AN EXAMINATION OF FOUR THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES RELATING TO THOUGHT AND
ACTION IN AN EXISTENTIAL CONTEXT:
AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR AN ECLECTIC MODEL

by
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This thesis is concerned with the relationship between thought and action as that relationship is construed in the theoretical perspectives of four thinkers who have addressed themselves to the question of the existential determination of thought and its consequences for social action. The four thinkers are Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and Claude Lévi-Strauss.

No attempt is made to treat the entire works of these four thinkers in their systematic context. Instead, a set of four 'vignettes' is presented, in which some of the major arguments in their respective writings are isolated and discussed. These include:— Goffman's concern for the individual and the latter's attempts to sustain self-value; the concepts which Schutz develops concerning the phenomenology of the social world and his argument regarding typification as an intrinsic aspect of the orientation of actors to their situations; Mannheim's examination of the ramifications of social existence in the formulation and re-formulation of thought-structures; and Lévi-Strauss's attempts to generate 'structural' models of the collective thought-
systems of 'primitive' societies.

The first chapter presents a general synopsis of the four perspectives and points out certain epistemological linkages between them. The four subsequent chapters treat each perspective individually and in more depth. The final chapter represents an attempt to articulate some of the interstitial connections among these four relatively diverse perspectives. These connections are reflected in a general philosophical similarity in dealing with knowledge as a pattern of communicable ideas. It is argued that it is the constitution of symbolic constructs, the process whereby those symbolic constructs are maintained and the manner in which they find their dissolution, which provides the key to the relation between thought and action and between social stasis and social change. Symbolic concepts arise in the social process and are maintained or sustained in correspondence with praxis. Dissolution of symbolic concepts is a phenomenon which is accompanied by reflective effort and occurs as a result of disjunction between praxis and theoria. Concluding comments deal with the problem of categorization as a function of human thought, the dilemma of existential thought in the social milieu, and the paradox of ontological certainty.
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Introduction

Within recent years, the sociology of knowledge has been developed and extended to cover aspects of social life which did not fall within the rubric of thought of such original proponents of this discipline as Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. It was the achievement of the latter thinkers (with others) to restore the individual and his thought to the social context in contradistinction to the classical theory of knowledge, inspired by Locke, which detached the knowing subject from the social milieu, and yet sought to validate knowledge by an analysis of that subject.

Whilst not explicitly concerned with the philosophical basis of the sociology of knowledge in its present state, this thesis has a concern with the implications of the fact that thought is tied in a continuous relationship to social existence. In this regard, this thesis examines aspects of the work of four thinkers who have addressed themselves to the question of the existential determination of thought and its consequences for social action. These thinkers are Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and
Claude Lévi-Strauss.

The thesis deals only with vignettes, as it were, of the writings of these four thinkers and no attempt is made to treat their entire works in their systematic context.

The first chapter outlines, in synoptic form, the perspectives of thought and social existence which are considered generally representative of the theoretical position taken by each thinker. The four subsequent chapters present, in vignette form, an expanded version of these perspectives, coupled with some interpretive criticism. The final chapter represents an attempt to mediate those perspectives in terms of some general propositions concerning the relationship between thought and social action, with particular emphasis on the processes of the constitution, maintenance and dissolution of symbolic concepts, and the practical character of knowledge.
CHAPTER I
A general synopsis of the four perspectives

It is intended in this chapter to present, in synoptic form, the variety of perspectives concerning the relationship between thought and action which are exhibited in the work of Erving Goffman, Alfred Schutz, Karl Mannheim and Claude Lévi-Strauss as a prelude to the individual presentation of vignettes of their work in subsequent chapters.

Each thinker occupies himself with a relatively bounded range of interest. It is not the intention of this, or subsequent chapters, to entertain an exhaustive exegesis of their theoretical positions in toto. Comparisons inter se in terms of philosophical and theoretical positions will be offered and specific similarities in their respective approaches to their subject matter will be outlined at the end of this chapter.

In general terms, the range of interest for Goffman is microsociological, but the ramifications of his thesis extend beyond his analysis of particular social situations in the assertions he makes concerning the relationships between interpersonal exchange,
cognition and the awareness of self: Schutz contributes a set of hypotheses which deal with the processes of perception in relation to action, the social effect of the distribution of knowledge and the manner in which subjective meaning attains objective facticity: Mannheim offers a number of propositions dealing with the generic character and derivation of epistemological forms as evidenced in sub-groups of complex societies: Levi-Strauss completes the quadrant in his transcultural axioms dealing with implacable patterns ingrained in the human intellect which are supposedly responsible for the shape of things built by man as a cultural being.

The differentiated frames of reference outlined above have in common a stress on the importance of cognition and perception in situational contexts as the basis for the interpretation of motives for action. They are differentiated in terms of areas of interest, but to a lesser degree in terms of the philosophical influences behind their respective paradigms.

The principal focus of interest for Goffman is the individual. The explicans for Goffman is the maintenance of a viable identity or self-concept and the relationship of this human motive to another
problem, namely the articulation of this need by individuals in their association with each other. The explicandum for Goffman is derived from a synthesis of ideas put forward by William James, George H. Mead, Georg Simmel and Emile Durkheim.

In the general (if relatively recent) tradition of symbolic interaction theory, Goffman starts with the individual actor and views larger abstract complexes as resulting from the interlinkages and interrelations among a multiplicity of individual actors. Such complexes cannot be understood without reference to the importance of symbols as the communicative means used to express relations among superiors, inferiors and equals. Concerned as he is with the emergence of identity and with the importance of recognizing the significance of different social situations as arenas for the constitution and potential destruction of self-value, Goffman places himself at some distance from the traditional orientation of the sociology of knowledge, which has tended to define social reality not so much in terms of individual orientations, but in terms of the possible emergent properties or characteristics of human collectivities. In this sense, he would appear to be more sympathetic towards William James' notion that the detection of truth requires an
examination of the personal psychology of any individual
who asserts the truth value of his statements - and for
whom truth is a very personal business. Thus, Goffman is
inclined to assume a position perhaps best described as
individual pragmatism, i.e., to the acting individual,
social interaction is that which provides an
expeditious mechanism for producing the sense of primary
value of self as a meaningful object.

However, there is a secondary theme in Goffman's
work which provides a bridge between his interpretation
of the generic basis of self and those interpretations
which stress the importance of collective analysis.
For despite the attention which Goffman gives to the
importance of the manipulation of the symbolic mode of
communication on the part of the individual as he
endeavours to present himself in the most instrumental
fashion, the symbolic mode itself requires co-operative
effort for its sustenance. The point to be made here is
that whilst Goffman is concerned to investigate the
manner in which individuals attempt to differentiate
themselves from the collective representations which
are imputed to their roles, those same individuals
must be aware of the typical response conveyed by the
symbolic character of an action or a series of actions;
and that even the differentiation from such a typical
response must be made in such a way so as to convey meaning to others. Thus we find that when Goffman moves from the analysis of discrete situations (which are presented in order to illustrate the techniques of interpersonal adjustment and impression management) and addresses himself to the manner in which differentiated impressions are sustained over time, he finds that his socio-psychological approach is not entirely adequate:

"An individual's use of a secondary adjustment is inevitably a social-psychological matter, affording him gratifications he might not otherwise obtain. But precisely what an individual 'gets out of' a practice is perhaps not the sociologist's first concern. From a sociological point of view, the initial question to be asked of a secondary adjustment is not what this practice brings to the practitioner but rather the character of the social relations that its acquisition and maintenance require. This constitutes a structural as opposed to a consummatory or social-psychological point of view. Given the individual and one of his secondary adjustments, we can start with the abstract notion of the full set of others involved...to consider the characteristics of this set: its size, the nature of the bond that holds members in it and the type of sanctions that ensure maintenance of the system."}

This acknowledgement of the importance of recognizing the structural implications which follow
from the analysis of how individuals attempt to 'manage' their identities, in adjusting themselves to abnormal situations, does not mean that Goffman abandons his theoretical predispositions with respect to the instrumental function of consciousness in bringing the individual into a more serene adjustment to the problems of his existence. This will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Even the most unorthodox interpretations of reality (unorthodox here meaning the antithesis of 'official' stereotypes in institutional settings) requires a system of common meanings which is reflected in the 'structure' of the group; the symbolic representation of the activities of inmates of institutions, for example, differs according to the audience before whom the activity is presented. This suggests that the system of orientation is not necessarily bound to the concrete arrangements of which the individual is a part, but that symbolically defined type-constructs of reality are developed in terms of different collective concerns.

Like Goffman, Schutz is interested principally in the orientation of the individual actor towards the social world and in the correspondence of intersubjective experience. Unlike Goffman, Schutz is more
concerned with the examination of the phenomenological basis of social action on an abstract level, than with the description of actual social events in empirical situations. For Schutz, there are a number of fundamental presuppositions which underlie the 'common-sense' of everyday life. These presuppositions, which include the certainty of the individual's own self-existence and the acceptance of reality, also involve the notion that reality is seen as a unitary, connected world in which others live as unitary, connected selves. In developing his concept of the 'natural attitude' of everyday life, Schutz extends Edmund Husserl's doctrine concerning the nature of conscious experience to uncover the processes of ideation and abstraction as functional features of social interaction. In other words, Schutz seeks to utilize essentially Cartesian speculation as to the constitution of thought in an isolated individual as a springboard for the analysis of interpersonal relations. Some of the aspects of interpersonal relations, which in turn have to be located in the social structure, include characteristic features such as the organization and distribution of knowledge, the spatial and temporal co-ordinates of significant others and the definition of the biographical situation of individual actors as they themselves define it.
In expounding his theory of social action (understood by Schutz as purposive conduct projected by the actor) Schutz takes the formal sociology of Max Weber into account in developing his concepts, and in particular, Weber's insistence that to understand social action it is necessary to grasp the meaning which the actor gives to, or bestows upon his action, to comprehend what the action means to him. In adapting Weber's formal sociology, Schutz lays stress on the importance of typification as an a priori feature of mind. This characteristic of conscious activity, which brings with it associated hypotheses concerning the type of action directed towards others (as a result of their apprehension along a continuum of increasing generality or anonymity) will be the central concern of the subsequent chapter in this thesis which is addressed to Schutz's work.

In general, the prime motif of Schutz's thought is stated by Natanson thus:

"...a philosophically informed sociology cannot avoid a confrontation with epistemological questions and a phenomenologically informed sociology begins by locating those questions in the taken-for-granted world of the natural standpoint. Phenomenological description and analysis are not in competition
with empirical procedures. The latter consider objects and events as realities within reality, whereas phenomenology defines itself as the discipline of 'irrealities'; the fictive unities constituted in intentional consciousness."

It is possible to recognize a number of common epistemological roots in the work of Goffman and Schutz. In sociology, the principal mentor appears to be Georg Simmel, who asserted that cognitive 'syntheses' are the basis of the social process. In his article dealing with the constitutive problem of social life, Simmel argues that Kant demonstrated that nature was 'synthesized' or created by the human observer; in their immediate givenness, the elements of the world do not have the interdependence which alone makes them intelligible as the unity of nature's laws. Likewise, it is the observer who creates, through categories and explanatory systems, organized unity of the manifold and inherently unorganized sense perceptions, though in society, argues Simmel, every member, being an observer himself, performs this synthesis. Simmel states that

"(Society). . . is directly realized by its own elements because these elements are themselves conscious and synthesizing units. Kant's axiom that connection, since it is the exclusive product of the subject, cannot inhere in things themselves, does not apply here. For societal connection immediately occurs in the 'things' that is the individuals."
Simmel's notion that society exists in the synthesizing of relations of conscious individuals, in the reciprocal but usually asymmetrical cognitions and in the resulting interactions among such conscious agents, appears to be the common skeleton in Goffman's and Schutz's respective cupboards. In philosophy, (or perhaps more correctly philosophical psychology) it is William James who must take the credit. James' connection with the phenomenological movement has been noted by Spiegelberg; the former's theory with respect to the multiplicity of 'selves' in any one individual's dealings with the world is clearly reflected in Goffman's version of role-theory, whilst the suggestions which James makes concerning the relationship between 'attention' and 'actuality' and the notions of 'sub-universes' as different modes of symbolic representation are clearly at the back of Schutz's concept of 'multiple realities' and the problems of establishing consistency between such differentiated interpretations of reality.

We turn now to the work of Karl Mannheim, perhaps the 'grand old man' of the sociology of knowledge. Taking his cue from Marx's dictum that 'it is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence which determines their consciousness', Mannheim's concern is to attempt
to comprehend the connections between thought constructs of sub-collectivities and the ramifications of those constructs for the political decisions made in a variety of historical contexts. Mannheim thus argues that a complex society has many aspects. Like a multi-sided mirrored globe, society provides different views of itself depending upon the social location of groups, and these aspect-structures or world-views imply appropriately consistent motives and sets of explanations of reality.

Like Marx, Mannheim views the world as an arena of struggling social and political forces and seeks to elucidate the manner in which theoretical formulations of the world are rooted in the stylistic structure of thought of particular groups and social classes. In all such cases, Mannheim recognizes that the ideas of an individual are a function of the cultural-institutional complex in which he participates. The relevance of any situation is apprehended in relation to an existentially determined perspective. The specific area of concern for the chapter which deals with Mannheim's work will be his ideas on Weltanschauungen, which, as collectively derived mental products, or collective representations of reality, are among the cultural products found in human society.
The link between Mannheim and the two previous thinkers discussed above is a common emphasis on the pragmatic function of knowledge and the relational character of conscious activity. That is, in the selection of elements of knowledge, perception is always advised by interest; situations define the specific content of reality to be emphasized so that the relevant purposive goal can be attained.

For Goffman, the relevance of the situation is that which informs the individual as to what 'role' is to be performed: for Schutz, the relevance of the situation is that which is determined by the degree of intimacy between persons in terms of the typificatory schema and the articulation of symbolic sub-worlds: for Mannheim, the relevance of the situation is that which determines the political actions and beliefs of members of collectivities in relation to their 'placement' in historical, economic and structural terms.

The work of Lévi-Strauss takes us beyond micro-sociological situations in complex societies, beyond macrosociological interpretations of European history, to a pan-anthropological assessment of the working of mind as a phenomenon intrinsic to all human beings.
Lévi-Strauss involves himself with a wide variety of theoretical concerns in the fields of kinship, culture history, the interpretation of myth and symbol, together with philosophical analyses of the nature of temporal and spatial perception and particularly the phenomenon of communication. Most, if not all of these interests are subsumed under one epistemological umbrella, namely structuralism. In very general terms, the basic tenet of structuralism is that societies and cultures are ordered according to patterns which have been evolved by a process which is most likely to include that of unconscious reasoning. These patterns, in their fundamental reality, may be very different from the apparent and superficial organization of the particular society or culture. The problem which Lévi-Strauss seems most eager to solve, is to unravel the manner in which meaningful action takes place within a complex of social structures. The latter, in toto, always transcend the comprehension of the individual and is thus, by definition, beyond the collective grasp of the community as a whole.

Three principles appear to underlie Lévi-Strauss' structuralist theory: that patterns of human behaviour are codes, with the characteristics of languages, that man has an innate structuring capacity which determines
the limits within which the structure of all types of social phenomena can be formed, and that relations can be reduced to binary oppositions.

Lévi-Strauss is quick to point out that although anthropologists have been concerned with structure in the past (an in particular Radcliffe-Brown) and have often approached his own theoretical predispositions, the empirical and naturalist biases in their work have forced them to merge the concepts of social structure and social relations together: this means that Radcliffe-Brown's structuralism results in a kind of descriptive morphology and 'social structure appears in his work to be nothing more than the whole network of social relations.' To Lévi-Strauss, on the other hand, 'social structure' has nothing to do with empirical reality per se, but with models which are built up 'after' it.

If patterns of behaviour within a society are analyzed in terms of communication and exchange, and then interpreted in terms of levels of subordination, the whole social fabric can be considered as a network of different types of orders. Lévi-Strauss argues,

"The kinship system provides a way to order individuals according to certain rules; social organization is another way of ordering individuals and groups;
social stratifications, whether economic or political, provide us with a third type; and all these orders can themselves be put in order by showing the kind of relationship which exists between them, how they interact on one another on both the synchronic and diachronic levels.\(^{16}\)

The dialectical processes which take place between these so-called 'orders' are part and parcel of the substantiation procedures which members of groups indulge in, in order to validate segments of their existence. 'Lived-in' orders, for example, must seek correspondence with 'thought-of' orders; insofar as 'thought-of' orders are expressed in 'lived-in' orders, the anthropologist is placed in the position of relating one set of lived-in order with another set of lived-in order so as to investigate the logical (or illogical) coherence between them. Lévi-Strauss suggests that 'thought-of' orders are those of myth and religion and in more complex societies, the phenomena of political ideologies.\(^{17}\)

In the chapter of this thesis which deals with Lévi-Strauss' work, the central concern will be his notions dealing with models of communication and exchange and concomitant structural dialectics.

The influences behind Lévi-Strauss' work are too
broad to cite here. Predominantly, he is indebted to Durkheim and Mauss, but his attitude toward the fictive characteristics of cultural symbols and the possibility of uncovering levels of thought which reveal the inner dynamics or foundation of societies, is of course reflective of his affinity with the work of Freud and Marx. Unlike the latter thinkers, however, who both believed in the need to realize or bring out the mainsprings of action into the daylight of conscious reason as a therapeutic measure, Lévi-Strauss is content to offer analytic propositions from descriptive data.

Some broad common denominators can be found among the four systems of thought outlined above.

Each thinker stresses the creative, intentional and constitutive characteristics of mind as opposed to behavioural, passive or simple reflexive conceptions of it. Each would appear to disavow a mechanistic methodology as an appropriate approach to the study of man and there is little concern to concentrate on the causal nexus between events. Each thinker makes use of a dialectical appraisal of phenomena, either between an individual's interpretation of himself in relation to the symbolic character of his actions; or between an individual and others considered as members of an
abstract category; or between the perspective of an individual in relation to that of the other members of the group of which he is a member and the perspective of other groups; or between the symbolic orders perceived by an individual as facets of the cultural belief system.

We have, then, four relatively distinct but interrelated problem areas as represented in the work of the four contributors to the sociology of knowledge. First, a theory of the social processes which influence the construction of identity and the ramifications of symbolic interaction in terms of identity perpetuity and dissolution; secondly, a theory concerning the socio-cultural processes which shape the construction of reality and the ramifications of a priori categorization functions of mind; thirdly, a theory concerning the effects of modes of reality construction on the social structure particularly with reference to the exercise of power; and fourthly, a theory which deals with the question of how the differentiated modes of reality construction (which are set up to satisfy elemental needs) find their abstract consummation and articulation. As indicated above, the chapters which follow will examine each set of ideas in turn as they are presented by the respective thinkers.
Notes to Chapter 1


3) Goffman, E., Asylums, op. cit., pp. 200-1

4) ibid.


10) Vide James, W., Psychology - Briefer Course. Henry Holt, New York, 1892. p. 179. Also vide James, W.,


15) ibid., p. 322

16) ibid., p. 344

CHAPTER II
Erving Goffman

As pointed out in the last chapter, Goffman is concerned with the way in which the individual presents himself and his activities to others. Goffman's analysis and description of social interaction is advised in terms of the means by which people seek to control the impressions others receive of them. A major proportion of his work is directed towards an understanding of the type of behaviour an individual is constrained or allowed to exhibit in the presence of others. The method he employs in this latter enterprise is microsociological, i.e., the description and evaluation of interpersonal events which take place within a limited span of time and space.

Now although Goffman approaches the social sphere in terms of the transformational qualities in the behaviour of the individual, and thus as an exercise in psychology, he is aware of the net effect on others of interpersonal communication in social situations (in terms of moral expectations) and of the dialectical relationship between individual and social existence. The illustrative examples he uses in this regard fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, he examines
what might be called congeries of individuals engaged in sustaining a focus of cognitive and visual attention on a joint task (understood in terms of the definition of the situation) and on the other hand, in the examination of the social processes which take place in 'captive' institutions, and in particular, the 'moral career' of the inmates of such institutions and their attempts to redress the self-abasement which follows from institutional practices.

Goffman also develops a more universalist thesis, made explicit in one of a number of early essays, which pertains to what might be referred to as the abstracted constitutive principles that surround the evaluation of the self. It is this thesis that serves to illustrate Goffman's assumption that value judgements, as to the nature of the self and significant others, are more than psychological projections brought about by the manipulation of persons, but are representative of the moral principles which advise and give meaning to social acts.

Goffman therefore seeks to clarify the sense in which the person in 'our urban secular world' is allotted a kind of sacredness which is displayed and confirmed through the medium of symbolic actions. He suggests that rules of conduct carry with them a
double feature for the individual who is subject to them; first, an obligatory prescription involving restraint, and secondly, an expectation as to the reaction of others morally bound by the same rule. When an act is subject to a rule of conduct, its improper performance casts a reflection upon the conception of the self-image of those affected by its infract-ion.

Goffman is particularly concerned with ceremonial rules, or rules of conduct which have their primary importance as conventionalized means of communication by which the individual expresses his character or conveys his appreciation of the other participants in the situation. For Goffman, ceremonial activity refers to a 'component or function of action' and not to concrete empirical action itself. The basic components of ceremonial activity, or the two components which Goffman sees as important to delineate, are those of deference and demeanour.

Deference functions as a symbolic means of conveying appreciation to a recipient of this recipient, or of something of which this recipient is taken as a symbol, extension, or agent. This activity assumes a ritualistic character and can be expressed in two fairly
distinct analytical forms, avoidance and presentation. Goffman argues that avoidance rituals, or those forms of deference which lead the actor to keep distance from a recipient, constitute a recognition of the 'ideal sphere' which lies around the recipient and suggests that 'any society could be profitably studied as a system of deferential stand-off arrangements', noting that there is a correlation between the elaboration of such taboos and the social level of the participants. Presentation rituals refer to acts which are performed by the individual as indications of how he regards his recipients and how he will treat them in an on-coming interaction. It may be noted here that Goffman takes presentation rituals as a starting point for his major work on interpersonal behaviour.

By demeanour, Goffman refers to the indices of an individual's deportment which serve to indicate to those in his presence that he is a person endowed with certain qualities (both desirable and undesirable).

These two concepts, of deference and demeanour, are complementary; for the image the individual owes to others to sustain for himself is not the same image these others are obliged to maintain of him. Goffman concludes that the ceremonial rules of a society, such
as deference and demeanour, represent 'opportunities
to affirm the moral order' of society; when institution-
alized, such ceremonial rules facilitate the projection
of a viable 'sacred' self and at the same time under-
score the existential dependency of the individual on
the body social.

In his later work, Goffman concentrates on the
notion that disjunction can occur between a nominal
self and any one of a number of social selves, and also
between the social self as 'presented' in actual
situations and the anticipated behaviour expected by
the others in those situations. The knowing subject
recognizes the processes whereby the social 'me' is
generated, namely out of the responses and recognition
that he receives from others; like Simmel and James,
Goffman appears to uphold the idea that social life
allows for the preservation of a section of an individ-
ual's personality which is, in a sense, 'private
property'. The individual, when thinking, is always
more or less aware of his personal existence, and, as
Simmel argues, there is incessant interaction between
the 'extra social self' and the 'social self.' The
'extra social self' is, of course, a product of the
antecedent social interaction (as the 'I' in Mead's
analysis is necessarily a social product), but Simmel
considers that the extra social self is irreducible and persists side by side with those segments of personality which engage the individual as a member of various social groupings.

In *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Goffman employs a dramaturgical perspective in which the genesis of self is disregarded; the 'private' self, as an antecedent variable, is linked in an indeterminate relationship with the 'public self' and Goffman devotes much of his attention to the 'performer', which, in turn appears to be analogous with the 'public' or 'social' self. When he does refer to what might be associated with the construct of the 'private' self, it is represented as a relatively Machiavellian predisposition; for Goffman argues that there is less concern on the part of the actor to realize certain (moral) standards than to maintain the impression that these standards are being realized. Thus although social activity is concerned with moral matters, 'performers' do not necessarily have a wholly moral concern with them; as 'performers,' suggests Goffman, 'we are merchants of morality.'

The 'performance', which is a central construct in Goffman's theory, is defined as 'all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves
to influence in any way, any of the other participants.'

Participants in social situations assess or define the salient action which is appropriate to the prevailing occasion. To this end, both the actor who enters a social group and the members of the group require information concerning each other. Such information need not necessarily be of a personal kind, insofar as the participants can rely on past experience to advise them that only individuals of 'a particular kind' will be found in the anticipated social setting. Furthermore, it is likely that in the course of the activity, specific facts which would enable the participants to direct their action more shrewdly are inaccessible in terms of space and time from the interaction itself. Goffman suggests, following Thomas, that inference is a constant feature of all social action and the inferential feature of social situations brings with it the opportunity to manipulate the process of the communal activity. This is where the two-fold character of communicated actions becomes crucial for the negotiations of social identities and the negotiation of interactive roles. The double feature of communication refers to the fact that a symbolic dimension can be differentiated from the actual content of communicated acts. Goffman argues,

"The expressiveness of the individual (and therefore his capacity to give impressions) appears to
involve two radically different kinds of sign activity; the expression that he gives and the expression that he gives off." 9

This distinction between the communication of meaningful information and the elaboration of the communicative mode (performed for reasons other than conveying information per se) is of the same order of difference as James' distinction between 'knowledge of acquaintance' and 'knowledge about', perhaps best expressed in the semantic difference between savoir and connaître or between wissen and kennen. 10

Goffman concerns himself with investigating the mechanisms whereby the individual communicates knowledge about himself. Others in the company of the individual, being fully aware of the obligations imposed upon them by the individual's presentation, are likely to concede that the individual is what he claims to be (albeit, with reservations, for the opportunity to check on the authenticity between the content of information and manner presented always exists) it may then be said that the individual has 'effectively projected a given definition of the situation and effectively fostered the understanding that a given state of affairs obtains.' 11
The common recognition of a given state of affairs allows for a working consensus to be obtained whereby the participants are agreed (often implicitly) on the degree to which each individual can bring forward issues which are vital to him but which are not immediately important to others. This working consensus involves the reconciliation, on the part of the actor, of the part he would like to play, and the performance which is suited to the occasion; it also requires a compromise between the performance which he feels obligated to present and the ongoing performances of others.

In Znaniecki's view, the real objective social connection among individuals exists when the individuals rise above their own points of view to create a mutuality of experience which did not exist originally; this idea can be linked to the principle of emergence, a 'synthetic event', which is 'creative of real novelty, of some new quality or property of a type that did not exist before the emergence...' and which has causal efficiency in making a difference to the future course of events.

Goffman does not suggest that all 'performances' are created de novo in a conscious sense in all
situations, insofar as the individual can follow
traditional routines with a facility born of custom or
habit. But the implication exists that the working
consensus is fragile and is perpetuated in the face
of potential disruption. The disruption itself is most
likely to occur as a result of inconsistency in
discharging the requirements of appearing to be what
one claims to be; for such claims have a moral character
which is binding on all the participants in the action
situation.

In developing his analysis of individual perform-
ances, Goffman examines the paraphernalia which is
employed as a means to define the situation, and which
functions to influence the observer's perception of the
individual's behaviour. The analysis of performances
also includes reference to characteristic features such
as dramatization, idealization, maintenance of expressive
control, mystification and contrivance.

Perhaps the most fundamental characteristic of
individual 'performances' apart from those outlined
above, is that the performer will, according to the
specific audience to which he performs, attempt to give
the impression that his performance in front of them
represents his typical self, and that he is related to
them in an ideal way. Audience segregation implies that the individual will conceal his differentiated performances in front of differentiated audiences and it is necessary to maintain segregation between those who view him in varying modes of behaviour.

The segregation of audiences is particularly pertinent to the successful performance of 'team' behaviour; such segregation is often achieved by means of fixed physical barriers between 'backstage' and 'frontstage' regions in which differentiated behaviour patterns occur. By team, or 'performance team', Goffman refers to the co-operative activity of a number of performers which appears to fit together in the maintenance of a given impression before an audience. Goffman outlines two basic components of the relationship between those who constitute a team. The first is that, insofar as each team-mate is forced to rely on the good conduct and behaviour of his fellow team-mates, there is developed a bond of reciprocal dependence which links team-mates together and which can in fact transcend the formal or structural cleavages between members of a social establishment and this provide a source of cohesion in that establishment.

"When staff and line statuses tend to divide an organization, performance teams may tend to integrate the divisions."
The second component of the team relationship is that accomplices in the maintenance of a particular appearance of things are forced to define one another as persons 'in the know', i.e., 'as persons before whom a particular front cannot be maintained.' They are thus bound together by what is called the 'privilege of familiarity' which need not be 'something of an organic kind, slowly developing with the passage of time spent together' but rather a 'formal' relationship which is extended to, and accepted by, all newcomers to the team.

The concept of team performance is carried on, in a modified form, in a series of essays by Goffman which deal with life in corrective institutions of various kinds. In such 'total' institutions, Goffman finds that there is a 'basic split' between a large managed group, conveniently called inmates, and the supervisory staff. Each grouping tends to view the other in terms of narrow stereotypes, staff seeing inmates often as being bitter, secretive and untrustworthy, whilst inmates see staff as 'condescending, high-handed, and mean.' In studying these 'captive' institutions, Goffman examines in detail the processes whereby individuals express their rejection
of 'official' stereotypes of themselves as imputed to them, by the behaviour they are expected to enact. Goffman's argument is that inherent in all claims made on an individual, especially claims which originate from positions of power and which seek to regulate even the most intimate facets of the life-style of individuals, there exists a conception of what the individual's character must be for these claims to be appropriate. But within every such establishment, participants decline, in some way, to accept the 'official' view of what they should be contributing to and receiving from the organization. This assertion of individuality cannot be realized in the complete compliance to institutional orders, but in actual practice, the individual does not openly default his obligations. Instead, argues Goffman,

"...the individual...holds himself off from fully embracing all the self-implications of his affiliation, allowing some of this disaffection to be seen, even while fulfilling his major obligations." 20

Here again, is Goffman's argument that a symbolic dimension can be differentiated from the actual content of a communicated act; in this instance a deliberate manipulation of the symbolic mode serving to express 'distance' from the degradation and
humiliation that would otherwise be associated with the actions that an inmate is forced to perform.

The ability of the actor to blend the concrete demands of immediate situations with elements derived from a wider repertoire of internalized attitudes, is given more systematic treatment in an essay by Goffman which is addressed to the concept of 'role-distance'; the significant argument in this essay is that role-performances in complex societies should not be studied merely as contributory functions in the realization of a particular social goal, but as potentially problematical behavioural requirements which may, or may not, allow the individual the chance to co-ordinate his other social experiences (and associated social identity or status) into a consistent whole.

In summary, Goffman's work can be construed as an analysis of the ramifications for individual self-value which adhere in the symbolic aspect of communicated acts. Actors in social situations attempt to direct the actual course of the other actors' activities to mesh with their own projects and they must necessarily admit to some changes on their own part. The images of the partners, in terms of which an agent arranges his course of action, are very often built on subtle,
and often easily misread, cues. Since this process is of great strategic value to each participant, each tries to control the presentation of such cues to the other. He will try to present a more or less stylized image of himself in line with his objectives, his felt identity, and his situational context. Such attempts at stylized self-presentation aid in stabilizing the process of interaction in that they try to link the 'visible front' which each agent presents to his partner with the imputation of an underlying and continuing identity.

Every interactive experience which an individual may have, must thus become incorporated into two different contexts of meaning which are, in effect, two different histories which intersect, i.e., the order of the group and the meaning which the experience has in terms of its structural context on the one hand, and the order of personal identity and the significance and place the experience has in terms of the personal history of the individual on the other. Every act may be interpreted and perhaps legitimated in both of these contexts; to the group and to the self.

Now Goffman's somewhat unorthodox approach to the study of social life, i.e., unorthodox in terms of
the manner in which theory and illustration are often conjoined, brings with it a number of methodological problems. Not the least among these is his reluctance to define those representative features of action that demarcate any particular role. As Weber observed,

"It is necessary to know what a 'king' an 'official' an 'entrepreneur', a 'procurer' or a 'magician' does; that is, what kind of typical action, which justifies classifying an individual in one of these categories, is important and relevant for an analysis, before it is possible to undertake the analysis itself." 22

In his work, Asylums, Goffman approaches this requirement fairly closely, thus making it possible to entertain comparative studies of discrete institutions and the role behaviour which takes place within them; but his essay on role-distance does not make explicit what the role-expectations are that the individual actors take distance from.

Further, the decision to limit his analysis to the study of interpersonal situations, where the content of the symbolic mode of communication refers principally to individual character, mood, deportment, and personal life-style exhibited in face-to-face relations, precludes the inclusion of areas of concern which are bigger than
those situations. Thus, for example, for the individual who is caught up in a wider interaction process with others as a known category—particularly when the interaction process is symbolically defined in terms of abstractions which relate to the exercise of power or the pursuit of religious ends—the opportunities to become detached, through the manipulation of the symbolic mode, are more rare.

Furthermore, the concentration on small group-ings engaged in repetitive symbolic-interactional practices within the quasi-permanent setting of 'social establishments' results in a tendency to overlook the symbolic abstractions which adhere in trans-situational social factors of macrosociological magnitude and historical depth.

However, Goffman's propositions concerning the reaction of individuals to the formal expectations that others have of them and the relevance of those formal expectations for the constitution of self-value and interpersonal exchange, represents a worthwhile addition to the continuing debate concerning the question of the nature of the persona in the person and the person in the persona. By this, is meant the dilemma
posed in a society which is characterized by the establishment of impersonal role-tasks and yet which at the same time is characterized by the requirement to sustain the primary meaningful value of the individual in a world which contains other, meaningful things. Goffman does not consider, in any depth, the distinction between action which is 'role-directed', as it were, and 'role-free' (except by implication in his work *Asylums*): but he does illuminate the fact that whereas complete commitment to a given role does not allow for the expression of the full range of personal values, that without a degree of systematic role-performance social action is not possible.
Notes to Chapter II

1) In many respects, Goffman's sociology takes a similar direction to that of Alfred Vierkandt. The latter adopted an intermediate position between individualism and universalism in an attempt to combine the formal sociology of Simmel, which studies the relations between individuals, and the sociology of Durkheim, which emphasizes the reality of the whole, sui generis. Vide Aron, R., German Sociology, trans. Bottomore, T.B. and M., Free Press of Glencoe 1964, pp. 19 ff. Also vide Hochstim, P., Alfred Vierkandt. Exposition Press, New York, 1966. In his later works, Goffman's writing appears to reflect the organizing principles which Leopold von Wiese outlined, to facilitate the treatment of human interaction. These principles view all sociological processes as either, 1) associative - or actions of approach toward others and action with others, 2) dissociative - or actions of withdrawal or opposition, 3) a combination of both in some respects. Vide Mihanovich, C.S., The Sociology of Leopold von Wiese, Sociology and Social Research, Vol. 31, No. 3, 1947, pp. 172 ff.


6) Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self, op. cit., p. 251

7) ibid., p. 15


9) Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self, op. cit., p. 2


11) Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self, op. cit., p. 6


14) Goffman, E., The Presentation of Self, op. cit., pp. 22-76

15) ibid., pp. 106 ff.

16) ibid., pp. 79-105

17) ibid., p. 82

18) ibid., p. 83

19) Goffman, E., Asylums, op. cit., p. 7
20) ibid., p. 174


There is a double purpose in the phenomenological philosophy of Alfred Schutz. On the one hand, he seeks to probe the roots of commonsense reality to outline the constitutive principles which underlie social existence, insofar as they are exhibited in the apprehension of social reality by individual consciousness. On the other hand, he is concerned with the development of methodological propositions which would provide the basis for the exploration of social life in general.

These two aims overlap insofar as many of Schutz's assertions concerning the orientation of the actor to the social world advise his programme with regard to the appropriate manner in which to study social life; but this chapter will not be concerned with analyzing the merits of Schutz's efforts to relate phenomenological concepts to the interpretive sociology of Max Weber as an enterprise in the refinement of the latter's methodology. Rather, it is intended to outline the basic features of Schutz's investigation into the phenomenological constructs embodied in social existence.
First of all, it is pertinent to make some brief observations as to the aim and scope of phenomenological investigation. Although no definitive answer is forthcoming from the advocates of phenomenology as to what constitutes the exact procedure of this approach, some general characteristics can be identified. According to Strasser, the primary aim of phenomenology is to 'lay bare the general and necessary structures of experience' through a descriptive method which eschews the method of scientific induction. As a philosophy, phenomenology differs from most other philosophies in attempting to interpret all human forms of existence, including that of pursuing science, 'on the basis of man's being-in-the-world.'

Thevenaz suggests that the phenomenological method is descriptive, represents a form of radical empiricism and can be characterized as the science of experience. As a method, phenomenology does not concentrate exclusively on either the objects of experience or on the subject of experience but on the 'point of contact where being and consciousness meet.' There is thus a general rejection of the kind of explanation which proceeds from the assumption that man can be studied as if involved in a series of stimulus-response patterns. Rather, the individual is seen as a person
caught up in a social world in which his 'actions define his experience'. and who can be seen not only as the recipient of a series of disparate impressions received in a 'mind container', or simply as the recipient of experience given in a particular location, but as an actor who transforms his experience as a result of his intentional acts. Intentionality appears to be a central feature of consciousness for those who adopt a phenomenological position, and, in a metaphorical sense, intentionality is described as 'a living mirror capable of rearranging its images according to its own criteria and reacting to them in diverse ways.'

When linked with existentialism (and Schutz's work contains evidence of this linkage) phenomenological investigation does not adhere rigorously to the programme advocated by Husserl, insofar as perception is not regarded as a product of the individual mind sui generis, but is advised through the communicative social milieu. As Spiegelberg suggests, existentialism has 'humanized and socialized' phenomenological investigation.

Phenomenology, then, is not concerned with the ontological status of particular objects, not even with hypotheses concerning the history of ideas. This approach moves explanation into an abstract level with
concomitant problems of bringing it down to earth. Some of the arguments which follow, however, have been 'fleshed out' with empirical examples in Berger and Luckmann's work, The Social Construction of Reality.

In order to make Schutz's ideas concerning the question of social existence explicit, it is necessary to characterize the general components of the world of daily life as Schutz sees them. He argues that Man finds himself at any moment in his daily life in a 'biographically determined situation' within which he has his position. Position here refers to his place in the social structure as well as his ideas concerning the moral and political problems he encounters. This world, for the individual, is taken for granted by him as his reality. The objects, facts and events which the individual encounters and deals with in the course of his life are experienced as typical i.e., as 'carrying open horizons of anticipated similar experiences.' In the 'natural attitude' of daily life, individuals are concerned merely with some aspects of any particular typified object, for in the 'paramount reality' of the here and now, the interest of the individual is principally pragmatic: thus every element of everyday knowledge has a necessarily equivocal trait. In this sense, Schutz suggests that to assert
that object $S$ has the characteristic property $p$ in the form of '$S$ is $p$' is an elliptical statement. For the individual in 'the natural attitude' also recognizes that $S$ is $q$, $r$, and $t$ as well. If the individual asserts that $S$ is $p$ for a particular purpose at hand, this is not contradictory; for it is possible to ignore as irrelevant to that purpose the 'q-ness', 'r-ness' and 't-ness' of $S$. Thus says Schutz,

"...in the natural attitude of daily life we are concerned merely with certain objects standing out over against the unquestioned field of pre-experienced other objects and the result of the selecting activity of our mind is to determine which particular characteristics of such an object are individual and which typical ones."

13

It is the purpose at hand which defines those elements among others in a situation to be relevant for that purpose. Any change in the purpose at hand and the concomitant relevance system, or the shift of context within which $S$ is of interest, can induce the individual to become concerned with the q-being of $S$, its also being '$p$' having become irrelevant.

The world about the individual is oriented and organized for the individual's actions in a spatio-temporal continuum with the actual 'here and now'
functioning as the centre of a system of co-ordinates determining the organization of the surrounding field. As such, the individual's world is encountered as a hierarchy of zones within actual, potential and restorable reach, within which is the immediately available sphere of manipulation with its own spatio-temporal horizons. The concrete situation of an individual is constituted as an on-going course of typical experiences of typical objects and events.

But, as Schutz points out, the 'texture of meaning' is a cultural product and thus has its origin and institution in human actions. Cultural objects (including language, social institutions, tools, etc.) can only be understood by reference to the human activity from which they originate. In order to deal with the 'constructs' which emerge in common-sense thinking as a result of the socialization of knowledge, Schutz considers 1) the reciprocity of perspectives or the structural socialization of knowledge 2) the social origin or the genetic socialization of knowledge and 3) the social distribution of knowledge.

In dealing with the first aspect, Schutz points out that the individual is aware of the different relevance which objects have for other individuals.
at any specific time or place, not only because of the recognition that others are involved in differentiated projects, but also because of the recognition of variegated biographical histories. But common sense thought transcends the individual differences by virtue of 'two basic idealizations.' The first of these is that the individual assumes that should he change places with another individual engaged in his actions, that the same 'typicality' of things and the same 'distance' from things would logically adhere: the second idealization is that of the congruency of the system of relevances, or the fact that it is possible to ignore unique biographical situations (or at least consider them irrelevant) in dealing with the purpose at hand. Until or unless counter-evidence is presented, it is assumed by ego and alter that common objects and their features are at least empirically identical for both.

"Thus the general thesis of reciprocal perspectives leads to the apprehension of objects and their aspects actually known by me and potentially known by you as everyone's knowledge. Such knowledge is conceived to be objective and anonymous, i.e., detached from and independent of my and my fellow-man's definition of the situation, our unique biographical circumstances and the actual and potential purposes at hand involved therein."
With regard to the second aspect (the social origin of knowledge) Schutz argues that only a small part of the individual's stock of knowledge at hand originates with the individual; most of it is socially derived. The individual is taught how to define the situation (that is, how to define, in regard to the relative natural aspect of the world, the typical features that prevail in the in-group as the unquestioned but always questionable compass of things taken for granted until further notice); and the individual is taught how typical constructs have to be formed in accordance with the purpose at hand and its system of relevances accepted from the anonymous viewpoint of the in-group (ways of life, recipes for acting and the like). For this socialization, the typifying medium par excellence is the common vernacular, a language of named things and events, primarily, and thus of the typifications and generalizations prevailing in the in-group whose vernacular it is.

The third aspect which Schutz considers is the social distribution of knowledge. Our actual stocks of knowledge differ; some fields are known by acquaintance, others are known in depth and of others we have only a blind belief. Expertise, as such, is manifest in only
a small area. Knowledge is at any moment structured into zones of clarity, distinctiveness, precision etc. originating in the individual's prevailing system of relevances and thus is biographically determined. The knowledge of individual differences is itself an element of common sense experience; the individual knows whom he has to consult under typical circumstances for the amelioration of particular problems. The individual thus constructs types of the other's fields of acquaintance and of their scope and range, being guided by certain relevance structures experienced in terms of certain typical motives that lead to typical actions.

The three principal aspects of socialization, the idealizations belonging thereto and the typifications constructed by actors on the social scene, are, for Schutz, the foundation of social interaction.

At this point, it is possible to develop two relatively distinct theses from the extended analysis which Schutz makes of the constituent features of social life. The first is a theory of intersubjectivity, which Zaner argues is at the root of Schutz's work: the second is a structural analysis of the conceptual 'constructs' employed by members of groups.
in concrete historical situations, albeit in an abstracted sense.

The question of intersubjectivity will now be dealt with briefly, as it allows for the consideration of Schutz's assertions dealing with the interlocking processes of time dimensions, behaviour, attitudes and motives.

To Schutz, the intersubjective character of the world in general originates and is continuously experienced in the We-relation. Now although any face-to-face confrontation with an other (or Thou) is the general form in which any particular fellow-man is experienced in person, the necessarily social feature of such a confrontation exists only when ego and alter take into account some specific features of the consciousness of each other.

Schutz suggests that,

"In the on-going experiences of the We-relation I check and revise my previous knowledge about my partner and accumulate new knowledge about him. My experience of a fellow man in the We-relations thus stands in a multiple context of meaning: it is experience of a human being, it is experience of a typical actor on the social scene, it is experience of this particular fellow-man, and it is experience of this particular fellow-man in
this particular situation... my experience of the on-going phases of my own conscious life and my experience of the co-ordinated phases of your conscious life is unitary; experience in the We-relation is genuinely shared." 22

It is in this relationship, where the individual is able to apprehend the outcome of alter's plans by witnessing the course of his action, that the normal propensity of the individual to assign to fellow human beings a world which corresponds to the world as the individual experiences it himself, is given ultimate verification. When, in other words, the 'reach of my fellow man coincides with mine.' 23

Now Schutz argues that the individual usually imputes a set of 'because' and 'in-order-to' motives 24 to persons to whom action is directed. In this sense, the in-order-to motive is the projected act, the pre-phantasied state of affairs to be brought about by the future action; the 'because' motive, from the point of view of the actor, refers to his past experiences. When the actor 'lives in his on-going action' he does not have in view its 'because' motives. Only when the action is accomplished, that is, when it has become an act, does the individual turn back to his past action as an observer of himself and investigate by what
circumstances he has been determined to do what he did. Schutz states,

"In using the linguistic form 'in-order-to', I am looking at the on-going process of action which is still in the making and appears therefore in the time perspective of the future. In using the linguistic 'because' form for expressing a genuine in-order-to relationship, I am looking at the preceding project and the therein modo futuri exacti anticipated act. The genuine because motive, however, involves...the time perspective of the past and refers to the genesis of the projecting itself." 26

It would appear that the crucial difference between these two modes of motive is the relation which each has to the process of intersubjective interpretation. That is, insofar as the in-order-to motive refers to the attitude of the actor living in the process of his on-going action, it is an essentially 'subjective' category and is revealed to the observer only if he asks what meaning the actor bestows on his action. The genuine 'because' motive, however, is an 'objective' category, accessible to the observer, who has to reconstruct from the accomplished act (namely from the state of affairs brought about in the world by the actor's action) the attitude of the actor to his action.
Schutz argues extensively throughout his works that the world of ego, as an intersubjective social reality, includes alter egos with different spatial and temporal characteristics. Predecessors are those who lived before ego and are known to him through report. Contemporaries are those who share the same temporal world as ego. Consociates are those who are alive at the same time as ego and who also share ego's spatial segment of the world through face-to-face relationships. Successors are those who will live after ego dies, including those who will be born only after ego is dead. The social world is as much constituted by consciousness of predecessors and successors as it is by contemporaries and consociates.

Beyond the experience of the individual (or Thou) in a concrete We-relation, all others, including contemporaries, are apprehended mediately, by means of typifications. Only in the face-to-face relation, however superficial it may be, is alter encountered as a unique individual, with his own biographically determined situation. Furthermore, even in the face-to-face relation of consociates (defined as those with whom ego shares a community of time and space) the partners enter into social action only with a part of
their respective personalities (or in terms of social 'roles'). The process of constructing any alter as a performer of social roles plays its part in ego's own self-typification. In defining the role of alter, ego assumes a role himself, and these typifying constructs are often institutionalized in the course of on-going experience. Hand-in-hand with an increase in typification there is to be found an increase in anonymity with respect to others and a decrease therefore in the fullness of the relationship; the individuals are taken by each other as interchangeable, that is, as 'anyone'. The We-relation is thus inversely proportionate to the degree of typification arising through our actions.

As this writer interprets Schutz's thesis, the link between the in-order-to motive and the because motive and the significance of the We-relation is that when ego and alter share in a common project in both a spatial and temporal sense (i.e., as Schutz suggests, when ego and alter 'grow older together') there occurs a synthesis of the in-order-to and the because motives. As pointed out above, the because motive is essentially a reflective product (as is also the Me in Mead's analysis of self) and mutuality of shared experience predisposes an 'unbroken totality' which is less reflective in character.
Zaner's suggestion is that the We-relation is realized when ego refrains from typifying alter's behaviour, or refrains from pre-judging or pre-interpreting his action, but enters the relationship in the sense of being 'open to' or 'fully available' to alter as manifest in a mutual 'tuning-in of reciprocal concern.'

We shall now turn to the consideration of the ancillary thesis which is developed in Schutz's work and which was referred to above. What has immediately preceded this argument was principally an outline of Schutz's thought on the relationship between intersubjective thought in relation to social structure. What follows is an outline of Schutz's account of the process of constitutive meaning-structures.

Taking his lead from William James' analysis of the sense of reality, Schutz suggests that James' concept of sub-universes provides a philosophically worthwhile approach to the problem of experience and meaning. Now James had suggested that the 'popular mind' conceives of all sub-worlds (such as the world of science, of religion, etc.) more or less disconnectedly, and when dealing with one of them forgets,
for the time being, its relation to the rest.\textsuperscript{35}
Further, that with respect to each one of these sub-worlds, all propositions made within them are believed through the very fact of being conceived, unless 'they clash with other propositions believed at the same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the terms of these other propositions.' Schutz maintains that James' assertion that the sense of reality can be investigated in terms of a psychology of belief or disbelief must be amended, so as to treat it in a more social context.

"...we prefer to speak instead of many sub-universes of reality of \textit{finite provinces of meaning} upon each of which we may bestow the \textit{accent of reality}. We speak of the \textit{provinces of meaning} and not of sub-universes because it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of objects which constitutes reality."\textsuperscript{37}

Such a set of experiences is called a \textit{finite province of meaning} if it shows a 'specific cognitive style' i.e., that it show certain basic characteristics which include a specific suspension of doubt, a specific form of experiencing one's self, a specific form of sociality and a specific time-perspective. Now Schutz discusses the 'world of working in standard time' as one finite province of meaning, indeed a
'paramount' world which stands out over against the other provinces of meaning principally because of its pragmatic character. But he also suggests that there are many others accessible to the individual's intentional life. He offers the world of dreams, the world of art, the world of religious experience and the world of scientific contemplation as some examples.

The most significant sub-universe so far as this thesis is concerned, is that which James would refer to as 'ideal relations'; now Schutz does not deal with this construct per se, but makes reference to it within the context of the apprehension of meaning, or the interpretation of some sign according to some standard. It is necessary here to digress briefly to consider Schutz's arguments pertaining to 'signs' in order to make the connection explicit.

For Schutz, the things signs stand for are to be decided by reference to four types of orders, discussed below. The different kinds of order by which objects, facts and events are interpreted can be characterized by four basic forms of 'appresentational relations' employed by the actor for transcending the world within his actual reach, and which will be outlined first. The four are marks, indications,
signs, and symbols.

The mark, e.g. the notation on the margin of a book, serves as a subjective reminder for the interpreter when some object returns within his reach. The indication, or that which is frequently subsumed under the term 'natural sign' e.g., the halo around the moon which indicates coming rain, or the position of a needle on the dial of a car which indicates an empty gas tank. The sign designates 'objects, facts or events in the outer world, whose apprehension appresents to an interpreter cogitations of a fellow man'. The interpretation of an object, fact or event as a sign for someone's cogitations does not necessarily mean that the communicator intended the 'cogitations' to be interpreted by another party, or that the interpreter was intended as the recipient of the cogitations. Signs run the gamut of language, gesture, etc., and presuppose a set of common abstractions or standardizations to be successfully communicated.

Now the first three of the 'appresentational' references mentioned above, i.e. marks, indications and sign, help us to come to terms with transcendenties of the here and now, the other and the other's world. But they are still nevertheless 'immanent' in
the common-sense world of everyday life. Symbols, however, represent for Schutz a 'higher form' of appresentational reference which allow for the apprehension of transcendent phenomena contained in finite provinces of meaning described as 'sub-universes' earlier. In the 'higher appresentational form' of symbolic reference only the appresenting member refers to everyday life, while the appresented member (or the signatum) is in a sense non-experiential. Schutz agrees with Jaspers' definition, parts of which follow here:

"The main difference between meaning within the world and of metaphysical meaning consists in the criterion of whether in the relationship between the image and that which it represents the latter itself could be apprehended as an objectivity, or whether the image is an image for something that is not accessible in any other way. The symbol cannot be interpreted except by other symbols...the understanding of a symbol does not therefore consist in grasping its significance in a rational way but in experiencing it existentially in the symbolic intention as this unique reference to something transcendent that vanishes at the limiting point." 43

Now Schutz argues that the complicated structure of the symbolic relationship involves four schemes, the apperceptual, the appresentational, the referential and the interpretational. It is not necessary here to
outline the philosophical analysis which Schutz develops to distinguish these schemes: the examples which he provides are sufficiently explicit for our purpose. Thus he finds that the interpretational scheme is the most important in terms of providing a universe of discourse between interpreters. Following Bergson, Schutz suggests that various interpreters of a symbolic structure may accept the same referential scheme, yet apply different appresentational schemes to the apperceptual configuration, as in the history of sects which develop alternative theses concerning the consubstantiation of the Trinity, or parties in political organizations which believe in the basic law of the country but differ as to its interpretation. It is also possible that the appresentational aspect is taken 'as a prototype of order with the consequence that various referential schemes which are frequently inconsistent are connected with the same symbolic structure'; further, it is possible that the referential scheme, once constituted, becomes autonomous, i.e., independent of the appresentational scheme, the latter then seeming merely contingent.

This discussion leads us to Schutz's final arguments concerning the 'appresentational reference' of the social world. There are, he states, two such
levels; individual fellow-men are apprehended analogically, but both members are appresented within the 'reality of everyday life'; in contrast, social collectivities and institutionalized relations are as such not entities within the province of meaning of 'everyday reality' but constructs of thought which have their reality in another sub-universe, and likely in that which James referred to as the sub-universe of 'ideal relations.' Thus, although the social collectivity can be personified, as it were, in the roles of congressmen or policemen, the signatum exists only in the abstract symbolic form.

Now the symbolic representations of the We-relations of various kinds (partnerships, lovers, etc.) become more discernible the more the relationship is institutionalized, i.e., the 'home' becomes more than a dwelling place, the hearth is more than a fireplace, and the 'neighbourhood' is more than an ecological concept.

Insofar as the symbolic referents are realizable as it were, in the face-to-face relations, they are distinguishable from symbolic referents which cannot be, i.e., in the sense that a society can itself become the representative of something beyond itself, as of a
transcending reality.

Now Schutz is not altogether explicit as to the circumstances under which the apprehension of a 'fellow-man' will fall into one or the other of the symbolic referentia, but hints that this is dependent upon the definition of the situation, i.e. what Carfinkel would refer to as the 'constitutive accent' for a particular set of events. The constitutive accent, e.g. of a game, is, in turn, an eclectic term for the 'constitutive expectancies' or basic rules which provide a set of boundary conditions within which each player must make certain decisions and choices regardless of personal likes and dislikes, plans and consequences for himself or others, and whereby each player assumes a norm of reciprocity with respect to the alternatives binding on each other; also that players assume that whatever they expect of each other is perceived and interpreted in the same way.

The only example of Schutz's application of his theories concerning the problem of symbolic appresentation as a reflection of sub-universes (or provinces of meaning) is in his analysis of the dialectics between Don Quixote's phantasy-world and
that of his travelling companion Sancho Panza.

Finally, mention should be made of the manner in which Berger and Luckmann treat Schutz's theories. Their work is divided into two main sections, society being characterized as an 'objective' and a 'subjective' reality respectively. It is in the former section where Schutz's concepts of sub-universes and symbolism are given principal attention. Berger and Luckmann utilize the latter within the rubric of 'legitimation' which functions to 'make plausible' the 'first order object-ivations' that have been 'institutionalized' and they therefore view the 'symbolic universes' as a kind of legitimating modus operandi which lead to an integrated modus vivendi.

Whether this is the only interpretation of the function, or even the outcome, of the variety of symbolic universes within a single society can be disputed, depending upon the a priori assumptions of the investigator with regard to the actual character of human society, i.e., whether society is initially appraised as an arena which is never free from conflictual claims on the part of various segments, or as an arena in which integration and co-operation are both the hallmark and the goal of social action. The section
of Berger and Luckmann's work which is addressed to the 'subjective' facet of society, utilizes Schutz's work in association with psychological tenets which tend to portray socialization as a principal feature of intersubjective life and give emphasis to the passive mode of acquiring knowledge, particularly as a characteristic of so-called 'primitive' societies.

What emerges, then, from the phenomenological philosophy in Schutz's work, is principally a set of interrelated propositions concerning the 'essential' nature of social interaction and social thought, which emphasizes typification (or perceiving the world and structuring by means of categorical types) as an intrinsic aspect of the basic orientation of actors to their situations. All typification would seem to consist in the pragmatic reduction and equalization of attributes relevant to the particular purpose at hand for which the type has been formed, and involves disregarding those individual (and conceptual) differences of the typified objects that are not relevant to such purposes. As noted by Tiryakian, existential typologies are coming to be treated in their own right as important revelations of the fundamental foci of social structure and social organization. For Schutz, the typifications of
'common-sense' thinking are integral elements of the concrete Lebenswelt and their structure determines the social distribution of knowledge and its relativity and relevance to the particular social environment of a group in a particular historical situation. It is the examination of these 'constructs' and their cognitive style, together with the myriad dialectical patterns which emerge as a result of living in a world bounded by such constructs, which Schutz advocates. For him, the 'legitimate problems...of the so-called sociology of knowledge' will be tackled most appropriately in that enterprise.
Notes to Chapter III


2) *ibid.*, p. 277


4) *ibid.*, p. 19


6) *ibid.*


11) *ibid.*, p. 7

12) *ibid.*, p. 9

13) *ibid.*, pp. 8-9
14) ibid., p. 223
15) ibid., p. 10
16) ibid., p. 16. Also vide ibid., pp. 315-6
17) ibid., p. 12
18) ibid., pp. 15-16
19) ibid., pp. 4-15
22) ibid., p. 30
23) ibid., p. 31
25) ibid., p. 70
26) ibid., p. 71
27) ibid., pp. 69-71
30) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 16
32) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 16


34) Zaner, R.M., op. cit., p. 93

35) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 207

36) James, W., Principles of Psychology Vol II, quoted by Schutz in Collected Papers Vol 1, op. cit., p. 229

37) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 230

38) ibid., p. 230-1

39) ibid., p. 232


42) ibid., p. 320


44) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 338

45) ibid., pp. 352 ff.

46) ibid., p. 352

47) ibid., p. 354


51) ibid., pp. 119 ff.

52) Tiryakian, E., Typological Classification, ex International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Macmillan, New York, 1968 pp. 177-86

53) Schutz, A., Collected Papers, Vol 1, op. cit., p. 149
CHAPTER IV  
Karl Mannheim

The purpose of this chapter is to outline and examine a number of propositions which Karl Mannheim develops concerning the constitution of thought as a function of social participation.

Mannheim maintains that the sociology of knowledge is concerned with 'the varying ways in which objects present themselves to the subject according to the differences in social settings.' Utilizing a 'general-total-non-evaluative' conception of ideology, Mannheim seeks to determine the manner in which 'social structures come to express themselves in the structure of assertions' and embarks on an empirical study of political thought-models in order to illustrate his thesis.

Now insofar as Mannheim is concerned with the structure and formation of thought in individual minds, it must not be assumed that he conceives of the possibility that the individual can formulate political judgements which are made independent of evaluations of the world (made, in turn, by the social groups to which the individual belongs). In this sense,
Mannheim's conception of Man stands in contrast to the stream of thought running from Descartes to Locke to Kant which can be construed as an attempt to extricate the knowing subject from his social-historical context with the consequent attempt to search out the limitations on knowledge within the boundaries of the discrete individual: rather, Mannheim's approach is in the tradition of thought exemplified in the work of Marx, Scheler, Durkheim and Mead, which takes a more dynamic collectivist turn and sees the knowing subject as part and parcel of a creative and determinative institutional process. As Farberman argues,

"...where the classical approach strove to strip away the institutional biases from mentality, so as to uncover its inherent and necessary objectivity, the modern approach cannot conceive of thought as being apart from institutional involvement; hence, it is determined to search for the composition of mentality within the more or less resilient social process."

Thus Mannheim's main preoccupation is to discover how thoughts, ideas and 'mental structures' are formed in various historical contexts. What is the meaning behind his theory of the 'social or existential determination of actual thinking'?

Mannheim points out that by 'determination' he
does not mean to imply an automatic cause-effect sequence; instead, he leaves the 'meaning of determination open', and suggests that the connection must be established through empirical investigation. The criteria he offers in terms of establishing such a connection as a 'demonstrated fact' are illustrated in those realms of thought in which it can be shown that,

"...the process of knowing does not actually develop historically in accordance with immanent laws, that it does not follow only from 'the nature of things' or from 'pure logical possibilities', and that it is not driven by an 'inner dialectic.' On the contrary, the emergence and the crystallization of actual thought is influenced in many decisive points by extra-theoretical factors of the most diverse sort. These may be called, in contradistinction to purely theoretical factors, existential factors. This existential determination of thought will also have to be regarded as a fact...if the influence of these existential factors on the concrete content of knowledge is of more than mere peripheral importance, if they are relevant not only to the genesis of ideas, but penetrate into their forms and content and if, furthermore, they decisively determine the scope and the intensity of our experience and observation, i.e., that which we formerly referred to as the 'perspective' of the subject."

Now Merton takes Mannheim to task for being vague and obscure in his specifications of the type or mode of relations between social structure and knowledge, and notes the various terms which Mannheim
uses to refer to this connection. Merton also notes that Mannheim uses the term 'correspondence' (Entspruchung) to denote these relations. Thus Merton finds that in deriving certain forms of thought from certain types of social situations, Mannheim makes a variety of unintegrated assumptions. Among others, there is the assumption that there is a direct causation of forms of thought by social forces; that ideas and forms of thought are 'in accord with' the interests of the asserting subjects; that thought is directed by the formulation of the problem, awareness of which may in turn be attributed to the social position of the subject; that certain social structures are pre-requisite to certain forms of thought; that there is an emanation of one set of ideas from another set, explained in terms of 'compatibility', 'congruity' and etc., of Weltanschauungen.

Turning now to an examination of precisely what phenomena Mannheim attempts to link together, it is found that the superstructure or 'mode of thought' itself is a framework of categories which forms the validational base of an ideological judgement. As Mandelbaum notes,

"These categories of social and historical knowledge are to be understood only by relating them
to the fundamental reality which determined their emergence; they are to be understood as an expression (Ausdruck) of the inter-relation of thought and the external, non-rational, existential factors which determined it. For Mannheim this inter-relation is to be conceived in terms of valuation and will. These valuations and volitional elements have, naturally, no transcendent (non-existential) referents. Thus the categories of social and historical understanding which emerge in the historico-social process have their whole basis in the fact that an active, valuing subject (of somewhat indeterminate nature) "lives into" an external world. In this, thought and action are not wholly disparate; thought and modes of thinking, are brought within a larger activist framework."

It is these categories through, and by which, a subject, class or age group apprehends reality which Mannheim refers to as the 'perspective' or stylistic structure. Mannheim defines 'perspective' as the 'subject's whole mode of conceiving things as determined by his historical and social setting.' Mannheim illustrates the notion of perspective by suggesting that a mathematical statement such as 'twice two equals four' gives 'no clue as to when, where, and by whom it was formulated', whereas an art form may be dated according to its style, possible only under given historical conditions and revealing the characteristics of an
epoch; similarly, it is possible in a work of the social sciences to say whether it was inspired by the 'historical school' or 'positivism' or 'Marxism' and from 'what stages in the development of each of these it dates'. In assertions of this sort, argues Mannheim, it is possible to speak of an 'infiltration of the social position' of the investigator into the results of his study and of the 'situational-relativity' ('Situations-gebundenheit') of the relationship of these assertions to the underlying reality.

Turning now to the 'infrastructure' which, in a sense, generates the 'perspective', it is found that Mannheim does not exhibit clarity in his exposition. The principal element is the social situation. He chooses to employ the metaphysical notion of a 'collective unconscious' which he reformulates into the 'collective purposes of the group', the 'whole matrix of collective interests', and the 'collective historical experiences of a group' as the possible 'social ground' upon which the figure is discerned — very much after the fashion of Gestalt perception theory. Mannheim argues that class is the most significant variable to be taken into account, because 'all other social groups arise from and are transformed as parts of the more basic conditions of production and
domination'; but there are also other groups such as 'generations, status groups, sects, occupational groups, schools, etc.' which can provide the existential base. Mannheim recognizes that an individual has multiple affiliations with social groups, which aggravates the problem of discerning the crucial influences in the thought of the thinking subject; this question is not clarified, either, in his suggestion that 'workers' are less broadly affiliated than others:

"Those who participate in the process of production... (the workers)... being bound to a particular class and mode of life, have their outlooks and activities exclusively determined by their specific social situation."

In addition to the stylistic structure and existential conditions, Mannheim refers to a third element in the ideological judgement. He regards the stylistic structure as emerging from the interaction of the subject with the existential reality. The volitions vary with the nature of the social situation, but the categories making up the perspective are a consequence of the volitional responses to the social situation. Thus he argues,

"Men living in groups do not merely coexist physically as discrete individuals. They do not confront the objects of the world from the
abstract levels of a contemplating mind as such, nor do they do so exclusively as solitary beings. On the contrary they act with and against one another in diversely organized groups, and while doing so they think with and against one another. These persons, bound together in groups, strive in accordance with the character and position of the groups to which they belong, to change the surrounding world of nature and society or attempt to maintain it in a given condition."

It transpires, then, that the existential conditions are not non-rational or non-theoretical in any complete way, for they include the social situation as a principal element, and the social situation in turn involves a perspective (which itself is 'non-illusory'). Insofar as it is feasible to talk of the 'penetration' of the perspective by the social process, it is not a determination of thought by purely non-theoretic factors. As Taylor points out,

"The penetration is achieved only through the agency of a subject who in effecting the penetration does so on the basis of values, etc., derived from a past, or existing social situation. The rise of a new stylistic structure is in fact a consequence of the appraisal of his experience by a subject on the basis of an already existing stylistic structure."
Taylor goes on to point out that Mannheim's dichotomy of the existential and the theoretic definitely obscures this feature. The presence of a theoretic within the existential is recognized by Mannheim himself in his distinction between 'factual genesis' and 'meaningful genesis':

"'Social existence' is thus an area of being, or a sphere of existence, of which orthodox ontology which recognizes only the absolute dualism between being devoid of meaning on the one hand and meaning on the other hand takes no account. A genesis of this sort could be characterized by calling it a 'meaningful genesis' (Sinngenesis) as contrasted with a 'factual-genesis' (Faktizitätsgenesis). If a model of this sort had been kept in mind in stating the relationship between being and meaning, the duality of being and validity would not have been assumed as absolute in epistemology and noology. Instead, there would have been a series of gradations between these two poles, in which such intermediate cases as 'being invested with meaning' and 'being oriented to meaning' would have found a place and been incorporated into the fundamental conception."

Thus, it is possible to arrive at a formulation which resolves the conceptual ambiguities above (involving dialectical relationships between theoretical perspectives, groups, etc.,) which is consistent with the orthodox separation of thought and things by
stating that social existence (in the form of institutions, classes, sects, etc.) is the process in which concepts (categories, perspectives, stylistic structures, etc.) are expressed as the life activities of men and out of which new thought-structures are formed.

In this mode, Mannheim develops a number of theorems as a way of both illustrating and confirming his hypotheses. A selection of these theorems are given here.

Mannheim finds that groups of pre-capitalist origin, characterized by the prevalence of the 'communal element', may be held together by tradition or common sentiments alone. Theoretical reflection, in a political sense, is of secondary importance. Groups which are not welded together by bonds of community life but 'which merely occupy similar positions in the social economic system' can find cohesion only through rigorous theorizing. The Weltanschauung of the latter group is effective over 'great distances' in contrast to the sentimental ties, which are effective only within a limited spatial area. Mannheim insinuates that the 'theorizing' of the spatially dispersed or 'non-organic' groups necessarily involves a rationalized conception of history which serves as a socially unifying factor.
At another point in his work, Mannheim puts forward an argument within the rubric of the theory of knowledge which can be linked to the preceding hypothesis concerning the development of abstract inter-personal linkage. The theory he develops, he designates as the social genesis of abstraction. He claims that the idea of a continuously broadening base of knowledge and of the integration of various social 'vantage points' into the process of knowledge, together with the idea of an all-embracing ontology which is to be sought for, is a tendency in social and intellectual history closely connected with 'the processes of group contact and interpenetration.'

The upshot of this tendency is, at first, a neutralization of the various conflicting points of view (i.e. depriving them of an absolute character) and then secondly, the creation of a more comprehensive and 'serviceable' basis of vision. Mannheim finds it interesting that the 'construction of a broader base is bound up with a higher degree of abstractness' and 'tends in an increasing degree to formalize the phenomena with which we are concerned.' He argues that the trend towards a higher stage of abstraction is a correlate of the amalgamation of social groups.
"The corroboration of this contention is found in the fact that the capacity for abstraction among individuals and groups grows in the measure that they are parts of heterogeneous groups and organizations in more inclusive collective units, capable of absorbing local or otherwise particular groups."

Mannheim constructs 'ideal-types' as a method of illustrating his existential-thought-form thesis. These include 'bureaucratic conservatism' in which the most significant extension is the tendency to generalize bureaucratic experience and to overlook the fact that the realm of administration and of smoothly functioning order represents only a part of the total political reality; 'historical conservatism', which Mannheim characterizes among other features as an outlook which 'relates everything to the decisive dichotomy between "construction according to plan" and "allowing things to grow"' with the added assumption that the social order is natural and proper; 'liberal-democratic bourgeois thought' which assumes, among other features, that politics is amenable to satisfactory resolution through discussion; 'socialist-communist conception' which typically relegates the reciprocal relations of political action, economics, ideologies, and class together as a 'single group of problems';
and 'Fascism' which among other features can discern only the 'unordered' and the 'unrationalized' in the development of society, the 'structural development and the integrated framework of society remaining completely hidden from... view'.

In similar fashion, Mannheim relates four types of utopian mentality' - the Anabaptist chiliastic, the liberal-humanitarian, the conservative and the socialist-communist - to the social location and collective purposes of their protagonists.

Thus, in terms of the apprehension of time, for example, it is found that the Anabaptist chiliastic characteristic experience is that the 'present becomes the breach through which what was previously inward bursts out suddenly, takes hold of the outer world and transforms it'; the liberal humanitarian concept of time emphasizes the idea of the indeterminate future which will witness the realization of their ethical norms, and views with contempt as an 'evil reality' everything that has become a part of the past or is part of the present: the conservative time-sense envisages the past as inexorably leading to, and validating the existing reality and the 'here and now' is experienced as 'the embodiment of the highest values and
meanings': the 'socialist-communist' conception of
time, which is more complex, distinguishes between the
immediate and remote future, whilst emphasizing that
the concrete present embraces not only the past but
also the latent tendencies of the future.

It may be noted that, apart from pointing out
Mannheim's argument that the 'perspective' is 'non-
illusory', little reference has been made to the
problem of the attainment of validity as a moralistic
enterprise, i.e. in the resolution of conflicting
perspectives. Rather, attention has been paid to what
Taylor refers to as the 'immeasurable worth' of
Mannheim's work i.e., the discovery of perspectival
knowledge; this conception, which need not necessarily
be equated with qualitative knowledge (or valuational
concepts) demands that all knowledge be considered as
perspectival.

The philosophical problems which follow from
the decision to take an existential position as an
observer of social life (particularly with respect
to the possibility of attaining objective knowledge
imputed to the 'intellectuals' in Mannheim's writings)
go beyond the scope of this thesis. Suffice to point
out that Mannheim attempts to fuse his thesis concern-
ing the situational character of assertions with the ideal of freeing thought from its anchorage in the social process; an enterprise which demonstrated his lingering sympathies with the Marxian recipe for the resolution of conflict and the construction of a utopia.
Notes to Chapter IV


2) Mannheim arrives at this conception of ideology through the introduction of three distinctions to the overall Marxian theory of ideology. The first is that between 'special' and 'general' conceptions of ideology. In political battles, the opposing parties have often tried to argue that their respective opponents deal in falsehoods, based on a deliberate attempt to deceive, whilst claiming that there did exist an interpretation which corresponded with the truth (namely their own position based on the 'reality' of the situation). Anyone who acts in this fashion, i.e. by arguing that there is an ideological 'mote' in his opponents' eye, whilst denying the ideological 'beam' in his own, as it were, is operating with the 'special' conception of ideology. However, one who realizes that all thinking, including his own, is an outgrowth of certain pre-occupations and volitions, has advanced to the 'general' conception of ideology and has moved from a political to a philosophical point of view. The second dichotomy Mannheim introduces is that between the 'particular' conception, and the 'total' conception of ideology. The 'particular' conception, when indulged in, views only certain of the opponent's assertions as ideological, e.g. statements in an election campaign which can be related in a psychoanalytical fashion to the life-situation of the proclaimer. The adher-
2, cont.) ents of a 'total' conception, in contrast, view the all-important and all-inclusive categories of thinking as totally conditioned by substructural forces of some kind. Finally, a distinction must be made between the 'evaluative' and the 'non-evaluative' conception of ideology. The evaluative concept is essentially an adjunct of a political venture, designed to 'deflate' or 'debunk' the opponent's arguments: the 'non-evaluative conception of ideology, on the other hand, is the modus operandi of the scholar, bent on the search for hidden determinants of ideologies for the purposes of understanding. Vide Mannheim, K., op. cit., pp. 55-94

3) ibid., p. 266

4) Mannheim does not meet the issue concerning types of knowledge specifically or at length in his writings. As Merton points out, 'knowledge' in Mannheim's work is regarded so broadly as to include 'every type of assertion and every mode of thought from folkloristic maxims to rigorous positive science' (Merton, R.K., Social Theory and Social Structure. Free Press Glencoe, 1961. p. 497): The use of the word 'political', in context, is considered appropriate in view of the particular investigations which are illustrated here and which deal almost wholly with eschatologies and political convictions.


8) ibid., pp. 267 ff.
9) ibid., pp. 267-8
13) ibid., p. 272
14) ibid., p. 271-2
15) ibid., pp. 33 ff.
16) ibid., p. 117
17) ibid., p. 269
18) ibid., p. 276
19) ibid., p. 157
20) ibid., pp. 4-5
21) ibid., pp. 84-6
24) ibid., p. 131
25) ibid., pp. 301-2
26) ibid., pp. 301-2
27) ibid., pp. 118-9
28) ibid., pp. 119-22
29) ibid., pp. 129-30
30) ibid., p. 142
31) ibid., pp. 211-63
32) ibid., p. 215
33) ibid., p. 220
34) ibid., p. 233
35) ibid., pp. 245-6
36) Taylor, S., Conceptions of Institutions and etc., op. cit., p. 84
CHAPTER V

Claude Lévi-Strauss

Of all the four thinkers dealt with in this thesis, it is Lévi-Strauss who sets himself the most ambitious task. His project is to uncover the laws which he believes govern the functioning of the human mind.

The ultimate root of the tree of social life, namely the brain itself, is not Lévi-Strauss's concern; that is the province of the psycho-chemist and the biologist. Nor is Lévi-Strauss interested in the individual as an object of study, preferring instead to deal with mind as represented in collective phenomena, i.e. the products of mind as exhibited in the symbolic constructs of differentiated societies, which he examines by way of a 'structuralist' method.

In his autobiographical work, Lévi-Strauss refers to Rousseau as 'our master and brother' and elsewhere Rousseau, together with Bergson, are credited for the success in reaching the psychological foundations of 'exotic institutions' by a process of internalization. The upshot of the Rousseauian
approach is the demonstration that every human mind is a 'locus of virtual experience where what goes on in the minds of men...can be investigated.' To Rousseau, the improvement in arts and science brings a corruption of minds rather than enlightenment; he implies that there is a moral, rational and universal basis to society which can be obscured by the abuses to which the social order gives rise. Lévi-Strauss, like Rousseau, is a romantic in characterizing the Neolithic Age as a time in which science did not sever Man from the physical universe. Apart from his sentimentalism, however, Lévi-Strauss values the pre-scientific epoch as a source of information from which to discover 'the unshakable basis' of human society. There is not a 'utopian state of Nature or a perfect society to be found' in any cultural matrix which he studies; but it is in the examination of societies which are analogically parallel to Neolithic societies (in terms of the development of scientific knowledge) that Lévi-Strauss considers it most likely to find the most valuable components for his theoretical scheme. Such a scheme in turn will help to disentangle 'what in the nature of Man is original and what is artificial.'
A fundamental feature of Lévi-Strauss's theory is the assumption that manifest actions and the beliefs which sustain them conceal a logical system which can be approximately ascertained through the development of abstract models. This axiom, Lévi-Strauss contends, is common in a number of fields of thought, including psychoanalysis, physical geography, political sociology and linguistics. It is clear that the epistemological basis of his models derive from a synthesis of the latter two fields.

The Marxian notion that the ideal foundation of social life, the material infrastructure, is obscured by the ideological superstructure, finds a mirror-image in Lévi-Strauss's conception of the dichotomy between 'conscious' and 'unconscious' models. The 'conscious models' which Lévi-Strauss finds operative in societies, function in the same way as the 'ideological forms' of Marx. Further, the Marxian idea that transformations take place over time as a result of the interweaving of praxis and theoria is taken up by Lévi-Strauss, albeit in a revised form:

"If we grant, following Marxian thought, that infrastructures and superstructures are made up of multiple levels and that there are
various types of transformations from one level to another, it becomes possible— in the final analysis, and on the condition that we disregard content— to characterize different types of societies in terms of the types of transformations which occur within them. These types of transformations amount to formulas (sic) showing the number, magnitude, direction and order of the convolutions that must be unraveled, so to speak, in order to uncover (logically, not normatively) an ideal homologous relationship between the different structural levels....by replacing a complex model with a simple model that has greater logical value, the anthropologist reveals the detours and manoeuvres, conscious and unconscious, that each society uses to resolve its inherent contradictions— or at any rate to conceal them."

The quotation above reveals the degree to which Lévi-Strauss takes an ambivalent position with respect to the function of ideas in social life. Like Durkheim, Lévi-Strauss seems to imply that the ideas produced in a society represent obstacles which can stand between the observer and the 'logic' of structural relations.

The same kind of argument, which suggests that a conscious model has another model which underlies it and yet which is not given to immediate observation nor through the theoria of the conscious model itself, is
found in the analytical method of structural linguistics. Linguistic behaviour is that behaviour par excellence which is governed by rules not 'known' to the actor; in fact, the structural rules of a language are not 'thought through' by the speaker of a language when he is engaged in communication. Structural linguists are in an enviable position, according to Lévi-Strauss. They have been able, by virtue of their methodology, to enter the world of exact science hitherto denied the social sciences. They have been able to reformulate their hypotheses into data which becomes manipulable to the same degree as the data dealt with by the mathematician. The structural method in linguistics, Lévi-Strauss believes, will play the same 'renovating role' with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics has played for the physical sciences.

The anthropologists, albeit with certain modifications, should adopt a method analogous in form to the method used in structural linguistics. What are the basic principles of this latter method? Lévi-Strauss pays tribute to the 'illustrious founder of this sub-discipline'. N. Troubetzkoy, and outlines the latter's programmatic statements,
"(Troubetzkoy)... reduced the structural method to four basic operations. First, structural linguistics shifts from the study of conscious linguistic phenomena to study their unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat terms as independent entities, taking instead as its basis of analysis the relations between terms; third, it introduces the concept of system - 'Modern phonemics does not merely proclaim that phonemes are always part of a system; it shows concrete phonemic systems and elucidates their structure': finally, structural linguistics aims at discovering general laws, either by induction or... by logical deduction, which would give them an absolute character'."

In the most general sense, Lévi-Strauss's structuralism could be characterized as a 'linguistics of culture'; and it is from linguistics that he derives the cardinal facets of his theoretical approach. Thus all cultural phenomena can be regarded as instances of communications phenomena, governed by rules which approximate the classificatory principle of binary opposition as developed in phonology. Structural linguistics incorporates the notion of exchange as a tenet of phonemic analysis; wedded to the exchange theory propounded by Mauss, whom Lévi-Strauss refers to as 'the Newton of Anthropology', the 'symbolic systems' of a society, e.g. language, kinship, econom-
ics, art etc., are interpreted as instances of exchange relationships or 'structural orders.'

Thus each society is seen as composed of a variety of more or less interdependent orders of relationships including, for example, 'women, goods and services and messages': such orders differ in the 'materials' which are interrelated and in the ways in which the same materials are conceived as interrelated. It is likely that in any one society, each order is a variant of another, the important variables being the kinds of materials involved and the dialectical rules governing the number of possible permutations or variations. The likelihood of uncovering 'orders' (such as models of experience in myth and kinship) is dependent upon the establishment of constituent elements (akin to phonemes in phonology). In replying to critics who charge him for attempting to explain the structure of a society in terms of the structure of one facet of it (e.g. French society in terms of the phonemic structures of the French language) Lévi-Strauss contends that he compares 'structures... where they may be found' including political ideology, mythology, art, etiquette and cuisine.
Lévi-Strauss's structural analysis of cuisine will be outlined here in order to demonstrate some of the points made above and also to illustrate yet another argument, i.e. that 'orders' can be compared cross-culturally as well as within the boundaries of a single society (and, in this case, one of the few examples which include facts from European societies).

The constituent elements of a national cuisine (which are called 'gustemes') may be organized according to certain structures of opposition and correlation. There are three oppositions to be found which distinguish English from French cuisine. These are the endogenous/exogenous opposition, or national versus exotic ingredients, the central/peripheral opposition, or staple food and its accompaniments: the marked/not marked opposition, or savoury versus bland food. Lévi-Strauss suggests that the upshot of this venture demonstrates that in English cuisine main meals are made from endogenous ingredients, which are bland, and the exotic accompaniments are peripheral to the main meal and strongly marked: conversely, in French cuisine the oppositions of national/exotic foods, staple/accompaniment are not in evidence and the savory/bland opposition can be combined in a meal as well as being peripheral
to it. Other examples of this analytical method in the examination of cuisine which Lévi-Strauss pursues, include the suggestion that 'French hors-d'oeuvres are built around the oppositions maximal transformation/minimal transformation of the type charcuterie/raw.'; this opposition does not recur in subsequent dishes, whereas in Chinese cuisine such oppositions are suitable for synchronic presentation, i.e. for all parts of the meal, which can be served all at one time.

Now although Lévi-Strauss points out that this is a rather 'flimsy' example of his method, he uses it to defend the criticism that his analytical procedures are applicable only to so-called primitive societies. He finds 'nothing absurd' in the idea that once having defined the 'differential structures' in the culinary phenomena of a society, it would be possible to seek the 'transformations' of these structures in another sphere of the cultural milieu, or even in different societies.

"...if we find these structures to be common to several spheres, we have the right to conclude that we have reached a significant knowledge (sic) of the unconscious attitudes of the society or societies under consideration."

It is in the field of kinship analysis and the cross-cultural interpretation of mythologies where
Lévi-Strauss's structural anthropology has aroused the most interest.

In his earliest work on the subject of kinship, Lévi-Strauss differentiated between the 'system of terminology' and the 'system of attitudes' of any kinship system and attempted to apply his structural method to the 'system of attitudes'; the problem of specifying what it is that Ego perceives in his kinship affiliations without resorting to terminological classifications is resolved by Lévi-Strauss in his postulate of 'genealogical connections'. Such connections allow for the incorporation of non-kin into the categorical model, which in turn may serve as the underlying model for the organization of social relations throughout the whole society.

Now Lévi-Strauss suggests that in order to make the categorical attitudes and genealogical connections explicit, it is necessary to reduce any kinship system to its 'constituent elements' and the constituent element which is isolated as paramount is the 'atom of kinship', i.e., a group consisting of a husband, a woman, a representative of the group which has given the woman to the man, and one offspring.
Lévi-Strauss argues,

"...if we divide all the possible behaviour between kin according to a simple dichotomy, positive and negative behaviour... it can be shown that a great many different combinations can be found and illustrated by specific ethnographic observations. When there is a positive relationship between husband and wife and a negative one between brother and sister, we note the presence of two correlative attitudes: positive between father and son, negative between maternal uncle and nephew..." (and vice versa) 23

It is in societies where the normative rules appear to be based on a system of 'cross-cousin marriage' where the elementary structures receive their 'fullest expression'. Without proceeding with an in-depth outline of Lévi-Strauss's arguments concerning cross-cousin marriage systems, some of the major factors are given below.

Lévi-Strauss isolates a certain type of exchange of women, defines the social situation under which these exchanges take place and suggests the structural results of particular rules of exchange. Marriage which is prescribed with a member of a class which includes MoBroDa results in a system where groups always stand in
the same relation to one another and exchanges are always made in the same direction. The matrilateral rule results in a system which Lévi-Strauss refers to as 'generalized exchange': with a patrilateral rule, however, the exchanges are reversed with each generation, a system Lévi-Strauss terms 'discontinuous exchange'. In cases of bilateral cross-cousin marriage, kin groups are paired and they 'swap' women. This system Lévi-Strauss refers to as 'restricted exchange'. Now Lévi-Strauss distinguishes further between bilateral and unilateral forms of cross-cousin marriage and associates the former with 'disharmonic' regimes and the latter with 'harmonic' ones. By 'harmonic' is meant a society in which the rule of residence is the same as the rule of filiation; in 'disharmonic' societies the rules are different. The marriage rule which can link more than two common residence-and-descent groups together in a 'harmonic' society is the unilateral rule, and Lévi-Strauss indicates that the matrilateral rule results in a 'better integration' than the patrilateral rule, which results in a 'closed system' in perpetual disequilibrium.

Now Needham argues that Lévi-Strauss is not seeking any 'final cause' theory in his discussion of marriage rules, neither is he suggesting that his
assessment of the relative 'solidarity' which follows from the adoption of one rule or the other is a normative judgement. He states,

"What Lévi-Strauss is saying, as I interpret his argument, is that some institutions work more effectively than others, and that those which are less effective are less likely to persist." - 26

The question which arises here, and which will be taken up in a more general fashion at the end of this chapter, is the degree to which the native's phenomenological interpretation of his situation becomes dissolved in a series of postulates which have a particularly Hegelian character. If the attitudinal categories are the basic components in the order of kinship systems, their dissolution must be accounted for by reference to some 'unconscious' formulation, which is 'expressed' in structural relations.

The problem devolves around the question of whether the semantic categories (in kinship systems) held by the native are equivalent to the semantic categories developed by the observer. If they are not, then whose 'intellect' is at work here? The 'conscious' intellect of Lévi-Strauss, or the 'unconscious'
intellect of the natives themselves?

Turning now to consider some of the conclusions Lévi-Strauss arrives at in his study of myths, we encounter the crux of the structuralist method. It is with the study of myths that Lévi-Strauss has become increasingly concerned in his latest works.

Lévi-Strauss argues that the meaning of a myth does not lie in the 'isolated elements' which enter into the composition of a myth, but in the way those elements are combined. Further, as language in myth exhibits certain properties (presumably in the same way that poetry is differentiated from discourse, although Lévi-Strauss does not make this comparison) it is possible to isolate these properties which can then be reclassified in terms of 'gross constituent units' or 'mythemes'; 'mythemes', in turn are related not only to subject matter, but to each other. Thus we arrive 'at the very core' of Lévi-Strauss's argument concerning the modal unit which must be isolated, i.e. 'bundles of' the relations between 'mythemes'.

Lévi-Strauss maintains that to generate this unit of analysis is, in effect, to resolve the most problematical feature of myths; their timeless and yet temporally appropriate character.
He argues,

"Relations pertaining to the same bundle may appear diachronically at remote intervals, but when we have succeeded in grouping them together we have reorganized our myth according to a time referent of a new nature,...namely a two-dimensional time referent which is simultaneously diachronic and synchronic, and which accordingly integrates the characteristics of langue on the one hand, and those of parole on the other." 29

The concrete example he gives to accompany this formal explanation is an analysis of the Oedipus myth. Lévi-Strauss isolates elements in the narrative which are related to each other (sexual relations, murder, the slaying of animals, and physical impediments) and reformulates these elements into four common features, i.e., the overrating of blood relations, the under-rating of blood relations, the denial of the autochthonous origin of man and difficulties in walking and standing, respectively. The correlations which are then found between these elements leads Lévi-Strauss to suggest that,

"...it (the myth) has to do with the inability, for a culture which holds the belief that mankind is autochthonous...to find a satisfactory transition between this theory and the knowledge that human beings are actually born from the union of
man and woman." 30

He arrives at this conclusion by means of the following logic: the animalistic features of deformed men imply their autochthonous origin; but other aspects of the myth have to do with beasts being slain; similarly, the intrafamilial murders imply underrated evaluations of blood relation; but other aspects of the myth have to do with the care and overconcern for kin. In Lévi-Strauss's terms,

"The inability to connect two kinds of relationships is overcome (or rather replaced) by the assertion that contradictory relationships are identical inasmuch as they are both self-contradictory in a similar way... by a correlation of this type, the overrating of blood relations is to the under-rating of blood relations as the attempt to escape autochthony is to the impossibility to succeed in it. Although experience contradicts theory, social life validates cosmology by its similarity of structure. Hence cosmology is true." 31

In his work The Savage Mind, Lévi-Strauss investigates systems of thought in so-called primitive societies, and develops his arguments concerning the nature of mythology in conjunction with associated hypotheses with respect to the categorizing and transformational features of mind.
Utilizing ethnographic material from a wide variety of cultures, Lévi-Strauss attempts to show that the naming of details of variation in the natural environment, among primitive people, goes far beyond any considerations of utility and can in toto be characterized as the 'science of the concrete'. This 'primitive science' functions in the same way as modern science (albeit with reservations concerning its ultimate utility) in organizing the totality of experience into a coherent whole. But unlike the contemporary engineer of the modern world, who is concerned principally with the proper way of resolving abstract problems i.e., within the rubric of consistency and congruity, the primitive is less of an 'ingénieur' than he is a 'bricoleur', who formulates structures of thought from disparate elements, in the same way that a handyman will make a 'thing' from whatever bits and pieces are to hand.

As Caws argues,

"One of the fundamental theses of La Pensée Sauvage is that the structure is all-important, the material largely irrelevant; it is as if the mind had to busy itself about something of sufficient complexity, but cared very little about the nature... of its components."
Another important theme, which is allied to the notions of transformation and categorization, is that mythic thought represents an attempt to fuse the 'natural' and the 'social' worlds together. Lévi-Strauss takes issue with the so-called 'Naturalist School' who made the mistake of assuming that natural phenomena are what myths seek to explain, when they are, in fact, the medium through which myths try to explain facts which are themselves not of a natural but of a logical order.

In his latest works, Lévi-Strauss couples the notion of isomorphic correspondence between nature and culture with his assumptions concerning the binary mode of classification and communication and also attempts to reduce 'patterns of the discursive accounts to simplified forms' borrowed freely from mathematics and geometry. The ultimate goal of mythology-analysis, according to Lévi-Strauss, is to develop even more sophistication in the methods employed,

"...only then will it be possible to subject myth to a genuine logico-mathematical analysis..."

At this point, a major criticism of Lévi-Strauss's enterprise becomes almost self-evident. For
in generating his own objects of study, Lévi-Strauss moves into a philosophical realm in which the analysis of the relations between man and man is subordinate to a logic of aesthetic perception, and Hegelian forms waltz together with statistical matrices and formulae from projective geometry. The circularity of explanation which employs abstracted processes of structural linguistics to explain myth-logic, and myth-logic to explain structural processes, suggests that Lévi-Strauss's philosophy can attain the degree of onanism which Marx ascribed to all purely philosophical explanations.

In this regard, much of the criticism which has been made of Freud's work can be applied to Lévi-Strauss. As Meehan argues, in criticizing certain of the weaknesses he finds in Freud's attempts at explanation,

"In an explanation the conceptual framework serves as a linking mechanism; events are related and explained through the conceptual framework...instead of relational propositions linking inputs and outputs, Freud produced propositions that link outputs to hypothetical constructs. The hypothetical constructs do not connect the phenomena, they account for them."

38
To characterize Lévi-Strauss's structuralism (which he refers to as a form of 'super-rationalism') as either idealism, formalism, or a kind of sophisticated phenomenology, is to run the risk of being classified by Lévi-Strauss as just another representative of the 'public mind' which is prone to confuse structuralism with other schools of thought.

Structuralism is not idealism, he states, insofar as it defends the cause of materialism. It is not formalism, insofar as 'form defines itself by opposition to a content which is exterior to it' and structure has no content, but 'is itself the content' which is 'apprehended in a logical organization conceived as a property of the real'. Lévi-Strauss has to reject phenomenology because 'it postulates a continuity between experience and reality' and that in order to reach 'reality' experience must be repudiated; experience may be re-integrated into an 'objective synthesis', a synthesis in which 'sentimentality plays no part.' To this, it must be noted that it is the ideas of objects perceived and their transformation which represent Lévi-Strauss's stock-in-trade; he admits himself that in order to explain the nature of
'sociological solutions', appeal must be made to 'form and not content'; and if structure is itself content, must it not retain aspects of native experience, or only the experience of the experience, i.e., Lévi-Strauss's experience? In which case is it not feasible to consider that Lévi-Strauss repudiates his own experience?

This foregoing criticism does not seek to belittle the value of Lévi-Strauss's method as a way of looking at facts in toto, for his work contains much which is of value, including many fruitful, if seminal, hypotheses concerning comparative phenomenology. But it is clear that much of his work presupposes a determinate structure to the cosmos which in fact is a product of his own subjective certainty, rather than a fact amenable to corroboration and proof, if indeed probative at all. When that faith itself is rendered to the level of hypothesis, his method assumes a more credible character. Even so, it remains to be seen what utility his ideas will have as conceptual tools in the hands of lesser mortals. As Geertz argues,

"Is Lévi-Strauss writing, as he seems to be claiming in the confident pages of La Pensée Sauvage, a prolegomena to all future anthropology? Or is he, like some uprooted neolithic intelligence cast away on a reservation, shuffling the debris of old traditions in a vain attempt to revivify a primitive faith whose moral
beauty is still apparent but from which both relevance and credibility have long since departed?
Notes to Chapter V

1) Lévi-Strauss, C., The Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology, trans. Weightman, D. and L., Harper and Row, New York, 1969. "...if the human mind appears to be determined even in the realm of mythology a fortiori it must also be determined in all its spheres of activity..." (p. 10). Vide also Leach, E., Claude Lévi-Strauss, Anthropologist and Philosopher, ex. New Left Review No. 34, Nov/Dec 1965. "...Lévi-Strauss is concerned with nothing less than the logical ordering of the human mind..." (p. 14) Notice also the a priori assumptions of Auguste Comte:- "...thus, if we want to conceive of the rights of the sociological spirit to supremacy, we have only to regard all our conceptions...as so many necessary results of a series of determinate phases,...taking place according to invariable laws, statical and dynamical, which rational observation is competent to disclose..." Comte, A., Positive Philosophy pp. 793-94 ex. Simpson, G., ed., Auguste Comte: Sire of Sociology; selections from his writings. Crowell and Co., New York, 1969. p. 134


3) Lévi-Strauss admits that Ricoeur "rightly describes...my work" in this respect. Ricoeur's relevant statements are: "A Kantian, rather than a Freudian unconscious, a combinative, categorizing unconscious...a categorizing system unconcerned with a thinking subject...homologous with nature; it may


10) vide Durkheim, E., *The Rules of Sociological Method*, trans Solovay, S.A., and Mueller, J.H., ed. Catlin, G.G., Free Press, New York, 1964: "...we tend to substitute ideas for (things).... ideas are created to put our actions in harmony with our environment. Ideas...are like a veil drawn between the thing and ourselves, concealing them from us the more successfully as we think them more transparent..." (pp. 14-15)

11) Lévi-Strauss, C., *Structural Anthropology*, op. cit., Chapter II

12) *ibid.*, p. 33

13) *ibid.*, p. 162
14) ibid., pp. 83 ff.
15) ibid., p. 83
16) ibid., "...thus anthropology considers the whole social fabric as a network of different types of orders... the order of orders is not a mere logical reformulation of phenomena which have been subjected to analysis. It is the most abstract expression of the interrelationships between the levels to which structural analysis can be applied, general enough to account for the fact that the models must sometimes be the same for societies which are historically and geographically disparate... by order of orders, then, I mean the formal properties of the whole made up of sub wholes, each of which corresponds to a given structural level." (pp. 312, 332-3)
17) ibid., p. 46, p. 86
18) ibid., p. 85
19) ibid., pp. 85-7
20) ibid., p. 87
22) Lévi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, op. cit., p. 72
23) ibid., p. 73
24) Lévi-Strauss's work on kinship as an application of his 'structural method' or, what is often referred to by others as 'alliance theory', has stimulated
24, cont.) a good deal of controversy. 


26) Needham, R., op. cit., p. 27


28) Lévi-Strauss, C., Structural Anthropology, op. cit., p. 211

29) ibid., p. 212
30) *ibid.*, p. 216

31) *ibid.*, p. 216


34) Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Savage Mind*, *op. cit.*, p. 95

35) *vide* Note 28 *supra*

36) Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Raw and the Cooked*. etc., *op. cit.*, p. 31

37) Marx, K., 'Philosophy is to real life what onanism is to real love.'


40) Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Raw and the Cooked*. etc., *op. cit.*, p. 27

41) *ibid.*, p. 27. It should be noted that Lévi-Strauss argues that his analysis of Caduveo art and Bororo kinship organization are 'efforts to interpret native superstructures based upon dialectical materialism.' *Structural Anthropology, op. cit.*, note No. 31 to Postscript to Chapter XV. pp. 343-4

42) Lévi-Strauss, C., *The Raw and the Cooked*. etc. *op. cit.*, p. 27


45) *Ibid.*, p. 63. It should be noted, however, that Lévi-Strauss's work can be considered as phenomenological, in method at least. His argument that "all facts should be carefully observed and described without allowing any theoretical preconceptions to decide whether some are more important than others.. .", (*Structural Anthropology, op. cit.*, p. 280) is, as Nodelman points out, the same procedure as adopted by Husserl, who advocates the requirement to 'put in brackets' whatever presuppositions may impede the observer's grasp of the essence of the phenomenon. "This *aksesis*...this Epoché as Husserl calls it, is fundamental - though emphatically not final - to the method of structural analysis practised by Lévi-Strauss and by the Strukturforschung school": Nodelman, S., Structural analysis in art and anthropology. *Yale French Studies*, Vols. 36-7, 1965-6, p. 92

CHAPTER VI
Recapitulation and Conclusions

The last four chapters have illustrated four relatively diverse ways of proceeding with the search for adequate explanations concerning the nature of man's existential relationship to man and nature, with an emphasis on the generic function of mind.

It is the purpose of this chapter to select a number of themes which have an interstitial connection in the work of these four thinkers and to articulate those themes in a generalized fashion. Particular emphasis will be placed on the correspondence between symbolic concepts and action and the 'practical character' of knowledge.

To begin with, it is necessary to elaborate on an argument made in the first chapter with regard to the question of the relevance of the situation. The philosophical position which underlies the four paradigms with respect to cognition (or the gaining and communication of knowledge) is that knowledge in general terms can only mean the 'mapping' of experienced reality by some actor.
Knowledge, when defined as the 'communicable mapping' of some feature of experienced reality, implies that knowledge is relational to that experience; the actor apprehends what he observes in terms of a set of rules that define what is a permissible map. These rules are essentially given by the symbolic structure of the social milieu in which the actor participates. There is no absolute access to what Kant would call a 'thing-in-itself': the character of thought is circumscribed by the actor's frame of reference, the linkage of symbolic systems to the actor's experience, and the designated means of communicating the meaning of his experience to others.

If knowledge as a pattern of communicable ideas is ipso facto a pattern of symbols, it is necessary to outline the general characteristics of the symbol per se and to focus attention on the principal phenomena chosen by the four thinkers to which they ascribe importance as symbolized objects in social life. It is argued that it is the constitution of symbolic constructs, the process whereby those symbolic constructs are maintained, and the manner in which they find their dissolution, which provides the key to the relation between thought and action, and between social
stasis and social change.

For present purposes, the principal characteristic feature of the symbol is that it is a device which enables those who employ it to transcend the immediate ('factual', 'empirical', or 'discursive') apprehension of objects and persons such that there is a relatively parsimonious and fixed conception of the intended object or person which is readily conveyed in communicative acts. It is the symbolic meaning which is accorded to persons, things and events, which allows for the construction of a socially shared world, consisting of known or knowable objects. The verification and validation of persons as personae (or role takers) and of social groups as legitimate entities, is attainable only through communicated symbols.

To Goffman, the communicative symbolic context of experience is crucial to the realization of what Goffman takes to be a focal symbolic phenomenon in itself, i.e., the self. Because the communicated symbol (the social self as an acting unit) is manipulable, there is created a characteristic distance between the directly intentional act and the subjective experience of acting. The individual, insofar as
he is always initiating action, takes into considerat-
on the attitudes of others to that action and then
revises or alters that action in the light of those
attitudes.

It thus appears that reflexivity is an important
link between the presentation of the symbolic social
self and the purely existential 'I', itself a symbolic
construction; the ultimate value of the social self is
of a practical nature, in that it provides for the
establishment of a working social consensus which is
the a priori requirement for the construction of the
subjective identity. The adjustment which takes place
in response to the anticipated reactions or ongoing
reactions of others is not passive, but is the outcome
of actively devised strategies employed to maintain
the interaction in a way which also reflects an
agreeable or worthwhile subjective self-image. It
transpires that the ultimate value of interaction in
Goffman's analysis is found in the degree to which it
affords the individual the chance to maintain a con-
tinuing existential self-symbol, and the dynamic of
social action is to be found in the reflexive, or
dialectical process which occurs as a result of the
search for constancy, predictability and legitimacy
in terms of the existential self symbol on the one
hand, and the need to adjust to the social demands of changing situations on the other. Phenomenological reflection on the part of the individual leads to the recognition of the central authority of the social as the basis of the interpretive order, and the symbolic constructs inherent in that order. In other words, the reflexive process itself involves the consideration of the value of the symbolic social selves employed by the individual in his interaction with others; further, it is suggested that the notion of self-value is also an abstract social construct, which, as a collective representation, varies between societies.

Once the argument is put forward that the existential self is a social invention (so that the symbolic concept of the personal identity assumes the status of a special kind of being), other observations follow.

First, it explains the problematic features of social demands for self-realization, self-improvement and personal authenticity which characterize the 'urban secular world'; secondly, and more positively, the symbolic self-identity concept has, like most symbolic concepts, a practical feature in providing the mechanism necessary to cope with variegated social
situations and the multiplicity of actions typical of complex societies. The notion of the self-identity concept has to be realized before the reflexive process can take place. If the ultimate goal of the individual 'I' is to seek concordance with any particular social self or 'Me', it is achieved only in the social milieu which is marked by compromise, or a neutralization of perspectives.

Turning now to the deployment and function of symbolic concepts in social experience as Schutz views them, it becomes clear that the propensity for typification on the part of social actors is a reflection of the demand for object constancy which enables the actor to perceive things in a stable framework and is an attribute of consciousness, or mind. In some respects, typification, when applied to human relationships, corresponds to a central concept in the work of Marx and Lukacs, the concept of reification. For Schutz, however, the tendency on the part of men to see human relationships in terms of things, the inclination to transmute the flowing into the static, the relative into the absolute, does not ultimately result in alienation; rather, typification is regarded as a method of conceiving the world in a way which facilitates the solution of problematic situations.
Schutz's thought concerning typification, it must be emphasized, includes the assertion that both objects and persons are represented or given as symbolic constructs to the individual, who himself is concerned with the more concrete properties of such constructs only when he is forced to deal with them as component parts of some problem situation.

The abstract pattern of typifications dissolves only when individuals are engaged in a joint task in which both parties to the action come to 'flesh out' as it were, their mutual knowledge of each other, in terms of biography and motives for actions performed. As Schutz argues,

"...my experience of the on-going phases of my own conscious life and my experience of the co-ordinated phases of your conscious life is unitary; experience in the We-relation is genuinely shared."

The implications of this arrangement, however, are that joint purpose precludes the possibility of sheer existential orientation to others, and the mutuality of shared experience predisposes a moral commitment which is characteristically less reflective than other relationships. The symbolic representations
of the We-relationships of various kinds, such as 'buddies, lovers, fellow-sufferers' and so on, present a paradox; for in order to convey the meaning of their relationship to others, all those engaged in such relationships must reflect upon them and articulate their meaning in such a way as to reduce their dimension to some typification. However, both the typifications which refer to the face-to-face relationships and the symbolic constructs which refer to the more enduring institutionalized relations (including the transcendental interpretations of the collectivity itself) are intrinsic to the conceptual system of a society, and as such, do not require explicit formulation and description in the daily exchanges of communication between the members of that society.

Further, once the conceptual system contains symbolic constructs with respect to institutionalized relations, and these relations are made manifest in the praxis of that society, such reflection as does take place with respect to their validity is inhibited by their sacred character.

"Since institutions express the conceptual system, and the latter is a society's final statement of the world and its meaning, it follows that basic institutions are held to be sacred. For...the sacred
is but the fundamental concepts of the conceptual system. Finality is always sacred." 4

Thus the symbolic constructs of what might be called social existententialism are rooted in the praxis of social acts. The dialectic between praxis and theoria of the social is analogically similar to the dialectic between the social self and the private self in Goffman's analysis of social interaction. The most problematic situation for the individual, it is noted, occurs when his acts are symbolically discontinuous with his private assessment of himself, (most significantly in institutions, whose administrative personnel have an a priori 'typification' of the character of the inmates).

Now Mannheim's concern with the collective symbolic representations of social life also reveal the congruence between thought and action; however, Mannheim's recourse to the study of Weltanschauungen of a collectivity of subjects results in an emphasis on the dialectical relationship between symbolic representations of one group's collective world of lived experience vis-a-vis those of another group.

"But for the country lad who goes to the city and adapts himself
gradually to city life, the rural mode of living and thinking ceases to be something to be taken for granted...he distinguishes now, perhaps quite unconsciously, between 'rural' and 'urban' modes of thought."

Predominantly, Mannheim's interest in the dynamic aspect of social experience is limited to those orientations which encompass collective or institutional concerns of a political nature. It becomes clear that Mannheim interprets the generation of symbolic concepts as a function of social purpose. When that purpose assumes a political character, either in a direction which would maintain the status quo or in a direction which would change it, the impetus is found in a source outside the group itself. It is at this point when the logic of the symbolic conceptual system of any particular collectivity is either recast into a form which will incorporate the challenging alternative logic presented to that collectivity (which implies a higher stage of abstraction), or will become what might be called 'fugitive'.

As Taylor points out,

"Where two conceptual systems are presented to the individual, it will be necessary for him to reconcile their 'disparities' by some kind of philosophic rationalization, or to reject one or the other. A third alternative is to see each as constituting its own order of truth. This position, since it violates the
notion of the unity of knowledge, tends to be unsatisfactory, unless some way is discovered of reconciling these order on some more ultimate metaphysical ground."

It would appear that what Mills refers to as 'the situated vocabulary of motives' which arises in the normal praxis of a particular group, must be articulated in terms of constituted principles peculiar to that group and expressed in abstract form, to be a viable force in any dialectical relationship with another, alternative set of conceptual or symbolic categories. The amalgamation takes place as a result of the mutual recognition of the value of some common purpose, i.e. both parties find something common to their experience, a property which is of instrumental value in the realization of certain ends.

The symbolic concepts of the (largely acephalous) groups studied by Lévi-Strauss are seen as instrumental in bringing meaning and hence cognitive consistency to the natural and social worlds, which are conceived as a dynamic field in isomorphic correspondence. The reflexivity which represents the focal point of the relationship between communication and social interaction (as well as the structure of symbolism itself,
in the work of Goffman, Schutz and Mannheim) does not generate the same kind of revisions in the symbolic conceptual schemes of such groups as it does for the individual in the 'urban secular world' or for the 'We'-group, or for the 'communal' group confronted with the encroachment of gesellschaftlichen forms of social organization.

Instead, the 'savage mind' appears to 'feed' on disjunctions which may confront it, incorporating the immediately given into a scheme of thought which does not threaten or invalidate the existing order of symbolic concepts, let alone 'neutralize' them, as Mannheim expresses it.

"The savage mind... builds mental structures which facilitate an understanding of the world in as much as they resemble it. In this sense savage thought can be defined as analogical thought." 9

The 'sub-universe of ideal relations' is a universe peopled by sensible or concrete entities, rather than sheer abstractions, and the constitution and re-constitution of symbolic concepts such as the 'I' and the 'we' is jeopardized through the commitment to the concrete.
"Certainly the properties to which the savage mind has access are not the same as those which have commanded the attention of scientists. The physical world is approached from opposite ends in the two cases: one is supremely concrete, the other supremely abstract; one proceeds from the angle of sensible qualities and the other from that of formal properties."

It was argued above than an understanding of the processes whereby symbolic constructs are constituted, maintained and dissolved, provides the key to the relation between thought and action and between social stasis and social change.

Despite the relatively diverse starting points for enquiry which are adopted by the four thinkers dealt with in this thesis, their analyses of the relationship between thought and action appears to converge along the following lines:—

In regard to the constitution of symbolic concepts, whether these be the ultimate value of the individual, the classification of the natural or social environment, or the legitimacy of informal or formal groups, the genesis of such constructs are always the product of collective experience and never a strictly
individual elaboration.

In regard to the maintenance of symbolic constructs, whether they are the 'team' or 'buddies', the 'community' or myths of human origin, the continued existence of the particular symbolic concept is guaranteed insofar as the correspondence between it and the actions which it reflects is perpetuated. The real is rational and the rational is real in as much as the corresponding action does not bring about ambiguity in the more general sphere of social experience.

In regard to the dissolution of symbolic constructs, it is largely presented as a function of disjunction between praxis and theoría, which in turn forces a reflexive consideration of the more fundamental, legitimating features of thought. The reflexivity is prompted by a judgement made on the basis of some segregated portion or position within the total conceptual scheme, or from an institutional base which is foreign to the original actor but which either convinces him of the advantages to his purpose of the need to revise his symbolic constructs, or, (as in the case of the inmate in the institution) a judgement made on his behalf. The dissolution (and subsequent reformulation)
of symbolic constructs requires ontological scepticism and the capacity to find value in formal abstractions of increased scale and scope.

It may be noted that resistance to the revision of symbolic constructs is a feature of human thought which is not monopolized by the members of the acephalous societies studied by Lévi-Strauss.

In conclusion, brief reference should be made to at least three apparently paradoxical features of thought and action.

The first of these is the tendency of human thought to conceive of both human and natural phenomena in typological terms, with the result that taxonomies of human beings develop which are characterized by a form of reification and hence partial apprehension. To anthropomorphize things and to reify (or zoomorphize) human beings is a tendency which may be a reflection of the requirement to dominate nature or simply an extension of the apprehension of species-types in the animal world; taken to extremes, this tendency precludes the possibility of understanding anything concerning the human personality or social experience. A similar assessment can be made of the attempt to grasp the
meaning of the social in strictly mechanistic or mathematical terms. The qualitative feature of social life may be intangible, but it represents the very stuff of human experience.

The second paradox arises from the decision to become, and to remain, an existential thinker. To reflect on the legitimacy of an act presupposes cognitive constructions of the self, of the group and of the encompassing universe. Such cognitive constructions arise in the social process; thus the social process itself must be the final arbiter of such acts as are performed by the existential thinker. The social requirement for existential thought would appear to be a form of social organization which would combine an optimum opportunity for free choice, self-expression, mutual accommodation and viable social coexistence. The possibility of attaining this amalgam and the kind of social system and interpretive order necessary to its realization are questions which are not within the scope of this thesis.

The third paradox involves the question of what might be called ontological uncertainty. Social processes and the symbolic constructs which support them represent a human appetite for logical consistency and systematized
predictability. But each thinker in this thesis has shown the dialectical feature of thought as being pervasive in perception, even if the resultant synthesis (as in the case of the societies studied by Lévi-Strauss) only serves to consolidate, or slightly amend, the status quo. In societies which have adopted more systematic and formal techniques of social organization and scientific experimentation, the development of perspectives is a result of deliberate reflection and a sceptical evaluation of the prevailing order of knowledge and social organization. Thus insofar as man is condemned to reflect in the modern world, his actions are merely tentative: he is forced to build his house of knowledge on sand and to live in rooms furnished with distorting mirrors.
Notes to Chapter VI


10) *ibid.*, p. 269
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