NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

Si manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, S.R.C., 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.
THE FRONTIERS OF THE PERMISSIBLE:
A CONTEST OVER BROADCASTING AT THE MARGINS

by

Dorothy Kidd
B.A.A. Ryerson Polytechnical Institute, 1979

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MASTER OF ARTS
in the Department
of
Communication

Dorothy Kidd 1990

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

1990

All rights reserved. This work may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive, permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-315-63435-1
27 August, 1990

Dear Dorothy;

I would be delighted for you to use any of our maps or other material. Please be sure to give credit where due.

Keep in touch.

Kendall
NAME: Dorothy Kidd
DEGREE: Master of Arts (Communication)
TITLE OF THESIS: The Frontiers of the Permissible: A Contest Over Broadcasting at the Margins

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:
Chair: Dr. Alison C.M. Beale

Dr. Robert S. Anderson
Professor
Senior Supervisor

Prof. Liora Salter
Professor

Dr. Kelleen Toohey
Associate Professor
Faculty of Education
External Examiner

DATE APPROVED: 25 May 1990
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENCE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Dissertation:
The Frontiers of the Permissible: A Contest Over Broadcasting at the Margins

Author: signature

Dorothy Kidd

25 May 1990
ABSTRACT

During the 1970's, Canada and India were among several governments experimenting with the use of satellites for broadcasting and telecommunications. One set of these experiments tested the satellite's use for social development programming for people in remote regions. This experimental era led to the rapid international implementation of commercial systems.

This study analyzes the transfer of broadcast programming methods to two of these projects, focusing on the transition from the experimental to the operational stage, and examining the adaptation of the conventional methods at three levels: between the network and the production team; within the production team and between the production team and audience members. Through two case studies -- at Wawatay Native Communications in northern Ontario and the Development Education Communications Unit in the Kheda District, Gujarat, India -- it assesses how these projects have adapted these methods. It further determines whether these adaptations have reproduced or transformed the dominant rules of communications.

This study is based both on unpublished documents (interviews and observations in the field) and secondary literature. The major field study of Wawatay Native Communications took place during several periods between

The secondary literature includes a review of writing about international development communications and Canadian aboriginal communications.

The study concludes that both projects have transformed the conventional rules of broadcasting at the local level. Under severe constraints from national governments and networks, they have democratized some of the rules of conventional broadcasting within the production team and between the producers and their respective audiences. The study also concludes that the trend towards commercial financing is limiting these advances, and may lead to the further marginalization of these services and of the indigenous people who use them. Finally, the study makes several recommendations for future study: for research by those who are knowledgeable in indigenous languages and culture; and for the inclusion of communications systems in any future research, assessment or negotiation of Aboriginal relations with central governments.
Acknowledgements

A great many people have helped in the production of this thesis. Thanks to the staff of all the media organizations with whom I have worked and visited. Special thanks to the Okalakatiget Society and Wawatay Native Communications, for the learning we exchanged; and to the Development Education Communications Unit and the Development Communications Units. Thanks also to the staff of Participatory Research in Asia, and to the many people in India who made my trip possible.

Many others helped me during the writing stage. My thanks to all those who read and commented on earlier drafts: Farah Shroff, Camie Kim, Marilyn Fuchs, Uschi Koeberling and Alice Kidd; and especially to Susan Knutson for her insights on language, Lillian Saultier for her continuing support and my senior advisor Bob Anderson. Thanks to Ina Dennekamp and Sarah Sample for emergency computer use and to Lucie Menkveld for guiding me through the maze.

Grateful acknowledgment goes to the Canadian International Development Agency for funding me during my studies and to Kendall Lougheed and Associates for permission to reproduce the maps of Wawatay Native Communications and the Northern Native Broadcast Access Programme societies.
# Table of Contents

Approval ................................................................. ii  
Abstract ................................................................. iii  
Acknowledgements ...................................................... v  
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................ viii  

1. Setting the Frame  

Introduction ............................................................. 1  
The Roots of the Research Problem ................................ 4  
Building on the Critical Tradition .................................. 8  
Statement of Purpose .................................................. 10  
Contributions of this thesis .......................................... 11  
Research Methods ..................................................... 14  
The Wawatay Case Study ............................................... 14  
Field Work in India ................................................... 15  
Documentation and Literature Review .............................. 16  
Definition of Terms .................................................... 17  
Plan of Presentation ................................................... 19  

2. Zooming in to the Frame: A Review of the (Sub)texts  

Introduction ............................................................. 21  
The dominant paradigm ............................................... 22  
Challenging the dominant paradigm ................................ 24  
The Dependistas ......................................................... 26  
The McBride Report .................................................... 27  
Countering Dominance Through Community Media ............... 29  
Television in India: a Social Experiment ........................... 31  
Canadian Satellites: Integrating Aboriginal People ............. 34  
Media as Mirror ........................................................... 37  
Reflection or Refraction? ............................................... 38  
Summary .................................................................. 40  

3. "We are not as far from Delhi as we were ten years ago": The Kheda Project  

Introduction ............................................................. 44  
The Introduction of Television to India ............................. 47  
The Policy Environment: Television as Development .......... 49  
The Programming Environment ........................................ 54  
Shifting SITE ............................................................... 56  
The Transfer to Kheda ................................................... 61  
Planned Brinkmanship ................................................... 63  
Trying to Keep the Sets On ............................................. 69  
The Missing Link - Losing the Pij Transmitter ................. 70  
Institutionalizing Development Communications ................ 72  
Dissolving From Kheda: Lessons for Wawatay ...................... 76
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AMARC</td>
<td>World Community Radio Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBC</td>
<td>Canadian Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEIC</td>
<td>Canadian Employment and Immigration Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRTC</td>
<td>Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CTS</td>
<td>Canadian Technology Satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DECU</td>
<td>Development Education Communications Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCU</td>
<td>Development Communication Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOC</td>
<td>Department of Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSOS</td>
<td>Department of the Secretary of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESL</td>
<td>English as a Second Language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HF</td>
<td>High Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td>Inuit Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INAC</td>
<td>Indian and Northern Affairs Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INSAT</td>
<td>Indian Satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISRO</td>
<td>Indian Space Research Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunications Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAN</td>
<td>Nishnawbe-Aski Nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>Native Communications Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFB</td>
<td>National Film Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNBPAP</td>
<td>Northern Native Broadcast Access Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NWIO</td>
<td>New World Communications and Information Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECA</td>
<td>Ontario Education and Communications Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIDC</td>
<td>Ryerson International Development Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SITE</td>
<td>Satellite Instructional Television Experiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENO</td>
<td>Television Extension in Northern Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-national corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVO</td>
<td>Television Ontario</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Education Science and Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
SETTING THE FRAME

Introduction

In 1975-76, two U.S. satellites were launched on opposite sides of the earth, one in India and one in Canada. While the communications environments of these two nation states were very different, the experimental aims of the U.S. A-6 in India and the Hermes in Canada were remarkably similar. Both aimed to test the social and educational applications of satellite broadcast technology, create a base of national expertise and technological capacity, and extend the sovereignty of the national government to its most remote regions. Ultimately both experiments contributed to the conventional growth pattern of mass media -- the rapid expansion of commercial television in urban centres.

This thesis features two unconventional offspring of those experiments. Since the launching of the first satellites, Wawatay Native Communications and the Development Education Communications Unit (DECU) in Kheda, Gujarat have gone from being experiments to on-going operations. Their growth demonstrates departures from the conventional rules of broadcast media. The enquiry examines three levels of these changes: one, between the projects and the national
networks; two, among the producers; and three, between production teams and audience.

Both began as demonstrations of the capacity of satellites for decentralization. Each project produced programming in remote communities, with funding directly from their national governments. This was in direct contrast to the broadcasting industry's norm of production by public or commercial television networks in the national or commercial capitals -- production increasingly driven by advertising revenue. This thesis examines the impact of integrating the Kheda project and Wawatay into their respective national systems.

A subset of this process of integration occurred among the viewers or receivers of the communications service. Wawatay and DECU provided programming to viewers who had never before seen television: people far outside the urban middle class consumer orbit, on the furthest margins of their respective social, political and economic systems. The intention of both the Indian and Canadian governments was to integrate them into the national mainstream, as consumers of their respective national development plans. Both national governments also wanted to reduce any political opposition from these marginal populations.
Remarkably, in both cases, producers attempted a much different experiment: extending the involvement of local people beyond passive consumption of images to a more active role behind and in front of the cameras. They attempted to produce programming more suited to the indigenous aspirations and needs of people with the least social, economic or political power of their respective societies. This commitment to active involvement of the audience required novel on-air and off-air strategies, which challenged the conventional rules and procedures, not only of the medium, but of the political power structure.

This thesis examines the tensions within this process of national integration, because fifteen years later both projects are in danger of becoming marginalized within their respective national broadcasting services. While the projects have made some adaptations of the medium, they find themselves constrained by many of the same forces that operate in conventional broadcasting. The Kheda project has had to fight to keep its transmitter and the television sets on which its audience depends, and has encountered much more interference at the program level than ever before. The continual pressure for Wawatay Native Communications to mirror southern urban services has been increased as a result of major funding cuts from the federal government.
The Roots of the Research Problem

My concern about the limitations of using modern media for social change first began twenty years ago, when I worked as a video animator in a multiracial downtown neighbourhood of Toronto. It became much more focused in 1984, when I spent a year as a radio broadcasting trainer with the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation and Okalagatiget Society in northern Labrador. The only broadcast signals they received were CBC Radio and Television and the community radio station: most of the eight trainees were new to any kind of broadcasting. My job was two-fold: to pass on the techniques and concepts of southern broadcasting and to assist the group to match them to the needs of their Inuit and Native Settler communities.

The trainees and I often struggled with this cross-cultural transfer, sometimes together as we found a mesh, sometimes seeming at cross-purposes as we found no easy resolution. Occasionally, the whole group would express resistance to the new knowledge system they were learning, saying it was contrary to their values either as Inuit, northerners, or trainees. Sometimes individuals resisted, articulating their conflict as one of gender, age or settlement of origin.
By the end of the year, the new staff began a regional radio service in Inuktut (the Labrador dialect of Inuktitut) and English, serving the five northern Native communities. In the considerable effort and excitement of the project, my own questions about the value of the transfer lay dormant, only to resurface two years later, in 1986, when I was hired as the co-ordinator of Wawatay Native Communications Society's training program for regional radio and television staff.

While the situations were not identical, many of the same questions arose. This group had much more experience with broadcasting and journalism, as practitioners and as audience members. During the training program, there was a great deal of discussion of the meanings of "Native" and "non-native" "journalism" and "communications". There was also a great deal of talk of how to make "Native cultural" programmes, as well as some experimentation with local forms of story-telling, humour and music in the first radio and television shows that were made.

Since then, my perspective about what I wanted to know and how to find it out has shifted, as I moved from being an outsider within, to an outsider living miles away. My questions about how best to use broadcasting's tools and language led me to India, a country with a long history of using traditional and modern media to advance the people of
the oppressed classes. It was also the country, where, at the height of the Green Revolution, I had first become critically aware of the limitations of social change orchestrated from above. In my visits to government and non-government media projects, I encountered many parallels with my experience in community and aboriginal media in Canada.

Yet these parallels would not answer my first questions: there was no universal answer to how best to adapt modern communications to the needs of indigenous people. Differences in language, economy and history make that impossible to determine. The common link that I discovered was instead one of relationships: there were parallels between the ways that modern communications were introduced to mediate relations between indigenous people and both nation states.

More specifically, the story of the Indian satellite social experiments sounded very much like those in northern aboriginal Canada. Most telling, was that the stated aims of two of the groups of actors -- the government and the social change agents -- sounded very similar. So too did one of the subplots: options for producers and audiences were limited as the experiments were institutionalized within the commercially-driven communications networks.
I returned to Canada to document these parallels, or what the producers in the Development Communications Unit in the Kheda district called "the frontier of the permissible", the contest between the central government and the margins over what is broadcast, by whom and how. At the same time, I encountered a challenge to the perspective of this plan from another direction. Aboriginal people were voicing their concerns in non-native forums about sovereignty, not only of their land but of their ways of knowing.

As a result of these three experiences -- my training work with aboriginal broadcasting, my field work with popular and government media groups in India and the discussions of aboriginal sovereignty -- I revised my earlier approach. I decided that I would not be able, as an outsider who is not fluent in Gujarati, Cree or Ojibway language or culture, to tell the full story from the inside, of how the people of Nishnawbe Aski Nation or of the Kheda district adapted broadcasting to their local needs. Those stories remain to be told.¹ Instead I would tell the story that was available to me as an outsider, of how the receiving groups adopted, adapted or transformed broadcast production.

¹ In "Recommendations for Future Research", I have listed some of the stories which remain to be told by people with the requisite language and cultural qualifications.
Building on the Critical Tradition

In approaching these questions I have also drawn on the work of other communications theorists. Much of the previous development communications research, like the history of mass communication research in general, is the story of a mismatch between the study of mass media systems and the study of individual effects (McAnany, Storey, 1989:9).

This research gap between analyses of media and of effects has meant that early studies of technology transfer tended to blame problems on one of those two levels. First, instead of looking beyond the transfer itself to the wider context of institutional relations, they have blamed it on the technological or media innovation itself. With this in mind, analysts set about "isolating the object and then discovering its components. On the contrary, we have to discover the nature of a practice and then its conditions" (Williams, 1973:16). Analysing the nature of the broadcasting practice and its conditions will require exploring the dynamics between the central institutions and local groups, among producers, and between producers and audience.

In the earlier communications critiques, the second target for blame were the receiving groups. If the "effect" on them was not as intended,
the "problem" was attributed to common cultural and psychological characteristics of individuals... Systemic constraints that would prevent economic growth and development were overlooked (Mansell, 1980: 45).

Since critiques like the above by Mansell, there has been some lip service by policy writers to reviewing technological transfers and media institutions within a wider context (Servaes, 1986). In this enquiry, a wider context means that the implications of innovations can only be studied within the appropriate historical, economic and sociological contexts, and due attention must be given to other noncommunication institutions, processes and trends (Halloran, 1986: 243).

This enquiry looks at some of the international and national economic, political and cultural events that provided the backdrop to national communications policy in general and satellite broadcasting policy in particular. On the ground at the local level, paying attention to social conditions and social context, and noting the limitations of this researcher, this thesis will draw on ethnography in the major case study of Wawatay in Chapters 4 and 5, hoping to convey the drama of the production process, to link varying contexts or dynamics, interrelate meaning, context and resources, and illuminate agency and structure. (Intintoli, 1985:261).

Studying social practices, rather than quantifiable objects or behaviours, as Williams suggested, leads to perceiving
communications as a multi-dimensional relation between active subjects. This thesis begins by looking at the new technology of community broadcasting as a "practice of social interaction which follows certain rules in any given society." (Finlay 1989:44).

Both conventional and community-based broadcasting follow strict procedures or rules of production which are articulated in special languages. In both case studies, but especially in the case study of Wawatay, the enquiry will unwrap some of these rules or notions that travel with the hardware and analyse how they limit the production of programming relevant to receiving groups' own languages and cultural knowledge systems. I am frankly espousing values of social change and emancipation in order to:

evaluate the social implications of this technology by assessing the role that the socially acceptable rules of discourse and their concretisations in communications practices, play in hindering or furthering democratic human emancipation (Finlay, 1989: 44).

**Statement of Purpose**

This thesis examines the transfer of broadcasting techniques within the wider context of a national satellite system. There are three questions addressed:

1. How do the receiving groups adopt, adapt or transform broadcast production?
2. In particular, how do the receiving groups adopt, adapt or transform three subsidiary concepts of broadcast production -- centralized production; professional journalism, and audience relations?

3. To what degree does this transfer hinder or promote an adherence to the conventional rules of procedure of the dominant media and society?

**Contributions of this thesis:**

This thesis contributes to an ongoing debate among social scientists, government policy-makers and project workers. While these two projects present alternatives to the conventions of television production, their histories typify that of international communications in general, at several levels. Launched at the beginning of the rapid expansion of satellites and other capital-intensive communications technologies, their subsequent history follows the pattern of satellite growth, moving through the experimental to the operational stage (Hudson, 1985; Stahmer, 1979). Finally, the set of rules within which they operate -- the discourse -- is typical of the period.

This thesis deals primarily with this contest over rules. At the international level, these two projects have taken place within a fierce debate about the role of communications in development, a debate that was fought openly in international agencies such as UNESCO and the UN, and in
academic and administrative literature, and less publicly in the boardrooms of transnational corporations and national governments.

During the decade when these two projects were launched, critics and national governments alike were lining up to support two opposing paradigms of communications. The dominant paradigm promoted the use of capital-intensive communications technology to stimulate or reproduce Euro-American patterns of economic and social growth. The dependency paradigm said that these new communications technologies were being used to centralize the power of the already powerful transnational companies and their Euro-American governments. The watershed of this debate around a new world order of information and economics was the McBride Report: this literature is reviewed in the next chapter.

These debates have influenced everyone involved from the workers on projects such as Kheda and Wawatay, to administrators, social scientists, politicians and corporate executives. At the project level, they have affected how producers see their role in relation to their audience and to their message-making. This thesis is an examination of this contest over meaning at the microlevel. It uses these understandings about communication arising out of this debate to situate the process at the project level,
understanding that the process of producing knowledge is ongoing.

This enquiry sees the debates as ongoing contests over the control of the practices of international communications. It situates this new set of practices within their wider political, socioeconomic and cultural contexts, with the assumption that technology is neither neutral nor determinant.

While there have been attempts at synthesis, the previous reviews have followed different procedures. One set has tended to look primarily at the level of international or national policy, providing general administrative or critical prescriptions (Servaes, 1986, Mowlana, 1988 Hamelink, 1983). The second set has concentrated on analysing the technology in question, prescribing new configurations to solve problems of the transfer (Rogers, 1976, Singhal, 1989). The third set has provided overly-positive descriptive accounts of the work of small group media at the local level (Berrigan, 1979, Hancock, 1984), often with little critical awareness of the internal dynamics (Tomaselli, 1989, Salter, 1981, O'Connor, 1989). This thesis attempts to combine the best of all three levels of analysis.
In Canada, another group of social critics has demonstrated how the transfer of modern communications has affected the culture of Native people (Valaskakis, 1982, 1986). Others (Stiles, 1985, 1986, 1987; Valaskakis, 1986 and Koebberling, 1988) have looked at how national communications policies have constrained the growth of Native communications. The conclusion brings the analysis up to date with the effects of recent government decisions.

**Research Methods**

The research for this study consisted of a number of methods. It combined observations from field experiences as a trainer, training coordinator and training evaluator for three Native broadcasting societies in northern Canada, field work specifically for this study in India and northern Ontario, a review of documents, and a literature search. The following sections describe each task in more detail.

**The Wawatay Case Study**

Since 1986, I have continued to work as a consultant for Wawatay Native Communications Society, visiting Sioux Lookout three times to conduct workshops and produce reports and evaluations relating to training. First as a participant and then as an observer, I have been on hand to witness productions in progress as well as completed programs. I
have conducted a number of formal and informal interviews with trainee producers, trainers, producers, other staff and managers during the period of training and after. I have also conducted interviews with key resource people in other Native communications and cultural organizations, as well as government field officers, college extension workers and trainers and producers in public and commercial broadcast organizations.

Field work in India

The Satellite Educational Television Experiment (SITE) is one of the most widely reported communications projects in international communications literature. As well, the Canadian non-governmental organization, the Ryerson International Development Centre (RIDC) is co-sponsoring two training development broadcasting projects with the national Indian radio and television authorities. In the fall of 1988, I spent three months in India visiting these projects, as well as a number of non-governmental small scale media projects.

The field work consisted of viewing and listening to a large number of broadcast and non-broadcast programmes. I also conducted both formal and informal interviews with producers, managers and some of the participants of the small scale media projects, as well as academics, government
and non-governmental agency field workers. There are two ways these interviews are used within the text. Some include quotes from particular individuals, with the names, places and dates cited. Others refer to individuals indirectly, so that only the place and date is named.

**Documentation and Literature Review**

A documentation search was one of the principal methods used. The study has drawn on documentation available from Wawatay: society goals, objectives and policy statements; long-term training plans, yearly project goals, reports and evaluations; broadcast programme plans, scripts and finished programmes; and their newspaper, the Wawatay News. I also reviewed the relevant reports and independent evaluations from the funding agency, the Northern Native Broadcast Access Programme of the federal Department of the Secretary of State (DSOS).

Some documentation was also available from the Development Education Communications Unit (DECU) of the Indian Space and Research Organization (ISRO). This included reports outlining project and programming goals and activities.

The literature review drew on three kinds of materials. I reviewed a number of descriptive reports, impact studies and policy analyses dealing more generally with northern Native
communications in Canada and the Satellite Educational Television Experiment in India. I also reviewed a number of descriptive accounts of small-scale video and radio projects in Latin America, Australia, Africa and Asia, whose distribution is primarily local.

At the more theoretical level, I reviewed the international communications literature that has been produced in the wake of discussions of the New World Information Order. This included a number of critical studies of the international economic and political environment for telecommunications, and more general discussions of the impact of telecommunications transfers in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and especially on indigenous populations.

My third area of interest was works by or about Native people. This included general and theoretical accounts of Native history, and particularly the history of the colonial relationship with the dominant society in North America.

**Definition of Terms**

One of the most difficult tasks for critics of communications is the deciphering of meaning. Many groups with very different intentions and agendas use the same words. From citizens of the streets of Moscow, Prague or Berlin to World Bank representatives to Premier Vander Zalm, everyone talks about participation, decentralization, the
democratization of communication and self-reliance. This thesis, in turn, revolves around the meaning of those words, for aboriginal people in northwestern Ontario, villagers in Gujarat, program staff in both regions, and national governments in Ottawa and New Delhi.

**Development:** At its simplest, this word means "coming into being". However, it has become a highly contested ideograph, used by many different groups with widely varying agendas and models. As a result, I have used it sparingly, only when the speaker has chosen it.

**Development Communications:** This term is usually used by writers of the dominant paradigm school to mean the use of communications for local and national growth. Some critics of this school also use it to mean the use of communications for educational, socio-economic betterment of minority groups and other oppressed peoples.

**Marginal:** This term is used to describe groups of people whose role within mainstream society is partly defined by their position on the boundaries of that society. Its use supplants earlier terms such as exploited or oppressed.

**Participatory Communications:** This is a more recent term which is in vogue with writers of the dominant school and the critical schools. It refers to the involvement of the audience in the design and programming of traditional and modern media.
**Technology Transfer:** This term refers to the movement of systems of equipment, machines (technica) and of knowledge (ideas, information and techniques), primarily from the nations of the northern hemisphere to those in the south.

**Plan of Presentation**

The thesis begins with a wide lens view, sketching some of the socio-political and economic factors which frame the discourse within which these projects operate. Zooming in to India, Chapter 3 discusses the combined impact of state policy and an urban commercially-driven media on a locally-run centre. The case study looks especially at the integrative influence on distribution and production of the Development Education Communications Unit in the Kheda District of Gujarat.

The major case study which follows, in Chapters 4 and 5, continues to examine this process of integration in a focus on the production process. Some of the rules or conventions of broadcasting are dissected by looking at their transfer in the training of producers at Wawatay Native Communications in northwestern Ontario, Canada.

Chapter 6 moves back to a wider frame, discussing recent changes since the field work, in the context of increasing commercialization. It concludes with some observations, and
reflections for further study. Only one policy recommendation is presented: while this thesis deals indirectly with policy issues, it is outside of the parameters of this study to recommend any specific changes, without further study and consultation with the stakeholders.
CHAPTER 2
ZOOMING IN TO THE FRAME:
A REVIEW OF THE (SUB)TEXTS

Introduction

The mid 1970's, when the two satellite community broadcasting projects were launched, was a period of intense debate about the role of communications in international development. The backdrop to this debate was a competition among nation states and corporations for economic and political power, between transnational corporations operating under the banner of nation states. During the decade after the launches, this struggle changed shape, from a search for territory, to one for markets (Samarajiva, 1988).

In this chapter, I look in more detail at the contested territory of development communications and the frame that this discourse placed on community producers at the margins of satellite broadcasting. In particular, three key notions that came with the technology are unwrapped:

1. centralization and the tension between local and metropolitan networks
2. professionalism among media producers, and
3. audience as consumer.
I outline the debate about these notions below and explore how they act to hinder or promote adherence to the rules of communications used to maintain control by the dominant orders.

The chapter sweeps over three historical periods, weaving between theoretical and policy debates at the international and national levels and the work of community broadcasters at the local level. I begin, after European-World War II, with the widest frame, with an examination of what was to become the dominant paradigm in international communications, and its antithesis, the dependency paradigm. This takes us to the 1970's, when the focus narrows to the growth of community broadcasting in Latin America, India and Canada, exploring the parallels in notions of media centralization, professionalism and the role of audiences. The last section zooms out again to map the impact of changes in the two opposing paradigms on the frame surrounding our two case studies.

The dominant paradigm

The dominant or modernization paradigm in communications began in the United States after the second European-world war. It was a time of major changes in the geo-political map: in the northern hemisphere, the cold war was beginning between the Soviet and American empires; in the southern
hemisphere newly emerging nation states were gaining independence from their European imperial rulers.

The challenge for American imperial ambitions was to extend their economic and political control over the third world without overt military means. As President Truman said, they wanted to discourage "the advance of both Communism and extreme nationalism" (Samarajiva, 1988:4). American social scientists began to serve the needs of this policy by mapping out the discourse of the new discipline of communications.

Over the next thirty years, theorists such as Lasswell, Lerner, Rogers and Schramm, often with the financial support of the United States Agency for International Development, promoted the idea that technological innovation, and particularly modern mass media, would bring solutions to economic and political problems in developing countries. Their paradigm rotated on the axis of modernism: a belief that third world economies could be jump-started by western technologies to catch up with western political and economic institutions.

These theorists saw the problems of poorer countries within their own framework of meaning. The quantifiable measures of affluence, with which they were familiar, were not present in most of these newly independent states. Their rates of
industrialization and gross national product were low, as were the number of individual entrepreneurs. Looking through their own frame and only within these national systems, the communication theorists decided the barriers to the necessary growth and development were the beliefs and practices of the indigenous societies.

These "backward" beliefs and practices could be eradicated by convincing individuals, through the injection or shot of mass media messages, to embrace attitudes of upward class mobility and consumerism. This was known as the hypodermic or bullet theory: American-trained media makers would save non-American peoples from themselves, by the power of their persuasive messages. Individuals would change their attitudes and thereby take up new behaviours, either directly or diffusely through leaders or other institutions.

**Challenging the dominant paradigm**

By the late 1960's the modernization paradigm came under attack, its perspective and practice implicated as the principal problem to development. This attack came from many different directions: from government policy makers, social and communications policy critics, and a broad popular movement in many regions of the northern and southern hemispheres.
Underneath this dispute over the international communications discourse was the activity of groups of workers, peasants, students, consumers, women, and youth who opposed this new kind of "cultural imperialism" and who were trying out alternatives. But they were hardly visible in the literature. More visible was the debate of government leaders and social critics at the political-institutional level, beginning with the UNESCO conference in Montreal in 1969 (White, 1988), and extending through to the early 1980's. Providing the backdrop was the pressure of changing political power and ecological dynamics, especially the Arab oil cartel and world-wide pollution problems.

The debate was very wide-ranging: the socio-political movement that grew up "changed cultural perceptions of the nature of human communications and the role of media in society" (White, 1988:21). The following survey highlights some of the influences that contributed to the transfer of broadcast communications to groups on the margins. While the contributions of Canadian and Indian communications theorists and practitioners are discussed, I start with the work of a regional school that had tremendous international impact, that of the Latin American dependency school.
The Dependistas

The dependency school's social origins came in the aftermath of modernization in Latin America. Broad-based movements of rural and urban poor were being formed in the wake of the capital intensification of farming and the resulting exodus of subsistence or marginal peasants to unemployment and poverty in urban centres (White, 1988).

Critics in a wide range of disciplines, from sociologist Andre Gunder Frank, to educationist Paolo Freire and communications critics such as Roncaglio, Beltran, and Salinas created an alternative paradigm. Theirs was an antithesis to the modernist school, suggesting that underdevelopment in the third world and hinterland countries was a direct result of political and economic policies of the metropolitan countries of Europe and the U.S.A.

"Development and underdevelopment were interrelated and continuous processes - two sides of a single coin" (Mowlana, 1988:9). The critics cited practices such as price-fixing of commodities by Euro-American trade cartels and the tying of aid to the importation of western technologies and social welfare programs as factors creating dependence in the receiving countries.
Within this global economic framework of northern dominance, the role of mass communications was analysed. The critics' thesis was that metropolitan countries, and especially the United States, not only reaped profits from the sale of the hardware of electronic communications, but also increased the psycho-social dependency of the receiving country on the dominant ideology by selling them software such as films, television programmes, etc.

The "dependistas" criticized the importation of American programming for its projection of dominant values, and especially the way each message reproduces the receiver's status as an isolated and individual consumer (Mattelart, 1979). In international fora such as UNESCO, International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the UN, they called for equity and autonomy in communications. At the national level, they called for the establishment of regional press and other communications services to reinforce their indigenous cultures. Their points of view are perhaps best represented in the UNESCO report, Many Voices, One World.

The McBride Report

This commission, led by Sean McBride, is perhaps best known for popularizing concerns about imbalances and inequities of communications ownership and messages. The commission's call for a New World Communications and Information Order (NWCIO) led to strong reaction from Western journalists, news
syndicates and national governments, to the challenge to their right to collect and disseminate information across all borders. For them, the McBride Report represented a threat to the free flow of capital to sell the information commodity without restriction, so much so that the Thatcher government in Britain and the Reagan government in the USA pulled their support from UNESCO.

Indeed, the report represented a shift in the dominant paradigm's model of communications. It spoke of how modern communications, and especially direct broadcast via satellite, was a major obstacle to the democratization of communication. On the other hand, the report noted that these same new technologies could lead to decentralized, more democratic structures:

The conception of development as a linear, quantitative and exponential process, based on transfers of imported and frequently alienating technology, is beginning to be replaced by that of an endogenous qualitative process focused on man and his vital needs, aimed at eradicating inequalities and based on appropriate technologies which respect the cultural context and generate and foster the active participation of the population concerned (McBride, 1979:38).

The Commission supported the need to stop using communications as a pipeline, from dominant to dominated, describing one of the barriers to democratization as:

the structure of vertical communications, where the flow runs from top to bottom, where the few talk to the many about the needs and problems of the many from the standpoint of the few (McBride, 1979:167).
The McBride report also noted the activity of numerous "grass-roots groups" of citizens, workers, peasants, young people, and women; in "alternative communications" projects that were "bent on breaking the monopoly of centralized and vertical communications systems." (McBride, 1979: 170) They were countering the dominant channels of information with new kinds of messages, from publics not included in commercial media, and new "horizontal" methods of production, defining new relations between media professionals and their audiences.

Countering Dominance Through Community Media

McBride spotlighted activities that had begun in Latin America a decade earlier. One of the most prolific popularizers of this new school of communications and social change is Paolo Freire. He described the impact of the invasion of western ideology:

The invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group, in disrespect of the latter’s potentialities; they impose their own view of the world upon those they invade and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their expression (Freire, 1974:150).

Freire espoused a method of 'conscientisation' in which small groups of poor people would reject the invaders' explanations of the causes of their poverty. Instead they would counter the message and the medium by creating their own analyses of their situations, in their own languages and cultural forms.
In the 1970’s, many popular media experiments in Latin America were operating from this same premise. Like groups in India and Africa, the Latin American groups used indigenous media, such as dance, music and drama, but often within modern modes of transmission such as radio, print and video. They counteracted the messages from the national and international networks with new information or perspectives of their own. Often, the programmers were created as part of broader programs of social and political organization, in opposition to the dominant local, national and international political structures.

The work of these non-professionals countered notions of a passive audience, involved only in consuming messages of modernism. Local people were involved in creating programming in their own cultural and linguistic vernaculars, in a relationship that came to be described as horizontal and participatory, thus demonstrating that "the poor can have access to media in a way that is very usable" (White, 1988:22).

The experience of local media in Latin America also suggested new kinds of relations for journalists and communication professionals working in the mainstream media. Citing examples from the Allende period in Chile in the late 1960’s, Armand Mattelart notes that poor people, aided by the momentum of the popular revolution, were challenging
"the exclusive right of the information-professionals to produce news" (Mattelart, 1979:24). As a consequence, some supportive journalists redefined their role with their audience, opening up a new possibility for the production of news (Gilbert, 1988).

Many of these projects, in Chile and elsewhere, ended after the intervention of military dictatorships, their activists disappeared, imprisoned, or exiled. Yet a lot of the notions they had helped to spark continued at the international level in the non-aligned movement, a movement of countries outside of the orbit of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and outside of the Soviet Union.

Television in India: A Social Experiment

India was a leader in the non-aligned movement, whose political and cultural heritage from Mahatma Gandhi and the Nationalist movement was one of self-reliance, in resistance to European products and practices. Until the 1980's, joint-venture conditions were imposed on all foreign manufacturers, in a government policy of encouraging national industry. In the international arena of the 1970's, Indira Gandhi's government followed an official policy of socialism and neutrality, encouraging Soviet relations as well as European ones, and inter-regional alliances.
Within this tradition, television was considered a western middle-class luxury, meant only for entertainment purposes. As a result, it was first limited to social and educational programming for school children and group-oriented teleclubs in the national capital of Delhi. Yet from the beginning, other more conventional influences would conflict with this public service orientation.

In fact, the national broadcasting service, All-India Radio, only began to experiment with television when the Phillips Company gave them some production and distribution hardware. Soon after, UNESCO provided support and funding for a study of television's use as "a medium of education, rural uplift and community development" (Mody, 1988). In the early 1960's, the Ford Foundation provided money for the consultation of American educational television experts for the school project.

One of the key figures in continuing Indian television's use as a tool of social and economic development was Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, of the Indian space program. Dr. Sarabhai wanted to use television to educate the rural poor at the margins of Indian society. In 1967, the first program, "Krishi Darshan", sent the message out to farmers near Delhi by providing group viewing sets in the village, so that everyone could come to see it and discuss the messages.
In many ways, Dr. Sarabhai's vision was within the dominant paradigm, bringing modern concepts and techniques of agriculture and health to the rural poor. What was different were his attempts, and those of his colleagues, to indigenize the technology. Their work was part of the move to produce Indian technical and production capacity for direct satellite broadcasting to rural villagers (Sanjay, 1990). In the case study of Kheda, the project team's adherence to making indigenous hardware and software challenged some of the tenets of the dominant paradigm.

I also examine how these adaptations occurred within a national environment that promoted adherence to the dominant paradigm. The early public service experiments led to more conventional demands for television programming. The urban middle class had become familiar with the school and rural programmes from the capital city of Delhi. As they were not able to purchase television reception sets from Indian manufacturers, they began to import them from abroad. Their pressure for entertainment programming was one of the forces which led to regular daily transmission in Delhi by 1965 (Mody, 1988).

Another force at work was the need of the Indian nation state for sovereignty, not only over its international borders, but internally. After the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war,
while Indira Gandhi was in charge of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, she began to seriously consider expanding television. While still critical of the invasion of culture from abroad, she began to realize how television could be used as a propaganda machine to pacify her critics. Her championing of it was a prime factor in the conception and initial autonomy given the SITE experiment, an institutional arrangement that was unique in India.

Other governments of dependent states had much the same two-sided approach to communications. In international arena, they called for the end to foreign domination of their cultural industries, while within they used it to further their own national agendas. The introduction of satellite broadcasting in Canada exemplified this tendency.

**Canadian Satellites: Integrating Aboriginal People**

The first Canadian satellites were launched for much the same reasons as the Indian ones. They were intended to assist: Canadian businessmen to set up an indigenous telecommunications industry; government and resource industries to centralize their northern operations; and the military to secure national sovereignty (Valaskakis, 1986, Feaver, 1976). As well, the satellites would further integrate northern aboriginal people into the socio-economic
Other Inuit representatives and critics responded to the colonial expansion of communications in a number of ways. Some called for the provision of local programming: news, public affairs and shows of interest to northern Native
people. Others, especially the highly-politicized Inuit in northern Quebec, lobbied for other kinds of communication, such as radio and telephone, stressing inter-community communications links (Valaskakis, 1986).

With no opportunity for discussion of these options, the people of the northern Quebec communities and of Igloolik in the NWT, used the only option available to them. They refused to take television programmes from the satellite until Inuktitut language programming was provided in the early 1980's. With similar intent, Inuit Tapirisat leader Tagak Curley demanded Inuit-run production units and production centres (Feaver, 1976).

The Inuit media activists were supported in their critique by a group of social critics, some of whom had been working in community media in southern native communities and in urban centres. Extending the theory of Harold Innis, Gail Valaskakis cited the central role of modern mass media as a factor in "cultural replacement and the expansion of southern control" (Valaskakis, 1986:7). Liora Salter and others cited the satellites as an example of the trend of mass media to generate dependency of the margins upon the

---

2 The Quebec Inuit, together with the James Bay Cree, were immersed in Canada's first major land claims dispute, a battle with the governments of Quebec and Canada that centered on the hydroelectric power project in James Bay.
3 As Feaver, Finlay and other critics have suggested, this is often the only choice offered with modern communications, whether to turn on or off the system.
centre's demands, to shape problems in both economics and communications (Carey, 1981), and reduce "the significance of locality and the autonomy of regions" (Salter, 1981:197).

**Media as Mirror**

The native and community media advocates were continuing a Canadian tradition of using media to counter centralization by encouraging citizen-definition of and engagement in local political and social issues. Following in the footsteps of Farm Radio Forum, Citizen's Forum and Challenge for Change, these two groups of activists combined forces in the early 1970's to set up local media experiments in aboriginal communities, most of which were not hooked up to any regional or national networks.

One of these projects, the Kenomadiwin community radio station in northern Ontario, was the precursor to Wawatay. Its original goals were similar to those of the community media in Latin America. As Liora Salter notes (Salter, 1976) Kenomadiwin would programme in the local language, highlighting local problems and political issues and reinforcing indigenous cultural forms. This new aboriginal media was intended to counter the dominance of the Canadian state's non-native bureaucracy.
This approach, like that of the Latin Americans, emphasized decentralization, and a radical shift in notions of production and audience. A core of local people would produce a very informal style of programming, fed by the activity of the audience itself. The programming would provide a mirror for local people, as well as bring them news of other communities and centres where decisions affecting them were being made. This represented a resistance to the centre-pull of broadcasting, an example of the dialectic between local definitions of culture and the integrating forces of metropolitan directed technologies (Salter, 1981).

Reflection or Refraction?

As Salter analyzes in her account of Kenomadiwin, "Two Directions on a One-way Street", these original objectives were never realized. Their transformation of the media was limited: adapting an urban non-native medium meant that the young producers were pulled between the conflicting demands of northern communities and of native support groups and government in the south. These conflicting pressures on native media continue, as is noted in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

I specifically note the narrowing of alternatives within the state's regulatory and operational framework. Kenomadiwin
and other projects like it emphasized local self-sufficiency and control, but the government had quite a different agenda. Government agencies only provided funding on a short-term basis as their goals centered on creating labour mobility for an industrial work force (Salter, 1981).

By the mid 1970's, government support for native media projects was tied to experiments designed to test the satellite's potential for interactive broadcasting. Yet as we shall see, these decentralized uses were abandoned when the satellites were implemented, in favour of one-way, commercially-driven distribution systems. When the aboriginal broadcasting projects were institutionalized in the early 1980's, there were severe limits placed on native media groups' efforts to implement locally directed interactive media forms.

Chapter Five addresses how the alternative was shaped by the language of broadcasting. In her account of Kenomadiwin, Salter notes how the orientation of project members shifted as they learned to speak the languages of their supporters, the public and private funding agencies and the politically-oriented support groups (Salter, 1980). Contrary to the project members' original intentions, their establishment as go-betweens represented a break in the authority of their communities' elders and of local decision-making. James Carey, again invoking Innis, suggests that this phenomenon
of new classes and professions with authority over new structures of thought is cultivated by long distance communications (Carey, 1981).

In the Wawatay case study I return to explore the same phenomenon fifteen years later, although with some differences. This new generation of native broadcasters still devote much of their time speaking to public and private funders. The institutionalization of the earlier experiments has resulted in a change of dialects -- they are now speaking the language of broadcast journalism, rather than of radical politics. The study explores how the adoption of this new language and the rules that go along with it represents a move away from the indigenous systems of communication.

Summary

This chapter has provided some of the backdrop in discourse to our two case studies. During the decade when they began, there were major shifts in the two paradigms. The earlier hypodermic and magic bullet theories of effects are largely discredited and the two-way nature of communications with its interchange of sender-receiver roles is commonly assumed (Jacobson, 1989). While UNESCO and many governments no longer use the term, everyone from social policy critics to governmental and non-governmental organizations use the
rhetoric of the New World Information Order. There is a lot of talk of there being no universal path to development, but many paths, led by values that emphasize self-reliance, participation, and local needs-based approaches based on indigenous cultures.

Despite these claims made in discourse, there have been only moderate structural changes in the flow of communications between nations. There are more regional news services and exchanges of cultural commodities, such as television from Brazil and film from India. Yet, the central belief in modernization -- and its idea that the problems of underdevelopment can be solved by bringing in high-tech solutions-- continues in the policies of the World Bank, many UN agencies, transnational companies and governments in both the southern and northern hemispheres (Servaes, 1986, White, 1988, McAnany & Storey, 1989). The dominant paradigm has not passed, but is the same old emperor, in new clothes (Mansell, 1982, Samarajiva, 1988), his voice altered electronically, a la Laurie Anderson.

The changes to the rules have merely been a tinkering with the machinery, so that "different technological configurations could promote a redefined participatory development process" (Mansell, 1982:46). The tinkering does not deal with the structural constraints of assymetrical or dependent relations (Mansell, 1982, Samarajiva, 1988).
This lack of analysis of assymetry prevails in the new interactive horizontal model, as well. Communications is still seen as a "power-neutral, interactive process in which source and receiver share responsibility" (Samarajiva, 1988:22). On the national level, there is little critique of the impact of the integrative pull of communications. This issue of the balance between local and external networks, or self-determination versus integration, is key in the discussion of both case studies.

The significance of the debate of the New World Information Order has been largely symbolic, creating space in the discourse to allow many of the experiments at the margins to continue (White, 1988, Real, 1986). One of the best known critics of the monopolization of information, Herbert Schiller, optimistically speaks of the significance of the "new voices being added to the dialogue, locally, nationally and internationally" (Real, 1986:467).

The following two case studies explore the tensions within this space at the margins. The Kheda producers describe their work as the art of working on "the frontier of the permissible," constantly aware of the limits of their autonomy from local elites and from Doordarshan, the national television system. Wawatay, as well constantly vacillates between the demands of their own constituencies,
and those of their media supporters and government. This study assesses the strategies they used to broadcast within these boundaries.
CHAPTER 3

"WE ARE NOT AS FAR FROM DELHI AS WE WERE TEN YEARS AGO": A CASE STUDY OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

Introduction

For the first time people in the countryside were provided with a service that most of the urban folk had not had and had no chance of having for quite some time to come. Not only that, an entirely different pattern of programming evolved during the period of the experiment (Bhattia, et al, 1984:40).

The Development Education Communications Unit, (DECU) is often called the Kheda Project, after the Kheda district near Ahmedabad in Gujarat, where it operates. DECU was begun in the late 1970's, as an offshoot of the Indian Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, known as SITE. The history of the transfer of broadcast production via satellite to Kheda highlights many of the moments in the contest over the development communications discourse noted above.

In this case study, the transfer is situated within the institutional arrangements of the national television service, and more broadly within the growth of an urban-centred commercial system. I examine how DECU adopted, adapted or transformed these techniques and how this process promoted an adherence to rules of domination, especially among the audience and within program production.
The year-long SITE project in 1975 provided educational and development programming to 2400 widely scattered villages throughout six states of India. SITE was transmitted via the US-A6 satellite. One of its primary objectives was the indigenization of broadcast hardware, including the adaptation of portable production and robust reception equipment. In this chapter, I examine the transfer of software to Kheda, looking especially at the knowledge and practices of local development broadcasting.

The DECU project in Kheda is notable for involving a new kind of audience from the most oppressed of India’s peoples, the Dalits (former untouchables), and the women of the peasant classes. Kheda is also notable for creating a new relationship between this audience and the production team. Bella Mody, an evaluator of SITE describes this relation, where the audience is the source of their own programming, as "the receiver as sender" (Mody, 1986:147). The resulting programming differs in both form and content from the western broadcast tradition, and from the conventions in the studios of the Doordarshan national network.

Kheda tested another experimental concept: the use of the satellite for local programming hooked up to the national network, an idea which DECU manager Kiran Karnik dubbed "integrated decentralization" (Personal Interview, 1988). This potential use was what the staff of SITE and the other
satellite experimenters of this period, such as the Canadian Hermes, had been so keen to test:

A communications satellite makes it technically possible and financially feasible to program for a rural audience initially, without first passing through an urban programming stage. Thus the opportunity exists to base program judgments on rural needs and, ideally, to establish national television as a predominantly development-oriented medium, provided that an institutional commitment to rural needs exists.

A somewhat countervailing characteristic of satellite broadcasting, however, is that it may accentuate the bias already existing within most countries toward central program design and production (Block, Foote, and Mayo, 1979:119).

The ability of a satellite for multi-source and multi-directional patterning means that it can reach many remote rural communities, potentially reversing the one-way urban flow. It can send programs in several directions: locally, within the community which produced the programme; horizontally, between villagers in different villages to exchange experiences across the system; or up the line, reversing the usual vertical one-way flow, by sending programs from several rural areas to decision makers in regional or national capitals. However, the use of satellites, as Block, Foote and Mayo suggest, can also lead towards greater centralization.
In the late 1950's, when television first came to India, the primary goal of the Indian government was "relieving the burden of poverty inherited from the colonizer." (Mody, 1988:2). India was one of the poorest countries in the world, (and remains so) with approximately 40 percent of the population living below the poverty line. Within the government's public policy of socialism, television was considered a luxury of rich nations, primarily a medium of entertainment - a technology of no relevance to poorer countries, whose primary goals were to combat illiteracy, hunger and poverty (Sanjay, 1990, Bhatia et al, 1984). When it first arrived in 1958, it came as so many technology transfers have since the time of Troy, in the wrappings of magical novelty and gift.

In 1958, the Philips company brought some closed circuit television equipment to New Delhi for an industrial exhibition. The state broadcasting service, All India Radio, bought this equipment, and their engineers began to experiment with the medium. The same year, the United States Information Service (USIS) donated some production equipment to AIR which they used to set up a studio in Delhi and begin transmitting for one hour, twice a week. UNESCO gave them a further $20,000 to finance the production of
social education programmes, purchase 100 monitors to show the programs to teleclubs that they would organize, and evaluate the results (Bhatia, et al, 1984). The pilot project was to study television’s use as "a medium of education, rural uplift and community development" (Mody, 1988:3).

Two years later, the Ford Foundation donated money to hire American educational television consultants for advice on a small in-school experiment (Mody, 1988). From these early beginnings, there is a visible mix of interests -- the commercial interests of the manufacturer, the foreign policy interests of the American government, and the social education interests of UNESCO and the early Indian television experimenters. These different agendas continue to interact at every level of Indian television to this day.

Below is a brief sketch of the continuation of two of these sets of interests -- in policy and programming -- illustrating the political and economic environment in which the Kheda Project exists. It also serves to outline the different definitions of the problem the technology was intended to serve.
The policy environment: television as development

As noted above, the Indian government did not initiate the transfer of television and had no clearly defined communications policy at the time of the transfer. By the mid-1960's, at the time of the Indo-Pakistani war, this had changed. Indira Gandhi had become Minister of Information and Broadcasting and could see an important propaganda role for television. She continued to use the rhetoric of television as a tool for social and economic growth and national integration. As well, in spite of pressure from advertising agencies and advertisers, her government resisted the commercialization of television until the mid-1970's (Mody, 1988).

One other set of interests was represented by a group of physical and social scientists who began to work together during the UNESCO-funded programming. During the late 1960's they were led by Dr. Vikram Sarabhai, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission and founder of the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). Their original objective was to test whether advanced technology could be used for development, and particularly whether they could mold it to fit their situation.

We thought it could be very positive if properly used. Television had powers of attracting people and could overcome the literacy barrier, which is also an information
barrier, if we could take it to remote areas (Personal Interview, Kiran Karnik, 1988).

In a 1980 publication, they reinterpreted early government policy, suggesting that television be used as a:

medium of social education and that its development would be undertaken to make it an instrument to support the strategy and programmes of social and economic development (Bhatia, Jain, Karnik, Pal and Sehgal, 1984:39).

By 1973, this agenda was more sharply defined. The Seminar on Software Objectives, organized by All India Radio in New Delhi, publicly stated that:

Television must be utilized in the development process as an instrument of social change and national cohesion by unhesitatingly upholding progressive values and involving the community in a free dialogue. Indian Television has to shun the elitist approach and consumer value systems and evolve a true national model (Bhatia, et al, 1984:39).

This statement has been widely used by development communications researchers to promote the idea of building a national television system oriented to rural economic and social change. It was also quoted by the ISRO researchers as part of the rationale behind the SITE experiment of 1975, and further on in the Kheda Project. But by then, there was a competing vision, also based on the idea of national integration, but with such great strength that the Kheda managers began to describe their mission as "working at the frontier of the permissible" (Bhatia and Karnik, 1985:3).

In 1975, only two years after the Software Workshop, the Indian Government declared a National Emergency. Civil rights were suspended and all media were censored. The
government took over the broadcast news in Delhi. Without waiting for the evaluations of the SITE project, Mrs. Gandhi chose the satellite option over a terrestrial one.

She did not need the research data: she had experienced how the satellite had allowed her ruling party to get its point of view out instantaneously in pictures and words. She could speak simultaneously to every Indian citizen, including those who had never seen moving pictures in their lives before. Her need was so great for such a facility during the National Emergency when her political survival was in question that no convincing was needed. It was the right technology at the right time for the Indira-Congress (Mody, 1988:12).

As a result, the Cabinet sponsored the initiation of India's first generation of operational national satellites, INSAT, launched in 1982-1983.

Television enjoyed even more visibility in the government of Rajiv Gandhi, who came to power after the assassination of his mother in 1984, and stayed as Prime Minister until losing in the national elections in 1989. While publicly he remained committed to the Indian model of socialism, his policies shifted to a more centrist, private sector, market-oriented approach (Mody, 1988).

At the centre of his strategy of modernizing India with high-tech was a highly centralized television operations, as part of a larger telecommunications system. As a result, the Congress-I government refused all recommendations to relinquish control of broadcasting and turn it into autonomous broadcasting organizations (Rampal, 1984:12). In
the latest five year plan, communications surpassed the
budget allocations of the more traditional development
sectors of health and education, a budget priority
"unmatched in the developing world" (Fernandes, 1989:30).

Since 1980-81 the total expenditure of the national
television authority, Doordarshan, has increased almost
fifteen times. The television system has expanded:
into a gigantic network with over 240 stations including
relay centres spread over the entire country:...At the end of
1987 there were over 11 million TV sets in India. But, ...
over 90% of these sets are concentrated in urban areas. The
remaining 10% are owned by the rural upper class. This
evidence shows that the bulk of the rural population has not
benefited at all from massive investments in the television
network (Fernandes, 1989:31).

It has not only been the urban and rural upper classes that
have benefited from the Indian government's massive
involvement in television. Fernandes and other critics have
commented on the benefits for the indigenous electronic
component and equipment sector, as well as foreign
manufacturers. These investments are the result of two major
changes in government policy in trade and investment.

In the 1960's and 1970's, the government restricted many
imports of consumer technologies, such as television sets,
because of their drain on foreign exchange. During the Asian
Games of 1983, the import restrictions were relaxed. As
well, there was a relaxing of foreign investment regulations
in many industrial sectors to allow more corporate collaborations with transnational companies.

The demand for television came from urban and middle class consumers, whose population of one hundred million is larger than the Western European market. Another factor was the need of the national government to impress international visitors and viewers of the sports spectacle: they felt broadcasting in black and white would be an embarrassment to India. The government added twenty new urban transmitters that year, and began the conversion to colour. In the next three years, the rate of expansion of television was unprecedented. Coverage of the population went from approximately nineteen percent of the population in 1982, to seventy percent in 1985 (Mody, 1988).

This rapid expansion of the market came simultaneously with an explosion of advertising investment. From 1976, when commercials were first permitted, the commercial revenues from advertising have grown from US$640,000 to $80 million in 1986, with estimates of revenues ten times that amount in the year 2000 (Mody, 1988). This "pattern of early public service rhetoric, educational experimentation and then implementation on a large scale for elite pacification" (Mody, 1988:4) is familiar to many countries. In Canada "elite" need only be changed to "mass" to describe television's history.
In India, the television interests behind the scenes, of government, advertisers, industrialists and distributors, and the growing numbers of urban middle class viewers in front of the screens, made television the medium of the modern mainstream. From its beginnings as a social medium it had rapidly become the medium for entertainment and political purposes. Below I follow these parallel lines of interests - of the government and urban middle class - to Kheda and examine how they shape the broadcasting project. But first let's glance at the pictures emerging on the screens themselves.

The Programming environment: the proof is in the programming

Since 1959, the same narrowing of agendas has appeared in the programming mix. In addition to school and social education programmes, the agricultural programme for farmers, called 'Krishi Darshan' was started by physicist Dr. Vikram Sarabhai in 1967. Starting with a hundred community viewing sets in as many villages around Delhi, this experiment was expanded to villages in the neighbouring states of Haryana and Uttar Pradesh, gradually bringing in their state governments as partners (Bhatia et al, 1984).

The vision behind these programmes was to target programming for education and development to the rural poor through publicly financed and distributed television. With 70% of
India's population in rural districts that were not easily accessible by transport or terrestrial telecommunications, Sarabhai and his fellow physicist social reformers in the national space agency began to create plans for satellite broadcasting.

The configuration they envisaged was a:

rural education mechanism focusing on public service, non-profit areas such as agriculture, health, nutrition, science and math education for those who did not have enough to eat, and not a consumption-promotion tool for those with purchasing power to spare. Community television receivers for remote villages was a crucial part of their plan (Mody, 1988:11).

Yet, urban middle class people had already begun importing sets for their private use. By 1965, there was pressure on All India Radio to provide entertainment and information of interest for those who could afford sets. This meant a shrinking of hours of programming for groups of people who could not afford their own, who came together to view the educational programming in specially organized teleclubs (Bhatia, Jain, Karnik, Pal and Sehgal, 1984).

In the fall 1988 schedule, the social and educational programming was relegated to early evening and some weekend hours. Prime time was filled with entertainment shows: serials, epics and films made by the Bombay film industry and sponsored by advertisers. There was a great deal of news coverage of Rajiv Gandhi and his Congress-I Party,
signifying a major shift to the needs of the party and bureaucracy which had been reinforced by the move of Doordarshan Headquarters to New Delhi.

(The original space agency plan was based on community television sets for the underprivileged rural population, first. The Doordarshan plan gave priority to additional transmitters and stations for vocal urban publics...This was clearly a political decision to reach the vocal urban electorate as fast as possible --- with entertainment they wanted, and election propaganda the ruling party wanted them to have (Mody, 1988:12).

Both these pressures --the push to produce consumer-oriented entertainment programming in order to deliver the urban audiences to advertisers, and the centralized control of Doordarshan have affected the Kheda project, as is explored further below.

**Shifting SITE**

But perhaps I am getting ahead of the story and first need to jump back to the pivotal year of 1975, when Kheda was started as part of SITE. The Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) was launched by the Indian government on the U.S. ATS - 6 in August 1975. Aimed at 5,000 villages in six states, the experiment had several objectives. First, it was intended to stimulate national economic development by improving agricultural practices and encouraging the adoption of new farm technology, promoting
family planning, and increasing literacy, health and hygiene.
As well SITE would promote national integration.

At the same time, the project would advance technology adoption. It would allow the government the opportunity to test the satellite technology and particularly the capacity of Indian manufacturers, engineers and managers to design, install and maintain a national satellite-driven television system. The project had a bi-polar objective: to promote modern social and health practices in a program of national development by adopting the most modern communications technology.

SITE was an unusual project as it benefited many different groups with different agendas:

First, SITE provided the experience that was a prerequisite to mounting a national system - experience for the technical managers, the program producers, and the social scientists who will help to guide future programs. Second, it strengthened Indian confidence, because of the high technical standards that were achieved and the ability of the program's managers to succeed without undue reliance on foreign technical assistance.

Third, it provided a stimulus to India's electronics industry, stemming from the project's commitment to strengthen local capability and experience... Finally, it set India's national television service on an unprecedented course - that of producing a full program service specifically designed to serve its rural citizens (Block, Foote, and Mayo, 1979:116).

The evaluations of SITE have documented the successful transfer of hardware, some of which proved very useful for
the Kheda project, such as low-cost satellite receiver units, studio production equipment, and half-inch video portapacks for field work and television sets; all suited to the rugged requirements of rural Indian villages.

The success of the transfer was largely a result of SITE's unique organizational framework. At the national project level the management was flexible and responsive in a way that was unprecedented in most large government projects. The key participants were the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), the national television authority Doordarshan, the Indian National Council of Educational Research and Training and the National Aeronautics and Space Agency of the United States, which was responsible for the operation of the American satellite.

As we have already seen, the project had the direct support of Mrs. Gandhi, and the ISRO leadership reported directly to her. This meant that they could make and implement quick decisions without having to go through the usual administrative procedures, and that they also had a budget to carry them out.

The great deal of scientific credibility that Dr. Sarabhai and the other physicists of the Indian Space Research Organization had with the Prime Ministers of the period, Nehru, Shastri and Gandhi, helps to explain the unusual
management strategies that were implemented for SITE. With a heritage of a problem-solving research and development organization, "the goals of the individual projects were well-defined but the means used to achieve them were flexible, placing high priority on mid-course corrections" (Block et al, 1979).

At the program production level, the ISRO organizational structure was significant in two very important ways. The first was the involvement of social science researchers as part of the production team of producers, script-writers, and content experts. Earlier the "Krishi Darshan" programmes had involved content experts and used social science researchers for determining the impact and effectiveness of the program. Yet the ISRO researchers trace their own origins to the exposure of key people to American advertising techniques and specifically to the work of the Children’s TV Workshop or Sesame Street people (Bhatia et al, 1984).

At ISRO, the model was adapted and the researchers produced a great deal of formative research about the needs of the audience -- their customs, rituals, habits, attitudes, levels of knowledge -- as well as pretesting and later assessing the feedback of the audience to particular programs and script formats. They then brought back this information to the team where together they defined the
objectives and specific audiences for particular programs, decided program formats, presentation styles and scripts.

The second contribution of the 'software team' was the recognition of the importance of involving the rural population in programming decisions. During SITE, some of the researchers were enamoured with the technological possibilities of broadcasting to everyone from a single point, but they also had philosophical problems with this. They believed in a concept of "diversity and unity," in a country where there were many different languages, cultures, and religions. They were worried about possible misuses, such as acculturation of minority groups or the take-over of the technology by political dictatorship.

They also realized that it was not enough to produce programmes from three or four rural production centres, for these did not translate well across regions, languages and customs. The team would have to ensure that information was relevant locally by producing programming locally. "A centralized system cannot contribute to development unless you localize" (Personal Interview, Kiran Karnik, 1988). A decision was made to experiment with villager participation in one broadcast region -- and the Kheda Project was born.
The Transfer to Kheda

Below I demonstrate how the options for Kheda were narrowed by the institutional framework of a powerful national system as SITE's technology was transferred along the chain to the Kheda project (See Appendix 1: Key Dates for the Development Education Communications Unit). I examine three intersecting pieces of the technology transfer from SITE to the Development Education Communications Unit at Kheda:

* the transmitter or local distribution,
* the monitors or local receivers, and
* program production

within the cultural significance and organizational climate of television. I also sketch the next chain reaction in the establishment of development communication units within the national networks of Doordarshan and All-India Radio.

Until recently, Kheda TV was the only local television station in India. It began as an offshoot of SITE: a transmitter was set up August 1, 1975, in the village of Pij, in the Kheda District of Gujarat, about 50 kilometres south of Ahmedabad. The 1 KW transmitter was linked to the ISRO studio at Ahmedabad through microwave, and to INSAT-1 through a receive only terminal at Pij. While the signal reached Ahmedabad, the original focus was the inhabitants of 400 villages of the Kheda region.
Many of the farmers in the Kheda district do well financially growing tobacco. There are also large sections of people -- Dalits (former untouchables), landless labourers and small farmers -- who have little economic, social or political power (Berrigan, 1979). It was these groups who were the target of the Kheda project.

Approximately 550 community television sets were provided to villages in the region, and were set up in schools, panchayats (village councils), or farm co-operative buildings. The sets were switched on so that villagers could watch 30 minutes of programmes originating from Ahmedabad, produced by the Kheda Communications Project of the Indian Space Research Organization and 30 minutes of the national feed from Doordarshan, the national television organization.

Since the completion of the SITE project, there have been many changes in the organizational and communicational environment which have affected the Kheda Communications Project. In name, DECU, the Development Educational Communications Unit which is responsible for the Kheda Project, became independent of the Indian Space Research Organization in 1985. In practice, the unit lost a great deal of its former autonomy because it became subsumed under Doordarshan.
Planned Brinkmanship

During Kheda’s early years, the only production centre in Ahmedabad was the ISRO/DECU one and the project inherited much of its flexible research and development organizational culture. The team approach was modified as there were fewer people and resources in Ahmedabad, much more production pressure, and a lack of research staff to do formative research. Perhaps because of this there began to be a blurring of lines dividing functions. Producers alternated as content experts, script-writers or researchers; everyone had a high involvement in the process.

In the beginning, there was a high level of commitment from the project team members.

DECU wasn’t just a job but a commitment... We made challenging, bold programmes that sometimes questioned the state directly... The media personnel were recognized as catalysts for change, rather than mere programmers or researchers (Personal interview, Kalwachwala, 1988).

Although they were city-dwellers, the producers regularly visited the villages to involve people in the designing, producing and analysing of the programmes. Many of these productions were not broadcast. Sometimes they were shown only to the group involved or to another group as a basis for discussion. Sometimes videos of villagers' problems and complaints were shown to decision-makers as ‘evidence’, with the ensuing discussion then taped and taken back to the
villagers as a record of the event and the promises made 
(Berrigan, 1979).

The Kheda project had also inherited a lot of experimental 
thinking from SITE. Kheda was to test further the concept of 
"unity in diversity": a combination of locally-directed 
growth within national goals. Local development planning 
would follow local conditions of the earth -- such as soil, 
water and climate; and people -- such as language, culture 
and health. The diversity of this local programming combined 
with the integrative national programming from Doordarshan 
would lead to "integrated decentralization". They would test 
whether this plan was economically viable (Personal 
Interview, Karnik, 1988).

Thus, the focus was on the objective of local development 
and not on programme production per se:

The aim was to make the people feel that this is their own medium, that it reflects their joys, aspirations and 
problems and deals with issues of concern to them. The programmes are participatory, involving the audience to the maximum extent possible (Bhatia and Karnik, 1985:3).

The early programmes dealt with conventional development 
broadcasting subjects such as agriculture, animal husbandry, 
health, nutrition and family planning. But as Kheda grew, 
the production team began to realize that lack of 
information was not the only barrier to social change.
They started making programmes that explored the structural inequalities to economic and social change. Some of these advocacy programmes dealt with the exploitation of poorer peasants by landlords, employers' lack of compliance with minimum wage laws, and the special discrimination suffered by lower caste and tribal people, children and women. They also made shows encouraging local participation in economic alternatives such as co-operatives; and in local political elections.

Evaluations of these programmes by in-house social scientists have indicated that respondents in the villages with television are more aware of the minimum wage; more likely to support the poor uniting to get the minimum wage and more likely to support co-operative farming. "A study conducted after an intensive effort prior to parliamentary elections showed a significantly higher percentage of voting" (Bhatia and Karnik, 1985:11).

Focusing on the most oppressed as an audience led, from necessity, to some very innovative formats. In the beginning, the production team used traditional documentary techniques, including interviews and discussions, with local villagers, officials and government workers. Eventually, they had to reduce the use of this format.

Asking people to appear in programmes which contained criticism of the establishment and local power groups aroused anger and threats of violence towards the participants. It did nothing to help them achieve better
conditions but could make their circumstances worse (Berrigan, 1979:38).

Instead they invented the strategy of fictionalizing situations, calling the genre the 'false illusion.' A documentary of a real-life situation was made up to the point where it was unsafe to portray individuals or groups, because of a fear of reprisal from power elites. Then the situation would be fictionalized through drama, puppets, satirical skits or traditional folk forms (Berrigan, 1979).

The positive interaction between production team and audience has produced other creative genres, as well. In one instance, they brought a popular street theatre concept from Calcutta and adapted it for the Kheda villages. Most significantly, they have adapted local folk forms. For example, they have used one form, the 'bhavai,' where a story is told in song between two anchor characters, as an effective form of social satire.

Another strategy was used in programming for women. Starting in the early 1980's, they produced a number of programmes, dealing with sensitive topics such as schooling for girls and women, child marriage, discrimination against girls, wife-beating, divorce, economic self-reliance, dowry, and widow remarriage. The DECU team decided to try and minimize gender polarization by involving both women and men in the design and production of the serials: "the different women's
and men’s points of view were presented side by side so that everybody would sit through it and discuss it" (Personal interview, Kalwachwala, 1988).

Their concern to involve audience members, not only in productions, but in mobilization around these issues led to new concepts of characterization, from the didactic to the dialectical. In one example, an early series used the technique of a grandmother dispensing advice. The audience felt this was too simplistic so in the next serial they introduced a younger married couple who posed questions, rather than offering solutions.

In another example, a serial centered around a women’s group who got together to sing ‘bhanjans’ or religious songs. While many ‘mahila mandals’ or women’s groups are focused on this activity, the producers decided that the portrayal was limited to one religious group, as well as showing women in a passive role. Their next series included women singing ‘bhanjans’, but also participating in forming a workers’ co-operative.4

While producers were aware of the risks from the beginning, the constraints on this growing relationship between oppressed audience and privileged production team began to

---

4 The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) which is made up of several women’s producer co-operatives is based in Ahmedabad, and has worked with the Kheda Project.
show. They had always been aware of the possibility of backlash, describing their overall credo as working at the "frontier of the permissible," pushing the limits of the permissible through "planned brinkmanship" (Bhatia and Karnik, 1985:3).

From early on the production team had asked how far media practitioners could go around struggles and whether it was right to light a fire and not be there to fight it out?" They continued by bracing themselves with the belief that using the national media would give issues in Kheda more credibility with government officials and therefore more authority to the programming and to the local people who were fighting for changes. (Personal Interview, Kalwachwala, 1988).

The DECU team also felt that they had created some protective space at the state government level. While they have had a number of confrontations, the programmes have led to several changes in the bureaucracy. DECU management thought that this success was due to the vulnerability of state governments, three of which had been overturned in the decade. Perhaps Kheda was protected as well by the links the project has had with other governmental and non-governmental agencies.
Trying to keep the sets on

"Planned brinkmanship" has proven more difficult at the local and national levels, due to the changing political context of television in India. At the village level, when landlords or village leaders have felt threatened, they have just had the custodians turn off the community viewing sets. DECU has tried being "less frontal, using more indirect means and especially to increase the amount of entertainment" (Personal interview, Karnik, 1988).

This has not and perhaps cannot solve the more serious structural problems. During Kheda's first decade, television has taken off as a political and mass consumer medium. Many middle and upper class village families now own their own private sets. Increasingly, it is the disadvantaged who have no access to private sets, and who are thus pushing for the continuance of community viewing. DECU is trying to make sure they have access by setting up the community sets in poorer neighbourhoods, but now after fifteen years, many of the sets are getting past the stage of repair. Meanwhile, at the other end of the signal process -- the transmitter, their national link -- they are also losing support.
The Missing Link - Losing the Pij Transmitter

Kheda lost their transmitter for three years, from 1985 – 1988. Doordarshan decided that it was better used in Madras, a large urban market, and also a strong anti-Congress-I state, whose administration was subsequently taken over by the central government. After protest from the Kheda district, including hunger strikes, the transmitter was reinstalled in Pij. While the move was rescinded, it underscored DECU’s shrinking autonomy from Doordarshan, a lack of power that was beginning to affect their programming.

One ex-producer, Dinaz Kalwachwala, felt that moving the transmitter weakened the resolve of the producers because the main audience for the programmes became Ahmedabad, and this shift in focus from rural villagers to middle class urbanites turned some heads.

It works on the mind. Producers now get recognition from establishment quarters. The awards and the recognition draw you in (Personal interview, Kalwachwala, 1988).

Karnik agreed that the transmitter move had an impact on the producers, suggesting there was now a subtle pressure on them to produce other kinds of programmes for the urban audience. The national Doordarshan service was becoming popular among the increasing numbers of viewers, and among opinion and decision-makers, due to the rise of television
in the national political milieu. This increased visibility meant more pressure on local managements of both Doordarshan and DECU. For the production team, it meant the beginnings of disputes between them and their own management.

This was evident in the treatment of "Bhadke Bale Che Sindagai" or "Life Is On Fire", a programme that was initiated after a group of neighbours approached a producer about an incident of wife-burning. Frank interviews were recorded with these neighbours, police officials, the doctor who gave first-aid, other witnesses, and local women's groups. As a result, the husband tried unsuccessfully to stop the broadcast of the program by filing a defamation case.

In the beginning, DECU stood firmly in support of the broadcast. But, as the legal case wore on over two to three years, DECU made a compromise and stopped the broadcast of the fourth episode. Kalwachwala felt that the transmitter move and shift in audience affected the decision.

DECU is not very different than Doordarshan, it is part of the establishment, part of the same process of co-optation (Personal interview; Kalwachwala, 1988).

In DECU literature, "Life is on Fire" is listed as one of its accomplishments. In 1988, Kiran Karnik placed the program in a grey area, between the exposing of institutions
and the defaming of individuals. Nevertheless, he agrees that DECU has lost autonomy of its operations to Doordarshan.

We are walking a tightrope and working within the constraints of being part of the government. It affects how we can interact with the government.

We are not the national broadcaster. Doordarshan has the final veto... We have to be more careful. There has been a slight change in the perception of programmes, from rural to more urban audiences. We are still doing programming to encourage people to fight for their rights. It's better than ten years ago, but we have a fine line as a medium. We are in a climate where all around, in Pakistan, Bangladesh, there is military dictatorship...

Ten years ago, we had one negative letter a month. Now we get a flood saying the program is trying to foment revolution and if we are not to be shut off, we need to be more cautious....

Ten years ago we were not involved, we kept out of Doordarshan, but as viewership increased, we are not as far from Delhi as we were ten years ago. In Kheda, anything was popular. The problem is we have to compete with the national network (Personal interview, Kiran Karnik, 1988.)

Institutionalizing Development Communications

In 1989, the Rajiv Gandhi government lost the national election, and it is unclear as of this writing whether the new government will loosen its ties on Doordarshan, and on Kheda. In this section, the legacy of Kheda is explored in the next transfer down the line: the institution of locally-oriented broadcast services within the national networks of Doordarshan and All-India Radio.
In looking at these new projects the discussion for our second case study is set up. For two of the Development Communications Units (DCU’s) -- a radio centre in Kota, Rajasthan and a television centre in Nagpur, Maharashtra -- were set up with the assistance of the Ryerson International Development Centre, a non-governmental organization in Toronto, Canada, and share some heritage with Canadian aboriginal media, such as Wawatay Native Communications.

While Kheda inherited the experimental mind-set and organizational autonomy of SITE, these centres are run from the central headquarters of the two national networks. All staff are employees of their respective networks, and staff selection is subject to the decision-making of these large national bureaucracies. As a result, the staff vary widely in their expertise and commitment.

Nevertheless, the team composition that evolved at Kheda has influenced the new DCU’s. In Nagpur, three local social science researchers were hired to work closely with the production team and to liaise with government and non-government agency workers in the area (Personal Interview, 1988). The difference between this DCU and the DECU in Kheda is that this group of workers were grafted onto a very conventional broadcast team. It is still too soon to judge

5 Producers in Kota felt that they had been sent to this smaller centre as punishment (Personal Interview, 1988).
whether this group of young female researchers will be able to effect many changes among the crew of older males, schooled in conventional production hierarchies and formats.

More critically, the new DCU's do not operate with the same credo of "permissible brinkmanship" noted at Kheda, where programming is designed to involve groups of oppressed villagers articulating their opposition to the landlords and other power hierarchies. In Nagpur, the script concepts of the first six programmes were generated by government development officers and consisted of messages to educate the "ignorant" villagers about water and sanitation problems (Nagpur DCU Research Report, 1988).

In the Kota Radio DCU, the producers' definition of their role parallels the Kheda credo, but actually derives from a different tradition. While a Kheda staff person was involved in the original research planning for the centre, a more significant influence was the Canadian aboriginal broadcaster Brian Maracle, hired by Ryerson (RIDC) in the fall of 1987 to orient the Kota production unit and several others from around the country.

Maracle adapted his notion of "investigative journalism" to the Kota setting. He encouraged the producers to visit the villages or urban bastees (slums) and to do their own research with the people there, then to produce a story of
active resolution to conflict. This approach clashed with the organizational heritage of the All-India Radio producers, who were producing studio programmes, under a strict division of labour, where they did not do any manual work.

Although the Kota producers initially resisted this training, they eventually became more enthusiastic. In their first year on the air, they produced two controversial series, one documenting their investigation and follow-up into the corruption of local officials at a hospital, the other documenting their investigation and follow-up into housing for lepers. (As all three producers are familiar with the local dialects, drama and music forms, they incorporate these in their programmes).

While still too soon to make a full assessment, the new Development Communications Units represent a narrowing of the Kheda alternative in its institutionalization within the national networks. Key decisions are not made locally, but from the network centres in Delhi and Bombay. At the level of production team, the experimental heritage of the Kheda project has been grafted onto the conventional hierarchical television team, with less room for change.

At Kota, a simpler division of labour has evolved within the radio production team, partly because of the greater
flexibility of the medium, partly because of the influence of an outside trainer. However, at the level of producer-audience relation, in both centres production is still producer-centred, rather than the arc being "the receiver as sender" (Mody, 1986). Wawatay operates with the same model as is noted in the next chapter.

**Dissolving from Kheda: Lessons for Wawatay**

The DECU experiment has provided some significant lessons for our review of community broadcasting via satellite. In this section, I review: national integration versus local autonomy; the role of professional broadcasters and the audience.

Kheda's credo of involving the most oppressed was a radical departure from many similar projects in India, and from conventional television. Kheda demonstrated how people without social, economic and political power could nevertheless have some involvement in designing, producing and evaluating television programmes. Feedback from the audience at all these stages led to creating new kinds of programming using indigenous folk forms, an approach that Kiran Karnik thought was one of the most significant.

---

6 Many critics have commented on radio's potential for decentralization and local use (Berrigan, 1979, Hancock, 1980, Mowlana, 1988).
original contributions of the project to Indian television (Berrigan, 1979).

In the process of creating a more participatory relationship with the audience, DECU invented some unique strategies. Both the 'false illusion', and the inclusion of male points of view on subjects where women could be vulnerable, were attempts to protect vulnerable groups. Within the dramas they moved from one-dimensional characters who simply gave advice to ones with greater depth whose role was to portray the complexity of questions. They also moved from representing women as passive characters to agents active in their own social and economic milieu.

Not only is the audience the source of their programming, but the team production approach is also significant in another way. The audience has worked for the first time with a team of producers, writers and researchers, and with workers from other governmental and non-governmental agencies and bureaucracies. The production team, made up of city-trained middle class people went to the village for 40% of their programming. This period to gather feedback has been reduced since the transmitter move, nevertheless represents a significant break from the usual process of television production.
While Kheda's lessons -- of audience and production -- can not be transferred directly to Wawatay's very different environment, the parallels with the new DCU's are striking. As we shall see in Chapter Five, one change agent, Brian Maracle has worked in both environments, and I review the impact of similar notions of journalism at Wawatay. As well, there are similarities between the national environments surrounding all of these projects, as sketched below.

In the late 1970's, when Kheda was first beginning, the Indian communications environment was very different. DECU was the only local television station in India and the only station in Ahmedabad. Nationally, India had a small public television service. As a result, the Kheda producers had a great deal of political space protecting them.

At that time, researchers such as Berrigan and Hancock remarked on Kheda's political insecurity, especially among local elites and the traditional socio-political structures. But they also felt that the project had found some strategies to work within and stretch the political space available. Rather than confrontation, Kheda had invented the concept of "planned brinkmanship."

working on the problems that exist, taking them as far as they can be taken, then switching to another mode when they strike a particularly dangerous or sensitive area... They have tried to sharpen political awareness, and to make people aware of their rights through information; they have tried to work with 'good practice' by showing just treatment of the underprivileged and to work on the conscience of
others through example. They have tried to create some dialogue between those who rule through the bureaucracies and those who are affected by this rule (Berrigan, 1979:38).

Since then, the political space has been shrunk by three kinds of integration: the political censorship of a cautious government-responsive media authority; the economic pressure from a growing commercial medium; and the social pressure from the demands for entertainment and information relevant to the needs of a growing urban middle class.

While these pressures came to the fore very quickly during the last decade, they were not entirely unexpected. The lack of foresight in Berrigan's analysis stems from a problem already noted in the same period in the dominant paradigm. Berrigan, as did Rogers in 1976, tends to situate media innovations too narrowly, not addressing the wider contexts of institutional bias or the pressures of class conflicts within the state (O'Connor, 1988).

In a more recent analysis of community radio in Latin America, Alan O'Connor suggests that Berrigan also left out the role of social and political movements in the analysis of strategies. It is the strong involvement of these groups that allows community radio to survive as a dynamic force, resisting the pressures of other dominant media messages and of local elites; and creating new forms of production (O'Connor, 1989; Balke, 1986).
In the following case study, I look at the political space around the transfer of local broadcasting via satellite to Wawatay Native Communications. Wawatay's case is significantly different than Kheda in that members of the oppressed group - aboriginal people - are the principal producers of their own programming. Nevertheless Wawatay has also had to deal with crises in the crucial relationship with their social and political constituency: the Cree and Ojibway of Nishnawbe-Aski. The resolution of these crises have, coincidentally, involved the same tactic of protest as in Kheda, as shown below in the story of a hunger strike.
CHAPTER FOUR
HOW DOES IT SLIP FROM DISH TO LIP:
THE TRANSFER OF BROADCASTING TO NISHNAWBE ASKI NATION

Introduction
Survival through communications ... blending technology and tradition. (Slogan line on the cover of the Wawatay News.)

The following two chapters examine another transfer of local broadcasting via satellite, to the Wawatay Native Communications Society, in northern Ontario, Canada. The same fundamental question is posed: whether the transfer reproduces or hinders rules of domination; addressing especially the concepts of : centralization, journalism, and audience.

In Chapter 4, I review the background to the transfer, beginning with a survey of earlier colonial transfers: the establishment of regional boundaries, and colonial and neocolonial patterns of communications. Chapter 5 will concentrate on one recent period of Wawatay’s history: the training programme that led to television broadcasting.

The Creation of Regional Boundaries

Wawatay, meaning "northern lights" in Ojibway, is the communications society of the nation known as Nishnawbe
Aski. It serves the territory of 20,000 Woodlands or Algonkian peoples: the Cree-speakers on western James Bay, and the Ojibway in the woodlands south to the CN Rail track on the south, with Quebec on the east, and Manitoba on the west (See Appendix 4: Map of Wawatay Native Communications).

This region of the Nishnawbe (Nishnawbe is the Ojibway word for the people) is full of forests and lakes, rich in the natural resources of fish, animals, trees, water and minerals. While most now live in log or prefabricated houses in small settlements of 100 - 1500, the economy of hunting, fishing and trapping was land-based.

Because land was so important as a source of livelihood and common survival, the Indian people related to it as "Mother Earth": a source of nourishment for their physical, economic and social needs, and more importantly for their spiritual and cultural sustenance...An unwritten ethic of co-operation and sharing was strictly followed. Everyone took part in the traditional economy, and had a role to play. Leadership by consensus was in tune with the natural environment (Sainnawap, 1987:4).

Indian history is recorded in legends and rites, in a complex system of knowledge passed down from generation to generation.

7 "The late Mason Koostachin first suggested the name Wawatay - northern lights ... He might have been thinking of the waves of electric energy a sprawling network of radio stations would bring to the north" (Wawatay, 1989).
Prior to 1600, we had spiritual, social and economic independence -- we had people to train our people in all aspects. We had a tough justice system, a system bordering on truth; justice and truth. That is why the elders have been so strong on defending our rights for our land... If you don't know history, you can't stand firm (Archie Cheechoo, Wawatay Press Workshop, 1988).

The present regional borders did not arise from this heritage. They have no linguistic or cultural justification, but were maps drawn by European economic and political agendas:

I don't know when the year was, 1700 or something. That's when history began for those people, when they first came here. But for us, the Native people, history is longer (Jerry Sawanas, Wawatay Press Workshop, 1988).

The fur traders were the first Europeans to map the territory -- marking the rivers for their trade routes. They were also the first European change agents, introducing technologies such as the gun and the boat rudder. (The word for European, in Ojibway, derives from rudder.)

The adoption of the fur trade by the aboriginal people led to changes in their economic and social structures. While the history is in some dispute, (Driben and Trudeau, 1983) it is clear that the demographics of the territory went through major changes during the fur trade; some scholars think that the Cree had moved west into the area as intermediaries for the trading companies, while the Ojibway had moved north from the shores of Lake Superior. In any case, both groups had made major adaptations to their.
hunting, fishing and gathering economies to the new territorial configuration: fixing their networks of trap lines and water trading routes more closely to the fur factories on James Bay.

They had also adjusted their social organization: for example, the larger Ojibway clans were replaced by trapping units of about twenty people who were members of the same extended patrilineal family. By the beginning of the twentieth century, trapping units had become even less formal, and the clans had lost most of their original significance (Driben and Trudeau, 1983).

Nevertheless they retained some of their own legal, educational and social systems, as well as managing the land-tenure system where they hunted, fished and trapped (Tanner, 1983). During the time their economy was linked to the fur trade, they maintained some geographical autonomy, as well. Most of the year they spent in nomadic hunting camps, away from the control of the colonial government, or of the fur companies, until well into the twentieth century.

The second set of change agents were those of the Christian Churches, the Roman Catholics settling in Cree territory and the Anglicans on Ojibway lands. While the fur traders had marked the external boundaries, the Church introduced more internal changes, to the system of knowledge and the ways in
which this was passed on. Yet, while Innis would suggest that the traders came from a space-binding culture and the priests from a time-binding one, Native people who are recollecting the whole of their colonial history do not make that separation.

There was a time when we could tell our youth our history. But then, when the white man's laws were introduced, there's been distrust. They came here with the bible. Now we have the bible and they got the land. (Archie Cheecheo, Wawatay Press Workshop, 1988).

The Cree's memory of the role of the Catholic Church in the colonial expansion of space is still very much alive. At a workshop in 1986, Louis Bird from Winisk told the story passed down to him about the second mapping of the region's boundaries: when the James Bay or Treaty Number 9 was signed with the federal and provincial governments in 1905. The priests told the Cree chiefs that the white negotiators represented God: it was part of Christianity to sign and accept God's word.

The coercion was more secular over in Ojibway territory. Frank Beardy has been involved in the Nishnawbe Aski Nation organization and Wawatay since the mid-seventies. In the same 1986 Wawatay workshop, he told the story passed down to him by his grandfather, Samson Beardy. Not until 1929 did the inlanders sign, after their nets and hunting equipment
had been confiscated resulting in people starving. The chiefs who gathered in Big Trout Lake were given four hours to make up their minds.

The chiefs took the only option they felt was available within the constraints of the binary option, yes or no. As Frank Beardy recounted, they understood they were signing a friendship treaty to share their land and resources in exchange for the benefits of education, health and welfare. It did not signify the giving up of their sovereignty over land or resources, or their status as distinct peoples.

For the federal government, the signing of the treaty by the Cree, and the later adhesion by the Ojibway, signified the extension of their centralized authority. Their acceptance of the responsibility for all treaty Indians' health, education and social welfare was not based on values of sharing. Instead, it was an exchange for control of the territory: insurance that the people of the territory would not prevent further resource exploitation, by companies wanting to follow the westward expansion of the fur trade.

*Treaty Nine and Colonial Relations*
This transfer to national authority, with its formalization of the dependency of Native people on the dominant society, has shaped many of the other transfers on down the line. Its first impact was on the restriction of hunting, fishing and trapping within the areas administered by the government, a restriction that continues to be fought in the courts. The second impact was through the institution of schooling and health services.

Although the federal government had promised schools, educational materials, teachers, and health services as part of their Treaty 9 obligations, there were very few local schools or clinics until the 1950's and 1960's when several bands began to lobby for more. Until then, while the government provided some funding, they delegated their responsibility for administering these services to the Anglican and Catholic churches.

While there were exceptions, the basic pattern of services established by the churches was a colonial one of metropolitan-hinterland relations. Most of the decisions were made by southern headquarters and then implemented without regard to the needs or wants of the local people.
The paradigm guiding their paternalism was similar to that of the dominant paradigm operating in the "third world": the indigenous people needed to be saved from their "primitive" life styles and beliefs by indoctrinating them with modern messages.

The new wrinkle in the strategy was to acculturate the children by educating them in the language and values of Europeans, far away from the influence of their traditional way of life. (The practice of the Oblates in Fort Albany was an exception to this rule. They used Cree extensively in their churches and schools, with French used to a lesser degree, and English seldom used.) In the next section, I examine the effect of these relations on Indian communications.

When the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC) took over the role, they maintained the same pattern of relations: the distinctive status set up was "a more restrictive legal status and centralized administrative system than the rest of the population" (Tanner, 1983:2). The administration was directed by INAC in Ottawa through local Indian agents. By any measure, the provision of schooling, health care, and waged jobs has been a monumnetal failure: aboriginal people, including those of NAN continue to have by far the lowest rates of schooling, health care and employment in the country (Driben and Trudeau, 1983).
Earlier, I discussed the formation of a national Native movement in response to the policies of assimilation regenerated by the federal White paper of 1968. In some parts of the country, this struggle has been framed by claims over land. In Nishnawbe Aski nation, the debate has been over the control of the administration of social, educational, health and economic matters, as well as land tenure. Some of the same issues of sovereignty are at stake as during the signing of the treaties.

In the mid-1970’s, a key resource issue catalyzed the organization of chiefs and of Wawatay. The Reed Paper Company had proposed, with the support of the Ontario government, to extract timber from a huge section of old-growth forest in the western part of the region. The fight of the Grand Council of Chiefs of Treaty Nine against the proposal led to other changes. In 1976, a multi-million dollar provincial inquiry into the exploitation of natural resources was held, the Royal Commission on the Northern Environment, at which Native journalists from the Wawatay News got their first sense of the power of their press.8

8 Liora Salter has noted that many of the community media experiments in Canada were introduced in the same regions where the federal government was promoting the exploitation of natural resources. I am not sure whether Wawatay’s beginning fits this mould.
The enquiry also led to the establishment of a more vocal political organization, the Nishnawbe Aski Nation, whose first declaration told the federal and provincial governments that they were a sovereign people with the right to self-government. Down the line, this institutionalization of the contest over sovereignty framed the growth of regional communications and the subsidiary definitions of local and regional, of professional journalists, and of audience.

**Earlier Patterns of Communications and Knowledge**

Communications between the communities and with the rest of Canada has until very recently been limited. Transportation is still only possible year-round to most communities by plane, with boats used in the summer and snowmobiles and caterpillar-tracked snow roads in the winter. During winter freeze and spring break-up, many communities are still cut off, yet some very important patterns of communication have grown up within this isolation.

During the period of the fur trade, there was regular travel between some communities. There was also a tendency, when one community grew too large to support its population, to send out people to start up satellite communities. These original reserve-satellite reserve connections form the base of the six sub-regional Tribal Councils. These community
connections and rivalries continue to this day, playing a role in the regional systems of government and communications.

There was also a complex net of communications within each settlement. The social structure included a division of labour that recognized leaders in hunting, education and decision-making. This hereditary leadership vested in the chiefs was changed in this century by agents of the Department of Indian Affairs into a system of elected chiefs and councils. The tension between this new class of leaders and the new journalists will be discussed in Chapter Five.

Communication on the level of education also had a very particular form. It followed the pattern of many other oral and/or aboriginal cultures. The elders tended to pass on their learning by allowing the younger ones to observe them practicing their life skills, while at the same time passing down the knowledge in stories which explained the unity of the natural and supernatural worlds.

This system of communications and education was altered by the introduction of Christianity by Anglican and Roman Catholic churches. While neither church discouraged the use of Native languages, they introduced the new authority system of the Bible, through the medium of print. This introduction represented a shift from the time-biased
culture of oral tradition to the space-biased culture of written tradition (Valaskakis, 1981). Methodist minister James Evans, is usually credited with introducing the phonetic writing system called syllabics, the same system introduced to the Inuit. Although, the transfer of literacy was not complete as there have been few secular texts created, many older people today still use syllabics to write letters and other inter-personal and inter-community correspondence.

The aboriginal education system based on face-to-face shared knowledge and group participation was disrupted further when the children were sent out to residential schools. As noted above, the residential schools represented a new wrinkle in the assimilation strategy, through the separation of the children from their traditional ways and languages. Below I examine the impact of this privileging of English literacy down the line in the transfer of broadcasting.

There has been a great deal of publicity given recently to the very harsh manner in which this separation was carried out and particularly the physical and sexual abuse that resulted (Haig-Brown, 1989). The impact on the trainee producers at Wawatay was underlined in the first drama they produced:
Charles sits in front of the classroom under the watchful eye of the teacher. Each time he would turn to look at the other students, the teacher yells at him to turn around. He noticed that the students who spoke to each other in Indian got punished. First they would be sent to the reverend where judgement was passed then the super would administer the punishment. Charles saw students being sent to the dorms without getting supper, they washed the floors, stood in the corners on their knees for hours. He kept overhearing students told not to speak Indian, not to speak Indian and that this was against the rules of God (Boyce, 1986).

One result of that experience, common to other aboriginal people, is that the residential schools became the meeting places for young people across the region, and across the country. As they learned the language and rules of the dominant society, they became the contact agents for that society. Some from that experience have gone on to become the new leaders in Nishnawbe Aski Nation, and as described below, the new sub-grouping of journalists and producers.

Eventually local schools were established in the 1960’s as the result of two different interests. The first was that of the parents who wanted to reunite their families. The second was INAC’s interest in ensuring that all Native children were schooled in the "modern educational system" (Driben and Trudeau, 1983:26). Moving to permanent villages also reduced the number who were willing to trap, away from their families, and forced many to rely on government assistance. This transfer also led to many others, as Driben and Trudeau describe in their account of Fort Hope, an Ojibway community in the south-east:
As the villages grew around the schools, the band's political system also began to change. People who were used to living in small groups were now faced with the problems involved in managing three new communities. One result was that the chief and council began to play a much more active role in administering band affairs. In addition, soon after the villages were formed, regularly scheduled air service was inaugurated, and this brought the band into closer contact with the outside world. Federal and provincial officials began to visit more frequently, and within a short period of time band members were dealing with an ever-increasing number of professional bureaucrats and government programs (Driben and Trudeau, 1983:26).

The 1950's strategy of demanding local schooling has led to struggles over local control of that schooling in the 1970's and 1980's. There are now many band-controlled schools in the territory and a Native education authority, the Northern Native Education Commission, which directs students who go out of their communities for further schooling. Yet, most of the trainee producers were in school in the earlier period: their resistance to some aspects of the Wawatay training programme mirrored the contemporary resistance of northern children and parents.

As discussed above, many of the church-controlled residential schools discouraged all uses of Native languages. Despite this, many of the Wawatay employees over twenty five still speak their own language, although they can not read or write syllabics. They fear that their

---

9 While the languages are in danger, Cree and Ojibway are two of only three aboriginal languages in Canada that the Federal Department of Secretary of State expects to survive
children are in danger of losing their language entirely, due to schooling in English and the proliferation of English-language television. This problem of English being privileged over Cree and Ojibway emerges again in the discussion of the training programme in Chapter 5.

Modern Mass Communications: The Birth of Wawatay

Modern mass communications came very recently to the people of Nishnawbe-Aski Nation. In the early 1970's, there were few telephones, fewer radios and no televisions. In a brief to the federal Ministry of Communications in 1973, a fledgling new group, Wa-Wa-Ta, noted that:

Until recently there has been almost no way for chiefs and community leaders to discuss matters of importance - except over the Bell Radio Telephone system which is done through an operator in Kenora - and which does not serve many communities, and which is not very reliable...

The Department of Health and Welfare operate a radio system for medical reasons - but which is only available to the community in times of emergency. Quite a few of the airlines have radio telephones in different communities but because they use lots of different frequencies, it is not possible for people to use their radios for good communication - even if the air charter companies would let them. Some churches have radios too, but these are not available to most people. Hudson Bay Stores also operate radios but again they won't let the people use them.

The chiefs therefore said to government that it was important that all communities should be linked by a radio system which was controlled by Indian people in the communities...(Hudson, 1974:234).

until the next century. (Lougheed, 1986:4). The other language is Inuktitut.
What the Chiefs got was a baby born in the test tube, whose parents combined European and Native heritage. One parent was the Chiefs' organization. As discussed above, many aboriginal people had been organizing against what they saw as the policy of assimilation in the White Paper of 1968. This organizing took a regional form in the Treaty Nine area, as the Grand Council of Chiefs built a power base in both Cree and Oji-Cree communities, defining their opposition to provincial and federal governments in terms of aboriginal sovereignty.

Wawatay was established by them in late 1973 (See Appendix 2: Key dates for Wawatay Native Communications) to complement their new political organization, whose acronym N.A.N. stood for the Nishnawbe-Aski Nation. Their first project was to link sixteen communities with HF trail radio, facilitating the exchange of information about regional events, Native economic and political matters and government affairs (Stiles, 1986). This experiment called The Northern Pilot Project was funded by the Department of Communications.

In Chapter 2, I discussed the heritage of Wawatay's other parent: the Canadian government. This parent's interests for the child were very different than the chiefs, although its articulation of these interests has not always been clearly stated. Instead government policy has been created on an ad
hoc basis, to meet the varying demands of more powerful family members, the resource and aerospace industries, as well as its own military and cultural interests of northern sovereignty. This parallels the state of national communications policy in most countries (Servaes, 1988).

The third parent, or perhaps more aptly, the midwife of this project was a group of social experimenters much the same as those running the Development Education Communications Unity in Kheda. Their interest in the baby was to test the capacity of the satellite for interactive and local broadcasting that would promote the educational and developmental needs of the indigenous people (Valaskakis, 1983, Stiles, 1986). One key difference between those at Kheda and those in northern Ontario, was that the new child would from the beginning be pushed out onto its own two feet. While the social scientists would guide the experiment, they had shifted from the earlier paradigm of creating the messages themselves.

Wawatay became autonomous from NAN in 1976, setting up their own Board of Directors from communities across the region. The ties still remain as we shall see in the next chapter. They are partly reinforced by the movement of staff between Wawatay and NAN; as a small group of young, almost exclusively male leaders shuffle jobs from among the small number of native-led organizations.
By the early 1980's, Wawatay had expanded from a volunteer association to an extensive regional communications network. Their services ranged from the local HF and community radio services, to the regional monthly trilingual newspaper (Oji-Cree, English and Cree), to the telephone translation service to assist unilingual Cree and Oji-cree speakers to deal with government and private authorities in the south.

While Wawatay was expanding its services, so were the other more conventional networks and utilities. Bell had installed telephones in many of the larger communities. The increased satellite capacity meant that some communities could also receive CBC radio and television, as well as a growing number of other channels and American super channels. In less than a decade, some of the larger settlements had become completely wired to southern urban information and entertainment services, while the smaller ones are only now becoming wired, as I discuss below.

Wawatay attempted to resist the centralizing pull, adapting the configuration of these technologies for its own needs. Their most successful work of this nature was with radio (realizing, as noted in the example of the Kota DCU and as many critics have noted, that it offers greater flexibility). From the beginning, the Board made a priority of the HF trail radios which were essential for the survival
of trappers and hunters in the bush, "as well as being an electronic meeting-hall for people joined by family ties but living in separate communities" (Wawatay, 1989).

Wawatay provided the network infrastructure free and the individual sets at a nominal cost and maintenance. They continue to maintain this system, although this service has been threatened by the recent government budget cuts, which I will discuss in the conclusion.

**Community Radio**

Wawatay also supported community radio. The first community radio in the region was set up in 1973 in Big Trout Lake as a non-profit station supported with funds from the federal government.

The idea was to give the people local information such as weather, community announcements and reports from their leaders, as well as giving the elders an opportunity to pass on traditional ways and values to a wider audience...There are now over thirty community-run stations across the region (Wawatay, 1989).

The majority of the community-run stations use low-power transmitters and equipment installed and maintained by Wawatay (Wawatay, 1989). Until the federal budget cuts of 1990, Wawatay was able to fund this service with contributions from two programmes of the federal Department of the Secretary of State.
During the mid-seventies, the national public service, the CBC, helped install four community stations as part of their expansion to small communities in the north. Under this programme called the Frontier Coverage Plan, the CBC allowed community access to their local transmitters, and provided studio facilities and equipment maintenance. In return, the local stations were expected to broadcast the national network programmes, doing their own local programming in the off-hours, although many ignored this requirement. The transfer of the technology was primarily technical: there was no training for community radio personnel and no funds were available for paid staff beyond a station manager. This left the stations to reflect the kinds of communication already in the community.

Native community radio stations, in NAN and throughout Canada, continue to operate much differently than do other radio stations in Canada. Most of the stations are open for the use of anyone and everyone in the community. While there is some formal programming by volunteers, it tends to consist of musical request programmes, community message boards, talk shows and radio bingos. There are very few news programmes, structured by journalists or programme staff. Instead, the news and information about current issues gets on the air in a much more informal process. For example, the Chief and Council, will just show up and make speeches or reports, as will other community services. Other individuals
reports, as will other community services. Other individuals or families will phone or bring in messages about lost children, goods for sale, or to organize search parties for missing hunters.

A more conventional use of radio was begun in 1978, when Wawatay joined the experiment of the Department of Communications on the Canadian Technology Satellite (CTS) "Hermes." For three months, four stations were hooked up, allowing them to broadcast daily half-hour newscasts in their own languages between the communities. Listeners nicknamed the network, "Iron Star Radio". This trial of inter-community links and more formal news programmes was the precursor to the regional network discussed below.

**The Pull South**

Wawatay, which had instituted HF trail radio and community radio for local purposes, began to find itself hooked up to a communications system with a much different configuration. The service that had begun as a demand for communication within and between communities, to counteract the dominance of the southern state, coalesced into a regional communications society, with a strong southern bias.
This southern orientation is part of the conventional pull to metropolitan centres that the Innis theorists cited. First nations groups demanding sovereignty, including economic and political autonomy, from the central government have tended to orient themselves to the centre’s seats of government and industry. In Wawatay and NAN’s case, this meant south and east to Toronto and Ottawa; in Kheda’s, north to Ahmedabad and Delhi. Langdon Winner suggests that the technology itself comes with this kind of central spatial wrapping (Winner, 1986).

The growing dependency on funding and contacts with government meant the new Native organizations needed regular lines of communications with the south. The growing Native organizations, including Wawatay, set up their headquarters south of the Native communities in Sioux Lookout. This non-Native town on the CNR rail line, seventy miles from the Trans-Canada Highway, and with a small commercial airport, had become the jumping off point for mining exploration and lumbering in the north. Several government departments had also set up there, most notably INAC, and the Zone Hospital, which served the people of NAN.

Sioux Lookout was attractive to Native organizations because of its accessibility to southern transport, federal government services and the availability of business office space. The groups may also have chosen Sioux Lookout because
it was a non-Native town and not subject to the local and sub-regional rivalries of a northern Native community: it was neutral territory for Oji-Cree speakers, if not for the Cree.

Nevertheless, this establishment of a headquarters, south of the Native population of NAN, within what was becoming a southern administrative town, acted to reinforce the centre-periphery relations. While this relationship was assymetrical, it was not entirely one-sided. The gathering of Native organizations in Sioux Lookout also encouraged co-operation between Native groups and as I examine in the next chapter, facilitated the growth of new kinds of Native leaders and leadership.

I also demonstrate another area of impact from the transfer of these modern media: on the indigenous languages. On one hand, the centralization of Wawatay staff in Sioux Lookout privileged the use of English. On the other hand, it also led to individuals from communities across NAN learning each other's dialects, and beginning to standardize the languages used on radio and in the newspaper.
Other regions of the north were going through the same rapid changes in communication, and groups like Wawatay were springing up nation-wide. In the late 1970's, the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) appointed a commission to address some of these concerns. The Therien Commission heard from many Native and non-Native groups and in 1980 released a report that was sympathetic to the preservation of Native languages and the maintenance and preservation of Native cultures (Stiles, 1986).

The Therien Report was an impetus to the drafting of a Northern Broadcasting Policy and in 1983, the federal government started the Northern Native Broadcast Access Program (NNBAP), which provides funding for thirteen Native communications groups across the Canadian north. (See Appendix 5: Map of the Native Communications Societies of Canada)

While the NNBAP promised longer-term funding, it came with many more restrictions. The new premise was that Native broadcasting would be integrated into the national system. The innovations to the conventional broadcasting model, introduced during the experimental period were now silenced: no funding was available for satellite uplinks and telecommunications hook-ups that could allow interactive
programming. "The preferred technological choices, such as local access to television transmitters were continuously rejected" (Koeberling, 1988). Native communications groups were left to negotiate for satellite time with the commercial or public broadcasters.

Wawatay had fewer problems than many of the other groups, as they were able to hook-up with the Ontario Education Communications Authority (OECA), commonly known as TV Ontario or TVO. The Wawatay Native Radio Network (WRN) went on air, via satellite, in 1984, from their studio in Sioux Lookout. The programming was fed to twenty-seven of the communities, where it was usually included in the broadcasts of the local community stations. Broadcasting in Oji-Cree and Cree, by 1986 WRN were programming eight hours a day, with news, features, music, specials on elders, children, religion, a popular talk show, request hour and local reports from the northern communities.

Another limitation of NNBAP was that it only funded regional operations, not local ones. Wawatay and other communications societies had argued for a mix of regional and community radio. Community radio could provide a solid foundation for regional radio: through community radio's strong links with the local audiences and as a potential training ground for

---

10 This was another example of the binary options available. The community radio managers had the option of turning on or off the network feed.
regional broadcasters (Stiles, 1986:66). Instead, community radio was left behind in the older, poorer Native Communications Programme. The NNBAP privileged the new regional media of satellite radio and television.

Policies of the NNBAP also constrained the programming options. Funds were limited for any further growth of local interactive programming, whether through the informal genre of community radio or through high-tech telecommunications hook-ups. The programme also did not allow sufficient funding for the kind of programming offered by conventional networks. Instead of creating formats that suited their indigenous cultural forms, the Native broadcasts were restricted by funding, and had to choose the kind of pre-formed programming packages already used by conventional broadcasting, such as studio-based information and entertainment shows.

**Making do with Make-work Programmes**

The training options available squeezed the frame even tighter. No provisions were made to fund training. While Native organizations had requested an expansion of Canada Employment Immigration Commission (CEIC) programmes to fund Native broadcast training, their "requests were ignored" (Stiles, 1987:41). The groups were expected to negotiate individually with CEIC.
In 1985, CEIC announced a change in their overall policy direction. The new programme, the Canadian Jobs Strategy (CJS) encouraged employers to contribute to training costs and also set stringent limits on the funds available per project. These two factors, plus the fact that the programme was implemented differently in each region meant a wide variation in the training support the Native communications societies were able to secure.

Wawatay was considered lucky by the other communications groups because of the program funding and administration available in the NAN region. Even so, as examined below, the Job Development programme severely limited the length of training and the kinds of people who could be trained. The short training period meant that staff would be only partially trained before they would have to operate under the pressures of being on the job.

The funding restrictions also meant that there was little money or time for the Native groups to explore alternatives to the dominant rules governing programming (Stiles, 1986). Instead the programmes were set up with southern-trained broadcasters, based on the exchange of knowledge that had grown up in southern commercial or public broadcasting. The
bureaucratic compartmentalization of training and communications also discouraged attempts to co-ordinate services with other organizations or departments (Stiles, 1986).

**Summary**

The decade of experiments had proved that local indigenous broadcasters could establish local systems of communications exchange and make them available across the region via the satellite. Yet the NNBAP followed the trend that was institutionalizing satellite broadcasting world-wide. Native broadcasting was set up on the frame of a one-way metropolitan-oriented distribution system. Native programming was drawn on the screen of a southern-based broadcasting heritage. In the next chapter, I examine some of the images that emerged on the print through this transfer of knowledge.
CHAPTER 5

MAKING THE CHARACTERS FIT THE STORY: THE TRANSFER OF BROADCAST TRAINING

Introduction

By 1984 Wawatay was providing several services from their headquarters in Sioux Lookout. The technical department rented and serviced HF radios for families in the bush, while the translation department continued the translataphone, mediating on the telephone between Ojibway speakers and English-only services. The newspaper came out monthly with local and regional news and features in three languages, Oji-Cree, Cree and English, while the radio network provided a daily service of news, music and magazine shows targeted to special audiences, such as the elders and youth.

Encouraged by the funding available from the NNBAP, and aware of the growing impact of television on their communities, the directors of Wawatay Native Communications conducted a survey of their communities and decided to pursue television programming. They felt that television could provide them with a picture of their Native communities, help reinforce their language and culture and assist them in understanding the changes of the modern
Television would complement the news and information services already provided by their newspaper and radio network. Following approval for funding, Wawatay set out to plan their television operation.

Their plans included some decentralization. The first production centre would be set up in Sioux Lookout. Soon after, they intended to fulfill a long-time dream of setting up communications services in the Cree territory along James Bay. With the administrative centre in Sioux Lookout, there had been a bias towards Oji-Cree speakers, who were more numerous in the region as a whole, and particularly in Sioux Lookout, to the south of their communities. Wawatay hoped that setting up a radio service in Moose Factory and a television production centre within the area would break down some of this historical division.

The first year’s programme plan was based on audience needs identified by Wawatay, and articulated in terms of two NNBAP objectives -- language and cultural enrichment. The first year of programming was targeted at young adults, with the hope that the novelty would mean that it would also reach elders and children.
The first half-hour programme would be called "Keenawin" meaning 'us' in Ojibway. Programme items would promote a wide variety of aims: vocabulary and syllabic learning for young people via a Sesame Street-style insert, the veneration of traditional community leaders in "Elder Speaks", inter-community exchanges of information in "Community Spotlight", and the maintenance of community ties for students studying in southern centres via "Letter Home". Additional items of humour, music and sports would promote regional cultural forms.

The Objectives of the Training Program

The expansion plans required hiring new staff, doubling the organization's complement of people. Although some had used a portable video camera unit, only one person had any broadcast television experience. Their previous experience in training regional radio staff had also demonstrated the need for a longer-term residential training programme. (The radio network staff had begun broadcasting with only six weeks training, made up of two-week sessions with broadcasters brought in from the CBC. It had not been long enough to make people comfortable doing complex interviews, features, or music programming, and the radio staff had learned to rely on southern news services for news copy.)
Securing funding from the regional CEIC Job Development Programme, they planned a training programme within those guidelines. They proposed a combined programme for ten Oji-Cree speakers to staff a new television production centre in Sioux Lookout and four Cree-speakers who would begin their training there before relocating to Moose Factory to set up a radio production centre.

There were six objectives for the training:

1. to promote the self-determination efforts of Nishnawbe-Aski Nation through protecting and enhancing Native languages and cultures

2. to provide information from a Native perspective and in the Native languages to be used in increased community participation in public affairs and decision-making

3. to build up employability and employment in the region

4. to strengthen the sense of being a region and a nation

5. to strengthen the existing regional and community organizations and structures

6. to develop individual skills, self-confidence and understanding of Native culture and history

(Kidd, 1986:10).

These objectives underline some of the competing tensions in this transfer of network broadcasting. They are consistent with the political aspirations of NAN: making explicit reference to self-determination and nation-building, implicitly countering non-Native dominance. Yet they also collapse the idea of region into nation, using both the government's and Nishnawbe Aski Nation’s definitions of
boundaries, making little differentiation between these two. This is an indication of the contest over sovereignty of the territory that remains unresolved to this day.

Within this overall goal of transferring broadcasting to indigenous control are more specific goals. Priority was given to promoting communications horizontally within the territory, through the strengthening of Native languages and cultures, and community organizations. Information was seen as a process in which community members could participate. While not explicit, the model was one of indigenous self-reliance, rather than the dominant paradigm's concept of 'modern messages from above changing traditional behaviour'.

The Plan

Because they had little internal experience Wawatay went outside for help. Once they had established their overall goals and secured training funds, Wawatay hired three consultants from the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation (IBC) to design the course, as IBC had the most training experience of all the northern Native groups. Once the design was completed, I was hired to work within Wawatay as a training co-ordinator. Wawatay maintained administrative control and had regular input into the content through training meetings.
However flexible the planning process, it had to fit within what was already a very constrained space. The program was pulled in one direction by CEIC's restrictions on length and on quality of trainees. It was pulled in another direction by demands from the NNBAP to produce programming. And it was pulled in a third direction by a lack of aboriginal models of broadcasting: Wawatay and the trainers ended up agreeing to a transfer of southern methods, particularly those of the CBC, which Wawatay would eventually adapt to fit their needs.

While everyone wanted the training to remain separate from production to protect the trainees from production pressure, the time line was very short. Within a year, two new production centres had to be on the air. This included building and equipping them under the special conditions of northern communities. (Sioux Lookout is accessible by road, but had almost no vacant residential or commercial buildings for housing and office space. From the south, Moose Factory can only be reached by plane or train via the neighbouring community of Moosonee; even this access is limited during spring and fall break-up of the ice-road to the island.) The Radio producers had an on-air date at the end of five months of training. The Television team had twice as long: ten months of training with a projected on-air date two months later.
These administrative constraints narrowed the alternatives before the programme had begun. With little time or resources for adaptation, we outlined a profile of production jobs that reflected those in southern broadcasting operations, with some modifications introduced by the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation. From this profile and the programming outline, we designed a curriculum in which each trainee would be streamed into their specialized job function. Everyone would go through a four month course of Basic Journalism Training including Native language, history and cultural studies. The larger group would then split into two -- Television and Radio -- to get ready to go on air.

The training program began in March 1986. As it was running, other principles were instituted to facilitate: integration of the production teams into the Wawatay organization; and adaptation of the production skills to the needs of Wawatay. Skills were introduced from simplest to most complex in a series of simulated production exercises, so that trainees would immediately see the results of their work in a Wawatay medium. When the trainees were ready, their work would be broadcast or published: no one would be embarrassed or pushed before they were ready. Organizational integration was promoted through regular meetings and the inclusion of other staff in teaching and learning.
Adaptation was encouraged in two ways. One was through an emphasis on building a production team autonomous of outside assistance, encouraged by regular individual and group evaluations of the training programme. The other was through the preparation of exercises in the Native language. As non-Native instructors could only give general guidance, their authority was reduced, and the group learned to critique their own material.

**Transfering Professional Journalism: Wage Labour**

Any transfer of a technology includes the transfer of knowledge systems, or rules of procedures, that have been determined in the interplay between several social, cultural and political factors. At the core of professional journalism is the concept of "professional": at its most basic, it is the idea of a waged job, for which a worker has to train to learn a code of knowledge and procedures, which includes identification with others doing the same kind of job.

The concept of "professional" builds on a more basic concept of wage labour. As already discussed, this region has very high unemployment. The transfer of wage labour had not been uniform among the Native population, nor was it uniform among the trainees. They thus had a wide variety of work and
training histories, only a few of which could be called professional.

Ranging in age from the early twenties to the fifties, there were twelve men and three women. Many had lived most of their lives in the northern communities, supplementing hunting and trapping with welfare, government or band job schemes. One of the older men had trained as a shaman, learning to watch and follow the direction of an elder in bush survival and Native spirituality. Their non-Native schooling experience reflected the community standard, an average of Grade 9.

Many of the trainees had also lived for varying periods in the south, attending residential school, training programmes or surviving on urban job schemes. Their skill profiles reflected the kinds of training and government work programmes that had been available in the region in the last ten years: teacher's aid, Drug and Alcohol Abuse counsellor, secretary, actor, writer, musician. Most of those programmes had also been short-term and had allowed little adaptation of the skills to a northern environment. As a result, the trainees who had been through this situation before were able to articulate some of the problems. They may also have had a special vantage point as they were in between systems of rules.
Whatever their previous experience, their most difficult readjustment was to living in a southern non-Native community and surviving on a wage. There was very little housing available, and less for Native people who were discriminated against. A small number of trainees were paying rent for the first time because they previously used reserve housing which was usually built by local people and rent-free. They now also had to learn how to use banking and credit facilities. Their children had to adapt to going to southern schools where English was not only the language of instruction, but the language of the school yard. The men’s wives had to adapt to a much larger white English-speaking community with few of the same family supports or sources of childcare. The women’s partners had to learn to accept their partner’s role as breadwinner.

This adaptation to southern living was not easy. Often the family wanted to return to their northern communities, back to their social support system and away from this cold place with few recreational opportunities outside of the local bars. The children were all streamed into ESL courses, including two who had moved from Ottawa and knew no Oji-Cree. Several of the children were sent back up north to stay with grandparents. Four trainees left the programme in the first year, three of whom had been very highly motivated, as a result of family problems.
These relocation problems tended to split the training group. Those who survived the first year were people who already had some urban experience, the wanderers - the younger single or divorced people. They were not necessarily those with the highest skills or motivations or strongest relationship with their home community and culture. If this was to continue, it would mean that the Wawatay employees would be those who had already adapted to the dominant culture, a serious problem for an organization that is trying to maintain the traditions of the Native culture, and of more remote northern communities.

The advantage of having experience in both cultures was clearest in the speed with which many of the trainees picked up both radio and television techniques. The younger group of first year trainees were quick to figure out ways to utilize the medium, mixing sound and music, picking up the ideas of editing quickly. It did not come so easily for the older ones, who had had very little exposure to English language radio or television and thus to the peculiar 'timing' sense of modern media.

---

11 Since the first training program, the picture of who would survive has changed. The only pattern among the twenty people in the two training groups, is that all three people older than forty have gone back to their communities.
Learning the Language of the Outsiders

The second core-concept of journalism that became problematic was the choice of spoken and written language. While there were differing views on the significance of literacy for journalism, the training staff and Wawatay management felt that producers needed to be able to speak and understand Cree or Oji-Cree and to write in some way. This was basic to acquiring the skills in the training program and being able to function as media professionals: planning and producing scripts and programmes, as well as communicating among production teams and with other staff.

While the problem of illiteracy reaches all adult Canadians, there are some unique problems that are common among Native communities. As stated above, Cree and Oji-Cree are only two of three Native languages that the federal government expects to survive into the next century. Their use is declining among young people who are being acculturated into the dominant culture and language through the medium of English schooling and of television.

Even more widespread is the inability to read or write in a Native language. In earlier generations, there had been no complete transfer of Ojibway or Cree orthographies, or for
that matter, of English literacy. Many of the Wawatay staff and some of the trainees were not fluent in their mother languages; even more were not literate in them.

This tendency was reinforced by the administrative structure and demands of the organization. Sioux Lookout is predominantly a non-Native town and some of the Native staff and all of the non-Native staff could not speak either Native language. As well, much of their communications was with southern government and commercial enterprises, reinforcing the English language bias. As a result, the language of the work place at that time was English and this bias affected the programme.

Wawatay had created other language strategies in the past. Up north, they had supported community radio station managers and northern field producers who were functionally illiterate. Yet, in Sioux Lookout, the organization expected everyone to fill out travel forms, time sheets, requisitions, etc., which required English literacy skills.

One staff worker had designed an Oji-Cree language training course which several Native and non-Native staff had taken through the region’s community college, Confederation College in Thunderbay. The senior translator for the newspaper had also worked for a term at the same college
teaching night school. Both were hired to teach Oji-Cree during the first year of training and one was hired in the second year.

Yet while English literacy has spawned a whole professional discipline world-wide of ESL, there was no such body of resources to draw on for Native literacy. Another complicating factor was that these two language experts used different writing systems. The older one used syllabics exclusively while the more formally trained younger one had adapted Roman letters for a more phonetic system for Ojibway and Cree.

Both language experts were in heavy demand elsewhere and the trainees did not have enough exposure and training in either system. The trainees started to learn both systems, but did not have enough time to really try either of them successfully as a functional writing system for scripts.

The solution that emerged was biased towards those with the strongest English writing skills. With no common Native writing system, scripts were first written in English, and then translated on-air by the host or announcer into Oji-Cree and Cree. (This is also the standard practice of many other Native groups across the north, including Inuktitut and Dene speakers in the Northwest Territories.) The
instructors attempted to balance this English literacy bias by stressing team production and the practical application of several other technical and production skills.

There was another partial solution that also limited the extension of Native literacy. In the television group, one woman tended to do most of the syllabic titles. In radio, much of the syllabics writing was contracted out to the oldest trainee, who was highly skilled as a translator. This effectively ghettoized Native literacy and the others stopped learning.

An attempt to correct this problem in the second year ended up reinforcing it. The planners tried to increase the amount of time given to both English and Native literacy. An ESL teacher was hired for two nights a week to work with trainees whose English literacy was below a Grade Nine entrance level. The trainees resisted this program, which was not integrated with the journalism courses; instead they demanded a stronger program in Native language and culture (Kidd, 1987).

As a result, the students were enrolled in a summer Native literacy programme at the regional community college. However this venture was not successful either: the students
resisted learning grammar and another writing system, especially as the college instructor was not fluent in either Cree or Ojibway.

There was little mediation of this gap in literacy in the second year. In an effort to compensate for the lack of basic schooling trainees arrived with, the planners extended the first basic journalism part of the programme, placing much more emphasis on writing, and less on applying skills in a production atmosphere. There were also very few aboriginal studies sessions. All of this meant that most effort and authority was given to the English Journalism program.

**Journalism: New Ways of Making Meaning**

Two of the basic structural concepts brought by the transfer agents were wage labour and English literacy. In this section, I look at another structural level: journalism's system of knowing.

Assumptions about the use of language can be a significant though unrecognised form of cultural domination in the interaction between culturally different communities because they can subtly suppress or promote certain values (Harder, 1989:25)
In southern Canada, mass media is structured by concepts of wage labour and time. Whether commercial or public, the common intention is to win audiences, for the purpose of delivering them to advertisers (Smythe, 1979). As the number of media outlets has grown, the strategy to secure audiences has changed. What was once a contest over territory, or the winning of a mass audience in one area, has now become more specialized. Now, media programming is targeted to small audiences (defined by their relation to the wage). The contest has shifted to one over time.

Programming has evolved to match this need to secure focused audiences. The programming premise is to grab your audience immediately, so as not to lose it to your competitors. Once you have them, you lead them through the item from top to bottom. The marketplace has become the determining factor in European-based culture’s concepts of time and media and is quickly becoming the case across India and northern Canada, as discussed in the conclusion.

Tied to this premise is a particular narrative structure. The model story tends to have a common shape, although there are some differences between radio and television. Radio tends to emphasize an omniscient narrator who guides you through from the posing of the story to closure in the
resolution. Television tends to be more synthetic, often presenting two "points of view" with the reporter presenting the synthesis as closure.

Some theorists have suggested that this is an inherent requirement of western media which follows the literary tradition, where:

an interposing voice imposes its own story with its own causes, effects, climaxes and resolutions on what we see. Are news broadcasts, discussions, interviews, reduced to literary models in the same way? How far do the classically literate virtues of balance, clarity, precision and a continuing sequence of cause and effect, subject followed by object, serve to reduce much of the material processed by the medium to a particular formula? (Hartley and Hawkes, 1977:51).

This premise of framing your whole interview or item around the idea of a continuing sequence of cause and effect where active subject leads object is taught to CBC broadcasters in "focus workshops". A CBC "Our Native Land" alumnus, Brian Maracle, explained the concept of focus in a workshop with the Wawatay Training Program, in 1986, saying that a focused story is "about people doing something for a reason".

There was a great deal of resistance to this concept of focus in the Wawatay training programme. Some trainees rejected it because of the way it imposed a predetermined agenda, a clash with their way of exchanging information.
Several said that it wouldn't work with the elders: one of the radio producers who was in an earlier training programme expressed this in a workshop in 1988:

The elders taught us to respect our laws, to respect an older person. Never interrupt, walk in between, talk in a soft voice, never speak in a negative way."...When an elder's intelligent, he doesn't speak in white man's language, he speaks in Indian, and long. I don't talk back (Wawatay Media Workshop, 1988).

When speaking or writing in English, most of the trainees did not use the active voice. Pat Ningewance, an Ojibway linguist, explained this difference in discussing the ways that jokes are structured. English jokes are usually about a situation where people are doing something and they have a punch line or some kind of an end point. Ojibway jokes are more pictorial than situational, and the many jokes and puns are usually about contrasts of colour, image or sound. The jokes don't follow the same structure of building to an end point.

While some were resistant to this idea of focus and others found it difficult to grasp, it is also true that it is a difficult task for southern journalists and for other community journalists. Nevertheless southern journalists are brought up asking questions, modelling the Canadian current affairs tradition, learning to tackle "hard interviews" almost before they learn to ask the five w's (why, what, who, where, and when).
Native people have tended to put more emphasis on training by observation, emulation and the use of silence. As well when you live in a small community with a great deal of knowable occurrences, there are fewer questions to ask. Some trainees maintained that there were no easy translations of the five w’s. (These questions will not be resolved until there is more understanding of the differences between these two Native languages and English, and the different systems of knowledge and communications).

The Politics of Journalism Within NAN

The political context also affected the transfer of journalism. As seen above, this whole broadcasting operation was begun as a network to promote nationalism among the people of forty isolated communities. Leadership had communicated by word of mouth, mediated through the chief and elders at the local level. While INAC had changed the system of chief selection, the contemporary chiefs still hold power at the band level, in the tribal councils (a sub-regional grouping of communities) and at the regional level, in the Nishnawbe Aski Nation organization.

Their power was a major factor in framing the political space among Native people. Most of the trainees knew many of the chiefs personally from residential school or from social
contacts within the growing Native population of Sioux Lookout. They were loath to criticize the established Native leaders for several reasons. One, the chiefs were the authority figures. Two, they were the source of many band jobs and positions, and could offer transportation for journalists to key events. Three, they would continue to be the sources for many of the stories in the future. Four, they were also friends and fellow Indians in a non-Native dominated environment.

The dynamic between the trainee producers and the chiefs was in sharp contrast to that between the trainees and non-Native bureaucrats. Within a very few weeks of the beginning of the first training program, the trainees had invited the head of the local INAC office in to explain the workings of his department. While their questions were not all critical, it was clear that they were not afraid to approach him.

**Hunger Strike Moves to Wawatay Studio**

By January 1988, the shift in balance between the chiefs and the journalists/producers had led to a crisis. As part of ongoing negotiations with the federal government over regionally-controlled aboriginal health care, three men from the community of Sandy Lake went on a hunger strike in the INAC or Zone hospital in Sioux Lookout. In the words of independent broadcaster Brian Maracle:
The chiefs and tribal leaders were solidly behind them. The staff at Wawatay Radio probably was too, but they covered the first day of the hunger strike as part of their regular news operation. The chiefs and tribal leaders wanted more coverage. They demanded that Wawatay broadcast reports on the hunger strike every fifteen minutes. Wawatay refused. Emotions were running high. The chiefs and tribal leaders complained that Wawatay was refusing to co-operate with them on a life and death issue.

Finally, on the third day of the hunger strike, Wawatay bowed to heavy political pressure. It decided to allow the tribal leaders to make a statement on the air, under Wawatay's supervision. But when the leaders started talking, they didn't stop. They kept talking -- for hours--and refused to leave the studio. In effect, they took over the station. Fortunately, the take-over ended a few hours later when the hunger strikers and the government reached an agreement.

The controversy created a lot of anger and bitterness. In February, the board of directors met and adopted a policy to keep Wawatay free from political interference. The controversy, officially at least, is over. But the bad feelings among the staff and between the society and the tribal leaders have not yet healed. It could be a long time before they are (Maracle, 1988:11).

In some respects, the conflict was a question of cognitive dissonance. The leaders had no expectation that the Wawatay staff would question their demand for unlimited access. As one staff member put it, "they're used to going on the community radio whenever they feel like it". Some of the staff also supported the efforts of the chiefs and one resigned over the issue, although he has since returned.
Other staff members strongly defended their right for a "free press," to decide on programming access and content. The crisis was itself muddied when the initial negotiations for Wawatay were carried out by two non-Native staff people, who were operating on a concept of autonomy adopted from the CBC.

While the chiefs had formally given Wawatay independence, the crisis revealed that the ties had not been fully severed. It also suggests, as had Innis before, that the shift to independence of the press does not come through a political decision made for greater democracy. Instead the institution of the "free press" came about due to political and economic factors, which represent a change in monopolies of knowledge.

Wawatay is now one of the largest Native employers in the region, with over 50 employees and an annual budget of $3 million (Axtell, 1989). As well, the Wawatay staff form a sizable number of the waged Indian minority in the non-Native town of Sioux Lookout. Many have come to count on each other as they no longer have the day to day support of their communities, and do not go home on a regular basis to approach their traditional elders, leaders or other members of their community for feedback and suggestions. Some are
also estranged geographically and socially from their communities and chiefs because of life-style choices, such as divorce, etc.

The different points of view were expressed at a special workshop held to deal with the crisis in Sioux Lookout in 1988. Those arguing loudest for their autonomy during the Zone crisis felt that the current Native leadership is out of touch with their people.

I respected and admired old Tom Fiddler before he died when he was chief...When he used to come back from a meeting, whether he was in Toronto, Sioux Lookout, or wherever else he was meeting those government officials, and whatever else they told him, he’d come back and tell us at a band council meeting. He’d sit around and say, "what do you people think? Should we accept this proposal? And I want some opinions!"

Well, that stopped when this new Grand Council Leadership came in. These new people come in, maybe spend a month out there, make a few BCR’s (Band Council Resolutions) and back out again. You know they don’t inform anybody. The people at the community level aren’t informed of what’s going on and they are a part of the country and the Nishnawbe Aski Nation (Wawatay Media Policy Workshop, 1988).

Newly waged and encouraged by the journalism change agents from the south, some of the Wawatay staff had begun to see themselves as a separate group within the Native community, a Native fifth estate. While they spoke of the need for direction and leadership from elders in the north, they expected this authority to come from within their own autonomous organization, from the members of the Wawatay Board, not from the band or regional chiefs.
One of this group, Jerry Sawanas, a radio producer, saw their role as imparting information, aiding the modern transfer:

We need to explain to people what journalism is, because it's new, just like when other things were first introduced, such as traps, guns, telephones, etc... Journalism is coming no matter what we say or do. It's going to be here forever.

I think it's up to us as Journalism people, as part of Wawatay's mandate, we have to explain to those people, because nobody else seems to have an interest in doing this... Regarding education, regarding social welfare, regarding government programmes, everything that is going on north of Sioux Lookout. They have no other way of finding out, other than the Wawatay newspaper, radio and television.

It's scary for some people up north because it makes them accountable... We need to make them accountable by interviewing them, by getting after them... Everytime we interviewed them before, they would be in charge of the interview, not us... And my opinion about the relationship between the reporter and the ogema (chief) is that I ask the questions. I'm the one that says, "D., how come it took you so long to do this?" That's what's been lacking (Wawatay Media Policy Workshop, 1988).

Long-time Native correspondent, Brian Maracle, promoted this point of view of a "free press".

Generally speaking, native people don't know why a "free press" is so important. It's time they did. Native people must have a free, vigorous and independent news media if we are ever to have a democratic form of self-government. Native people should rise up and defend the freedom and independence of the native media whenever they come under attack because a "free press" is the best friend we have (Maracle, 1988:11).

---

12 This view is supported by other journalists in Native communications societies across the country (AMARC Workshop, 1986). Like Wawatay, many of these organizations had at one time been connected with the Native political organizations in their respective regions, but now stress the importance of keeping independent from the political groups.
"Culture" Versus "Journalism"

While not a homogeneous grouping, there were others who contested the meaning of "journalism", defining it in opposition to "(Native) culture". Some of this group had been supportive of the chiefs taking access. Their point of view was expressed further at the workshop, in response to the question: "who and what are you loyal to?" While the brain storm lists included: profession, Wawatay, telling truth, getting information to the people, etc.; they also included: chief, family, culture, language, traditions and the church (both Christian and traditional).

In the workshop discussion, individuals spoke of the need to do more "cultural" programming. While there were those who wanted to redress the balance and mix more "culture" with the journalism, there were others who spoke of a movement to pan-Native spiritual values, or to a more secular vision of Native culture and tradition. Although some of this persuasion have left the organization, there is still a core that remains.

Some of this contest over "journalism" and "cultural programming" was also a contest over the management of the organization and who and how it would be directed. Some had expressed their resistance earlier, in remarks to the trainers about "journalism" not fitting with Native
traditions. Others were also resistant to management changes going on in their departments at the time: changes they saw as being directed by "white" people or people who were sympathetic to "white" values.

The new executive director in 1989 publicly expressed the dispute in a report to members:

In the Indian world that I know, rules and regulations are foreign. Many of the rules we have to abide with at Wawatay have been criticized as the "white man's way" of doing things. As Indian staff, we have never faced such expectations from us before. But with the changes history has forced on us, we must adapt our habits. To adapt is to survive and overcome (Wawatay, 1989).

These points of view reflected the social and organizational changes brought about by new authorities among the new systems of communications. At the end of the staff workshop, the majority of the staff opted for operating as an independent free press. They recognized the need to formalize the division of labour between those who would produce cultural items, and those who would produce more journalistic items.

Beginning with the parameters of an autonomous organization, they discussed how to strengthen their relations with their audience, renewing their commitment to providing coverage to and increasing the participation of the communities. They spoke of the importance of talking to all the people in each
community, making sure not to talk just to the traditional leaders. They also spoke of how they could work more closely with the local community radio stations.

It won’t come all in one day. It’s something that our cultures are not going to like, they’ll be scared, just like the first time they bought a gun, or television or telephone. So we’re going into a lot of crises, but I think it’s something we should continue to try to figure out. We can be warriors in fighting for language, culture and traditions (Wawatay Media Policy Workshop, 1988).

Freezing the Frame on Wawatay: A Summary

The transfer of broadcasting to Wawatay led to a whole chain of reactions right on down the line, narrowing the space available to Native broadcasters and the people of Nishnawbe Aski Nation. The NNBAP’s restriction on funding and distribution policy meant few opportunities to set up local level communications, which could be more participatory and interactive. It also forced Wawatay to search for funding for training from CEIC.

The CEIC Canadian Jobs Strategy policy implemented in 1985 imposed further restrictions on who could be hired and on the length of the training programme. This further limited the transformations of the dominant broadcast rules to more appropriate aboriginal models. It also reinforced the creation of the journalists as a separate labour hierarchy.
This transfer in turn reinforced a reliance on southern public journalists. This group’s transfer of training privileged English language writing, the journalistic narrative and further strengthened the new knowledge elite within the aboriginal communities.

At another level this chain reaction affected the broadcasters’ relations with their audience. While Wawatay had begun with trail and community radio, regional radio and television has taken over in importance within the organization. Without electronic facilities for interactive programming with the communities, producers rely on travelling themselves to the local communities, a solution which is limited by high northern travel costs and small programme budgets.

The choice of a Sioux Lookout centre, south of the communities further restricts the audience’s -- and particularly the elders’ -- participation in the design, production or evaluation of most of the programmes. It also biased the programming to the perspective of the younger political leaders, in Sioux Lookout in transit from travelling down south. The mediation of information by a paid staff also meany that many people were starting to expect to be paid for their information.
Since the training programme and the implementation of regional broadcasting, Wawatay has made other attempts to transform the dominant rules of communications. At the level of network, they have been trying to adapt communications services that are being offered in NAN.

Most recently, they have been trying to work within a new communications expansion programme of the provincial Ontario government. The Television Extension in Northern Ontario offers a variety of television channels via a community cable system. After negotiations with the communities, many have accepted with "aya-koh-mee-seeh-win", (caution).

Their first concern was the impact of additional TV on their children. They needed assurance that this expansion of the "white way" would not cause further erosion of their language or lifestyle. Looking to Wawatay for help, they have insisted on more Native-language programming (Wawatay, 1989).

Wawatay is working on providing the communities with cable. The system will also include a remote video uplink so that programmes could be produced:

live from various communities wherever traditional teachings, activities and assemblies are taking place... (and) WRN (Wawatay Regional Radio) plans to locate its radio transmitters right in the communities. This will also make more interactive radio between communities possible (Wawatay, 1989).

At the level of production, they have been creating a variety of new programmes. The "Keenawint" magazine show, has been joined by a current affairs show called "Animochikunun" or "Stories About Things That Are Around."
The programme log for the first year is like an index of social and political issues in NAN: Post-secondary Education Cuts, Response to the Zone Crisis, Trappers Education, Child Abuse, Family Violence, Mental Health and Suicide, Aboriginal Language Instruction and the History of Treaties. A new children’s programme is being produced in Timmins in conjunction with the Oji-Cree Cultural Centre. As well, a youth programme was tested last summer, with plans for youth to eventually take over its production.

In the concluding chapter, I describe some of the ways that Wawatay is continuing to try and map out a new future for Native broadcasting within an even greater threat from the federal government -- funding cutbacks.
CHAPTER 6
THE NARROWING OF ALTERNATIVES: A CONCLUDING DISCUSSION

Introduction

In the fifteen years since the US AT-6 and the Canadian Technology Satellite Hermes went into orbit, two new broadcasting projects have grown up. Begun as experiments, Kheda and Wawatay started far from the centre of their respective national networks, as alternatives to the dominant discourse of communications. They sent television and radio signals to new audiences who had never before received broadcasting. Both projects have made adaptations to broadcasting’s conventional rules of procedure.

Most noteworthy was the change in who and what made it to the screen. The images and voices of these oppressed groups were broadcast for the first time, their languages and cultures given new authority by their inclusion in mainstream media. They spoke with new narratives: in Kheda half of their programming discussed the structural barriers of caste, class and gender facing Dalits and other groups at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder; in Nishnawbe Aski Nation, aboriginal producers made programmes examining the social problems facing them as Canada’s most oppressed group. Both used new kinds of production teams: the DECU production unit involved a team of writers, social science
researchers, directors and technical crew; the Wawatay unit involved Native people as producers and crew.

Like many community media projects, both used the medium as a mirror, reflecting the audience to itself (Salter, 1981), yet there were differences in the way each mirror was directed. After initial resistance from the Kheda villagers to this new group of change agents who brought in the top-down government programming, the social science researchers decided to turn the mirror around and focus it on the least powerful. They attempted to include these audience members in each step of the production process from the writing of scripts, to on-camera interviews and dramatizations, and evaluation in the formative and post-production stages.

The interaction, called "formative research" between production team and audience resulted in some innovative new programme uses and formats. When the most vulnerable resisted participating in public discussions, the team chose one of two options. Some programmes were not broadcast, but were only shown to those involved. Other programmes used fictive genres to protect individual identities. The regular contacts between production team and villagers were also instrumental in the urbanites learning about local knowledge and communications systems, and incorporating folk motifs and folk forms in programme formats.
In Nishnawbe Aski Nation, the mirror was held by producers who came from the aboriginal audience. They used much less systematic kinds of formative research, relying on informal contacts between themselves and their communities, plus a yearly audience survey. Thus the infusion of indigenous creative forms did not come from systematic research, but from the skills already existent within their own team and contacts already established in their community. For example, they use local narrative forms in dramatic and current affairs programmes, often highlighting legendary characters and local humour. As well, their studio backdrop uses local motifs; and their theme music is written by staff, who are among the region’s most noted popular musicians.

The mirroring capacity of both projects represented attempts to counter the forces of dominant communications, by reinforcing indigenous knowledge and culture and in turn, explanation’s contact with activity (Salter, 1981). This chapter concludes the discussion of how these projects have transformed the dominant rules of communications. The analysis is of course complicated by the dialectical nature of modern communications media.

---

13 The children’s programme now in production is using formative research techniques adapted from Sesame Street and the CBC.
Although DECU and Wawatay share some heritage with other community media projects, they are unique because of their hook-up to larger networks, DECU to the national service of Doordarshan and Wawatay to TV Ontario. In order to assess the space described by these alternatives as they became operational I necessarily move to the national context, to examine the impact of the contradictory aims and interests at that level.

I examine the dialectic at work: in India, in the transfer from Kheda of development broadcasting to projects within Doordarshan; in Canada, in the impact of recent federal budget cuts to the Native communications programmes which fund Wawatay. But first, I again review the international dimension, as this dialectical relationship means constant revisions to the dominant paradigm: changes in the geopolitical context which are changing the dominant rules are also shaping the space around local broadcasting at the margins.

A New International Agenda: Commercialization

The view of the earth's surface from a satellite fifteen years ago was radically different than what can be seen today. At that time, the maps divided the world into three: the first world of the western industrialized nations, the second of the eastern socialist bloc and the greatest
expanse, an "other space," labelled the "third world". To retain this balance, satellites were used by governments of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to surveil the territories within their own and their "enemy's" orbit.

Since then, there have been profound changes to that map. Countries other than the U.S. are operating businesses internationally, largely through transnational corporations (TNCs). Competition is no longer bi-polar, between the governments of Washington and Moscow, but among a multiple of TNCs operating in metropolitan centres all over the world. Trade barriers are in flux as sovereign states have relaxed their territorial barriers to allow the free flow of capital across their borders. The restructuring of the Soviet bloc will open up the territories and markets of the world even more.

These new commercialization strategies represent a shift from the expansion of territories, to those of markets, (Samarajiva, 1988) from the dominance of space-based media to time-based ones. This shift is reinforced by the profound economic crisis facing nations in north and south who are desperate to open up their territories. By jumping into the international marketplace, many countries are taking the only option they see available, that of turning the technology switch on, and investing their small amounts of
capital and foreign exchange in the newer time-based technologies, such as data transmission via satellite.

The configuration of communications technologies reflects these changes. In North America and Europe the channels available have gone from a handful to literally hundreds. Perhaps more importantly, the broadcast signal is now much more fragmented, with programming targeted to audiences whose capacity for consumption is determined very precisely by sophisticated market surveying techniques. The broadcasters compete, not for the sale of masses in a territory, but for the sale of multiple fragments, in a specific time frame, who are then sold to advertisers.

While countries such as India may only have one channel, the same commercial values are driving their systems. Fifteen years ago they only received one channel; now the middle and upper class in places like Kheda can get more and more entertainment programmes from the urban signal. This is also the case in outlying regions within Canada, such as Nishnawbe Aski Nation. In NAN, satellite dishes mixed down by cable are bringing in the multichannel urban television configuration to most of the last remaining communities..
The need for profit that is influencing national communications is also having a profound impact at the local level. A shift from concerns of territorial integration to market integration will mean a different kind of relationship between states and populations at the margins. The protective geographic space has shrunk between these frontiers and the forces at the centre, as examined below.

**Doordarshan and the Future for Community Broadcasting**

In the chapter on Kheda, some of the contending interpretations of the story were noted. The manager of DECU, Kiran Karnik, acknowledged many of their constraints. He noted the constant struggle to keep the sets on, due to their old age and opposition from the local powerful classes. As well, he admitted the limitations of working within Doordarshan: the pressures of competing with commercially-oriented programming and with a highly centralized party-directed network that was resistant to criticism.

Nevertheless, he believed in the concept of "national integration" and felt that "unity in diversity" could be achieved through a national link: allowing DECU to distribute their programmes locally and across districts and regions. Censorship was a problem, but producers also had to recognize the greater threat of dictatorship which could
remove them from the air entirely. The producers needed to diffuse their attacks, containing their energy for major political battles. Karnik believed that DECU still had enough space on the "frontier of the permissible".

An ex-producer, Dinaz Kalwachwala, interpreted the evidence in another way. In her descriptions of DECU's relationship with the villagers, she noted the growing trust as the producers made more adversarial programming. Although she agreed with Kiran's reluctance for producers to stand on the sidelines while others fought and suffered, her strategy was to jump in, the opposite of his. She created serials where characters created activist groups to challenge the status quo, including both class and gender barriers. After two of her serials were discontinued, she left DECU to work with other community media groups, particularly some feminist groups. She suggested that DECU has outlived its usefulness, and is "no different than the national broadcaster (Personal Interview, Kalwachwala, 1988).

Frances Berrigan foretold of these constraints in her review of community media in the late 1970's. Nevertheless, she felt the strategies DECU was developing to neutralize their critics by aligning themselves with governmental and non-governmental agencies and Doordarshan would ensure them some "political space" (Berrigan, 1979).
Writing in the late 1980's, Alan O'Connor sharply criticizes that analysis, noting instead that the only long-term insurance was for community stations to ally themselves with indigenous popular movements. Other social critics in India support this criticism.¹⁴ They endorsed DECU's attempts to work locally with disempowered groups, but felt that any gains were short-term unless tied to organizations of workers and peasants.

Some also felt that Kheda was fatally compromised by their connection with a national network so closely tied to the ruling Congress-I government of Rajiv Gandhi (Personal Interviews, 1988)¹⁵ its programming defined by the needs of advertisers to deliver the urban upper classes. Instead, media activists should utilize the traditional forms of communications of face-to-face contacts and meetings, as well as other folk genres such as drama, music etc., within the formal and informal networks of popular movements.

Nevertheless, even among the critics and activists, there is a recognition of the need to come to terms with modern media, which is rapidly reaching the most remote villages.

¹⁴ This would include: Rajesh Tandon, Participatory Research in India; Kamla Bhasin, FAO Action for Development; Abba Bhayya, Jagori, and Usha Jumani, SEWA.
¹⁵ See also (Pendakur, 1988) for his analysis of the relationship between the national government and its social critics after the National Emergency of 1975 introduced by Indira Gandhi.
Although, so far, only a handful are using electronic media (Personal Interview Usha Jumani, 1988; Kamla Bhasin, 1984). This study points to the need for similar research from Indian-based scholars into the uses and adaptations of modern media by popular movements not attached to the national networks.

**Grafting Kheda onto the National Networks**

The analysis of Kheda also included looking at the chain reaction of transfers down the line. Although both Development Communications units examined are very new, there are some emerging lessons. The DECU model cannot be easily transferred within the present institutional framework of Doordarshan and All-India Radio. Kheda’s credo of focusing on the issues of the most oppressed was realized within a unique organizational heritage. The unit came into existence buffered by the well-respected Indian Space Research Organization, which encouraged experimentation and organizational autonomy for the eighty or ninety staff people of DECU.

In contrast, the tiny new DCU’s have both been grafted onto huge bureaucratic networks. Neither operates with as strong a credo as Kheda. Not only must they counter the variety of constraints seen at Kheda, but their organizational framework further limits them from challenging the dominant
rules of procedure of broadcast production. While both centres have moved out of the studio, both are producer-centred, although the Kota centre has experimented with some local drama.

The adaptation at Kota was serendipitous, as by chance it brought together a crew who all come from that state and have demonstrated commitment to their project. The successful transfer of techniques of "investigative journalism" may not have been so coincidental. More research is necessary to determine whether this project will adapt to the organizational form that privileges journalists and allow the audience more participation. A further question might consider a comparison of the institution of journalists in Wawatay and Kota, as a collective coping mechanism within the constraints of centralized media.

The Future for Wawatay Native Communications

Some of the contending interpretations of the Wawatay crisis with the chiefs were described at the end of Chapter 5. All agreed that the introduction of modern media is inevitable and positive for the people of Nishnawbe Aski Nation. All would agree that Wawatay is reinforcing aboriginal languages and cultures and assisting people in NAN to find out information that is necessary to their survival. The differences between them emerge in their relationship to the
impact of modernization, the traditional leadership and their audience.

One group of staff felt that the balance had swung too far away from their indigenous systems of communications and leadership. Wawatay should keep closer to their original mandate of maintaining their cultures and languages. Too many "white" ideas had seeped into the organization through the management, and they needed to "Indianize" it again. The introduction of "journalism" was one of these "white" ideas that had some limited value, but needed to be balanced with "cultural programming". They wanted direction for the scope of the programming to come from the elders and chiefs, who would set the parameters on discussion.

Another group of staff interpreted the dispute with the chiefs as part of a struggle for a free press. They stressed the necessity of giving their Cree and Oji-Cree audience the tools to break their isolation and adapt to the non-Native modern world around them. The Wawatay staff would take the lead in this balancing of "technology and tradition", beginning by educating the people of NAN about the necessity of a free press of Native journalists, that would make the leaders accountable.

These tensions over how to mix Native and the dominant non-native traditions of communications and leadership continue.
While there were differences about how to do it, everyone recognized the necessity of reaching out to the communities. However the resolutions adopted from the workshop point to the second direction, Wawatay as an autonomous media organization in the model of other non-native media outlets. While there was some recognition of the importance of involving the elders and chiefs, the resultant plans were to reinforce the rule of the new class of media producers, with the establishment of written policies and a concentration on the training of managers.

Further research is necessary to document these two strategies: to hear the competing assessments of Wawatay from the inside. Not included in this review is other points of view from within the community: the elders, the chiefs and others. Stiles has noted problems of "audience research" of native communications groups (Stiles, 1986a). More research is necessary into the uses that people of NAN make of the media and how they want the communications service to grow; although this participant-directed research will be difficult to fund as recent budget cuts have shifted the organization's priorities.

**Cutting the Budget**

In March 1990, the Conservative Party who hold power in the Canadian federal government, announced major cuts in their
annual budget; among them cuts in grants to Native communications societies and political organizations. The Native Communications Program under the Department of the Secretary of State, was slashed entirely, eliminating funds for Native newspapers, community and HF radio, and other non-broadcast services. The NNBAP was cut by 16%, representing a reduction of $600,000 from Wawatay’s annual $2 million budget.

The Native communications groups have lobbied to have these funding cuts rolled back. They have met with government officials, held demonstrations and mounted a media campaign throughout the mainstream and Native media. Their protests have garnered support from social critics, social action groups and newspaper editors across the country, and led to guarantees of some interim funding from the federal government; yet they have been unable to reverse the government’s decision.

Critics have ridiculed the government justification of the cuts as a need to reduce the deficit. Many make the point that the total amount due Native communications is very small: it matches the amount to be spent on summer fireworks for tourists in Canada’s capital, Ottawa. Although there has

---

16 A sampling of newspaper articles includes editorials in Kahtou, the Wawatay News, the Ottawa Citizen, the Globe and Mail and under the bylines of Ronald Wright, Jo Anne Williams Bennett and Roy MacGregor.
been no government explanation of the reasons for cutting these particular programmes, Wawatay staff have developed their own interpretations after meetings with government representatives.

Throughout the history of Native media, groups have withstood cuts and freezes from the ministerial level. At the programme level, as noted above, they have become very adept at juggling funds from different government departments. As seen, above, there were limitations on how much tinkering they could do. These cuts signal a shift in the relationship between government and governed.

In late spring, 1990, James MacDonald, the regional director of the Department of the Secretary of State (DSOS), demonstrated the earlier paternalist approach to Native people at a meeting in Sioux Lookout. His intention was to assess how much Wawatay and other Native groups know about other sources of funding. A spokesman for Wawatay said:

We told them we know how to access federal funds. We told them about different ways we do it that they didn't even know about (Fine, 1990).

Other Native groups were angrier. The National Aboriginal Communications Societies, a co-ordinating group, has refused to meet with the task force set up by INAC.
At another meeting in 1990, DSOS Minister Gerry Weiner, commented that the Conservatives were so low in the polls, criticism would have no effect, as they could go no lower. More telling was his comment that the Native groups did not have the support of the "public ... your support is even lower than it was for the Japanese", which a Wawatay manager interpreted to mean a lack of calls and letters from the mainstream of white voters. (Personal interview, Martin, 1990).

This arrogant approach to marginal groups may also reflect the move to the time-based media of telecommunications, and in particular to the use of polls. Rather than creating a broad consensus made up of territories of support, the Conservative government appears to be relying on formal and informal polls to make policy decisions at the ministerial level. Nevertheless, their overall strategy is very clear. Gerry Weiner and his task force reveal the government's appropriation of the concept of self-reliance: it will force groups that have previously been publicly funded to compete in the marketplace for support. The transfer of this concept to Wawatay is already in evidence.

---

17 Japanese Canadians had sought redress for being evicted from their lands and businesses during the second European war. They won compensation on the eve of the last election.
The more drastic impact of these cuts has been the ending of maintenance funds for HF trail radios. The trail radios have always been a priority for the northern Board who plan to continue their traditional lobbying process, sending elders to speak to the Minister in Ottawa. The other strategy to restore the service points to a new imprint on the operations -- commercialization. Wawatay has very reluctantly raised the charges for renting the sets and may have to impose a maintenance fee. They are also considering buying the company that manufactures trail radio sets and assembling them in Sioux Lookout.

There are contending interpretations of this story as well. Lawrence Martin, executive director of Wawatay, reluctantly embraces the new entrepreneurial strategy, hoping the government will recognize that Wawatay is following their lead. Wawatay senior management is actively looking for entrepreneurial opportunities in the communications and telecommunications fields. They have formed a new corporation, "Wabun Ojekiwish", or "Morning Star", whose board of directors is made up of a majority of staff members, not representatives from northern communities.

The corporation will continue operating some of the present commercial ventures begun in the last three years: a recording studio; a video production unit for non-broadcast contracts; and the publication of an atlas and dictionary.
They are considering options to administer most of the new communications technologies that are coming into the region, through the federal government's Canadian Aboriginal Economic Strategy.

This managerial shift has encountered some reaction among staff and board members. Within the last year, and recently exacerbated by the cuts, there has been some resistance to management's stream-lining, which included the lay-offs of several people. Staff have objected, saying this is not the "Indian way", those people should have been given another chance. They got support from the Board, who put management on probation. During the re-evaluation after the cuts, there has been a debate over management's insistence on the priority being "productivity": the contending view has said that the priority is the maintenance of Indian language and culture. More research is necessary to analyse this emerging conflict over the organization's leadership.

---

18 The possibilities include: the distribution of distance education programmes via the TVO legislative channel; purchasing the federal government's old radar base in Sioux Lookout to start up a local newspaper in competition with the present non-Native one; and purchasing a regional country music FM station.
Wrapping Up: Looking Ahead to Further Research

This enquiry has described the different interests competing for the broadcasting space at the margins. I have described how the discourse has been shaped by various forces, especially how the potential for transformation has been limited structurally by the conventional rules of procedure of broadcasting on three levels: at the national network, the production unit and the audience relation.

The definition of the margins these projects occupy has changed at all three levels of interaction. No longer are the producers and audience of these regions so remote from the influence of national communications systems and their institutions of government and broadcasters: "we are not so far from Delhi as we were ten years ago." In this section, I summarize some of the main themes that point to further research.

Although commercialization has added a new wrinkle, it has not changed the continuing dialectic between the centralizing influence of new communications media and the resistance to it at the margins. The intention of national governments in both India and Canada remains to integrate the people at the margins. Commercialization has changed that process from a spatial integration of territories, to one of markets. For broadcasting groups at the margins, this
may mean that the recognition in national government policy of their rights to broadcast may be drowned out within the multiplicity of other messages and channels.

Some commentators would probably argue that the government intended to contain any resistance to this integration policy within these new communications institutions (Dyck, 1985, Tanner, 1983, Pendakur, 1988). Instead, the resistance has spilled out: this enquiry has demonstrated some of the ways the indigenous groups in NAN and Kheda have adapted the media, rupturing long-held rules of both broadcasting and of the dominant society in the process (See also Stiles, 1986, Koebberling, 1988, Bhatia and Karnik, 1985).

Both locally and internationally, Kheda and Wawatay have garnered a great deal of support, creating a space for themselves and the possibility of other alternative operations. No longer is the national or commercial broadcaster the only option: while the new broadcasters will have difficulty being heard among the multiplicity of new channels, those that tune in will see greater authority given to their concerns and self-representations.

Other possibilities are also emerging. The experiments into interactive technologies of the 1970s led to the advancement of hardware which could be adapted for community-run media. These include the local radio transmitters and video
satellite up-links introduced into several communities by Wawatay, and the community radio operations through All-India Radio. Further research is necessary to trace the course of these new transfers.

The resistance to the conventional rules of broadcasting is most obvious at the level of production, as noted in the two case studies. New voices are emerging, speaking in languages that have never before been broadcast, and also using very different narratives, both in structural form and in content. More research is necessary from indigenous people or those who are fully fluent in those languages and cultures to analyse the significance of these adaptations.

In terms of audience relations, I have noted new levels of involvement and uses of the media. At this level of relations, other alternatives are emerging as groups and popular organizations at the local level begin to use these media for their organizational work. They influence groups such as Wawatay and DECU in formal and informal ways: through demanding more access, as the Chiefs did; and through introducing other ways of using the media, as did the Self-Employed Women’s Association of Ahmedabad.

19 There are already some stories emerging that point out differences between the ways aboriginal broadcasters are documenting aboriginal struggles over self-government and/or land claims. Note especially the participation of the Native press in the national campaign for continued post-secondary funding and most recently their participation in the covering of the blockades in the summer of 1990.
Since the budget cuts in Canada, Native organizations have become more aware of the necessity of these communications societies which may lead to a greater level of support and participation from them in the future. More research is necessary to evaluate this relation between broadcasters and audience.

In the next two sections, I summarize the future directions by presenting recommendations for research and policy.

**Recommendations for Future Research**

1. Further research is necessary to assess the ways popular and non-governmental organizations are adapting radio and television.

2. This research could specifically address the ways that popular and non-governmental organizations are using the networks established by the Native Communications societies in Canada; and the Development Communications Units within Doordarshan and All-India Radio in India.
3. Research could also address the ways that indigenous communications patterns and leadership are changing since the introduction of modern media. A case study in Canada might focus on the use of radio and television by the traditional elders and chiefs.

4. Discourse analysis is needed to analyse the new uses of language within the production process and in programmes themselves. For example, a study might conduct a narrative analysis of new programmes.

All the above studies require researchers who are knowledgeable in the indigenous cultures and languages.

5. Further research is necessary to explore how media production units work, specifically addressing the ways they act out their understandings of themselves as professional journalists and also how they relate to their audiences. A case study might compare the institution of journalists at Wawatay and the DCU of All-India Radio in Kota.

6. Research is also necessary to analyse management roles and relationships within these new media institutions. This could take the form of an analysis of technology transfer, comparing the organizational culture of Kheda, Wawatay and
the DCU at Nagpur. It could also examine the heritage of "Sesame Street", comparing its transfer to ISRO/DECU, Wawatay and the Inuit Broadcasting Corporation.

**Recommendation for Policy**

1) Based on a consideration of the evidence, I have one comprehensive recommendation. Throughout this study I have noted the constraints placed on Aboriginal broadcasting by national communications and economic development policy. This study supports the necessity of indigenous people creating systems of communications relevant to their own knowledge systems and systems of leadership. Thus, this study concludes that any research, assessment or negotiation of Aboriginal land claims or self-government also include the right to control and operate communications systems.
Appendix 1:

**Significant Dates for the Development Education Communications Unit, Kheda District**

1958  The Phillips Company brings television equipment to trade exhibition in New Delhi.

1959  Educational television experiment begins in Delhi.

1965  Government mixes entertainment programming with social and education programmes.

1967  "Krishi Darshan" - the Pilot Rural Agricultural Television Project begins.

1975  Satellite Education Television Experiment conducted in India in 2400 villages in six states via US A6 satellite.


Transmitter set up in village of Pij, Kheda District, linked to ISRO studio 50 km north in Ahmedabad via microwave.

1983  DECU set up as separate unit from ISRO.

1985  Doordarshan moves transmitter to city of Madras. Hunger strikes in Kheda District.

1987  Transmitter restored in Pij.

1987  Development Communications Units set up within Doordarshan and All-India Radio

1989  Rajiv Gandhi Congress-I Party defeated in national elections
Appendix 2:

Significant Dates for Wawatay Native Communications

1973  Wawatay is established by the Chiefs of the Treaty Nine area.

1974  Wawatay is incorporated.

Wawatay purchases the rights to "Keesis" from the Sioux Lookout Friendship Centre and renames it "Wawatay News". The first issue comes out in January of that year.

Big Trout Lake applies for its own non-profit community radio station, CFTL.

1976  Hermes Satellite launched. Inuit in Northern Quebec begin experimenting with interactive broadcasting.

1978  Wawatay participates in the Hermes satellite experiment, where four communities are linked up in an interactive network.

1982  Wawatay Radio receives funding from NNBAP.


1984-1985  10 radio broadcasters trained: five placed at WRN headquarters in Sioux Lookout, five as community-based reporters

1984  Wawatay Radio goes on air from the Sioux Lookout Headquarters to 22 communities by means of a sub-carrier on the satellite transponder leased by TV Ontario.

1985-1986  10 broadcasters trained, three for Cree Radio, seven for Wawatay TV.

1986  Cree Radio opens in Moose Factory.

1987  The premiere broadcast of "Keenawint" on Wawatay TV in January.


1988  Cree TV Centre opens in Moose Factory.
1989  Total hours of Cree and Oji-Cree language programming from production centres in Sioux Lookout and Moose Factory: 90 minutes of TV, 22 hours of Radio.

1990  Native Communications Programme eliminated. NNBAP contribution to Wawatay cut by $600,000.
### Appendix 3:

**Wawatay Training Expenditures**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total $ on training</th>
<th>CEIC/other training $</th>
<th>NNBAP/NCP income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1983/84</td>
<td>282,100</td>
<td>201,300</td>
<td>736,200 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>472,600</td>
<td>322,600</td>
<td>791,900 (19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>270,300</td>
<td>50,300</td>
<td>930,400 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>878,700</td>
<td>424,600</td>
<td>2,154,000 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88</td>
<td>780,000</td>
<td>431,600</td>
<td>1,920,400 (18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals** 2,683,700 1,430,400 6,532,900 (19%)

* 95% of the $1.43 million Wawatay received between 1983 and 1988 came from CEIC.

** The percentage of $ spent on training that comes from the production and service income is in brackets.

Appendix 4:

Map of Wawatay Native Communications Society

Reprinted with permission of Lougheed and Associates
Appendix 5:

Map of Native Communications Societies of Canada

Reprinted with permission of Lougheed and Associates
References


Bennett, Jo Anne Williams. "The most unkind cuts: Topies $3.4-million trimming will have crushing impact on natives", The Ottawa Citizen, March 6, 1990.


Farrell, Siobhan, "Literacy and the Canadian Inuit", Communication and the Canadian North. Montreal: Department of Communications Studies, Concordia University, 1983.


Real, Michael. "Demythologizing Media; Recent Writings in Critical and Institutional Theory"; Review and Criticism, CSMC, 1986.


Interviews


