ATTITUDES TOWARD CHINESE IMMIGRANTS
TO BRITISH COLUMBIA 1858-1885

by

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ABSTRACT

One of the more pervasive myths that British Columbians retain is that minority groups were dealt with fairly and equitably in the west. A part of the pluralistic image of Canadian society, this comfortable view of British Columbia's past is in need of revision.

The thesis demonstrates that Chinese immigrants were never perceived or treated as equals by the white population; in fact, they faced oped discrimination. In the early days the "responsible" sectors of the population discussed restrictions on the Chinese, while white men, remote from officers of the law, physically abused or threatened the Chinese with violence. During this first contact period white racist attitudes and actions defined the position the Chinese were to occupy in the economy of British Columbia. They were placed at the bottom of the labour hierarchy, performing low status, low paying jobs considered undesirable by white men. Yet these jobs were necessary for the Colony's development. Thus the Chinese were consciously excluded from the political, economic and social mainstream of society. It was also made clear to the Chinese that their presence in the colony was only at the forbearance of the whites.

The thesis begins with a recognition of the reality of social and economic relations between the two races in early British Columbia. The origins of white prejudiced attitudes are traced to the nature of the contact between the west and the Chinese in China, prior to the settlement of British Columbia. Imperialist nations, bolstered by notions of their
own superiority as a race, used military force to dictate policy to the Manchu government. Through this contact the western world formed a more-or-less consistent stereotype of "the Chinaman" prior to his arrival in British Columbia. White men carried this category with them as part of their cultural baggage, and this determined the attitude taken toward an individual Chinese.

The rationale used to enact restrictive legislation municipally, provincially and federally is explored. The extent to which this was the result of a clash of cultures is discussed but final responsibility for racist legislation is placed on the politically and economically dominant group, white men, and their desire to build a white British Columbia.

Primary sources consulted in support of the thesis are contemporary journals and newspapers, particularly the mainland British Columbian, colonial office correspondence, white travellers' accounts, the memoirs of early white settlers and colonial officials, and federal immigration reports.
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The sources of assistance and scholastic criticism I received over the last five years are too many and varied to detail. Suffice it to say that I am grateful to those who constructively criticised the thesis.

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INTRODUCTION

A person deprived of opportunity may be lazy, deprived of schools may be ignorant, deprived of hope may be careless -- and the depriving majority may then accuse him (sic) of the very characteristics they have brought about.¹

Recent historians' studies of the contribution Chinese immigrants made to the building of British Columbia and the discrimination they faced usually begin with railroad construction. Or the legislative attempts at restriction are emphasized in the period after the mainland and island colonies were united and had joined the confederate provinces of Canada. Others have concentrated on the later period of organized labour's agitation and campaigns to have Orientals eliminated from the province, emphasizing class-based economic competition. Another has discussed the Oriental experience on Vancouver Island, particularly Victoria, with little reference to the mainland colony. Prior to this more recent "discovery" of the Asiatic minorities, historians dismissed the Chinese in a few pages, concentrating on the political and economic contributions of the capitalist Anglo-Empire builders.

The Chinese experience in British Columbia from the early period of the colony's development to the passage of the first federal restrictive legislation in 1885, is the historical time period covered by this thesis. The main focus is on the initial period of contact, the first stage in the development of social, political, and economic relationships between the two races on the British Columbia mainland. At this time economic competition was not a major reason for white hostility. But it was during this period that the Chinese as a race were placed outside the mainstream of economic, political and social life, and arguments for their control and exclusion were first advanced.
Exclusionists in the 1870's and the 1880's reiterated and echoed the racism of the 1860's. Thus the events of the 1860's set the stage for later racial discrimination and explain its form in British Columbia.

The treatment of the Chinese by white men during the gold rushes is detailed to demonstrate that prejudice existed from first contact, and that it was not class based. The attitudes expressed by white miners, the white merchant class, the mainland Legislative Council and the British Columbian Legislative Assembly support this argument. It is predominantly a white male view because the population contained proportionally more males than females during this period. As the several attempts to import white women demonstrate, and travellers comments reinforce, women were a relatively scarce commodity in the mainland colony. Moreover, source material represents both a white and male viewpoint, except for the few accounts left by women of wealthy households. These women who employed Chinese domestics in their kitchens -- and who wrote of the "servant problem" -- were a small percentage of women in the colony, and thus their attitudes cannot be taken as representative. As managers of households they viewed the Chinese men as a servant class, valuable but of a lower class and racially inferior to themselves. It does demonstrate that hierarchical nature of upper class households, a hierarchy which reflected and reinforced the sex, class and race hierarchy of the larger society. These sources are insufficient to radically change the general findings.

Of greater significance, however, is the fact that white men comprised the group which held political, economic and social control in British Columbia. Initially, the Chinese people were forced into a subordinate position by violence or by the threat of violence from the whites. Later, with control
of the local legislature, white males used legal means to keep the Chinese in their place.

The social scientist Otto Klineberg has pointed out that it is not contact between two groups per se, but the nature of that contact which is important in the formation of attitudes and relations. If each group is of equal status, then such contact is beneficial. However, if one group is dominant then the prejudices already held by this group are reinforced by contact with the inferiorly perceived group. This negative attitude dictates the nature of the relationships between the two groups because the dominant group has the means to enforce it. It is argued that contact between Europeans and Chinese in the years prior to the first British Columbian gold rush was of this type. Mid-nineteenth century western imperialist nations dictated the terms of their relationship with China and through a missionary and military campaign used force as a means of persuasion. Notions of western superiority justified this forceful entry into China, and a negative stereotype of the Chinese people was formed. This image was propagated throughout the west. The roots of the racist treatment of the Chinese by British Columbians are thus located in ethnocentric attitudes of white superiority.

The rationale by which British Columbians justified racist legislation is examined and its development traced from initial prejudiced attitudes to municipal and provincial legislation. Having social and political control, the white population made distinctions on racial grounds and because of the nature of the democratic system had the power to legislate, and thus institutionalize, their own interests, greed, prejudices and fears at the minority group's expense. The two cultures, with differing values, world views, attitudes, habits,
social organization and languages, were seen to be in collision. To the white population, co-existence was out of the question. The Chinese were viewed as a threat to the homogeneity of white British Columbia.

Although the final responsibility for racist immigration legislation rests with the Federal Government, the Act of 1885 was passed in response to British Columbians' demands - demands which its white population made from early colonial days. This act placed restrictions on a minority group on racial grounds, thus setting a precedent in Canadian immigration legislation. Only immigrants who would assimilate and bolster the values of the white society were welcomed. Such immigration laws emphasized the racial origin of the immigrant and considered this to be the most important factor in the process of assimilation. The legacy of such laws remain as assumptions behind present day legislation, as the Green Paper on Immigration and Population demonstrates.
Footnotes (Introduction):


2. "Extracts from the Journal of the Archdeacon of Columbia", September 8, 1861, Victoria, in *Third Report of the Columbia Mission, 1861*, (London, R. Clay, Son, and Taylor, 1861), pp. 28-29. He states: "Here women are few indeed. This is very striking to a new comers (sic)."


CHAPTER I

THE BRITISH COLUMBIAN SETTING: THE TREATMENT OF CHINESE IMMIGRANTS BY WHITES IN THE GOLD MINING PERIOD

The first Chinese men to come to the Pacific Northwest were brought by John Meares in 1788. He arrived at Nootka Sound with two ships and fifty Chinese carpenters, coopers, armourers and craftsmen on board. A two-storied fort was built and also a sailing vessel which on its maiden voyage visited the Queen Charlotte Islands. Meares' colonial experiment failed, however. These settlers were captured by the Spanish and put to work at San Blas, Mexico. They were released in 1790.1

It was not until 1848 that Chinese men again visited the West Coast. They were attracted to the gold mines of California. Few immigrants would do the low status manual labour and menial jobs in the gold mining communities. According to Mary Coolidge they were welcomed,2 but only while they occupied these roles and their numbers were small. As pressure of population grew, antagonism increased. In 1850, of 57,787 miners, there were only 500 Chinese miners. By 1852 immigration of all nationalities had greatly increased, and the Chinese now numbered 20,000, of which many went to the mines. White miners demanded the exclusion of the Chinese from the mines with Governor John Bigler's support.3 The Foreign Miners' Tax Law of 1852 was aimed chiefly at the Chinese miners. Of all foreigners, they were particularly resented because they were more obviously alien and kept to themselves.4 The Chinese miners began to leave, taking employment on the railroads, in the mines of Idaho, Montana and Oregon, and embarking for British Columbia. By 1858 they were despised in California.5 Civil disabilities and statutory restrictions were imposed by the State Legislature to check their immigration. Occupations chiefly undertaken by the
Chinese were taxed for two contradictory motives: the need for taxation income to run the state, and demands to exclude Chinese workers. The collection of license taxes from Chinese miners was so successful that it was extended in 1860 to the fishing industry, a predominantly Chinese occupation.\textsuperscript{6} They were denied citizenship through their exclusion from the naturalisation process, were denied suffrage and access to public schools, and were not permitted to testify in court for or against white people after 1854. Excluded from the due process of law, they were denied protection against white violence.\textsuperscript{7}

Indians, South Americans, Mexicans and Chinese were the targets of physical abuse in California. Such experiences led the Chinese in San Francisco to send one of their number to British Columbia to investigate the situation there. He reported that the country was rich, and that he had been offered twenty dollars a day and board as a cook.\textsuperscript{8}

The Chinese came to British Columbia in the hopes of better treatment and jobs. They had experienced abuse and hostility which had culminated in a series of discriminatory laws. The Californian experience is important to an understanding of the attitude of whites to the Chinese and their treatment in the British Columbian colony. In the first Fraser River gold rush the bulk of the immigrants came from the Californian gold fields or spent time in San Francisco with its segregated Chinatown. Many miners wintered in California. Along with their mining outfits the white miners brought their cultural baggage, which included a racial hierarchy and notions of racial superiority. With a stereotyped image of "the Chinaman" already formed, they looked for its confirmation.
The first influx of miners to British Columbia came in the spring of 1858. Chinese miners arrived in the summer. Kinahan Cornwallis, an early British arrival, published *The New El Dorado* in London in 1858. He had spent the spring in British Columbia in the gold mines and passed through Victoria on his way back to England. He comments on the arrival of the Chinese miners on the *Republic* in June 1858:

> One of the many curious sights visible in town after the arrival was the spectacle of the Danish Consul at San Francisco marching wearily up one of the streets - Johnson Street - under the burden of his blankets, and followed by a batch of Chinese; but as to whether their efforts were to be devoted to the washing of gold or of shirts, I could not ascertain.

The *Victoria Gazette*, the first newspaper published on Vancouver Island, in its second issue headlined an article on "A Pioneer Chinaman":

> Doubtless ere long the familiar interrogation of "Wantee Washee?" will be added to our everyday conversation library.

Mention was also made as to whether the Chinese would be involved in seeking after gold or dirty laundry.

These first reports of Chinese people in British Columbia reveal the white attitude of "amused detachment" and "immediate disdain". Douglas, the Governor of the newly established colony, had from the first made it clear that his policy was for a British British Columbia. His first impulse had been to prohibit immigration of all foreigners to the colony -- foreigners being all persons who had not embarked directly from England. He received a sharp reproof from Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton:

> [It is] no part of their policy [Her Majesty's Government] to exclude Americans and other foreigners from the gold fields.
Thus the Chinese, too, were to be officially permitted free entry and it was
made clear that British Columbia was regulated by the policy of the Colonial
Office on such issues as immigrants. Bulwar Lytton informed Governor James
Douglas in the summer that he approved of the latter's taxation measures but
no distinction must be made between foreigners and British subjects
as to the amount per head of the license fee required.\textsuperscript{13}

If immigration restrictions and special taxes on foreigners were implemented
in British Columbia, they would have gone against Imperial interests and
Imperial treaties.

Merchants in Victoria viewed all immigrants as sources of profit, and land
speculators also benefitted from influx of immigrants. Chinese merchants
bought property in Victoria as early as July 1858.\textsuperscript{14} In the gold fields, how-
ever, the attitude was hostile. The first reported clash occurred over the
sale of liquor and arms to local Indians by the Chinese. The white miners had
passed a resolution forbidding this practice other than by authorized person,\textsuperscript{15}
the punishment being public flogging.\textsuperscript{16} This was a touchy issue. Governor
Douglas had reported that during the winter, Hudson's Bay Company men digging
for gold had been closely watched by the local Indians, who "quietly hustled
and crowded" out the white men and took over the diggings. He anticipated
trouble when a large influx of white miners arrived\textsuperscript{17} - and was correct. The
Chinese action of supplying the Indians with arms in an inflammable situation -
even though it is doubtful that they knew of the miners' law - must have re-
inforced the popular negative image:

That for ways that are dark
And for tricks that are vain
The heathen Chinee is peculiar.\textsuperscript{18}
One of the first aggressive actions by white miners occurred at the beginning of the 1858 mining season when a mob from California tried to prevent a steamer carrying Chinese miners from landing at Hope. They threatened them and the Captain with violence, and it was only by the intervention of the Hudson's Bay Trader, Donald McLean, and his son, that the Chinese were permitted to disembark. The white miners were reminded that on British soil people of whatever nationality or colour were allowed free access. However violence and the threat of violence ensured that the small number of Chinese who first came worked only the abandoned claims. In 1859 the British Colonist reported that in the Little Kanyon, conflicts occurred between white and Chinese miners in which the latter were obviously intimidated:

The white men aver that the Celestials have pursued a most aggressive policy -- jumping claims while the owners were in town buying provisions; pulling up stakes and tearing down notices; and behaving in an insolent manner generally, thereby meriting a sound trouncing.

The Chinese actions were not illegal unless these white miners had Miners' Licenses - a questionable probability. The Chief Inspector of Police, Chartres Brew, in his letters wrote of the difficulty of collecting the fee from the miners. Between Yale and Hope in March 1859 only eighty dollars was collected from the miners. He wrote:

On the "American Bar" ... the miners, except a few Chinamen, absolutely refused to pay and only laughed at the demand.

By 1860 public sentiment was sufficiently anti-Chinese that a public meeting in Victoria passed a resolution for a poll tax on Chinese men. The proposal was an alternative to the mule tax, a tax of one pound sterling imposed on every loaded quadruped leaving Douglas. This tax affected both the merchants and the miners on the mainland, adding to the already prohibitive cost of
provisions in the gold fields. It was imposed to raise funds for an as yet non-existent road to the mines. The alternative resolution proposed that revenue be obtained by a duty on all imports into British Columbia, a moderate land tax, and a poll tax on all Chinese men entering the colony.

Although there was some opposition to the poll tax, the sentiments of the meeting were in support of the resolution. It was stated that the Chinese were "a nuisance -- a moral scourge -- a curse", that they "produced nothing; he didn't even reproduce himself. [Great laughter and applause]". An amendment to strike out the poll tax clause was lost.22 Fearing the consequences, a delegation of three Chinese residents met with Governor Douglas after the meeting. He reassured them that even if he wished to tax them he was prevented by law.23 The Colonist pointed out that, at this time, such a law was opposed to the interests of the merchants of Victoria since the Chinese purchased merchandise.24 The British Columbian, however, based on the mainland at New Westminster, was more sympathetic to this anti-Oriental attitude.

The editor of the British Columbian, John Robson, advocated a special tax on Chinese miners in his first issue.25 On March 14, 1861, the editorial entitled the "Celestial Tax" compared the Californian and British Columbian situation and emphasized the "Oriental menace". In California, he stated, their numbers had increased from 15,000 to 50,000 in five years despite "organized oppression and persecution". "What may we reasonably expect in British Columbia," he said, "where they are sure of protection and toleration?"26 Robson, overwhelmed by yellow-peril-type fears, expressed his belief that by the end of the 1861 season there would be 20,000 Chinese in British Columbia from California and China direct. He put forward the rationale for Australian and Californian
dislike of the Chinese and inferred that British Columbian objections were based on the same grounds. In all three places, he said, Chinese miners rapidly exhaust the surface diggings; live on only a little rice thus spending only half as much as Europeans on necessities and nothing on luxuries; return to China taking their gold with them; and in British Columbia they do not pay their fair share of the tariffs, yet they benefit equally from its expenditure. California and Australia had imposed a fifty dollar tax, and Robson proposed a similar tax in British Columbia.

And can British Columbia afford to be more liberal in this matter than either Australia or California? Or should we stand and look on with our thumb in our mouth, while these people exhaust our mines, and, like a swarm of locusts, leave the country impoverished and desolate.27

Thus the example of legislation in California and the Australasian colonies was used to buttress and rationalize prejudice in British Columbia. Chinese miners wherever they went suffered under the white stereotype image of them as a race.

Robson in 1861 expressed objections that were to arise constantly over the next seventy years, and his editorial contains the misrepresentations and actual errors common to the prejudiced attitude of whites. The number of Chinese expected to arrive in British Columbia was always inflated. The assumption that they spent little for food and sent large fortunes back to China was discounted in the Royal Commission Report on Chinese Immigration in 1885,28 but until that time (and after) this belief was maintained and reiterated constantly. They were not wanted as a permanent part of the population yet they were abused when they left the colony with their gold. Governor James Douglas, speaking as a government official, said of the Chinese:
They are certainly not a desirable class of people as a permanent part of the population but, for the present, are useful as labourers and as consumers of a revenue-paying character.\(^{29}\)

While they were of use, kept to their positions in jobs that white people would not do, kept off the newly discovered gold fields and paid taxes, they were barely tolerated, but certainly not welcomed.

The British population viewed the Chinese as a threat to the cultural destiny of the new colony, and this was a major source of inter-racial tension. Their obvious alienness was a threat to what was hoped would be a pure or at least homogeneous population in British Columbia.\(^{30}\) The prevailing assumption among the British was that they were ordained by God as the ruling race throughout the world and that their presence brought civilization.\(^{31}\) The material and technological sophistication of the West was taken as evidence of a "higher civilization". Pseudo-scientific theories of race, environment, and national character steadily gained in popularity during mid-century and supported notions of racial superiority.\(^{32}\)

The developing science of ethnology, based on white supremacy, provided some support for racism. As Philip Curtin has pointed out in *Imperialism*, imperial theory was not confined to Europe but its ideology was also located in European colonies.\(^{33}\) For example, Matthew MacPie, a resident of Victoria for five years, argued his racist philosophy by referring to the twenty-three distinct crosses that ethnologists had "scientifically" located from the inter-marriage of Caucasians, Native Indians and Negroes. His questions assume both a hierarchy of races, with the British possessing the most desired hereditary "drives" and attitudes, and include the concept that other so-called "inferior" races are unclean and thus a threat.
It is to be feared that these varieties of humanity do not occupy our soil and multiply their kind, in every instance, without detriment to that type which we [Englishmen] desire should predominate. What is to be the effect, upon that section of posterity which will, in future Centuries, inhabit the British North American shores of the Pacific, of this commingling of races so diverse in physiological, psychological, intellectual, moral, religious and political aspects? . . . Does the presence, so largely of inferior races forbode the fatal tainting of the young nation's blood and signal its premature decay, or will the vitality of the governing race triumph over the contamination with which more primitive types threaten to impregnate it?34

The new colony of British Columbia was to be white, and British. To ensure this, emigration direct from Britain was encouraged. Douglas requested Englishmen for colonial offices - Englishmen of "sterling uprightness" and "integrity".35 He stressed the need of the "respectable British element"36 in the population of "birds of passage".37 English travellers publicized the new El Dorado in Britain, stressing the need for British settlers to emigrate and selling a dream to prospective immigrants. For instance, William Hazlitt, in The Great Gold Fields of Cariboo, emphasized that a new and better life could be had, quoting wages, living expenses and reiterating stories of successful immigrants. A letter published in the Times, March 25, 1862, stressed the need for two classes in British Columbia - capitalists and labourers and their families.38 Kinahan Cornwallis expressed two reasons for British immigration. First, the British were supporters of a monarchy and an aristocracy which would counter Americanism with its republicanism and democracy and thereby fortify British influence and maintain the British hierarchical class and race structure in British Columbia. (This fear of Americanisation and democratisation of British Columbia and possible annexation was a concern of early British officials and travellers to the colony, though it abated somewhat during the American Civil War). Second, the emigration of educated classes from Britain would ease the pressure on this strata of society.39 The Bishop of
Columbia in 1860, reflecting on the future of British Columbia considered that the colony only needed population and capital. His vision was of British Columbia being populated with people from England so that the colony would be a flourishing representative of Great Britain on the Pacific Coast. . . . Englishmen . . . to establish the constitution of England in all its security - fair dealing and purity, as well as freedom.  

Clive Phillips Wolley, advising on emigration, stated that it was better to guide our strong-limbed true-hearted wanderers to lands in which they may beget a race of thoroughbred Britishers, who . . . may be our strongest weapon for defense or offence in a federation of Britain and her colonies which shall contain within its domains all the products of earth or sea that man can need, and be strong enough to keep the peace of a world.

An outpost of the British Empire, British Columbia should be inhabited by "full-blooded Englishmen". Racial thought emphasized the superiority of Caucasian blood. Contamination by "foreign" blood was seen as a threat to the tenuous superiority of Caucasians. The deleterious results of intermarriage were stressed and particularly the creation of "debased hybrids". The intermingling of so-called inferior races with the white race was considered to have an ill-effect on the morality of the white race. The best way to protect the latter was to ensure that it did not come into close contact with "inferior races". It was to this class that the Chinese people as a race were assigned. Although MacFie did not recommend the exclusion of Chinese men from the colony because of their value as labourers, his attitude of English superiority and Christian paternalism provided a rationalisation for their exploitation.

He wrote:
Let the \([\text{English}]\) colonists show the fruits of a superior civilisation and religion, not in ridiculing and despising these pagan strangers \([\text{the Chinese}]\) but in treating them with the gentle forbearance due to a less favoured portion of the family of mankind, and they will continue to be useful and inoffensive members of society.\(^44\)

While it suited the capitalist class and especially in times of labour shortage when their labour was needed, Chinese men were "useful". In times of economic stagnation when the colony suffered from a lack of consumers due to a decline in white immigration, merchants did not consider it to be economically viable to dispense with Chinese immigration. Amor de Cosmos, speaking for the merchant class in Victoria, voiced this attitude in the spring of 1860, when Fraser River mining suffered its first decline:

> What the trade now suffers from is the lack of consumers, the supply being greater than the demand . . . They \([\text{Chinese}]\) may be inferior to Europeans and Americans in energy and ability; hostile to us in race, language, and habits, and may remain among us a Pariah race; still they are patient, easily governed, and invariably industrious, and their presence at this juncture would benefit trade everywhere in the two colonies. We are disposed to accept them as a choice between two evils – no white immigration or a Chinese immigration . . . Hereafter, when the time arrives that we can dispense with them, we will heartily second a check to their immigration – treaty stipulations to the contrary.\(^45\)

The present-mindedness and self-interest of the merchants and government officials on Vancouver Island and the Christian paternalism of MacFie was not the attitude of the mainland merchants and gold miners, who had different interests and aims and methods of their own for obtaining them. Coming from California, the miners experienced mining-town self-government. Methods of community control could not be entirely transferred to British Columbia because British law and order were established in the colony from its inception. In California, an appointed mining camp committee set up the rules for claims.
and established a rudimentary code of criminal law and procedure. The most prevalent categories of offense were theft and murder, the penalties being banishment from the camp and hanging. Authority was sanctioned by public opinion. There were instances of self-rule at times in the British Columbia mining camps. The presence of the Chinese men in the gold fields was an issue to white gold-miners. As a visible minority, the Chinese miners were the target of white democratic community law enforcement. A company of Chinese men were friven off the new field at Similkameen in August, 1860, by the white miners already working the area. W.T. Ballou, of the Ballou Express Company, reported to the Colonist that government officials would "fare roughly" in the white miners' hands. The Cariboo white miners, in 1861, passed a local law prohibiting Chinese miners from entering the field, reasoning that white men had prospected and opened up the area and "it would be unfair to allow 'John' with his bag of rice, to step in and reap that which another hath sowed". An "indignation meeting" took place in a Barkerville saloon in January 1865, after a dispute over wood occurred between a white man named Moresby and a Chinese man. The meeting of white miners empowered a committee to request the Chinese as a class to leave the creek. At the height of the gold mining season in the same year, white miners on Lightning Creek drove the Chinese miners off the shallow diggings. As more Chinese entered the fields in 1865, tension increased. The British Columbian reported that twelve Lillooet residents jumped the claims of Chinese miners on Bridge River and "are doing well". A letter written by the former owner of the Cariboo Sentinel, Alexander Allan, expresses the white miners' hostility toward Chinese miners, considering them "a curse to any country they inhabit". The Chinese miners prepared to proceed to the Peace River gold mines in the spring of 1870, but Allan prophesied that
they would be back quicker than they went.

It is a fierce determination among miners to drive them out and keep them out of that country at all hazards.\textsuperscript{54}

Antagonism also took the form of individual physical attacks. In August 1858, a nameless Chinese man was shot with five bullets and no attempt was made to solve the crime.\textsuperscript{55} Two Chinese men were murdered in their tent at Big Bar in early April, 1860; the deed was considered to have been the work of white men.\textsuperscript{56} In a claim dispute in the Cayoosh region, two Chinese men were shot by two white miners, in May, 1860.\textsuperscript{57} A Chinese miner was murdered north of Boston Bar in July, 1860, and another Chinese miner was murdered near Lytton in June, 1862. The case was never solved.\textsuperscript{58} A Chinese man was found drowned near Lillooet, the circumstances of his death unknown.\textsuperscript{59} Such cases occurred frequently enough that one wonders if in fact they were "accidents". In 1863 a Chinese man was hanged, the reason given - "I didn't like his face". The murderer was released.\textsuperscript{60} In April, 1865, a white man by the name of Copeland cut off a Chinese man's queue and discharged his revolver into a group of Chinese men on board the steamer \textit{Hope}. He was arrested but released on bail. Copeland left for Victoria, and the case was never tried.\textsuperscript{61}

The Attorney-General's records of inquests into deaths which occurred in British Columbia are incomplete and for some of the early years of the mainland colony, non-existent. Thus estimates of the number of Chinese people murdered or physically attacked in British Columbia are not available. The Colony, unlike California, did not set up a special committee to investigate inter-racial violence. However, Judge Matthew Begbie, of "hanging judge" notoriety, stated that the Chinese would not have been safe in Williams Lake
in the early 1860's, because of anti-Chinese actions. In the gold mining areas generally, Begbie considered that the police could not have guaranteed their safety.62

The neighborhood of Lytton has been the scene of terrible outrages against Chinamen, in all of which the perpetrators have escaped scot free. One case in particular . . . the alleged ringleaders, though fully identified by four of the surviving victims, were acquitted by the jury upon evidence of an alibi which the prosecutors might well deem perjured.63

Begbie also considered that the rise in crimes of violence among the Chinese in the 1880's was

due to the demonstrated impotence of our criminal law to protect Chinamen from the most enormous outrages, as well as from petty annoyances.64

The prejudiced belief that the Chinese as a race were dishonest and therefore their word could not be trusted meant that the white controlled court system worked against them. In the experience of Attorney General A.E.B. Davie, a barrister in the province since 1862: "White people, to my knowledge, have escaped owing to juries distrusting the Chinese."65

A favourite sport among whites was cutting off queues -- an experience causing not only great shame to a Chinese man, but also problems for him when he returned to China where he was required to wear a queue by law. Because the life of a "Chinaman" was not considered by the majority of whites to be of any great value, it is probable that only a small percentage of attacks were reported. Also, in this early period, settlement in the gold mining areas was not established and communications with Victoria or New Westminster did not occur on such a regular basis that all events would have been brought to
the newspapers attentions. Fair and equitable treatment in British Columbia is a myth.

The antagonism and violent treatment of Chinese miners by whites was acknowledged by Indians who accepted the white man's racism. This situation was recognized by white contemporaries. The Bishop of Columbia wrote in 1860 that the Indians south of Lytton looked upon Chinese men with "an evident sense of their own superiority", holding the Chinese in great contempt. Commander R. C. Mayne spent four years in British Columbia from 1858 and in his experience the Indians refused to regard both blacks and Chinese with "any of the respect claimed by and shown to whites". He recounts an incident when a local Indian asked him about the Chinese and when told they were "carqua King George men (i.e., the same as Englishmen)"; the Indian replied "Wake, wakel (No, no!)". The local Indian population faced dislocation as a result of the arrival of gold miners and settlers, and they directed their frustration at the Chinese. In the spring of 1859, Indians attacked Chinese miners at Bridge River on the Fraser. A fight broke out between the Indian and Chinese populations in New Westminster in May 1860. "Jonah" of Yale warned of trouble between Indians and Chinese on the bars in the vicinity of Yale in the summer of 1860 and on August 10, the Shuswap Indians attacked a Chinese camp at Cayoosh, demanding provisions. Returning later to procure the Chinese miners' blankets, the Indians found the Chinese had armed themselves in preparation. In the "war" that broke out, two Chinese men, two Indian women, and two Indian men were shot. Most of the Chinese were sufficiently intimidated to leave the area for diggings on the lower Fraser. Indians on the coast held captive Chinese men who arrived by junk. Douglas dispatched soldiers to force the Indians to release their captives.
Individual Indians, aware of the white man's lack of concern for Chinese people also attacked and plundered Chinese miners. One such reported instance concerns an Indian, Tachnack, who was found with gold and the personal effects (including boots) of a Chinese miner, Pulingo. Tachnack had been hired by Pulingo to take him by canoe from Harrison River to a point eight miles above Hope. Pulingo was never seen again and Tachnack was tried for theft, receiving one year's jail with hard labour. The charge of murder was not laid because Pulingo's body was never located. It would appear that the racial hierarchy and power structure of white society was visible to the local Indian population.

Further evidence of the discrimination, abuse and physical attacks that the Chinese faced can be found in the formation of Freemason Societies throughout British Columbia, organized for mutual assistance and protection. The first of these lodges was established in Barkerville in March 1863. Through the Chinese merchants in Victoria, these associations became province-wide. To prevent disunity among the Chinese men they were discouraged from using the white legal system. The association settled disputes between its members, and thus the white legal system was largely ignored. The concern of Chinese men regarding their treatment at the hands of white men was expressed officially in an address to Governor Kennedy on his arrival in Victoria in 1864. Presented by the Chinese merchants on behalf of all Chinese in the colony, it contained in part:

Chinese seem much devoted to Victoria Queen for protection and distributive rule of him Excellencey old Governor Sir James Douglas, so reverse California ruling when applied to us Chinese countrymen . . . In ending, us confide in gracious hope in thee, first degrees, and first rank and first links, and trust our California neighbours may not exercise prejudice to our grief.
During the 1860's, white miners tried other methods of excluding the Chinese miners from the gold fields. Appeals were made to Governors Douglas and Kennedy in the form of petitions and after the Legislative Council of the colony of British Columbia was established in 1864, their interests were presented by their representatives. Miners' candidates attempted legislatively to exclude the Chinese, but did not have adequate support in the Council for these measures. Most members saw the issue to be one of taxing the Chinese present in the colony.

The first major issue to merchants in the colony of British Columbia concerned import tariffs and the Chinese were again treated as scapegoats. The mainland was still governed from Victoria, which was still a free port while New Westminster merchants had to pay a ten per cent tax on imported goods. Robson argued in editorials against Victoria's favoured trade position, voicing the attitudes and opinions of the New Westminster merchants. Victoria was the port of arrival for most gold miners - whatever their origin - and they bought their mining equipment and provisions there rather than paying the increased mainland prices at New Westminster. But Robson, in an editorial in the Spring of 1861, singled out the highly visible Chinese miners, implying that only they bought their outfits in Victoria and thereby avoided paying duty. Because the Chinese did not pay their fair share of the colony's revenues, Robson argued, the burden of taxation fell on the merchant class. He also complained that the Chinese miners did not buy the taxed goods in any quantity because of their simple life style and lack of luxuries.

The Chinese thus suffered from their high visibility. Conspicuous due to non-Caucasian physiognomy, dress (queue, pajama-type clothing), eating habits, philosophy, values and way of life, they could be easily located in the com-
munity and taxes could be imposed upon their food and occupations. Legislation
directed specifically at the Chinese people was initiated in the first Legis-
lative Assembly of the British Columbia colony when it was necessary to defray
the high cost of road building and the running of the colony.

In the spring of 1865 the Customs Amendment Ordinance passed its third
reading, and a relatively higher tax on goods used by Chinese miners was
imposed. This was the first discriminatory tax.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dried Goods</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groceries</td>
<td>12-1/2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Fish</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables (preserved)</td>
<td>12-1/2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a result of its introduction Chinese men were seen as potential smugglers of
opium. On April 22, a Chinese man was caught with twenty-two pounds of opium
and jailed, but the arresting officer had jumped the gun. There was insufficient
evidence to prove the Chinese man's intention of evading the custom laws. 81
This case did nothing to improve the image of the Chinese as a race.

It would seem almost necessary that every Chinaman should be
thoroughly searched on arriving in the colony, as we understand
they have already had recourse to the artifice of secreting opium
beneath the lining of their jackets. 82

When it was suggested by a reader that if such a policy of searching was to be
initiated then all persons "without respect to position or gender" should be
searched, Robson advocated the abolition of the duty if such an "offensive precaution" was required. It might be necessary to apply a "more stringent rule to John Chinaman" to prevent opium smuggling but it was "uncalled for" and "impolitic", and "obnoxious system" to propose searching all white people docking at New Westminster. 83

In the same session, the representative for the mining area of Douglas-Lillooet, Holbrook, moved an amendment to clause twenty-five of the Gold Fields Amendment Bill, proposing a miner's license for Chinese miners. In the debate that followed he argued that large numbers of Chinese were expected in the mining area, and it was unjust to white men if Chinese miners should escape from payment. The Honourable Mr. Henry Maynard Ball pointed out that from his experience as Gold Commissioner on the Fraser and Thompson Rivers, a compulsory license tax was inadvisable. The miners' license tax was unpopular with all miners, it was difficult and expensive to collect, and, at this point, there were insufficient magistrates to ensure that a compulsory tax would be enforced. Chinese miners were subject to the same penalty as white miners who did not take out a license - their claims could be jumped. He argued further, and was supported by Elliott, that the Chinese miners were too poor to pay any taxes, and if it was imposed the jails would be full of Chinese men, an added expense to the colony. Mr. J.A.R. Homer, representing New Westminster, countered that a large number of Chinese men worked for one master who could afford to pay the license. The Attorney General pointed out that the discussion was out of order, that if any tax was to be imposed it ought to be general and not directed at Chinese miners specifically. The motion to amend the bill was lost, but the topic was not dropped. 84
White miners at Lytton petitioned the Governor arguing that they, as free miners, paid a mining license of one pound a year, and so should the Chinese miners, who enjoyed the privileges of free miners, tax free. Their failure to pay the license, the white miners argued, was not only unfair but meant a loss of public revenues. The eighty-six miners who signed the petition demanded that all Chinese miners working the bars be required to pay the tax. In essence, they were demanding a compulsory tax specially for Chinese miners. 85

This was the first of many attempts to place a specific tax on Chinese miners - attempts made first by the Legislature of the colony, and after 1871, by the British Columbia Legislative Assembly in Victoria. In neither case were they successful. In 1886 the Federal Government of Canada finally acquiesced to the demands of the province. The Governor in his reply to the white miners' Chinese Tax Petition in 1865 gave the reasons for the refusal to allow such discriminatory laws:

Her Majesty's instructions expressly prohibit the Governor from assenting to any ordinance whereby persons of African, Asiatic or Indian birth may be subjected or made liable to any disabilities or restrictions to which persons of European birth or descent are not also subjected or made liable. If therefore the Chinese be compelled to take out licences, the compulsion must be made universal.86

The Governor concurred with the miners' attitude that "the Chinese are not the most desirable colonists whom our gold mines attract", and hence he allowed the new tariff "to press with some severity on articles mainly consumed by them". 87

The desire to tax Chinese miners was not universal within the colony, however. In a letter to the editor of the British Columbian, "Justicia" con-
sidered the tax on Chinese goods to be discriminatory. The Chinese miners mainly worked the diggings abandoned by white miners, it was argued, and these diggings barely afford them support, and that placing an undue tax on their very necessities of life is simply putting it out of their power to render productive what can never be made so by any other description of labour. 88

The editor, Robson, got the last word in:

there is a great waste of sympathy upon the Chinese miners of this colony, and that the cry of "oppression" sought to be raised upon the new tariff is not justified in fact . . . they are the most worthless class of our miners, who never become colonists, who never prospect the country . . . who amass large quantities of gold, all of which goes to enrich a country which is closed against civilization, and which shows precious little consideration for British subjects in its legislation. 89

This was the stand that Robson took throughout this season. The newspaper used a lot of print to prove that the Chinese miners were profiting from their panning of abandoned claims, countering the argument that Chinese miners were too poor to pay the mining license. During the 1865 season, reports from the mining areas, and from Lytton in particular, stressed the "rich harvest" 90 that the Chinese miners were reaping. At Yale and Lytton, Chinese miners wing-dammed the river and were reported as making from $20.00 to $40.00 a day. 91 A Chinese man was reported to have mined 126 ounces of gold from the Fraser River, quite a fortune when gold sold for £16 an ounce. 92 A letter was printed from "Aegathalian" of Lytton who considered that as a class, the Chinese are doing better than the whites, and that the touching commiseration of their condition by certain honourable members of the legislature was a ridiculous farce. 93
public opinion was pushing for a tax of some form on Chinese miners. In the editorial of the first issue of the Cariboo Sentinel, the editor stated he was disposed to a tax on Chinese miners. Holbrook, in a meeting of his Douglas-Lillooet constituents in June, reported his attempts to bring in a measure to tax Chinese miners. Defeated because only a few elected members supported him, he said:

as I have the voice of the people with me, I will bring it in again next session.

The proportion of Chinese people in British Columbia had increased since they first arrived in 1858, although it is extremely difficult to reckon their actual numbers. Holbrook stated in June 1865 that there were 3,000 in the colony, and 2,000 more were arriving or expected to arrive in the 1865 season. It was reported in the British Columbian that "probably" 70 per cent of the total of 487 people who arrived in the colony in the last week of May, 1865, were Chinese. Throughout the summer, accounts from the interior, although inflated, tend to indicate that their numbers had greatly increased. Previous reporting of the movement of Chinese miners from one area to another spoke of "several Chinamen". Now, in the 1865 season, it was "hordes of Chinamen" and in August, 1865, it was reported that 1,500 Chinese men were mining on the Columbia River. It would appear that the antagonism became more vocal as the numbers of Chinese increased. It occurred at a time when through the Legislative Assembly of the colony - laws could be passed which reinforced the existing prejudice. Racism became institutionalized. The duty on Chinese goods was the first step. The second step was the compulsory miners' license.
Another factor contributing to the prejudice was that the "Chinese pickings" now appeared profitable to white miners. The mining areas of the Cariboo, the Kootenays and the Columbia River were not easy or cheap to work. W. Champness had been lured to the Cariboo from Britain in June, 1862. He spent two weeks at Antler Creek and returned to Victoria, dispirited, disillusioned, broke, and bitter at the gross misrepresentation.

To mine the area a large capital outlay was required. They were not surface diggings, for deep exploration was necessary at enormous expense. A single miner would have little success. His was not a unique experience. On his way up to Antler Creek, Champness met hundreds of disgruntled miners returning from the Cariboo. Most, because they were inexperienced miners, could not even get work with a mining company. In the late summer of 1863, miners left the Cariboo because they could not get employment. New discoveries in the North Island of New Zealand began a rush there and Cariboo miners left to try their luck in the South Pacific. Companies worked the Cariboo. One company, the Cameron Company, paid its employees between $75.00 and $100.00 a month, which indicates the high investment (and profits) made in mining. The cost of provisions in the Cariboo, estimated by the Gold Commissioner, Peter O'Reilly, to be 350 per cent higher than in New Westminster, also added to the cost of mining. It was not until roads to the region were improved that the prices of provisions decreased. A party of white miners returned from the Columbia area in March 1865, declaring those diggings a "humbug". In the same summer white miners drove Chinese miners off the surface diggings on the lower Lightning Creek, and found that they could make from $20.00 to
$30.00 a day.\textsuperscript{108} Because the new diggings required such a large capital investment, white miners took a second look at what they had previously dismissed as "poor man's pickings" yielding "Chinaman's wages".

In the 1865 session, the British Columbia colonial Legislature passed the Gold Export Ordinance which imposed a tax of two shillings an ounce on gold exported. This was initiated as an alternative to the introduction of a compulsory miners' license,\textsuperscript{109} which was unpopular among white miners and was only collected with a lot of grumbling and difficulty.\textsuperscript{110} The Gold Export Ordinance also proved unpopular and difficult to enforce. In the Fall election in Cariboo West, the successful candidate Robert Smith called for the abolition of road taxes, the export duty on gold, the duty on spirits, and modifications to the customs tariff\textsuperscript{111} - all miners' demands. The Acting Gold Commissioner at Big Bend, R.T. Smith, estimated that figures for only half of the gold taken from that area were known, the rest being smuggled south over the border to avoid the tax.\textsuperscript{112} The Gold Export Ordinance was abolished in the 1866 session. A new source of revenue to replace it had to be found\textsuperscript{113} and the means to tax the Chinese miners within the laws of the Imperial Government.

A.W.S. Black, the Cariboo West representative, in the 1864 - 65 session expressed the hope that the Governor, on his return to British Columbia, would have been empowered by the Imperial Government to permit the Legislative Council to place a head tax on Chinese people. If this did not happen, Black advocated a compulsory mining license as the only means allowable to collect revenue from "these foreigners".\textsuperscript{114} The editor of the British Columbian reckoned that the proportion the Indians and Chinese bore to whites for re-
venue purposes was 10:3:1. The speech from the throne at the opening of the Legislature made it clear — again — that a special tax could not be placed on Asiatics. The only way open was a compulsory miners' licence on all employed in mining pursuits. The Administrator of the Government, Arthur N. Birch, stated:

It is therefore only by this measure that our large Chinese population can be made to contribute to the Revenue in equal proportion to the white race. Few Chinamen now take out a Mining Licence, whereas, on the other hand, few white miners are to be found without one.

The estimated revenue from the collection of the Free Miners' Certificates for 1886 was $26,750.00, as compared with $17,169.00 for 1864.

Another tax was introduced in this session which was directed specifically at a predominantly Chinese occupation. This was the ground rent and trading licence for growing and selling vegetables. The first mention in the British Columbian of Chinese involvement in agriculture is in July, 1861, at Lillooet, where they grew potatoes for the mining population. As many miners were leaving the Cariboo due to lack of provisions, Chinese small-scale farming was extremely beneficial. In the winter of 1861, potatoes sold at Lillooet for three cents a pound, as compared with twenty-five cents at Quesnel, and up to fifty cents a pound in the Cariboo. In the autumn of 1865, the Chinese population at Quesnelmouth and Keithley's Creek was supplying miners for the first time with potatoes. Previously they had never sold for less than thirty cents a pound, but that year they were down to twelve and one-half cents a pound. In the spring of 1866 "Interrorem" of Lillooet wrote to the British Columbian asking why every Chinese man had to pay fifty dollars a year "for
the privilege of welling the product of the little patch of ground he cultivates by his own labor". The writer suggested that if this was the law, then it should be changed "the sooner . . . the better". However, in the Trades Licences Ordinance which passed its third reading in the Legislature on February 23, 1866, Chinese gardeners had to take out a licence of $2.50 for every month that they used crown land, and a licence of $7.50 for every three months that they were occupied in retail trade. A predominantly Chinese occupation had been heavily taxed by the Legislature.

Despite the fact that Chinese miners were forced to pay into the colony's revenues in the same proportion (if not a higher proportion) as white miner, despite the higher import tariffs on Chinese goods, and the horticultural taxes, Chinese people were not permitted the same rights as whites. The issue of the franchise demonstrates this. In the first election of representatives to the Legislative Council of British Columbia in 1863, no qualifications were required for voters in the three districts of Hope-Yale-Lillooet, Cariboo East, and Cariboo West, and hence alien men of all nationalities could vote. The Chinese miners voted at Cariboo West. To Robson, and other white men, it was bad enough that Europeans had been allowed to vote without reference to nationality,

but Asiatics, on the way down from the mines, many of them doubtless en route to China, were dragged up to lisp the name of the ambitious candidate for legislative honors. We protested at the time against the degradation thus cast upon British residents by placing them upon a political level with Chinese . . . Let it no longer be said that British colonists are to submit to the indignity, upon their own soil, of walking side-by-side with Chinamen to exercise that right so sacred to every Briton.
The Returning Officer at Quesnelmouth, Cox, struck out all Chinese votes in the 1863 election, the only aliens mentioned as being treated in this way. In the 1865 election Chinese men again voted, one white voter estimating that one third of the voters were Asiatics. The issue was even more of a political scandal in this election because, according to Robson, the wrong candidate had been elected. He suggested disenfranchisement of the whole district until the voters learned that the franchise was "a sacred trust".

In the discussion on the Native Evidence Ordinance, a bill brought in to deal with Indians giving evidence in court who were "destitute of knowledge of God and of any religious belief", the question of Chinese people's evidence was discussed. Because of the form of the oath they swore in court, it would seem that their evidence was not taken too seriously.

If the farce enacted of breaking a saucer in their presence were to prevail, and such a proceeding form the obligation of their oath, no credence whatsoever could ever be given to their evidence . . . it was a well known fact that such was not their mode of binding their consciences to tell the truth. I had merely been prescribed for them.

Mr. Elliott expressed the view that from his experience he would rather "place the Bible in the hands of a savage than a Chinaman". As far as he was aware, the Chinese people had no form of binding oath.

Aside from the question of whether their evidence was believed in the white men's courts, there is the issue of their treatment in the legal system. The fact that the Chinese people formed Benevolent Societies to deal with problems within their own community and to protect individual Chinese against white violence indicates that they did not receive justice in the white courts, nor
did they place much faith in them. A few examples of their treatment illustrates that their position was founded on experience. It has been demonstrated that physical assaults on Chinese miners often went unpunished. To obtain justice from contractors who did not fulfil their obligations, the Chinese brought charges against them. In one case a Chinese man Ah Yek (Ah Yep?) sued for wages of $960.00 which were owing to him for work done on the Cottonwood Road. In the final settlement he received $371.74. A similar incident occurred in the Douglas Road contract when Koo Loo, representing twenty-nine Chinese men, appealed to Governor Seymour for payment of $708.50 owing from the contractor, Scott. The Governor could not help him as final payment to Scott had already been made by the government. In another case a Chinese man was unjustly declared responsible for debts amounting to $60.00 which a white man had incurred. The Chinese man lost $2,400.00 worth of property and was unable to obtain legal redress. A Chinese cook employed by the Western Union Telegraph Company was charged with stealing a piece of pork valued at $5.00. He was sentenced to six months jail with hard labour, a relatively severe punishment. The instance previously mentioned of the Chinese man accused of smuggling opium demonstrates the white attitude toward Chinese "crimes".

Such cases were used as examples to the rest of the Chinese community. Robson commented on the opium smuggling arrest: "A few such cases will teach these rascals a salutary lesson". A similar attitude was taken when seven men running a Chinese gambling house in Yale were arrested. Newspaper reports of Chinese criminal cases contain an "I told you so" attitude. They reinforced the image of the average Chinese man as being by nature left-handed, cunning, stolid, cruel and inhumane.
An incoherency can be found if one traces the irrationality of early white immigrants' attitudes to Chinese people. No matter what they did, they could not upgrade their inferior position or change the negative opinion that whites held, to a more positive image. In the early years of the gold rush, Chinese miners worked the abandoned bars on the Fraser River. It was pointed out that if they did not work them no-one would because the return was so low. Yet, because they did work them, they faced abuse. It was said of them that they rapidly exhaust the surface mines, "and like a swarm of locusts leave the country impoverished and desolate", yet when they did move off the abandoned diggings it was reported that they were "taking over" areas which white men had opened up. An argument put forward both by Robson and miners generally was that the Chinese never prospect new gold fields but "jackal [sic] like, follow upon the heels of the hardy [white] pioneer". They were damned if they stayed on abandoned claims, and damned (and faced open hostility and violence) if they moved into new diggings.

That Chinese miners never prospected new areas was an assumption held by many people at the time, and one which historical writers have perpetuated. William Hazlitt's guide for gold seekers points out that Chinese miners out of necessity were not long satisfied with low yield diggings:

Some of the Chinamen, while serving their novitiate are satisfied with such poor diggings as yield only $1.00 to $2.00 a day, but they are soon forced by their taskmasters, who paid their expenses from China and San Francisco, and for whose benefit they labour, and who tax them both for repayment of these expenses and for a profit on the venture, to abandon such poor diggings for a richer. And as to white miners, not one of them will work for the small earnings I have mentioned.
Chinese miners did prospect new fields during this period. Governor Douglas on a visit up the Fraser in 1861 met a party of seven Chinese men who had discovered gold on Spuzzum Flat. He promised them protection. In May 1866 it leaked out that a company of eight Chinese miners had prospected and were mining successfully at Canon Creek. Within ten days a white party from Quesnel was organized to prospect the creek with funds raised by the Quesnel inhabitants ($300.00) and the government (contributing $200.00). In the same month reports reached New Westminster of Chinese miners prospecting the Similkameen River. Another company set off to prospect the Coqueballa, and in June 1866 a company of Chinese miners were prospecting and had begun working on the north fork of the Similkameen River. Only a few miners actively prospected for gold, the majority merely moving on to a newly discovered region as soon as word reached them. But it was only the Chinese who were singled out as committing this crime. Most miners left the country taking their gold with them but it was usually Chinese miners whose actions were objected to and who were accused of exploiting the colony's gold resources.

By the autumn of 1866 the complaint against the Chinese was no longer that they exhausted surface minings abandoned by white men. The cry was now that they were taking over. They were not only monopolizing the Kootenay mines, according to Robson, but also the trade and commerce of the area, and he feared that in the 1867 season there would be few white men in the area. If they entered predominantly white fields they faced the possibility of being driven off. If they kept to themselves and worked specific areas they were blamed for taking over. The Chinese as miners were simply not wanted except by the government who valued their tax dollars. Until 1866 however, Chinese miners
usually worked over the abandoned claims of white miners. Forming companies, they could make them pay. The companies were divided into two sections, one to work the mines, the other to grow the food necessary for the whole company's survival. By co-operative action they were able to make a living in areas which individual white miners dismissed as unprofitable diggings.

The Chinese people faced hostility which cannot be explained away by economic competition during this period. They did not take over jobs that white men had previously done. Instead they did work that white men were unwilling to do – either low status jobs and/or low paid work. Labourers were in short supply, and the Chinese were employed on jobs that white men, attracted to British Columbia by the lure of gold and the promise of wealth, were not interested in doing – other than in times of extreme economic hardship.

Chinese workers built many of the wagon trails in this period. They were employed to build the Douglas-Harrison Trail to Harrison Lake in 1858 along with British, American, Danish, French, German and black miners on their way up to the gold fields. The Cariboo Road through the Fraser Canyon from Lytton was built in 1862 and 1863 with Chinese labour supplied by the Ho Hang and Ah Yep firms. White labour was unobtainable after the first twelve miles due to news of gold discoveries in the Cariboo, but the Chinese stayed on demonstrating their reliability]. The Indians and Chinese workers hired by the contractors Walter Moberly and Charles Oppenheimer were decimated by small-pox in 1862-1863. In 1865, Dewdney, the contractor for the trail from Hope to Wild Horse Creek, hired seventy-five Chinese labourers for $75.00 a month and found. They were also employed on the wagon road from Quesnelmouth to Cottonwood.
as cooks, polemen and wiremen.\textsuperscript{153}

Chinese men in the gold mining towns provided the services necessary for a population of predominantly single men without the family institution and the work of women to provide for everyday survival needs. Chinese men started small businesses and filled this gap. They began truck farming, supplying miners with fresh vegetables by peddling their produce.\textsuperscript{154} They worked in laundries and by 1862 most of the restaurants were run by Chinese men, providing hot, appetizing meals at reasonable prices.\textsuperscript{155} Kwong Lee, a Chinese merchant, grazed stock for the Lillooet market.\textsuperscript{156} He opened a branch of his firm in Quesnelmouth, providing provisions for both white and Chinese miners, but especially for the latter who could not obtain credit above Lillooet.\textsuperscript{157} Gint Cawston, an old-timer, in his recollections, recalled pack trains run by Chinese men in the early days. Lew packed into the Cariboo, and Yib Poy at Lillooet.\textsuperscript{158} They also drove pigs and other stock to the mining towns. In the Kootenays, both local Indians and Chinese owned cows.\textsuperscript{159}

As the above evidence indicates, the Chinese people supplied the gold mining towns with necessities. Their labour was also useful to later settlers in the clearing of land and the harvesting of crops. The \textit{British Columbian} reported in the late summer of 1868 that farmers in the Cariboo were offering $2.50 to $3.00 a day to labourers and still could not obtain adequate help.\textsuperscript{160}

In some instances, a family of white men occupied in establishing a farm hired a Chinese labourer. His work could mean the success or failure of the undertaking. Employed as a servant, his jobs were as "cook, washerman and general man of all works, for nothing came amiss to him".\textsuperscript{161} They
cooked, baked, did washing and scrubbing, milked cows, bucked the wood, fed pigs and in leisure hours went into the garden.\(^{162}\)

In the Report of the Royal Commission of Chinese Immigration 1885, a judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Henry P.P. Crease, gave evidence on the labour situation in this early period. White men, if they did not get the high pay they considered their due, crossed the United States' border where they could obtain higher rates of pay. Crease stressed that there was a scarcity of reliable white women to do the "servile occupations" of the pioneer household. Indians were considered unsuitable as employees, at first because their large numbers were threatening, and then because they were seen as being "restless, nomadic" - and thus unsuitable as domestics. Several ships were chartered by prospective employers to bring female servants from England to chop and cut wood, get water, clean the dishes, pots and pans, cook, wash, bake, sew, and rear families, and discharge all the other onerous and multifarious duties of the manage.\(^{163}\)

Repayment of the women's fares was anticipated out of their salaries. Few women, however, stayed in the households long enough to make full repayment. Hence, they proved "a complete failure". "Kanakas", native peoples from the Sandwich Islands, were tried next, and "also failed; so, by the mere process of exhaustion, no resource was left but Chinese labour".\(^{164}\) Crease states:

Everyone had a great and not unnatural objection to try them, but necessity has no law, it was Chinese labour or none at all . . . gradually as the white woman saw her neighbor get some relief from the killing domestic slavery of colonial life she also adopted them and, by the sheer necessity of the case, their employment as domestic servants became general, and at last universal.\(^{165}\)

It was the usefulness of Chinese men as domestics that Crease emphasized.
Without them
the privations in family life, extreme and of wearying monotony, would have become intolerable, and a general exodus of families would have been the result.\textsuperscript{166}

Another factor was that Chinese domestics knew their place in the household while
white labour . . . especially female servants, . . . would not submit to consider themselves in the household arrangements as in any respect subordinate to their employers.\textsuperscript{167}

Chinese domestic servants relieved wealthy white households of some of the arduous tasks, and unlike whites, worked for what Crease considered were "reasonable or practicable rates". They were more reliable and knew their subordinate position. Although at first a necessary evil, Crease considered that they performed their job so well and their work was so necessary that it "created a good feeling towards them". It may have been the case that the wealthy classes in Victoria who employed servants - a small percentage of the population\textsuperscript{168} - moved beyond their prejudices in the face of necessity but the fact that the Chinese did perform these servile tasks merely reinforced the stereotype image of them as an inferior race. To these Victorians they were a servant class and to other classes the Chinese were fair game, and targets of white men's hostility and aggression. White "hoodlums" assaulted Chinese domestic servants on the streets of Victoria.\textsuperscript{169} To explain this phenomenon merely in terms of economic competition is too simple. White men did not work as domestics. Nor did they want to. Dissatisfied with their economic position, white men expressed their frustration by attacking a subordinant group, the Chinese.
It is clear that Chinese men were employed in occupations considered too arduous for Europeans to engage in, such as menial low-paying and low-status occupations. Although the tasks of building roads, providing essential services in the gold mining towns, and work as domestics were of the utmost importance in the development of the pioneer society, they were low-status occupations and lacked the prestige, glamour and possible monetary rewards of either gold prospecting or white men's work in business, politics, the professions or home-stead ing. Because of the scarcity of white women, Chinese men did the tasks normally assigned to women. As mentioned, they predominated in domestic service and in the laundry business. In California the washing of dirty linen had been predominantly a Chinese occupation and the first appearance of Chinese men in Victoria conjured up the stereotype image with an attitude of amused contempt. Ronald Leal, in his short history of laundry, points out that washing clothes - an occupation whose history goes back to before the established settlements of Egypt and Mesopotamia - has been primarily the work of women. This was the attitude in the gold rush period. Rather than doing their own laundry

the prospectors in the California Gold Rush, out-numbering the women twelve to one, sometimes sent their shirts all the way to China to be laundered.170

This type of domestic work is by its very nature non-productive. In a pioneer society involved in the rapid exploitation of natural resources, the most important consideration was profit. The lure of gold, the myth of the heroic and adventurous life of a gold miner, and the free and active life-style also attracted men to British Columbia. But in a capitalist, colonial society, the work one does determines one's position and image. The work of Chinese
men in domestic service - women's work - reinforced the image whites carried
of the Chinese as a passive, inferior race, ready to work for lower wages
than white men in occupations they considered were beneath them. By doing
what was considered to be degrading work, the Chinese were considered
degraded.
Footnotes (Chapter I):


7. Ibid., p. 80.

8. Tieng-fang Cheng, p. 35.


12. Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, to Governor James Douglas, July 1, 1858. First drafts of despatches outward from the Colonial Office in response to correspondence inward
from the colony. Colonial Office Manuscripts 60/1 (Microfilm, S.F.U.), (Hereafter cited C.O. 60/1).


Douglas was continually concerned with establishing British Columbia as a British colony, and wrote to the Colonial Office asking for "upright" Englishmen for colonial offices, English clergymen to prevent the introduction of foreign clergy and their influence, and generally of the need for a "respectable British element" in the population, thus supporting land grants to retired men of the army, navy and royal engineers. Douglas to Lytton, 29 September, 1858; 27 November, 1858; 6 November, 1858; 8 November, 1858. C.O. 60/1.

13. Lytton to Douglas, 14 August, 1858, C.O. 60/1.


15. Victoria Gazette, August 10, 1858.


17. Douglas to Right Honourable Henry Labourchere, April 6, 1858, C.O. 60/1. (Also in Robert M. Ballantyne, op. cit., Appendix VIII, pp. 98-99).

18. F. Bret Harte, That Heathen Chinee.


Banfield, the King's Printer, 1926.), p. 94.

Henry Maynard Ball in a letter to the Colonial Treasurer of British Columbia, November 30, 1860, estimated that one half of the Chinese in the Lytton district took out mining licences and only two-thirds of all miners took out the licence. That season Chinese miners were the principal source of the Miners' Licence Revenue in the Lytton district, and he anticipated that this revenue would be lost to the district in 1861, when the Chinese located higher up the Fraser River. E. C. Gold Commission, Lytton. Correspondence Outward, 1859-1863. Ms. P.A.B.C.

22. British Colonist, March 6, 1860, p. 3.


24. Ibid.


The editor, John Robson, was born in Upper Canada of Scottish parentage. He was a pro-confederationist and an anti-Chinese representative in the Legislative Council. In the first Provincial Legislative Assembly (1872) he introduced a motion that a bill should be sent to the Dominion Government providing for a fifty dollar head tax on all Chinese men in the province.

26. Ibid., March 14, 1861, p. 2.

27 Ibid.

28. The average wage of a Chinese labourer was $225.00 a year; his living expenses $182.00 a year; hence he could not save more than $43.00 a year. From Tieng-Fang Cheng Oriental Immigration in Canada, (Shanghai, Commercial Press Ltd., 1931), p. 56.


31. Douglas to Lytton, 27 November, 1858, C. O. 60/1.

Charles W. Dilke, writing in 1869 expresses the notion as:

Nature seems to intend the English for a race of officiers, to direct and guide the cheap labour of the Eastern peoples... It looks as though the cheaper Chinese would starve out the dear race English as rabbits drive out stronger but hungrier hares.


33. Curtin (ed.), Imperialism, XI.

35. Douglas to Lytton, 29 September, 1858, C. 0. 60/1.

36. Ibid., 8 November, 1858, C. 0. 60/1.

37. Ibid., 12 October, 1858, C. 0. 60/1.


39. Kinahan Cornwallis, *op. cit.*, XVI.


42. For this English pre-occupation see L. P. Curtis Jr., p. 12.

43. MacFie, p. 381.

44. Ibid., pp. 387-388.


47. A vigilante group was formed at Wild Horse Creek in 1864 when two rival gangs threatened to disrupt the camp. An officer of the law arrived to deal with the situation. It was "by chance" that he was in the

An incident occurred in Victoria in 1858 when a prisoner was rescued from the hands of the police and it was proposed that the American Flag be hoisted over the fort. Alfred P. Waddington, The Fraser Mines Vindicated, (Vancouver, Robert R. Reed, 1949), p. 34, (1st published, 1858).


50. Ibid., January 25, 1865, p. 3.

51. Ibid., June 6, 1865, p. 2.

52. It is difficult to make an accurate estimate of the numbers of Chinese men working in the gold fields, as newspapers - and most others - tended to over-estimate their numbers. During the months of May to August 1865, the British Columbian reported on the large numbers of Chinese entering the gold fields of the Cariboo and the lower Columbia. British Columbian, May 2, 1865, p. 3; May 30, 1865, p. 3; August 17, 1865, p. 3. By August 17, fifteen hundred Chinese miners were estimated to be mining the Columbia River. Holbrook estimated that there were three thousand Chinese men in the colony of British Columbia in June 1865. British Columbian, June 6, 1865, p. 3.

53. British Columbian, May 5, 1866, p. 2; May 19, 1866, p. 3.


58. Report of the Columbia Mission 1860, op. cit., pp. 74-75, British Colum-
blian, June 21, 1862, P. 2.
A possible reason that more crime did not occur in British Columbia, as compared to California, has to do with the climate and topography of British Columbia, rather than the presence of British Law Enforcement Officers. It was more difficult to make a complete getaway as there were only a few possible routes out of the area. Giving credit where it is due, however, the British magistrates were more dispassionate in dispensing justice when they were present, than Californian Law Officers.


63. Ibid., Appendix T., further evidence Judge Matthew Begbie, p. 415.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid., Evidence Honourable A. E. B. Davies, p. 51.
73. *British Columbian*, May 7, 1864, p. 3.


It was argued that use of the white legal system would "create more trouble and expense or damage friendships".


81. *Ibid.*, April 22, 1865, p. 3; April 25, 1865, p. 3.

82. *Ibid.*, April 25, 1865, p. 3.

84. *British Columbian*, February 25, 1865, p. 3.


86. *Ibid.*, March 14, 1865, p. 3.


For further examples of this kind of reporting see *British Columbian*,
July 4, 1865, p. 3; August 17, 1865, p. 3; September 13, 1865, p. 3;
November 25, 1865, p. 2.

94. *British Columbian*, June 17, 1865, p. 3.

95. *Ibid.*, June 6, 1865, p. 3.


These numbers are inflated. The population of the B. C. colony estimated
in September, 1865, was: 8,000 whites; 3,000 Chinese; 50,000 Indians.
*British Columbian*, September 20, 1865.

98. Ibid., August 12, 1865, p. 3; May 2, 1865, p. 3; May 11, 1865, p. 3; May 20, 1865, p. 3.

99. Ibid., August 17, 1865, p. 3.


For information on the Big Bend area and the difficulties in mining it see British Columbian, June 16, 1866, p. 2; July 11, 1866, p. 3.

101. Unlike the first gold rush of 1858, the Cariboo rush attracted more Britons than Americans - due partly to reports which Donald Fraser submitted to the London Times. W. Champness, op. cit., p. 7.

102. Ibid., pp. 62-63; p. 70; p. 73.


104. British Columbian, January 4, 1865, p. 3.

105. British Columbian, March 9, 1865, p. 3.

See also, William Mark, Cariboo: A True and Correct Narrative, (Stockton, W. M. Wright, 1863) for an account written by an unsuccessful and disgruntled miner.

106. British Columbian, June 20, 1865, p. 3.

107. Ibid., March 30, 1865, p. 3.

108. Ibid., June 6, 1865, p. 2.

109. Ibid., February 1, 1865, p. 1.

111. *British Columbian*, October 18, 1865, p. 3.


113. The revenue collected from the Gold Export Tax amounted to £10,428. 14.2d. Of this, £9,919.13.3d was collected at New Westminster and £1,300-0-11d at the southern border. *British Columbian*, January 31, 1866, p. 3.


121. *Ibid.*, September 27, 1865, p. 3.

122. *Ibid.*, February 3, 1866, p. 3.

123. *Ibid.*, February 24, 1866, p. 3.

124. Amor de Cosmos complained in the Legislative Assembly in 1861 that Chinese people monopolised the vegetable trade to the detriment of white gardeners. Reported in *Colonist*, December 15, 1968, p. 5.
125. British Columbian, November 11, 1865, p. 2.

126. Entry, December 12, 1863, Diary of John Evans, op. cit., p. 78.


128. Ibid.

129. Ibid., January 28, 1865, p. 3.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid., November 25, 1865, p. 3.

There were other labourers — both Chinese and some whites — who were also left without provisions or back pay when the contractor went bankrupt.

Ibid., December 16, 1865, p. 3.

For the Douglas Road contract see Koo Loo, "Letter to His Excellency Governor Seymour", New Westminster, 21 June, 1865. Ms. P.A.B.C.

132. From a letter signed "Nonverosasrnzaspin" to the editor, British Columbian, February 14, 1866, p. 3.

133. Ibid., May 2, 1866, p. 3.

134. Ibid., April 22, 1865, p. 3.

135. Ibid., July 4, 1861, p. 2.

136. E. G., the headline above the report of the murder of a Chinese man by two of his compatriots reads "Terrible Butchery at Lillooet". British Columbian, October 11, 1865, p. 3.


138. Ibid., March 2, 1865, p. 3.


141. *British Columbian*, May 9, 1866, p. 3 and May 19, 1866, p. 3.

142. *Ibid.*, May 12, 1866, p. 3.

143. *Ibid.*, May 16, 1866, p. 3.

144. *Ibid.*, June 30, 1866, p. 3.


146. *Ibid.*, November 14, 1866, p. 3.

147. In 1878 at McDame Creek this is how the Chinese companies worked. See Lyn Hancock, "Gold Fever at McDame Creek", *Westworld*, September-October, 1975, p. 24. In a fictional piece set in 1862, two white men lured to the Cariboo by the gold rush hired a Chinese cook, Phon, in Victoria. He provided the essential services necessary for their survival while the white men prospected and mined. Clive Phillips-Wolley, *Gold, Gold in Cariboo: A Story of Adventure in British Columbia*, (London, Blackie and Son Ltd., 1894).

148. W. Champness worked on a farm in the Thompson River Valley for three months in an attempt to recoup the heavy losses from his abortive trip to Antler Creek in 1862. W. Champness, p. 88.


Five hundred Chinese labourers were employed by Wright and Company to construct the Cariboo Road at $40.00 a month. In James Morton, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

152. *British Columbian*, August 17, 1865, p. 3.

153. Ibid., October 27, 1866, p. 3.


156. *British Columbian*, March 30, 1865, p. 3.

157. Ibid., May 9, 1866, p. 3.

"Because the Chinese could obtain little credit further south, the first store was built at Quesnel as early as May 1867; a second one, farther up the river, by June". From Gordon R. Elliott, *Quesnel - Commercial Centre of the Cariboo Gold Rush*, (Quesnel, Cariboo Historical Society, 1958), p. 46.


Ellison considers that a Chinese servant is superior to a white maid servant who was prone to up-and-leaving at the first opportunity. He paralleled the work of Chinese servants and wives and inferred that a wife is superior to a Chinese domestic because the latter has to be paid whilst the husband owns the labour of his wife, for as long as she lives. Also, her capacity to reproduce more labour for a farming enterprise was valued. He states: "A mother,
sister, or wife comes in handy, and is so valued in the settle-
ments and amongst the backwoodsmen of the Far West." pp. 64-65.

further evidence of Chinese workers on homesteads see Rev. W. G.
H. Ellison, op. cit., and Francis E. Herring, Among the People

163. R.R.C. 1885, p. 142.

164. Ibid.

165. Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Ibid.

168. In British Columbia in 1884, Chinese cooks and servants numbered 279;
washermen 156.

From Chuen-Yan David Lai, "Home County and Clan Origins of Overseas
Chinese in Canada in the Early 1880's." B. C. Studies, No. 27,
Autumn 1975. Table 9, p. 16. From the Royal Commission Report
on Chinese Immigration of 1885.

169. See J. W. Boddam-Whetham, Western Wanderings. A Record of Travel in

Also, W. A. Baillie-Grohman, Fifteen Years' Sport and Life in the
Hunting Grounds of Western America and B. C., (London, Horace
Cox, 1900), p. 347. Chapter XV titled "The Yellow and White
Agony - A Chapter on Western Servants by Mrs. Baillie-Grohman",
deals with the servant problem in British Columbia in the 1870's
and 1880's. She employed a white gardener for $1.00 a day and
three meals, the daily rate of Chinese gardeners with food addi-
tional, but he worked for only three days before leaving. He
wouldn't work if he only got "Chinaman's wages". p. 354.

170. Ronald Leal, "Rub a Dub Dub: A Short History of Home Laundry" in
Raymond F. Locke, Ed., The Human Side of History. Man's Manners,
"In order to justify degrading employment and treatment, exploiters argue that the workers are innately degraded and degenerate and consequently merit their condition." p. 334.

It is not only the employers who view things in this way. In a capitalist, patriarchal society the work one does determines one's position and image in that society. As Evelyn Sullerot has pointed out:

"activities within the house are feminine, those which take place outside - business, politics, war - are masculine. This polarity of inside - outside, interior - exterior, imperceptibly became a distinction between inferiority - superiority. Gradually, activities conducted inside were considered inferior to those performed outside. Evelyn Sullerot, Woman, Society and Change, Transl. Margaret Scotford Archer, (New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1971), p. 23.

This polarity becomes even more explicit in a society based on the profit motive. Work that is socially useful (domestic work) is devalued because it does not directly produce commodities for exchange. See Genevieve Leslie "Domestic Service in Canada, 1880 - 1920" in Janice Acton, Penny Goldsmith and Bonnie Shepard (Ed.), Women at Work, Ontario, 1850-1930, (Toronto, Women's Educational Press, 1974), pp. 71-125.
CHAPTER II

THE IMPERIAL CONNECTION

With such a people I maintain it is folly to say that they will "break before they will bend". They are only Asiatics; make them do a thing - compel them to advance - and they will do it as well as any of us; but consult their prejudice, or their ease, and good-bye to any change or advancement. Bear that in mind - treat them as children; make them do what we know is for their benefit, as well as our own, and all difficulties with China are at an end.¹

Up to this point, the discussion has dealt with the colony and its relationship to Vancouver Island or California. But British Columbia was a British colony, and as part of the Empire was subject to British law and Imperial policy. British Columbians were to learn that policies contrary to Imperial treaties could not be implemented in the colony.

British relations with China had significant consequences on colonies within the British Empire. The China trade was of importance economically and emotionally to Britain. For instance, one ninth of the total income of Great Britain and one seventh of British India's revenue in 1852 was derived from the Opium Trade between India and China. Britain had been an acquiescent guest in China, but by 1842 this policy was changing. Britain became an aggressive foreign power and laid the rules governing its presence in China. Other Western nations, particularly France and the United States, supported British attempts to open the doors of China by the use of gunpowder and they also joined in the distribution of the spoils. The effect of these policies on the Chinese and British Columbians will be discussed in the following pages.
The romantic image conjured in Europe by the fabled Cathay changed by the mid-nineteenth century to the image of a dark, heathen, backward people. The roots of this western hostility began when traders attempted to open Chinese markets to manufactured products. Advanced technology was seen by westerners as evidence of a higher civilization, and few recognized that there was a difference between civilization and technological development. Having imbibed the notion of the superiority of the West's economic and social systems, an attitude reinforced by their demonstrably superior military force, and bolstered by the Napoleonic wars and the conquest of India, Britain set out to end Chinese isolation from the West. A hundred years of foreign aggression, domination, and invasion followed, and the Western economic penetration of the peasant economy disrupted the fabric of Chinese society.

The motivation behind the attempts of Westerners to open Chinese ports to trade lay in the increased demand for Chinese exports in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Concurrently, Manchester merchants dreamed of opening this inexhaustible market of four hundred million people. By 1840, the industrial revolution increased the efficiency and output of British factories to such an extent that to maintain productivity, new foreign markets had to be found. England desired a reciprocal trade, while China was content with exporting what it considered were luxury items - tea, silk, rhubarb, procelain and lacquer-ware - in exchange for silver. Isolation and exclusion had been the official Chinese policy since the Manchu conquest in the 1640's. Being an alien dynasty, the Manchus faced opposition from within and from the "sea-barbarians" without. They feared that the latter would be able to gain access to the empire through foreign trade, join forces with opposition groups with-
in China, and thereby overthrow the Manchu dynasty. Thus for reasons of internal security as well as their official attitude toward trade, restrictions were placed on foreign merchants. Most importantly, China was economically self-sufficient and did not need western products, a fact that Britain did not recognize until the Mitchell Report of 1852.

A further affront to the British was the Chinese insistence on a tribute form of trade, implying Chinese superiority over all foreigners. Envoys were expected to acknowledge their submission in the Kotow ceremony. China's refusal to treat England as at least an equal was an important factor leading to the collision of the two nations.

Control over and dominance of India had important psychological and economic effects.

Wherever else the Briton went he felt and spoke as representative of the power at whose feet crouched a hundred million Hindus; he saw other "natives" as so many more crouching Hindus in different disguises.

Not only "natives". The Chinese were also seen in this way. But there were also economic links between India and China. The cultivation of raw cotton and opium in India was controlled by the East India Company, and these products provided commodities to exchange for Chinese exports - alternative commodities to gold and silver. The Opium trade was a complex arrangement between the East India Company and the "Country traders". The East India Company had a monopoly on British trade with China and granted licences to private merchants who carried the trade between India, South-east Asia and China, a trade in spices, cotton and opium. These licences provided funds in Canton
for the Company's tea investments. The private merchants were not permitted to deal in tea. As their exports to China far exceeded imports, the private merchants used the Company's banking system at Canton. The Company accepted the specie the country trade yielded, and exchanged it for Bills on the Court of Directors in London, or on the Government of Bengal. In this way the East India Company obtained revenue to exchange for Chinese products in demand in England. The Country trade was the key to the old China trade and as the trade increased these private merchants demanded an end to the East India Company's monopoly, and an end to China's closed door policy. The Opium trade was "inextricably mixed up with every trading operation between the three countries [India, China, and Great Britain]." In 1852 China only imported one and a half million pounds sterling of manufactured goods while Britain bought more than five million pounds sterling of tea and silk. The difference was made up by the Opium trade.9

Despite the Chinese government's prohibition on the importation of opium in 1800, the trade increased in the nineteenth century.10 In the hopes of interesting the Emperor in British manufactured goods, and thus expanding the export trade, embassies were sent to China but they had no success in changing Chinese policy and attitudes toward foreigners and foreign trade.11 This uncompromising attitude, the refusal to deal with foreigners on equal grounds, and China's refusal to adopt commercialism, were interpreted as evidence of China's stagnation.12 The accounts of these missions were widely publicised in Europe and replaced the optimistic and in some cases imaginary accounts of China that had previously circulated.13 The negative image was in formation as British traders saw China preventing them from fulfilling what they saw as their mission.
Westerners impregnated with their ethos of change, progress, energy, invested commerce with the same divine right that monarchy formerly claimed, and were irresistibly tempted to resort to force. . . . To knock down decrepit regimes was to liberate people's from the crushing burden of their past. . . . Backward lands would be given civilization, in return for the products wanted by Europe.14

Religious opinion also condemned China's closed-door policy. The London Missionary Society sent a missionary to Canton in 1807,15 but Robert Morrison had little success in converting the Chinese to Protestantism. With unrealistic hopes of successfully converting four hundred million souls, the missionaries' efforts were doomed to failure. Their concurrent disappointment coloured the image of the Chinese that they presented to a wide audience through lectures, books, and religious society publications. Archibald Little, himself a missionary in China for forty years, considered that many of the misconceptions that westerners had concerning the Chinese and their government, customs, laws and religion, were due to the fact that such information came from missionaries. To demonstrate the need for their existence, to justify their life-work and lack of visible success, missionaries represented China in its worst light,16 emphasising vice, debauchery, infanticide, idolatry, licentiousness and the degraded position of women.17 Further evidence of Chinese backwardness and need of reform was found in the attitude of Chinese officials who did not encourage the missionaries' efforts. Missionaries thus supported efforts to change the attitude to and the position of the foreigner in China.

It was the combined pressure of religious, trade, and political interests that caused a shift in British policy in China. Prior to 1839 the British had tried to persuade China that a more stable trading relationship would
benefit both nations. But with the voice of these interest groups, with the backing of the manufacturing interests of England, and after the 1832 Reform Bill with the backing of the House of Commons, military force was advocated to open Chinese ports. The Opium Wars and the Taiping Revolution reinforced the notion of western superiority. The unflattering image of the Chinese, which was necessary to justify British aggression, was publicized in western accounts of these wars. Chinese closed-door policy was explained in racial terms— as evidence of Chinese inferior "character"— and the solution was their education through the use of force. The East India and China Association, which represented the merchants of London with interests in the Far East, explained to the Foreign Secretary after the First Opium War:

Submission will now only aggravate the evil, ... an attempt should be made, supported by a powerful force, to obtain such concessions from China as would place the trade upon a secure and permanent footing. 18

The prevailing view in 1855 was:

For a revolution to be effective in China— effective in reforming every branch of the government, and in improving all classes of the people— we believe it will have to call in the aid and the influence of the foreigner . . . British representatives of political and commercial and religious departments / bent on the improvement and the welfare of the Chinese branch of the human family. 19

Captain Sherard Osborn in the Spring of 1858 wrote of the necessity of the second Opium War in the same paternalistic tones:

Great Britain had to interfere, not only to retrieve her damaged prestige— ... but physical force had to be applied to compel the Chinaman to do what we thought right. 20
The Opium Wars closed with the Manchu government acceding to western demands in harsh and humiliating treaty terms. The Treaty of Tientsin and the Convention of Peking gave Britain all the concessions for which the wars had been fought. Britain obtained extra-territoriality in China, access to over ninety ports, concessions in mining and railroads, missionary access to inland China, and restrictions on Chinese sovereignty. One of the most important restrictions was the control of the Chinese Maritime Customs by foreigners. By setting the import tariff at five per cent ad valorem, China could no longer protect local industry.  

In Frederic Wakeman's brief analysis of the economic consequences of the importation of British manufactured goods on rural cottage industries, he underestimates their effects on both local industry and the social structure of rural China. He points out that in rural areas where cottage industry was most affected by British textiles "anti-foreignism" was most marked. He also argues that rural impoverishment has been "grossly overemphasized". But he does not consider women's work, and therefore its cessation, to be of sufficient importance to include in his analysis. That it was not insignificant is demonstrated by the fact that in Shun-te county in 1853, half of the women weavers lost their occupations due to the introduction of competitively priced foreign cloth. The loss of their local market resulted in the intensification of family members inter-dependence. A greater reliance was placed on the earning power of male members of the lineage and this in turn altered social relations.
In the early nineteenth century, Ch'ing emperors expanded cotton cultivation and cloth was exported to the West in large quantities. Between 1860 and 1890, however, Lancashire drove the native cotton cloth entirely out of the urban markets of China, until by 1905 foreign cloth constituted forty-four per cent of China's foreign imports, excluding opium. The loss of the market meant the loss of occupations for cotton growers, spinners and weavers. As a consequence, male members of lineages emigrated. By 1870 a similar pattern of unemployment had occurred among the spinners and weavers of P'an Yu county in Kwangtung. In the early 1880's sixty-five per cent of the Chinese population on the Thompson River, British Columbia, and nearly sixty per cent of Lillooet's Chinese population had emigrated from P'an Yu. This indicates that impoverishment in this county was of sufficient severity to compel Chinese men to migrate as labourers to a foreign and hostile country, in an attempt to assist their lineages economically. Unfortunately there has been no research done on the records of the earlier Benevolent Societies, and thus no information as to the county origins of earlier Chinese immigrants. However, the Chinese pattern of "chain migration" suggests that earlier immigration to these areas in British Columbia probably originated from the same counties. What is certain is that the Chinese who did immigrate to North America originated from the two provinces of Kwangtung and Fukien and that these areas were most affected by the social, economic and political dislocation which occurred after Britain intervened in China.

Thus the economic and social dislocation which occurred in Kwangtung and Fukien as a result of the Opium Wars and the Taiping revolution was to bring to the British Columbian colony unwelcome Chinese sojourners. Rela-
tions between China and Britain had additional effects on the mainland colony. Article V of the Convention of Peking contained a stumbling block to exclusionist policy makers in British Columbia and other British colonies. Its importance warrants the full quotation:

As soon as the Ratifications of the Treaty of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight shall have been exchanged, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China, will, by decree, command the high authorities of every province to proclaim throughout their jurisdictions that Chinese, choosing to take service in the British colonies or other parts beyond the sea, are at perfect liberty to enter into engagements with British Subjects for that purpose, and to ship themselves and their families on board any British vessel at any of the open ports of China. Also that the high authorities aforesaid, shall, in concert with her Britannic Majesty’s Representative in China, frame such regulations for the protection of Chinese emigrating as above, as the circumstances of the different open ports may demand.

The young colonies soon discovered that their interests were indeed of secondary importance to the commercial ambitions of Great Britain. In 1866 Robson of the British Columbian was to complain:

We are quite aware that the "Instructions" from the Colonial Office forbid the imposition of special taxes upon persons of Asiatic Origin; but surely there is a possibility of having these "Instructions" so modified as to admit of a poll-tax upon Chinese. It is hardly fair for the Imperial Government to throw so small and young a community altogether upon its own resources - compel us to pay our way and defend ourselves, and at the same time impose such restrictions as will prevent our Government from carrying into effect a fiscal system which would fall equitably upon all classes of the community.

He called for the recall or abrogation of such Imperial "instructions" which placed limits upon possible legislation by the British Columbian Legislature.

A further factor which added fuel to already racist fires had to do with the timing of the immigration. The Chinese emigrated from Kwangtung at a
time when slavery was a controversial issue in North America. Slave labour had been abolished in British possessions in 1833 and it was slowly being recognized by economists that a slave labour system involved more capital outlay than a disciplined "free" labour force.

When the pressure of population induces the freeman to offer his services as he does in all old countries, for little more than the natural minimum of wages, those services are very certain to be more productive and less expensive than those of the bondsman, whose support is a charge to the master and who has nothing to gain by his industry.29

This proposition had been proven in the West Indies where, with the introduction of Indian "coolies", prosperity exceeded the level reached prior to the abolition of slavery.30 The Anti-Slavery Reporter published reports demonstrating the advantages of free labour over slavery. An impoverished Ireland provided a ready source of cheap labour for the United States, labour cheaper than black slaves.

The pilots of the Mississippi steam boats tell travellers that they cannot afford to have negro stokers - they are too expensive. Every time a boiler bursts they would lose so many dollars' worth of slaves, whereas, by getting Irishmen at a dollar a day, they pay for the article as they get it; and if it is blown up, why they get another, and only lose a day's wages by the transaction.31

The Chinese filled a similar need for manual labourers in the Pacific Northwest and their lives were as cheap. They were known as the "Irish of the Pacific", and as contract labourers went from China to the West Indies, Cuba, Peru, Chile and the Pacific Islands. In the twentieth century they were contracted to Western Samoa, New Zealand, and the Transvaal.
The contract traffic was called the "pig trade". Foreigners engaged the services of Chinese men for usually five year contracts and shipped them directly from China (the earliest port of exit was Amoy for this trade) to their contract destination. Through this system, Indian and Chinese "coolies" replaced slave labour on the plantations of the British colonies. China and India were seen as vast reserves of unskilled labour. Their recruitment in China, often under false pretenses, was carried on through Chinese coolie brokers employed by foreign firms. The Chinese law of debt bondage made it possible for Chinese men to be obtained through "debt, deceit, or argument", and as they were kept under close guard in barracoons - "pig-pens" - escape was improbable. Persia Crawford Campbell describes the trade as follows:

Coolies were induced to sell their freedom in the gambling dens, or they were deceived by promises or engagements of work ... Some of the coolies were deliberately drugged and possession taken of their persons, others were seized by force ... The coolies were misused and beaten. If necessary they were tied up by the thumbs ... Or they were plunged into the cold waters of the river until they consented to emigrate. Some were told to choose between emigration and death.

Their forced emigration and treatment on the voyage occasioned riots and mutinies, and British newspapers reported "another coolie tragedy" frequently in the 1850's.

Reports of the contract traffic confused the white population. Although the bulk of the Chinese immigrants came to the Pacific North West by the credit-ticket system, Europeans misunderstood the nature of the credit-ticket system and saw it as being the same as the contract labour system. Thus the Chinese labourers were known as "coolies" and never lost the connotation of slave labour. John Robson reported in 1865:
The great bulk of these people are mere slaves, and as such may be considered poor in a sense. 35

A negative stereotype of the Chinese as a race was thus formed before they reached the west coast of North America. They did not arrive in British Columbia in an "opinion vacuum". 36 The rise of the popular press at the time of the Opium Wars spread the unpopular image throughout Britain and North America. 37 British and American travellers to China viewed the Chinese with disdain and their attitudes reached a wide audience through lecture tours and publications. Writing from the point-of-view of British merchants and British "honour", Captain Sherard Osborn described the Chinese as "money-making animals (for they are little better)". 38 Of greater influence in North America, particularly California, in forming opinion among a population ignorant of China and Chinese customs was Bayard Taylor, who was the most popular lecturer of his time. 39 After having spent a few brief months in China in - and that was spent mainly in ports with day excursions to the Chinese quarters of the city - he spoke as an authority on the Chinese. Of the Chinese character he said, "The Chinese nature appears to be so thoroughly passive that it is not even receptive." 40 He continues:

The only taste which the Chinese exhibit to any degree, is a love of the monstrous . . . they admire whatever is distorted or unnatural . . . It is my deliberate opinion that the Chinese are, morally, the most debased people on the face of the earth . . . there was enough in the things which I could not avoid seeing and hearing . . . to inspire me with a powerful aversion to the Chinese race. Their touch is pollution, and, harsh as the opinion may seem, justice to our own race demands that they should not be allowed to settle on our soil. 41

John Robson of the British Columbian printed miscellaneous items on China from English papers - items which reinforced the negative image of the Chinese as a people.
The probability is that the day is near when the Chinese as a nation will cast off the veil of pride and self-conceit with which their minds have so long been blinded.42

Peter Ward in "White Canada Forever" has demonstrated the commonality of the Chinese stereotype in Britain, British North America, and the United States, by looking at the image portrayed in school geography text books.43 Through this medium the negative image was perpetuated. The white population defined "the Chinaman" and then saw what had already been defined in the behaviour, habits, and customs of the Chinese immigrants. Permitted greater freedom of movement to British colonies after the signing of the Convention of Peking, facing economic and social instability and uncertainty in their home counties, and encouraged by the exaggerated stories of the riches to be made across the seas, the Chinese headed for British Columbia, California and other British colonies. They immigrated at a time when cheap labour was required to replace slave labour. Confusion between the credit-ticket system and the contract labour system resulted in the Chinese being branded as slaves - at a time when slavery was a controversial issue in North America. Thus the negative stereotype formed by Europeans as a result of their ethnocentric reporting of events in China was reinforced by contact in North America. The unpopular image had been formed and from this basis demands were made for the exclusion of the Chinese from British Columbia with additional arguments based on the science of ethnology, a greater awareness of health and disease, and an emphasis on morality. The popular image was printed in Punch in 1858 and can be located in the minds and newspapers of North America and British colonies.
A CHANSON FOR CANTON

John Chinaman a rogue is born,
The laws of truth he holds in scorn;
About as great a brute as can
Encumber the earth is John Chinaman.

Sing Yeh, my cruel John Chinaman,
Sing Yeo, my stubborn John Chinaman;
Not Cobden himself can take off the ban
By humanity laid on John Chinaman.

With their little pig-eyes and their large pig-tails,
And their diet of rats, dogs, slugs, and snails,
All seems to be game in the frying-pan
Of that nasty feeder, John Chinaman.

Sing Lie-Tea, my sly John Chinaman
No fightee, my coward John Chinaman;
John Bull has a chance - Let him, if he can,
Somewhat open the eyes of John Chinaman.
Footnotes (Chapter II):


3. Barriers to trade included: the limitation of trade to the Canton area and the restriction of trading with one group of Chinese merchants - the Co Hong - which eliminated a competitive market; foreign residence restricted to the factories of the outlying districts of Canton, and only between October and May; prohibitions on the hiring of Chinese servants, the possession of firearms, and the bringing of wives to China. In the Confucian class system trade was considered a profession of low repute and merchants a despised class. G. B. Endacott and A. Hinton, Fragrant Harbour: A Short History of Hong Kong (Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 9-11. See also J. L. Cranmer Byng, op. cit., p. 8.


6. "This involved three separate kneelings, each one followed by a full prostration with the forehead knocking the ground three times," J. L. Cranmer-Byng, op. cit., p. 6.


10. In the early eighteenth century the annual import of opium into China was 200 chests. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, it had risen to 5,000 chests per annum; by 1831 to 16,500 chests; by 1838-39 (after the East India Company monopoly had been abolished), to 40,000 chests per annum. (1 chest = 3/5 lb.) G. B. Endacott et al., op. cit., p. 14.

11. Lord Macartney led an embassy to China in 1794 which failed to expand the trade in British goods partly because of: the conflict between China and Britain in Tibet; the threat Britain posed due to its vast acquisitions in India; the attitude of the Chinese Viceroy in Canton who opposed further extensions of trade; and because Lord Macartney refused to perform the Kotow. Chinese officials continued to view the trade as one desired by the barbaric English, and they were not impressed with English science and technology. J. L. Cranmer-Byng, op. cit., and Hugh Murray, John Crawford, Peter Gordon et al., An Historical and Descriptive Account of China, 3 Vols., (Edinburgh, Oliver and Boyd, 1843), Vol. I, p. 315.

The East India Company requested a second embassy to open the China trade in 1814. Britain had violated Chinese neutrality by seizing an American ship at Whampoa in April-May 1814, and by bringing captured loot to Macao during the War of 1812. To remove these past grievances and to open normal trade relations Lord Amherst was sent to China in 1816. His mission had even less success than Macartney's and he was ordered to leave Peking before an audience took place. The East India Company paid the expenses of the mission and Lord Amherst had been authorised to perform the Kotow if there was a chance of "material benefit" to the company. William L. Tung, China and the Foreign Powers: The Impact of and Reaction to Unequal Treaties, (New York, Oceana Publications, 1970), p. 6, and Hugh Murray, op. cit., Vol. I., pp. 325-331.

12. The historical debate over the "Asiatic Mode of Production" continues. For a refutation of Marx, Engels and later Wittfogels conceptualization of late Imperial China as a stagnant and stationary society see Frances Moulder, "The Asiatic Mode of Production and Late Imperial China: A Society Without Class Conflict and Social Change?" Radical History Review, Vol. 3, No. 1-3, Fall-Winter, 1975, pp. 44-55. See also Joseph Esherick, "Harvard on China: The Apologetics of Imperialism", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol IV, No. 4, (December 1972), pp. 9-16, for a discussion of the assumptions held by twentieth century apologists of western imperialism in Im-
perial China. Hu Sheng in *Imperialism and Chinese Politics*, (Pek-
ing, Foreign Languages Press, 1955) argues that the Manchu dynasty
was facing severe threats to its authority from peasant uprisings
and that the presence and active support of foreigners intensified
the autocratic rule of the Manchus. pp. 11-54. Ping-ti Ho, in
*Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*, (Cambridge Massachu-
setts, Harvard University Press, 1959) demonstrates that the treaty
tariffs, by protecting foreign-owned industry in China impeded
China's economic progress. p. 207.

13. J. L. Cranmer-Byng, *op. cit.*, p. 55. See also Raymond Dawson, *The Chi-
inese Chameleon*; *An analysis of European conceptions of Chinese ci-


I, (Reprint, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1st. printed 1899),
p. 104.


In Raymond Dawson, *op. cit.*, the change in the European attitude to
China is explained by the loss in impetus of the sinophilism of
the Enlightenment and the "chinoiserie" vogue, and the industrial
progress in Britain coupled with overseas imperialism which engend-
ered an attitude of superiority. However, Dawson considers that
Protestant Christianity was "at the heart of this new attitude,
providing its ideological justification." p. 132.

17. Stuart C. Miller, *The Unwelcome Immigrant*, Berkeley, University of Cali-


a missionary in China from 1839 to 1854 with the London Missionary
Society. This Society had many businessmen on its Board of Direc-
tors whose policy was that the Society should largely pay its way.
Missionary ships could carry out cargoes of missionaries and recoup the Society through return cargoes of merchandise. R. Lovett, op. cit., Vol I, p. 78.

Missionaries also directly served traders in China by travelling with them in the capacity of interpreters.


This is not to say that there was unanimous agreement in Britain on the "rightness" of the Opium Wars. William E. Gladstone condemned it as a war "to protect an infamous contraband traffic", "a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated to cover this country with permanent disgrace, I do not know and have not read of". Quoted in William Tung, op. cit., p. 7.


23. Ibid., p. 187.


This was one of a series of lectures delivered before the University of Oxford in 1839, 1840, and 1841.

30. Ibid., p. 346.

Merivale here refers to the example of Mauritius.


32. Persia Crawford Campbell, op. cit., p. 95.

She describes this system and the part played by British firms in Amoy in "Chinese 'Contract Emigration' ", Part II.

33. Ibid., pp. 117-118.


A description of the Portugese coolie trade at Macao published in a Hong Kong newspaper reads: "Coolies, kidnapped, imprisoned in barracoons, flogged to make them consent to sign the iniquitous contract that binds them to a life of slavery marched with a strong guard to testify at the Government offices to their signature as given voluntarily and freely, half-starved, exposed to blindness and disease on board ship in transit to the place of their exile, tossed overboard, or left on some barren isle to die, if loss of sight or sickness render them useless to their masters."

Ibid., p. 169.

For descriptions of similar conditions and treatment on board American and British vessels see Persia Crawford Campbell, op. cit., pp. 95-98. Chinese labourers contracted by Andrew Onderdonk came directly from Hong Kong in the 1880's to build the British Columbian section of the Canadian Pacific Railroad. Left to fend for themselves after completion of the C.P.R., they would have starved if they had not received aid from the Chinese Benevolent Associations.
35. British Columbian, March 2, 1865, p. 3.


37. For the formation of the negative image in U.S.A., see Stuart C. Miller, op. cit., especially Chapter 5, "Opium War popularizes the Unfavourable Image 1839-1850". For formation of the image in Europe (particularly England), see Raymond Dawson, op. cit. See also George Wingrove Cooke, China: being "The Times" special correspondence from China in the Years 1857-1858, (London, G. Routledge and Co., 1858). In a description of the Chinese he writes:

"The stupid expressionless pigs' eyes and bald faces, and the same attitude of stolid grave conceit which we fancy to be a caricature when we see it on a willow-pattern plate, but find to be true vegetating Chinese life." p. 5.


41. Ibid., pp. 353-354.

42. British Columbian, August 1, 1861, p. 1.

This was a comment at the close of the Opium War - after China had been forced to accede to British demands.

43. William Peter Ward, "White Canada Forever. British Columbia's Response to Orientals, 1858-1914", PhD., Queen's University, Ontario, September, 1972, pp. 3-4.


The image of the Chinese is too similar to the image Anglo-Saxons held of the Irish to be mere co-incidence. The Victorian image of the Irish contained the following notions: that they were childish,
emotionally unstable, ignorant, indolent, superstitious, primitive or semi-civilized, dirty, vengeful, violent, and feminine. The cartoon image was that of the pig. As with most stereotypes, this image tells us more about Anglo-Saxons than the Irish. The similarity of the images of the two racial groups - Irish and Chinese - can be explained in terms of Anglo-Saxon ethnocentrism, the British assumption that they had been chosen as the "Lords of Human Kind", and the cheap unskilled labour force that the Irish and Chinese supplied.

For the Anglo-Saxon image of the Irish see L. P. Curtis Jr., Anglo-Saxons and Celts, (Connecticut, Published by the Conference on British Studies at the University of Bridgeport, 1968).
CHAPTER III
THE RATIONALE FOR THE RESTRICTION
OF THE CHINESE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

Shall the fair prospects of this Pacific province be marred with a flood of the worst and most degraded elements of paganism, and made a reformatory for Asiatic criminals and a nursery of vice? (Royal Commission Report 1885, Evidence David William Gordon, M. P., p. 140.)

The economic and political situation in China accounted for the necessity of the emigration of Chinese men. The social organization of a south-eastern Chinese village explains why they could leave their families and communities, and why many were only sojourners in British Columbia. Ties with their village drew them back to China. Their social structure, habits and culture were brought to British Columbia with them and re-established here with necessary modifications. Their social organization made it possible for them to survive in a hostile and alien environment. Europeans, already perceiving the Chinese negatively, saw the segregated Chinatown of early British Columbian towns, with its different culture, organization, and social values as evidence of the unassimiliability and alienness of the Chinese, and this provided a rationale for restricting and taxing them.

The political, economic and social dislocation that began in Kwangtung with the Opium Wars intensified with the Taiping Revolution - a civil war which cost at least ten to twenty million Chinese lives.¹ Added to the political situation were the perennial problems of pressure of population, famines bringing poverty, land-lordism, and land shortages. Land-lordism, however, has been exaggerated by modern writers.² The Chinese were not a
migratory people, but economic conditions and political upheaval forced emigration. With no land of their own, the poor laboured for landowners and were the first to suffer if crops failed and food was scarce. The scorched earth policy of the Imperial government during the Taiping revolution forced others off the land to the coastal cities. With a bleak future in China, thousands of young Chinese men, encouraged by foreign agents, emigrated with the philosophy

To be starved and to be buried in the sea are the same . . . Why not plunge right into death rather than wait for death?³

The more politically independent people of the Province of Kwangtung⁴ were exposed through commercialism to the wider world. The Manchu dynasty confined the western trade to Canton in 1757 and thus the Cantonese were further exposed to westerners and gained knowledge of the Americas, hearing stories of the greater economic opportunities available in the "Gold Mountains". Friends and relatives followed the early emigrants, encouraged by shipping companies' propaganda of high wages and material success. Thus the chain migration began. Faced with economic and political uncertainty in their own villages they looked to the Americas to make a living.

The social organization of south-eastern Chinese villages made this emigration possible. The family served as the organizing principle of the village. Villages were composed of families related by male descent to a common male ancestor, and inhabitants were predominantly or entirely people with a common surname.⁵ The lineage functions were economic, ritualistic and re-
igious, educational, social and included welfare functions. Thus, a Chinese male could leave his village with the intention of economically improving his lineage and not leave his family destitute. Other members of his family could fulfil his roles and duties in his absence. However, these family obligations ensured that his loyalties would be retained in the lineage and village.

The close-knit community organization of the Chinese village was transported, with necessary modifications, to British Columbia. Chuen Yan David Lai, researching the records of the Chinese Benevolent Society in Victoria, discovered that in 1881 the majority of Chinese inhabitants of a Chinatown in British Columbia spoke a common dialect, dominated specific occupations and trades, and originated from the same county and/or clan. For example, seventy-seven percent of Quesnelmouth had originated from K'ai-p'ing. Of this dominating county group, eighty-four per cent belonged to the Chou clan. Forming county or clan associations for mutual help, these organizations excluded from the area Chinese who were not members. Unless a Chinese male was a member of the local clan group he had difficulty finding work either among the Chinese or the white community. Thus the exclusiveness of a south-eastern Chinese village was established in British Columbian Chinatowns.

These clan and county societies provided some stability to Chinese immigrants in their initial period of adjustment as new immigrants - "culture shock" occasioned by leaving a highly organized and sociologically complex society and being faced with the striving pioneer frontier of British Columbia. Other functions were to provide social and economic assistance to clan members. As aliens in a hostile white society, they were delegated the
lowest economic position which effectively excluded them from the social and political life of the colony. Living on the fringes of the dominant culture the associations provided the Chinese community with a cohesiveness. But as Chuen-Yan David Lai points out, this clan solidarity produced divisions within the larger Chinese community when the interests of different clan or county associations conflicted. Local loyalties could have the effect of weakening Chinese community unity.10

Chinese immigrants came to British Columbia either as free miners from the Californian gold fields and overland from Portland, Oregon; by assistance from relatives; or through the credit-ticket system. Early immigrants spread the word to relatives in China, paying their fares to North America in some cases, and instigating a "chain migration".11 In conversation with George Hills, the Bishop of Columbia, a nineteen-year-old Chinese man from Canton, Wong Chan Yun, explained:

The Chinese here, he said, have come on their own "hook". In California they are bound to some head man who receive part of their earnings.12

He had himself arrived in California in 1851 from Hong Kong. Reliable information on the nature of the credit ticket system is scanty and inadequate. The Chinese kept to themselves and did not proffer information to the white community regarding emigration, and thus conclusions can only be tentative. Under the credit ticket system Chinese men were indebted to the local Chinese merchants who acted as labour agencies and contractors. The cost of passage was retained by the merchant from their wages until it was fully paid.
White employers endeavoured to recover the cost of passage of female domestic servants from Britain in 1862 in the same manner. Persia Crawford Campbell concludes from her research that Chinese immigration into British Columbia followed along the Californian system. In the 1876 Report of the United States Commission on Chinese Immigration into California, several witnesses stated that the system was based not on service contract but on debt-bondage. Once a man had repaid the debt which ensued from leaving China, he was free. This debt was estimated by the Chinese Consulate in San Francisco, Huang-Sic-Chen, as being seventy dollars a head from China to British Columbia.

This variation of the indenture system explained by Stanford Lyman, enabled Chinese men to leave China and provided passage, food, lodging and employment for them on their arrival in San Francisco. Money for his passage was obtained from kinsmen or fellow-villagers who assigned the collection of the debt to kinsmen or Landsmänner in San Francisco... The merchant leaders of the Lui Kuan (Landsmannschaften) acted as contractors and sent gangs of men out to work. The debts incurred by the Chinese immigrants were deducted from their wages by Chinese headmen, and defalcating debtors were prevented from escaping back to China by special arrangements between the Chinese creditor associations and the merchant fleet. The entire system was fraught with corruption and undoubtedly not a few Chinese found themselves poorer off in the end than they had been when they began their American adventure, and many were forced to stay overseas much longer than they had anticipated.

In British Columbia the Chinese merchants established social and economic prominence in the Chinese community because of the absence of a gentry class. This was a marked improvement over their previous status in China where their profession placed them at the lower end of the social scale. The Victoria Benevolent Society records demonstrate that merchants controlled
Chinese labourers joined associations of their own county or clan to gain employment, and as merchants controlled these organizations on a rotating basis they were directly or indirectly under control of that class. Before he left Vancouver, the individual Chinese man was checked to ensure that he had repaid his debts. He could not get passage back to China unless he obtained this clearance.

Evidence from their records suggests that in British Columbia clan associations were benevolent in their functions. They provided lodging on arrival or in periods of unemployment, and served as employment agencies. They provided capital for a member to set up in business, settled disputes between members, gave legal support in a dispute with a non-Chinese, and provided welfare benefits for its needy members. Debts owing could also be collected through the clan association. One of the regulations of the Chih-Kung T'ang, known as the Chinese Freemasons, states:

Members, no matter whether they are living in town, in mining areas, in ports, or in cities will not be permitted to reduce wages or to spread slander against each other in order to compete in hiring. Anyone committing these acts will be punished if a complaint is made and evidence presented.

Thus the Chih-Kung T'ang acted as a trade union. It also ran a hostel, a brothel, and a gambling house for its members.

The majority of witnesses who gave evidence in the 1885 Canadian Royal Commission on Chinese Immigration, portrayed the Chinese men as terrified...
slaves of Chinese companies who directed them as to their place and conditions of work and who had exclusive control over them. From the information gleaned from white women's accounts of their dealings with Chinese domestics, it appears that they had much more freedom of movement than white men's reports indicate. Mrs. Baillie-Grohman resided in British Columbia in the 1870's and 1880's and she remembered being left in the lurch when her Chinese cook left her while she was living on a ranch in the Kootenays. She says, "John disappears without warning, as he often will." Chinese domestics in Victoria could only be hired through a downtown Chinese agency which set the wages according to the household-type. This agency was seen by the white community as evidence of Chinese slavery. In fact, it served Chinese domestics well, as through it wages were maintained at the going rate, and close attention was paid to conditions of work. This agency must have been invaluable to a Chinese man new to the domestic scene in Victoria. Judge Matthew Begbie said of such organizations:

Another ground in which I have heard it asserted that slavery is general among Chinamen here is rather, I suspect, a proof of their freedom, or would be so accepted among whites. It is that they demand wages, not such as they would take if left to their own choice, but such as are dictated by certain leaders, who subsist on a percentage of those wages.

I have no doubt but that they have some sort of trades-unions, whose officers and head-centres are supported by subscriptions from the wages received; themselves deciding both on each man's wages and on his subscription. I have no doubt but that compulsion is put on all Chinamen, so that it is very difficult for them to obtain work, if they remain outside this organization.

Chinese servants meeting in Chinatown would have talked among themselves about the families they worked for and their situations. Some families had
difficulty in obtaining servants if they mistreated or overworked them.\textsuperscript{24} In this way the Chinese domestics had some control over their working conditions and employers. One witness told the Commissioners in 1885 that if wages were reduced the Chinese were so well organized that a replacement servant could not be found. He complained that they would not compete with each other.\textsuperscript{25} Chinese domestics in fact had more independence than white women in domestic service. A female servant, especially if she had no family in the colony, was isolated from the rest of the community. Because of her sex, she was restricted in her movements by prevailing notions of respectability and obsessive supervision of her behaviour and morality. These attitudes prevailed in British Columbia as illustrated by the issue of the employment of women in concert saloons. In the \textit{Colonist's} campaign to prevent this occupation for women one article stated:

There is an absolute and great disproportion between the sexes in this country. There is a want of good steady industrious girls to furnish virtuous wives for our men and make them something else than the reckless restless mortals so numerous on this coast. To supply this want must be one of the objects of any measure for the encouragement of emigration . . . . There is quite a sufficient demand for steady girls to act as servants in respectable families, and at very fair wages.\textsuperscript{26}

Working class women's sphere was defined by the \textit{Colonist} as either paid or unpaid domestic service, although concert saloons provided a less restricted life style and better pay.\textsuperscript{27} Although the Chinese domestic was also isolated and excluded from white society, he had clan or county members in nearby Chinatown. As a member of a racially distinct group with its own community organizations his isolation was not as complete. If he wished to leave his
employment he could obtain another position through the Chinese domestic a-
gency. A female domestic in the same situation had to fall back on her own
resources, without a protective association or servant organization to aid
her in finding a new position. As she dealt personally with her employer and
not through an intermediary, her conditions of work and hours of employment
were set by her employer.28 If she was "let go" she faced greater insecurity
for she also lost her home and a roof over her head. A Chinese domestic who
was fired could fall back upon either his clan association hostel or clan mem-
bers for temporary support. The economic necessity of earning a living could
force the female domestic into the position of selling her sexuality, either
through prostitution or marriage, as few economic avenues were open to women.
The Cariboo Sentinel reported the predicament of "girls" who came to British
Columbia from England and could not find "honest employment", thus "their only
resource was prostitution".29 It was not the Chinese domestics who had to
provide references - rather white employers were kept on record by the Chinese
agency.

In the 1879 Report of the Special Committee on Chinese Emigration, Mr.
Barnard, M. P., reported that a gentleman who had been unable to obtain white
household servants applied at a Chinese agency for a domestic. He found that
the Chinese agent

had in his books a complete register of the whole of his family
affairs, and at the end of the register was set down the price which
he was required to pay in order to secure services of a Chinaman. He
also found that he could not get a Chinaman for anything less, and on
making enquiries he discovered that they had a correct record, not of
the standing of the servant who was to be employed, but of the stand-
ing of the masters who were to employ these men as servants.30
The Chinese domestic, because he was hired through an intermediary, had control over wages and working conditions, and he could effectively pressure the employer, especially in times of economic prosperity or when domestics were in short supply.

Tentative research suggests that the Chinese were involved in many co-operative endeavours which must have appeared as a master-slaves relationship to Caucasians, whose mode of action was generally individualistic. The Chinese migrated from a society where co-operation was necessary for survival, and where close kinship ties further encouraged this mode of action. "Chain migration" and the formation of clan and county associations in British Columbia for mutual aid ensured that these ties were maintained. Hostility from the white community had the effect of intensifying the need to co-operate for protection. On gold-bearing creeks, for instance, some of the Chinese mined while others gardened. The fact that they combined their efforts on creeks, thus evading the mining tax, led white miners to petition Governor Seymour in 1865, arguing that all Chinese miners should pay the tax. At this time only self-employed miners paid the tax and then only if they did not want their claims jumped.

A further example of co-operation among Chinese was their refusal to be exploited by a steamship company. The agent of the "Brother Jonathan" demanded twenty dollars each of two hundred Chinese miners for the downward trip to San Francisco. The Chinese miners attempted to get passage for fifteen dollars each. After much delay and haggling the vessel left without them, for they refused to pay the extra five dollars. They collectively agreed to chart-
er a sailing vessel rather than pay the steamship company rate. The exploitation by steamship companies was a common complaint of white travellers, yet a similar example of combined action among whites has not been recorded.

Another example of collective action occurred when the British Columbia Legislature passed "An Act to provide for the Better Collection of Provincial Taxes from the Chinese" in 1878. Laundries closed, vegetables peddlers and Chinese merchants refused to sell goods to white people, cooks left their domestic situations and restaurants, wood-cutting ceased and the boot and shoe and sewing factories employing Chinese workers closed. The strike lasted for one week and protested the implementation of a quarterly licence of ten dollars on all Chinese people. The Act was declared null and void in a decision by Judge Gray in the case of Tai Chong vs. John Maguire.

The Chinese community was separate and to a large extent self-sufficient. The Chinese inhabitants of Yale even built a hospital there in 1861, before the white community had such an institution on the mainland. Chinese merchants imported material goods for the community and operated a banking system for Chinese miners and labourers, sending remittances back to China on their behalf. Thus the European marketing and banking systems were by-passed. The self-sufficiency and "alienness" of the Chinese community reinforced the image Caucasians held of the majority of Chinese labourers being enslaved to a few Chinese merchants.

The system of contracting for workers through an intermediary was not limited to domestic service. Baillie-Grohman writes of Chinese contractors in the Kootenays vying with each other when her husband advertised for Chin-
ese labourers. The underbid each other in an attempt to win the contract. Obtaining work in this manner would mean the labourer was indebted to the contractor, but whether this was a form of slavery as white men understood it to be, is questionable. Mr. Justice Crease stated to the Royal Commissioners in 1885:

Certain degrees of labour contract of limited duration, amounting while it lasts to a species of slavery, are said to be common among them.

Given the almost total ignorance and definite misconceptions that whites had of the Chinese and their social organization it is not surprising that the white population viewed Chinese labour in this way. In addition, in the early 1880's Chinese labourers were contracted by Andrew Onderdonk, to build the Port Moody to Savonas Ferry section of the Canadian Pacific Railway. Six thousand Chinese were employed to build this railway in British Columbia. They were contracted through Chinese merchants in British Columbia and San Francisco, or directly from Hong Kong. Those who came under contract directly from China fared badly. Of two shiploads, each of one thousand Chinese men, one tenth died of scurvy after arrival in British Columbia in the spring of 1881. On completion of the railroad in 1886, the Chinese navvies were discharged into the community.

Some Chinese assert that the Canadian government reneged on an agreement to pay return passage to China for contracted labour, thus causing a serious problem of indigence in both Vancouver and Victoria.

The white population in the province had attempted in 1879 to prevent the employment of Chinese labourers on this Dominion work, sending a petition of fifteen hundred signatures to the House of Commons. Having failed to ex-
clude them, their presence under contract must have reinforced the white attitude that all Chinese labourers were slave labourers.

A further belief was that Chinese merchants contracted large numbers of Chinese labourers direct from China. The records of the Chinese Benevolent Association in Victoria suggest that Chinese merchants had little, if any, control over Chinese immigration. With the increasing agitation by white labourers against the Chinese, this association tried three times between 1884 and 1915 to discourage Chinese from immigrating to Canada, urging the Chinese government to restrict emigration. \(^{44}\) This was motivated by concern over the large number of Chinese labourers who were poor and unemployed, as one of the functions of the association was to aid destitute Chinese labourers. Chuen-Yan Lai also considers that the Chinese merchants were motivated by self-interest. They feared that a continued immigration of Chinese labourers would lead to antagonism directed at their own class. \(^{45}\) In the two years, 1884-1886, the Chinese Benevolent Association sent seven thousand Chinese labourers back to China. \(^{46}\)

Chinese merchants did act as intermediaries between white employers and their Chinese employees and through this system the Chinese labourers were open to abuse from both white employers, the Chinese middle-men, and later, white labour. Robert Dunsmuir, the proprietor of the Wellington Coal Mines, employed Chinese manual labourers. They received their wages individually at the pay table as white miners did. The advantage of Chinese labour, Dunsmuir explained, was that he did not have to deal with each individual Chinese man as he had to with white miners. If a Chinese man was sick or did not show up for work, a substitute was found without inconvenience to either the
foreman or the superintendent. The Chinese contractor found a replacement. The disadvantage to the employer of this system was that in a dispute between the employer and a Chinese employee the whole work crew would withdraw their labour. However, the Vancouver Coal Mining Company in 1867 set about changing its system of employment from a day-labour basis - whereby the company supplied the blasting materials and mining implements - to one in which the work was done by contracts tended by the miners, who were also required to supply materials and implements. The advantages of the contract labour system to the mining companies obviously outweighed the disadvantages or they would not have attempted to initiate it among white miners.

The Chinese contract labour system left plenty of opportunities for abuse. According to David William Gordon, a Vancouver M. P. from Nanaimo, the Chinese under contract complained bitterly to the white population of their treatment at the hands of the Chinese "bosses" who arranged their contracts. Their exploitation was, however, of a limited duration and was a form of debt bondage. As clan associations acted as employment agencies, labourers were bound by clan loyalties to their employer. This relationship also provided some protection for the employee. The intention of Chinese men early in the colony's history was to stay only a short time, working initially to repay their debts, then to achieve their limited goal, and thereafter return to China wealthier than when they migrated. Thus the fact that their situation was only temporary made it bearable.

Chinese women in British Columbia were, however, in slave bondage and faced exploitation on the grounds of race and sex. The prevailing view among
Occidentals was that all Chinese women in British Columbia were prostitutes or at least concubines. They were economically exploited by Chinese associations and madams, and sexually exploited by Chinese labourers and white men. This was to some extent a reflection of the position of women in Chinese society. But it was also the result of a pioneer society of predominantly young transient single men. For Chinese men, either unmarried or with wives in China, the Chinese prostitutes served their sexual needs. Until the first decade of the twentieth century, single white women were a scarce commodity in British Columbia, especially outside the towns. The 1881 Census of Canada shows British Columbia's female population at 19,956; male population, 29,503. In the children and unmarried category there were 11,503 females to 20,294 males. Unfortunately, the statistics for racial origins do not include a sex breakdown. The Salvation Army sponsored female emigration from the United Kingdom until World War 1. The effect of this disproportionate sex ratio among whites resulted in young white men patronizing Chinese prostitutes. An additional factor was that their rates were lower than those of white women. 

In Chinese patriarchal society women's roles were completely subordinate to that of men, and women had little control over their persons or children. Her value as a human being was ideologically devalued by a patriarchal religion which claimed that:

the reason for their having been sent into the world, this time as females is because of lives of wickedness, or for some peculiar crime in the previous existence. Women were kept in subservience and obedience by the promise of a better life in their next reincarnation. In her previous life, she was told,
You would not then desire to adorn virtue, to heap up good actions, and learn to do well; so that now you have been hopelessly born a poor female; and if you do not this second time speedily amend your faults, this amount of wickedness of yours will be getting both deeper and heavier, so that it is to be feared, in the next stage of existence, even if you should wish for a male's body, yet it will be very difficult to obtain it.  

In practice she was considered the property of her father or husband, and her role confined to the home. A daughter was considered of less value than a son for the former would marry and thence her labour and reproductive capacities would be lost to her father's household and lineage. A son, however, could be relied upon to support and honour his parents in their old age. In periods of severe economic hardship, female infanticide was practiced. The dowry system resulted in the sale of wives and daughters as slaves, concubines or prostitutes.

Women's seclusion in the home was reinforced by the custom of foot-binding which severely restricted their mobility. Thus, Chinese custom and social pressure, and physical incapacity, prescribed that women remain in China, even when their husbands migrated. Other families "had no means" to enable women and children to come to the colony. Also, in the early period of settlement, Chinese men did not migrate with the intention of permanently leaving China. They planned to return after a few years in the colony. Many left China before they had reached marriageable age. Initially it was only a few Chinese merchants who brought their families here. The first Chinese woman in British Columbia, for instance, was the wife of the Victoria merchant Kwong Lee. She arrived in 1860. The Bishop of Columbia, while he was at Douglas in 1861, visited a Chinese man, his wife and child, which he reported to be "a great rarity in this part of the world". She did not have small
feet. Women were also brought in as wives and concubines. Lady Dufferin, while she resided in Victoria, noted in her journal the visit by the wife of her Chinese cook. She writes:

    Poor baby that she is, she has only been married a week, and has not known Ah Sam, who is an elderly and very ugly gentleman, much longer.62

Ah Sam must have resided in Victoria for some years for he had cooked for six Governors prior to the Dufferins.63 It is not clear whether Ah Sam had a wife in China or whether this was his first wife.

West coast mining towns were predominantly male. Recreational outlets in Chinatowns were limited to opium smoking, gambling, and brothel visits, lucrative businesses for Chinese associations. Women for brothels were procured in several ways. The practice of selling daughters - in the hopes of their escaping from poverty, famine, sickness and war - was one avenue. Other women came under the mistaken assumption that they would be married on arrival.64 Some came under contract, the debts of passage and other expenses to be paid from their expected wages as domestics and on the understanding that they would be freed from bondage on their eighteenth birthday.65 Others were kidnapped during raids on villages and forced to leave China.66 In 1869, A. W. Loomis published the translation of a proclamation posted in San Francisco, which told the story of a Chinese woman, Ah Shau. She had been kidnapped in a raid on her village, taken to Macao, and then to Hong Kong before being located in a San Francisco brothel. She was "constantly subjected to distressing persecutions" to force her into prostitution. Her brother asked for assistance from his clan members to recover her and the case was brought before
the Californian Courts. Ah Shau's brother lost the case because "the defendant had more money than the plaintiff", he claimed. Ah Shau was never retrieved. 67

The Reverend Otis Gibson, a Methodist missionary of ten years in China, and eight years in San Francisco, was interviewed by the 1876 committee on Chinese Immigration. As he was fluent in two of the Cantonese dialects, his information is probably more reliable than that of most white witnesses. He presented translations of two contracts signed by two prostitutes. In one contract Ah Ho was in debt for $630.00. She agreed to "give her body to Mr. Yee for service as a prostitute for a term of four years" in return for his payment of the debt she owed, a debt incurred for her passage over. 68 During these four years she was to receive no wages, and if she ran away her mistress (from whom Mr. Yee bought her) was to find her and return her to Yee-Kwan. Ah Ho was to be responsible for such additional debts. If she became ill her service contract was to be extended by an extra month for each ten days she was "off duty". In the second contract Loi Yau was indebted to her mistress Sep Sam for four and one half years, receiving no wages. If she ran away she was to pay the expenses incurred in returning her. If Sep Sam returned to China then Loi Yau was to serve another party. For each fifteen days that she was ill, she was to serve an extra month. If she was ill for one hundred days or more and could not be cured she had the option of returning to Sep Sam. 69

These two contracts give evidence of the absolute bondage in which women were held and hint at the life that Chinese prostitutes endured. Some of
these women tried to escape from the brothels, but in California their attempts were frustrated by the police.

It is alleged, however, that when a Chinawoman escapes from a brothel there is wonderful activity manifested in certain quarters, the police force to recapture the runaway and return her to her vile den wherein she has shown a disinclination to reside, a special pecuniary benefit accruing from such services being represented as inducement.

Thus the system of female ownership leading to degradation, demoralisation, disease and death was upheld by the white legal system. Laws directed specifically at Chinese prostitutes were enacted, many being Health Ordinances, but most were not enforced. However, "by 1865 three-fourths of all Chinese arrests were of prostitutes". Most of these arrests were under bogus warrants, and few went to trial. It was through this system that Chinese women who had escaped from the brothels were returned by law enforcement officers, who received a pay-off for their trouble. The attitude of "good citizens" was that Chinese prostitutes were a necessity. The white family was "much more sacred and more pure", with their presence.

This Californian evidence is of value because it influenced the Commissioners in 1884 and therefore their final report and recommendations. Also, evidence presented before this Canadian Commission demonstrates that a similar system functioned on a smaller scale in British Columbia, although care must be taken in sifting through the evidence of obviously prejudiced white men who looked for - and thus found - a prostitute in every Chinese woman. The overwhelming opinion of witnesses was that all Chinese women in British Columbia were prostitutes, although the Chinese Consulate at San Francisco, Huang-Sic Chen, presented statistics of the numbers of Chinese and their occupations,
which show that Chinese women in the province numbered one hundred and fifty-five of whom sixty-seven were prostitutes in 1884. 76

Evidence does demonstrate that Chinese women were bought and sold in British Columbia. A Chinese Rescue Home was set up in 1887 in Victoria by the Women's Missionary Society. Its object was to rescue women from being "enslaved" and the Commissioners in 1884 praised the society for "checking the traffic in slave girls more effectively than could possibly be done by paid officials". 77 The brothel business caused problems in Victoria's Chinatown as evidenced by the reasons given for the formation of the Consolidated Benevolent Association in Victoria. 78 In the Royal Commission Report, Begbie explained that a Chinese man could buy a woman for five hundred dollars and this permitted him complete possession of her for a period of six months, or until they disagreed. 79

It is evidence that the female is a mere slave, and that opinion is conclusively established when the husband, after the fashion of his people, hands her over to a second husband for a similar amount. The woman is a slave sold into prostitution. 80

It was common knowledge that Chinese women were sold into prostitution. One witness, a resident of Forks Quesnelle, who had lived in the mining section of the Cariboo for twenty-five years stated:

It is a fact that they sell and trade their females just as we would any domestic animal. 81

John Tindal, a resident in the province since 1862, expressed the same sentiments. 82 Prostitution was not limited to Victoria and the Cariboo. The Sheriff at New Westminster considered that there was more vice among Chinese wo-
men than among white women, although Huang Sic Chen's population statistics show that a total of thirteen Chinese women lived in New Westminster of whom seven were prostitutes. John Westrop Carey, the Mayor of Victoria, and a resident since 1859, expressed the predominant attitude of whites to Chinese women: if they were not prostitutes then they were second wives. In either case, they were immoral and not respectable.

Chinese women were stereotyped in this way because they were Chinese but also because they were women. White men, seeing so few Chinese women among a community of single Chinese men, saw their function in sexual terms. Chinese men were degraded and degenerate, therefore, by association, were Chinese women. The system of prostitution that existed was taken as further evidence of the innate character flaws of the Chinese race, and proof that none should be welcomed as settlers. In contrast, British Guiana imported Chinese and Indian labourers. Plantation owners realized that the success of the contract labour scheme rested on the importation of Chinese and Indian women too, for their presence led to "an eminent improvement of morality in the Colonies". Also, one suspects, the presence of families would mean, economically, it was more feasible for labourers to remain in British Guiana rather than demand back passage when their contract ended. However, white British Columbians did not want an alien community in their midst and thus Chinese female emigration was not encouraged. In fact, the Victoria Gazette called for the prohibition of "depraved" Chinese female immigrants as early as 1859.

The issue of Chinese female immigration demonstrates the cumulative nature of racism. Social customs existed in China that were a barrier to female
emigration, but some wives did emigrate. However, the prejudiced view and racism of white settlers in British Columbia was not conducive to Chinese settlement, and the introduction of a poll tax effectively prevented it. The Chinese population remained predominantly single and male until after 1946. Thus the combination of the prejudiced attitude and Chinese social custom resulted in an intensification of racism. The lack of females in Chinatown was seen as evidence of the immorality of the Chinese race and provided further support to arguments for their restriction.

Chinatowns throughout British Columbia were separate from the white community and highly visible. This led to further accusations concerning their inferiority as a race. In Victoria, in 1860, for instance, Chinatown covered a rectangle formed by Yates, Fort, Quadra and Cook Streets. Not only was it separate but

it was from a residential point of view a most undesirable area. There was a two-acre lake between Yates and Cook Street... all dry land was at a premium.

Lytton was also a segregated town in the sense that the Chinese section was distinct. The upper part of the town was Occidental while

in the lower part of the town, which is chiefly inhabited by Chinese, there are four bakers, five shops, four restaurants.

Of Barkerville in 1865, the British Columbian reported that a large number of Chinese were building houses close to Barkerville, the implication being that a Chinatown was being built separate from the white town. The white community did not want the Chinese as neighbours. They feared an alien com-
munity in close proximity. These fears were often voiced in terms of morality or health at a time when medical science had come to recognize the connection between dirt, overcrowding, and disease. However, rather than understanding these problems to be dependent on the social and physical environment, white British Columbians related them to the character of the Chinese race and demanded their exclusion.92

As early as 1866 the British Columbian lambasted the filth of Chinatown in an invocatory article titled "The Approach of the Cholera - Prepare". It described Chinatown's streets as:

almost inundated with stagnant water, its lanes and back yards literally reeking with filth, Indians, Chinese, and whites more degraded than either, huddled promiscuously together in low and noisome hovels, we say Victoria presents a fertile field of operation for the coming pestilence.93

The Reverend Philip Dwyer expressed the same fears to the Royal Commissioners.

Their houses, and yards, and streets, and drains (such as the latter are in Victoria), are offensive alike to the senses of sight and smell; and should any epidemic arise, the combination of Chinese, living on low diet and congested amidst reeking offal and fecal matter, must breed if not spread plague or pestilence . . . sooner or later "Chinatown" must become a mine of destructive influences, operative over a wide radius, against the life and health of the city of Victoria.94

Thus, the fact that they lived in a low lying area of the city with little or no drainage,95 that human fertilizer was kept for gardens, and that they lived in crowded quarters upset the delicate sensibilities of the white community. A common belief expressed by John Robson was that disease, especially leprosy, syphilis, and small-pox, originated in Chinatown.
I do not know of any contagious diseases amongst them, but the Chinese quarters are looked upon with fear and trembling when any contagious disease comes around. These myths were dispelled by witnesses before the Commission. They are indicators of the ferocity of racial prejudice. Not one witness placed the responsibility for Chinatown's drainage problems where it should have rested - on the local authorities. The taxes paid by Chinese in Victoria included trades licences, water rents, road taxes and real estate taxes, the bulk of the revenue coming from trade licences and water rents. Yet the city, it would seem, did not provide adequate services in return.

It was not only Chinatown that was viewed as disease-ridden. Individual Chinese were seen as the carriers of diseases, particularly venereal disease. One witness who had resided in the province since 1862 presented the following evidence to the Commissioners:

Some very feeble-looking Chinamen I have seen sitting by the roadside were turned out by their countrymen and not allowed to come near them, that they were suffering from a dangerous and very infectious complaint; that if a person even sat on a chair they had occupied the disease would be transmitted.

Dr. Helmcken considered that they were "crowded and dirty rather from choice, perhaps than necessity." Although the majority of witnesses could not disagree that the individual Chinese was clean in her/his person, they believed that the Chinese, as a race, were filthy in their habits.

The Chinese lived in dormitory-type dwellings in Chinatown that were, by white standards, over-crowded. Caucasians inferred from this that the Chinese labourers were not free agents but were kept there against their will,
exploited by their Chinese landlords. However, the tax figures for the city of Victoria indicate that there were only four Chinese real estate owners in the city.\textsuperscript{101} The overcrowding was to some extent a result of their social organization but it was white landlords who demanded the high rents and as a consequence contributed to the overcrowding.\textsuperscript{102} As Justice Crease stated to the Commission:

This in British Columbia is directly owing to the fact that as foreigners, held in dangerous disesteem by an active section of the whites, they naturally cling together for protection and support. Their very language keeps them together and apart from the whites; but much of this overcrowding is attributable to the whites themselves, who extort heavy rents from them for very scant house accomodation, and they accentuate the very evil for which in public they profess such profound dislike.\textsuperscript{103}

This combination of crowded living quarters and a predominantly male population led to the stereotyping of the "immoral Chinese". James Young, the recording secretary for the Knights of Labor, Nanaimo, stated:

I have never yet seen so many white people with so few women among them; but wherever I have known any considerable number of men deprived of female society for any length of time, the inevitable result has been that they have become coarser. The intellect is depraved, the whole moral tone is lowered, and men rush into a greater depth of wickedness and vice than would otherwise have been possible. Such is the effect amongst white men, even of the better class, and I judge that the effect is similar amongst the Chinese, only it must be worse amongst them, seeing that the standard of morality with them is immensely below ours.\textsuperscript{104}

Dr. Stevenson countered as "abominable slander"\textsuperscript{105} the claim that sodomy was practised among the male Chinese. With the attitude that the morality of the Chinese was lower than that of whites, that there was more vice among the Chinese, the white population saw the Chinese as a threat to the moral fibre of the community.\textsuperscript{106} They were accused of enticing white women\textsuperscript{107} and
young white men into their brothels, and complaints were made of insults white men encountered while walking through Chinatown streets "by the solicitations of depraved Chinese".

Much was made of their opium smoking and they were accused of spreading this habit to working men and white women, even white girls of "respectable parents". The only white woman seen by the Commissioners in their visit to the opium dens of Victoria's Chinatown - and the only woman interviewed by the Commissioners in British Columbia - permitted them to interview her and advanced a very different view of Chinese men. She explained that she needed opium to live, that she was "a fast woman" and that "troubles" led her to smoke. When asked if she had ever been interfered with by a Chinese man she answered no - "in that respect they are far superior to white men". She considered that non-opium-smoking Chinese men are far more certain not to offend or molest a woman than white men, especially white men with a glass in.

Her opinion was, however, a minority one. Prevalent was the negative view expressed by one witness who considered the Chinese to be inferior because they did not get drunk like Europeans. He said:

They only get stupidly drunk, like animals when intoxicated. A man must have brains to get hilariously tipsy and noisy under the influence of strong drink.

Their "paganism" and lack of "proper respect" for Christianity provided further evidence of their inability to assimilate. Another witness was asked what the difference was between getting drunk or smoking opium. He replied
that "one was a Christian habit, the other was a heathen vice". This statement contains in a nutshell the content of the hostility of whites to Chinese. Viewing their own culture as superior, the white community stereotyped the Chinese people as lesser human beings, more prone to vice, immorality, and uncleanness and saw this view confirmed in the Chinese community. Armed with this "evidence" of Chinese racial inferiority, white British Columbians called for legislative powers to restrict their activities in the province, and, eventually, their entry into Canada.

The effects of white attitudes on Chinese people were economic, social, psychological and political. The white community was aware of the situation of Chinese prostitutes yet the majority reaction was to stereotype all Chinese women as prostitutes. By acquiescence to the status quo this system of female slavery was upheld. Chinese men were relegated to the low paying, low status jobs that white men would not do. By the 1870's and 1880's much of their work was seasonal - in the sawmills, salmon canneries, and on railroad construction - and this added to the density and problems of Chinatowns, especially Victoria, in the winter months.

The Chinese were poor labourers, on the whole, dependent for their livelihood on a hostile white community. Being sojourners, dependent on white or Chinese bosses, confined to Chinatown by the hostility of whites to their habits, dress and customs - by their obvious alienness - the picture of them being patient docile workers is understandable. Dependency implies conformity or at least adaptability. This passive and docile image has been perpetuated by Anglo-Saxon historians who have accepted the racist stereotype at face
value and thus have ignored the economic, political and social reasons for this mode of action. Subservience was a response to the hardship and oppression that the Chinese faced in an alien and hostile land, not a characteristic innate to Asians. The fact that few intended to stay long would tend to make tolerable working and living conditions which on a life-time basis would be intolerable. Aside from this, what has been ignored are the many attempts that early Chinese immigrants made to fight white racism. This was done through individual acts of rebellion, strike action, co-operative activities through their various associations, and by fighting local legislation through the court system.

The Federal Government refused to permit restrictive immigration laws before the promised railway was built as Chinese labourers were "necessary" for this public work. But by 1885 it was no longer necessary to import Chinese men for railway construction. Therefore, the Federal Government brought in legislation that restricted the number of Chinese permitted to be carried on a vessel to British Columbia, and instigated a fifty dollar poll tax. Provincial and municipal governments prohibited the employment of Chinese upon public works, and the former passed a law in 1884 prohibiting the Chinese from buying land. The municipal government in Victoria passed sanitary ordinances and trade licenses directed specifically at the Chinese and their occupations. One such act, passed in 1878, and said to be a health measure, was directed at the Chinese men's queues. All long-term prisoners had their hair cut. With the memory of brutal experiences in the gold fields and early settlement period, with the situation of and attitude toward Chinese railway navvies (when many Chinese men were dying of vitamin deficiencies in the hard
winter of 1882-1883, no medical assistance was supplied by the railway contractors), the Chinese learnt that survival necessitated a stolid acceptance of the status quo. Classed as aliens, prohibited from voting provincially, or federally, the Chinese could do little to change their situation, for the dominant white community had placed the Chinese in a politically powerless position.

Organized labour considered that it was impossible to co-operate or work with the Chinese. Thus the Chinese functioned as a reserve supply of cheap labour which undermined the position of white male workers. A representative of the Knights of Labor voiced to the 1884 Royal Commissioners the particular fears of the working class as well as those fears of disease, filth, prostitution, gambling and opium smoking which all classes expressed. The additional fear was that:

Their mode of living, a few cents per day, and the absence of families among them will make the white men powerless to compete against them for labor.

The argument was not that Chinese labour was cheap labour, but rather

Chinese labor is confessedly of a low, degraded, and servile type, the inevitable result of whose employment in competition with free white labor is to lower and degrade the latter without any appreciable elevation of the former.

Again, the fear expressed was that the Chinese would:

Become all too dangerous competitors in the labor market, while their docile servility, the natural outcome of centuries of grinding poverty and humble submission to a most oppressive system of government, renders them doubly dangerous as the willing tools whereby grasping and tyrannical employers grind down all labor to the lowest living point.
In 1884 the Chinese did not compete with skilled male labor. This was recognized by the Knights of Labor and other working class witnesses before the Commission. But the presence of Chinese labourers meant that the sons and daughters of the working class could not obtain employment until they reached maturity. Thus they could not contribute to the family income in the normal way by working as unskilled labourers or as domestics.\textsuperscript{125} Neither did they receive the necessary socialization and training in diligent work habits.\textsuperscript{126} The fear raised was that white employers would extend the employment of Chinese into the skilled sectors on the grounds that they were less trouble. If this gave those employers an advantage it would mean that to compete, other employers would also have to employ the Chinese.\textsuperscript{127} Thus, to prevent an extension of Dunsmuir's policy in the Wellington Collieries, the Knights of Labour demanded "as a right, that the further immigration of Chinese be at once stopped".\textsuperscript{128}

Organized Labour's agitation against the Chinese was focused at Nanaimo and was the result of bitter experience in the coal mines where the Chinese had been used as a weapon to settle strikes.\textsuperscript{129} By using the Chinese as a weapon against white workers, employers bred hostility and divided the labour force to their advantage. The use of the Chinese created uncertainty and insecurity among working men and an anti-Chinese platform was one of the major issues around which workers unionised from 1884.\textsuperscript{130}

One witness before the Commission described the prevalent prejudice aptly as "self defense".\textsuperscript{131} In 1885 working people feared that the Chinese would take over skilled jobs; small businessmen saw the Chinese dominate such oc-
cupations as the laundry business and vegetable growing and marketing, and feared their extension into other businesses; white merchants saw the Chinese people purchasing their material needs from Chinese merchants, and consequently by-passing white establishments. The Chinese were industrious, economical, and sober, and as one witness stated:

What is most annoying, they come here and beat us on our own ground in supplying our own wants.

The fear was that unchecked they would supersede the Occidentals.

Industry, sobriety, cleanliness, faithfulness, peaceableness will have the victory. Is our race worth saving? That is the question.

Thus, the superior attitude of Occidentals was based on a profound insecurity. This insecurity was not solely economic, although the fear was developing that the Chinese were competing in the system too well, that their co-operation and exclusiveness was detrimental to white individualistic, small-scale capitalism. But the fear voiced over and over again was that the morality of whites was debased with the presence and contact of Chinese people.

The moral effect on whites of being so unfortunate as to be placed on the same level and obliged to comingle with Chinese on an equal footing in the battle of life would be bad, too bad for any respectable Canadian to contemplate.

This fear of pollution is not the voice of a self-confident people. Commissioner Gray stated in his findings:

It is something strange to hear the strong broad-shouldered superior race, superior physically and mentally, sprung from the highest types of the old and the new world, expressing a fear of competition with a small inferior, and comparatively speaking, feminine race.
Gray stated that there were in fact no more grounds for excluding the Chinese than there were for excluding "any other class of dirty people". Yet the Commissioners brought forward recommendations to restrict the Chinese people on the grounds of such rationalisations. Although the Act of 1885 did not satisfy British Columbians, it was very significant. As Canada's first racially discriminatory immigration act it marked the change in immigration policy which was to lead to the exclusion of Chinese immigrants in 1923. It was the consequence of attitudes which distinguished between people on grounds of race. This was not simply a matter of physical appearance, for it implied a definite racial heritage of mental abilities, tendencies, habits, culture, language and morality. By emphasizing what were determined as negative traits, Caucasians argued for restriction on Chinese activities and demanded their exclusion from the province of British Columbia.
Footnotes (Chapter III):

1. Wakeman, *Strangers at the Gate*, p. 3.

   The Taiping revolution occurred between 1850-1864 and began the disintegration of the Chinese Empire. Ping-ti Ho considers that the 20-30 million estimate of lives lost is too low. Writing in 1959 he states that some counties still have not made up the population numbers of 1850. Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953*, pp. 246-275.


4. Pyau Ling's article, first published in 1912, explains emigration from Kwangtung in terms of the peculiar local character of the Chinese. The political independence of this area is stressed. Canton did not join the Celestial Empire until the Ming dynasty and refused to submit to the despotic rule of the central government. In addition the early commercialism of the area exposed people to a wider world. *Ibid.*, pp. 135-136.


7. Chuen-Yan David Lai, "Home County", pp. 18-19, Chain migration appears to have been the usual mode of emigration. Karl Gutzlaff writing in 1840 describes chain migration of the Chinese of Kwangtung and Fukien provinces to Siam. The largest number came from Chaou-Chow-foo, the most eastern part of Kwangtung and were mostly agriculturists. Members of another distinct group (the Khehs or Hukkas) were chiefly artisans in Siam. A few migrated from Tungan district of Fukien and were mostly sailors or merchants. Karl Gutzlaff, *Journal of three voyages along the coast of China in 1831, 1832 and*


In this excellent article, Lai provides substantial evidence demonstrating the "chain migration" nature of Chinese immigration to B. C. Although his data is from the early 1880's one can assume that this was a continuation of a system that had much earlier beginnings. Chain migration was a phenomena not only to be found in British Columbia. See above footnote 7.


19. R. R. C., 1885, Commissioner Chapleau's Report, LXXV. See also, Fong Kum Ngon, p. 522.


See also, the reminiscences of Mrs. Mallandaine who came to the colony in 1862 as a companion in Nancy de Bertrand Lugrin, Pioneer Women of Vancouver Island 1843-1866, (Victoria, Women's Canadian Club, 1928), pp. 149-151.

For an account of the supervision of the sixty young women, most between the ages of 12-16 years, on board the Bride-ship the Tyemouth see A. Reeves, "Best Imported Wives", British Columbia Digest, 1 September, 1946, pp. 84-86.

27. Ibid. The "Waitress Question" again received the attention of the Colonist on July 12, 1864 when the annual licensing court met. A petition signed by eighty citizens protested the granting of licences to those establishments that employed women to wait on patrons. As the issue was beyond the jurisdiction of that Court, the petition was sent to the Governor.


Cariboo Sentinel, May 16, 1867, p. 2.

30. R. R. C. 1885, Commissioner Gray's Report, XXXVI.


"It is generally agreed by writers on China ... that the kind of extensive lineage system we have been examining is above all characteristic of the south-eastern and parts of the central regions of the country. These are irrigated rice-growing areas, and it is clear from both the evidence on other parts of Asia and the data on China that this form of agriculture allows dense populations to build up on small surfaces of land. Moreover, and more to the point, I suspect that there is a positive correlation between extent of irrigation and the degree to which land is held in joint estate ... Intensively irrigated and worked rice paddies have initially required a great investment of labour (in the making of channels, dams, terraces, and so on) but the rewards to this investment are extremely high, and it allows the system of cultivation to be intensified in response to growth in the number of people living off it. To produce such a system, groups of men have had to co-operate; it has been built up piecemeal over time, but co-ordinated labour has been required at most stages of its evolution. It is perhaps in the productivity and co-operative nature of the enterprise that we can see a key to common estates.", pp. 159-160.

Freedman considers that this process took place over a period of "hundreds of years" in Fukien and Kwangtung. One of the factors, therefore, leading to the establishment of lineage estates is co-operative action in land reclamation, and this mode of action is further encouraged by the nature of rice paddy cultivation.

32. The tax was not in fact compulsory and the penalty for not paying it was the same for miners of all races - their claims were jumpable, British Columbian, February 21, 1865, p. 3; February 25, 1865, p. 3.

As Robert E. Wynne has pointed out, the Chinese evaded the tax if they worked for a company or if they formed partnerships. Wynne, p. 136.
33. Colonist, October 12, 1860, p. 2.

34. Colonist, September 18, 1878, p. 2; September 22, 1878, p. 3.

35. Colonist, September 28, 1878, p. 2; p. 3.

There were strikes of Chinese gangs during railway construction in British Columbia. In other instances the Chinese retaliated when physically harrassed by white foremen.

See James Morton, pp. 100-101.


The British Columbian in 1866 reported that Kwong Lee, who established a branch firm at Quesnelmouth, sent three thousand dollars of gold from the Canon Creek diggings to Victoria. This was probably gold recovered by individuals on the creek. British Columbian, May 9, 1866, p. 3.


The estimates of the numbers of Chinese navvies varies. Arthur J. Johnson in "The Canadian Pacific Railway and British Columbia 1871-1886", unpublished M.A. in History, U. B. C., September 1936 claims that white labourers usually exceeded Chinese labourers except on the section from Emory's Bar to Port Moody. pp. 134-135. The actual numbers of Chinese workers were inflated by the anti-Oriental organizations. In 1882 it was rumoured that 20,000 immigrants were arriving from Hong Kong, but in fact only 5,000 came in that year. Tien Fang Cheng, Oriental Immigration in Canada, p. 46. Fear tended to inflate numbers.

Stated by H. J. Cambie and quoted from Noel Robinson, *Blazing the Trail through the Rockies*, (n.d.).

42. Willmott, "Approaches", pp. 46-47. The Chinese Community was left to solve the problem of Chinese unemployed labourers.


45. Ibid., p. 49.


48. Ibid., Evidence Portland, Oregon, 1884, Nelson Bennett, Contractor of Cascade section of the Northern Pacific Railway, p. 171. He stated that if you have "trouble" with one white man then you can discharge him alone. If you have "trouble" with "one Chinaman", then you have "trouble" with the whole gang.

After the introduction of the poll tax in 1885, Chinese labourers were in greater debt than previously and were employed under contract in more industries. Francis E. Herring, writing at the turn of the century, describes Chinese contract labourers in the salmon canning industry. If the Chinese labourers "get a down on the owner", then after the stipulated number of cases had been canned they refused to work for that owner. Or the Chinese contractor could insist on a substantial increase in price. Francis E. Herring, pp. 273-274.

49. *British Columbian*, June 1, 1867, p. 3; June 5, 1867, p. 2. The Company lowered the pay from $1.25 a ton to $1.00; and provided neither materials and implements nor free domestic coal when they called for tenders from the white miners.

51. The parallel can be drawn (but was not at the time) between the young Chinese labourer whose goal was to return to China as a man of moderate wealth - a not unfeasible proposition - and the British migrant who set out to "make his mark" in this outpost of the British Empire, returning to Britain as a successful man on retirement.

52. R. R. C. 1885, Evidence Sgt. John Flewin, City Police and City Sanitary Officer Victoria, p. 50. Evidence John A. Bradley, p. 161, who stated: "The gross clasps of a lascivious Chinawoman can be procured for fifty cents or less".


55. Ibid.

Reference to this belief can be found in many American and English travellers' reports on China, e. g., George Wingrove Cooke, China, pp. 121-122.


56. Mrs. Baillie-Grohman's Chinese cook said to her on the birth of her son: "A boy all light, girls no good". He explained that girls cost money to bring up and they cannot do business for their father. pp. 337-341.

57. This practice continued until the 1947 revolution. For further details see "The Prostitutes of China" in Fernando Henriques, p. 267.

Excluding the silk districts, prostitution was one of the few occupations other than marriage open to women.

See also, William W. Sanger.
A different social organization existed in parts of Shun-te, the centre of the Kwangtung silk industry. Here, evidence suggests, women could lead more independent existences, setting up houses on their own with, relatively, fewer male controls. One of the features of this area was a weaker lineage organization. See Freedman, op. cit., p. 32.

58. This was not a universal custom. Reverend Milne, a missionary in China during the 1840's, found few instances of this custom among Cantonese boat-women, or female domestics in the province of Canton. It was not, however, a custom restricted to women of the upper class. In Chusan and Ningpo women of all classes, he stated, had stunted feet. The reasons he presented for the custom are:

- to imitate small delicate feet, or
- to keep women from gadding about,
- or to denote gentility and freedom from toil and hard work

(i. e., as a visible sign of wealth and a form of conspicuous consumption). The artificial deformity was also considered an essential element of (Chinese) feminine beauty which Milne placed on a par with the corseting of women's waists in England. Whatever the cultural reason given it had the social and political effect of isolating Chinese women from a wider sphere than the home. Even walking was difficult and in some instances women had to be literally carried in baskets thus making them dependent on others for their mobility. Milne, Life in China, pp. 8-16, and Cooke, pp. 8-9.


60. British Colonist, March 1, 1860, p. 2.


63. Ibid., Diary entry, 16 August 1876, p. 253.

64. A. W. Loomis, p. 346.

66. R. R. C. 1885, Appendix A. Evidence from 1876 Committee of the House of Representatives in San Francisco. Evidence Reverend Otis Gibson in charge of the Methodist Church Mission, p. 163. On one occasion he arranged passage back to China for ten women who had been kidnapped and forced to leave China against their wills.


68. R. R. C. 1885, Appendix A. Evidence Reverend Otis Gibson, p. 262. The translation states that this debt was incurred "for passage". Passage to Vancouver from China was estimated at $70.00. Thus, included in the debt must have been her purchasing price.

69. Ibid.


Often the runaway women were arrested under a bogus warrant. See pp. 67, 168.

However, in California, the majority of Chinese prostitutes were owned by Chinese companies in California, and the prostitution business was a very lucrative one as the "Tong" wars demonstrate.

Chuen-Yan Lai in "The Chinese Consolidated Benevolent Association in Victoria", p. 61, states that Chinese prostitution was one of the main causes of trouble in Chinatown and the Benevolent Association was formed, in part, "to curb violence and crimes".

71. The workings of this system, by which Chinese companies in California kept their prostitutes in absolute bondage until they sickened and died was open knowledge to every one in the state, including the helpful magistrates who issued the warrants for the arrest of these women, and the peace officers who served these warrants. Paul de Fella, p. 67.

See also, Stanford Lyman, "Strangers in the City", in Roots, footnote 127, p. 185.
Gayle Louie, p. 199.

Ibid., p. 198.


Ibid., Evidence J. Pawson, J.P. of Nanaimo. He considered that nearly the whole of the Chinese females who left China were professed prostitutes from children of ten to twelve years to "old hags", p. 133. (According to Huang Sic Chen's statistics there were four married women in Nanaimo, two prostitutes, and two children.)

David William Gordon, M.P., for Vancouver but resident of Nanaimo, considered that ninety-nine percent of Chinese females were prostitutes. Ibid., p. 134.

James B. Kennedy, a lumberman of New Westminster, stated in his evidence that the Chinese women who came were common prostitutes. Ibid., p. 106.

Joseph Metcalf (Jr.) of Nanaimo put the number of Chinese prostitutes in the province at 150. Ibid., p. 83.

Charles T. Bloomfield, Superintendent of Police in Victoria considered that most Chinese women were prostitutes, bringing syphilis and other venereal diseases. Ibid., p. 48.

Sergeant John Flewin of the Victoria City Police and Sanitary Officer for the city stated that of the over one hundred Chinese women, almost all were prostitutes - frequented by young white men. Ibid., p. 50.

Ibid., Appendix C., pp. 363-366.


R. R. C. 1885, p. 81. Begbie draws the interesting parallel between the practice in Europe of settling a marriage contract by the husband's payment of ten or twenty thousand dollars to the woman's parents. Or the miner who pays twenty dollars for "the possession of a female for a single night", yet is "scandalized" at a Chinese miner paying five hundred dollars for six months possession.
80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., Evidence W. Stephenson, p. 124.

82. Ibid., Evidence John Tindal of Victoria, p. 121. He stated:

It is a well known fact that their women are sold all over the country as prostitutes. Notwithstanding the great influence that the leaders have over the masses, no attempt is ever made to liberate a woman sold into the market of shame.

83. Ibid., Evidence William James Armstrong, p. 117.

84. Ibid., Appendix C., p. 363.

85. Ibid., Evidence Mayor Carey, p. 45

86. Anti-Slavery Reporter, No. 1, No. 4 (New Series), (April 1, 1853), p. 89.

87. Ibid., Vol 1, No. 1 (New Series), (January 1, 1853), p. 15.

88. Victoria Gazette, 31 March 1859, p. 2; July 9, 1859, p. 2.

89. Gregson, pp. 123-124

90. Sproat, p. 69.

91. British Columbian, October 11, 1865, p. 3.

92. Sir Edwin Chadwick in his Sanitary Report of 1842 set out to prove the connection between dirt, overcrowding and disease in British towns. This connection was accepted by the public in general in British Columbia as evidenced by the number of witnesses before the Royal Commissioners who complained of the overcrowding and filth of Chinatown and voiced fears of catching contagious diseases. However, most witnesses blamed the Chinese for the problem and, unlike Chadwick, did not recognize the need for improvements to the external sanitation and drainage of the area. It is interesting to
note that in the 1880's the European residents of Hong Kong wanted certain reserved residential districts set aside for Europeans on the grounds that the Chinese were less sanitary and more likely to spread disease. S. E. Finer, The Life and Times of Sir Edwin Chadwick, (New York, Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1970), pp. 209-229; and Endacott and Hinton, p. 190.

93. British Columbian, April 28, 1866, p. 2.


According to another witness, Sergeant John Flewin who was also the sanitary officer of Victoria, the Chinese habitations were filthy. He stated that they kept their urine for use as fertilizer on their gardens. Ibid., p. 49.

95. Ibid., Evidence Sergeant John Flewin, p. 50.

96. Ibid., Evidence Honourable John Robson, Provincial Secretary, p. 65.

97. Ibid., Sergeant John Flewin, p. 50, on syphilis; Evidence Dr. Helmcken, p. 58, on leprosy; Evidence Dr. E. Stevenson, p. 92, on venereal diseases.

98. Ibid., Appendix J., p. 394. Mayor Carey informed the Commissioners that Collecting Officers got a ten percent commission on collections made from the Chinese. Ibid., p. 44.

The total taxes paid to the City of Victoria by the Chinese are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>$5,827.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>$6,191.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1882</td>
<td>$7,712.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1883</td>
<td>$8,414.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ibid., Appendix J. p. 394.

99. Ibid., Evidence John Tindall, p. 120.

100. Ibid., Evidence Dr. Helmcken, p. 58.
101. Ibid., Appendix J., p. 394. Real estate taxes for the years 1879 to 1883 amounted to $187.00 a year from the Chinese property owners.

102. A property owner (Caucasian) in Portland, Oregon explained that the Chinese tenants were prompt with their rent payments, were morally superior to any other immigrant race and that in one house he had four hundred Chinese tenants. Unfortunately, the Commissioners did not interview representatives of a similar class of capitalists in Victoria. Ibid., Evidence Joseph P. Kennedy, property holder in Portland, Oregon, 1884, p. 176.

103. Ibid., Evidence Mr. Justice Crease, pp. 143-144. According to the records of the City of Victoria, only four Chinese men owned real estate and they paid each year $187.00 in real estate taxes.

Ibid., Appendix J., p. 394.

One of the more common offenses for which the Chinese community was prosecuted was infractions of the sanitary by-laws. See Appendix H., p. 386, and Evidence Mayor John W. Carey, p. 44.

In September 1878, the Colonist exposed Mr. Dalby, a candidate standing for election to the House of Commons, for exactly what Justice Crease complained of. Mr. Dalby had leased property on Cormorand Street and placed old shanties on it, accommodation that the Colonist considered could only be for the Chinese that Dalby anticipated would be imported for the building of the railway. Mr. Dalby was also the foreman of a shoe factory which employed fifty Chinese, thus excluding white boot and shoe makers. Daily Colonist, September 13, 1878, p. 3.

104. R. R. C. 1885, Evidence James Young, p. 89.

105. Ibid., Evidence Dr. E. Stevenson, p. 93.

106. "White people have sunk to the lowest depths of degradation when they mixed with the immoral Chinese, and a growing number have so sunk themselves. Ibid., Evidence James Young, p. 89.

107. Ibid., Evidence Joseph Metcalf Jr., p. 83.

108. Ibid., Evidence Sergeant John Flewin, p. 50; Statement from John A. Bradley, p. 161.
109. Ibid., Evidence James Young, p. 89.

110. Ibid., Evidence Superintendent Charles Bloomfield, p. 48.

111. Ibid., Evidence "Emily Wharton", a pseudonym. pp. 150-151. She had explained to the Commissioners that she had never been interfered with by a Chinese man awake or asleep in the opium den. They won't even speak to her unless she approaches them. After the first whiff of opium you don't want to talk, she said. p. 151.


113. Ibid., Evidence B. M. Pearse, Victoria, p. 97. He stated:

"We want here a white man's community, with civilized habits and religious aspirations, and not a community of 'Heathen Chinee'."

Another witness, David William Gordon, M. P., claimed that they practiced pagan rites with effrontery, denounced the cross as "too muchee lie", and jeered at all Christian denominations. Ibid., p. 136.

114. Ibid., Commissioner Gray's Report, LX.

115. Ibid., Evidence Sergeant John Flewin, p. 51.


117. E. g., Tai Chong vs. John Maguire. This Chinese merchant went to court charging the collector of the Chinese Tax John Maguire with the illegal seizure and sale of goods from Chinese merchants in lieu of payment of Local Chinese Tax. Through these proceedings the local Act was declared null and void by Mr. Justice Gray. Reported in the Daily Colonist, September 28, 1878, p. 3 and September 28, 1878, p. 2.
Francis Herring noted that the white foremen of a salmon cannery carried revolvers in case of trouble from the Chinese workers. They had been especially necessary before mechanization when the fish had been cut up by hand, for at that time the Chinese workers were by necessity carrying knives. This does not fit with the docile, passive image of Chinese labourers. Herring, pp. 257-268.

118. Tien-Fang Cheng, Oriental Immigration, p. 49. The Chinese were prohibited from buying crown land in 1884.

119. Ibid., p. 39. In 1875 the bill was passed and enforced locally.


121. The essayist Gilbert M. Sproat stated that Canadian workingmen "cannot associate with Chinaman in the general interests of labor or for any purpose whatsoever". R. R. C. 1885, Evidence Gilbert M. Sproat, Essayist of Victoria, p. 167.

The statement made by the Knights of Labor, L. A., No. 3017, Nanaimo, expressed these same sentiments, emphasising that the Chinese were not fit to participate in political life because they had "no sympathy in our higher aims and objects". Ibid., p. 155.

122. Ibid., Evidence Mr. Tuckfield, Victoria, p. 66. (Emphasis added.)

123. Ibid., Statement of the Knights of Labor, L. A., No. 3017, Nanaimo, p. 156. (Emphasis added.)

See also Ibid., Evidence John A. Bradley, a working man of Victoria, p. 161.

The Knights of Labor stated "Chinese labor is little, if any, cheaper than white labor."


126. *Ibid.*, Evidence Samuel M. Robins, Superintendent of the Vancouver Coal Mining and Land Co., Ltd., of Nanaimo, p. 120.


129. *Ibid.*, Evidence Samuel M. Robins, Nanaimo, Superintendent of the Vancouver Coal Mining and Land Co., Ltd., p. 118. See also British Columbian, June 1, 1867, p. 3. Chinese strike breakers were used by Dunsmuir in the Wellington coal-mine strike in February 1877 and again in the March-April strike in 1878.


130. Phillips, *No Power Greater*, p. 8, p. 162. Male white workers also used direct action. Chinese labourers were brought into McDougal's work camp on Burrard Inlet. An angry "mob" attacked the camp in January 1867, and drove "the Chinese people to the cliffs of the Inlet (and) forcing them to jump into the wintry waters". In 1886, Chinese labourers from the Hastings Mill were attacked on their way to vote in Vancouver's municipal elections.


It should be remembered that - again - the economy of British Columbia was not in good shape and working conditions poor in 1886 after the completion of the C. P. R. The expected boom did not happen.


132. Ibid., Evidence Samuel M. Robins, Nanaimo, p. 118.

133. Ibid., Evidence Chief Justice Sir Matthew Begbie, p. 72.

134. Ibid., Evidence Dr. E. Stevenson, Victoria, p. 94.

135. Ibid., Evidence David W. Gordon, M. P., p. 133.

136. Ibid., Commissioner Gray's report, LXIX.

137. Ibid., LXV.
CONCLUSION

You know that joke about the white man's burden? They make it, we carry it.¹

The conflicts resulting from racial prejudice have been the topic of research by many social scientists. Charles Wagley and Marvin Harris have seen the conflict between races as being caused not by ethnocentrism or endogamy but by competition for limited resources.² Gordon Allport's theory offers little hope for the elimination of prejudice as he sees the process of categorization into hierarchies as "natural".³ Philip Mason considers that social stratification arose - and with it a myth structure to justify "patterns of dominance" - with economic specialization and consequent political specialization.⁴ Dominance of one group over another "springs from passions that are common to all men".⁵ T. Adorno, in contrast, sees the ideology of ethnocentrism as "a general frame of mind",⁶ an individual character trait peculiar to the authoritarian personality.

Racial prejudice is seen in this thesis not as a problem of race, nor as a character trait, nor as "natural". This would be to assume that aggression and competition predominate and are an approved mode of response in all cultures.⁷ Rather, racial prejudice is seen as being intimately bound to a complex economic political and social system, gaining force from that system and in turn reinforcing the values of that system. It is argued that the prejudice of Westerners to the Chinese has its roots in the notions of superiority and the hierarchical view of the world that formed the myth structure which justified European imperialism. As Joseph Esherick has stated, "imperialism was a total system - economic, political, social and cultural - and
that its component parts were intimately interrelated."⁸ The ideology of British imperialism from the mid-nineteenth century assumed both a racial hierarchy and the superiority of its own social, economic, political and legal system. With a belief in progress and in the evolution of society from an inferior social organization to a superior civilization the British saw their responsibility (the white man's burden) and their Protestant mission to be that of bringing enlightenment to "less fortunate" and "underdeveloped" nations.

The colonization model as expressed by Robert Blauner is a useful tool of analysis to explain racial prejudice. He states:

The essential condition for both American slavery and European colonialism was the power domination and the technological superiority of the Western world in its relation to peoples of non-Western and non-white origins. This objective supremacy in technology and military power buttressed the West's sense of cultural superiority, laying the basis for racist ideologies that were elaborated to justify control and exploitation of non-white people.⁹

His colonization complex has four basic components. First, the forced involuntary entry of the colonizer. Second, the effect this entry has on the culture and social organization, namely the transformation or destruction of indigenous values, orientations, and ways of life. Third, the colonized group are administered by representatives of the dominant group. Fourth, the principle of racism is used to exploit, control and oppress socially and psychologically the colonized group.¹⁰

It is true that the classic colonization model outlined above does not fit China completely. China, unlike India for example, was more successful in
resisting imperialist forces. In particular, the Manchu Government remained administratively in control although this was only through the active support of Westerners. It was with Western aid that the Taiping revolution was subdued.\(^{11}\) Robert Hart's custom organization produced one third of the entire revenue of the Chinese government by 1898.\(^{12}\) And the principle of extraterritoriality ensured that Westerners were beyond Chinese jurisdiction. However, the other components of the colonization complex and their effects apply to China. Attitudes of racial superiority served to justify the imperialistic thrusts of the Western trader, missionary and government official in China, and the negative stereotype of the Chinese race that was propagated by these interest groups spread throughout the Western world.

By looking at Chinese-Western relationships in the context of imperialism the roots of white racist attitudes in British Columbia can be located. Contact between Europeans and the Chinese from the mid-nineteenth century was predominantly determined by Westerners. Technically, their military machine was superior to that of China. This enabled them a forced entry into China, and access to some ninety treaty ports along its coast. The numerous economic, political and social effects of imperialism on indigenous Chinese society can not here be elaborated.\(^{13}\) Apologists of Western imperialism have seen the economic and institutional transformation of China which occurred from mid-century as "modernization" and "both necessary and good".\(^{14}\) The assumptions behind this conclusion are that: firstly China was backward prior to the West's "contribution"; secondly, the indicator of an advanced economic system is one involved in foreign trade (the imperialistic model); and thirdly, Britain and America were, in fact doing China a favour by demanding commercial
exchange. This interpretation - aside from its obvious ethnocentrism - ignores the well developed Chinese production and marketing system which existed prior to Western contact, a system which demonstrates that China was in fact economically self-sufficient. It also denies the fact that it was by force that the West intervened in Asia, and that in China the West was pushing opium. In 1890 opium was still the largest single Chinese import. In this way the aggressive nature and immorality of Western imperialism is excused or dismissed.

The two provinces first effected by the disruption of Chinese society occurring after Western intervention were Kwangtung and Fukien, and it was from these two provinces that the Chinese who immigrated to British Columbia originated. Conditions in China forced them to leave and seek employment in a hostile and alien environment. They came with the intention of making sufficient money to return to their home villages, with the same intention as the bulk of people who came to British Columbia at this time. But only the Chinese miners were singled out and classified as locusts, accused of exploiting the gold resources of the colony. These accusations rested on racist attitudes.

The Chinese stereotype had been formed from contact in China, and supplemented and reinforced by contact in California. The belligerent attitude of Europeans to the Chinese in the early gold fields was reinforced by the nature of the colony. The population was predominantly made up of single men involved in the exploitation of gold resources, of merchants supplying food and supplies at exhorbitant rates, of land speculators here to make a fast buck. The economy was unstable, the population of all nationalities migra-
tory - conditions leading to instability and insecurity in a society. In the past the example of the Californian gold mining towns' treatment of the Chinese has been used to explain the attitude of Europeans in British Columbia. It is a fact that many miners did come from these fields, or at least passed through San Francisco on their way north, and thus came in contact with Californian nativism and xenophobia. However, recent research has shown that in California, too, the Chinese were never welcomed as possible immigrants. The attitude that the Chinese were inferior as a race, that they were unassimilable aliens and less than human preceded them across the Pacific.

This attitude is a legacy of Western notions of superiority. Relationships between dominant and subordinant groups are cumulative. When the dominant group has formed a picture of the way the other is expected to behave, evidence will be found to strengthen the view and, in the case of the Chinese in British Columbia, legislation introduced to enforce this behaviour. Missionaries, traders, embassy officials and travellers to the East were instrumental in shaping the attitude of the Western world towards the Chinese people. Through their published works, lecture tours and influence the predominantly negative image spread. Western accounts of the Opium Wars further emphasized this stereotype. White racial attitudes effected the Chinese in British Columbia and were an important factor determining where and how the Chinese lived, the type of work they did, and, later in the century, were a factor determining the decision of the Chinese not to remain in British Columbia. Poll taxes ensured that their families could not join them.

White men's treatment of the Chinese in British Columbia has been detailed to establish that prejudice existed from the early days of the gold
rush and to demonstrate that restrictive and exclusion legislation followed logically from the white attitudes and the events of these early years. The Chinese did not consent to their oppression. Responsibility for racism leading to restriction and final exclusion of a group of people has been placed not on the minority group - the Chinese - but rather on the majority group, the group that threatened and ultimately used brute force to keep the Chinese inferior economically and politically. At first they were excluded from the better diggings by violence or the threat of violence, and thus the Chinese took over abandoned fields. They worked at jobs that white men would not do - as menial servants and farm or town labourers. Municipal and provincial legislation was implemented to narrow their economic and political activity. Restrictions were placed on their mode of living. Thus the economic niche to which they were limited by these acts as well as social custom and expectation tended to reinforce the negative stereotype. Later Federal Acts were used to eliminate the Oriental "problem" from British Columbia, Acts given moral and ethical credence by the fable of Anglo-Saxon racial superiority.

The rationale for the restriction of Chinese immigrants up to the first Federal Act of 1885 has been discussed, and the particular facets that comprised the expressed negative stereotype isolated. Some of these resulted from the value placed on the marked cultural differences between Chinese and Europeans. But on the whole Europeans were ill-informed and had unfounded notions and little understanding of the Chinese or their social organization. Their collective habits were viewed with suspicion and fear. Overcrowding, prostitution, drainage and disease were seen as additional evidence of the
racial inferiority of the Chinese. Rather than recognising these as social problems that could be eradicated, whites saw them as proof that the Chinese should be excluded from the province.

Anti-Chinese attitudes were not class-based. The consensus of opinion in the province was that they were aliens, unassimilable and not desirable as a permanent sector of the population. Thus the Anti-Chinese agitation cannot be explained exclusively in terms of crude economic competition.\(^{19}\)

Even in 1885, after the completion of railway construction work, the Knights of Labor stressed the fear of Chinese competition rather than their actual competition. For over twenty-five years the Chinese had been limited to unskilled, low-paid, non-competitive labour and anti-Chinese feeling was firmly rooted in the province.

It is true that agitation against the Chinese did increase after the C.P.R. was completed, but there were additional factors besides "cheap Chinese labour" to account for this. A slump occurred in British Columbia. The anticipated increase in trade, prosperity and jobs did not occur. The railway brought an influx of new settlers from the east, to compete for jobs with men dismissed from construction work. White men looked for any kind of work, even low-paid seasonal and transitional jobs such as woodcutting. These jobs, formerly typed as "Chinaman's jobs" and filled by Chinese men,\(^{20}\) now were acceptable to white men. Thus demands for Chinese exclusion were loudly made. Anti-Oriental sentiment has always been a convenient scapegoat for economic instability and depression.
The Anglo-Saxon social structure thus remained dominant in British Columbia. The sense of insecurity that prevailed meant that any threat to the homogeneity of the dominant group had to be removed from the immediate vicinity - in the case of the Indians - or eliminated. This process took until 1923 when a Federal Exclusion Act was passed that stopped the immigration of the Chinese to British Columbia. But by 1885 with the introduction of the fifty dollar poll tax the possibility of Chinese men settling with their families in British Columbia was ruled out. The subsequent taxes, of one hundred dollars levied in 1900 and five hundred dollars levied in 1903, demonstrated that in white British Columbia there was no room for coloured minorities. Thus the possibility of the development of an ethnic mosaic was never permitted and the principle of the right of the majority to govern and the obligation of the minority to obey and assimilate was firmly established.
Footnotes (Conclusion):


13. Some specific effects in the province of Kwangtung have been considered in Chapter 2. For a more analytical discussion of this aspect of imperialism in China, see Esherick, who has isolated the various economic, social and political effects of Western aggression.

See also Andrew J. Nathan "Imperialism's Effects on China", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 4, No. 4, (December, 1972), and Hu Sheng, op. cit.

14. Esherick, p. 9. These sentiments, of course, originated from nineteenth century imperialists. The modern founder of this school of thought is John K. Fairbank. See his The United States and China, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1971).


16. Esherick, p. 10. In 1870 opium made up 43% of China's total imports.

17. Wynne accounts for the heavy racist nature of the editorial policy of the Victoria Gazette in 1859 in terms of the origins of the two men who owned and edited the newspaper. Both men were from San Francisco, and Wynne states that their "Californian attitude" was contrary to the general trend of attitudes in British Columbia at that time. Wynne, p. 112.

18. Mason, op. cit., p. 46.

19. F. W. Howay, British Columbia: The Making of a Province, (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1928), p. 263. Howay contends that anti-Chinese agitation had begun by 1874 and that after the completion of the Canadian Pacific Railway their competition was "severely felt". His implication is that it was a working class phenomenon.

21. As mentioned in Chapter one, a similar situation occurred in 1865 in the gold fields when "Chinese pickings" began to attract white miners disillusioned with the Columbia and the Cariboo. The present rise of Anti-Asiatic sentiment and actions in Vancouver, directed particularly at Sikhs, demonstrates that this attitude is still prevalent in British Columbia.
POSTSCRIPT

In a recent issue of This Magazine, Satu Repo interviewed a Latin American immigrant, Graciela Lopez. An illegal immigrant, she explained that she had emigrated because she could not support herself and her three children on the wages paid to her by the American-owned dress factory in Central America. She came to Canada because she had heard that work was available here. Unable to find work on her own in Toronto, she contacted a fellow countryman who found her a job working seven days a week for below the minimum wage. At this time her plans were to work in Canada until she could make enough money to set herself up in her own business in her home town. However, after a return visit she realized that there was in fact no future for her there. Not only were the factories foreign-owned, but the retail outlets were also foreign controlled. She thus returned to Canada with her children to pessimistically await consideration of her application for landed immigrant status.¹

The experience of many Chinese immigrants to British Columbia over one hundred years ago is being repeated by new immigrants to Canada today.

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