THE HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE, IN SOCIAL SCIENCE:
THE CASE OF ERICH FROMM

by

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation is an examination of Erich Fromm's contribution to humanist social science and a discussion of this contribution. It is suggested that Fromm's major contribution is not accessible to social scientists in its directly apparent form. As a serious contribution to social science the immediately apparent meanings, of Fromm's ideas which are rendered at first reading of his writings, are quite 'deceptive.' This deceptive quality in Fromm's opus has tended to result in a number of critical articles and books on Fromm which stress his contributions as being that of an ethical philosopher rather than as a social scientist. This type of judgement has serious implications for the present situation whereby Fromm's work is generally regarded to be on the periphery of "institutionalized social science" conceptualizations and consequently for advancement of the more recent development toward theoretical integration of the various disciplines which come under the rubric of the social sciences (i.e., sociology, social psychology, political science and anthropology).

The task of this dissertation has been to extricate a systematic thematic structure in Fromm's opus, through a hermeneutic. Two propositions underlie the interpretation of Fromm's work presented in this study. The first is that for Fromm humanism is essentially a vehicle for the realization of selfhood for all mankind, where selfhood implies the realization of man's powers. The second proposition is that Fromm's work involves a continuous integration of social-psychology and
sociology. A survey of literature, on contemporary developments in the social sciences, indicate a gradual reawakening of interest in the idea of incorporation of a humanist perspective in contemporary social science. Such an incorporation tends to be increasingly viewed as a means to (a) resolving the problems of an overly positivistic empiricism in social science and, (b) providing the basis for the systematic integration, at the level of meta theory between the social psychological and the structural level of analysis in the social sciences.

The most significant conclusion drawn from the interpretative scheme of the study is that Fromm's work as a whole rests on a conception of social science as an attempted synthesis of the 'key' ideas of Marx and Freud. The study presents a discussion of themes integrated to form a 'hexagon' along the following lines: a concept of essence; a sociological diachrony, in which the concept of character is central; the concepts of power and humanism; an anthropology which is constituted of a philosophical anthropology and ethnography; and a concept of self. These themes also provide the foci of orientation for the various chapters of the work.

In terms of the foregoing, Fromm's conceptions of social character, his formulations on the nature of man and his articulation of good and evil are substantive categories of "a second order" predicated upon the earlier mentioned conception of social science. This conclusion is in contrast to most of Fromm's critics who belong to two groups: psychologists in search of a theory of socio-psycho pathology, and moral philosophers. The former group has tended to ignore the
problem of a humanistic social science, while the latter group has emphasized the significance of Fromm's ethical postulates without developing the interconnection between ethical postulates and the infra-structural assumptions of social science, and empirical concepts such as power, character, and so on. It is asserted in this study that either treatment does not give full scope to the potentialities of Fromm's empirical categories of character and social structure. This dissertation is partly based on the proposition that when Fromm's theoretical conception of social science is extricated from the body of his writings we find a cogent argument for and a model of humanistic social science, as well as a more ramified concept of social character. In the first instance we find a systematic critique against much of contemporary social science. In the second instance we find a view of social character with affinities to Weber's 'ideal type' view of social science. Moreover, in those terms the concepts of 'good' and 'evil' are conclusions of Fromm's work and not conditions derived from his 'theoretical' analysis of human nature, as so many of his critics argue.

Throughout the study attention is focused, where appropriate on the weaknesses of Fromm's formulations, most of which are substantive, for example his analysis of character and of power necessitate some reformulation. Nevertheless his major contribution has been the call for reflectivity in social science theorizing, as an ingredient of the humanistic approach.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The ideas in this manuscript are the product of a long history of search for a synthetic format for expression of a range of analytical, theoretical and practical problems which come under the rubric of the social sciences. While clear identification of such a format is impossible at this stage of development of the task, I have developed a clearer view of the centrality of a humanistic perspective to such a format. I am indebted to Dr. Ernest Becker for encouragement and guidance, in an area in which one could easily become lost, when mainly lofty intentions prevail. Dr. Karl Peter acted as an effective 'sounding board' for many of my ideas and provided criticism for specific sections of the work. Dr. Jerald Zaslove has (worked) provided consistent advice over the last two years, through long hours of patient, probing discussions. Finally, I am indebted to a 'non-academic' who listened to ideas which were too 'speculative' but pointed directions which I could not traverse.
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THE HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE, IN SOCIAL SCIENCE:
THE CASE OF ERICH FROMM
INTRODUCTION

Erich Fromm's life work can be summarized in the question: What is the nature of evil, and how is it possible to develop a systematic analysis of evil that is at once sociological and clinical? Such a concern is by no means the sole prerogative of theologians and moral philosophies. In fact, such a concern can be metaphorically expressed as one side of a coin, the other side is the concern with 'self' which has been the undergirding of social science from its earliest formulation.

Such a bold assertion in a study dedicated to the assertion that Fromm is a humanist social scientist, cannot unfortunately, move directly to the examination of Fromm's substantive formulations because existing in contemporary social sciences are particular conceptions of what constitutes social science. In the 'institutionalized' paradigms of social science the conceptions of what constitutes social science is at radical variance with the implicit conception, of science, of Erich Fromm. Some discussion of the methodological features of academic social science, via the paradox of essence and existence, though a 'detour' is an essential part of this dissertation. We will attempt to demonstrate, after a presentation of Fromm's conception of social science, that part of the reason for the present malaise in sociological methodology and theoretical development, exists in the "dichotomization" of essence and existence with respect to the problem of human nature. We will show that in the case of both grand theory schemes of
the Parsonian variety and in 'abstracted empiricism' they are caught in the misconception of a contradiction between essence and existence. The significance of a humanist social science, such as that of Fromm's, is only adequately expressed against the background of a critique of academic social science. But some methodologists and 'philosophers of social science' (which is, by the way, a curious misnomer) have been making the claims asserted here for a long time. In have in mind writers such as Baraun and Morris Cohen. Writings such as Erich Fromm's are kept on the periphery of academic social science for the simple reason that they are viewed as "value-laden," prescriptive and so on. There are, as later chapters will show, serious weaknesses in some of Erich Fromm's substantive empirical formulations; but the grounds on which humanism have been excluded are very weak. Morris Cohen's comments on the nature of a prioris justify reiteration of such an assertion. Briefly, Cohen points out a priori principles whose substances tend to assert uniformities in nature, are methodologic, assisting scientists in the organization of factual knowledge. But Cohen also warns that the substance or content of the a priori should be as such as not to shut out all issues making for the growth of science. Much will be made in this dissertation of the analysis outlined by Cohen with specific reference to the nature of the social sciences—others prior to Cohen have made these statements but in an undifferentiated manner, or without specific reference to the social sciences. We will extend Cohen's analysis in order to attack the false separation between formal theoretical knowledge and factual knowledge, which underlie the rejection
of the concept of human nature which is a very central heuristic device of a scheme such as Fromm's. We will also discuss the ways in which Fromm deals with the concept of human nature in terms of 'essence and existence,' implicitly rejecting either their rigid separation, or non-differentiation in contemporary social science. One example of confused non-differentiation exists in the work of Talcott Parsons. The specifics of this non-differentiation need not delay us here. It is dealt with in chapter four.

We will show that Fromm's aim at its 'highest' level, is clinical and structural evil, that is to show to what extent pathological forces are in some senses inherent in man, and to what extent it is institutionally determined was 'resolved' at two levels. The first was by dissecting human nature into essence and existence and stressing essence as "negatively defined," that is as 'freedom to,' and existence is viewed in terms of man's essential nature, his needs which are partly socially directed but not socially given. At another level we see Fromm attempting to integrate psychoanalysis, sociology and a specific type of anthropology. The more obvious concept of social character is part of an empirical framework which lies, then, midway between these two levels. In other words the concept of social character is part of a conceptualized diachrony, and the two cannot be divorced without some distortion. To sum up what has been said in the foregoing paragraphs, Fromm's conception of social science tends to reject the divorce between purely normative and 'toughminded' social science, as providing any viable direction for our understanding of evil. The first
is too relativistic, the second has an implicit conception of human nature, though overtly denying this, which is unhistorical. Fromm accepts the principle of alternativism as a way out, and the latter is the foundation of his humanistic social science. Thus human nature is made up of essence and existence as qualities. Fromm assumes an existential position which most resembles that of Otto Rank in its existential leanings, stressing however, the largely unconscious aspects of the psychological consequences of man's being expelled into the world and displaced from it against his will--this is true of the species for Fromm. But Fromm also stresses the historical aspect, in the notion of contradiction and of ontogenetic development, and of socialization. This section is also outlined in my discussion "Fromm the Proposition of Human Nature to the Theory of Human Character" and the section following it "An Outline of Fromm's Theory of Human Character"; both in chapter two.

The link between the work on human nature and the work on social character, that is between 'presupposition,' in the specific sense adopted in this dissertation, and sociological analysis requires an "anthropological centre." This is provided in chapter five. But this whole discussion so far gives the impression that all this is quite obvious in Erich Fromm's writings, and this is not the case. So perhaps this is the point at which to introduce the author's conception or approach to Fromm.
Hermeneutics is briefly defined as the science of interpretation. But it is interpretation according to given rules or patterns. It is an interpretation which facilitates or 'presides over' an exegesis "... that is, over the interpretation of a particular text, or a group of signs that may be viewed as a text." Since there is no simple theory of hermeneutics, Ricoeur suggests that it is concerned with a mapping of the area of 'symbols' or double meanings and the areas in which the various textual interpretations of a subject confront one another, short of a theory of language, we shall term our attempted approach at interpretation of Fromm's humanistic social science, hermeneutic. There is one further criterion which justifies our use of the term: a hermeneutic is an attempt to construct a single text at a level other than that given by the author. In this dissertation our concern is not generally with placing Fromm within the tradition of humanistic social science in general. This is so far two reasons, first because Fromm does not explicitly propose a theoretical program for his view of social science theory, secondly because he admits of no philosophical traditions. There is a further reason for a hermeneutics and that is between a first reading of Fromm's writings and a reflection on certain 'key' signs or use of terms, double meanings emerge. The concern here is not with the 'meanings' of his writings given at a first reading, but with the underlying 'meanings,' which provide, as this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate, a single systematic exegesis of Fromm's writings.
The discourse in this dissertation then and the adopted problematic can be more adequately criticized in terms of the form of interpretation given Fromm. The conclusions from the interpretative approach adopted here: does not regard Fromm's 'thought,' his conception of social science as developing chronologically, over the years. Some of the more important concepts and insights appear to have been developed in the 1960's as well as in the 1930's, for example his concept of menotheistic deities are among his earliest and later writings, "The Dogma of Christ" (1930) and You Shall be as Gods (1966), nevertheless they constitute two of the main components of Fromm's anthropology, and so on. Nevertheless the interpretative schema which emerges at the end of this study is integrated and provide us with an alternative view of the problematics usually associated with Fromm's writings, and an alternative interpretation of humanism to Fromm's apparent meaning.

It is with the foregoing approach to interpretation that the first chapter in the study is entitled "Erich Fromm's Concept of Social Science." Within the body of his writings his discussion of Marx and Freud in 1962 provide a base upon which to reconstruct a problematic which is antinomous in relation to the interpretation, given, on first reading. This also allows us to pursue antecedent philosophical strands of thought, rarely explicated by Fromm himself, and so elucidate an assemblage of key terms and concepts which together lead to the problematic and Fromm's solution of it.4

We turn now to the admitted intellectual traditions of Fromm and the senses in which they are related to this study. As will become
clearer in the first section of the first chapter of this study, Fromm has a grounding in at least two broad and not always clearly defined boundaries, both of which are indicies of his particular theoretical formulations. The first and most important is what Paul A. Robinson has termed the 'Freudian left.' The second, much less clearly articulated tradition is the American liberal tradition of the early 1950's of which a good example is perhaps David Riesman whose studies of character were clearly influenced by Fromm. There are two further statements in Robinson's study with which I am in general agreement: the first is that Fromm's relationship to the Freudian left is ambivalent compared to Robinson's three subjects, to the extent that although Fromm stands to the left of Freud he is a "sexual conservative." Fromm then is a left Freudian who is ambivalent to the thesis that at the level of individual psychology and the evolution of civilization there is real significance for sexuality, but he has attempted to explore the radical potential in Freud. More importantly, what Fromm has in common with the Freudian left is the anthropological ideas which underlie such a connection and the elaboration and development of this element. For the individual sexuality, Fromm eschews, he substitutes an emphasis on the matriarchal and patriarchal principles in this anthropology. And this has all the advantages and disadvantages from which any 'sexual constancy' factor would suffer. In the final analysis, what Fromm, Marcuse, etc. have in common is a relentless extension of the left Freudian elements for selfhood, or individual liberation. The second theme in Robinson is that Marcuse and Fromm believe that Freud and Marx
were revolutionaries of comparable stature. But as is obvious from the later polemic between both men what Fromm meant by the radicalism of Freud and Marcuse's meaning differ markedly.

While Fromm disassociated himself from the 'pan-sexualism' of the Freudian left he compensated his work in another area, apart from individuation and freedom, that is, the development of a comprehensive theory of society, and particularly a study of authoritarianism and Nazism with the Institute for Social Research in the 1930's. There is little doubt that Fromm exercised some influence on the early members of the Frankfurt Institute, especially Theodor Adorno and the former's early work *Escape From Freedom*, bear traces of this interchange. Robinson suggests that Fromm's formulations of authoritarianism and Nazism were highly influenced by Wilhelm Reich's earlier work *The Mass Psychology of Fascism*, though Fromm's study appears to attribute greater value to Reich's *Charakteranalyse* (1933). At the same time Fromm's consistent refusal to be dubbed a neo-Freudian is probably correct. There are two reasons for this: the first is that his longest co-operative intellectual ventures outside of his work in Mexico seemed to have been with the transplanted Frankfurt School which contained a mixed group of social scientists, and his work in the founding of Dissent. The second is Fromm's early independence from many of his fellow exiles. In the first instance there was a strong emphasis on the crystallizing of ideas through theoretical concepts. Henry Pachter explains Fromm's 'exile' to Mexico in terms of early transcendence of his original intellectual heritage in Europe.
This takes us to the second important influence in Fromm's intellectual career. Fromm like many of the younger refugee intellectuals has been highly influenced by the American political and intellectual environment, which was a more consistent adaptation given their social democratic politics in Germany. In terms of the political environment of the 1930's to 1950's, Fromm like Pachter had an ambivalent relationship to the 'Establishment,' they were not German nationalists, critical of aspects of America's domestic policy, but certainly not anti-American on America's foreign politics. This posture is best expressed in two of Fromm's works The Sane Society and May Man Prevail. In these terms Marcuse's political critique of Fromm is a valid one, understood from the perspective of the radical youth politics of the 1960's. A politics which is anti-colonialist and more clearly Marxist compared to the environment of fear, intimidation and subsequent clouding of ideas with which 'Marxist' thinkers had to contend in the McCarthyite era. Erich Fromm's humanism then has been shaped by a number of forces including direct experience of two World Wars, which reinforced his rejection of nationalism and coercion as forces of social change. At the same time Fromm has expressed his concept of the self and of alienation not through a simple re-interpretation of historical events, but as will become clear in this study, a complex theoretical paradigm which whatever its weaknesses, has few parallels, in contemporary social sciences.


4. These key terms and their alternative hidden meaning are presented in the conclusion of the study.


6. Robinson's precise terminology is that Fromm is a "rabid sexual conservative" (p.5). This is a play on words, Fromm dropped the emphasis on genital sexuality with his rejection of the "biological organicism". There is no evidence to support the inference that he dropped the latter because of his rejection of the former. But like Reich and Marcuse, Fromm is a political activist as well, abandoning the 'detached', clinical preoccupation of Freud.

7. One must of necessity exclude a personal biography of Erich Fromm, who of all the radical psychoanalyses and German refugee tradition has paradoxically remained relatively anonymous. Little is known about Fromm's personal life apart from the usual information on the dust-jackets of his books and what Fromm has himself chosen to reveal in his writings. Neither critiques nor intellectual biographies including *In the Name of Life* (1971) provide precise information on his background. I have arrived at the conclusion that this "privacy" of Fromm is related to his explicit dislike of group therapy (which involves sharing of personal information) and Fromm's commitment to individualism in the sense of 'personal liberty'. Within the context of the mass, public, market oriented society which Fromm has characterized as America, it is difficult not to share this bias. At any rate, Fromm was born in Germany in 1900, the only child of an orthodox Jewish family (pampered by his own admission). He also had a thorough education in the Old Testament and Talmud, and Jewish tradition, by three rabbinical scholars (Ludwig Krause, Mehemia Nobel and Salman Rabinkow). His ideas were also influenced by Hermann Cohen, a Kantian philosopher. Fromm studied sociology and psychology at Heidelberg, Frankfurt and Munich as well as the Psychoanalytic Institute of Berlin. He has been in clinical practice since 1926. Fromm emigrated to the U.S.A. in 1932 and taught at various colleges including, the New School for Social Research, Columbia University, and as head of the William Alanson White Institute, which he helped found, as well
as the National University of Mexico. He is now partially retired and resides at Cuernaxaca, Mexico.


10 Ibid., pp. 39-40. Pachter has mentioned in his essay, the political environment during McCarthyite days in which the New School of Social Research had to survive, ie. by the use of "Aesopian" language in which the use of the word 'alienation' meant capitalism and reason, revolution. More that for all Fromm's concern he has not published a systematic critique of McCarthy, as the more conservative Parsons did. Though the former has made frequent references to McCarthyism.
CHAPTER I

ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

What holds true for psychology holds true also for sociology. If I am not concerned with society, then my thinking about society has no focus; it is nothing more than a blind groping, even if the blindness is hidden by a collection of data and impressive statistics.¹

The foregoing is an apt summary of Erich Fromm's conception of social science. The statement is also significant because it is taken from the single work in which that writer could be said to explicitly articulate his "philosophy of the human sciences."

In *Beyond The Chains Of Illusion*, Fromm articulates three aspects of an intellectual position which is fundamental to all of his work, regardless of changes in many of his substantive ideas. First of all Fromm believed that much of sociology and conventional psychology in current times have not penetrated beyond the "illusions of reality" to some of the core features of social reality. Secondly, the implication emerging from the first point is that until the social sciences penetrate beneath these "illusions," they would lack a firm commitment to the moral ideas crucial to humanity's "ultimate" welfare. That is to say Fromm refuses to divorce moral philosophy from social science. Thirdly, the title of Fromm's book suggests that Marx and Freud influenced some of Fromm's more basic perspectives on man and society.

I will discuss these three points and their related implications for a "radical sociology." I will suggest that in so far as we can grant

¹
that these ideas taken together constitute Fromm's conception of social sciences, his widely discussed theories of the individual and of human nature can only be adequately established and criticized within the framework of such a conception of the social sciences. The approach being suggested here will proceed at differing levels of complexity and will attempt to unravel, in a tour de force, some of the intricacies of Fromm's thought.

There is a radical difference between the approach to an understanding of Fromm's work attempted in this chapter and some of the recent critiques of Fromm in English. Here I am asserting that Fromm is just a strongly a social scientist as he is a moral philosopher and psychoanalyst. Moreover I am suggesting that from this vantage point his moral philosophy is a "second order strategy" which can only be adequately appreciated when Fromm is viewed as a social scientist. That is to say Fromm's ethical system is predicated upon his outlook on social science, the former is dependent on the extent to which Fromm has developed a philosophy of the social sciences.

It is clear from his work that Fromm himself does not separate clearly between his moral philosophical assertions and his epistemological and social scientific postulates. It is the underlying rationales for this approach which require re-examination. Some of the reviews and critiques of Fromm's work have tended to ignore the distinction altogether, or alternatively to look at the development of his thought chronologically. The weight of discussion in this chapter will delineate Fromm's conception of social science by concentrating on two of Fromm's
works--Beyond The Chains Of Illusion (1962) and The Revolution Of Hope (1968). Part of the rationale for the first choice has already been made. One additional point is that Fromm is more reliant on Freud than he is on Marx. The rationale for choice of the second work is its polemical quality and Fromm's implicit but vital statements on scientific and technological knowledge. When examined the outlines of a radical epistemology can be recognized. The position outlined here is a departure from Schaar's analysis of the significance of Fromm's work for social science.  

John Schaar's otherwise authoritative critique of Fromm suffers from a number of shortcomings. First of all Schaar suggests that Fromm's rationale for his own moral philosophy rests on his view that "scientific knowledge of man is inadequate." Secondly in stressing Fromm's "attitude" to contemporary social science Schaar does not present an adequate statement of social science, and therefore underestimates the fundamentals of that social science, and in the final analysis the real power of Fromm's critique of social science. For example Schaar summarizes his analysis by suggesting that Fromm is searching for a middle position, between naturalism and supernaturalism, in the form of "normative humanism" as his answer to the question of the nature of evil. Schaar suggests that Fromm uses the rhetoric of social science but it "clutters" his analysis. Fromm is allegedly skeptical of social science assumptions of man. Further Schaar presents the following summary of what contemporary social science is all about:
Modern social science studies how men live and what they do. Perhaps when we have collected enough behavioural data and observed enough connections among them we shall have the measure of man himself.

Schaar goes on to suggest that contemporary social science is primarily concerned with the "public things about man," that this kind of social science has become uncritical. I suggest this is only part of the case.

I will discuss the two foregoing criticisms of Schaar and my own uneasiness with Schaar's view of social science, after which I will attempt a more coherent and systematic statement of Fromm's conception of social science. If we take Schaar's just point, it is by no means clear from his book what Schaar means when he suggests that Fromm regards modern social science knowledge as 'inadequate.' It is quite valid that empirical sociological knowledge of the 'public things,' of man's merely public roles does not tell us enough about man. But this is a truism.

It is clear from Edward Shils' recent authoritative analysis that sociology was from its earliest inception a "heterogeneous aggregate of topics." From Shils' account the concern with fundamental moral issues is only one aspect of the sociological tradition. Shils also relates that the institutionalization of modern sociology varied in time and quality in different parts of Europe and the United States. Louis Althusser has a more scathing attack on the contemporary pretentions of much of the social sciences engaged in and devoted to "precise pragmatic interests, but having as their only unity a "technical practice." Althusser's criticisms may have underrated the possibilities for ideological critiques of contemporary theory and practice within the
specialized area known as the sociology of knowledge. In less pessimistic
tones Irving Louis Horowitz concludes that:

... The rationalist belief in human life as a value to be preserved
conditions social science in a unique way. For here alone values
and human interests are as much factors of analysis as descriptions
of processes.\textsuperscript{11}

Modern sociology is not all about the public things about man, nor is
this all that Fromm is saying. What Fromm is saying is that contemporary
social science has tended to narrow its focus to a very superficial view
of social reality. Moreover that whatever the substantive weaknesses of
"early social science" its founding concern was a moral one. The more
or less exclusive focus on "role theory"--as man is intricately inter-
connected connected to the wider technological and materialistic develop-
ment of the wider society from the Middle Ages onwards--has had as a
consequence modern social sciences' abandonment of its basic responsi-
bility to the "system man."\textsuperscript{12} In short Fromm is calling for morally
responsible social scientists and a social science dedicated to "life"
rather than to "death." Fromm's call is reiterated in the third book of
a triology by Ernest Becker:

... the science of man in society must be a superordinate value
science; one which has opted for human progress, and which has a
clear and comprehensive, compelling idea of what constitutes such
progress. The task of such a science would be the incessant imple-
mentation of human well being.\textsuperscript{13}

Fromm's concern then is typical of a whole corpus of work in the
social science. It is with regard to the dilemma which face social
scientists and the choices made by them to resolve this dilemma. His
critique of the nature and value of social scientific knowledge must be
understood within the framework of that critique. Robert Friedrichs in
his recent book has put the problem as follows:

The activity of sociologists as scientists, . . . , are always and in
principle nested in a larger frame that includes the intrasubjective,
the unique and the existential. And it is because we are never able
to extricate ourselves from that context, even when we take on the
"role" of sociologist as scientist, that the image of man resident
within the rhetoric of science may serve as a powerful tool in the
service of a more fundamentally and humane paradigm.14

The foregoing statement disproves Schaar's theorie that Fromm's
model of man finds its legitimacy not primarily in his social science
but in his moral philosophy. Schaar states:

Fromm's real answer to the questions, how do we know a common core
of human qualities exists, and if it does exist, what are its con-
tents, is a philosophic position, rather than a scientific conclu-
sion.15 [Italics mine]

Schaar's statement implies that a scientific epistemology which could
possibly develop a "common core of human qualities" would be devoid of
philosophic assumptions. This is of course not possible and at best
Schaar's statement betrays a misconception of science whether natural or
social. This problem is well discussed by Horowitz in his analysis of
the philosophic presuppositions of pragmatism, positivism, and dialectics
as scientific methodologies. Horowitz concludes with the view that a
"value free" scientific methodology--witness the development of
positivism--became increasingly sterile.16 One of the few portions of
Schaar's work in which he attempts to posit a position of his own renders his own conception of social science very close to that of the logical empiricists who assert that a positing of values in science is only possible when scientific knowledge is complete, since such a science does not exist knowledge can be judged only on the basis of its adequacy in a particular situation. This conclusion is derived from Schaar's critique of Fromm's attempt to derive a common core of values from history. Now history is for Schaar a record of "reactions of men to the conditions of their lives." [Italics mine]

In contrast to Schaar's rather limited view of Fromm's contribution to and commitment to social science, Friedrichs' analysis puts the problem in an alternative perspective. Friedrichs' statements summarize the problem which modern theorists faced with the system paradigm of T. Parsons and the Marxian based conflict paradigm; have as their ultimate problem. Put generally the implications of the system paradigm is toward the "priestly mode," whereas the implications of the conflict paradigm tend toward the prophetic mode. Friedrichs suggests:

The scientist as priest would address his professional and communal life to confronting, evermore intimately the reliability ordered core of nature and natural man and would seek to mediate between it and the flux that is the evident world of the layman. . . . Anything that would threaten reliability in the precipitation of order--the unique, the private, the absolute--must be relinquished as heresy. Indeed from this point of view the "prophetic" mode is the focal threat, for it is dedicated to change, not order; risk not reliability; "subjective" standards, not "objective" perception.

Of the "prophetic" mode to which Fromm, by his refocusing on the alienation concept of early Marx, is viewed as having contributed to the paradigmatic dichotomy in sociology, Friedrichs has this to say:
Simply put, it means only that those enamoured of the prophetic posture find their special forte to be criticism rather than construction.  

Whatever doubts can be raised about Friedrichs' analysis of the "prophetic mode"--and one could argue that at the general theoretical level of sociology it "constructs" by suggesting what kind of perspectives sociology "should" adopt--it is clear that what Fromm means by the statement that sociology should penetrate beneath the "illusions of reality" is much more than is expressed in Schaar's use of the term "inadequate."

Sociology and the "Illusions of Reality"

At another level of analysis Erich Fromm attempts to stand on the shoulders of Marx and Freud in order to penetrate the "illusions of reality." The main assertion in this section of the work is that Fromm's conception of social science is primarily grounded in his interpretations of and attempted synthesis of Marx and Freud, rather than primarily in the Judaic-Christian and Zen-Buddhist religious traditions. The former conclusion acquires legitimacy when we distinguish Fromm's work as having developed in two interrelated dimensions. The first I have termed his sociological-epistemological, and the second, his historical and empirical. This chapter will examine the first dimension only. There are two aspects of Fromm's work, which form part of the first dimension: the sociology of knowledge aspect; and Fromm's analysis of the relationship between advancing industrial technology and its social and institutional consequences and social science knowledge.
Here Fromm's assertion is that valid social science knowledge can only come from the social scientist who is engaged in life. The social scientist must according to Fromm have "hope" for man's growth both as individual (the healthy character) and as social being. The social thinker who is fixated to a superficial notion of scientific objectivity, who destroys all emotional concern with and substitutes it with an acquisition of techniques whether statistical or solely linguistic, does not accumulate real knowledge. Fromm summarizes this position as follows:

It is assumed that scientific objectivity demands that thoughts and theories concerning man be emptied of all emotional concern with man.

Earlier on the same page Fromm notes:

Reason flows from the blending of rational thought and feeling. If the two functions are torn apart, thinking deteriorates into schizoid intellectual activity, and feeling deteriorates into neurotic life-damaging passions.

In terms of Werner Stark's definition of the sociology of knowledge as being both "a doctrine and a method a doctrine or theory which will show exactly what the interrelations of social substructure and intellectual superstructure are: . . ."; Fromm's earlier quoted statement can be taken as a summary of his sociology of knowledge. Start makes two further assertions which correspond closely to the ideas of Fromm. The just is that the knowing subject is not an isolated individual, the
second is that the perceiver and "knower of the external world" is not separate from man as a member of "a concrete society." In epistemological terms Fromm is quite validly asserting that without the valuation of hope we cannot as scientists assign any meaning to the social facts which we comprehend. In the development of his work Stark further develops the categories which determine the content of intellectual ideas by delineating the "macrosociology of knowledge," that epistemology which fixes its attention to influence of the inclusive society in determining the form and content of ideas. The microsociology of knowledge is concerned with the precise ways in which the authorities which control university financing and research influence through these controls the form and content of scientific knowledge. Fromm's concern in The Revolution Of Hope which a macrosociology of knowledge.

Fromm's inquiries and their implications for his views on knowledge does not follow the orthodox procedures of other scholarly works. Most of The Revolution Of Hope, is directed to the technological society and the process of dehumanization at differing levels of the social structure of the United States of America. This dehumanization has tended to manifest itself in a loss of "hope." For Fromm:

To hope is a state of being. It is an inner readiness, that of intense but not-yet-spent activeness. . . . Hope is a psychic concomitant to life and growth.

Fromm believes that hope, its existence, or its loss is part of the character structure of members of technological societies. Where social scientists as members of modern societies have hope, they "relate" in a
fashion to social problems which tend to result in positive theories and conclusions. That is to say, to a social science perspective which expresses the preference for "growth and life." Where social scientists lack hope, they tend to subscribe to social science ideas which support or are ambivalent to the mechanical in man and society. The knowledge produced by this kind of social scientist lacks vision. Fromm summarizes this idea as follows:

It seems that the great minds of a hundred years ago saw what would happen today, or tomorrow, while we to whom it is happening blind ourselves in order not to be disturbed in our daily routine.

Contrasting the work of thinkers of the stature of John Stuart-Mill and Veblen, who paradoxically though not living at times of the completion of the institutionalization of advanced technology, were still able to perceive some of the disastrous consequences for man and growth with contemporary social thinkers, Fromm states:

The fascination with the merely mechanical is supplemented by an increasing popularity of conceptions that stress the animal nature of man and the instinctive roots of his emotions or actions.

The reference in the foregoing statement is to the works of Konrad Loreng and Desmond who Fromm contends want to combine the "emotions of a primate with a computer-like brain." The alarm with which Fromm responds to this revival of ideas—which are at best crude expressions of Darwinism—can be found in the work of other thinkers, though in more "scholarly tones." Marvin Harris criticizes attempts to establish a theoretical paradigm for cultural anthropology concepts of the individual which have
their genesis in the "etiology of the individual and psychological complexes." 29 Whatever the other theoretical problems of Fromm's theories it is clear that John Schaar is inaccurate in his assertion that Fromm's solution to the problem of alienation denies the necessity of social science (p. 166). In fact Fromm's critique of alienation is as a form of social pathology which produces character disorders which vitally affect the form and content of social science knowledge. 30

Later we will examine the coherence of Fromm's ideas in his own counter presentation of a theory of human nature and character structure which is in direct opposition to the "crude Darwinism" of Lorenz and Morris.

**Summary Remarks: Fromm's Place in the Sociology of Knowledge**

Fromm explains the substantive content of the ideas and concepts of social scientists as well as the forms of those concepts in terms of the existence or lack of hope of the authors. Nevertheless, what Fromm has failed to do is to discuss whether there is some one to one relationship between the presumed existence of "hope" and the relative value of the ideas themselves. The single indication of his views on this point is a short sentence (p. 29) in *The Revolution Of Hope*; in which he implies that the political ideological "conservatism" or "radicalism" of a writer is not directly related to that writer's hope or lack of it. It should be noted that this quality of intellectual stance may be directly related to Fromm's ease in taking ideas from widely scattered fields and thinkers of sometimes varying political persuasions.
Fromm's assertion that the responsibility of the social scientist influences the content of knowledge finds support with Friedrichs and Sheldon Wolin. Friedrichs summarizes his analysis of the competing paradigmatic frames in sociology: system and conflict, the modes of scientists adhering to either of these frames, priestly and prophetic and the consequences for this process on the advancement of sociology as a science. Friedrichs put the entire problem into the framework of the body of knowledge, techniques which we call sociology and the scientist as man. Friedrichs suggests:

Thus when one extends the domain of man's accountability he enlarges his responsibility. And this is exactly what the epistemology of sociology as a social science is uniquely equipped to do. . . . It demonstrates, . . . a universality of concern seldom shown even by our avowedly universalistic religious tradition. . . . For the cognitive conditions for such qualities are laid down when one uncovers the determinate dimension in any human action. It undergirds as well the substantive realization so central to the sociological stance, that man is not man except in community: that he cannot simply choose in the privacy of his existential selfhood the path that will guarantee social maturity and ethical sensitivity but that he is largely dependent upon responsible interaction with others for his integrity. Sociology can in a very real sense, then claim a prime position within the role that a mature Heidegger could grant science as a whole: that of the shepherd of Being.31

The above statement aptly illustrates Fromm's position very well, that sociologists as members have a responsibility, one that is inherent in the traditions of the discipline.32

Sheldon Wolin in Politics And Vision (1960) provides the second example which illustrates my argument about the correctness or validity of Fromm's assertions on "hope of the scientist." But where Friedrichs writes of "responsibility," Wolin writes about the significance of
"vision" for meaningful political theory. Wolin states:

If the imaginative element in political thought were merely a methodological convenience which enabled the theorist to handle his materials more effectively, it would hardly warrant the extended attention we have given it. . . . It (imagination) has been the medium for expressing the fundamental values of the theorist; it has been the means by which the political theorist has sought to transcend history.33

Wolin extends his conceptualization of political theory by suggesting that political vision may be architectonic, that is the attempt to mould the perceived political phenomena to some vision of the Good. For example the work of Plato, or alternatively Fromm's view of socialist society would be relevant examples. But the vision can be religious or economic, or as in the case of Hegel the society of the future can "acquire temporal depth" originating in a view of history.34 Whenever the nature of the vision Sheldon suggests that all "long lasting" political thought has that vision, over and above the substantive weaknesses in the content of the ideas. The Wolin thesis can be applied to sociology as well. The point, however, is that "vision," "responsibility" or "hope" all point to the conclusion that the thinker, social scientist has a choice not entirely dependent on the paradigmatic framework of the discipline. This choice gives the theorist a perspective which either supports or denies growth in Frommian terms.35

Industrial Technology and Social Science Knowledge

The second aspect of Fromm's sociological epistemology has to do with his analysis of the relationship between advancing industrial
technology and its social and institutional consequences and social science knowledge. Fromm's conception of social science in its chronology of development is a process whereby social scientists have, due to a kind of inverse dialectical process in Western societies "gathered more and more information about less and less." Yet this process of historical crises, partly as consequences of the structural developments of industrial societies; has escalated and each time threatened man's extinction. Fromm's demand for a "morally committed" science is a logical outcome of his assertions in the foregoing context. But Fromm developed that context as a theoretical synthesis of Marx and Freud.

The aim in this part of the discussion will be to articulate the implications for social science of this intellectual synthesizing process. This task is a distinct one from that of asserting that Fromm's theory of human nature and character are products of his attempted synthesis and thereby proceeding to examine this theory of human nature. A number of difficulties appear to necessitate this distinction. I will raise these problems briefly without engaging in systematic discussion of them. The first and obvious point is that Fromm's intellectual development is not yet completed (witness the subtle shifts in his thinking over the years). Second his writings display a style and deceptive simplicity which at first tends to give the social scientist the impression that Fromm is far more interested in conveying his ideas to the general reader than he is in maintaining a sustained dialogue with academic social scientists, about the natures of their enquiries. Third, arising partially from the above "deceptive quality," are the
problems of delineating from these public messages, a coherent philosophy of the social sciences which retains Fromm's interdisciplinary orientation. Fromm does not provide anywhere a sustained critique of the social sciences.38

Robert Merton once suggested that the twentieth century "sociological conception that scientific discoveries emerge from the existing cultural base and consequently become . . . , almost inevitable." The inevitability of these discoveries is due to the cumulative nature of sociological like all scientific knowledge.39 We find Bernard Chartes' dictum an apt description of the nature of Fromm's sociological epistemology. Fromm believes that his insight into the nature of social reality is the product of his having stood on the shoulders of Marx and Freud.40 Fromm perceives the difference between his contemporaries and himself as deriving from his dual perspectives.

Fromm proposes the rudiments of a sociological epistemology which he asserts is common to Marx and Freud. This epistemology is constituted of three postulates: firstly, Marx and Freud believed that "of all one must doubt"; secondly, Marx and Freud believed nothing human to be alien to them; and thirdly, they believed that the "truth shall make you free."41

The three rudiments of Marx and Freud become an intelligible motif when the second rudiment (nothing human is alien to the knowing self) is elaborated to mean that the knowing self only begins to approximate reality, when it ceases to regard itself as a "split off object" and become me, yet remains also not me. This paradoxical and rather clumsy
Frommian usage completes his attempt to magnify the Marxian-Freudian epistemology for Fromm's own intellectual development.\textsuperscript{42} It is in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) that some of the elements of this epistemology have their roots. We will examine some of the Kantian elements of Fromm's assertion (of the knowing subject taking the perspective of the other) because Fromm does not clarify in his analysis ["Some Related Ideas" in Beyond The Chains of Illusion] what being part and yet not part of the other involves. At points Fromm's perspective resembles Max Weber's verstehen. But such a conclusion raises problems because if Fromm stands on the shoulders of Marx and Freud then their anti-Kantian formulations would influence Fromm's methodology.

The three elements of the Marxian-Freudian motif are not as unique as at first appear, what is unique are the ways in which they were interpreted and developed by these thinkers. It is important to clarify Fromm's particular methodology since the organization of ideas in his work and discussion of these ideas depend largely on his resolution of the traditional philosophical and ontological division within which all the social sciences developed. When Fromm attempts to stand on Marx's and Freud's shoulders he is attempting to reconcile epistemological elements which are partially irreconcilable.

The irreconcilable elements which constitute a philosophical and epistemological dichotomy arose from the question: is knowledge of reality gained through \textit{a priori} conceptual categories, as the rationalists tended to believe since Plato's time? Or, is reality independent of human cognition but apprehended only through the senses? Kantian
philosophy is an attempted resolution but in Marx and Freud as well as others after Kant, the question was re-opened. But in the eighteenth century Kant inherited the questions in the form of two contradictory philosophies that of the rationalists and the empiricists.

Kant proposed a synthesis which asserted that human knowledge consists of both "pure reason and sensory experience." His epistemology asserts that we cannot know "things-in-themselves" (noumena), but only as they appear in our experience (phenomena). Kant restored the old concept of Reason and avoided the charge of idealism by asserting that objects of perception are partly formed by the categories of the observing subject. Kant's philosophy suggests that the categories of the intuition functioned synthetically in the process of cognition to establish order, unity and interdependence to objects on which the human intellect focus. These questions were universal and developed in the course of life.

For Kant then, the mind was the centre of knowledge. But the categories of the intellect are tools and therefore not sufficient for knowledge. Thus from the time of Kant the main problem in philosophy focused on "how we come to know." Man's knowledge of the natural and social world was seen to be not an exact reflection of those worlds, but phenomenal knowledge. The unity and order of those worlds by intuition—the forms of space and time—and the categories of understanding. In asserting reality to be the corollary of the subjectivity of human consciousness, Kant established the basic framework for a sociology of knowledge, just be positing the existence of intuition and understanding
as peculiar to man as a whole as observing subject; secondly by establishing the context for the Hegelian-Marxian and Freudian "level of consciousness" as influencing the quality of the human knowledge problem. 46

Summary: Kant's Influence on the Intellectual Milieux of Marx and Freud

It cannot be overstressed that what Fromm discusses as "The Common Ground" of Marx and Freud: doubt, humanity and truth, do not only find their modern formulations in Kant, more so than in any of Kant's predecessors; but doubt, humanity and truth constitute too general a set of criteria for the specific sociological epistemology on which Fromm allegedly stands. An examination of Beyond The Chains Of Illusion, indicates an unsatisfactory format in so far as the chapter "Common Ground" is not a detailed analysis and the important methodological ideas which raise epistemological questions are relegated to the end of the book. Most of the middle portions of the book are presentations of the conclusions of Marx and Freud rather than discussions of the epistemological roots of those conclusions. 47

Kant's philosophy raised radical issues for the epistemological statuses of the natural and social sciences. With regard to the latter Talcott Parsons has argued with Kant's assertion that a logical prerequisite for empirical knowledge being intuition. The radical dualism implied in this position reaches its most acute focus in "relation to man--at the same time a physical and a spiritual being." 48
One element of the Kantian epistemology was generalized by Hegel and itself became the attempt at a still different synthesis: Kant's individualistic reason, intuition and understanding. Where Kant had asserted that the norms that regulate mental activity are a set of *a priori* independent categories, with experience providing the condition for all knowledge; Hegel held that these categories were located in the Giest, but only manifest and work themselves out in the weltgist (individual consciousnesses). In another sense Hegel's epistemology is a reaction against Kant for the former's dialectical process is constituted of a mutual determination between the mind and the world. This is the background to the Marxian epistemological system.

In the case of Freud the epistemological tradition is different. Fromm has remarked of Freud:

> Freud had a deeper insight (than Marx) into the nature of the process of human thought, affects, and passions, even though he did not transcend the principles of bourgeois society.

Fromm's claim that Marxian method and Freudian psychology can be synthesized can partly be substantiated in the empirical analysis and use of historical data underlying Fromm's work. Such an illustration however, does not lessen the epistemological difficulties of Fromm's work.

**Fromm's Articulation of Freudian Categories**

First, Fromm asserts that Freud like Marx before him developed a concept of human nature as the most crucial element of his thought. This human nature was defined in terms of psychic and mental characteristics.
Secondly, that Freud's 'model of human nature,' the concept of a naturally inherent libido, which is the driving force, the movement toward the "pleasure principle"; is a materialist based doctrine. Thirdly that Freud postulated the potential of the libido to be the same in each individual and yet its manifestation is culturally variable, and individually variable. Fourthly, that Freud's anthropology is based on an assertion that in the 'state of nature' uninhibited evolution of libido toward the 'pleasure principle' resulted in complete individual satisfaction, but no creativity and civilization. Fifthly, that the evolution of creativity and civilization necessitates a dialectical repression in social and institutional means and individual internalization of that repression. Fromm suggests that Freud's use of the foregoing categories makes for Freud the skeptic and a skeptical view of the historical process and the future.

The question can be asked whether Fromm is postulating what are in fact Freud's conclusions as though they were the starting point of Freud's analysis. Paul Ricoeur has an alternative view of Freud's philosophy and one that is more systematic. Rather than begin with the assertion that Freud was a skeptic, Ricoeur begins from the position that Freud was concerned at first with developing a natural science of psychology, one that could represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined. This natural science of psychology is, according to Ricoeur, only one 'cycle' of Freud's attempt to view all consciousness "primarily as 'false' consciousness"--an attempt which Freud shares with Marx and Nietzsche, as thinkers schooled with the problem of Cartesian
doubt. There are two further cycles of Freudian epistemology articulated at two further and distinct levels of analysis. The second level of analysis Ricoeur terms Freud's theory of consciousness as a reductive and demystifying hermeneutics, that is the science of interpretation. The third level of analysis deals with Freud's return in psychoanalytic focus to a mythological philosophy, the emblems of which are Eros, Ananka, and Thanatos.

Ricoeur establishes the three foregoing frameworks as frameworks within which psychical facts are given quantitative frames of reference. That is to say Freud perceived his psychical facts, for example the dynamics of ego and id, as though they were quantifiable facts and his frameworks were frames of reference within which to validate their existences and functions. Nevertheless, Ricoeur states:

It should be noted that Freud does not say much about the origin and nature of what he calls 'quantity.' As for its origin, it comes from external or internal excitations and covers pretty much the idea perceptual and instinctual stimuli: the notion Q serves to unify under a single concept anything that produces energy.

The notion Q then becomes in Freudian epistemology a quality of any aspect of the individual. Id, Ego and Superego then become principles. Ricoeur posits Freud's principle of inertia which is equivalent to the id. "The principle of inertia means that the system tends to reduce its own tensions to zero, to discharge its quantities, to get rid of them." The principle of constancy is equivalent to ego. This means that the system tends to maintain the level of tension at a minimum. But the divergence between inertia and constancy tends to give rise to a
"secondary" process, called the principle of perceptual neurons, which is equivalent to the super-ego.

Within the context or cycle of Freud's biological scientism the id, ego and super-ego are consequences of the operations on the principles of inertia, constancy and neurons. Here the third or perceptual neuron principle becomes a Freudian contrivance for changing quantity into quality. In terms of his conception of the individual as a complex outcome of the operation of the three principles, Freud gives the appearance of having established a paradigm which could actually articulate qualitative differences in character as an outcome of the specific operation of these forces. However this is not the case for as Ricoeur concludes:

... the whole system rests on the simply postulated equivalence between unpleasure and the rise in the level of tension on the one hand, and between pleasure and the lowering of the level on the other.58

What Ricoeur presents as a Freudian epistemology resting on analogues, Marcuse (1962) presents as the more familiar dual triads of phylogenetic and ontogenetic growth and the inverted dialectical process linking both triads. Marcuse presents a summary of Freud's metapsychology and philosophy in chapter I of Eros And Civilization. The phylogenetic aspect of Freud's paradigm is dialectical (in the sense that historical movement consists of rebellion and change which results in destruction of old forms of despotism and incorporation of the old forms in higher organizational forms of societal repression). The stages in this phylogenesis consists of an early stage of the primal horde
characterized by the singular primal patriarchal domination. Marcuse terms this stage "biologically justified authority." Social order based on physical force results in fear and jealousy on the part of the younger, weaker males and leads to rebellion and the next stage of "brother-clan" societies, the main features of which are the incest forbidding family and "domination by several." Symbolically the murdered father survives as god. This is the beginning of civilization for Freud, for it is the start of rationality and the progress of the reality principle. Subsequent stages realize a diversification and differentiation of institutions with what Marcuse terms "rewarded inhibition."

The significance of the foregoing analysis rests on the assertion that ontogenetic progress is the increasing internalization by the individual organism, from early infancy of the parallel forces of fear repression and compromised freedom.

Marcuse's presentation of Freud's epistemology is based on a philosophy of history and social psychology which suggests that:

If absence from repression is the archetype of freedom, then civilization is the struggle against this freedom.

Further, Marcuse suggests that Freud's dialectical conception of history toward increasing unfreedom rests on a metaphysical conception of 'energies' (Ricoeur's term) moving toward the:

Replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle. 

... the great traumatic event in the development of man--in the development of the genus (phylogenesis) as well as of the individual (ontogenesis). According to Freud this event is not unique but recurs throughout the history of mankind and of every individual.
Phylogenetic repression, finds its parallel in the ontogenetic development of individuals and the "victory" of the superego over the id. The notion of the adult individual implies a history of internalized repression. The causal roots of anxiety and mental illness are located in the dual processes of expanding institutions of social control and in the nature of the super-ego's relationships to the id and the ego. The successes of increasing civilization also rest on these dialectically connected forces.

As has often been noted Erich Fromm's overriding concern in his writings is with "societal and individual freedom." The question remains whether Fromm can develop a social theory of human freedom if he is standing with one foot on the Freudian and the other on the Marxian system. Freud's sociological epistemology rests on the metaphysical assertion that the material witnesses to civilization are inherently incompatible with 'freedom' if the latter is perceived in terms of "absence from repression," lack of domination of man by man, and so on. In this sense Freud may be a pessimist, perceiving little hope for man as a whole, but rather viewing psychoanalysis as a major form of individual liberation, to the extent that individuals can become conscious of their own internalized repressive mechanisms. In this conclusion reason is itself an inseparable derivative of the reality principle.

The contradiction between the Marxian and Freudian philosophies rests on the different conceptions of human reason since for Marx reason, though not relative configurations of human consciousness, is inherent in human nature. Georg Lukács' History And Class Consciousness
the ambiguity of Marx's position in this connection by asserting that Marx used the dialectic to emphasize the epistemological problems of theory and praxis or consciousness and historical process [In Lukács' Marxism historical process and consciousness can be translated into terms human reason and consciousness].66

"Hope," Knowledge and a Theory of Society: A Summation

What matters is not that a new insight is necessarily the last word of truth, but that it is fruitful, that it is conducive to further discovery, and more that that: that in discovering truth, man changes himself because he becomes more awake and can transmit this greater awakedness to those who follow after him.

[Fromm, 1962, p. 153]

Fromm is concerned with establishing the hypothesis that the epistemologies of Marx and Freud have similar foundations. These foundations take us back to the problems with which discussion in this chapter opened. These have to do with the 'illusions' which shroud social reality, knowledge of social reality which take the forms of: 'viable' social theories in the case of social scientists and increasing levels of consciousness, in the case of ordinary members of society; and consequent changes in the nature of society. In this sense the most significant point of similarity between Marx and Freud is "hope," in Fromm's estimation. Fromm argues that he accepts "hope" as a fundamental postulate of his work and in so doing stands on the shoulders of Marx and Freud. Moreover, the basis of that "hope" is for human freedom, both individual and social. In Fromm's terms therefore, social theory like its societal counterpart, developing consciousness, to be "viable" must be linked to
efforts toward human freedom. This assertion is fundamental to Marxism sociology, that is to say, to Marx's epistemology. But, what is its status in Freud's philosophy? An answer to this question necessitates a distinction between reason and consciousness. The problem of reason put in Kantian terms is taken to mean "pure reason," that is to say "to the human faculty of comprehending, through conceptual thought, the true good and the right." In Kant's Critique Of Pure Reason (1787), the question posed, "how much and what can the understanding and reason know apart from all experience?; has a basic assumption that homo-sapiens can in a speculative anthropology be conceived as endowed with reason. This implicit assumption discusses reason as distinct from particular sense representations. Here the Kantian assumption is that what renders homo-sapiens, a distinct specie, is the possibility of the a priori judgement, that is a "necessary Judgement." Kant asserts:

For if we eliminate from our experiences everything which belongs to the senses, there still remain certain original concepts and certain judgements derived from them, which must have arisen completely a priori, independently of experience. . . .

Again in terms of Kantian categories a distinction can be made between Reason and Consciousness in the context of a speculative anthropology if the latter is taken to mean knowledge in order of time, i.e., empirical knowledge, which by definition involves Kant's three fold synthesis (apprehension, reproduction and recognition). This involves personal awareness of experience of self, now as subject, now as object.

Within the context of the foregoing distinctions it could be
argued that Freud may have confused Reason and Consciousness, seeing both as dependent on the progress of civilization, hence the significance of his theory of inherent organismic drives and their determining function. Marx, however, makes a clear distinction between Reason and Consciousness which is implicit in his organizing concepts. The analysis of this chapter and the foregoing conclusions can be summarized by suggesting that Fromm's position is an over-simplification of the positions of both Marx and Freud. In Richard Evans' book: Dialogue With Erich Fromm (1966), Fromm reiterates an earlier assertion (1962) that to comprehend Freud's epistemology analysis must begin from the philosophical postulate that Freud's overriding concern was truth; assuming, of course, Freud's psychoanalysis to be the logical outcome of all of his earlier work. Fromm states in Beyond The Chains Of Illusion:

While for Marx truth was a weapon to induce social change, for Freud it was the weapon to induce individual change; awareness was the main agent in Freud's therapy.70

Fromm's reasoning in The Dialogue, takes the following form: to the extent that Marx and Freud were preoccupied with discovering the true nature of man and society, their epistemologies emphasized neither "free will" nor determinism. Quite correctly Fromm views the epistemologies of these thinkers as having been determined by their philosophies:

Spinoza, Marx and Freud saw no substitute for truth. For them the biblical injunction applies: it is truth which will make one free. . . . It was the particular situation of Spinoza, Marx and Freud to have been at the same time determinists and indeterminists.71
It is the contention of this chapter that Fromm proposes an integration of the philosophical positions of Marx and Freud as a basis for a new kind of social science.\textsuperscript{72} In attempting this task Fromm has delineated the strands of philosophical ideas common to both thinkers, but has tended to smooth over some of the epistemological difficulties inherent in any attempted integration. The conclusions of integration have been synthesized in Fromm's philosophy of 'alternativism' as mediating between the extremes of 'free-will' and 'determinism.'\textsuperscript{73} But the specific epistemological conditions of 'alternativism' remain unclear, though Fromm's concept of character and his theory of human nature are derived from the philosophy of 'alternativism.' It is to this problem that discussion of Fromm will focus (in the following chapter) in an attempt to further explicate the meaning and status of Fromm's theoretical system.
FOOTNOTES


3 I stress this point because of the three major critiques (in English) of Fromm's position, the most extensive, Schaar's devotes nine pages only to the specific problem of Fromm's philosophy of the social sciences. The most recent, Rubin Grotesky, Personality: The Need For Liberty And Rights (1967) is a political philosophical critique and ignores the problem almost entirely. Harry Wells', The Failure Of Psychoanalysis: From Freud to Fromm (1963), is rather truncated because although recognizing Fromm's debt to Karl Marx attempts to discuss some of Fromm's most important ideas from the perspective mainly of psychoanalysis and to debate around Freudian revisionism. Frank Isaac's unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, "The Concept of Human Nature: A Philosophical Analysis Of the Concept of Human Nature In the Writings Of G. W. Allport, S. E. Asch, E. Fromm, A. H. Maslow and C. R. Rogers," University of Maryland (1966), takes up the problem of Fromm as social scientist but mainly within the context of the debate between holists (Karl Popper) and methodological individualism.


5 Schaar, ibid., p. 37.

6 Schaar, ibid., p. 35.

7 Schaar, ibid., p. 38.

8 Critiques of this type vary. Talcott Parsons in the 1968 introduction to his Structure Of Social Action: A Study In Social Theory With Reference To A Group Of Recent European Writers (New York: Free Press) Vol. I identifies the problem as a growing empiricism, a wish to be identified with the hard sciences, p. VII.
Shils' analysis of sociology to the present day though different from Robert Friedrichs' *A Sociology Of Sociology* (New York: Free Press, 1970), is in many ways similar. Both utilize Thomas Kuhn's *The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) to forward the notion of scientific paradigms. Though Shils (p. 760 and 818) denies that sociology is a "real science." Like Robert Nisbet, *The Sociological Tradition* (Basic Books, 1966), pp. 5-6, Shils sees the "unity which transcends specialization in sociology" as resting on a common devotion to a small number of "Key words" (p. 819). Nisbet delineated five unit ideas. See Edward Shils, "Tradition, Ecology, and Institution In the History Of Sociology, DAEDALUS: Journal Of the American Academy Of Arts And Sciences, Fall 1970, Vol. 99, No. 4, "The Making Of Modern Science: Biographical Studies, pp. 760-825.


Cf. Ernest Becker, *The Structure Of Evil: An Essay On the Unification Of the Science Of Man* (New York: George Braziller, 1968), p. xiii. The two other works of the trilogy are *The Birth And Death Of Meaning: A Perspective In Psychiatry And Anthropology* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1962) and *Revolution In Psychiatry: The New Understanding Of Man* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). In *The Birth And Death Of Meaning*, Becker concludes that a unified social science would contain the following: a) Invariant points of reference in the individual actors: man's need for a symbolically predicated sense of primary self value. (Precisely because of the importance of symbols in human phylogenesis which creates a disjunction with nature (p. 56)); b) A structural-functional model of the institutions of society; c) A problem for analysis at the present moment in historical time. (Becker suggests alienation, again reiterating Fromm's position); d) A focus for controlled social scientific inquiry. This best provided by a value-explicit psychiatry working within legal democratic safeguards (p. 174). In *Revolution In Psychiatry*, Becker traces the appropriation of the problem of mental illness (a socio-cultural problem) by medical psychiatry; the symbolic meanings of individual action and the inability of conventional psychiatry to cope with this symbolism in its etiology and diagnosis on the one hand and the relative fruitfulness of the ideas of thinkers like Dewey on the other (pp. 22 passim). We will return to Becker's particular treatment of the social sciences later in the thesis.

Schaar, op. cit., p. 35.


Friedrichs, op. cit., p. 107.

Ibid., p. 75. It is worth noting that both R. Nisbet (The Sociological Tradition), p. 35 and E. Becker (The Structure Of Evil, esp. pp. 3-14 and p. 7) emphasize this aspect of the sociological tradition as giving sociology its particular and lasting orientation.

In subsequent chapters of the work I will suggest that Fromm's work as a whole has to be approached in two dimensions first, the theoretical and sociological epistemology and the historical and empirical. In the section under discussion we are primarily concerned with the first. Secondly, I am simply noting at this stage that the position that Fromm's work is largely dependent on Marx and Freud is in radical contrast to some of the conclusions of scholars on Fromm's work. I have in mind John Schaar (1961), p. 47 and Harry Wells (1963), pp. 185-187.


Ibid., p. 14. Stark suggests further in the text that without a system of values "we should never be able to focus any social fact" (p. 16). Horowitz, op. cit., (1961) focuses on the sociology of knowledge and social change, esp. pp. 36-37.

Ibid., pp. 20-21. It is clear that Fromm's "sociology of knowledge" is in contrast to and is of a different order from Karl Mannheim's 'relationism' and Max Scheler's "relative consolidation." Horowitz, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

26. Cf. Erich Fromm, The Heart Of Man: Its Genius For Good And Evil (Harper and Row, 1964). The concepts of "life" and "growth" which are sub-themes of this work will be fully developed in a subsequent section of the work.


28. Ibid., p. 46.


32. It is interesting to note that Friedrichs does not accept Fromm's position in at least one sense, that the early Marx provides an epistemological basis for a "science of hope." However the rejection by Friedrichs is implied. Ibid., p. 300.


34. Ibid., pp. 19-20.

35. The term paradigm is used in the sense postulated by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure Of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University Press of Chicago, 1962). In his work Kuhn makes a distinction between "normal" and "extra-ordinary" science. In "normal Science" i.e., a field of study characterized by progress, "an unparalleled insulation . . . from the everyday demands of the laity (i.e., the mass of ordinary members of the wider society) and of everyday life"; the paradigm which is a "network of commitments," "a criteria for choosing problems"; give rise to a set of rules for defining research problems, validating procedures and so on. Kuhn's frame of reference is the empiric sciences. To the extent that much of the social science disciplines are not characterized as "normal sciences," they are "extra-ordinary sciences." Whereas in "normal science" we internalize as "real" the things (phenomena) to which the concepts we acquire refer (Friedrichs, p. 51). In "extra-ordinary science" (i.e., one characterized by change and insecurity rather than accumulation of elements of empiric knowledge exclusively) we have to redefine constantly our concepts, assumptions and metaphysical and epistemological problems. In other words what Kuhn terms "insulation from the wider society" is not possible on a number of planes and therefore acquisition of relevent values is possibly easier. Where Freidrichs (1970) uses the term paradigm for sociology, Percy Cohen (Modern Social Theory,
London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1968), talks about meta-theories in sociology with two sets of features: analytic and normative, i.e., theories which incorporate statements which are axiomatic and propositional and which elaborate a set of ideal states "to which one may aspire" (p. 2). The point I wish to make here is that to the extent that rules of verification and validity are subordinate to paradigmatic assumptions or commitments, the problem of "vision" or "hope" cannot be simply dismissed as ethical and therefore unscientific. Summarizing Kuhn's "demystification of scientism" for values or "vision/hope" etc. in the above sense, in social science David James Harding (The Ideology And Logic Of Scientism, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, April, 1970) had this to say:

Technology and its uses shape the function of science and the class of problems with which it deals. And since the uses of technology relate to the system of political and economic power, the system of power in society can affect the very core of the scientific method. (p. 109)

36 It is worth noting that this statement with regard to modern science raises the problem of the changes in the notions of "objective" and "subjective" Reason which is excellently traced in Max Horkheimer's book (The Eclipse Of Reason (Oxford University Press, 1947)). Horkheimer arrives at a conclusion with regard to scientific knowledge, which is similar to Fromm's, although Horkheimer is critical of Fromm's philosophy (pp. 16-19).


38 To date available Dissertation and Periodical Abstracts reveal four Ph.d. dissertations and a host of articles on Fromm (in English).

39 Cf. Robert Merton, On The Shoulders Of Giants: A Shandean Postscript (New York: Free Press, 1965), p. 367. Merton reiterating the aphorism of the "dwarf on the shoulders of giants" is enabled to see further than the giant himself, raises the dilemma of whether in social sciences, each succeeding generation stands on the shoulders, or in faces of those that have gone before (pp. 267-268).


42 Ibid., p. 149-151. This aspect of Fromm's analysis is rather truncated so that a motif is not recognizable until chapters ii and xi of Beyond The Chains Of Illusion are brought together. For a similar statement on the "me yet not me," see Norbert Elias' "Involvement And Detachment," British Journal of Sociology, Vol. II, 1956, p. 226-252.
43. By rejecting Hume's scepticism, which held that men could not arrive at general and necessary laws about empirical facts, Kant was ultimately seeking an answer to the epistemological problem of how can statements derived not from experience or from logical inference attain the status of objective knowledge. Cf. Gunther, Remmling, Road To Suspicion: A Study of Modern Mentality and the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Meredith Publishing Co., 1967), p. 57.

44. Kant's analysis of the nature of these categories—there were twelve in all—were categories of understanding, which is an element of the human mind. There was also the element of intuition with its constitutive elements of space and time. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by Norman Kemp (London: Macmillan, 1956).


47. The significance of these conclusions become clear when one considers that Kant's epistemology is the basis of systematic doubt in modern philosophy. Remmling, op. cit., p. 61.


51. Of the concept of human nature, Fromm distinguishes between the concept of human nature and "that of certain attributes of man common to all," that is "essential attributes" and the essence of man or human nature which may comprise all these essential attributes or more, "and may possibly be defined as something from which the various attributes

52 Fromm, op. cit., Beyond The Chains Of Illusion, p. 31.

53 Ibid., p. 37.

54 Cf. Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy And Freud: An Essay On Interpretation, tr. by Denis Savage (Yale University Press, 1970), p. 71. In this elaboration of Ricoeur's Terry lectures (1960), Ricoeur gives a hermeneutic and symbolic interpretation to Freud's psychoanalysis and psychology. Ricoeur also takes the position that in order to get at Freud's epistemology, the scientist has to momentarily ignore the Freudian ontology and analyse the logical and symbolic structures of the Freudian paradigm. Ibid., pp. 3-19.

55 Ibid., p. 59.

56 Ibid., p. 63.

57 Ibid., p. 73.

58 Ibid., p. 76.

59 This is a recapitulation of Freud's position as set out in The Future Of An Illusion (1907) and Civilization And Its Discontents (1961).


61 Ibid., p. 70.

62 Ibid., p. 17.


64 Ibid., p. 14.

65 Ibid. It is necessary to strike distinctions between "freedom" as return to some state of unchecked fulfilment of the pleasure principle and freedom in the sense being discussed here. It is not clear that Freud conceived a historical process in an overall "cyclical fashion" (Toynbee) and therefore whatever the particular disagreements between Marcuse and Fromm, the definition of freedom as "non-repressive civilisation" is common ground. See also Beyond The Chains Of Illusion, p. 177.


69 Cf. Graham Bird, Kant's Theory Of Knowledge: An Outline Of Central Arguments In the Critique Of Pure Reason (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1962). See also Marcuse, op. cit., Negations. Marcuse suggests that in Kant's philosophy: "Reason is the locus of the final unity, totality, and universality of knowledge: the faculty that unifies the rules of the understanding under principles (p. 53). Nevertheless Kant has two different concepts of reason, these are intertwined. Reason as the unifying totality of man's cognitive faculty "as which it is the subject of the 'critiques' of pure and practical reason; and reason . . . , as a single faculty that rises 'above' the understanding, as the faculty of those 'Ideas' that can never be adequately represented in experience and have a merely regulative function" (pp. 53-54). Marcuse argues that for Kant the transition to practical concepts occurs through reason in the second sense. Marcuse states: "the 'Idea' is transformed into a 'postulate' and the 'postulate' into a 'fact' of practical reason" (p. 54).

70 Fromm, op. cit., Beyond The Chains Of Illusion, p. 16.


72 Ibid., p. 99.

73 Ibid., p. 94.
CHAPTER II

ERICH FROMM'S CONCEPT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

... I regard man as a freak of nature, because although he is an animal, he is the only case of a living organism having awareness of itself. [Erich Fromm, 1966]

Erich Fromm's theories of human character and personality are predicated upon his conceptualization of human nature. The uniqueness of Fromm's conceptualization of human nature, considered within the wider context of his work as a whole, lies in its explicitness and the urgency with which it is formulated. It should be noted, of course, that the primacy of human nature concepts in social psychology theories, as a specific approach is by no means unique to Fromm. For in general there appears to be a connection between the call for an ideologically unified social science committed to humanist ends and the methodological procedure of social psychology through assertions and concepts of human nature. Fromm himself is as a social scientist committed to developing this connection and specifying some of the concerns of such a social science.

The proposition proposed by this thesis is counter to Schaar's general evaluation of Erich Fromm's work. Schaar argues that Fromm's work as a whole rests on ethical postulates which are a priori prescriptions. The ethical prescription is an attempt to delineate the conditions, for "living well." That is to say that Fromm wants to delineate the social and psychological conditions which will ensure that the quality
of human life will progress. Schaar goes on to suggest that from the foregoing vantage point Fromm's theories are cluttered by appeals to science but:

... the basic presuppositions and intentions of his work have very little to do with science.

Within the framework of Schaar's analysis of Fromm, the former suggests that Fromm's aim is to develop a science of man which will build a "true model" of human nature. The outline of Fromm's work, then according to Schaar, is of a thinker who begins with given ethical a prioris about 'how' man should live, develops a theory, a model of man which makes claims to social science, but is at bottom a prescriptive analysis, develops a character study and theories of personality on this "philosophy." In this endeavour Fromm is portrayed as drawing on various sources, including religion and sociology. From Schaar's vantage point then, and implicit in his critique is the idea that Fromm's critique of social science is incomplete and at the end of his approach rather than at the core of his work.

The proposition of this thesis is partly the converse of Schaar's. In my own analysis, I argue that Fromm begins with a conception of social science which is partly the outcome of a critique of the underlying assumptions of much contemporary theory. Fromm thus moves to develop a theory of man and society and a character study and personality theories. From this vantage point assumptions about man's nature and ethical prescriptions can be modified. To 'test' this proposition
entails a discourse on the nature of social science and the place of ethical values or prescriptions in an applied social science.

Human nature can never be observed as such, but only in its specific manifestations in specific situations. It is a theoretical construction which can be inferred from empirical study of the behaviour of man. In this respect, the science of man in constructing a 'model of human nature' is no different from other sciences which operate with concepts of entities based on, or controlled by, inferences from observed data and not directly observable themselves.7

Human nature is inferred from a study of human behaviour, and is not an a priori proposition, only complete analysis of the social conditions and psychological tendencies underlying the orientations of behaviour can reveal human nature. What is scientific about this position? Before discussing this question what is meant by human nature requires clarity.

**Some Notes on the Concept of Human Nature**

Erich Fromm does not simply assert that his model of human nature is the culmination of an entirely empirical analysis of human behaviour. His work is an attempt to develop some essential postulates as guidelines for his social psychology and yet avoid the charge of having posited un-testable propositions which lie outside the scope of his scientific analysis, on the one hand. On the other hand, Fromm attempts to devise the maximum utility from his empirical analysis. Fromm states this inherent dilemma as follows:

Is it necessary to come to the conclusion that there is no human nature? Such an assumption seems to imply as many dangers as those inherent in the concept of a fixed nature. If there were no essence common to all men, it may be argued there could be no unity of men,
there could be no value or norms valid for all men, there could not even be the science of psychology or anthropology, which has as its subject matter "man." Are we not then caught between two undesirable and dangerous assumptions: the reactionary view of assuming a fixed and unalterable human nature, and the relativistic one that leads to the conclusion that man shares with other men only his anatomical and physiological attributes? [Italics mine]

It is clear from the foregoing statement then that in procedural terms the problem of a concept of human nature is interconnected with the problem of social science, for Fromm, over and above the substantive weaknesses of a concept of human nature.

What does Fromm mean by a concept of human nature? In philosophical and methodological terms, Fromm makes a distinction between the 'essential attributes' or qualities of character common to man 'qua man' and the 'essence' of man. The essence of man may comprise all the former attributes, and the attributes of character may follow from the 'essence' of man. The ramifications of Fromm's distinction between essential attributes and the essence of human nature refer back to Fromm's aim of penetrating below the illusions to the deeper meanings of human reality. But the distinction between attributes and essence rests partly on his critique of antecedent philosophies of man. Fromm suggests that attempts to define human nature in terms of "reason, the capacity for production, the creation of social organization, the capacity for symbol making" are attributes, but do not constitute the "totality of human nature." Such attributes do however influence human character. Fromm asserts that from the time of the ancient Greeks, through medieval philosophy and to the nineteenth century, such attributes have been mistakenly used to define the essence of human nature. Fromm therefore turns to the
nineteenth century phenomenologists and existential philosophers (Kierkegaard, William James and Bergson), for the essence of man as process. In other words Fromm settles for a definition of human essence in terms of existence. Here the essence of human nature is both historical and temporal. In these terms it is the "questions," not the "answers" which defines man's nature.

Now, human nature is not only a principle, but is also a capacity. Fromm concludes that the 'essence' of human nature rests in the 'capacity' for reasoning, love and 'awareness.' Essence also implies the 'possibility' for freedom; that is the "revelation of human dignity." The possibility of freedom in this sense is here dependent on the development of awareness. But the authenticity of awareness and the possibility of freedom has to be directed to "human interrelatedness." Man in his very nature is a being for others. The distinction between essential attributes and human nature is a consistent theme in Fromm's writings and requires greater elucidation. The consistency of the formulation, of the essence of human nature, previously outlined can be traced backwards in Fromm's work to as early as 1957. At that time Fromm asserted that knowledge of human nature, of 'essence' was outside the scope of psychology. He suggested:

Psychology can show us what man is not, [Italics Fromm's] it cannot tell us what man, each one of us is.

In "Man Is Not A Thing," Fromm engages in a critical polemic against psychology which focuses mainly on studies directed to manipulating the
individual to the dictates of industrial production and consumption and individual psychoanalysis as a method "by which one can attain happiness and maturity and yet avoid the jump, the act, the pain of separation." This type of psychology and psychoanalysis aids the "universal process of alienation." This critique is based on Fromm's assertion that "man is not a thing." According to Fromm psychologists and psychoanalysts cannot gain full and complete knowledge of the essence of man except in the 'act of love,' an act which transcends thought and words. This is a continual process from birth of the "separation of the primary ties of soil and blood."

On this point of the essence of man and knowledge of it, Fromm assigns to psychology and psychoanalysis negative roles, that is the removal of 'distortions' and 'illusions,' "not the positive, full, and complete knowledge of a human being." On this point Fromm concludes:

\[\text{Just as mysticism is a logical consequence of negative theology, love is the logical consequence of negative psychology.}\]

It is worth noting however that there is no mention of a commitment to a Marxian concept of human nature in "Man Is Not A Thing." Though Fromm's use of the concept of love seems to have been taken from Marx's statements on the nature of love. Fromm's discussion of Marx's concept of 'love' tends to focus on Marx's assertion of the distinct and qualitative differences between human actions which emphasize receptivity as a condition of alienation and productivity which stresses the relation of human being to human being. According to Fromm, Marx viewed the essence of man, in his early writings, to be based on the "principle of movement,"
not a mechanical one, but one that strives for creativity and self-realization through practical means, ones that resolve the antinomies between subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, and so on.17 [Italics mine]

Erich Fromm's work is committed to the position that there is no contradiction between a concept of human essence, a social scientific theory of human alienation and a verifiable social science. This commitment is forcefully argued in Marx's Concept Of Man. This commitment also means that Fromm is one of the central figures in the debate in recent discussions of the 'philosophy of social science' about whether it is possible to postulate 'essences' and legitimately justify the conclusions derived from such analyses as social science. The discussion which follows will deal with the foregoing problem in relation to Fromm's discussion of Marx's concept of human nature and the strategic significance of this particular Marxian posture to Erich Fromm's own work. A subsequent section of the chapter will present the more generalized forms of the debate, within the context of methodology.

Fromm outlines the debate as that between writers who support Daniel Bell's 'end of ideology' thesis in the West and 'Communist writers' such as Lenin and Bucharin in the Soviet bloc, on the one hand; and those who stress the continuity of thought in Marx such as Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, Karl Lowith and Paul Tillich.18 The former group suggests that Marx's "idealistic humanism" and his claims for the essence of man outlined in the Economic And Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, were abandoned by the mature Marx who became more historical and
adopted a more economic analysis. The latter group argue generally that a continuity exists between Marx's humanism and his scientific socialism and that no contradiction exists. The two sides of the debate can be summarized in the following statements. Daniel Bell claims that Marx had repudiated the idea of alienation, divorced from the economic system, and, by so doing, closed off a road which would have given us a broader, more useful analysis of society and personality than the Marxian dogmatics which have prevailed.19

Fromm explains the parallelism of ideas between Bell and the Communist writers on the domination of positivistic-mechanistic ideas in social science thought from the 1880's to the 1920's.20 Fromm makes three further arguments which substantiate his thesis. The first is that Marx did not abandon his views on the essence of man in his later writings such as Capital. Rather Fromm suggests that all Marx did in his later writings was to change his use of terms, rather than the ideas which these terms expressed. Fromm takes selections from The German Ideology and Capital to demonstrate that Marx never abandoned the notion of an essence in human nature, he develops his analysis of alienation to illustrate the historical consequences for that essence, as societies develop and change. Fromm's reply to Daniel Bell and others deserves quoting in full:

Marx does not say, as Bell quotes, that 'there is no human nature inherent in each separate individual,' but something quite different, namely, that "the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each individual." It is the essential point of Marx's 'materialism' against Hegel's idealism. Marx never gave up his concept of man's nature . . . but this nature . . .; is one which can be understood only historically, because it unfolds in history.21
The second point is that Marx shares a humanistic tradition which is non-
theistic, but goes back to prophetic messianism, Spinoza, Goethe and
Hegel. That the narrow interpretation of Marx which attempted to negate
Marx's relation to that tradition and can be partially explained by the
relative success of mechanistic materialism; was negated by the failure
of the dominant industrial systems to eliminate dehumanization and poli-
tical barbarism in the East and West. This latter failure led to a re-
interpretation of Marx, "based on the whole Marx and his humanist
philosophy."22 The third point, directed to Bell, is that the latter
mis-understands the concept of alienation.23

Elsewhere, Fromm has suggested that just Marx's concept of human
nature or essence is inextricably bound up with the latter's view of
alienation in general and alienated man in particular. Second that Marx
never put his psychological views in any systematic form, but these
psychological views are "distributed all over his work. Thirdly and
ironically Marx's unique contribution to psychology though developed
earlier than that of Freud, had to await Freud's own discoveries before
the former's was given any attention.24 Fromm's ideas as outlined in
"Marx's Contribution To The Knowledge Of Man" have a direct bearing on
his polemic against the narrow interpretation of alienation provided by
writers such as Bell and on Fromm's assertions on the necessity of the
concept of 'essence' to a viable psychology and sociology. Marx's depth
psychology preempts later views of human nature and is a critique of
mechanistically oriented experimental psychology. It is also a critique
of the 'model' of man as an 'isolated' homme machine although Marx's work
anticipates Freud's. Fromm suggests the force of Marx's concept of 'essence,' runs throughout all his works, and is of empirical and epistemological value. Fromm states:

... Modern academic and experimental psychology is to a large extent a science dealing with alienated man, studied by alienated investigators, with alienated and alienating methods. Marx's psychology, being based on the full awareness of the fact of alienation, was able to transcend this type of psychological approach because it did not take alienated man for natural man, for man as such.

Here Marx's critique has two elements, one is a critique against Hegel's absolute mind and the process of the dialectic, the other is Marx's distinction between animal and human nature. In terms of the latter point, although Marx speaks of man as having 'constant' drives, these constant drives of eating, drinking and procreating are not of the same quality as animal instincts, because the former cannot be considered in abstraction from "the environment of other human activities." That is to say the human environment does not become, for Marx, an object for the individual's satisfaction of these drives.

Fromm's assertion then is that Marx's statement is that concrete individuals have a human nature, and that nature is in its core or essence, social. This sociality is for Marx the universal and eternal characteristic of both constant and relative drives. Later we will examine in greater detail Fromm's assertion of man's need for interrelatedness as an essential factor in the essence of man, we will also examine this statement as a synthetic one mainly derived from Fromm's interpretation of Marx. Here I want to examine another dimension of the statement that for Marx one of the essences of human nature is its social
quality. According to Fromm Marx demonstrates this assertion by linking the assertion to the idea that man is a creature who makes himself in a process of self-creation, from the beginning of history. This process of self-creation, of activity, is one of man, from his early history, but it is activity directed to man; producing his means of subsistence. In this process of the self-creation of his means of subsistence man transforms himself and his relationship to nature. This is the core of Marx's historical materialism. But in this context historical materialism is not a psychological theory. Fromm suggests that the only "quasi-psychological premise in this theory lies in the assumption that man needs food, shelter, etc.; . . ."28 These are the constant drives "which exist under all circumstances and which can be changed by social conditions only as far as form and direction are concerned."29

What Marx appears to be saying here is that for all individual men the drive for food, sex and shelter are constant but the very generation and establishment of these drives bring men into processes which, even at the early stages of human pre-history, are nascent social relationships. These drives are constant to the extent that they can be modified only in form and direction, but not in content. Relative drives are different in that they are historically and socially variable. These ideas require clarification.30

The distinction between constant and variable drives does not imply a separation. Since the variable drives which are totally social in origin is, presented by Marx, dependent on the particular social expression and forms of the constant drives. A central postulate in Marx's
analysis of the development of constant and fixed drives, and the particular constellation of these drives in the consequent human character, is the element of labour.

Labour is the factor which mediates between man and nature; labour is man's effort to regulate his metabolism with nature. Labour is the expression of human life and through labour man's relationship to nature is changed, hence through labour man changes himself.31

The use of the term 'labour' in the foregoing context is critical in Marx's exposition of historical materialism. Emerging from Marx's analysis in the Economic And Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 is a qualitative distinction between 'alienated' and 'non-alienated' labour.32 Alienated labour is 'life activity' which appear to man "only as a means for the satisfaction of a need, the need to maintain his physical existence." Non-alienated labour "is life creating life . . . Life itself appears only as a means of life."33 [Italics author's]. In Marx's view conscious activity distinguishes man from the activity of animals. Marx suggests that man is only a conscious being, that is his own life is an object for him, because he is a species being.

Only for this reason is his activity free activity. Alienated labour reverses the relationship, in that man because he is a self-conscious being makes his life activity, his being, only a means for his existence.34

One of the objectives of Marx's analysis of the phylogenetic evolution of man is the intent to illustrate that man produces--i.e., non-alienated production--only when freed from the direct physical need which characterizes animal production. Alienation which Marx viewed as being
to some extent an inevitable consequence of production under conditions of physical need in man's early history can be eliminated later in man's history if only because of increasing technological progress. This is a viewpoint which is developed later by Erich Fromm. But Marx's analysis in the Manuscripts focuses on an explanation of alienation in causal terms which is placed in human 'will' and 'choice' as well for he states:

Human alienation, and above all the relation of man to himself, is first realized and expressed in the relationship between each man and other men. Thus in the relationship of alienated labour every man regards other men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself placed as a worker.

In the same text Marx argues:

Every self-alienation of man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation which he postulates between other men and himself and nature.35

In this part of the text Marx's analysis focuses on private property not as a thing 'external to mankind' but as the "sensuous expression of the fact that man (is a unique and particular individual) is at the same time an objective fact for himself; just as his manifestation of life is also his alienation of life. . . ." In short for Marx private property is a consequence of alienated labour, it springs from the relation between man and other men and in which the labour, desires, etc., of the self appear to be other than self's activity, they belong to another power.

The development of private property is the material necessary in the beginning of society, for cultural development and with it the antinomies of activity and passivity, essence and existence, subjectivism
and objectivism; and so on. The resolution of these antinomies comes with the positive abolition of private property, i.e., with communism, "the return of man as a social being." Communism is, for Marx, the:

... true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. If is the solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to be this solution.36

In an attempt to elaborate on Marx's analysis of the essence of man, and historical materialism, Fromm argues communism is not the aim of human development. Socialism, argues Fromm is the aim. Fromm implies that communism and socialism are different phases of societal organization to the extent that the latter focuses on man, whereas under communism a realm of necessity under which man produces continue to exist. Of socialism Fromm argues:

Beyond it (communism) begins that development of human power, which is its own end, the true realm of freedom, ... 37

Further, Fromm suggests that one can understand Marx's concept of socialism if the distinction between man's 'true needs' and the synthetic 'artificially produced needs' is maintained. The former are rooted in man's nature. "Man's true needs are those whose fulfilment is necessary for the realization of his essence as a human being."38 But in this statement of Fromm's 'essence' has become ontological, since in an earlier part of his analysis Fromm discusses the concept of essence as though it were inherent in man. Essence is existent in man but essence is also in the process of becoming. Yet paradoxically Fromm does not discuss the concept of essence dialectically and historically.
The Concept of Essence in Human Nature

In the foregoing section analysis has been focused on those areas of Marx's thought which provide one of the boundaries of Fromm's concept of human nature. We saw that for Marx the essence of human nature was man as "becoming," that inherent in this notion of becoming was the idea of individual freedom. In Fromm's terms it is a 'freedom to,' develop and realize himself. This freedom was a capacity for Marx, the possibility of which is realized in historical materialism. The problem of the essence of human nature was therefore in Marx's terms not so much existent in man's biology, but rather in his social being. The contradiction between man's essence and his existence, between his capacity for freedom and his temporal alienation was one that is resolved with the passing of time; one that man becomes conscious of with reflection on praxis.

Discussions of the concept of human nature are confronted by a variety of problems at differing levels of the history of philosophy and at differing levels of epistemology. These problems directly influence the possibility of a human sciences. One of the problems germane to such human sciences is existent in the concept of essence. For Fromm the concern with essence expresses itself in his intellectual focus on human nature and on the problems of illusions and the reality of social reality. The latter is a transformation of the philosophical and scientific concerns with the former. On the problem of the concept of essence Marcuse has remarked:
Its manifold forms have as their common content the abstraction and isolation of the one true Being from the constantly changing multiplicity of appearances. Under the name of "essence" this Being is made into the object of "authentic" certain and secure knowledge.40

Marcuse's essay is concerned mainly with the epistemological problems of the concept of essence. But much of what he has to say is relevant for Fromm's concerns as well. The problem of essence in general seem to arise in the human sciences out of three disjunctions. First, the disjunction between society and the individual. Second, the disjunction between nature and human nature, and finally the disjunction between the relativity of knowledge and the absolutism of being.

Marcuse comments on the attempt to eliminate the concept of essence from science as follows:

A theory that wants to eradicate from science the concept of essence succumbs to helpless relativism, thus promoting the very powers whose reactionary thought it wants to combat. Positivism cannot provide an effective critique of the idealist doctrine of essence. Doing so devolves upon the materialist dialectic.41

Instead, Marcuse suggests that ever since Aristotle's time, the concept of essence has had a historical and dynamic character. But in later philosophy (particularly in late antiquity and the Middle Ages when logos was translated into man as rational) man's being was translated into Christian theology's world view. Thus Marcuse argues:

Aristotle's doctrine of the essence of man is not comprehensible simply through his general 'definition' of man as . . . (zoon logan echon; zoon politikon) for it presupposes his metaphysics as well as his ethics, politics, rhetoric, and psychology, from which come the notions logos, politikon, zoon. It presupposes no less his postulation of domination and servitude as modes of Being and his view of the role of material labour in the totality of the areas of life.42
In this essay Marcuse asserts that his primary concern is with the "significance of the problem of essence for materialist theory chiefly in terms of the concept of the essence of man." His concern is to show that transformations in the meaning of essence for Descartes, Kant and Hegel, ensue from the forms of human social organization which the later concepts of essence reflect. Whole dimensions of man's existence become inessential or contingent. The historical and concrete contents of the experience of particular groups are lost as bourgeois society evolves. It is only with the development of a Marxist materialist theory that the original focus and sharpness of the concept of essence is revived and transcended, that the critical motif of the theory of essence, the "tension between potentiality and actuality, between what men and things could be and what they are in fact" is stressed. In this analysis Marcuse like Fromm stresses Marx's focus on the connection between essence and existence and potentiality and actuality; but unlike Fromm Marcuse stresses the critical class perspective of this concept of essence.

Materialist theory moves beyond historical relativism in linking itself with those social forces which the historical situation reveals to be progressive and truly 'universal.'

In discussing essence Marcuse defines "materialist theory" in very broad terms, rather than in its strictly Marxian formulation. This allows Marcuse to trace the continuity from Plato to Marx. In the case of the former, the concern is with the movement of social forms, social organization. Thus Plato viewed social movement as one of unrest and continually transformed tensions between existence (which we might term social forms
of limited temporality) and essence, but with the transformation of the former preserved in later forms.

With the emergence of Christian philosophy, essence and existence are kept ontologically separate. Essence is viewed as external to and yet necessary to existence.

The essence conceived in this way can become real only through a principle that is 'exterior' to it. . . Human beings are thus exonerated from concern with the 'ontic' difference between essence and existence in the realm of finite being.46

Here, of course, the reference is to the philosophy of Thomas Acquinas. Here too Thomistic philosophy impeded the reduction of the problem of essence to one of logic and epistemology. Such a reduction Marcuse views as central to the possibility of a concept of essence which would have its prior referent in concrete individual human beings.

The philosophy of Rene Descartes (1596-1650) is significant in this development of an essence whose referent is the autonomous individual. Here essence became the object of the ego cogito, of theoretical and practical reason. But according to Marcuse this change also echoes the beginnings of modern idealistic philosophies of essence. The rational autonomy and sovereign reason of the individual subject, as the essence of human nature, an autonomy and rationality that Descartes fashioned along the lines of mathematical science; paradoxically, is confronted by an external world over which the individual has no power. For Descartes, the individual had power over only his thoughts and desires. Yet Descartes is concerned with human freedom.
... That this freedom is freedom "only" of thought, that only the 'abstract' individual is free, that concern with human freedom becomes concern with the absolute certainty of thought, demonstrate the historical veracity of Cartesian philosophy. ⁴⁷

Descartes formulations provided the basis for theory of transcendental subjectivity as it was developed by Kant and later by Edmund Husserl. Husserl for example defines essence in opposition to any given spatio-temporal facticity, that is to say in this type of phenomenology, the tension between essence and existence is lost. Hegel's reformulation of essence as the absolute unity of "being-in-itself" and "being-for-itself" substitutes a reciprocity between essence and existence for the earlier loss of tension. Hegel's formulation is a dynamic historical one but one in which essence is "always prior to all states of fact." Marcuse comments that:

Hegel's theory of essence remains transcendental. ⁴⁸

The significance of the above formulation for Fromm's usage of the Marxian formulation is that in the case of the phenomenological (Husserlian) formulation the essence of the individual is located in pure subjectivity, it has no utility in Fromm's scheme since such a method could not for example demonstrate the effect on social institutions and values in shaping essential attributes. Alternatively Fromm could not explain by this method the historical movement of evil, of the pathological forces which are responses to structural and material distortions of man's possibilities. By the same token the Hegelian notion of essence through its locus in an absolute Being denies the elements of individual
will and choice in the formation of human character and the variability of character as located in spatio-temporal reality. In the final analysis such spatio-temporality is contingent for Hegel.

It is only in the materialist dialectic as sociol theory that the opposition of essence and appearance is given a critical motif. First, because the dynamic focal point in this theory of essence is on the historical relationship which constantly transforms the tension in this life by real men and in the lives of real men. Secondly because the incompatibility between potentiality as essence and actuality as existence "incites knowledge to become part of the practice of transformation." Thirdly, essence is the "totality of the social process as it is organized in a particular historical epoch." But this totality is multidimensional, and in methodological terms not data of the process is relevant at any given time. It is the relation of an individual factor to the whole process which determines the whole of life. In this historical epoch the economy has become the fundamental level, other levels of reality have become its "manifestations." Fourthly, the central phenomena, the essence do not appear as such to individuals and groups. The latter base their actions consequently on "appearances." The emergence of essence takes place only later in the historical process. In this theory of essence, the difference between essence and appearance is a historical constellation of social relationships, but both are parts of a historical process.

But we find much of Marcuse's analysis of essence focused on its present basis where the essence of the social life process is grounded
on the 'present' antagonism between the processes of production on the one hand and the realization of capital on the other hand. From here the antagonism is seen as penetrating on areas of life. The questions

Summary

In the foregoing discourse the concept of essence has been discussed as both method and value. Method, in the sense that within the social sciences inquiry seeks to penetrate beneath the realm of apparent meanings. For instance in analysis of the problem of what social factors shape human character and personality, Fromm's task has been to go beyond the general assertion that individual will and social factors operate to determine character. Such a question implies a method of inquiry which is not totally dependent on assembly of empirical data since the question does not presuppose knowledge of all levels of social interaction in all known societies. In short the question is formulated at a general theoretical level, the problem of human nature is not postulated for purposes of philosophical discourse, but because the problems of various human character types require what Northrop terms normative theories. Northrop suggests that social scientists cannot confuse the logics of both sets of theories, i.e., factual and normative theories and that the method inherent in any theory should be dictated by the questions posed and not the other way around.

Normative social theories, which are the only relevant answers to problems of value in the social sciences and the humanities, differ radically from this (i.e., factual theories). No normative theory . . ., could ever hope, nor does it pretend, to be completely in accord with what is in fact the case in any specific society.
The Northrop distinction between theories of fact and normative theories, assert that in contrast to the natural sciences—where these are only problems of fact—in the social sciences the problems which give rise to inquiry can be either problems of fact or problems of value. Normative theories are an inherent aspect of the social sciences, due to the fact that social institutions and their study—the very stuff of the social sciences—are man made and raise questions of an "ought" character; a type of question inherent in the social sciences.

Northrop's distinction and his explanation of the existence of "ought" problems in the social sciences are crude but provide one explanation of "value" as constituted in the concept of essence. At the same time it provides a basis for an analysis of essence as method and as value. Problems of value and method though distinct are not separate at least in sociology. This position was just recognized by Max Weber.

The conception of science based on an Aristotelian natural philosophy which in turn seeks to understand things in terms of qualities, of essences which are determined would approximate Northrop's conception of science and would isolate existence from essence as well. But such a conception of science has long been discarded. If Northrop does not hold any such view then the categorization of sciences of 'fact' and sciences of value due to some metaphysical relations of the distinct subject matter of natural and social phenomena remain crude and less than useful. At any rate Northrop's rationale for his categorizations—the fact that institutions are man made, i.e., the relation of 'subject' and 'object' is one that still enjoys wide currency. Such a view misconstrues the essence of scientific activity as well.
It is no longer debated in philosophic discussions of natural sciences that there is a close and ever changing relationship between mathematics and all fields of natural science. Whether mathematics is the language of nature, that is simply reflects metaphysical qualities and relations between orders of nature or whether mathematics is only an intellectual tool is another problem, investigation of which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Mathematic science and its own limitations provide a key to the understanding of limitations of inquiry and explanation in other realms of science. 55

Ideas of numbers are abstractions from experience, that is to say, ideas of number and form transcend the world of nature. This is exemplified in the Platonic tradition. Ideas of numbers can also be treated as discrete and separable. At any rate the assertion about abstractions as one element of scientific inquiry raises the problem of propositions in science as a whole. Summarizing his ideas on the significance of mathematical propositions for the development of science in general and that of physics, one of the most rapidly changing of the sciences in particle, Hawkins comments as follows:

But science is not a school of metaphysics, committed once and for all to any set of pre-suppositions that the philosophical critics may label it with. What science is committed to is the truth of partial truths and the discipline of extending them. 56

The context of the foregoing statement is seen in the author's summary discussion of the concept of essence as a metaphysic in relation to scientific explanations of relations in modern physics. Hawkins begins by noting Aristotelian natural philosophy sought to understand things in
"terms of qualities, of essences, which in turn, determined characteristic forms of the interrelation of things." The mechanistic natural philosophy conceived things as structural, but the structures were inevitably plastic and responsive, on a continuous scale of transitions, "to the environment in which they existed." Quantum physics, provides for the "possibility of wholeness and organization, but does not explain the actuality of phenomena. It conceives phenomena in terms of:

The interactions among things are conditioned by their character as things, by their qualities. The things have their qualities, . . . not in isolation, but in a milieu of relations with other things. The particle-field duality is the expression of this logical instability as it appears in modern physics.57

In other words explanations of relations of parts—which are fluid and changing take place within a nexus of essential more stable relations, these relations are antecedent to those of particular relations of parts. Hawkins, moreover applies a similar idea to his analysis of scientific epistemology.58

It can be summarized from the foregoing that concepts such as essence are not antithetical to scientific inquiry since concepts are an inherent part of science. Moreover that there is a specific sense in which such concepts imply a value. The misunderstanding in the social sciences which has led to attempts to divorce all concepts of values. Such attempts persist in their hostility to concepts such as essence but may well be based on a particular and questionable view of what types of inquiry and questioning constitute the social sciences. For this reason assertions such as those of Fromm and Marcuse of the necessity of
essence, of a concept of human nature are by no means popular and require justification in the form of a discourse on the philosophy of science in general and the particular relevance of such a discourse for the social science. 59

Human Nature in the Philosophy of Social Science

Most of the sciences which are of practical importance are, logically speaking, a mixture of natural history and physics. The nearer one is to natural history, . . . the better the traditional logic-book account fits; the nearer one is to physics, the more unsatisfactory it becomes. 60

A plethora of literature purporting to deal with the philosophy and methodology of the social sciences has developed over the past few decades. The approaches and subject matter vary in this literature, but there is general agreement that the most fundamental problem in the philosophy of social science is: how is a science of man possible and what is the shape of a science of man? As has already been suggested Erich Fromm's reply to such a question is to develop a science directed toward the formulation of a theory of human nature. Fromm reformulates the question in the following forms: what is the nature of evil and does a systematic conception of human nature and clinical evil negate a critical Marxism, i.e., a social theory which focuses on the process of social structural diachrony and synchrony in their influence on human behaviour? The philosophical and methodological implications of these questions for a unified science of man is summarized by Hoselitz as follows:
But the final barrier of full co-operation in the social sciences will be removed only when all specialists are able to see and appraise their special fields of research in its context within the whole field of the study of man and society.61

Discussions in the philosophy of social science have also in the last few decades avoided use of the terms human nature and essence but the expressed ideas are nevertheless similar, as are the problems which arise from use of the concepts of human nature and essence.62

It is now a truism to assert that science does not attempt to explain facts, that any notion of science involves the occurrence of a problem. Scientific explanation only makes sense when the notion of order exists. A notion of order is implicit in any paradigmatic framework. Within this notion of order analysis of particular events and their interrelations are given regularity. Here too arise the notions of laws and so on. The notion of order in science is best represented by what Toulmin terms "principle" in his articulation of the nature of explanation in physical sciences. We now turn to this problem to throw light on the nature of modern social sciences.

In sociology a dichotomy in epistemology, methodology and the philosophy of science exists between those social scientists whose questioning and problems begin with an explicit notion of society as a system and those theorists who begin with an explicit concern for man. In the former approach, the view of man and of human nature is implicit in the paradigm; in the latter approach the presupposition about human nature tends to be more explicit.63

The distinction being made here between sociologists committed to
the system paradigm in contrast to sociologists committed to an explicit concern with man; is also an attempt to evade the narrow labelling of some types of theories as being more conservative or radical than other types in terms of the political implications of the substantive ideas. The system/man distinction cuts across political value lines. In other words no sociological theory is 'value-free,' but in systems theory whether of the geometrical types such as von Bertalanffy's or the action-cybernetic systems of Talcott Parsons the view of man and human nature is implicit and hidden within the axioms of the theory. Presuppositions about man and human nature of the Parsonian system paradigm are located in Parsons' use of the term boundary maintenance, as a functional pre-requisite of the system. That is to say for Parsons the major problem of the individual in society is successful internalization of the major value-orientations of the society and learning the role set or one of the role-sets defined by the society. Parsons states this view of human nature as follows:

There is reason to believe, that among the learned elements of personality in certain respects the stablest and most enduring are the major value-orientation patterns and there is much evidence that these are "laid down" in childhood and are not on a large scale subject to drastic alteration during adult life.64

Parsons has defined human nature in terms of existence, a spatio-temporal process which is universalized and eternalized in his scheme. In contrast to the pragmatism of C. W. Mills' criticisms, the problem with Parsonian "grand theory" is not so much its lack of ground in empirical reality. Mills is opposed to a priori presuppositions in sociological theory which
attempt to delineate a concept of human nature, because he himself is
caught in the dilemma of a dichotomization of essence and existence. Mills misses the essential point in his critique of Parsons by implying
that 'grand theory' could provide an isomorphic research model for the
investigation of problems of order and change for any given society.
To the extent that 'grand theory' cannot function thus Mills dismisses
grand theory and deprecates presuppositions of human nature in such
theory. But paradigms in the social sciences are heuristic and cannot
be used as isomorphic models. At best Mills is guilty of a misconception
of presuppositions in scientific paradigms.

What is true of Parsons' grand theory is also true to some extent
of structural-functional analysis which prides itself in its grounding
in empirical inquiry. In both cases the underlying assumption about
human nature is that man is a tabula rasa or alternatively that human
needs are wholly relativistic. Criticisms of this brand of social science
is well documented.

The other approach in the social sciences, what C. W. Mills calls
abstracted empiricism is partly a reaction against grand theory schemes
of the Parsonian variety. The appeals to "value-freedom" and the narrow
concern with methodology abstracted from the natural sciences led to a
limiting of the sociologists attention to the "minutiae within man's
larger cultural and historical experience that could be grasped through
quantification." Here too the focus was on a divorce between existence
and essence. Existence itself came to be defined as what is. Here
the substance of human nature is no more explicit in the empirical model,
what is explicitly denied however is the possibilities of realization of essence or of any postulation of qualities of human nature which transcend the immediate spatio-temporal reality. In this sense system grand theory of the Parsonian variety is not essentially different from abstracted empiricism. Two important statements serve to illustrate my point about the relative triviality of 'abstracted' empiricism. Jacques Bargun writing in the 1930's warned against the substitution of mechanistic methodology for critical judgment in establishing postulates for a viable paradigm as follows:

What we want to know cannot be squeezed out of a machine by throwing in the raw materials at one end and grinding out results at the other. Any investigation, be it door-to-door canvass, a questionnaire, an historical essay, or a statistical study, starts with definitions and assumptions, expressed or implied, and the worth of these--other things being equal--is the worth of the study.68

The second statement was made by Robert Redfield whose main argument is that while the methods of physical science have a place in social science work, social science is also art since it consists (should) in part of "perceptive understanding of some aspect of human nature." Redfield suggests that three works considered to be classics in the contemporary social science circles (and investigated by a committee supposedly with the approval of one of the professional social science associations), had the following similar, advantageous characteristics. First, a combined use of both inductive and deductive methods. Secondly, these methods were used to illuminate the relations of human nature to the nature of society. Thirdly, they "throw light upon man in society through the more or less objective presentation of generalized conclusions
from the study of particular societies." Finally, each is an expression of some perception of human nature; but also of man transcending the particularities of given experiences. Redfield summarizes his position as follows:

In reading these books, we catch a glimpse of the eternal in the light of the ephemeral. We see ourselves as exemplifications of patterns in nature. Social science is concerned with uniformities. The uniformities are exaggerated; they transcend the particularity of real experience and historic event; they claim more than each fact by itself would allow; . . .

The foregoing discussion suggests that much of the debate in the social sciences about methodological procedures and the place of general principles or major premises (Toulmin), or a priori statements (Morris Cohen) appear to be based on a misconception of science. Consequently a major portion of methodological discussions within the social sciences is a misplacement of a fundamental problem. Thus writings such as those of Erich Fromm with its open assertions of the necessity of the major premise of human nature and essence tend to be neglected in the main stream of social science discourse with the over simplified charge that his work belongs among the ethical philosophers. Clearly the formulation of social science methodological dilemma's in terms of grand theory schemes with implicit and one sided views of human nature, on the one hand, and abstracted empiricism on the other; a distinction which emerges from the scientifically unfounded separation of 'objectivity' and 'subjectivity' or induction and deduction has not much advanced our understanding of the problems of social science.
... though the vision into the Absolute is either into a fathomless depth in which no distinctions are visible or into a fullness of being that exceeds our human comprehension, we need the idea of it to characterize our actual knowledge at any time as incomplete and fragmentary. The wells of rational knowledge offer no magic potion to those who thirst for the absolute certainty which will solve all ultimate questions. But they do offer us living waters which strengthen us in our arduous journey.

The foregoing statement concludes Cohen's discussion of the nature and function of the a priori in science. Cohen's analysis begins by examining the problems of epistemology in scientific discourse and asserts that to the extent that we are creatures in time and space our scientific knowledge will always be relative. Moreover some forms of knowledge though essential to us will always be beyond our "rational forms or systems" of empirical science. Secondly, in terms of rational or scientific proof the validity of existent facts is always in terms of some future state of affairs and once the contingency of existent facts on future states is understood not so much logically but substantially, the presence of a priori propositions in science, not derived from experience becomes a fundamental problem in philosophy and science. Cohen then makes a distinction between psychological and logical a priori propositions. The former which is a "question of temporal priority in an individual mind." Although Cohen does not make this point forcefully, there is a connection between psychological a prioris and the exclusive use of the inductive method. Rather Cohen suggests that the former derives from a one-sided use of the intuitive method. Rather than analyse the problem in the way that Toulmin does--by suggesting that the logical status of psychological a prioris is contingent upon our view of
language and the particular context in which language is used, as affecting the meaning of statements which are postulated as *a priori*—Cohen focused on the problem of how we perceive phases of nature and generalize upon particular perceptions. In other words, Cohen treated the problem of "psychological propositions" in terms of a universalistic psychological and metaphysics, whereas Toulmin dealt with it in terms of epistemological analysis as distinct from epistemological theory.

The core of Morris Cohen's resolution of the problem of *a priori* as methodologic postulates in science rests on his distinctions between perception and knowledge in everyday experience and the procedural rules of the scientist. In the former case universal ideas; which are really a given society's general ideas "which emphasize certain aspects of existence"; and particular fact "develop into clearness together, the particular instance helping to give body and prehensibility to the idea, and the idea making the instance clearer and more definite." In science however there are "ordinary hypotheses"—which can be disproved by their consequences, i.e., with subsequent discovery of phenomena—and the *a priori* assumptions, the essence of which is then irrefutability. Taking Poincaré's assertion *a priori* propositions are irrefutable because they are "really firm resolutions to carry on the scientific game according to certain rules or stipulations," Cohen concludes that *a priori* principles—whose substance usually assert uniformities (essential) in nature which can be discovered over time—are methodologic, assisting us in the organization of factual knowledge. He states:
Reflection, . . . , shows that it is possible to view a priori principles as both expressive of the fundamental nature of things and as enabling us to organize them according to certain orders or patterns suggested by these principles. [Italics mine]

In the final analysis however Cohen himself was not satisfied with this definition of the scope of the a priori, since he recognized that advancement in science can challenge the status of the a priori. Thus Cohen suggests that the substantive context of the a priori should be as such as not to foreclose all issues making for growth of science.

The ambivalence of Morris Cohen's position on a priori postulates becomes clear when his ideas are viewed in the context of his conception of social science. Cohen views the social sciences as empiric--that is based on material observations. Although Cohen defines the unity of social science in terms of some conception of "ultimate social ends, a fact is equally valid for other sciences," he proposes procedural methodology in terms of empiric type (ideal) models. Cohen favours explicit statement of moral values as ends or possibilities, but his discussion of this problem is in terms of social science as applied science (Alvin Gouldner) rather than in terms of the theoretical problems posed at a paradigmatic level. This weakness is seen in Cohen's choice of the deductive empirical method for social science. Cohen's solution to the problem appears to this writer to be a confusion at a number of levels. First, of all Cohen does not make a clear enough didistinction between natural and physical sciences. Secondly Cohen discusses social science as an essentially empiric science, i.e., one based on the discovery of new phenomena, and thereby tends to blur the distinctions between
paradigmatic postulates and those which can be directly tested in the research problem area. Thirdly despite his discussion of logical and methodological issues Cohen restricts his discussion of a prioris in the social sciences to strictly normative ones.

We have therefore to return to the problem originally posed in this section. Whereas Cohen does not sufficiently distinguish between natural and physical sciences, Toulmin makes this the basis of his discussion of the philosophy of science. Fundamental to Toulmin's philosophy of the sciences are two principles. The first is his distinction between the natural and the physical sciences. The second, is his view that the physical sciences is "organized common sense," and the uniqueness of scientific analysis lies in inferences which are given to familiar data rather than the discovery of new data. The purpose of this discussion of Toulmin is my assertion that his work on the physical sciences can be used to some extent to characterize the social sciences, that is to say, by implication parallels can be drawn between physical sciences and the social sciences.

To return to the first point--the distinction between natural and physical sciences, Toulmin viewed natural sciences such as biology as fundamentally "descriptive" in approach.\(^78\) The physical sciences are however explanatory. Toulmin suggests:

The point can be put concisely by saying: physicists do not hunt out regularities whose existence is already recognized.\(^79\)

According to Toulmin's analysis then "natural historians" or natural scientists lack for regularities of given forms, that is to say they are
"tied in its essentials," to the everyday classification of phenomena. Physical sciences "seek the form of given regularities." This assertion has important implications for an understanding of the methods and logics of the social sciences, for whereas Toulmin was not asserting that in the physical sciences/natural sciences distinction we have a complete separation of issues he was asserting that in the physical sciences mere accumulation of data was insufficient for the drawing of theoretical conclusions. Rather Toulmin suggests that in the physical sciences "it is no use even beginning to look at things until you know exactly what you are looking for: observation has to be strictly controlled by reference to some particular theoretical problem" [Italics mine].

But what does Toulmin mean by theory in the physical sciences and in what sense does the construct of existence and essence provide techniques for "inference drawing," equation of a "picture" of the motions of a social system? Toulmin saw imagination, not metaphysics as fundamental to science. What Toulmin means by this is that discovery in the physical sciences consist of new modes of representation. Representation is not a type of ad hoc activity, representation and therefore imagination is mostly dependent on training. Toulmin's ideas come close to that of Thomas Kuhn in this respect. Toulmin summarizes his views on theory in physical sciences in the following terms:

> It is natural for a logician to suppose that, in order to justify a theoretical conclusion, one must collect sufficient experimental material to entail it; and that if one does anything less, the theoretical conclusion will assert something more than the experimental
But this is a mistake. For it is not that our theoretical statements ought to be entailed by the data, but fail to be, and so assert things the data do not warrant: they neither could nor need to be entailed by them, being neither generalizations from them nor other logical constructs out of them, but rather principles in accordance with which we can make inferences about phenomena.82

In Toulmin's terms then the "truth" of a theoretical statement does not derive from formal deductive logic or extrapolations from given tested phenomena. Rather the truth of a theoretical statement is related to the degree of specificity of the question posed and is related to the particular context of the problem. Starting with the definition that inferences in science represent the specific set of relationships that new techniques open up for observation, Toulmin concludes his analysis of physical science in terms of procedure by suggesting that the fact that:

... at any particular stage, many of the propositions are taken without question does not make the exact sciences any less empirical: it merely reflects their logical stratification. Certainly every statement in a science should conceivably be capable of being called in question, and of being shown empirically to be unjustified; for only so can the science be saved from dogmation. But it is equally important that in any particular investigation, many of these propositions should not actually be called in question, for by questioning some we deprive others of their very meaning. It is in this sense that the propositions of an exact science form a hierarchy, and are built one upon another; ...83

Toulmin is suggesting then that some propositions—the most fundamental for establishing the "boundaries" of a scientific paradigm are not directly empirically testable though models and hypotheses derived from such statements can lend specificity to aspects of empirical work.

The overriding significance of Toulmin's work rests on the conclusions which he draws from his analysis of the necessity of understanding
the classes of statements in physical science. On the problem of what has come to be called "laws of Nature," he suggests that it is not Nature which is uniform, but scientific procedure; and "it is uniform only in this, that it is methodical and self-correcting." Self-correction is possible if the four classes of statements in science are not confused. The classes are as follows:

Firstly, abstract, formal statements of a law or principle.
Secondly, historical reports about the discovered scope of a law or principle.
Thirdly, applications of a law or principle to particular cases, i.e., a model.
Fourthly, conclusions of inferences drawn in accordance with a law or principle.84

Toulmin suggests in using the term laws of nature a distinction be made between expressions which are to be labelled "laws of nature" and those expressions which are applications of laws to special ranges of circumstances. The former are "instructions for the formation of propositions, rules of conduct, maxims and directions for the investigator."85 Words such as "true" and "false" are not therefore applicable to laws of nature, but rather to the statements which constitute applications of laws. The laws themselves allow the investigator to "find his way about in reality." But no particular direction is suggested in the law itself. This notion of laws of nature is compatible with Toulmin's first class of statements.
Much of what Toulmin has to say about the nature of statements in the physical sciences is applicable to the social sciences. The question whether statements about human nature are necessarily true or false is ruled out since they are in a very general sense heuristic. Moreover as Toulmin has shown statements of this class rests neither on induction or deduction. Whereas from the perspective of social science as based on logical empiricist methods; the concepts of human nature as essence and existence would be viewed as a prioris and not capable of direct testing, Toulmin's assertion is that such statements function in a specific sense in science. Moreover that to constitute the social sciences as capable of articulation in the same terms as the natural sciences is to misunderstand description as the sole method of scientific analysis. To the extent that much of the raw data of social life is capable of formulation in terms of what Toulmin calls "common sense," then there is a role for concepts of human nature in the social sciences since scientific investigation would then consist of drawing new inferences from existing data, and these new inferences become the "gristle" for theory construction in the social sciences. So that for example empirical data pertaining to character analysis in Fromm's terms would have their genesis in models based on an adequate conceptualization of human nature. But the adequacy of the data and the inferences drawn from models of human behaviour would depend on a viable formulation of the relationship between essence and existence as elements of human nature. Such a conception of human nature would be in Toulmin's terms a "representation statement."
Toulmin makes much the same point in another work, where he suggested scientific analysis begins with "prior theoretical considerations, that is to say pre-formed concepts" and that this is inevitable if the concepts are subject to reshaping in the light of experience. These pre-formed concepts take the form of ideals of natural order and other levels of inquiry are concerned with finding deviations from that ideal order. The concept of essence in human nature provides in formal terms just such an ideal of nature and is flexible enough to allow for the formation and investigation of concepts at other levels of articulation. It allows for the more empirical analysis of concepts and models of character in Erich Fromm's terms as well as for models of social structure. In Fromm's terms it allows for the explanation of the real in terms of the pathological a point which Toulmin also makes. In this sense essence is both method and value. To the extent that contemporary sociological theory lacks a paradigm with a suggestive conception of man this task appears urgent, for a unified theory of man and society.

From the Proposition of Human Nature to the Theory of Human Character

In Chapter One I suggested that a broad distinction can be made in all of Erich Fromm's work between what I have termed his theoretical contributions which can be further subdivided but in which the fundamental question posed was: what was the nature of evil in society? Fromm believes that this question is of urgent significance to a science of man. Social science paradigms must be based on this problem. Fromm does not conceive of this question in a purely relativistic and normative
manner, for him it is an existential and historically relevant problem, in the same way that modern physics in relation to machine computation, using modern electronic calculators is vital to a dynamic physics in the twentieth century. For Erich Fromm the scientific rationale underlying the attempted reconciliation between Marx and Freud, may be a first step in the attempt to provide a relevant set of questions and propositions for investigations of the connection between clinical evil and the dynamics of structural phylogenesis. The success of this venture partly rests on other matters. The other section of Fromm's work, the empirical—perhaps Fromm's most important contribution to social science—can only be fully appreciated within the context of the first distinction. Here we find Fromm testing some of his fundamental notions by examination of the developmental processes at both the structural and the character level. This for example is the significance of one of Fromm's most consistent themes in his analysis of modal personality: the contradictions in some character types between freedom from traditional sources of deprivation and political authority and man's general inability to develop positive freedoms to realize himself.

When Fromm's work is examined in light of the foregoing there is a direct connection in his intellectual biography between his continuing concern with human nature on the one hand and clinical sources of pathology on the other. This for Fromm appears to be one of the keys to developing a theory of human character. It is to the outlines of this problem that we must now turn our attention.
Man suffers from a fundamental dualism, however one may formulate it, and not from a conflict created by forces in the environment that may be avoided by a "correct bringing up" or removed by later de-education (psychoanalysis). ("Life Fear and Death Fear" in The Myth of the Birth of the Hero and Other Writings, p. 267, Otto Rank)

Reality in spite of all difficulties and pain, is not just the enemy of the individual, as it might seem from the neurotic viewpoint, but also a great help to the ego. While the average human being has to learn to use reality therapeutically, something which the neurotic can attain only in the therapeutic relationship, this could never happen unless the possibility had been given in reality itself. It is not unsatisfying reality, but a wilful turning away from this natural therapy as given, that characterizes the neurosis. ("The Individual and the Social" in Will Therapy and Truth and Reality, p. 195, Otto Rank)

One of the ironies of Erich Fromm's work on a science of character—a study which both Rank and Fromm view as having its genesis in the work of S. Freud—is that Fromm's work finds a number of parallels in the work of Otto Rank and yet Fromm makes no reference to Rank's theories in his own writings. The writings of both portray an ambivalence and a hostility to the ideas of Freudian psychology, and both men attempt to transcend orthodox Freudianism. Again both Rank and Fromm attempt to develop a theory of character and culture in phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms based on a fundamental dualism in human nature. Fromm appears to have a debt to Rank's ideas, but it is not one so far acknowledged.

In both opening statements of Rank, quoted above, there are indications of what Rank regards as existential dichotomies and there is little contrast between these dichotomies and those of Erich Fromm. Both men are concerned with fear as a problem inherent in human nature. With his analysis in the Trauma of Birth (1929) Rank discloses the unconscious striving of the child to return to reunion in the uterus—the source of
life and death, the primal trauma—but the "intrauterine state" also causes anxiety and fear since it is a reminder of "expulsion from Paradise" (Trauma of Birth, p. 75). From this standpoint the external environment, chiefly society was for Otto Rank an open stage on which in individual and extra-individual terms, man with the single variable, will re-enacts and attempts to resolve this dilemma. Human character types were then viewed as formed in this process. Otto Rank concludes his analysis of the foregoing in the following terms, which can be viewed as the basis (in terms of its logical conclusions) of Fromm's anthropology.

In cultural adjustment, with all its difficult normal and super-normal achievements, we witness various largely successful attempts to overcome the birth trauma, . . . For we see in the child's biological adjustment to the extrauterine situation, in the normal adjustment of the civilized man, as well as in his compensatory super productions of art (in the widest sense), the same striving to overcome the birth trauma enacted in similar forms, the only essential difference being that the civilized human being and still more the "artist" can reproduce this objectively in manifold, strictly determined forms, fixed by the primal trauma, whilst the neurotic is compelled again and again to produce it in a similar way on his own body. But the essence of most pathological processes seems to rest on this compulsive "return of the same" product on one's own body. The neurotic is thrown back again and again to the real birth trauma, whilst the normal and supernormal throw it, so to say, forwards and project it outwards, and are thus enabled to objectify it.87

We can conclude from the foregoing statement that for Rank's theory of character formation, stress is placed on the role of the individual's conscious will in a deliberate attempt to form an "effective and integrated personality for himself," that in most men there is a creative impulse to harmonize the dualism of all life. The creative personality
successfully overcomes the dualism, while the neurotic personality has failed to do so.

It is worth noting that much of Fromm's general theory of character formation and personality stresses the role of conscious will and productivity as well as the over-arching themes of life and death. It is also worth noting that as Fromm's opus develops his concept of character shifts increasingly toward the ideas of productivity and of "social character as an influential factor in the formation and development of individual character types and personality." For the purposes of outlining what appears to Fromm to be the most advanced elements of his thought on the problem of the genesis and formation of character, and in keeping with the format outlined in Chapter One of this discussion, I propose to look at Fromm's later works and then trace where possible continuities and discontinuities in his writings on the theory of character.

One of the most significant factors in Erich Fromm's work on the problems of existential and historical contradictions and the theory of human character is the analogy which he draws between the child's expulsion from its mother's uterus, from organic nature as it were and the historical separation of man from nature, the slow process of individuation in phylogenetic terms. In his earlier works Fromm tends to view these as the sources of fear (in Rankian terms).

The social history of man started with his emerging from a state of oneness with the natural world with an awareness of himself as an entity separate from surrounding nature and men. . . . In the life history of an individual we find the same process. A child is born
when it is no longer one with its mother and becomes a biological entity separate from her.90

Later in the same chapter Fromm suggests that the paradox of birth, the emergence of individuation inevitably brings with it the awareness of mortality of finitude in individual terms and the awareness of death as a human problem, what might be termed "primal consciousness":

He becomes aware of death as his ultimate fate even if he tries to deny it in manifold phantasies.91

Other metaphors in Fromm's discussions betrays a parallelism to the work of Otto Rank, particularly the usage of terms such as "man's expulsion from paradise" and his allusion to some of man's ancient myths such as the Garden of Eden.92 However Fromm never undertakes a systematic analysis of mythology as Rank does. Such an analysis of mythology is important for Rank's final theory of human character. This is so for the following reasons, which will be noted, rather than discussed. Firstly, Rank believed that the ultimate source of imagination in the individual is in the active, unchecked and exuberant imaginative faculty of the child.93 Secondly, the what is normally termed the fancies of psychoanalysis is viewed by Rank as an instrument for observing these fancies.94 Thirdly, the substance or content of myth and its formation and their connection with childhood imaginings provide in Rank's view, "the most sublime survival of what is perhaps the most primitive adjustment both in the phylogenetic and also in the ontogenetic sense"; that is to say the adjustment of every individual child to the intra-extra-uterine situation, on the one hand, and the adjustment of "reality to
the Unconscious, what might be termed 'birth trauma' at the cosmic level, between Nature and civilization."95

The essential difference between Otto Rank and Erich Fromm within the context of the foregoing is that whereas the former's task was to provide in his work a systematic analysis of the dilemma of life and death at the ontogenetic and phylogenetic levels, Fromm may have simply absorbed this problem as the basis of his life's work, simply by posing an analogy between childhood socialization and the character development of man as a whole, as located in this ambivalence to life and death. According to both Rank and Fromm man had to emerge from Nature in order to become human and yet Nature promises immortality, by keeping man from the tragedy of human consciousness. Being human provides life, but also brings with it consciousness of death, of mortality. Whereas from the perspective of humanness identification and oneness with Nature promises a return to the "primal state," an eternal sleep, which is non-individualized. It is by posing this problem that Rank provides his own basis for a theory of human character, and the process of the will in its formation.96 Rank's interest in the nature of evil develops from his question of the nature of the death instinct as it manifests itself in human consciousness—the only terms in which we can speak of it—with psychoanalytic knowledge that the child just experiences the feeling of fear in the act of birth, which Rank viewed empirically as manifesting itself, now as fear of life and at another time as fear of death. What Rank was postulating here is the actual ambivalence of life and death as processes, quite distinct from man's consciousness of this process as dichotomous experiential categories.
When Rank formulated the human dilemma in the foregoing terms, he was opposing the Freudian conception of man—since Rank was opposing the Freudian conceptions of life and death instincts as metaphysical things, quite apart from particular human consciousness of them. It was for this reason that Rank reintroduced the problem of will in the formation of human character. Summarizing his critique of Freud in this regard, Rank has stated:

However anti-moralistic psychoanalysis may seem, at bottom for Freud, will—or whatever he understands by that term—is exactly as "bad" as for the Old Testament man or the Buddhist or the Christian, exactly as reprehensible as it still is for Schopenhauer or other philosophers who played reason against it. 97

Rank asks the question why must will be denied if it plays "so great a role in reality," i.e., in the creativity of the self and the environment. 98

An Outline of Erich Fromm's Theory of Human Character

In his attempt at developing a theory of human character, Fromm's task is at once more general and more specific than that of Otto Rank and other predecessors. The task is more general in the sense that at the theoretical level of formulation Fromm begins with a conception of human nature as essentially paradoxical, without specifying in terms as precise as those of Rank the nature of that paradox—Fromm attributes the paradox neither to specific life and death instincts rooted in human biology as does Freud, neither does he specify the paradox in psychic-biological terms of the human experience of fear in the "primal
situation," as does Rank. Fromm raises the question is man essentially
good or evil, or is the essence of good or evil rooted in man's character
as he makes a choice? Generality and specificity of Fromm's task is
related when he asks given this choice or these choices, what is twen-
tieth century man's character is he tending toward greater freedom or
unfreedom and what are the consequences of earlier choices for contempor-
ary character? In other words, what is the connection in human history
between earlier character configurations and present day character and
its possibilities? The philosophical and theoretical force of these
questions lends urgency to Fromm's empirical findings. At the same
time Fromm's empirical findings continually focus and specify his theo-
retical formulations through modification of his theoretical postulates
and a prioris. In this sense Fromm's empirical findings are tentative.

In this section I propose to outline the major character types in
Fromm's scheme and then connect these to the major historical stages
outlined by Fromm. In keeping with the format suggested earlier in this
chapter, on the significance of distinguishing between Fromm's critique
of the social sciences, including psychology and his value position, in
this case his "psychology of ethics," discussion of knowledge of good
and bad will be postponed to a later section of the dissertation, and
Fromm's character types will be treated as empirical models within the
wider context of Fromm's analysis of human behaviour in scientific rather
than in ethical terms. 100

Fromm develops his outlines of character structures from two pro-
positions, the existential dichotomy as it gives use to historical
contradictions. His thesis is that man conscious of life and death (the existential dichotomy) has attempted to create technical means for material satisfaction. This was an historic choice, an attempt to create a world of his own, "in which he can feel at home with himself and his fellow men." The new contradictions arising from this choice, like the choice itself is man-made and soluble, unlike the existential dichotomy. Although the contradiction (historical) may not be soluble at an earlier temporal stage, it is certainly soluble at a later stage. For example the socio-economic and political contradictions arising from the institution of slavery in ancient Greece may not have been soluble at that time, they were certainly soluble at a later epoch in European history, when the technical means were developed. But much of the history of European societies have been attempts to resolve earlier contradictions by creating rationalizations, for instance the creation of ideologies to make it appear as though the material and socio-political inequalities rooted in the alienating social relations of production were natural inequalities, that is to say by making it appear that the historical contradictions were existential, and that the oppressed and exploited had to resign themselves to these relations. Again men engaged in ceaseless activity, in business and pleasure to escape inner restlessness. But much of the solutions of this kind spring from "lack of courage and an unwillingness to face truth." In quasi-Feuerbachian-terms Fromm suggests that even the attempts to create all inclusive "religious" views of the world without changing other spheres of human existence, are incomplete and compound the earlier contradictions. Fromm concludes to understand
human motivation--as the first step toward understanding human behaviour and character--we (social scientists) must accept as a basic proposition that all men have need of a system of orientation and devotion, but differences in the content of these systems reflect differences in the "idealism of his spirit," some "idealisms," or choices are conducive to the unfolding of man's powers, other choices warp this growth and atrophy his potentialities.

From the foregoing outline Fromm makes a distinction between the concepts of character, personality and temperament.

Character

Fromm defines character as "the (relatively permanent) form in which human energy is canalized in the process of assimilation"--the ways in which man relates himself to the world by acquiring and assimilating things--"and socialization"--the ways in which man relates himself to the world by relating himself to people. The choices come out of the existential contradiction which is the essence of human nature. The choices are two possible attempted solutions to the contradiction. Explaining the development of the individual character, Fromm suggests that it is determined by "the impact of its life experiences, the individual ones and those which follow from the culture, on temperament and physical constitution." In order to develop an integrated view of the connection between the individual "physical constitution" and the social environment, Fromm uses the concept of "social character" as mediating process, which provides a core of orientation for individuals during
processes of socialization. In other words factors such as class and ethnic groupings determine the nature of character structure but manifest themselves more directly in the social character, which in turn guides, negatively or positively, the formation of individual character.

The fact that most members of a social class or culture share significant elements of character and that one can speak of a "social character" representing the core of a character structure common to most people of a given culture shows the degree to which character is formed by social and cultural patterns.105

The differences then between social and individual character are due to factors such as the specific personality patterns of parents, the specific individual psychic endowment of individuals and the specific social environment in which the child grows up.

**Personality**

This is defined as "the totality of inherited and acquired psychic qualities which are characteristic of one individual and which make the individual unique. Here Fromm proposes a concept of personality, accepted in conventional interactionist social psychology. For Fromm personality is not directly observable, rather it is a whole set of traits which are unique and predisposes the individual organism to act or strive in particular directions. Personality also consists of inner dispositions which may not eventuate in overt behaviour. Shibutani defines personality as:

... consisting of potentialities for action. It is not so much what men actually do; it is the direction in which they would strive, were it possible for them to do so.106
Fromm regards personality as an all inclusive concept, that is to say when the individual organism has appropriated one or more character elements into himself, this is transformed in terms of the unique psychic constitution with which he is endowed and through this a core of the personality, the "I" emerges, this "I" or core of personality, is relatively unchangeable and persists throughout life.\textsuperscript{107} For Fromm, then personality is a totality.

Temperament

Temperament refers to "mode of reaction" and is constitutional and not changeable. Temperament is distinct from character and confusion between the two affects the place and substance of ethics in discussion of human behaviour. Fromm utilizes Hippocrates' four types of temperaments in his own empirical work, they are: "choleric, sanguine, melancholic and phlegmatic. The sanguine and choleric are modes of reaction which are characterized by easy excitability and quick alternation of interest, the interests being feeble in the former and intense in the latter. The phlegmatic and melancholic temperaments, . . . , are characterized by persistent but slow excitability of interest, the interest in the phlegmatic being feeble and in the melancholic intense."\textsuperscript{108} The direction of temperament depends on the type of character an individual possesses. Fromm postulates temperament as a concept the substances of which are ethically neutral, since temperament will tell investigators the "how of reaction," but not the consequences of that reaction.\textsuperscript{109}

Partly because Fromm believed confused thinking to exist in many
areas of social-psychology, particularly with respect to ethics in human behaviour, he developed his character typologies. He believed character to mean not the single trait, but a whole organized orientation from which single traits which can be acquired by individuals, follow. In this sense Fromm's character orientations are 'ideal types' (in the Weberian sense of its methodological value). The character types are ideal types for two general reasons. First because Fromm's aim is in the final analysis to understand behaviour and to develop a theory of personality from it. Secondly because according to Fromm himself character orientations whether of socialization or assimilation are not found expressed as Fromm set them out in his analysis; to the extent then, that Fromm's concern is in part modern man and the paradox of highly evolved technologies and poor socio-ethical relations, then individuals express this contradiction as well. 

The following is an outline of Fromm's character types as action orientations:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Assimilation</th>
<th>Socialization</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I) Non-productive Orientation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Receiving . . . . . . . . . . (Accepting)</td>
<td>Masochistic)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Exploiting . . . . . . . . . . (Taking)</td>
<td>(Loyalty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Hoarding . . . . . . . . . . (Preserving)</td>
<td>Symbiosis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Marketing . . . . . . . . . . (Exchanging)</td>
<td>Sadistic )</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Authority))</td>
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<tr>
<td>II) Productive Orientation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working . . . . . . . .</td>
<td>Destructive )</td>
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<td>(Assertiveness))</td>
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<td>Withdrawal</td>
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<td>Indifferent )</td>
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<td>(Fairness) )</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Loving, Reasoning</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Fromm's analysis is partly aimed at indicating the affinities between socialization and assimilation and the ways in which orientations develop in reality not exclusively on one or the other. Moreover Fromm suggests that, in reality from the perspective of an individual or social character type there can be blends of non-productive with productive orientations. He states:

... in reality, we always deal with blends, for a character never represents one of the non-productive orientations or the productive orientation exclusively.\textsuperscript{112}

Moreover any of the non-productive orientations has a positive and negative aspect, "according to the degree of productiveness in the total character structure."\textsuperscript{113}

In his attempt to correlate development of ontogenetic character orientations with the phylogenetic evolution of social structures, Fromm utilizes a number of propositions which will be outlined. First, Fromm's starting point is the historical contradiction of freedom from primary ties and freedom to. Secondly particularly because part of the empirical data for his orientations derives from his psychoanalytic experience, Fromm locates the genesis of the contemporary meanings of freedom from and freedom to in the breakdown of medieval social structures and the evolution towards modern capitalism. He states:

We shall start our study of the meaning of freedom for modern man with an analysis of the cultural scene in Europe during the Middle Ages and the beginning of the modern era.\textsuperscript{114}

The phylogenetic stages which follow the chapter structures of \textit{Escape}
From Freedom are as follows:

1) a) The Breakdown of Medieval society and the outlines of Renaissance social structure: The social structure is characterized by a general lack of individual freedom. Men were conscious of themselves only as members of a race, family, party or corporation. The Church fostered a sense of guilt, and social and geographic mobility was low and discouraged.

b) The emergence of the Renaissance foreshadows the later collapse of rigid feudal structures and new criteria of social status, in place of birth and rank, wealth becomes the measure of social stratification especially in and around Italy. Political struggles develop and result in the emergence of new emperors and political units. The emergence of new forms of urban industry and the rise of a moneyed class in Italy.

The Renaissance is a culture of wealthy burghers and nobles on the one hand and exploited and manipulated masses on the other.

Freedom and tyranny, individuality and disorder were inextricably interwoven.115

Individuals become objects to be manipulated or manipulating subjects. But in ideational terms the Renaissance is also a period of the revival of humanist ideas and forms of investigation which later resulted in the emergence of natural science.
2) **Social Structures from the Renaissance to the Reformation:**
Generally a period of growth of commerce to larger national and international proportions. The fifteenth century sees this growth accompanied values favouring economic and capitalistic development. There were also changes in the attitudes to work, for example the idea of efficiency becomes almost a moral value. The Reformation witnesses an open split with the Roman Catholic notion of authority and the assertion of the individual's "liberty of conscience." But the political structures stress new forms of authoritarianism, as the ideas of the Reformation increasingly become a weapon of the "princely" order in its fight for secular power.

3) **From the Reformation to Modern Industrial Capitalism:**
The development of the factory system and the transformation of the rural peasant into an urban worker, is the main feature of this period. But this period marks a sharpening and synthesizing of forces and institutional features, taking shape from an earlier period, for example the development of the market, and the principle that each individual acts to maximize profits, and yet this being to the benefit of all. There is also the rapid introduction of machine technology and in North America the rapid dissolution of the large scale plantation system and the emergence of corporate investment. Out of this process the self becomes something to be marketed, like any other product. The worker becomes an insignificant thing, in the face of the expansion of
the multi-national corporation and the large, bureaucratized trade union. "Power becomes anonymous."[117]

Summary Remarks

Fromm's attempts to investigate the structures of mental health as well as pathology tend to follow along conceptual and historical lines. The main contention of this chapter has been that such an investigation involves the development of concepts of character which are grounded in a notion of human nature as paradox. Not only has the notion of essence a legitimate place in social science, but such a notion does not necessarily commit the investigator to a set of ethical presuppositions or normative prescriptions. Fromm's work shows a systematic connection between his conception of human nature and his critique of theory in the social sciences. Moreover Fromm's empirical constructs such as individual and social character is based on the type of questions which he proposes and this is a valid procedure in the physical as well as the social sciences. Fromm then is not committed to a view of essence as substance so much as essence as method. He has suggested that the increasing expulsion of essence from contemporary sociology can itself be understood in sociological terms. The real difference between thinkers of the stature of Parsons on the one hand and Fromm on the other, rest on the fact of essence as presupposition in the case of Parsons and proposition in the case of Fromm. But this is not to say that Fromm's substantive conclusions are necessarily valid.

The task of the following chapter will be to examine whether Fromm
has succeeded in presenting a coherent view of human behaviour and an explanation of evil as it manifests itself in individual behaviour patterns in terms of the structural dynamics of social evolution.
FOOTNOTES


3 This statement is meant to be tentative, no more. Since quite apart from the hypothesis itself which finds support in the numerous works of Dr. Ernest Becker and earlier on F. S. C. Northrop; what is human nature in the context of this section has not yet been defined.


5 Ibid., p. 38.

6 Ibid., p. 35.


9 Ibid.

10 Ibid., pp. 5-6.

11 Ibid., p. 9.

12 Ibid., pp. 11-19.

14 Ibid., p. 11.

15 Ibid.

16 See for example Marx's discussion of love in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, cited in Erich Fromm, Marx's Concept of Man (New York: Fredrick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 30-31. In this part of the Manuscripts, Marx saw the essence of man as a natural species to sensuous. This sensuousness indicates for Marx and for Fromm the specifically human nature. In another translation of Marx's Manuscripts, there is no mention, in the sections quoted by Fromm, of productivity and receptivity; rather Marx discusses 'real value' and 'use value' defined by money in capitalist society. Marx suggests of love: "As money is not exchanged for any one specific quality, . . ., or for any particular human essential power, but for the entire objective world of man and nature, from the standpoint of its possessor it therefore serves to exchange every property for every other, even contradictory, property and object: it is the fraternization of impossibilities. It makes contradictions embrace." See Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, tr. Martin Milligan, edited with an introduction by David J. Struik (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 169. [Italics mine] In Milligan's translation it is not so much the antimony of productivity versus receptivity which is emphasized but the transforming power of money in capitalist society. In short in capitalist society money becomes the truly creative power. Of course both Fromm and Milligan assert Marx's belief that the resolution of this contradiction is only finally possible in communist society.

17 Fromm, op. cit., Marx's Concept of Man, p. 35.

18 The outlines of the debate referred to here and Fromm's position on it can be found in "The Continuity of Marx's Thought" in Marx's Concept of Man, pp. 69-79.

19 Cf. Daniel Bell, "The Meaning of Alienation" in Thought, 1959, quoted in Fromm, ibid., p. 77. Fromm notes that Bell's position is similar to that taken by Russian Communists, though the motives are different. Bell's motives are supposedly intellectually conservative, that is favouring individual role adjustment and the equilibrium of the social system.

20 Fromm, op. cit., pp. 71-72. For an alternative approach to the same problem exclusively with respect to sociology see Robert Friedrich's A Sociology of Sociology (1970), pp. 24-25. Friedrichs explains the dominance of mechanistic-positivism in American sociology up to the 1950's as being due to the 'late discovery of the writings of the young Marx.'
21 Fromm, op. cit., p. 78.
22 Ibid., p. 72.
23 Ibid., p. 79.
25 Ibid., p. 9.
26 Ibid., p. 8.
27 Ibid., p. 10.
28 Ibid., p. 12.
30 This argument of Marx's raises the problem of 'form' and 'content.' Marx is making a phenomenological assumption (which continues to find support in some areas) that form can change without changing the character of the relevant content. This viewpoint is best established in Georg Simmel's sociology. Simmel suggests that identical content may take on different forms. He states: "... a contentually identical interest may take on form in very different situations." Further in his work Simmel is more explicit: "... --everything that is present in them in such a way as to engender or mediate effects upon others or to receive such effects, I designate as the content, as the material as it were of sociation." These materials are factors in sociation only when they "transform mere isolated individuals into specific forms of being with and for one another. ..." See Kurt H. Wolff, The Sociology of Georg Simmel (New York: Free Press, 1950), p. 22 and pp. 40-41.
31 Fromm, op. cit., p. 16.
32 As analysis in the Manuscripts progresses Marx tends to restrict use of the term 'labour' to alienated labour and work to free conscious non-alienated labour.
34 Ibid., p. 102.
35 Ibid., pp. 103-105.
36 Ibid., p. 127.
37 Ibid., p. 59.
38 Ibid., p. 62.


40 Ibid., pp. 43-44.

41 Ibid., p. 45.

42 Ibid., p. 79.

43 Ibid., p. 80.

44 Ibid., p. 69.

45 Ibid., p. 78.

46 Ibid., p. 47.

47 Ibid., pp. 50-51.

48 Ibid., p. 69.

49 Ibid., p. 70.

50 Ibid., p. 71.

51 Ibid., p. 84.

52 Cf. F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities (New York: World Publishing Co., 1959). Northrop makes a distinction between factual and normative social theories. The latter is introduced to change the defacto situation or to conform to it. "It defines the ideal society at which we are aiming. It does not purport to designate, after the manner of a theory in natural science, the defacto state of affairs which we actually have" (p. 21). Factual theories in social science are answers to problems of fact and "must necessarily designate a form of social organization which corresponds exactly to what is in fact the case in a specific society or culture to which the theory purports to refer" (pp. 20-21).

53 Ibid., p. 21. Northrop has the following to say on the examination of problems of fact:

An examination in social science of problems of value and problems of fact makes the difference between them evident. Problems of fact in society involve the construction of hypothetically designated, indirectly verified scientific theories, after the manner of those in the natural sciences. It is the characteristic of the method
appropriate for verifying such theories that they designate any
theory to be false if one fact is out of accord with any deduced con-
sequence of the theory. (p. 20)

54Ibid., p. 255. Northrop's conception of natural science as con-
cerned only with problems of fact warrants a minor challenge. Northrop
does not clarify whether what he means by fact is elements of Nature
with identifiable metaphysical qualities which can be empirically known
and validated in some a priori fashion. Moreover even if Northrop holds
this Platonian view of matter that aspect of science no longer persists
in the divorce between matter as essence and existence. The process of
levels of indeterminacy between essence and existence, on the one hand
and empiric science's explanations of facts as relative to specific types
of explanation are no longer denied in 'normal science' (Kuhn). For
further analysis of this problem, see David Hawkins, The Language of
Nature: An Essay in the Philosophy of Science (San Francisco: W. H. Free-

55Hawkins, ibid., pp. 11-39.
56Ibid., p. 162.
57Ibid., p. 185.
58Ibid., pp. 244-246.

59Such a set of generalizations is not an attempt to set up a
"straw man." Nevertheless the disquiet in contemporary sociology against
the classical problems: ambiguous general theorizing and levels of
empiricism which vary in the degrees of triviality which clutter the
questions asked; are legion criticisms. However some of the solutions
to these problems spring from equally ambiguous and sometimes confused
thinking about the senses in which sociology can be a science or is a
science. This is very clear as a general observation in a set of essays
written by a group of eminent U. S. social scientists. See: Kewal
Motwani, A Critique of Empiricism in Sociology (India: Allied Publishers,
1967).

60Stephen E. Toulmin, The Philosophy of Science: An Introduction

61Bert Hoselitz, Reader's Guide to the Social Sciences (Illinois:
Social Scientific Knowledge (New Jersey: The Bedminster Press, 1963),
p. 524.

62This statement requires some clarification. To the extent that
the general trend within the development of sociology has been away from
"grand theory" and a minimizing of the influence of traditional
philosophical problems terms such as human nature are not considered fit in scientific discourse among many groups of sociological thinkers. But some thinkers such as C. W. Mills in polemicizing against abstracted empiricism continue to suggest that the most important questions for modern sociologists have to do with: "... what kinds of 'human nature' are revealed in the conduct and character we observe in this society in this period? And what is the meaning for 'human nature' of each and every feature of the society we are examining?" [Author's italics] See C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 7.

63 This distinction, between system theorists and those sociologists concerned with man, is not meant as exhaustive of the variety and types of sociological theories. Such variety is not being denied in the history of sociology. Rather I am more concerned, at this stage, with striking a distinction which illustrates the ways in which thinkers operate, this tends to manifest itself in the forms and types of questions posed. See for example Robert Merton, *On Sociological Theory: Five Essays, Old and New* (New York: Collier-Macmillan, 1967), pp. 3-7.

64 Cf. Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (New York: Free Press, 1964), p. 208. A more systematic analysis of the Parsonian paradigm will be undertaken in a subsequent chapter. At this stage I only want to draw attention to the implicit assumptions about human nature in the work.

65 Mills, op. cit., *The Sociological Imagination*, pp. 39-49. Mills 'skirts' the problems raised by his critique of Parsons by suggesting 'grand theory' or social science paradigms should not attempt to stress conflict or integration, conformity or non-conformity in a priori. His solution is a series of empirical problematic models. But this does not resolve the problem of inadequate pre-suppositions. Mills states: "... To emphasize such conflict of value is not to deny 'the price of rational consistencies.' The discrepancy between word and deed is often characteristic, but so is the striving for consistency. Which is predominant in any given society cannot be decided a priori on the basis of 'human nature' or on the 'principles of sociology' or by the fiat of grand theory" (p. 39). [Italics mine]


67 Ibid., pp. 47-48. This period in the development of sociology is well documented and equally well criticized. Among the vocal critics C. Wright Mills is the best known critic of abstracted empiricism which he defines as "... the simple classification of questions: who says what to whom in which media and with what results?" C. W. Mills, op. cit., p. 51. Mills views the principal shortcoming of 'abstracted empiricism' as an abdication of social scientists from questions which touch on the
nature of the social structure of a given society. There is also a "pronounced tendency to confuse whatever is to be studied with the set of methods suggested for its study."


72 Ibid., p. 136.

73 Ibid., p. 137.

74 Ibid., p. 138. Cohen's recognition of the role of language in the context under discussion is as follows: "Each one of us is born into a community and the general ideas of that community are imposed upon us through language and through social modes which emphasize certain aspects of existence to the neglect of others" (p. 138). For an extensive treatment of Toulmin's view of the problem see David James Harding, The Ideology and Logic of Scientism, unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1970, Chapter 16 "Logic as Argument: Toulmin," pp. 318-359, especially p. 348.

75 Morris Cohen, op. cit., p. 143.

76 Ibid., p. 144.

77 Ibid., pp. 333-368. Cohen concludes his analysis as follows: "To the extent that the social sciences aim at the adjustment of human difficulties, they involve more judgement and circumspection. To the extent that they aim at insight . . . , they are at one with pure science and with religion and poetry." See also Alvin Gouldner, "Anti-Minotaur:
The Theoretical Requirements of the Applied Social Sciences, "American Sociological Review, 1957. Here Gouldner makes a point similar to Cohen, that sociology should develop theoretical concepts which are more in line with the layman and thus facilitate the resolution of practical societal problems.

78 Toulmin, op. cit., p. 44.
79 Ibid., p. 44.
80 Ibid., p. 53.
81 Ibid., p. 54.
82 Ibid., p. 42.
83 Ibid., p. 81.
84 Ibid., p. 90.
85 Ibid., p. 100.

Because of the development in both Marxist and psychoanalytic thinking, the time seems to have come for humanist Marxists to recognize that the use of a dynamic, critical socially oriented psychology is of crucial importance for the further development of Marxist theory and socialist practice; that a theory centered around man can no longer remain a theory without psychology if it is not to lose touch with human reality. (p. 231) [Italics mine]

This statement is followed by an exposition of Fromm's concept of 'social character.' The above stated shift in Fromm's thinking was earlier discussed in Chapter One of the dissertation in more general terms of Fromm's social science.
Erich Fromm, The Fear of Freedom (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 19. This text is published in North America as Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (1941) and 1965), pp. 39-40. No reasons for the title change are given, but there is no doubt in my mind that the analogy suggested in the text is fundamental to Fromm's formulation of the problem of existential and historical fear. For example in the 1965 edition Fromm states in Foreword II:

It becomes ever increasingly clear to many students of man and of the contemporary scene that the crucial difficulty with which we are confronted lies in the fact that the development of man's intellectual capacities has far outstripped the development of his emotions. Man's brain lives in the twentieth century; the heart of most men lives still in the Stone Age. (p. xiv) [Italics mine]

Clearly the implication here is that there is a dichotomy of sorts between the intellectual and physiologic attributes of man and that this is partially the source of human evil.

Fromm, op. cit., The Fear of Freedom, p. 27.


Ibid., p. 66.

Ibid., p. 67.

Ibid., p. 223. See also Fromm's critique against Freudian psycho-analysis' aim to cure the irrational by appeals to reason, op. cit., Man for Himself, p. 36.

The consistency of Fromm's empirical task which is widely referred to can be traced in the following works: Escape from Freedom (1941); Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (1947); The Sane Society (1955); The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil (1964); E. Fromm and Michael Maccoby, Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Sociopsychosocial Study (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).

Failure to make this distinction clearly in Fromm's work is the main weakness of some of Fromm's critics such as Rubin Grotesky, Personality: The Need for Liberty and Rights (1967) as cited earlier.
The 'notions' of existential and historical dichotomies are also present in the works of other writers with respect to historical development and character and behaviour. Otto Rank discusses the process of existential and historical dichotomies--without actually using those terms--in relation to sexual love, happiness and redemption, in the following terms: "All man's longing for happiness and redemption corresponds then to a spontaneous therapeutic attempt either to unite harmoniously once more this insoluble opposition of will and consciousness of guilt or to separate them entirely. Both must miscarry." (p. 299). But in terms of the temporal problem, will, guilt and consciousness maintain themselves differently. For will, "however one comprehends or interprets it, remains a constantly operating force, while consciousness above all is a quality, a state, and as such is passive and temporary. . . . The feeling of pain, which maintains itself psychically as guilt feeling, arises from the attempts to unite these two incommensurable powers." (p. 298). See Otto Rank, op. cit., Will Therapy and Truth and Reality. Dr. Ernest Becker writing three decades later from an equally anti-Freudian standpoint and using the notions of contradiction in relation to contemporary psychiatric problems states the problem in the following manner:

For the sake of his equanimity and power man is trying to entwine cultural rules with objects. But by thus incarnating the fiction it becomes real and enslaves him. . . . The paradox is that for conviction man needs to merge rules and objects; whereas for manipulatory control over the rules, for the power to change his designs, man needs to disentangle the rules from the objects. . . . Little wonder that guilt is rampant in human life. Man is hoist with his own petard, with his need for conviction. The child or the adult who concretizes the rules does so under the impetus of a primary esthetic desire to merge the mental and the material. He is hardly to be blamed when, for the sake of certainty, he finds the concrete hardened around his own feet.


Fromm, op. cit., Man For Himself, pp. 50-57. I use the term "religious" not to refer to strictly theistic systems. Fromm uses the terms "frames of orientation and devotion" (p. 56).


Fromm, op. cit., Man for Himself, p. 208.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid., p. 62. Fromm attributes part of the confusion about ethics in human behaviour to C. G. Jung (p. 61). See also John Schaar, op. cit., Escape From Authority, p. 86. Schaar suggests that Fromm views inherited qualities as synonymous with temperament, and acquired qualities with character.

Ibid., pp. 162-163. We will return to this problem in a subsequent chapter.

Fromm, op. cit., Man For Himself, p. 117. The definitions and discussions of these orientations will be developed in Chapter III.

Ibid., p. 118.

Ibid., p. 119.

Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, p. 53. One of the rationales underlying my focus on these propositions is that whereas in Escape from Freedom, Fromm's analysis focuses on the socio-structural outlines of the stages of development, in Man For Himself, the analysis is ontogenetic.

Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, p. 63. For an analysis of rigid rank and stratification in matters of dress in (Goth) thirteenth century Europe see J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages: A Study of the Forms of Life Thought and Art in France and the Netherlands in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries (London: Edward Arnold, 1924), p. 43.


Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, pp. 148-152.
CHAPTER III

A DISCUSSION OF ERICH FROMM'S THEORY OF HUMAN
CHARACTER, AND THE INDIVIDUAL

There is no more a specific, independent principle of evil then there is a specific principle of darkness, for both spring from an absence of the positive, which reveals itself and its contrary.¹ [Karl Lowith]

In Fromm's investigations into the nature of evil, he is specifically concerned with clinical evil, that is to say pathological and social evil. He is not so much unconcerned with evil as a philosophical and moral ethical problem, rather he is focused upon an anthropo-sociological problem. Such an investigation does not negate philosophical inquiry, so much as it would be an error to translate Fromm's propositions to strictly ethical and philosophical discourse, by the same token it will be an error to evaluate his overall task in one dimensional terms. Fromm recognizes the multi-dimensional nature of his questions, he also recognizes the logical and substantial connections between philosophical propositions and psychoanalytic and sociological inquiry. The preceding chapter is concerned with the specific nature of the connections between philosophical proposition and psycho-analytic and sociological inquiry. This chapter is concerned with the historical and empirical investigations of Fromm.

Fromm's character typology of productive and non-productive and his sociological statements parallel his articulation of good and evil
in philosophical terms. Such an articulation have the Kantian formulation of evil in "anthropological" terms (of "radical evil" which refers to man's specifically human nature, one able to direct itself with reason and freedom); as well as Leibniz's paradoxical definition of evil as absence of the positive and yet that the human is an outcome of a transcendent God, revealing himself in the human person. Fromm's pronouncements at the philosophical level shift between Kant's "limitation" of reason as "pure reason" and therefore evil as an ethical concept, in this sense, on the one hand and Leibniz's imputation of evil to finite creatures, on the other hand, hence Fromm's assertions of the "burden of reason" as defining the boundary between human and pre-human states of existence and his concretization of evil. Precisely to the extent that Fromm's philosophical conception of good and evil is influenced by Leibniz he could assert with Leibniz:

Adam and Eve's disobedience to God are not called sin; nowhere is there a hint that this disobedience has corrupted man. On the contrary, the disobedience is the condition for man's self-awareness, for his capacity to choose, and thus in the last analysis this act of disobedience is man's first step toward freedom. [Italics mine]

The foregoing statement reiterates Leibniz's "optimism" when he says:

Thus the seeming deformations of our little worlds combine to form beauty in the great world and in no wise conflict with the unity of an all embracing, infinitely perfect principle: on the contrary, they enhance our admiration for its wisdom, which puts evil into the service of the greatest good. [Italics mine]

Fromm's philosophical position then reveals a paradox of Leibnizian religiosity and Kantian rationality. At a different level Fromm in
attempting to penetrate this problem further, translates this paradox into a thoroughly sociological one: the primary relations of family, blood and nation which we must separate ourselves from and the uncertainty of possible structures--the problem of "freedom from" and "freedom to." Fromm also translates the problem into a psycho-analytic one of will and guilt (Rank's terms) at the level of depth psychology. The establishment of weaknesses in Fromm's ideas at what I here term his philosophical level of discourse does not provide in itself an effective critique of his work as a whole. If only because Fromm shifts constantly in his loyalty to antecedent ideas and use of metaphor, which is employed in his work. It is partly for this reason that the distinction was earlier made between Fromm's sociological epistemology and his sociology of knowledge and Fromm's historical and empirical writings.

Fromm's empirical work indicate awareness of this problematic in his assertion that his character types as pure types are meant to be didactic and in reality actual individual characters have to be presented as "blends" of different non-productive orientations or of non-productive and the productive orientation. He states this as follows:

To understand the character system, it is necessary to take account of the interrelationship between modes of assimilation and relatedness, the quality of incestuous ties, and the degree of productiveness.6

This statement although repeated, with variations, throughout Fromm's has never been given extensive methodological or theoretical explanation, what Fromm appears to be saying here is that his character orientations
are "ideal types" almost in the Weberian tradition. Such a parallel is however misleading. A few words on this problem is in order, for just as postulation of Weber's "ideal type" and the subsequent controversy marks the status of that thinkers transition between theory, methodology and empirical analysis, so in Fromm, his notion of "blending of orientations" marks a critical point in his work.

Because Fromm's concept of character is both an individualizing and a generalizing concept (in von Schelting's terms) it betrays some affinity with Max Weber's approach to social phenomena. The latter strategy is employed in Fromm's empirical analysis in Escape From Freedom and in his most recent work Social Character in a Mexican Village: A Sociopsychoanalytic Study. Fromm's concept of character is a general ideal type to the extent that it is applicable--all his types of character--to an indefinite number of concrete cases and any character type with all its elements may be applicable to given concrete situations, for example this is evident in Fromm's use of the marketing orientation as a type of social character typical of advanced industrial societies. But there are differences between Weber's and Fromm's formulations of ideal types. Weber's assertion that the considerations preceding the selection of the substantive content of a given type, being "value-free," that is having nothing to do with considerations of what ought to exist; can be contrasted with Fromm's view that the relation between productive and non-productive modes of socialization and assimilation point to an imperative.

There are two further significant differences between Weber's and
Fromm's formulation of ideal types. The first is Weber's assertion that his types made no presuppositions attributable to psychology but rather were selected from classes of phenomena contrasts sharply with Fromm's admission that individual cases from psychoanalytic practice influence, among other things, his selection. The second relates to the varying attitudes of Weber and Fromm to history. Weber asserted that his ideal types were based on what is logically possible, whereas the historically real was often quite distinct in terms of what causes explain an event, and therefore unrelated to the individual question posed. This line of reasoning lead Weber ultimately to a kind of type atomism. Fromm has a less rigid attitude to history. Whereas Weber's concern is with an ideal type construct that explains historical particulars or the unique occurrences of phenomena, Fromm's concern in his ideal type is with regularities which transcend the particular. By transcendence of the particular is meant a level of analysis which signifies socio-economic development and a development of "life-centered values." Nevertheless the method employed by Fromm in this approach to his subject matter is not dialectical in Sartre's sense of the diachronic and entogenetic.

In terms of his empirical and historical anthropological work Erich Fromm's concern with clinical evil is best understood within the context of his general assertion that the relationship between normal and pathological behaviour exists as a continuum. In other words the distinctions between normal and abnormal are more quantitative than qualitative in manifestation. From the time of Freud this idea has tended to influence social science discourse. But how could Fromm assert
in his sociological epistemology that life and death or good and evil are opposed and assert in his historical and empirical work that a continuum exists between normalcy and pathology? In his examination of Fromm's work, Schaar was troubled by this apparent contradiction. While Schaar holds that Fromm's organizing concepts of productive and unproductive or in personality terms good and bad, is taken from Fromm's moralistic position and have little to do with empirical reality. Herbert Marcuse, in an earlier, more scathing attack held that such pronouncements came from Fromm's support for the reigning and repressive ideology and therefore indicative of a far more conservative position than Freud himself:

There is furthermore the distinction between good and bad, constructive and destructive (according to Fromm: productive and unproductive, positive and negative), which is not derived from any theoretical principle but simply taken from the prevalent ideology.

In other words Marcuse suggests that behaviour which is in reality productive is almost impossible in contemporary society. In fact any observed diversities of character in contemporary society, are "secondary phenomena." Moreover Marcuse's implicit criticism is that Fromm should focus his powers of investigation not at the level of such observed diversities of psychological and socio-psychological patterns, but on the "scope, form and effectiveness of repressive controls prevalent at the given stage of civilization." When examined more closely, Marcuse is stating that the diachronic processes are prior and determine the nature and scope of factors that influence behaviour in contemporary
society, that is at the ontogenetic level--thus Marcuse does not undertake a clear distinction, on the Freudian model, between civilization and contemporary society. But if the nature and scope of the ontogenetic can be simply deduced from phylogenetic processes what is the place of Rank and Fromm's assertion of will? It is to this concept of will that Marcuse does not address himself in his specific polemic against Erich Fromm.\textsuperscript{14} It would appear that Marcuse and Rank are at cross purposes.

Fromm's use of the concept of will in his meta-psychology is meant to break the deadlock, the contradiction as it were, between Marx's focus on the social order partially dictating and partially a determinant of class praxis, on the one hand and Freudian individualism, on the other. By ignoring this concept of will Marcuse tends to identify isomorphically, the development of the individual and the history of past society.\textsuperscript{15}

Within a wider social science discourse the relationship between normality and abnormality is no less problematic. Like Freud, Marcuse accepts as true that in the early emergence of civilization a "certain basic repression and asceticism was indeed necessary to build civilization because of the facts of economic scarcity and the work necessary to overcome scarcity."\textsuperscript{16} But social structural development up to now has witnessed a build-up of repressive techniques or surplus repression. In \textit{One Dimensional Man}, Marcuse extends his hypothesis to suggest that far from an increase in the development of non-repressive sublimation (a development of sexual impulses which without losing their erotic energy, "transcend their immediate object and eroticize normally non- and
anti-erotic relationships between the individuals and between them and their environment; there has been an extension of repressive de-sublimation ("release of sexuality in modes and forms which reduce and weaken erotic energy"). The extension of the latter leads to an extension of the Reality Principle over the instructual Eros. When translated for the purposes of analysis of a theory of social character in contemporary industrial society, the Marcuse hypothesis allows for a single character type. It is one in which the individual psyche "becomes the more or less willing receptacle of socially desirable and socially necessary aspirations, feelings, drives, and satisfactions."

In Frommian terms the productive character and in Marcuse's terms the liberated individual, one with a level of consciousness, a radical transvaluation of values, in short a non-repressive praxis is in most respects a consequence of qualitative social and institutional change. Marcuse asserts:

The individual, and with him the rights and liberties of the individual, is something that has still to be created, and that can be created only through the development of qualitatively different societal relations and institutions.18

In terms of the foregoing social character is one-dimensional, for Marcuse then the problem of normality and abnormality is in a sense irrelevant, since all individual praxis is abnormal, but only from a perspective (a critical theoretical and ideological one of "true Reason"). Marcuse implores us to see that the Reality principle which once, in the historical past was Reason, has now become Un-Reason. For the contemporary
intellectual psychological categories must become political categories since there are no "objective cultural values" (Marcuse's terms) contingent of "material ground" which allows for the realization of normality. Marcuse charges Fromm with having divorced cultural values, the criteria for psychological performance, of the material base of which they are made. Given the widespread influence of Marcuse's social theory it is no wonder that the belief in many social science circles that normality and abnormality is highly relativistic is so pervasive, it has become another truism.

There are two further sets of arguments for the relativity positions which are variants of Marcuse's ideology critique (or of which Marcuse's ideology critique is a variant). These arguments are stated briefly in order to show that in some ways Fromm's work on character is an attempt to transcend such arguments. The just argument, put forward by the philosophical relativists is that there is no tenable philosophical basis for the categories good and evil as absolutes and therefore normalcy and pathology. Although relativism in its most radical expression is commonly associated with pragmatic and utilitarian philosophies, as a tendency it can be traced to the sophists. The breakdown of feudal society and the later corresponding emergence of utilitarian ideas sealed the divorce between moral and factual questions. The emergence of utilitarian culture also clashed with the "Christian conception of morality as supernaturally sanctioned." Alvin Gouldner in his recent book, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, suggests an important link between "utilitarian culture," the emergence of bourgeois society (in a Marxian sense) and the
transvaluation of values which led to the Durkheimian critique of society and the formulation of the concept of anomie. Synthesizing these connections Gouldner remarks:

... To evaluate men or things in terms of their consequences is to evaluate them in terms of how they may be used to pursue an interest, rather than of what they are in themselves or because they may be deemed good in their own right. Things are good or evil not in themselves, but in whether they produce agreeable outcomes.

Gouldner makes a series of observations on the emergence and development of modern bourgeois capitalism, some of which have been recorded elsewhere and which provide a point of departure for the relativity position between normality and abnormality.

The first point is a qualification of his earlier statement by which Gouldner suggests that the rising bourgeoisie after the eighteenth century stressed also a conjunction of morality and utility. For example the "Declaration of the Rights of Man" in the French Revolution which established both a minimum of inalienable rights of the individual and the rights of property as a natural right. A central contradiction of such a declaration was that utility becomes a morality in itself where what was normal behaviour at an individual level depends on the consequences of the actions of the individual but at the same time men as individuals were conceived as having intrinsic rights and thus the validity of actions deriving from such rights would not depend upon consequences.

Gouldner's second observation derives partly from the first, that is that this contradiction marked a tendency for bourgeois morality to
drift toward an "anomic normlessness." In one sense this anomic normlessness is a class phenomenon, a consequence of the resolution of personal worth into exchange value. Thus Marx for example suggests that historically the bourgeoisie played a revolutionary role in demystifying feudal and "idyllic relations" and the "eternalistic" norms which reinforced these relations. Erich Fromm makes a similar observation about the role of the small, wealthy and powerful upper classes in Renaissance Europe which exploited the objective contradictions of the period and destroyed the culture of the Middle Ages. But Fromm adds:

The masses who did not share the wealth and power of the ruling group had lost the security of their former status and had become a shapeless mass, to be flattered or to be threatened--but always to be manipulated and exploited by those in power. A new despotism arose side by side with the new individualism. Freedom and tyranny, individuality and disorder, were inextricably interwoven.  

It is worth noting that in terms of the impact of the emerging trading classes on the impetus for extension of new ideas of philosophical individualism and modern science, unanimity by no means exists among Marxist thinkers. M. N. Roy in Reason, Romanticism and Revolution, Vol. I, has suggested that the connection between the rise of individualism, modern science and the rise of the bourgeoisie is not mainly causal but accidental.  

Whatever the merits of the foregoing observations, Gouldner makes a third observation which supports the relativist tendency as an historical process and this observation supports the Durkheimian notion of anomie in the modern era as partly the outcome of increased competitiveness
between individual and individual as a basic commitment of emerging bourgeois society. This competitiveness sets the stage for the "normalcy of pathology" outlook on the level of ideas.25

Gouldner develops an analysis of the relation between utilitarianism, as earlier defined, and modern social theory, and one which provides a point of departure for discussion of the second level of arguments in psychology and psychiatry about the relativism of normalcy and abnormality. Gouldner suggests that since objects are no longer experienced or regarded as having an intrinsic value, what is real is also no longer fixed.

... one effect of a utilitarian culture is that the established cultural mapping of objects, as a socially shared order of reality and value, tends to be attenuated, with the result being that traditional definitions or locations of objects have less power to impose themselves on persons. There is diminished certainty about either their reality or value. On the one hand this means a greater possibility of individual disorientation and anxiety; on the other hand, it also means a greater freedom to perceive and conceptualize objects in new, unconventional, and non-commonsensical ways. And the two are likely to be connected: the increased disorientation prompts new efforts at conceptual mapping.26

For Gouldner "utilitarian culture" generates the development of social theory because, first, social ideas have to cope with "grotesqueness, or reducing the dissonance between the dimensions of power and goodness in the object world." Secondly, it has to redefine the relationships between objects in the social world.27

Gouldner's statement is only significant as a reflective one, there is little that is very striking about the observation that with the advent of bourgeois industrial utilitarianism, front rank thinkers
all over Europe begin to cast doubts on the belief in a fixed and separated relation between normal men and the mentally ill. By the same token, Gouldner's use of the concept of utilitarian culture is too broad and all inclusive to recognize the distinction between general and critical statements which question the psychological premises of assertions about normalcy and abnormality as though they were separate objects—a critique which precedes the emergence of utilitarianism and assertions about behavioural relativism which develop from a systematic critique of conventional, professional psychiatry. Fromm's work is important for its contributions to the latter tradition. For the conventional professional psychiatry, its labelling and allied practices have underlying them a systematic social theory, many aspects of which come out of the utilitarian tradition itself, which Gouldner views as having given impetus to a liberal relativistic behaviourism.

The second level of arguments in psychology and psychiatry forwarded by Thomas Szasz (1961), Ernest Becker (1964), Ronald Laing (1965) and Michel Foncault (1965) among others; contend that an ambiguity in the interpretation of psychological data, the aetiology of mental illnesses as presently characterized and the norms of professional psychiatry and psychoanalysis itself, renders questionable the categories of neurosis and psychosis. Explanations for this final opinion tend to vary as does the weight of argument on any one of these factors, nevertheless the viewpoint is generally held.

R. D. Laing commenting on the paradox of "normalcy and abnormality" in everyday behaviour as well as the internal contradiction in
professional psychiatry between its liberating and repressive tendencies summarized the problem succinctly:

The statesmen of the world who boast and threaten that they have doomsday weapons are far more dangerous, and far more estranged from 'reality' than many of the people on whom the label 'psychotic' is affixed. Psychiatry could be, and some psychiatrists are, on the side of transcendence, of genuine freedom, and of true human growth. But psychiatry can so easily be a technique of brainwashing, of inducing behaviour that is adjusted by (preferably) non-injurious torture.  

Although a critique such as Laing's asserts the relativity of the normal and abnormal from different professional and epistemological positions than Fromm there are many similarities between these two positions. I will mention briefly two similarities because of their specific significance for Erich Fromm's statement of the normality-abnormality controversy. 

The first point is a highly critical posture against contemporary psychoanalysis and some forms of psychiatry adopted by professionals such as Laing and Fromm. Both psychoanalysts argue that psychoanalysis has with its increasing professionalization become more conformist in perspective. The consequences of this posture is that clinical observation of individual patients take place within a context of unconscious "collusion" between analyst and patient, in which: "... All too many patients were no challenge to the analyst nor the analyst to them." The centralization and bureaucratization of the International Psychoanalytic Association, on the one hand, which zealously protected a narrow Freudian conception of psychoanalytic theory (and of course excluded radical
psychoanalytic theorists such as Ferenzi, Rank and others); and an increasingly large supply of high fee paying patients, on the other hand, tended to obstruct fundamental self-inquiry on the patients' part and produce laziness on the part of many analysts.33

The second point of similarity between Fromm and Laing is the recognition of a conflict in contemporary society between health in social terms and health in human terms. We recognize this in Laing's stress on the term **reality** in the first paragraph and **transcendence** in the second paragraph of the quoted statement.

Fromm provides the clearest conception of normality and abnormality in the foregoing sense by suggesting that Freud had two conceptions of mental health which could equally be operationalized clinically. Health in human terms "refers to the functioning of the psychic system in its own terms." The raison d'être for this goal is making the unconscious conscious. The second conception of mental health--not a principal goal of Freud's--involves clinically ego-development and getting the individual patient to adjust to the existing society. But the clinical methods and therapy suggested by "health in social terms" is more specifically applicable to the "sick" in the conventional sense. In his critique of psycho-analysis Fromm asserts Freud's conception of health in human terms was developed mainly from the latter's empirical observations rather than metaphysical speculations and that its raison d'être was Freud's theory of the irrational which was both a critique of a sick society and therefore restricting of the label of mental illness to the more extreme psychotic problems. But such an unrestricted use of the
concept of abnormality does not reduce the criteria of mental health to purely individual arbitrariness.34

The unique contribution of Fromm's empirical work for an understanding of the problem of normalcy and pathology as clinical and empirical postulates derive from his attack on the influence of ego-psychological revisionism on social science thought.

The egopsychological revision did not only start by studying the psychology of adaptation, it is in itself a psychology of the adaptation, it is in itself a psychology of the adaptation of psychoanalysis to twentieth century social science.35

In response to this new positivism in psychology which reinforces an un-critical social science praxis and effectively denies social pathology, Fromm has asserted a double-edged strategy. The first and earlier stated response is a re-assertion that on the clinical level the most rewarding aspects of psychoanalytic theory is its concern with the unconscious processes of the "id." The second strategy is Fromm's assertion that Freud's distinction between health in social and human terms can only be empirically resolved in terms of a dynamics of social character. That is to say that clear clinical focus of minor or extreme forms of pathology require as a prior context of interpretative analysis a concept of social character. It is an articulation of social character which provides a clue for the analyst as to what is being repressed at the group and individual level.36 Fromm suggests that repression in the dynamic psychoanalytic sense is repression as unconscious.

Fromm's position is that Freud's concern with the unconscious was the basis for a "science of the irrational," a science which although
not developed into a revolutionary critique by Freud himself—as witnessed by Freud's shift of emphasis from the life instinct to the death instinct as the motive force behind human behaviour—nevertheless was an incipient radical critique of society by virtue of that very concern with the unconscious, but always with the environment as a modifying factor. Such a concern with social factors excludes the possibility of an inconcileable conflict between Freudian social psychology and a dynamic sociology. In fact Fromm views one of his major tasks to be to integrate both disciplines and he finds a tool for such integration in the concept of social character. Fromm believes that an integration at the conceptual and theoretical level is therefore possible between a historical materialist sociology and psychoanalytic inquiry. Fromm stated this in one of his earlier essays as follows:

Let me just point out that every society has its own distinctive libidinal structure, even as it has its own economic, social, political and cultural structure. This libidinal structure is the product of the influence of socio-economic conditions on human drives; in turn it is an important factor conditioning emotional developments within the various levels of society, and the contents of the 'ideological superstructure.' The libidinal structure of a society is the medium through which the economy exerts its influence on man's intellectual and mental manifestations. 37

The major premises of discussion of character, therefore, presuppose diachronic processes throughout historical development (of Europe) from the Middle Ages in a continuous manner on the one hand, and historical-ontogenetic changes paralleling the former processes, on the other hand. The historical-ontogenetic changes culminate in the system which Fromm terms social character, and can be distinguished from
ontogenetic processes (which are conceptualized as character in the individual sense) in the following terms: while the latter refers to individual processes, that is to say processes which are distinguished for articulating personality and character development; within a given epoch or social structure; the former refers to processes of change which are cumulative, i.e., long term and transcend the immediacies of a given social structure. Fromm applies the term social character to the long term factors of change. Moreover Fromm's thesis on character development is that ontogenetic processes have their terms set for them by the conditions of historical-ontogenetic processes. It is worth noting that there are ideas in the foregoing statement suggestive of a methodology which recognizes the circularity of an exclusive focus on either psychological factors or distinct social structural (i.e., historical) factors. In this statement of Fromm's we are provided with crude outlines of an interchangeable analysis, or rather a specific connection between the clinical and the socio-structural dimensions of human behaviour. Contemporary methodological discussion has stated the problem in terms of holism versus individualism. But what is equally important here is that Fromm is attempting to show how such a connection is possible with an analysis that can discuss mental health and ill health without falling into the trap of an extreme relativism. Suggesting that the fundamentals of this possibility existed since Freud, Fromm states that Freud never assumed an isolated man devoid of all social ties (and therefore mental illness to be other than social illness), to be the object of psychology.
On the other hand, Freud basically ruled out the illusion of social psychology whose object is a group as such, "society," or a social complex with a "mass soul" or "societal soul." Rather, he always proceeds from the fact that every group is composed only of individuals and that only the individual as such is the subject of psychic properties. Freud likewise refused to accept the notion of a "social instinct." 38

The priority of Fromm's variables of socialization and assimilation derive partially from Fromm's belief that his method develops logically out of the Freudian position. According to Fromm psychoanalysis' inability to systematize a social psychology came out of two weaknesses: firstly the absolutization of bourgeois capitalist society and secondly the empirical understanding of sick and healthy members was restricted to middle class patients. Both weaknesses in turn derive from an inability to rigourously analyse the family as determined by wider socio-economic relationships as well as being the psychological agency of society at the ideational level. 39 To the extent that socialization and assimilation are mutually operative in shaping social character they also define the boundaries of culture of a given society, and again appear as forces shaping individual character. But in this socio-economic classes are the dependent variables.

The Dilemma of Modern Man as Located in his Character Structure

As individuals express their life, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what they produce and with how they produce. The nature of individuals thus depends on the material conditions determining their production.40

[Marx and Engels]

Marx views the individuation of man as gradual and historical and
in the periodisation of history undertaken by Marx and Engels, the Middle Ages marks an important juncture in this individuation in the sense that in this period there developed the third form of private property ownership, that is feudal or estate-property. But the Middle Ages also signifies in the structural tension between town and country and the later opposition to traditional sources of political and intellectual authority the later domination of the bourgeois social character in the form of the medieval burgher. This Marxian analysis provides the starting point of Erich Fromm's empirical analysis of modern man and evil and normality.

It is in the Middle Ages particularly the later phases that Fromm sees the essence of modern man emerging, his analysis of the significance of changes from this period onwards is important for all his work for it is here that the concept of essence derives its socio-historical grounding. In Marxist terms the disintegration of the objective social structural forces such as the displacement of the classical feudal nobility and the increasing challenge to medieval forms of religious and political authority, the rising explosions of the more articulate peasant groups all over Europe were symptomatic of changes in the productive and technological spheres of social life. Whatever the debate around the causal explanation for these changes, the pressures on feudal authority which reinforced medieval forms of stratification in the countryside, on the one hand and the growing differentiation and monopolization of the guild system in the towns, on the other hand, forced psychological changes at all levels and social classes of European
society. Such changes culminated in the paradoxical condition, which is the essence of modern man. Man freed from old sources of constraint and yet isolated and insignificant in the face of new organization and movements which threaten to annihilate the very individuation which appeared so well established by the time of the Enlightenment. It is this historical dilemma of "freedom from and freedom to" in which Fromm's conception of essence and existence are merged in dynamic analysis. But the search for the unique forms of psychological adaptation are attempts to inquire into the conditions of the individual's existence. Examination of the diachrony from the Middle Ages then is a Frommian strategy to focus on the Reformation and providing parallels to the psychological existence of man in the present day, a time of ambiguity.

... in spite of all the obvious differences between the two periods, there is probably no period since the sixteenth century which resembles ours as closely in regard to the ambiguous meaning of freedom.43

When Fromm's empirical and later clinical analysis are brought together with his concepts of essence, evil and human nature, the socio-historical features of his analysis give these concepts precise meanings and the social phenomena which they identify, a focus which places Fromm in the forefront among social scientists.

In this section of the discussion three points are discussed which are antecedent to Fromm's conclusions from his clinical and empirical works. The validity of Fromm's conclusions will be raised at the end of these discussions.

The first point is Fromm's proposition that the modern dilemma of
"freedom from and freedom to" is the contemporary expression or the contemporary form of human essence. Its particular historicity can be traced to the diachronic change from Medieval society to the Reformation and the psychological adaptation to these structural changes.

The second point is that the contemporary expression of evil is man's willingness to submit to external forms of authority, to the blind dictates of mass movements and to totalitarian political ideologies and beliefs in attempts to escape feelings of isolation and aloneness. Although Fromm is primarily motivated to this question by the events of World War II, he asserts that the flight from aloneness is general to modern man, in particular members of highly industrialized societies.

The third point is Fromm's hypothesis that what must be rejected is the sociologistic viewpoint that the problems raised in points one and two can be understood as simply passive responses to the social structures as they evolved. Fromm substitutes an analysis which treats the objective economic and political forces not as causal, but rather as conditional for personality development.

Fromm's conclusions from the foregoing are as follows: The modern individual has an ambiguous personality, lived in a socio-economic-political context characterized by "good will and knowledge about the facts and consequences of nuclear war," on the one hand, and an increasingly mechanized industrialism on the other. The contemporary character structures (social), facilitate the continuation of this ambiguity of freedom, which with minor modifications in some of the objective conditions of the twentieth century; continue to channel behaviour and attitudes. Fromm in
drawing these conclusions suggested that the Reformation is similar to contemporary social conditions.44

Freedom from: Freedom to and the Sociological Diachrony

The contribution of history to concrete knowledge of human reality that is to say to an historical sociology implies the study of history not primarily for means, but for values and ends. Erich Fromm intends the study of history as such a project with the formulation of freedom from and freedom to as a synthesizing value at the level of processes of individuation in Europe. We have already summarized the nature of the social structure of Medieval society which in the classical period is characterized by a rigid system of social stratification and exploitation by a small and powerful feudal nobility. As Marx has said the Middle Ages starts with the "countryside as the location of history." Medieval society was then a social order conceived as a natural order in which economic ends such as production for profit were subordinated to human ends. In stressing this latter point Fromm is reinterpreting the history of the Middle Ages to attach specific meaning to exploitation then as distinct and sharply contrasted with the forms and mechanisms of individual exploitation under modern bourgeois social relations of production, rather than to romanticize social relations in the Middle Ages. Whereas Marx and Engels stressed the change from medievalism to modern industrialism as characterized by the transformation from instruments of labour as individual instruments of labour and production itself (in town or countryside) as a "series of individual affairs," to productive
forces as social forces workable by a collectivity of men; Fromm places the stress elsewhere. The very concreteness of face to face relations partly facilitated by the rigidity of status and class stratification, began to collapse once medieval systems of authority were challenged. The challenge to feudal authority which ended the economic exploitation of the nobility also challenged the supranational posture of the Roman Catholic Church in its assurance of forgiveness and unconditional love. In the first instance the challenge to the doctrines of unconditional love by dissident forces within the Roman Catholic hierarchy on the one hand and the increasing differentiation of craft guilds system--the growing influence of capital and monopoly as a qualification for guild membership--in the cities on the other hand, produced fear and doubt in the middle classes, as well as among the wealthy nobles and burghers during the Renaissance. The Renaissance which is distinct from the later Reformation then is characterized by a widespread psychological state of anxiety and fear among urban classes. The material and socio-structural distinctions between the Renaissance and the Reformation are conditional in the sense that the important question for Fromm in both instances is, "What are the subjective motivations which make a person aware of certain problems and make him seek for an answer in certain directions?" Fromm accepts Burkhardt's view of the problem in so far as the Renaissance is concerned. The small and wealthy upper classes confronted by a new sense of individualism but at the same time having lost the belonging to medieval society, attempted psychological adjustment in a "craving for fame." Fame elevates "ones individual life from
But only the small wealthy groups possessed the means to fame and so all other groups became the object of exploitation. Fame is viewed as providing the genesis of a new character trait existent in contemporary society: the exploitative orientation. Elsewhere Fromm defines the exploitative orientation as having its basic premise in the feeling that the source of all good is outside, but that these things have to be taken from others, although Fromm never explicitly states that the conditions which restricted the cravings for fame in the Renaissance to a small group changed with the passing of time and changed material conditions to become part of the psyche of other social classes as well.  

In one sense this analysis of Fromm's constitutes a weakness for it is one by which the proto-bourgeois classes of Renaissance society are given a function which needs to be re-examined. What we have in Fromm's articulation and analysis of the psychic adaptations in the Renaissance (as in the Reformation) is an outline of the "evolution of consciousness" an explanation of social pathology in modern society (and in terms of genesis) which is one-dimensional and over simplified. If Fromm's view of fame in the Renaissance is valid then the interpretation of interpersonal relations in the Renaissance can only be summarized as alienating to an extreme degree. But is Fromm accurate in attributing the role to the small wealthy groups which he does? What other forces can be identified as significant in this period and was the small wealthy class the founder of the notion of fame and therefore the sole determinant of social character? Moreover does Fromm's analysis of the Renaissance
invalidate the label of Reason attached to it by other philosophers of history?

While all the questions raised cannot be tackled systematically here the analysis which follows will show that Fromm's analysis of the character adaptations in the Renaissance needs to be re-examined.\(^49\)

Fromm's analysis is one-dimensional in the sense that he views the socio-economic changes in the Middle Ages as destroying feudal political authority and religious authority, as resulting in contradiction of increased strength and increased isolation of the individual. This contradiction Fromm sees expressed in Renaissance humanistic writings.\(^50\) And after this statement, nowhere in Fromm's *Escape From Freedom* does he show how the increased strength results in more positive character adaptations. The universal exploitation of all classes in the Renaissance produces a vulnerable middle class which later in the Reformation encourages a selfless attitude to authoritarian elements in the Reformation religions. From this period onwards anxiety increases the feelings of individual helplessness and the basis for the "other-directed" character structure of modern mass capitalist society or totalitarian communism of which Fromm's characterology is a variation.

The first problem is that Fromm does not show where the notion of "fame" appropriated by the upper classes in the Renaissance came from. When analysis of the structural changes on the material level is kept distinct from analysis of change in the realm of thought and ideas and from the ideological interpretations attached to the two former levels of change by contending socio-economic groups, the notion of fame is
seen as a specific response of the upper classes to their situation in the Renaissance rather than as a wider societal ideology.

The principal features of the Renaissance were the rise of the trading classes and the atmosphere favouring new scientific knowledge focused in the principles of individualism and humanism. "Fame" can be seen as an upper class psychological orientation deriving from the particular ideological interpretation of pessimism given by that class to the period. Where expedient these wealthier classes sought alliances with the revolutionary ideational forces, with the men of talent, the poets and scholars such as Dante, so too did the emerging political despots and soldiers of fortune. But the "ideology" of fame was not the sole intellectual product of the epoch, nor is fame synonymous with individualism and humanism which was the potential consciousness (Goldmann's term) expressed in the Renaissance. The concept of individualism and humanism in the latter sense is not a mere superstructure, nor a justification of the exploitation of the wealthier classes. The notion of individualism and humanism in the Renaissance—which has its genesis in changes preceding the specific socio-economic upheavals between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries—expressed ideals of universal man, "the archetype of a future of free humanity." 50 A number of writers have labelled the Renaissance the Age of Reason and in this refer to a process of change in the emancipation of man from nature and consciousness from the "unconscious" (in Erich Neumann's sense of the term) not ultimately explicable in terms of the social structural changes of the epoch or the dominant interest groups. The very emergence of
Protestantism in the Reformation--on which Fromm's work focuses heavily --does not simply represent a break in the theological, or spiritual realm with medieval theology. When the arguments of Fromm's theological critics are extended backwards in time towards the Renaissance, it is revealed that Fromm's perspective on religion is a partial simplification of Weber's and Marx's, i.e., Protestantism as the religious correlate of capitalism. \(^5^1\) Sheldon Wolin in his analysis of Christianity through to the Reformation suggests that the very expansion of Christianity in the West and its function as "residuary legatee of the Roman Empire" tended to result in a "politicization of religious thought. During the Renaissance the religious and political spheres were not dual but were interwined authorities. At the same time they were universal. Luther and the Protestant Reformation served to de-theologize politics but at the same time served the cause of national particularism." From this perspective the Reformation was profoundly reactionary. \(^5^2\) Fromm has only noted briefly in his major analysis positive individualism as part of the process from the medieval to the age of Reformation what he stresses is alienated individualism. \(^5^3\) In short, despite the fact that ideological elements in the Reformation served the interests of dominant socio-economic groups starting in the Reformation, both the notion of individualism which in its positive interpretation transcends the particular emergence of these groups and in the secularized implications of Reformation processes for individualism transcend the Reformation itself. Thus Fromm may have applied a particular orientation to all groups in the society in the Renaissance, which only applies to the middle class groups.
For example Otto Rank's analysis suggests that the narrow notion of fame may have sprung from the notion of genius, an ideology which was used partly as a weapon during the Renaissance, by "art" and against "the collective spirit of Christianity." Rank's analysis of the creative function of art in the Renaissance suggests that the ideology of genius became an aesthetic of feeling dependent on consciousness of personality. To the extent that the artistic motifs of the Renaissance dominates over the religious ones the notion of "fame" can be seen as a particular distortion of the individualism developed by the artist and summarized in Rank's concept of "genius."54

What tentative conclusions can we draw from the foregoing discussion. First of all Frommm not only states that the ideology of fame was universal to society in the sixteenth century but that the middle classes and poorer groups were simply unable to achieve the wherewithal to realize the substance of this ideology. Frommm then suggests that it was under the conditions of material insecurity but with the false consciousness, as it were, of an upper class ideology that the conditions, within which Protestantism could thrive, were ultimately established. Where it is not one's aim to question the view that material deprivation existed among classes which were subordinate to the wealthy elite, it is certainly one's aim to question Frommm's conclusion that the ideology of genius was viewed as the sole ideological response to these conditions. Did other deprived groups such as the urban proletariat and groups in the countryside but in transition, evolve other ideological interpretations? The displaced middle class groups with a false ideology at the
end of the Renaissance, increasingly identified themselves with Lutheran-
ism and later with Calvinism as means of resolving their contradictions
with freedom, but what of other classes? How is formation of their
social character to be explained? Fromm does not deal with these prob-
lems exhaustively. If then he is implying that there were some conver-
gences toward social character structures as capitalism evolved, from
what points did they converge. Are they converging? These are important
questions for Fromm's analysis of social character and the development of
social pathology. Whereas the task of identifying the source of later
character traits is beyond the scope of this dissertation, the connec-
tion which Fromm establishes between the position of the middle class at
the end of the Renaissance, the adoption by that class of Reformation
ideology and its function in creating character orientations; can be
questioned as being too one-dimensional. In other words his explanation
in structural diachronic terms of evil as social pathology, as the
dilemma of freedom translated into terms of specific behaviour at the
clinical level has a semblance of validity and is faced with a host of
difficulties. Fromm explicitly argues in reinterpreting this historical
epoch from the Renaissance onwards that men in middle class groups and
below lacked the material means to realize their individualism in more
positive terms and therefore turned to Protestantism. Furthermore that
this is where the abandonment of freedom began.

Whatever the merits of the foregoing argument in terms of Protes-
tant theology today, Fromm's bold assertion about the adoption of
Lutheranism and Calvinism by the middle and lower classes immediately
prompts replies. It is not the task of this dissertation to trace the merits of Fromm's interpretation of Protestant gospel. Three of Fromm's critics (John Schaar (1961); Guyton Hammond (1965); and Stanley Glen (1966)) have attempted theological and philosophical critiques, leaving the Frommian thesis more or less intact. Part of the reason for the inconclusiveness of this debate is that Fromm's thesis is by no means clear having at least two directions for argumentation and analysis. The first is that Fromm may mean in his analysis that there is a substantive psychological connection between the middle class adoption of Protestantism during the Reformation and the later submission by the same German and European lower middle class to Nazism. In other words that the conditions for the authoritarian character can be traced substantively to the Reformation.

The focus of analysis for this thesis centres on the role of the middle classes during the Reformation as mediating between the powerful, new aristocracy of capitalism and the rebellious working classes and the parallel role of the middle classes in the twentieth century. In the same vein Fromm focuses at the ideational level in order to draw a continuity between the articulation of doubt at the philosophical level in Luther's and Calvin's doctrines and the later more explicit articulation of doubt and its resolution in Nazi doctrines.

Fromm's thesis is synthesized by the suggestion that doubt in the Reformation and in the 1930's in Europe was ideologically resolved in the principles of man's ultimate worthlessness as an individual and the call to submission, as follows:
Once man was ready to become nothing but the means for the glory of a God who represented neither justice nor love, he was sufficiently prepared to accept the role of a servant to the economic machine—and eventually a "Führer." [Italics mine]

The second direction for argumentation of the Fromm thesis with respect to modern man will be for his critics to treat Fromm's thesis as argument by analogy. Here the weight of discussion would centre on Fromm's treatment of human behaviour, that is on the dynamics of class relations in both epochs. Whereas in the first case the wider framework for argumentation will be on the function of ideological systems, in this case it will be on the dynamics of class and psychological processes within social structures which resemble in their intensities of structural change. Discussion in this part of the dissertation will interpret Fromm's meaning in the second sense in an attempt to deal with the contemporary problem of evil as man's willingness to submit.

A further comment on the significance of the distinct interpretations is in order. The apparent "God everything-man nothing" formula which is existent in Fromm's "identification" of the inner-core authoritarianism of Reformation Protestantism and Nazism led Fromm to a critique of Protestant asceticism, in a similar fashion to the Weberian and Nietzschean critiques. Where the response to Fromm's thesis is at the level of his substantive treatment of the early Protestant theology, the discussion is bogged down in the problem of the nature of Protestantism and Fromm's implicit ideas on middle class consciousness as false consciousness is obscured.
There are not two kinds of man, but two poles of humanity. No man is pure person and no man pure individuality. None is wholly real, and none wholly unreal. Everyman lives in the twofold I. But there are men so defined by person that they may be called persons, and men so defined by individuality that they may be called individuals. True history is decided in the field between these two poles. [Martin Buber, I and Thou, p. 65]

There are in the writings of Buber and of Fromm a pattern of similarity to the extent that both men desire a quality of freedom which is non-utopian. Fromm's conception of symbiosis as an exclusive orientation is similar in some senses to Buber's conception of individuality as defined in the I and Thou. Similarly, there is some resemblance between Buber's use of the concept 'person' and Fromm's concept of the syndrome of growth. It is worth emphasizing the non-utopian notion of freedom in Erich Fromm's sociological analysis in order to justify a discussion of Fromm's thesis in its concern with blind obedience in the Reformation and in the twentieth century. In short the thesis does not rest exclusively on an ideology critique. If Reformation religious principles were the opposite to Fromm's interpretation of them, the validity of Fromm's thesis would still not be refuted. For Fromm defines freedom as existing in man's possibility to choose between the existing real possibilities. Therefore one of the possibilities for freedom, a central one, is attainment of a level of consciousness which allows one to recognize real possibilities.

As was earlier stated, in this chapter, the central thesis of
Fromm's socio-historical analysis in *Escape From Freedom* is the parallel function of the middle class as a mediating group between the two major antagonistic forces which emerged with the development of modern capitalism. The psychological adaptation is significant for demonstrating Fromm's central hypothesis in his empirical and clinical work that the basic problem of modern man is the dilemma between "freedom from and freedom to." I will therefore take as my point of departure for discussion Chapter IV of *Escape From Freedom*, "The Two Aspects of Freedom for Modern Man." One aspect of the Frommian discussion of the thesis is that the inclusion of historical epochs preceding the present day is meant to demonstrate:

a) That the emergence of individualism and forms of consciousness are gradual social processes.

b) That specific forms of psychological adaptation within a society are related to the manner in which crucial groups such as the middle class are conscious of the real nature of processes of change which are central to their historical reality; as well as their own class or social group reaction to those changes.

c) That the "quest for freedom" is a necessary result of the societal or diachronic process of individuation and become part of the subsequent culture of a later society. This quest for freedom dictates the conditions which would make the middle classes in contemporary society fertile ground for a political ideology and practice which threatens the entire society.
The foregoing are three basic sociological postulates which are operationalized throughout Fromm's empirical analysis and direct its author to three general conclusions with respect to modern man. The first is that although it is generally true to state that from the Renaissance to the present day the lower classes (the peasantry and proletariat) and the middle classes experienced alienation (i.e., powerlessness, feelings of insignificance and aloneness) deriving primarily from the specific economic and political exploitation attendant with the rise of capitalism; the psychological reaction and consequent adaptation was different in both groups throughout the Reformation and into the early twentieth century—largely because the nature of false consciousness or illusion in both classes varied. The second conclusion is that the genesis of authoritarianism in modern society has its antecedent basis in the false consciousness and psychological adaptation of the middle class as a whole, during the Reformation. The particular experience of alienation of this group became fertile ground for authoritarian, destructive and for automation conformity as cultural escape mechanisms. Thirdly the particular economic changes toward monopoly capitalism and large scale bureaucratic organizations after World War I as well as the change toward oligarchic trade unions and labour organizations and the perfection of mass media, created conditions which favoured the spread and dissemination of middle class "cultural mechanisms of escape" to other socio-economic groups. This explains the relative popularity and success of Nazi ideology in the 1930's. But more importantly the canalizing of these mechanisms of escape into social character
orientations which pervade the entire social structure irrespective of class, indicate that today the illusions of individuality have become even more complex in inverse proportion to the decline of real individuality.

One of the most crucial analytical links here is the connection between "cultural mechanisms of escape" and the formation of social character orientations in a subsequent social structure. The basic datum for Fromm's analysis of the three major mechanisms which he identifies are the unconscious forces which are part of the individual psychological complex. Fromm asserts that the findings from psychoanalytic observations of neurotic persons can be applied to the group as a whole (the middle class).

Articulated in this manner then, Fromm's explanation of the evolution of character orientations from the Reformation to their present forms, is straightforward. From the perspective of Fromm's later writings, the middle classes during the Reformation had one of two courses open to them after they had supported the forces favouring a breakdown of feudal ties and the principle of economic progress (in brief the freedom from); they could have related "spontaneously to the world in love and work and thus contributed to a new synthesis with man and nature." The second course would be to give up the struggle for positive freedom by surrendering individuality. Implicit in Fromm's analysis that on the whole the members of the middle-class who experiencing most acutely, relative to the two other classes, alienation, chose the second course as is seen by their receptiveness to early
Protestantism. Fromm substantiates this part of his discussion by turning to psychoanalytic experience. Here the implication is that the middle-class attraction to and development of early Protestantism indicates one side of the masochistic solution: submergence of doubt and powerless in the notion of God. This takes the contemporary form of the submission to a leader ideology, so prominent among the lower middle-class during the rise of Hitler. Fromm states

The individual facing God's might alone could not help feeling crushed and seeking salvation in complete submission.

However the masochistic psychological striving is one of many aspects of the authoritarian mechanism of escape. Fromm's thesis holds that this early escape mechanism is crucial for the formation of the four main types of social character under modern capitalism. Fromm attributes this psychological posture as a main feature of the process of reification symbolized in money, material gains and so on. In one of the vital sections of Man for Himself, Fromm renews his concern with authoritarianism, this time at the ontogenetic level and as a major feature of the unconscious psychic forces of modern man. Here Fromm's analysis is that the contemporary individual has tended to "internalize the voice of an external authority." Whereas in this connection Fromm may have taken an extreme interpretation by suggesting that the confusion between selfishness and self-love finds its classic expression in Calvin, Fromm's aim is nevertheless to demonstrate that it was the original psychological orientation which forged early Protestant theology into an ideological tool favouring authoritarianism.
Automaton Conformity

This is a character trait which expresses modern man's attitude toward authority. Fromm argues that during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries Western society was characterized by rational and irrational authority but both were overt and visible. But with the structural changes within capitalism "Authority in the middle of the twentieth century has changed its character; it is not overt authority, but anonymous, invisible, alienated authority." Fromm's position is that from the development of Protestantism to the present day has witnessed a substitution of "internalized authority for an external one," but this is an ideal since in "recent decades" external authority has become invisible, the notion of conscience has little validity since conformity is stressed. Fromm's position is that although the individual is removed from traditional and overt sources of control, new sources of control which are external to the individual threatens to "change positive freedom into its opposite."

With the disintegration of overt forms of authority then, more covert forms of authority have been internalized. Fromm is hard put to suggest that automaton conformity is a mechanism which was adopted by the early Protestant and Puritan middle class since the ideology of individualism or 'liberty of conscience' which developed from the Reformation and through the Enlightenment was a basic ideology which is in conflict with Fromm's illustration of automaton conformity. But Fromm suggests elsewhere that the contemporary lower middle class, from the time of Nazism in Europe and in present day North American society, have adopted this mechanism. Nevertheless the notion of individualism remains
rooted in modern society, it is an illusion. Automaton conformity is conceived as a variant of authoritarianism. Summarizing this idea Fromm argues that as distinct from the working class, the nobility and the upper middle classes, the lower middle classes in Europe has a love of the strong and hatred of the weak as well as a narrow asceticism, suspicion of the stranger and rationalization of their envy as moral indignation. With respect to German fascism Fromm suggests that structural changes such as growing working class militancy, prior to 1930 and the financial slump which tended to decrease the material welfare of the lower middle class intensified the psychological traits and gave Nazism strong appeal. Thus whereas both working and lower middle classes were politically defeated by 1930 the reaction of both groups to Nazism varied. The former resisted mildly then collapsed, the lower middle class especially the younger generation embraced Nazism. Fromm suggests

To say that the social character of the lower middle class differed from that of the working class does not imply that this character structure was not present in the working class also. But it was typical for the lower middle class, while only a minority of the working class exhibited the same character structure in a similarly clear cut fashion; the one or the other trait, however, in a less intense form, like enhanced respect of authority or thrift, was to be found in most members of the working class too.66

The foregoing statement also summarizes another of Fromm's important conclusions and that is his attribution of destructiveness, his third mechanism of escape to the lower middle class, this refers again to the genesis of this mechanism. Destructiveness is differentiated from the earlier outlined sado-masochistic strivings, in so far as in the former the aim is "elimination of its object," rather than active or passive
symbiosis. It is a "constantly lingering tendency within a person which ... waits only for an opportunity to be expressed." Like the strivings toward authoritarianism and automaton conformity, destructiveness is "caused" by alienation, and the anxiety created by the threat to material and emotional interests. "Destructiveness is the outcome of an unlived life." In this respect too, Fromm views the lower middle class as having a higher content of destructiveness as compared with the working class.

Summary

What conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing observations? The first is that Fromm views the modern sources of social pathology, that is to say, the psychological reactions and negative character traits within the social character orientations of modern man, in the patterns of lower middle class adaptations. In terms of the non-productive character orientations outlined in *Man for Himself*, elements of the three escape mechanisms previously outlined, figure prominently in Fromm's four character orientations. Fromm asserts that what he means by this proposition is that the strivings which underlie his escape mechanisms are typical, differentiating lower middle class behaviour patterns from those of the rich bourgeoisie and the working classes. He is not asserting that these escape mechanisms are not found in the behaviour of these other two classes. The constant proposition which underlies Fromm's adumbration of the receptive, exploitative, hoarding and marketing orientation is the psychological state in which the individual views the source of all good as lying outside of himself. This attitude then
is typical of lower middle class behaviour from the Reformation to the present day, it epitomizes alienation and powerlessness, in Fromm's terms. Anxiety and fear of the self are by products of this phenomena. Whether the individual or group orientation is receptive or exploitative, hoarding or marketing alienation is the cause. For example the only differences between the experience of alienation, as an historical particular experience, of the individual, rest in the responses of individuals. So that in terms of the exploitative orientation the individual believes that the source of good which lies outside of himself has to be taken by force or coercion whereas the marketing orientation character believes that what is good can be won by "selling himself" on the local market.

In The Sane Society, acknowledged as a continuation of the sociological themes outlined in Escape from Freedom, Fromm elaborates his 'pathology of normalcy' theme of Western culture. The first is that there is a dialectical process in Western culture from the Reformation whereby the disintegration of external and covert sources of authority corresponds to the increasing awareness of individuals of this loss of social control, with one resolution manifesting itself in individual control taking the form internalization of irrational ideologies. This is the significance of the Reformation theology since it thwarts the evolution of real forms of consciousness. It is worth noting here that Fromm in asserting the significance of irrational ideologies and their function in symbiotic adaptation, is not using the term symbiotic to suggest a return to earlier identical forms of control. Since belief systems operate covertly as sources of authority. There is another level
of resolution of the dilemma and that is the individual's increasing rootedness to external symbols of power, prestige and authority. This theme is an extension of the Marxian notion of reification. Here too the elaboration of complex illusions about the self is furthered.

The second conclusion to be drawn from Fromm's analysis of character is that social pathology indicates both the complexes of configurations of socialization and assimilation which have internalized as "normal" either the "good" or "guilty" authoritarian conscience, on the one hand, and the elements of structure which perpetuate and reinforce these psychologically. An essential element in the notion of evil at this point becomes guilt. In the cases of the hoarding and marketing social characters, both reinforced by the "good authoritarian conscience," the level of guilt is low. The authoritarian guilty conscience "which reinforces the hoarding and exploitative characters imply greater feelings of guilt by the individual."70 Fromm implies that it is the strength of external mechanisms of control which prevent the guilty authoritarian conscience from being transformed into a more humanistic conscience and a productive orientation. Fromm's long discussion of selfishness and self-love in both Man for Himself and in The Art of Loving, are attempts to articulate the conditions for the transformation of guilty authoritarian into humanistic conscience.

Among other things, one of the difficulties of Fromm's work in this area of the development of psychological and sociological factors in relation to individual character is that Fromm's work is constantly moving from interactionist to a dialectical framework. For example in
terms of the question what is it that determines the character orientation and predispositions of the individual as a specific member of a class or social group, Fromm's reply comes close to that of Parsons for its functionalist implications. Where the question is with respect to the social group within the framework of the development of the wider society, Fromm's theoretical outlines are dialectical. The problem of Fromm's concept of character goes beyond this observation also, for his character orientations are deeply rooted in the experiences of Europe and fascism. His recent work in Mexican villages is an attempt to make his character types into non-deterministic tools of analysis. Fromm develops variants of the main types in terms of productive and non-productive hoarding and so on, and analyzes behaviour in terms of the material conditions of peasant life in a changing village. The study utilizes a series of methodological and technical measurement devices in an attempt to produce an answer to the main question in the second part of the study: what new type of character structure will emerge with changing material conditions. Fromm suggests that the exploitative character, a deviant type between the Revolution and 1950's, is emerging because it proves itself as successful adaptation in a society in which all the dynamic features of modern capitalism, have not yet emerged. Thus the productive-exploitative seemed to emerge as the dominant type. This kind of study and conclusion, whatever Fromm's scientistic posture, is subject to the same kinds of criticisms about type atomism and non-critical approaches, the framework of Mexican society as a whole is accepted as the status quo (in Marcuse's terms). Nevertheless Fromm's
work partly develops out of a critique against the view that social structures are 'eternal.' We turn to this contribution.
FOOTNOTES


2. Erich Fromm, The Heart of Man: Its Genius for Good and Evil (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 33 and 128. On p. 128 Fromm refers to Leibniz's formulation of freedom in terms of various degrees of inclination, without alluding to Leibniz's strong Christian bias. Fromm also states on the same page: "Our moral conflict on the question of choice arises when we have to make a concrete decision rather than when we choose good or evil in general" (p. 128).

3. Ibid., pp. 19-20. It is for this reason also that Fromm attacks the "pessimism" of Sartre's existentialism in his foreword (p. 13).


7. Fromm has used the notion of blending in a number of works. See for example, Fromm, Man For Himself (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1947), p. 85; also Escape From Freedom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1941), p. 305. In his later work on attitudinal syndromes in personality formation Fromm makes a similar point. See The Heart of Man, op. cit., p. 23. The point I wish to stress here is that Fromm is conscious of the conceptual status of "character." This discussion is in no way intended to repeat the arguments of the preceding chapter, the level of analysis here is distinct, since in this section the focus is on the transition from concept to empirical analysis, whereas there it was mainly on the approach to theory and concept formation.

8. In its simplest terms Weber's ideal type is a "mental construct formed by the synthesis of many diffuse, . . ., concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged, according to certain one-sidedly accentuated points of view, into a unified analytical construct, which in its conceptual purity cannot be found in reality; it is a utopia, a limiting
concept with which concrete phenomena can only be compared for the purpose of explicating some of their significant components." See Carl Hempel, "Typological Methods in the Social Sciences" in Maurice Matanson, Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader (New York: Random House, 1963), pp. 210-230 (p. 211). Von Schelling defines the individualizing ideal type as being a) the "concrete historical individuals which constitute the objects of causal analysis." In this case abstraction is essentially a consequence of the "selectiveness of scientific interest." The application of this kind of ideal type to the concrete reality explains nothing, but points out what is to be explained. Another type of individualizing concept contains ideas, which are not so much the actual contents of the minds of all individuals, but are exaggerated but consistent forms of wider belief systems, for example, the ideal construct of Calvinism. In contrast to the above, a "general ideal type is a construction of a hypothetical course of events with two other characteristics: 1) abstract generality and 2) the ideal typical exaggeration of empirical reality." See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action


10 This point is succinctly made by Parsons, op. cit., The Structure of Social Action, p. 516.


12 Herbert Marcuse, op. cit., Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, 1962, p. 228. See also Dissent, op. cit. (1955), p. 227. The well known polemic between Fromm and Marcuse (see Dissent, Vol. 2, No. 3, 1955, pp. 221-240 and Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall, 1955, pp. 343-349; and Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1956, pp. 79-83) is largely a debate at cross purposes. Marcuse's original charge against Fromm was that the latter defines personality by negating the individual pre-formation of personality at the "deepest instinctual structure." A pre-formation which Freud saw as the work of "accumulated civilization," op. cit., Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 230. Contemporary society shares with preceding historical forms, types of repressive controls which render both epochs repressive (cf. Marcuse, Dissent, Winter, 1956), p. 80). In these terms, Marcuse suggests that the radical element of Freudian psychology would focus on the depth of repressive controls and the content and dynamic of the unconscious. Moreover, Marcuse suggests that Freud refused to treat the alienated individual in alienated (present) society as a total personality, but viewed the fate and eventual freedom of the individual as tied up with the general fate. On the other side of the polemic Fromm suggests that Freud in assuming love in its essence to be "sexual desire" assumed also a contradiction (an historical contradiction) between love
and social cohesion. Fromm, of course views Freud as trapped in the nineteenth century ideology (manifested in political economy and Darwinian biology) of human nature. This view is for Fromm a mistaken one and so he substitutes the concept of social character—which Marcuse opposes—to demonstrate both the variations of individual character in contemporary society and their historical rootedness or genesis. Fromm also believes that a use of the concept of social character would demonstrate the potential behaviour patterns which would transcend contemporary alienation (i.e., create revolutionary structural change) and provide the possibilities for individual liberation, a goal which both Marcuse and Fromm desire. It appears that Marcuse's view of repression is one-dimensional and therefore his distinction between civilization and contemporary society is not only defined negatively, but also "blunt." He could not therefore if even he were politically disposed to do so make out a case for Fromm's concepts of mental health and psycho-pathology as historical particulars which do not negate but incorporate the fundamental contradiction of man and society.

13 Herbert Marcuse, op. cit., Eros and Civilization, p. 230. Though Marcuse makes a distinction between "basic" and "surplus repression."

14 This problem is intriguing also because Marcuse implies admiration for Rank's findings on the existential dilemma.

15 Cf. Alasdair MacIntyre, Marcuse (London: Fontana, Wm. Collins and Co. Ltd.), p. 51. Marcuse's intellectual biographer MacIntyre, concludes from this and other points that Marcuse is essentially a pre-Marxist thinker.

16 Ibid., p.

17 Ibid., p. 45.


19 The Sophists (especially Antiphon) were relativists in the sense that they specified and emphasized the disjunction between "nature" and "convention." Implicit in Sophist doctrine was the notion of the relativity (temporality) of values of the legal and moral order of a given society, hence Plato's attack on Sophist doctrine.

20 See Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p. 66. Gouldner's book is essentially concerned with the paradox which resides in modern academic sociology. A paradox its "liberative potential" and its conservative structure, and the problem becomes extricating the former from the latter which involves, "... the penetration of an historically informed critique of sociology as a theory and as a social institution" (p. 12). This is a vital task
for Gouldner partly because of the ironic posture of the "young radical who in stridently criticizing existing social institutions, including establishment sociology, tend to despise theorizing and so fall into a relativization of values tinged with personal sentiment and totalitarian realpolitik.


22 Gouldner, op. cit., p. 70.


25 Gouldner, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

26 Ibid., p. 83.

27 Ibid., p. 85.


29 Social thinkers in addition to Gouldner, such as Marcuse in Reason and Revolution, have suggested the paradoxical tendencies of liberal and positivistic social thought which emerge in the early stages of the industrial revolution.


31 The similarities referred to partially derive from substantive arguments which stress the implicit critique of contemporary society as structurally pathological (Freud) and further that the only difference
between the so called mentally ill and the so called normal members of modern society, is that the former have been successfully labelled, to the extent that being abnormal means from the perspective of the psychiatrist being "ill." This is not the place to engage in detailed examination of the issues involved. It is worth noting however, that Becker (1964) asserts at the end of a thorough examination of the issues, that the normal is an ideal, the normal individual being one who is "not stupid" which means being not coerced, it means being creative and exercising control over "choice of means and ends." Ref. E. Becker, op. cit., The Revolution in Psychiatry, p. 209.


33 Ibid., pp. 1-4. While Fromm does suggest that some psychoanalysts made significant contributions to further clinical knowledge about mental illness, he implies that the long overdue connection between the insane (in a conventional sense) people "suffering from aggravating symptoms like phobias, compulsions and hysteria," and the patients with complaints about their "inability to enjoy life" (but who presumably could still "function" at least minimally in the society); was not fostered at the clinical and empirical level. There is also a parallel of sorts between Fromm's health in social terms and health in human terms and Laing's distinctions between "sane schizoid way of being-in-the-world" and "psychotic way of being-in-the-world," though Laing utilizes the latter distinction phenomenologically and existentially.

34 Ibid., pp. 23-29. Fromm criticizes Hartmann and the ego-psychologists for identifying "human and social health" and thereby denying social pathology.

35 Ibid., p. 27.

36 Ibid., p. 17. Fromm criticizes Marcuse for using the term repression indiscriminately. He argues as follows:

Not less serious is the distortion of Freud's theory in Marcuse's use of the concept of repression. . . . But the central category of Freud's system is "repression" in the dynamic sense of the repressed being unconscious. By using "repression" for both conscious and unconscious data the whole significance of Freud's concept of repression and unconscious is lost. Indeed the word "repression" has two meanings: first, the conventional one, namely to repress in the sense of oppress, or suppress; second the psychological one used by Freud . . . , namely to remove something from awareness. The two meanings by themselves have nothing to do with each other. By using the concept of repression indiscriminately Marcuse confuses the central issue of psychoanalysis. (p. 17)
Fromm's observations are 1) part of his ongoing polemic with Marcuse witnessed in the articles in Dissent and is significant for Fromm's assertion that Freud's theory of character is based on his clinical observations—hence what is removed from awareness, cannot be decided theoretically; 2) part of Fromm's attempt to assert that Freud viewed character as variable to the extent that he did not perceive sexual repression to be identical with the reality principle.


38 Ibid., p. 115. While extensive discussion of the methodological implications will take us too far away from our original intentions, it is worth noting that Fromm is drawing attention to Freud's later awareness of what methodologists such as Ernest Gellner term the "hen and egg" characteristic of debates about "holism and individualism" (see for example Ernest Gellner's "Holism Versus Individualism," in May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968), pp. 254-268. Fromm's statement also indicates awareness of some variety of methodological individualism, though he may be extending to Freud a commitment to social psychology which was by no means consistent (see p. 116 of Fromm, op. cit., Crisis of Psychoanalysis). To the extent that Fromm is more committed to clinical psychoanalysis and empirical social psychology than was Freud, Schaar's Chapter 2, "Character and Goodness," is also in need of extensive revision.

39 Fromm, op. cit., pp. 116-119. To the two reasons cited by Fromm, one could add a third, namely that all psychiatry from its inception was confronted with the problem that in order to analyse and explain behaviour it had to classify that behaviour, but once psychiatric 'labels' had been attached, the 'labels' became barriers between patient and doctor, in the sense that the doctor had now become the society's jailor. Freud's intellectual development reveals an awareness of this, though minimal (in his social theory) but the dilemma between examination of his own "conceptual categories" and possible loss of control over the behavioural phenomena which concerned Freud, on the one hand and more rigid acceptance of his "categories" and control of behavioural phenomena, on the other hand, is a dilemma which he never resolved satisfactorily.

41 The first form of ownership is tribal ownership. The second form is ancient communal and State ownership. Ibid., pp. 122-125. See also Friedrich Engels, Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science: Anti Dühring (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1935), esp. pp. 104-110, for Engels' analysis of the evolution of the bourgeois and proletarian demands for equality in this period. Contemporary Marxist methodologists are more insistent than Erich Fromm was (at the time that Escape from Freedom and Man for Himself was being written) that economic factors occupy a unique position of importance in analysis due to its significance in the unfolding of history, more than to anything else. Cf. Lucien Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, tr. H. V. White and R. Anchor (London: Jonathan Cape, 1969), p. 87.

42 Fromm is not alone in conceptualizing the Middle Ages as a significant point in the evolution of the psychological development toward modern man. Michel Foucault views the period between the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as a significant transition in the meaning of madness, in the former the motifs emphasized madness as sin, but not unreason. By the end of the Middle Ages, madness was folly, in Foucault's words, madness had lost its voice, it had become unreason, reminding "each man of his truth." Madness is also confined, a forerunner to the later utilitarian notion of the mad as useless and the obligation to work (Ref. M. Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, op. cit., Chapters 1 and 2). Reinhold Niebuhr discusses the contradiction between the Reformation and Renaissance as destroying the "medieval synthesis" in which the Catholic Church was the historic "locus where the contradiction between the historical and the divine was overcome in fact" (p. 139). The development of Reformation philosophical theology marks the final destruction of this synthesis, faith and original sin became the driving forces of Christian theology, its consequences for the individual self are well documented elsewhere (Ref. R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation, Vol. II (New York: Charles Scribner's and Son, 1964). J. Huizinga, analyses the end of the Middle Ages as a period of intense formalization of behaviour patterns and the stylization of norms as one of the determining patterns on eighteenth to twentieth century manners and morals (Ref. J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, op. cit., pp. 40-41).

43 Fromm, Escape from Freedom, op. cit., p. 54.

44 Ibid., p. 54. These conclusions were drawn initially in 1941, but Fromm's work in the 1960's and 1970's reiterate them.


46 Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, p. 82.

Two recent critiques of Fromm raise questions about the nature of his social psychology and his analysis of alienation or estrangement, though neither of these raise questions about his analysis of the Renaissance in relation to these problems. See Guyton B. Hammond, Man in Estrangement: A Comparison of the Thought of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1965); and J. Stanley Glen, Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966).


J. Stanley Glen, op. cit., Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, p. 27.


Cf. Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, pp. 119-120. Erich Neumann sees the notion of the sanctity of the individual soul as antedating the Renaissance in religion, however this notion was secularized in the Renaissance and in this sense the Reformation was a reaction. Though Neumann does not extend his analysis to the Reformation he implies that the Reformation and particularly the evangelization tended to inhibit the growth of individual consciousness.

The sanctity of the individual soul which asserted itself throughout the Middle Ages in spite of all orthodoxy and all burnings of heretics, has become secularized since the Renaissance, though it was in existence long before that.


This deflection of the core of Fromm's thesis and subsequent obscurantism is present in the sometimes penetrating but not quite convincing polemics in the work of Stanley Glen who simply brings together
a host of scriptural arguments to give the obverse interpretation to Fromm's thesis, that is where Fromm is interpreted as saying that the relationship of God to man is authoritarian, Glen argues that the separation of God and man is the very condition of freedom, and not of man's submission as sado-masochism. See for example Glen's claim to provide conflicting Biblical reference in Chapter 5 of his book (Ref. S. Glen, op. cit., Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, esp. pp. 99-101).

Another line of criticism can be directed against John Schaar's assertion that when Fromm "talks about religion he is not really talking about religion at all but about ethics" (p. 126) op. cit., John Schaar. In the cases of Glen and Schaar theological and philosophical discussions of Fromm's thesis is substituted for Fromm's sociological posture.


58 Fromm, op. cit., The Heart of Man, p. 143.


60 Ibid., p. 129.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid., p. 133. For an explication of the various forms of authoritarianism as a psychological escape mechanism, see Ibid., pp. 163-202. It is not the aim in this dissertation to deal exhaustively with the problem of authoritarianism. Apart from the classic study by T. W. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, et. al, The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper, 1950); there is a good discussion in Roger Brown, Social Psychology (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp. 477-546. There are essential differences in the meaning of authoritarianism in Fromm's terms in contrast to Adorno et. al. The latter is based almost wholly on consciously held attitudes, whereas both the genesis and the use of unconscious data predominate in Fromm's concept.


64 Cf. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 152. Fromm's distinction of rational and irrational authority rests on the assertion that although both are characterized by inferior/superior relations and "imperative co-ordination" (Weber's term), the direction of interests lie on the same path in rational authority. See also Escape from Freedom, pp. 188-189.

65 Fromm, op. cit., Escape from Freedom, p. 156.
When discussion of conformity shifts to contemporary North America, Fromm does not conceptualize authority as superior and tangible, but as the commonly held beliefs in the neighbourhood of either the necessity of "keeping up with the Joneses or the obsession with "adjustment" to the norms of the neighbourhood. Here too it is in Fromm's view a distinct characteristic of the lower middle class. The authority here is fear of the sanctions of one's peers, without reasoned thinking accompanying the behaviour pattern in question. See Fromm's discussion of this intangible and all pervading phenomena in Sane Society, op. cit., pp. 152-166.

The debate between Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm on the concepts of alienation (partial aloneness and separateness of the individual, which operate dialectically and is sublated at a more 'advanced' structural level) and estrangement (Tillich's term which describes the total existential dichotomization of man from nature); is not of central concern here. One of the few Fromm critics to acknowledge the centrality of alienation to Fromm's framework is Guyton Hammond. For a discussion of Fromm's concept of alienation as well as Fromm's differences with Tillich see Hammond's, Man in Estrangement, op. cit., pp. 120-125.

Empirically, Social Character in a Mexican Village, is Fromm's most complex work. Partly because Fromm is tied to his materialistic bias in the definition of what is productive, at times the work is uncritical of assumptions in bourgeois economic theory. Fromm views the new economic opportunities, corporatives, capitalization of agriculture, etc., as opening up possibilities for the productive exploitative types. Fromm makes no attempt to evaluate this change. See, Fromm and Maccoby, op. cit., pp. 230-231.
CHAPTER IV

POWER AND MORALITY: LACUNAE IN PARSONS' SOCIOLOGY

Introduction

Structurally, then, Academic Sociology is characterized by the importance it attributes to values and by its failure to develop - in its characteristic manner which transforms almost everything into a specialization - a distinctive sociology of morals. [Alvin Gouldner, p. 141]

Broad, generalized statements of criticism against the nature of contemporary sociological theory are rarely satisfactory explanations for the present state of sociology as a theoretical science. One of the hallmarks of the increasing maturity of this theoretical science is the recent emergence of three distinct lines of criticism. There is criticism from the standpoint of the logic and philosophy of science; from the standpoint of theoretical content; and from the standpoint of reflexive sociology. In the first case the critical concern is with theory as a formally logical system and the strategy adopted by a theorist in order to construct given empirical models, and the criteria of verifiability for the theoretical system as a whole. In the second case theoretical criticism tends to concern itself with concrete substantive elements of a theory and the particular assumptions of a given theoretical strategy. In the third instance criticism is aimed at the infrastructural assumptions of a sociological paradigm as a whole and the wider societal influences bearing on the development of that paradigm. This third type
of criticism is the most recent and the one which points to the conti-
nuity in the development of late twentieth century sociology, as well
as some of the fundamental dilemmas of this sociology. This type of
criticism concerns itself with explanations for the lack of a systemati-
cally critical social theory; with the almost "universal" adoption in
current theory of a view of human nature which sees man as a passive
object "responding" to structural forces, and or of the "necessity" for
instructional norms and controls over the individual. This tends to
be a criticism of modern social theory for its ambiguity in articulating
the relation between power and morality. 1

Our task in this chapter is to criticize the infrastructural
system of assumptions of modern social theory, as epitomized in the
thought of Talcott Parsons, but from the perspective of Fromm's thought.
Our selection of the Parsonian system is not ad hoc or arbitrary. The
emergence and diffusion of Parsonian structural functionalism took place
in the 1930s and 1940s in the United States. In terms of content Parsonian
social theory was a synthesis of the basic elements of the German Romantic
and French functionalist traditions. Parsons' aim is to develop a con-
ceptual theoretical framework which stresses the inward orientation of
the acting subject integrated into a framework of societal institutions
and relationships which had a social utility. A social utility which
Parsons conceptualized in his early period as resonating the moral or
normative values of the society as a social system, for the orientation
of the acting subject. In the words of Alvin Gouldner, Parsons' pre-war
theoretical conceptualizing can be viewed as an effort to locate the
vitality of the social system in the "inward moral convictions of the individual" rather than the "imputed usefulness for or function in the larger group or society." In this sense Parsons' early theoretical posture was an Americanized Romanticism and anti-utilitarianism, where the latter is understood in a chiefly economistic and organizational sense.2

A fundamental characteristic of the Parsonian opus is the cementing function of morality for the social system, it is an opus in which Parsons has stressed the individual's internalization of the moral code, for voluntary social action. Gouldner has characterized Parsons' early conceptual efforts as containing a tension between utility and morality. This tension can be traced to the very genesis of a social science attempting to accommodate itself to the consolidation of middle-class power at the very core of bourgeois society in Europe, and North America.

Parsons' combination of functionalism and voluntarism was a reflection, within the idiom of technical social theory, of the continuing conflict in bourgeois culture between utility and morality or "natural rights," and it was an effort to confront and resolve this cultural conflict on the theoretical level.3

Two additional characteristics of Parsons' work merit attention before engaging in a fuller discussion of the problem of morality in Parsons' thought. The first is that Parsons views his theoretical conceptualization as a scientific synthesis of the anti-Marxian polemic of the classical European period of social thought. This classical period is characterized by the anti-Marxian sociology of Durkheim, Weber, Pareto and Sombart. Thus the Parsonian opus starts with the conclusions
of this anti-Marxian critique, by ignoring the original works of Marx and Engels. In short it is an attempt to "expel Marxism from "true, scientific sociology."4 The second point is that Parsons aimed at a world view, at a method of understanding society as a total system in terms of the interconnection of its institutions, but it is a world view with a distinctive "ideological identity." It is an ideological identity which takes the posture of a synonymity between abstract technicality, detachment from the deep conflicts of American society in the 1930s, and scientific objectivity. Gouldner summarizes Parsons' intellectual stance and its significance and points to the critical infrastructural assumptions in the following terms.

Despite Parsons' great significance for technical theory-work, there remains the paradox that his work seems to be detached from the world around it. . . . Cast on its high level of abstraction, it does not manifestly center on American society as such or even on industrial society more broadly. . . . It employs a terminology that obviously does not coincide with that of everyday usage. If ever a social theory seemed to grow only from purely technical considerations internal to social theory, as if born of an immaculate conception, it is the work of Talcott Parsons. . . . The reality of the situation, while by no means simple, is quite different. What is usually forgotten, or at least never remarked upon, is that this theory actually emerged in the United States during the Great Depression of the late 1930s. The historical juxtaposition of Parsons' detached, technically engrossed theory and this time of turbulent travail seems so sharply incongruous as to lend almost prima facie plausibility to the assumption that the theory emerged independently of societal pressures. Such an appearance of social irrelevance, however, is totally deceptive. We must not mistake detachment for irrelevance.5

The above statement is a classic assessment of the political and ideological subtlety of Parsonianism, the centrality of Parsons' posture of science to most of American academic sociology. It is also
an implicit attack on most of Parsons' critics, with the exception of perhaps C. Wright Mills. This statement is the basic justification for Gouldner's reflexive sociology, as well as for the task of this chapter which is the centrality of the problem of power and morality for any social science.

Walter Buckley in an introductory chapter of his work Sociology And Modern Systems Theory has suggested that the modern systems theory concepts in physical and social science is the culmination of "a broad shift in scientific perspective striving for dominance over the last few centuries." Buckley also traces through specific American social scientists the contemporary sublation of the mechanical and organismic analogies of society by the notion of society as a socio-cultural system, which is a complex adaptive system, which create, elaborate or change structure as a prerequisite to remaining viable, as ongoing systems, rather than minimize organization (equilibrium maintenance) or preserve a given structure. In this shift Talcott Parsons' early work The Structure of Social Action is viewed by both Buckley and Ludwig von Bertalanffy as a major contribution, not withstanding their criticisms of Parsons. While it is not my intention to discourse on the specifics of systems theory as expounded by Parsons over the past four decades, it is my intention to argue that there is a connection between Parsons' empirical analyses of the particular social problems which he has tackled from time to time, and the ultimate problems of power and morality; and in this sense, the basis for points of comparison exist between Fromm and Parsons. The connection within a single methodology of a systematic
approach to power and morality at a theoretical, analytical level, on
the one hand, and analyses of empirical problems such as fascism, on
the other hand, cannot entirely evade some mention of the technical the-
oretical issues raised by Talcott Parsons. But these will be kept to
a minimum.

In the first chapter of this discussion the point was raised
that in contemporary sociology there was an increasing realization that
rules of verification and validity with respect either to particular
substantive theories or the verification of particular elements of a given
meta-theoretical system, were subordinate to the problems of the paradi-
matic assumptions or commitments of either the Marxian conflict or the
system orientations. Furthermore, to that extent, the problem of 'vision'
or 'hope' could not be simply dismissed by sociologists as an ethical
problem. Rather it is a part of the area of work which comes under the
rubric of 'philosophy of the social sciences' and is central to meth-
odology. This discussion is resumed in this chapter.

The body of work termed 'philosophy of the social sciences'
include problems of methodology as well as problems of infrastructural
assumptions—and thereby a reflexive sociology. The term methodology
is used in the general sense to refer to questions of the nature, 'how
can the social scientist approach social phenomena to gain valid and
'testable' comprehension of its elements and interrelations?' Questions
about technique in theory building, as well as questions about the infra-
structural elements of a sociological paradigm, have their ultimate
referent in methodology in this general sense. Consequently the works
of both Fromm and Parsons are subject to considerations in a comparative sense, from these perspectives, however diverse the levels of analysis of both men may at first appear.

The thought of Erich Fromm and Talcott Parsons reveal some significant parallels. Both men developed in the traditions of European and United States sociology. They were highly influenced by the events of the 1930s and by the Second World War, for example both attempted analyses of fascism. Fromm and Parsons undertake an interconnection of sociology and psychology. But there are equally important contrasts in Fromm and Parsons. Where Fromm's work has a popular appeal to the lay public in American society, appearing on public newstands, nationally and internationally, and where Fromm uses a language which appeals to the non-specialist, Parsons' work has no such appeal. The latter's work is scarcely read outside of academic social scientific circles. The obscurity of Parsons' style betrays a singular lack of interest in communicating his sociological meaning to the widest possible community of scholars, this renders Parsons' international reputation something of a paradox. Parsons' task has been not so much to develop substantive theories but that of a general theory of human action, by developing "logically inter-related sets of categories and concepts which will presumably enable theories to be developed." Consequently Parsons' empirical writings may appear to be somewhat peripheral to his main task. In Parsons' eyes these two orders of his work have not yet fully converged.

The volume and intensity of critiques and commentaries on Parsons' thought testify to the host of problems which face many of Parsons' conceptual assertions, but more importantly to the general malaise in recent
sociological theory. Part of the malaise has to do with at once widespread influence of structural-functionalism in twentieth century sociology and the fundamental weaknesses of this orientation. Vastly elaborated versions of some of these criticisms are applied to Parsons' work also. But there is a difference. First, there is a recognition on the part of some recent critics that the Parsonian system partly due to its recognition of the gap between its abstract and its empirical statements, cannot be so easily dealt with. Secondly because of Parsons early criticisms of positivist methodology, that is his explicit rejection that the scientific orientation which exclusively directs its attentions on the purely physical aspects of human behaviour; it is recognized that Parsons' theoretical statements cannot be evaluated in terms of the canons of natural science. In other words Parsons' early assertion of the primacy of the subjective factor, of voluntarism in human action, raised questions about critical criteria which stress the empirical referent as a basis for evaluating the Parsonian scheme. The implications of this explicit assertion for at least partial evaluation of the Parsonian opus continues to the present day in sociological theorizing. For example in a recent commentary on Parsons scheme the author recognizes that because the theory is not intended as a complete deductive system, "we cannot judge it solely or even primarily in terms of its production of predictive and explanatory propositions." But once we abandon these strict criteria, we are faced with two critical perspectives: a) "we can take Parsons' overall strategy, that of prefacing fully theoretical work in sociology with the construction of a categorical
system, as given and examine the adequacy of his scheme as a body of categorical knowledge" or b), "we can argue that his theoretical strategy is itself misguided and unlikely to facilitate the development, by which alone it can finally be justified, of a full theoretical system."\textsuperscript{13} The problem with either of these critical strategies is that they have both been observed by Parsons. First because Parsons asserts that his theory is not a body of categorical knowledge, precisely to the extent that he insists that his concepts are intentionally abstract. At points in \textit{Toward A General Theory of Action} Parsons comes close to asserting that his concepts and categories are "free creations of the human intellect." They are initially more logical models than models for events of physical existence.\textsuperscript{14} Secondly because as earlier stated Parsons continually asserts that his theoretical system is unintegrated and incomplete. It is worth noting that both assertions are not fully explicated as to meaning, by Parsons. What is significant about Mulkay's analysis is his tacit recognition that it is difficult to come up with a body of criteria with which to evaluate Parsons' analytical work without having the author say as he did to Black and others that they have missed the point of his work.

It is my contention in this chapter then, that due to the manifold difficulties of developing a body of theoretical criteria which can justifiably be utilized in an examination of Parsonian thought meaningful discussion must be focussed on Parsons' "empirical" writings, rather than at the level of his analytic schemes. We can outline the reasons for the adoption of this strategy as follows:
First, a cursory examination of the volumes of critical material on Parsons suggest that the main difficulties stem from Parsons' substantive preconceptions at the paradigmatic level, rather than from his general orientations on the nature of theory or theoretical construction. In other words to elucidate why a theorist of Parsons' calibre does not consistently define 'order' at the system level of articulation or why his paradigmatic metaphor shifts from voluntary action, to structural functionalism (ie. organicism), to exchange and cybernetics, attention has to be focussed on what substantive factors in society he is attempting to unify or translate into exchangeable terms at the paradigmatic level of discourse. More often than not these factors are in contradiction at the level of social experience of everyday reality. In the case of Parsons the irreconcilables are power and morality.

Secondly Parsons has staunchly held that many of his critics discuss his "general theory" as though it were complete. Parsons holds that the outlines of his "general theory" is continually being developed. Parsons suggests that the program to develop "grand theory" cannot be abandoned before the more empirically based "middle range theory" is integrated with "grand theory." In a very recent comment on the problem Parsons asserts:

... the controversy over the virtues and vices of "grand theory" shows no sign of subsiding.16

Implicit in the context from which the preceding statement was taken, is Parsons' suggestion that the empirical work is also incomplete. Moreover, Parsons is stating more specifically that his analytical grand
Finally, implicit in the foregoing argument is the assertion that Parsons' work cannot be finally and decisively shifted, by dint of theoretical critiques alone, to the forefront of sociological development, or alternatively removed altogether from this development—aspects of Parsons' work will continue to constitute an important part of sociological knowledge. As was the case with both Durkheim and Weber, an important strategy of retrospective critiques was the lacunae in their respective works between their theoretical and conceptual writings and their "descriptive" and empirical writings. This critical strategy can be applied to Parsons but the attempts at this stage must focus on his empirical and interpretive essays. This consideration is given added weight in the light of the following observation by Talcott Parsons which is quoted in full:

At any rate, the whole collection [of empirical essays published in the volume being introduced] is meant to be presented as an example of the virtues of theoretical 'holism' in attempting to tie together the immense variety of phenomena which, ..., are touched upon in the volume. The essential theoretical background throughout is the theory of the social system, treating the concrete system not as an empirically integrated whole, but as a system the problems of which must be analyzed in terms of an integrated conceptual scheme. Only by following this path, whatever the specific conceptual content of the scheme, can the various problems associated with the common categories of 'structure', of 'function', of 'process', of 'conflict', and of 'change' be related to each other in such a way that we can speak of an empirically viable 'sociological theory' and not merely of a catalogue of discrete 'theories' each relevant only to its particular subject-matter. The underlying question is, is sociology coming to be a science, or must it remain a congeries of discrete protosciences? [Italics mine]
The point here is that Parsons' tacitly accepts the criticisms that his 'conceptual scheme' is not in fact integrated prior to empirical analyses and testing and that the content of much of the categories which comprise this 'conceptual scheme' may be problematic. This is a self-criticism in spite of the charges of his critics and not necessarily because of them. Rather than claim that his categories are specific or his conceptual scheme is theoretically successful Parsons is suggesting that relevant empirical problems can only be identified specifically and relevantly researched within the context of his categories. The more intriguing question following from the implications of this latter assertion becomes then, not is Parsons' structural-functional strategy or his work as a whole valid, but why Parsons has adopted this strategy? It is pursuing this line of inquiry that power and morality become focal issues, and a demonstration of the meaning of Parsons' work highlighted in his empirical and interpretive essays.

The Parsonian Definitions of Power and Morality

The intellectual community's retreat from responsibility may have part of its source, paradoxically, in the way in which 'democracy' has become a substitute for religion in the formal accumulation process. [Robert Friedrichs, 1970]

We have to substitute with the help of the Institutions the force and inflexible justice of the laws for personal influence. The Revolution will thus be strengthened; there will be no jealousies; there will be no pretentious claims and no calumny . . . we have . . . to substitute the ascendancy of virtue for the ascendancy of men. . . . Make politics powerless by reducing all to the cold rule of justice. [Saint-Just]
What took the form of a plea and an ideal with Saint-Just takes the form of observed reality for Parsons. The former wanted to reduce politics to questions of morality, and consequently education; the latter completed the sociological frame of reference as a specialized frame of reference, made the 'organization' into a type of sub-system of the societal system and therefore a filter of the societal morality and the morality as a generator and regulator of power. In these terms power as a phenomenon of coercion, as an exercise of control over others, in short, the zero-sum concept of power has become for Parsons a special case of power, at least in "modern societies." Parsons did not easily produce an equation of power and morality at the conceptual level that could be consistent with his 'grand theory ambitions.' The final equation of power and morality— that is to say his conception that power is a generalized, symbolic medium of exchange analogous to money in terms of having as part of its constituent certain binding obligations that are exchanged in transactions—necessitated a gradual but consistent abandonment of Parsons' earlier recognition of the hierarchical elements of power and the zero-sum concept of power. By 1960—when Structure And Process In Modern Societies was published—the 'policy' had become a clearly articulated sub-system of the social system, political science a "distinctive conceptual scheme" like economics, and the earlier ambiguity of the role of political science in his general scheme had all but disappeared. The following are excerpts from Parsons' changing definitions of power from the 1930s to the present.

In his 1953 essay "A revised analytical approach to the theory of social stratification" Parsons conceptualized power holding interest
groups within the society as a "system-unit" and suggested that such a system-unit's hierarchical position cannot be only a function of its "place in a scale of valuation relative to an integrated common value system," in other words the power groups cannot be conceptualized as possessing such relative power by virtue of its commitment to values on a scale which emphasize integration of a wider value system. This was so because in concrete terms a discrepancy exists between the "normatively defined 'ideal' ranking order and the actual state of affairs, in terms of the relation between ranking in value terms and 'power.'" Following this statement Parsons defines power as:

The realistic capacity of a system-unit to actualize its 'interests' (attain goals, prevent undesired interference, command respect, control possessions, etc.) within the context of system-interaction and in this sense to exert influence on processes in the system.20

Although much of the discussion of the concept of power, in this essay, leaves to one side the transference of the exercise of power between systems, and power not as the resultant, but the condition for claims to high standards of valuation, the condition for social control over others (alter) and finally, the control of possessions; it attempts to recognize authority and legitimizing as factors which are comprehensible in terms of the exercise of power.21 At any rate this Parsonian conception recognizes power as a concrete phenomenon of action orientation.

A further complication inherent in Parsons' conception of power is recognized as part of his earliest conception, Parsons' discussion of authority and legitimation as distinct from a formal definition of
power but integral to empirical generalization of it. In order to trace the sources of this concern we need to go back to Parsons' early work in *The Structure Of Social Action*. One of the central sub-themes of this analysis is Parsons' concern with a stable system of action in a complex society and the normative regulation of power for the regulation of interaction between individuals. Hobbes' zero-sum concept of power as a means by which one individual achieved his wants, was for Parsons a clear sighted view. At the same time Parsons' concern with 'order' and the possibilities of the "unlimited struggle for power" led him to view the solution in integration of individual action orientation in a common value system. This fact rendered institutional norms legitimate.22

At this stage of early formulation Parsons limited his notion of power to 'coercive rationality.' Power is a relative concept and not a property of the total action system. Part of Parsons' critique of Hobbes here, was that the latter ignored a common value system which transcends the acquisition of power goals. The lack of characterization of a normative order as well as the conception of power as means in the achievement of a given end are key weaknesses in Hobbes which Parsons notes. In the second case Parsons suggested that to the extent that it was inherent in human action that the actions of some men would be a means to other men's ends then it was 'rational' that all men should desire and seek power over one another. But in this case power becomes an end in itself and the very earlier ends which Hobbes articulated are lost.

At this point in the discussion, Parsons' focus changes from a critique of the substantive issues raised by Hobbes to a sociology of
knowledge critique of utilitarian thought in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Parsons suggests that the animus of Hobbesian philosophy was for a normative order and a secular defense of individual rights. But within the dominant stream of utilitarian philosophy Hobbes' work tended to be viewed as a literal description of existing society. Thus began, states Parsons, the shift from a normative to a factual order or theory of society. Marx's conception of power as class power, a bargaining weapon of the dominant class and its control of the institutional framework is recognized by Parsons as a major advance on Hobbes, but Parsons implies that Marx's discussion of class power as a means within the dominant institutional framework is invalidated because the economic process, a key factor in such control, is invalidated by more contemporary economic theory.

In a later work Parsons modifies the Hobbesian view of power, "a man's present means to any future good," by suggesting that such means constitute his power; "so far as these means are dependent on his relations to other actors; the correlative is the obligation of alter to respect ego's rights." Here the concept of power as an individualized facility of control over others, whether to obtain influence on another's action--the positive, or to guarantee the non-interference of others, the negative--is the important constituent of power. Although we find Parsons suggesting, explicitly as well as implicitly, that his work on the concept of power is continuous, involving clarifications and allowances for issues not specified in the Hobbesian concept of power, his changed definitions are in fact discontinuous. All roads do not lead to the
Parsonian conceptual framework. Firstly, Parsons is saying that Hobbes intended physical force to be one form of power. Secondly, Parsons is saying that any facility which obliges alter to respect ego's rights and which 'constitute' ego's means is possession of ego's power. The analytical rationale for this assertion is Parsons' view that political power is inherently diffuse, in contrast to the specificity of economic power. He states:

This means that a theory of political power must in the nature of the case take into account as variables, most of the variables of the social system.25

The meaning and significance for Parsons' conception of empirical political problems is by no means apparent for he is stating a number of complex and sometimes contradictory things, which ultimately and in terms of Parsons' scheme does not provide a systematic concept of power.

One major difficulty is Parsons' analysis of the problems of institutionalization and internalization. We will examine these briefly. On the problem of institutionalization Parsons has two aspects to systematize: the first is that in complex societies the governmental political system controls and regulates other sub-systems and institutions within the society. At the same time the political system defines and limits the possibility of means within which particular actors and groups realize their goal orientations. In other words through power the rights of individuals are institutionalized. Parsons summarizes both the facets of power as follows:

The significance of power to the realization of any goal-orientation of one or more actors within the social system
is a function of the extensity of the system of actual or potential exchange relationships through which it ramifies.26

Before dealing with the problems of the ambiguity of the foregoing formulation either as analytical or empirical referent, two further aspects are worthy of note. One is the universalization or generalization of norms which transcend the particularity of specific relationships.

Breakdown of particularistic ties is the first condition of extension of the power system.27

The other is the system's definition of what is regarded as a legitimate choice of means, that is to say, the limits on individuals over the use of force, fraud and 'control of organization.' In other words the legitimate authority to arbitrate the conflicts between parties is a function of the institutionalization of power.

Parsons summarizes his concept of power, at this point in his intellectual career, by suggesting that economic power is 'lineally quantitative,' while political power is hierarchical.

While the structure of economic power is, . . . lineally quantitative, simply a matter of more and less, that of political power is hierarchical; that is, of higher and lower levels. The greatest power is power over the lesser, not merely more power than the lesser. . . . This is perhaps another way of stating the diffuseness of political power, in that it is a mobilization of the total relational context as a facility relative to the goal in question.28 [Italics mine]

We can now resume discussion of the ambiguity of meanings of Parsons' concepts of power in the above formulation. The main weakness of the formulation is not Parsons' assertion of the generalizing quality
of political power, in contrast to the specificity of economic power; but non-human tendency of this generalization. Parsons views the nature of economic power in the social sub-system as a distinct 'product' of political power which is in turn a mobilization of the total relational context. This is simply an analytical formulation of the notion that "power comes from the people." From this simple assertion Parsons specifies two processes which changes the picture: the institutionalization and universalization of norms and the integration in organizational and regulative terms of all the component sub-systems of the society. In all this Parsons recognizes the crucial focus on the modern nation state but says virtually nothing definitive about who controls the state, how the state comes to have this centrality, or how the regulative institutional processes which guarantees the state from "particularism" and defines the conditions of economic exchange are arrived at, much less maintained. On the nature of the mobilization toward the modern state Parsons states:

Since ability to use force in its relation to territoriality is one ultimate focus of power in this sense, [in the sense of force being a form of power along a continuum which includes 'fraud', purchasing power', the abuse of control of organization', and even 'expressive symbolism')] the control of the use and organization of force relative to territory is always a crucial focus of the political power system, in one sense the crucial focus. It is this which gives the state its central position in the power system of a complex society. It is in turn the functional need to organize the power system relative to force and territory which gives control of the machinery of governmental organization its strategic position as a proximate goal of emulation for power.29

It is through the modern state then, that inter-sub-system integration is achieved, but this is done by politicians, this Parsons
fails to make explicit, rather he suggests that the generalization of this function is dependent on the "level of universalism." In this very paragraph Parsons suggests further that the institutionalization of economic power is focussed on the maintenance of the conditions of reciprocal exchange transactions and of the generalization of these transactions. Equally however institutionalization of economic power includes insulation of large concentrations of economic power from 'having undue influence' as facilities for the exercise of political power. Once again the question here is not so much that such insulation is historically impossible within the context of modern political democracies, rather it is that Parsons apart from asserting that economic power cannot be diffused and that economic exchange conditions take place under rigidly defined conditions; does not analytically specify how these regulative mechanisms exist. Such an analytical clarification is crucial to Parsons' concluding theme which is the notion that political power integrates into a coherent system of 'legitimized authority' and 'collective responsibility.' His earlier assertion therefore that economic or purchasing power has a certain scope but one that restricts the 'purchasing' of fraud, force and abuse as a means to gaining political power advantages is not demonstrated in The Social System. We can regard it as Parsons' preferred mode of analytical articulation and no more. This preferred mode of analogizing and expression has a personal referent in Parsons' ideological commitment "traditional liberalism" of the eighteenth and nineteenth century variety. At a distinct level it is a preference which hinges on Parsons' conception of man. While it is not necessary to
probe deeply either of these levels at this stage to bring out more clearly the relation between power and morality which Parsons' draws, it is worth noting that there is a connection.\textsuperscript{31} Approaches to this connection from both these perspectives would take us far afield from our original 'strategy' in this chapter. But there is another problem. However much the essays of Hacker and Winter provide general guides to an understanding of the significance of the underlying problems of Parsons' conception of power, they are still simplifications in one sense that becomes clearer from the foregoing analysis. Parsons does not fully disparage the zero-sum concept of power, for in the concept presented above Parsons definition of power is not fully committed to a functionalist conception of power, whatever his orientational aims. This is one lacuna in Parsons.

\textbf{A Critique of: "On The Concept of Political Power"}

"On The Concept Of Political Power" is generally regarded as Parsons' main attempt at a clear conception of power. As was remarked earlier, Parsons was from the outset concerned with power and morality, but there is a difference between his earlier statements and the one presently under consideration. In his earlier work Parsons looked at power and morality as aspects shaping stratification categories of contemporary societies. But in these early efforts Parsons adopted a less ambitious conceptual strategy and therefore did not assert the parallelism of economic and political theory characteristic of "On The Concept Of Political Power." In terms of the earlier effort power was a
"residual category" of differential valuation. Specifically a variety of value systems was viewed as providing justifications of why discrimination and differential access of individuals to the statuses, roles, incomes and so on, was legitimate. Parsons suggested six bases of differential valuation of which power was one. This was clearly a structural-functionalist conception of social stratification but power was still a phenomena at the facility of individuals, a means in the conventional sense, rather than a 'generalized medium.' More importantly however the equivalence of power and morality characteristic of his later conception is lacking. Parsons did not view all normative orientations and normative patterns of action as relevant to the moral sentiments governing differential ranking in general terms. Though moral evaluation was the central criterion of differential ranking, it was implicit in Parsons that moral evaluation was to some extent defined by the competing individuals, a retrospective process, a rationalization in Weber's terms, rather than something which 'defined the situation of action.' The discontinuity between the implications of the earlier and later conceptions of power give significance to this view and to the shaping of Parsons' thoughts on power. In the early essay Parsons held that moral superiority was the object of an "empirically specific attitude," and that the place of moral evaluation in a stratification system was determined by the place of moral evaluation in the "theory of action." Then Parsons suggests that moral evaluation is a main aspect of the broader phenomenon of "normative orientation": ..., since not all normative patterns which are relevant to action are the objects of moral
sentiments. While it is accurate then to say that for Parsons the "social world is primarily a moral world and social reality is a moral reality," and equally that "social exit" is dysfunctional and unreal, it is certainly not accurate to hold that non moral norms are either neglected or "only marginal" to Parsons. More importantly the Parsonian morality was in his earlier formulation subsumed under the more equivocal normatives. The wider encompassing of the world as a moral entity had to await the 1963 generalization of power and its equation with economics.

There is a fundamental shift in Parsons' thought with reference to power. It is a shift in focus from individual goal orientations to the 'collectivity.' While this shift commits Parsons to a peculiar holism with basic implications for a rigidification for the conceptions of social evil and morality which closely approximates Gouldner's statement on Parsons (quoted above), it also entrenches these concepts within Parsons' analytical-theoretical framework. In is in this sense of increasingly entrenched concepts which furthers the rigidity of the overall framework that Parsons' particular notions of evil as focussed on power and morality are interwoven into the corpus of his work as a whole. These concepts cannot therefore be fully extricated from this framework, without seriously distorting Parsons' meaning of 'evil,' power and morality. An alternative approach will be adopted, that is to discuss "On The Concept of Political Power" as a basis for presenting the problems of his major interpretive essays.

Parsons does not subscribe to the view that power in the "individual enterprise and in the wider society is fundamentally evil," rather he
views the 'polity' as a system of direct empirical reference for the analysis of power in modern society. It is a sub-system which parallels in terms of its characteristics as the economy. Parsons sees the polity as composed "of the ways in which the relevant components of the total system are organized with reference to one of its fundamental functions, namely effective collective action in the attainment of the goals of collectivities." Parsons asserts at the start of the essay that he is only prepared to regard as power the exchange relations between two or more systematically related collectivities which have sufficiently mobilized organizational resources in arriving at their goals.

The analogy of the polity and the economy are important in the following ways:
First, because it is the point of departure for a polemical critique against C. Wright Mills' work on power relation in contemporary America. It is an argument against the zero-sum concept, a concept of which Parsons is not at all clear in his early discussions of power. After calling Mills a 'utopian individualist,' Parsons states:

\[ \ldots \] The dominant tendency in the literature, for example in Lasswell and C. Wright Mills, is to maintain explicitly or implicitly that power is a zero-sum phenomenon, which is to say that there is a fixed 'quantity' of power in any relational system. \[ \ldots \] There are of course restricted contexts in which this condition holds, but I shall argue that it does not hold for total systems of a sufficient level of complexity. \[ \ldots \]

Second, because Parsons aims to relate the coercive and consensual aspects of power without subordinating one to the other.
Thirdly, because the policy has three "operative contexts" which gives it the resemblance of the economy, these are:
a) the polity can adjust to the 'demands' of the groups in the society over whom power is exercised. Moreover that these 'demands' emerge outside of the polity itself,

b) the 'resources' for the exercise of power must be mobilized within the polity,

c) there are processes whereby the 'factors of production' within the polity can be combined creatively in the light of the utility of outputs of the political sub-system. Parsons suggests that just as 'value reference' in economics is utility, a factor which applies equally to producers and consumers, the factor of effectiveness is the value reference in political sub-systems. Further Parsons asserts that the "goal-demands" of interest groups, that is to say the political demands of groups in the society, is another factor, like effectiveness, which has parallel status to consumers wants in economic analysis.

Fourth, like economic analysis, political analysis has a central place for a generalized medium. In economic analysis it is money, in political analysis it is power, which is the generalized medium. For the foregoing reasons then, Parsons states that power is the generalized medium of the polity, in a sense directly parallel in its logical structure to money in the economic process. It is a means of acquiring the 'factors of effectiveness,' but power is not the same as one of the 'factors of effectiveness.' Power then in the Parsonian sense, circulates within the policy, but into other sub-systems of society as well, such as the judiciary, the police and other areas of the integrative sub-system; the cultural, educational and socialization agencies of the pattern-maintenance sub-system; and the economic or adaptive sub-system.
Apart from the vital assumptions of 'free competition' and a presumed level of knowledge and rational choice which led the 'classical economists' to accept 'utility' and 'consumers wants' as 'givens' for economic analysis, Parsons is equally wrong in postulating 'effectiveness' and 'goal demands' as given for his political analysis. He begs the question, and in so doing presumes as 'given' the very things which he sets out to analyse, that is the relationship between power as a circulating medium and a level of morality or normative orientations, in complex societies. It is ironic that he should state, soon after adumbrating the factors of the 'operative context' of power; that we should not mistake power with the 'factors of effectiveness,' one of which is morality, when he has just finished doing precisely that. Whereas in classical economics the major role of advertising as a form of psychological coercion could not have been anticipated in the postulation of consumers' wants and utility, Parsons cannot be said to be ignorant of the unspecified underlying forces which determine, and sometimes produce 'constituent demands' in the modern polity. We must assume then, that Parsons deliberately constructed a circular model being intent on asserting coercion whether physical or otherwise as an analytically distinct form of power.

The remainder of this analysis will focus on Parsons general treatment of coercion and consensus, of which the zero-sum concept of power is treated as a particular variant. Parsons asserts that power has both coercion and consensus as aspects, when conceptualized as a circulating medium. This is another way of saying that the particular
groups, institutions and agencies, including the military and police which apparently have power—the generalized capacity "to secure the performance of binding obligations by units in a system of collective organization when the obligations are legitimized with reference to their bearing on collective goals" and where there is recalcitrance negative sanctions can be imposed—are dealing in a medium which has 'exchange,' but no 'use' value. Further, Parsons states that power is an exchange value in so far as its proper functioning is dependent in the final analysis, neither on ascriptive obligations nor on barter relations. Exchange is rather dependent on a stable "institutionalized confidence in the power system."40

Parsons' strategy is to put the focus of power on the capacity to secure compliance as a generalized feature of power relations and the function of 'sanctioning acts' as a generalized aspect of this relation. Force, then, is not the single functioning sanction. Force is an agency of enforcement, for binding obligations. Paralleling this generalized feature of compliance, Parsons suggests that the power holder, so called, has nothing but a set of 'expectations' that he can invoke certain obligations, but legitimation of these expectations is part of power. Legitimation then functions in the same manner as confidence in mutual acceptability and stability of the monetary unit in economic systems. In these terms, force and legitimacy exist in inverse relationship to each other. Force is a means of gaining compliance, but the intrinsically most effective means of coercion. Parsons summarizes this point as follows:
... power cannot be only an intrinsically effective deterrent; if it is to be the generalized medium of mobilizing resources for effective collective action, and for the fulfillment of commitments made by collectivities...; it too must be both symbolically generalized, and legitimized.41

Parsons extends his analysis within the context of two general paradigms: the input of "factors of production" from different parts or sub-systems of the social system and inputs to the social system; and four types of strategy. The point here is that Parsons tries to demonstrate a simple point, namely that within integrated systems most political relations are based not on force, but on an institutionalized normative order. Whereas the relations between national collectivities only rests on the more general strategies of "situational inducements," and "intentional persuasion" where both countries enjoy friendly relations. However where the general relations are ambiguous or at issue, the power systems are more vulnerable to explicit resort to threats of coercive sanctions and 'intrinsically' effective measures, that is force.

The critical point, at which the institutional integration of power systems is most vulnerable to strain, and to degeneration into reciprocating threats of the use of force, is between territorially organized political systems. . . . In this connection it should be recognized that the possession, the mutual threat, and possible use of force is only in a most proximate sense the principal 'cause' of war.42

This is in effect a scientific rationale for the modern nation state for Parsons states that the "effective" management of the power system like that of the monetary system must be integrated into the institutionalization of political power and the monopolization of physical force. Not only does Parsons go beyond Max Weber in not differentiating
between power, domination and legitimacy, he also derives his definition of democratic systems from the nature and functioning of the existing institutions. Secondly, although Parsons maintains throughout the centrality of infrastructural moral systems and consequently the function of institutionalized norms, neither the moral system nor the norms sense any end in themselves. They facilitate orderly exchange between units in the system. Yet Parsons recognizes, at least implicitly, that different units in the social system may give differing interpretations to the moral codes of the social system, hence his recognition that differentials in commitments to collective goals may exist. This is not only the case with those on whose behalf goals are articulated but also those in the higher echelons of power and authority. Parsons recognizes this but suggests that compliance applies to both subordinates and superordinates. He is not correct when he suggests, however, that the norm is that binding obligations "can clearly be 'invoked' by lower-order against higher-order agencies." 43

Despite this institutionalized domination, Parsons holds that there is no evidence from examination of empirical problems to conclude as C. Wright Mills does that there is a trend toward hierarchization in the total social system because there are two different principles arising from the generalization of the medium of power, though not from the hierarchy of authority. The first is the 'equality of the franchise' which is a control on differential power 'from above.' The second is equality of opportunity which is a control from below. 44

Parsons summarizes his essay by asserting that the interchange between the polity and the integrative sub-system, that is the system
which functions to organize and legitimize authority, can be conceived as a circular flow system, in terms of the analogue of modern banking systems. This 'circular flow system' is a way of characterizing democratic electoral systems. Here the elected leadership is in a position analogous to that of the banker. In a pluralistic society the freedom of the leadership to make binding decisions is confined to the circular flow system. Here a balance would tend to exist between the people's input of power through the channels of political support, and the 'output' through policy decisions to interest groups which have specifically demanded these decisions. This freedom gives the leadership the facility to create 'power credits.' They do this through use of influence which derives from the 'prestige of office.' This element of credit creation is on a dimension of 'inflation-deflation.' Parsons characterizes the McCarthy era in the United States as the equivalent of a deflationary trend, with McCarthy demanding a liquidation of all other political commitments in favour of the national priority. This line of analysis indicates Parsons' movement to an increasing moral relativity—he suggests that there is a fine line between solid, responsible leadership and political recklessness.45

The fundamental significance of Parsons' conceptualisation of the institutionalization of action orientations had to await his articulation of power.46 Consequently we find Parsons asserting that the "problem of evil" in society has to do with undeserved suffering in terms of the current value system, and to the "actual existence of unpunished behavior in contravention of the moral norms of the society,"
... And yet Parsons views morality in terms of public and private or informal spheres, with the increasing differentiation of society producing informal criteria for definitions of morality. For instance in discussing morality in complex societies, Parsons states:

There is a moral issue only when the alternatives involve a presumption of relevance to the 'integrity' or the 'solidarity' of an interaction system when the preservation of that integrity or solidarity is itself a value.47

One of the significant lacunae in Parsons' thought is implicit belief that morality is coextensive with reality. If we define morality as being rooted in the "scarcity and contingency of desired objects and performances."48 According to Alvin Gouldner, moral claims are rhetorical and made by Ego to mobilize Alter's motives for complying with his wants, "without express reference to the manner in which the situation will be changed by improved benefits or by avoided costs." Morality is a tacit promise of mutuality of gratification and therefore obligations and rights for the parties subject to it. Consequently there are ambiguities and vulnerabilities inherent in all moral systems. Gouldner in a relentless attack on Parsons suggests that the latter wants to have his "moral norms without paying the Positivist price of a deterministic universe." What is wrong with Parsons' conceptions of power and morality is that he not only refuses non-morally sanctioned power, and yet power and morality are only sociologically recognized where they are institutionalized. This renders superfluous both his concepts of consensus and legitimation as processes. How can Parsons examine sociologically socially institutionalized patterns of deviance such as Nazism and McCarthyism, with
such conceptions? In both cases power and legitimacy were existent. Parsons makes explicit that forms of coercion are not power if they are not legitimized or justified. Although Parsons recognizes those who possess power sometimes fail to discharge the rights of others, he is not prepared to see this as patterned, and therefore that default on moral obligations may be due to the very possession of power. Ignoring this facet leads Parsons to the implicit view that possession of power is right and sanctified.  

Parsons' Empirical and Interpretive Essays

We come now to the final section of this chapter: an evaluation of Parsons' empirical and interpretive essays, in terms of his earlier discussed pronouncements on power and morality. The main contention in this section is that in his more empirical essays Parsons has not demonstrated that he has gained any unique insights from the complex and often convoluted discussion of basic concepts such as power and political interaction. Parsons' empirical essays are scattered throughout his career but I will select for focus his two essays on Nazism because they best highlight the differences between Parsons and Erich Fromm, also because both essays were published about the same time as Fromm's major work, Escape From Freedom. The latter work was of course, prompted partly by the emergence of fascism in Europe.

In the essays of Parsons and Erich Fromm the fundamental problem is focussed on explanations for the emergence of fascism and Nazism. In the case of fascism an implicit analytical distinction is drawn from Nazism. But the similarity in attempts end here, for whereas Fromm accepts
the general thesis that fascism, as 'radicalism of the right' is deeply rooted in the structure of Western society as a whole, and locates this rootedness in the character structure of modern man: Fromm does not believe that the authoritarian social character is due to anomie, or the lack of integration of man with stable institutional patterns, as does Parsons. On the contrary, Fromm's thesis argues that the so-called anomie was an historical problem which Western man resolved since the Reformation by abandoning choice, to a large extent by conformity. This leads Fromm then to place less emphasis on the apparent differences between social structures in Europe and North America and more emphasis on the continuities between social structure and personality and character in any given industrial society. In other words, Fromm conceptualizes fascism as the twentieth century manifestation, with Nazism as an institutionalized, state instrumentalization of these forces. This manifestation of totalitarianism is just as likely to emerge in the United States, in a distinct form, as in any of the other highly industrialized European societies. More importantly Fromm does not regard as historically significant the fact that overt totalitarianism has no emerged in the United States. Parsons does, though he recognizes some structural similarities between Nazi Germany and the U. S. of the 1940s, and he states that the psychological response to endemic anomie is "submission to some strong authority and rigid system of belief," in which the individual finds a measure of escape. If Parsons takes seriously his assertions that there are structural and psychological similarities in Western society to the degree that he identifies them how does he explain the
"intrinsic uniqueness" of Nazism as a uniquely German phenomenon? For he suggests that Nazism or totalitarian processes like it could not emerge in the United States and criticizes 'Marxist writers' for suggesting that it could. When we pursue this line of analysis it becomes possible to recognize the interpretive stance of Parsons essays over time—for example the connection between the conclusions of the essays presently discussed and his work on McCarthyism and patterns of voting behaviour in the United States, and so on. 51

The point of departure for Parsons thesis with respect to the social structure of Pre-Nazi Germany is an anti-radical critique. It is one in which Parsons is saying that there are great resemblances in the economy and institutional apparatuses of Germany and the United States, but that the causes of Nazism in Germany lie at the subtler institutional levels. Parsons states:

It will, by contrast (to Marxist writers who view the emergence of some form of Nazism in the United States as quite possible) with that view, be the thesis of the present analysis that a divergence of political orientation so fundamental as that at present developing between the fascist and liberal-democratic societies must go back to deeper structural sources than this view would indicate. 52

An evaluation of Parsons' essay on fascist movements will be undertaken first and his conclusions on Nazism placed within that context because like most other writers on the subject, Parsons recognizes fascism in Europe as the more general sociological phenomena. First of all, as was earlier stated Parsons takes the view that fascism is deeply rooted in the internal strains and conflicts of Western society. Parsons attempts an analysis of the cause of fascism at a number of levels,
the key ones being the historical, the modern social structural and the psychological. He suggests that fascism is a radical response which is discontinuous with the conservatism of pre-1914. Parsons explanation runs as follows:

Fascism is a particular response led by 'privileged elite groups' with 'vested interests' in their position. It is their response to anomie. In this sense Parsons conceives a constant relation between fascism and 'vested interests' but the vested interests identified are the traditional feudal and semi-feudal remnants from an earlier agricultural society, and the lower middle classes from contemporary capitalism. But Parsons is not fully committed to this explanation and leaves the matter open by asserting that what specific groups are involved is a matter of the particular structural situation in the society in question. The implication however is that they are economically deprived.

Parsons suggests that the historical factors "causing" fascism go back in the first place to the Industrial Revolution and the consequences of the change from predominantly agricultural to industrial and commercial societies, with the attendant growth of migration to and rapid expansion of cities. The growth of migration has meant difficult processes of assimilation to different cultural settings.

Another historical factor is frequent economic instability, characterized by cyclical fluctuations and unemployment. Another source of constant change is changes in fashion, dress and taste, as well as ideas, political and cultural. A major change here is the debunking of traditional ideas, values and religious patterns.
The structural factors are characterized by the following conditions: a) the processes of rationalization which can be found in the changing patterns of science and technology. These forces radiate to change rapidly the occupational roles of men's lives as well as their private lives, patterns of consumption and recreation. Such changes necessitate an abandonment of traditional orientation patterns.

b) Another source of structural change is that of 'contractural relationships.' Parsons summarizes this aspect as follows:

Contracturalism overlaps widely with the use of money and the wide extension of market relationships.56

Parsons isolates the segregation of occupational roles from kinship and local ties, particularly in large-scale social organization as a crucial process in this contractualism.

The third factor, the psychological and ideological implications of these processes of change, is the final one in Parsons' analysis. One form of ideological change is manifested in 'movements of the left.' Parsons characterizes this as part of the intellectual movement which debunked ignorance and superstition on the one hand as well as the tyranny of monopoly capitalism on the other.57 In other words, the range of the psychological reaction has tended to be both an attack on the traditional order and a "naive rationalistic topianism." Another psychological reaction is the "fundamentalist" type where aggression has turned toward the symbols of 'rationalization' which are seen to be subversive of traditional values. In other words fascism is partly an outgrowth of this fundamentalist reaction, but one which finds a great bolster
in nationalism. In Parsons' words nationalism is the "lowest common 
denominator of traditionalistic sentiments."58

Parsons suggests, in conclusion, that vested interest groups 
feeling insecure by the increasing attacks on privileged positions, 
by which he means rigid stratification, from organized labour reacted by 
supporting an older traditional society. He suggests that fascism did 
not arise in the United States because it would have to combat the power 
of the symbols of liberty, democracy and the rights of the individual 
which stem from the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century.

Parsons' analysis is general to such an extent that it is true 
of almost all modern societies. For example his explanation of why 
fascism did not emerge in the United States does not withstand rigorous 
scrutiny. For it is just as true to suggest that the slogans of the 
Enlightenment of the eighteenth century were to some extent institu-
tionalized in the socio-political structure of France. In terms of 
ideology the very nationalism which provided the basis for the support 
of fascism do not in many cases antedate the general spread of Enlighten-
ment. So that in this respect the United States, at least in theory, 
has no special attribute.

But Parsons' analysis is weak on another important ground, that 
is his assertion that fascism is an ideology which does not antedate 
1914. More rigorous studies have shown that on parts of the European 
continent such as Germany and France fascist ideological elements are 
present since the 1870s. J. L. Carsten in a recent work, for all its 
other shortcomings dispels through rigorous historical research the
notion that fascism was the raison d'être of the threatened lower middle classes and suggests that most of the founders of fascist and pre-fascist movements were respectable academics and professionals but that the structural conditions for fascism were the increasing concentration of capitalism and the social changes after 1918 were a catalyst. He states in one chapter dealing with the pre-1914 situation:

The extreme right wing movements from the later nineteenth century onwards affected all major countries on the European continent. These groups and parties had much in common. They were not only nationalist and expansionist, but at the same time anti-liberal, anti-parliamentarian, anti-democratic and anti-freemason, as well as outside Italy—anti-Semitic.59

The same author goes on to show that in almost every case examined fascism was initiated and supported in the large urban areas and by groups which had economically and status wise the most to gain from rationalization and industrialization. Parsons however does not want to indict growing capitalism, for this would raise questions about the "moral institutionalization of norms" of U. S. society, a society which Parsons repeats time and again is democratic in a unique manner. Moreover another factor which is dominant in fascism, racialism and which has serious implications for the nature of the social structure would have to be re-examined by Parsons. There is a further lack of specificity which weakens Parsons analysis. The stress on the mass nature of fascist movements and the role of residual traditional groups tend to ignore two vital features of fascist 'seizure of power' in Italy and Germany. The first is that in all cases the majority of the followers of the movement were manipulated into support of skillful leaders and therefore the real battles for
power took place not in the streets but in ministries and government buildings. In this sense fascist movements were much less romantic from the vantage point of the leadership and more so challenges for state power. The second is that in many cases the old ruling class, as for example in Germany, and in England were under attack from fascist parties. The explanation of anomie which Parsons views as stemming from threatened vested interests is therefore tenuous. Again Carsten states:

Once in power, they (the fascist leaderships) naturally had to use many of the old experts, civil servants and generals, but these were no longer in command. They received their 'marching orders' from the new leaders who often came from entirely different social groups, far below the level of the old ruling-class.60

It is clear from the accounts of both Parsons and Carstens that fascism found substantial support among all classes in Europe and therefore the explanation of threatened vested interests may be applicable in particular historical situations, but such explanation is not general enough for understanding fascism as sociological phenomena in its wider sense. Although Fromm too gives some credence to these threatened vested interests, his own explanations tends to probe to a level of problems which underlie specific class interests, and therefore is a basis for a more fruitful line of inquiry.

Parsons' analysis of the social structure of pre-Nazi Germany is an attempt at a more general perspective on fascism with his explanation of specific forces peculiar to Germany which he identifies as underlying institutional forces which came into association with the more general tendencies in Europe previously articulated.
Here again his thesis is an attempt to explain Nazism as the product of residual pre-modern capitalistic tendencies which survived. Briefly Parsons identifies the Junker military elements with its traditions of Prussian aristocratic values and the middle-class bureaucracy and the solidarity of both with royalty. Combined with these forces were two other distinct forces, the strength of Lutheran ideology and sense of the ultimate legitimation of authority generated by the two groups which limited and undermined the workings of the more universalistic parliamentary forces in the Weimar Republic. Parsons' explanation then, focusses on the structure of the German state and the prominence in this state of the feudal-militaristic elements. He suggests that the deposition of the monarchy after 1918 went far toward diminishing these elements, but not far enough.\(^1\)

At the same time that the above forces came into conflict with the democratizing processes after 1918, the removal of royalty from power and the structure of parliamentary change, "deep-seated romantic tendencies such as the heroic idealization of men and the formality of traditional status hierarchies." These things contradicted the tendencies toward working class dominance and socialism. Parsons suggests that: "'Leftist radicalism' appealed to organized industrial labour and to some intellectuals, but it had too narrow a base in the social structure to be stable."\(^2\) But what does Parsons mean by this? Earlier in the essay Parsons suggests that the romantic elements were also in conflict with the bourgeois attitudes and values, precisely secular values of achievement which were opposed by Lutheran protestantism. But Parsons discusses
these elements as though they emerged from below, whereas in effect
they were propaganda elements disseminated downwards from the leadership
of the National Socialist Party in order to widen its base of support. Whereas it would generally be correct to suggest that Weimar political
institutions were worn down and demoralized from both Communists and
fascists alike between 1918 and 1933, it is a very different matter to
suggest that the rank and file of the Nazi movement could articulate
pre-industrial romanticism to support the Nazi attacks rather than the
Communists. Parsons' explanation then may help to explain the elements
which went into a constituting of Nazi ideology but this is a very dif-
ferent matter from suggestions that the mass membership constructed that
ideology. Moreover it is the success and power of the Nazi movement
that was its greatest attraction rather than its polemic stance as Parsons
suggests. Parsons fails in his analysis to show that it was Nazi mobili-
ization of science, technology and complex organizational patterns from
its early history, under the guise of a romantic ideology, which gave
Nazism its peculiar significance. We see Parsons repeating in many
ways the weaknesses of his study of Nazism, in his study of McCarthyism.
In both cases there is a singular failure to express explicitly the
process in power relations leading to increasing legitimacy. So that
there is an implicit notion in Parsons that the legitimacy adopted by
the Nazis came from the truth of the social strains which grounded the
movement.
Conclusions

In conclusion, both Parsons and Fromm are concerned with the psychological complexes which partly derive from the contradictions of change in complex modern societies, but by locating Power as a generalized medium, Parsons weakens his perspective. To what extent are both Nazism and McCarthyism not causes but in fact symptoms, whose removal tell us little about the removal of the causes. Parsons tacitly admits this possibility, but does not tackle the problem beyond discussion in terms of structural tendencies and fundamentalist romanticism. This is the vital question for a sociology of modern society, and it is one which an incorporation of Fromm's work into the mainstream may help to penetrate more fruitfully. In addition to this advantage it could throw light on a position held by a number of contemporary sociologists, including Lipset and Kornhauser and centralized political power is non-specific in class terms. The adoption of this position is a theoretical strategy adopted by Parsons and others in an attempt to develop explanations of political relations which would incorporate explanations about the connection between personality and specific structural conditions, but apart from the concept of working class authoritarianism, this strategy has had only limited success.
FOOTNOTES

1 Examples of the three forms of criticism in relation to Parsons' thought are as follows: a) In terms of the formal criteria of science see M. J. Mulkay "An Assessment of Parsons' Scheme" in Functionalism, Exchange And Theoretical Strategy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), pp. 66-93.

b) One of the best known criticisms of the second type is Max Black's The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons: A Critical Examination, edited Max Black (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1961).

c) An example of criticism of the third type will be found in two recent works are Robert Friedrichs A Sociology Of Sociology, op. cit., esp. pp. 25-30; and Alvin Gouldner The Coming Crisis Of Western Sociology, op. cit., esp. chapter 7, "The Moralistics of Talcott Parsons: Religion, Piety and the Quest for Order in Functionalism," pp. 246-282.

2 See Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, op. cit., p. 139.

3 Ibid., p. 139.

4 Ibid., p. 188.

5 Ibid., p. 169.


7 Ibid., p. 5.

8 The criticisms of L. von Bertalanffy and W. Buckley will be taken together at a later stage in the discussion; but only as they relate to the problem of power and morality.


Perhaps, with due caution, it is permissible to introduce an analogy between the process of theory-building in a developing scientific field and the process of development of a legal system. There is a sense in which more general theory is to a field of science what the more general legal principles are to a legal system. . . . Here the function of the theorist in science may be likened to that of the appellate judge whose primary function for the system is not the disposal of cases, but rather the interpretation of rules at the higher levels of generality, their codification in relation to general principles, testing for consistency and the like. (p. 321)

The above statement is Parsons' way of asserting the following.

a) The general theory of action is about the actor qua actor and groups of actors (both actor and action are abstracted concepts) and the regularities and inconsistencies which they exhibit over a period of time. The crucial problem for the social sciences is to develop the principles of action into a theoretical structure or structures.

b) Such a task involves two levels of problems, one which I term here operational, the other the elucidation and codification of substantive axiomatic principles which would render the system a logico-deductive system, facilitating the selection of empirical problems for research and providing hypotheses for investigation of these problems. Such systematically derived hypotheses and the resulting prepositions would contribute to the validation and revision of theory. But the approach "is not yet a logico-deductive system." The first, or operational level of problems has been a major focus of Parsons' task (just as much as the second has been--in fact they are as projects interwoven but distinct). This involves a disciplinary integration of elements of general theory of sociology with social anthropology, psychology of personality, economic theory and political theory. At the system level this involves the adumbration of sub-systems of action. This includes the cultural system, the personality system and the behavioral organism, and so on.

c) Parsons contribution has been of two orders, first an abstract theoretical and conceptual structure which is "more than an eclectic collection of unrelated theoretical ideas," at the macroscopic level. Parsons' assertion here seems to be that his theoretical contributions cannot be intelligently examined by critics in terms of logico-deductive criteria (pp. 316-317). Parsons implicitly recognizes only time, and "... the outcome of the process of natural selection through professional criticism by which scientific reputations ultimately come to be sabitized" (p. 321), as the deciding factor on the question of the merit of his ideas [Italics mine]. What "natural selection" means in terms of the establishment of a distinct set of principles for the evaluation of the Parsonian scheme, remains an open field among 'Parsonian' and other commentators.

The second order of contributions is Parsons' writings at the level of summary and interpretive essays, his empirical work. He implies that he has selected problem areas deriving from the more general scheme of the conceptual interrelation of institutions and self-interest.


In brief some of the criticisms are: a) Structural-functionalism is an attempt to avoid causation, by substituting such concepts as function, dysfunction, system equilibrium, etc.
b) Structural-functionalism commonly confuses function and cause partly as a consequence of the foregoing substitution.
c) Structural-functionalism hinges on the false assumption of system integration.
d) Functionalists speak as though the goal of a dynamically moving system were inherent in the system itself. In reality these are the values of the functionalist, wrongly imputed to the system. Patterns of behaviour are then viewed as functional or dysfunctional according to whether they contribute to the achievement of this goal.
3) Due to these weaknesses structural-functionalism cannot provide an all-embracing model.


Two critiques of Parsons' thought selected at random to illustrate my case are: 1) Walter Buckley, op. cit., esp. pp. 23-24, where Buckley makes the following observations, first that some of the Parsonian critiques are the "crudest of caricatures" because Parsons' framework is not a "close knit postulation system of well defined concepts" and because statements can be found in Parsons' work as a whole which seemingly refute almost any criticisms made against it; 2) M. J. Mulkay, op. cit., who notes Parsons' shift at the level of categorical conceptual formulation, from action to structural functionalism to exchange (ref. p. 89) [Mulkay defines categorical systems, as a level of constructive formulations which involve "sets of classifications" which reflect more accurately and more consistently the relations existing in the "real world." Categorical systems differ from ad hoc systems in being internally more consistent and in being related to their subject matter in a more specific and detailed manner." (Ref. p. 36)].

Where Buckley's focus of attack is on Parsons' problem selection of "order" and the lack of specificity in Parsons conceptual definition of "order" (p. 24); Mulkay's focus is on the strategical inconsistencies in their implications for empirical reference, in terms of Parsons' conception of for example stratification (pp. 91-93). In the case of both Buckley and Mulkay, quite apart from the confusion they generate by the profusion of definitions, they focus on the symptoms of Parsons' weaknesses as a theorist.


It is worth noting that Mulkay recognizes that Parsons' statement on the social system and its elements is not a theory in the precise sense defined by Parsons and is not intended to be a theory by Parsons, but rather a conceptual scheme with differentiated levels of categories. See for example Mulkay, op. cit., p. 65, p. 67. On page 120 of his book Mulkay accuses George Homans of misunderstanding Parsons conceptual scheme for a theory. Whatever Parsons' avowed statements--and they vary considerably--it is clear that Parsons regards as his specific contribution to sociology, identification of the sub-systems of society as a specific social system, and the economy as a definable sub-system (hence the concentration on Marshall in The Structure of Social Action) and the interpretation of modern industrial society. Parsons wanted each theory, of an aspect of the system, as an analytical scheme to be part of a "more generalized theoretical organon." On the level of conceptual articulation Parsons wants to conceive the economy as a sub-system parallel to the polity as a sub-system, just as at the level of his 'theoretical organon'--the general theory of action--he wants to conceptualize power and norms as generalized medium of exchanges.


*Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 94. This shift in analysis is also the point of departure for Parsons' comparison of Hobbes and Marx and a criticism of the latter's conception of power. Ref. pp. 107-110 and Vol. 2, pp. 488-495. The 'normative' and the factual refer, roughly, to what 'ought to be', and as a 'scientific theory of human action as it was', respectively.


Andrew Hacker suggests the personal ideological preference, that is the traditional 'liberal' commitment of Parsons contains a mixture of ideas resembling those of Edmund Burke and John Locke. It is reflected in the centrality of 'equilibrium' on the one hand and the 'assumption of public responsibilities for the general welfare', on the other. Hacker provides one of the best critiques of some of the difficulties of Parsons' substantive conclusions deriving from his interpretive essays. Gibson Winter suggests that ultimately the contrasting theories of power and social change, highlighted in the debate between Parsons and C. W. Mills are "inseparable from the conceptions of man implicit in the contrasting models of social process." (p. 39). Winter does not go on to suggest explicitly what the nature of these contrasting conceptions of man are, and this is a weakness of his work. He does state however in terms of the problem of power 'interest theorists' such as C. W. Mills are conceived with 'who has power.' They are interested in what changes in power relationships are doing 'for man' and 'to man', while Parsons
and the functionalists are concerned with 'what' changes in technology, etc. come from power increases in the total system (pp. 194-195).

32 The others were: 1) membership in a kinship unit, 2) personal qualities, 3) achievements, 4) possessions and 5) authority. Ref. T. Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification" (1940), in Essays in Sociological Theory, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

33 Ibid., p. 70.

34 See Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, op. cit., p. 246 and pp. 417-418. This aspect of the gradual evolution of Parsons' position tends to be ignored by Gouldner.


36 Parsons defines goal-attainment as the "satisfactory" relation between a collectivity and other collectivities, some of which may be parts of other societies. Cf. T. Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," op. cit., p. 233.

37 Ibid., p. 233.

38 Ibid., p. 233. This summary of the 'operative contexts' of the polity is a re-phrasing of Parsons' language, but retains the meaning.

39 Ibid., p. 236.

40 Ibid., p. 237. Parsons suggests that exchange gives the 'recipient' four degrees of freedom in his participation in the total exchange system:
1) He is free to spend his money/power for any item or combination of items, on the market which he can afford.
2) He is free to shop around among alternative sources of supply for desired items.
3) He can choose his own time to purchase.
4) He is free to consider terms which, because of freedom of time and source he can accept or reject.
To corroborate his argument that force is an increasingly specific means along a continuum (within which two extreme types of strategies apply) constituted of four strategies in two dichotomous categories (the positive and negative). The former strategies are those determined by the situation 1) positive: inducement; 2) negative: coercion; 3) intentional:
persuasion; 4) negative activation of commitments. (Ibid., p. 238).
Force is then a negative sanction.

41 Ibid., p. 240
42 Ibid., p. 242.
43 Ibid., p. 243. For another specific statement on authority and compliance, see p. 250, where Parsons notes that the justification for invoking compliance by superordinate agents rests on an "institutionalized code within which the 'language of power' is meaningful and, therefore its use will be accepted in the requisite community, which is in the first instance the community of collective organization in our sense."

44 Ibid., p. 249.

46 Parsons defines three types of institutionalized action orientation in complex social systems as being a) the instrumental in which the goal is given, i.e. is unquestioned, where evaluative selection gives primacy to cognitive considerations. b) the expressive orientation, where the orientation is not to the attainment of a goal, but the organization of the "flow of gratifications." Gratification interests have primacy. c) the moral aspects of ordering, here evaluative interests have primacy. The cultural values which have primacy are moral values. The focus is on the integrative problems. The actor with this interest is "responsible" for the impingement of his action on others and for collectively defined interests. See T. Parsons, The Social System, op. cit., pp. 48-51.

47 Ibid., p. 97.
49 Ibid., pp. 290-297.

50 T. Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements," in Essays in Sociological Theory, op. cit., pp. 128-129. The second essay which forms part of this discussion is "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany." Both are published in the above volume and reprinted in Politics and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1969). Because these essays remain unrevised it is assumed by this writer that Parsons still adheres to the conclusions arrived at in 1942, when they were first written.

52 See T. Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany," *op. cit.*, pp. 105-106.

53 Parsons relying heavily on the Durkheimian theory of social structure, which relies heavily on the normative integration of society notion, defines anomie as being "the state where large numbers of individuals are to a serious degree lacking in the kind of integration with stable institutional patterns which is essential to their own personal stability and to the smooth functioning of the social system" (ref. T. Parsons, "Sociological Aspects of Fascist Movements," *op. cit.*, p. 125.

54 Ibid., p. 140.

55 For an outline of the historical factors discussed see ibid., pp. 127-128. Parsons argues that from these historical forces alone, the incidence of large-scale anomie in Western society can hardly be said to be in doubt, but this fact demonstrates only the susceptibility to fascist movements. Thus the historical factors alone does not constitute a sociological explanation.

56 Ibid., p. 130.

57 Ibid., pp. 132-134.

58 Ibid., p. 138.


60 Ibid., p. 236.


62 Ibid., p. 122.

63 Andrew Hacker, in "Ideology and Sociology," *op. cit.*, makes a similar point. See Hacker, p. 293.

CHAPTER V

FROMM'S "THEOLOGICAL AND RELIGIOUS WRITINGS" AS THE SOURCE OF HIS ANTHROPOLOGICAL PREMISS

It does not follow that goodness, justice, wisdom are chimeras because the existence of god is a chimera, nor truths because this is a truth. The idea of God is dependent on the idea of justice, of benevolence; a God who is not benevolent, not just, not wise, is no God; but the converse does not hold.1

Erich Fromm has not abandoned his project, identification of the psychological complexes and the ways in which these are now causes, now consequences of the historical dilemma of the "freedom from-freedom to" question, which is the legacy of modern man. The project was not abandoned with the publication of Escape From Freedom and Man For Himself. For Fromm any analysis of power whether theoretical conceptualization or empirical investigation is at the sociological level, an equation which demonstrates the urgency of the dilemma of modern society by leading back to the paradox of "freedom from-freedom to." From a Frommian perspective then, Parsons' work on power and morality is a failure, because it is not an equation that is traced back to the nature of the historical paradox. For his part Fromm does not adopt a sociological analysis of the diachrony of historical stages, rather it is a search for common features, psychological and societal-institutional which nourish power-seekers and thwart human creativity.
Perhaps the most fruitful distinction that can be made, in an effort to understand the significance to Fromm of knowledge about the subjective feelings of those who obey and thus the nature of good and evil as a persistent theme, is the distinction between concentrations of authority and concentrations of power. When we come to examine Fromm's concepts of God and its anthropological implications such a distinction would be instructive. In this context authority is a value, that is a right to make decisions, allocate roles and a right to expect compliance or obedience among other things. Power however is an instrumental value of which force and coercion are aspects. Fromm's concern with the essential nature of the rights of authority and power leads him to an examination of the theological and the religious. No review then, of Fromm concepts of good and evil and the essence of man, is complete without an analysis of Fromm's theological and religious writings.

A simple articulation of Fromm's thought frequently leads to the conclusion that his religious writings strategically serve to render more forceful Fromm's imperative claims, that is claims about what ought to be. This view is an over-simplification. Despite this observation, there are in fact, many polemical responses to Fromm's writings on religion, a level of response with few parallels in other areas of Fromm's writings. There are a host of grounds on which these critiques are based. The first and most basic reason is a general questioning, by mild supporters and critics alike, of the scientific status, of the ramified assertions which reveal an interconnection in his work between ethics, a humanistic social science concept and hard empirical data.
His critics aim to question any presumed interconnection between the first two (ethics and a humanist social science concept) through questioning the validity of his theological and religious writings. For example, John Schaar, Fromm's most systematic critic, reveals his concern in the following statement:

If Freud was the Moses who showed the people the way out of the Egypt of their passions, Fromm aspires to be the Jousha who would lead them into the promised land of the sane society.³

**Format**

The discussion of Fromm's "theology as anthropology" in this chapter is proposed in three sections. In the first section which is divided into three subsections the following themes are discussed.

a) An analytical definition of theology as anthropology.
b) This anthropology is shown as constituted of two distinct traditions. The first, the philosophical anthropology which has a continuity in the psychoanalytic anthropology of Rank, Jung and Fromm will be briefly sketched in the formulations of Hegel, Feuerbach and Freud, partly synthesized in the modern humanist tradition.⁴ This tradition is of course one of Fromm's primary sources. The second aspect of the tradition is seen in the evolutionist focus of nineteenth century anthropology. In this tradition the search is for naturalistic laws of society which could trace some presumed parallelisms between the evolution of religious beliefs from primitive to civilized society in relation to the material development of these societies. Here too the analysis will be brief.
Section two of the chapter is also sub-divided into two parts. In the first part I will examine the ideational content of Fromm theological analyses, focussing mainly on the changing conceptions of God, man and history as examined in *You Shall Be As Gods* (1969). In the second part I shall argue that in Fromm's analysis of "Jesus" there is a blending of the philosophical and evolutionist tradition in anthropology. I shall also review Fromm's analysis of the institutionalization of modern Western European Christianity from the Roman Empire. The source for this analysis will be the "Dogma of Christ," first published in 1930. In section three I shall discuss Fromm's misplaced critics suggesting that Fromm is not concerned to prove the existence or non-existence of God as such, but that he uses theological sources as anthropological data.

**The Meaning of the Theological as Anthropology**

The movement which has been loosely termed "theology as anthropology" is itself part of the wider movements of nineteenth century philosophy and the social sciences, and many of the philosophical issues which found expression in the overthrow of the theistic system can only be adequately interpreted within the "language of the Enlightenment." Though this is not to be interpreted as meaning that the overthrow of theism is an Enlightenment phenomena. The concern with an inclusive characterization of theology as anthropology however is important for clarification of how Biblical texts and the concept of God came to be interpreted in a more secular and scientific light. Viewed in this
light, the Lutheran Reformation and Protestantism is not the end of a process, but mid-point, culminating in the logical overthrow of that very Protestantism. There had from the early stages been criticism of Biblical texts but the start of theology as anthropology came with Hegel's philosophical challenge of Christianity. For it was with Hegel that the claim, that the essential truth of the spirit or of the existence of God can only be revealed to man was decisively refuted. Up to the time of Hegel, Christian doctrine had held that it was through revelation and not through experience that man becomes aware of the truth of Christianity, but this was not the point at which the debate originated. The discussion of theology as anthropology refers to those thinkers who, using Biblical texts criticize the statements of the text on historical grounds, suggesting that the truths of the Bible are not literal so much as they are symbolic of the anthropological truths about the relations of man and man and man and nature. The ontology of these relations may be differently expressed by different writers but they tend to have in common the view that all phenomena have a material basis and that minds as separate from body, or God as separate from the world of nature are non-existent. Any discussion of theology as anthropology however implies a distinction between theology, religious feeling and expression and the institutionalization of religious ritual and practice. Theology as anthropology is not so much concerned with the ontological nature of a given practice or religious belief, rather its explicit concern is for a level of meaning, of these phenomena as outlined in Biblical texts, other than the stated theistic meanings
themselves. It makes implicit inference to the existence of God and
the super-mundane sphere but does not begin from philosophical specu-
lations about the existence or reality of God as such. Theology as
anthropology is characterized as historical criticism of the Bible with
the method of scientific thought. It emerged under the impetus of the
Darwinian theory of evolution without being part of the intellectual
tradition which views science and religion as being in open hostility.
It is a rejection of traditional interpretations of the doctrines of the
Christian churches without an attack on the reality of religious beliefs
as such. Theology as anthropology does not, in its early forms attempt
to undermine religious faith in the essential truth of Christianity.

The forces which generated demands for a new conception of the
nature of the bible and rejection of the prevailing view that it con-
tained timeless, universal and final teachings, had ramifications far
beyond the scholarly reinterpretations of nineteenth century theologians
such as Schleiermacher who insisted on separating theology from religion
and others such as Carlyle, Matthew Arnold, Huxley and Clifford. This
is due to the nature of these forces. These forces can be briefly
adumbrated as being, the progress and sophistication of scientific
methodology of which Freudian psychology, cultural anthropology and
Marxian social analysis are descendants. These are metaphysical idealism,
positivism, and the doctrine of materialism. There is also the philo-
sophical debates generated by the philosophical systems of Kant and
Hegel which partially fed the sophistication of scientific methodology.
The third force is humanism which is more ambiguous and is partly a
derivative of the former two forces.
Not only did the foregoing forces remove the old distinction between sacred and profane writings, it also stimulated a "higher criticism" toward a reinterpretation of the view of history traditionally established in the Old Testament. The latter ceased to be regarded as a uniform set of writings, and more as discordant sources, reflecting the aspirations of people at temporally different periods, and monothemism increasingly came to be seen by scholars as an evolving system. Most of the early criticism of Old Testament texts propounded the view that such texts were more products of a religious culture, than they were products of divine inspiration. These early critics--of whom there was a strong tradition in nineteenth century Germany, which must have influenced the work of the psychoanalysts--aimed to understand the nature and history of that culture. Hegel's philosophy of history and Darwin's concept of evolution, provided the methodological basis for Old Testament research. In this type of research, the problem of the ultimate meaning of the Scriptures was approached through patient examination of the internal evidence of the Old Testament. Such criticism suggested the possibility of reconstructing the religious history of Israel. This documentary scholarship is distinct from the more orthodox anthropological research into religion, of Adolf Bastian, Edward Tylor, Robertson Smith and James Frazer, to the extent that while the latter's aim was elucidation of a general scheme of cultural development of all mankind; the former research concentrated on reinterpretation of the minute details of the historical chronology contained in the Bible. Some of these findings had implications for an anthropological
theory of the evolution of religious belief, but the research itself did not inquire into the phenomenon of God.

Theology as Anthropology: Two Aspects of the Tradition

The critical approaches to the doctrines of the Old Testament earlier outlined partly stimulated and was partly "fed" by two further, distinct traditions within this area as a whole, the philosophical anthropology and the cultural anthropology. Both traditions as well as Old Testament research constitute the antecedents of Erich Fromm's work, and are here presented in order to sketch the background against which Fromm's work is best understood; but by itself the Old Testament research could not constitute itself as an anthropology, not because the concept of evolutionary change did not exist within the Bible—especially in the Old Testament—but because first the idea of evolution toward monotheism as an ultimate form and secondly the very concept, the metaphysic of God would have to be challenged from elsewhere. Old Testament research therefore could increase anthropological knowledge, but not anthropological understanding.

The significance of the notion of understanding, takes us to the heart of the problem, the meaning of anthropology, and the place of philosophical anthropology, in it. Within the context of a general definition of anthropology as being the "sum total of knowledge about man," as the science of human nature, "as it appears in society and history," but one dedicated to the characterization of the "moral purpose of human freedom;" philosophical anthropology is a "sub-discipline"
concerned with the elucidation of the essence of man, it is the fundamental philosophical science. But as Martin Buber suggests however, philosophical systems, by recognizing "stages in life," types and characters in human life, "and from the constantly new proof of the one in the many, can . . . come to see the wholeness of man." Although Ernest Becker does not allocate specific portions of his critique to philosophical anthropology as a unique aspect of orthodox anthropology he recognizes the vital nature of the questions originally posed by Kant, and suggests that the increasing exclusion of these questions from later anthropology led to entropy. These questions have to do with the real participation of the anthropologist in the process of knowing man, and that anthropology implies that the observing subject comes to know the ethical and moral norms which can guide his action. The peculiarity of the approach after the Enlightenment to this wide ranging prospectus, which began with the Greeks, was the distinctive secular outlook with which the question was posed. But as Becker suggests the task of moral and ethical elucidation has as its aim personal freedom and social community and this demanded a fundamental ontology, one that implies a theory of alienation as a synthesizing point for the host of problems implicit in the task of personal freedom and social community. From the philosophical anthropological standpoint neither the metaphysic of God as superordinate phenomena or the a priori detachment of the investigator were adequate. Man is a whole being and the investigator's experience of his humanity are crucial perspectives. The philosophical and ontological debate about the existence of God after Kant is central to
anthropology because nothing less than the realization of the early aims of anthropology defined by Kant depends on this problem.

The role of Ludwig Feuerbach in this debate is central. Feuerbach's work is a product of post-Kantian and post-Hegelian philosophy. He has been described as the philosophical anthropologist par excellence not only for his demolition of the concept of God and his critique of Hegel but for his exclusion of theology from religion.

The concrete, individual and sensuous man is the subject of Feuerbach's philosophical anthropology, this implies rejection of the reduction of man to exclusive reason. This also means that Feuerbach formulated his view of reality in terms of the dualism of subject and object, and rejected any attempted resolution of it in a monistic system based on pure thought. For him pure thought is only taken into the real world through the senses, such as imagination, but since thought as objects of the imagination are dependent, they are private and subjective, in contrast to things of the objective world of reality.

But in the same way that Feuerbach used his notion of the senses to criticize all universals—including Hegel's Absolute Mind—he used it to criticize religion. This critique has two aspects, in the first Feuerbach suggests that religion is an obstacle to man's material improvement by directing man's attention to a transcendental Heaven for the fulfillment of happiness. Thus he suggests that a precondition for emancipation of the underprivileged is the rejection of God. His second line of attack is on the speculative-ontologic level. First he argues that there is no direct experience of a supernatural God. Secondly
Feuerbach asserts that the qualities attributed to God are really human qualities and aspirations projected outside of man, and it is possible to reject the concept of God without rejecting the qualities. The power of Feuerbach's critique was in his 'explanation' of the psychology of projection and objectification.

Through his analysis of the processes of projection and objectification then, Feuerbach provided an important philosophical foundation for the ontologic basis of modern anthropology. We can thus view Darwin as providing the scientific basis and Marx, the historiographic one. The three together would constitute the, more or less, complete methodological foundation of modern anthropology. The significance of Feuerbach's assertion that there is no experience indicating the existence of God, implied acceptance of, or consideration of another proposition, namely that religious phenomena and "theistic language," cannot be taken at face value; that is to say, that they must be interpreted as referring to man. However, if we accept this latter proposition—which became the ontologic basis for an anthropological analysis, of theistic phenomena, with a long tradition of which Fromm is a part—it does not imply an acceptance (with the proposition), with the proposition that there is no human experience indicating the existence of God. And so, what Feuerbach had hoped for, a complete philosophic-materialist anthropology, find dissenters among a later group of philosophic anthropologists, whose tradition is a polemic against Feuerbach. From a critical Marxian perspective then the term philosophic anthropology is an apt description not because of the point from which Feuerbach began his
critique of theology and of Hegel but because of abstractness of that anthropology, that Feuerbach deals with man in his abstract species nature. From a Marxian perspective the ontology which Feuerbach proposes is incomplete, man's concreteness is material and yet abstract. A peripheral concern in an analysis of Fromm's anthropology will be to examine his work in this light, to view the extent to which he does stand, in his empirical examination of Old Testament doctrine, on the shoulders of Karl Marx.

Feuerbach turns to a psychology of projection and objectification in order to explain the workings of the imagination of sensuous man as the ultimate source of the genesis of the belief in the supernatural concept of God and the "metaphysical correlate of faith."\(^\text{13}\) The hub of Feuerbach's project then rests on his explanation of God as the end product of human imagination which is in turn contingent on sense perception, an attribute of concrete man. But imagination as a creative role which for Feuerbach, has no limits. Mainly due to man's finitude and his inability to satisfy all his material wants, creativity is directed to the realm of the fanciful. In early life the illusion of God fulfilled man's need of realizing his full potentialities. "God is the portrait that man paints of himself as fully realized."\(^\text{14}\)

Feuerbach in explaining how man can realize his full potentialities by re-translating divine attributes into human attributes came upon another difficulty however, for the concept of God is characterized by material and non-material attributes. Material attributes of God could be assigned to concrete individual man but the non-material
ones such as infinitude, omniscience and omnipotence are not. These Feuerbach attributes to the human species as a whole. For his critique to be consistent therefore Feuerbach would have to say that the species as a whole can realize the non-material attributes. This apparent duality in Feuerbach is the strength and weakness of his philosophical anthropology, the point of attack for Engels and Marx as well as for supporters of theism. This dualistic weltanschauung in Feuerbach is attacked by Engels and Marx as being a philosophical anthropology which Feuerbach fails to transform into a historical-materialist anthropology. We will examine this critique in order to demonstrate the paradoxical continuity and discontinuity between philosophical anthropology and historical-materialist anthropology, thereby placing the Fromm's exposition of theology into its intellectual context.

Feuerbach's dualism of sensuous, concrete man as passive agent of Nature and generic abstract man, is complemented by a double explanation of alienation. For Feuerbach, alienation is firstly a condition "caused by the fact that man, whose true nature is divine, falls short of the divine in his actual existence." To the extent that man has not realized his divine or human qualities, he is alienated from his true self. But, secondly, alienation also comes from man's projection of part of his being into an imaginary being, God. Alienation therefore is caused by man's fantasy of a God. Thus for Feuerbach, the primary solution to alienation is removal from human language and thought all traces of transcendence and the supernatural and the placing of man in complete space and time dimensions. The resolution of man's problem is to change
human consciousness. Feuerbach therefore rejects the Hegelian monism and the resolution of alienation as the unity of thought and being. But while Marx and Engels concur in Feuerbach's critique of Hegel, they reject Feuerbach's solution of alienation, and his "causal explanation of it."

The notions of theology and anthropology as characterized and articulated by Ludwig Feuerbach is of more than just intellectual significance. The Feuerbachian definitions of them portray them to be two all comprehending and inclusive weltanschauungen that are fundamentally juxtaposed. This juxtaposition signifies Feuerbach's critique of Hegel's speculative philosophy. The anthropological weltanschauung "takes matter as a real and independent being and therefore bases itself on sensation as the primary means of the authentic cognition of reality."16 This anthropological view bases thought on sensation. The anthropological view therefore opposes the notion of pure or abstract thought. The theological weltanschauung, in contrast, views absolute mind determines reality, it is the means to grasp reality. Feuerbach's contribution to this characterization was to demonstrate through his critique of Hegel that absolute mind or pure thought is the essence of the God of theology. Feuerbach asserts that Hegelian philosophy is thus the highest expression of speculative theology, in the following statement:

But in Hegel the essence of God is actually nothing other than the essence of thought, or thought abstracted from ego, that is from the one who thinks. Hegelian philosophy made thought--namely the subjective being conceived, however, without subject, that is conceived as a being distinct from the subject--into a divine and absolute being. The secret of 'absolute' philosophy is thus the secret of theology.17
Feuerbach saw his own philosophy as the "new philosophy," as the dissolution of the "old philosophy," the former makes man, the "unique, universal and highest object of philosophy." According to Feuerbach, it thus makes anthropology, with the inclusion of physiology, "the universal science." There is however, an added aspect to Feuerbach's anthropology, and one that becomes the focus of later theological anthropologists, though to some extent in contradiction with Feuerbach's physiological man, and that is that the true dialectic and the highest principle of philosophy was also asserted as the "dialogue between I and thou," as the "unity of man and man."¹⁸

The ambiguity of Feuerbach's position, his assertion of the concrete physiology as the locus of the senses, on the one hand, and generic man on the other hand, led to the observation that Feuerbach reduced theology to anthropology and at the same time elevates his anthropology into a theology. Marx and Engels' most striking criticism of Feuerbach is that he displaces God from religion but maintains the divine. A similar observation is made by John Schaar about Fromm's formulations. Schaar suggests that Fromm too displaces the rigid supernatural monotheism but retains the mystical element of God and religion, that is to say Fromm anthropologizes the concept of God.¹⁹ Manfred Vogel in his introduction to Feuerbach's Principles Of The Philosophy Of The Future, suggests that Feuerbach's critique though valid in its assessment of Hegel stopped short of a full concretization of man, since such a position implies an analysis of the "social conditions which gave rise to the God of religion in the first place."²⁰ Moreover Vogel
adds that Feuerbach's demand for a concrete man stopped midway; Vogel states:

... Feuerbach again did not go all the way. He stopped midway with what is still the bourgeois conception of man, namely the private individual. This is for Marx, still an abstraction from the fully concretized man. The truly concretized man must be placed in a social context. His essence must not be severed from his social matrix or, for that matter, from his political powers. 21

The implications of the social matrix and the historical context in which Marx and Engels place man make them diametrically opposed to Feuerbach. This is so partly because the latter relies on the notion of the centrality of sense perception but because Feuerbach held that the truth and reality of the being are in nature, and independent of human activity. For Feuerbach the human subject, in nature, is a passive ego, whereas for Marx man is an active agent. 22

The weaknesses of Feuerbach's substantive formulations and particularly the Engels-Marx critique of those weaknesses has been too well documented to justify reiteration here. What is far more significant apart from the intellectual connection between Feuerbach and Fromm is the incipient and undeveloped modern humanism in Feuerbach. He criticizes a supernaturalistic conception and poses as the elemental nature of man the relation between I and thou as a substitute, for the relation between God and man, as the fundamental problem. Where I and thou is the basic anthropological formulation of the question, what is man, however, we are led to the paradoxical conclusion that in one very important sense, Feuerbach posed the anthropological question for theism without providing an answer to that question. 23
Erich Fromm's Anthropology and the Socialist Humanist Tradition

As has been shown in the foregoing section Feuerbach's work, his philosophical anthropology is a form of humanism. Similarly, an understanding of Erich Fromm's anthropology is grasped only when his pivotal role in the 'resurgence' of the humanist tradition in its attempt to inject a new direction into an atrophic social science, is grasped. This atrophic social science is an ideological 'reflection' of the material relation of economic and political power forces existing within contemporary capitalist societies, in the Western world. The question to be decided then is not whether Fromm's work is part of the intellectual landscape traversed by Feuerbach and criticized by Marx--so that the substantive Marxian critique is not central here--but whether Fromm's anthropology is a departure from the 'abstract humanism' characteristic of the English liberal philosophies and consistent with his Marxism, which as Louis Althusser has shown carries within itself the dual, ambiguous themes of "socialist-humanism." Althusser in stressing Marx's rupture with Feuerbach, asserts that Marx was struggling against ideological interpretations of idealist and humanist varieties which threatened "Marxist theory." By a "Marxist theory," Althusser means a theory which defines itself dialectically--one which is simultaneously a science of history (historical materialism), and a philosophy which can account for the nature and history of its theoretical formations.

It is on the basis of the foregoing criteria that the distinction between theory and ideology can be applied to Fromm's writings, but
also because as was stressed in the first chapter, Fromm is in agree-
ment with many Marxist scholars that Marxism is not simply a political
doctrine but is indispensable to the theoretical development of the
'human sciences,' and to philosophy. Fromm suggests that socialist
humanism which is experiencing a renaissance just now is a branch of
humanism, which has a long tradition stretching backwards to the Hebrew
prophets and Greek philosophers. The former is defined simply as:

   The belief in the unity of the human race and man's poten-
tial to perfect himself by his own efforts . . .

Fromm further implies a philosophical and theoretically problematic
continuity between Marx and Feuerbach, through his crude distinction
of religious and non-religious humanists; suggesting that the latter
hold that "man makes his own history and is his own creator" (thus
Fromm stresses the continuity between Gianbattista Vico and Marx).
Fromm holds however that the main distinguishing feature of Marx's
socialist humanism is the declaration that theory cannot be separated
from practice, knowledge from action or spiritual aims from the social
system. Further, Fromm suggests that the theoretical and ideological
aspects of socialist humanism are primary problems for modern socialist
humanism.

A complex of questions with direct bearing on Fromm's anthro-
pology emerge from the foregoing discussion. The vital questions are
what are the implications for his anthropological conclusions, and to
what extent is Fromm able to maintain critical theoretical control of
his Marxist posture without transforming real humanism into idealism,
in Althusser's terms without transforming Marxist theory into 'ideology'? While this theme cannot be exhausted in this part of the work, a few words of caution are in order. These words are in order because if Fromm's analysis of theology as anthropology involves a blending of the philosophical anthropological and the materialist and evolutionist traditions of anthropology then a crucial question for any evaluation and critique of Fromm's theory will be the extent to which Fromm maintains the dialectical materialist logic and to what extent his theory 'descends into a simple analytic logic.' Althusser asserts that Feuerbach's humanism had its theoretical moment in the Germany of the 1840s, serving to 'release' the young Hegelians from their theoretical impasse created by Hegel's philosophy of history, on the one hand, and the repressive political regime of William IV, on the other hand, and the contradiction between them. Now, Marx's theoretical problematic as well as his idealist humanism, prior to 1845 are Feuerbachian, i.e. they derive from Feuerbach's philosophic problematic. Marx, then simply borrowed this problematic and applied it to an understanding of human history. But Marx develops a new problematic and breaks with Feuerbach, this break is largely theoretical rather than philosophical however, for once the theoretical break was made it was a break from the conceptual set of Feuerbach and not just from a simple concept in isolation from its context. Althusser makes this point because Marx's 1841-1845 writings do not contain an explicit Marxist philosophy. Althusser makes this point in order to reject what passes for Marxist humanism, the elemental decomposition of Marx into a young and mature Marx by critics, who hold to the reciprocity
of materialism and idealism as though they were dual problematics in Marx, in which Capital becomes either a betrayal or an expression of the "Young Marx." Althusser summarizes his argument as follows:

... Understanding an ideological argument implies, at the level of the ideology itself, simultaneous, conjoint knowledge of the ideological field in which a thought emerges and grows; and the exposure of the internal unity of this thought: its problematic. Knowledge of the ideological field itself presupposes knowledge of the problematics compounded or opposed in it.

As we shall show in the following sections of this chapter, Althusser's remarks provide a programmatic framework for analysis of the ideational structure and concrete formulations of Fromm's work on theology and religion. Fromm then is not simply borrowing isolated concepts from the works of Feuerbach and earlier thinkers, rather a "balanced critique" of Fromm's anthropology necessitates an articulation of the ideologies of science and humanism in the contemporary world and an implicit reference to the socio-economic realities of the present day of which those ideologies are partly reflections.

The Second Aspect of the Tradition: "Academic Anthropology"

Anthropology has been traditionally defined as the science of man which distinguishes a) various physical types of human beings and b) studies the manners and customs of these types of human beings as "expressions of psychological peculiarities" associated with physical ones. With the differentiation of anthropology into sub disciplines, from the second half of the nineteenth century, the focus on man as a
biological organism and the physical aspects of this became the province of physical anthropology, here religion was excluded from central focus. But to most other anthropologists, the nature of culture—and thus religion and the interrelationships of its concrete elements, the growth, change and effects on man has continued to be defined as anthropology. What distinguished "academic anthropology" from one of its branches, philosophical anthropology, however was the application of 'scientific methods' to this study.  

As Marvin Harris has suggested in the first two chapters of his work no single individual from the late seventeenth to the mid-nineteenth centuries, is responsible for the rise of cultural anthropological theory, though throughout this period intellectual history has recorded the many concepts and idea threads which provide the concern with explaining culture from a 'materialist' and socio-structural standpoint. Moreover the problematic of contemporary anthropology theory is synthesized at the point in the mid-nineteenth century where 'racialist scientism' characterizes the ideological and theoretical struggle between 'racial egalitarianism' and 'racial determinism.' But this problematic is partly the reflection and activation of the rapid expansion of industrial capitalism and colonialism on the one hand and the intellectual compromise with the theological reaction of the early nineteenth century against the Enlightenment liberalism.  

The development of an evolutionist focus in contemporary cultural anthropology corresponds to the material development of 'Western society' and partly manifests itself in the 'materialist behaviourism' which has characterized much of the science's development from the nineteenth...
century. Two points should be noted in relation to this development in contrast to philosophical anthropology. The first is that the anthropologist is committed, whatever the substantive variations, to a science that is deterministic and materialist—"the doctrine that the nature of that which is self-existent is material in character"—believing that a complete description of some state of nature, would enable him to calculate any event of the past or future. There is further the view that "like causes" produce "like effects." Moreover there was the behaviourist view which compared to other disciplines exercised sway in cultural anthropology.\textsuperscript{34} Within this context the duality of nationalism and empiricism and between necessity and contingency, has had serious epistemological and scientific implications.\textsuperscript{35} These dualities pervaded sub-disciplines within anthropology, such as social anthropology, psychological anthropology, and so on, as well as theoretical systems, throughout the period from the 1890s to the present day. The epistemological problems raise questions such as how do we know that other minds exist? The scientific problem has to do with the relation between necessary and contingent facts. The second point is an extension from the first and briefly is that with the search for general laws, then structural patterns with comparative utility in cultural anthropology, the theoretical conclusions of anthropological theory though not focussing on the metaphysical reality of the ideational content of non Western theistic systems, nevertheless arrived at conclusions with implicit inferences for that content. The idealist elements of Feuerbach's anthropology was implicit in the inferred conclusions of the studies of religion and theology.
adopted within cultural anthropology. In this sense there was a mis-
placed idealism in cultural anthropology which remains to this day.

Thus, while philosophical and socio-cultural anthropology remain
separate, they have common threads running through their approaches to
the study of religion and theism. It will be shown in this chapter
that Erich Fromm's work partly 'bridges' the distance between both fields,
just as Teilhard de Chardin's work has attempted to do.

An Analysis of the Ideational Aspects of Theology
and the Early Christian Tradition in Fromm's Works

All of the passionate speeches of accusation against the
Spirit, in which modern philosophical literature is so rich,
cannot make us forget, therefore, that here in truth it is
not Life striving against the Spirit, but the latter striv-
ing against itself. And this internal conflict is really36
its appointed fate, its everlasting, inescapable pathos.

I believe that the concept of God was a historically con-
ditioned expression of an inner experience.37

It is remarkable that Erich Fromm should "turn to religion and
theology" for deeper insights into the concepts of culture and psychology
thereby following two earlier psychoanalysts, often suggested to be
Fromm's 'masters,' Freud and Otto Rank. Fromm uses the Bible as an
ethnological source, but this is distinct from the assertion that Fromm
is 'following' Freud and Rank--as was illustrated in the foregoing
section the secular philosophical and anthropological critique of Biblical
sources has a long tradition. In this section discussion will centre
on the proposition that the Frommian analyses of theological sources is
neither psychoanalytic and symbolic, nor the derivation from some a priori
ethical posture.
The anthropological project which Fromm undertakes in his writings on Biblical texts is a blending and cross fertilization of two distinct traditions in anthropology, the philosophical and the empirical ethnographic. The rationale for terming Fromm's study as anthropology derives from the definition of anthropology as a discipline which began as a science of history for the study of the nature of man [Ernest Becker, 1971 and Marvin Harris, 1968]. From this broad definition then, the significance of the interpenetration of ethnography by philosophical anthropology is the internal establishment within the infrastructural framework of a conceptual basis for the concern with the self in developmental terms. In Fromm's terms, this would take the form of the anthropological concern with the "freedom to" aspect of human essence, with man as becoming. In this sense, therefore, the forced separation, or splitting off of philosophical anthropology from the ethnographic side of the discipline has major implications for ethnography's epistemological foundation. In the first book examined in this section it will be shown that implicitly Fromm attempts to reconcile this split, thus his Biblical writings do not stem from eclecticism but from a vital epistemological postulate. In this sense his 'radical humanism' is partly constituted by a specific epistemology--of which the freedom from-freedom to proposition is a concrete manifestation--though partly constitutive of that epistemology. The epistemological orientation is distinct from the question, why Fromm chose the Old Testament?; to which the simple answer is, because it appeared fruitful in documentation for his 'radical humanism'.
aspect of Fromm's anthropological orientation or project is clear in the following two statements:

The Old Testament is the document depicting the evolution of a small, primitive nation, whose spiritual leaders insisted on the existence of one God and the non-existence of idols, to a religion with faith in a nameless God, in the final unification of all men, in the complete freedom of each individual.

Then again Fromm states:

Interpretation of an evolutionary process means showing the development of certain tendencies that have unfolded in the process of evolution. . . . A history that ascribes the same importance to all facts is nothing but an enumeration of events; it fails to make sense of the events. Writing history always means interpreting history.39

The evolution which is the subject of Fromm's work is the study of the diachronic change of the Jewish people from a "small nomadic tribal society to the enculturation of Hellenistic culture and the internal development of sharp stratification characteristics." This process of change contains internal contradictions, explicable in terms of the specific socio-economic conditions of the geo-political environment. But the internal contradictions of ancient Judaic society are partly manifested in the opposing ideological tensions between "nationalism and universalism, conservatism and radicalism, fanaticism and tolerance."40

Fromm views the Old Testament writings as depicting the nature and transformation of these contradictions. Fromm also views these contradictions, though changed in form and content as factors in contemporary Jewish societies. Fromm views these societies as characterized by the
contradictions between clannishness, arrogance and internationalism, peace, justice, and humanism. Foremost in Fromm's conceptions then is the notion that the Old Testament is not a substantively uniform text.

Before exploring Fromm's anthropological orientation in You Shall Be As Gods and the Dogma of Christ, it will be necessary to indicate the two main axes on which the plausibility and social scientific 'possibility' of any such project turns. The first axis is the interconnection and interpenetration of philosophical anthropology and contemporary academic anthropology. These two disciplines have been kept quite separate and sometimes hostile, in the recent past. The Engels critique of Feuerbach attests to this fact. The almost complete juxtaposition of philosophical anthropology from the dominant cultural-materialist strategy is reiterated in otherwise brilliant work of Marvin Harris. Harris attacks the "idealist" and mentalistic anthropology of a host of writers from Comte to Levi-Strauss and later in the same work disassociates Levi-Strauss from the latter's self-proclaimed Marxism. Later in the same work, however, he takes this critique to a more extreme position with the following statement:

Let those who know how to explain what the cultural-materialist strategy has thus far failed to explain step forward with their monothetic alternatives. We do not demean a theory by its failures to explain everything, but by its failure to explain as much as its nearest rivals. In this frame of reference, the alternatives to cultural-materialism have failed and have as often obscured as enlightened our understanding of socio-cultural evolution.

While there can be little quarrel with the Harris critique of particular idealistic anthropology, it is significant that there is little or no
mention in his work of a possible rapproachment between the idealistic element of the philosophical anthropological tradition and the Marxist cultural-materialist one; in view of the absence in physical anthropology of 'positive' or definitive conclusions about the specific origins of homo-sapiens, based on 'concrete' empirical data. With a conceptual formulation from physical anthropology it is possible to integrate both disciplines. Such a position has in fact already been adopted by Ashley Montague to cite one anthropologist who insists on the principles of co-operation and 'love' as the ontology of contemporary cultural anthropology. The second axis derives from the first and has to do with the dichotomization of humanism and Marxism. To the extent that Marxism is viewed as historical-materialism, humanism is regarded as another form of idealism. One aspect of Fromm's work has been to re-integrate these two "strands of thought," by giving them an ethnological focus. Eventual success here have radical implications for the classical expulsion of Marxism from anthropology.

Erich Fromm's anthropological focus is oriented to a discussion of the concepts of God, man and history in his interpretation of the Old Testament and the concept of Christ in early Christianity. These analyses are focussed at the ideational level. The question, however is whether Fromm's materialist explanation for the emergence of Christianity during the Roman Empire is residual to the theoretical conclusions arrived at from analysis at the ideational level? In order to discuss the question whether Fromm's materialist explanation of the changing dogma of Christ is residual in his overall perspective on
religion or theology--and if that is the case critics such as John Schaar will be essentially correct in calling Fromm a moral philosopher--and therefore whether his "anthropology" fails to convince; we propose to treat his later You Shall Be As Gods as an attempted theoretical undergirding of the "Dogma of Christ" as well as intended to decrease the Freudian symbolic overtones behind the conclusion of much of the latter. This proposition is evidenced by two things; the first is the fact that "The Concept of History" is the axis on which all the other substantive discussion of You Shall Be As Gods rests, it is its axis as it were. The second thing is Fromm's assertion that the future of modern civilization as a study and proxis should (will) be concerned with demonstrating the essential rightness of the 'X' experience as experiential human phenomena, regardless of conceptualizations . . . , on the basis of a highly developed anthropology." Fromm puts this epistemology, ontological project and imperative in the following terms:

In short, we are in need of an empirical psychological anthropology which studies X and non-X experience as experiential human phenomena, regardless of conceptualizations. Such a study might lead to establishing rationally the superiority of the X way to all others, as methodologically the Buddha already did. It may occur that while the Middle Ages were concerned with the proof of God's existence with philosophical and logical arguments, the future will be concerned with outlining the essential rightness of the X way on the basis of a highly developed anthropology.44

What then is the substance of the X and non-X experience which characterizes the subject matter (the ontology) of Fromm's anthropology? Fromm terms this experiential substratum the X experience because, he asserts, there is no word in the Western languages, other than those
with a theistic reference, to refer to the experience. Secondly, the X experience, though religious is "not necessarily" connected with a theistic thought concept. Thirdly, Fromm distinguishes between theism, ethics and religion, the latter is also humanistically ethical, but need not be theistic. Fromm suggests the following characteristics of the X experience: the first (experience) characteristic is the experience of the individual's separation from man and nature as a deep problem and the wish to find "at-onement." It is dissatisfaction with mundane life, experience of the existential dichotomies as requiring an answer. Secondly, there is the experience of the optimal development of one's own powers of love, reason and so on as the highest in a hierarchy of values. The X experience is one in which the worldly life "is permeated by spiritual aims." Fromm suggests that his hierarchy of values does not imply asceticism, but that worldly achievements are subordinated to the highest human values. The apparent similarity between Fromm's position in this regard and Max Scheler's subordination of "pleasure" to "vital" values has no basis, however, in their respective works. The cultural anthropological basis for Fromm's hierarchy of values as for the X experience as a whole will be extensively discussed later in the chapter. Fourthly, in contradistinction to materialistic culture, the X experience lives life as a constant process of inner transformation and "becoming part of the world in the act of living." "Man alone is an end and never a means." Fifthly, this involves abandonment of the ego, which implies openness, not passivity, as a pre-condition to love and becoming part of the world. It involves
"transcendence of the ego." It is this X experience with which Fromm is concerned in _The Art of Loving_, where he suggests that modern man has the capacity for it, not because of but inspite of the contradictions of modern capitalism, technology and the power of political institutions, but as he also suggests this capacity does not mean that man necessarily has the ability as a species for the experience. 46 This capacity is the culmination of the process of phylogenetic evolution of homo sapiens. Fromm states:

> The realm of love, reason and justice exists as a reality only because, and in as much as, man has been able to develop these powers in himself throughout the process of his evolution. 47

At the ideational level of his anthropology then, Fromm traces the cultural development of the "category" of X experience in relation to its symbolic referent 'God' and the cultural referent the concept of Man, both in early Judaism, precisely because of its "positive universalism." 48

Fromm predicates his anthropology on what is for him the concrete political problem of twentieth century societies, whether capitalist or socialist, the dual problems of the threat of nuclear extinction and the transformation of men into "appendices of machines." Both phenomena threaten to exterminate the human species, but they also thwart man's capacity for the X experience which is the central reflection of contemporary alienation. Thus the central anthropological and historical issue is for man to recognize this alienation and its expression as
idolatry. One expression of idolatry is the present socio-economic structure of "industrialized society." The formulation of this idea is by no means specific in Fromm but gives the impression that contemporary capitalism, the bourgeois state power and class exploitations and antagonisms are all expressions of a socio-historical praxis, idolatry. Fromm's definition of his task is not a discussion of the concepts of God and man from early Jewish society but the experience in which these concepts refer.

Fromm explains the contemporary idolatry as due to a "negative" relation to the matricentric and patricentric principles, both of which have played a part in the evolution of man's psychic structure. The constellation of forces which make up this psychic structure are as follows: a) Patricentrism; characterized by authoritarian relations, a strict superego, internalized guilt and acceptance of punishment for one's guilt; the Protestant work ethos with its emphasis on extreme rationality; and work and labour as a means to earning rewards such as love and affection; an identification of duty and personal happiness at the level of familial relations between father and son.

b) Matricentrism; attachment to blood and soil; regression to infantilism, passivity-receptivity; mere negation of patriarchalism without a progression to higher forms.

Armed with this array of concepts Fromm's anthropology has two aspects. The first is to use his physical anthropological synthesis to demonstrate the emergence of human self-awareness as a unique phenomenon not determined by instinctive determination in the individual
physiological being but by the socio-historical facts which shaped the human configuration. The second aspect is to trace through the Old Testament texts the human response to the existential dilemma as the response changed, thereby showing man's capacity for the most archaic and the most creative and liberating experience as manifested in his (religious) spiritual history. However, the force of the second aspect of Fromm's analysis is partly dependent on his success in establishing the first argument. 51

Fromm suggests that culmination of phylogenetic evolution toward homo sapiens resulted in man with a high level of cortical development and a diminished level of instinctive functioning, an emergence from instinctive adaptation. This means that the capacity for self-awareness, spatially and temporally is inherent in man. Fromm suggests further, that long after the biological capacity of the brain has ceased to evolve in homo sapiens, man's reason, that is his capacity for grasping the world by thought, continues to evolve, but this evolution does not occur automatically. 52 By distinguishing reason from intelligence, the latter being man's ability to manipulate the world, Fromm is able to demonstrate the specific function of thought and objectivity in the development of human culture.

Fromm asserts a correspondence between man's political-economic structural adaptations and the internal ideational content of man's theistic and religious forms. In this sense Fromm's utilization of anthropological material is cultural materialist as was that of many nineteenth and early twentieth century thinkers. For instance Fromm states in The Sane Society:
He (man) develops animal husbandry, learns to cultivate the land, achieves an every-increasing skill in art and craftsmanship, . . . . His gods change accordingly. As long as he feels largely identified with nature, his gods are part of nature.53

The following is a substantive summary of Fromm's anthropology of religion. 1) Since the conception of a god as another human being implies a relatively evolved socio-economic structure; and this combined with the truth that the Old Testament conceptions of God explicitly rejected matriarchal notions of ties to blood and soil (a form of idolatry), then the mergence of God as a patriarchal figure implies highly evolved structures in terms of diachrony. Thus Fromm summarizes these points as follows: "At first--and this seems to correspond to an agricultural stage--God appears to him in the form of the all-protecting and all-nourishing 'Great Mother.' Eventually he begins to worship fatherly gods, representing reason, principles, laws."54

2) Although man's early history is of social structures ideologically dominated by matriarchal beliefs, his earliest ideational content in religion is neither specifically matriarchal or patriarchal, but by animism or fetishism, as understood in the Comtean sense.

3) The Old Testament conception of man and God before the "fall" supports the hypothesis that matriarchy preceded patriarchy since woman is the more "active and daring of the two," and only after the "fall" "does God announce the principle that man shall rule over woman." Thus the entire Old Testament is an elaboration of the patriarchal principle in various ways with the prohibition against fixation to soil. In a corresponding sense the Christian religion tends throughout its development to
stress the patriarchal principle, culminating in contemporary Protestantism. Roman Catholicism represents prior to the Renaissance the only contradiction to this conclusion, here elements of the matriarchal principle had a positive focus in the notion of an all-loving, all-forgiving God.

4) The flowering of science and rational thought in particular and the emphasis on reason in general, since the sixteenth century is related to the increasing rise of Protestantism with its characterization of positive and negative aspects of the patriarchal spirit. The contradiction however is that while science and technology here created the conditions for human universalism, the Western world has fallen back on new forms of idolatry and the negative forms of matriarchalism.

5) The paradox is that these forms of negative matriarchalism are the very forms which the prophets of the Old Testament tried to overthrow.

A Presentation of Fromm's Substantive Anthropology

The three major themes of You Shall Be As Gods, the concept of God, the concept of man and the concept of history is really a presentation of a single phenomenon from different perspectives. The phenomenon being dealt with is the 'X' experience and the differing conceptions of it, as it is transformed from the Creation. When the process is viewed in overall terms the following outlines appear.

1) Fromm begins with the Creation which the Old Testament texts reveal as a situation in which the concept of God is as an absolute ruler, a patriarchal figure. Yet man is God's rival, he has the potential to become God, although the latter was made man and nature. God feels
threatened when man 'eats' of the tree of knowledge, and moves to protect his supremacy, "by expelling Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden and thus preventing them from taking the second step toward becoming God--eating from the tree of life" [Italics mine]. According to Fromm God was an arbitrary and all powerful ruler precisely because human history had not yet begun, once Man is expelled however the process of independence begins and so human history also begins. But the concept of God as man's owner also begins to be diminished. At the level of ordinary life, every individual has to break ties to his parents to begin the "evolution" toward freedom and individuation.

2) In the second phase of the concept of God and the Biblical conception of the relation between God and man, He and Man have become "partners in a treaty" or covenant. Fromm suggests that this covenant has three aspects. The first is between God and Noah, in which the former agrees not to destroy all life. However Fromm does not tell us why God makes such an agreement. Fromm does assert however that:

   The idea of the covenant constitutes, indeed, one of the most decisive steps in the religious development of Judaism.

   In the second part of the covenant phase, God makes a covenant with the Hebrews in which the latter are requested to leave their land and go to some unspecified land (God is to show the Hebrews the new land). For Fromm this is an expression of universalism. Here again Fromm has no explanation for this covenant, except that man should obey--as distinct from being fixated to--God.

3) In the third phase, we see the most radical expression of man's
covenant with God, for the latter is completely persuaded by Abraham not
to destroy a city where man's or some men's potential for good exists.
Here man has the right to demand with pride, rather than beg. For
Fromm this is expressed in Abraham's mixture of defiance and formality
in the face of God's power. The former binds God to the norms of justice
and love mutually agreed to earlier. Fromm states it thus:

Precisely because God is bound by the norms of justice and
love, man is no longer his slave. Man can challenge God--
as God can challenge man--because above both are principles
and norms. Adam and Eve challenged God, too, by disobedience;
Abraham challenges God not by disobedience but by accusing
him of violating his own promises and principles. Abraham
is . . . a free man who has the right to demand, and God has
no right to refuse.58

Fromm formulates the third and most significant phase as God's
revelation to Moses--specifically around the issue of the liberation
of the Hebrews from the Egyptian empire--of himself as the God of history
rather than the God of nature, and thereby separates himself from the
notion of God as an idol. Here Fromm attempts to show the Jewish tradition
as rejecting the possibility that God's essence can be known. Instead
we find the notion of God as being "to be" (the name Eheyeh which Fromm
translates to mean "becoming"). The significance here is that idols
are things, completed processes, totalities, in the Hegelian sense.
This Fromm asserts to be one of the antecedents for the tradition of
"negative theology" developed by Maimonides, who asserted that God had
no positive attributes. The concept of negative theology is charac-
terized by a) the attribution of action to God and b) the idea that
man can only know God by what he is not.59
The ultimate consequences of Judaic formulations in the foregoing sense is that there can be no justifiable theological speculations about who or what God is. The Talmudic interpretations are about the law and principles governing conduct in life. Fromm asserts that Judaism did not develop an effective theology precisely because of its negation of ideology. Thus the logical consequence of "Jewish monotheism" is the absurdity of theology. In so far as the prophets continually characterize idolatry as self-castigation and self-humiliation and the worship of God as self-liberation and liberation from others, a fear of submission to God tended to (develop) increasingly diminish. This is contrasted with the notion of arbitrary acts of God with respect to man's fate--as for instance in Calvinism. To this extent the Judaic tradition is an early humanism. The former is pervaded then by a humanistic conscience.

In his analyses of the concept of man and of history, Fromm utilizes the anthropological formulation of the evolutionary process with the aim of keeping the development as problematic for man rather than predetermined. Fromm achieves this effect by stressing two sets of 'facts' from Biblical interpretations. The first is that the most fundamental anthropological assertion is that man is made in the image of God. Nevertheless this likeness is latent (Eritis Sicut Dei). But man is not God, he can imitate God, however, his mortality distinguishes him from the latter and so man has to strive for the likeness. The second set of factors are, first that man has to cut incestuous ties to "blood and soil," this has an initial consciousness awakening consequence; secondly that he has to cut ties to his "father's house"
and cut social ties; thirdly man has to arrive at a state of "complete inneractivity and productivity"; finally there must be conscious inculcation of the belief that every man carries all of humanity within himself.  

The existential dilemma which Fromm poses at the level of the individual human being is paralleled by the historical dilemma between Paradise and the Messianic time. Where Paradise is viewed as the "original pre-individualist harmony between man and nature and man and woman"; the messianic time is viewed as the historical answer to the existence of man, on a higher level, precisely because man creates himself through an historical process of suffering and awareness. Fromm presents an analysis of this historical development through an analysis of the story of Moses, Pharaoh and the Hebrews in Egypt. The author's central thesis is that the possibility of liberation exists only because people suffer and because (in biblical language) God understands the suffering and hence tries to relieve it. This formulation is beset with ambiguities however, firstly because the very biblical formulation still contains an anthropomorphic God concept, which Fromm tends to gloss over, and secondly because the substance of the proposition implies an inverse relation between degree of suffering and level of self-awareness. We will return to these problems later, but it should be noted that Fromm views the experience of suffering as universal, connected with a second observation, i.e. that the Hebrews developed new powers in their original desertion of their homeland and in the process of liberation from Egypt. But Fromm does not specify what these powers are.
Fromm presents three 'acts' in the drama of Hebrew history: the dialogue of doubt and fear between Moses and God and the fear of freedom of the Hebrews; the encounter between Moses and the Pharaoh and their mutual use of force, but Moses' tactical use of force is stressed. Here Fromm implies an analogy between modern man and the Egyptians; and the wanderings of the Hebrews in the wilderness, and their tendencies to regress to values more compatible with the well-regulated conditions of slavery. God issues two commands for life in the wilderness; the first is that life is to be lived not hoarded (i.e. the Hebrews are not to collect more food than could be consumed in a day); the second is the institution of the Sabbath day. This institution is a symbolic representation of the harmony between man and nature and man and man. The Talmudic concept of 'work' is any activity or interference by man of nature and this interference is eliminated by representing the possibility of man's victory over time.63

Fromm attempts an articulation of the dialectical relation between the Hebrews and Pharaoh which has a teleological quality in two senses. The first is that God predicts to Moses the intransigence of the Egyptian rulers who succumb to Moses' request for freedom of the Hebrews, only with a demonstration of force. In this sense the Pharaoh's reaction is both predicted and "caused" by God. Fromm's interpretation of the dialectic here, betrays a somewhat mechanical conception. Fromm states for example:

Any act that will necessarily happen is God's will. Hence, when God says that he will harden Pharaoh's heart, he is announcing that Pharaoh's heart will unavoidably harden. (p. 80).
In a similar vein God also knows that the Hebrews are unprepared for freedom. For example in that part of the dialogue which deals with Moses' doubt that the people will believe God to be the God of history, Fromm states:

God's answer is the first of various concessions he makes to the unpreparedness of the people. (p. 76)

With the above Fromm maintains that force never convinces either the Pharaoh or the Hebrews, who "regress to fear of freedom and to idol worship whenever they encounter difficulties or when the charismatic figure of the leader is not present." (p. 79). The contradiction here is that Fromm holds to the notion that God does not interfere in the historical process, that man is left to himself "and makes his own history; God helps, but never by changing man's nature, by doing what only man can do for himself. To put it in my own non-theistic language: man is left to himself, and nobody can do for him what he is unable to do for and by himself." (p. 74). Thus it was not the Hebrews who freed themselves with God's assistance, it was entirely God's will, for Fromm is unable to demonstrate adequately the process between man's initial cry for help and its relation to any conscious action following on that cry. In other words Fromm's analysis here suffers from the same defect of Hegel's and some Marxist thinkers: the connection between an apparent level of consciousness as a manifestation of action. Fromm has not demonstrated that the observed consciousness is objective possibility. "Understand" is ambiguous. A second ambiguity is that following from the first, there is no necessary connection between the increasing use
of force and the hardening of the heart, at best this is equivocal without an appeal to an anthropomorphic view of God. Fromm suggests that what both Hebrews and Egyptians had in common was the illusion that force guarantees freedom, whereas in effect increasing force only hardens "men's hearts." Then Fromm draws a parallel between the biblical story and the contemporary arms race in the following words:

They (the Western and Soviet blocs) believe that the threat of force will guarantee 'freedom' or 'communism'--as the case may be. They do not see that this course only hardens man's heart more and more, until he arrives at the point where he ceases to care; at this point he will act as did Pharaoh, and perhaps did the Egyptians.65

In other words, for Fromm, force is ultimately counterproductive. But this is a proposition which few will deny. What Fromm does not do satisfactorily is to articulate the specific positive value of force in the historical process. In order to get at the root of Fromm's ambiguity, we have to return to the dialectical relationship between Paradise and the Messianic time as fundamental to Fromm's concept of God and history. Where the former implies self-awareness of estrangement between man and man, and so on, not original sin; the latter implies man as a whole as "fully born," man at home again in the world, in the future. Fromm asserts that the prophetic teachings since the time of Moses sought to remind man of the possibility of obtaining peace in the future, without the use of secular power and force. Fromm's own ambivalence toward force and power in the revolutionary process is indicated in the analysis, for it is one thing to suggest that force is ultimately counterproductive, it is quite another to suggest there
is no moral foundation for the use of force but only a tactical basis for such usage. Fromm alludes to the latter position in a number of sections in attempting to integrate his "messianic time" with the prophetic concept of peace among the Judaic prophets. In one statement Fromm stresses the tactical or strategic aspects of the use of force; in the other two he stresses as a consistent prophetic attitude the task of separating power from morality. In the first statement Fromm argues as follows:

An essential aspect of the prophets' messianic teaching is their attitude toward power and force. Indeed, we must admit that all human history so far (perhaps with the exception of certain primitive societies) has been based on force; the force and power of a prosperous minority over a majority who work hard and enjoy little. . . . The prophets are revolutionaries who rob force and power of their moral and religious disguises.66

In the second statement, Fromm emphasizes as one of God's roles in history his "sending of prophets" to perform four functions, one of which is:

. . . the establishment of a society governed by love, justice, and truth; they insist that politics must be judged by moral values, and that the function of political life is the realization of these values.67

In the third statement Fromm's analysis shifts to the tactical element in force. In order to demonstrate the relative ambivalence of Fromm's own thought here we refer to the fact that Fromm quotes two positions held by Jewish prophets about the preconditions for the messianic time in Talmudic literature. The first position is that some sources argued that the messiah will come only when suffering and evil has reached
such a degree "that men will repent and thus be ready." In sociological terms, revolutionary change will take place when the consciousness of all lead them to abandon force. In the second interpretation, the messianic time will come when the oppressed class becomes a revolutionary class. From quotes one source as stating this as follows:

The messiah will not come until there are no more conceited men in Israel, or until all judges and officers are gone from Israel, or that Jerusalem will be redeemed only by righteousness.

In Fromm's view there is a parallel between Marx's thesis that the working class precisely because it is the most alienated and suffering is also the most revolutionary. But Fromm's parallel is misleading to the extent that there is (in this author's view) a more striking similarity between the second Talmudic precondition for revolutionary change and Marx's own conception. If we take the notion of "until all judges and officers are gone from Israel" to mean the willingness of the oppressed to expel exploiters from among their midst, then this accords with Marx's concept of the exploited serfs becoming transformed into a non-feudal group only partly through their own efforts. Inter-group struggles assist in but does not transform the conditions of society, this is more dependent on socio-economic forces having attained a level of contradiction and tension whereby the sectors of urban society most affected by these changes begin to transform the society. Marx saw the degree of dependency between serf and landlord to realize that the former did not initiate change in the sense Fromm implies for feudal type societies. What Fromm does not do is what Marx did and that is to
recognize political action as historically and structurally determined. Fromm tries to condemn force in total while and the same time recognizing its tactical usefulness and only resolves the sociological contradiction between both alternatives by implying that they are dialectically resolved in the concept of hope. In other words Fromm attempts to substitute hope for force, in order to restrict the role of the latter.

In the concluding sections of the most important discussion of the concept of God as history, Fromm launches an attack (undifferentiated) against the proponents of force as having moral value in history: Robespierre, Diderot, Stalin and Lenin. He draws an analogy between the establishment of a "workers state" in the U.S.S.R. and the institutionalization of Christianity as itself indicative of a fundamental shift, an attempt to delude the majority that the 'hoped for' or the messianic time has arrived. Fromm implies that both situations represent a corruption of the revolution, and like the situation in antiquity where Moses could lead the Hebrews only "to freedom," but not "in freedom." What all these situations reveal, according to Fromm, is that revolution takes place in steps. Implicit is the notion that to attempt to force evolution by use of power and coercion leads to reaction and "fear of freedom." What is lacking in these assertions is clear structural referents. We see in this aspect of Fromm's work a conservative bias which having rejected force leads to an idealistic attachment to hope or to skepticism. Although Fromm suggests that the third revolution the "freedom in," had failed, he makes a distinction between the Hebrew followers and the Hebrew prophets. The revolution had not failed for
the latter because history indicated the truth of their teachings. Fromm employs two sets of factors to explain the specific failure of the first generation of freed Hebrews, to establish a new life without idolatory: the fact that their past as slaves set limits on what they could achieve, they were slaves who started the revolution they could not finish it; secondly they were idol worshippers and could easily fall back into idolatry, since only those not born into slavery could succeed in achieving the promised land; and thirdly the Hebrews use force ruthlessly in their conquest of Canaan to root out idolators and in this inhumanity destroyed the very things they hoped to save. Thus the Hebrews fell back into idolatry.

The problem with Fromm's explanation is not his conclusions which are possibly valid, but his explanations which do not go far enough into the institutional frameworks established by the freed Hebrews as corroborative data allowing further insight into why this behaviour pattern developed. This is important if Fromm takes seriously his aim which is to demonstrate that the spiritual leader is a religious leader and that an understanding of the laws which he enunciates ia at one and the same time an understanding of the laws of history and of God's laws. It is the interpretation of events against which these laws are alternative modes that questions can be raised. The epistemological implications of such a line of inquiry take us to the third section of this chapter, to which we now turn.
Fromm's strongest critique of institutionalized Christianity from its integration into the ancient Roman Empire is the distortion and disintegration of the prophetic messianism which is Christ's tradition to monotheism. This 'sellout' as it were also constitutes the point of departure, for Fromm between institutionalized Christianity and the essentials of Judaism. In the "Dogma of Christ," Fromm traces the historical development leading to the collapse of the most dynamic and revolutionary concept within early Christianity the concept of Christ as a historical symbol of the ability of man to transcend himself, to become God, as represented in the relation of God to Christ. Fromm traces the socio-economic conditions and the socio-psychological consequences of the transformation ideologically from Christ becoming God to God becoming man. In other words there is at least one continuity of ideational theme between the two works under investigation here, that is the messianic quality in both traditions, despite the differing levels of analysis of the two. The passion of Fromm's analysis is shown in the following concluding statement:

The change in the economic situation and in the social composition of the Christian community (from 1 AD-4 AD) altered the psychic attitude of the believers. Dogma developed; the idea of a man becoming a god changes into the idea of a god becoming a man. No longer should the father be overthrown; it is not the rulers who are guilty but the suffering masses. Aggression is no longer directed against the authorities but against the persons of the suffers themselves.
We will examine in greater detail, later on, the critical posture adopted by Fromm and his position that the loss of hope meant the abandonment of the original aggressive posture of the early Christians, and the fact that this had implications for the use of force. This is the paradox of Fromm's position who appeared early to recognize the significance of force and later to abandon this position. It is worth noting that the significance of force and violence in the forging of both Christianity and Judaism is noted in another famous work, Karl Kautsky's *Foundations of Christianity* who states on the messianic component as follows:

> The belief in the Messiah arrives at the same time as monotheism and is closely connected with it. Precisely for this reason the Messiah is not thought of as God, but as a man sent by God. He was to establish an earthly kingdom, not a heavenly kingdom (for Jewish thought was not as abstract as all that), a Jewish kingdom. In fact, Cyrus, who released the Jews from Babylonia and sent them back to Jerusalem, is already designated as the Lord's anointed, Messiah, Christ.\(^{72}\)

Whatever the difference between Fromm and Kautsky, the latter gave an anthropological interpretation of early Christianity's conception of God and Christ, what Kantsky did in his sociological analysis of the sources of Western monotheism. Already, Kautsky shows both Judaism and Christianity as we know it as a compromise with imperial power.

But in what sense is Fromm's essay "The Dogma of Christ" anthropological? The following are the main senses:

first, Fromm uses a fundamental notion of matriarchal and patriarchal principles, throughout his analysis;

secondly, Fromm is searching for a modal social psychological structure
as it changes under the impact of historical change in the Roman Empire; thirdly, Fromm uses a concept of social stratification in order to examine the particularities of this change in their social psychological impact.

The analysis of "The Dogma of Christ" will be presented in its entirety before elucidating the foregoing principles of discussion. Fromm's concern with the concept of God is extended to the relationship between God and Christ, but now his specific task is examination of the motives which conditioned the evolution of concepts from the beginning of Christianity in the first century A.D. to the Nicene Creed in the fourth century A.D. These changing concepts are termed Dogma which Fromm defines as largely conditioned by the realistic socio-political motives of three principal groups within the Roman Empire, who were of Palestinian origin: the Pharisees, Sadducees, and the Am Ha-aretz. Fromm suggests that this dogma served to express the changed attitude toward God and society during the crucial three hundred year period, with the content of the dogma of early institutionalized Christianity suppressing the original eschatological and spiritual conceptions of Christ and God. The general forces underlying the evolution of this dogma follows the same laws that govern "compulsive-neurotic processes" (Fromm, p. 92). Dogma functions according to Fromm as a banner to dissipate the political and revolutionary aspirations of the Am Ha-aretz (the Roman lumpen proletariat), i.e. the skilled, unskilled and poverty striken rural class, thereby deflecting the brunt of opposition of the Palestinians against the Romans, on the one hand and on the other hand helped to reconcile the Pharisees (or middle classes) and Sadducees (or rich upper
classes). All three groups are not originally classes within Palestine so much as they were groups which were religious and political responses of distinct groups within the Empire, in their genesis. The dogma which is a consequence of the socio-psychological development of the dialectical relation between these groups, served as a "recognition of the banner . . . the avowal of membership in a particular group" (p. 92). Dogma in this sense is an ideological synthesis, the parallel at the socio- logical level comparable to a powerful suggestion. In terms of the substantive content of Christian dogma as a culmination of the historical process which Fromm examines the "new dogma" (in the sense of a substitution of a contemplative faith for an active revolutionary religious ideology) is developed around the "idea of a god becoming a man," the converse side of the adoptionist theory (i.e. that God made Jesus, Lord and Christ). With dogmatic Christianity man no longer even looks forward in the future for salvation, "... salvation was already prepared for man and man for salvation." 

Fromm outlines the methodological and epistemological basis of his culture and personality anthropology as follows. 

It (the analysis) will attempt to understand the ideas in terms of men and their life patterns, and to show that the evolution of dogma can be understood only through knowledge of the unconscious, upon which external reality works and which determines the content of consciousness. 

Fromm opens his account by suggesting that in the first century (A.D.) Palestine, of which Jerusalem was a city with the largest proletariat within the Roman Empire, was a colony of the empire. The social
stratification in Jerusalem had become restructured under the impact of expanding commercial trade on an international scale and the termination of feudal oligarchic domination by the Augustan rulers (Karl Kautsky suggests that trade and migrations are part of the classical history of Arabia in general and Palestine in particular). Although there had always been forms of social stratification among the Jews of Palestine, both Kautsky (pp. 238-259) and E. Fromm stress the polarization of social groupings on the basis of economic power and deprivation and the rising resentment characterized by the poor urban groups within Jerusalem from the first century B.C. There were essentially three broad strata within Palestine, the small feudal, moneyed and powerful upper stratum, many of whom were administrators in Roman provinces, such as tax collectors. What this privileged group had as a common feature with the rest of the Jewish population was a certain religious and national patriotism, stimulated by their varying relationships, over time, to the Roman political power centre. They developed the political and religious grouping called the Sadducees. The Sadducees representing a power holding religious nobility. This group increasingly lost power and influence to another sect, the Pharisees, a middle economic 'class' grouping, constituted of members from a variety of economic and occupational backgrounds, whose distinguishing feature was a mixture of religious traditionalism and an expectation of arrival of the Messiah, Jewish patriotism and contemptuousness of the Romans and Sadducees. It was from among this group that the oppressed, disenfranchised, urban lumpen proletariat, found its anti-Roman rebel leaders in the early days. Fromm suggests that the latter group, the lowest strata of the society, were poverty striken
composed of skilled and unskilled as well as rural socio-economic groups--the Am Ha-aretz. Fromm writes of the Am Ha-aretz in the following terms:

They stood economically and social outside the Jewish society integrated into the whole of the Roman Empire. 77

What Fromm is referring to is the fact that Roman society, which was an estate society and therefore governed by forms of stratification which were economically based, but defined in terms of legalistic criteria, defined most of the lower orders as non-citizens. However, with the increase in trade and urbanization, these groups were more exploited and became increasingly conscious of their vulnerability. Consequently they had no stake in supporting the status quo. Paradoxically, tension and polarization, in contrast to the earlier period (before Christ) increased within Jewish society, manifested itself in the mutual contempt between Pharisees, Sadducees and the 'lumpen proletariat.'

The two forms of mass movements, as responses to changing social conditions, that is political revolt on the one hand and various forms of religious-messianism, on the other hand; had as one aspect a splitting apart of the Pharisaic group along clear class and ideological lines. As the opposition became increasingly revolutionary and violent in content, not only was Jerusalem and its religious-economic institutions threatened and finally destroyed, but increasingly during the third century more members from the non-Roman colonized provinces were co-opted and integrated into the governing power structure. This had the effect of making it non-profitable for scholarly and middle-class Pharisees to disassociate themselves from the rebellious masses. This had the
effect of uniting sections of the urban lower groups under the Zealots. Fromm attempts to trace this process of development in dialectical and historical materialist terms, showing the increasing class and ideological polarization within a Jewish society in which formerly all sectors reconciled their differences in the common hatred of Roman rule and Judaic religious identification. But the more radical the tenor of popular revolt, the more privileged Jews withdrew and reconciled themselves to Roman authority. This further weakened the power of the masses who were repeatedly crushed by imperial military force. One serious outcome was the emergence of civil war within Palestine and a war between Rome and Palestine. The futility of the anti-Roman struggle is partly symbolized in the charismatic, pseudo-messianic character of much of the rebel leadership. 78

The content of opposition to Roman rule indicates that no sharp separation can be made between religiously and politically expressed opposition. There is a long tradition of messianic expectations and eschatology in Judaic ideational forms preceding the 'arrival' of Jesus. Fromm stresses the function of apocalyptic literature, on the one hand, and the consistency of opposition and the appeal of such literature to the poorer classes, on the other hand, in the following terms:

The bleaker the hope for real improvement became, the more this hope had to find expression in fantasies. The Zealots' desperate final struggle against the Romans and John the Baptists' movement were the two extremes, (of religious and political expression) and were rooted in the same soil: the despair of the lowest classes.

From this stratum of the poor, uneducated, revolutionary masses, Christianity arose as a significant historical messianic-revolutionary movement. 79
"Primitive Christianity" and the Early Christian Community

With the abortive rebellion against Rome, and the disintegration of Judaism in Jerusalem and its environs, expressions of discontent take on increasingly class characteristics. The analysis of transition from the specific Jewish rebellion against Rome to the formation of early Christian communities and its incorporation of non-Jewish oppressed sectors of society is given slightly different focus in the work of Fromm and Kautsky. Where the former stresses a distinction between the Zealots and Sicarii resting on the sense of "hopelessness of realization" of the eschatological goals in earthly life, and the formulation of fantasies expressing a spiritual relief from oppression, Kautsky cites the Essenes (emerging as early as 150 B.C.) as a proletarian movement characterized by a "this worldly" communistic praxis, whose traditions were orally transmitted, and who were a community of consumption rather than production, sharing food, clothing and rejecting single family life styles. In other words, where Kautsky stresses that the ideological superstructure of primitive Christianity emerged from practical considerations, rather than eschatological reformulation, Fromm stresses the social-psychological adaptation to secular power (Roman imperial power), in the form of democratic orientations and brotherly love. What both thinkers stress however is the psychological attitudes of hatred against the rich and privileged and hope as common attributes of these communities. Primitive Christianity then had clear anti-institutional features and ideological characteristics. Fromm has remarked of these early Christian communities:
If Jewish society of the time was characterized by the extreme caste spirit pervading all social relationships, the early Christian community was a free brotherhood of the poor, unconcerned with institutions and formulas.

**Man: The Messiah Attains Divine Grace**

One of the doctrines, which is a pre-condition for the Church institutionalization of Christianity in the form of Roman Catholicism is the deification of Christ to the status of God. Although Christianity began to evolve as an internally structured and hierarchical organization long before the final, official acceptance of the "Homooonsian dogma," acceptance of the latter marks a crucial stage in the transformation from primitive Christianity to institutionalized Christianity. The Homooonsian dogma is the belief in the identity or unity of substance of God and Christ, Father and Son. But what is the anthropological and social psychological significance of this dogmatic transition?

Fromm suggests that corresponding to primitive Christian communes which emphasized an egalitarianism and hope, was the emergence of the idea that Jesus was a man, chosen to introduce the "new Kingdom," which would contain the suffering and oppressed, and messiah whom God would 'adopt' and exalt as his son. Fromm views the significance of Jesus' suffering and death, preceding adoption, as a powerful psychic force, which reconciled the oppressed individual with suffering as an indicator of his eventual triumph. In keeping with his most ambiguous anthropological formulation to date, i.e. the positing of the "patriarchal principle" at an abstract level of the ideational content of thought
The belief in the elevation of a man to god was thus the expression of an unconscious wish for the removal of the divine father. Fromm's explanation is that the oppressed having been physically defeated by the military and political power of a patriarchal imperial system, which appeared to have absolute secular authority, it would have been easy for the early Christians to extend that resentment to a patriarchal God and wish his removal, but the doctrine of the elevation of Jesus to the God, cancelled the monolithic "appearance of power." It was in Nietzsche's term a transformation, simply at the mental level what was defeat into "positive victory." Fromm suggests that the figure of a suffering Christ served a three fold function: a) provided a figure with whom the masses could identify; b) shifted some of the death-wishes against the father to the son; c) through identification, they themselves suffered and atoned for these very death wishes. Although Fromm refuses to term this identification as masochistic strivings, one could add a fourth function, that is that in universalizing suffering, the "adoptionist theory" allowed an individual internal contemplation of redemption (because such acceptance would imply a grounding in faith) to become a competitive "alternate reality," to the real lived reality. The theory provided a systematic alternate paradigm for analysis of all experience. In this way religion became that of the "oppressed pagan masses," since the epistemological framework no longer required a historical awareness. One of the weaknesses of the Frommian analysis
in this connection is that he views the change to Catholicism and a matriarchal principle critically, what he has not done is to develop adequately a critique of even the adoptionist theory and the concept of the messiah as an inherently conservative ideational principle. Nor does he question the status of the juxtaposition of matriarchy and patriarchy as a limiting dichotomization.

In spite of the ontological conservatism of the adoptionist principle, Fromm regards it as a revolutionary one. Fromm's dialectical analysis is weak on this point to the extent that he does not recognize the inherent contradiction in any totalization. Such a recognition implies the acceptance that new syntheses can formulate at the ideological level. Rather Fromm treats the decline of adoptionist theory as the termination of clear 'revolutionary' elements in the diachronic process. He is of course encouraged in this conviction by the attribution of matriarchal principles to Roman Catholicism. Thus he states:

The early Christian adoptionist belief was born of the masses; it was an expression of their revolutionary tendencies, and offered a satisfaction for their strongest longing.

This position leads Fromm to an implicit critique of all religion in Christianity as conservative. But unless he is to be involved in an obvious contradiction, he can be seen to be referring to institutionalized Christianity, since the formed critique is a "vulgar Marxist" critique, stemming from a misconception that Marxist methodology is essentially reciprocal, and therefore religion is a "super-structure" in some metaphysical sense. A view which orthodox Marxism has rejected.
Fromm suggests that institutionalized religion preserves the "interests of the governing classes." Fromm's conception of adoptionist theory as fantasy for the 'working classes' is ambiguous, the difference between it and the pneumatic viewpoint being that in the latter God becomes man, rather than any elevation of man.

So primitive Christianity is rejecting centralized secular political authority in the state, evolves various forms of "love communism," a religion of the most oppressed groups. The corresponding ideational system was the "adoptionist theory." But here too both the oppressed groups and the religious orientation were outside of the control and influence of the Roman and Jewish ruling classes. The bitter class hostility and hope are constitutive of the organizational and ideational characteristics of early Christianity; but they are also constitutive of a silence between classes and between early Christianity and other ideological interpretations, within the Roman empire. This silence renders early Christianity revolutionary, in a sense analogous that that articulated by Foucault as characteristic of the juxtaposition of reason and mental illness in Europe, up to the end of the eighteenth century. For Foucault also this renders mental illness a viable alternative to sanity, since insanity takes the posture of an 'autonomous other,' one whose legitimacy is not dependent as later on dialogue through the intermediary (the psychiatrist) psychiatry. Early Christianity too is not dependent as it comes to be later on on "professional theology" for its dialogue with secular society.

Where Foucault's aim is the archaeology of the silence prior to the end of the eighteenth century European experience, Fromm's task
is an anthropology of the silence and its break. Fromm's analysis throughout the remainder of his essay is not so much: why did this silence gradually recede into the background, disappearing completely by the third century, but rather how did this silence recede? To the latter question, Fromm provides a simple answer, it is the change in psychic attitude among the oppressed classes which lends meaning to the economic and material forces which he "isolates," on the one hand and this very changed psychic outlook manifests itself in the ideational content of later Christian religious dogma. Both sets of forces, Fromm argues, became increasingly synthesized in the institutionalization of Christianity, the Church and its tacit identification with the State. Fromm makes two further points worthy of note, first that this synthesis is not an entirely smooth process and cites the institutional expulsion of and suppression of Gnosticism and Montanism before the period of the Micene Council as a necessary part of the consolidation of religious-political power in the hands of the intellectual and priestly representatives of the political ruling 'classes.' Both Montanism, an attempt to separate Christianity from State power and to highlight the "Return of Christ," and the Gnostics who rejected eschatology, stressed "acute secularization," a rejection of "collective redemption and an assertion of the class stratification of society, . . ."; were suppressed by the early Church. The first was suppressed because it was in direct contradiction with the ideological orientation of the Church, the second because the doctrine pre-empted later Catholicism, but was out of step with the then consciousness of the masses. This is a paradox. However according to Fromm both processes can be best understood dialectically.
We turn now to an analysis of the earlier mentioned psychic change and the material forces facilitating dogma change. Of the second century of Christianity, Fromm stresses the nature of the psychic change in the following statement:

The real, historical world no longer needed to change; outwardly everything could remain as it was—state, society, law, economy—for salvation had become an inward, spiritual, unhistorical, individual matter guaranteed by faith in Jesus. The hope for real, historical deliverance was replaced by faith in the already complete spiritual deliverance. The historical interest was supplanted by the cosmological interest. Hand in hand with it ethical demands faded away.

Fromm asserts that the psychological response of the masses was an adaptation of the changed reality and the new response of the rulers toward Christianity indicates another level of psychological change to the earlier changed attitude of the masses. In other words after the destruction of Jerusalem, the masses increasingly and consciously turned to belief in the Messiah as a reality of deliverance. This is fantasy, but progressively the hatred for Roman authorities was no longer conscious and the revolutionary expectation was abandoned, so that by the fourth century, they were mentally prepared for the Homoousian dogma. Fromm puts this as follows:

If it was hopeless to overthrow the father, then the better psychic escape was to submit to him, to love him, and to receive love from him. This change of psychic attitude was the inevitable result of the final defeat of the oppressed class.

Fromm further suggests that because the real oppression and exploitation was not removed, the earlier aggression did not vanish, but was turned
toward the self, and away from their earlier objects, the authorities and the symbolic father. Fromm summarizes this as follows:

For them no longer were the rulers to blame for wretchedness and suffering; rather the sufferers themselves were guilty. They must reproach themselves if they are unhappy. Only through constant expiation, only through personal suffering could they atone for their guilt and win the love and pardon of God and of his earthly representatives. By suffering and castrating oneself, one finds an escape from the oppressive guilt feeling and has a chance to receive pardon and love.

Here Fromm can be seen as extending an analytical perspective, first developed in *Escape From Freedom*, in both the earlier Roman empire and in the Reformation, the escape takes the form of theological fantasy. Here however it is not the economically more prosperous but the more deprived groups who attempt to "escape." We suggest that anthropological significance of Fromm's proposition is that he attempts to show the genesis of the symbolic figure of the father, for contemporary culture.

The 'rulers' derived a twofold advantage from this change, partly facilitated by the Catholic Church's development of guilt and sin. First, it diverted the aggression of the masses and assured the rulers of the gratitude, love and dependency of exploited groups. Secondly, it relieved the rulers of the guilt feelings "they experienced because of the distress and suffering of the masses whom they oppressed and exploited." According to Fromm they came to believe that since the Son of God had suffered voluntarily, "suffering for the masses, was a grace of God, and therefore they had no reason to reproach themselves for causing such suffering."
At the level of the material changes taking place within the Roman Empire Fromm stresses that these were all changes toward a feudal class state. This is a strange use of terminology since more recent writings have stressed that the Roman Empire was an agrarian system, which is the consequence of small advances in technology, resulting in an enlarged economic surplus, and advances in military technology, and the 'conquest state.' But as Lenski has suggested these conquest states and especially Rome, until its decline, was not a feudal society in the classical sense, power was used to enhance the wealth of the governing class and the ruler. To the extent that public office was used to increase wealth there was substantial mobility within the system, for the governing class. 93

Under the impact of expanding "commerce" and more intense forms of war, not only did Christian ideas spread beyond Palestine. Fromm suggests from the middle of the second century Christianity, a) began to win followers among Greeks, Romans, Syrians, with an increasing internationalist ideology from the political centre. b) Christianity began to become prominent among sections of the ruling classes. c) Christianity began to adopt ideational features from Egypt and Greece, to mention two areas which were transformed into the later Homoensian doctrine (Kautsky, pp. 139-142).

But these were manifestations of the breakdown of local and national differences and the gradual 'feudalization,' i.e. the creation of compulsory work groups. Slaves and serfs, into hereditary groups and artisan
guilds in the towns. Forms of taxation increased corresponding to these groups. Another important change was the tradition set by Nero for other rulers whereby central Roman authority became the guarantor of some rights of the poor and slaves, but the latter were used as a counter-force in disputes between the rulers and the entrenched hierarchy (Kautsky, p. 129) and (Lenski, p. 241). Of course when Christianity became a state religion under Constantine, all of these developments spread with rapidity.

Christianity as official religion became internally hierarchical, corresponding to the wider society, for example the spread of ecclesiastical unions with authoritative leaderships displaced the egalitarianism of brotherly love. Love and grace were no longer dispensed by God, but now by the Church, the locus of morality within the empire. Fromm summarizes this change as follows:

Economic regression had supervened; the Middle Ages began to develop. The economic situation led to a system of social ties and dependencies that came to their peak politically in the Roman-Byzantine absolutism. The new Christianity came under the leadership of the ruling class.94

The dogma is thus in content an (ideological) ideational expression of change.

Synopsis

Both Fromm and Kautsky suggest that the new Christianity provided a universality and additional moral control for the Roman Empire in a way that neither the Mithras cult or any of many sects introduced earlier
succeeded in achieving. Christianity integrated the masses into the State, the Paulinian doctrine of acceptance and love and obedience to the master revived within Christianity. Thus the shift from man becoming God to God becoming man signalled an anthropological role to the Church as bastions of state power. As Fromm suggests (p. 69), the transformed Christological dogma and the religious organization as a whole, merely corresponded to the sociological function of religion in general, in the West. The Church does this by having the mediating power of salvation and by the Middle Ages, Roman Catholicism is characterized by the matriarchal orientation (the masses as her children) as represented in the 'elevation' of the Virgin Mary to mother of God, a transformation from recipient to dispenser of grace. But the father, patriarchal principle is represented by the notion of God as the final authority and the Pope as his representative and the notion of submission. This mixing is a highlighting of a process corresponding to the social structure of the empire.

Section 3 - Fromm's "Misplaced Critics"

There are at least two published works dealing almost entirely with Fromm's religious perspective. Both works stress however Fromm's concern with Protestantism, rather than Fromm's critique of institutionalized religion in modern history which as had been suggested above is itself part of the implicit diachronic viewpoint which I have termed Fromm's anthropology, since his aim ideally seems to be to identify specific institutional and psychological, cultural forces, operating to produce contemporary cultural symbols such as the father figure. I have further
suggested that Fromm's critique along the 'freedom from, freedom to' dimension is completed in a conceptual manner when his anthropological writings are integrated into his sociological ones. The incipient concepts of contradiction at one level and of alienation and regression used historically at another level derive perspective from this approach.

Both Glen and Hammond take Fromm's concepts of alienation and humanism out of perspective and discuss them abstractly, that is without the distinctly historical and materialist character given them by Fromm. We will examine the formulation of both thinkers individually and then look at them critically. We will take Stanley J. Glen's critique in Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, first because it attempts to be the most systematic.

Glen's work begins with the assertion that Fromm's critique of Christianity is essentially a Marxian one which starts from his conception of alienation as a product of the loss of self-esteem and ends as a thorough-going critique of evangelical Christianity in "every period of history." What Fromm tries to do, suggests Glen, is to draw affinities between his analysis of contemporary man's alienation and aspects of Biblical theology. The author then draws a similarity between Fromm's "humanistic self-realization" and that tradition of which John Dewey is a part. Hence the popularity of Fromm's work in America, comes from this tradition with a more radical social criticism, thrown in. 95

After suggesting Fromm's closeness to Dewey, Glen moves to what he terms a level of conservatism which is expressed in the religious context of Fromm's psychology. Fromm's "mystical atheism" indicates
a "lingering fascination for his earlier religious faith as indicated by the frequency with which he turns to the Old Testament and the Talmud for illustrative material." This fascination betrays a religious mysticism and a theological atheism, the former positive, the latter negative. This alternativism is for Glen vacuous, because it is devoid of any explicit doctrines of theology and intellectualization of faith.96 Fromm is seen as supplanting the "notion of feelings of oneness with God for the principle of "believing in God," without being sufficiently self-critical of its assertion that God is a symbol of man's powers, not one of God's power over man.97

Glen's major criticism is that because Fromm's critique of the Protestant gospel ignores the evangelical claims of Protestantism (that is that man is wholly in need of Christ) it holds to the popular misconception that the "depravity of man" means his reduction to the lowest possible degradation (that is, "God everything-man nothing"). Further Glen argues: "He (Fromm) then translates the formula into psychological terms, with the conclusion that such a God is sadistic and the submissive believer is masochistic."98 Glen suggests that Fromm's critique of the 'God everything-man nothing formula' that sees the formula as inversely proportional to the development of the economic pattern typical of capitalism. In other words that the particular formulation of "God and man" is a direct "ideological" manifestation of the structure of capitalism in its historical development. Moreover, Glen suggests that Fromm's thesis is that this also expresses the typical economic and political pattern of the German Nazi state, with the all-powerful God
representing the totalitarian dictator, while the completely surrendered God represents the subjugated citizen. Fromm is viewed as deriving his causal (not just coincidental) analysis from Weber—the idea that Protestantism is the religious correlate of capitalism. Glen suggests that Fromm however extends the conclusion to state that Protestantism is the correlate of Nazism. Glen concludes that what we see in Fromm's work is a psychoanalytical version of the Marxian critique of religion, which in turn derived it from Feuerbach. The remainder of Glen's work is devoted to rejecting this supposed formulation.

The main propositions on which Stanley Glen's alternative interpretation of the Reformation scriptures is based, are as follows. First that the word of God (theology) is a body of objective truth that interprets revelation, and that can be studied of itself and independently of life. This is his interpretive norm. Secondly Glen rejects the position that the interpretive norm is "the subjective life of man," or that theology is determined by man's character structure, or the economic situation. Glen summarizes his theological outlook in the following statement:

Obviously there is no recognition (by Erich Fromm) given to the possibility that the gospel in its essential meaning is a message objective to history and to economic, social and psychological conditioning and therefore unconditioned.

From this lofty position Glen concludes, in the positive aspect of his critique that it cannot be established—as Fromm attempts in "The Dogma of Christ"—that there were two gospels, a revolutionary and a conservative one, both corresponding respectively to a revolutionary and conservative or reactionary religion; during the transformation of Christianity.
Glen argues that the New Testament sources do not support the Frommian contention that there was an original Jesus who was a political messiah, who died as a suffering hero and was exalted to the status of God. Moreover, Glen argues, that the conception of two different gospels tend to reflect the outlook of the more extreme German liberal New Testament critics of the nineteenth century. Glen argues that the New Testament sources indicate that Jesus rejected apocalypticism. Rather, the emphasis is on the inner-directed spiritual source of man's inhumanity to man, rather than upon the social and economic environment. In short, Glen's aim is to prove that Jesus is incompatible with revolutionary activity, and tended to be a pacifist. The New Testament then argues that there is more to life than what is of economic or material importance, and it insists that man needs the assurance of the *ultimately good* purpose of the whole order of existence more than anything else.

What Glen does then is to develop a radical theology as a reaction to the very existential polarization of man of which he accuses Fromm, Marx and Feuerbach of establishing, that is the "God-everything-man-nothing" thesis. Where Fromm and others responded with the assertion of a thoroughly social man, Glen responds with a thoroughly spiritual man. This shows also the significance of the Nietzschian formulation that God is dead. ¹⁰¹ In other words to the supposed challenge of "God everything" of which Glen accuses Fromm, the former replies with the notion of Christ as the answer. Glen in order to do this simply provides alternative Biblical interpretations of grace in terms of the doctrine of predestination and depravity; of the meaning of sin as total depravity;
and of the relationship between God and man. In terms of grace, Glen suggests that it refers to the "gratuitous goodness of God" in his power to create, sustain and so on, this involves undoing what is wrong as well as restoring what is right. Finally Glen argues, the doctrine of grace suggests through the initiative of divine love that God knows man, before man knows God. Secondly, Glen argues that sin as total depravity in Lutheran theology really means guilt as objective guilt, with no reference to feelings of guilt as such. The relationship between God and man is one in which guilt and grace are interpersonal relationships of two different kinds, not substances as such. Thus the theology of the Protestant Reformation is relational, not substantive, and therefore capable of conceiving of the believer as a sinner and a saint at the same time, and of man as made in the image of God and yet depraved. It is Glen argues, the whole man in his relation to God, not his substance, which defines the totality. This is the paradox of God, rather than the simple logical meaning. Glen's most significant statement in the body of his critique is his assertion that Fromm views the relation between God and man as an interplay of faces in which 'the force of God' is inversely proportional to the force of man, and therefore fails to attribute any significant place to sin and forgiveness (in You Shall Be As Gods, Fromm devotes an entire chapter to sin and repentance). According to Glen, Fromm is pushed to this extreme interpretation because, like Weber before him, he was troubled by the existence of two conceptions of God; the kindly New Testament figure on the one hand, and the hidden God, the deus abscondis of Luther, i.e. the transcendent God, on the other.
Just as Calvin too had two notions of predestination, one Christological, the other philosophical, neither Luther nor Calvin reconciled these binary compositions. Glen's point then is that Fromm's analysis becomes a gross generalization in his critique of Christianity.

While there is little doubt that Fromm's conception of religion in 1950 (Psychoanalysis and Religion) reveals less concern with theology in the more integrated sense of You Shall Be As Gods, it is clear that Fromm's concern has always been of a fundamentally anthropological nature, rather than as a substitute for theology. Though Fromm does tend to give the impression that he is more concerned with an alternative religion (see Psychoanalysis and Religion, pp. 1-5) this arises from Fromm's concern with contemporary expressions of alienation. This takes us to Guyton Hammond's view of Fromm (in Man In Estrangement) on the problem of alienation, on which Hammond relates the views of Paul Tillich and Erich Fromm. The latter's view of alienation is termed naturalistic, the former's theological. 105

It is this alleged naturalism in Fromm which requires examination, though in its essential orientation Hammond's view of Fromm is more "balanced" than Glen's. Hammond's critique like that of Schaar's begins from the assertion that there are two somewhat contradictory tendencies in Fromm, the naturalistic and the humanistic. Fromm's attempt to view man as biological and psychic, leads Fromm not only on a quest for a "model of human nature," but also leads to a religious aspect in a naturalistic form. He sees Fromm's view of religion as existentialist in the Feuerbachian sense. 106 In that sense the concept of alienation
is central. Moving to Fromm's anthropology, Hammond suggests that Fromm views death as antithetical to life and cannot be incorporated into a philosophy of life, and the concept of God is understood by Fromm as a source of love for man. This conception of God is of course taken from Fromm's earliest work on religion. The author suggests that Fromm views man as becoming alienated, as a necessary consequence of the development of society and the development of consciousness. Hammond also provides a second concept of God as universality and in contrast to alienation. Therefore religion is man's answer to his problem of existence. Fromm is then seen as distinguishing between humanistic and idolatrous religion which is one form of regressive answer.

Here too we see the tendency to discuss Fromm's work in the binary terms which Fromm himself partly develops. What is missing in the critiques of both Glen and Hammond is that for Fromm human evolution and therefore the concept of God are historical problems, not ones which work according to "pre-historic values." In contrast to both Glen and to a lesser extent Hammond, it can be asserted that for Fromm alienation is not the primary concern in Fromm's anthropology, rather it is the concern with contradictions in the diachronic movement of structural categories. Fromm is asserting a metaphorical association between later Christianity and the patriarchal orientation which is not rigidly determined. This is distinct as a problematic from Fromm's historical and sociological analysis of a correlation between Protestant Reformation and authoritarianism. Where Fromm is concerned with metaphor, matriarchy and patriarchy are not substances, but qualities of relations as such.
Fromm has repeatedly asserted that he is not primarily concerned with theology for the existence or proof of the essence of God or man, rather in both cases the qualities associated with both are viewed in a dynamic context from the standpoint of the appearance of contradictions in the relationships between man and man and the impact of these relations for generating psychological characteristics.

Both Glen and Hammond are mistaken in their views that Fromm's theological and religious critique stem from his moral presuppositions, in the first instance—though it should be noted that Fromm partly gives this impression in his two earliest known works, to an English audience. Fromm's synoptic view of theology as a system, and the place of alienation in such an analysis cannot be simply deduced from Fromm's statements about religion as an institutionalized system. The latter is anthropologically and historically determined, the emergence of a patriarchal concept of God is historically specific. Glen and Hammond suggest that Fromm explains religious alienation as a product of loss of self-esteem. But Fromm does not utilize psychology to explain psychology. Rather Fromm is asserting that clear structural changes in the history of man, induce psychological responses which eventually penetrate to the level of the unconscious, for example there are two outstanding periods in the history of Christianity where the psychological responses are similar, the first is the defeat of the Am Ha-aretz in Palestine and the second is the displacement of the lower middle classes after the Renaissance; the first is military and political, the second, economic and social, but in both cases there is loss of self-esteem and in both
there are major advances for institutionalized religion and subsequent ideological syntheses. Between the institutionalization and the ideological syntheses however there is a broadening of the membership base as oppressed groups turn away from a secular toward a more spiritual interpretation of theology, on the one hand, and an internalization of and suppression of hostility, on the psychological plane, on the other. The point here is that where Glen and Hammond both suggest that Fromm's critique begins with psychological and existential precepts, this analysis stresses that Fromm's work on religion and theology began with anthropological analyses and work toward psychological conclusions.

**Summary**

Analyses of Fromm's anthropology have radical implications for his entire opus. The tensions revealed in his analysis of theology and religion stem from Fromm's inability to adequately integrate the positions of a Marxism with its focus on a materialist historical dialectic and the symbolic and psychoanalytic focus of Freud. The tension is particularly clear in Fromm's attempted continuity between the philosophical and empirical ethnographic anthropology. One of the conclusions of this analysis is that beginning with the notion of man as active (in contrast to Feuerbach) Fromm tries to demonstrate that for contemporary society the integration of church and state implies the "defeat" of the oppressed groups at strategic epochs. The bourgeois state, class exploitations and antagonisms are partly expressions of a "socio-historical praxis," at the level of structural analysis. These are
specific forms of idolatry. Idolology also expresses itself as idolatry at the ideational level. In this sense Fromm's analysis discredits Glen's critique of Fromm. Glen is mistaken in his view that Fromm conceptualizes Christianity's ideological element from a limited critique of capitalism and Protestantism which is essentially Weberian and Marxian.

Nevertheless there are two significant areas of Fromm's idealism which require mention, and elaboration in the subsequent chapter. The first is that Fromm like Feuerbach wants to transform the world by changing man's consciousness, although Fromm arrives at this from a position slightly different from Feuerbach. This conclusion constitutes a serious defect in Fromm's overall scheme, and is partially indicative of Fromm's bourgeois conception of man which comes up against his materialist interpretation of history. Not only does Fromm not tell us why the oppressed classes should reject force with a more militant eschatology, but he is unable to demonstrate that where "God uses force" it is simply tactical. This rejection of force is partly indicative of the contradictions between Marxism and humanism, to which Althusser alludes. It constitutes an "ideological bias" in Fromm's work. There tends to be a substitution of hope for force, and a concept of gradualism which emerges as the important lessons for history from the Old Testament Hebrews. For Fromm revolution proceeds in stages, since force is counter productive. Franz Fanon in his work on the psychology and organization of violence from the perspective of the oppressed gives a more adequate explanation for the failure of violence in classic colonial situations which throws light on Fromm's problematic. Fanon suggests revolutionary
violence tends to collapse where the politically most conscious elements in the society are approached in the first place (instance) for alliance or compromise. Fanon insists that in colonial situations, the politically most conscious groups have more to lose through use of force. In short Fanon looks at the psychic differentiation of urban and rural groups. He also suggests a vital organizational tie between political continuity and the points at which force emerge. In other words force and violence have to be subjected to structural and sociological analyses like other factors such as class. Thus alternative explanations for the first 'failure' of the Hebrew revolution out of Egypt and the oppressed Christian groups may be that, a) violence was not initiated by the Hebrew slaves, but by Moses who used it as a point of bargaining with the Pharaoh, rather than as an organizational and consolidating mechanism; b) the leaders of the Am Ha-aretz turned for alliances to the Pharisees and so alienated the oppressed groups, respectively. We turn now to the second weakness of Fromm's analysis.

Fromm's thinking takes the form often of binary oppositions. This is the case with his anthropological use of the concepts of matriarchal and patriarchal. Man's history prior to the "fall" is matricentricism, this is all a non-productive aspect of man's history, for there is non-individuation and lack of institutionalization. If this interpretation of the Old Testament texts is valid then Fromm would have difficulty explaining traditional matriarchal structures as anything but archaic and regressive, in anthropological diachrony. Thus, for Fromm, the entire Old Testament is an elaboration of the patriarchal principle
with the prohibition against symbiotic ties; or matriarchy is used in a particularistic sense. Here we see a bias which is partly characteristic of Freud also. Fromm view the maturing of science (and by implication technology) as outgrowths of rational thought since the sixteenth century and positive expression of the patriarchal principle. Later Protestantism is a negative characteristic of the same principle. This strict adherence to Bachofen and classical anthropology diminishes the vitality of Fromm's anthropology. The explanation of technology and science also partially explains why Fromm conceptualizes technology as an "independent factor" in his sociology. This latter point constitutes a serious defect in his work. Nevertheless Fromm's conclusions which are sound at the structural level and ambiguous at the ideational level is that the messianic time -- another expression of self-hood--which is revolutionary, is the historical answer to man's existential dichotomy. It is to this "revolutionary concept" of self-hood that the discussion turns.

"The Lord: No, they will conceive of a sacrifice so perfect that it could cancel off all their guilt, however mightily that guilt might be.
Satan: But only a god would be perfect enough for that!
The Lord: Quite right.
Satan: I tremble! You mean . . .
The Lord: Yes. And finally a cult will arise which holds that I, in my infinite mercy will send my only begotten Son as the perfect sacrifice for the Earth-People's redemption.
Stan: Send your Son, to redeem such vermin! What pride they have! What haughtiness! How perfectly revolting.
The Lord: Easy, my lad. This issue can't be solved by a hot-head. You must realize that this issue involves not only a principle of theological perfection, but also a principle of logical perfection. I told you that we should be hearing much about "perfection" before we were through."

FOOTNOTES


2 Both this question and the empirical material (i.e. theology and religion) which Fromm examines in his attempt, highlight the problem which emerges with any attempt to make connected assertions about human behaviour; and that is the unavoidability of the social scientist, taking an implicit or explicit position on two questions. The first is what relative weight should be given to empirical fact-gathering and to "formal deductive logic, the elaboration of analytical categories and their relationship to one another." The second question concerns the "moral position of the scientist in relation to his subject matter, . . . " Assertions about both questions underlie this dissertation; See Chapter 3; "The New Scholasticism and the Study of Politics," in Political Power And Social Theory: Six Studies, by Barrington Moore, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), esp. p. 89.

3 Cf. John Schaar, Escape From Authority, op. cit., p. 5. What Schaar could not have fully realized in 1961 was that Fromm like Freud went "back" to religious and theological writings in order to lead. Whatever the contrasts in the substantive aspects of the work of Freud and Fromm, their reversion to theological sources are similar. This appears to be true of other psychoanalysts such as Otto Rank, Carl Jung and so on.

4 It has been noted that the humanist tradition as well as the sources of a philosophical anthropology antedate the writers mentioned, in fact it precedes the Protestant Reformation if aspects of the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas and Dante are included. What is striking of these is the teleological quality of the debate, repeated to a large extent in the work of Hegel.


6 Briefly, metaphysical idealism may be defined as: the view that those traits which define man as a spiritual being can reveal through natural human experience, the understanding of the ultimate nature of reality. This is taken to be a specific rejection of revelation and an opposition to materialism. See M. Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 6. Positivism as defined above, rejects all forms of metaphysics, a search for repeated correlations of phenomena through direct observation and an explanation of phenomena in terms of such uniformities. Also that
such knowledge (scientific) constitutes the ideal form of knowledge. These characteristics constitute the core of Comte's teachings. Mandelbaum touches on the conception of materialism as a scientific epistemology of the nineteenth century when he states that materialists believed: that "there is an independently existing world; that human beings, like all other objects, are material entities; that the human mind does not exist as an entity distinct from the human body; and that there is no God (nor any other non-human being) whose mode of existence is not that of material entities." Cf. Mandelbaum, ibid., p. 22.

7The significance of humanism and of Kant and Hegel will be discussed more fully when the problems of "philosophical idealism" is taken up.

8Herbert F. Hahn, in The Old Testament In Modern Research, with a survey of Recent Literature (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), p. 7. Hahn cites the example of the conclusion of Wilhelm Vatke who in 1890 suggested, from a critique of Old Testament texts that the Hebrew religion underwent three changes. The first was the "age of primitive worship;" the second, "the age of ethical consciousness"; the third, the "age of the more external, ceremonial religion represented by the Levitical legislation." Vatke's work is suggested to be one of a host of religious reinterpretation of Christianity influenced by Hegelian implications for historicism.


10Cf. Martin Buber, Between Man And Man (New York: Macmillan Co., 1965), pp. 122-123. The assertion of philosophical anthropology as a "sub-discipline" as used in this context is not intended in an overall taxonomic sense but as a specification of one of the means by which anthropological knowledge can be obtained.


12I refer here to the works of Karl Bath's Church Dogmatics, Vol. I, and Reinhold Niebuhr's, The Nature And Destiny of Man, Vols. I and II (New York: Charles Scribner, 1964). In terms of writers of the above genre, the critical anthropological school emerging out of Engel's critique has a different ontologic relation to Feuerbach.

mechanism that attempts to satisfy man's needs and wants by overcoming his finitude. Through projection and subsequent objectification, man creates his ideal image. He creates God. It is the human imagination that projects and is thus creative" (p. xxiii). Objectification for Feuerbach, however, is the attribution of independent existence to projected human qualities. Feuerbach stated his principle of objectification and faith as follows:

Where the existence of God is a living truth, an object on which the imagination exercise itself, there also appearances of God are believed in. Where on the contrary, the fire of the religious imagination is extinct, where the sensational effects or appearances, necessarily connected with an essentially sensational existence cease, there the existence becomes a dead, self-contradictory existence which falls irrevocably into the negation of atheism.

See Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, op. cit., p. 203. The point has also been made by a number of writers including Engels and Vogel that Feuerbach was not the first philosopher to deny the existence of God as a supernatural existence, from the Sophists to Rousseau, there is a consistent tradition. Feuerbach's uniqueness is his explanation of the genesis of the notion of god in sensuous man, and the throughness and systematization of this explanation.

14 Ref. Manfred Vogel, op. cit., p. xxv.

15 Ibid., p. xlv.

16 Ibid., p. lxxiii.

17 Ibid., p. 36.

18 Ibid., pp. 68-72.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. lxiv. See also John Schaar, Escape From Authority, op. cit., pp. 125-126.

21 Ibid., p. lxvi.

22 In this context Marx and Engels are more in agreement with Hegel than with Feuerbach, first because the former hold that sense certainty is not the final criterion of truth, secondly because Feuerbach ignores the dialectic method. For Feuerbach the true dialectic is a humanistic principle, the dialogue between I and thou (ibid., p. 72). Thirdly because Feuerbach ignores the process of labour. Feuerbach's conclusion, therefore, that the realization of truth requires a change in man's consciousness is in radical contradiction to Marx's postulates. It is not within the scope of this discussion to engage in a systematic Marxian critique of Feuerbach, this is adequately done by Fredrick Engels in Ludwig Feuerbach And The Outcome of Classical German Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1935).
Feuerbach made one mention of the I and thou which lacks systematic discussion. Cf. L. Feuerbach, Principles Of The Philosophy Of The Future, op. cit., p. 72. See also Martin Buber, Between Man And Man, op. cit., p. 147.

Where Gouldner holds that entropy is developed in sociology, via the crisis of functionalism, this writer asserts that entropy is taking place after a long process of theoretical and ideological confusion. Cf. Alvin Gouldner, The Coming Crisis In Western Sociology, op. cit., pp. 373-376.

Cf. Louis Althusser, For Marx., op. cit., p. 11. Georg Lukacs, writing some quarter century prior to Althusser stated the same dilemma of Marxism as follows:

"When the problem of connecting isolated phenomena has become a problem of categories, by the same dialectical process every problem of categories becomes transformed into a historical problem." Though it becomes a problem of universal history which appears simultaneously as a problem of method as well as our knowledge of the present. And from this standpoint alone does history become a history of mankind, for it contains everything that leads back ultimately to men and the relations between men. Then again: "It is because Feuerbach gave this new direction to philosophy that he was able to exercise such a decisive influence on the origins of historical materialism. However, by transforming philosophy into 'anthropology' he caused man to become frozen in a fixed objectivity and thus pushed both dialectics and history to one side. And precisely this is the great danger in every humanism or anthropological point of view. For if man is made the measure of all things, and if with the aid of that assumption all transcendence is to be eliminated without man himself being measured against this criterion, without applying the same 'standard' to himself . . . , then man himself is made into an absolute and he simply puts himself in the place of those transcendental forces he was supposed to explain, dissolve and systematically replace. At best, then a dogmatic metaphysics is superseded by an equally dogmatic relativism."

Thus, states Lukac's, the failure to make man dialectical is complemented by the failure to make reality dialectical.

It is the eventual reign of Man. It is the ideological problematic from which Marx emerged. But for Marx humanism was the "theoretical principle of his world outlook and of his practical attitude." It was the basis for a "rigorous theory of history" and a "consistent political practice." Further, Althusser defines ideology as "the lived relation between men and their world, or a reflected form of this unconscious relation, for instance a philosophy . . . , etc." Ideology is distinct from science by the fact that the practico-social predominates in it over the theoretical. Historically, ideology precedes the science produced with an epistemological break, but it survives alongside science as an essential element of every social formation. Ref. L. Althusser, op. cit., pp. 222-223 and pp. 251-252.


28 Ibid., pp. vii-viii.

29 For an extensive discussion of the distinction between analytic-positive reason and dialectical reason, see R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper Reason and Violence, op. cit., pp. 10-13. See also L. Althusser, For Marx, pp. 90-93, where stress is placed on the epistemological aspects of the dialectic. Finally, George Lukacs in History And Class Consciousness, op. cit., discusses the problem of dialectical and analytical reason from the standpoint of the unity of theory and praxis and from the objectivist character of the criteria of academic science. Thus Lukacs stresses in his discussion the historical conditioning of all facts unearthed with a dialectic method. See pp. 5-15 of "What Is Orthodox Marxism." The simplistic characterization of the dialectic as a method in the human realm—a fact on which both Sartre and Lukacs concur—is as a relation between the knower (analyst) and known, and the nature of the known. The dialectic recognizes the historical moments of percept and concept, and aims not as 'totalities,' but as totalizations-detotalizations-retotalizations. Cf. p. 10, Laing and Cooper.


31 Ibid., p. 70.

Herder is asserted as one of the founders of anthropology because of his insistance on the unity of the human species. It should be noted that Harris traces anthropology to Locke's concept of culture in his *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1960); and Enlightenment thought.


38 Ibid., pp. 10-11. Fromm uses the terms radical humanism and socialist humanism interchangeably.

39 Ibid., pp. 10 and 13. Early in the introduction Fromm declares the intellectual nature of his value biases to be radical humanism, influenced by three Jewish scholars of humanist ideology, but with varying orientations of traditionalist mystic and Hasidic backgrounds. Ibid., p. 14.

40 Ibid., pp. 12-13

41 Ibid., p. 16.


43 In this sense, I do not regard the following Fromm's works as central to his anthropological perspective: *Psychoanalysis And Religion* (Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1950); *Zen-Buddhism And Psychoanalysis* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960).


45 Cf. ibid., p. 48. This writer has seen at least two brief references to the similarity between Fromm and Scheler, but this is not borne out in a reading of the literature. For the latter the higher values are an ethical a priori which is religious or sacred. These
values correspond to a hierarchy of men characterized by the "religiously superior" at one extreme and the "artists of consumption," at the other. It is bourgeois morality which eroded Christian morality, from the thirteenth century onwards, which are the roots of ressentiment, in Scheler's philosophical anthropology. Cf. Max Scheler Ressentiment, tr. W. Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 10-22.

47Ibid., p. 60.
49Erich Fromm, op. cit., pp. 177-180.
50These ideas are implicitly and explicitly stated in Fromm's two essays on Bachofen, see "The Significance Of The Theory Of Mother Right For Today" (pp. 79-83) and "The Theory Of Mother Right and Its Relevance For Social Psychology" (pp. 84-109) in The Crisis Of Psychoanalysis, op. cit., 1970. There are also positive aspects. Ref. The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 57. The concept of idolatry also requires definition. Fromm's notion of idolatry is similar to Marx's concept of reification and is used in an equally wide-ranging sense. "Man transfers his own passions and qualities" to a thing or essence outside of himself and worships it. "The more he impoverishes himself, the greater and stronger becomes the idol. The idol is the alienated form of man's experience of himself. In worshipping the idol, man worships himself. But this self is a partial, limited aspect of man; his intelligence, his physical strength, power, fame, and so on. By identifying himself with a partial aspect of himself, man limits himself to this aspect; he loses his totality as a human being and ceases to grow. He is dependent on the idol, since only in submission to the idol does he find the shadow, although not the substance of himself." See E. Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods, op. cit., p. 37. Also pp. 36-41.
52Cf. Erich Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 64. For summary statements of Fromm's view of phylogenetic evolution see The Art Of Loving, pp. 6-7; The Sane Society, pp. 23, 27-28.
53E. Fromm, The Sane Society, op. cit., p. 50. This cultural evolutionism is taken straight from the work of J. J. Bachofen. For example Marvin Harris states of the latter: "Bachofen's scheme, . . . ,
included not only the evolution of social organization, but also a parallel and functionally related evolution of religious ideas. Indeed for Bachofen it was a series of religious reforms that set the direction of history" (see Marvin Harris *The Rise Of Anthropological Theory*, op. cit., p. 200).

57 Ibid., p. 23. Fromm does imply that the idea of a God who resembles man was an 'archaic' one, and thus the Biblical interpreters imputed human psychological responses to God. He suggests in the same paragraph that this apparent archaism or regression is a step preparing the way for complete human freedom.
58 Ibid., p. 25.
59 Ibid., pp. 28-33.
60 Ibid., pp. 40-50.
61 Ibid., pp. 52-69. Fromm suggests that the humanist concept of man survives in the Jewish tradition inspite of the elements of nationalism which he explains in terms of the epochs of persecution and ghettoization of Jews in Europe. But the nationalistic attitude in the Bible is balanced by the principle of universalism. This universalism flourishes under socio-political conditions (for example the nineteenth century) where barriers are broken down (see pp. 66-69).
62 See ibid., pp. 96-98, for an extensive discussion of the messianic time in the biblical sense. Fromm conceives of the messianic time in the Hegelian sense of the 'master-slave' dialectical relationship. Both Paradise and the messianic time are states of harmony, but the latter is a consequence of man having been born, a future state; where a pre-condition of the former is that man is not yet born.
63 Ibid., pp. 151-157. See also pp. 79-87.
66 Ibid., pp. 102-103.
67 Ibid., pp. 93-94.
68 See pp. 110-111, especially footnote on p. 111 where Fromm
draws the parallel. Fromm is also wrong for another simple reason, i.e. that Marx did not in his concept of history identify serfs with exploited castes, with the working classes. The latter is a historically unique phenomena. Working class implies polarized groups in a specific structural sense. Serfs and landlords are opposed groups in another sense. The non-monolithic nature of Marx's "theory of history" cannot be overstressed. See Henri Lefebvre The Sociology of Marx, esp. "Sociology And Social Classes," pp. 87-122 (New York: Vintage Books, 1969).

69 See E. Fromm, You Shall Be As Gods, op. cit., p. 113 and pp. 121-124.

70 It is worth noting that although Fromm was acquainted with the alternative analysis of Karl Kautsky (The Foundations Of Christianity, tr. Henry F. Minns, New York: S. A. Russell, 1953); when he wrote his earlier essay "The Dogma Of Christ" which is an alternative analysis on the monotheistic sources of Judaism with strong oppositions to the historical and ideological authenticity of the Old Testament, Fromm chooses to ignore these sources in this second essay You Shall Be As Gods.


73 For extended definition and analyses of the concept of dogma see the writings of A. Harnack (1957), Martin Werner (1957) and Karl Kautsky (1953), also R. Niebuhr (1964), Vol. 11. While writers such as Harnack and Niebuhr define the problem of Christian dogma from the inception of this debate about God and Christ as though it were simply a problem of the divinity of Christ, a kind of theological-philosophical and epistemological issue about whether Christ is also God, in short about the continuity between Primitive and Hellenistic Christianity (Niebuhr, pp. 60-61), writers such as Martin Werner are closer to Fromm's conception of dogma. Werner defines dogma as the conditions (circumstances) in which at least two decades after the Crucifixion, two rival interpretations about the nature and mission of Jesus emerged. In this sense the synoptic formulations in theology are only surface manifestations of the history of dogma and the forces shaping that history. The ideological point of departure is the relationship of the death of Jesus to the Judaic messianic concept of Law. At another level it is the sociological causes of the transformation of the primitive Christian faith and its imminent eschatology about the transformation of the world order, the appearance of the Kingdom into the doctrines of early Catholicism. The ideational content of theology becomes that of order and hierarchy. (See Martin Werner, The Formation Of Christian Dogma: An Historical Study Of Its Problem (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1957, pp. 3-27.)
Whereas Werner looks at the problem of dogma as a whole, Fromm's analysis is only concerned with the specific period from the first to fourth centuries. Fromm also deals with the problem anthropologically in the sense that he examines it from a 'personality-social structure' perspective.

74 See E. Fromm, *Dogma Of Christ*, op. cit., p. 60.

75 Ibid., p. 10. It is worth noting that Fromm distinguishes between Freud's and his own study. He suggests that Freud aimed to study people (that is their psychic religious orientation and the inner power of religious doctrines) vis a vis a study of those doctrines. Fromm on the other hand aims to understand dogma on the basis of people. Ref. ibid., pp. 17-21. See also George Wilbur and Warner Mennsterberger (editors) *Psychoanalysis And Culture: Essays In Honor Of Geza Roheim*, Part I essay by H. Hartman, E. Kris and R. Loewenstein, "Some Psychoanalytic Comments on 'Culture And Personality," pp. 3-31, p. 4 (New York: International Universities Press, 1951); for mention of Fromm's anthropological posture as distinct from Freud's.


77 E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 25.

78 Ibid., pp. 27-34. Both Fromm and Kautsky provide adequate concrete examples of conflict, co-optation and repression within the empire. Kautsky, of course draws parallels at points with the French Revolution and particularly with the Paris communal revolt of 1871. Kautsky also suggests that sections of the opposition had designs not simply on overthrowing the Rome hierarchy, but of taking control on behalf of the oppressed Jews and spreading Judaism. These points are ignored by Fromm. See K. Kautsky, op. cit., Kautsky's interpretation of sections of the "book of Daniel," pp. 235-236. For an analysis of the nature of social mobility and the possible conditions for flexibility and therefore co-optation within the ruling elite see, R. Hopkins, "Elite Mobility In The Roman Empire," *Past and Present*, No. 32, 1965.

79 Cf. E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 36.

80 Cf. K. Kautsky, op. cit., pp. 258-271 and E. Fromm, pp. 40-48. The Essenes were originally Jewish proletarian groups which stressed puritanism, celibacy and asceticism and unfreedom of the will and fate, group exclusiveness and peasant agriculture. They existed around Palestine from the second century B. C. to the second century A. D.

81 Cf. E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 42. Like most eschatologies, early Christian ones stressed also the ultimate reversal whereby the rich would suffer punishment and the poor exalted to happiness.
82 Cf. E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 49.

83 Fromm does recognize a defusing of revolutionary content at this point. See E. Fromm op. cit., p. 52.

84 Ibid., p. 51.

85 Ibid., p. 69.

86 The pneumatic viewpoint evolves toward eventual and complete identity in the following manner: 1) Jesus, son of God begotten of the Father, before all time and of one nature with the Father; 2) The Arian similarity of natures but not identical natures is rejected in favour of the view that two natures are only one nature, i.e. the duality and simultaneity view. Ibid., p. 64.

87 Cf. Michel Foucault, Madness And Civilization: A History Of Insanity In The Age of Reason, op. cit., pp. x-xi. Foucault states this concept of silence in the following manner.

In the serene world of mental illness, modern man no longer communicates with the madman: on the one hand the man of reason delegates the physician to madness, thereby authorizing a relation only through the abstract universality of disease; on the other, the man of madness communicates with society only by the intermediary of an equally abstract reason which is order, . . . the requirements of conformity. There is no common language, no dialogue between them, . . . The language of psychiatry, which is a monologue of reason about madness, has been established only on the basis of such a silence.

Fromm also commenting on the characteristics of the early silence following the failure of the Pharisees to lead the revolutionary process suggests: Like John the Baptist, early Christian doctrine addressed itself not to the educated and the property owners, but to the poor, the oppressed and the suffering (p. 36). But an essential element structurally as well as ideationally was the struggle against paternal authority (p. 38).


90 Ibid., p. 67.


94 E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 65.

95 Cf. Stanley J. Glen, Erich Fromm: A Protestant Critique, op. cit., pp. 20-21. Some of the implications of Glen's conception of Fromm's similarity with Dewey will be taken up in the next chapter.

96 Ibid., p. 24.

97 Ibid., p. 25.

98 Ibid., p. 27.

99 Ibid., p. 27.

100 Ibid., p. 31.

101 Ibid., pp. 47-49.

102 Ibid., p. 52.

103 Ibid., pp. 52-54. In a subsequent section Glen deals with the "negativism" in Fromm, again in terms of grace, sin and God (ref. pp. 54-74). The main conclusion arrived at is that for Calvin and Luther, man was existentially guilty, but not necessarily evil.

104 Ibid., pp. 72-85.


106 Guyton Hammond, op. cit., p. 42.

107 Ibid., pp. 60-63.

108 I refer to Psychoanalysis And Religion (1950), op. cit. and E. Fromm and D. T. Suzuki and D. T. Martino, Zen Buddhism And Psychoanalysis
Both of these works have been highly criticized elsewhere. For a critique of the latter work, see for example Paul Wienphal, "Book Review," in Philosophy East And West, Vol. 15, 1965, pp. 81-82.

This point is elaborated and discussed in chapter six where Fromm's concept of self is critically examined.


CHAPTER VI

THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SELF

Why then become agitated? We have, on the one hand, various techniques, each of which exerts only partial action and can therefore be of no damage to man's total being. On the other hand, we have a myth, 'Man', which more or less defies him and in any case strongly affirms that technique is subordinate to the human being. What more could we want? (Jacques Ellul)

While Erich Fromm's anthropological strategy rests on his demonstration of the increasing "potential" of the human species for a creative self with the dissolution of symbiotic ties - that is ties to matriarchal orientations, ties to blood, soil and a protective authoritarian deity; the sociological corollary focuses on what happens to that potential and the diachronic relations with the advance of technology and industrialism. As was suggested in the previous chapter to fully comprehend the sociological strategy implies an analysis of the anthropological one, equally however, a comprehension of the notion of potentiality implies some inquiry into the underlying connection between Fromm's view of technology, his analysis of power and the option of consciousness through education (in its broader senses) for the notion of self as becoming as ability, rather than simply capacity. The anthropological and the sociological strategies taken together constitute
the main framework of the Frommian opus.

But it is on the latter that any synoptic evaluation of Fromm's work must, in the final analysis, be based. This chapter has as its principal task such an evaluation, which takes the form of the question: "what are the implications of the freedom from - freedom to postulate for the selfhood of modern man?" It is clear that the notion of selfhood is distinct from the notion of "productive character", for the distinction rests on the fact that where the former is non-specific emphasizing essentially the individual's capacity to transcend the given society, stressing creativity and the species capacity for it, the productive character is a specific concept referring to the means (a category not at all finalized in Fromm's opus) for such creativity. This distinction cannot be overstressed largely because the area of selfhood is probably the least developed and specific of Fromm's works.

It is also one of the areas in which many critiques of Fromm's opus tend to become bogged down for his critics tend to argue that he is either a) passing off ideology as critical human science and so justifying the status that is to say not recognizing an essential truth in Freud, the contradiction between the individual and society quo, (Marcuse 1955, pp. 242-243; Harry Wells (1963); Y. Lowenfeld (1960). Or b) that Fromm misunderstands the phenomenology of liberty and authority and so essentially advocates
democratic rule by whim or desire (J. Schaar (1961), pp. 288 and 295 and R. Grotesky (1967)) and or exempts some of his own "objectives" from the determinism which he himself (Fromm) wants to avoid (Henry Kariel (1957). While it is by no means our intention to suggest that there are no ambiguities in Fromm's work, we suggest that those ambiguities are not satisfactorily explained in terms of Fromm's work as liberal ideology on the one hand or scientistic determinism on the other, rather they rest on the different contexts - in this connection - between Fromm's use of, and allusion to the notion of, the self and to the concept of the productive character as social character. In line with the earlier distinction struck between concepts at the infrastructural level and those at the empirical theoretical level it is suggested here that Fromm's concept of the self is at the just level of articulation and his concept of the productive character is at the second level. The epistemological problem which underlies Fromm's conception of the self is not unique to his work alone, but underlies the entire attempt to integrate and synthesize social psychology and sociology. The problem is best expressed in one of Fromm's recent works, where he states:

"there is a tremendous difference to be found between our most undeveloped ancestors and civilized man as he appears in the last four to six thousand years of history. On the other hand, if one accepts an evolutionary concept and thus believes that man is
constantly changing, what is left as a content for an alleged "nature" or "essence" of man?"

A little later in the same text Fromm suggests that selfhood is the transformation through activity into realization of our essence but such a transformation implies the "real possibilities" which are determined by the "total situation". Selfhood as freedom then lies in the "possibility to choose between the existing real possibilities (alternatives). Freedom in this sense can be defined not as 'acting in the awareness of necessity' but as acting on the basis of the awareness of alternatives and their consequences. Social character in the form of the productive character is not an end in itself - in the long run - but a means a "real possibility", at the level of Fromm's empirical psychology. Fromm is likely to be misconstrued because he has not made this point explicitly. Conversely, the transformation of the socio-economic system of modern society is not an end itself but a precondition, a means to the realization of selfhood. This line of interpretation is in keeping with Fromm's repeated assertion in his recent works that the social character is a canalization and channelling of forces in a given direction but not a thing in itself and for itself. It serves to "explain the link between the material basis of a society and the "ideological superstructure". The real difficulties of Fromm's position in terms
of his conclusion then does not rest on his concepts of the self or his concepts of social character and so on. Rather the difficulties stem from his sociological analysis itself. Put more specifically it stems from the "empirical" analysis of the particular processes of elimination which led from to the treatment of technology, in modern society, as though it were an independent variable, from the lack of a systematic critique of the content of such technology. Thus Fromm tends to argue that part of the process of changing the material preconditions of the society in order to facilitate the operationalism of the productive character must involve a change in the direction of technology, but he says little that is substantive about the real difficulties involved in this, but rather implies that this can be achieved through a process of 'education'. Put more generally this implies changing man's consciousness. But what are the possibilities for this in modern industrial society? What concept of power does such advocacy imply? And to what extent does such a critique of Fromm's render his translation from social psychology to sociology a form of sociologism, just as his anthropology suffers from an evolutionary simplification - the inability to recognize elements of quality in the inter-relations of primitive or traditional societies.
The assertion that the ramifications of meaning implicit in Fromm's concept of the self, cannot be treated lightly; once it becomes clear that the self is an infrastructural component of the opus. Points of reiteration of issues discussed earlier in Chapter Two are unavoidable at this stage of the work, for what is involved here is a drawing together of the threads of interpretation engaged in so far.

In the first Summary of Chapter Two we suggested that where Fromm's concept of human nature is viewed in terms of essence and existence, essence becomes method and value, in the sense that philosophers of science have articulated clearly - and Fromm has tacitly adopted their stance - that in order to penetrate below the illusions of society as well as to pose questions relevant for a human sciences, necessitated a concept of essence which transcends behaviourism. We also suggested in that chapter that the concept of character, its integration of social-psychology and sociology, were predicated on such a concept of essence. But all this is at one level of theoretical analysis, the methodological. At another level of Fromm's work, the empirical theoretical and synoptic level, and thus in terms of some of his concrete conclusions, the concept of essence re-emerges in Fromm's notion of the self. We see for example in Fromm's 'anthropology' the attempt to inject into his notion of essence a
historical proof which could complement the analytical and methodological assertions, and it is in this sense that his anthropology and sociology are interconnected. We can view the tracing by Fromm of changing relations between man and God leading to the notion of autonomy as evidence of this project, so that the self which Fromm adheres to, is one which he believes to be historically and institutionally, a specific one to modern man. The problem however is that a clear conception of the self while clear enough as an infrastructural conception in the form of the notion of human nature underlying the Frommian development of the concept of character in his orientation to social science, is by no means clear in another part of Fromm's work. In the area of Fromm's concrete empirical work the concept of self is at times latent, at other times garbled and confused, with a tendency to become rhetorical. Here we see at some points a tendency in Fromm to confuse the concept of productive character and the concept of the self. If the line of interpretation that productive character, is fundamentally a means to selfhood, is a correct one, then such confusion constitutes a major weakness of Fromm's work and puts one in a better position to understand the kernel of validity in many of his critics' assertions about Fromm's works. It is important to recognize two points stemming from the foregoing remarks,
however. The first is that many of Fromm's critics (discussed in detail throughout the work here) have only a kernel of validity, where they recognize ambiguities and unclarities, but that the distinction between 'means' and 'end', between character and selfhood is latent in Fromm's work. The second point is that there is a substantive and methodological connection between the ambiguities with respect to character and selfhood and Fromm's treatment of power and technology, particularly Fromm's treatment of physical force as an agent of social change. Briefly Fromm's humanism leads him to reject physical force as a viable agent of social change which could yet lead to man's selfhood. Although he wants to view that selfhood as becoming, creativity and realization of powers within man, without specifying in detail the substances of selfhood, since this would render his work deterministic and no less totalitarian than his opponents (who could then accuse him of extreme social engineering); Fromm consistently rejects the use of physical force even against the authoritarian state, and favours instead 'education', self-realization and consciousness as a vehicle of social change. When Fromm asserts the necessary precondition of the socialization of the means and forces of production, as 'elements' of material socio-economic change, he is justifiably attacked by Marcuse and Harry Wells of being rhetorical. Nevertheless the Frommian ambiguity has to be
viewed as originating in the concept of selfhood which Fromm holds.

Two tasks are necessary before moving to the more 'concrete' discussions of the chapter about these key issues in the conclusions of Fromm: the first is to quote a few sections from Fromm's writings where he takes up the link between psychology and sociology as psychoanalysis and Marxism (in order to demonstrate our assertion that the distinction alluded to above is latent, rather than manifest); the second is to engage in a short discussion of the methodological value of the concept of selfhood as it relates to this chapter. This involves examination of the brief outlines of the advantages in perspective of such a concept as infrastructural.

Fromm's concern on the first point is seen in the following statements:

"What is the primary importance of this kind of social psychology (i.e., characterology) for sociology? Its primary value lies in the fact that it enables us to understand the libinal forces that find expression in character, in their role as factors which work to further (or inhibit) the social development of a society and its productive forces. . . . . . The application of psychoanalysis will not only provide sociologists with useful viewpoints in their study of these questions; it will also prevent the uncritical use of false psychological categories". 5

Fromm's meaning in this statement is in keeping with his often repeated assertion that conventional social psychology can at best have a negative function, i.e. tell
us what man is not, but that it could not elucidate and present positive values for self-development. But such a statement begs the question for the use of terms such as "productive forces" imply positive direction. Elsewhere Fromm's statement on the "psychology-sociology link" is less guarded; for example in his essay "On The Limitations And Dangers Of Psychology", he discusses the integration of "market psychology" and "human relations" and then integration with modern economics and market research disciplines with "benefits" for capital investment and consumption patterns. Later on he articulates this integration within the context of aspects of psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic knowledge's reinforcement of popular beliefs on the simple attainment of happiness. Both reinforce the alienation of therapist and patient. He summarizes these points as follows:

Psychological knowledge (Meuschenkenntnis) has assumed a particular function in capitalistic society. A function and a meaning quite different from the meaning implied in "Know thyself". 6

While the foregoing statements are clear as examples of Fromm's critique of knowledge (psychological) and its use in modern society, and his position on "negative psychology", it is less than clear on how selfhood is possible at the level of dyadic relations. This poses difficulties for Fromm's work on the positive path to
selfhood, and the role of knowledge in this context. There is little in his work beyond his assertion of the need for love and commitment. Though he suggests desperation for closeness with the other may lead to a search for knowledge - a type of psychological knowledge which is a form of coercion, a forced penetration of the other and hence the destruction of the other - which is in effect power over the other. ⁷

Is such prevarication satisfactory? To say that psychological knowledge can be liberating or oppressive while satisfactory in other contexts, raise critical issues in relation to selfhood as positivity. And the closest Fromm gets to investigation is his identification of such knowledge as forms of power, which are again translated to the level of character structures, a manageable level at which one could treat problems of power as sadistic, destructive and so on, in terms of one's binary structures (set out in The Heart Of Man). Such a treatment constitutes a major methodological shift from the dialectic logic (where the concept of contradiction is central) of a "Marxian psychology" to analytic logic. The fact that Fromm explains the 'power process' in dyads in terms of the unconscious motivation to dominate others does not detract from this criticism. It is not so much Fromm's conclusion that the pattern of behaviour is pathological which comes under criticism - other
psychologists such as R. D. Laing, Thomas Szasz and Erving Goffman arrive at the same conclusion - it is rather Fromm's failure to provide systematic analysis of the self as praxis, that is to tell us how the behaviour is pathological. 8

The use of the terms "sadism" and "destructiveness" as applied to descriptions of the self-other orientations which result in knowledge and power as substitutes for commitment, and love" are unhelpful to the extent that does not provide in-depth explanation of the ways in which those who control the "definition of the situation" in dyadic structures, hold social power. 9 Where Fromm's analysis of power as physical force is viable at the socio-structural level, tend to become reifications at the interpersonal level of analysis. Can a praxis be explained in terms of itself? 10

As was suggested in the previous chapter Fromm's "descent" into analytic logic can be traced 'back' to his anthropology where for example he relies on a metaphor to force an explanation of contemporary man's orientation to self and other as child-like, or resembling that of "a primitive idolatric tribe." Such a linear evolutionary perspective tantamount to stating that what is "primitive or traditional" is necessarily lower on the "diachronic scale." 11 In this sense Fromm's work has a conservatism and a radicalism. One aspect of the whole which allows us
to see this conservatism is in his view of technology and power, in modern society, which constitutes at the psychiatric level, the absence of critique, except for Freud. Fromm pays little attention to the work of critics such as Foucault and Laing and David Cooper, whose works have been criticized as existential by Fromm.

"Things are going to be difficult if you tell me that I am experiencing something which I am not experiencing. If that is what I think you mean by unconscious experience. As far as I know, there is no comparable practical and theoretical set of problems in natural science. . . . . Only some psychologists seem to be unaware of this. . . . . It is premature to speak of an already existent systematic method of investigating the field of inter-experience, let alone the phenomenology of such a method." (R. D. Laing, Self and Others12).

The methodological problem of the self in metapsychology is not whether the first thing given to each of us is the self, or whether the first thing we grasp is "another human being in his body, movements, gestures and so on. As Laing succinctly stated it, metapsychology has to begin with somebody's experience, the problem is whose and or what experience? The latter part of the question has been answered by a variety of psychologists, philosophical anthropologists and sociologists with the notion of the "We". The works of Laing and Cooper pose a challenge for contemporary social science and psychoanalytic praxis by asking the question whose experience is the 'We'
experience. Schutz makes it very clear that his concept of the *lebenswelt*, which is central to his sociological task of interpreting social action for 'selves' and 'self': takes its starting point in the pre-givenness of the 'We' to the 'D' and the 'Self'. By modifying the concept of the 'We' with the alter-ego, Schutz proclaims that it is a "sufficient frame of reference for the foundation of empirical psychology and the social sciences". While this type of typification takes cognizance of the classical discoveries of G. H. Mead on aspects of the self process in early socialization and Jean Piaget heteronomous and autonomous orientations in early childhood and so on, it generalizes the scheme. Laing and Cooper's work assert two things with respect to the question whose experience is the 'We' experience and thereby throw light on the sociological and synoptic value of the self concept: the first is that the essential 'We' historically is the modern bourgeois family, the second is that the we is primarily characterized by a series of collusions, illusions, coercions and repressions. David Cooper's rejection of absolute moralities at the level of the dyad in this connection is based on his assertion that the family's codes like the wider society's have been frozen and abstracted 'out of time', processes of self, then, involve serial repetitions, there is a family which is oriented solely to security which it achieves by teaching submission and the 'glueing' of human beings as halves to each other. There is also by
early adolescence an interorganization of the same family within us and the wider world is itself a repetition and the model of the same family. In many ways Cooper's work is a viable synthesis of the formulations of R. D. Laing and his colleagues.

As will be shown later in the discussion while Fromm stresses the problem of individuation, there is no systematic critique of the contemporary family in capitalist society, whatever the weaknesses of Cooper's own critique, to this extent, Laing and Cooper's work attempt to articulate the problem of selfhood as ability, whereas Fromm's analysis still tends toward a critique of the self as capacity. The real question is, however, why is Fromm's concept of selfhood equivocal in parts and what is the relationship between equivocality and Fromm's concepts of power, the state and technology? We turn to this question.

From 'Socialist Humanism' to American Functional Sociologism: War or Peace

"The voices of reason must declare themselves first in private chambers all over the world, even behind Iron Curtains and Chinese Walls; then rise in the quiet exchanges of friend with friend, of work fellow with work fellow, until they swell into a confident public command: 'Men and brothers, let us come to our senses and behave like men'. For there is no valid human goal, neither freedom nor solidarity, neither capitalism nor communism, that will not be obliterated in the total madness that will be the fruit of total war." (Lewis Mumford, 1954).
Few statements uttered in recent years better characterize the underlying appeal of the Frommian grand opus. But such 'dreams' tend to evoke skepticism among many social scientists about the core of meanings underlying the poetic prose. Without an elucidation of such core of meanings Fromm's work will be ignored, justifiably by 'tough minded' social scientists. The Frommian grand opus reflects a concern with human development which has three broad aspects. The first is a reflection of the Institute of Social Research and Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung - and the German refugee intellectual tradition, that is the dual concerns with a theoretical articulation of fascism and communism on the one hand, and an identification of the conscious and unconscious forces at a group level which are vehicles for these systems. Fromm's concept of social character is largely a partial resolution of this problematic.

The second aspect of Fromm's concern - partly reflect his influence by the North American intellectual tradition. This is the intra and inter systemic rivalry of the two powerful blocs, the Soviet Union and China, on the one hand and the United States and capitalism on the other. Here the concern is with a total holocaust, in the form of a third world war and the possibilities for nuclear disarmament. This concern emerges clearly in 1955, 1961 and most clearly in 1968.17 Thirdly, the
sharpening of focus on the probabilities of a final nuclear holocaust leads Fromm to an interesting conclusion about individuality in the Soviet Union, Communist China and the U.S.A., namely that in all three human freedom and the possibility of selfhood as futurity is thwarted, that true individuality does not exist. In all three systems states Fromm there is neglect of the affective side of man and a worship of the intellectual side. Fromm's position is based on the view that the emphasis on industrial production and economic and military competition in the case of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and the rapid discovery of new techniques for the mobilization of human resources in China have as a consequence a neglect of individuality. In one sense then there is a form of convergence between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in many of their structural features and orientations. In terms of international politics only some countries of the Third World, the "independent democratic socialist" states such as Yugoslavia and India, reveal a varying picture. This type of perspective largely reflects the influence of the North American intellectual tradition on Fromm's development. For example the role of industrial and military technology and organization are vital factors in the notion of 'convergence'. Similar views are held by widely scattered (ideologically) social scientists from Daniel Bell and
David Riesman of more conservative persuasions to Lewis Mumford, and C. Wright Mills, George Novack and others on the political 'left'. The difference however is that both C. Wright Mills and Novack regard the 'convergence' as resting on the existence of alienation in the three types of societies, with less focus on the problems of nuclear war probabilities.

The enlargement of Fromm's sociological canvas has radical consequences for Fromm's view of the self in modern society. Here the analysis set out in May Man Prevail will be reiterated in outline and its implications for his view of technology, power, the state and violence will be established. It is clear from a recent interview, that for Fromm the problems of nuclear war and individuality are not just ideological or distant political problems, but in fact vital to all of his work. Fromm tacitly agreed with the view that technological development had far outstripped man's emotional development and in fact was in contradiction with it. Moreover it is clear that he believes an international solution to the 'arms race' was somehow related to dehumanization and alienation. For example Fromm states:

"If we can avoid war, then I will be very optimistic. I would have faith that man would overcome even the potentially dehumanizing effects of industrialization."
Fromm goes on to suggest that paranoia in international relations would have to be eradicated together with a change in the direction of political thinking, with the Soviet Union, as a state, managed bureaucratic society, with a population naively oriented to material welfare as the road to salvation. He gives the impression that what has to change is the direction of thinking and technology. Thus for example, he supports the peace research scheme. 19 Fromm the Marxist seemed to have receded to the background. But what does it mean to change the direction of technology? And what is Fromm's view of propaganda, myth and ideology in the complex systems of international relations, he describes, is it an adequate view? These questions are central to a comprehension of the subtle change in Fromm's recent thought. For as was suggested earlier there is a connection between Fromm's view of violence and social change in his anthropological analysis of Old Testament texts and his view of the solution to contemporary world problems. What is under scrutiny is not the challenge of world peace and the return to a human society - this has been the theme of a host of writers over the last few decades - but the specific analysis which Fromm offers, and his solutions. 20

While a theory of authoritarianism remains a task for Fromm, he does not refer to it as the central problem of the modern world. In contrast to the thematic structure
of Escape From Freedom, in May Man Prevail, the central problems are the threat of nuclear war on a vast scale or the use of missiles aimed at limited targets but accidentally or otherwise initiated by one of the major powers, on the one hand, and "the future course of the underdeveloped nations, which comprise a majority of the human race", on the other. In other words there are two aspects of a "revolutionary" process in politics and technology with due consequences for all mankind. While the technological and productive ability to produce the most 'efficient', computerized and speedy weapons systems is a reality; signalled by the stockpiling of armaments. The large proportion of the productive capacity of the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. is devoted to a weapons industry and the high status of military strategy in both societies. Viewed in the light of the self-conception each power has of itself and the other, the threat of war through accident or design, is always present. At the same time a socio-political upheaval, since the 1940's has been occurring among the colonized and less industrialized nations, for industrialization, an end to exploitation and so on. From the standpoint of the latter countries Fromm asserts:

"They insist not only on obtaining political independence but also on rapid economic development." (p. 249).
Within the context of this aim of decolonization and political economic development, but from the standpoint of the major powers - the United States, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China there is competition for the "hearts and minds" of the peoples of the developing areas. This means that there is an extension of the polarization of the Cold War and its residual elements into the "newly developing areas". Fromm explains the basis of this struggle in terms of the following historical processes:

1) The two World Wars coincided with violent revolutionary processes of change - first in Russia, then China which has culminated in large scale economic and political advancement in these countries. Both these countries therefore provide 'models' for the developing nations. So that the question is not whether these colonial nations will join the communist or the capitalist systems, but whether they will "accept the Chinese or the Russian form of communism,..." (pp. 14-15). (Fromm conceptualizes three models of non-capitalist development, (a) "Krushchëvism, a system of complete centralized planning and state ownership of industry and agriculture,"; (b) Chinese communism, ..., a system of total mobilization of its most important "capital asset", people, and complete manipulation of their physical and emotional energy, without regard to their individuality. (c) humanistic socialism, which ties to blend
a minimum of centralization, state-intervention and bureaucracy, with a maximum of decentralization, freedom and individualism (p. 14).

(2) In contrast to the nineteenth century picture, when the socio-economic gap between the classes in capitalist societies was wide, this gap is increasingly being narrowed between the 'haves' and 'have-nots' within Western industrial countries, however the socio-economic gap between 'rich' and poor nations has been widening, while the militancy of the latter has been increasing in the twentieth century (p. 11). On this point Fromm states:

"Two thirds of the human race are unwilling to accept a situation in which their standard of living is only from 10 to less than 5 per cent of that of people of the richest country - the United States - which with six percent of the world's population produces today 40 percent of the world's goods".23

Fromm asserts that the colonial revolution and its increasing militancy was sparked by the weakening military and economic dominance of traditional European colonial powers after 1918, and the dissemination of ideology and technological ideas with revolutionary potential.

(3) The emergency of China as a successful socialist state has two major consequences. The first, is an increasingly tension filled relation between itself and the U.S.S.R., as the latter has advanced industrially and materially it has come to be a "have" country, "threatened" by the militancy
of the underdeveloped countries. Secondly, China has become the moral leader of the developed countries. Thus the U.S.S.R. has come to seek a detente with the U.S. without turning this into an overt alliance against China. (p. 12).  

(4) Western capitalism has undergone considerable change due to a separation of ownership and management of invested capital (Ralf Dahrendorf makes this point in Class And Class Conflict In Industrial Society, 1959). It is therefore subject to the very criticisms directed against Dahrendorf. There is also massive state intervention in the economics of Western countries, particularly with the concentration on the armament's industry. Fromm's position on the relationship between the "technostructure and state in modern capitalism is paradoxical, for whereas he admits that there is an "increasing element of state planning in Western capitalism", through massive state intervention - he even recognizes the Atomic Energy Commission as the largest industrial enterprise in the U.S., he nevertheless holds the view that this does not imply overall planning in the U.S.; and that "some measure of competition in Western systems still exists." This position is very ambiguous, since, we can for example, note in passing the view held by J. K. Galbraith that not only does the Federal State account for between one fifth and one quarter of all economic activity and
regulate the total available income; but also "technological compulsions and not ideology or political will require the firm to seek the help and protection of the state". The problem of industrial planning goes beyond the reach of the industrial firm. The weakness of Fromm's analysis is that he implies that state intervention is a matter simply of military strategy and ideology. Fromm then holds the view that it is partly the necessity, but mainly an ideology of planning as a means which underscores both state capitalism in the West and state ownership in the East. Thus Fromm arrives at his first important solution to alienation under Western capitalism in the following terms:

"The Soviet system is not the opposite of the capitalist system, but rather the image into which capitalism will develop unless we return to the principles of the Western tradition of humanism and individualism."27

The viewpoint that, on the criteria of concentrated ownership of capital, bureaucratic management of production and manipulation of consumption; twentieth century capitalism is different only in degree, not quality, from Soviet communism is erroneous (p. 81 Fromm). This takes us to the fifth point of Fromm thesis.

(5) Fromm explains the "convergence" between the Soviet Union and the United States in particular and Western capitalism on the whole, in terms of the rigidification of
forms of social stratification within the Soviet Union. He uses two factors to assert this similarity: monetary incentives and partly deriving from this is status reinforced by occupational mobility and educational opportunity. This position will be criticized more fully later in the chapter, suffice it to say that this type of analysis suffers from some of the worst methodological defects of sociological functionalism. For Fromm concludes his discussion of similarities between both systems on the following note:

"Russia is still a reactionary state; we are still a liberal welfare state. . . . . The Soviet system will shift to the same means that are used in the West: the methods of psychological suggestion and manipulation that give the individual the illusion of having and following his own convictions, while 'his' decisions are in reality made by the elite of the 'decision makers'".29

While in one sense Fromm's isolation of the problematic of inter and intra system rivalry and the threat of nuclear war shows the scope of his concern with the potential for selfhood, his articulation of this problematic is grossly incomplete, for he has devised an analysis which gives priority to ideology and technology. However much means adapted within socio-economic systems resemble, similar means do not imply similar political or human ends. Stalinist propaganda apart, there is little doubt that alienation exists within Soviet bloc, but the
essential difference between the Soviet bloc and China on the one hand and Western capitalism on the other, is that the ownership of capital and the resting place of profits is in private hands in the latter system. The relative closure of the 'gap' at the intra system level in the West does not reflect a redistribution of this capital, on the contrary, indications are toward greater concentrations of capital (in the classic Marxian sense) into fewer private hands, in all the major capitalist countries. The modern nation state in capitalist economics may serve through its various mechanisms to redistribute specific sources of the national income, but it does not serve to redistribute capital, that is privately owned capital. While this discussion is not primarily a treatise on economic theory, it is worthwhile quoting again from Mandel's extensive treatment of the problem:

"The evolution of present-day capitalism is said to be not towards a concentration, but, on the contrary, a dispersion, an ever-greater levelling of incomes. So far as wealth and property are concerned, especially the ownership of industry and property in capitalists' savings, these allegations are a crude untruth: all the facts we have point to an increasing concentration of this ownership." (p. 335 Vol.I).

Mandel then provides a systematic breakdown of the States' income in terms of direct and indirect forms of taxation for the U.S.A., Great Britain and France, as well as Denmark and Belgium for a period varying from 1937 - 1949
and concludes that the effect of redistribution of income in favour of the working classes is slight or non-existent (except in capitalist countries during specific economic crises, or a lost war, when there tends to be some redistribution in favour of the poorest strata, the unemployed and war victims). Mandel then concludes on this sombre note:

"In so far as the price of labour power includes a relative element, namely the average needs determined by the average level of civilization in a country at a certain epoch, the State by guaranteeing to the wage-earners certain services which they do not have to purchase with their money wage, merely guarantees, on behalf of the bourgeoisie as a whole, the payment of an integral part of wages. The State does not transform surplus value into wages; it merely plays the role of central cashier per the bourgeoisie, paying part of wages in a collective form, so as to socialise certain ends." 30

The foregoing critique of Fromm's position on convergence is put forward partly to 'block' the suggestion that the inter-systemic rivalry of the major industrial systems is primarily ideological, in the sense used by Fromm, i.e., the popular beliefs held by the masses that each wants to expand its imperialistic aims, and or destroy the other, and that this is mere belief, since they resemble 'materially' and structurally. Fromm underestimates the intra-systemic conflict of capitalist societies and the fundamental difference between these and the intra-systemic conflicts within communist societies. 31
Later we will examine this type of problem with respect to developing nations in the 'have-nots' sphere. We turn now to Fromm's proposals for solution of international rivalry, since these proposals are interconnected to Fromm's overall analysis.

Fromm's basic proposals are based on his consistent belief that in contemporary political terms what is really at stake is the tradition of humanism and individualism which is inherent to the Western tradition. So he does not go to the extreme to suggest that the 'East' (in the above terms, the Soviet Union and China poses a threat of totalitarianism) poses that threat, but it is difficult to resist the implication. Proposals have two aspects. He makes the following observations: 1.(a). The U.S. can compete with communism by demonstrating that it is possible to raise the living standard of the underdeveloped countries to a degree comparable with that which totalitarian methods achieve without using methods of coercive regimentation. This can be achieved through just, "re-directing the thought orientations" of the policy makers in the U.S. government and the West, toward Latin America, Asia and Africa, in an effort to end support for military dictatorships and the economic exploitation inside these regions. Fromm implies that the United States and allied support
for dictatorships in Latin America, Spain and Taiwan under the slogan that they are part of the "free world" is a consequence of a mixture of "paranoid", "projective" and "double-think" thought orientations. Thus he states:

"We in the West call dictatorships 'part of the free world' if they are anti-Russian. Thus dictators like Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kai-Shek, Franco, Salazar, Batista, to mention only a few, were acclaimed as fighters for freedom and democracy, and the truth about their regimes was suppressed or distorted..."32

Fromm suggests that accompanying this change of thought orientation should be massive food and capital aid from the Western nations to the underdeveloped countries. This could be facilitated by reorganization and strengthening of the United Nations so that it has the capacity to supervise international disarmament. At the same time the public media, such as television and radio could be re-oriented to education of the masses, toward new forms of humanistic ideas (in contradistinction to Fromm's notion of ideologies).33

The second set of proposals refer specifically to an end to the psychological Cold War and the 'military arms race'.

A pre-condition for the effectiveness of any proposals, Fromm suggests, is 'psychological disarmament', that is to say, "the ending of the hysterical hate and suspicion among the main protagonists..."34 This does
not imply the abandonment of genuine political and philosophical convictions, nor the right to criticize other systems. But such criticism will not be tainted by hate and a warlike spirit. Fromm implies that 'psychological disarmament' specific to the orientation of the masses to international relations is intricately interwoven with his later proposals for a humanization of technology, where he advocates the reassertion of will for the revitalization of the American democratic system, from the passive consumer to an "active, participant culture". He states this as follows:

"The fact is that there is a striking correlation between education and the political opinion of voters. The least informed voters lean more toward irrational fanatical solutions, while the better educated ones show a tendency toward more realistic and rational solutions. . . . . . . As political education grew they would become increasingly a part of the decision making on the national and state level".35 (Italics mine).

It is clear from the foregoing that Fromm links re-education to rational alternative politics on the national and international level, but this is linked to his rejection of physical force as an agent of social change at the intra-systemic level. In the very intra-systemic context Fromm rejects force, for what he regards as structurally pragmatic reasons, such as the lack of a mass base for those groups presently advocating change in America - blacks and
radical students. These latter are a minority suggests Fromm. Fromm also rules out the possibility of successful urban guerrilla warfare, the urban populations in the U.S. are if anything hostile to these groups, Fromm suggests. Finally a victorious revolution would lead to a breakdown of the technological, managerial and industrial infrastructure. Here Fromm quotes Veblen approvingly. Force as a means is indicative then of spiritual and political despair. At the level of international politics, Fromm sees one sector as 'capable' and justifiably using force, the colonized Third World, but this only if the revolution is thwarted by the major powers, but this 'probability' carries with it a threat to the international status quo, and nuclear war. Since this is unacceptable to Fromm his solutions at the international level are simply a modification of those favoured for international peace in the U.S. Fromm therefore devotes one of his longest chapters in *May Man Prevail*, to nuclear disarmament. The discussion is roughly subdivided into two parts: a critique of the 'game' strategies offered by Kissinger, Kahn and the R.A.H.D. officials. In the second section he elaborates on his concept of a 'multi centered world, dependent on the acceptance of the international status quo by all powers and effective disarmament.* Concurrence with Fromm's views on the first part of his analysis does
not imply acceptance of the second point. On the first point Fromm rejects the assumptions of thinkers such as Kahn who propose a nuclear strategy based on continued armaments and minimization of loss in the case of an attack or counter attack. But Fromm also rejects those who argue for 'arms control' as a substitute for disarmament. Fromm responds by suggesting that 'arms control' is really part of a theory of armament. In terms of the second point Fromm suggests a gesture of disarmament to generate trust between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., as one way of ending the 'Cold War' deadlock. Fromm also suggests a Russian-American modus vivendi over West Germany and Berlin, which includes non-aggression by the U.S. of West Germany's claims for reunification, and so on. Most of Fromm's proposals imply 'goodwill' as a precondition, even his analysis of a transformed relationship of the U.S. to Latin America. What becomes clear is that while Fromm recognizes economic neo-colonialism, for example in Guatemala, Venezuela and Columbia, as a basis for the State Department's support of military dictatorships in these areas (1961), he does not give this relationship the historical materialist analysis it deserves. In this sense Fromm's solutions on the second proposal is idealistic and abstract.
A Critique of Fromm's Analysis of
Technology, Power and the State:
and the Ambiguity of Selfhood

Unless Erich Fromm has abandoned his basic precept
of the necessity for transforming the economic and material
infrastructure of advanced capitalism as a precondition for
the transformation of man, it is difficult to comprehend
his vacillation from his earlier precepts. It is clear to
even neo-Marxists that whatever the inherent contradictions
of Soviet economics of the Russian or Chinese variety,
these contradictions cannot be comprehended as existing at
the same stage of development as the contradictions within
capitalist economics. To the extent that the former have
undergone revolutionary changes in the productive sectors
which have abolished the category of private ownership of
the means of production, which is itself the fundamental
cause of alienation in its extant form, the contradictions
internal to Soviet and Chinese communism are at a different
stage from those internal capitalism. On the level of
economic productivity this difference can be characterized
quite simply as being, that in the Soviet states the major
contradictions 'spring' from the antagonisms of a socialist
planned economy which are bureaucratically linked to
bourgeois forms of work allocation and the redistribution
of incomes, in the case of the latter these forms express
themselves in the money incentives in agriculture and some
forms of industrial production. In capitalist economics on the other hand the contradictions are between direct state intervention and fundamentally antagonistic classes.39

We will begin our critique of Fromm's position by re-examining the very premises of his basic analysis. His argument tends to explain the basic pathological forms of thought in the U.S.A., the "free world", on the one side and of the same pathological forms in the communist countries as somehow being the cause of the tensions and the consequent use of political power and technology in the direction of heavily armaments, oriented industry with its consequent 'threat' to the Third World. Not only is such a premise in direct contradiction with Fromm's consistent assertion of the 'powerlessness' of the masses in highly industrialized countries, but we may well ask how (in terms of political processes) such pathological thinking influence the highest levels of decision making for the production of armaments, and the maintenance of the 'Cold War'? We propose a further question, is the relationship between the 'content' of technological knowledge and other features of highly industrialized society, related to such popularly held beliefs; or is the direction of technological advancement dictated by other quite unrelated forces in these societies? In his articulation of pathological thinking Fromm fails to strike a distinction between the
popularly held beliefs by the members of the working classes and the structural capacity of these groups to exercise influence and control of the magnitude he suggests, in contradistinction to the situations existing among the upper strata within these societies. Without necessarily starting from the economic infrastructure of capitalist or socialist societies in his analysis, analysis based on such a distinction would orient Fromm's analysis in a direction fundamentally difficult from that in *May Man Prevail*. A distinction between popular beliefs and ideology implies a class analysis of society. For any analysis which constitutes the major forces of contradiction and change in contemporary civilization as historically and materially determined in a dialectical manner the popular beliefs of Fromm's concern would be conceptualized as determined by clear ideological forces at the levels of political control. In short the beliefs would be manifestations of more complex ideological and material contradictions of Cold War politics, the outcome of international material and economic conflicts at the intra and inter systemic levels. For example Roger Garaudy has remarked recently that at this stage in the development of the productive forces "(that of the present scientific and technological resolution) the full development of man becomes the necessary pre-condition for historical development if this is not to be
held back". Nevertheless Garaudy rejects a methodology which would view socio-political processes in terms of impending chaos and an Apocalypse, as sociologically superficial. The point here then, is that it is possible to hold the view of Fromm with respect to the primacy of selfhood and yet reject his particular analysis almost completely. 41

Central to a non-mechanistic, non-apocalyptic view of contemporary society also is a rejection of the view that technological change is an independent autonomous factor. Some Marxists such as Ellul and Marxist agree on this point. Fromm does not explicitly argue that technology is an independent factor but holds this point by implication, and it is one which has become more prominent in recent years. In The Revolution Of Hope, Fromm discusses the transformation of American society by studies based on a choice between "life furthering" and "life-hindering needs", without coming to terms with the essential contradiction between capitalism and technique (in Ellul's sense of the term)42 The following is a short excerpt from Ellul's counterpoint on the subject:

"The pursuit of technical automation would condemn capitalist enterprises to failure. The reaction of capitalism is well known: the patents of new machines are acquired and the machines are never put into operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Capitalism is no longer in a position to pursue technical automation on the economic or social plane. It is incapable of developing a system of distribution
that would permit the absorption of all the goods which technique allows to be produced. It is led inevitably to crises of overproduction. And in the same way it is unable to utilize the manpower freed by every new technical improvement. Crises of unemployment would ensue."43

Ellul is expressing the classic Marxian critique of the nature of contradictions at the intra systemic level of capitalism.

Fromm's analysis of present day developing societies and the 'way out' of poverty, clearly derives from his understanding of the consequences of the transformation of capitalism and its apparent resolution of class contradictions in terms of a more primitive form of Marxian analysis. In conjunction with this synthesis, Fromm's failure to grasp the view that the extreme centralization of the Soviet economy did not primarily take place because Stalin was a power hungry madman. The latter may well be the case, but this is not the central issue. Centralization can be explained in terms of the following: cultural and technological backwardness, material poverty, and the blockade by capitalist powers, including the United Kingdom, and the war. Increasingly with the results and scientific research, pressure for new 'models' of development are emerging, for example in Czechoslovakia. The ideological obstacles to such processes are then one variable which cannot be isolated.
We turn briefly to Fromm's analysis of the relation between capitalist countries and colonial and neo-colonial societies outlined by Fromm. While he recognizes some of the U.S. investment in Latin America for instance, Fromm gives the impression that the former's support for 'dictatorships' in these areas is primarily due to the fact that these dictators are anti-Russian and anti-communist. The oligarchical control of politics and the multi-national corporation with respect to 'capital' invested both within the U.S. and outside has been too well documented to require repetition here. 44 'Under development' is the logical conclusion of capitalist expansion, from its early spread in Western Europe. It is therefore a euphemism for Fromm to suggest that these nations will not adopt capitalist modes of development for psychological reasons, even the conception of a 'third world' is a euphemism for Gunder Frank, the overall economics of colonial societies are integrated into the complex socio-economic structure, of the metropolis, characterized by the multi-national corporation. 45 In one sense then, the colonial revolution is an outcome of over three centuries of resource, labour and consumer market exploitation and only peripherally related to the Second World War. Moreover Fromm also betrays a lack of intensive analysis of neo-colonial processes, by suggesting that the
United Kingdom's 'abandonment' of its imperial role in India, among other areas, constitutes independence from economic exploitation, which is the key factor.\textsuperscript{46} If the analysis with respect to Great Britain in the 1960's are partially correct for the United States, France and West Germany, the so-called 'Cold War' is not a threat to peace in the sense Fromm implies, since the spread of neo-colonial exploitation is facilitated by such an ideological 'smoke screen'.

**Summary**

There is no doubt that capitalism is not infinitely flexible but most recent Marxist analyses have stressed the flexibility while contuing to point to changing internal contradictions, not just a series of repetitions. While Fromm appears to have widened his scope for analysis, beyond a concern simply with authoritarianism and the re-emergence of fascism, his efforts so far as unconvincing. Fromm has ignored an entire generation of Marxist scholars who are non-mechanistic and tend toward inter disciplinary integration. As a substitute, he has tended to adopt a static structural functionalism. So that he is mistaken in viewing the Cold War as an obstacle to selfhood. Changes taking place within each type of system are clearly determined by other kinds of variables. Cold war 'smoke
screens' may serve to rationalize the military industrial integration which is part of every major capitalist country, but this is just as much due to what Mandel terms the crisis of Post War (1945) capitalism as due to Cold War politics. The simple fact is that today armaments are a considerable export business to small nations. Many recognize that the major threat of the latter half of this century is not international war, but civil and restricted wars. Within the context of this political environment force itself is part of the sociological dialectic of social change. While it cannot be predicted with certainty what the consequences for selfhood would be behind the 'iron curtain', it is gross generalization to suggest, as does Fromm that the Chinese revolution cripples selfhood, when the preconditions for such selfhood as still being formed. With respect to colonial societies engaged in anti colonial revolutionary processes, the same can be asserted. This is the position of an earlier Fromm, who asserted the necessity for socio-economic change as a precondition to selfhood. Any prior rejection of force, in terms of the realities of class society and imperialism is an absolutization of a factor and abandonment of the logic of Fromm's position. Fromm needs to recognize the radical 'discontinuity' of his thought if the latter is the case.
FOOTNOTES


4 This anthropological over simplification is seen in even Fromm's recent writings, see for example The Revolution Of Hope: Toward A Humanized Technology.


7 Ibid., pp. 202-204. Fromm states: "There is one other way... to get to know the secret: it is that of complete power over another person; the power which makes him do what I want, feel what I want, think what I want; which transforms him into a thing, my thing, my possession" (p. 202).

8 Fromm tells us essentially that "society" is responsible and the individual is responsible, but that is all. Fromm's critique becomes an explanation of why people "unconsciously" seek power in terms of their acceptance of the dominant ideology of capitalist society. Belief in ideology (current) thus leads to regression and idolatry. For this position see, E. Fromm, "Love And Its Disintegration", PASTORAL PSYCHOLOGY, Vol. VII, No. 68, 1956, pp. 36-44.


11This analytic-lineality appears scattered in his writings, but see "Love And Its Disintegration", op. cit., p. 44, among other references.


13This question takes precedence in this discussion, over the strictly phenomenological one of what is the self. My own orientation as "background" argumentation of the phenomenological issue of the self derives largely from Alfred Schutz's Collected Papers (three volumes), edited and introduced, Maurice Matanson, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, 1964 and 1970 respectively. Many volumes have been written on the 'self' one of the simplest definitions of the self is Harry Stack Sullivan's that it is constituted of the reflected appraisals of others. See also Hans Girth and C. Wright Mills Character And Social Structure: The Psychology Of Social Institutions, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World Inc., 1953, especially Chapter IV, where the authors suggest that the self is a more or less conscious realm of experience of our bodies and those of others, our acts and others and our experience of others appraisals of our appraisals of them (p. 51). The stress in Laing and Cooper's of the self as a totalization which they suggest is in most contemporary societies frozen, divorced from itself through a series of interiorized strategies. In Volume I of Collected Papers: The Problem Of Social Reality Schutz explains the self as constitutive and constituted (Laing's terms). He states: "Then my "Self", which has been hidden (before reflection) as yet by the objects of my acts and thoughts, emerges. It does not merely enter the field of my consciousness in order to appear on its horizon or at its center; rather it alone this field of consciousness. Consequently, all the performed acts, thoughts, feelings reveal themselves as originating in my previous acting, my thinking, my feeling. The whole stream of consciousness is through and through the stream of my personal life, and my self is present in any of my experiences". (p. 169).


17 In The Sane Society (1955), op. cit., the concern is there but rather muted compared with May Man Prevail: An Inquiry Into The Facts And Fiction Of Foreign Policy, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1961. Much of this chapter is based on the ideas set out here and in The Revolution Of Hope: Toward A Humanized Technology, 1968 (op. cit.).


19 Cf. Richard Evans, Dialogue With Erich Fromm, op. cit., Quote taken from p. 104. See pp. 103-113. This interview is significant because it reveals that in retrospect Fromm regards his analysis in MAY MAN PREVAIL as central to his opus.

20 There has been a proliferation of literature on this subject in the 1960's, and we will refer to only a few of the more prominent works in this field among them are Lewis Mumford, In The Name Of Sanity, op. cit.; The Myth Of The Machine: Technics And Human Development, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966 and Paul


22 Although Fromm does not provide statistics on the percentage of the total budget given to defense expenditure the figures are as follows: U.S.S.R.: defense budget for 1971 was 17.9 billion rubles of a total budget of 160.6 billion rubles. There are 3,300,000 men under arms of a total population of 241,784,000. The military expenditure was 11.1% of the total budget, a decrease of 1.3% (approx.) on 1970 figures. (Source The 1972 WORLD ALMANAC, New York, Newspapers Enterprise Assoc. Inc. The breakdown of U.S. statistics in the same source is more complex but it is $76 billion dollars (approx.) for 1971, compared to slightly over $50. billion in 1965 (excluding veterans' expenditure). Source, p. 69. There are no reliable totals for the overall strength of the armed forces, per total population. My estimates are close to 3 million. Little unanimity exists among economists on military expenditure for example Galbraith suggests that in the first half of the 1960's defense outlay constituted between 55% and 60% of the total budget of the Federal Government, whereas E. Mandel reports this percentage for the years 1957 - 1958. See J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1967, pp. 228-230; E. Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, Vol. II, tr. Brian Pearce, London, Merlin Press, 1968, p. 533. Both authors agree on the increasing size of the Federal budget given to military expenditure during the last 10 years however.

23 E. Fromm, May Man Prevail, op. cit., p. 11.

Congressional Committee Papers.


26. Ref. J. K. Galbraith, op. cit., p. 20. We can compare Fromm's implicit assertion that the fundamental difference in the two systems is ideology with those of E. Mandel and R. Garaudy.

27. E. Fromm, op. cit., p. 82.

28. Ibid., pp. 82-84.

29. Ibid., p. 84.

30. Cf. E. Mandel, Vol. I, pp. 335-337. Surplus value is of course defined as the creation of "use-value" over and above the labour needed to produce the equivalent of the wage paid for that labour. Ref. Karl Marx, *The Poverty Of Philosophy*, intr. F. Engels, New York, International Publishers, 1963, pp. 90-108. See also E. Mandel, *Marxist Economic Theory*, Vol. I, (op. cit.), pp. 132-181, where the author discusses various means of creating surplus value under contemporary capitalism, such as speeding up the pace of work; speeding up the machinery, increasing the number of machines to be watched and so on.

31. This point also implies that 'alienation' in both types of systems also require alternative explanations to that offered by Fromm. See for example *The Marxist Theory Of Alienation*, by Ernest Mandel and George Novack, New York, Pathfinder Press, 1970.

32. Cf. E. Fromm, *May Man Prevail*, op. cit., p. 28. Fromm defines the three types of thought orientations as follows: (1) Paranoid thinking; involve entire groups believing that another country or government (U.S.S.R. or China) is 'after them' and will invade them, (2) 'Projective thinking'; exists where each society accuses the other of its own internal, usually aggressive designs. The enemy appears as the embodiment of evil, and ego, the embodiment of all that is good, (3) 'Double think' (taken from Orwell) means "the power of holding two contradictory beliefs simultaneously, for example to support the principle of independence for small nations and yet support the overthrow of other small nations. Fromm also isolates 'fanaticism' and 'automaton' thinking at the group level. The latter involves whole societies believing that their thoughts are their own, when in actuality, these beliefs have been adopted because they were presented by sources
that carry some form of authority. Fromm makes two points about these forms of thoughts a) they are pathological, psychological processes at the mass level and are all capable of manipulation through propaganda b) they are based on logical possibilities (i.e. what the other might do) rather than probabilities (i.e. thoughts based on realistic assessment of the political and social situations. Ref. E. Fromm, Ibid, pp. 17-30. (the term 'possibilities' is used in a different context to that applied in The Revolution Of Hope, op. cit., p. 147.


34E. Fromm, May Man Prevail, op. cit., p. 16.


36Ibid., pp. 148-150.

37See Chapter 7, "Suggestions For Peace", in May Man Prevail, op. cit., pp. 177-250.


40If we define ideologies as being more than just secondary manifestations at the level of thought which reflect underlying real forces of conflict and change, and include within this conception the notion of ideologies as partly constituting these forces, that is to say as shaping these forces. Ideologies can then be understood as class derived incapitalist societies. See for eq. Maurice Cornforth The Open Philosophy And The Open Society, New York International Pub. 1968, pp. 387-388.


43Cf. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, op. cit., pp. 81-82. This is not the place to deal with a later contradiction of Ellul's position with regard to capitalism and colonial areas and the spread of technique. Here Ellul contradicts his earlier position. See pp. 119-120. See also Garaudy, op. cit., p. 33.


Ref. Robin Blackburn, "The Heath Government: A New Course For British Imperialism", *New-Left Review*, No.70, November-December, 1971, pp. 3-26. Not only does Blackburn reveal the radical rendering of allied relations vis a vis the U.S., traditionally taken for granted (a point also asserted by E. Mandel on intra system currency and gold fluctuations); but Blackburn, like Gunder Frank also suggests that many of the regimes in the 'third world' such as Egypt, Sudan and Zambia, far from being 'independent democratic socialists' acting against neo-colonialism, in reality facilitate continued more covert forms of socio-economic exploitation. Blackburn suggests that in the case of Great Britain overseas imperial investments increased by 2,000 million pounds between 1945-1964. He states "Moreover, political decolonization did not mean that the real economic sinews of Empire were in any way abandoned; gold in South Africa, rubber and tin in Malaya, oil in the Middle East, were all preserved intact" (p. 5).
"The quest of science is relatively new ... , among those circumstances whose selective action in the far past has given to the race the human nature which it now has. The race reached the human plane with little of this searching knowledge of facts ... ; but it has never until now been put in the first place, as the dominant note of human culture. The normal man, such as his inheritance has made him, has therefore good cause to be restive under its dominion." [THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 1906]

The main task of this study has been to extricate a systematic humanist social scientific "infrastructure" in the writings of Erich Fromm. Neither the task itself nor the broader aims for its persual are self-evident, but in the case of Erich Fromm's work any attempt of the first task implies some establishment of the second. Put differently, Erich Fromm is not simply a social critic--in the loose sense of the term--he is a systematic social scientist who has not taken the time to tell us "academic social scientists", what he is about and why he is about what he is about. This takes us to a second observation, Erich Fromm's restiveness. Few statements, among which is Veblen's, earlier quoted, characterize the personality and the work of Erich Fromm, so that to examine this work is of necessity to juxtapose the restive and the "tough-minded" social scientists. Our first conclusion then is that Fromm's 'socialist-humanism' is a considered response to restiveness. It is a humanism not based on some vague 'existential choice' but on a historical perspective, in its turn predicated on a specific ontological and epistemological framework. The restiveness which Veblen traces in "The Place of Science In Modern Civilization", and in which he does not
exhort us to choose the "tough minded" or the humanist (for Veblen a mixture of "dramatisation" and scholarship); gave birth to social science. The roots of social science then are theoretically and substantially critical with respect to modern civilization.\(^1\)

The foregoing analysis constitutes at one level, the central case of chapter one of this study. We have shown that the very concern with the integration of sociology and social psychology theory partially derives from the critical restiveness of Fromm. Fromm's critical restiveness is summarized in his constant use of the phrase "illusions of reality" which is at one and the same time a critique of social science and of orientations of people in ordinary life. But this is a complex proposition which Fromm attempts to resolve theoretically and practically. The dual critique just mentioned derives from Fromm's view of contradictions in phylogenetic and diachronic development of man and society. The first is primarily an anthropological postulate, the second is a sociological one. We have argued that Fromm's attempt to synthesize the ideas of Marx and Freud is a unique attempt at theoretical synthesis, emerging from the contradictions which he asserts exists between the underlying (Fromm terms it unconscious) 'needs' of man (thesis) and academic social science (antithesis). There is another attempted synthesis, this time at the practical level, and expressed in the Frommian exhortations of 'love' and hope, on the one hand and the productive character on the other. This level of synthesis is in relation to the tension or contradiction between man's species nature (Marx) and his own historical and cultural response (as antithesis). Fromm's meets the first criteria of a humanistic social science, one dedicated to selfhood, by choosing the concept of 'productive character' as the
vehicle for articulating the 'paths' to that selfhood.

But the humanist perspective in social science is not simply based on the assertion of selfhood alone, nor is it derived alternately from critiques of positivism, which has again become very current in sociology in particular. Fromm's work in *Beyond the Chains of Illusion* is very instructive here. When Fromm claims that his own intellectual and theoretical orientation derive from Marx and Freud, he is making two implicit assumptions which are central to any conception of a humanistic social science which aims to transcend the merely rhetorical. The first is that a critical social science is nothing new--whatever the claims of Robert Friedrichs and Alvin Gouldner, this is distinct from the problem of theoretical entropy which they emphasize. Critical theory is traditional to social science as Ernest Becker has asserted consistently, where the term critical is taken to mean criticism of social and political policy. Fromm takes the problem a step further by suggesting that humanistic social science further implies an intellectual posture which has the capacity to criticize its infrastructural components, its own conceptual categories, where those categories form metatheory. This is the reason why Fromm stresses that the intellectual tradition of *DE OMNIBUS EST DOBITANDUM* (of everything one must doubt) exists in both Marx and Freud. In just this sense the humanist tradition as Fromm also points out in *The Nature of Man* (1968) extends backwards into philosophy and other areas as well. John Schaar's critique of Fromm, then, is somewhat inadequate when he suggests that the latter is criticizing social scientific empiricism, and that Fromm wants to substitute an alternate moral philosophical base. No, Fromm is calling for reflectivity in social science theorizing, an ingredient of humanism. As is clear from
a large part of his work, Fromm is engaged in constant empirical analysis of social life. His binary groupings of 'life' and 'death', good and evil, productive and non-productive, and so on, extend to his entire intellectual orientation is not limited to being a technical device. Rather its value as technical device in sociological structural analysis and in psychoanalytic clinical practice derives from Fromm's view of science. Fromm's 'integration' then is at the level of sociology, anthropology and social psychology as well as these disciplines and philosophy. In a sense then Fromm's intellectual development is essentially from that of a sociological perspective, the concept of selfhood is predicated on a sociological epistemology. The concept of 'human nature' is derived from an anthropological standpoint.

In spite of the theoretical clarity of Fromm's work as a basis for his opus there are many conceptual and empirical weaknesses. We confront some of these difficulties in Fromm's analysis of character which is also the strength of his work, since he makes the vital integration with the concept of character. Most of the sticking criticisms have previously been stated in the two final sections of chapter three, so only those remarks which bear directly on the overall framework which has been developed in the dissertation, will be reiterated here.

In an earlier discussion in chapter three, of Fromm's articulation of character adaptations, it was suggested that a certain one dimensionality exists in Fromm's strategy in explaining character adaptations. For in the case of the Renaissance, he did not show how increased strength of the individual, as one part of the paradox of 'freedom from' old ties and alienation at the same time. In short there was little mention of positive individualism, what Fromm stressed was alienated
individualism. Fromm does not tell us how differentiated class response is possible, under what are by his own accounts internally varying socio-economic conditions for different classes in the same society. We suggested also that this was because Fromm's main focus is on abandonment of freedom. But it was mentioned that Fromm may be arguing by analogy. In other words Fromm is searching for similar responses by the same class, the lower middle class in different historical epochs. This analogy is extended into Fromm's anthropology in his "Dogma of Christ".

If we examine Fromm's analysis of the structural relations among the various socio-economic groups in Palestine prior to the development of Christian dogma, we find an analysis which closely resembles the one set out of the Renaissance—the lower middle classes, (the Pharisees' behaviour resembles that of the lower middle class during the Renaissance), sell out the proletariat and lumpen proletariat every time. What is peculiar here is that Fromm does not provide any adequate analysis of why this is the case in every instance, rather than the assertion itself. To the extent that both analyses were developed at a period when Fromm was highly influenced by Marxism it is possible to understand this conclusion of Fromm's. It is possible to accept the conclusion and question the reasoning behind it, which is the position of this author. The dictum here appears to be: "the lower middle classes are not to be trusted as a revolutionary force". But Fromm tells us little more. This is a problem in his work especially because Fromm also wants to develop an analysis of 'Freedom to', which if we take Fromm's analysis to its logical conclusion leads to Marxism with the emphasis on the proletariat as the revolutionary force. But Fromm does not make
that commitment. Fromm therefore has to find other means to 'shore up' his system as a whole.

This is precisely what Fromm does. We will 'draw a sketch' of that system as a whole:

a) The basis of the system is the conception of social science grounded in an attempted synthesis of Marx and Freud. As was suggested Fromm extends his antecedents without resolving some fundamental contradictions. Rather he constructs a hexagonal system on this in an attempt to integrate his basic themes at the centre. 'Hope' emanates from this formulation.

b) Fromm then moves to do two things from this base: to develop a concept of essence on the one side with part of its antecedents in Marx and the conceptual basis for a notion of freedom. On the other side of the (Marx-Freud base), Fromm works on a concept and theory of social character. Nevertheless part of the antecedents here, particularly those which validate his substantive formulations are dependent on Freud. On the side of essence Fromm produces he 'question posed' with respect to human nature and essence as the central concern. On the side of the 'hexagon' dealing with character, the immanence of the problem of choice between 'life and death' is the central question.

c) If Fromm's opus had moved vertically from the side of character he would confront the problem of power in all its dimensions, not just physical force. But this is by no means clear in his scheme, partly because he had not resolved the individual freedom versus social character, problem. Therefore, there is an interchange of power and humanism. It is partly for this reason, the difficulty of unearthing
a systematic theory of power that analysis in the dissertation shifted to Parsons.

d) On the opposite or fifth side of the hexagon, Fromm engages in a detailed and systematic anthropology. The background ideas here though theological have two long range implications, the first coincides with Fromm's view of social institutions; the second clarifies a concept of self.

e) The final aspect of Fromm's work has to do with the notion of freedom to which is partly a product of the cross fertilization of an analysis of essence and existence on the one hand and individual character on the other. Here we find Fromm's concept of selfhood. At the centre of the scheme is revealed Fromm's view of modern civilization. Here also all the earlier contradictions come to rest, many unresolved. Two sets of contradictions stand out in particular, the first has to do with Marx and Freud at the base of the 'hexagon'. The second has to do with Fromm's essential closure of a class analysis of society so that individual and social character are now synonymous, now in contradiction.

It is worthwhile stating the central core of concepts earlier alluded to which tend to reside within the Frommian framework:

a) hope; b) 1) the concept of the 'question' as the important point of orientation for analysis of man and society, b) 2) the concept of life and death and the potentiality to choose between them; c) the dual concepts of power and humanism. Here is the weak link in the system; d) the concept of self as freedom from and freedom to; e) the notion of the modern world as qualitatively different from earlier civilizations. It is clear from Fromm's reflections on his work that he regards his system of notions and concepts as a more or less neat scheme. But
this is hardly the case. At the same time the outer shell which has been constructed in this study, is integrated in terms of the disciplinary program which Fromm adopts.

A hermeneutics such as adopted in this dissertation allows us to examine a major contribution to humanistic orientations in the social sciences. In spite of the criticisms levelled against that scheme, its tendency to be reduced to a form of sociologism, and this from a Freudian social psychologism of 'freedom from'- 'freedom to'; we cannot fully comprehend the latent critique of academic social science in this psychology at a simple level of interpretation. A further point has to do with the significance of Fromm's concept of 'freedom to' or selfhood, whose ambivalence can be traced back to the first chapter of this study, but the critical value of which cannot be dismissed.
FOOTNOTES


2 His work with Michael Maccoby, Social Character In a Mexican Village (1971), attests to a great deal of empiricism.

3 I have suggested that the integration of these disciplines with philosophy is, at the epistemological level, with Kant, and Hegel, with the stipulation that Fromm's concept would be incompatible with the teleological implications of the Absolute Spirit.

4 The notion of theory is used in a wider sense, than its restriction to empirical theory. This writer takes the view that in works such as Fromm's the distinction between metatheory or infrastructural levels and empirical theoretical levels have to be imposed to facilitate interpretation but are not original to Fromm's work, in contrast to a thinker such as Parsons who is more disciplined in this sense.
ARTICLES


BOOKS


Barth, Karl. *Church Dogmatics,* Vol. I.


For the most extensive bibliography of Erich Fromm's works see B. Landis and E. Tauber, *In The Name of Life: Essays In Honor of Erich Fromm*, pp. 323-328.


