FIGHTING JOE MARTIN
IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

by

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Bachelor of Arts
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FIGHTING JOE MARTIN IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

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ABSTRACT

Although the years from 1897 to 1904 represent a critical turning point in the political history of British Columbia, they have not been properly examined. Those who have written on the subject describe the period as one of confusion and go no further. By explaining the part played by Joseph Martin, it is possible to begin to make sense out of the confusion. That is what this thesis attempts to do.

Martin was a contentious figure in Canadian politics long before he came to British Columbia. He made his mark in Manitoba where he played a leading role, first in the formation of the provincial Liberal party, and later as Attorney-General in the Greenway Liberal government. As Attorney-General of Manitoba he drafted the schools legislation that exploded as a national issue in the 1890's. He also used his position to attack the C.P.R. monopoly as he was later to do in British Columbia.

Martin moved to British Columbia in 1897 after reaching a dead end in Manitoba politics. For a brief period he dropped out of public life, accepting employment as a C.P.R. company solicitor. However, within months of his arrival in Vancouver, he moved to the centre of the British Columbia political stage. In doing so he tried to bring Liberal party politics to a province in which there were no party organizations. The government and the opposition were loosely knit alliances. Unfortunately, Martin possessed a personality that served better to divide than to unite. He failed to forge a united opposition front in the election of 1898; he proved to be a disruptive member of the Selmin government of 1898-1900; and, during the constitutional crisis of 1900, he accepted the premiership under circumstances that left him isolated within the legislative assembly.
By 1900 he had emerged as an advocate of railway lines that would compete with the C.P.R., and he drew heavily on the American railwayman J.J. Hill for campaign finances. With this backing he managed to derange the politics of British Columbia even if he failed to create a strong provincial Liberal party. Many Liberals found him an embarrassment, and his activity, in the end, provided an opening for Conservatives who slipped into office in 1903 with British Columbia's first party government.

Because there are no Martin papers, the material in this thesis is based primarily on newspaper sources and printed government documents, although some insights have been gained from a small body of Martin letters found in the collections of his principal correspondents.
TO KATHLEEN BROCK
I wish to acknowledge the help and advice of D.C.
Masters, Hugh Johnston, Robin Fisher and Martin Robin.
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This thesis is essentially a Martinization of the British Columbia Legislative Journals for the period 1897 to 1903-4. There were many interesting themes that I omitted, such as Martin's relationship with the radical labour movement of his time, but the tyranny of relevance precluded such an undertaking. I felt hampered by the absence of work on the other main characters of the era: Turner, Semlin, McInnes, Carter-Cotton, Curtis, and especially James Dunsmuir are nearly historical blanks. The newspapers I found confusing and misleading: in the beginning I put a lot of effort into trying to make sense out of the stories, but towards the end I concluded that the stories were sometimes intended to be publicity releases for railway promoters, and so not distinguished for their accuracy. There were no Martin papers. The Laurier papers were by far the largest collection of Martin's writings that were available. Some sources that could have been of great help were reluctant to release the material that I asked for: The Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway in Victoria and the James J. Hill Memorial Library in St Paul sent little or nothing; and the documents sent by the C.P.R. Corporate Archives in Montreal seemed to be incomplete.

This work really goes beyond the direct evidence that could be cited. I did not even find any concrete proof that the C.P.R. and the Great Northern were in conflict with one another, but given the objectives of each railway, and the Hill - Van Horne rivalry, including the manner in which Hill split away from the C.P.R. in 1884, the inference that the two companies were in conflict seems completely reasonable. Both Margaret Ormsby and Martin Robin
suggest that powerful outside interests had the power to make, or unmake, the government of the day in British Columbia, but they give few specific examples. I have put together the C.P.R. - Great Northern fight with the Ormsby - Robin allusions and tried to construct a reasonable case for the political manifestations of the company struggle from the viewpoint of Fighting Joe Martin.

I hope that everyone who comes to know Joseph Martin the rebel will see a little bit of him in themselves.
1- INTRODUCTION

Both Martin Robin and Margaret Ormsby, the authors of the two general histories of British Columbia, characterize the period at the end of the nineteenth century as a time of confusion and tumult culminating in the introduction of a formal party system and a return to stability under the new administration of Richard McBride and the Conservatives in 1903. The early studies of Edith Dobie and W.N. Sage have focused on the creation of political groupings after Confederation and on the Smithe dynasty of Premiers from 1883 to 1898, largely dismissing the end of the era in a paragraph or two as a time when "group government was breaking down". Later writers like G.F.G. Stanley, J.T. Saywell, and others, have attributed much of the upheaval to the new Lieutenant Governor who appointed a number of Premiers who had little support from the established political channels of the province and so precipitated a constitutional crisis which brought about his own dismissal by the Governor General. But all of these views neglect to include the effects of the railway boom then gathering force in the West and the powerful presence of Joseph Martin.

The period of the Smithe dynasty coincides with the appearance of the Canadian Pacific Railway and its growth into being the dominating economic power in British Columbia. The period of tumult which followed Martin's arrival on the coast can best be understood by tracing his activities in organizing a behind-the-scenes revolt against the domination of the C.P.R. and its political friends. With the backing of the Great Northern Railway of the United States, Martin brought about the dismissal of the
Lieutenant Governor, seized control of the embryonic provincial Liberal Party, plunged the established political figures of British Columbia into a series of scandals thereby upsetting the traditional patterns of the province, and for the first time in the province's history, brought a Conservative Party government into power which struggled to restore order. And all these events were a product of the railway struggle for control of the mineral wealth of the Kootenays for use in the developing trade with the Orient.

Fifteen years earlier, Martin had led a similar fight against the C.P.R. in Manitoba at the time when the Great Northern was trying to establish a branch line into Winnipeg. Elected to the Manitoba Legislature in the spring of 1883, Martin plunged into local politics with vigour, espousing the farmers' cause against the C.P.R. monopoly there, and, with Thomas Greenway, he became a leading light in the formation of the Manitoba Liberal Party. After bitter fights, lasting some years, the Liberals defeated Premier Norquay and his Conservatives and in January, 1888, with Greenway becoming Premier, Martin became Attorney General, Minister of Education, and Commissioner of Railways. Prime Minister Macdonald was facing growing pressure not to interfere in Manitoba politics and to allow the abrogation of the C.P.R.'s monopoly position in the West (in return for substantial compensation, of course), so that when Greenway and Martin arrived in Ottawa in April of 1888, Macdonald acceded to their demands and the two Manitobans returned home as heroes. A line connecting Winnipeg into the Great Northern system was completed a few years later.

In 1889 Martin launched into his campaign to deny the local French state funding for their parochial schools. The next year he intro-
duced his set of bills creating the Manitoba Schools Question which bedevilled Canadian politics for the next decade. He defended his legislation through to the Privy Council in London and went into federal politics in 1893 to fight the Conservatives and their Remedial Bill in the Dominion House, but in the general election of 1896 his old fight with the C.P.R. caught up with him and the railway company orchestrated his defeat in his home power base of Winnipeg. This time, however, the C.P.R. saw the wisdom of trying to control their Manitoban bete noir rather than simply fighting him: they offered him a job.

Martin was in a rather isolated position. He had earned the hatred of the Conservatives by fighting them so vociferously in Manitoba and Ottawa, but he had also earned the hatred of many Liberals. He had tried to seize the Premiership from Greenway but lost his attempted coup to Clifford Sifton and others who eased him out of party and power in Manitoba. During his Ottawa fight against the federal Conservatives he had alienated many Quebec Liberals who resented his actions against the Manitoban French, and so Prime Minister Laurier was not keen to help his former Western Liberal lieutenant. Martin was passed over for Sifton in the appointment of the new Minister of the Interior and he bitterly declined a consolation appointment to the Bench. It would surely have appeared to Martin that his political career was finished, so, in the best Liberal tradition, he accepted the highest paying offer that was available; namely, company solicitor to the Canadian Pacific Railway.

Perhaps the C.P.R. was as surprised that Martin would accept their offer as Martin would have been that they would have made it, but nevertheless, having come to terms on employment, Martin was dispatched to
their most remote area of operations; British Columbia.

Needless to say, Martin's pacific posting was not greeted with unreserved enthusiasm in all quarters of the province. British Columbia based federal Conservatives like Edward Gawlor Prior (in the Tupper cabinet) and Frank Stilman Barnard, who had reeled under Martin's attacks in Ottawa, would be bitterly hostile to him and doubtless would convey their feelings to their friends on the coast. And British Columbia being a rather conservative place, their friends would be legion. Typical of the response to Martin's arrival in 1897 was an incident concerning Martin's application for a call to the British Columbia Bar. Quite naturally, in his position as solicitor to the C.P.R., Martin would want to be admitted to the law union as quickly as possible, but the conservative Benchers of the Law Society did not seem equally anxious to have him. The Benchers then were: C.E. Pooley, a Conservative M.L.A. since 1882, (and also a Director and Secretary to the Esquimalt and Naniamo Railway, owned by the powerful Dunsmuirs of Vancouver Island); L.G. McPhillips, brother of A.E. McPhillips, an enemy of Martin's from their days at the Manitoba Bar; Charles Wilson, President of the Vancouver Conservative Association; Dallas Helmcken, President of the Victoria Conservative Association; E.V. Bodwell, a keen federal Liberal, and probably another anti-Martinite; F.B. Gregory, later a prominent Liberal (and in 1910 a Supreme Court Judge) who was to protest Martin's activities in the Liberal Party three years later; J. Stuart Yates, a prominent Victoria lawyer and later in the Martin cabinet (a possible sympathizer to Martin); E.P. Davies; and E.A. Jens. Martin had supposedly written a letter in which he purported to be a Member of the Bar and the Benchers decided to prosecute. They instructed Gordon Hunter, a Crown
Prosecutor, to proceed against Martin and his friend from Manitoba, Smith Curtis, without even a preliminary hearing. They apparently expected to send the two Manitobans to jail. Curtis was away in Rossland in the Kootenays setting up his new law practise, but Martin, in Vancouver, got wind of the intentions of the Benchers and immediately went to Victoria to insist on a hearing before their action went further. He was quickly able to convince the Benchers that they had no case against him and they dropped their suit, but they continued against Curtis. Martin took the extraordinary step of publicizing the issue. In a letter to the editor of The Province on the thirtieth of October, 1897, Martin noted how unfair it was to pursue Curtis when another Rossland lawyer had been guilty of graver offences but had not even been charged with them. Curtis' case was dismissed in court, but the trend of events was clear: the conservative elements of British Columbia were determined to make Martin's stay as brief and as unpleasant as possible.

In contrast to the federal Liberals, who were annoyed with Martin over his anti-French crusade in Ottawa, what few Western Liberals there were thought rather well of him. In the three years that Martin was the only Liberal M.P. in the West he had tried to organize the party as best he could. His notoriety as a radical of sorts had endeared him to the Labour leaning Liberals, and at the close of the nineteenth century, British Columbia was noted as the centre of radical Labour activity. With the support of Senator Thomas R. McInnes of British Columbia, Martin had produced good results from his organizing efforts. In the 1896 election, four out of the six M.P.'s allotted to the province were Liberals - the first since Confederation. The most notable of these new M.P.'s was William Wallace.
Burns McInnes, a young Nanaimo lawyer and a son of Senator McInnes. Others were George Maxwell, a Vancouver Presbyterian minister; Hewitt Bostock, a Cambridge man, Cariboo lawyer and newspaper publisher; and Aulay Morrison, a young New Westminster lawyer. William Templeman, publisher of the Victoria Times, the first Liberal paper in British Columbia, was not successful in the election, but still had considerable influence in coastal Liberal circles. These new M.P.'s would certainly have some feelings of gratitude to Martin for his efforts in helping them get elected.

Thus Martin arrived in British Columbia in the anomalous position of solicitor to his old enemy, the C.P.R. His background included the likelihood that he had worked with James J. Hill and the Great Northern Railway in Manitoba, and he had an established national reputation as a pugnacious champion of the rights of the West in Confederation. While he had a great many enemies he still had considerable political potential in the more radical atmosphere of British Columbia.
FOOTNOTES

1. cf APPENDIX for a full discussion of these points


6. Creighton, John A.Macdonald, the Old Chieftan, p.509

7. Pyle, op cit, p.299-300

8. Martin to Van Horne, 23 May 1896, 10 June 1896, and 3 July 1896; Van Horne to Martin, 28 May 1896, 18 June 1896, and 15 July 1896. (Martin's detailed complaints and Van Horne's bland denials) C.P.R.Corporate Archives. see also Laurier to Martin 25 June 1896, noting C.P.R. intervention in Martin's election, and Martin's reply 2 July 1896. Laurier Papers, PAC

9. Dafoe, Clifford Sifton, p.103


11. information drawn from Jackman's Portraits of the Premiers and The Men at Cary Castle

12. information drawn from Jackman's The Men at Cary Castle

13. the last two men are unknowns

14. The Province, 26 June 1897, p.403. Archer Martin appearing for Curtis

15. Robin, Radical Politics and Canadian Labour

16. information drawn from the 1898 Parliamentary Guide
2- ATTORNEY GENERAL

The headquarters of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia was in the lower mainland area of the province. There, Harry Abbott, who had been western general superintendent of the company for many years, had come to exercise an influence akin to that of James Douglas of the Hudson's Bay Company in an earlier era. But Abbott had retired just before Martin's arrival on the coast and the new superintendent, Richard Marpole, was beginning to grapple with far larger problems than Abbott had had to contend with. Many years earlier, the Hudson's Bay Company had struggled in vain to establish a regular trade with the Orient and the C.P.R. was taking up the old struggle again. So too was James J. Hill of the Great Northern Railway, which had arrived in Seattle in 1893, and was now trying to generate the huge amounts of traffic which would be required to make a profit out of the western section of the line. And Martin, as company solicitor to the C.P.R., would certainly be quite aware of the grand designs of the railway giants, but as a reformer and prairie populist, he would also be concerned with the parochial outlook of the local politicians. But British Columbia was quite new territory to him and it would take him quite some time to discover what his opportunities were in his very changed circumstances.

On the provincial scene, the regime of Premier Turner (the latest incumbent in the Smithe dynasty), was tottering from numerous allegations of corruption and the Semlin Oppositionists published their platform calling for redistribution, Civil Service reform, more control
over the provincial aid going to the railways, and land grants for settlers only. Several of the Oppositionist items were from the Liberal platform of 1893 but there was no formal link between the provincial group and the federal party structure. Talk was growing of a provincial election. Lieutenant Governor Dewdney's term of office was just about to expire and the new appointment would be Prime Minister Laurier's first in British Columbia. Rumours were rife that the job was to go to a man from Quebec: someone who had been Premier there during a constitutional crisis about twenty years earlier; Sir Henri Joly de Lotbiniere. The Toronto Evening Telegram suggested that Martin was wrong to launch any venture with the C.P.R. and confidently predicted that he would soon be back in politics, but Martin had to be quite cautious in the new and confusing political atmosphere on the coast.

In British Columbian provincial politics, there were no clearly identifiable labels for the various factions contending for power. There was a vast range of individuals standing for office under a confusing array of titles. At the end of the nineteenth century, these labels included Turnerites, Semlinites, Cottonites (each denoting the leader of the particular ticket), 'straight' Conservatives, various Labour and socialist groups backed by different trades unions, and a wide range of candidates who called themselves Independents. Once elected, these diverse individuals normally became either Government supporters, or Oppositionists, but this tended to add to the public confusion, for different men might be 'straight' Conservative Oppositionists or 'straight' Conservative Government men. But labels aside, there was a party system in the Legislature and it worked
rather well, although Martin could not be expected to see this right away, for he was familiar with the traditional formal party system such as existed at the federal level.

The national political system had not yet penetrated British Columbia politics. In line with Laurier's policy at the 1893 National Convention of Liberals, the provincial organizations were to be the working units of the party: this arrangement was to placate Quebec's fears of being dominated by an English national setup, but the policy applied to British Columbia too, and the net effect was that little attention was devoted to the coast from national circles. What organizational work that had been done was attended to largely by Martin during his three years as the only Liberal M.P. in the West, assisted to some extent by Senator McInnes, but all this work had an exclusively federal orientation. Little thought had been given to organizing a provincial party with provincial goals. Martin would therefore be quite unsure of how his federal Liberal connections could be used in the provincial arena.

With the return of four Dominion M.P.'s in 1896 and a new federal Liberal administration, considerably more effort went into the British Columbia party, but all still with a federal character. This drive was not without opposition: the Nanaimo group haughtily rejected the call of the federal men, but under the leadership of William Templeman, the first convention of the British Columbia Liberals went ahead. The province was divided up into federal constituencies and an entourage of Liberals was encouraged in each locale. At their meeting in October of 1897, telegrammes of congratulations went out to Laurier for his knighthood, addres-
ing him as "...our respected and esteemed leader..." and they established an executive according to the Dominion constituencies, but however strong the federal thrust of the new party, there were obvious provincial implications. The popular feeling for federal party labels to introduce some clarity into British Columbia elections would be accelerated by the presence of a disciplined nationally recognized party which could become a clear alternative to the existing framework of the Smithe dynasty, and the Oppositionists. This was a sufficient threat to draw out nay-sayers like C. B. Sword. He was a provincial Oppositionist and so felt quite entitled to attend the meeting but he was also an ardent federal Conservative and perhaps anxious to impress Charles Tupper and Mackenzie Bowell who were touring the province at the time. Sword objected vigorously to the creation of a federal party presence in British Columbia (especially a Liberal presence) but the assembly pressed on notwithstanding. William Templeman was elected to lead the British Columbia wing of the party and a platform nearly identical to Semlin's was adopted. Joseph Martin also went to the founding convention of the party and was given an enthusiastic greeting from the floor but in view of his employment with the C.P.R., he could say nothing. It would have been gratifying for him to be well received by the Liberals, but this would have little real significance for him as the federal channels were essentially closed to him and the Liberals were then not a real force in provincial politics either. The new provincial Liberals at once began to exercise their power in Ottawa; by November it was released to the British Columbia press that the local man, Senator McInnes, would be the new Lieutenant Governor, not the Quebec man that was the original rumour, and
that William Templeman, the new provincial leader, would take McInnes' place in the Senate.

Martin would have been quite impressed with the apparent show of power of the British Columbia Liberals and in view of his popularity with them he probably began to ponder how to use his position to the maximum advantage. Martin was upset over the continuing press criticism of his employment with the C.P.R. and felt that he must get out somehow. If he were strong with the local Liberals, perhaps they could get him a patronage appointment from Ottawa too. In December he went to Ottawa to discuss the vacant judge's position (on the resignation of McCreight) with David Mills, the Minister of Justice. Martin did not get the appointment, but he still kept his low profile. By the spring of 1898, another seat on the bench was available, this time the chair of the Chief Justice, and once again, stories emanated from Ottawa suggesting Martin for the job. Senator Templeman and three of the new M.P.'s (Maxwell, McInnes and Bostock) recommended Martin for the job but the Ottawa establishment was not disposed to do Martin any favours and he was passed over again. This clearly indicated that the coastal Liberals could do nothing for him federally and that if he were to capitalize on his popularity he would have to resume a provincial career. The old fire blazed again. Martin was back in action.

A provincial general election was called for the ninth of July and on the tenth of June, Martin was nominated as an Oppositionist in Vancouver City along with three others in the four seat riding. His running mates were Francis L. Carter-Cotton who had held the seat since it had been created in 1890; he was one of the founders of the Vancouver Board
of Trade and the publisher of the *News Advertiser*; Robert Macpherson, a
carpenter, and a Liberal anti-Asiatic free trader of Labour sympathies.
He had held a Vancouver seat since 1894. The other new-comer was C.E.Tisdall,
vice president of the Vancouver Board of Trade, an arms importer and al-
though a Conservative, he was an opponent of Turner. There were only fifty
people at the nominating meeting, but enthusiasm ran high and Premier Turner
must have felt that his worst fears were about to be realized. Turner had
offered to appoint Martin as his Attorney General, but at the time of the
negotiations the federal judicial appointment had been in the offing and
they had not come to terms. Now Martin was running as an Oppositionist
and his immense energy and organizing ability were regarded with apprehen-
sion by the Government men. His opponents in Vancouver were Garden, the
mayor of the city; Carroll; McDonald; and William J.Bowser, a Conservative
lawyer who had been unsuccessful in the 1896 federal election, but was
later to be Attorney General and Premier of the province.

At the June nominating convention, Martin displayed his flair
for antagonizing everyone. In his speech, he admitted to having negotiated
with Turner; he confessed to a profound respect for Semlin, but proffered
his doubts on the ability of the man to be an effective Leader of the
Opposition. He proclaimed that he had agreed to run as an Oppositionist
on the understanding that the man to be Leader of the Opposition would be
decided upon after the upcoming general election. Clearly, he had himself
in mind for the job.

Martin toured the province campaigning on behalf of all the
Opposition men. The Conservative press compared Martin with Satan and
carried reports of Thomas Greenway of Manitoba describing Martin as a man with neither a heart nor conscience. The venom of the past poured out again; it was a particularly bitter campaign. The Independent, Labour and Oppositionist forces were buoyed up by the widespread public disgust of Turnerism which meant to them mounting public debt, extravagance, reckless favouritism, give-aways and kick-backs. The popular feelings ran so high that none of the Government supporters ran as Turnerites except a new-comer to the provincial political scene, Richard McBride, who only a few years later was to be Premier. It is possible that Martin could have obtained some campaign money from the Great Northern Railway. Martin would likely have raised as much money as he could, and Hill, knowing Martin's power for retribution, would be unlikely to refuse Martin some kind of donation - more likely, Hill would have contributed to both sides so that he was sure to be backing a winner - but as is almost invariably the case, any documentation of campaign funding is not available.

All four Oppositionists in Vancouver were elected by a substantial margin, as were the Labourites R.F.Green, ex-mayor of Kaslo; Ralph Smith, that September to be elected President of the Dominion Trades and Labour Congress; and Dr.R.D.McKechnie, vice president of the B.C.College of Physicians and Surgeons and President and Treasurer of the B.C.Liberal Association, but the overall results were not clear. Press reports differed, but it appeared that about seventeen Government Members and about the same number of Oppositionists were returned. The doubts about the election results were further increased by the wholesale legal challenges to various constituency reports for the first time in British Columbia politics.
This legal manoeuvering was undoubtedly the product of Martin's fine legal hand in the organization of the campaign of the Oppositionists. In the rather uncertain atmosphere surrounding the election results, Martin had a very clever scheme for trying to appear as though he had won. He would try and create as much confusion as possible and continue the electioneering after the balloting was over. Should he be able to build up enough of a bluff that his side had won, and should his old colleague from Ottawa (who was now the Lieutenant Governor) call them to office, there was no bar to them accepting the call and bargaining for supporters from a position of strength pending the summoning of the Legislature. To do so, he had begun to appear as though he were the leader of the Oppositionist forces and he thereby earned the hostility of the official leader, Semlin. Semlin stated his dissatisfactions to the press, a bad blow to Martin's strategy of creating a strong impression for the public, but he kept up his plans.

Through the offices of Senator Templeman a call went out for all Opposition candidates to meet in Martin's law office in the Hotel Vancouver. The meeting produced a statement to the press proposing a cabinet with Martin as Premier and Attorney General; Carter-Cotton as Provincial Secretary and Minister of Education; J.D. Prentice as Treasurer and Minister of Finance; Semlin as Minister of Agriculture (as an insult?); T.W. Paterson as Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works; James M. Martin (no relation) as Minister of Mines; Thomas Forster as President of the Council; and R.G. Macpherson as Speaker of the House. This statement was issued almost as though Martin had already been called to office and would have contributed to the general doubt as to who was Leader of the Opposition and who was entitled to form the government. The names mentioned are quite impressive:
particularly those of Semlin, Carter-Cotton and Paterson and had they endorsed the statement, the group would indeed have stood a fair chance of forming a government, but there is no mention of who attended Martin's meeting. Presumably very few men did. In an accompanying interview, the hostility of the press becomes evident. Martin is portrayed as being disdainful of Ralph Smith, the Labour leader. Later events suggested that the two men did dislike one another but they stuck together politically and the press report was likely an attempt to split the two men up. It did highlight one of the features of the election results, though. If the Oppositionists were to be called to office, they would have to get the support of the Labourites, and Martin's proposal for his cabinet did not include anyone who held Labour support.

Premier Turner, obviously, and quite reasonably, expected to continue in office until the election results were finalized and a meeting of the Legislature called where he could face a vote of confidence, but he was not of the same mind as the new Lieutenant Governor. It was something of a tradition in British Columbia for the Lieutenant Governor to exercise a kind of supervisory initiative. The first Lieutenant Governor, Joseph Trutch, had done so to quite a remarkable degree, as had Hugh Nelson in 1892, and in 1896, the Governor General, Lord Aberdeen (who lived in the Okanagan), had refused to allow some of Prime Minister Tupper's appointments. McNees certainly felt that it was quite within his prerogative to choose a Premier in an ambiguous situation, and he proceeded to do so. He asked for Turner's resignation. Volumes of letters changed hands, but McNees stood by his decision. Turner was out.
McInnes' decision as to who to call to replace Turner requires some explanation as well. Many years earlier, McInnes had speculated heavily in real estate in Port Moody in anticipation of the arrival of the C.P.R. on the coast. When the C.P.R. shifted its declared terminus to Vancouver from Port Moody, McInnes was ruined and he became an outspoken advocate of government ownership for railways and reciprocity, both anathema to the C.P.R. McInnes' anti-C.P.R. feelings made him work well with Martin while they were trying to organize the Liberal Party in the West and with McInnes' new appointment as Lieutenant Governor of British Columbia, he apparently resolved to do what he could to shake up the interests of the C.P.R. in retaliation for their earlier blow at him. To simply appoint Martin as Premier would look too much like a Liberal conspiracy and Martin's recent national notoriety would make such an appointment appear extravagant at the minimum. Carter-Cotton was a long standing M.L.A. from Vancouver and McInnes undoubtedly suspected him of being rather too sympathetic to the power baron of his constituency, Richard Marpole, and the C.P.R., and from Carter-Cotton's prominence in Oppositionist ranks, and the personal weakness of Semlin, and appointment of the Oppositionists to office might not have quite the desired effects that McInnes wished to create. As an alternative to the obvious choices, McInnes picked Robert Beaven. Beaven seemed a very odd choice to everyone, but McInnes' reasoning was probably as follows: Beaven was the last of the Premiers of British Columbia before the Smithe dynasty began and McInnes was probably convinced that Beaven was not much influenced by the C.P.R. Beaven was widely noted for his skills as a parliamentarian, and in the fractious
atmosphere following the election, McInnes probably felt that Beaven would be able to trade on his status as a former Premier and bring the disputatious Opposition men together and form a reliable anti-C.P.R. ministry. It was true that Beaven had just been defeated in the election, but as Premier he would have been constitutionally required to be re-elected anyway, to provide popular endorsement for his appointment, and it would probably not be too difficult to win such an election if he were the head of the government when he went to the polls again. Anyway, the plan did not work. After four days of trying, Beaven could not get the backing necessary to carry on with a government and had to resign. An excited press reported Martin attending Government House to see McInnes. Was Martin going to be asked to try where Beaven had failed? McInnes would have told Martin that the business community of the province was already sufficiently alarmed at the simple fact of his election, and that any appointment to the Premiership would have to await a more favourable climate of opinion.

The next day McInnes decided that whatever his misgivings over the railway attitudes of the Oppositionists, he would have to offer them a chance to form a government, and he asked the Leader of the Opposition, Charles Semlin, the rancher from the Cariboo, to be Premier. Semlin had to get support from his recent rivals on the Opposition benches, and this might not be easy. Martin at first declined Semlin's offer of a portfolio, probably out of pique that he had not been invited to try and form a government himself, but under the pressure of time, and the realization that the Turnerites would have to be recalled if they were unable to agree amongst themselves, Martin finally agreed to support Semlin. This time
the rumour was that Martin had accepted office with the intention of ousting Semlin within a few months. Knowing Martin's record, this was probably a good bet. The Montreal Witness, a Liberal paper, castigated Martin for his antics. It recalled the Black Tarte—Yellow Martin days in the national capital when the two men had amused nearly everyone in Ottawa with their indiscretions, but that the situation in British Columbia was serious. An Opposition gadfly could be funny, but if the political stability of the province was to come into question, then Martin must act in a responsible way.

Lieutenant Governor McInnes gazetted C.A. Semlin as Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works; F.L. Carter-Cotton as Minister of Finance, Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Mines; Joseph Martin as Attorney General and Acting Provincial Secretary with interim responsibility for Public Schools; and Dr. R.E. McKechnie as a Member of the Executive Council without portfolio. Martin's position was downgraded a bit with the entry into the cabinet a few days later of J.F. Hume, a Cottonite, taking over Martin's acting portfolio of the Provincial Secretaryship and also Carter-Cotton's acting position in Mines, but with uncertain backing from the Legislature, and in some public turmoil, the new reform administration was in office.

No one knew quite what to expect. Semlin's platform called for redistribution, Civil Service reform, more provincial control of railways, and some smaller items, but that was hardly relevant now. Joseph Martin the radical was in the cabinet and that might mean anything. Also the ministry had to depend on Labour support and although the Labour man
in the cabinet did not have any direct responsibility, he would doubtless use his influence for as much socialism as possible. In any event the new group was a startling change from the old style of governments that they were used to and it looked like a new era in British Columbia politics. And, of course, the C.P.R. would have prepared for the worst.

Attorney General Martin seemed quite taken with his regained importance. He appeared in his official capacity in Judge Walkem's court to speak to an election petition the judge was hearing, but the judge was not about to be upstaged in his own court and Martin's unorthodox effort to assist his political friend backfired on them as was predictable. But he was re-elected by acclamation in the Vancouver by-election after his appointment to the cabinet and soon after, his friend from Manitoba who had defended Smith Curtis from the Law Society's proceedings, Archer Martin, was appointed to the vacant seat on the bench. The federal Liberals were probably making a conciliatory gesture to their newly restored colleague in British Columbia. Also, Joseph's brother, Edward Daniel Martin, a wealthy drug manufacturer in Winnipeg, was elected President of the Manitoba Liberals. It certainly began to look as though Martin were quickly re-establishing his old influence in the West.

William Van Horne, President of the C.P.R., came to Vancouver to confer with the new government, doubtless apprehensive over their intentions concerning 'more provincial control on aid to railways'. It would be of great concern to him that their old enemy from Manitoba was back in power in his place of exile and he would be anxious to know what Martin's new plans were. Martin would have been too shrewd a politician to
discuss his plans with the President of the C.P.R. but one thing that none of them knew at the time was that Van Horne had a secret arrangement with one of the members of the reform cabinet. If McInnes had suspected Carter-Cotton of C.P.R. sympathies, he would have been right. The nature of the secret deal between Carter-Cotton and the C.P.R. was only to come out years later when Martin chaired a Select Committee of the House to begin an inquiry into the Columbia and Western scandal.

But the new reformers were primarily concerned with implementing their programme of action. Attorney General Martin began a vigorous campaign for financial retrenchment and Civil Service reform. Not having much confidence in the local people, Martin brought in his deputy Attorney General, McLean, in from Manitoba to assist in the housecleaning. The British Columbia Civil Service had grown lax under the Smithe dynasty and Martin wished to put things right. He promulgated that regular nine to five hours must be kept; that there were to be no more bribes; and that no more outside businesses were to be run by government employees. These reforms did not rouse much enthusiasm from the Civil Service itself and some of them were to become so hostile that Martin would later find it difficult to carry on the administration of his department.

All Martin's political experience had been as a Liberal, and he was only too well aware of the power of a well organized party structure. After the founding convention of the Liberal Party in October of the previous year, the various constituency organizations began to appear and Martin knew very well that if he could capture the backing of his own Vancouver group that it would augur well for his political future. J.C. McLagan,
editor of The World newspaper, and a prominent Vancouver businessman, was
starting to setup the Liberal machine in his city, and in keeping with the
character of the party generally, the new group was to be oriented towards
federal politics. Martin still felt that the federal Liberals were implac-
ably opposed to him and that therefore he had to undercut McLagan's in-
fluence in Vancouver. At the first meeting of the Vancouver Liberals, Martin
did try to keep McLagan out of any position in the party, but quite without
success. In the meeting the next month (November 1898) Martin tried to
get a clause inserted in their constitution prohibiting the packing of
meetings, but (probably at a packed meeting) the anti-Martinites, led by
J.C.McLagan, laughed him down. The split in the Vancouver Liberals became
even more apparent in December. A dinner was held in honour of D.C.Fraser
featuring Joseph Martin as the principle speaker, but this dinner was only
a prelude to the full scale gathering the following night which was attended
by all the prominent local Liberals, but only by Joseph's wife, Elizabeth.
The group was so badly split that they could not even sit down to hold
party dinners together. This incident was typical of Martin's grim abrasive
attitude. If he had a lighter touch in his dealings with other people and
some sense of reasonable compromise he would not have let the occasional
slap at his dignity interfere with his overall goal of establishing a
power base in his home territory. Had he accepted McLagan's right to
organize for the federal Liberals and asked in return that McLagan respect
his right to organize provincially the two men could have been of great
help to each other, but instead Martin made an enemy out of the man. Luckily
for Martin, McLagan was a good politician and saw the value of co-operating
for mutual ends and in spite of it all he was to be of considerable assistance to Martin at a critical juncture in the future.

By the time the Legislative session opened in the New Year a workable majority for the reformers had been formed with the support of Semlin and Carter-Cotton, Martin, and the Labour group under Dr. McKechnie. The party numbered about twenty, facing the displaced Turnerites, who now counted only about fifteen. Important new men in the House were James Dunsmuir, inheritor of the coal kingdom of Vancouver Island. James' father, Robert, was the first powerful local man in British Columbia. In cooperation with the Royal Navy he had established the Wellington coal collieries, and with support from the Colonial Secretary in London and the Governor General in Ottawa, he had obtained the backing of the Pacific Quartet (the big four financiers of California) to build the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway. At the time of Robert's rise to power, Vancouver Island was the only region of importance in the province and he had used his industrial might to dominate the politics of his time. But by the time his son James succeeded him there were two other regions of importance in the rapidly developing province. The lower mainland area had mushroomed with the arrival of the C.P.R. in 1886 and the Kootenays region was undergoing a mining boom. While Dunsmuir continued to dominate the Vancouver Island region (to the counter point of near open warfare with the mining unions), and the C.P.R. was pre-eminently influential in the lower mainland area, the Kootenays were the subject of contention. D.C. Corbin's Inland Empire centred in Spokane Washington was bringing down much of the mineral wealth of the Kootenays for use in the United States. Similarly, James J. Hill and the
Great Northern Railway were anxious for their share of the valuable ores and were competing with Corbin in the exploitation of the area, as was the C.P.R., but overshadowing the whole struggle was the violent and bitter labour battle to establish some rights for the miners. Perhaps the most dramatic labour fight in Canada was the trial of the Western Federation of Miners to create some safety standards for the mines, get some proper wages for the men who actually dug up the mineral wealth and to stop the company stores selling foodstuffs at highly inflated prices. These union men would look to the new Semlin administration for help in their fight with the big companies that ran the business of the area, and the Semlin men were quite prepared to do what they could to be of assistance.

The session of 1899 was to be a momentous one for the province. The reformers had prepared a thorough and profound redirection for the government and for British Columbia as a whole. They would face a backlash from the business community of major proportions, angry foreign governments, and an exasperated federal administration, all of whom tried to reverse their policies but they stuck together and saw things through as best they could.

Hume brought in a bill to set up the Department of Mines and to establish an office of Inspector of Mines which reported directly to the Minister. Presumably, Hume felt that his staff in the Civil Service was not completely in tune with his new policies. The Metalliferous Mines Inspection Act was the famous eight hour bill. It was introduced by Kellie (from the West Kootenays) who was Chairman of the Mining Committee, and subsequently carried by Carter-Cotton. This Act was certainly what the
miners in the Kootenays wanted. It set up some safety standards that the
Inspector was to enforce, together with the explosive Chapter Four which
provided that the miners were only to work an eight hour day. The big
metal mining men were furious about the bill and some even closed their
mines rather than subscribe to the new law. As a further concession to
the Labour demands, the Semlinites also yielded to their anti-Oriental
proclivities. McKechnie introduced the Coal Mines Regulation Act which
prohibited Japanese and Chinese from working underground in any provincial
mine. This was another direct threat to the mining magnates who depended
on cheap Oriental labour to operate their mines at a higher profit than
they would get if they were forced to pay reasonable wages to the more
demanding white miners. But while the bill annoyed the coal magnates (such
as James Dunsmuir), it also embarrassed Prime Minister Laurier. The Act
drew an official protest from the Emperor of Japan and Laurier came under
pressure to disallow the legislation.

The Act was simply another entry in the long history of such
British Columbian legislation. The Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1888 had
been held intra vires on reference to the Supreme Court of British Columbia,
inclusive of the section proscribing Chinese from the mines. The Coal Mines
Regulation Amendment Act of 1890 prohibited boys under twelve, females, and
'Chinamen' from working underground, and it went on reference as far as the
Privy Council, but the definitive ruling was made in the Union Colliery Co.
of B.C. v Bryden (1899) Case in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that
the Amendment Act was ultra vires. The McKechnie amending Act of 1899
was just another entry in the complicated legal tangle of the British Col-
umbians to enforce their racist feelings against an embarrassed federal
government and a disapproving court system. Martin was well known for his
stand against any federal interference in provincial matters, and given
the probability that the courts would strike down the protested law, Laurier
felt that the wisest course would be to avoid antagonizing Martin and let
the matter be handled by the judiciary.

Carter-Cotton's bill extending Free Miners' rights to prospect on railway lands was of most significance to Dunsmuir's Esquimalt
and Nanaimo Railway and this proved to be another hot public issue, but
the only bill to be federally disallowed was Hume's Act to amend the Placer
Mining Act. Popularly known as the Alien Exclusion Act, the bill provided
that only British subjects could take out a Free Miners licence or hold
an interest in any mineral claim. The provision cut off many Americans who
held such mining interests in the Atlin and Bennett Lakes area near the
Yukon border. This was another very complicated problem. Martin wrote to
Laurier that the legislation was a consequence of the "very bad behaviour
of the Americans" in failing to remove bonding restrictions at Dyea and
Skagway in the trade with the Yukon which had been promised the previous
year. The American miners circulated a petition which they sent to President
McKinley in Washington asking that their rights be restored. This put the
American government in an awkward position because so many of the British
Columbia provisions were copied direct from United States laws. Secretary
Hays invited Laurier to recommend an amendment to the Alaska law under
which the Secretary of the Interior had issued a regulation in essence for-
bidding Canadians from exercising their supposedly reciprocal mining rights
in Alaska. The recommended amendment to the Alaska law failed to pass and the Under Secretary of the Colonial Office in London noted that the American position was a 'sham', but Laurier wished to use his right to disallow as a chip in the Alaska boundary dispute then coming to a head, and on the theory that if you are nice to them, they will be nice to you, he quashed the provincial statute. Before all these events transpired, Martin anticipated the fuss over the exclusion and in a conciliatory gesture he introduced an Act to provide for the cheap and speedy adjudication of whatever individual complaints that might arise, but his effort was overtaken by the international reaction to the original bill.

Indeed, although Martin's cabinet colleagues put through legislation which aroused storms of protest, Martin's bills were by contrast quite modest, reasonable and progressive. His vindictiveness showed up quite clearly in the way he treated the Law Society. He amended the Legal Professions Act to repeal the six month residency requirement that had annoyed him in 1897. Another Act set up the Department of the Attorney General, and Martin pleased the Vancouver Bar by amending the Supreme Court Act to repeal some restrictions on the appointment of judges and broadening the court's jurisdiction so that it could hear cases in Vancouver. There was then a provincial rights dispute with Ottawa concerning the appointment prerogative for Queen's Counsel. Until that point, the prerogative of appointment had rested with the national government, but along with several other provinces, Martin passed an Act reserving the right of appointment to the provincial administration. But he went further than that and made it contempt of court for any barrister to wear his silks in court if he
held only a federal appointment. This would have antagonized many members of the British Columbia Bar. The senior members of the Bar insisted that it could not be contempt for them to claim the privileges bestowed upon them by the Governor General and decided to ignore the change in procedure. Martin also created a list of seniority for the appointments made that year and placed himself close to the top of the list. But notwithstanding his pettiness to the Law Society, he did introduce the bill which was to prove the most enduring importance to the province for that session. This was the Act establishing the Torrens Land Registry System. The Act received comparatively little attention at the time because of the explosive nature of the other measures, but it was a fundamental change in the land titles system for British Columbia. The bill replaced the old English system, known to solicitors as the trunk-full-of-deeds system. When anyone wished to sell his property, he would have to present all the deeds and conveyances of the title going back to the original crown grant of the land. The buyer would then have to engage a conveyancing solicitor to check every deed who would assure the contemporary purchaser as to the validity of each item, and draw up a new conveyance. Should the solicitor discover a flaw anywhere along the line of deeds, all subsequent conveyances would come into question and the last unflawed owner would have a right of action for recovery against all the questioned owners. This tangled antiquation proved to be an excellent source of income for lawyers, but of little benefit to the owners of the land, and Martin's action in dispensing with the old system would greatly benefit everyone who owned or wished to buy land. The Torrens system was simply a government guarantee as to the valid title of each
owner as soon as his deed was accepted for registry, so that each new buyer would only have to check one deed for mortgages or restrictive covenants. Thus although Martin would have antagonized some members of the Bar, his general record as Attorney General for the 1899 session was moderate, productive and beneficial to British Columbia.

The government's major project of reforming the Civil Service was expedited considerably by Carter-Cotton's Appointments Act terminating all appointments made to Boards on the thirtieth of June 1899. This freed their hands to make their own appointments and facilitated the implementation of their new policies. The Turner Opposition was greatly distressed by this Act and to pacify them the government agreed to table a report of all those dismissed by the Act, which Martin did later in the session.

The Semlinites did little in terms of legislation that was of much direct consequence to the railways. Premier Semlin rescinded a deal that William Mackenzie and Donald Mann had negotiated with Premier Turner concerning the Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway project. The cancellation resulted in litigation in Exchequer and a judgement for a refund of their $250,000 deposit and $329,000 in damages, but the law suit did not seem to prejudice the railway promoters with the Semlin regime. They were still able to obtain passage of an Act extending for one year their time limit for performance of several contractual obligations on the Columbia and Western Railway probably over the objections of the C.P.R. which controlled the line. Also their clever lobbying showed up in their express exemption from an Act which repealed some minor governmental obligations to aid the railways. Indeed, if the under-the-table dealings with the C.P.R.
and Carter-Cotton be taken into account, the Semlinites were positively
magnanimous to the railways, considering what they might have done.

The primary thrust of the Semlin men had been against the mining magnates. In a bid for support from the Kootenay mining unions and the Vancouver Island colliery workers, they had enacted the eight hour law, safety standards, government inspection of the mines, and the anti-Oriental provisions that the miners wanted. There were also rumours that Martin had blocked certain government payments to the Crow’s Nest Pass Coal Company. If this were true it was likely an effort on Martin’s behalf to assist James J. Hill in his efforts to buy out the company in line with Hill’s plans to link up the Kootenay coal with the iron deposits in eastern Washington State to create a steel smelter. This is only speculative, but it may indicate Martin’s connection with Hill at this early date. It would also help to explain the strong personal enmity between Martin and Carter-Cotton: each suspected the other of acting for outside railroad interests.

In Rossland, in the heart of the Kootenays mining region, Martin’s old friend from Manitoba, Smith Curtis, was thinking of running for office should the occasion arise. It would certainly redound to his credit if he were able to mollify the outraged mining operators and reduce their hostility to the Semlin government. He pursuaded Martin to come and address a dinner that he had arranged so that the local captains of industry would at least hear the government’s side of the story, and from their most moderate member. The dinner was to be a classic Martinesque fiasco. As Martin spoke at the gathering, he was continuously heckled by the mine
owners. As the din rose, Martin lost his temper and shouted that he would not be "silenced by hobos in evening dress." In the brawling community of Rossland, those were fighting words, and Attorney General or no, a scuffle ensued. 'Fighting Joe' earned his name once again. It would be just too galling for him that he should be called to account for the actions of a man that he thought to be a scoundrel even though the man be a cabinet colleague and when the fracas was over, Martin denounced Carter-Cotton, accusing him of all sorts of sleazy dealings, and departed Rossland in a huff. Naturally, this put an end to his aspirations for calming the Kootenay mine owners, and it would have similarly hurt Smith Curtis, and made him rather annoyed with Martin, but when the incident was reported in the press it was to have far larger ramifications.

Martin had broken cabinet solidarity and embarrassed the government. Premier Semlin really could not tolerate such behaviour and still try and maintain his own political dignity. He must act. He probably had a choice between firing Martin or seeing Carter-Cotton resign in protest, so the mild mannered Semlin gathered his courage and demanded Martin's resignation. Martin was not about to go gracefully. Once again he could not swallow his pride and accept a compromise and he instead turned on his allies. After a steamy confrontation with Semlin, Martin demanded that the Premier resign, but after a caucus vote supporting Semlin, Martin was expelled from the party. He had just alienated his reform allies. And considering the split Liberals he was once again in the position that he had been in in Manitoba only a few years earlier: almost completely isolated from all the established political channels in the province.
By this time, both Martin and the C.P.R. would have realized that their attempt to control him was a failure; that Martin had considerable popular appeal in British Columbia; that if he continued in elected office he would be able to hurt the company's interests (if he had not done so already); and that the company would be well advised to help defeat Martin at the polls as they had in 1896. Martin would be anticipating the C.P.R.'s acting against him again and would be making every effort to establish new political allies. His obvious alternative in British Columbia would be to try and get the support of the Dunsmuirs of Vancouver Island and to look to large outside interests who might be interested in supporting a fight against the C.P.R.: this outside interest would almost certainly be James J.Hill and the Great Northern Railway.
FOOTNOTES

1. cf. Ormsby, *British Columbia: A History*, p.305 (she refers to the C.P.R. as the government of the lower mainland)

2. Ormsby, *op cit., p.66


4. cf. *The Province*, 10 April 1897, p.193

5. *The Province*, 31 July 1897, p.468. The Platform was:
   1. redistribution
   2. reorganization of the Civil Service
   3. more public works
   4. discourage oriental immigration
   5. amend land act on timber and coal claims - land for settlers only
   6. repeal the mortgage tax
   7. amend Free Miners' licencing laws
   8. more provincial control on aid to railways

   the platform was later condemned as being without backbone. -cf. *The Province*, 7 August 1897, p.486


8. reprint in *The Province*, 25 Sept. 1897, p.8

9. cf APPENDIX


12. Dwyer, *op cit., p.33-4


15. SWW, 26 April 1898, p.8

16. SWW, 29 April 1898, p.2

17. SWW, 10 June 1898, p.4

18. information from the 1898 *Parliamentary Guide*
19. reprint from Toronto World, The Province, 31 March 1898, p.3
20. SWW, 17 June 1898, p.1
21. SWW, 17 June 1898, p.1
22. Robin, The Rush For Spoils, p.69-70
23. SWW, 28 June 1898, p.2
24. SWW, 24 June 1898, p.2
25. information from the 1898 Parliamentary Guide. The characterization of the Turner regime and the identification of the Labourites is from Robin, op cit, p.69-70
26. SWW, 12 July 1898, p.8
27. SWW, 15 July 1898, p.2
28. Ibid, p.4
29. SWW, 30 Aug. 1898, p.6-7
31. cf. Morgan, Canadian Men and Women of the Time, p.78
32. SWW, 12 Aug. 1898, p.6. It is important to note that there was no significant blow back on McInnes for the Beaven appointment.
33. a kind of double shuffle in reverse?
34. SWW, 19 Aug. 1898, p.3
35. Ibid, p.8
36. SWW, 28 Aug. 1898, p.3
37. SWW, 6 Sept. 1898, p.1
38. SWW, 20 Sept. 1898, p.1
40. SWW, 21 Oct. 1898, p.3
41. SWW, 11 Oct. 1898, p.4
42. cf. Appendix of the Journals of the Legislature for 1902 & 1903
43. Vancouver Daily World, 18 Aug. 1898, p.3
44. SWM, 20 Sept. 1898, p.1
45. From McDonald, Business Leadership in Vancouver
46. SWM, 25 Oct. 1898, p.3
47. SWM, 29 Nov. 1898, p.3
48. SWM, 9 Dec. 1898, p.4 & 6
49. Cf. Appendix
50. Cf. Norris, "Lord Dufferin's Visit to B.C."
51. Fahey, Inland Empire: D.C. Corbin and Spokane
52. All this information on the proceedings from the Journals and Statutes for B.C. in 1899
53. Ormsby, op cit, p.320
54. Martin to Laurier, 7 Feb. 1899, p.30325-7, Laurier Papers, PAC
56. Penlington, Canada and Imperialism 1896-1899, p.202-3
57. An inference from the Journals, 1899, p.65 and the Statutes, 1899, p.16
58. Cf. the Act, Statutes, 1899, p.9
59. Watts, History of the Law Society of B.C., p.69
60. Ibid, p.70
62. Stevens, Canadian National Railways vol 2, p.86
63. Cf. Journals, 1899, Petition #4
64. Cf. D.A. McGregor, The Province, 20 Sept. 1955 (Vancouver City Archives) and the News Advertiser, 18 March 1900 (also in Martin's file in Vancouver City Archives), and Saywell, The Office of Lieutenant Governor, p.139
65. Cf. Ormsby, op cit, p.333. The coal could have been intended for use with the iron ore shown on geological maps across the border.
66. Robin, op cit, p. 71

67. an inference from the fact that he did run the next year, and that Martin would have little other reason to go to Rossland.

68. Robin, op cit, p. 71; Ormsby, op cit, p. 320

Martin could have followed parliamentary tradition and paid for his fall from grace with a period of penance on the backbenches of the party, but his overpowering vindictiveness prevented from doing so. He determined to bring down the government that had expelled him and so continued to be a powerful disruptive force in the province. He carried on his vendetta against Carter-Cotton, the Minister of Finance, by accusing him of altering some government documents in the embroilgo concerning Deadman's Island in Stanley Park but after some press coverage the issue died, resulting in further alienation of public support for the ex-Attorney General. What he could not do by public campaigning, he attempted by private means. He would know that Lieutenant Governor McInnes was less than enthusiastic with Semlin's performance in office. McInnes would have wanted the reformers to try and regulate the activities of the C.P.R. more closely but instead they had devoted themselves to assisting the mining unions and antagonizing the Americans rather than dealing with the railways much at all. Martin would be certain that Premier Semlin could no longer count on twenty supporters in the House and that if an election were held soon, the reformers would be the target of their best campaigner rather than the vehicle as Martin had been for them only the previous year. But time was of the essence. He must exploit his advantage before Semlin had the opportunity to recruit more support. Probably reminding McInnes that he was the most reliable anti-C.P.R. man in the country, Martin would have encouraged the Lieutenant Gov-
I do not think that I should any longer ignore the existing political conditions in the province, and the unrest and uncertainty resulting from recent political changes... It is sufficient I think, that grave doubt now exists as to whether your administration retains the confidence of the Legislative Assembly. And for this reason I believe it to be my duty to insist that you either meet the Legislative Assembly on or before the 20th day of October next, ...or that the Legislative Assembly be dissolved, and a general election be held on or before the said date.

McInnes was probably using the oldest parliamentary threat of an election to get Semlin to come to terms with Martin, but the Premier would not be pressured into any deal. He replied

I hasten to assure Your Honour that the Council has the utmost confidence that it will be able to satisfy you that there is no cause for apprehension respecting the general political conditions now existing in the province. As regards the relations of the Government to the Legislative Assembly, I have no reason to believe that the Government will not command a majority of the House.

Thus Martin could not force the reformers to take him back through either public arousal or private pressure.

Following Martin's expulsion from the Semlin ministry, rumours reached Ottawa that McInnes was quite sympathetic to Martin and the federal government began to follow the Lieutenant Governor's actions with growing alarm. Laurier was relieved that there was no major row over McInnes' dismissal of Turner and Beaven in 1898, but these new ventures on McInnes' part in trying to pressure the Premier might be indicative of an undesirable pattern. The Secretary of State, R.W.Scott, wrote to the Lieutenant Governor to advise a much more cautious approach to his political decisions. He indicated that the federal authorities were anxious that
McInnes not behave in a precipitous fashion again and so cause an awkward constitutional problem that would have national implications. Scott's letter, written on the same day as the McInnes-Semlin exchange, advised against allowing any pressure from Martin move the Lieutenant Governor act in a way that would exploit Semlin's temporary weakness - particularly an early calling of the Legislature. Largely as a result of the federal interest in the matter, McInnes decided to accept Semlin's reply to his warning and he agreed to the next session being called for the fourth of January, 1900. Thus any immediate assistance that McInnes might have been to Martin was effectively spent.

The Lieutenant Governor could still be of value to Martin in the longer term. Senator George A. Cox, a very prominent financier and national Liberal fund raiser, in company with Robert Jaffray, another national figure, and a director of the Crow's Nest Pass Coal Company, visited McInnes to warn him that they would 'skin him alive' if he called on Martin to replace Semlin. What they did not anticipate, was that given the Scots temperament of the Lieutenant Governor, such an approach would be likely to be counter-productive. By this time it was generally known that the Semlinites had conveyed to the British Columbia Southern Railway Company, formerly the Crow's Nest Pass Railway Company, and now a subsidiary of the C.P.R., a land grant of over six hundred thousand acres known to be coal bearing. Martin denounced the grant as a "robbery of public assets and an outrage on the people of British Columbia". McInnes would have had similar feelings, and probably about this time the two men secretly agreed that if Martin were able to rally sufficient strength in the Legislature, and defeat
Premier Semlin, then Martin himself would be given the opportunity to form his own administration.

During the last fall of the nineteenth century it became clearer that Semlin's confidence that he could produce a majority in the House was rather optimistic. His party was much more unified now that Martin was gone, but D.W.Higgins had defected from the government ranks along with Martin, and his working majority now depended upon J.D. Prentice, an unreliable ally at the best of times. Prentice had been absent for twelve of the nineteen divisions in the 1899 session and had voted with the Turnerites once. W.C.Wells had frequently been absent as well, but could probably be counted on to support the government much more loyally than Prentice. In the tightest spots the vote of the Speaker could be relied upon, but the trick of success would lie in accommodating Prentice's vital vote somehow. One bright spot was that Turner's position in Opposition was not all that solid either. James Dunsmuir was almost always absent and others, like Dallas Helmcken, were not resolute followers of Turner's lead. With some luck they stood a fair chance of getting through the business of the House unscathed. They just had to keep things short and uncontroversial.

Martin was short but he was not uncontroversial. Martin had formed a tacit alliance with James Dunsmuir and the Turner Opposition, who were only too happy to help defeat the Semlin government—all the while quite unaware of the secret agreement between Martin and the Lieutenent Governor as to who would be the next Premier. Semlin's parliamentary tactics could not have allowed for the bitter and dogged hounding of his group by his ex-Attorney General. Procedural votes carried, but there were many
of them as Martin tried to force as many divisions as possible, hoping that each might defeat the government. Sometimes the casting vote of the Speaker carried the day for Semlin, but the substantive measures seemed stuck. A general election seemed inevitable, but the long standing cry for redistribution was still unsatisfied. According to a front page report in the *Daily World* of the twentieth of February 1900, an election was to follow the passage of redistribution. This was a good strategy for Semlin to follow for it put Martin in an awkward spot. To oppose redistribution would be to oppose the strong popular demand for it, but if Martin allowed the bill to pass, it would give Semlin a considerable advantage in the ensuing election. Not only would the newer and probably more progressive communities be more likely to vote for the reform administration, but Semlin would then have the upper hand in calling the election on his own initiative and on his most convenient date. The balance of alternatives pointed to forcing a defeat on redistribution, if he could muster the strength, and hope that the more conservative older ridings would support those running against Semlin. On the twenty third of February the redistribution bill came up for second reading, and with Martin leading the Opposition forces, the bill was defeated by one vote - Prentice's.

Defeat in the House did not have any automatic consequences as it did in the Dominion House. Semlin would have been quite in order to carry on and face a direct vote of confidence (and bargain for more support) but once again McInnes stepped in. He ordered the Premier to make up his mind within three days as to whether he would resign or ask for dissolution. Semlin was furious. He was sure that, given the time to recover, he could
negotiate a deal with some of the more independent members of the Opposition and regain his majority, but McInnes refused a request for a delay, and on the twenty seventh of February he wrote to Semlin that he could not continue to be guided by his advice. He was dismissed! Martin would have reminded the Lieutenant Governor of their secret arrangement: he had established a reasonable record as Attorney General; Semlin had not tried to restrict the C.P.R. as McInnes had hoped when he called Semlin to office in the first place - quite the contrary; Martin did have a clear anti-C.P.R. record and would do what he could to bring the rail giant into line; he had successfully led the House Opposition into defeating Semlin; and he now wished to try his own hand at the Premiership.

Semlin knew that the House deeply resented the interference of the Lieutenant Governor in its operations and he at once asked for a resolution on McInnes' latest action. The division was not quite as decisive as Semlin would have wished for. Twenty two Members condemned the dismissal but fifteen were in support of the action. There was still some potential in the House for a new Premier to work with. McInnes would have felt that he had established his right to select the Premier, and he would exercise that right again. The day after their condemnation of Semlin's dismissal, the House was extremely tense, awaiting the outcome of this latest crisis. They were not kept long in suspense. Joseph Martin rose to a stunned House and announced that he had been called upon to form a government! The arrangement that the new Premier had made with the Lieutenant Governor was that as soon as Martin had arisen to make the announcement of his appointment, McInnes would appear immediately to prorogue the
House to preclude any repetition of the previous day's tactics of passing inconvenient resolutions which would impede their plans. But their timing was a little bit out. The House instantly passed a motion of no confidence "in the Honourable third Member for Vancouver who has been called upon to form a government", by a majority of twenty eight to one. A moment too late, McInnes arrived to prorogue, but once again the Members acted quickly to indicate their refusal to accept the situation. Led by James Dunsmuir, all the Members trooped out of the chamber, leaving Martin alone with the Lieutenant Governor. Nervously, McInnes took his seat. Realizing that the ceremonies surrounding this event might be a trifle strained, and amid a growing chorus of jeers and catcalls from the crowded galleries, McInnes stammered through his official prorogation and hurriedly left the House to an uncertain crowd outside. Immediately the Members returned to the chamber and joined in a roar of disapprobation. Someone announced the news of the relief of Ladysmith in the Boer War then dominating the news and another roar of joy went up for the British Army. The scene was without parallel certainly in the British Columbia House, and perhaps in the entire Commonwealth. The tumult was reported as far afield as the London Times. Laurier had his dreaded constitutional crisis.

Martin and McInnes could not have anticipated the depth of hostility to their actions. The Province's front page cartoon the next day entitled "Take The Head of Him" (suggesting his execution?) typified the reaction of the country. Undoubtedly they were both shaken by the twenty eight to one vote of no confidence from the House and by Dunsmuir's parade of M.L.A.'s out of the chamber, but while McInnes carried on a lengthy
"TAKE THE HEAD OF HIM."

Patrick Buscombe received the following brief letter from Geo. Hutchings, No. 7601, Gemfontain, and dated April 12th. "Sam" was the Vancouver contingent on the regiment to go to Africa, and valued employee of globe, and he evidently apprised employer. Mr. Hutchings—You will have doubtless the fighting in which the regiment took part, so I need not detail. Our company "A" was as heavy as any, but the Zululand men suffered most. Victoria, they had four killed and wounded. Vancouver one wounded. The right half was the hottest part of the fight. Heavy losses. It was a sight to see so many fall. I bury 8 of the Gordons and 26 men next day. From Paardeburg till we arrived arched 76 miles, and since have been on several long bounding up the Boers. I'm sure I am in the best of health. I trust that you are well. Business is brisk at China. Look for the ads in The Province and Advertiser, and was pleased to see the change. I am from here. Regards.

Very truly,

GEO. HUTCHINGS.

Your Ten has the biggest sales.

A GUEST'S WATCH.

A Porter at The Oriental Hotel for Eighteen Months.

When I quit my post at noon today the porter had a very serious case to deal with. Richard Fleming, who has been at the Oriental hotel for 18 years, was at the situation. He had been a guest of a connoisseur of money and a gold watch. When the man who had the watch, had given him a tip, the porter put it in the safe. The watch was opened, and it was found that the man had taken it. It was sold to another, and the porter naturally followed. In the arrest of the porter he confessed and offered to return the money which he said he had taken. He pleaded drink as an excuse.
correspondence defending his position (comparing himself to George III and Martin to Pitt) against the barrage of criticism from Ottawa and many other sources, Martin quickly recovered. Here was a new Goliath to fight.

Fighting Joe Martin believed that he could call a convention of the British Columbia Liberals, get their endorsement as leader, and respond to the long standing call for party lines in elections. He would thereby force all the Liberals into the fold for a contest that he was sure he stood a good chance of winning. The scenario did in fact begin to unfold that way. In Vancouver, Martin's stronghold, the Liberals held an executive meeting on the third of March, and although they had earlier been badly split they were convinced by the federal man, J.C.McLagan, to endorse Martin and call for party lines in the election that everyone knew had to come. Clearly, Martin had spent some time mending fences. Charles Wilson, President of the Conservatives, called for party lines too and it looked as though they might in fact be adhered to. But within a few days any Liberal solidarity vanished. The provincial executive, composed of federal party men led by Senator Templeman, met and asserted that there would be no party lines in a Martin led contest. The Conservatives did not appear eager to follow Wilson's lead either, and all the old labels of the past re-appeared. Hewitt Bostock, the Liberal M.P., noted at least six competing groups: the 'straight' Conservatives; the Turner Party; the Cottonites (or Provincial Party as they were sometimes referred to as); the Independent Liberals; the Independent Conservatives; and the various Labour candidates. As time went on it became clear though, that the labels really meant nothing: the important positions were either pro or anti Martin.
As his Goliath grew in stature, Martin had great difficulty getting help in his role as David: no one wanted to join his cabinet. He had become something of a political pariah. His old friend, Smith Curtis, came down from Rossland to accept the portfolio of Minister of Mines, but others were not forthcoming. There were a number of stories of Martin walking around Victoria trying to recruit men to accept office, but there were few takers. In desperation, Martin abandoned traditional political channels and turned to the general public. There is the story of a grocery clerk, Cory S. Ryder, complimenting Martin during a train ride and of Martin's response—asking him to join the cabinet—but whatever the myth surrounding the appointment, Ryder soon became an embarrassment and on the third of May he was replaced by a more credible incumbent in the Finance portfolio, J.C. Brown, former mayor of and M.L.A. for New Westminster. Another unknown, George Washington Beebe, a farmer, became Provincial Secretary but Martin had better luck with the remaining recruits. J. Stuart Yates, a prominent Victoria lawyer, ex-Pencher, and former Liberal alderman, became Chief Commissioner of Lands and Works (resigning on the twenty fourth of March but remaining a Martinite). The press dubbed them a 'cabinet of curios'—even Martin himself did not take them too seriously, regarding them as merely constitutional fillers-in pending his success at the polls.

The Secretary of State was rather more serious about the appointments than the British Columbians were. He later wrote to Lieutenant Governor McInnes...not a single member of the existing Government had then, or even has up to the present time, received the approval of the people. Only one of them had even been a member of the Legislature, and he had no following; and I think it is without parallel in the history of constitutional government that a body of men, five
sixths of whom had never been members of the Legislature, should be permitted to carry on a Government for three months without any public sanction or approval. It is useless now to comment on it. I was very sorry at the line taken, and as you must have observed by the public press all over the Dominion, the propriety of the action taken has been very severely criticized.

The Secretary of State was quite right. The absence of really any support for the Martin administration was underscored by the lack of any significant business for them to transact. What little correspondence that was received was stamped by the Attorney General's office - the last publicly endorsed position that Martin had held. Probably even Martin himself did not really feel entitled to call himself Premier. Of the 123 letters received, only one proffered encouragement. That one was from A.A.Davidson, President of Consolidated Fire Mountains Mines Ltd. A letter from F.J. Deane, President of Copper Mines Ltd., and a Vancouver Liberal, carried the notation on its letterhead that Martin & Deacon were their solicitors (this was Joseph's firm). But Deane was Semlin's most loyal supporter, and of course he did not offer Martin any help. Other local notables writing on minor routine matters were R.F.Gosnell, on behalf of the Greenwood Board of Trade, Dallas Helmcken, who was concerned about a Marine Hospital problem, and Charles Semlin, the former Premier, recommending someone as a Justice of the Peace for the Queen Charlotte Islands. Hardly the stuff of great things or indicative of the drama going on around the hapless Premier.

All the circumstances surrounding Martin's appointment as Premier - the vote of no confidence, the repudiation of the Liberals, the makeshift cabinet - clearly demonstrated that Martin was quite without support in British Columbia, yet he still planned on winning an election.
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To do so would require a massive amount of financial and political support from somewhere. For the money, Martin went to James J. Hill and the Great Northern Railway.

Hill had become interested in British Columbia in the early 1890's and had persuaded Premier Davie to let him build into the most strategic areas of the province. With the beginnings of regular trans-Pacific shipping to the Orient in 1897, Hill saw the value of the minerals of the Kootenay and Boundary regions and tried to get Premier Turner to support the construction of a coast to Kootenay rail link. In line with the National Policy, however, Turner's support went to the C.P.R., which built a line from the Kootenays through the Crow's Nest Pass to Lethbridge for bringing the valuable ores out into the eastern region of Canada.

Thus with D.C. Corbin drawing the Kootenay wealth down to Spokane and the C.P.R. shipping the ores into eastern Canada, Hill's best access to the region would be building directly west to the Pacific coast. He would be most desirous of building the line in British Columbia, so that he would qualify for the government subsidies given for rail construction, but to do so, he would obviously need the backing of the provincial government.

Hill had known Martin from their Manitoba days and he knew that Martin was a bitter enemy of the C.P.R. Martin's sudden appointment as Premier of British Columbia could be a golden opportunity for Hill. If he were to give Martin the proper backing so that Martin could win an election, or at least get enough seats to hold a strong influence in the House, and if Martin were to promise to obtain the required backing for the coast to Kootenay railway, then the campaign investment could be turned into a
fortune through selling the Kootenay minerals in the Orient. Hill would therefore be delighted to subscribe to Martin's campaign fund. The donation would be most advantageous, however, if it were kept as quiet as possible. Not only was there an anti-Americanism prevalent in British Columbia, but as is traditional in politics, no politician wishes to be seen to be acting on behalf of any private interest. As well, it would be the wisest policy to minimize the information available to Martin's political enemies, including the C.P.R.

For political support, Martin once again turned to the Liberals. J.C. McLagan, manager of the Daily World, the only Martinite paper, and the man who had supported Martin a month earlier in the attempt to declare party lines in the election, wrote to Prime Minister Laurier to ask what ought to be done. He noted that things could be very awkward for the Liberals in British Columbia in consideration of the federal election expected for later in the year. Should Martin effectively respond to the popular demand for party lines in the provincial election and rally the local Liberals, and get elected, he would be of great help in the federal general election following. Should Martin try and fail to bring in party lines, the Liberals would probably split and that would have dire repercussions for the federal election. McLagan concluded by advising Laurier to send a telegramme supporting the Liberals in B.C. This would indirectly support Martin through its implied call from Ottawa for party lines in the provincial election. Laurier replied that he could not support Martin in spite of his feelings of good will towards him, because McInnes' action in appointing Martin might have to be reviewed in Ottawa and because Martin insisted
on a Japanese exclusion plank in his election platform in direct conflict with federal policy on the matter. Laurier sent a telegramme the same day declaring no intervention in British Columbia politics.

The distinctive items of Martin's platform were: the abolition of the two hundred dollar deposit for candidature to the Legislature (supposedly it was this item which induced John Oliver—later Premier—to run as a Martinite); implementation of the Torrens Land Registry System (which had not been proclaimed); a balanced budget for the government; the repeal of the Alien Exclusion Law (which was just about to be federally disallowed anyway); and, most significant, a coast to Kootenay railway. His items on logging, real estate speculation, and Orientals were essentially carryovers from the Liberal (and Semlin) platform of 1897. There was nothing that was unusually anti-Oriental. Anti- 'Mongolian' (as they were then called) items at election times were a commonplace in British Columbia politics, and Martin did not specifically mention the Japanese at all. The source of Laurier's objections was probably McKechnie's Coal Mines Regulation Act of 1899 which had drawn the Imperial Japanese protest. Martin could quite reasonably feel that Laurier was being less than candid with him. The real reason for Laurier's refusal of support probably lay in the hostility to Martin of the business elite of the whole country.

Martin attempted to override the declaration of the provincial executive of the Liberal party. He arranged for the second convention of the party to be held in Vancouver on the sixth of April to try and get the direct support of the rank and file members. The anti-Martinites were
equally determined to stop Martin from invoking the party's name. About three hundred people turned out to the meeting and there was an immediate procedural fight over who was an accredited delegate and who was not. Delay worked against Martin, and so right from the start things went rather badly. Martin's choice for chairman of the convention was Alderman James McQueen, but this was immediately challenged, and Fred Peters, the former Liberal Premier of Prince Edward Island, was elected chairman instead of McQueen. Obviously, from Martin's point of view, things were going from bad to worse. A fight broke out and the police had to be called in to restore order, but nothing could really be decided in such an atmosphere. Peters adjourned the convention to the next day, but another fight broke out again then and the meeting turned chaotic. E.P. Davis, a solicitor for the C.P.R., introduced a resolution that the Liberals did not support Martin, but before anything could be done, the order was lost and the convention dissolved. The pro-Martinites, including Ralph Smith the Labour leader, held their own meeting afterwards and pledged loyalty to Laurier and Martin, but the whole purpose of the convention was lost to him. He was not able to overrule the provincial executive. Martin played his final card. He appealed directly to Laurier, but this only brought the sharp retort that he had been remiss in dismissing the House and that he must get on with an election without further delay.

The first public news of an election came in a front page story of The Province on the eleventh of April. It was revealed that Laurier had told McInnes to either call the House or dissolve it, and that the Lieutenant Governor had taken the latter course. An election was called
for the ninth of June.

It was an extremely dirty campaign. The news was generally dominated by the news of the Boer War, but what second string coverage that there was traced the various groups in their travels around the province drumming up support for their tickets. Martin drew large crowds and handled them very well, but the press seemed decisively against him. His personal contempt for Ralph Smith was widely reported in an attempt to split away the Labour vote from the Martin camp; he was also accused of being backed by the Japanese government; and that the coast to Kootenay railway was really going to be built because Martin and Smith Curtis owned half of the Sunset Mine in the Similkameen and that the line was to carry their ores. But the most damaging story was the revelation of the source of Martin's campaign funds. On the front page of The Province, two days before election day, there was an affidavit from E.A. Gardiner, of Seattle, declaring that Martin had accepted $100,000 from J.J. Hill in return for a promise that effective control of the proposed coast to Kootenay railway would be in Hill's hands. Martin's secret was probably discovered by the C.P.R. and published to discredit him, which it likely did.

Martin's performance in the brief time that was available to him is tremendously impressive. Not only did he struggle with the Liberal Party for recognition and help, but he toured the province getting twenty seven men to stand for election on his ticket. He organized a platform, obtained the finances to fight the campaign and at the same time carried on nearly all the offices of the cabinet as best he could. This in the face of hostility from nearly everyone.
The election results, keenly followed by the C.P.R., drifted in in the days following the ninth of June. Martin was personally re-elected in Vancouver, but defeated in the holding action that he ran in Victoria. His cabinet generally did well too: J.C.Brown was elected in New Westminster (but also defeated in Victoria); Curtis was elected in Rossland; J.S.Yates was defeated in the Opposition strongholds of Victoria and Nanaimo; and Beebe put on a very strong showing in Yale West, but lost to the Dunsfuir man, Denis Murphy. H.B.Gilmour was returned in Vancouver with Martin, but the other half of the ticket, McQueen and R.G.Macpherson (who had been successful with Martin in the 1893 election) did not make the grade. With John Oliver from Delta and E.C.Smith from East Kootenay South, six declared Martinites were elected. Martinism probably captured the 'radical' vote of the time, but just exactly what 'radical' meant then is anything but clear. The term then probably included everyone from anarchists and atheists through nudists to vegetarians, but if Martin did carry the 'radical' vote, then the constituency results show that they were surprisingly strong in the election, though not decisive. Snodgrass ran very well against the Okanagan cattle king, Price Ellison. Other Martinites were close too: Whetham came close to Richard McBride in Dewdney; Rowan came within seven votes of downing Kidd in Richmond; McPhee did well against the Dunsfuirite Mounce in Comox; and Sangster lost by only fifty votes to Roberts in Victoria South. F.W.Howay characterized Martin's effort as "comprehensive, his campaign strong, vigorous, brilliant..." and his opponents certainly felt the power of his attack. Carter-Cotton, running under the Provincial Party label in Vancouver, was personally defeated. He had
"BLEAK HOUSE" UP TO DATE.

LITTLE JOE, THE CROSSING SWEEPER.

"This boy," said the Constable, "although he's repeatedly told to, won't move on---"

"I'm always a-moving on, sir," cries the boy, wiping away his grimy tears with his arm. "I've always been a-moving and a-moving on, ever since I was born."

IN CHINA'S CAPITAL

TRAINS OF THE POWERS ARRIVE IN OLD Peking

And Neston Born, as Every Day Brings
News of Massacres—Beasts Interred
And Murder Foreigners at Foo Ting Fu.

Tien Tsin June 2: The French consul has received information from the priests at Tung Po that thirty

measures 1 chicken pox; 2; total 3.

Deaths in the city during the month

Mr. E. T. Brown, official observer, reports the rains. 1 during the month of May at 3.3 inches. There were 18
days on which no rain fell, and on 17
days there was more or less moisture.
The heaviest rainfall in twenty-four
hours was on May 24th when 4.5 inches
fell from the hours of 2 to 4 o'clock in the morning.

LOCAL BRIEF.

W. T. Alexander of the Queen
was made responsible for the duties of
recruited eleven candidates and only five of them got elected. Semlin was not even able to secure re-nomination in Yale and Charles Wilson of the Conservatives went down to defeat against Martin in Vancouver.

Martin could probably have bargained for more support, but the cartoon of Little Joe the Crossing Sweeper being pushed away by the constable labeled 'public opinion' illustrates the general outcome of the election, albeit in a hostile way. Although Martin had probably obtained the largest following of any leader, it was not a majority and although the others were divided on most issues, they could all agree on opposition to Martin, so he had to go.

Martin would be particularly anxious that someone as independent from the C.P.R. as possible should take over, and after having worked with James Dunsmuir in the fight to defeat Semlin, and considering the Vancouver Island figure to be something of a power in his own right, he recommended the appointment to the Lieutenant Governor, who agreed. He tendered his resignation on the fourteenth of June, and, tired and lonely, he went to see his mother and family in Detroit for a rest.

McInnes' fate had become tied to Martin's. The Members-elect met in Vancouver, and on the eighteenth of June they endorsed a resolution from R.G. Tatlow and Richard McBride requesting the dismissal of the Lieutenant Governor. Laurier wrote to ask for McInnes' resignation, but McInnes refused, claiming that his decision to dismiss Semlin had been sustained in the election. He insisted that the Legislature be assembled before any decision be taken on the propriety of his actions, but under pressure from E.G. Prior, the Conservative M.P. from Victoria, and many others, Laurier
sent a wire to McInnes on the twentieth of June informing him that he was dismissed and that the man originally rumoured for the appointment would now get the post. Sir Henri Joly de Lotbiniere was the new Lieutenant Governor of the province. The Vancouver and Victoria Liberal Associations protested the dismissal, but to no avail. Joly was to be just as arbitrary as McInnes had been, but he was not to make the fatal mistake of appointing Martin to anything.

From Martin's viewpoint (and certainly from McInnes'), the Premiership experiment had been a failure, but from the viewpoint of J.J. Hill, the results were quite satisfactory. Martin had created a group of supporters in the House that would likely be of considerable influence, and although the Premiership was now out of friendly hands, it was also out of the control of the C.P.R., and if Martin could establish a good working relationship with the new Premier, then the main project of the coast to Kootenay railway might still be successfully completed.
FOOTNOTES

1. Colonist, 18 Aug. 1899, p.4

2. Colonist, 20 Aug. 1899, p.4

3. Colonist, 17 Sept. 1899, p.4

4. An inference from McInnes' background and Semlin's performance


6. Stanley, op cit, p.282

7. Stanley, op cit, p.283

8. Ibid


12. Robin, op cit, p.71

13. Ibid, p.72

14. An inference from their similar background and beliefs and the manner in which the announcement of Martin's appointment and the arrival of McInnes to prorogue took place in a co-ordinated fashion.

15. Cf APPENDIX, table for Semlin 1000 session

16. Cf APPENDIX, table for Semlin 1000 session

17. An inference from the defection of Prentice to the Turnerites to defeat Semlin and his subsequent appointment to the Dunsmuir cabinet. Prentice had been an independent reform man who did provide the key swing vote to down Semlin. Martin was leading the effort to defeat Semlin, and if Dunsmuir promised Prentice a cabinet spot if he would defect (as did happen) then Martin and Dunsmuir must have been working together at least tacitly. This kind of inference is typical of much of the reasoning in the thesis. In the absence of hard information, much in-
ferential reasoning was necessary to make some sense out of the very odd sequences of events of the time.

18. from the Legislative Journals 1900


20. Robin, op cit, p.72


22. Journals 1900, p.43

23. an inference from the co-ordination of the announcement and the arrival to prorogue, see footnote 14

24. Journals 1900, p.43

25. The Journals 1900 records J.M. Martin as being the sole vote supporting Joseph Martin as Premier. On the balance of probabilities, this must be a mistake made by a clerk who was quite upset at the events around him. Joseph would certainly vote for himself and J.M. Martin (no relation) had no reason for helping Joseph. The sole vote must be Joseph's.

26. Ormsby, op cit, p.322

27. Times, 1 March 1900, p.5; 3 March 1900, p.8; etc.

28. Stanley, op cit, p.287

29. Martin to Moncrieff (an old friend of his who was editor of the Winnipeg Tribune) 6 March 1900, Moncrieff Papers, MPA

30. Colonist, 4 March 1900, p.1

31. Ibid

32. Colonist, 8 March 1900, p.2

33. Ormsby, op cit, p.323

34. as told by C.Norman Senior, Colonist, 4 March 1962, p.10. Senior apparently worked for Martin on the Evening Journal experiment in 1915.

35. Information from the 1901 Parliamentary Guide

36. F.W. Howay, "Political History 1871-1913", p.225
37. cf Inward Correspondence, Premiers Papers 1900, PABC

38. an inference from the manner of their appointment and their later behaviour. Martin was no fool and he would certainly know that his appointments were not cordon bleu.

39. Stanley, op cit, p.288

40. cf. Inward Correspondence, Premiers Papers 1900, PABC

41. Ibid, letter rec'd 7 March 1900

42. Ibid, letter rec'd 29 March 1900

43. Ibid, letter rec'd 3 April 1900

44. Ibid, letter rec'd 9 April 1900

45. cf affidavit of F.A. Gardiner, The Province, 7 June 1900, p.1

46. Ormsby, op cit, p.314

47. Ibid, p.317

48. Ibid, p.316

49. McLagan to Laurier, 3 March 1900, p.42937, Laurier Papers PAC

50. McLagan to Laurier, 29 March 1900, p.42938, Laurier Papers PAC

51. Laurier to McLagan, 4 April 1900, p.42945, Laurier Papers PAC

52. Laurier to McLagan, 4 April 1900, p.42948, Laurier Papers PAC

53. as published in The World of 9 March 1900, p.1. For a comparison, see the Conservative platform in The Province of 4 June 1900, p.1

54. Morton, Honest John Oliver, p.61

55. The Province, 6 April 1900, p.1

56. The Province, 7 April 1900, p.1

57. Ormsby, op cit, p.322

58. The Province, 2 June 1900, p.4

59. The Province, 4 June 1900, p.1

60. cf. telegramme file #60356, C.P.R. Corporate Archives
61. F.W. Howay, op cit, p.226

62. returns a composite of information published in both the Colonist and The Province from 23 May 1900 to 11 June 1900

63. both Robin (p.74) and Ormsby (p.323) indicate that McInnes chose Dunsmuir. It is my inference that Martin chose Dunsmuir and recommended him to McInnes based on how the two men must have co-operated in the House and from the fact that E.G. Prior, an old friend of Dunsmuir's was the leading advocate of removing McInnes. The Lieutenant Governor would be unlikely to choose a man who was trying to have him removed.

64. from a letter of Mrs. Maurice James (Joseph's niece) in the possession of Mrs. Mary Nairn (another niece of Joseph's)

65. Stanley, op cit, p.291

66. Ormsby, op cit, p.324
While in the United States, Martin undoubtedly conferred with J.J.Hill. A number of international developments were confirming Hill's vision of a lucrative trade with the lands across the Pacific. Tons of invaluable art relics from China were on their way to Vancouver to be transshipped by the C.P.R. to the Royal Ontario Museum - booty seized by the European Imperial powers during their savage repression of the Boxer Rebellion. Hill's agents had reported that wheat and lumber would be valuable trading goods as well as the minerals for Japan - his timber operations in British Columbia now looked very attractive indeed. Further, the Chinese Eastern Railway through Manchuria was now finished and the trans-Siberian railway, ten years in the construction, was due to be completed in 1901. These lines would open up the cheap labour pool of Asia to the capital, expertise, and raw resources of North America. The potential was immense. The C.P.R. was quite aware of the possibilities too, and was preparing to send William Whyte, second vice president of the C.P.R. (and an old enemy of Martin's from Manitoba), to Moscow to enquire into the technicalities of establishing a commercial interchange at Vladivostok with C.P.R. steamships out of Vancouver. Other railway promoters such as Mackenzie and Mann of the Canadian Northern and Charles M.Hays of the Grand Trunk Pacific must have been quite cognizant of the Orient trade as well, but they all had a common interest in keeping as much of their plans from the public as they could. Government subsidies would appear necessary and reasonable if they
were thought to be inducements to open up a vast new country that might have a great future but little in the way of immediate returns that would allow capitalist investors a chance to profit from their risks. But if those same subsidies were seen as giveaways to political friends to build small links in vast trans-Pacific trading schemes, then popular enthusiasm for the subsidies would probably be dimmed somewhat. Hill would therefore want the coast to Kootenay railway to appear as purely a local project, perhaps capitalizing on anti-eastern sentiments in British Columbia to suggest that Vancouver was to be a major beneficiary of the line. If Martin were able to arrange this, generous financing for his activities would be available. Surely there would be some local provincial business men who would profit from such a line? And surely the Dominion government could be persuaded to help in the financing for the line?

Martin returned to British Columbia determined to continue and enlarge upon the working relationship that he had established with Dunsmuir with a view to getting government support for the coast to Kootenay project. His last official act as Premier had been to issue a proclamation, under the signature of Lieutenant Governor McInnes, summoning the House for the fifth of July. The political turmoil of the last year had preoccupied the Legislature and there had been little attention to routine government business for quite some time. There was a backlog of bills to pass, including a vote for supply, so that the Civil Service could carry on properly, so an early meeting of the House was indispensable. Premier Dunsmuir's first official act was to issue a new proclamation, postponing the call to the nineteenth of July. The election results had clearly shown
that Martin was not acceptable as Premier but they had not endorsed anyone else in particular to assume office in his own right. Dunsmuir's appointment to the Premiership gave him the right to exercise the office, but he still had to get the backing of a majority in the House. There were many new faces in the Legislature, and they needed time to adjust to the personal touch of British Columbia politics. After so many years of radicals and instability, Dunsmuir did not have much trouble getting the support he wanted. John Turner was taken into the cabinet to secure the backing of his old friend, and J.D. Prentice, the swing voter who had defeated Semlin in the winter session past, went to his reward of ministerial office, as did Semlin's other party problem, W.C. Wells. Together with R.F. Green, Thomas Kidd, and such regional chieftans as Price Ellison of the Okanagan and J. F. Garden, ex-mayor of Vancouver and sometime lobbyist for the C.P.R., the new Premier had created a strong group of twenty four supporters as against only eleven Oppositionists under Martin. Martin was just accepted as Leader of the Opposition mainly for lack of any serious alternative, and he was frequently absent from his post. In his stead, his ex-ministers, Brown and Curtis, attended to most of the duties of leading the Opposition in the House, and they had a fractious group to manage: Munro, Houston, and Neill were often either absent or voting against their lead. Martin was not the best example for them to point to. He was engaged in securing the confidence of Dunsmuir and company.

A great deal of bitterness towards Martin still existed, and in a conciliatory gesture from Dunsmuir, McBride, one of his ministers, got a House resolution allowing the appointment of the Leader of the Opp-
osition to the Mining and Railway Committees and it was on the Railway group that Martin focused his time. He drafted a 'Model Railway' bill and obtained its adoption by way of an amendment to the Rules of Order to the House. C.E. Pooley, the Chairman of the Committee (and a Director and Secretary to Dunsmuir's Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway at the same time), had recommended that some standard be set for the rush of applications for railway charters that the Committee was being called upon to deal with and Martin saw this as his chance. In offering his widely admired legal skills for drafting a railway application form, he could move towards obtaining the confidence of the government: the government, of course, would be happy to have the Leader of the Opposition engaged in some technical legal job instead of opposing them in the House and accepted Martin's offer of help. Martin used this opportunity to point out to Dunsmuir that the federal government ought to be of more help in subsidizing provincial railway projects and got the Premier to start the pressure on Ottawa for better consideration. He also wrote in some of his pet ideas on the regulation of freight rates and passenger fares as a corollary to subsidization, interpreting his arrangement with Hill in the light of his own beliefs. The adoption of the bill did not necessarily mean that Dunsmuir accepted Martin's outlook. Many of the railway charters that the Legislature passed were never acted upon in the sense of actually building anything on the ground. Sometimes they were just triggers for waves of real estate speculation along the publicly announced routes for the new lines, which the backers of the rail charter would have bought up before hand, but those projects that were serious could easily be granted any exceptions thought desirable
at the time. The main point of the bill, though, was the demonstration that the two men wished to get along with one another: Dunsmuir did not wish to play another Goliath to Martin's David as had been the case with Semlin, and Martin wished to obtain the co-operation of the Premier for the coast to Kootenay rail line.

When Dunsmuir had been a backbencher in 1899, his main task had been to prevent Martin from assuming power, a task in which he had conspicuously failed, and his new conciliatory attitude to Martin did not wash well with many other members of the House. By December of 1900, the Oppositionists organized a conference in Vancouver to try and replace Martin with Smith Curtis as Leader of the Opposition "in consideration of Martin's failing health". There surely was a feeling that someone else would organize and represent their interests more effectively, so that their concern for Martin's health was not fully real, but Martin was indeed ill. As a child on his father's farm in Canada West, Martin had fallen off a wagon and damaged his left knee. It had never healed completely and after all the electioneering, it was acting up again. Martin quashed the revolt and then went into the hospital for an operation on his leg but in so doing he further alienated his Oppositionists - including his old friend Curtis. Two months later, Martin was still in hospital, this time trying to negotiate through his new confidante, H.B. Gilmour, to try and convince his old running mate R.G. Macpherson to stay on as a Martinite. He could not, and Macpherson ran as an Independent Labour candidate, against J.F. Garden in Vancouver. His collusion with the government was blowing his group apart.

By the second sitting of the Legislature in late February of
1901, Martin was back on his feet again, bursting with the old confidence, and now acting like an attorney general. He introduced ten bills, obtaining passage of seven of them, nearly all of a technical legal nature. Examples were his Act to amend the Trustees and Executors Act (bill #40); an Act amending the Absconding Debtor's Act (bill #37); and an Act amending the Summary Convictions Act (bill #39). Martin was also having another tiff with the Law Society. He stated to the press that many British Columbia lawyers practised champerty and over the objections of the Bar Association he introduced an Act to amend the Legal Professions Act (bill #34) to legalize the custom. This was another instance of his unfailing vindictiveness. There were several items pertaining to railways too, such as an Act amending the Tramway Incorporation Act (bill #35) and an Act to amend the B.C. Railways Act (bill #77) and a number of other items all of which were pointing inexorably to the fact that not only did Martin have the cooperation of the government, he was even coming to dominate it. His influence was such that he was finally able to achieve his major goal: at the end of the session a vote of no confidence put forth by some dissident M.L.A.'s which, stripped of its procedural implications, was a vote on the Loan Bill providing support for the coast to Kootenay railway. Martin had demonstrated tremendous parliamentary prowess in manoeuvering the government as he had. He was successful in achieving Hill's objective of getting support for the railway, and he now set about achieving his own goals.

The press seemed particularly slow in perceiving the budding romance between the Leader of the Opposition and the Government. Early hints were articles like "Scandalum magnatum" in the twentieth of March.
edition of the Colonist (Dunsmuir's own newspaper). This article posed as being a reprint from the New York World (an allusion to Hill, who was vice president of the New York Chamber of Commerce), and was very obliquely phrased, reflecting serious dissention in the Dunsmuir camp at Martin's position of power and influence among them. It was not until the fall of 1901, however, that the story of Martin's collusion was spelled out in print. Eberts was about to retire (de jure) as Attorney General, and Martin was rumoured as his successor. He did announce his support for the government, but his loyal lieutenant, J.C. Brown, went into the cabinet instead of Martin himself. It was a clever scheme. If Martin could dominate the government and the Opposition too, then dissident voices could not be easily heard.

The alliance of the Martinites and the formal acceptance into the cabinet of Brown would have occasioned the gravest alarm to the C.P.R. It would have seemed iniquitous to them that Martin had re-asserted himself after so decisive a reverse only one year ago. He now was dominating both the government and the Opposition. This simply would not do. They needed someone to forcefully present their views in the House and in politics generally. Who could it be? John Turner had gone to London as the Agent General there; Prentice and Wells were of doubtful reliability; Eberts wanted to retire; and Dunsmuir was very much his own man. Who was left? Richard McBride! He was charming, affable, had no enemies, and had a solid base in his constituency. He had never shown any particular belief in anything. Just the man for the job! The entry of Brown into the cabinet had elicited a strong denunciation from the provincial Conservatives, who had
been building their party along with the Liberals. McBride denounced the appointment as well and resigned in protest. With his new and powerful backer, McBride set about capturing the leadership of the Conservatives, becoming a real Leader of the Opposition, and above all the immediate goal of defeating Brown in the election that had to come upon his acceptance of office. He acted with vigour and secured the return of Thomas Gifford over Brown in the New Westminster by-election; through this he began to be publicly viewed as the real Leader of the Opposition; but he lost the Conservative leadership to Charles Wilson at the fall convention of the party. The press took up the cry against the Dunsmuir-Martin combination, without, of course, being aware of its purpose, and the tide began to turn against Martin and his plans.

It was well known to political insiders that Dunsmuir was rather unhappy with his job as Premier and wanted to get out. The struggle as to who would replace him was taking shape. McBride was trying to build a viable group of backers and several others were jockeying for position within government circles. The anomalous figure in the whole thing was Martin. He was officially the Leader of the Opposition and so was shutting out a thrust against the government from that quarter and that was the vital road to office for McBride if he were not to wait for an election. He knew that he must unseat Martin in the House.

Things were closing in on Martin from the Liberals as well. Just after Brown's defeat in New Westminster, Martin was defeated as Honourary President of the Vancouver Liberal Association, and his aide, H.B. Gilmour, was defeated as President. Instead, Robert Kelly, the wealthy grocery wholesaler, got in as Honourary President, setting off a feud that
was to last for many years between the two men. R.G. Macpherson, the former
Martinite and Independent Labour man, topped Gilmour for the President's
post. Martin's home base was falling into hostile hands. He simply could
not allow that to happen. At once he began to organize the third convention
of the Liberals for a showdown over who was going to run the provincial
wing of the party.

About this time, Joseph Martin Senior, an uncle, who had come
from the home town of Milton to be with some of his family that had come
to settle in Harrison Mills in British Columbia, died. The death must have
affected Joseph Junior very deeply for he tried to get out of politics
altogether with an application to Laurier to be appointed to the Supreme
Court of Canada, but the application was not received with favour and
Martin had to carry on with his B.C. career.

Martin must have convinced Hill that the control of the local
Liberal party would be a valuable thing to have, for when the convention
opened in February of 1902, his augmented power was quite evident. Senator
Templeman was still the recognized leader of the party from the first
convention in 1897, and Martin's first objective would be to get rid of him.
Quite predictably, there was a hotly contested credentials fight, but the
Martinites now held the upper hand from the start. Senator Templeman was
expelled from the hall and nearly all the federal people went along with him.
Martin then addressed the throng, making a conciliatory speech, promising
to "bend his course in the interests of the Liberal Party" - a party which
he anticipated to be under his direction. The remaining M.L.A.'s spoke in
favour of party lines in the next election and they all endorsed Martin as
their leader.

The platform they adopted reflected Martin's intentions for the immediate future: they called for redistribution; government ownership of public utilities (subtly changed from government ownership of railways); guarding against monopoly interests (that is, the C.P.R.); taxation on "privilege rather than industry" (an ambiguous phrase which could be intended to attract the labour vote, but could mean taxing the C.P.R.'s privileged position rather than industrious Hill); supression of land speculation; cash grants to railways only; and encouraging non-Oriental immigration. The presence of the McLean brothers (more supporters of Hill's) can be detected in the call for more dyking (the McLean brothers were the leading dyking contractors in British Columbia); and the statement that they did not plan any radical changes in the mining laws would be directed at local men like F. J. Deane, President of Copper Mines Ltd., and a prominent Liberal, as well as the larger promoters like Hill.

Martin had captured the local Liberals, but he had done it ham handedly and alienated the federal connections. Laurier wrote to Martin and W.W.B. McInnes that the federal Liberals were completely neutral in the affairs of the British Columbia party. That is, they were being restrained from attacking Martin from Ottawa? And no federal ministers visited British Columbia during the period of Martin's domination, and no federal money was forthcoming for local promotional activity.

Meanwhile, McBride was doing rather well in Opposition circles. There were quite a few men who did not like either Dunsmuir or Martin and were receptive to McBride persuasion to defect to his side. Kidd switched
back, away from Dunsmuir, and Tatlow, Taylor, Murphy, Garden, McPhillips, and Fulton saw the light as well. Together with Gifford, newly elected from New Westminster, the McBride group had risen to fifteen and they were a much more united group than Martin's following had ever been. The Opposition caucus met before the spring session started and voted confidence in McBride as their new leader. Flushed with success, McBride turned to the awkward problem of actually disposing of Martin. There did not seem to be any easy way. When the Members arrived for the opening ceremonies of the Legislature, they were surprised to see McBride already in the chamber, sitting in the chair of the Leader of the Opposition! Martin was also flushed with his recent success in capturing the B.C. Liberals and he was outraged at McBride's usurpation of his coveted chair. During prayers, he slipped in behind McBride and recovered his chair. When prayers were over, McBride turned to see Martin glaring up at him, and, in a fit of pique, he grabbed the unabashed Martin and tried to physically throw him out of the seat. A scuffle ensued and in the shocked House, the supporters of each man tussled with one another to right their aggrevement. A petty episode, but conclusive evidence that Martin could not continue his claim to be any real Leader of the Opposition.

Incredibly, Martin used his influence with the government to obtain a House resolution reasserting his right to the Opposition post. He retained the name only, however, and was really driven over to the government ranks. With him he took Stables, Gilmour and McInnes, so that with the Opposition strength up to fifteen, and Dunsmuir himself being often absent, Martin's voting bloc became vital to the survival of the government. He
had secured the incorporation of the Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway Company and had obtained the passage of the Loan Bill to authorize the government to borrow the money to finance the project. The remaining legislation would be to pass a bill actually appropriating the money that was borrowed to the railway company, (the aid bill) and this Martin set about arranging. A great many complications had arisen, and many items remained to be solved, but the main project itself seemed to be well on the way.
FOOTNOTES

1. Gibbon, Steel of Empire, p.356
2. Pyle, The Life of James J. Hill, ch 24, "Again the Orient Beckons"
3. Ormsby, British Columbia: A History, p.339 (the 'St Paul' interests that she mentions must be those of Hill)
4. Sun, Chinese Railways and British Interests, p.149 (American purchase of)
5. Gibbon, op cit, p.354-6
6. cf. Chafe, Extraordinary Tales from Manitoba History, particularly "The Battle of Fort Whyte" - Martin leads a mob against the C.P.R.
7. Gibbon, op cit, p.355
8. an inference from the APPENDIX. see footnote 17, Chapter 3
9. from the APPENDIX table for Martin 1900
10. Journals 1900, p.39
11. Ibid, p.175
12. cf. Ormsby, op cit, p.333 plus the inference that Martin was the pusher for the new policy - which, given the character of Dunsmuir, seems an eminently reasonable assumption
13. an inference from my studies of the innumerable charters granted and the absence of construction during the real estate boom
14. Ormsby, op cit, p.330
15. The Province, 15 Dec. 1900, p.1
16. both from the viewpoint that he was not doing the job properly to start, but also he would not allow even a stand in while he was in the hospital. cf. The Province, 18 Dec. 1900, p.2
17. The Province, 2 Feb. 1901, p.5
18. The Province, 22 March 1901, p.2
19. cf. Colonist, 15 Aug. 1899, p.8
21. The Province, 5 Sept. 1901, p.1
22. cf. Robin, op cit, p.77
23. Ibid
24. cf. Ormsby, op cit, p.333 for description of McBride
25. for a brief treatment of this era from the Conservative viewpoint, see
27. Ibid, p.15; Ormsby, op cit, p.334
28. see "A Shower of Bouquets", The Province, 9 Sept. 1901, p.4
29. Jackman, The Men at Zary Castle, p.87. see also Jackman's chapter on
   Dunsmuir in his Portraits of the Premiers
30. The Province, 11 Oct. 1901, p.1
31. Martin, Genealogy of the Martin Family, p.14
32. Martin to Laurier, 21 Jan. 1902, p.61750, Laurier Papers PAC
34. Ibid, p.82
35. Laurier to Martin, 20 Jan. 1902, p.61513, Laurier Papers, PAC
36. Ward, Federal Provincial Relations Within the Liberal Party of B.C., p.36
37. cf. APPENDIX for comparison of tables for 1901-1902
38. Ormsby, op cit, p.334
39. Journals 1902, p.5
40. the Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway was thought by some to be just
    a renaming of the Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway -
    see Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review, p.79 (for 1902). The VV&E
    was known to be owned by Hill - see Howay, Sage & Angus, British
    Columbia and the United States, p.252, and go on to p.257 for
    the exploitation of the Kootenays by the Great Northern, etc.
5- CHAIRMAN OF THE RAILWAY COMMITTEE

On the same day that Martin was affirmed by the government as Leader of the Opposition, Premier Dunsmuir brought his old friend, E.G. Prior, into the cabinet to fill the vacancy occasioned by Brown's resignation the previous September. This new Minister was an anti-Martinite, but the appointment was not all bad for Martin. Prior was later to run in a by-election against E.V. Bodwell (and win) both campaigning on a Canadian Northern ticket, so that Prior was an ally for what was becoming Martin's railway grand design. Further, McBride's seizure of the Opposition Leader's chair was awkward for Martin, as now there was an effective avenue for protest in the House against his plans. Being driven into the government's ranks really forced him to act before he was fully ready, but with his bloc providing vital support for the Dunsmuirites, he had to move then or risk not moving at all.

Martin's efforts to implement Hill's plans for the coast to Kootenay railway were becoming enormously complicated, and in effect, turning into a grand design. There seemed to be a never-ending stream of people to orchestrate into a workable deal, each having his own objectives. Dunsmuir was anxious to sell his Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway on Vancouver Island but Hill was not really interested in buying it. Martin saw that Dunsmuir's goodwill and free co-operation came at the price of arranging an advantageous sale of his railway, so, somewhere, a buyer had to be found. Luckily, he did not have to look too far: the irrepresible team of Mackenzie and
Mann were eager to build a line into British Columbia to complete their route to the Pacific and were quite prepared to negotiate a deal with Dunsmuir if he would agree to provide governmental backing for their line across the province. The problem here was that, as always, Mackenzie and Mann did not have the funds to put up for the purchase of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo. The financing for the purchase had to be kept quiet as well so that Dunsmuir could easily buy out his father's partners in California for a reasonable price. Martin struggled to convince Hill that he ought to put up the money so that the local arrangements could be proceeded with, and he would have pointed out to Hill that Mackenzie and Mann could repay the loan of the money with Canadian wheat from the prairies that could be used in the overall trans-Pacific scheme.

The public was kept in the dark by a spate of confusing press stories, and naturally, as much information had to be kept from the C.P.R. as could be managed so that they would not be able to anticipate their plans and organize against them. In a sense, the new lines that had to be worked into the overall plan were helpful as they served to further confuse the structure of the main plan.

In the past year, Martin had made great strides in recruiting supporters for his railway projects. With the help of John Hendry, President of Hill's Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway, and the McLean brothers, who expected to get a substantial portion of the rail construction business, Martin had convinced Frank Stilman Barnard to take a big gamble and emulate Mackenzie and Mann on a provincial basis. Barnard had agreed to sit on the Board of their Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway and lend what influence he could muster to support the plan. In return,
Martin promised to help Barnard. He was on the Board of the Pacific Northern and Omineca Railway (Captain John Irving's project) which was arranging for extensions of its Edmonton to Kitimat route to build up into the gold rush area. Martin promised to assist this plan of theirs by increasing their subsidy from the government to $5000 per mile, and as an added benefit, he was prepared to help Barnard's Okanagan Land Development Company. In this ancillary deal he had also recruited Price Ellison, the cattle king of the Okanagan. Martin projected a line from Midway (the gateway from the Kootenays to the coast) to run up into Vernon in the Okanagan. This new railroad would provide the long sought after competition for the C.P.R., and greatly increase land prices in their region — a factor which would redound handsomely to the two men.

Vociferously opposed to the railway deals were the ex-Martinites Smith Curtis and John Oliver. Oliver was publicly pressured to support the coast to Kootenay line by Thomas Ellis Ladner, a highly influential constituent, who stood to gain greatly from where the line passed through his area. Oliver was a former Methodist minister and his sense of righteousness drove him into two of the major scandals of the year, one of them blowing up far larger than he originally thought that it could.

The public had railway fever. Railways appeared as a symbol of 'progress' and 'civilization' and the politicians of the era rode the wave of popular demand for their construction. All three levels of government were active: municipal councils did what they could to encourage railways to pass through their cities on an advantageous route; the provinces viewed the railroads as a means of turning their potential into prosperity.
and they followed a policy of encouraging the lines with generous grants of cash and land; the federal government shared the same outlook with the same policy and was additionally concerned with trying to tie Confederation together. In Ottawa, the Railway Committee of the Privy Council considered the various applications for federal aid, but it was coming under increasing criticism from an indignant public which felt that the government’s largesse was often more concerned with the benefits to accrue to the friends of the party in power rather than the benefits to the nation as a whole. By 1904 the Board of Railway Commissioners took railway financing an arm’s length away from immediate party politics, but in 1902, the old system was still in effect. Successful railway promoters in British Columbia were expected to go to the federal Committee for aid under Dunsmuir’s policy, but in 1902 the federal body did nothing of much significance for British Columbia, so for that year, the primary focus of railway activity for the Pacific province was on the Railway Committee of the British Columbia Legislature.

The British Columbia Legislative session of 1902 was long and contentious. The main issues were railways, alien and immigration matters, and redistribution. Some of the bills had wide implications which peripherally related to railways, such as the measure which repealed the prohibition on the employment of aliens on government subsidized railway projects. There was also considerable railway hoopla which did not emanate from the House. The opening of the Kettle River Valley Railway on the twelfth of April was greeted with much acclaim. The line was inaugurated by one Tracy W. Holland who was simultaneously Mayor of Grand Forks and General Manager of the railway. There was no suggestion that it might be improper
for him to hold the dual employment. There was also the report of the Nanaimo Board of Trade upon "returning from Ottawa to Victoria to persuade James Dunsmuir to build the Comox and Cape Scott Railway", and an even more fanciful proposal to build a railway under the Bering Straits, but the really significant projects, unbeknownst to nearly all the people of the province, were the three bills that Martin was orchestrating in the House.

On the Railway Committee in 1902 were eighteen men. Martin was the Chairman, and his aide, W.W.B. McInnes, was the Secretary. With the support of his follower, H.B. Gilmour, and the help of Price Ellison, Martin held the balance of power on the Committee as he did in the House.

Joseph Hunter, vice president of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway, and Richard Hall, probably the exclusive distributor of Dunsmuir coal on Vancouver Island, led the Dunsmuir faction of John Houston, C.W.D. Clifford, S.A. Rogers and A.W. Smith.

McBride's Oppositionists were led by A.E. McPhillips, who, with E.C. Smith, the ex-Martinite, had previously acted on behalf of Senator George A. Cox. They were supported by Thomas Taylor and F.J. Fulton. Thomas Gifford, Denis Murphy, C.W. Munro, and J.F. Garden were other Oppositionists who defected to vote in favour of the key aid bill for the coast to Kootenay line.

Small items they considered were bill #29, an amendment to the C.P.R.'s charter for the Vancouver and Westminster Railway Company to extend their deadline for completion of their work; and bill #93, the aid and tax exemption for the Midway and Vernon Railway Company fulfilling Martin's pledge to Price Ellison. With bill #30, the increase in aid and
redifinition of route for the Pacific Northern and Omineca, the promises to Frank Barnard were also completed. The vital bills, however, were numbers 86, 85A, and 34.

Bill #86 was the Act to provide subsidy funds to build the Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway, or as the project had come to be called, the Midway to Vancouver bill. Midway was the gateway to the Kootenays and the change of name for the bill created the impression that this was a new project quite separate from the earlier Vancouver and Coast Kootenay project, but it was, in fact, one and the same thing. This was also the bill that five Oppositionists broke ranks to vote for. John Oliver got the bill amended to prohibit any crossing of the line into the United States, but to do so would indicate that he did not fully understand the intent of the bill. No crossing into the United States would be necessary or even desirable. Hill would build the line right down to the coast in British Columbia to get the maximum subsidy for the project. Hill's real intentions thereafter were guessed at in some newspaper stories of the time. The Province, in a front page story on the nineteenth of June suggested that in essence, the Vancouver and Coast Kootenay Railway was the same as the Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway (a subsidiary of Hill's Great Northern). There were many other stories on the rail deals of that year, but the best one was Wade's as published in The Province of the seventh of May. Wade took a rather jaded view of the intentions of the Dunsmuir government. He insisted that the Vancouver mentioned in the bill was not Vancouver City at all, but rather Vancouver Island: that the line was to link with the Great Northern line in Ladner (thus benefitting T.E. Ladner) with only a spur
line north into Vancouver City; that the ferry system in the bill would cross to Sidney on Vancouver Island and there link up with the Great Northern's Victoria and Sidney Railway, thus making Victoria the real terminus of the line. Wade was likely only partly right. Vancouver would not be the terminus of the line. Premier Dunsmuir probably insisted that the ferry system make Victoria the real terminus of the line, but Hill's intentions more probably were focused on his Ladner link, the New Westminster Southern, to trans-ship the Kootenays ore down to Seattle and thus bypass Dunsmuir and Victoria altogether and save himself the cost of the ferry system which would really only be a burden to Hill. Thus Hill's British Columbia phase of his great trading plans was set.

Bill #85A was a replacement on the order paper for the original bill #85, the Queen Charlotte Islands Railway bill which was inexplicably dropped. Perhaps the importance of the replacement was sufficient to simply crowd out the lesser bill.

During an interview with Mackenzie and Mann, Premier Dunsmuir produced his father's old Canadian Western Central Railway charter which granted him the right to build from the Yellowhead Pass to Bute Inlet (a harbour 110 miles north of Vancouver). The route had been rendered rather obsolete by the rise of Vancouver, but Dunsmuir had a new idea. If the line were built, and a ferry system linked it to the Island, then Victoria would stand a chance of recapturing its old pre-eminence over the mainland. The ferries could further mesh with Dunsmuir's plans to sell the Esquimalt and Nanaimo. If the ferries landed at Nanaimo, then the Island railway could be the last link in the new trans-provincial route into Victoria. If Hill
were going to terminate his coast Kootenay line in Victoria, then how could Mackenzie and Mann be reticent to do the same? They agreed.

Bill #85A was the legislation to implement their agreement. It is entitled An Act to Aid the Construction of a Railway from Victoria to Yellowhead Pass, and the statute envisaged a line to run from the Yellowhead Pass to Bute Inlet—*not* Victoria as the title would suggest. The line was to be built by the Edmonton, Yukon and Pacific Railway, which was owned by Mackenzie and Mann. A careful reading of the statute shows their intentions quite clearly: "...it being the true meaning and intent of this Act to provide for the construction of a continuous line of transportation from the eastern boundary of British Columbia at or near the Yellowhead Pass to a point on the seaboard at or near Bute Inlet; thence by ferry to Vancouver Island; thence by the Victoria and Seymour Narrows Railway or the Esquimalt and Nanaimo Railway to Victoria..." The statute provides aid to the Edmonton, Yukon and Pacific and to the Victoria and Seymour Narrows Companies to the tune of $5000 per mile, and the whole plan is contingent upon the granting of aid by the Dominion government, as was Dunsmuir's policy.

Richard Hall introduced bill #34, An Act to Incorporate the Victoria and Seymour Narrows Railway Company, and touched off a storm of protest. Smith Curtis charged in the House that the company was simply a device to raise the $3 millions of its capital stock. This is just exactly what it was. Hill could quietly put up the money to buy the stock of the Victoria and Seymour Narrows which would be used by Mackenzie and Mann (as the quid pro quo for the coast Kootenay line) for the purchase of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo, thus satisfying the terms of their own statute. Thus,
Hill would end up with his subsidized coast Kootenay railroad, plus the indirect ownership of the Esquimalt and Nanaimo which would be held as a kind of mortgage pending his repayment by Mackenzie and Mann as they shipped wheat into Hill's trans-Pacific trading scheme. Dunsmuir would sell his railway at a handsome price as he wanted to do, and Mackenzie and Mann would end up with their Pacific link for their national rail network. And the general public, through their taxes, would contribute generously to the scheme. A very neat arrangement. In total, the railway package that Martin had put together was a kind of revolt against the C.P.R. They would now have competing lines for the Canadian business as well as for their own efforts to establish a trans-Pacific trading empire. This they could not tolerate. Richard Marpole, the western general superintendent of the C.P.R. would be under tremendous pressure to kill the package any way he could. If he were unable to arrange the defeat of the deal in the House, then another way would have to be found.

James N. Greenshields was proposed for the Board of Directors of the Victoria and Seymour Narrows Railway and he was to prove to be Marpole's key to success and Martin's undoing. Marpole probably passed along to Richard McBride the information that Greenshields was a solicitor for the Canadian Northern Railway in Montreal, and McBride discovered that Greenshields had been appointed by Dunsmuir as the provincial government agent to negotiate the deal for the Victoria and Yellowhead Pass line with the Edmonton, Yukon and Pacific, a Canadian Northern subsidiary. Was it not improper, McBride asked in the House, for the solicitor of the Canadian Northern Railway to be appointed as a provincial agent to arrange a contract
with a Canadian Northern subsidiary? And could Greenshields then reasonably be on the Board of one of the lines envisaged in the resultant legislation? He pressed for an inquiry into the issue and the press picked it up, strongly indignant at such a state of affairs. With newspapers printing indignant stories, and McBride pushing in the House, an inquiry loomed large. Dunsmuir, already unhappy in his role as Premier, would not want to face a scandal.

And scandals started to break out everywhere. In an effort to neutralize John Oliver's support for the coast to Kootenay line, it was revealed (probably through the graces of the C.P.R., which would be best able to obtain the information) that Oliver was bidding on some railway construction contracts on behalf of the Olalla Mining Company of New York. And Oliver's reply was to press certain questions in the House over the propriety of some government payments to the Columbia and Western Railway (a C.P.R. subsidiary). A Select Committee of the House was struck to inquire into the matter, with Joseph Martin as Chairman, and Oliver, McBride, A.W. Smith and Joseph Hunter as members. Obviously, with such important M.L.A.'s sitting on the inquiry, it was to be a major investigation, and a strong blow at the C.P.R.

As it happened, the investigation concerned F.L. Carter-Cotton and his relationship with the C.P.R. while he had been Minister of Finance in the Semlin administration. As Carter-Cotton was interrogated in the Legislative Committee room, the issues seemed to get broader rather than being resolved. The investigation led to the all-engulfing Columbia and Western scandal of the next year. The details of the matter are quite com-
plicated as one might expect. Very briefly, the allegations developed as follows: the C.P.R., through its subsidiary, the Columbia and Western, was dissatisfied with some of the land that it had been granted under a construction agreement with the government of British Columbia for a railway in the interior of the province. Popular feelings had been growing that land grants were just too much of a giveaway and that grants ought to be on a cash only basis. With this as one of their commitments, the Semlin group was installed in office after the 1898 election. Carter-Cotton, as Minister of Finance, was responsible for dispering the grants as the railways became entitled to receive them. The C.P.R., however, was not interested in the cash. It wanted to select alternate blocks of land not directly contiguous to its trackage in replacement for the land that it had already been granted and had later been found to be worthless. Further, the Columbia and Western was bound by its contract to complete its line right through to Penticton before it would be entitled to any grant of land at all. The line had not in fact been built through to Penticton, but stopped in the mineral rich Boundary Creek area. The Select Committee wished to discover by what sequence of events the C.P.R. had received its land grants to which it was not legally entitled; and how it had obtained the land not originally set aside for it in the contract, but rather the land it wanted which was reputed to contain oil. Further, how had Mackenzie and Mann been able to sell what were supposed to be the C.P.R.'s obligations to build through to Penticton, to the Victoria, Vancouver and Eastern Railway of James J. Hill? A provocative question indeed. Martin had earlier made allegations that Carter-Cotton had falsified the minutes of the Executive
Council, that he had committed breach of trust with some valuable property in his care; and that he had earlier fled the State of Colorado over certain financial problems. Martin seemed to be suggesting that Carter-Cotton and the Columbia and Western conundrum were illicitly connected. The puzzle was not solved with Martin's Select Committee and by the time the full inquiry got underway the next year, Martin was out of power and unable to influence its proceedings.

Meanwhile, Premier Dunsmuir, under the threat of the Green-shields inquiry, delayed the matter as long as he could to give himself time to buy out the Pacific Quartet from their interest in the Esquimalt and Nanaimo, but he could not hold out long enough. In November of 1902, he decided to resign gracefully and pass on his office to his heir apparent, E.G. Prior, "who had only joined the cabinet to assist the passage of the Yellowhead Pass bill".

Clearly, Prior, from the C.P.R.'s viewpoint, was just as unacceptable as Dunsmuir had been, and Prior was in a weaker position. Along with McBride, Prior had been unable to secure the provincial leadership of the Conservatives and Dunsmuir's early resignation forced him into the Premiership before he was really ready for the spot. He had detached McInnes from Martin by getting him to accept a cabinet post and Stables and Gilmour stayed on the government benches too. But even with this support he only had a majority of one in the House. He would have to go to an election soon. And Prior's weakness was the product of a split in the Great Northern camp.

Martin's leg had swollen up again and he was back in the
hospital. He had an operation to remove some bones which were not properly in place and the operation was a failure. During Martin's absence from politics, Prior had come to terms with his followers. His personal dislike for Martin made him try to dispose of the importance of the man, but Prior was to find that Martin's vindictiveness, once aroused, was a full Opposition in itself. Denis Murphy, a Prior minister, had resigned without explanation (probably for some special consideration from the C.P.R.) and Prior needed a replacement quickly. Martin's doctors advised him that he would need six months to recover from the operation, but Martin decided to have his leg amputated so that he could carry on with politics immediately. He came out of the hospital fighting: he denounced Prior, insisting that he stood for nothing except obstruction to the party line movement (and the Conservatives agreed). Of course, as provincial leader of the Liberals, Martin would want party lines to amplify his own position.

A by-election was called in Murphy's seat of West Yale and the Prior men nominated a Dr. Sanson to contest the seat, but Charles Semlin, the Premier that Martin had fought so viciously, was nominated for the Oppositionists. The C.P.R. would also likely support anyone who was running against Prior, so Martin was faced with Hobson's choice: who to support? A diplomat might suggest doing nothing, but that was not Martin's style. He could not allow Prior to get away with seducing his followers away from him and he lunged into the campaign on behalf of Semlin. This action would be seen with some anger by Hill: Prior was a supporter of his railway plans and now Martin, his British Columbia lieutenant, was fighting him. Semlin was handily elected, and the survival of the Prior government now looked doubtful indeed. Hill would be furious, and would almost certainly cut off
Martin's funding. At once, everything began to slide for the hapless warrior.

When the House came into the 1903 session, the Columbia and Western scandal dominated its proceedings, but Prior hung on and could not be defeated on any floor vote. Again scandal reared its head. Prior was discovered to have influenced the awarding of government contracts to his own firm, and without trial, Lieutenant Governor Joly dismissed him and called Richard McBride to the Premiershio. A very convenient sequence of events for the C.P.R. McBride was not the leader of the Conservatives, and due to the vital support that he had from both Liberals and Conservatives, everyone just assumed that he would carry on with the old party system.

At this time, however, Martin's leadership of the Liberals was coming under serious question. His home base, Vancouver, now under the leadership of his opponents Robert Kelly and R.G. Macpherson, moved that the provincial executive be asked to hold a convention with the implication that Martin's status be reviewed. If party lines were coming, then Martin would be particularly anxious to retain his position with the Liberals so that he could implement the railway deal himself and recoup his backing from Hill. At a stormy meeting of the Vancouver Liberals on the seventeenth of March, Martin was unable to get them to rescind their request for a convention. Men like John Oliver, J.C. Brown, F.J. Deane, J.A. Macdonald, Stuart Henderson and W.W.B. McInnes were widely thought of as possible successors to Martin. With the federal Liberals openly split away from the party (they had walked out of Martin's convention when he had ousted Senator Templeman as leader of the party) and even the provincials fighting amongst themselves, any pretense of Liberal unity was a joke. This could not have escaped the
wily McBride and his advisors. Should he declare party lines and rally the Conservatives to his side, he could not help but benefit from the chaos in Liberal ranks. He would lose some valuable supporters to be sure, but by being seen responding to the popular call for party lines and running a strictly Conservative ticket, he would stand a good chance of regaining the foregone support. This gamble he took. On the second of June he formed an exclusively Conservative cabinet, put through a couple of routine bills, and called an election for the sixth of October. He then set about getting the backing of the Conservatives in British Columbia.

The day following McBride's formation of the cabinet and the election call, the provincial executive of the Liberals met to consider the call for convention. After a heated debate on the issue, Martin suddenly stunned them all by resigning as leader on the spot. This can only be understood in the light of Martin's impulsive rebelliousness and the frustration that he would be feeling at watching his carefully crafted grand railway plans being brought down by people who knew little of what they were doing. The executive unanimously opted for no leader at all for the upcoming election.

In a last desperate effort to save his scheme, Martin applied for the Chairmanship of the federal Railways Commission, but, of course, no federal favours were forthcoming, and, in weakened health after his amputation, the gloom seemed all-pervasive.

Martin had lost his spirit. He did little campaigning, and on election day, in a surprise upset, the Conservatives swept Vancouver, downing Martin badly. But the provincial results were not so conclusive.
The McBride Conservatives elected nineteen men, the Liberals eighteen, and the Socialists two. The returns did not establish McBride as a winner with a clear majority. In reaction to his personal defeat, Martin bitterly declared that he was finished with politics forever and without any recognized leader to dispute McBride's claim to power, the Liberals lost by default. Liberal-Labour coalitions were within the traditions of the Liberals and they could have created a partnership with the Socialists and formed the government, so from this viewpoint, Martin effectively handed over power to the Conservatives, and all as a product of his failed railway deal.
FOOTNOTES

1. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1902, p.76; Colonist, 28 Feb. 1902, p.1

2. cf. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1902, p.78-80

3. cf. Skelton, The Railway Builders, p.188-9

4. Ibid

5. An inference deduced from the nature of the overall scheme. It was commonly rumoured at the time that Hill was backing MacKenzie and Mann.

6. cf. Ramsey, PGE, p.8; Roy, Railways, Politicians and ...Vancouver, p.65; The Province, 28 April 1902, p.1; The Province, 23 Feb. 1903, p.1

7. Background information on Barnard from Jackman, The Men at Cary Castle. The inference of Martin & Hendry convincing Barnard to come in with them is derived from the repeated appearance of Barnard's name in the incorporating statutes of these projects.

8. cf. the incorporating statute of the V & C.K. in Statutes of B.C. for 1901


10. cf. McDonald, "Business Leadership in Vancouver" (PhD thesis in prog. U Vic.) Barnard's company would benefit from the rail line into the area.

11. An inference from Ellison's position in the Okanagan and his activity in helping Martin in the House with the bills.

12. The Province, 8 April 1902, p.7; The Province, 31 March 1902, p.1

13. cf. Skelton, op cit, p.243; Paper #20, Sessional Papers of the Parliament of Canada, 1903; no records of the provincial committee survive

14. An inference from the bills themselves. see Journals 1902

15. The Province, 12 April 1902, p.3

16. The Province, 14 May 1902, p.1; Gosnell, op cit, p.321

17. The Province, 26 April 1902, p.1


19. Inferences from studying the bills, the Journals, the newspapers, etc.

20. Hill would not want to bother with local ferries to Victoria: they would
be quite irrelevant to his trading plans and too expensive.

21. Stevens, Canadian National Railways vol 2, p.87-92

22. which Hill was not, unbeknownst to Dunsmuir: see footnote 20 & Regehr, Canadian Northern Railway, p.253-5

23. Statutes of B.C. 1902, p.297

24. Journals 1902, p.98

25. as listed on their incorporating statute - cf. Journals 1902

26. cf. Regehr, op cit, p.255 - the reference to the C.P.R. is mine

27. cf. The Province, 10 April 1902, p.3; Colonist, 10 April 1902, p.4, 15 April 1902, p.4, 16 April 1902, p.5; Journals 1902, p.80,127,135

28. Morton, Honest John Oliver, p.75-7 & 80-1; Journals 1902, p.94; The Province, 22 April 1902, p.1

29. Journals 1902, p.167

30. cf. Appendix to Journals of 1902 & 1903; Morton, op cit, p.74; Sessional Papers of the Province of B.C., p.1245, & 1375

31. cf. Journals 1900, p.67-8


33. The Province, 23 April 1903, p.1; Colonist, 23 April 1903, p.7

34. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1903, p.209

35. Colonist, 25 April 1903, p.5

36. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1903, p.209

37. Ibid

38. Ibid - allusion to vindictiveness is mine

39. The Province, 12 March 1903, p.4

40. The Province, 17 March 1903, p.5

41. Hopkins, Canadian Annual Review 1903, p.222

42. cf. Hunt, The Political Career of Sir Richard McBride, p.15
43. *The Province*, 2 June 1903, p.1

44. *The Province*, 3 June 1903, p.1

45. Ibid

46. Martin to Laurier, 18 Aug. 1903, p.76257-9 Laurier Papers, PAC

47. *The Province*, 6 Oct. 1903, p.1

48. Ibid
6- CONCLUSION

It clearly appears that no explanation of this period can account fully for the upheaval of the times without including the activities of Joseph Martin and the railway battle for control of the Kootenays mineral wealth. It is extremely difficult to trace the railway battle with much precision or certainty because all of the participants wished to conceal their activities from each other and from the public to the extent that they were able to do so. No one wished to be seen manipulating the Legislature to their own private advantage, and, of course, no Member of the Legislature wanted to be seen acting in the private interests of the railways, but in consideration of the extent to which the politics were disrupted, the most reasonable explanation must be that new, powerful outside interests attempted to upset the established interests of the province. That is, the Great Northern Railway tried to upset the domination of the Canadian Pacific Railway in British Columbia for control of the Kootenay ores for use in the developing Orient trade.

Joseph Martin had a national reputation for his rebellious attitude to the established interests of Canada, both for his stand on the Manitoba Schools Question and his fight against the C.P.R. monopoly in Manitoba. Lieutenant Governor McInnes had a good deal of bitterness towards the C.P.R. after he lost a small fortune from speculating in real estate when the C.P.R. shifted its western terminus to Vancouver from Port Moody. When the two men met in British Columbia and McInnes appointed Martin Premier, Martin had alienated both the conservative and reform elements in the province, and so
he turned to an old acquaintance, James J. Hill of the Great Northern Railway, for campaign financing. Martin lost his vital election in 1900 and McInnes was dismissed for appointing him, but Hill had a continuing interest in getting a rail link to the coast from the Kootenays and so he continued to back Martin in a further effort to get government subsidies for the line. Martin had to get the support of Premier Dunsmuir through orchestrating a number of railway deals and as they developed they came to be a direct threat to the near-monopoly of the C.P.R. in the province. The Canadian rail giant therefore opposed Martin and Hill and the struggle led to turmoil that the province had never seen before. And, as each railway company manipulated the legislators to their own advantage, they also made every effort to keep their activities as quiet as they could: this gave the appearance of confusion and disintegration of political groupings.

Thus, the characterizations of this period must be seen within the context of a behind the scenes railway revolt, led by Joseph Martin.
APPENDIX

Political parties can be defined as simply as institutions to get people elected, and in that case, there would have been more political parties at the turn of the century in British Columbia than there were members of the Legislature. The modern popular sense of the phrase 'political parties' envisages large on-going institutions of varying popularity and success which provide the framework for elections and the brokerage of power in the interims. An academic analysis of political parties ought to include such things as finances (from whom and to whom and why); pressure groups; ideology; structure; and nomination processes (patterns of recruitment); together with a comparison of the data with comparable data of other parties existing in the system, and how the various groups interlock and struggle for power.

Such an analysis would be of considerable difficulty within the context of early British Columbia, for very little work has been published on the era so far. Studies like Cornell's on the Union House or like S.D.Clark's on the Canadian Manufacturer's Association have not been circulated which relate to British Columbia in this time period. What literature that is available characterizes "...1898 to 1903 (as) an era of confusion culminating in the introduction of party government by Richard McBride..." Recent work follows the same line: "...party line movement emerged in response to political instability which beset the province following the defeat of Turnerism in ...1898..." Certainly parties were based on systems of individual gain and personal loyalty with a varied
rate of recruitment and stratification. But to date, no empirical evidence has established the norm from which the period is reputed to have deviated nor yet established a norm for the period itself. The common assumption seems to be that the system of personalities had ceased to function effectively and that the formal party system was a necessary ordering of what had become an unmanageable House.

In an attempt to establish some guidelines by which the operation of the political machinery of the time may be judged, I have done an analysis of the voting records of the Members of the Legislature from 1897 to 1904 to try to clarify the causes of the crises which gripped British Columbia at the time.

The assumptions and methodology of the analysis are as follows:

1. The Journals of the Legislative Assembly of the Province of British Columbia were scanned and all the divisional votes of the various Members were recorded. Not all Members who were elected are listed. Some never recorded a vote and so were ignored. Mr. Kitchen, of Semlin's group in 1897, voted three times and then took ill and died. I felt safe in assuming that this was not a politically motivated act and so I excluded him from consideration.

2. Cornell knew of the existence of a number of groups in the Union House and proceeded to establish their size and performance. There were many political tickets in those days but rarely was anyone specifically identified with any particular ticket. Having few names to work with, I assumed that there were two groupings in the House: those who voted with the Premier and everybody else. If a sufficiently high variance had been
generated from this assumption it would have indicated that the assumption of the two groups was a poor one.

3. A preliminary look at the record indicated that some degree of variance was definitely going to have to be anticipated. They did not vote in rigid blocs as is the case today. Anyone who voted against the Premier occasionally might still be counted as a member of the Premier's party. Indeed, preconceptions about even the cabinet voting as a bloc were soon dispelled. Cabinet ministers and party whips tended to rank around the middle of the party in terms of cohesion and loyalty. Thus having accepted the need for some variance, the size of the variance became a measure of the cohesion of the party. High variance indicated low cohesion and loyalty, and low variance indicated high cohesion.

4. The Premier's group was identified on the basis of their voting record and not with reference to the published claim of the Member as to party affiliation. This then provided some measure of the significance of the claim to party affiliation once voting patterns were established.

5. Everyone not included in the Premier's group was then presumed to be in the Opposition group. One effect of this grouping assumption would be to create the probability that the Opposition would have a higher variance than the Premier's group, or Government Party. This did turn out to be the case, and it is not an unreasonable result. The Premier would have far more favours and punishments at his disposal than the Leader of the Opposition and so could probably ensure greater discipline in his own party. It is also possible that there were two or more
Opposition groups. The assumption of a single Opposition was made in the first instance for the sake of convenience only and would have been invalidated had the Opposition had a large enough variance from the Government Party to make a comparative analysis doubtful. This was not the case and the assumption of a single Opposition Party seems to have been vindicated. Whatever loose fish that existed would be the Members with a high variance within one of the two groups.

6. After listing all the divisional votes beside each Member's name, his pattern was compared with that of the Premier. Those approximating the Premier's record were assigned to him and the instances in which the Member's vote was contrary to that of the Premier's were totaled and constituted the total variance for that Member for that session. Then the patterns of the remaining Members were scored against each other and the Member chosen as Leader of the Opposition was the one who minimized the variance for the group. Summing the total variance and then averaging the figure over the number of Members of the party and the number of divisions recorded for the session provided the numeral representing the cohesion figure for the party for that session. Naturally, there were problems. Once McBride was Premier, he seemed to command less loyalty than his back room boss, Bowser. Variance was significantly lower if Bowser was presumed to be Premier, but in keeping with the general methodology, I selected McBride as the appropriate yardstick. Not surprisingly, Joseph Martin was a statistical problem. He was expelled from the Semlin group in the summer of 1899 and when the Legislature reconvened the next year, Martin led the fight to defeat Semlin, but his voting
record did not place him as Leader of the Opposition. Also, Martin's absence figure was so high as to make him an unfair choice to compare voting records with, so where indicated, I chose instead the record of his known friend and confidant, J.C. Brown. Martin was also Premier of the Province for some three months, but no Legislative test appears for him because only one vote was taken under his administration and that one was a 28 to 1 motion of no confidence in him. Processing such data would generate a statistical anomaly equivalent to his ministry, but as the averaging quotients would thereby be unfairly skewed, I chose to deal with his ministry only in prose. Incidentally, the Journal records the Member voting for Martin as J.M. Martin, a man of no relation to the newly appointed Premier. This I thought must be in error for J.M. Martin appeared to have no motive for standing alone against his colleagues, so the more likely explanation would be that the single vote of support was Joseph Martin's own.

7. Absences of the Members were recorded as well, on the assumption that they would provide a measure of the reliability of the Member's voting pattern. For instance, if a Member always voted with the Premier but was frequently absent, it could be inferred that on some of those occasions of absence the Member would have voted contrary to the Premier had he been in attendance, and that the absence is therefore really an abstention. Further, a Member is of little use to his party if he is not there, so some measure of party discipline is derived as well; i.e. how effective the apparatus of the party was at turning out the vote. To be sure, absences might be explained by the Member being absent on official
party business somewhere, but this business would likely be scheduled in such a way so as to ensure his presence on critical House divisions when at all possible. Sickness and boredom or other business would likely account for many absences too, but these excuses would probably cancel out when comparing the figures with each other, and so the absence figure is used in placing the Member in party loyalty rankings as a secondary consideration to his variance. A problem was how to treat those Members who resigned their seats midway through a session and then were re-elected to the same session. In the 1899 session this applied to Turner, Hall, McPhillips, Tisdall and Hume. I chose to ignore their absences for the periods of their elections.

8. The test also gives a rough measure of the value of the party to the individual Member. Those with high loyalty patterns who kept re-appearing in the record obviously got re-elected. One inference to be drawn from this is that the party may have helped him get re-elected in reward for his loyalty. Members with high loyalty ratings who did not re-appear may have been defeated or may have been given a patronage appointment. If the party member had a low loyalty rating, presumably the party would not be quick to augment his campaign funds, so if he continued to get re-elected, it might imply that he had his own resources, making the party of little value to him. This aspect of the study would simply be suggestive for further research.

9. Each session follows with a list of the voting Members ordered in degree of loyalty to the party leader. On a summary page, the variance of the variance is calculated for each leader to illuminate the
differences in loyalties accorded to each leader. If the leader scores beyond the range considered 'normal' (greater than average variance from the average variance or more than one standard deviation) then that leader's score is judged to be significantly high or low as the case may be. If the score is two or more standard deviations away from the norm, then the leader is judged 'very high' or 'very low'.

10. Asterisks beside a Member's name indicate that he is a cabinet minister.

11. Some comment on the reason for selecting the Legislative voting record would be appropriate to conclude the preface to the test. The Legislature was, in those days, a very real arena of decision making. It was the crucible of the political forces of the province. Politicians might say one thing and mean another in their speeches, but their vote in the House can only be interpreted one way on any given issue and that is the most reliable record of their commitments. For instance, Hawthorne-thwaite, an avowed Socialist, appears with high variance in opposition to the government in 1901 through to 1903, but with the accession of McBride to power in 1903, he and his colleague Parker Williams appear as moderately loyal government men.

The most important weakness of the test is the treatment of all divisions as being equally important. Obviously, some divisions were of far greater significance than others. Matters of little significance would at the same time carry little pressure to conform but also little pressure to deviate. Similarly, matters of great moment would carry much party pressure to conform, but high inducements to deviate. Taking this
factor into account would provide some averaging tendency in the weighting of the bills, besides the obvious factor of the immediate importance of the bill itself. Further, any weighting procedure would have an arbitrary element to it that would be difficult to introduce and justify. How could one adequately weigh J.D. Prentice's vote in February 1900 which defeated the Semlin government and put Martin into power? Avoiding complications of this sort does not introduce an unreal simplicity into the test. It seems quite reasonable to allow the averaging factor of party pressures and greater or lesser importance of the bill or vote act in the breadth and number of the divisions and consider them as equal for the purposes of this test.

In the following tables, the figures at the end of the party tabulations are the most important ones. The average variance overall was 0.100 with a standard deviation of 0.036; that is, the average variance figure for each sessional group would have to be less than 0.063 or greater than 0.136 before the figure would be considered beyond the norm for the test. Similarly, the absence figure was 0.152 overall with a standard deviation of 0.025 making 0.127 and 0.177 the limits of significance.
Session of 1897 - 43 Divisions

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</tbody>
</table>

Totals           | 98       | 105     |

Average Variance = \( \frac{98}{18 \times 43} = 0.125 \)

Average Absence  = \( \frac{105}{18 \times 43} = 0.130 \)
Session of 1897 - 43 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semlin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. J. B. Kennedy</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kidd</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Williams</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Macpherson</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Forster</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Graham</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Sword</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Walkem</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Carter-Cotton</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Hume</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kellie</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>89</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance = \( \frac{41}{11 \times 43} = 0.087 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{89}{11 \times 43} = 0.188 \)
Session of 1898 - 53 Divisions

<table>
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<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Premier Turner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.Bryden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*2.Eberts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.Walkem</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Irving</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.Adamis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*6.Pooley</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*7.Baker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.Rogers</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.Mutter</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.Rithet</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.A.W.Smith</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12.Huff</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*13.G.B.Martin</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.Hunter</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.Stoddart</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.Braden</td>
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<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.McGregor</td>
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<tr>
<td>18.Helmcken</td>
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<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.Higgins</td>
<td>15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
<td><strong>163</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance = \( \frac{73}{19 \times 53} = 0.072 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{163}{19 \times 53} = 0.161 \)

* Higgins Speaker to 9 March 1898, so he is measured on only 44 Divisions
Session of 1898 - 53 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Semlin</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Carter-Cotton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Kidd</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Macpherson</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Graham</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Forster</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Sword</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Vedder</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hume</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Kellie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Williams</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>35</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance $= \frac{35}{10 \times 53} = 0.066$

Average Absence $= \frac{46}{10 \times 53} = 0.087$
### Session of 1899 - 19 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premier Semlin</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Macpherson</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Deane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Kellie</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4. Jos. Martin</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Higgins</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. R. Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Hume</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Helgesen</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Munro</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kidd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Prentice</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Wells</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. J. M. Martin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*14. McKechnie</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Neill</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Henderson</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Kinchant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Tisdall</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*19. Carter-Cotton</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Green</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Totals**

Average Variance = $\frac{28}{20 \times 19} = 0.071$

Average Absence = $\frac{33}{20 \times 19} = 0.083$
### Session of 1899 - 19 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opposition Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turner</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Eberts</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Bryden</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Irving</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Hall</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dunsmuir</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Clifford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Baker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. McBride</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. McPhillips</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Robertson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Booth</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Pooley</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Ellison</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Helmcken</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>11</strong></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance = $\frac{11}{15 \times 19} = 0.026$

Average Absence = $\frac{40}{15 \times 19} = 0.134$

*Ebert's record used in place of Turner's because of Turner's absences*
Session of 1900 - 36 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Deane</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Munro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Wells</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*4. Hume</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*5. McKehnie</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Macpherson</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Green</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*8. Carter-Cotton</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Helgesen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Kellie</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Kidd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Neill</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Tisdall</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. R. Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*15. Henderson</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Kinchant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. J.M. Martin</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>18. Prentice</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td><strong>27</strong></td>
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</table>

Average Variance = \( \frac{18}{18 \times 36} = 0.028 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{27}{18 \times 36} = 0.042 \)
### Session of 1900 - 36 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>Turner</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Ellison</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A.W. Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Baker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Dunsmuir</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Irving</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pooley</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Eberts</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Booth</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. McPhillips</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. McBride</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Hall</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Bryden</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>13. Robertson</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Clifford</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Higgins</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Helmcken</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>17. Jos. Martin</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Average Variance** = \( \frac{67}{17 \times 36} = 0.109 \)

**Average Absence** = \( \frac{54}{17 \times 36} = 0.088 \)
### Session of 1900 - 38 Divisions

<table>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Mounce</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>*2. Hall</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*3. Wells</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Rogers</td>
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<tr>
<td>*5. McBride</td>
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<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Clifford</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Helmcken</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Hayward</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Murphy</td>
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<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*10. Turner</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. Fulton</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>12. Dickie</td>
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<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*13. Eberts</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*14. Prentice</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. A.W. Smith</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16. Garden</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Hunter</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Pooley</td>
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<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. Taylor</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. Tatlow</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21. McPhillips</td>
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<td>1</td>
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Session of 1900 - 38 Divisions (continued)

<table>
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<th>Absence</th>
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<tr>
<td>23. Kidd</td>
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<tr>
<td>24. Green</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance = \( \frac{48}{24 \times 38} = 0.053 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{102}{24 \times 38} = 0.112 \)
### Session of 1900 - 38 Divisions

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Opposition Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ 1.Brown</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.Curtis</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.E.C.Smith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.Stables</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.Gilmour</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.Oliver</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.McInnes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.R.Smith</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.Munro</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.Houston</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.Neill</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Average Variance = \( \frac{57}{11 \times 38} = 0.136 \)

Average Absence  =  \( \frac{72}{11 \times 38} = 0.172 \)

+Brown's record used in place of Martin's because of Martin's absences
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government Party</th>
<th>Variance</th>
<th>Absence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Premier Dunsmuir</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#1. Turner</td>
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<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#2. Prentice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>#3. Eberts</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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Session of 1901 - 41 Divisions (continued)

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Average Variance = \( \frac{73}{24} \times 41 = 0.074 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{147}{24} \times 41 = 0.150 \)
Session of 1901 - 41 Divisions

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Average Variance = \( \frac{120}{11 \times 41} = 0.266 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{73}{11 \times 41} = 0.162 \)

+Browns record used for Martin's
Session of 1902 - 116 Divisions

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Average Variance = 168/19x116 = 0.073

Average Absence  = 441/19x116 = 0.198

*Eberts record used for Dunsmuir's
### Session of 1902 - 116 Divisions

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Average Variance = $\frac{183}{15 \times 116} = 0.104$

Average Absence = $\frac{414}{15 \times 116} = 0.269$
### Session of 1903 – 14 Divisions

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Average Variance = \( \frac{33}{18 \times 14} = 0.124 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{35}{18 \times 14} = 0.139 \)
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Average Variance = \( \frac{14}{17 \times 14} = 0.059 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{52}{17 \times 14} = 0.219 \)
Session of 1903-4 - 24 Divisions

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Average Variance = $\frac{56}{22 \times 24} = 0.105$

Average Absence = $\frac{73}{22 \times 24} = 0.150$
### Session of 1903-4 - 24 Divisions

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Average Variance = \( \frac{30}{17 \times 24} = 0.074 \)

Average Absence = \( \frac{66}{17 \times 24} = 0.162 \)
Summary and Inference

Leader | Loyalty | Absenteeism |
--------|---------|-------------|
1. Turner | 0.083 normal | 0.128 normal |
2. Semlin | 0.063 high | 0.100 very low |
3. Martin | 0.201 very low | 0.167 normal |
4. Dunsmuir | 0.067 high | 0.153 normal |
5. Prior | 0.124 normal | 0.139 normal |
6. McBride | 0.089 normal | 0.213 very high |
7. Macdonald | 0.074 normal | 0.162 normal |

Average Variance Overall = 0.100 / Standard Deviation 0.036
Average Absence Overall = 0.152 / Standard Deviation 0.025

Thus a rough sketch of House 'normalcy' appears. John Turner was the last member of the Smith dynasty of hand-picked successors to the Premiership which had run since the Canadian Pacific Railway began its construction in British Columbia. He was supposed to be the last of the 'stable' Premiers before the troubled times of the turn of the century period, yet he achieved only normal loyalty from party followers with a normal absenteeism which would indicate adequate reliance on the loyalty figure.

In spite of Semlin's personal weaknesses as a party leader and the strong rivalry of Martin and Carter-Cotton in his cabinet, he
obtained the highest loyalty from his followers and the lowest absenteeism by far which would indicate a strong reliance on the loyalty figure. Perhaps his party were unified by their dislike of Turnerism and dedicated to the reforms that they were trying to effect.

Martin got a very low loyalty figure and a normal absence rate indicating adequate confidence in the loyalty quotient. The analysis does bear out the usual remarks of Martin being the stormy petrel of Canadian politics.

Dunsmuir, the new coal king, obtained normal loyalty and a normal absence rate indicating adequate reliance on the measure of loyalty. This suggestion of stability under Dunsmuir is further reinforced by the quantity of legislation passed during his ministry and his normal length of tenure in office.

Prior, although in power rather briefly, did get normal loyalty and normal absenteeism indicating a party functioning quite within the standards for the period.

McBride, the man who was generally thought to be the first of the new line of restored stability, only obtained normal loyalty and a very high absence rate. This would be some evidence that his stability was not based in a cohesive party during the first year of his administration. It is true that he had to rely on two Socialists who held the balance of power in the House, but they were of middling loyalty to him. His cabinet ministers were among his least loyal supporters. How McBride gradually introduced party discipline into the House, and the province, would have to be the stuff of a further study.
Macdonald, the Liberal Party leader who took over from Martin, did well to achieve normal loyalty and absenteeism so quickly.

The statistics do seem to indicate that the instability of the period could be attributed to causes other than a disintegration of the party system. R.M. Dawson has argued that "Lieutenant Governor McInnes ... succeeded in getting the affairs of that province into hopeless confusion in 1898 to 1900 through a misguided use of the power of dismissal". That is only a partial explanation of the problem. McInnes dismissed Turner, Beaven and Semlin without any major reaction. He only got into serious difficulty when he appointed Joseph Martin to the Premiership in 1900. Martin's political career in British Columbia coincides with the period of instability and it is the contention of this thesis that his activities were the major destabilizing element of the time.
FOOTNOTES


2. Robin, The Rush For Spoils, p.35

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I PRIMARY SOURCES

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