitute our daily lives -- eating, commuting, cleaning, dressing, writing, etc. It is true, of course, that we can sit back and contemplate the entities before us as Descartes did, but a more basic, pre-theoretical way of encountering these entities is to use them in achieving our goals. Heidegger says:

The less we just stare at [an entity], and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more does our relationship to it approach the primordial, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is. [69]

In our activities, we do not ordinarily encounter entities as mere substances with properties accidentally located here rather than there. Most of the time, we encounter them as tools available for our use, gear which we manipulate in order to get on with the task at hand, things that are familiar and significant to us because they have a "place" in our world. Because we are
involved in goal-oriented interactions with most of the entities around us, entities are seen primarily as extensions of ourselves, not just physical extensions but extensions of our concerns and interests. Heidegger calls the mode of being of such entities "availability" ("zuhandenheit"); he refers to these entities themselves as "equipment" ("zeug") or sometimes as "the available" (zuhanden).

Heidegger says:

Taken strictly, there "is" no such thing as an equipment....Equipment is essentially "something in-order-to"....[And] in the "in-order-to" as a structure there lies an assignment or reference of something to something. [68]

In other words, equipment always refers to other equipment (e.g., hammers refer to nails and boards) and are assigned a function in a context of purposive activity (e.g., hammers are assigned a function in building and fixing). Any given item of equipment is defined by the role it plays in an equipmental nexus and a functional context. A single piece of cloth, for example, may be used as a bed-sheet, a wrap-around skirt, a table cloth, a curtain, etc. The cloth is not simply an extended region of matter possessing attributes as a discrete, independent thing. It is that which one uses in conjunction with a window in order to keep out light,
in conjunction with a mattress and blankets in order to
sleep comfortably, and so on.

Equipment is defined by its function (its in-order-to) in a referential whole, but it is also caught up in means/end relationships even broader than functional roles. In order for equipment to have a function, it must fit into a context of meaningful activity, activity that makes sense because it is "for-the-sake-of" something, activity that makes sense of things having a function. Dreyfus puts it this way:

Hammers make sense by referring to nails, etc. But how does the activity of hammering make sense? Equipment makes sense only in the context of other equipment; our use of equipment makes sense because our activity has a point....To take a specific example: I write on the black board in a classroom, with a piece of chalk, in order to draw a chart, as a step towards explaining Heidegger, for the sake of my being a good teacher.15

There are two major differences between the occurrent and the available. First, while the occurrent can be characterized independently of a subject and context, the available can be characterized only in relation to a subject and context: the available is always available to someone for some purpose. Thus, the nature of the available cannot be understood without reference to a context (what it is available along with), a purpose (what it is available for), and a subject (to whom it is available).
Second, while the occurrent comes to us as meaningless bits of matter which must later be invested with significance, the available derives its significance from its context. Consider the example Heidegger gives when discussing signs, one particular type of equipment.

Motor cars are sometimes fitted up with an adjustable red arrow, whose position indicates the direction the vehicle will take.... This sign is an item of equipment which is available to the driver in his concern with driving.... [It] is available within the world in the whole equipment-context of vehicles and traffic regulations. It is equipment for indicating, and as equipment, it is constituted by reference or assignment. [78]

When we are actively engaged with the world as drivers or pedestrians, the red arrow comes to us not as a meaningless bit of colored plastic whose significance we must discover or interpret. Rather, in our familiarity with vehicles and traffic regulations, we understand the arrow first as an indicator of the direction the vehicle will take. There is no separate act of interpretation, no inference drawn from basic beliefs, no judgement made regarding the meaning of the arrow. The significance of the arrow does not lie in its physical properties, but in the role it plays: the arrow is in order to indicate direction for the sake of preventing injury to people. It is only after we disengage ourselves from our involvement with the world of traffic, set aside our concern for our own safety, and
just stare at the indicator that we notice it is a colored object of a certain size and shape, and wonder how it gets its meaning.

For Heidegger, availableness and occurrentness are not two different but equally basic characterizations of entities within the world. We can understand entities as occurrent because we are able to decontextualize them in the way Descartes decontextualized everything including himself. We can step back and just stare at them, contemplate them as brute things, focus our attention on properties while ignoring context and purpose. We can, in other words, understand occurrentness as decontextualized availzbleness. We cannot, however, invest the occurrent with value independent of Dasein's interests; tools do not have properties of usefulness independent of the contexts of activity in which they gain their identity as tools. The following passages from Heidegger will help to clarify this point.

No matter how sharply we just look at the "outward appearance" of things in whatever form this takes, we cannot discover anything available. [69]

When something cannot be used -- when, for instance, a tool definitely refuses to work -- it can be conspicuous only in and for dealings in which something is manipulated. Even by the sharpest and most persevering "perception" and "representation" of things, one can never discover anything like the damaging of a tool. [354]

When we are using a tool circumspectively, we can say...that the hammer is too heavy or too
light. Even the [simple predication] proposition that the hammer is heavy can...signify that the hammer is not an easy one...that it will be hard to manipulate. [360]

Dreyfus adds:

When the hammer I am using fails to work,...I have to deal with it as too heavy, unbalanced, broken, etc. These characteristics belong to the hammer only as used by me in a specific situation. Being too heavy is certainly not a property of the hammer, and although the philosophical tradition has a great deal to say about properties and the predicates that denote them, it has nothing to say about such situational characteristics...like "too heavy for this job."16

In short, we cannot account for availableness in terms of occurrentness.

The important point here is that the available does not have characteristics or identities independent of human activities and interpretations (i.e., norms of use). If Heidegger is correct in claiming that the available is closer to the primordial than the occurrent, it follows that entities cannot be fundamentally characterized "in themselves" and so the fundamental structure of entities "in themselves" cannot, even in principle, be discovered by a beholding subject. Thus, the Platonic/Cartesian project of determining the underlying structure of reality and using this structure as a foundation for knowledge cannot even get started.

The ontological significance of the available is closely
connected with that of being-in-the-world. Chapter two contains a discussion of being-in-the-world.

1.4: HEIDEGGER'S VIEW OF LANGUAGE

Heidegger believes the substance/attribute ontology underlying the scientific enterprise, and the Cartesian search for its foundation, derives its plausibility largely from the subject/predicate model of language. Heidegger attributes the origins of this model to Aristotle's theory of grammar, formulated in De Interpretatione, where Aristotle draws a distinction between nouns, verbs, and adjectives, suggests that spoken utterances signify ideas in the soul, and outlines the truth conditions for assertion. On both the Aristotelian and modern versions of this model, words get their meanings by referring, in some particular way, to entities/properties in a correspondence relation. The basic function of language is to predicate properties to subjects in simple assertions (i.e., to represent the connection between substances and attributes). Language is treated as a set of (occurrent) lexical items to be used in various combinations according to the rules of syntax, rules which represent substance/attribute relations. All other forms of language are treated as derivatives of simple predication. Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published at the beginning of this century, just as Heidegger was writing
Being and Time, has been an influential example of this treatment of language, made possible by Aristotle's subject/predicate grammar. Heidegger reverses the derivation, arguing that the subject/predicate model is derived from a more general and more holistic conception of language. In Basic Problems of Phenomenology, written during the same period as Being and Time, Heidegger says:

Language is not identical with the sum total of all the words printed in a dictionary; instead...language is as Dasein is...it exists.\(^{14}\)

In Being and Time, he says:

Language is a totality of words -- a totality in which discourse [or telling] has a "worldly" being of its own; and as an entity within the world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as available. \(^{161}\)

Guignon suggests that the Heidegger of Being and Time alternates between two views of the nature of language, both of which are incompatible with the Aristotelian view mentioned above and discussed in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. Guignon calls these the "instrumentalist" view and the "constitutive" view.\(^{20}\) On the instrumentalist view, language is one type of equipment available within the world and, along with other types, helps make the world intelligible but is not itself the most basic tool of interpretation available to Dasein. The primary function of language on this view is
to reveal or point out certain aspects of an already intelligible situation. As Guignon says:

From the instrumentalist's standpoint, our ability to use language is grounded in some prior grasp of the nonsemantic significance of the contexts in which we find ourselves....Although language may play a very important role in making the world intelligible, it is itself possible only against the background of an understanding that is nonlinguistic.21

The constitutive view of language is more radical (in the sense that it is further from the Aristotelian tradition) and resembles the view espoused in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*. Here language serves as a sort of template through which we first come to understand ourselves and the world.

Language literally constitutes the world by making it possible to characterize entities.

Whereas the available is ontologically defined by its place in a total context, language plays the role of generating those contexts of activity and making possible the fact that there are such contexts at all....Language on this view inhabits our lives and shapes the situations in which we find ourselves.22

Language, then, is not something merely available that can (but need not) be used to point out things that have independent identities and properties. Rather language constitutes intelligibility itself; if there were no language, there would be no identities and no attributes.
The prior articulation of the world in language is so all-encompassing that there is no exit from the maze of language. We can never encounter a world as it is in itself, untouched by the constituting activity of linguistic schematizations.23

Because the grammar of public language determines the essences of entities within the world, there is no nonlanguage-bound way to distinguish between the way things are in themselves and the way we describe them or talk about them in our everyday lives. That is, the contrast we in fact draw between language (the way we talk about things) and reality (the way things are in themselves) is itself a language-bound distinction.

It is clear from his later writings that Heidegger eventually explicitly adopted the constitutive view. In the Introduction to Metaphysics, written in 1935, Heidegger says:

Words and language are not wrappers in which things are packed for the intercourse of talking and writing. It is in words and language that things first come into being and are.24

And, in a much later essay entitled "On the Nature of Language," written in 1957/8, he says:

Only where the word for the thing has been found is the thing a thing. Only thus is it. . . . The word alone gives being to the thing. . . . The being of anything that is resides in the word.25

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In *Being and Time*, however, Heidegger fails to
distinguish between these two views of language and, as a
result, appears to switch back and forth between them.
Dreyfus suggests that this apparent vacillation is not
entirely due the Heidegger's text but is, in part,
attributable to the Macquarrie/Robinson translation of
the German word "rede" as "discourse." Dreyfus says
"discourse" is too formal and too linguistic for what
Heidegger includes under this term.

*Rede* ordinarily means talk, but for Heidegger
*rede* is not necessarily linguistic, i.e., made
up of words. So I shall translate *rede* by
"telling," keeping in mind the sense of telling
as in being able to tell the time, or tell the
difference between kinds of nails.\(^2^6\)

The translation of "*rede*" as "telling" casts the
Heidegger of *Being and Time* primarily as an
instrumentalist and results, I believe, in the most
coherent reading of the text.

The intelligibility of being-in-the-world
...expresses itself as telling. The totality-
of-significations of intelligibility is *put
into words*. [161]

[Dasein discloses] "significations": upon
these, in turn is founded the being of words
and of language. [87]

The existential-ontological foundation of
language is telling. [150]

[T]elling expresses itself for the most part in
language. [349]

When fully concrete, telling...has the
character of speaking -- vocal proclamation in
words. [32]
The main difference between the instrumentalist view, on which language is one mode of telling, and the simple predication model of language is that on the former view assertions are context-dependent and derive their meaning from the role they play in the larger context of purposive activity, while on the latter view assertions have a fixed meaning independent of the context in which they are uttered and derive their meaning by referring to entities/properties. The use of language as a whole is grounded in the practices of the community; it is subject to communal norms which are themselves dependent on still more primordial communal norms of use and activity.

The transition from language as interpretation to language as predication occurs in three stages. At the most primitive level, assertions are a way of calling attention to something, of pointing something out within an already meaningful context. Dreyfus gives the following examples:

If, in a shared context, something needs attention, language can be used to point out characteristics of the work in progress. Thus, while involved, I can point out, "The hammer is too heavy." Clearly, it is not too heavy in isolation, but it is too heavy for this specific job, and I point this out to someone on the job with me. What I let him/her see is the shared problem, not some representation or meaning I have in mind.27
At the second level asserting is a way of calling attention to a specific characteristic of the item or activity in question.

In pointing out the characteristic of the hammer that needs attention I can "take a step back" from the immediate activity and attribute a "predicate" ("too heavy") to the hammer as "subject." This singles out the hammer and selects the difficulty of the hammering from a lot of other characteristics, such as its being "too loud," thus narrowing our attention to this specific aspect of the total activity.²

At the highest level, the assertion is cut off from the context altogether, yielding a theoretical assertion. A property (heaviness) is predicated of a subject (the hammer). Heidegger says:

Within this discovering of occurrentness, which is at the same time a covering-up of availableness something occurrent which we encounter is given a definite character in its being-occurrent-in-such-and-such-manner. Only now are we given any access to properties or the like. [158]

According to Heidegger, then, the primary function of language is to communicate relevant aspects of a situation within a world whose structure has already been articulated through activity. The subject/predicate model of language is derived from this situated use of the language whole. The derivation that takes place here is similar to the derivation of occurrent objects from available equipment: both consist of the decontextualization of essentially context-dependent
entitles into isolable things and the fragmentation of an essentially holistic phenomenon into discrete pieces. Because Heidegger believes the very possibility of decontextualizing and fragmenting presupposes prior participation in an inter-dependent whole, he suggests that we begin our investigations by examining the nature of the whole. That is, rather than beginning with questions regarding the underlying structure of occurrent particulars, questions concerning how individual occurrent words attach to individual occurrent objects, and questions about how isolated mental subjects can have access to independent physical objects, we should begin by examining the nature of the entire phenomenon of being-in-the-world. In this way Heidegger hopes to show that subject/object metaphysics is derived from being-in-the-world when both physical reality and language are regarded as dissolvable into distinct categories, rather than as being essentially inter-dependent.

Heidegger is concerned with undermining the subject/predicate model of language because the subject/predicate model lends plausibility to subject/object metaphysics. That is, the subject/predicate model enables us to see language primarily as a means of representing reality; a language consisting of subjects and predicates maps neatly onto a reality consisting of substances and attributes. In
arguing that the instrumentalist view of language is more basic than the subject/predicate model, Heidegger does for language what he did for reality when he argued that the available is more basic than the occurrent. He deprives language of its static, absolute character, tying it essentially to human purposes and activities. For Heidegger both practical and linguistic telling is dependent on the prior structural articulation of the world. This structural articulation is based on the "disclosedness" of the world which is in turn dependent on Dasein's being in-the-world. Chapter two contains a discussion of the ontology of being-in-the-world and, derivatively, a discussion of the world's disclosedness.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE


4Rorty, 51.


7The difficulty involved in distinguishing between the notions of essence and substance in Aristotle is further complicated by the subsequent history of philosophy. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre says: "[In Aristotle] the name given to the being that the intellect grasps is ousia, which W. D. Ross renders as essence, following Quintilian and Seneca, who translated it as essentia....Augustine used substantia and essentia without difference of meaning, and Boethius translated ousia as substantia." Alasdair MacIntyre, "Essence and Existence" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol.3, 59-60

8Rorty, 51-2.


10For example, Descartes begins with the "self-evident" claim that we first perceive feature of things and then draw inferences from those perceptions to the things themselves. He says, for example: "[W]hen looking from a window and saying I see men who pass in the street, I really do not see them, but infer that what I see is men....And yet what do I see from the window but hats and coats which may cover automatic machines? Yet I judge
these to be men." And later he says: "I judge that the wax is or exists from the fact that I see it." Both of these quotations are from: Rene Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy" in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol.1, trans. Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 155-6

11Guignon, 34-5.

12Ibid., 32.

13Ibid., 219.

Equipment is a technical term. It does not refer to a certain type of entity, but to those entities with which Dasein has a certain type of relationship. That is, an entity is an item of equipment if and only if it plays a role in a use-context. Therefore, equipment is identified in terms of Dasein's interests and its ontological status cannot be accounted for by means of traditional substance/attribute metaphysics. Even such apparently independent and objective entities as the objects of theoretical physics are part of a broader explanatory context.

14"Equipment" is a technical term. It does not refer to a certain type of entity, but to those entities with which Dasein has a certain type of relationship. That is, an entity is an item of equipment if and only if it plays a role in a use-context. Therefore, equipment is identified in terms of Dasein's interests and its ontological status cannot be accounted for by means of traditional substance/attribute metaphysics. Even such apparently independent and objective entities as the objects of theoretical physics are part of a broader explanatory context.


16Ibid., 77-8.


19See the section entitled "The Nature of Dasein" in chapter two of this thesis for a discussion of Heidegger's use of the term "exists."

20Guignon, 117-8.

21Ibid., 117-8.

22Guignon, 118-9.

23Ibid., 119.


Dreyfus, 215.

Ibid., 209.

Ibid., 211.
Heidegger argues that subject/object metaphysics emerged from the Parmenidean interpretation of being as objectively structured and "presented" to the mind (or as it is "re-presented" by the mind). It should be made clear, however, that Heidegger does not believe subject/object metaphysics is wrong or that we should get back to the correct view of the pre-Socratics. If he did, he would be committed to the view that there is a single correct interpretation of the nature of Being -- a view Heidegger clearly rejects. Furthermore, Heidegger realizes that the Parmenidean interpretation of Being has had many culturally significant effects. It has led us to decontextualize objects and study them as isolated portions of matter, and thus to formulate the laws of science as the expression of that interpretation. This has made possible the very existence of science and technology and has established them as defining characteristics of Western civilization.

Heidegger also believes, however, that the Parmenidean interpretation has no special claim to authority as the deepest account of the structure of reality. Indeed, to understand subject/object metaphysics and the interpretation of Being upon which it is based as an absolutely accurate representation of
reality at its deepest level is to adhere to a specific interpretation while ignoring the fact that it is an interpretation. On Heidegger's view, what is basic to Dasein's nature is interpretation itself. Interpretation is, therefore, connected directly to the phenomenon Heidegger describes as being-in-the-world.

Heidegger says being-in-the-world is a single, "unitary" phenomenon presupposing the interdependence of Dasein and world. It is nothing like the joining together of a subject and objects within the world where subjects and objects are taken to be static, independent, occurrent things. Because being-in-the-world is more than the sum of its parts, it cannot be broken up into components and pieced back together [53]. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to examine briefly the phenomenon of being-in-the-world in terms of its three constitutive elements: the being who is, in each case, in the world, the activities of being-in, and the constituted nature of the world. I begin with the nature of the being who is in the world.

2.1: THE NATURE OF DASEIN

Heidegger calls the being who is in the world and does the interpreting "Dasein." He chooses this term primarily because it is not tied to any historical interpretations of personhood and so does not carry with it any philosophical baggage. Literally, "Dasein" means
"being there." In colloquial German, however, it means roughly "everyday human existence" and so Heidegger uses the term "Dasein" roughly to refer to human beings. But we are not to think of Dasein as a particular sort of thing as Descartes tried to do. Heidegger's goal is to discover what makes human beings different from mere objects with properties and he finds this difference in the way human beings are involved with the world through their activities -- manipulating things, taking things apart, putting things together. Thus, Dasein is not to be construed independently of its activities in the world. It is not a rational animal, a mind/body, a conscious subject, a Cartesian "I," a Kantian ego, or any other traditional conception of human beings relying on the substance/attribute picture of reality. Rather, "Dasein" refers to human being, in the sense of the human way of being. Dasein is a way of engaging or interacting with the world, akin to the cultural/historical/racial heritage shared, for example, by members of the Jewish community, but with a scope inclusive of all peoples: a sort of fundamental culture shared by all humans. Dasein can be understood as a gerund as well as a noun: dasein-ing is the activity of being human through activity in the world. One can't take Dasein out of the world within which it has its identity. One can't treat Dasein like a substance with attributes.
Heidegger uses the term "existence" to refer generally to the activities of Dasein. He says that Dasein possesses the character of a "who" rather than a "what" [45] and the "who" attaches to activities. Existence does not simply mean oriented in Newtonian space or having temporal duration. It is rather a particular way of being involving purposive, usually rule-governed activity: enquiring, seeking truth, and taking a stand on being through interpretation of self and others. Thus, trees and rocks and even dogs and cats do not "exist" in Heidegger's sense because they are not involved with the world in the required way.

It should be noted that, for Heidegger, cultures and institutions exist as well as individual human beings because the concerns, attitudes, and practices of cultures and institutions, like those of individual human beings, contain an interpretation of what it means to be that culture or institution. So, "the whole question of whether Dasein is a general term or the name for a specific entity is undercut by Heidegger's more basic interest in the way of being that [individual] human beings, cultures and institutions share."

The distinction between individual Dasein and cultural/institutional Dasein is further undercut by the rejection of individualism implicit in Heidegger's account of Cartesianism. Because individual Dasein's identity is determined in relation to its cultural
possibilities, culture cannot be a composite made up of individuals; it is more than the sum of its parts. That is, because the meaning and organization of cultures defines norms (the "in-order-to's" and "for-the-sake-of-which's" available to individual Dasein), the normative organization and meaning of a culture must be taken as basic or logically prior to the desires, interests, and even identities of individuals. Through their participation in a culture, individuals are socialized into a particular understanding of themselves and the world and, until they are, individuals are not Dasein. This point is discussed in greater detail in section 2.4.

2.2: Being-in

The second component of being-in-the-world is the phenomenon of being-in. Heidegger begins his discussion of being-in by calling attention to the fact that the preposition "in" has various meanings. One such meaning is that of spatial inclusion. Water may be in a glass, for example, or a coat may be in a closet. "By this 'in' we mean the relationship of being which two entities extended 'in' space have to each other with regard to their location in that space" [54]. The theoretical extension of the "in" of spatial inclusion is Newtonian space; reality is taken to be the collection of entities in that space. This is the sort of "in" pertaining to occurrent things. It is not, however, the sort essential
to the being-in of Dasein. In section 44(b), Heidegger says:

"The ultimate business of philosophy is to preserve the force of the most elemental words in which Dasein expresses itself, and to keep the common understanding from levelling them off to that unintelligibility which functions in turn as a source of pseudo-problems." [220]

Regarding the "in" of spatial inclusion as ontologically basic is, Heidegger argues, one such "source of pseudo-problems." For this reason, Heidegger reminds us that the preposition "in" is derived from "innan" meaning "to reside" and "habitate" meaning "to dwell" [54]. These words are meant to convey a sense of involvement in and familiarity with transcending mere spatial location. It is the sense conveyed by expressions such as being in love, being in the army, or being in business: non-spatial involvements playing a crucial role in an individual's interpretation of self and world. The being-in of Dasein's being-in-the-world is, then, meant to convey a sense of Dasein's involvement in and familiarity with the world, a sense of the dependence of Dasein's identity on that involvement and the roles provided within the world.

Heidegger maintains the "in" of involvement is more primordial than the "in" of spatial inclusion. It should be noted that Heidegger seems to use the term "primordial" in two different ways. At times he seems to use it in the sense of "ontologically basic" or
"fundamental," at other times in the sense of "historically early" or "primitive." As Charles Guignon points out, however, "what must be understood is that, for Heidegger, these two senses of 'primordial' amount to the same thing." The interpretation of being underlying subject/object metaphysics has played such an important role in our philosophical tradition and has become so pervasive in our world-view that it has taken on a virtually self-evident character. For Heidegger, the only way to escape the monolithic consequences of this interpretation is to evaluate the tradition as a whole. Heidegger also believes, however, that there is no neutral vantage point from which we can carry out such an evaluation. Since the only ways of encountering the world open to us are those passed down by our ancestors and comprising our culture, the only available option is to return to roots of our heritage and try to discover possibilities of interpretation, possible ways of understanding the world, that were closed off to us during the establishment of the scientific world-view. By pointing out that the "in" of spatial inclusion is derived from the "in" of involvement, Heidegger is also pointing back to a time before the distinction had been drawn. He is showing us a fork in the road. Our ancestors chose one side of the fork and we have moved further and further from the other side almost to the point of having forgotten there ever were other options.
Heidegger's rejection of spatial inclusion in favor of involvement as the primordial metaphor of being-in is associated with his rejection of abstract reasoning in favor of "understanding" as an explanation of how we make sense of the world. In short, Heidegger denies that knowledge can entirely be characterized in terms of theories of perception, intentionality, and the like, all of which rely heavily on metaphors derived from the "in" of spatial inclusion to describe constructs such as "inner representations" and the "external world," the "mental" and "physical realms," or "logical space," "semantic space," and "physical space."

For Heidegger, our ability to act appropriately in various situations, our immediate grasp of the significance of signs, our everyday activities and undertakings are not ultimately grounded in the kind of metaphysical distinctions that have emerged since Plato. Rather, they are based on a multifarious set of shared skills, practices, and discriminations into which we have been socialized and which must remain firmly in the background if we are to function in our day-to-day dealings. French anthropologist Pierre Bourdieu gives the following example of this process of socialization. He says:

A whole group and a whole symbolically structured environment...exerts an anonymous, pervasive pedagogic action....The essential part of the modus operandi which defines
practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical state, without attaining the level of discourse.\textsuperscript{3}

For Heidegger, there simply is nothing inner (uninterpreted perceptions, self-evident truths, background beliefs, sub-conscious inferences) that could provide a grounding or foundation for knowledge. Our shared skills, practices, and discriminations are non-intentional and non-discursive. We are not, for Heidegger, intentional beings at birth and, to pursue the metaphor, we are never intentional beings distinct from a cultural perspective -- our beliefs and interests are constituted by a particular culture, similar to the precedence of Wittgenstein's forms of life to language. Our skills, practices and discriminations are not about anything in the way beliefs and propositions are about things and they cannot, even in principle, be systematically spelled out as intentional.

An example will help to clarify why Heidegger rejects the "in" of spatial inclusion in favor of the "in" of involvement and how the "in" of involvement is partly pre-theoretical and pre-linguistic. Consider the relationship between business people and business. Being in business is constitutive of being a business person. That is, one cannot be a business person without being in business and if one is in business then one is \textit{ipso facto} a business person. One can, however, be (spatially) in a place of business without being a business person and
business people need not remain (spatially) in places of business to be business people. The "world of business," in turn, exists only because of and in relation to the business people who constitute it. That is, there could be no world of business without the shared practices, values, beliefs, and activities of business people. Because of this mutual interdependence, neither business people nor the world of business could exist without the involvement of the one "in" in other. Indeed, without this mutually constitutive involvement it would not even make sense of speak of business people being in places of business since neither business people nor the world of business would exist. Furthermore, being in business is, at least to some extent, pre-theoretical. Through involvement in the world of business, business people (may) acquire certain pre-theoretical skills, practices, attitudes, habits, etc. which (may) pervade their lives and color their outlook in other areas: one begins "investing in leisure time," "maintaining a family support network," "optimizing career potential," or what have you.

Heidegger argues that the same is true of Dasein and world. Being-in(volved)-in-the-world is constitutive of Dasein and the world exists only in relation to Dasein. Through activity Dasein creates an understanding of the world, an interpretation that makes the world intelligible. What we (Dasein) take entities to be like,
what we find important or noteworthy about them, is a function of the way we are involved with them. To a large extent, our involvement determines the being of entities. Laszlo Versenyi puts it this way:

To say that Dasein is always characterized by being-in-the-world means not only that Dasein is always involved in a great variety of essential relationships with all sorts of other beings without which (relationships) it could not exist but also that these beings and the world itself are dependent for their mode of being on Dasein's relations to them. They too would not be what they are but for these relationships, which are thus essential not only to Dasein but also to everything in its world....(Words like) "utensil" and "mere thing" [for example] are not terms for different kinds of ontic beings; they designate different relations of Dasein to them.6

Heidegger phrases it in more poetic terms: "The botanist's plants are not the flowers of the hedgerow; the 'source' which the geographer establishes for a river is not the 'springhead in the dale'" [70].

The way we are involved with entities is, in turn, a function of our self-interpretations: of how we understand ourselves and our world, of the roles we each have assumed, and of the roles available to us within our cultural and historical context. It is because the roles of both poet and geographer are available in our society, because each role is familiar to us, that we can understand Heidegger's river as both a geographical "source" and a "springhead in the dale." Which way a person is inclined to see the river depends on how that
person sees herself and on what she takes to be important about the natural world.

2.3: The World

The interdependence of Dasein and world gains plausibility from Heidegger's complex reinterpretation of "world." In Being and Time, Heidegger lists four different meanings of the term. The first two meanings are based on the "in" of spatial inclusion and have been taken to be basic by traditional Western philosophers.

1) The world is the totality of objects of a certain sort. For example, the physical world consists of all the physical objects located in space.

2) The world is "a set of particulars specified in terms of the essential characteristics of the entities that make up that set." The physical world, for example, is defined by what all physical objects have in common, e.g. substance or energy.

Heidegger maintains, however, that these two senses of "world" rely on a confusion between entities within the world and the world itself. The world is not a great container filled with objects, nor can it be built up out of the entities within it, as the positivist and empiricist traditions have attempted to do, because the identity of at least some entities is dependent on their relationships to other entities, equipmental contexts, purposive activities, etc.
A more fundamental way of understanding the world is based on the "in" of involvement. Thus, Heidegger lists two additional senses of "world."

3) The world is "that 'wherein' a factual Dasein as such can be said to 'live'" (65). It is the entire configuration of beliefs, values, habits, interests, techniques, mannerisms, etc. shared by the members of a community.

This sense of world is reflected in expressions such as "the child's world," "the world of fashion," "the business world," or when we speak of two people "being worlds apart," or of wanting to "be a part of that world." I will use the term "sub-world" to refer to the worlds of definition three.

4) "The world" refers to the most general systems of equipment and practices shared by the sub-worlds of definition 3.

It is the network of very general systems of beliefs, values, skills, etc. common to members of all the various sub-worlds. The presence of these general systems makes possible the existence of particular variations of beliefs, values, skills, practices, etc. within the sub-worlds.

It is important to note that Heidegger's worlds (the third and fourth senses above) are always public "we-worlds." "There is no such thing as my world, if this is taken as some private sphere of experience and meaning, which is self-sufficient and intelligible in itself, and
so more fundamental than the shared public world."

Rather, *my* world is constituted by the unique blend of sub-worlds in which I dwell and by the roles I assume within those worlds.

Dreyfus provides a useful example to help clarify the difference between the traditional definitions of world (one and two) and Heidegger's definitions (three and four), and why Heidegger takes the latter senses to be basic. He says: "It helps here to contrast the *physical world* (sense number 1) -- as a set of objects -- with the *world of physics* -- a constellation of equipment, practices, and concerns in which physicist dwell." The world of physics, in the sense just mentioned, determines the nature of the objects belonging to the physical world and the underlying characteristics shared by all such objects. The world of physics is, therefore, logically prior to the physical world. It "creates" the physical world by establishing such things as paradigms, standards of justification and evidence, physical laws, etc. thereby determining which entities count as physical and why they count as such. Thus, the world of physics is directly, and the physical world derivatively, dependent on physicists for its being. The reason it seems so strange to say the physical world is dependent on Dasein for its being is that the world of physics has determined that the physical world is independent of human activity. Indeed, this independence
has been made one of the defining characteristics of the physical world. But Heidegger's point is that the physical world would not have any defining characteristics whatsoever were it not for the work of physicists and hence the physical world could have no being without the activities of physicists.

The metaphysical priority of involvement is also true at the global level (the world of definition four). Global Dasein's activities allow entities within the world to show up in certain ways, to have certain defining characteristics: the world is "disclosed," as I defined that term in the introduction. I return to this point in section 2.5. It should be remembered that for Heidegger the available is more primordial (i.e., both more fundamental and more primitive) than the occurrent. It should also be remembered that in order for the available to be available it must fit into a context of purposive, rule-governed activity. There must be a reason for doing things, a right way to do things and a right way to use things. This rule-governedness is, for Heidegger, what distinguishes human from non-human activity. A bird's nest-building activities, for example, are purposive, but not rule-governed. There is no normatively (though there may be an instinctually) right way for a bird to build a nest, and there is no way a bird could understand its activities as purposive

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activities by, for example, articulating the rules governing them.

There is a right way to use equipment in rule-governed activities and it is this normative aspect of equipment usage that determines what entities are. That is, what something is in a use-context is a function of what it is used for when it is used as "anyone would use it." But, the activity of Dasein is logically prior to the assignment of functions to the available, logically prior to there being equipment; the world must be in place, so to speak, before entities within the world can be discovered as entities within the world. Dasein's being-in-the-world is, thus, constitutive of entities, even when entities are taken to be occurrent.

2.4: CARE

Dasein has been defined as the being for whom being is an issue [191] and who takes a stand on being through its participation in the world. Heidegger calls Dasein's way of being-in-the-world "care":

[Care] is to be taken as an ontological structural concept. It has nothing to do with "tribulation," "melancholy," or the "cares of life," though ontically one can come across these in every Dasein. These -- like their opposites, "gaiety" and "freedom from care" -- are ontically possible only because Dasein, when understood ontologically, is care. [57]

The ontological concept care has a three fold structure: "being-already-in" (or "thrownness"), "being-amidst"
("or "fallenness"), and "being-ahead-of-itself" (or "projection") [193].

"Being-already-in" refers to the fact that Dasein is always "thrown" into a previously characterized world, a world not of its own creation and not under its own control but whose already articulated structure Dasein absorbs through socialization. Dasein always exists in and is defined by a common institutional framework of interdefined norms of behavior and use. Through its being-already-in, its thrownness into a particular cultural and historical epoch, Dasein acquires a template or framework for understanding the world.

"Being-amidst" refers to the fact that Dasein inhabits or dwells in the world, amidst the entities within the world. Dasein tends to "fall" into the dominant interpretation of its culture, to be preoccupied with individual details, absorbed in the available and the in-order-to, and so to lose sight of its own thrownness (being-already-in) and projection (being-ahead-of-itself). "Fallenness" is the assumption that one's "concerns" for entities within the world are absolute; one "falls in with" the predominant interpretation without understanding its origins or limitations.

"Being-ahead-of-itself" means that Dasein takes over the possibilities disclosed through being-already-in and projects these possibilities into the future. Dasein
always has a prior grasp of its own "potentiality for being," in the form of the "for-the-sake-of-which's" made available within a culture. This projection of possibilities lends unity to Dasein's activities by providing an underlying reason for the activity, an intentional context of roles governing Dasein's involvement with the world. Through "being-ahead-of-itself" Dasein has a future orientation: Dasein is always "not yet" and hence cannot be an occurrent ("present") thing.

In being-amidst, Dasein is always now in some definite situation, a situation always pre-determined by being-already-in and always future oriented in being-ahead-of-itself. This care structure grounds the possibility of things mattering. As John Haugeland says, "[things can] matter only because Dasein is somehow stuck with them as they stand...[F]or Dasein in each case, the current situation is [always, already there and], inevitably, [always] the first situation of the rest of its life."12 In section 41, Heidegger characterizes Dasein's care structure this way:

The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the world) as being-amidst (entities encountered within the world). This being fills in the significations of the term "care" [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner. [192]
As something factual, Dasein's projection of itself understandingly is in each case already amidst a world that has been discovered. From this world it takes its possibilities, and it does so first in accordance with the way things have been interpreted by the "they." This interpretation has already restricted the possible options of choice to what lies within the range of the familiar, the attainable, the respectable -- that which is fitting and proper. [194]

Through care the world is, so to speak, the meeting place of Dasein's past (its being-already-in) "and this always means the past of its 'generation' [20]," its present (the in-order-to or how things are done), and the future (the for-the-sake-of-which or why things are done). This is why Dasein cannot be in the world like an occurrent thing: Dasein and world are always pre-determined and yet always incomplete (or "not-yet"). Because Dasein appropriates its past and projects itself into the future, Dasein's identity lies in both past and future as well as present activities. That is, Dasein's identity now is determined, in part, by what is not "present" -- the past and future -- and so Dasein's identity is fluid and "non-substantial." Dasein comes out of the past, "looks to its future," and acts "for the sake of" its future.

2.5: THE NATURE OF REALITY

Dasein's activities disclose the structural articulation of the world. Global Dasein's activities disclose (or articulate the structure of) the world
(definition 4); specialized groups disclose (or articulate the structure of) sub-worlds (definition 3).
The activities of the scientific community, for example, their methods, paradigms, and concerns allow certain types of entities and certain patterns to reveal themselves and hence to be discovered; disclosure makes discovery possible. But what is disclosed depends, in turn, on the activities of the group. The sub-world disclosed by one group, therefore, has no special claim to authority and the discoveries made about entities within that world are intelligible only within the structural disclosure provided by that group.

Heidegger believes that the role Dasein's care structure plays in determining the structure of the world has been covered up by the ascendancy of the scientific world-view. Science characterizes the world as the sum total of occurrent entities within the world, governed by universal principles, and independent of human interpretation. This characterization of the world has become so pervasive as to have taken on the entire meaning of reality. Heidegger says:

[In accordance with its falling kind of being, [Dasein] has, proximally and for the most part, diverted itself into an understanding of the "world"...the interpretation of being takes its orientation in the first instance from the being of entities within the world. Thereby the being of what is proximally available gets passed over, and entities are first conceived as a context of Things (res) which are occurrent. "Being" acquires the meaning of "reality." Substantiality becomes the basic
characteristic of being....Like any other entity, Dasein too is *occurrent as real*....The other modes of being become defined negatively and privatively with regard to Reality. [201]

Another way of putting this point is to say that when Dasein falls into the dominant interpretation of being, the framework and methodology presupposed in that interpretation is left unquestioned. In our case the dominant realism of our interpretation is most clearly manifest in our belief that science tells us about the world as it is in itself and our adoption of the scientific method as a paradigmatic mode of enquiry to be emulated in other disciplines.

Under this framework, the world reveals itself as being a certain way, specifically as consisting of objectively quantifiable, independent substances. Only what can be quantified (i.e., what is substantial) is allowed to count as real. Any way of understanding not grounded in scientific theory becomes merely "subjective" and "aesthetic." But, Heidegger believes the scientific way of being-in-the-world has no priority over other ways. The many ways of being -- such as "poetic," "scientific," "religious," "technological," etc. -- bear no hierarchical relation to each other. The world disclosed by science, therefore, is no more "real" or "objective" than those disclosed by poetry, religion, or technology.
The reason the scientific world-view and the search for its philosophical foundations has gained such a firm grip on us can be found in the very fact that Dasein is care. When Dasein is thrown into a world already understood to be the sum total of entities within the world, and entities within the world are already understood to be occurrent things, there is a tendency for Dasein to understand itself as an occurrent thing (a mind/body, a rational animal, etc.) and to concern itself with pushing back the boundaries of discovery with regard to itself via scientific enquiry, while ignoring the fundamental disclosure of the world, its own thrownness into the world, and its projection of the framework onto entities within the world. In short, Dasein ignores its roots in being-in-the-world as the activity of interpretation; it substitutes discovery within the disclosed framework of substance. However, in section 43(c), Heidegger reminds us:

All modes of being of entities within the world are founded ontologically upon the worldhood of the world, and accordingly upon the phenomenon of being-in-the-world. From this there arises the insight that among the modes of being of entities within the world, reality [understood as pure occurrentness] has no priority, and that reality is a kind of being which cannot even characterize anything like the world or Dasein in a way which is ontologically appropriate. [211-12]

Reality cannot characterize Dasein and world in an ontologically appropriate manner because it cannot
account for the very involvement that is the source of Dasein's "scientific" self-understanding. To say that Dasein is "ahead" of itself or projects itself into the future is to say that Dasein cannot fully be captured by the "scientific" understanding of itself as an occurring being. Science cannot account for the disclosure of the world as ontologically occurring because science is based on a disclosure; it does not itself disclose.

In section 43(c), Heidegger attempts to clarify the distinction between what he calls reality and the real, and the contribution Dasein makes to the constitution of reality. Heidegger here uses the term "reality" to refer to the world as characterized by science. Reality is the totality of objectively structured, independently existing, occurring entities located in space. "The real," on the other hand, is just whatever it is; it is completely uncharacterized and uncharacterizable, except, of course, through Dasein's interpretations. Giving the real a characterization would essentially alter its way of being because characterization involves putting the real into a framework, for example, understanding the real as occurring. Heidegger tries to evoke in us a sense of the real by discussing what would be if Dasein did not exist. He says:

When Dasein does not exist, "independence" "is" not either, nor "is" the "in itself." In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case
even entities within the world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not. [212]

The pervasiveness of subject/object metaphysics should be apparent from the fact that the words Heidegger places in quotation marks ("independence," "is," "in itself") have all acquired the meanings they have within the framework of subject/object metaphysics. This is not intended to be a defense of idealism, nor is it intended to have great impact on our view of reality or on the scientific enterprise. Heidegger's only objection to science is that it misunderstands its own foundation and so misunderstands what it is about. He says:

But now, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of occurrentness, it can indeed be said that in this case entities will still continue to be. [212]

Heidegger's point is that reality is a human construct, or characterization of the real, possible only on the basis of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Without Dasein ever having, been no such characterization could ever have been given. Entities within the world could never have been disclosed as entities within the world. But reality has been disclosed by Dasein and occurrent things have been disclosed as permanent, independently existing entities. Thus the continued existence of occurrent...
things is assured by the way Dasein has disclosed reality.

The real is independent of Dasein but reality exists only in relation to Dasein because reality is what Dasein discloses. Thus when Heidegger says "being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of being; that is to say reality (not the real) is dependent upon care" [212] he is warning us that in our investigations reality (understood as a particular characterization of the real) must not be made basic, but must always be traced back to the being of Dasein. Dreyfus calls this position "hermeneutic realism" and notes that, for hermeneutic realists, the realism that is part of the practices of science "cannot be used to justify the claim that the object of science exist independently of the activity of the scientists, nor can this understanding dictate what structure the science's objects must have." 13 [254]. I discuss Dreyfus' characterization of Heidegger's position as hermeneutic realism a little more fully in the conclusion.

Heidegger has attempted to present a coherent alternative to traditional metaphysics, one that describes the origins of the metaphysics of subjects and objects and provides what Heidegger believes to be a more faithful portrayal of the human situation. If his project succeeds, its implications will reverberate throughout the philosophical enterprise because Heidegger
is emphasizing activities in the world rather than states in the mind as the primary medium of representation.

This is a major departure from traditional subject/object metaphysics. Fortunately, our concern is only with its implications for traditional theories of truth. I turn now to a discussion of these implications and of Heidegger's own conception of truth.
NOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO


2Ibid., 13.

3Ibid., 14.


7Guignon, 89.

8Ibid., 90.

9Ibid., 90.

10Heidegger uses the term "ontically" to mean roughly "in actual cases"; the term "ontic" and its variations refer to entities at the level of "discovery." "Ontically" is contrasted with "ontologically," meaning roughly "at the deepest level"; "ontological" and its variations refer to "being" and the level of disclosure.

11Macquarrie and Robinson translate the German "sein bei" as "being-alongside." However, I will follow Dreyfus in translating it as "being-amidst."


13Dreyfus, 254.
CHAPTER THREE  
HEIDEGGER ON TRUTH

Heidegger's claim that subject/object metaphysics is derived from the more fundamental ontology of being-in-the-world has important consequences for traditional theories of truth because the dominant traditional theories are, Heidegger argues, all based upon subject/object metaphysics and the distinctions between inner/outer, ideal/real, and representation/reality engendered by that metaphysics. Thus, if Heidegger hopes to show that traditional metaphysics is derived from an ontology devoid of these distinctions, the onus is on him to provide a conception of truth that does not involve the traditional distinctions.

3.1: THE SHIFT FROM ALETHEIA TO TRUTH

Heidegger begins his discussion of truth by pointing out that, according to Aristotle, the pre-Socratics already had a "science of truth" [213] prior to the Platonic invention of the ideal. Aristotle says the early Greeks defined philosophy as that which "contemplates entities as entities" [213]. In their search for understanding early philosophers were, for Aristotle, "compelled by the things themselves," "compelled by the truth itself," "compelled to follow that which showed itself in itself" [213]. "Truth" was
used as a term for entity in the sense of "that which shows itself" [213]. Heidegger concludes from this that prior to Plato aletheia was not a theme for a theory of knowledge or judgement but was understood as having a pre-theoretical connection with Being deeper than and logically prior to the modern notion of truth as agreement.

Heidegger reminds us that the Greek word "aletheia," means literally, "not-covered." He says:

[Aletheia meant] taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their uncoveredness (their uncoveredness). [219]

Truth (uncoveredness) is something that must always first be wrested from entities. Entities get snatched out of their hiddenness. [222]

To translate this word as "truth," and, above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up the meaning of what the [pre-Socratic] Greeks made "self-evidently" basic. [220]

It should be noted that there is nothing about correspondence or agreement in the notion of aletheia prior to Plato. The world "showed itself"; it was not represented by experience. "Wresting entities from their hiddenness" becomes truth as correspondence only when the activity of "wresting" or "uncovering" from hiddenness is performed by means of concepts or representations rather than directly in the sense Heidegger tries to describe as fundamental to being-in-the-world.
In *Being and Time* Heidegger traces the shift in the meaning of *aletheia* from the uncoveredness of beings to its meaning as correctness of judgement or representation back to Aristotle. However, in a later essay entitled "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," Heidegger locates the shift one step further back, in Plato's allegory of the cave. This allegory is meant to be an illustration of the essence of education, but Heidegger maintains "that what underlies Plato's thinking is a change in the essence of truth."¹

As the inhabitants of the cave move through the various stages of their education they are exposed to a series of images becoming progressively more "real" as the prisoners move closer to the source of knowledge. But, these images display themselves only in their "outward appearance." And Heidegger says:

Plato does not take this "outward appearance" as a mere "aspect"....In Greek "outward appearance" is *eidos* or idea....According to Plato, if man did not have these ideas before his gaze as the respective "outward appearance" of things, living creatures, men, numbers, and the gods, then he would never be able to perceive this or that particular thing as a house, as a tree, or as a god.²

Because ideas induce unhiddenness (i.e., enable us to perceive this or that particular thing as the thing it is), unhiddenness is taken from the entities themselves and put under the control of the idea. In making this shift, Plato moves the essence of truth from the
unhiddenness of entities to the ideas that permit unhiddenness. Heidegger says that when the idea becomes "the master permitting unhiddenness...the essence of truth...shifts its abode to the essence of the idea."³

Central to the education of the inhabitants of the cave is the painful process of looking at brighter and brighter images (i.e., grasping higher and higher ideas) until at last they are able to stare at the sun (i.e., grasp the idea of the good).

Liberation [for the cave dwellers] does not take place in the mere act of getting free from the chains and does not consist merely in being untrammeled....Actual liberation lies in the steadiness with which one turns towards what manifests itself in its outward appearance and is in this manifesting the most unhidden. (emphasis added)⁴

Plato himself says, "turned towards things that are being more, he can have a more correct glance."⁵ Heidegger adds:

The transition from one situation into another consists in making one's glance more correct. Everything depends on the orthotes, the correctness of the glance....Truth becomes orthotes, correctness of the ability to perceive and to declare something.⁶

As we saw earlier, however, Heidegger does not attribute the shift in the meaning of "aletheia" to Plato until later in his career. In Being and Time, the shift is attributed to Aristotle. Gary Steiner summarizes Aristotle's notion of truth this way:
[For Aristotle] Aisthesis [sensuous perception] and noesis [mental perception of simple natures] are always true; they cannot be false. The possibility of falsity depends on synthesis, which is found in discursive thinking [or judgement] (dianoesis) and in a particular use of language (logos) which represents that thinking, namely in assertion (logos apophantikos).  

For Aristotle, then, the synthetic structure of assertion and judgement (i.e., the grammatical synthesis of subject and predicate) makes it possible for assertions and judgements to be true or false because only at the level of synthesis is it possible that things will be combined in thought which are not combined in reality. Heidegger says:

In the final chapter of the Book IX of his Metaphysics... where Aristotelian thinking about the Being of beings reaches its peak, unhiddenness is the basic feature of Being holding sway over everything. But at the same time Aristotle can say: "The false and the true are not in the act (itself)... but in the understanding." Where the understanding makes an assertion in order to pass judgment is the place of truth and falsehood and their difference. The assertion is true in so far as it is compared to the circumstances and is therefore likeness. This essential definition of truth contains no further reference to aletheia in the sense of unhiddenness."

It is this "essential definition of truth" that Heidegger has in mind when, in section 44(a) of Being and Time, he says, "Aristotle, the father of logic [and grammar], not only assigned truth to the judgment as its primordial
locus but set going the definition of 'truth' as
'agreement'" [214].

3.2: TRADITIONAL THEORIES OF TRUTH

One of Heidegger's goals in Being and Time is to
reawaken in us a sense of the pre-Socratic notion of
truth as unhiddenness (or disclosedness). However, he
approaches the notion of truth as unhiddenness by first
pointing out the main problem inherent in all
correspondence theories. At the beginning of section
44(a) Heidegger says traditional correspondence theories
of truth are characterized by the following theses: 1) The
locus of truth is assertion or judgement; 2) the
essence of truth lies in the "agreement" of the judgement
with its object. Heidegger also says, 3) Aristotle
assigned truth to the judgement and set the going
definition of truth as agreement [214]. That is, with
Plato and Aristotle a theory of truth was established.
It was a theoretical device in that it used terms like
"agreement" and "judgement" in a way different from the
way in which they had previously been used. From Plato
and Aristotle to Descartes and Kant, truth has been
understood as adaequatio intellectus et rei: agreement
(or "likening") of judgement with its object [214].

But what does it mean to say a judgement agrees with
an object? The relationship cannot be one of equality
because judgements and objects are "not of the same
species" [216]. We are perhaps inclined to say that the
judgement and its object are similar in some respect.
But Heidegger objects to this vague notion of similarity.
He says:

Knowledge is still supposed to "give" us the
thing just as it is. This "agreement" has the
relational property of the "just as." In what
way is this relation possible as a relation
between intellectus and rei? [216].

The problem has plagued correspondence theorists since
Plato: what does it mean to say a proposition, judgement,
or representation corresponds with an object or state of
affairs?

Rather than try to answer this question head-on by
giving the account of representation correspondence
theorists have been waiting for, Heidegger maintains that
the question has already been "perverted" in the very way
it has been approached: perverted "by the ontologically
unclarified separation of the real and the ideal" [217].
The German word translated as "perverted" by Macquarrie
and Robinson is "abwehr" meaning literally "to turn
away." The point Heidegger is making here, then, is that
with the Platonic separation of reality into universal
and particular, and subsequent re-workings of this
separation into distinctions between the mental and the
physical or representations and reality, questions
concerning the nature of truth were turned away from
questions about the unhiddenness of entities and
transformed into questions about the nature of correspondence. If we take the ontology of being-in-the-world seriously, however, we will see that the separation of representation and reality is a theoretical construct based on one specific interpretation of being. And, as such, it has no valid claim to special priority, contrary to what Aristotle maintained in his history of philosophy. Indeed, we will see that problems concerning the nature of this correspondence are, in principle, impossible to solve.

However, if Heidegger is to show that the correspondence theory of truth is not monolithic, he must give an account of truth that does not involve the subject/object distinction. How, then, are we to approach the subject of truth? Heidegger tells us that truth becomes phenomenally explicit when knowledge "demonstrates itself" as true. Thus, we are to clarify the notion of truth (and the relationship of agreement) by examining the "phenomenal context of demonstration" [217]. Heidegger gives the following example of such a demonstration:

Let us suppose that someone with his back turned to the wall makes the true assertion that "the picture on the wall is hanging askew." This assertion demonstrates itself when the man who makes it, turns around and perceives the picture hanging askew on the wall. What gets demonstrated in this demonstration? [217]
We may be inclined to say that what gets demonstrated is an agreement between a belief and the thing in question. The demonstration of this correspondence results in "knowledge." Heidegger says that whether this is correct depends on our interpretation of "what is known" and so on our understanding of what agrees with what. What does not get demonstrated is an agreement between a "representation" of the real picture, in the form of a belief or mental state, and the real picture itself. How is the man able to recognize his mental state as a representation of the picture on the wall? Conversely, if the man is able to recognize the representation of the picture, why can he not recognize the unmediated picture itself? Of what use is the representation? In demonstrating the truth of an assertion we do not compare a representation with a real object (correspondence); nor do we compare one representation with another representation (coherence).

Representations do not get compared, either among themselves or in relation to the real thing. What is to be demonstrated is not an agreement of knowing with its object, still less of the psychical with the physical; but neither is it an agreement between "contents of consciousness" among themselves. [218]

Heidegger says what one "has in mind" when one makes an assertion is the real thing and nothing else [217]. No representations are relevant to the truth of the belief
or judgement. To suppose they are not only relies on the representation/reality distinction, it also "belies the phenomenal facts of the case" [218].

The truth of the assertion "the picture is hanging askew" gets demonstrated when the man who utters it turns around and sees the picture hanging askew: "sees" not in the sense of "represents to himself," but "sees" in the sense of notices or confirms his suspicion or belief that the picture is hanging haphazardly or in a way that is out of the ordinary and "sees" that the picture requires straightening. The demonstration takes place in the activity of turning around, looking, straightening the picture, etc., or even in the act of neglecting to straighten the picture and simply getting on with other things. The truth is demonstrated in finding out what is the case.

3.3: THE NATURE OF ASSERTION AND TRUTH AS UNCOVERING

At the primordial level, assertions are not to be understood as representations of any sort. They are to be understood as speech acts, linguistic acts of interpretation (or discovery) and, even more fundamentally, as acts of interpretation they are grounded in Dasein's non-discursive background understanding of the world (the world's disclosedness) and are essentially tied to the context in which they are uttered.
Heidegger claims that at the more basic level of understanding asserting is a way of pointing to the relevant object, of directing attention to the entity or activity in question. At the level of discovery, the truth of an assertion gets demonstrated when the entity or activity shows itself as being the way it was said to be in the assertion. This is the pre-Socratic sense of truth described by Aristotle.

[The entity or activity] shows that it... is just as it gets pointed out in the assertion as being -- just as it gets uncovered as being. [219]

The assertion "the picture is hanging askew," for example, was demonstrated to be true when the picture showed itself as being just as it was pointed out in the assertion as being. No representations are necessary here; assertoric language simply picks out certain features of the world, calls attention to one aspect of the surrounding totality.

To uncover or discover an entity is to show it as being a certain kind of thing or as being a certain way. Thus the essence of assertion is the uncovering or discovering of beings rather than the synthesizing of nouns and verbs into likenesses of reality. The assertion "The ball is red," for example, directs attention towards the entity in question (the ball) and brings to light one its aspects (its redness). It
uncovers the ball in the "how" of its being. The uncovering of entities within the world, however, always takes place relative to the structural disclosure of the world as a whole. The subject/predicate structure of the assertion "The ball is red" is pre-determined by the (already articulated) categorial structure of language as ascribing properties (predicates) to objects (subjects) according to the template "The ___ is ___ " and the (already articulated) categorial structure of reality as consisting of substances with attributes, established as the essence of linguistic representation by Aristotle in De Interpretatione. Substance/attribute ontology implies and is implied by subject/predicate language. The structure of the world is disclosed. The "how" of this particular entity within the world is discovered relative to the disclosure. Heidegger says:

To say that an assertion "is true" signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself. Such an assertion asserts, points out, "lets" the entity "be seen"...in its uncoveredness. The being-true (truth) of the assertion must be understood as being-uncovering. [218]

"Being-uncovering" (truth) is not a relation between two things. Rather, it is the activity of revealing or uncovering entities as being of a certain character, as having some determination or other relative to the categories set up through disclosure and manifest in the grammar of language. Asserting is one possible
way of revealing entities (and so it is one possible form of truth), but it is not the only way. Another way is to seize hold of entities and use them in getting on with the task at hand. If, while making a bookshelf, for example, I pick up an entity and use it in order to hammer nails into wood, I reveal that entity as being of a certain sort, i.e., the sort which is suitable for driving nails into wood. As Mark Okrent says in *Heidegger's Pragmatism*:

[For Heidegger] these practical acts of interpretation, as well as assertions, can be true. For such an act to be true it must succeed in using the thing as the thing it is attempting to use it as. If the act succeeds, the thing is revealed to be as it has been taken to be [interpreted as being] in the practical activity.10

It must be remembered, however, that individual Dasein is always part of a communal way of being. Therefore, it is not my act which must succeed but anyone's act. That is, anyone (though not everyone) must succeed in using the thing as the thing one is attempting to use it as when one is attempting to use it as anyone would use it. I may get along very nicely using a blanket to cover a window, but still one uses blankets to keep warm in bed and one uses drapes to cover windows. What I reveal by succeeding in mis-using the blanket is not that this blanket is really a drape, but that it works nicely when used as a drape. It should be noted, however, that there
is no correct way to use things independently of communal practices; one time aberrations can become communal practices when widely accepted.

Heidegger argues, furthermore, that without practical acts of interpretation there could be no linguistic truth. In other words, linguistically characterizing entities as substances with attributes (the "as" of assertion) is dependent on uncovering something as something through practical activity (the "as" of interpretation). To see why this is so, we must return to Heidegger's claim that truth becomes explicit in the phenomenal context of demonstration. The truth of an assertion is demonstrated when the entity in question shows itself as being the way it was said to be in the assertion. But, how is it possible for an entity to show itself as being a certain way? Only, Heidegger says, through the entities already playing a role in a context of rule-governed, purposive activity. Dasein's activities give entities some determination; they let entities show up as being like (or failing to be like) they were said to be in the assertion. Thus, before an assertion can be true or false, the object of the assertion must already have been (non-linguistically) assigned a function in a context of purposive activity.
3.4: TRUTH AS DISCLOSURE

All uncovering or discovering is based on the prior structural articulation of the world (the world's disclosedness) and this structure is articulated (the world is disclosed) through the activities of global or communal Dasein. The entities that are uncovered or discovered within the world are thus said to be true only "in a second sense."

Uncovering is a way of being for being-in-the-world. Circumspective concern, or even that concern in which we tarry and look at something, uncovers entities within the world. These entities become that which has been uncovered. They are "true" in a second sense. [220]

Being-true-as being-uncovering, is a way of being for Dasein. What makes this very uncovering possible must necessarily be called "true" in a still more primordial sense....What is primarily "true" -- that is uncovering -- is Dasein. [220]

Global Dasein's activities disclose the worldliness of the world. That is, they set up a world (definitions 3 and 4, Chapter Two) that allows entities within the world to show up under descriptions, available contexts, etc. and hence to be discovered. Only through Dasein's activities can truth get a grip on the world. So, Dasein as being-in-the-world characterized by care is the primary condition for truth. However, even this condition is subject to change with alterations in the disclosure.
This latter phenomenon (being-in-the-world), which we have known as a basic state of Dasein, is the foundation for the primordial phenomenon of truth [219].

Truth here is not a correspondence between beliefs or propositions and the world but flows out of the communal practices and activities that identify entities through the practices and functions possible within the world.

Because truth is always related to Dasein's activities, Dasein is, as Heidegger says in section 44(b), ontologically "in the truth" [221]. That is, individual Dasein always operates within a framework, making it possible for that Dasein to discover truths about the world; traditionally "being in the truth" has been being able to represent occurrent entities.

Heidegger is quick to point out that this does not mean Dasein is always or in each case "introduced to all the truth" [221]. Ontically (i.e., in actual cases), Dasein can be mistaken, wrong, believe falsehoods, etc. The following remarks will help to clarify what Heidegger means when he says Dasein is ontologically "in the truth."

Since Plato and Aristotle, truth has come to be understood as the activity of uncovering how things are in the world. Individual Dasein uncovers or discovers truths through individual acts of interpretation, through "seeing" entities as substances with attributes. Such
interpretation is an on-going process; each time an individual Dasein uses something or asserts something that Dasein is interpreting how things are in the world. But individual Dasein's ability to uncover truths is based on the world's disclosedness, that is, on the world's showing itself to Dasein as having a certain structure. The world is already conceived to possess a certain structure independent of our perceptions, interests, and activities. This is true even in cases where individual Dasein discovers something new or original. Heidegger says:

It is...essential that Dasein should explicitly appropriate what has already been uncovered, defend it against semblance and disguise, and assure itself of its uncoveredness again and again. The uncovering of anything new is never done on the basis of having something completely hidden, but takes its departure rather from uncoveredness in the mode of semblance. Entities look as if...That is, they have, in a certain way been uncovered already, and yet they are still disguised. [222]

The way the world shows itself to Dasein, the structure of what is disclosed, as well as the characteristics and determinations the world and entities within the world show themselves as having, are all dependent on global Dasein's purposes, concerns, skills, practices, etc. When Dasein carves out a sphere of significance for itself, it allows the world to show up in a certain way, a way, but not the only way, that the world really is in itself. For Heidegger the real does
not have an absolute structure. Rather, it conforms to an infinite variety of interpretations with no one interpretation being more accurate than any other. As the being who does the interpreting and the uncovering, Dasein is being-uncovering (i.e., Dasein is the way of being which Heidegger has defined as truth). Thus Dasein is ontologically "in the truth" by allowing the world to show up in one way. However, Dasein is also in the untruth because when it allows the world to show up in one way it simultaneously closes off other possible ways in which the world could show itself. Not all possible determinations of entities can show through at once because when one interpretation gains primacy it pushes other possible interpretations into the background. This is what happened to the pre-Socratic notion of truth as unhiddenness when Plato/Aristotle made truth correctness of representation; the earlier interpretation was simply pushed aside. Therefore, by opening up one sphere of significance Dasein is closing off others. Furthermore, because Dasein projects its possibilities into the future, Dasein constantly "assumes" that truth has yet to be uncovered. Truth, like Dasein, is always "not yet," always still to be discovered. Truth and untruth are thus interdependent and there is a constant tension, deriving from both past and future, between disclosure and hiddenness. Dasein is caught in between the correlative activities of uncovering and covering up.
Therefore, because Dasein can never be completely represented to itself, Dasein is also ontologically "in the untruth." Truth goes with disclosure. There is no disclosure-independent truth; nothing (or everything) is true of the real.

3.5: THE SHIFT FROM UNCOVERING TO AGREEMENT

Heidegger maintains that his definition of truth as uncovering is more primitive (both historically and ontologically) than the definition of truth as correspondence. To show this, Heidegger proposes to show how truth understood as agreement is derived from truth understood as disclosedness. Heidegger says that discourse (or telling) is an essential feature of Dasein's disclosedness. It is through discourse (or telling) in general and assertion in particular that Dasein expresses itself about the entities it uncovers [223-4]. But assertions not only contain the uncoveredness of the entities they are about, they also preserve it. The assertion becomes something available within the world that can be taken up and spoken again.

In section 44(b), Heidegger says:

The assertion which is expressed is about something, and in what it is about it contains the uncoveredness of these entities. This uncoveredness is preserved in what is expressed. What is expressed becomes, as it were, something available within the world which can be can be taken up and spoken again. [224]
While the assertion takes on the character of equipment in its own right, it does not lose its relationship to the entity it is about.

[But] when Dasein speaks over again what someone else has said...it has been exempted from having to uncover [the entity the assertion is about] again, primordially, and [Dasein] holds that it has been thus exempted.

The assertion expressed becomes an item of equipment available within the world by means of which the uncoveredness of the entity is preserved. That is, subject/predicate language reflects and preserves substance/attribute ontology.

[When this occurs] Now to demonstrate that [the assertion] is something which uncovers means to demonstrate how the assertion by which the uncoveredness is preserved is related to these entities. (emphasis added) [224]

The assertion is said to contain something that holds for the object [224]. But the kind of being belonging to the object and to the assertion is misunderstood when both object and assertion are taken to be occurrent: when entities are taken to be fundamentally substances with attributes and assertions are taken to be fundamentally syntheses of subjects and predicates. As a result the relationship between the two shows itself as an agreement
of two occurrent things, an agreement which is itself occurrent, and so correspondence theory is born.

Heidegger believes that this is a necessary outcome given the kind of being Dasein possesses.

Dasein, in its concernful absorption [with the world], understands itself in terms of what it encounters within the world. The uncoveredness [of entities] which belongs to uncovering [activity of Dasein], is something that we come across proximally [and for the most part] within the world in that which has [already] been expressed....Our understanding of being [in general] is such that every entity is understood in the first instance as occurrent. [225]

So, when we come across an assertion, we understand it first as an occurrent thing with a static subject/predicate structure that is about another occurrent thing with a static substance/attribute structure. Our equation of occurrentness and being is so pervasive, once the view that language consists of occurrent lexical items hooked on to the world has been established, as it was by Aristotle, the question of whether truth is an occurrent relation (agreement of assertion and object) "can not come alive at all" [225]. The issue has been settled; correspondence between language and world becomes an unquestionable characteristic of truth.
3.6: THE NATURE AND PRESUPPOSITION OF TRUTH

In section 44(c), Heidegger himself asks the obvious question: "Does this signify that all truth is 'subjective'?" His reply: "If one interprets 'subjective' as 'left to the subject's discretion', then it certainly does not" [227]. Because disclosing and uncovering are global activities, Heidegger in no way makes truth "subjective" or relative to individual acts of interpretation. Furthermore, within a disclosed framework, the characteristics of the entities themselves limit the possibilities of both individual and global interpretation. If, for example, while building my bookshelf, I grab a bag of marshmallows or a light bulb or something similarly unsuitable for hammering, and attempt to use it to drive nails into the wood, my practical act of interpretation is bound to fail. The failure, of course, does reveal a truth: that marshmallows and light bulbs are unsuitable for hammering. The point here is simply that within a disclosure the possibilities of interpretation are limited by the entities in such a way as to preclude the subjectivity or relativity of truth.

Nevertheless, Heidegger does make truth depend on the existence of Dasein because it is only through Dasein's disclosive activities that entities can emerge as entities of such-and-such-a-sort, that entities can be entities with defining characteristics within the world.
Things like lightbulbs and bags of marshmallows are entities that emerge within a disclosure; they exist at the level of reality, not at the level of the real as Heidegger distinguished them in section 43(c). The real (whatever is outside the disclosure) does not have any defining characteristics and so can be accurately characterized in an infinite variety of ways. Thus, only within a disclosure are the possibilities of interpretation limited. However, because the practices that disclose the world are global practices and because the real does not have a structure in itself, truth, even at the level of disclosure, is neither subjective nor relative.

Furthermore, although Dasein's activities take place within purposive contexts, the most fundamental of these activities are not intentional. The relation between the hand and the hammer, for example, is not intentional because it is non-propositional. It is even unperceived, until something goes wrong. When Dasein is hammering, the question of truth does not arise. But if the hammer breaks, Dasein's concern must switch over to "deliberation" in the form "if ___ then___" e.g., "if I am to continue with my project, then I must get a new hammer." When Dasein's concern switches over to deliberation, Dasein's activities become propositional and intentional. However, Dasein and being-in-the-world cannot be completely alinguisitic. Dasein is essentially
a language using being, but there are also preconditions to language in being-in-the-world.

As Heidegger has already noted, disclosedness (the basis of all truths) is an essential feature of Dasein and only of Dasein. Heidegger concludes from this:

"There is" truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed. [226]

This holds equally for contingent truths, physical laws, and truths of logic.

Newton's laws, the principle of contradiction, any truth whatever -- these are true only as long as Dasein is. Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more. For in such a case truth as disclosedness, uncovering, and uncoveredness, cannot be. [226]

To say that there could be no truth without Dasein says equally that there could be no falsehood without Dasein.

Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not "true"; it does not follow that they were false, or even that they would become false if ontically no discoveredness were any longer possible. Just as little does this "restriction" imply that the being-true of "truths" has in any way been diminished.[226-7]

This restriction does imply that without Dasein the real (whatever is independent of Dasein) would not have been characterized (made into reality). The world would not have been disclosed, entities within the world would not
have been uncovered, assertions would not have been made, correspondence would not have arisen, nothing would be true and nothing false.

To say that before Newton his laws were neither true nor false, cannot signify that before him there were no such entities as have been uncovered and pointed out by those laws. Through Newton the laws became true and with them, entities became accessible in themselves to Dasein.

This is not to say that physical laws, truths of logic, or reality are only contingent.

Once entities have been uncovered, they show themselves precisely as entities which beforehand they always were. Such uncovering is the kind of being which belongs to "truth." [226-227]

Here we should recall Heidegger's claim that "being (not entities) is dependent upon the understanding of being... reality [how entities are disclosed through Dasein's activities] (not the real) is dependent upon care" [212].

At the end of section 44(c), Heidegger asks: "Why must we presuppose that there is truth?" [227]. He answers this question rather obscurely, saying:

It is not we who presupposes "truth"; but it is "truth" that makes it at all possible ontologically for us to be able to be such that we "presuppose" anything at all. Truth is what first makes possible anything like presupposing. [227]
The tack Heidegger is taking here is similar to one commonly found in his later works where he says such things as: "Language brings entities as entities into the Open [being] for the first time."\textsuperscript{11} Language ascribes a determination to entities; gives them a place in the world and lets them be entities of such and such a sort. In the say way, truth brings Dasein into being, lets Dasein "exist" in Heidegger's technical sense of the term (inquire, interpret, take a stand on things).

But the operation of bringing Dasein into being is not itself completely linguistic. Rather, it is founded on being-in-the-world as forms of understanding and disclosure that make language possible. Aristotle's "disclosure" of the world as consisting of substances with attributes goes hand in hand with the language of subjects and predicates and the subsequent forms of "discovery" or uncovering based upon subject/object metaphysics.

Heidegger says that "presupposing" means understanding "something as the ground for the being of some other entity" [228]. Thus, to say we presuppose truth means we understand truth as the ground for our own being. It must constantly be kept in mind that Dasein is not a thing but the activity of Dasein-ing and that Dasein-ing always takes place in the world. The primary activity of Dasein-ing is the search for truth. Dasein does this by disclosing the world and discovering
entities within the world. So, the presupposition that there is truth is the necessary condition for Dasein's "existence."

We must "make" the presupposition of truth because it is one that has been "made" already with the being of the "we." [228]

Dasein never freely decides to come into Dasein: Daseining is thrust upon Dasein and with it the presupposition that there is truth is also thrust upon Dasein. This is why Heidegger says:

The usual refutation of that skepticism which denies either the being of "truth" or its cognizability, stops half way. What it shows, as a formal argument, is simply that if anything gets judged, truth has been presupposed....One here fails to recognize that even when nobody judges, truth already gets presupposed in so far as Dasein is at all. [228-9].

And later, preminiscent of Wittgenstein's and Davidson's rejection of global skepticism:

A sceptic can no more be refuted than the being of truth can be "proved." And if any sceptic of the kind who denies the truth factically is, he does not even need to be refuted. [229]

If we can't make sense of Dasein without Dasein's interconnection to the world through its activities (i.e., no activities, no Dasein), it makes no sense to question the existence of the world. Dasein's activity has a self-confirming characteristic. Searching for
truth is an activity taking place in the world that has been disclosed in a certain way. The presupposition that there is truth makes it both possible for and necessary that Dasein discloses and discovers. But the philosophical tradition has thought of representation in such a way that the nature of the search for truth has been covered-over. Dasein tends to fall into the world and forget that it is interpreting the world, forget that consciousness and representation are interpretations, and forget that the primary phenomenon of truth has been covered-over by our understanding of being as occurrentness.¹²
NOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE


2 Ibid., 254.

3 Ibid., 265.

4 Ibid., 259.

5 Ibid., 265.

6 Ibid., 265.

7 Gary Steiner "Heidegger's Reflection on Aletheia: Merely a Terminological Shift?" in Auslegung, vol.13, No.1, 41.

8 Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," 266.

9 This is essentially the later Wittgensteinian argument (The Blue and Brown Books and Philosophical Investigations) that mental representations are either useless or redundant.


CONCLUSION

Heidegger argues that the Western world-view is based on certain implicit ontological presuppositions that were inherited from the ancient Greeks. The most important of these presuppositions are: 1) There is a fundamental ontological distinction between knowers and the object of knowledge. 2) The primary mode of access knowers have to the object of knowledge is disinterested observation or contemplation. 3) Truth consists in accuracy of representation.

These presuppositions have led to a picture of reality according to which: 1) There is a way the object of knowledge (the world, reality, etc.) is in itself, independent of human activity and interpretation. 2) There is a way knowers (human beings, representers, etc.) take the world to be, which may or may not be an accurate representation of reality. As a correlative of this ontological picture, truth is understood to be a occurrent relation between reality and representations of reality.

Using the ontology of being-in-the-world, Heidegger argues that the traditional ontological picture and its corresponding view of truth as correct representation, does not adequately capture the nature of human existence or the relevance of human existence to truth. By focusing on concerned activity rather than on
disinterested " beholding," and on metaphors of involvement rather than spatial inclusion, Heidegger is able to escape traditional conclusions, with all of their inherent problems, regarding the nature of reality and the nature of truth. First, Heidegger argues that construing entities as available (i.e., characterizing them primarily in terms of their function) is a more fundamental way of understanding them than is construing them as occurrent (i.e., characterizing them primarily in terms of substance/attribute). This is meant to show that any conception of the structure and identity of entities within the world is dependent on Dasein's purposes, concerns, and activities, i.e., to show that there is no way entities within the world are "in themselves," independent of human interests. Second, Heidegger characterizes being-in-the-world as a type of involvement in a system of human practices that are necessary for the emergence of entities within the world. This is meant to show that both knowers and the object of knowledge are interdefined through the practices in which they are involved. Under the framework of being-in-the-world it is, therefore, impossible to characterize truth as an occurrent relation between the independent realms of representation and reality.

Heidegger, however, does not reject as wrong traditional subject/object metaphysics or its complementary view of truth as some form of...
correspondence. Rather, he seeks to show the origins and limitations of the traditional view: i.e., to show its roots in a particular interpretation, itself rooted in a particular cultural and historical epoch. In so doing, Heidegger tries to show the inability of traditional metaphysics to provide an absolute characterization of reality at its deepest level. Indeed, Heidegger goes further than this, arguing that "reality" is always a particular characterization of "the real." The real does not have a determinate structure; it is infinitely dense.¹

Heidegger wants to retain both the common sense view that facts about the world are discovered rather than invented and the philosophical view that "the real" is indeterminate independent of the projection of a framework. To accomplish this Heidegger's philosophy functions at two levels: the ontic and the ontological. Ontically (i.e., in particular cases) facts within the world can be discovered by individual Dasein. However, the ontic is essentially dependent upon the ontological. Ontologically the world is disclosed, for Heidegger, through the activities of global Dasein. Traditional subject/object metaphysics and its accompanying view of truth as correspondence are reserved a place at the level of ontical discoveries within the world. At the higher levels, Heidegger is a realist in the limited sense that he believes there is an independently existing level of
occurrent reality. To re-quote an important passage discussed in section 3.5.

But now, as long as there is an understanding of being and therefore an understanding of occurrence, it can indeed by said that in this case entities will still continue to be.

Heidegger also recognizes, however, that despite playing the role of determining our understanding of key philosophical concepts, ontology is ultimately interpretation. We always work within a cultural and historical perspective, within a language and a vaguely defined range of concepts which limit the ways in which we can understand or characterize "the real." Perhaps even more fundamentally, we are limited by biology, by the narrow range and limited power of our ability to sense and perceive, and by our limited capacity to reason.

It is not the case, however, that we could access the real if we had more diverse and powerful senses, or if we had more acute powers of reason. The real, for Heidegger, cannot be characterized in an absolute sense, from God's point of view (which is not a point of view); it can only be contrasted with particular characterizations of reality, e.g., as occurrence. Attempts, such as that made by Dreyfus in his account of hermeneutic realism, to portray science as "getting at
ultimate causal powers" and religion as "getting at ultimate saving powers," and that, therefore, both the scientific and religious accounts can be "true" of the real, seem to miss the point.² They imply that "ultimate characterizations" are open-ended or incommensurable, but nevertheless directly about the real. But, there is no independent criterion of ultimaticity except from within an interpretive framework. Dreyfus seems to want to have it both ways. He wants to have a traditional ultimate characterization of the real and to have a hermeneutical account of truth. For Heidegger, however, the real is simply open to an infinite number of interpretations, no one of which can be picked out as the most fundamental. What is fundamental for him is Dasein's interpretive activity.
NOTES FOR THE CONCLUSION

1 John Tietz, "Heidegger on Realism and the Correspondence Theory of Truth" in Dialogue, forthcoming.

REFERENCES


