TOWARD A GEOGRAPHY
OF THE HUMAN CONDITION

by

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Toward A Geography Of The Human Condition

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ABSTRACT

Geographic enquiry is failing to humanely engage the human condition. Evidence of this failure is the increasing number and intensity of pleas and demands for the discipline to be relevant, or radical, or revolutionary.

This thesis contends that, unhappily, the responses to these recent pleas and demands, though well-intentioned and often competent, are destined to default. They fail to establish the ontological level of human enquiry as their starting point.

Human geography emerged from its long history of descriptive accomplishments into an epistemological apprenticeship that rigidly bound it to a single interpretation of the philosophy of science, that of logical positivism. This epistemological confinement provided the mandate to emphasize methodological concerns, and it has begun to unravel as alternative views gnaw at its edges and inch their way into journals, meetings, and lecture halls.

Part One assesses some of these alternatives. A crucial epistemological debate is starting to unfold. The several philosophies of science are being scrutinized. Marxism is establishing a niche. Existentialism and phenomenology are finding small but receptive audiences. The handful of Marxists would have geography go "to the root of the problem" which they know to be man. Even fewer dedicate themselves to discovering the geographic expressions of how man makes
meaning in the world, especially in the environment. Both approaches
deserve fundamental roles in directing the future of the discipline.
But it is the purpose of Part Two to disclose why they are not truly
revolutionary steps. They are decidedly anthropomorphic in their
premises and concerns.

Humanism, however conceived, is not enough to humanely engage
the geographer in enquiry concerning the human condition. A more
revolutionary undertaking is required. To be a humanizing human
geographer entails a thorough understanding of what it means to be a
human being. Knowing about being human entails knowing about what it
means to be. Knowing this entails knowing about Being. It is the
ontological level of enquiry that asks about the meaning of Being.

Martin Heidegger contends that our methods and epistemologies
fail to humanely serve man because they are defined by an ontology that
is really only a metaphysics rather than a fundamental ontology.
Either we simply ignore Being or agree to treat it like every other
thing (ourselves included) and subject it to the same calculative,
rationalizing, "objective" enquiry. Heidegger claims that our history
of metaphysics began with Plato and culminated in Nietzsche. We
suffer in the aftermath in which all the world and those in it are
subject to the measure and machinations of calculative thinking.

Part Two introduces Heidegger's analysis, tentatively applies
it to contemporary human geographic enquiry, and suggests that the
discipline has lost sight of Heidegger's insistence that "Poetically
man dwells on this earth." If human geography is to serve man it must
establish its epistemological and methodological endeavours in terms of a creative rediscovery of the pre-Socratic grasp of Being. The human geographer is possibly uniquely situated to respond to Heidegger's call to cast aside Cartesian dualism and the Platonic notion of truth. Heidegger dares us to reunite earth, sky, gods, and mortals by attending to Being.

Of all the social enquiry subjects, human geography is closest to Heidegger's foursome, and in this age of ecological understanding readiest to appreciate his meaning and analyses. Canadian human geographers are best placed of all, because they have the remarkable ontological riches of contemporary Canadian poetry with its almost unmatched concern for man in the landscape. Drawing upon this poetic heritage could centre Canadian human geography in the heart of Heidegger's world—in the very midst of earth, sky, gods, and mortals. Each understood in terms of the others, and all in terms of Being.
TO

Henry August Carlson

(1883–1963)

grandfather, geographer
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the following: My wife Betty, for her love; Michael Eliot Hurst whose willingness to take over the supervision of my thesis enabled me to finish my studies, and who always maintained "to thine own self be true;" Ed Gibson who pointed me towards existential and phenomenological thought, and who cared about every word I wrote; Joe May for his encouragement and criticism; Sara Lee David whose wise counsel and understanding helped me through the most troublesome stage of the writing; Larry Boland who taught me the philosophy of science; Frank Collinge who taught me the philosophy of the social sciences; Hari Sharma who introduced me to Sartre's dilemma; Chris Taylor for his file of SERGE correspondence; my colleagues at Douglas College for their indulgence; those graduate colleagues at SFU who share in the search for a geography of the human condition; the staff of the SFU Geography department who are so adroit in soothing the nerves of harried graduate students; Wendy for her thoughtful arguments and queries; Alberta for her art and care; Graham, Sherry, Ann, and several other of my students who became enthused with how human geography could be; Vi Ellingson for typing the thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>(iii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEDICATION</td>
<td>(vi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>(vii)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PART ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFATORY QUOTATION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER ONE: 1970</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Fire!&quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kindling</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Decade Dawns</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Was Not Quiet on the Western Front</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meaning?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explorations</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confusions and Doubts</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER TWO: 1971</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West by North-West</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boston or Bust!</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business as Usual</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happenings</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Shores, Other Eyes</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER THREE: 1972</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxism?</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAG Again</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PART TWO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFATORY QUOTATION</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FOUR: HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanism Is Not Enough</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Question of Questions</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My Personal Project</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Preliminary Consideration</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>But Why Being?</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Ontological Difference&quot;</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasein</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being-in-the-World</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphysics</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Transformation of Truth</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physis and Logos: Being and Thinking</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER FIVE: EROTICS</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanism Is Not Enough</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What About Romanticism?</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explanation, Experience, Erotics</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil, Landscape, and Love</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological Pointers: Yi-Fu Tuan and Relph</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER SIX: POETICS</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restatement</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poetic Dwelling</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
PART ONE

And young people precisely are called to this chief end: to fulfill the true humanization of man wherever it cries out for fulfillment and thrills their spirit with its will to be.

—Ernst Bloch

*On Karl Marx*

*New York, Herder and Herder, 1971, p. 15.*
CHAPTER ONE

1970

"Fire!"

For Cole Harris, the winter of 1970 at the University of Toronto was a time for "Reflections on the Fertility of the Historical Geographical Mule," but it was also a time to remark on the "general uneasiness about the orientation of geography today."¹ Virtually an aside, in a paper deserving a pivotal position in geography's growing concern with philosophical issues, Harris's observation effectively serves as a "benchmark". It provides a temporal fix on a gradually ripening debate within the discipline. More importantly, his tone seems to accurately reflect the level of anxiety afoot, and serves to alert those who haven't yet heard of geography's belated bout of existential queasiness, and to bate the breath of those crying "crisis!" in geography. Unhappily, their cry is both premature and misdirected, not because enough haven't heard the awkward and discomforting questions, but precisely because those professional geographers listening most closely are those in positions of power within "establishment geography."² The real crisis is the apparent success these


practitioners are experiencing in frustrating, appropriating, and co-opting the initiative of the critics. Fire?

These first three chapters will evaluate selected recent efforts to forge a more relevant, radical, or revolutionary human geography. We will discover profound proposals rich in philosophical awareness; soundly conceived criticism; some ill-conceived renderings; considerable confusion; and some cleverly constructed facades. We will also witness establishment geographers indiscriminately dousing these fledgling flames or incorporating these new energies into their own machines.

Kindling

The summer of '69 celebrated the arrival of *Antipode*, subtitled *A Radical Journal of Geography*. The spirit of the season did not go undetected in even the most established quarters of discourse. Guest editorials graced the pages of *Economic Geography*: J.J. Parsons heralded the trend "Toward a More Humane Geography," and J.E. Vance sensed the necessity of raising the issue of "Moral Rectitude Among Economic Geographers" because "Practices of everyday life increasingly enter our professional activity." And, that same summer was not to pass without Edward M. Gibson reminding the annual meeting of the Canadian Association Geographers of the discipline's tradition of radical humanism and introducing them to the radicalizing potential of phenomenology. He detected

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[^4]: Vol. 45, No. 4, 1969, p. i.
[^5]: "Landscape Aesthetics: The Radicalism of Traditional Geography," presented at Memorial University, St. John's, Newfoundland, August, 1969 (mimeo) 13 pp.
several phenomenological precursors amongst the early adherents of landscape aesthetics: (1) in the work of Ratzel, Oppel, Wimmer, Banse, Volz, and Passarge who all attempted to develop a geography of aesthetics; (2) in the logic of Jean Bruhnes; and (3) in the writing of Sir Frances Younghusband and Vaughan Cornish. He went on to cite J.K. Wright and D. Lowenthal for their achievements in the "scholarly communication of the direct meanings of landscape." It is fascinating to note the similarity in speculations by Parsons:

The humanistic approach to learning may prove more congenial to the coming generation than any other viewpoint. Geography, as landscape appreciation, faces previously undreamed of new horizons and opportunities.

and by Gibson:

Under the force of the new radicalism, geographic thought could very well be turned back upon itself, it could become once again, the vague science at which Hartshorne only glanced as he passed in review of the German geographic method.

In just such equivocations, speculations, and publications were the seeds of the seventies. They were being sown just as David Harvey was reaping the harvest of the sixties. His Explanation In Geography


7 Gibson, op. cit., p. 7.

8 Parsons, op. cit.

9 Gibson, op. cit., p. 2.

appeared, as Harris so aptly phrases it, just "as the bloom was leaving the spatial movement."11 So it seems that those fine flowers which failed to enthrall Hartshorne were about to become thorns for Harvey thirty years later, along with whole fields of new concerns.

A Decade Dawns

In search of a sequel to '69, Wilbur Zelinsky soared "Beyond the Exponentials"12 in evaluating "the role of the geographer in the great transition" as that of "diagnostician, prophet and architect of utopia."13 Also, in 1970 University of Toronto graduate student Ted Relph initiated "An Inquiry Into the Relations Between Phenomenology and Geography,"14 in which he struck a response to Vance's concern about the pervasiveness of everyday life. Relph informed us that, "The phenomenological method is a procedure for describing the everyday world of man's immediate experience."15

Vance was concerned that when the moral and ethical issues of our everyday existence impinge upon the discipline they create a situation in

11 Harris, op. cit., p. 171, n. 2.


15 Ibid., p. 193.
which "intellectual accommodation is difficult." Apparently this unwarranted hardship arises when the profession, rather than its individual practitioners, is asked to declare its position on an issue. He suggested that such demands are based on the assumption that "there must be consentaneously defined truth to be matched to a proper moral position," and that such posturing defaced a discipline in which "doctrinal confrontation is already a tradition." The basis for such rarefied clashes of intellectual and societal loyalties would dissolve if the discipline would embrace the Lebenswelt as Relph suggested. The aim of phenomenology "is to provide a means of investigation through which the 'lived-world' of man's experience can be restored to a place of prominence in our thinking."

It is interesting to speculate about the impact such thinking might have had on Harris. His original discussion paper made no mention of phenomenology yet his later published version ended with the addition of a somewhat acrid analogy. Allowing that future developments might prove productive, he went on to liken those currently fascinated with phenomenology to:

... Ferdinando, that Spanish bull who loved to sit under the corktree smelling the flowers. Fond as we must be of Ferdinando, I have argued here that there is a valid middle position which draws on our distinctively geographical tradition, recognizes the relevance of scholarship, and challenges our best minds.

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16 Vance, op. cit.

17 Relph, op. cit., p. 194.

18 Harris, op. cit., pp. 170-71.
The implication, however jocular, that phenomenology is just a lot of bull, by so respected a geographer as Harris, would most likely stifle Relph or any other graduate student around a seminar table. But, to commit to print a juxtaposing of Yi-Fu Tuan to such virtues as geographic tradition, scholarship, and intellect seems incredulous. Yet, how else are we to interpret Harris? No doubt Yi-Fu Tuan had been formulating and sharing these ideas during his tenure at Toronto, and in January of 1971 he visited the department at Toronto to lecture on "Geography and Phenomenology." He further developed this theme at the Spring A.A.G. meeting in Boston. Nonetheless, later in 1971, Harris's article shared the same issue of the Canadian Geographer with Yi-Fu Tuan's impressive "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature" which provided a substantial antidote for the analogy.

The publication of Joe May's *Kant's Concept of Geography* assured the excellent vintage of the University of Toronto, 1970. We can reasonably imagine the ferment of those months being distilled down by Harris to the essence of "general uneasiness," but May's masterful contribution surely has made it more awkward for the "spatialist" geographers to ply their trade. He effectively exposes the illogicality of the relentless efforts to ground geography's independence in a spatialist.

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paradigm. For Harris, and others equally distressed by the philosophically uninformed scientism associated with the powerfully funded and administratively entrenched spatialist school, this was heady wine indeed. Harris poured on a generous libation of May wine in his "Theory and Synthesis . . ." article which provided the historical geographical mule with a hefty kick.

All Was Not Quiet on the Western Front

The West Coast was also in for its fair share of the soul-searching of 1970. Two SFU geographers, Michael E. Eliot Hurst and Ed Gibson were in California as visiting lecturers and both presented their colleagues with severe critiques of the discipline's direction. Eliot Hurst meticulously unpacked the structure of "establishment geography." The

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23 Typical of such scientism, and more particularly in Harris's own field, is Paul M. Koroscil, "Historical Geography: A Resurrection," The Journal of Geography, Vol. 70, No. 7 (October, 1971), pp. 415-20. Widening his scope to include "The Behavioural Environmental Approach," Area, Vol. 3, No. 2, 1971, pp. 96-99 Koroscil falls prey to the understandable but mistaken assumption that, "The philosophical basis of Gestalt psychology is phenomenology" (p. 96). This leads him to misinterpret the relationship of unconscious processes, Gestalt theory, and phenomenology. Compare the discussions of psychoanalysis, Gestalt psychology, and phenomenology in William A. Sadler, Existence and Love: A New Approach in Existential Phenomenology, New York, Charles Scribner's, 1969, especially p. 14 where he states that "... Gestalt psychology has tended to remain in a broad physicalist framework in which it originated."

24 Harris, op. cit., pp. 157-59.
sociology of knowledge approach he used suggested an unfortunate sequence of events was responsible for the firing of faculty, suppression of criticism, repression of publications, and the exploitation and frustration of graduate and undergraduate students which so demean the discipline. His disciplinary matrix identifies establishment mainliners of various ilk and marginals, and anti-establishment marginals. He suggested that the most radical and thorough critique really arises only in the "anti-establishment marginal" periphery. But perhaps Eliot Hurst doesn't drive his analysis deep enough. Because as long as the most outspoken establishment marginals and the most print-worthy anti-establishment marginals are professional geographers who have first paid their intellectual dues in the orthodox arena and then proclaimed conversion or evolution to critical stances, we should reserve judgment about the extent to which the discipline has been radicalized or even shaken. Analyses such as Eliot Hurst's should serve to caution us that, only when the critical literature is being primarily publically generated and institutionally taught by those who labored long in the wings at considerable professional cost will radicalism have arrived. Then will the cry of crisis be justified. Currently, the authentic role of most of those being proclaimed in print as "radical" is as mentors of a revolutionary thrust in geography, not as progenitors. The discipline's revolutionary theorists and the accompanying vanguard have not yet arrived. We might find them smouldering in the graduate ranks. But, if the existing mentors do not use their power (as administrators and/or

25 Eliot Hurst, op. cit.
grantsmen) and prestige (as previously accomplished orthodox practitioners) to admit, harbour, and nourish radically committed students in the very midst of the disciplinary matrix, the best we can expect is that the following assessment might one day soon characterize geographic discourse:

The alteration of language and viewpoint is not of course, universal, but it has at least ceased to be the monopoly of a very small group of dissidents. The more moderate views are now on the defensive; and if it is only radical rhetoric, rather than radical analysis, that now stands at center stage, that is still something of a momentous change.26

Eliot Hurst also exposed the discipline's morally and ethically impoverished posture of value-neutrality as the outcome of the intellectually incestuous relationship of scientism, positivism, and quantification. Appalled by this philosophical superficiality he suggests that, "Rather than being scientific, perhaps we should term geographers as merely technique-oriented."27 The mandate for such a debilitating methodological fixation is unquestionably Harvey's Explanation in Geography which he insisted was a "book concerned with methodology rather than with philosophy."28 Further, it was his contention, "that the adoption of a methodological position does not entail the adoption of a corresponding philosophical position."29 Ironically, his own book refuted this very


27 Eliot Hurst, op. cit., p. 43.

28 Harvey, op. cit., p. 6.

29 Ibid., p. 7.
contention. As Joe May pointed out:

Its whole line of argumentation rests upon a logical howler of the first order. Harvey attempts to draw an initial distinction between methodology and philosophy, and although he admits that any methodology is underlain by a philosophy, he dismisses the basic philosophical issue as irrelevant for his purposes; yet, he then proceeds to construct a so-called "methodology" along positivist philosophical lines. No justification for this doubtful procedure is ever offered, and so I regard the book as philosophically naive.30

With the decade barely begun already we have found: Harris locking horns with phenomenologists and with the purveyors of scientism; Eliot Hurst diagnosing the discipline's several pathologies; Joe May fundamentally shaping the philosophic discourse of geography, and in the process disemboweling the spatialists and positivists; storm warnings being posted; and a "radical" journal being published. But we will also find Ed Gibson breaking new ground and unearthing another layer for geographic examination.

Meaning?

Gibson, in another unpublished address,31 maintained that cultural geography fails to comprehend the human condition in an urban context because, "its starting point is the set of answers to questions raised from the geographical and social reality of nineteenth-century Germany."32 He was equally distressed that, "the mode of inquiry followed by social

30 Personal communication, Feb. 19, 1970.


32 Ibid., p. 1.
geography leads to theories about urban geography that are often meaningless to human experiences and biased towards the preservation of established urban groups.  

He warned that to "bypass the question of meaning—which is central to the behaviour of man—is to make a sham of the empiricism on which most current science is based." Here we find Gibson focusing on the second of Lowenthal's three realms in the universe of geographic study and enriching it immensely by specifying meaning as a proper subject for geographic inquiry.

Human geographic enquiry began the 60s by grappling with Lowenthal's suggestion that the study of the environmental perception process at the level of the individual decision maker would yield new insights regarding human spatial and environmental behaviour. Throughout the ensuing years the bulk of behavioural research in geography has employed perception models rooted in the stimulus-response effect propounded by


34 Ibid., p. 9.

35 "... the nature of the environment; what we think and feel about the environment; and how we behave in, and alter, that environment." From his introduction to David Lowenthal, ed., Environmental Perception and Behavior, University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No. 109, 1967, p. 1.

psychologists. This bias entails conceiving of the meaning-making or interpretive process as an intervening variable. Thus:

Interpretation is regarded as merely a link between a quantitative index representing human experience and one representing the geographical products of this experience. In these instances the concern is with two variables and not with what is between them.37

This analysis led to Gibson suggesting, in graduate seminars, that students anxious to investigate meaning formation in the symbolic landscape, but who were wary of the demands for "rigorous" analysis (a requirement inspired by the "quantitative revolution") should consider Osgoode's semantic differential and refinements of it.38

Less constrained by professional protocol and the prevailing methodological fetish, Gibson was already delving into the school of symbolic interactionism in sociology. He was quickly drawn to the work of Herbert Blumer and was prompt in reporting its potential to his West Coast colleagues.39 This new field was a most understandable and

37 Gibson, "Urban Geography . . .," op. cit., p. 10.


39 Gibson, "Urban Geography . . .," op. cit., drew their attention to Herbert Blumer, Symbolic Interactionism, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1969. "The interactionist assumes that humans are capable of making their own thoughts and activities objects of analysis. That is, persons routinely and habitually manipulate symbols and orient their actions toward other objects. . . . Yet humans possess the ability to self-consciously direct their own activities—-to break out of old routines and to construct new lines of action. The interaction process may thus be classified into those behaviours that are routinely organized and those that are actively constructed in a self-conscious and interpretive fashion. (Blumer, 1966: 537-538). Granted this assumption,
perceptive gravitation for Gibson. He realized geographers exploring the relationship between Lowenthal's second and third realms would simply "accept as understood that the interpretive or meaning process is central to human activities." \(^4^0\) This proclivity for relegating meaning to the status of an intervening variable would ensure that "Social geography only investigates human action and its geographic expression." \(^4^1\) The focus would fall on observable behaviour rather than the creation of meaning.

Gibson detected the necessary corrective in the development of phenomenological interactionism which is best exemplified by Blumer. Taking everyday life as the fundamental human and sociological (read geographical) reality, Blumer and his students are methodologically committed to "study the phenomena of everyday life on their own terms, or to make use only of methods of observation and analysis that retain the integrity of the phenomena." And, since they hold that "human actions are highly situational, and human actors act in accord with their

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construction of meanings for the concrete situations they face, they could never regard meaning as the indigestible meat in a stimulus-response sandwich.

Explorations

Gibson proposed that it is precisely because human geographers are so unclear about the mediating role of the meaning or interpretive process that they can convince themselves of its irrelevance in their enquiries. Ever mindful of Lowenthal's earlier insistence on the importance of personal geographies, they would concur that this process is undertaken by individuals and informal groups, but more importantly, also by more formal, public, or corporate institutions. Since individuals alone or as part of informal groups can assign such a vast range of meanings it could force the geographer into a virtually psychoanalytic mode of investigation. But, the formal, public, and corporate institutions aggregate into rational patterns and serve to regularize the assignment of meanings into legislation, economic doctrine, operating policy, etc. Therefore, in dealing at the more macro-levels, they feel justified in skirting the meaning process and attending only to observable behaviours and their impact in the environment. (We have already

42 Jack D. Douglas, "Understanding Everyday Life," in Douglas, op. cit., page 16. "There is a parallel but conflicting strain of interactionist thought: behavioral interactionism which shares with phenomenological interactionism the commitment to take everyday life as the human reality rather than as some abstract structure created by the sociologist, [but then] . . . immediately proceeds to impose ordering concepts and hypothetical forms of reasoning upon the everyday world, rather than seeking to describe and analyze the ordering concepts and forms of reasoning of the social actors," (p. 17).
seen that, at the micro-level, instead of ignoring the process, it is reduced to an intervening variable.)

Gibson's rejoinder suggested that although nineteenth-century urban societies might manifest stability at the macro/formal level, it is change which characterizes contemporary urban society. Thus, "the geographical effects of actions to which standardized meanings can be assigned are few." In such periods of rapid and accelerating change people repeatedly face new and shifting milieux and the necessity of ever assigning new meanings which might stabilize in some situations but generally will vary in differing social situations. Gibson contended that, "While the process of interpretation does not order the entire creation of geographical formations, it is the chief process by which man has related to his urban environment until now."44

Attuned, as always, to sociology Gibson coincided with Douglas who saw that:

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43 Gibson, "Urban Geography . . .," op. cit., p. 9.

44 *Loc. cit.* Compare: "Man's environment does not consist of objects that carry intrinsic meaning. Social objects are constructs and not 'self-existing entities with intrinsic natures.' (Blumer, 1966:539). An object is 'anything toward which action can be organized and it may be as physical as a chair or imaginary as a ghost.' (Blumer, 1966:539) Objects consist of any event that persons can designate in a unitary fashion and organize action toward. The meaning of an object resides in the meanings that are brought to it and hence must be located in the interaction process. As indicated, the meaning of a class of objects often becomes stabilized and perhaps even written into custom and tradition. Legal codes and etiquette are two examples. Frequently, however, meaning must be worked out and negotiated for organized joint action. At this point the distinctive nature of the human is brought forth and displayed in the interpretive process of self-directed action." Denzin, *op. cit.*, p. 261 (His references to Blumer are from Blumer, "Sociological Implications . . .," *op. cit.*).
However much some sociologists today may be constrained in their thinking by the tatters and remnants of nineteenth-century positivism, there is no doubt that almost all of them agree that social actions are meaningful actions, that is, that they must be studied and explained in terms of their situations and their meanings to the actors themselves.45

Certain of the eventual impact of this development on geographic study he has kept his attention on a broad spectrum of related research interests. Already familiar with Max Weber, he has extended his reading in, and application of, verstehen (which he earlier referred to as "the method of discovering common-sense meaning").46 Building also on an appreciation of Husserl's contribution of the concept of the Lebenswelt,47 and of the many theoreticians who have since pursued this focus, Gibson has also been examining the works of Alfred Schutz (Schütz, Schuetz).48

45 Douglas, op. cit., p. 4.

46 Gibson, "Landscape Aesthetics . . .," p. 7. For an extended discussion of Verstehen see Maurice Natanson, "A Study in Philosophy and the Social Sciences," in his Literature, Philosophy and the Social Sciences, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1962, pp. 161-65. Natanson makes particular reference to the argument by Alfred Schutz that verstehen has at least three different levels of application: "as the experiential form of common-sense knowledge of human affairs . . . as an epistemological problem, and . . . as a method peculiar to the social sciences." (Schutz, cited on p. 161.)

47 See, for example, Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2nd ed., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, (Vol. 1), pp. 159-62, who in assessment of Husserl, suggests that: "Thus, a life-world is to be conceived as an oriented world with an experiencing self at its center, designated as such by personal pronouns. Around this pole the world is structured by such peculiar patterns as 'near' and 'far', as 'home ground' (Heimat) and 'foreign ground' (Fremde). Its spatial frame of reference is experienced as stationary, contrary to the scientific concept of the Copernican universe" (p. 162).

48 Personal communication.
Further, he has drawn from the writings of Max Scheler, Henri Bergson, William James, and George Herbert Mead. It was Schutz who began to see the fruitful connection in the work of Max Weber, Husserl, Bergson, Scheler, James, Mead, and others (e.g. Sartre). It should be kept in mind that, until the emergence of Martin Heidegger, that Scheler was second only to Husserl in phenomenological circles. It was Scheler's conviction that the crises of the twentieth-century were, and were to become even more so, social and economic, and he consequently maintained a persistent interest in sociology. 49

What is now needed is an additional essay analysing the applicability to geographic enquiry, of: the creative syntheses of Schutz; the analyses of the sociologically obsessed phenomenologist Scheler; the "intuitionism" of Henri Bergson (and its direct impact on geographic thought, e.g. on Jean Brunhes); 50 and especially of the insights of George Herbert Mead. 51

49 Ibid., p. 231.

50 Anne Buttimer, Society and Milieu in the French Geographic Tradition, American Association of Geographers Monograph No. 6, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1971, pp. 59-60 briefly mentions Brunhes' association with Bergson.

51 Mead played a formative role in both the conflict and interactionist schools of sociology, as well as proposing an outline of the development of scientific thought that would provide geographers with a stimulating break from the overly-quoted Kuhn. See, Douglas, op. cit., pp. 16-19 and Denzin, op. cit., pp. 264-65.

Gibson has already examined the work of Lewis and Coser and its applicability to "The Conflict Paradigm in Geography," in an unpub. paper read to the Department of Geography Seminar, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, February, 1968.
Before concluding this discussion of the geographic significance of meaning, let us examine more closely the concept of the \textit{Lebenswelt}, and the debate over the proper analysis of meaning, both in philosophy proper and in sister social sciences. We should expect geographers to display, in the next few years, an interest in the ideas of Eugene T. Gendlin and John Wild. Gendlin's \textit{Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning} accepts the necessity of fitting concepts to human experience and proposes to achieve this by a blend of:

Logical positivism and existentialism [which] can be advanced, not by changing either, but by adding a missing systematic piece between them . . . . the relationship between symbolizing and preconceptual experiencing. In this relationship meaning is formed, and hence we must inquire into the function of experience and of symbols in the formation of meaning.\footnote{New York, Free Press, 1962, p. vii. It is worth noting that: "A particularly important aspect of Scheler's phenomenological experience is its de-symbolizing quality, i.e., its role as a guide away from symbolizing thought to the symbolized self-given phenomenon. In contrast to symbol-dependent enterprises such as science, Scheler conceived of phenomenology as the concerted effort to go from the symbols back to the things, from a conceptual science and a civilization contented with symbols to intuitively experienced life. In this he sympathized particularly with Bergson and dissented from a conception like that of Ernst Cassirer, who saw in man primarily the symbolic animal. For Scheler this was a one-sided interpretation of man. The danger of symbolism lay in the tendency of symbols to displace and to conceal the phenomena." Spiegelberg, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 241-42.}

Those geographers less locked into positivistic philosophy and more aware of analytic philosophy (linguistic analysis) might well seek support in John Wild's claim that the \textit{Lebenswelt} of phenomenological analysis is really the same world as the world of "ordinary language"
which increasingly engages British and American philosophers. Thus, Wild construes Husserl's conception of the Lebenswelt as the key concept in a new philosophy which merges phenomenology and analytical philosophy. Wild's avowed anti-Marxism will attract those geographers who resent the push for epistemological change coming so strongly from the left.

Gibson's intellectual labors are sustained by the conviction that:

To survive, geography must fit the empirical realities of the human condition. Urban geography must be a geography of human experience.

Confusions and Doubts

Of course, other avenues of inquiry were being explored in different quarters in 1970. Whereas Canadian geography departments displayed


54 "We find ourselves engaged in what is primarily an ideological war against a formidable enemy, well equipped not only with physical weapons but with ideological armament as well. Their ideas are not a mere jumble. They are ordered into a systematic philosophy, a coherent whole technically known as dialectical materialism, one of the great world philosophies which has drawn from the deepest spring of modern reflection," John Wild, The Challenge of Existentialism, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1955, p. 5.

remarkable critical and philosophic potential, their American counterparts evinced considerably less promise. For example, Clark University (birthplace of *Antipode*) demonstrably failed to set the standard for dissent and redirection. Dan Amaral and Ben Wisner were at Clark and were involved in *Antipode*. Their concerns were not unlike Gibson's but their proposal contrasted markedly both in intent and in competence. The remainder of this chapter will support this contention with reference to some of the material published in the August edition of *Antipode* which editor Ben Wisner devoted to discussions of "radical methodology."\(^{56}\)

Particularly uninspired was Ronald J. Horvath's "On the Relevance of Participant Observations."\(^{57}\) Implying that geographers have not

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\(^{56}\) That same month Wisner circulated his own discussion paper for the San Francisco A.A.G. annual meeting: "Protogeography: Search For the Beginnings," in which, according to the abstract: "A search is begun for the original forms, essential structure, and causes of human symbolization of man-environment relations and integrations of the knowledge of place. A framework is proposed within which further search might proceed after the temporally or logically prior properties of environment, culture, and mind which underlie protogeographic experience and behavior. Several methodological problems are explored, including the application of phenomenology to the search. Finally, a connection is made between protogeography and the problem of understanding and surviving modern technology." Because the paper does not expand upon these points very clearly it is difficult to assess it, therefore, I have excluded it from the review proper. Beginning with Cassirer's view of man as "homo symbolicus," he proceeds to incorporate a considerable number of paradigms instead, ranging from Piaget and Chomsky through Lévi-Strauss to Schutz and even Jung, with large doses of geology, archaeology, and ethology included. Aware of the "many dangers inherent in such a cross-disciplinary or comparative method" he implies the need for "... the provision of a set of rules for combining and weighting the inputs from sciences with different assumptions and methods" (mimeo, pp. 7-8). The reader will no doubt have a position on the advisability of such an undertaking.

fully understood, nor really employed, he suggested that it would serve geographers in their shift from "reading the landscape" to obtaining data from people. Apparently, using the technique will mean fully involving the academic in the social world, since, in order to:

. . . meet the requirements of participant observation in the purest form—that the research behavior should not influence that reality being observed—it follows that one should be totally involved and completely committed to the place being studied.59

That Horvath is most unclear about the principles and operations of science, to which he appealed in justifying the "subjectivity" of participant observation is demonstrated in the articles by Relph, and by Amaral and Wisner. Relph is disturbed by, among other points, Horvath's attempt to justify a subjective technique in terms of natural science. "In phenomenology this would be unthinkable." Amaral and Wisner scrutinized Horvath's notion of meaningful involvement via participant-observation, both in terms of science (especially the

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58 "The message of the paper is intended to be more than just the announcement of another technique . . ." Ibid., p. 35.

59 Loc. cit.


62 Relph, op. cit., 39.
implications of the "uncertainty principle") and phenomenology, and found him wanting (to the extent of offering "condolences for his unfortunate shipwreck").

Disturbed by the implication of an observer in participant-observation as an explicit denial of phenomenological engagement with the subject, Amaral and Wisner recast the technique as "participant-experience." This curiously redundantly worded label, from a phenomenological perspective, was designed to extend the participant's role from that of observing behavior to experiencing values, intentions, hopes, daydreams, etc. There seems little point, however, in trying to rehabilitate a technique which entails premises fundamentally in conflict with a phenomenological focus on the Lebenswelt. Either one is committed to experiencing (in the phenomenological sense proposed by Amaral and Wisner) all phenomena in their concretely given daily existence, or, one accedes to the positivistically premised restriction of observing "behavior". The observation-statements (facts) recorded by the participant-observer are theory-laden (and collected with an eye to the eventual test of correspondence with theories, or hypotheses, either extant or to be reformulated). Thus they are incompatible with phenomenological evidence gathered in conjunction with scrupulous attention being paid to recognizing presuppositions as pre-suppositions.

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63 Amaral and Wisner, op. cit., p. 43.

64 Ibid., p. 46.
and eliminating their effect in the enquiry enterprise. 65

We are told that the mandate for transcending the inherent contradiction (observing vs. experiencing) is the creation of a hybrid science along the lines proposed by Wisner at San Francisco. 66

Maurice Natanson has characterized a considerably more astute attempt (Wild's proposed convergence of phenomenology and linguistic analysis) as, "the inevitable triumph of an eclecticism which is determined at all costs to award everybody prizes." 67

We should enjoin Amaral and Wisner in their "celebration of human meaning and advocacy of plans which increase human dignity," and concur that, indeed, these would be "facilitated by a non-manipulative social

65 Often it is those who fail to examine their own assumptions (e.g. those premises fundamental to a belief in "scientific objectivity") who also scoff at Husserl's aim of establishing a "presuppositionless" philosophy. However: "A presuppositionless philosophy does not mean a philosophy without presuppositions; instead, what is involved is a philosophy which attends phenomenologically to any commitment, however profound and primal, which may be delineated in its own procedure. Presuppositions are rendered explicit through phenomenological inspection and so neutralized to whatever extent neutralization is possible in rational operations." Natanson, op. cit., p. 11. Thus the phenomenologists insist on no unexamined assumptions in our inquiries. We are required to put our assumption cards on the table, so to speak, and continuously monitor our impressions for distortions invoked by them. Amaral and Wisner evidently hold the unexamined presupposition that presuppositions don't count for much, and thus profound paradigmatic discord and negation give way to synthesis or to a kind of conceptual tandem harness all too cleanly.

66 Amaral and Wisner refer their readers to Wisner's "Protogeography" paper.

67 Natanson, op. cit., p. 41.
science grounded in phenomenology. Yet, we should be very cautious about endorsing their over-riding conception of a hybrid science of experience and behaviour, even though they qualify that proposal to the extent of giving "primary emphasis" to experience rather than to observation of behaviour.

Amaral and Wisner seem to teeter between Tymieniecka's version of phenomenology and Farber's methodological pluralism. I.M. Bochenski, in his introduction to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka's book claims that it attempts "to show how phenomenology outlines a scheme of universal inquiry which empirical and deductive methods find their proper place and can co-operate toward a complete world view." Tymieniecka tells us that:

Phenomenology intends to provide a methodological basis for all fields of inquiry, a basis which satisfies the criteria of precision and verifiability. On phenomenological grounds new dimensions of human life are recognized as autonomous, many rejected factors of cognition are reinstated, new data are taken into account, and a new basis of cognitive evaluation is established.

Amaral and Wisner seem to share Tymieniecka's interest in Husserl's search for a rigorous method to unify all the sciences at the level of

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68 Amaral and Wisner, *op. cit.*, p. 48. We are left to wonder if they support revolutions which increase human dignity, or simply view the geographer's proper social role as that of "advocate" (suggesting institutional reform and piecemeal social engineering). They even refer to "clients" on the same page.

69 *Loc. cit.* (emphasis added).


their "presuppositionless" foundations and his insistence on the admis-
sibility of all events of cognition. Their fascination with a geographic
application of Husserlian methodology is understandable enough. With
Husserl posited as the necessary methodological antithesis to Harvey's
thesis the inevitable synthesis is to be a synthesis, a hybrid meta-
method. But they have not articulated their awareness of what Tymieniecka
refers to as "the pivotal point of Husserl's foundation of phenomenology,"
intentionality. 73 Furthermore, their position is not distinguished by
the continental scholarship Tymieniecka exhibits by also drawing on the
basic tenets of existentialism. She blends Husserlian ambitions and
insights into the new dimension of human life, *Existenz*, (which
Karl Jaspers explored so meticulously) with "Martin Heidegger's non-
physicalistic conception of the world . . . in which the pivotal
concepts of space and time are understood in terms of intentional
phenomena." 74 Part Two of this thesis will pursue this further since
it is devoted to an explication of the relevance of Heidegger's philosophy
to human geography.

Amaral and Wisner also appear to parallel American philosopher
Martin Farber's unrelenting plea for a plurality of methods. He suspects
that Husserl and Scheler are opposed to science and characterizes
phenomenology as subjectivist. This subjectivism is opposed to
naturalistic objectivism which distinguishes naturalists, pragmatists,
realists, and positivists. Farber insists that phenomenology, left to

addresses himself to this concept," p. 194.

74 Tymieniecka, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.
itself, lapses into idealist entanglements and he proposes grounding all methods in a "new materialism." For him, phenomenology is but a stage within the vision of a complete process of reflection, and: "One should only decide on the basis of concrete studies whether it has anything to contribute as a supplement to the objectivistic approach of the natural and cultural sciences." Amaral and Wisner do not clarify how their attempt to ground social science in phenomenology is radically different from Farber's methodological pluralism. Either they view phenomenology as a method among methods (Farber) and thus in need of grounding (in a "new materialism?"); as the method of rigorous inquiry (a Husserlian spin off); as a grounding philosophical position (an existential "stance"); or as both a method and a paradigm. Their answer is not apparent.

It is just such conceptual obfuscation that invokes caution. They wish to celebrate meaning, yet they counsel combining methodological and philosophical approaches to meaning which deny one another. This is symptomatic of geographers' eclectic courtship of philosophical postures.

Geographers have been flagrantly negligent about specifying the terms and premises they are incorporating from philosophical discourse. For example, positivism, neo-positivism, logical positivism, logical empiricism, empiricism, are used interchangeably or the term chosen is

never defined. Similarly, pragmatism, materialism, dialectics, and
dialectical materialism are ambiguously employed. Analytical
philosophy, symbolic logic, and linguistic analysis are virtually unused
terms. Even more disturbing is the willingness of the discipline to
adopt Harvey's text as a seminal statement of scientific philosophy and
method. It is simply the explication of a narrow, contested, and all
but abandoned conception of the philosophy of science, namely "logical
positivism." He ignored countervailing views (especially the work of
Paul Feyerabend and Michael Scriven) and the prevailing philosophic view
of linguistic analysis. Harvey was apparently ignorant of the contribu-
tion of Wittgenstein to both logical positivism and linguistic
analysis. The implications of this in terms of Harvey's text are
brought to the fore when we realize that:

76For a stimulating critique see: David H. De Grood, Dale Riepe,
and John Somerville, eds., Radical Currents in Contemporary Philosophy,
St. Louis, Warren H. Green, 1971, esp. Riepe's "Critique of Idealistic
Naturalism: Methodological Pollution in the Main Stream of American
Philosophy," pp. 5-22. Geographers with a Marxist bent will relish
this reader.

77The literature by, and on, Wittgenstein is too vast to indicate
general references, but in terms of the discussion at issue here see:
Cornelis A. van Peursen, op. cit., Ch. 9, "From Logical Positivism to
Analytical Philosophy: The Uses of Language," pp. 131-45, and Jerry Gill,

Joe May succinctly dealt with the implications of Wittgenstein's
thought for geographic explanation as a guest lecturer at UBC, Spring, 1970.
At SFU Philip Wagner has been reading Wittgenstein and predicting his
arrival in geographic discourse whilst imploring his students to avail
themselves of Wittgenstein. In effect, he is pointing students towards
"ordinary language analysis" as a basis for approaching everyday experi-
ence. This is consistent with his skepticism of the phenomenological
method.
Both Wittgenstein and Moore were troubled with the thought that philosophers were attempting to say the "unsayable"... Such considerations as this moved Logical Positivism into the area of Analytic Philosophy, with its emphasis on language clarification; and gave birth to Operationalism, with its insistence upon operational definitions; and later prompted the Vienna School to equate philosophy with methodology, which drifted into the methodology of radical Scientism, the belief that the scientific method alone issues in validity.78

Students relying on Harvey's text would not have an inkling that linguistic analysis stands at center stage in Anglo-American philosophy and philosophy of science. They would be even less aware that phenomenology is the countervailing view.79 Perhaps just the barest hint of these situations can be found in Peter Hagget's new introductory text, Geography: A Modern Synthesis where he admits, in the briefest of asides, that phenomenology, is an extreme position in geographic enquiry and that the other extreme, positivism is being criticized.80 Contemporary graduate training in geography seems to condemn its apprentices to the philosophic poorhouse.

The conceptual confusion and uncertainty, characteristic of contemporary geography, plague Amaral and Wisner. It was precisely because such positivistic methods of inquiry as participant observation were so


inadequate in dealing with meaning that symbolic interactionism came to prominence in sociology. Cornelis A. van Peursen found it necessary to devote two chapters to: "Phenomenology and the Problem of Meaning," and "Logical Positivism and the Problem of Meaning." Amaral and Wisner wanted to "celebrate meaning" but were unsure about where to hold the party, in phenomenology's house or that of positivism. They decided to build a breezeway between the two. We can appreciate their reluctance to abandon positivism's place, because the house rules pertaining to meaning are clearly posted there:

In sum, the general features of the positivistic position are
(1) that meaning is tied to method of confirmation [that] is . . . if confirmation or disconfirmation is not possible, then the sentence is meaningless,* . . . (2) that confirmation is ultimately based on the "observable characteristics of physical objects," and (3) that a proposition to be confirmable and consequently meaningful, must be capable of precise and preferably measurable formulation.82

Accepting these rules for meaning closes the door to phenomenology. Even allowing for Husserl's appreciation of a primal form of positivism,83

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81 van Peursen, op. cit., pp. 29-43, 57-72.


*This meaning criterion is often referred to as the "principle of verification" or the "empiricist criterion of cognitive significance." "Due to internal difficulties, the meaning criterion has gone through a number of evolutionary developments. Probably its most sophisticated version is the position that a sentence is meaningful only if it can be translated into an artificial or well-formed language whose vocabulary consists solely of the observable characteristics of physical objects," p. 434.

83 Especially that identified with Mach who Husserl felt had paved the way for phenomenology through "analysis of sensations." "The central point of Positivism is the emphasis on the given in the interpretation
the treatment of meaning has set positivism, in all its evolutionary stages and deviations, apart from phenomenology:

Analysis has been carried in a widely different direction by the modern Neo-Positivists and is, of course, to be sharply distinguished from the phenomenological analysis. Neo-positivism, or logical positivism, in common with positivism of the original type, seeks to interpret the world in terms of perceptible elements of sense-data; but the approach is through logical analysis of language--forms of propositions through which we express our knowledge of the world. The task of philosophy, according to this school, lies not in the discovery of any new kind of facts, but in the clarification of propositions and their relations in language. Thus positivistic analysis is concerned with finding equivalent expressions, but with simpler structure.

The logical-positivist program of analysis is thus concerned only with the logical structure of language rather than with the meant content. Phenomenological analysis, on the other hand, is not, as such, concerned with linguistic expressions, but with the phenomena within the region of immanent experience meant by such expressions. It undertakes to trace the elements and structure of the phenomena obtained through phenomenological intuiting.84

Thus, in simpler terms, the logical positivist seeks to make meaningful statements about the world (of observables), and the phenomenologist seeks the meaningfulness of the world.

of knowledge. All knowledge, according to positivistic philosophy in general, is to be based on the sense-given as the real source of knowledge. Positivism thus tends to be a philosophy of the given which seeks to base all systems of knowledge, free from ideal presuppositions, on the 'positive', i.e., on what is actually and originally given. In this sense, Husserl claims, phenomenology is genuine positivism . . . . Phenomenology does not agree with the positivists in restricting givenness to particular experience only and rejecting the possibility of an intuiting of general essences and relations. According to Husserl's observation, the positivists are prejudiced in not accepting anything other than particular data, and especially sense-data." In D. Sinha, "Phenomenology and Positivism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 22, No. 4 (June, 1963), pp. 562-63.

84 Ibid., p. 572.
This now gives us a clearer idea of the hollowness of Amaral and Wisner's celebration of meaning. Could it have been otherwise? Let us assume positivism's house burned down and was replaced with a more modern structure. In other words, let us ascribe to Amaral and Wisner a linguistic analytic, or better yet, ordinary language analysis philosophic basis for their appreciation of scientific methodology (an allowance not earned by their article). The celebration would still be hollow if they held it in the breezeway, that is, if they persisted in synthesizing rather than choosing. Because:

The principal difference lies in the fact that for language analysts language seems to be a *repositum* of meaning, whereas for the phenomenological analysis, language is treated as *revelatory* of meaning. Again, linguistic analysis seems more concerned with the propriety of rules of language which will permit language itself to be talked about as a relatively stable object, a sort of supreme court of meaning beyond which no appeal can be made, whereas phenomenologists seem to be more interested in the role of language as making the dimensions of inter-personal relations and the reflexive functions of introspection available for understanding and exploration.  

and

The analytic philosopher is primarily an observer; he shares with the natural scientist a professional distrust of first-person reports. And to the extent that he is true to this orientation, he adopts a view of mind which is necessarily antagonistic to phenomenology. Behaviorism and phenomenology are irreconcilable terms.

So we see that even if we enabled Amaral and Wisner to justify their synthesis into a hybrid science of experience and behaviour on

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86 Natanson, op. cit., p. 41.
the premise of a convergence of the world of ordinary language and the Lebenswelt (i.e. to join the new house we have given them, to phenomenology's), they would still have to resolve the issue of meaning. The celebration is still in difficulty. Why? It seems they have virtually ignored intentionality. Why is this a serious oversight? Because, what essentially distinguishes ordinary language analysis from phenomenology is "that intentionality is missing from the analyst's scheme of consciousness and that as a consequence a completely different conception of meaning arises for both camps."\(^{87}\) Since their explication of intentionality is relegated footnote status, and since the concept is not invoked in their celebration of meaning, Amaral and Wisner fail in their synthesis. This is especially interesting because the footnote begins by stating that Husserl's "discovery was that the essence of consciousness is intentionality."\(^{88}\) Thus it seems fair to conclude that they are either unaware of, or avoiding mentioning, the implications of Husserl's discovery for approaching meaning.

We might be tempted to set Amaral and Wisner aside at this point, but there is still another issue to be examined. Hidden away in that same footnote is the keystone in Amaral and Wisner's structure. Their footnote reference to intentionality is actually a quote from Peter Koestenbaum. His chief accomplishment is the construction of a method which constitutes "a blend of the empirically oriented insight

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\(^{87}\) \textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.

\(^{88}\) Amaral and Wisner, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 51, quoting Peter Koestenbaum discussing Husserl.
of pragmatism, logical positivism, and phenomenology." He claims that, "With such a 'hybrid' or 'aufgehobene' methodology, new life can be injected into the entire province and history of philosophy." He proposes to:

- retain the positivist meaning criterion and its correlative conception of science but that we expand the meaning of data. A sentence is still to be considered meaningful by reducing it to those experiences or operations that will confirm or disconfirm it. These experiences and operations, however, rather than being restricted to sense data or the observable properties of physical objects, must include the more vague experiences of individuality, freedom, and Existenz suggested above, as well as some of the other themes brought to the articulate surface by recent phenomenological researchers.

But, if Koestenbaum understands Husserl's discovery of intentionality as the essence of consciousness why has he failed to incorporate that insight in his hybrid method? Aside from avoiding discussion of intentionality (let alone its implications for meaning), this failure is never more patent than when he suggests that, "It is as empirical to consider the experiences of time, mood, and intentionality as observable characteristics, as it is to consider color, shape, and weight as observables." It is twisting Husserl too far to equate intentionality with the conscious experience of a mood or time; and it is misrepresenting Husserl altogether to say that intentionality is the same as the mere perception of color or shape. But Koestenbaum surely relies on these distortions in order to extend the positivistic conception of protocols to include phenomenological techniques, e.g. *eopoche*, and

*which, of course, entails modifying the concept of observable data.


90 Loc. cit.
thereby claim that, "the positivistic meaning criterion coincides with the phenomenological conception of meaning." To maintain his argument he must ignore, or remain unaware of, the crucial aspect of intentionality. That:

- the entire phenomenological conception of meaning is generated out of and sustained by its special treatment of the stream of consciousness. The primary locus of meaning is not the linguistic instrument which is the vehicle for the expression of meaning but rather the activity of an intentional consciousness in whose dynamic operation unities are constituted. Even before the predications expressed in linguistic form are possible or given, there is a pre-predicative range of experience within which unities of meaning are primordially grasped.

Thus we hardly need be surprised to find Amaral and Wisner proposing a Koestenbaum derivative as the new direction for geographic methodology.

The closing months of the 60s and the initial year of the 70s were indeed days of "general uneasiness about the orientation of geography today." The beginning of the decade disclosed the depth and breadth of critical scholarship possible in the discipline. Some of the difficulties that can engulf geographers, however sincere their intentions, have been revealed. The promise of this first year paled in the next. Not unexpectedly, 1971 was to be a year for rhetoric and retrenchment. The level of discourse swiftly degenerated once establishment geography began to wrestle with the task of re-aligning itself. Consequently, the criticism we can engage in will seem shallow in comparison with that warranted by the preceding material.

\[^91\text{Ibid.}, \text{p. 435.}\]
\[^92\text{Natanson, op. cit., p. 40.}\]
CHAPTER TWO

1971

West By North-West

The spring of 1971 found the academic endeavours emanating from Clark and allied American departments being brought west by Roger Kasperson in his keynote address to the Western Division of the Canadian Association of Geographers annual meeting held at UBC.¹ According to Kasperson, geography was revolutionized by behaviouralism,² and as this paradigm stultifies into the new orthodoxy it will be challenged (Kuhnian process implied) by "The New Men." These counter-culturally inspired agitators "have one common denominator—they reject the notion of a value-free science" and "see themselves as whole men, not compartmentalized into private citizen, geographer, teacher, etc." They will see to it that "the geography of the 1970s will be a geography of humanism and values."³ The direct outcome of this shift will come in terms of the selection of problems for research and pedagogy. Kasperson nominated no less a "geographic graybeard" than Gilbert White,


² Which Kasperson referred to as: "the bastard child of behavioralist psychology and logical positivism," ibid., p. 7.

as a model for this selection process. He quoted from White's 1970 AAG address "Geography and Public Policy:

Speaking only as one individual, I feel strongly that I should not go into research unless it promises results that would advance the aims of the people affected and unless I am prepared to take all practicable steps to help translate the results into action.4

We might be tempted to wonder if, when White speaks of advancing the aims of the people affected, he anticipates himself being among the affected? And, we can only trust that he means the definition of aims, and choices of strategies to advance them, are the people's not his. As to the extent of personal action encompassed in White's reference to "practicable steps," we can only speculate, but it would doubtless be less than what American revolutionary Angela Davis saw as necessary.

Predicting increasing reliance on "Methodologies of engagement with the subject" (and citing Amaral and Wisner's paper as exemplary), Kasperson concluded with a brief mention of phenomenology. He made a strong statement about the discipline's ability to describe and perhaps explain events without ever feeling them. He suggested examining verstehen in this regard. But no hint of the applicability of Marxist analysis can be discerned in his remarks. This is a peculiar omission since he despaired of the discipline's preoccupation with abstracted empiricism which "provide little or no direction or strategy for change."

It is worth noting that he cited Daniel Bell as support for this contention.5 Reliance on Bell's anti-Marxist analysis would certainly explain


5Kasperson, op. cit., p. 9.
Kasperson's apparent failure to recognize the Marxist solution to his concerns about geography's abstracted empiricism. What is it that he has missed? Essentially, that Marxist theory is "interested" theory. That is, it projects a possibility, and a plan of action to achieve it, out of analysis of the contradictions inherent in the system. If Kasperson is hesitant about investigating the Marxist-Leninist solution to his concern, he might find some of the more phenomenological analysts associated with the Marxist based "Frankfurt School" (e.g. Marcuse) useful allies in overturning geography's acquiescence to the status quo.6

At the same meeting, John Chapman, head of the department of geography at UBC, asked "Relevance to What?" and undertook "A review of Some Contemporary Forces For Change and Their Impact Upon Geography."7 Striking a cogent argument, he managed to transmute the issue of relevance. Underlying his comments was an unmistakeable conservative tone, a sort of--let us not be stampeded, let us step back and take a disciplined look at things, attitude. He was on solid ground in his insistence on "scholarship and substantiation."8 Likewise, in his view that "the

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7 In Leigh, op. cit., pp. 21-31.

8 "... 'hot issues' and the necessity of becoming action-oriented should not be influential unless and until they are presented in a scholarly and substantive form, and their effectiveness is demonstrated not asserted." Ibid., p. 26.
most influential forces of change will be those arising from increasing philosophical awareness and changing philosophical postures followed by generally increased methodological explicitness coupled to a willingness to adopt carefully selected methodological innovations. But, by confining himself to discussing relevance only in terms of what will further define and enhance the scholarly status of the discipline he neatly sidesteps the very concerns which raised the question of relevance. It is rather like counselling one's colleagues to keep a taut ship when the ambient social sea, which for so long bouyed up the craft, has suddenly become an ocean of existential acid eating away the hull. Therefore, we might suggest that a more meaningful reply to the concern about relevance would address itself to the question, "Relevance to Whom?"

Boston or Bust!

At the Boston AAG meeting a month later social accountability appeared to be edging toward center stage as the issue facing professional geographers in this decade. Special sessions had been arranged, for example, one by Dick Peet of Clark on "Geographical aspects of American poverty and social well-being." For most, participation in such sessions simply meant changing the object of inquiry without adjusting or exchanging methodological lenses. Consider, "The spatial distribution of low-wage industries" by Ernest Wohlenberg, or "Mobility patterns of the hard core unemployed in Indianapolis" by Shane Davies and

\[^9\text{Loc. cit. (emphasis added).}\]
Melvin Albaum. Some participants had sensed the necessity of penetrating below such descriptive exercises into the social fabric itself. For example, David Harvey's "Social justice in spatial systems." Other sessions were set up to grapple with such topics as: "The socially responsible geographer: problems and strategies," and "Environment and Public Policy."

To more fully sense the tenor of this meeting it will be instructive to retrace an aspect of Wilbur Zelinsky's activities prior to convening at Boston. At about the same time (late summer, 1970), as the editors of Antipode were calling for submissions to an alternative Proceedings for the 1971 AAG meeting, Zelinsky was scouting out support for a special workshop at Boston. Initially, he enlisted the aid of Chris Taylor (University of Toronto graduate student) and Gilbert White in designing and organizing the session. In a letter inviting Taylor's participation Zelinsky stressed that the special session should be one "at which those of our ilk can seriously discuss strategy for research, teaching and action concerning the basic ecological-demographic-technological problems of our transitional

10 Though never published, it was to be titled: "Studies in Survival and Radical Geography." It was announced that, as an alternative to the AAG's Proceedings, "We want to print alternatives—the people's geography, survival geography, humanistic (lovin') geography, radical geography. Non-geographers, non-AAG members, workers in all disciplines are therefore invited to submit contributions." Antipode, Vol. 2, No. 1 (August, 1970), p. 3.

11 From correspondence between Zelinsky and Taylor, Aug. 27, Sept. 10, and Oct. 3, 1970, and from photocopies of correspondence between White and Zelinsky Oct. 3 and 12, 1970. Eventually disillusioned by the outcome of his series of efforts to work with just such established geographer, Taylor recently turned over his SERGE correspondence to me for use in researching this thesis.
society." (Which he considered to be "fundamentally theological and political" problems.) He further stressed that he should "like to aim at fundamental issues rather than be diverted by the agonizing immediate issues of social injustice, racism, urbanoid rot, or the 1970 or 1972 elections, difficult though this might be to do."\(^{12}\) But when it came to publically soliciting support for the session Zelinsky was not willing to be so specific about what agonies he considered diversions. In a rough draft of a news release for the AAG Newsletter Zelinsky couched his concerns quite differently: "The emphasis will be upon the basic and general, not upon the particular or ephemral. To use a crude analogy, we wish to draft plans for a Geographic Fire Department; we shall not worry at the moment about dousing any specific blaze."\(^{13}\) To these ends, Zelinsky sought to forge the "SERGE movement."\(^{14}\) Evidently, the discipline would not have to fret about Zelinsky and his cohorts kindling any revolutions at Boston.

**Business as Usual**

Concern for social accountability was even on the agenda for the AAG Business Meeting at Boston. A resolution calling for an end to American involvement in Indo-China passed, but another calling for the release of Angela Davis failed to get a majority. An inquiry into the status of women in the profession was initiated; student representation


\(^{13}\) Enclosed in letters to White and Taylor Oct. 3, 1970.

\(^{14}\) Socially and Ecologically Responsible Geographers.
on Council was supported; and minority group geographers were invited
to participate more fully in the future work of the association. Where-
as just two years earlier Bunge and his comrades found it necessary to
"storm" the 1969 Ann Arbor AAG meeting in order to confront colleagues
with urgent social issues, 1971 found such issues being deliberated
upon in the Business Meeting. Outrage to legitimation in only two years!

Co-optation eliminated the possibility of meaningful confrontation.
"Marginals" could consolidate their position (and worry less about losing
their jobs) because the initiative was being seized by important "main-
liners." For example, Zelinsky would attend to the greening of
geography—a new growing edge for research and publication had been
defined, but most of the "greening" would be in terms of increased grants.
Since the bulk of such monies would be government funds, any turning to
Marxist analysis would impede grantmanship. American socio-political
and economic reality was not ignored by the geographers assembled. The
defeat of the Davis resolution and the paucity of Marxist analyses
indicated the kind of social accountability geographers were striving
for.

Happenings

Yi-Fu Tuan's pronouncements on phenomenology and geography
baffled many at Boston, impressed most, provoked a few, and reassured a
handful. Given Yi-Fu Tuan's status, it would seem reasonable to expect
that phenomenology was now assured of at least a footnote in future
writings concerned with methodology and philosophy. Legitimation was
proceeding apace on several fronts. (Comment on Yi-Fu Tuan's 1971
published version, and more on the Cole Harris article of that same year, will be introduced in Chapter 5.)

Michael E. Eliot Hurst was also at Boston. Using a multi-media format to present "Now That the Buffalo Are Gone . . .," he berated his colleagues for denying the geography of North American native peoples. He singled out Canada: A Geographical Interpretation, edited by John Warkentin, as an appalling example. Published under the auspices of the Canadian Association of Geographers to celebrate the centennial of Canadian confederation, this volume of more than 600 pages devoted fewer than a dozen pages to indigenous peoples. A typical comment is that used to describe the genocide waged by the European settlers upon the Beothuk natives of Newfoundland: "Soon after contact they went the way of the Tasmanians and the Great Auk."

Other Shores, Other Eyes

The Boston meeting was also reported on abroad in Area, the Institute of British Geographers' newsletter. The sub-titles of a two-part interpretation indicate clearly the essence of the meeting in the estimation of two British geographers who attended. Hugh Prince reported back on the "Questions of Social Relevance" that arose, but he sensed that enthusiasm for them was not pervasive. Of the sectional

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sessions, he decided that:

Their subjects of inquiry, when not remote from issues of present-day concern, were treated with a cold lack of moral sensibility and human compassion. It was a serious game played by professionals, by hired mercenaries.18

David Smith went home asking, "Radical geography—the next revolution?" Writing under a heading of "Social relevance and the radical revolution," he revealed what John Chapman had refused to see, that the new criticism "represents a basic re-evaluation of the scope and subject matter of geography, against a new criteria of relevance."19 He might have more accurately reflected the American scene if he had said "represents a need for a basic re-evaluation" thus not implying (as he does) that the re-evaluation is a fait accompli.

Whereas 1971 lacked substance and was less than provocative, the following year commanded every human geographer's attention, or at least deserved to.

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18 Ibid., p. 153.

19 Ibid., p. 155.
Marxism?

Surely the most discussed publication of 1972 was David Harvey's "Revolutionary and Counter Revolutionary Theory in Geography and the Problem of Ghetto Formation." Most geographers were astounded by this apparent denial of Harvey's own earlier Explanation in Geography. However, the notion that Harvey's embracing of Marxist theory and analysis entails a radical shift in his epistemology warrants close and continuing scrutiny. Though he might now be apprenticing in a different "ideological" school, Harvey is still using his old tools. If he seeks to employ his skills to serve the oppressed, forgotten, and dispossessed he should be encouraged and supported. But, rather than abdicating any fundamental philosophical assumptions, he has been able to align them with a less than mature articulation of Marxism. The outcome is a curious conceptual construction which no doubt allows him to feel less the bourgeois academic when facing the obscenities and injustices of modern urban society. Regretfully, he is facilitated in this by indulging in Marxism in the same superficial manner he dealt with the philosophy of science.

More likely, he is simply confused. This conclusion seems inescapable when we find him advocating a strategy based on a blending

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of what he claimed are the methodological and philosophical overlaps amongst positivism, materialism, and phenomenology. He went so far as to claim that, "This overlap is most clearly explored in Marxist thought."2 Harvey's failure to comprehend even modern phenomenology is exposed when he suggested that some of the writings of Marx are phenomenological and derived from Hegel's *The Phenomenology of Mind*.3 Hegel used the word phenomenology in quite a different manner and context than that of Brentano, Husserl, Scheler, or Heidegger. Taking into account recent claims by French phenomenologists that Hegel is a precursor, and aware of the central role of Hegel in Sartre's thought,4 Spiegelberg still convincingly justifies his exclusion of Hegel from his history of the phenomenological movement.5 It verges on the preposterous to simplistically suggest that Marx was a phenomenologist. Harvey would learn much from careful study of Jean-Paul Sartre's struggles to employ phenomenology in his efforts to synthesize existentialism and Marxism. Although Sartre profoundly adopts several central Marxist concepts6 he

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4 But it was the "dialectic" that Sartre was drawn to in Hegel, not his phenomenology.


is deeply disturbed by the metaphysics of dialectical materialism. 7

The first phase of the encounter between phenomenology and Marxism can be fixed rather firmly, it lies in Herbert Marcuse's prophetic essay "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical Materialism." 8 Written in 1928, when existentialism was still in the cradle, and phenomenology was little discussed outside of Freiburg, Marcuse's essay anticipated the very themes that were to so engulf Sartre later. 9 The subsequent development of the relationship between phenomenology and Marxism was described in Paul Piccone's, "Phenomenological Marxism." 10 Marcuse is one of the founders of the "Frankfurt School" of "critical theory." Steen Folke, in an important commentary on Harvey's paper, directed the geographer's attention to this body of theory. 11 But, with the exception of the formative period of Marcuse's thought, "the

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8 Telos, No. 4 (Fall, 1969), pp. 3-34.

9 Heidegger had just published his monumental work Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) in Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung (Halle), VIII, pp. 1-438, in 1927.

10 Telos, No. 9 (Fall, 1971), pp. 3-31.

direct relationships between the Frankfurt School and Husserlian phenomenology have always been strongly polemical."\textsuperscript{12} There is a tendency to generally characterize the Frankfurt School as a phenomenologically oriented group of Marxist thinkers.\textsuperscript{13} This is a reflection of the popularity of Marcuse in recent years (Horkheimer, Habermas, and Adorno are not nearly so widely read in North America). However, it was Heidegger who influenced Marcuse, and for adopting Heideggerian elements Marcuse has been bitterly attacked by other Frankfurt School scholars.\textsuperscript{14} Thus, even for Marcuse, and other phenomenologically competent Frankfurt scholars, the phenomenological aspects of Marxism are not nearly so evident as Harvey claims they were for Marx. However, it is clear enough that there is a convergence of sorts "in the sense that both the Frankfurt School and phenomenology were on the attack against a model of scientific development and 'bad' rationalization leading both positivism in its new forms as well as idealism to a radical crisis."\textsuperscript{15}


\textsuperscript{13}An example of this is D.I. Davies, "Walter Benjamin: Marxism and Trivia," \textit{The Canadian Forum}, May, 1973, p. 28.

\textsuperscript{14}Many articles in \textit{Telos}, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), esp. p. 154. Heidegger's split with Husserl is legendary in the phenomenological movement.

\textsuperscript{15}Rovatti, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 25. Similarly, Davies, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28, "many of the Marxist phenomenologists of the Frankfurt School were writing against positivism and empiricism." Rovatti also mentions another common element: "The insistence on human emancipation which is connected in Husserl with the reconstitution of the meaning of humanity through the re-founding of science itself; and in Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Adorno, although with different emphases, with the recovery of the young Marx's humanistic theses against the naturalization of Marxism." \textit{Loc. cit.}

See also, Mihaly Vajda, "Marxism, Existentialism, and Phenomenology: A Dialogue," \textit{Telos}, No. 7 (Spring, 1971)
Harvey would do better to examine his own position in relation to this convergence than to flirt with tenuous renderings of Marx and Hegel.

The irreconcilable position of phenomenology and positivism have already been dealt with in Chapter One. The criticisms lodged against the efforts of Amaral and Wisner are equally applicable in the case of Harvey's contention of overlap.

Harvey's notion of the potential for overlap between positivism and Marxism was so poorly expressed that it is difficult to comment. We were told that "both have a materialist base and both resort to an analytic method." Thus, they are clearly in league with a dozen other philosophical positions. But to suggest that the essential difference boils down to positivism simply seeking to understand the world while Marxism seeks to change it, is vacuous.

Since Harvey is so fuzzy in his delineation of what he considers to be Marxism, it seems fair to at least subject him to the scrutiny of the provocative Marxist-Leninist scholar Vladimir Ruml. His recent article, "Positivist 'Philosophy of Science' Versus Science" identified positivism, in all its varieties, as the arena of the bourgeois scholar. We see Harvey, clutching his conceptual baggage, neatly fingered when Ruml declared that the fundamental fault of positivism is its obsession with extending "research methods and devices suitable and effective in

16 Harvey, "Revolutionary . . .," op. cit., p. 7.

solving definite problems to cognitive activity and culture as a whole.\(^\text{18}\)

The Soviet geographer M.I. Al'burt transposed Ruml's point into a more specifically geographical framework:

> Neither mathematics, with its common set of mathematical tools, nor cybernetics and cybernetic devices, which in some cases suggest an analogy between the functioning of engineering structures, the life activity of organisms and the evolution of groups of living beings, can eliminate the differences between non-identical laws of nature and society or between the social (class-oriented, party oriented) sciences and the natural sciences, as would happen according to the canons of social physics and of a "unified geography."

Further:

> The laws of spatial distribution are just as different and just as specific as the laws of development of various phenomena of nature and society.\(^\text{19}\)

Ruml also stressed virtually the same point Folke drew to Harvey's attention:

> It is only dialectical materialism, which summed up and assessed the previous development of man's spiritual and practical activity and disclosed the primacy of socio-historical practice over theory, which provides the key to the question of the essence of philosophy and its relationship to science.\(^\text{20}\)

Ruml moved methodically through a number of conceptual clashes. One example should serve to indicate the type of arguments Harvey must

\(^{18}\)World Marxist Review, September, 1972, p. 103. Ruml does not deny "the role of formal mathematical, cybernetic or semiotic methods in science in general," and he acknowledges that numerous logical positivists contributed "to the elaboration of a number of concrete logical methodological problems of specific sciences," (emphasis added). Loc cit.


\(^{20}\)Ruml, op. cit., p. 103 (emphasis added). See Folke, op. cit., p. 17.
be able to counter to be convincing:

Logical positivists interpret logical and mathematical assertions as analytical ones, i.e., as assertions whose truth is determined by the meaning and relationship of the logical terms they contain and does not depend on experience. In their view, they contain no information about the outer world and in this sense are a priori.

This conception contradicts scientific practice. Although the relation between the truths of logic and mathematics and the external world is indirect, they are revealed in man's practical activity and fixed in his consciousness.21

In a long, and painstaking analysis, Siegfried Muller-Marcus detailed the difficulties the demand to adhere to dialectical materialism has created for Soviet philosophy of science and especially physics.22 Harvey, with his fascination for indeterminancy and stochastic processes would do well to investigate the dilemma Heisenberg created for Soviet science. For example, the Copenhagen School of quantum mechanics founded by Bohr and Heisenberg, with its key principle of complementarity, is anti-thetical to dialectical materialism. Also, Einstein provoked seemingly endless debate amongst Marxists.

Geographers have long puzzled over the nature of space and its relationship to time and have frequently turned to physics for guidance. In this regard it is fascinating to note that:

Soviet philosophy champions a radical epistemological realism which at time leads it to assert that space and time are objects of the material world. Its basic thesis is the objectivity of space and time. Thus it firmly defends against Kant and modern positivism.23

21 Ibid., p. 105.


23 Ibid., p. 44.
From this stance the Marxist-Leninist argues that fluctuations in our space perceptions are a function of the objectivity of space which in itself is a consequence of the objectivity of matter. Thus, though Einstein is a materialist, in that he allows the properties of space and time to be determined by matter, as a philosopher he regards them only as an ordering of subjective sensations. His special theory of relativity makes this materialist physicist no friend of the Marxist philosopher. We should also remember that Lenin's major philosophical treatise (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism) was a bitter battle with Kant and with the founders of contemporary positivism such as Mach and Avenarius.

It is unfortunate that the focus of May's study on Kant did not allow him to fully elucidate the issue of Kant's concept of space. Harvey in his Explanation text included a few pages on the topic. However, again it is not quite the straightforward matter Harvey implied, and it really requires a Kantian scholar to discern the complexities. Kant was not explicit in what he meant by the "absolute" nature of space. If geographers are to fully grasp the debate between Bunge and


26 For example, see Christopher B. Garnett, Jr., *The Kantian Philosophy of Space*, originally published in 1939 by Columbia University Press and re-issued in 1965 by Kennikat Press.
Hartshorne\textsuperscript{27} it will require clear expositions of both Kantian concepts of space and Marxist conceptions. It is not enough to just mention absolute concepts of space versus relativistic ones.

In marked contrast to Harvey, not only is Bunge cognizant of the concerns I have pointed to in Marxist-Leninist thought, he meets them head-on. But in engaging in this struggle he reveals a contradiction he has been harboring. Whilst invoking the call for a de-Stalinization of Soviet science, Bunge manages to ignore the point that Marx, Engels and Lenin fiercely decried social physics. Lenin explicitly stated that "no research into social phenomena can be done, no method of the social sciences can be explained by means of these concepts [of 'social energetics']."\textsuperscript{28} Al'brut, in reference to a recent Central Committee decree delineating the Marxist differentiation of the sciences and a call for an offensive against bourgeois ideology, asked Soviet scholars to do all they can "to expose the unscientific character of social physics, including its geographical interpretation."\textsuperscript{29} Bunge's reaction was to reject the Central Committee's jurisdiction:


\textsuperscript{28}Cited in Al'brut, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 142.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 143.
what we do not need is this anti-geography of calling in the political police to settle a trade matter inside the trade.

To gratuitously plunk down "the Central Committee" inside a discussion of how to build a house makes as much sense. Marx was not organized by a Central Committee but by science.\(^{30}\)

However we judge Bunge's stance on such issues, his attacks and alignments\(^{31}\) appear to be informed judgments. Harvey's claims stand out as murky misappropriations.

Harvey's notion that "scientific discovery is not predictable"\(^{32}\) needs considerable clarification. Does he intend this as the same kind of anathema for dialectical materialism as Bohr's "atoms have freewill?"

It also has a decidedly Popperian ring to it. In his Poverty of Historicism, Karl Popper held that we are unable to predict the future growth of scientific knowledge and therefore are incapable of predicting the future course of human history.\(^{33}\) Further, Harvey would have it that this inability to predict scientific discovery suggests that the natural sciences are in a "pre-social state." Harvey's solution for this unhappy result was the "socialization of natural science" via the philosophy of social science, which he claimed is "in general much superior to that of

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\(^{30}\) W. Bunge, "Ethics and Logic in Geography," pp. 6-7 (photocopy of undated manuscript).


\(^{32}\) Harvey, "Revolutionary \ldots," op. cit., p. 5.

natural science." If the natural sciences are in the condition Harvey implied they are, surely they would not provide an effective model for achieving revolutions in the social sciences. Yet, Harvey began his analysis with reference to Thomas S. Kuhn's *Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Here again, Harvey seems to employ a Popperian perspective in his reading of Kuhn. That is, he adopts Popper's more traditional *philosophic* approach to the growth of scientific knowledge whereas Kuhn's approach to the history of science is decidedly social-psychological. Harvey branded Kuhn's approach "an idealist interpretation of scientific advancement" and faulted him for "his abstraction of scientific knowledge from its materialistic basis." In view of this, Harvey's next step is puzzling indeed. He attempted to incorporate Kuhn's model of scientific revolutions by grafting onto it an economist's idea of the formation of

34 Harvey, "Revolutionary . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 5. The nature of this superior philosophy is left unspecified. A bourgeois social science which has attempted to incorporate "questions of social action and social control" seems to be implied.


37 Harvey, "Revolutionary . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 2.
counter-revolutionary theories. This would surely strike Marxists as a crude, circuitous and piecemeal way of establishing a model already provided in the theory of dialectical materialism. We can only wonder why Harvey, who turned to Engels for insights into land rent surfaces, did not rely on him for the following assistance:

The form of development of natural science, insofar as it thinks, is the hypothesis. A new fact is observed which makes impossible the previous method of explaining the facts belonging to the same group. From this moment onwards new methods of explanation are required—at first based only on a limited number of facts and observations. Further observational material weeds out these hypotheses, doing away with some and correcting others, until finally the law is established in a pure form. If one should wait until the material for a new law was in a pure form, it would mean suspending the process of thought in investigation until then and, if only for this reason, the law would never have come into being.\textsuperscript{38}

Finally, most certainly Harvey, and perhaps many others (including most self-proclaimed Marxists) will insist that Harvey's Marxism has been most unfairly measured here. Harvey decried the "counter-revolutionary co-optation of Marxist theory in Russia after Lenin's death."\textsuperscript{39} But it is Harvey who has failed to spell out what he understand to be "the essence of Marxist thinking" and "the true flowering of Marxist thought."\textsuperscript{40}

They will find that Harvey really fares no better when judged against recent statements by Soviet Marxist-Leninist purists and non-Soviet


\textsuperscript{39}Harvey, "Revolutionary . . .," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5.

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Loc. cit.}
Marxists, including those in North America. Those who question this final claim should consult Mihailo Marković's "Marx and Critical Scientific Thought."\(^{42}\)

AAG Again

By 1972, Zelinsky had so threatened his colleagues by spear-heading SERGE that they confirmed him as president of the Association of American Geographers at the Kansas City meeting! The issue of social relevance really never did pervade these proceedings, rather it was divided into special SERGE sessions. However, most of these were devoted to effete efforts at tackling already over-researched subject areas, especially those issues amenable to grantsmanship. Geographers who had been poised at the edge of the garbage pit of society's symptomatic super structure took the plunge into such sessions as: Waste Disposal and Materials Recycling, "The Energy Crisis," and "Concentrations of Toxic Materials in the Environment." Clearly, geographers were cashing in on the call for "a greening." SERGE's attempt to focus on "Visual Blight in America" was distorted by Yi-Fu Tuan and David Lowenthal who dazzled the assembled by waxing eloquently about inconsequential aspects of landscape aesthetics.

\(^{41}\) Many of these views are exemplified in DeGrood, Riepe, and Somerville, \textit{op. cit.}, see especially: Hansen, "An Historical Critique of Empiricism," and Somerville, "Ideology, Scientific Philosophy, and Marxism."

\(^{42}\) \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 159-73.

\(^{43}\) This and the following observations are based on the author's attendance at, and participation in, the meeting. (See also the program booklet.)
Indicative of the special sessions not organized by SERGE was the one devoted to the crucial concern of "Geography and Economic Development." Typical contributions were: Robert W. Brown "Strategies and Realities in Pipeline Terminal Location," and, Donald D. Davies, "Development of Crude Petroleum Transportation in South Louisiana." In the regular session on "Residential Geography" concern for the poor was introduced by selecting the sample using a racist criterion. (Fowler and Davies, "The Urban Residential Location of Disadvantaged White Migrants.")

The SERGE workshop on "Experimental and Model Courses" provided the meeting's only decidedly provocative presentation. Using sophisticated multi-media techniques M.E. Eliot Hurst and M. Hoskins asked, "Geography For Whom?" They effectively compressed geography's history of being hand-maiden to colonial and imperialist masters right through to its present proclivity for asking socially irrelevant questions, into a brief but devastating display of analysis and self-criticism. No one left the room unscathed, and the responses ranged from outrage to a request to present it at the University of Chicago. This invitation was subsequently quashed by department chairman M. Mikesell.

But it finally fell to the SERGE session on "Metropolitan Spatial Injustice" to salvage some indication of a redirecting of geographic inquiry. David Harvey added relatively little to his argument of the last two years with his "Spatial Injustice: A Demand For Revolutionary Theory in Geography." Eliot Hurst shared his attempt at concretizing radical critique in the context of the classroom. His "Metropolitan Spatial Injustice: An Alternative Approach to Instruction in Urban
Geography" provided a useful handbook for re-orienting urban studies.

In a third analysis of the metaphorical language in geography, by Anne Buttimer, the Cartesian paradigm and "rather managerial perspective on social life" that dominate human geographic inquiry were revealed. These proclivities result in most geographers adopting the unexamined assumption that improved quality of life is related to increasing the efficiency of spatial systems. Therefore, Buttimer saw the urgency of raising the question of "efficiency for whom?"

What if some of the key ingredients of human happiness are not reducible to a metric which can be accommodated in our models of spatial analysis? What, again, if in fact it is the very efficiency of our spatial systems which often militates most against the quality of human life?

A common outcome of a geographic expedition into the jungle of social justice is a program for piecemeal spatial engineering.

Thus emerges a pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas, aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to terms of this universe. They are redefined by the rationality of the given system and of its quantitative extension.

As we have seen, a somewhat crude scientism characterizes the established

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44 (Sr. Mary Annette) The paper she circulated in conjunction with her Kansas City address was titled, "'Inequality', 'Inefficiency', and 'Spatial Injustice'," (mimeo), 13 pp.

45 As well as "a tendency to extrapolate from partial analyses of disciplinary-defined problems to a blueprint for societal planning." Ibid., p. 10.

46 Ibid., p. 7.

47 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Boston, Beacon, 1964, p. 12.
universe of geographic discourse, and a rather anemic approach to advocacy
defines the usual universe of action. Consequently, social justice is
reduced to spatial justice, and inequality is redefined as a measure of
deviation from someone's postulated ideal social order. In the realm of
action, social justice is to be attained through advocating some kind of
spatial adjustment. The implication does not escape Buttimer, "To study
the phenomenon 'scientifically' one needs measurement, one seeks order
rather than meaning." Buttimer recognized the difficulties here, "For
meaning is an existential concept, . . . not easily defined in terms of
any checklist of objective measures." Thus, she reinforced Gibson's
earlier insistence on the inclusion of the meaning dimension in human
geographic inquiry.

Another key element in Buttimer's paper was her suggestion that
geographers develop a sensitivity to "human becoming." This is a stance
which is central to existential and phenomenological scholarship. The
search for social justice would be well-served by geographers assisting
people to discover, choose, and enter a meaningful path to becoming.
Geographic research might focus "attention on those systems of domination
which prevent them from becoming."
The intellectual's role then—be he social scientist or philosopher—can only be seen within the large framework of an on-going process leading toward social justice. The first step may be an attempt to awaken the socio-political consciousness of the people presumably involved in the socially-unjust state: to allow the "objects" of our research to become the "subjects" of the drama, the quest for social justice. We may have some expertise to offer at various stages of this effort, but to imagine we can write the script, set the stage, and manage the production is not only pretentious, but could also be harmful if it stifles the very humanizing process of becoming for the people involved.  

Both Gibson and Buttimer seem acutely aware that, "The source of self-making is not simply, as Plato would have it, the experience of meaning but the experiencing of the creation of meaning."  

Pluralism

At a time when Harvey was attempting to demonstrate the efficacy of Marxism as an alternative approach to empirical science, Yi-Fu Tuan was busily broadening the scope of geography's predominant functionalist paradigm. In his "Structuralism, Existentialism, and Environmental Perception," Yi-Fu Tuan acknowledged that, "Functionalism is our basic model for explaining man as a socioeconomic being" and he concluded that, "Structuralism and existentialism supplement this model from opposite sides." Rather than embroil himself in geography's emerging debate about the proper paradigm for empirical verification, Yi-Fu Tuan chooses

52 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
55 Ibid., p. 330.
to direct colleagues' attention to structuralism and existentialism because they "reveal those dimensions of man, including his responses to the world, which cannot be directly observed."\textsuperscript{56}

It is all too typical of geography to be the last of the social inquiry subjects to explore alternative philosophies, paradigms, and methods developed and debated in sister disciplines. Even a partial listing surely proves embarrassing: Wittgenstein and linguistic analysis, existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism, structuralism, and ethnomethodology. But we must also guard against being too ready to rely on superficial or tentative investigations of such areas by geographers anxious to comment on their geographic applicability.

It will be instructive to focus on a remark by Yi-Fu Tuan. He suggests that "A common charge against the structuralist perspective is that it neglects history and development."\textsuperscript{57} In asserting that the charge "is unanswerable" and that the central figure of structuralism, Lévi-Strauss, has avoided the application of his techniques to history,\textsuperscript{58} Yi-Fu Tuan implies a stance strikingly consistent with a concern to enrich and enliven functionalism in the face of an emergent Marxism in geography. Lévi-Strauss has frequently cited Marx and emphasized his relationship to Marx's theory of history. Jerzy Topolski, in his comparative study, "Lévi-Strauss and Marx on History," cites a typical example:

\footnote{Ibid., p. 321.}

\footnote{Ibid., p. 325. (He does not footnote any source(s) typical of such a charge.)}

\footnote{Ibid., pp. 325-26.}
Anthropology cannot remain indifferent to historical processes and to the most highly conscious expressions of social phenomena. But if the anthropologist brings to them the same scrupulous attention as the historian, it is in order to eliminate, by a kind of backward course, all that they owe to the historical process and to conscious thought. His goal is to grasp, beyond the conscious and always shifting images which men hold, the complete range of unconscious possibilities. These are not unlimited, and the relationships of compatibility or incompatibility which each maintains with all the others provide a logical framework for historical developments, which, while perhaps unpredictable, are never arbitrary. In this sense, the famous statement by Marx, "Men make their own history, but they do not know that they are making it," justifies, first, history and, second, anthropology.59

Though Lévi-Strauss is not indifferent to history and development,60 his adoption of Marx's theory of history need not concern Yi-Fu Tuan. Lévi-Strauss' central hypothesis about the existence of identical universal unconscious structures of the mind is not verifiable by empirical evidence. Such an assumption places him in fundamental contradiction with Marx. Marx's view of man as a rational being and of the historical


60Lévi-Strauss' statement clearly shows his views on historical process and historical study:

(1) Reality presents people with a given (but finite) set of actions possible to accomplish; however, which of these actions will be undertaken is determined by the universal, unconscious structures of the human mind which are identical for all men.

(2) The task of the structural method is to "reach" these deep, unconscious structures, thus explaining the shape ("architecture") of the social reality.

(3) The task of history—of the historical method—is to provide descriptive material for the structural procedure in order to "cleanse" it of everything added by the historical process and consciously acting man.

process as the result of man acting consciously and purposefully is empirically verifiable. He would reject any notion of a Universal Mind reducing man to an abstract non-historical entity.

Problems

Whereas even Yi-Fu Tuan's tentative examinations of extra-disciplinary literature and ideas are usually meticulous and always cautious, other commentators are not nearly so careful. Typical of such questionable excursions is a survey of *Phenomenology and Related Non-positivistic Viewpoints in the Social Sciences* by two geographers at Monash University, D.C. Mercer and J.M. Powell. They introduced phenomenology almost solely in terms of Husserl, relying on Peter Koestenbaum's introduction to Husserl's *The Paris Lectures*. Their summary really added nothing to the geographic literature beyond the contributions of Edward Relph and Yi-Fu Tuan. Existentialism was ignored; Sartre and Husserl are not in the bibliography. From a sketchy introduction to phenomenology, they moved to investigate "phenomenology and sociology." From their remarks it seems that they failed to recognize that most sociologists encouraging phenomenological inquiry "display only a metaphorical understanding of phenomenology as a philosophy and as a set of methods . . . [and] as a result fail to understand the relationship between sociology and phenomenology." Central to sociology's concern to specify the relationship of phenomenology and sociology is the role

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61 Monash Publications in Geography, No. 1, Melbourne, 1972.

of "ethnomethodology" ("ethnoscience" in anthropology). It would seem that:

... the claim of ethnomethodology to be the application of the phenomenological programme to sociology hardly stands the test of evidence. [that] There is, however, an intimate link connecting ethnomethodology to the early versions of existentialism—those typical of the pre-phenomenological phase ... [but that] The conduct of ethnomethodology toward existentialist philosophy, ... is neither more faithful nor more understanding than its behavior toward phenomenology.63

or that:

It is a program of inquiry which combines certain phenomenological and sociological concerns while transforming them in such a way as to do violence to neither but, rather, to constitute for itself a unique and independent domain of study.64

In view of their inadequate handling of phenomenology and existentialism and their apparently less than extensive investigation of the introduction of phenomenology to sociology, it is surprising that Mercer and Powell did not directly equate ethnomethodology and phenomenology. But when it comes to their claim that ethnomethodology is a non-positivistic viewpoint they are on shaky ground indeed. In an impressive analysis of the philosophical status of ethnomethodology Bauman concluded that positivism and ethnomethodology are in epistemological concurrence, that they broadly agree "as to the acceptable model of the knowledge of the social," that:

The minimalistic—phenomenal, nominalistic, contingent and value-neutral—model of social science, the heart of the positivistic programme, is, however, adopted in full in ethnomethodological practice.65


64 Heap and Roth, op. cit., p. 363.

65 Bauman, op. cit., p. 22.
But Mercer and Powell stretch their credibility to the breaking point when they discuss participant observation as a non-positivistic method and imply that it treats its subjects phenomenologically.\(^66\) There will be those who will be perplexed by their claim that, "Philosophically, perhaps the most important contribution made by the behaviouralists has been to preserve and foster a 'humanist' alternative to the popular mechanistic explanation."\(^67\) And finally, it is difficult not to wonder about their motives in publishing such a survey when they maintain that: "In no sense should the subjective method of phenomenology be presumed to displace entirely the traditional methods of objective science."\(^68\) Rather than fomenting a profound revolution in human geographic inquiry we find them admiring that safest of all academic perches—synthesis, and seeking to foster a human geography "producing lasting scholarly accounts which display no single allegiance to positivism, Idealism, phenomenology or any other major mode of explanation—but learning from all."\(^69\)

Human geographers have generated divergent, frequently contradictory, and most often peculiar, responses to the variously pitched and canted calls upon them to be relevant, radical, or revolutionary. Too many of the responses reviewed above foundered on philosophical and logical shoals, too few compelled serious consideration. A sordid sociology of knowledge was glimpsed too often, an uncompromising commitment to meaningfully grapple with the human condition characterized too few.

\(^{66}\)Mercer and Powell, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 28.  
\(^{67}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 39.  
\(^{69}\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 36.
Philosophical awareness and methodological innovativeness are the exception in their responses, not the rule. Moreover, most of these attempts suffer from epistemological constipation. We can only conclude that most of the discipline's practitioners are still wrestling with matters more related to the traditional three Rs of their school days.

Unhappily, even the handful of human geographers who deserve to share in the re-orienting of geographic discourse and endeavour labour almost alone. We have discerned the elements of a new domain of geographic enquiry, but not its design. Those who were reviewed favourably in the preceding chapters were those whose contributions will endure as elemental and visionary. Perhaps the articulation of a design requires the inclusion of a fourth dimension, a final R, namely "Romanticism." Paul Goodman insists on just such an element:

Consider the world-wide unease about the technology, the social engineering, the specialist sciences and their positivist value-neutral language. Suddenly, the line of dissent of Blake, Wordsworth, Shelley, William Morris, the Symbolists, and the surrealists no longer seems to be the nostalgic romanticism of a vanishing minority, but the intense realism of a vanguard.70

The work of Gibson and Buttiner 71 evince this element, Yi-Fu Tuan effuses it, Lowenthal and Prince have occasionally included it. In contrast to the superfluous mysticism of today, 72 Romanticism is imbedded in a tradition of rebellion and refusal.

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71 See, for example, her *Society and Milieu in the French Geographic Tradition*, American Association of Geographers, Monograph, No. 6, Chicago, Rand McNally, 1971.

The beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, insecurity that attend a true beginning. Repetition as we understand it is anything but an improved continuation with the old methods of what has been up to now.

—Martin Heidegger (1935)
CHAPTER FOUR

HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT

The three Rs, so long symbolic of traditional teaching, are being thrust aside in the rush to be relevant, radical, and revolutionary. Unhappily for humanity as well as human geography, these three new Rs (and the fourth possibility--Romanticism) are no less tradition-bound. They fall firmly within the tradition of Western thought. Truly, the revolutionary commitment is embodied in the song title "We Shall Overcome!"

But, just what is it that we must overcome? Nothing less than the entire history of metaphysics from Plato to Nietzsche is Martin Heidegger's answer. The second part of this thesis is devoted to a basic explication of that answer, and to a tentative and preliminary casting of human geographic enquiry within that context.

This chapter will introduce the reader to Heidegger's project—the overcoming of metaphysics. From this perspective the fifth chapter will reassess some of the work reviewed in Part One and evaluate other recent works. The conclusion will suggest the impact of just one of Heidegger's themes on contemporary geographic thought. We will contemplate our discipline discovering that "Poetically man dwells on this earth."

*Humanism Is Not Enough*  
Heidegger tells us that:
When we think of the truth of Being, metaphysics is overcome.¹

and that

To think of the truth of Being means at the same time to think of the humanitas of the homo humanus.²

If we can but grasp why our tradition of metaphysics must be overcome, and why thinking the truth of Being achieves this, then, following through Heidegger's two dicta above, it seems but a small step to a fundamental realization. The first step towards a geography of the human condition* must be along the path to Being. In fact, Heidegger insists that, "The history of Being sustains and determines every condition et situation humaine."³ But, if thinking the truth of Being overcomes metaphysics (and assuming we become convinced this is necessary) and if thinking the truth of Being means at the same time to think of the humanity of the human being, why not dispense with all

*For those readers unfamiliar with the existentialist connotations of the phrase "the human condition," Hannah Arendt, a student of Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger wrote "A Study of the Central Dilemmas Facing Modern Man" entitled The Human Condition, Garden City, Anchor Doubleday, 1959.


²Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Barrett and Aiken, op. cit., p. 295. (This is a translation by Edgar Lohner of pp. 53-119 of Heidegger's Platonas Lehre von der Wahrheit (1942); Mit einem Brief über den "Humanismus" (1946), Bern, A. Francke, 1947.)

³Ibid., p. 271.
this talk of the truth and history of Being and rely on "humanism" to guide our human geographic inquiries? Surely, the West's long tradition of humanism is nothing else but a profound and enduring inquiry into the *humanitas* of *homo humanus*. A reasonable proposal to be sure; and perhaps a path some readers have resolutely chosen. But on this issue Heidegger is most firm—"every humanism remains metaphysical."4

Interestingly enough the humanist's proposal encapsulates Heidegger's fundamental concern. He despairs at our reluctance to even entertain the thought of thinking about Being.

However, we must be most assiduous in our rendering of Heidegger's *dicta*. In our anxiety to justify humanist thought as the basis of a humanizing geography it is all too easy to overlook a crucial distinction. A mistake to be expected in view of our metaphysics Heidegger would argue, but also one that augurs most calamitously for mankind's future. We are too ready to take "... means at the same time ..." to imply "means the same as." To think the truth of Being is not the same as thinking of the *humanitas* of *homo humanus*. The fault lies not so much with the humanists but with our tradition of Western metaphysics which persists in thinking of the humanity of man without thinking of the truth of Being. It is our wont to think of man as being first a human being—an entity. Amongst the living entities of this earth man is *animal rationale*. We strive to plumb the depths of man's humanity via such categories. We are content to contemplate man without asking about Being.

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4Ibid., p. 276.
On the other hand, according to Heidegger, in thinking of the truth of being, we cannot avoid thinking of man's humanity. Both modes of thinking must go on at the same time. Without Being the human being would not be, but without human beings Being would not be discovered. One thinking will not stand for the other; both must stand together. From this stance metaphysics will be overcome.

If the unsuspecting reader now harbours the uneasy feeling that a trap had been prepared, his suspicions are not altogether unfounded. What our hypothetical humanist, albeit with the best of intentions, has slipped into is a microscopic mirror image of our macroscopic metaphysical pitfall—the forgetting of Being. It is even Heidegger's contention that the uneasiness mankind senses in itself is the result of such forgetting. If all this talk of Being seems strange to us it is because we have estranged ourselves from Being. If by now the reader is fairly crying out, "But what is Being?" we can begin the promised explication.

The Question of Questions

To establish Heidegger as the Western world's most revolutionary, or perhaps only truly revolutionary, thinker we would have to essentially grasp his answers to at least the following questions:

1) What is metaphysics?
2) How are Plato and Nietzsche involved?
   (And, the other great philosophers historically between them?)
3) Why must their metaphysics be overcome?
4) What does it mean to overcome metaphysics?
5) How is metaphysics to be overcome?
6) What is thinking?
7) What is truth?
8) What is "Being" as distinct from "beings"?
9) Why in thinking of the truth of Being is metaphysics overcome?
10) How is man's humanity related to the truth of Being?
11) How is it that the history of Being sustains and determines the human condition?
12) Why is humanism metaphysical?

These questions are encompassed by Heidegger's fundamental question: "... the question of the meaning of Being" and its two correlative questions: "What about Nothing?" and, "Why is there something and not rather nothing at all?"

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6 Martin Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" (tr. by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick), in Martin Heidegger, Existence and Being (edited, with an introduction and analysis, by Werner Brock), Chicago, Regnrey (Gateway ed.) 1947, p. 337. Originally published as Was ist Metaphysik?, 4th ed. with postscript added, Bohn, Cohen, 1943. The lecture was originally published in 1929.

7 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, 2d ed., Vol. 1, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969, p. 306. This is a more generally acceptable translation of the first line of Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Tübingen, Niemeyer, 1953 than Ralph Manheim's original translation in Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1959, which reads "Why are there essents rather than nothing?" In his translator's note he clarifies "essents" as "existents", "things that are," "being,"
The reader should be forewarned of the possibility of being disconcerted by a seeming circularity in the answers to those twelve questions. This is because these subordinate questions all revolve around the central question of the "meaning of Being." To demonstrate the foolhardiness of this whole venture, and at the same time, the profundity of Heidegger's thought let us examine but a few of the titles of Heidegger's essays and books: "What is Metaphysics?", Introduction To Metaphysics, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Hegel's Concept of Experience, The Question of Being, "On the Essence of Truth," "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," What Is Called Thinking?, Discourse on Thinking, "Letter on Humanism," and Nietzsche (2 vols.). When we further consider that Heidegger's major work Being and Time, and everything he has written since, is concerned with the "meaning of Being," the virtual lunacy of attempting to handle those twelve questions in answers of a sentence or paragraph or even several pages is manifest. The question of the meaning of Being is not a question to be directly answered. It is the question to be reawakened and eternally renewed. Asking it guarantees our humanity. To grasp why our humanity requires the continued renewal of the Seinsfrage: "the question of the meaning of Being" ("die Frage nach

etc. (see also Barrett and Aiken, op. cit., p. 219). This introduction of a new term ("essents") has been rejected by Heideggerian scholars. The usual translation is "beings". For example, William J. Richardson, S.J., Heidegger--Through Phenomenology To Thought, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963, p. 259, translates the question as "Why are there beings at all and not much rather Non-being?" This translation indicates Heidegger's focus is still on Being. Fr. Richardson's magnificent volume has become the standard reference work for Heideggerian scholars. Heidegger himself wrote the preface.

*Perhaps, with a wry smile, the reader noted that my foolhardiness should not be understood as the same as Heidegger's profundity.
We need to essentially grasp Heidegger's answers to the twelve questions. Fortunately there is a way of reducing the risk of lunacy inherent in such a task. Looking back to Heidegger's two dicta and his declaration on the human condition we can readily see the relevance of the twelve questions. But what is not evident is that truth has changed. In finding the answer to "What has happened to truth?" we discover a basis for essentially answering the other questions and for realizing the necessity of the Seinsfrage and its two correlatives. Thus our primary task will be to discover what has happened to truth. To demonstrate how all this could be achieved let us consider the way in which Heidegger lead me to grasp the meaning of Being.

My Personal Project

It is the very richness of Heidegger's thought that enthralls me and it is my deepest concern that human geography not be conducted in ignorance of the truly revolutionary nature of the Heideggerian quest. If I can do no more than hint at some possible implications for geographic thought and thereby encourage others to engage in similar studies my purpose will have been achieved. For me, attempting more than this preliminary sketch will require many additional years of preparation. I write this thesis with the conviction that those who

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Reference to Plato and Nietzsche is implicit (re: question (2)). Heidegger considers them to be the two historical poles of Western metaphysics. He has also seen the other great Western philosophers as stages of the tradition initiated with Plato and culminated in Nietzsche.
begin to sense the direction of Heidegger's thought will become increas-
ingly disquieted about their geographic inquiries and eventually abandon
them in order to engage in the quest, i.e., to reawaken "the question of
the meaning of Being." Heidegger speaks directly to every issue that
vexes and perplexes us today and also to those that invite or excite us.
Whether it be man's proclivity for genocide, impending environmental
collapse, increasing mechanization, or the study of Zen or modern art
and literature, Heidegger is there--posing the most provocative of
twentieth century interpretations.

Overcoming metaphysics will entail the destruction of our
discipline as we know it. Some of us will choose this path sooner,
others later, once it is well-lighted many will follow. This thesis is
but a first step along the way. For those already committed to the
destruction of human geography as it has come to be, I implore them to
consider Heidegger.

A Preliminary Consideration

One crucial aspect pertaining to Heidegger's voluminous writings
requires clarification at this point. This issue is especially vital
for those who might decide to immerse themselves in Heidegger's works.
I believe it is an aspect that eludes even Heideggerian scholars,
especially those most critical of Heidegger. Virtually every commen-
tary on Heidegger begins with a discussion of the difficulties due to
the seeming obscurity of his writing. These remarks range from
apologies to condemnations. Of course, those completely imbued with
positivism would likely recoil at the very idea of tackling any obscure
thinking. For they are certain that what cannot be expressed clearly
and distinctly is better not said at all since it can only end up as "meaningless verbalism." In view of such predispositions, this osten-
sible obscurity is qualified, most usually, by referring to the difficulty that German-speaking philosophers have in coping with Heidegger's
original texts, and of the almost intractable problems of translation into English. William Barrett notes that obscurity is traditionally a
hallmark of the German philosopher, and in comparing Heidegger with Kant and Hegel he finds his style more "compact and incisive." Whereas Hegel
seems disposed to obscurity, Barrett feels Heidegger is determinedly struggling to communicate. "The difficulty comes, rather, from the
obscurity of the matters with which Heidegger is grappling."\(^9\)

This is, however, only half the answer. Nonetheless one we should reflect upon once we learn how our metaphysics has obscured
Being from us. We must also consider that in argumentation based on
the established rules of logic, semantics and etymology Heidegger's
acumen is widely, if often grudgingly, acknowledged. This is particu-
larly the case in reference to his rebuttal of criticism and his
"interrogations" of the philosophies of Kant and Hegel.\(^10\) The


\(^10\) Vincent Vycinas, in his *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, p. 77, tells us: "Often, dealing with the thoughts of earlier philosophers, Heidegger shows how profoundly he can grasp the basic elements of their thoughts, analyze them, and reveal them in the sharp light of his logic." He goes on to quote Heidegger's severe critic Karl Lowith: "Nobody can deny, that Heidegger, more than any other contemporary interpreter, is clear-sighted and possesses skill in the art of reading and explaining when he carefully takes apart and reassembles the
structures of sayings in thought or poetry."
concern for clarity is directed, almost entirely, at his questioning about Being. In this matter Heidegger is sole master of a method uniquely his own. His purpose in creating such a method is the other half we must appreciate if we wish to understand Heidegger.

Based on my own experiences, it seems that you can struggle for months, or years, with Heidegger's writings and finally one day the "A'ha I see!" experience engulfs you. You have repeatedly wrestled with a particular passage and finally it yields to a "I see what he (Heidegger) is getting at (i.e. means)! This accomplishment spurs you on to more reading, or re-reading, and you set aside your books for the day confident that you are finally on the path to Being. However exhilarating such a realization is, it is but a pale reflection of what has really happened, but has gone tragically unrecognized.

It is not that you saw what Heidegger was "getting at" or what he meant. It was Being getting at you. In more Heideggerian terms, Being dis-closed or dis-covered itself to you. For one brief moment you glimpsed the meaning of Being. Once you have realized this is what has happened you are ready to recognize it for what it really is the next time it is experienced. This will only be possible because you have somehow come to realize your earlier error. This belated awakening is an echo of the experience of what might have been, and indeed was, if only you had been attuned. But it is enough to sustain you and you are heartened by it. You have been awarded the strength and courage to continue your endeavours. You are anxious to recapture that moment:
When on a summer's day the butterfly
settles on the flower and, wings
closed, sways with it in the
meadow-breeze . . . .

All our heart's courage is the
echoing response to the
first call of Being which
gathers our thinking into the
play of the world.

In thinking all things
become solitary and slow.

Patience nurtures magnanimity.

He who thinks greatly must
err greatly. 11

But even more had happened. If we reflect further on the realization of the first call of Being upon us we must also realize that Being had been hiding from us. Heidegger helped us attune ourselves to Being's presence so that we might experience its disclosure. The truth of Being lies in its revealing and concealing. 12


12 "Precisely because Being is an emerging from concealment, there can be no emerging unless there be concomitantly a concealment whence it comes. This is true not only for the primal obscurity that precedes emergence, but also for the process of self-revelation itself. Concealment impregnates it at every moment and in every way, in order for it to be what it is. Unless there is a veil, there can be no unveiling, re-vealing. This irremovable veil is the congenital concealment that permeates every self-disclosure, and concealment '... lies in the essence of Being, of self-revelation as such ...'" Richardson, op. cit., p. 265.
But Why Being?

On the first page of his seminal work, *Being and Time*, Heidegger introduces the Seinsfrage ("die Frage nach dem Sinn Von Sein"). In German, Sein is understood in the sense of the infinitive "to be". English also has this understanding, e.g. "Being (i.e. "to be") with him is a joy." Here the expression functions as a synonym for the infinitive. However, in English it most usually functions as a substantive (noun), e.g. "The slug is an ugly being." In German, such a use of the word being translates as das Seiende, meaning "thing" (in the sense of "that which is"). "And in Heidegger das Sein is always understood verbally,"¹³ (i.e. as a verb). Thus, the Seinsfrage needs to be understood as "the question of what it means to be," (i.e. "Being" understood verbally, Be-ing).¹⁴

The English translation of *Being and Time* translates das Sein as Being, but fails to make explicit its infinitive sense. Whereas literal translation as "to be" would facilitate this understanding, it can be

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*(Since King does not follow the convention of capitalizing the "b" in the translation of "Sein" I have altered it for consistency.)*
stylistically awkward and thus the usual practice of using "Being" is acceptable once the reader is apprised of the required "verbal" understanding. Although das Seiende is most usually translated as "being" or "thing" or "entity", it has been subject to other translations and interpretations, e.g. "essent". Heidegger is concerned to distinguish the difference between "Being" and "beings" and to demonstrate their intimate inter-relationship. These concerns are revealed in his repeated reference to "das Sein des Seienden."

But why bother about Being, its meaning or anything else about it? There is so much to be done! Most geographers seem to be doing so little! The human condition cries out for help from every quarter! Geographers are being urged to rally to this plea, or to be relevant, radical, and revolutionary! In response to such pleadings a few human geographers are at long last beginning to criticize our discipline's lack of "revolutionary" zeal, critique, and theorizing. "Establishment geography" is declared "counter-revolutionary," and infusions of Marxist, Leninist, Maoist, leftist, old left, new left, and even left-liberal and "counter-cultural" critique and theorizing are being suggested and supplied. Ways

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15Seidel, op. cit., p. 5, n. 16 feels that to translate das Seiende as "being" (i.e. with a small "b") and das Sein as "Being" (i.e. with a capital "B") "... does not bring out sharply enough the contrast which Heidegger draws between being (das Sein) and things (das Seiende)." Whereas John Wild criticizes "entity" as a translation "... which is unnecessarily abstract, and which fails to suggest the intimate connection between Sein and Seiendes" in "An English Version of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time," The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Dec. 1962), p. 206. Both scholar's concerns are well-founded. Such issues require that anyone undertaking an initial reading of Being and Time certainly should avail themselves of such reviews as Wild's and handbooks such as Gelven's op. cit., and King's op. cit. (das Seiende has been variously translated as: being, thing, entity, existent, essent, that which is).
to combine existing revolutionary theory and geographic practice will
strain anti-establishment geographic imaginations for years to come.
Why cloud the issues with questions about Being? Who needs it?

Let us examine the most extreme example of a need for asking the
Seinsfrage. It is surely a grotesque but telling commentary on our
times that we so often find that those who call themselves "revolution-
aries" are also those ready to take lives in order to create a "more
humane society." Crudely simplified, the rationale goes something like
this. Those responsible for "man's inhumanity to man" must yield power
or mend their ways. It is inevitable that some will have to be forced
(by whatever means necessary), and if they resist violently their
resistance must be overcome by violence, including killing if necessary.
The "bourgeois pacifist" exposes himself in his refusal to torture or
take lives. The "real" revolutionary is distinguished by his total
commitment "to the cause," epitomized in laying down his life or in
taking another's.

Given our historical experience and understanding of "revolutions"
this analysis appears to me to be justified. The rudimentary A, B, Cs
of revolutions would have us compare China to Chile to decide whether
lasting revolutions to improve the human condition come from the barrel
of a gun or out of a ballot box. If a bloody revolution is required in
our society the only revolutionaries will be those prepared to kill
their opponents. Mass premeditated murder is only possible by viewing
the human being as an object--a "thing" (das Seiende)--a "being". The
killing is facilitated by reducing this object to something objection-
able. "Kill the capitalist pigs" or "Bomb the Gooks" are two sides of
the same coin. Nietzsche saw the culmination of modern man in the "will to power," Heidegger sees it in the "will to will"—the refusal, or inability, to let Being be.

The vision of more just and humane society requires an understanding of man, the human being. We have to know what it means to be human in order to judge the humanity of our society, and utopia. What the revolutionary fails to realize is that knowing what it means to be a human being entails knowing what it means "to be"—i.e., asking the Seinsfrage. 16 This failure is every man's, not just the revolutionary's. We are all complicit. We in the West are not asking the Seinsfrage. Our heritage is characterized by the forgetting of Being. Concern for Being is denounced as meaningless, and those who inquire after Being are branded "mystics". Revolutionaries who seek to absolve themselves of the charge of failing to go to the root of being human by claiming to rely on Marxist humanist principles might be inclined to respond to the Seinsfrage if it is asked this way: Why did Erich Fromm write Marx's Concept of Man17 rather than Marx's Concept of Being? Human geographers would be well-advised to heed the Heideggerian answer. Before we rush

16 J. Glenn Gray has observed that: "Philosophical reflections on violence are not very numerous in our Western literature. It is, therefore, time, high time, that we reflect on this problem in our present context in order to seek means of mitigating it. If the social and natural scientists can be practically more effective than we in the short range, philosophers are more likely than they to uncover the roots of violence by renewed reflection on what it means to be a human being." See his: On Understanding Violence Philosophically and Other Essays, New York, Harper & Row Torchbook, 1970, p. 33.

head-long into revolutionary activity we should ask what it means to be a revolutionary. Before any geographer counsels any action he should consider the Seinsfrage for it is no less our question than anyman's. Human geography should not be conducted in ignorance of the relevance of the question of the meaning of Being.

**Being**

Heidegger's obsession with the Seinsfrage began in 1907 with his first reading of Franz Brentano's doctoral dissertation, *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* (1862). The title page bears a quotation from Aristotle which Heidegger translates as: "A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in many ways." In his remarkable preface to Fr. Richardson's study of his thought Heidegger relates how:

Latent in this phrase is the question that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings? This question raised another: what, then, does Being mean?\(^{18}\)

But the problem Heidegger began grappling with in 1927 with his *Being and Time* is with us still. We are not in the least troubled by our inability to understand the expression "Being". The Seinsfrage is plainly irrelevant. It is important to realize Heidegger would have us recognize that this attitude is rooted in the classical Greek's initial efforts to interpret Being. Their labours launched a tradition distinguished by a dogma that disparages the Seinsfrage and sanctions its neglect. The opening lines of *Being and Time* identify the source of this tradition. In Plato's *Sophist* we hear of a dramatic change:

\(^{18}\) Richardson, *op. cit.*, p. x.
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression "being". We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed.\textsuperscript{19}

For those no less perplexed today we must suggest how this came about, and why it is important to be informed about it.

Heidegger addressed himself to the three key presuppositions that undergird this dogma that inquiry into Being is unnecessary.

1. Aristotle tells us Being is the "most universal" concept, and Thomas Aquinas assures us "An understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one apprehends in entities."\textsuperscript{20} Hegel, though not discounting talk of Being as meaningless discourse, does hold that Being is the broadest of all categories and therefore empty, i.e., all the content has been generalized (abstracted) out and no hint of a concrete characteristic ("determination") is left to distinguish Being.\textsuperscript{21} But, "The 'universality' of Being 'transcends' any universality of genus."\textsuperscript{22} Heidegger points out that Aristotle recognized this primordial quality of Being as significant and meaningful in that it made Being the most general concept. But hardly the clearest concept of all, rather, the most obscure ("the darkest").

\textsuperscript{19} Translated by Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, op. cit., p. 1.

\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{21} George R. Vick, "Heidegger's Linguistic Rehabilitation of Parmenides' 'Being'," \textit{American Philosophical Quarterly}, Vol. 8, No. 2 (April, 1971), p. 140. Vick updates Heidegger's 1927 analysis of the attacks on the concept of Being by indicating the nature of the more recent nominalist/empiricist and Logical Positivist rejections and Heidegger's rebuttal.

\textsuperscript{22} Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, op. cit., p. 22.
2. We are further informed that Being is indefinable. This condition is contingent upon the preceding supposition. If everything that exists belongs to the class "Being" nothing is left by which to define Being. Such a genus/species determination of Being's indefinability is valid if the only way to have meaning is to be subsumable under a broader term. Indeed, we can neither build up to the meaning of Being by generalizing from the concrete characteristics of entities, lower in the hierarchy, nor can we move down from a broader category to Being. It is this very technique of definition via traditional logic that Heidegger rejects in reference to Being, although he allows that, within certain limits, it provides a justifiable way of characterizing beings (entities, things). This indefinability does not absolve us of the responsibility to search for Being's meaning, it compels us to answer the Seinsfrage by some other process than capture by category.

We should not be surprised by this outcome, it is simply the affirmation that Being is not a being (entity). Being is no thing (nothing, nothing that is). There is no thing that is a "to be", therefore, we must find some way of ascribing meaning to Being other than as an object (thing, entity, being).

3. Finally, we traditionally understand Being as self-evident. Being is assumed to be self-evident in such assertions as "the rose is red," or "I am a geographer." We are not to understand self-evident in the logical sense of denial entailing self-contradiction. We can deny that there is such a thing as Being and not falsify our observation that "The rose is red." Thus, without ever needing to think about what we mean by "is" or "am" we plunge on with inquiry, discourse, and even action.
Heidegger insists we do this by virtue of: "The fact that we already live in an understanding of Being . . ."\textsuperscript{23} i.e. we have some pre-discursive, pre-conceptual, pre-analytical awareness of Being. But our previous suppositions, by clouding its meaning, make its presence anything but self-evident. With Heidegger, we must conclude that Being requires a special kind of inquiry.

Fr. Richardson encapsulates the argument as follows:

Let us begin with an initial fact: even before posing the question, man has some comprehension of Being. No matter how dark or obscure Being itself may be to him, still in his most casual intercourse with other beings, they are sufficiently open to him that he may experience that they are, decide about the truth of them, etc. He comprehends, somehow, what makes them what they are, s.c. their Being. Again, every sentence that he utters contains an "is". His exclamations (v.g. "Fire!") suppose the "is". His very moods reveal to him that he himself "is" in such and such a way. He must comprehend then, no matter how obscurely what "is" means, else all this would have no sense.\textsuperscript{24}

This vague, undefined, unquestioning, primordial sense of Being means our unquestioning acceptance of Being as if it were not there. "But this vague average understanding of Being is still a Fact."\textsuperscript{25} Any inquiry that begins its questioning with the certain knowledge of this fact is surely primordial, fundamental thinking.

The inability of the three suppositions above to serve Being stems from their being simply the products of an inadequate approach to Being, namely metaphysics. "In fact, metaphysics begins precisely at that

\textsuperscript{23}Ibid., p. 25.

\textsuperscript{24}Richardson, op. cit., p. 33.

\textsuperscript{25}Heidegger, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 25.
moment when Being is forgotten, namely with Plato."26

Ontology

The mode of inquiry that characterizes our metaphysics can be described as "ontic", i.e. enquiry about entities,27 (beings, things). Scientific inquiry is ontical investigation par excellence. "Ontological" inquiry "is to explain Being itself and to make the Being of entities stand out in full relief."28 The outstanding philosophers of our metaphysical tradition have not been oblivious to the necessity for ontological inquiry but they have been instrumental in confining such inquiry to the ontic mode. That is, Being is enquired about as if it were a being. This is understandable enough in view of our tradition's success in applying categorical analysis to beings (things, entities). Therefore, our tradition's history of ontological inquiry is essentially the same as its history of ontical inquiry, i.e. ontology=metaphysics=ontical thought=obfuscation of Being.

Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its ownmost aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task.29


28 Heidegger, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 49.

29 Ibid., p. 31.
Thus, whether he is discussing "The Task of Destroying* the History of Ontology"\(^30\) of insisting that we overcome metaphysics, Heidegger is saying the same thing. He is requiring that we participate in "fundamental ontology"\(^31\) which begins by asking the Seinsfrage—by inquiring after Being on its own terms. Until Heidegger, our history of ontology was characterized by a method of analysis appropriate to being (things). In his later writings Heidegger, in an effort to diassociate himself even more clearly from this history, stops referring to his own analysis as "fundamental ontology" and speaks of "essential thinking" or just "thinking", in the sense of thinking that begins by thinking of Being and never loses sight of that source.

"Ontological Difference"

Heidegger found it necessary to invoke his "fundamental ontology" because of our metaphysical tradition of failing to preserve the "ontological difference"\(^**\)--the distinction between Being and beings.

\(^*\)Destroying in the sense of de-structuring in order to see how it has functioned in order to learn how to undermine it.

\(^30\)Ibid., pp. 41ff.

\(^31\)Ibid., p. 34.

\(^**\)The term "ontological difference" does not appear as such in Being and Time. But even there he was most emphatic: "'Being' cannot indeed be conceived as an entity . . . nor can it acquire such a character as to have the term 'entity' applied to it," (p. 23). In later works he introduces the term and then abandons it, again to divorce himself from the tradition of ontology, and speaks only of the Difference. The essential role of the ontological difference in all of Heidegger's thought is detailed in L.M. Vail, Heidegger and the Ontological Difference, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1972.
In forgetting the difference, the forgetting of Being is begun. This forgetting initiated and sustains metaphysics.

Being (das Sein) is not a being because it is the process (event) that allows beings to be with human beings and human beings with each other. Being (das Sein) is that by which every kind of being is.

Understood thusly, it makes no sense to say "Being is ___" (and fill in the blank with some-thing). Being is the process of "is-ing". Being is.

The verbal understanding of the "is" of Being is transitive in the sense that Being "is-es". Being "ises" beings.

From the point of view of beings, Being encompasses them all, just as a domain of open-ness encompasses what is found within it. This domain is not, of course, "space" but rather that dimension out of which even space and time themselves come-to-presence. Being is the domain of open-ness, because it is the lighting process by which beings are lighted-up. If these beings be "subjects" or "objects", then the light itself is neither one nor the other but "between" them both, enabling the encounter to come about.

What is, in the sense of anything that is, is because Being illuminates it. But analogous to light, Being itself is unseen. Without

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We understand the verbal substantive "Being" [Sein] from the infinitive, which in turn remains related to the "is" in all its variety of forms. The definite and unique verbal form "is", *the third person singular of the present indicative*, takes precedence over all other forms. We understand "to be" [sein] not in relation to "thou art," "you are," "I am," or "they were" which are just as much part of the conjugation of "to be" as "is". "To be" [sein] is for us the infinitive of "is". Hence we interpret the infinitive "to be" [sein] from the "is".

33 Richardson, Heidegger . . ., *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.
the things Being brings to light it would be unknown and without it no things (nothing) would be known. In revealing things Being conceals itself. It cannot be brought to light as a being. It requires some other approach. What then about this concealed source of non-concealment? This is the question metaphysics never asks--the Seinsfrage. Only the human being can ask this question and he has become animal metaphysicam, concerned only with beings as beings, alienated from the Being of beings (das Sein des Seiendes) i.e. from "the Being of what-is." In view of the verbal understanding we have assigned "Being" (Sein) we can rephrase "the Being of what-is" as "the Is of what-is." William Barrett has contributed greatly to the grasping of Heidegger's concept of Being by sensing that:

... this Is of what-is--in its sheer presence--is what poet and artist make manifest. People under the influence of mescaline have described the wonderful perceptions they have had of the most ordinary objects. The chair across the room Aldous Huxley tells us, is not blurred or distorted, but remains just what it is, a chair, but a chair that shines now with its own Being. Without drugs we get a similar experience from art in Van Gogh's painting of a little wicker chair: IT IS, just that little chair, manifest and open to us; and the simple yet astonishing miracle is that it is.34

It is especially interesting for geographers that Barrett chose Huxley's record of his mescaline experience35 for a demonstration of

34 Barrett, What . . . , op. cit., p. 137. We could of course extend the list, for example Andrew Wyeth's painting of a laundry basket resting against a wall, or James Agee's phenomenological descriptions of the homes of Alabama tenant farmers in his Let Us Now Praise Famous Men (with photographs by Walker Evans), New York, Bal'antine (1941), 1960; or perhaps Mahler's music.

"Is-ing". Under the effect of the drug, Huxley was gazing at some books lining his study wall. A companion asked him, "What about spatial relationships?" Huxley then realized that spatial relationships had lost their usual predominance. Rather than attending to such concerns as Where?--How far?--How situated in relation to what? Huxley found himself perceiving the world in other than spatial categories. He was preoccupied with the luminous "is-ing" of the books on his shelf, rather than with their positions in space. The category was not entirely obliterated because he could still move about his room without misjudging the placement of objects within it. Thus:

Space was still there; but it had lost its predominance. The mind was primarily concerned, not with measures and locations, but with being and meaning.36

Dasein

It is man who encounters both Being and beings, in other words, it is man who is capable of discerning, and forgetting, the ontological difference. Because of this capacity man cannot be viewed as just another being among beings (things, entities) of the universe, and thus certainly not as just animal metaphysicum. In Being and Time Heidegger initiated his lifelong quest to overcome our traditional ontology (metaphysics) which defines man in terms of the way things are, rather than in terms of how Being is. "He sought to do this by showing that man is a being of quite his own kind, namely Dasein, which in its being is concerned

36 Ibid., p. 19.
with its being and is this being." Heidegger is most emphatic and explicit about this matter. He introduces *Dasein* as:

... an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it... *Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being.* Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.

Such ontical inquiries as natural and social science can assume ontological dimension only by forgetting that fundamental characteristic of being human. They fail to realize (remember) that, "whenever an ontology takes for its theme entities whose character of Being is other than that of Dasein, it has its own foundation and motivation in Dasein's own ontical structure, in which a pre-ontological understanding of Being is comprised as a definite characteristic." Thus the sciences must fundamentally fail in their grasp of what it means "to be" man. Some other mode of inquiry is initially required into the question of being human. "Therefore *fundamental ontology*, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the *existential analytic of Dasein*." If our task is to interpret the meaning of Being then *Dasein* is the primary "entity" to be interrogated.

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38 Heidegger, *Being and Time*, op. cit., p. 32.


Heidegger's *Being and Time* is an attempt to reveal, phenomenologically, the characteristics ("existentials") of *Dasein*. Such an endeavour is decidedly not anthropological in intent. Heidegger is not concerned with giving an account of the nature of man, "but rather, through a detailed analysis of *Dasein* to reveal Being itself ontologically."\(^{41}\) *Dasein* is compounded of *Da* and *sein*, *Da-sein*, *Da* being translatable simply as "there". The condition of being human--human existence--is "to be"--there, or, "there-Being" (or "Being-there"). In his *Introduction To Metaphysics*, Heidegger instructs us to understand man as the site which Being requires in order to disclose itself.\(^{42}\) Man is the site of openness, the there (of, for, Being). We can perhaps grasp this concept through an exercise in exaggeration. The very next time you encounter a human being, point your finger and exclaim "There!" "There!" "Being!" Once you get the feeling of what is meant by this exercise you will be content to proclaim (silently to yourself now) each time you encounter another, just "Da-Da!" (i.e. There! There!) Our own son for the first few months of his intentional verbalizing single-mindedly confined such activities to uttering "Da!" He would point his finger, in a most deliberate manner, at the object or person of his attention and joyously proclaim "Da!" or "Da-Da!" Our efforts to teach him the "correct" labels were to no avail for several months. Heidegger in his later works calls for a joyous celebration of Being through being open to Being by "being-there" for it. In all of his works, Heidegger has invoked the poet


\(^{42}\) *op. cit.*, p. 205.
because he is convinced the poet's primordial (in a sense, "primitive" by virtue of being untainted by metaphysics) utterances most clearly and directly call Being to us (i.e. to our attention). Whereas only a few months ago our little poet brought us joy by letting Being be noticed in our lives through his wonder and amazement, as he now approaches his eighteenth-month, he pleases us by "getting things right." "To adapt to this world the child abdicates its ecstasy." Our daughter, as she nears her third birthday, affirms this abandonment of Being.

*Being and Time* is an incredibly exhaustive description of human existence, yet Heidegger achieves his goal without using the term "man" at all. This ensures that we avoid the assumption that we are investigating some definite object of a fixed nature. In this regard we should note that Heidegger makes human existence consistent with Being by using the verbal *Dasein* rather than the substantive form *Daseienden*.

He desires thus to express the idea that every element of man's nature is an active way of existing and that, conversely, these ways of existing reveal his being. The disclosure of his being-there, expressed in active wondering and raising questions about it, is the primitive phenomenon.

By deliberately avoiding mention of "man" Heidegger emphatically disassociates his undertaking from our tradition of subject-object metaphysics which defines man either as an object distinguished by a complexity not attributable to the other objects of the universe, or

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as pure consciousness and thus removed entirely from the world (i.e. conscious of that which it is not). Dasein is more primordial than man. "If man is only man on the basis of the Dasein in him, then the question as to what is more primordial than man can, as a matter of principle, not be an anthropological one." In being prior to man, Dasein is more than man. We have referred to it as the place (site) of Being (das Da des Seins). Man is man by virtue of Being-there (Dasein).

Consistent with being neither humanist nor anthropologist, Heidegger is also not an existentialist. Though even his detractors acknowledge "his decisive role in the history of existentialism," Heidegger claims to be first, last, and always an ontologist. If being an existentialist means being identified with the work of Kierkegaard and Sartre, Heidegger says, "No!" In his "Letter on Humanism" Heidegger delineates the essential distinctions between his effort and the development of thought which enabled Sartre to announce that "Existentialism is a Humanism." Sartre insists that in adopting his thought "Precisely we are on a level where there are only men," and Heidegger would have it that "Precisely


47 In Barrett and Aiken, Philosophy in the . . ., op. cit., pp. 270-302.

we are on a level where there is principally Being."

In his focus on *Dasein* and *Being and Time*, Heidegger seemingly suspends himself from dealing directly with Being. This strategy is nonetheless ontological through and through because he tells us that:

"We shall proceed towards the concept of Being by way of an Interpretation of a certain special entity, Dasein, in which we shall arrive at the horizon for understanding of Being and for the possibility of interpreting it." Thus *Being and Time* as an "existential analytic of Dasein" is not like Sartre's existential analysis of man. It is rather an ontological analytic revealing the basic structure ("existentials") of "Being-there" and as I have attested it is thus a revealing of Being. Once this analysis has enabled us to recognize ourselves as "Being-there" then we are ready to deal directly with Being. We are ready to heed the poet, to hear him call Being. In other words we are ready to engage Heidegger's subsequent, and especially his later, works without accusing him of changing direction—of abandoning man in order to embrace Being, of escaping from existentialism into mysticism, of the so-called reversal (Kehre) in his thought. He has always been on the path to Being.

Heidegger was also able to conduct his inquiry into human existence without reference to "consciousness." He emphasizes that any understanding


of *Being and Time* is thwarted if the reader equates *Dasein* with "consciousness." "The term 'being there' neither takes the place of the term 'consciousness' nor does the 'object' designated as 'being there' take the place of what we think of when we speak of "consciousness." Consistent with not being a humanist, nor an anthropologist, nor an existentialist, neither is Heidegger a phenomenologist if it means being included in the philosophical movement identified with Husserl and, of course, Sartre. Heidegger considered his conception of phenomenology to be more radical than Husserl's. Though he acknowledges his debt to Husserl, he rejects phenomenology as a movement. He is adamant that what is essential in the initial conception of phenomenology "does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement' (Richtung)."

Heidegger instead stresses its possibility. "We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility." That is, as a possible way to uncover Being. To distinguish such an understanding and use of phenomenology from Husserl's, Heidegger called his method "hermeneutic phenomenology." "Meanwhile phenomenology in Husserl's sense was elaborated into a distinctive philosophical position according to a pattern set by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte." In the same way

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that the use of the expression "ontology" in "fundamental ontology" and "ontological difference" discomforts Heidegger because of its almost inevitable association with our tradition of ontical understanding, Heidegger is uneasy about the term "phenomenology" even if qualified as "hermeneutic phenomenology" because of its association with the Cartesianism of Husserl and Sartre. Vincent Vycinas encapsulates the distinction as follows:

For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is plainly a philosophy revealing the essences in reality; about Being, it has nothing to say, for Being does not appear. On this very important point Heidegger breaks away from Husserl. Since phenomenology aims to disclose phenomena, according to Heidegger, the theme of phenomenology is truly the outstanding phenomenon, i.e. that phenomenon "which primarily and mainly does not display itself, and which, when compared to that which primarily and mainly does display itself, remains concealed and nevertheless essentially belongs to that which primarily and mainly displays itself. It belongs to it in the sense that it constitutes its meaning, founds it." This outstanding phenomenon is Being, and phenomenology basically is ontology.57

Just as Heidegger abandons the use of the term "ontology" and comes to rely solely on "thinking" to stand for thought of Being, i.e. for "fundamental ontology" and for thinking of "the difference," i.e. the "ontological difference," so he abandons reference to "phenomenology" i.e. "hermeneutic phenomenology," and turns instead to "thinking". It is the same thinking, the same thought, thought of Being. This thought is never abandoned. The labels may change but the thought remains the


same, always of Being. "Only as phenomenology, is ontology possible."\textsuperscript{58}

Thus, Fr. Richardson's study is aptly titled \textit{Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought}. Some forty years after \textit{Being and Time} Heidegger was asked if it could be said he had discarded phenomenology. He was still able to reply, "Only as a philosophical movement (\textit{Richtung})."\textsuperscript{59}

In fact, in 1963 Heidegger felt justified in declaring that:

> The time of phenomenological philosophy seems to be over. It appears already as something passed, still to be listed only historically among other movements of philosophy. Yet phenomenology in its inmost property (in ihrem Eigensten) is no movement.\textsuperscript{60}

The thinker and the poet are in concert. The thinker gets us back to Being and the poet bring Being back to us. The thinker thinks through words (in the sense of breaks-through) to Being; and through words (in the sense of medium) the poet brings Being back to the fore for us. In both endeavours, words are of the essence. The difference lies in what each does with them. The thinker works with words, i.e. interprets, to get to Being; the poet makes words work to bring Being forward. Heidegger is fond of calling language the "house of being" and it is Dasein who dwells there. Dasein is verbal in its linguistic form.

\textsuperscript{58}Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 60.


\textsuperscript{60}From Heidegger's "Niemeyer Festgabe," quoted by Adamczewski, p. 19. Compare Heidegger's preface to Richardson's \textit{Heidegger . . . op. cit.}, esp. p. xiv. Adamczewski concluded that Husserl's "science of essences," "precisely as movement, discipline or school, may be listed only within the long series of footnotes to Plato." But that "Heidegger's possibility of thought, whether or not it coincides with philosophy, transcends that series" (p. 20).
and it is man who "verbalizes". Because of what we have said, historically, about Being we have lost sight of it, i.e., of its being hidden, of its "truth"—to hide as it discloses beings. All our talk about things has hidden Being's hiding from us. The utterance is primordial. Hence the need for poetry—not as another thing, but in the verbal sense of an act. The thinker must commit poetry, and the poet must commit his poetry to what needs to be thought—Being. 61

... to be a poet of first rank there is a thinking that the poet must accomplish, and it is the same kind of thinking, in essence, that the thinker of the first rank must accomplish, a thinking which has all the purity and thickness and solidity of poetry, and whose saying is poetry. 62

In comparing the phenomenological method—that is, the "thinking" Heidegger intends for us—to poetry, we have seen the essential historical dimension of both activities. The poet is ever re-calling Being 63 and the phenomenological thinker must peel back the centuries of ontical inquiry to get back to Being. Heidegger's thought is through and through historical. "In analysing the historicality of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity is not 'temporal' because it 'stands in history,' but that, on the contrary, it exists historically and can so exist only

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because it is temporal in the very basis of its Being."\(^{64}\) The intention of the "hermeneutic phenomenology" is an historical interpretation of \(Dasein\).\(^{65}\) But the interpretation is to be in terms of Being, not consciousness nor objects.

As with all of Heidegger's terms, "hermeneutic" is painstakingly selected because of a connotation. He implicates Hermes the Greek divine messenger who brought the message of destiny.\(^{66}\) The history of Being was destined to be, i.e. was fated. But it could have been otherwise. The inmost property of phenomenology is this possible other way, that was, and is, always there—in \(Dasein\), in Being-there. Heidegger's "history" is not at all that of our tradition of historical inquiry. Heidegger does not concern himself with what occupies the historian, namely the past. The past with which the historian deals has no fate. Rather, it is the has been which fascinates Heidegger. What has been (the case with Being) still is, and can be again. Heidegger's theory of history is equally rooted in all three tenses.

At present, \(Dasein\)’s future is no less its past. "The future is not later than having been, and having been is not earlier than the

\(^{64}\)Heidegger, \textit{Being and Time}, op. cit., p. 428.

\(^{65}\)"Our investigation itself will show that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in \textit{interpretation}." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 61.

\(^{66}\)"All this makes it clear that hermeneutics means not just the interpretation but, even before it, the bearing of message and tidings." Martin Heidegger, "A Dialogue on Language," in his \textit{On the Way to Language}, op. cit., p. 29.
For Heidegger, contemplating the future entails consideration of the Pre-Socratics. In these very origins of Western thought we will discover how the first "fate-ful" steps of thought about Being were taken.

When it comes to history as we commonly refer to it, Heidegger acknowledges the relative superiority of the Marxist interpretation of history to all others. In Marx's emphasis on the alienation of man, he:

... reaches into an essential dimension of history ... .

Because, however, neither Husserl now, as far as I can see, Sartre recognizes the essentially historical character of Being, neither phenomenology nor existentialism can penetrate that dimension within which alone a productive discussion with Marxism is possible.

Only ontology, as Heidegger conceives of it, is capable of meaningful debate with Marxism. Marx's elaboration of alienation as an historical condition of human being, and one to be overcome by becoming fully human, enrthalls Heidegger. But whereas Marx considered the root of man to be man himself, Heidegger understands Dasein to be prior to man and man in terms of both his thought and action thus rooted in Being. Where

67 Heidegger, Being and Time, op. cit., p. 401.

68 See especially Seidel, Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics, op. cit., Ch. II, "The Meaning of History for Heidegger," pp. 15-26. He suggests that while "It is quite possible Heidegger's theory of history raises as many problems as it solves; nevertheless, the originality and the profundity of his treatment are not to be denied" (p. 15). See also, Calvin O. Schrag, "Phenomenology, Ontology, and History in the Philosophy of Heidegger," in Kockelmans, Phenomenology . . ., op. cit., pp. 277-93.

Marx insists that human alienation "is first realized and expressed in the relationship between each man and other men." Heidegger insists that this alienation originates in each man's relationship to Being. Where Marx remains fully anthropological in his premise that "My own existence is a social activity," and that "The individual is the social being." Heidegger remains fully ontological in his stance that my Dasein (my own existence) is an expression of Being, that, before a being can be a social being, it must first be there. Before being a social being man is Da-sein.

**Being-in-the-World**

We can speak of man as a social being because Dasein is never ontologically alone in its relation to Being, but always with the "Other" (Mitdasein), i.e. with Dasein other than its own, with others. But neither is Dasein ever apart from things (des Seiendes). Although each Dasein can distinguish itself and others (Mitdasein) from the things (des Seiendes) of the world, Dasein is nevertheless intimately and inextricably bound up with these things--Dasein is involved with them. Thus, to be dasein is "to be-in-the-World-with-Others." In

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other words, each unique human expression of Being, that is—every Dasein, which is also a Mitdasein, is an expression of "Being-in-the World" (In-der-Welt-sein). To be-in-the-world is to be-in-volved with things.

To be human is to be-in-the-world, Dasein and "Being-in-the-World" are synonymous. Before we can conceive of there being human beings distinct from the other beings of the world, there must first be the possibility of there being both, i.e. both man and nature, both humans and things, both subjects and objects. There-being-both, is Dasein, and the possibility of there being both is "World". Before there can be both, there must first be a "World" where both can be together.

"World" opens up ways of Being to Dasein, especially the ways of being with things. "'World' does not signify in this determination a being at all and no realm of beings, but the openness of Being."72 Vincent Vyncinas tells us that:

The world opens itself only with man, the being who has the knowledge of Being. The world is the realm wherein our history occurs, wherein we encounter things and encounter ourselves.73

In marked contrast, the non-human entities are not worldly, they are worldless, they exist only within an environment, rather than being

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72 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in Barrett and Aiken, op. cit., p. 293. See also Vyncinas, op. cit., p. 38. "The world is not a thing, nor is it a framework for all things, but the world is in a more primary way than are things."

open to possibilities they are surrounded. A stone or a cow is not open to the possibilities of being there, i.e., to the possibilities of Dasein; each is not open to Being, each is not of the "World", but is simply there—in the world of Dasein. A stone IS, a cow IS, but how each is for Dasein is a relationship established in terms of the world of Dasein. An Andrew Wyeth painting of a cow or a Van Gogh chair, become works of art for us because they compel us to set aside our world and stand before the cow or chair for what it IS, in terms of itself. It is the very unexpectedness of this occurrence that tells us we are experiencing a work of art. We are not used to being before Being. It is a rare occurrence. Just as "poetry" needs to be understood as a verb, so does the "work" of an art work. The work of art (like that of poetry) is to bring Being to us. "The art work opens up in its own way the Being of beings."

We can be renewed or refreshed by art work and then usually want to rush out and see if the world is really like that. The sunflower Van Gogh painted is not beautiful in itself, but what it tells us is beautiful, simply that it IS. Of Van Gogh's painting of a peasant's boots Heidegger tells us that:

This painting spoke. In the vicinity of the work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be.

We usually tend to be in the midst of things and ever ready to comment on the way someone is doing something (some-thing i.e., doing


75 Ibid., p. 35.
things). Of the "World" of possible ways of being with things, at any
given instant one way—a world, establishes the relationship. To be
in this particular world, i.e. to be this one expression of "Being-in-
the-World," is to be in a certain relationship with things. When we
speak of the way a person is doing things, or even of "Doing our own
thing" we are really recognizing that, of the "World" of possible ways
(of being with things), this Dasein at this time is experiencing one
way—is experiencing "a world". As Heidegger would have it: the "Wo
worlds. The "worldhood" of "World" manifests itself in the manifold
worlds that are possible for Dasein and unknowable apart from it.76 In
the Indian's world the cow is a sacred symbol; in the Western world it
is a commodity, precious in another sense: as a source of profit to the
rancher and as an increasingly costly source of tasty protein to the
consumer.

But we should not construe World as some sort of floating, uni-
versal set of possibilities. A world is more than any possible world
we are free to reject. It is in a sense fateful. In Being and Time
Heidegger elucidates a basic feature of human existence—its facticity,

76 Ibid., p. 44. See Magda King, op. cit., "The worldishness of
World," pp. 70-98. Though "Being-in-the-World" is central to any dis-
cussion of Heidegger perhaps the clearest exposition is found in
W.B. Macomber, The Anatomy of Disillusion: Martin Heidegger's Notion of
Truth, Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1967. See esp. Ch. 2,
those readers seeking a comprehensive and comprehensible introductio
n to Heidegger's work this volume assumes less philosophical background
than most Heidegger texts and is remarkably readable. For the reader
pressed for time, Edward G. Ballard, "A Brief Introduction To The
Philosophy of Martin Heidegger," op. cit., is highly recommended.
i.e. the fact that we are thrown into "our world." The world we come to discover ourselves as being-in is not of our own choosing. Just what possibility would there be of being thrown today into the Homeric age? There is an expression of destiny here rather than randomness, of being "delivered over" rather than either choice or fluke.

With his explication of Dasein as the condition of being human Heidegger eradicates the Cartesian conception that epitomizes modern metaphysics. Descartes, with his "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, therefore I am") ushered in our modern epoch by locking man up in his own ego. (Alan Watts describes this most Western conception of man as that of "an ego encapsulated in a bag of skin.") That things were "out there" in the world had to be assumed and the nature of the relationship between them and the island self had to be explained. Having thus conceived of ourselves as being separate from nature nevertheless we persist in trying to understand ourselves purely in terms of physical realities, i.e. objectively, in terms of assumptions, theories, and methods devised for ontic inquiry.

The pitfalls of such a presupposition were readily apparent and to abolish them man was conceived of as essentially consciousness and perception postulated as the effect that establishes the relationship with objects. Perception would have to be an impartial act. Even Husserl never escaped this fundamental framework. The pure consciousness

78 Loc. cit.
he phenomenologically sought always being a "consciousness of" and the "things themselves" always being objects for consciousness.

Heidegger has been able to carry out his exhaustive explorations of human existence without the use of the words "consciousness" or "man". He deliberately eliminates the gulf between subject and object. He would not have us peering at the world outside ourselves through perceptual portholes or have sterile "sense data" penetrating our minds through these windows on the world. His very notion of existence is that we are already and always in the condition of being outside ourselves (ex-istence). We are extended beyond our bodies as a field of Being bounded by our "world". The "in" of being-in-the-world therefore does not express a spatial relationship, i.e., a body-bounded ego located somewhere amongst others and things. Our "in-ness" implies we are "bound-up-with" a world of objects and others. We inhabit our world.

Though Heidegger would wince at the analogy, we might consider how Newton conceived of a material body as existing within its surface boundaries whereas Einstein viewed matter as a "field" (e.g. a magnetic field). Dasein could be thought of as such a "field" without a corporeal core, as encompassing a field of concern (in-volvement) rather than radiating from an ego center.

It takes a little time to get used to this Heideggerian notion of a field, but once familiar it is at once inevitable and natural and alters our whole way of looking at the human person. To be sure, this existence is always mine; it is not an impersonal fact . . . . Nevertheless the mine-ness of my existence does not consist in the
fact that there is an I-substance at the center of my field, but rather in that this mine-ness permeates the whole field of my Being. 80

The use of hyphens in the compound expression Being-in-the-world is intended to convey the impression of a unified, structural whole. We are not in the world like a chair is in the room. Dasein is not spatially contained. In an even cruder analogy, this time with psychadelic jargon, we are "spaced-out". Dasein is spatial. To adopt this vision of being human is to refuse to imagine yourself metaphysically.

Metaphysics

In answering "What is Metaphysics?" Heidegger draws upon Descartes' analogy of philosophy being a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches are the several sciences. Draw yourself a little picture to represent this analogy, and then, along with Heidegger, ask yourself, "What is the ground in which metaphysics is rooted?" There is only one possible answer, Being. The "ground" of metaphysics is the Being of the beings metaphysics has traditionally addressed, and confined, itself to. Surely then there is a necessity to address ourselves to the soil ("dress the soil") that sustains that which springs from it. We need to enter the ontological dimension of inquiry. In order to do this fundamentally we must ask the Seinsfrage. To "overcome" metaphysics we must come to know how it came to be obsessed with beings. We cannot discover this history by thinking metaphysically--we must get over such thinking, i.e. "overcome metaphysics." "Getting over" suggests learning how to get along without

something which was previously meaningful to us, e.g. getting over the loss of a treasured family heirloom; and "getting over" also suggests explaining something, e.g. getting an idea over to the class. Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology of the history of Western thought serves this two-fold purpose. Heidegger very effectively gets over to us the history of our metaphysics and what it means to our lives today, and he provocatively suggests what it would mean to mankind to get over such metaphysics.

To get back to Being we must stand back from our metaphysics. Such a backing away from our historical fixation on beings does not entail a going back into the past and staying there, but a bringing of Being back into the future of mankind. In the origins of our metaphysics, in the pre-Socratics, Being held sway. Standing back from our metaphysics means going back to its roots in order to bring forward Being by discovering that it has always been with us. Being is just hidden away "back there" somewhere, remote from our daily dealings with the world. When we realize we are in the world with things by virtue of Being-there we overcome our metaphysics by experiencing our individual existence as a Being-there-in the midst of things, as Dasein, as "being-in-the-world." Thus, enmeshed as we are in our metaphysics we miss Being, in the two-fold sense of "miss", as something we fail to find and as something we feel the absence of. Our missing Being in the sense of failing to find it (in the midst of our existence) is more an inability to discover (dis-cover) what is already there for us, but covered over by a dense accumulation, namely metaphysics. Our metaphysics disposes us to experience the forgetting as something missing
in our lives, rather than disposing us to search for, let alone embrace, the nothing (no-thing) which Being is.

Metaphysics began when the Greeks separated beings from the ground of Being. Plato was the instigator, Heidegger claims, "when he made the distinction between the beings of experience as a world of shadows and the Being of these beings as a world of Ideas."\(^1\) This thought detached things as clear and distinct forms from their all-encompassing (back)ground so that they might be more clearly reckoned with and effectively controlled. "With this objectification of nature—that is, the detachment of objects as objects from the environing ground of Being—the age of metaphysics begins."\(^2\) This truncation was accomplished by a crucial transformation in the meaning of truth. Heidegger associates these two intricately-related events with the "Allegory of the Cave" in Plato's *Republic*.

The Transformation of Truth

Heidegger's outstanding and essential contribution to the history of philosophy is his conviction that Plato was able to steer Western thought onto the path of forgetting Being because of a fundamental ambiguity in the thought of the pre-Socratics. This fateful ambiguity concerning Being enabled Plato to argue convincingly for his interpretation of his predecessors, the pre-Socratics: Anaximander, and especially Parmenides and Heraclitus. Heidegger's interpretation of the

\(^1\)Richardson, *Heidegger: Phenomenology . . .*, p. 5.

pre-Socratics is as essential to his historical project (overcoming metaphysics) as is the existential analysis of Dasein in Being and Time. Both endeavours think on Being.

As well as experiencing the existential analysis of our existence we must share in Heidegger's interpretation of the pre-Socratics and interrogation of the philosophical greats: Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche. In providing the potential for the Platonic misinterpretation, the pre-Socratic ambiguity about Being equally harboured the authentic thinking of Being. Parmenides and Heraclitus spoke the truth about Being, but they also afforded Plato the opportunity to change the nature of truth and to disregard the ontological difference. Subsequent philosophers variously elaborated this crucial event, some drawing closer to Being, others looking even further away until finally, with Nietzsche, this entire history exhausts itself as error. It fell to Heidegger to examine this entire history and judge it ill-conceived. Any man who suggests that 2500 years of intellectual investment constitutes a less than worthy investment will not be suffered easily.

Such an adjudication as Heidegger's should not be considered an act of personal arrogance. Rather than being arrogant, Heidegger stands in awe of the thinking of the pre-Socratics. Rather than being "pre" in the sense of preliminary (to Plato and Aristotle) they were great. They thought greatly about Being; their poetry about Being distinguishes them from the philosophers who followed them as mere metaphysicians. Heidegger claims that surviving fragments of Parmenides' "Way of Truth" poem "might perfectly well replace whole libraries of supposedly
indispensable philosophical literature." Heidegger is under no allusions about the accusations those with a vested interest in such literature will hurl at him:

"... [to them] our interpretation of the fragment must appear to be an arbitrary distortion. We are accused of reading into it things that an "exact interpretation" can never determine. This is true. In the usual present-day view what has been said here is a mere product of the farfetched and one-sided Heideggerian method of exigesis, which has already become proverbial. But here we may, indeed, we must ask: Which interpretation is the true one, the one which simply takes over a perspective into which it has fallen, because this perspective, this line of sight, presents itself as familiar and self-evident; or the interpretation which questions the customary perspective from top to bottom, because conceivably—and indeed actually—this line of sight does not lead to what is in need of being seen.

In an assessment of "Recent Work on Presocratic Philosophy," G.B. Kerferd identifies the widely diverging lines of development within traditional pre-Socratic scholarship. The contention that even Aristotle "read into the Presocratics assumptions that were of his own making" makes it difficult to dismiss Heidegger outright. Yet, "Existentialist interpretations tend to seem obviously wrong in both method and in resulting interpretation to most members of the English speaking world [of pre-Socratic scholars]." And, G.S. Kirk, believes

83 *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 96.


87 *Loc. cit.*
the pre-Socratics "have fallen victim to some particularly wild interpretations" by Heidegger. But Kirk and Raven have been accused of being too narrow in their presentation of the pre-Socratics as "cosmologists and scientists, and on occasion, as theologians and mystics," and of ignoring them "as philosophers in any modern sense of the term." Heidegger would concur that those pre-Socratics indeed were not philosophers but original thinkers of Being, ontological poets not mystics. Typical of Heidegger's "radical" renderings is his insistence that Heraclitus and Parmenides say the same about Being; whereas Plato cast them in opposition (Heraclitus: "All is flux," vs. Parmenides: "All is permanence"): Thus, if Heidegger's interpretations of the pre-Socratics are to be criticized, they cannot be criticized according to the standards and norms of currently accepted historical interpretation. For one thing, Heidegger's purpose is different. For another thing, [he] has called these very standards and norms into question.

The early Greek thinkers characterized Being as the "presencing of the present." This twofold pre-Socratic experience of Being embodied an essential ambiguity. It harboured the basis for our historical failing to discern the ontological difference. Buried in this


89Kerferd, op. cit., p. 132.

90Seidel, op. cit., p. 12. See also Vick, op. cit., n. 57, p. 150 for a succinct statement of how Raven's rejection of Heidegger is the result of failing to grasp Heidegger's desire to provide us with the opportunity to individually experience Being as it was originally thought.

91Seidel, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
fateful ambiguity was the ontological imperative to distinguish between Being and thing. This ambiguity afforded Plato the possibility of displacing a tradition devoted to experiencing the manifold dimensions and expressions of Being by transforming the nature of truth. By changing our thinking about truth Plato altered our relationship to Being. Being, thinking, and truth were for the Pre-Socratics a unified experience and Plato was able to fragment and refashion that experience. Whereas Heidegger found Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides in accord about Being, he does not consider Plato and Aristotle as the authentic fulfillment of pre-Socratic thinking. Seidel suggests that, "Though later and more influential, Plato and Aristotle represent rather a degeneration and a falsification of a truer and more original and more authentic tradition." The thought of these two later Greeks corresponded to the two aspects of Being for the pre-Socratics and thus served to sunder what was originally a unified experience.

The pre-Socratic experience of Being was expressed in the dual terms "\textit{physis}" and "\textit{ousia}". Nothing less than Heidegger's own words will suffice to convey the sense of these two expressions. Heidegger claims that "\textit{physis}" originally meant standing-forth, or coming-to-stand in the sense of arising-from-itself.

What does the word \textit{physis} denote? It denotes self-blossoming emergence (e.g. the blossoming of a rose), opening up, unfolding, that which manifests itself in such unfolding and perseveres and endures in it; in short, the realm of things that emerge and linger on . . . .

\textsuperscript{92}Ibid., p. 43.
Physis as emergence can be observed everywhere, e.g. in celestial phenomena (the rising of the sun), in the rolling of the sea, in the growth of plants, in the coming forth of man and animal from the womb. But physis, the realm of that which arises, is not synonymous with these phenomena, which today we regard as part of "nature". This opening up and inward-jutting-beyond-itself must not be taken as a process among other processes that we observe in the realm of the existent (of "things"). Physis is Being itself, by virtue of which existing things become and remain observable. . . . Physis is the process of a-rising, of emerging from the hidden, whereby the hidden is first made to stand.93

On the other hand, Heidegger would have us understand that "ousia" meant remaining-in-standi ng. He maintains that all the original definitions of Being that he examines are:

. . . grounded in, and held together by, that wherein the Greeks unquestionably experienced the meaning of Being, and which they called ousia, or more fully parousia. The usual unthinking translation of this word as "substance" misses its meaning completely. For parousia we have in German a corresponding term--An-wesen (presence), which also designates an estate or homestead, standing in itself or self-enclosed. In Aristotle's time ousia was used both in this sense and in the sense of the fundamental term of philosophy. Something is present to us. It stands steadily by itself and thus manifests itself. It is. For the Greeks "being" basically meant this standing presence.94

Thus, Being meant:

1. standing-in-itself (In-sich-stehen) in the sense of arising (Ent-stehen, standing-out-of) (physis),
2. but, as such, "permanent" (ständig), i.e. enduring (ousia).95

Vick summarizes Heidegger's argument of what then happened to Being as follows:

93 Heidegger, An Introduction To Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 14-15. (Slight modifications to Manhein's translation have been made for the sake of consistency. See Vick, op. cit., pp. 144-45 and Gray, op. cit., p. 75.)


95 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
With Plato, it became necessary to ignore the standing-forward of what is, to focus instead, upon the "what", or *eidos* which stands forth, with Aristotle it became necessary to be concerned, not so much even with the patterns which stand forth, as with the correspondence of our own acts of judgment to these patterns, or to external things, viewed now primarily as criteria of the correctness of our thought; and with Kant, almost the last vestige of our consciousness of *physis* disappeared, as things themselves came to be thought of, not as standing-forward, but as posited or synthesized by our own thinking.96

More important than his insistence on this process of degeneration are Heidegger's efforts to have us recover the original awareness of *physis*. What we have lost is astonishment. In being concerned with what is there, and with correct perception of it, we are no longer amazed that there is anything there at all. Caught up in substantial things we no longer marvel at there being something there rather than nothing at all (see p. 73). Rather than begin with questions addressed to the nature of relationships, processes and things we must first ask how it is that these are there for us at all. It is Being understood and experienced as *physis* which opens a domain of enquiry for us and maintains it for us. For Heidegger it is of the utmost significance that the Pre-Socratics...

... did not learn what *physis* is through natural phenomena, but the other way around: it was through a fundamental poetic and intellectual experience of Being that they discovered what they had to call *physis*. It was this discovery that enabled them to gain a glimpse into nature in the restricted sense. Hence *physis* originally encompassed heaven as well as earth, the stone as well as the plant, the animal as well as man, and it encompassed human history as a work of men and the gods; and ultimately and first of all, it meant the gods themselves as subordinated to destiny. *Physis* means the power that emerges and the enduring realm under its sway.97

*ideα, "the Forms".

96 Vick, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Fascinated with solving the puzzles of physics we have forgotten how to wonder at *physis*. A child exclaiming "Da!" amuses us; what amazes him or her has become alien to us.

First as his *Being and Time* evinced the ineluctable temporal dimension of Being, Heidegger's writings establish the sense of "true" involved in understanding our daily use of the verb "is". Truth and Being are intimately related, involved in each other. Truth as it was understood, experienced and expressed by the pre-Socratics has become as foreign to us as *physis*. Where as *physis* was displaced, truth was transformed.

"The presencing of the present" says that, "What is now present presents itself; hence there is no presence--no Is--without revelation, or truth." And this is just how truth was initially understood by the Greeks, as "alétheia", translated best as "unhiddenness",


99 "Unhiddenness in Greek is alétheia, which word is translated as 'truth'." Martin Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, *op. cit.*, p. 257. See also his essay "On the Essence of Truth" in his volume *Existence and Being*, *op. cit.*, pp. 292-324 where he indicates truth was revelation in the secular sense of disclosure, ". . . truth is rather the revelation of what-is, a revelation through which something 'overt' comes into force" (p. 309). See especially Chapter 3, "The Essence of Truth: Unhiddenness," in W.B. Macomber, *op. cit.*. This book is a most readable and thorough examination of the tradition of truth and Heidegger's critique of that tradition and his attempt to rethink truth as it was first encountered by the Pre-Socratics. Heidegger's discussion of what happened to truth divided *Being and Time* into two equal parts, see pp. 256-73, where Heidegger demonstrates that, "Moreover, the 'definition' of 'truth' as 'uncoveredness' and a 'Being-uncovering', is not a mere explanation of a word" (p. 263).
"unveiledness", 100 or "non-concealment", 101 rather than "revelation" with its theological undertones. In his account of physis as standing-forth Heidegger argues that it is a standing-forth-into-the-light, 102 as emergence into unconcealment, into the Pre-Socratic alétheia. It is this truthful way of Being that we no longer attend to,

For metaphysics meditates being (a 'being' is 'that which is,' a Seiendes) as beings but never meditates the process by which beings are what they are, sc. Being (Sein) itself. Being for Heidegger, then, is fundamentally a process by reason of which beings are, but which for that very reason is itself not a being. More precisely, Being is a process by which beings come-to-presence for man, i.e. emerge out of some antecedent obscurity, or concealment (-léthē), and become 'lit-up', so to speak, or rather un-concealed (a-léthes), sc. revealed as what they are in truth. Furthermore since the emerging-into-presence of being as beings is a process which continues as long as the beings remain, an element of obscurity (-léthē), or 'negativity', always remains intrinsic to the process of a-létheia. It is a-létheia thus understood that Heidegger takes to be the authentic meaning of 'truth': for him, Being and Truth are one. 103

We have come to attend to the what (appearance) of what is present. We have lost the sense of truth belonging to Being and have come to insist upon truth as a characteristic of a proposition, a human proposition, or

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102. See esp. Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 98-103. Seidel, op. cit., p. 35 acknowledges that in terms of classical scholarship "coming forth into the light" is somewhat outrageous etymologizing. But again Heidegger invites us to hear the poets as they originally spoke to us, not through the filter of scholarly obfuscation. See also Vick, op. cit., p. 149.

of the mind that formulates the proposition. But, "truth is a characteristic of Being itself in the sense that in order for any fact to be present it must to some degree be revealed."104 Neither then does truth reside in the thing as an attribute in a substance. Thus, Aristotelian, Medieval, and modern metaphysics fail to grasp that:

... truth is a condition for the presence of anything, which just insofar as it is present must have revealed itself. Truth, in the most basic sense, resides neither in the subject (the mind) nor the object (the thing), but in that enveloping presence within which the thing has already become present, or revealed.105

For mental judgments to correspond with material facts there must be a field or region in which the two can meet and coincide. This "field" is Being--"the enveloping presence"--the region which makes it possible for subject and object to meet. The distinction between subject and object (or, theory and fact) must presuppose this third presence which is neither physical nor mental but the open field in which these two are already there. It is just this openness of Being which is the original Greek sense of truth as álētheia. Our modern conventional notion of propositional truth is derivative, first there must be álētheia. Only Heidegger has made this hidden assumption of "unhiddenness" explicit. Vycinas summarizes this unique and celebrated exposition, thusly:

Truth, as the agreement between cognition and the thing known, is, according to Heidegger, not sufficiently primary thought. For a thing to agree or disagree with cognition, this thing must appear, reveal itself, come out of concealment. The thing in its


105 Loc. cit.
disclosure is in a more primary sense true than in its agreement with the mind. The truth as agreement Heidegger calls correctness (Richtigkeit), hence—not really truth. Correctness is not located in reality like the truth as disclosure, but in sentences.106

Heidegger's argument for how truth as correctness began with Plato must await one more consideration. Earlier, Dasein was introduced as the condition of "there-being-both" (humans and things, subjects and objects) or as a field of Being. Thus, we have come full circle. Because of our humanist philosophical traditional and our ingrained anthropomorphism we find it difficult to grasp that Dasein does not express the essence of man, but the condition of being human (Being-human, the process of human-Being). Dasein is,

... this bringing into the light of Being, the revelation of Being. The Da in Dasein is Being itself revealed or brought out of concealment into disclosure. Since disclosure in Heideggerian thinking is truth, Dasein is the truth of Being.107

Dasein is the place where Being is revealed, not a spatial place, but the "open field" where it becomes apparent that for there to be both there must first be truth. Dasein is in this sense then the "source" (place/"open field") of truth.

Truth is located not in things and not in man but in Dasein, the openness of Being, itself. Man can be the source of truth only because Being holds sway over him. Disclosure is not an act of man but of Being.108

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106 Vycinas, op. cit., p. 73.
107 Ibid., p. 69.
108 Ibid., p. 75.
To suggest that truth is a property of the mind, an outcome of intellect, is symptomatic of our historical severance from Being. Such a contention characterizes our history of humanist and subjectivist metaphysics. Modern physics is our most recent expression of this tradition of truth and thus its claims of objectivity are really nothing else but steadfast adherence to subjectivity. Because, to subject truth and things to rigorous operations of the intellect is to subject them nonetheless and is quite in contrast to openly receive them as they are there for us.

How is it that we should attribute the transformation of truth to Plato? How is it that direct experience of Being (as physis) came to be replaced by ideas, concepts, and systematic philosophies of being? How is it that the Western scientific, philosophical, and religious mind "... has tended to be theoretical in its approach to reality—that is, to explain the directly experienced world by means of the unseen idea or theory?" Nowhere is the answer better summarized than in the following passage by Barrett:

The nub of the matter lies in Plato's theory of Ideas. The question of what is the meaning of Being (i.e., what is the meaning of Is?) Plato transformed into the question: What are the things that are really real? His answer is that these are the Ideas—the eternal essences that lie beyond time and space and are grasped not by the senses but by the intellect alone. But what is an Idea? Here Heidegger in his grubbing fashion, fastens on the etymology of the word: idea in Greek is connected with the root verb for seeing, the same root that appears in the

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Latin video, and in our English vision. Thus an Idea, in its root sense, is an aspect or perspective. Every perspective, moreover, implies a human point of view. Hence the "really real" things, the things to which Plato accords a pre-eminent reality, are at bottom human perspectives. Consequently, for Plato, truth ceases to be a-letheia, the unhiddenness of Being as it reveals itself, which was the meaning of truth for the earlier Greeks, and becomes instead the correctness (orthotes) with which the intellect grasps and manipulates its own perspectives.110

We find the key to this subordination of Being to the correct perception of beings in Heidegger's interpretation of Plato's "allegory of the cave."111 In the allegory the original intuition of a-letheia and physis persist but they become subordinated to a concentration on ousia expressed as "idea". Playing on the two-fold ambiguity of Being, Plato occludes the role of a-letheia by focusing on the ousia nature of Being which he interprets as Idea. Thus physis fades into insignificance.

110 Barrett, What Is Existentialism? op. cit., pp. 195-96. Barrett goes on to indicate how this event was the source of the definitive difference between East and West that so fascinated Northrop:

"Neither Chinese nor Indian thought took this step declaring truth to reside in the human intellect. Their emphasis is quite the contrary, and they leave man thoroughly immersed in Being. For this reason, perhaps, they were not able, like the Greeks, to create science" (p. 196).

111 Heidegger's essay on "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," op. cit., begins with a translation of the relevant sections of Plato's Republic and then proceeds to his interpretation and its relationship to the historical development of Western metaphysics. This essay is best read in conjunction with Richardson's article "Heidegger and Plato," op. cit. (This same analysis, but with a less effective introduction appears in his Heidegger: Through Phenomenology To Thought, op. cit., pp. 301-08). A lucid and compact resumé and analysis of Heidegger's essay is included in Bernd Magnus, Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 70-79. He goes on to suggest three possible criticisms.
and ousia understood as "idea" comes to prominence in the West. The Idea becomes what makes it possible to see things as they are. It is in the allegory that:

Plato first set thought on the wrong path by identifying the Being of beings with the essence of a thing--its idea--which sheds the "light" which illuminates what-is. Being is no longer physis, but essence and the "thinking of Being" is construed as a "seeing" by the mind of "idea".\(^{112}\)

Heidegger shows how Plato, by building on the ousia side of Being convinced us that:

The "idea" is the outward appearance which gives a perspective upon what is present. The idea is pure shining in the sense of the phrase "the sun shines." The "idea" does not just let something else (behind it) "amke an appearance," it itself is what appears, and it depends upon itself alone for its appearing. The idea is the apparent. The essence of the idea lies in the qualities of being apparent and visible. The idea achieves presence, namely the presence of every being as what it is. Being is continuously present in the what of beings. Presence however is really the essence of Being. Being, then for Plato, has its real essence in its What.\(^{113}\)

In Plato's own words Idea is "itself master, dispensing both unhiddenness (to what emerges) and the ability to perceive (the unhidden).: \(^{114}\)

"Alétheia comes under the yoke of the idea," and thus:

When Plato says that the idea is the master permitting unhiddenness, he banishes to something left unsaid the fact that henceforth the essence of truth does not unfold out of its own essential fullness as the essence of unhiddenness, but shifts its abode to the essence

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\(^{114}\)Ibid., p. 265.
of the idea. The essence of truth relinquishes the basic feature of unhiddenness.115

Thus:

Unhiddenness now refers to what is unhidden in the sense of being accessible through the apparentness of the idea. But insofar as such access is necessarily obtained through "seeing", unhiddenness is hitched into a "relation" to seeing, and is "relative" to this.116

Throughout the allegory unhiddenness is subordinated to that which is revealed and the way in which it is perceived. Each stage of the soul's turning to the light emphasizes catching sight of "outward appearance." The struggle is for a more accurate viewing. In being liberated from being faced with only shadows, the flame in the cave allows the prisoner to see more. He sees the things that form the shadows as being more than the mere shadows of his previous seeing. As Plato relates, "turned toward things that are being more, he can have a more correct glance."117 And in the light of the sun outside the cave he sees most "rightly" (correctly) of all.

The transition from one situation into another consists in making one's glance more correct. Everything depends on the orthotes, the correctness of the glance . . . . Truth becomes orthotes, correctness of the ability to perceive and to declare something.118

In ascribing primacy to idea and idein (vision) over alētheia Plato transformed the nature of truth and changed its domain as well. Truth resides now in human judgment. Truth is made subject to the correspondence

115Loc. cit.

116I have taken the liberty of combining the translation in ibid., p. 262 with that of Macomber, op. cit., p. 150 to smooth readability. (The original German is in Macomber, p. 150.)

117Ibid., p. 265.

118Loc. cit.
of *idea* and *idein* and because of this Heidegger considers all of Western metaphysics to be subjective. The correspondence theory of truth\(^{119}\) which underlies modern scientific inquiry is the necessary extension of the allegory.\(^{120}\) Heidegger has traced out the fateful devolution of truth and Being according to the following generalized pattern:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Era</th>
<th>Truth</th>
<th>Being</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Platonic</td>
<td><em>alētheia</em></td>
<td><em>physis/ousia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platonic</td>
<td><em>orthotes</em></td>
<td><em>idea</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td><em>veritas</em>(^{121})</td>
<td><em>natura</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medieval</td>
<td><em>adequatio intellectus et rei</em>(^{122})</td>
<td><em>transcendens</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cartesian</td>
<td><em>certitude</em>(^{123})</td>
<td>&quot;will&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nietzschean</td>
<td><em>error</em>(^{124})</td>
<td>will to power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(value)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{119}\) The correctness of sight in relation to what is sighted (the *orthotes* of *idein* to *idea*), guarantees *homoiosis*—a 'correspondence' between knowledge and its object." Magnus, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

\(^{120}\) Already in Aristotle we find it claimed that "The false and the true are not in the act [of Being unhidden] ... but in the understanding." Heidegger, "Plato's Doctrine of Truth," *op. cit.*, p. 267.

\(^{121}\) In the translation of *alētheia* to *veritas* the Greek word loses its negative character (i.e. non-concealment) and becomes positive and underived. See Macomber, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

\(^{122}\) St. Thomas Aquinas said, "truth is really met with in the human or in the divine understanding." *Alētheia* here becomes *adequatio*. Loc. cit.

\(^{123}\) Descartes insisted that, "Truth or falsehood in the real sense cannot be anywhere else except in the understanding alone." Loc. cit.

\(^{124}\) Nietzsche held that "truth is a kind of error." Loc. cit.
Common to this history of truth's decline is the necessity of this new humanized, i.e. subjectivized, understanding of truth to require expression (human declaration, therefore no longer is the truth of Being to assert itself). The requisite assertion is true to the extent of its comparability to evidence. No longer understood as unhiddeness alétheia becomes expressed as the opposite of the false (in the sense of the incorrect). The mystery of Being (its proclivity for hiding) ever revealed by its truth (the hidden coming into discovery) fades from experience as it is replaced by a human determination of what is "true", i.e. correct (not false). This very forgetting of Being nurtures our failure to discern the ontological difference. Dasein itself falls prey to becoming objectified—human beings can become things for us. Modern science is obsessed with being exact (in the sense of "accurate" about men and things—i.e., about "objects" or "subjects" of enquiry) and modern technology enables us, as never before, to be exacting. In our precisely instrumented science and technology even objects dissolve. They are disintegrated into subatomic structures or energy equivalents. Human beings are reduced to their genetic codes. Every entity and existence is subject to such disintegration. Modern art reveals this fragmentation. Nothing

125 "Both, subjectivism as well as objectivism, belong to the same level of thinking. An object can only be an object for a subject, and a subject is always opposed by objects. Therefore Heidegger considers subjectivism and objectivism under one and the same name, 'subjectivism'." Vycinas, op. cit., p. 95.

126 In the sense of "extracting" e.g. of materials and energy from our environment and labour from humans.
(no-thing) is left intact. Nothingness abounds. Nietzsche warned us of this very nihilism:

What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can longer come differently: the advent of nihilism.\textsuperscript{127}

Western societies have been most effective in eliminating fellow human beings through the process of objectifying ("thingifying") them and then labeling them as objectionable entities, e.g. "gooks", "slopes", "chinks", and "niggers". Evidently, we can observe that the objects correspond with our idea of the objectionable and thus truly warrant eradication or containment. To salvage our liberal rhetoric of freedom, equality, and fraternity, we have had to call upon early anthropological science to identify and classify the "savage" (the sub-human) we have enslaved and annihilated. The obscenity of this nihilistic imperative reached its apex when it was concluded that:

Women have no existence and no essence; they are not, they are nothing. Mankind occurs as male or female, as something or nothing. Woman has no share in ontological reality, no relation to the thing-in-itself, which, in the deepest interpretation, is the absolute, is God . . . . Woman has no relation to the idea . . . .\textsuperscript{128}

To appreciate why Heidegger considers Nietzsche to be the culmination of metaphysics we must be most clear about what he was reacting to.


\textsuperscript{128}Otto Weininger, \textit{Sex and Character}, London, Heinemann, 1906, p. 286. This work was considered scrupulously scientific and the quote is cited in Betty Roszak and Theodore Roszak, eds., \textit{Masculine/Feminine}, New York, Harper Colophon, 1969, p. 89.
In Plato's and Aristotle's concern for the presence of what was present (in their focus on *ousia*) they were aware that the explanation had to be "beyond the totality of material things." Meta-physics is this very search to find the special thing that explains the presence of other things. But this totality was conceived of in terms of being the sum of objective, determined, graspable things therefore their quest for the ground of the presence of the things-that-are was a search for the thingliest of things. Hegel's affirmation of the absolute spirit concludes the hunt. It is against the self-producing system of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* that Nietzsche revolts. Zarathustra's cry "God is dead" is not a proclamation of Nietzsche's personal atheistic stance but rather it symbolized the destruction of that supersensible reality (the Platonic Ideas, the Absolute, etc.) where man's highest values resided. "God" was Nietzsche's expression for the supernatural realm of ideas, ideas which Plato led us to acknowledge as the only true world, the domain of the really real. Nietzsche's proclamation struck down any supersensory transcendent as a possible ground of Being and re-introduced the problem of the presence of the things-that-are.

But Nietzsche's position is also the culmination of metaphysics, for it repeats the traditional error of grounding this presence in a thing instead of preserving the essence itself as ultimate. The thing in question is not a supersensory *Seiende* this time, but the *Wille zum Willen*; this dissipates the last equivocation that still protected the primitive astonishment and respect for the mystery of the presence of the *Seiende*. There is no more problem of Being, the quest for truth is ended and declared meaningless.129

That Nietzsche should have made the "Will To Power" the essence of Being is remarkable because Nietzsche considered the very concept of Being as a "ghost" and a "vapour". He thought Being the thinnest gruel philosophical minds could have extracted from the concrete realities of the senses. By opposing all expressions of idealistic, Platonic supernaturalism Nietzsche felt he was overcoming metaphysics but Heidegger insists that it was nothing more than "the reversal of Platonism, the reversal by which then for Nietzsche the sensible becomes the true world and the supersensible the untrue" and thus "remains thoroughly within metaphysics." Furthermore, Nietzsche held that "truth is a kind of error."

Truth, in Nietzsche's thought came to its ultimate expression as subjectivity in the "will to power." He did not overturn the tradition of truth Plato and Aristotle initiated, and he scoffed at Being. Although he did not transcend metaphysics he brought it full-circle because:

He had perceived correctly that the principal conflict within Western philosophy lay at its very beginning, in Plato's condemnation of the poets and artists as inhabiting the world of the senses rather than the supersensible world of the abstractions, the Ideas, which represent true Being as opposed to the constant flux of Becoming in the world of the senses.

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130 Heidegger from an as yet untranslated volume quoted in Vycinas, *op. cit.*, p. 98. (The abode of truth is changed, but not the nature of truth.)


Physis and Logos: Being and Thinking

The emergence into unconcealment of the physis sense of Being "would itself occur in, and in a sense be, the ordering and distinction, the gathering-together through setting-apart, through which things emerge into apprehension as what they are, e.g. as sea, as earth, as animal, etc."\(^{133}\) which is to say that Being would also be what Heidegger claims Heraclitus and Parmenides meant by logos. "In the Pre-Socratic thinkers Physis and Logos were intimately united."\(^{134}\) The Pre-Socratic sense of logos is the original sense of "thinking" and it was one with Being. It was thought of Being, that is, it belonged to (or, with) Being. In Greek thought thinking (logos) was split from Being (physis) and lodged in the human mind as logic, or ratio, or "Reason" to finally emerge as our modern calculative thought that operates via capture by categories.

We strive today to think only in a logical (rational) manner and are admonished to abhor irrational ("emotional", "subjective") lapses. We seek rigor in our calculations and preciseness in our measurements and "objectivity" in our mental operations. Heidegger's several philosophical critiques amply demonstrate his ability to be "logical" but he insists this is not enough. He does not counsel irrationality when he implores us to think beyond logic to logos as it was in the dawn of Western thought and experience. Rationalism and irrationalism


\(^{133}\)Vick, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

\(^{134}\)Seidel, op. cit., p. 44.
reverberate at the same level. Authentic thought—"originative thinking" leaps over this level to resonate with Being. To be ever reminded of the ontological difference we have to be able to think ontologically. Logic is ontical thought and will not aid us in answering the Seinsfrage. Being's thought—logos must be re-experienced in its original occurrence.

Initially logos was the "logic" of physis, i.e. its ordering energy ("the primal gathering principle" or "original collecting collectedness") or, the "assemblage" achieved by Being. But then, with Plato and Aristotle, logos becomes understood in relation to idea as the logic of statement:

In the first case physis itself is that which assembled all things into their 'somethingnesses' by throwing them into their boundaries; physis is logos. In the second case, idea is that which assembles all the things into their 'somethingnesses'; idea is logos. But in order for idea to so appropriate logos it had to transform its meaning—from gathering to statement, from logos to ratio. This paralleled the requisite transformation of alétheia to orthotes. As did truth, logic loses its ontological dimension and becomes subject to human determination. Thus, whereas:

Initially logos as gathering is the event of unconcealment, grounded in unconcealment and serving it. Now logos as statement becomes the abode of truth in the sense of correctness. And this process culminates in Aristotle's proposition to the effect that logos as statement is that which can be true or false.137

135 Heidegger, Introduction To Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 128. "The original and authentic meaning of Logos was collection (Sammlung)." Seidel, op. cit., p. 44.

136 Vyncinas, op. cit., p. 145.

137 Heidegger, Introduction To Metaphysics, op. cit., p. 186.
Heidegger summarizes this whole affair and its consequences as follows:

Logos becomes statement, the locus of truth as correctness, the source of the categories, the fundamental principle in regard to the possibilities of Being. "Idea" and "category" become the two terms that dominate Western thought, action, and evaluation, indeed all Western being-there. The transformation of physis and logos and hence of their relation to one another is a decline from the first beginning.¹³⁸

The earliest Greek poets were thinkers of Being, they were under the spell of Being's logic and truth. Today's great poets and artists are the least likely to be bound by our metaphysics, the likeliest to hear and see Being in its original fullness, in its unison with logos and álētheia and to experience physis. Today's thinking is ontical because it is contained by idea, orthotes, and ratio. So:

The misinterpretation of thought and the abuse to which it leads can be overcome only by authentic thinking that goes back to the roots--and by nothing else. The renewal of such thinking requires a return to the question of the essential relation of thinking to Being, and this means the unfolding of the question of being as such. To surpass the traditional logic does not mean elimination of thought and the domination of sheer feeling; it means more radical, stricter thinking, a thinking that is part and parcel of Being . . . We must know more--i.e. our knowledge must be stricter and more binding--than all the epochs before us, even the most revolutionary.¹³⁹

And so we are brought back to the quotation that introduced Part One of this thesis and, through the answers to the twelve questions posed at the start of this present chapter, to an appreciation of the


What Heidegger requires of us can hardly be construed as mysticism. Indeed he invites us to discover the understanding that will enable us "to fulfill the true humanization of man" and to thrill our spirit "with its will to be." Such aims demand that we ask the Seinsfrage and answer those twelve key questions. Achieving the "true humanization of man" commits us to thinking truly about what it means to be human and this involves our appreciation of Heidegger's profoundly historical analysis of what has happened to thinking and to truth and to Being. Furthermore, we must be open to Heidegger's concerns about our obsession with "will" and "willing". He has entitled one of his latest works Gelassenheit, which translates as "releasement" to distinguish his thought from the final manifestation of metaphysics as "will". ("But thinking, understood in the traditional way, as representing, is a kind of willing.") The Marx inspired end that Ernst Block entreats us to pursue entails our prior consideration of Heidegger.

140 Ernst Block, On Karl Marx (see introductory quote, p. 1).


142 Ibid., p. 58. An inquirer who has listened to Heidegger explicate Gelassenheit remarks: "You speak without let up of a letting-be and give the impression that what is meant is a kind of passivity. All the same, I think I understand that it is in no way a matter of weakly allowing things to slide and drift along" (p. 61). The response which emerges is that releasement lies "beyond the distinction between activity and passivity . . . because releasement does not belong to
As we have seen (p. 103), perhaps no one is more cognizant of the accomplishments of Karl Marx's thought than Martin Heidegger. Notably, he proposes that within the context of Western metaphysics "the Marxist view of history excels all other history." Heidegger suggests that only his ontological enquiry probes deeper than Marx in the search for the source of man's alienation. Therefore, if the human condition is to remain subject to our metaphysical tradition then Marxism warrants our fullest consideration, but, Heidegger makes us painfully aware that:

The beginning must be begun again, more radically, with all the strangeness, darkness, and insecurity that attend a true beginning. Nor, should we be surprised to find the same realization echoed in the poetic utterance of a North American who tirelessly sought out the domain of the will" (p. 61).


Paralleling Kreeft, but in terms of Western metaphysical themes, J.N. Mohanty, Phenomenology and Ontology, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, p. 24, suggests that "we may safely say that Heidegger is dissatisfied with the dichotomy of theory and practice and that he seeks to overcome this dualism not by reducing one to the other but by deriving them from a higher, a more original unity."


144 See Martin Heidegger's 1935 quotation, intro. page, Part Two.
unheralded experiences of the human condition.

But there must be an end to this: a sharp end and clean silence: a steep and most serious withdrawal: a new and more succinct beginning . . . Nor may this be lightly undertaken: not lightly, not easily by any means: nor by any hope 'successfully'.

145 James Agee, Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1941, p. 91 (Ballantine Books edition). In 1936, James Agee and the photographer Walker Evans lived with Alabama tenant farmers and the prose and photographs comprise a phenomenological document that was suppressed by the editors of Fortune who commissioned the work.
CHAPTER FIVE

EROTICS

*Humanism Is Not Enough*

We have discovered that human geography cannot be based on humanist philosophy and scholarship because our entire tradition of metaphysics must be overcome. Our first step toward a geography of the human condition must be a thorough consideration of Martin Heidegger's thought. We will be unable to create and sustain a humane and humanizing geography if our initial reference point is a vision of man as the animal metaphysicum. Instead we must focus on Dasein, on "Being-in-the-World." To do this we must ask the Seinsfrage: "If, as we unfold the question concerning the truth of Being, we speak of overcoming metaphysics, this means: recalling Being itself."¹

What we in the West have lost sight of, what has concealed itself in our tradition, is the "involvement of Being in man:"

Due to the manner in which it thinks of beings, metaphysics almost seems to be, without knowing it, the barrier which keeps man from the original involvement of Being in human nature.²

Traditionally we have understood man as one kind of being among others, and placed ourselves at the pinnacle of a hierarchy of beings as the self-conscious and rational animal. We were able to do this


because we forgot the "ontological difference." Such forgetting was the result of failing to constantly renew the question of the meaning of Being. Rather than experience ourselves as Dasein thinking (as logos) the truth (as alétheia) of Being (as physis), we have conducted our inquiries in terms of representational thinking, starting with consciousness, the cogito (the datum self) and assuming the subject-object dichotomy as our frame of reference. Human geography is probably the "social science" least cognizant and critical of this tradition. Only of late, have geographers begun again to explore their epistemological frontier.3 The ontological realm, however, remains terrae incognitae for geographers. The events of our time draw us to the brink of discovery and Heidegger waits to guide us through. He has mapped the way.

Because he rejects "humanism" as the essential message for our time, some might misunderstand Heidegger and brand him anti-humane.4 Such unfortunate misjudgments would come from reading elements of his thought, e.g. "Letter on Humanism" without the context of his entire historical vision.

We have seen that Heidegger has always acknowledged the greatness of the Greeks. His thought is not simply a denial or diminution of what

3Fred Lukermann, Anne Buttmer, Joe May, and Ed Gibson (and, in an oblique and negative fashion, Hartshorne) have analyzed or commented upon human geography's earlier phases of epistemological expansion.

4Such a charge would not surprise Heidegger, for he has suggested that: "Because 'humanism' is argued against, one fears defense of the inhuman and a glorification of barbaric cruelty. For what is more 'logical' than that for one who negates humanism only the affirmation of inhumanity can remain?" Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, op. cit., p. 29.
Plato and Aristotle accomplished. They forged the basis of "humanism", which we could consider as having rescued man from his immersion in nature and as having distinguished the strictly human from the animal.

In making such a claim, Barrett has suggested that:

The great artistic expressions of humanism are those beautiful and idealized forms of man created by the classic Greek sculptors. If the modern sculptor cannot create such idealized forms, it is not because he is anti-human or anti-humane; another vision claims him, such as the need to reintegrate man into nature, so that some of Henry Moore's carvings, for example, exhibit the human body as a rock eroded by the sea and cast upon the shore from the waves.5

Humanism as a doctrine is incomplete for an age in which humans threaten to overpower nature and perhaps over-populate the species. It will not reclaim Eliot's "Wasteland" because:

Modern man sees the meaning of his life in complete domination or ruling of the world. The world is for man's use and exploitation, and this exploitation is the meaning of human life. The meaning of the world is derived from man, and the meaning of man is placed in the conquering of the world. This reciprocal relation of world and man is a meaningless circle . . . . Modern man is speeding toward the extremes of his subjectivity to hold the world completely in his hands. He believes he will then be fully man. However, at exactly that time the complete emptiness of modern man will be revealed. If man is not seizing the world any longer (world is conquered), who is he? What is his meaning?6

What About Romanticism?

Through decidedly fewer than the more politically and phenomenologically inspired attempts at humanizing geography, efforts by


geographers to evaluate the romantic rebellion of the nineteenth century beg consideration at this point.⁷ We should not expect any neo-Romanticism to infuse our history of humanism with what is essentially lacking in our age. The Romantic poets and artists sought to express the alienation of man from nature. But Heidegger would have us realize that the source of our contemporary poets' and artists' anxiety is severance of man from Being. Even more significant than their protests against mechanization and their celebrations of nature, the Romantic poets left another legacy. Whereas historically poets had often found themselves at odds with the prevailing view, the Romantics were the first to feel exiled "through the sheer fact of being a poet."⁸ This was a quiver of ontological uneasiness that now reverberates with renewed energy amongst many modern poets and artists. It is this dimension of Romanticism geographers need to sense if they are searching that period for signs of our times and hopes for a creative reunion of man and nature.

More urgent are the ontological lessons to be learned if human geographers would contemplate modern art and poetry, particularly

⁷ As previously suggested, the writings of Buttiner, Yi-Pu Tuan, Lowenthal, Prince, and Gibson contain aspects of this theme. (At Simon Fraser University students are given opportunities to explore through courses, the human geographic significance of the Romantic period. Most generally they find that Romanticism's treatment of landscape was confined to the picturesque, but some romantics, notably Wordsworth, did transcend the strictly pictorial to engage the spirit or surrounding presence of landscape. Ed Gibson analyzes the Romantic symbolism of the Victorian city embodied in its art, architecture, and literature. F.F. Cunningham examines Romantic themes in landscape art, e.g. in the work of Turner.)

contemporary Canadian works. Canadian landscape art compels human
geographers to discover our *Dasein* nature. Contemporary Canadian poetry
some of it remarkably ontological, establishes the significance of land-
scape in the meaning of *being* Canadian. Nor can human geographers in
Canada be excused for failing to immerse themselves in Canadian literature
in search of the relationship to land, place, landscape, and nature
involved in being Canadian. But, to ensure that the ontological
dimension of such enquiries is not lost, it must be remembered that:

9 Note the stress is on the *ontological* aspect of these works,
not on the issue of Canadian nationalism. The significance of land,
landscape, and nature in the various expressions of the human condition
in Canada is here a *Dasein* question and should not be confused with the
question of a national identity such as is found in Cole Harris's
essay, "The Myth of the Land in Canadian Nationalism," in Peter Russell,

10 Geographers will want to consult the following: Laurence Ricou,
*Vertical Man/Horizontal World: Man and Landscape in Canadian Prairie
Fiction*, Vancouver, University of British Columbia Press, 1973;
Donald G. Stephens, ed., *Writers of the Prairies*, Vancouver, University
of British Columbia Press, 1973; Margaret Atwood, *Survival*, Toronto,
Imagination*, Toronto, Anansi, 1971; D.G. Jones, *Butterfly on Rock: A
Study of Themes and Images in Canadian Literature*, Toronto, University
of French Canada* (University of Toronto Romance Series, 12), Toronto,
University of Toronto Press, 1968; also Marcia B. Kline, *Beyond the
Land Itself: Views of Nature in Canada and the United States*, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1970. At Simon Fraser University, Michael E.
Eliot Hurst initiated a significant opportunity for geographers to
discover the poetics of space, place, and landscape. The geography
and other departments in conjunction with the Canada Council supported
a novel series of guest lectures/readings, entitled "Canadian
Landscapes," Series I and II featured such guests as: poets Birney,
Purdy, Mandel, Lee, Waddington, art critic and historian Barry Lord,
and such geographers as Harris and Warkentin. Series III hopes to
include poets Atwood and Acorn.
The being of Dasein is primarily the being of man. It is the primordial experience and "location" of the unveiling of Being in the human situation. Dasein as "Being there" does not mean a particular place, like an object or person being at a particular place at a particular time. It is more like a context in and through which Being manifests and expresses itself.11

It will be useful to re-examine now, from the ontological perspective, some of those geographers reviewed in Part One of this thesis. Those influenced by Marx will not be included because it has been suggested by Heidegger that they are heirs to a profoundly historical understanding of modern man's condition. If overcoming our metaphysics demands too much, then geographers should not settle for less than an exhaustive evaluation of Marxist thought. Of course, neither should the insights of existentialism, nor the discoveries of phenomenology, be avoided or denied in establishing humanist premises for the practice of geography.

Explanation, Experience, Erotics

Cole Harris suggested that we might reasonably expect geography to take a leading role in our universities because of its history of, and potential for, synthesis. Such a capability seems vital for comprehending our growing environmental crisis. That geography has not assumed this role "reflects the fact that our students are steeped in methods rather than in ideas that can stem from wide-ranging knowledge, while their teachers seek out spatial relations that are often as

11Oswald O. Schrag, Existence, Existenz, and Transcendence, Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1971, p. 113 (emphasis added).
unimportant as they are irrelevant to the distinctive task of geography." Recognizing the unnecessary and stifling confinement such a state of affairs reveals, Harris sets about expanding the epistemological domain of human geography especially in terms of its tradition of historical enquiry. Though his article effectively contributes to philosophical awakening within the discipline, it does not point toward the ontological issues considered in this thesis.

In fact, in a period when "it has become increasingly clearer within Western civilization as a whole that the understanding of the historical nature of reality is the distinguishing characteristic of our time," Harris's considerations seem narrowly conceived. His own sincere concerns for "wide-ranging knowledge" suggest that basic necessity for an even broader spectrum of debate regarding the relationship of theory to historical explanation than he acknowledged in his article. Too many philosophers whose major contributions have a direct bearing on the problems of historical understanding and explanation seem conspicuously absent from Harris's argument. N.R. Hanson and


13 Though not ontologically oriented either, J.A. May, Kant's Concept of Geography and Its Relation to Recent Geographical Thought, University of Toronto, Department of Geography Research Publications, No. 4, University of Toronto Press, 1970, is of considerably more philosophical importance to the discipline. Compare, Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problems of Metaphysics, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1962.

S. Toulmin are not referred to for example, nor is Michael Scriven whose response to Carl Hempel warrants consideration by every historian. The omission of Karl Popper's works is likely linked to an even more significant aspect of historical scholarship not mentioned by Harris, i.e. Marxism.

Though he clearly chose to confine himself to the more compact issues of historical understanding, historical explanation and historical causation we might reasonably still have hoped that Harris would refer to the field of "speculative philosophy." Historical geographers need to immerse themselves in the immense and important debate generated by those who claimed to be able to chart the course of history and predict the future in terms of an overarching scheme or system. Here we would consider, for example, Hegel, Marx, or Toynbee. Popper's attempted argument with Marxism is a chapter in intellectual history that human geography needs to digest as part of its philosophical nourishment.

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16 References to Toulmin, Hanson, Scriven, and Popper can be found in Antipode, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Feb., 1972), particularly in Christopher J. Smith, "Epistemological Problems in Planning," pp. 23-40, though the level of appreciation leaves much to be desired.
A third level of concern for historians is centered in the more recent attention being given to the problem "of the origin and nature of historical consciousness as such."\(^{17}\) This issue ushers historians into the ontological realm because here they must ask: "What does it mean to see human experience as being basically historical in nature?"\(^{18}\) Harris's focus on the issues involved in historical explanation, and his rejection of phenomenology, shield him and his readers from the necessity to experience being historical. He denies us our Dasein nature.

Also, there are questions being asked about the ontological status of history itself. Assuming that the historical domain is the totality of human events, creations, and institutional crystallizations, then:

Self-impelled and self-sustained, the historical process is distinguished from natural processes as a novel or superimposed mode of existence. The character of history as a sphere superimposed upon the given realm of nature renders its existence problematical, raising the question: What is the raison d'être of the historical process?\(^{19}\)

But, it is the previous question of a new attitude to experience—namely, the historical, which is of most interest to us ontologically. Not surprisingly for a theological treatise, Stevenson's *History as Myth* finds the origin of the historical understanding of reality in biblical

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\(^{17}\) Stevenson, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

\(^{18}\) *Loc. cit.*

\(^{19}\) Nathan Rotenstreich, "The Ontological Status of History," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Jan. 1972), p. 49. He analyzes the answers he finds in Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger, and concludes that the question of the raison d'être of history is invalid and he attempts to reformulate the problem of the nature of history. His treatment of Heidegger is highly questionable.
experience, but it also asks: "Where shall we locate the emergence of our modern historical consciousness, with its self-conscious awareness of man as a peculiarly historical being who is continually creating himself in the historical process?" He suggests that the late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century years generated "for the first time a self-conscious, systematic, and critical approach to historical reality." It should be of great interest to Harris and the historical geographers he has influenced to find that in this early period historians revolted against the abstract, ahistorical Cartesian rationalism. Foremost among these rebels was Giambattista Vico (1668-1744).

In his fourth chapter, "Toward an Erotics of History: Language and History," Stevenson examines possible similarities in Vico's thought and Heidegger's. For example, Vico rejected objectifying thought as the primary way to apprehend reality, he insisted on the primacy of man's self-knowledge and he was convinced language was the key to such knowledge, and thus he was preoccupied with etymological analysis.

Further:

20 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 33.

21 Loc. cit.

Vico believed that his contemporaries had gone astray in their approach to the reality of history, and, as we have seen, his corrective for this situation was to invite his contemporaries to examine their experience in a new way: namely, through the examination of primitive experience of the "first men" who were poets, and "truthful by nature."23

Stevenson suggests that Vico's approach to historical experience and Heidegger's "hermeneutic phenomenology" provide a basis for an erotics of history. With reference to Susan Sontag's essay "Against Interpretation" he adopts her stance that "Western civilization's preoccupation with analysis, interpretation, 'true meaning', etc., has come to be a stifling approach to experience, at least in the realm of literature", and that:

As a liberating alternative to "interpretation", Sontag calls for a greater attentiveness to form in art; for the development of a descriptive, rather than an analytical and prescriptive, vocabulary for forms; and for a "really accurate, sharp, loving description of the appearance of a work of art." The goal of this erotics is "transparence." "Transparence means experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are." An erotics of art will seek this transparence of experience by showing us how our experience "is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than show what it means."24

To this Stevenson grafted Gerhard Ebeling's statement that:

The primary phenomenon in the realm of understanding is not understanding of language, but understanding THROUGH language.25

and concluded that:


When language and history are approached in this way, then the interpretation of language ("X really means A") is replaced by the interpretation through language, i.e., the really accurate, sharply loving description of an event in all its luminosity. Here the possibility of an erotics of language is opened up; a fundamental reversal in which we renounce the infirm glory of the positivist describing of things as they "actually happened," and begin to understand that at least to some extent the event happened as it is described, because the description is what is meant.26

Judging from the way he seemed to spurn phenomenology we might well expect Harris to recoil from the suggestion that an erotics of history holds promise for the human geographer. From both the ontological perspective and the current status of historical enquiry itself we must conclude that Harris's article represents solid journeyman labour—real intellectual craftmanship—but lacks the leap of imagination needed to establish a truly human geography in the remainder of this century.

Soil, Landscape, and Love

Interestingly, we have already been provided with a premise which suggests the possibility of establishing an erotics of geography both humanized and historical. Though not an ontologist, Karl Jaspers constructed his philosophy around many ontologically significant insights, such as:

The profoundest quality of Being must appear . . . essentially in the sensuously concrete . . . . Soil, landscape, and love, the institutions of communality, friends, the beloved, are for me not only the sensuous reality of perceptibility but the historical presence of Being itself.27

26 Stevenson, op. cit., p. 121.

Because he is not ontological in any Heideggerian sense Jaspers does not require us to "overcome metaphysics," but nevertheless his existential philosophy possibly could stimulate geographers into exploring a new domain of meaning for their subject—an erotics of geography. Less radical than Heidegger, Jaspers would still provide a basis for a human geography that would be more humane, integrative, holistic, and less Cartesian than most of the discipline's recent endeavours and altogether more ontologically oriented.\textsuperscript{28} Whereas Heidegger investigates \textit{Dasein} to discover the universal structures (characteristics—"existentials" he calls them) of human experience, Jaspers conceives of \textit{Dasein} in such a way that it becomes subject matter for the traditional categories. Oversimplifying, we can understand Jaspers as claiming we have missed a crucial aspect of human existence in our investigations—the experience of \textit{Dasein}. Thus:

For Jaspers, \textit{Dasein} is essentially empirically and culturally conditioned. It is our geographical, biological, psychological, and sociological "thereness".\textsuperscript{29}

For Jaspers this empirically confined \textit{Dasein} is a level of inauthentic existence to be surpassed, i.e., transcended. For Heidegger \textit{Dasein} is itself transcendence, the condition of being extended into, involved with, a field of significance. Heidegger would have us realize that the existence of \textit{Dasein} fundamentally challenges

\textsuperscript{28}The similarities and differences in Jaspers' and Heidegger's philosophy are detailed in Schrag, \textit{Existence . . .}, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 107-20. This is the most ontologically aware introduction to Jaspers' philosophy available in English.

\textsuperscript{29}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 113.
the role of traditional categories in human enquiry. Regardless of such differences, we have in Heidegger a perspective by which we can evaluate existential/phenomenological thought and sense the wisdom of the emergence of an erotics of geography.

Though Relph's dissertation\(^3^0\) became available too late to be considered fully enough for commentary in this thesis, a preliminary reading, consideration of his recent CAG paper\(^3^1\) and personal discussion make me reasonably confident that his translation and contemplation of Eric Dardel's *L'Homme et La Terre, Nature de la Réalité Géographique*\(^3^2\) could significantly contribute to an erotics of geography. Let us consider at length Relph's summary of Dardel's work:

The most complete investigation of the direct experiences of the world that underly geography is that by Eric Dardel in his study of the nature of geographical reality. He argues that before any scientific geography there exists a profound relationship between man and the world he lives in--"une géographicité de l'homme comme mode de son existence et son destin." Geography is not to be understood as just another branch of knowledge with geographical reality being primarily an object and geographical space a blank that is waiting to be filled in. Rather we should recognise that geographical reality is first of all the place where someone is, and perhaps the places and landscapes they remember--formal concepts of location, region or landform are subsequent. It follows from this that geographical space is not uniform and homogenous, but has its own name and is directly experienced as something substantial or comforting or perhaps menacing. It is the space


\(^3^1\)Edward Relph, "Levels of Significance in Sense of Place and Place-Making," presented at the University of Toronto, May, 1974.

\(^3^2\)Presses Universitaires de France, 1952. Relph should be encouraged and assisted in making his translation and commentary available as soon as possible.
of earth and rock, water and air, the built space of towns and
cities, or landscapes expressing entire complexes of human
intentions. In short, Dardel argues that geography is initially
a profound and immediate experience of the world that is full
with meaning, and as such is the very basis of human existence.33

In Dardel's work we find a justification for asking, "What does
it mean to see human experience as being basically geographical in
nature?" and thereby invoking an erotics of geography. From a
Heideggerian perspective the ontological indications in Dardel are quite
provocative and the existential and phenomenological significance of
his inquiries are only too apparent.

We might also wish to consider the value of an erotics of space
as a useful criticism of the "spatialist" geographers; that is, as a
means of humanizing their questions and methods. Here the primary
question would be: "What does it mean to see human experience as being
basically spatial in nature?" In such an inquiry we are aided immensely
by Gaston Bachelard's profoundly phenomenological The Poetics of Space
in which he seeks to "determine the human value of the sorts of space
that may be grasped, that may be defended against adverse forces, the
space we love."34 Though not Heideggerian in intent, Bachelard's work
is of great interest to those with a Heideggerian interest because of
its unusual and ontologically aware treatment of poetry. He tells us
that, "Because of its novelty and its action, the poetic image has
an entity and dynamism of its own; it is referable to a direct


34(Translated by Maria Jolas, with a foreword by Etienne Gilson)
ontology" and that, "The poet speaks on the threshold of being." Just as Dardel's untranslated book promises to nourish the more encompassing notion of an erotics of geography, Georges Matoré's l'Espace Humain promises to enrich an erotics of space. Even the most cursory translation, and a study of its footnotes, proclaims its relevance. So far the Anglophone geographer's appreciation of this work has been confined to a tantalizing excerpt entitled "Existential Space," and a very brief mention in Edward T. Hall's The Hidden Dimension. Matoré tells us that:

Space is far from being a simple concept; it is felt. There is a proximity which has nothing to do with distance.

Using the historical approach, Matoré analyzes literary metaphor to reveal what he calls the "unconscious geometry of human space." This "geometry" has shifted radically from the essentially geometric and intellectual spatial imagery of the Renaissance to an emphasis on the "sensation" of space. Effectively complementing Heidegger's history

35 Ibid., p. xii.
37 Landscape, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Spring, 1966), pp. 5-6.
39 "Existential Space," op. cit., p. 6. He prefaces this claim about space with the remark that, "For Heidegger existence by the very fact that it is in the world has a spatial character."
of our traditional metaphysics, Matoré suggests that, "In traditional thought the world was limited to a seen space, but it was more seen by reason than by the eye; it was analyzed but not really observed." Yet it is Matoré's contention that, "Today, the idea of space employs more movement and goes beyond the visual to a deeper sensual space." Matoré orients us to an erotics of space by insisting that, "Space is not only perceived, it is experienced."

Matoré emphasizes that modern man is frantically trying to maintain meaningful contact with an increasingly elusive world and that it is therefore essential that he be able to understand his situation in concrete terms, and that:

This can be achieved by grasping, by prehension; but the tactile sense, though it provides rich experiences and permits us to establish a close intimacy with objects, is difficult to explain and communicate, precisely because of its authentic quality. As

40 Loc. cit. We might remind ourselves that, "the intellectualist tradition began when Plato interpreted the primary being as idea, that which is visible to the intellect." Edward G. Ballard, "A Brief Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger," Studies in Recent Philosophy, Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 12, New Orleans (in conjunction with Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague), 1963, p. 108. Ballard's contribution to the subsequent Vol. 13, 1964, pp. 55-79 was titled "Renaissance Space and the Humean Development in Philosophical Psychology," and it warrants serious study by both positivists/ spatialists and their critics. See also, Everett Knight, The Objective Society (Intro. by Wm. Barrett), New York, George Braziller, 1960, e.g. "We saw that the 'geometrization' of the universe accomplished by renaissance science brought about the withdrawal of God to distances which made the sensory communication of the middle ages unacceptable, but which was no barrier to mind or conscience" (p. 91).

41 Hall, Hidden Dimension, op. cit., p. 87 (emphasis Hall's).
a consequence we resort to a more objective, a more social sense--the sense of sight.\textsuperscript{42}

This sense of sight has come to attach primary importance to forms and their respective positions in space. Matoré suggests there is some evidence, however, of color re-emerging as a dominant means of expression chiefly through the influence of color television and motion pictures. It is fascinating to recall that Huxley, during his mescaline experience found "position and the three dimensions were beside the point" and that he was overwhelmed by books "that glowed with living light . . . Red books, like rubies; . . ."\textsuperscript{43}

Matoré's study is valuable because it focuses on an appreciation of the spatial mood of an age, but interesting work has been done also on the personal level of the relationship of an individual's mood to his senses of space. A fine example of this latter focus is O.F. Bollnow, "Lived-Space."\textsuperscript{44} He investigates space "as it appears concretely to man in his experience."\textsuperscript{45} Just as with Being, "the inner structure of space, as it appears concretely to man in his experience"\textsuperscript{46} is so close to us in our daily life as to be hidden or ignored.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{42} Matoré, "Existential Space," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 6.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Aldous Huxley, \textit{The Doors of Perception} and \textit{Heaven and Hell}, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1959, p. 19.
\item \textsuperscript{44} In Nathaniel Lawrence and Daniel O'Connor, eds., \textit{Readings in Existential Phenomenology}, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1967, pp. 178-86.
\item \textsuperscript{45} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 178.
\item \textsuperscript{46} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 180.
\end{itemize}
Because Bollnow refers to Heidegger and adopts a being-in-the-world influenced framework for investigating such typically Heideggerian phenomena as "dwelling", "housekeeping", "lived-distance", "space as felt", he provides geographers with an ontologically oriented initial step towards an erotics of space. His treatment of the Dasein distinction between the experience of highway travel and walking a path is especially Heideggerian. Bollnow suggests that:

The motorist does not move in the surrounding country, but just on the road, and remains separated from the country by a sharp boundary . . . . [whereas on a path] a man is in the landscape, taken up and dissolved into it, a part of it.47

In his later writing Heidegger deepens such a Dasein distinction by suggesting its ontological significance:

Through the ontological symbol of the country road, Heidegger visualizes the belonging together of Being and man. Interestingly, Heidegger does not choose for this symbol merely a way or a road, but specifically a country road or a forest trail. A mere road or street is usually a public street or road--road of the common man, whereas the country road or forest-trail is a way which is taken at one's own risk; it is a way of self-responsibility. On a public highway Being can never be experienced. The only places where Being is accessible are country roads or forest trails.48

He further employs the metaphor to reveal Being's logos nature when:

In his little and rather poetic work Der Feldweg, Heidegger pictures Being as a country road which assembles everything in its neighborhood upon itself . . . . 'On its path the storm of winter and the day of harvest meet each other; the agile thrill of springtime and the calm demise of fall encounter each other; the play of youth and the wisdom of the aged behold each other.'49

47 Ibid., pp. 183-84.

48 Vincent Vycinas, op. cit., p. 113.

49 Ibid., p. 112.
It would be interesting to re-read selected human geographic studies in the light of Bollnow's paper. For example, his view of a man's house as "the reference point from which he builds his spatial world" suggests a framework for re-considering Amos Rapoport's *House Form and Culture* where we are told that one reason for studying house forms is that they are the "direct expressions of changing values, images, perceptions, and ways of life, as well as of certain constancies."51

At the most personal and individual level of investigating human experience as being basically spatial in nature, geographers will want to refer to "A Clinical Introduction to Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis" by Henri F. Ellenberger.52 He provides a phenomenologically derived typology of human spatiality. One major category is *oriented space* which "is the form of spatiality of our most common experience," and which "has a center of reference that is itself mobile: the body."53 It is complemented by *attuned space* which is the "spatial experience determined by one's feeling tone or emotional pitch."54 Thus, "At the same moment that one is experiencing oriented space, the reference point of which is one's own body, one is also


53 Ibid., pp. 109-10.

54 Ibid., p. 110.
experiencing a special quality of space in accord with one's mood."\textsuperscript{55}

Such sub-categories of attuned space as \textit{clear space}, \textit{dark space}, and \textit{luminous space} are suggested. The latter being the spatiality involved in mystical or ecstatic experiences, such as Huxley's. Though Heidegger is mentioned, Ellenberger's analysis is not especially ontologically oriented and he relies more on Merleau-Ponty and Bachelard and several others engaged in phenomenological psychiatry many of whom influenced Yi-Fu Tuan in his writing of "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature."\textsuperscript{56}

It is of considerable importance to remind ourselves that an interest in the erotics of space—in the condition of being spatial—cannot be conducted from the standpoint of contemporary "spatialist" geography which is rooted in:

The odd belief [which] prevails in our culture that a thing or experience is not real if we cannot make it mathematical, and somehow it must be real if we can reduce it to numbers.\textsuperscript{57}

Furthermore, we must remember that the \textit{Dasein} constituted meaning of "spatial" differs radically from current usage of the term in geography because it connotes involvement rather than aspects of location and objective distance. Thus, when viewing the geographer's usual understanding of "spatial" from a Heideggerian perspective:

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{55} \textit{Loc. cit.} \\
\item \textsuperscript{56} \textit{Canadian Geographer}, Vol. 15, No. 3, 1971, pp. 181-92. See esp. p. 191, n. 2 where he lists these sources. \\
\item \textsuperscript{57} Rollo May, "Contributions of Existential Psychotherapy," in R. May, \textit{et al.}, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 39.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
It makes no sense, for example, to speak of a man in his world (though we often do) as primarily a spatial relation. The phrase "match in a box" does imply a spatial relation, but to speak of a man in his home or in his office or in a hotel at the seashore implies something radically different.

Heidegger accentuates this difference when he speaks of a person being some place by using such terms as "to sojourn" or "to dwell" rather than "is". Such non-spatial (in standard geographic perspective) conceptions of man in his environment are not to be neglected by human geographers in this era of alienation and environmental degradation. A new sense of "spatial"—one suited to an erotic inquiry into space—is essential for human geography because, "without a more adequate understanding of human space we shall eventually lose hold of the human world."  

Consequently to accept, in obedience to popular thought since Descartes' time, the abstract geometrical space—as the primordial character of the world in which we live, is to turn one's back upon the human context within which it is founded, and to acquiesce in a fallen vision of the world wherein human possibilities are progressively covered up. The inevitable and constantly reiterated consequence of this unreflective acquiescence in abstraction is human alienation within a worldless space. This is the abstract space, often viewed as a kind of container of impersonal facts which are dominated by techniques.

It is altogether tempting to go directly to Heidegger's few pages in Being and Time on "The aroundness of the environment, and Dasein's spatiality" for an ontological understanding of space and human

58 Ibid., p. 59.


60 Ballard, "A Brief Introduction . . .," op. cit., p. 139.
spatiality. But geographers would be wise to heed Heidegger's caution that, "Not until we understand Being-in-the-world as an essential structure of Dasein can we have any insight into Dasein's existential spatiality." There are no shortcuts to ontological awareness. For example, Dasein's spatiality is elucidated in relation to Dasein expressing "concern" (e.g. for tools), but it is not until much later in the text that we learn that such concern is fully understandable only in reference to "care" (Sorge) which is the basic "existential" (characteristic) of man.

Thus, it would be misleading for human geographers, in an attempt to engage Heidegger's thought, to confine themselves to those few fascinating pages in which we learn that:

A tool which is ready for use is "close" to Dasein within his world. Such closeness or remoteness, as linked with utility, defines a spatiality of concern. Dasein has an essential tendency to disconnect objects from their geographical remoteness or from mere observable location and to bring them close or to put them into readiness as objects of his directive (intentional) concern.

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63 "Because Being-in-the-world is essentially care, Being-alongside the ready-to-hand [e.g. tools] could be taken in our previous analyses as concern . . . Being-alongside something is concern, because it is defined as a way of Being-in by its basic structure--care." *Ibid.*, p. 237 (the first half of *Being and Time* culminates in the chapter, "Care as the Being of Dasein," pp. 225-73). "The human being, then, exists not so much as a who, or a person in the conventional sense, as a manner of Being. He exists as active need, as care." Ballard, "A Brief Introduction . . .," *op. cit.*, p. 128.
This kind of closeness is by no means proportional to "objective" distance. Thus the telephone receiver may be but little distance from one in a geometrical sense, but it is not so "close" in the concerned sense as the friend to whom one is speaking. This space of concern, in which the friend is "close" is a qualitative space. Directions rather than dimension figure in it. Places rather than points, paths rather than lines, serve to define. Dasein, as tendency to organize its world in this manner, "makes room for itself." 64

Rather, we should first address ourselves to understanding Dasein's more basic concern—care. The following lengthy, but superb summary by Sadler of Dasein's spatiality stresses Heidegger's insistence that Dasein's "in-ness" is first disclosed in terms of care (Sorge):

Heidegger's analysis of space started from an awareness that existential space is not thought of geographically, as space, "out there." In common parlance, the term "space" connotes magnitude, position; and relations between positions. Heidegger pointed out that this supposedly objective notion of space is secondary. Human existence is spatial; it is "in" the world. But a human being is fundamentally not in the world in the same way that objects are in space. Human existence is in the world in a creative and constitutive way; human being in the world constitutes a unique mode of historical space. Being in the world is not something about which man is concerned in the same way he is concerned about things at hand for practical use or things on hand to be analyzed and classified. Rather his in-ness is itself constituted by a basic concern which structures the meanings that beings have for him. The spatializing of concern is an existential a priori; it precedes any other awareness man has of space, even though one frequently or usually ignores such awareness. The spatialization of this basic concern for my own being constitutes a foundation of my being in the world. This basic existential space is characterized furthermore by the dynamic structures of distancing and taking a direction. By distancing myself and taking a direction I make room for things. My world is one which makes room for beings, giving them significant places to be. In Heidegger's view, then, man is not primarily an object in space; he is a being whose existence spatializes itself through concern . . . 65

64 Ballard, "A Brief Introduction . . .," op. cit., p. 138. This effective condensation and faithful paraphrase was selected because it conveys Heidegger's analysis without the encumbrance of his terminology. See Ballard's section, "The Factual and Spatial World of Science," pp. 136-44.

65 Sadler, op. cit., pp. 147-48. See also, pp. 79-80.
Allowing that human geographers should first familiarize themselves with Heidegger's ontological project before turning to his phenomenological treatment of existential spatiality, they are not left entirely without stepping stones. The preliminary provision of a Heideggerian perspective for an erotics of space can be acquired by geographers through consideration of William A. Sadler's, *Existence and Love*. Though his concerns are ultimately theological and he confines himself almost exclusively to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, he presents an adequate and readable introduction to Heidegger. He incorporates aspects of Heidegger's ontology into his chapter on "Exploring the Meaning of Existential Space" and his section on "Love's Spatiality." But he also effectively expands on Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of existential spatiality.

However, his book commends itself to us really only in terms of helping us to discern and establish an ontological dimension in an erotics of space. His concerns are not primarily ontological nor

66 In a similar vein, "spatial-behavioral" geographers with positivistic premises will be interested in seeing how space can be approached phenomenologically. This interest in seeing how "it works" would be consistent with their operationalist bias but it leads them to risk misappropriating the results of investigations based on conflicting assumptions. For example, it would be tempting for such geographers to incorporate the findings of a phenomenological investigation such as Edward G. Ballard's "The Visual Perception of Distance," in F.J. Smith, ed., *Phenomenology in Perspective*, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 187-201, without adopting the commitment to existential philosophy such a phenomenological approach entails. At the epistemological level this leads to syntheses fraught with contradictions and on the existential level to inauthenticity.

Heideggerian. He examines Husserl, Heidegger, Scheler, Buber, and Marcel with an eye to achieving a creative synthesis, with a central psychoanalytic thread, which can coexist with, and complement, the existing social sciences. For those geographer's not yet ready for a full expedition into Heidegger's ontological realm, yet compelled by Lowenthal's sanction of personal worlds of experience as a subject for geographic enquiry, but easily depressed by the usual themes existentialists examine, Sadler's work will be of interest.

Like Bollnow, Sadler is concerned that modern physics and philosophy have focused our attention on temporality and historicity and that human space is being ignored. He suggests that the limited number of pages, however brilliant, Heidegger devotes to spatiality is a case in point.

Sadler claims that Heidegger's characterization of existential spatiality was conceived of primarily in terms of visual models and in reference to objects and a concern essentially for one's own being. Sadler believes that auditory space, particularly the sound of music, more effectively conveys Dasein's spatiality. Musical space enables us to represent the condition of Dasein being with, and concerned about, others (Mitdasein) which Heidegger seems to avoid. He turns to the work of the Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger who, though profoundly

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"Philosophy in recent decades has been concerned to such a degree with the problem of the temporal structure of human existence that it may be considered the fundamental problem of present-day philosophy. The problem of the spatial constitution of human life, or of concretely lived-space has been dealt with surprisingly little." Bollnow, op. cit., p. 178.
influenced by Heidegger, rejected Heidegger's *Sorge* as the most comprehensive or basic "existential" of human existence because it seemed to have meaning really only in reference to me/my/mine. Being in love, however, reveals an equally fundamental our/we structure. Though Binswanger's and Sadler's assessment harbours a misconstrual of care as Heidegger intended it and a failure to fully appreciate his ontological project, Sadler's analysis contributes to an erotics of space. His use of an auditory space model, and an analogy to music, to express *Dasein*'s spatiality seems more illustrative than Heidegger's exemplification and he does succeed in focusing us on interpersonal spatiality, an aspect not readily apparent in Heidegger's analysis.

Without sacrificing the temporal aspect of *Dasein* so central to Heidegger's *Being and Time*, Sadler's exploration of existential spatiality in analogy to the sound of music equally invokes space and reflects *Dasein*'s "in-ness" more effectively than a visual model.

Because:

69 Sadler acknowledges that Binswanger has privately admitted to him that "he had in fact misunderstood the nature of Heidegger's ontology; however he hoped that his own development of a Heideggerian type of existential analysis would be considered a fruitful misunderstanding." However, Sadler believes Binswanger "uncovered basic existential structures, especially love, which simply cannot be fitted into a strictly Heideggerian scheme." Sadler's own position is basically in conflict with the purposes of this thesis because he maintains that "ontology seems not only to befog basic existential issues, but also to distort and conceal the radically historical and personal nature of man." The argument of his doctoral thesis was "that existential phenomenology is not an auxiliary of but a different approach to the mystery of being than ontology . . . [and] that ontology lends itself to a dogmatic approach which continually forces existential phenomena into an ontological procrustean bed." Sadler, op. cit., p. 118.
Of course musical sound does not occupy space in the way objects do . . . As a dynamically flowing phenomenon it is definitely temporal. Yet it would be ludicrous to deny that music has spatiality. When a tone strikes we say, "It is there." Eye experience is an experience of distance; the space of auditory experience is a participative experience . . . Musical space is one which obliterates the boundaries between my being and that of another being, the being of music. In the space of music two beings interpenetrate. In this space there is no longer subject over against object but a form of encounter in which we become one . . . Man is in the world in a way which is analogous to music in its dynamic, interpenetrating wholeness.70

To bring Sadler's music analogy into closer congruence with the purposes of this thesis it is necessary to refer to F. Joseph Smith's "Toward A Phenomenology of Musical Aesthetics,"71 which is developed within a much richer understanding of Heidegger's ontological project and with reference to Heidegger's later works. Smith is convinced that the historical imposition of visually ordered concepts and their attendant linguistic equivalents denies access to the full range of human experience and obscures the physis/logos nature of Being. He employs, in a most Heideggerian fashion, an "audial" vocabulary to describe musical experience. In so doing he radically breaks with tradition.

And thus we would not talk so much of eidos as of musical tônos or of a fundamental ëchos, that describes things not only as seen but as felt and heard. For ëchos, as sound, takes in everything from the tumultuous roar of the ocean and the grandeur of a summer cloudburst to the specifically musical tônos of Greek music, the tônus of medieval music, and the tonal/atonal systems of modern

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history. In short, *echos* takes in what we call primordial world, as it sounds and swells all about us and within us, as we are borne aloft on the crest of life. . . . Perhaps a primordial logos is the unifying basis of any eidos or *echos*, and thus of the visual and the audial, whether in general or specifically in the arts. But one looks in vain in Husserl for this kind of 'aesthetics'. One finds it, however, in Heidegger, when he deals with the origin of the work of art.\(^{72}\)

In concert with Smith, Sadler insists that "The space of music is not a primitive spatiality which should be superseded by or reduced to visual space."\(^{73}\) This stress on the appropriateness of an acoustically based approach to existential spatiality takes on added significance for human geographers when we consider its implications for cross-cultural research. Of particular interest to Canadian geographers is the case of the Aivilik Eskimo of Southampton Island documented by Edmund Carpenter, Frederick Varley, and Robert Flaherty.\(^{74}\) In a section titled "Acoustic Space" we learn that no example could be found of an Aivilik describing space in primarily visual terms. It seems that the "binding power of the oral tradition is so strong as to make the eye subservient to the ear." Acoustical experience and referents dominate Aivilik definitions of space. For them space is not static, it is, like music, always in flux.

In an aptly titled text—*-Topophilia*, meaning "human love of

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\(^{72}\) *Ibid.*, pp. 201, 205. (Here Smith refers to one of Heidegger's later works.)

\(^{73}\) Sadler, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

\(^{74}\) *Eskimo*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959 (unnumbered pages).
place"--Yi-Fu Tuan comments on the Aivilik example. He notes how they orient themselves in space via all the senses, for example on a horizonless day they exist in acoustic-olfactory space. But from a Heideggerian perspective, especially in view of the "transformation of truth," it is interesting to note that Yi-Fu Tuan finds no place for mention that:

To the Aivilik, truth is given through oral tradition, mysticism, intuition, all cognition, not simply by observation and measurement of physical phenomena. To them the ocularly visible apparition is not nearly as important as the purely auditory one.

Yi-Fu Tuan's hesitancy to touch on such ontological issues, introductory text notwithstanding, is consistent with aspects of his work to be commented upon in the next section. It must be mentioned that, in the section specified, Carpenter provides a most entertaining and effective summary of the Western obsession for optically acquired truth. Aivilik truth experience, in contrast, seems to have something of an αλήθεια/φύσις/λόγος quality to it. Carpenter suggests that the essential feature of sound is not its location, as is so often the case with the objects of visual perception, "but that it be."

As a final comment on the possibility of an erotics of space we return to Sadler who believes that:

... to achieve a flowing, alive, integrated sense of space which is historically cohesive through reciprocal interpenetration of past, present, and future, one must discover a home. To find a home means to find another person, for one is not really at home

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76 Carpenter, op. cit.
alone. An attentive phenomenology of existential space points to the space of interpersonal relations and in particular to the space of love.  

Sadler moves directly from that conclusion to an investigation of "love's spatiality." Geographers reading those pages might find it interesting to replace the poetic fragments Sadler refers to with passages from Keith Buchanan's *Map of Love.*  

If Canadian geographers wish to establish an erotics of geography, space, or place they will find its framework cast in the context of Canadian art (understood in its broadest sense) where the clearest manifestation of the Canadian imagination exists. In his "Notes on the Canadian Imagination," David Stouck proposes that:

While it is the special function of the imagination to make us more fully aware of life's potentialities, the Canadian imagination has traditionally been obsessed with the limitations rather than the possibilities of human experience. The imagination allows us momentarily to see the world differently, shaped not by economics and politics, but in accordance with man's deepest anxieties and wishes. Most positively it gives us a glimpse of life lived with a sense of greater freedom and fully expressed individuality, for at the center of every imaginative response, buried however deeply, is a vision of human existence liberated erotically. Canadian art, however, seldom directs us to the fulfilment of this vision; rather it accepts life's limitations and finds ascetic pleasure within their circumference.

He suggests we might assume that part of the reason for this acquiescence is related to our climate and geography, "for these have historically made survival rather than freedom the great fact of

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77 Sadler, *op. cit.*, p. 163.


Canadian life." He also claims that two images dominate the various dimensions of Canadian art. One is of the encounter with nature in all of its foreboding and bleak aspects. The other is of home experienced as a humble dwelling and human refuge from the austere environment and the elements. If we accept Stouck's thesis, then to see human experience whose being is basically Canadian in nature, means to see it reverberate in the tension of those two images. Canadian geographers sensitive to existential and phenomenological approaches will be well-placed to experience the fullness of its resonance, to take the measure of its meaning. Others find other images: e.g. victor/victim, colony, but all somehow seem to be exquisitely "geographical." An attempt to reveal to geographers the ontological expression of being in Canada concludes this thesis.

Ontological Pointers: Yi-Fu Tuan and Relph

Yi-Fu Tuan in his article, "Geography, Phenomenology, and the Study of Human Nature," contributes significantly to sensitizing human geographers to existential phenomenology--its themes, methods, and analyses. He points the discipline toward an erotics of geography, toward what it means to see human experience as being geographical and spatial in nature. But his investigations are confined to the ontic level. He begins by informing geographers that, "Phenomenology is concerned with essences: what, for example, is the essence of man,

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80 Loc. cit.

space, or experience." In the previous chapter (p. 99) we saw that Heidegger was at pains to distinguish his method from Husserl's phenomenology, because:

For Edmund Husserl, phenomenology is plainly a philosophy revealing the essences in reality; about Being, it has nothing to say, for Being does not appear. Though he acknowledges that phenomenologists attend to "the meaning of being human," and though he examines "meaning" in some detail, Yi-Fu Tuan's focus is on man, on "how geography illuminates human nature" at a fairly general level. He is willing to talk about "meaning" and "man" but avoids discussing "being". In fact, he commits what, from a phenomenological perspective, let alone the ontological, is an unpardonable substitution. In his concluding sentence he holds that the geographer's quest, like the phenomenologist's, is "the understanding of man-in-the-world." By replacing the crucial sense of "being" in expression "being-in-the-world" with "man" he dismisses the Dasein dimension of human nature and defaults on those very phenomenological insights he desires to bring to the geographer's attention.

82 Ibid., p. 181.
83 Vincent Vycinas, op. cit., p. 30.
84 Yi-Fu Tuan, op. cit., p. 191.
85 Ibid., p. 183.
86 Ibid., p. 191.
Yi-Fu Tuan seems to want to explore such geographic themes as environmental perception and human response to environmental setting through the application of the phenomenological method. This approach retains the Cartesianism of a subject-object split. Heidegger, and many phenomenologists, would have us begin with the field of significance itself--Dasein--with "being-in-the-world." For example, Yi-Fu Tuan's discussion of "home" and "journey" does not evoke the Dasein qualities of in-ness embodied in Heidegger's expressions "dwelling" and "sojourning." Yi-Fu Tuan's descriptions do not reveal Being. Rather, as he suggests, his "Geography reveals man."87

This inherent Cartesianism of Yi-Fu Tuan's approach is reflected in the title of a subsequent article, "Structuralism, Existentialism, and Environmental Perception."88 We should keep in mind that in marked contrast to Husserl with his Cartesian "consciousness of" and the implicit Cartesian dualism of Sartre's thought, Heidegger avoided use of either "consciousness" or "man". In this way he reminds us constantly of our Dasein nature as a transcendent condition, that of already being-in-the-world. We have seen (p. 97), that Heidegger's Being and Time as an "existential analytic of Dasein" is not like Sartre's existential analysis of man. It is rather an ontological analytic revealing the basic structure ("existentials") of "Being-there!"

87 Ibid., p. 181.

and thus reveals Being. Whereas Heidegger rejects Sartre's Cartesianism and humanism, Yi-Fu Tuan suggests that, "Certain concepts in Sartrean existentialism contribute to our understanding of perception . . ."\(^8^9\)

But the promise of phenomenology lies in disclosing a new order of questions for geographers to explore. And Heidegger's thought discloses a new vision of existence asking very different questions.

In this same paper Yi-Fu Tuan attempted to explain man's "desire to become thing-like, to fill the lack at the center of his being with an unvarying essence,"\(^9^0\) in Sartrean terms. But it is Heidegger who has shown us that what we lack today is Being, especially experience of its \textit{physis} nature. Because historically we focused on its \textit{ousia} side we have become obsessed with essences and "thingliness", with that which remains and does not pass away. Heidegger's most severe criticism of Sartre is that he fails to recognize "the essentially historical character of Being." Yi-Fu Tuan deftly skirts the issue of Being altogether.

From the perspective of Heidegger's ontology, most of the concerns expressed about Yi-Fu Tuan's articles apply to Edward Relph's "An Inquiry Into the Relations Between Phenomenology and Geography."\(^9^1\) His paper seems even more narrowly devoted to methodological concerns, to providing an alternative way of doing the human geography that currently exists. Nor does he undertake to apply or demonstrate the

\(^8^9\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 326. (The concept "perception of" is Cartesian.)

\(^9^0\)\textit{Ibid.}, p. 329.

phenomenological concepts and methods he summarizes. The geographical studies he cites as being more or less phenomenological seem to fall far short of the criteria he establishes for a phenomenological approach.

Like Yi-Fu Tuan, Relph is decidedly ontic in his concerns. He concludes his article by suggesting that, "if geography is thought to be concerned in some way with understanding man on the human level, then the concepts and methods of phenomenology have much to offer." Also, he repeatedly refers to "the anthropocentrism of phenomenology." Relph manages to move closer than Yi-Fu Tuan to incorporating the "being-in-the-world" concept. He tells us that in phenomenology "Man's relationship with the world is understood not merely as a cognitive relationship, but as something which permeates man's whole being." What denies this conception Dasein quality is Relph's reliance on the Husserlian notion of man's intentionality as the effect that unifies man and his world. Just how far Relph's characterization is from the realization that human being is the process of "Being-in-the-world" i.e. an expression of Being, can be detected in his claim that, "The anthropocentric basis of phenomenology gives the possibility of understanding man and nature as a single structure or system, unified in its reference to man's needs, intentions, and existence."  

92 Ibid., p. 199.

93 Ibid., p. 197.

94 Loc. cit. (emphasis added).
Relph's emphasis on geographers using phenomenology to focus on the "lived-world" of human experience is valuable for an erotics of geography. But his conviction that, "it is only through the study of man's intentions that we can comprehend the world," locks his thought into the very "subjectivism" that characterizes Western metaphysics. We have seen Heidegger's analysis of the sources and consequences of this epistemology. We should allow that Relph's hope of contributing "to the development of a philosophical background for humanistic approaches in geography" was realized. But, as with Yi-Fu Tuan, he does not contribute to an ontological awakening. But their efforts and others make it timely to broach the issue of overcoming our metaphysics.


97 A most effective way to assess Yi-Fu Tuan and Relph from an ontological perspective is to refer to J. Glenn Gray, "The New Image of Man in Martin Heidegger's Philosophy," in George L. Kline, ed., *European Philosophy Today*, Chicago, Quadrangle, 1965, pp. 31-60, where he suggests "that the genuine originality in Heidegger's philosophy lies as much in his interpretation of human nature as in his attempts to clarify the meaning of Being" (pp. 31-32).

98 And here we must include the work of Buttiner and Gibson reviewed in Part One. Though not ontological, it has prepared the way for the asking of the *Seinsfrage* by geographers.
Restatement

We will recall that, in the winter of 1970, Cole Harris remarked on "the general uneasiness about the orientation of geography today." A significant portion of the human geographic literature published around, and since, the time of Harris's observation would seem to indicate that we are looking for a way out of this "general uneasiness" but are unsure about which route to take. We have seen growing numbers of geographers wrestle with the question of how to make our discipline relevant, or radical or even revolutionary.

It has been the purpose of this thesis to suggest that perhaps there is a problem with our base map and that the philosophy of Martin Heidegger provides essential insights into the nature of our dilemma and an orientation for its resolution.

This thesis suggests the imminent arrival of our discipline at the ontological threshold. Heidegger stands on the other side beckoning us. Although usually recognized for his ontological investigation into the human significance of time, Heidegger has equally compelling thoughts about space, place, and environment. We, as both individuals and geographers ignore his work, particularly his later writings, at our own peril.

The previous decade's determination to establish the discipline's credibility through methodological monism culminated in David Harvey's Explanation in Geography. 1 Joe May's study of Kant, 2 and Cole Harris's "Theory and Synthesis in Historical Geography" 3 effectively exposed the narrowness of those endeavours. Ironically, Harvey has since turned to that very significant historical work Harris ignored, the thought of Karl Marx. 4

We are indebted to May, Harris, and others for their efforts to expand our appreciation of what it means to have a geographical explanation. We are finding increasingly incisive analyses from the left. In another area Marwyn Samuels received his doctorate for a

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2 Kant's Concept of Geography and its Relation to Recent Geographic Thought, University of Toronto, Department of Geography Research Publications, No. 4, University of Toronto Press, 1970.
credible existential appraisal of science and geography.\(^5\) Ted Relph was awarded his doctorate for a study of "place" in terms of both phenomenology and structuralism.\(^6\) Yi-Fu Tuan has examined phenomenology, existentialism, and structuralism. In Harris's own words, "Geography is again in a period of rapid flux from which the outcome is still unclear." And it will remain unclear until we stand back and get our bearings. We must make a leap to a vantage point—to solid ground—to ontology.

An expanding awareness of the long-standing controversy in the philosophy of science as to what constitutes an explanation, and a mature assessment of Marxist-Leninist (and Maoist) thought, existential and phenomenological positions, structuralism, symbolic interactionism, and anarchism, are essential to the conduct of enquiry in our discipline. But this thesis asserts that all this is not enough. Why? Though the answer can be succinctly expressed, it takes time to assimilate its significance. For me several years.

The practice of human geography implies knowledge of what it means to be a human being. In order to understand what it means to be

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\(^7\) Harris, op. cit., p. 170.
we must understand Being. To ask about Being is to enter the ontological realm of enquiry. It is here that we inevitably encounter the thought of Martin Heidegger. Before I can be a human geographer; before I can advise about the human use of the earth, before I can profess human geography, I must have made it my business to find out about Being. That is, to ask the Seinsfrage.

Upon reading such a proclamation many might be inclined to dismiss this and what follows as mysticism or subjective nonsense. Those so inclined should first consider the following. Our discipline conceived of as a social science must operate on the basis of hypothesis and test, and this entails making observation statements, that is, it requires the citing of facts, such as "the sky is blue." But what do you mean by is? Do things is themselves differently than people? Have you ever even thought about this? Heidegger has. He suggests that we daily use the derivations of the verb to be so confidently and unquestioningly because we have a preconceptual understanding of Being. He claims, however, that we have lost sight of this understanding of Being. Our experience of what it means to be has been covered over by categories and concepts and a set of linguistic structures. Heidegger identifies this historical process as our "metaphysics" and claims it began with Plato and culminated in Nietzsche, and that we are now in the twilight of a darkening night, that we are becoming increasingly blinded to Being, estranged from Being.

Heidegger seeks to help us to discover Being, dis-cover, in the sense of revealing Being to us in its truth. As it was before Western
thought denied us direct experience of it; as it often is for other
cultures; and as it is when it breaks through when our personal world
collapses around us, in those infinite instants when we glimpse what it
means to be only what we are and nothing else, nothing, no-thing. To
be nothing, to be no-thing is profoundly humanizing. We have come to
identify ourselves with, and as, things. This does not surprise
Heidegger for he has understood the history of this unique event in
the human drama. He tells how we have come to be able to conceive of
human beings as human material, as objects, and of the environment as
Zimmerman's "neutral stuff", as material to be done unto as we see fit
with no regard for its being. As Al Purdy insists:

To take away the dignity
of any living thing
even tho it cannot understand
the scornful words
is to make life itself trivial
and yourself the Pontifex Maximus
of nullity.8

Heidegger claims that we fail to distinguish between human beings
and things, and thus subject both to the same analyses and actions; and
that we are able, even driven, to do this because we have lost touch
with Being. Heidegger tells us that:

In self-assertive production, the humanness of man and the
thingness of things dissolve into the calculated market value of
a market which not only spans the whole earth as a world market,
but also, as the will to will, trades in the nature of Being and

8Al Purdy, "Trees at the Arctic Circle," Purdy Selected, Toronto,
McClelland and Stewart, 1972, p. 63.
thus subjects all beings to the trade of a calculation that
dominate most tenaciously in those areas where there is no need
of numbers.\(^9\)

If by now you fairly want to cry out, "But what about Being?"
the reply must be, "That is the question!" You are ready to pursue
Heidegger's Seinsfrage, the question of the meaning of Being. If you
want to know how all this relates to human geography I can reply that
Heidegger has the most provocative, historically developed theory about
technology and its relationship with man and environment.\(^10\) Or, that
his thought provides a new basis for ecological wisdom.\(^11\) Or, that
his writings on the nature of space could reshape, virtually redefine,

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\(^9\)Martin Heidegger, "What Are Poets For?" *Poetry, Language,
Thought* (tr. and intro. by Albert Hofstadter), New York, Harper & Row,

\(^10\)Though this theme pervades all his works, especially his later
writings, especially interesting summaries can be found in:
Edward G. Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and
Natural Science," in John Sallis, ed., *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*,
Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1970, pp. 37-64 and John Sallis,
"Towards the Movement of Reversal: Science, Technology, and the Language
of Homecoming" in *ibid.*, 138-168, and A.F. Lingis, "On the Essence of
Technique," in Manfred S. Frings, ed., *Heidegger and the Quest For Truth*,
Chicago, Quadrangle, 1968, pp. 126-138. In a letter to Frings,
Heidegger says that "The 'Being-question' properly understood, appears
as the question about the essencing of modern technicity and its relation-

\(^11\)A most unusual and stimulating analysis of this aspect of
Heidegger's thought is found in F. Joseph Smith, "In-the-World and
On-the-Earth: A Heideggerian Interpretation," in Frings, *op. cit.*,
pp. 184-203.
the practice of human geography. 12

From the ontological perspective Heidegger has explored man, his art, all manner of artifact, the organic and inorganic elements of nature. For a philosopher, he is remarkably concrete and graspable in many of these enquiries. He deals with human individuals in terms of their daily lived existences, and he also addresses himself to our artistic creations. 13 He examines our tools, from the hammer to "the Bomb." He considers rocks and trees, a wine-jug, a bridge, a country road, a radio. 14 More and more geographers are studying landscape art and Heidegger's aesthetics and art interpretations are of crucial interest to geographers, similarly his thoughts on the meaning of what we build.

Poetic Dwelling

But, of all the riches of his thought I have selected one insight I believe is essential for conducting a geography of the human condition. Heidegger draws heavily on poets for his fundamental assumptions and one phrase is of special interest to human geographers. Heidegger focuses

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our attention on the following line from a poem by the German mystic poet Hölderlin:

POETICALLY MAN DWELLS ON THIS EARTH

Before explaining the meaning Heidegger makes of this pronouncement I would like to demonstrate what can happen if human geographers are ignorant of, or lose sight of, Hölderlin's truth. Three examples will suffice to convey the consequences of failing to ask the Seinsfrage.

Since 1972 many students have been introduced to the study of geography through Peter Haggett's Geography: A Modern Synthesis. What image of man on earth does he wish to instill in his readers? On the first page we are told that:

Man has historically been a creature of the strandline between water and land. He moves like a crab in the dense bottom layer of gas at the very surface of the earth . . .

As if invoking a dehumanizing metaphor were not enough, Haggett also manages to eradicate any vision of blue skies, billowing clouds, shifting winds and fragrant airs, preferring instead the sterile imagery of a gas.

Haggett does not exclude the human figure from his pages, rather, he deliberately casts it in a manner which further illustrates how estranged from being human a geographer can become. That first page also displays a photograph of human beings lying on a beach. But it

\[15\] Martin Heidegger, "... Poetically Man Dwells ...," in Poetry, Language, Thought, op. cit. The full text of the poem "In Lovely Blueness ...," from which the line is taken can be found in Friedrich Hölderlin, Poems and Fragments (tr. by Michael Hamburger), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966, p. 601.

is an aerial photograph. Haggett emphasizes how such a perspective distorts the human form, suggesting it produces a "maplike picture."

It seems only a small next step to visualizing these human beings as the dots of a distribution map. Haggett explains that aerial photographs dominate the text because they allow "a much more accurate assessment of the location of people." We are further informed that "to specify location accurately is one of the prime rules of the geographic game." Remarking on science's fascination with magnification, Haggett suggests that geographers curiously follow a reverse procedure. "They bring reality down in size until it can be represented on a map." But, with the human form it is not merely a matter of miniaturization. It is not simply the reverse of enlarging a non-human entity. Transformation is involved. Transformation into something indiscernible as the human being--the ubiquitous dot. The perspective Haggett prefers is the same one the pilot of a bomber relies on to insulate and abstract himself from the human suffering he inflicts.

Some three hundred pages later a most disturbing aerial photograph introduces the section on "Interregional Stresses." It shows a long truck convoy destroyed in the midst of a desert. In its context of juxtaposed photographs of various spatial patterns it tends to appear as just another linear expression on a plane surface. Apparently

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17 Ibid., p. 3.

18 Loc. cit.

19 Loc. cit.
analogous to a meandering river. But are there human bodies scattered along that line? One cannot be sure. From the aerial perspective, lumps of twisted metal are indistinguishable from blobs that might be broken and burned bodies.

In reviewing the earlier 1969 publication of another introductory text, Otis P. Starkey and J. Lewis Robinson, *The Anglo-American Realm*, John E. Chappell, Jr. commented on the frequent use of air photographs and the abundance of statistical data. He noted that when the authors dealt with New York City:

> People are indeed everywhere in this chapter, but they are usually reduced to a fraction of a statistic or to an invisible speck smaller than a halftone dot on a photograph. On the twenty-six pictures used between pages 62 and 199, a section that includes the chapter on New York, not one person can be seen.\(^{21}\)

The reader who feels such critiques of the use of photographs in texts are perhaps unfair to the authors, or stretch a point too thinly, might wish to ponder Bill Bunge's choice of photographic content in his *Fitzgerald: Geography of A Revolution*.\(^{22}\) In this urban-historical study the pictures are devoted to expressing the human condition.

Similarly powerful is Michael E. Eliot Hurst's use of slides and film in his human geography classes at Simon Fraser University.\(^{23}\)


The practice of human geography in Canada has not been immune to the pressures, frequently generated in the American mid-West, to become more scientific, rigorous, and objective. A typical example can be found by comparing the content of two edited collections by R. Louis Gentilcore, *Canada's Changing Geography*, published in 1967, and *Geographical Approaches to Canadian Problems*, issued four years later. Articles dealing with locational and spatial analysis were brought forward from the earlier volume, but J. Wreford Watson's "Canadian Regionalism in Life and Letters," does not find its way into the recent collection. Watson, distinguished as both a poet and a geographer, perceptively uses Canadian poetry, literature, and art to evoke the experience of living in one of Canada's distinctive regions. Economic regional disparity is a problem much discussed in Canada these days. In view of this, does Gentilcore not consider Watson's contribution a sufficiently geographical approach? Surely though, if we are to understand why unemployed coal miners in Cape Breton prefer to remain unemployed rather than take higher paid jobs in Alberta we will have to understand first what it means to be a Nova Scotian.

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Watson discusses elements of the landscape as "felt realities" and of the Nova Scotians he tells us that, "Sea, tide, wind, and rage, then, are part of the human struggle; they have entered into the character of the people." Watson senses their poetic dwelling on the earth. In his discussion of Quebec he relates how the rural values were preserved for decades in an urban environment by those who left the land, but that now "the fact that they are townspeople is beginning to tell." Watson has an openness to the ontological.

At this point I should like to suggest that the humanistic traditions of our discipline could be debased and displaced so quickly by scientism and quantification because they were based in humanist philosophy.

Humanism, in its usual meaning, underestimates the dignity of man, the true dignity which derives from a voluntary recognition of his dependence upon and involvement in a wider and greater reality than the human. Heidegger seeks to relate men again to the sources of their being, to give them something they can revere. The radical romanticism that once infused certain quarters of the discipline was likewise easily shattered because of the mystical relationship it established with Nature. Both these geographic traditions were not casualties but part of the problem because they were seductive retreats from the encounter with Being. This is why I raised the

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question about the nature of our "base map." We have no ontological basis for our inquiries yet.

What does Heidegger say of our poetic dwelling on this earth? Dwelling connotes care, care-fullness, being full of care for our dwelling, be it our home, neighborhood, or environment, and we should dwell as our way of being-in-the-world. We should remind ourselves that in his masterwork, Being and Time, Heidegger identified "care" as the fundamental characteristic of being human.

According to Heidegger:

Dwelling, as "abiding of the mortals [men] on the earth" is at the same time their wandering under the sky, sojourning in the proximity of divinities, and their belonging in togetherness.30 "These four—earth, sky, gods, and mortals—belong together in an original unity."31 To name one is to think of the other three. As Heidegger expresses it:

But, "on the earth" already means "under the sky." Both of these also mean "remaining before the divinities" and include a "belonging to men's being with one another." By a primal oneness the four—earth and sky, divinities and mortals—belong together in one. This simple oneness of the four we call the fourfold. Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling. The basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve.32

That is:

30 Vincent Vycinas, Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1961, p. 15. (The quoted fragment is Heidegger's and the parenthetical insertion is Vycinas's.)

31 Loc. cit.

32 Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," op. cit., pp. 149, 150.
To dwell is to spare the earth, receive the sky, expect the gods, and have a capacity for death. The sparing of the earth and receiving of the sky means letting all the things on the earth and in the sky be the way they are in themselves by not subjugating them forcefully to our subjective order. Earth and sky themselves represent an order which holds sway over the things.33

But:

Dwelling is not the highly spiritual mode of living of an educated man or the way of life of a philosopher. To dwell means to live a concrete life, namely: to make a home on the earth, acquire food for the family, handle and use, build and cultivate things. For such a very concrete way of living or dwelling, the understanding of the interplay of earth and sky, gods and mortals is already presupposed. This again shows that to dwell is to be near things and the earth (be in the proximity) and at the same time to be near the gods (be in the distance).34

Thus:

To be close to things immediately about us, whether they be things of nature or made by man, requires us to live poetically on earth—earth understood in the concrete sense of soil, trees, and seasons. This capacity is more than the rapt attention of the child and the dreamy fantasy of young lovers, much more. It demands also the meditative capacity of a larger experience to discover a new innocence of eye and mind that will let things be as they are in themselves and hence enable us to be with them, rather than they with us.35

Therefore:

The ontological reality of the non-human world cannot appear through the manipulations of man. But things will not appear as things, he hastens to add, "without the alertness of mortals." In other words, human beings form an integral part of reality, a necessary element of the whole. If they achieve a proper relation to the other beings in the world, their role is indeed a central one in that they give Being a voice. But the achievement of this proper relation, or,

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33Vycinas, op. cit., p. 15.

34Ibid., p. 21.

in Heidegger's language, learning how to dwell aright on the earth amid things, is the hardest task for presumptuous man, and we have been increasingly failing in Western civilization.\(^{36}\)

It is essential that we realize that, "The gods are a people's conception of that which is highest and most real about their lives,"\(^ {37}\) thus not divinities or gods in any theological sense. Besides giving voice to Being:

By their peculiar sensitiveness the poets know how to unite the commonplace with the noble. They transmute the ordinary by showing its place in the scheme of Being, by linking it up to the highest reality.\(^ {38}\)

Remember, when Nietzsche declared "God is dead!" he was saying all values are devalued and the highest reality becomes the lowest common denominator. Considering what seems to be valued in our contemporary society, today's poet is faced with a formidable task. To dwell poetically on this earth is to find in the simple and homely things of everyday experience the highest reality.

Rather than play about with pretty words, with poesy, the poets:

Give names to that which other men could not experience without the naming. The names are not only symbols, shorthand of their experience; they are their experience. And men learn from the poets to live in new dimensions of the real.\(^ {39}\)

The poet's function, Heidegger thinks, is to make us truly aware of our poetic dwelling. In great poetry we discover that to dwell ultimately


\(^{38}\) *Loc. cit.*

\(^{39}\) *Loc. cit.*
means to spare or preserve the fourfold—earth, sky, gods, and mortals. "Mortals dwell properly when they learn to protect the earth, not to exploit or conquer or subordinate."\textsuperscript{40} Such proper dwelling is the fundamental task of man and it must be learned. Proper dwelling lets things be, not out of indifference or passivity, but by virtue of an active interest in finding out what they are like in their own being.

This sense of "dwelling" accords closely with what we learned from Heidegger's consideration of true "thinking". The \textit{logos} nature of "originative thinking" achieves the same end as proper dwelling, both let Being be. But because we are dwellers we are also builders. How and what we build and grow are intimately related to how we "dwell". "Building and dwelling are not two separate modes of the human way of being."\textsuperscript{41} Heidegger insists that, "building is not merely a means and a way toward dwelling—\textit{to build is in itself already to dwell}."\textsuperscript{42} Heidegger holds that thinking and building are different expressions of dwelling. To emphasize this unity he does not use commas in his essay title "Building Dwelling Thinking" in an attempt to convey their unity. It is fascinating for a geographer to read this essay because Heidegger reveals the spatiality that emerges in the conjunction of these three. The urban geographer whose field of study is so focused on the built environment will especially appreciate Heidegger's cogent analysis.

\textsuperscript{40} Gray, "Heidegger's Course: . . .", \textit{op. cit.}, p. 203.

\textsuperscript{41} Veycinas, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 14.

\textsuperscript{42} Martin Heidegger, "Building Dwelling Thinking," \textit{op. cit.}, p. 146.
Finally, Heidegger tells us that:

Poetry is a measuring . . . This measure-taking not only takes the measure of the earth, ge, and accordingly it is no mere geo-metry. Just as little does it ever take the measure of heaven, ouraunos, for itself. Measure-taking is no science. Measure-taking gauges the between, which brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another. This measure-taking has its own metron, and thus its own metric . . . . The taking of measure is what is poetic in dwelling.43

Thus, poetry is in a strict sense a measure or a standard by which man receives the measure for the breadth of his being.44 Because their language is concrete and exact poets are able to teach us how to dwell on the earth. Their utterances serve to keep us near the earth and to attune us to the real powers that dominate our lives. It falls to poets to teach us our limits. They can name those powers which endure in nature and culture, and they learn to sing and celebrate that which truly IS.

In short, poets establish for us our human nature; they define us in relation to the earth and sky. They teach us to dwell rightly on earth, to make a home instead of merely inhabiting a series of houses; they teach us how to build properly, which is an activity of dwelling; and how to think instead of merely logicizing . . . . If we can learn to dwell in the spirit of guarding and cherishing the earth, instead of exploiting and mastering it, we will learn that kind of gratitude which comes

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43. Martin Heidegger, "... Poetically Man Dwells . . . ," op. cit., p. 221 (extended emphasis added).

44. Ibid., p. 222.
from "care", which Heidegger from the beginning of his career has conceived to be the most comprehensive essence of human nature. 45

Heidegger is interested in poets for their ontological significance, for the truths they reveal about our way of dwelling on earth. William Barrett assures us that we need not confine ourselves to those poets Heidegger interpreted, "since poets in our own tongue, whose words we can hear directly, may serve as more compelling witnesses." 46 Let us turn finally to a few selections of Canadian poetry which seem remarkably ontological and convey our poetic dwelling on this earth.

In the following poem by George Bowering 47 we find ourselves measuring the breadth of our being in reference to that which really is;*


*These selections should be read aloud, and you should stress the various forms of the verb "to be": e.g. is, are, to be, and pause just ever so slightly after uttering the verb. This will help to disclose the ontological dimension and significance of the poems. I have discussed such a rendering in personal conversations with George Bowering and Miriam Waddington about the ontological aspects of their work and they found it both agreeable and interesting. I have heard Eli Mandel use such a technique to great effect in reading Canadian landscape poetry.
A Sudden Measure

This sudden snow:
   immediately
the prairie is:

Those houses are:
   dark
under roofs of snow -

That hill up to the cloud is:
   marked
by snow creeks down to town -

This footpath is:
   a bare line
across: white field -

   This woman appears
   thru drift of snow:
   a red coat.

Next, in the first two stanzas of her poem, Miriam Waddington, has us take the measure "which brings the two, heaven and earth, to one another." We discover our limits in the process, and finally we glimpse the ecstasy of one person's poetic dwelling:

A landscape of
John Sutherland

we are
in flight
we are
a space of
dreamed-of
light
autumn canyons
crevices
we are the blue
between
the sliding doors
of sky

we fall
among the shells
the molluscs
of our concerts
on the earth
our bones
are toys
and trumpets
for the wind
our song
sand
on a shore

our eyes
are owls
who scold
the lit-up
winter night,
our skeletons
snow animals
who prowl
through the
quiet moment
of landscape

that is
what I like
best, to find
the quiet moment
shadowless
in the roar
of landscape
to be the
landscape
Bill Bissett\textsuperscript{49} reminds us of the unity of heaven and earth as revealed by the relationship of the moon and tides, and of our essential role in that process. We need to move closer to our pre-Socratic origins where there was a more direct experience of all this.

\textit{our moon}

\begin{itemize}
\item is
\item sometimes
\item circular
\item is
\item yellow in
\item ourselves
\item is in the feet
\item how we move
\item closer always
\item into our
\item origins
\item is flat
\item on the eye
\item a penny
\item madness
\item business,
\item is deeply
\item in cycle
\item moon, hot
\item of pupil
\item cold, lash
\item blink, into
\item our stride
\item is
\item sometimes
\item oval, our
\item dreams
\item enclosed
\item pictures
\item we see, of
\item the tides
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{49} In Mandel, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 109
As an urban dweller, Margaret Atwood engages ontological issues, and wonders what other manner of "dwelling" the city might allow.

HYPOTHESES: CITY

To get out of this fear enclosing me like rubber, like a diving suit, the breath measured and strapped on my shoulders to get rid of the spear and swim the city freely, among its people, the streets, rooms, as though it were entirely natural But even fish have territories and go armed What then to be the water itself, the water all float in and none notice, to be everywhere and nothing as I was now (they walk through me, not seeing me)

my eyes diffused, washing in waves of light across the ceiling, my neck on the back of this chair.

---

Perhaps it is possible to wonder about the ontological status of a city itself as Irving Layton seems to in this next poem. And like Atwood, he too wonders about what it means to dwell in the city.

THAT IS THE QUESTION

In Skyros
under a fine unclouded sky
in the company
of cheerful relaxed people
who do not own a pot to piss in
I am certain
Toronto does not exist,
being less real than vanished Troy or Delphi

Returned home
to grey streets and greyer people
who lock their hearts
for safe-keeping in vaults and boxes
and regard me
with cold suspecting eyes
I am persuaded Toronto exists
and keep asking everyone why

Finally, we turn to the words of Dennis Lee, the most ontologically aware poet in Canada. He has been influenced by Heidegger's thought. His essay "Cadence, Country, Silence: Writing in a Colonial Space" is a thoroughly ontological enquiry into what it means to be

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51 Lovers and Lesser Men, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1973, p. 23. In this poem the reader should stress: "does not exist," "being less real," and "Toronto exists."

52 Open Letter (Second Series), No. 6 (Fall, 1973), pp. 34-53. Though no reference to Heidegger appears in the paper, his influence is obvious. When Lee read the paper in the SFU Canadian Landscape Series on Jan. 24, 1974 he replied to a query by Ed Gibson by stating "I would make no attempt to conceal my debt to Heidegger, it was there that I discovered that way of approaching things" (from an SFU Department of Geography audio tape).
a Canadian. It merits serious study by human geographers because it so effectively embodies the Heideggerian themes and approach of this thesis.

What Lee refers to as "cadence" is Being's call to be discovered. It is the physis nature of Being which the poet must first learn to hear, then heed, then give voice to.

And what is--this tree, this enemy, this rooted housing bylaw--makes its being known to us as cadence. That is what I started to hear. In cadence each thing declares not only what it is, nor even how it is--but that it is. At all.\textsuperscript{53}

He believes that "cadence chooses to issue in the articulate gestures of being human"\textsuperscript{54} and this always takes place somewhere. Thus he invokes "country".

To get at this complex experience we must begin from hereness, the local nature of cadence. We never encounter cadence in the abstract; it is insistently here and now. Any man aspires to be at home where he lives, to celebrate communion with men on earth around him, under the sky where he actually lives. And to speak from his own dwelling--however light or strong the inflections of that place--will make his words intelligible to men elsewhere, because authentic. In my case, then, cadence seeks the gestures of being a Canadian human.\textsuperscript{55}

Lee's study of the writings of the Canadian philosopher George Grant\textsuperscript{56} suggested to him that part of the reason for the migration of the United Empire Loyalists was a "disagreement with the early

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., p. 52.

\textsuperscript{54}Ibid., p. 36.

\textsuperscript{55}Loc. cit.

\textsuperscript{56}Technology and Empire, Toronto, Anansi, 1969.
Americans about what it meant to be a human being." Contemplation of Grant's works also helped Lee to discover what it meant to exist in "colonial space," to be without authentic space, to be denied the words to call native space into being.

Lee's essay provides a basis for grasping the Heideggerian sense of his Civil Elegies, which consists of nine meditations on the quality of Canadian civilization. These poems ontologically probe what it means to be a human being and what is the nature of our dwelling here in Canada.

In the second elegy, "Lord and Master" he laments the disappearance of "measure" and direct experience of "the fourfold."

Master and Lord, there was a measure once.
There was a time when men could say
my life, my job, my home
and still feel clean.
The poets spoke of earth and heaven. There were no symbols.

But, it is in the final stanza of his last elegy, the ninth, "Here, As I Sit," that we experience most fully Heidegger's insistence on dwelling.

57 Lee, op. cit., p. 42.

58 Dennis Lee, Civil Elegies and Other Poems, Toronto, Anansi, 1972 (a revision and expansion of the seven elegies which were originally published by Anansi in 1968 as Civil Elegies). Lee refers to the influence Hölderlin's poetry had on these meditations. Lee, op. cit., p. 49.

59 This elegy is reprinted in Robert Weaver and William Toye, eds., The Oxford Anthology of Canadian Literature, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1973, see pp. 280-81.

60 Ibid., see pp. 281-83.
Earth, you nearest, allow me. Green of the earth and civil grey: within me, without me and moment by moment allow me for to be here is enough and earth you strangest, you nearest, be home.

If there is to be a geography of the human condition it must establish its epistemological and methodological dimensions as the consequences of a creative rediscovery of the pre-Socratic grasp of Being. Geography now needs to explore the ontological realm. Human geographers are possibly uniquely situated to respond to Heidegger's call to cast aside Cartesian dualism and the Platonic notion of truth. Human geography has a heritage of studying man in his place. Now Heidegger dares us to reunite earth, sky, gods, and mortals by attending to Being, by learning how to dwell poetically on this earth.

The conclusion we are left to ponder as human geographers rests with Heidegger:

That we dwell unpoetically, and in what way, we can in any case learn only if we know the poetic. Whether, and when, we may come to a turning point in our unpoetic dwelling is something we may expect to happen only if we remain heedful of the poetic. How and to what extent our doings can share in this turn we alone can prove, if we take the poetic seriously.61

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61 Martin Heidegger, "... Poetically Man Dwells ...," *op. cit.*, p. 229.
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