The Semiotic Self - Ideological aspects of communication and characterization in films.

Simon Fraser University

M.A. Communication

1979

Dr. Beverlee Cox

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHEQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilm cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

Nov 17/78

#608-2035 Barclay Street

Vancouver, B.C. V6G 1L6
NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION HAS BEEN MICROFILMED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RECEÜ
THE SEMIOTIC SELF:
IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATION
AND CHARACTERIZATION IN FOUR FILMS

by

Judy M. Miles
B.A. (Hons.), University of British Columbia, 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS (COMMUNICATION)
in the Department
of
Communication

© Judy M. Miles 1978
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
November 1978

All rights reserved. This thesis may not be reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL

Name: Judy Mary Miles

Degree: Master of Arts (Department of Communication)

Title of Thesis: The Semiotic Self: Ideological Aspects of Communication and Characterization in Films

Examining Committee:

Chairman: Dr. T.J. Mallinson

Dr. Beverlee Cox
Senior Supervisor

Fred J. Brown
Assistant Professor

John Newton
External Examiner
Assistant Professor
Department of Theatre
University of British Columbia

Date Approved: No: 17/78.
PARTIAL COPYRIGHT LICENSE

I hereby grant to Simon Fraser University the right to lend my thesis or dissertation (the title of which is shown below) to users of the Simon Fraser University Library, and to make partial or single copies only for such users or in response to a request from the library of any other university, or other educational institution, on its own behalf or for one of its users. I further agree that permission for multiple copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by me or the Dean of Graduate Studies. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Title of Thesis/Dissertation:
"The Semiotic Self-Ideological aspects of communication and characterization in films."

Author: 

(signature)
Ms. Judy M. Miles.

(name)

(date)
ABSTRACT

TITLE OF THESIS: THE SEMIOTIC SELF: IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF COMMUNICATION AND CHARACTERIZATION IN FOUR FILMS.

The purpose of the study was to investigate ideological aspects of film communication, especially in the area of characterization. The study was particularly concerned with the ideology of possessive individualism dominant in Western culture since the end of feudalism and limited to fictional feature films produced in advanced Western capitalist countries. The study was therefore a preliminary investigation aimed at determining whether there exists congruence between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of possessive individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying characterization in the fictional feature films of the countries concerned.

A theory of character is outlined from the perspective of communicational semiotics. The subject matter of semiotics is the exchange of any messages whatever and the systems of signs that underlie them. The study outlines a coherent yet comprehensive conceptual framework for semiotics. It is based on a model of the communicative process instead of the language model proposed as a conceptual framework for semiotics by structuralism. Films are conceptualized as texts, i.e. as sets of complexly intertwined messages. Characters are conceptualized as fictional selves and the nature of the self is seen as semiotic. The self is not seen
as something existing outside of, and prior to, the communicative process but as being formed within communicational exchanges.

The method used in the study is based on a model of the communicative process and linked to the key concepts of the theoretical framework. The method is constructed by making suitable modifications to the classic model of the functions of the text proposed by Roman Jakobson. Jakobson's functions are based on the following elements of the communicative process: addresser, code, message, referent, contact, addressee. The major modification is made by introducing another element, the context. This has the effect of making the method sensitive to the sociocultural context within which communicational exchanges occur. The method is termed contextual analysis.

Four films from different countries are selected for analysis: *The Merchant of Four Seasons* (Germany), *Lipstick* (U.S.A.), *Network* (U.S.A.), and *Weekend* (France). The most important finding is that the major hypothesis is confirmed in three of the four films. Congruence is found to exist between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of possessive individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying characterization in the films, with the exception being *Weekend*. This text is not constructed on individualistic premises and constitutes a radical departure from the ideology of possessive individualism. It also constitutes a radical departure from prevailing cinematic aesthetic codes of visual form and
dramatic form, i.e. its method of characterization. An explanation of the results of the study and implications for future research are discussed.

The study has contributed to textual analysis by proposing a theory and a method for the study of film communication, with particular applicability in the area of characterization.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. Beverlee Cox, my Senior Supervisor, for her unfailing support and encouragement. I also thank Professor Fred Brown for his assistance as a member of my committee. I must express my gratitude to Professor John Newton of the University of British Columbia who assisted me both as a committee member and by making the film Weekend available for research purposes. I sincerely appreciate the cooperation shown by Ms. Laurine Harrison, the Manager of Cinema Simon Fraser, who made it possible for me to conduct research on the films The Merchant of Four Seasons, Lipstick and Network. Finally, special gratitude is due to Ms. Joyce Whisman for her personal support. Without her constant assistance, demonstrated in ways far too numerous to mention, this work would not have been completed.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approval</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstract</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acknowledgements</td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology and Communication</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Semiotic Approach</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE: THE IDEOLOGY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Secret Self</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 3. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 4. THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE SEMIOTIC SELF</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Epistemological Dimension</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Contextual Model of Human Communication</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Semiotic Self in Context</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 5. THE METHOD: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Functions of the Text</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metacommunication: A Confusing Concept</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER 6. HYPOTHESES</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>RESEARCH DESIGN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Nonexperimental Design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Materials Studied</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>ANALYSIS OF SELECTED FILMS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Statement of Position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Merchant of Four Seasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekend and Lipstick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Weekend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lipstick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ideological Aspects of the Aesthetic Function of Two Texts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>DISCUSSION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPENDIX 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOOTNOTES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

IDEOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION

Towards a Definition of Ideology

So far as philosophy is concerned, the nineteenth century has been characterized by Aiken (1956) as the "Age of Ideology". The term "ideology" was first coined by Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) who used it to refer to the empirical analysis of the human mind mostly formulated by Condillac (1715-1780), who in turn had been influenced by John Locke (1632-1704). This origin of the term is reflected in one of the definitions of "ideology" given in Webster's Dictionary: "the science of ideas; the study of the origin and nature of ideas; especially the system of Condillac, which derived all ideas exclusively from sensation". This analysis was adopted by the leaders of the French Revolution and consequently the term has come to be associated with "politically inspired and officially sanctioned doctrines" (Aiken, 1956: 16).

There is yet another definition of the term by Webster's. This latter definition is twofold:

a) "a system of ideas concerning phenomena, especially those of social life";

b) "the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or an individual".
The first part of this definition implies "a theory of phenomena, especially those of social life and thus suggests objective propositions that describe something existing in the world" (Aiken, 1956:14). The second part of the definition implies a set of attitudes or a way of thinking and not a theory. It suggests "not propositions which are true or false but something more subjective which expresses the manner in which an individual or group views reality" (Aiken, 1956:14).

Underlying the second definition is the problem of the subject-object relation. Prior to the nineteenth century, it had been largely assumed there was a way of thinking about reality which did not distort or radically modify the thing known. The nature of objectivity was taken for granted. From the time of Kant (1742-1804), this assumption was challenged, and more and more philosophers came to espouse the view the subject played an active role in experience and constructed the standards of objectivity. This subjectivism was modified by the concept of the "historical consciousness", most strikingly formulated by Hegel (1770-1831). For a summary of how this concept affected views on human nature and reason, we can turn to Aiken (1956:16):

... it became fashionable to think not only of human nature generally, but also of reason itself, as something developing within history, and hence as something continually affected by the changing conditions of individual and social life. This implied, or seemed to imply, that reason is not a constant universal principle both of human understanding and of nature, but an historically evolving form of thought whose standards of
validity are subject to change in accordance with the changing demands and opportunities of human life.

Both the above definitions of the term "ideology" are to be found underlying the conception held by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. In their joint work, The German Ideology, (1845-46), the term refers to all "forms of consciousness" such as politics, metaphysics, ethics, religion. In their view, in a class society, these forms of consciousness will express the attitudes and commitments of a social class. In this way, the associations of the term with political and social interest are kept in the Marxian theory according to which forms of consciousness belong to the "superstructure" and this superstructure is determined by the economic "infrastructure" in the last instance. The term "ideology" is still associated by Marx and Engels with philosophy, especially with idealism and mechanistic materialism.

Because Marx and Engels are concerned with formulating a materialist conception of history (as distinct from an idealist one), and consciousness is seen by them as occurring within history, they are concerned with a conception of a science of ideas from the standpoint of their "new" materialism. In the Theses on Feuerbach (1845), Marx is concerned with counterposing his kind of materialism against all pre-Marxian materialism which is seem as "contemplative". The
major distinction between the two materialisms is the Marxian stress on the crucial role of material practice in human cognition. If the problem is formulated as the relation between the economic infrastructure of society and the superstructure of the various forms of consciousness, the answer given by Marx and Engels is as follows:

The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men - 'language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men at this stage still appear as the direct efflux of their material behaviour. The same applies to mental production as expressed in the language of politics laws, morality, religion, metaphysics, etc., of a people. Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious being and the being of men is their actual life-process.

... It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness.

... Consciousness is, therefore, from the very beginning a social product and remains so as long as men exist at all.

(Marx and Engels, 1845-46: 35-49)

In this view, a given mode of production of material life will entail certain social relations of production, that is, the social relations that people enter into in the course of producing their material life. These social relations must be reproduced constantly, every day, by
inculcating in the social individuals the necessary values and worldview congruent with the dominant relations of production. These dominant values and worldview can be termed an "ideology":

An ideology is a system (with its own logic and rigor) of representations (images, myths, ideas, or concepts as the case may be) with an historical existence and a role in the heart of a given society... As a system of representations, ideology is distinct from science in that its practical-social function is more important than its theoretical or knowledge function... An ideology is profoundly unconscious.

(Althusser, 1965)

This definition appears to conceive an ideology as an information system similar to that of "natural language". An ideology in this view consists of a set (repertoire) of socially coded signs and a set of rules for the selection and combination of these signs. But there are certain problems in this conception. For example, if ideology is conceived in this way, then a primary task would be to isolate these signs and "lexical" and "grammatical" rules; or the problem would then arise of the relation between an ideology and other information systems, such as the press, television or even religion. Would this be a relation of translation? Is it that in a specific information system such as the press we would find two sets of messages coexisting simultaneously, one set "innocent", the other "ideological"? Can there be in fact an "innocent" (i.e. non-ideological) human information system, when it can be
strongly argued that human nature is already ideological? For if ideology is granted to be intimately linked with productive forces (means of production and social relations of production), then we must consider the implications of accepting the view of Marx and Engels (1845-46: 31) on what constitutes human nature:

Men can be distinguished from animals by consciousness, by religion or anything else you like. They themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organization.

Many of these problems would perhaps disappear if an ideology were to be conceived as a logic, a way of posing problems and solving them, a mode of thought where thought is conceived as a unity of cognition, affect and conation in action. A specific ideology would be a given mode of thought and as such already inseparable from a specific set of productive forces. An ideology would include a set of habitual assumptions and premises implicit in the real observable relations between individuals and their environment (physical, biological and sociocultural). At this point, we may wish to recall the association between the terms "ideology" and "ideas" and to point out that from a communicational point of view ideas are empirically verifiable. This is because they are conceived as messages (Bateson, 1972: 459) and a message is a circulating pattern of variety (structured set of differences) imprinted on a matter-energy base.
Ideology, Communication and the Self.

The role of an ideology is to assure the production and reproduction of the social-psychological individuals of a given society so that each individual acquiesces, at both conscious and unconscious levels, both to the working conditions and patterns of consumption of a given mode of production and to all the related values and attitudes serving to perpetuate the dominant relations of production on which the society is based. The creation and survival of an individual as a human being is the supreme problem posed for that individual and sociocultural system into which he/she is born. A given mode of production and the ideology corresponding to it will set the stage (mise en scène) on which the creation and survival will take place, will determine the constraints within which the problem will be posed and resolved, will locate a "phasespace" within which the individual as a human being, as a "self" in relation to other selves, is free to move.

The basic assumption in the view outlined above is that at the social-psychological level individuals are produced, in the sense of being the result of a societal process. This view is in accord with a major theoretical assumption of communication theory as formulated by the Palo Alto School (Bateson, 1951: 179-181; Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967: 83-93): every communication has a content and a relationship aspect and at the relationship
level people offer each other definitions of their relationship and therefore, by implication, of themselves:

... the self concept is continually to be rebuilt if we are to exist as people and not as objects, and in the main the self concept is rebuilt in communicative activity.

(Cumming, 1960 as cited in Watzlawick et al 1967: 84)

The self concept offered to others for ratification can be accepted, rejected, or worst of all, disconfirmed. Disconfirmation in effect says "You do not exist".

The self-other relation (where "other" means not inanimate "objective" reality or external things but other human beings) is crucial to the creation and survival of the individual as a human being, as a "self". This "self" is the product of the interaction of self and other and can only arise out of a prior unity with its environment, objects and other selves. This view has been summed up by Marx (1845) in the Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach:

But the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.

**Ideological Functions of the Mass Media**

If the role of an ideology is to ensure the creation and maintenance of "selves" that will perpetuate the dominant relations of production in a given society, we may
ask by what means this function of ideology is accomplished. With reference to capitalist society, an answer to this question has been advanced by Althusser (1969). He contended that there are certain state apparatuses (distinct and specialized institutions) which function primarily by ideology and secondarily by repression. Such institutions he termed "Ideological State Apparatuses". They are to be distinguished from other institutions (e.g. army, police, government) which function primarily by repression and secondarily by ideology. The Ideological State Apparatuses are exemplified by such institutions as the family, schools, press, radio, television, the cinema, and literature.

A similar viewpoint has been set forth by Smythe (1974). According to this researcher, (1974: 1), the various communicational institutions in the context of monopoly capitalism (e.g. book industry, recording industry, telecommunications, press, radio-TV, cinema, computers, teaching machines and others) have as their specialized function the role of legitimizing and directing the course of the societal system in which they are embedded, thereby propagating the ideological theory and practice of the entire system. Such institutions are termed by Smythe (1974: 1) the "agenda setters" of the system. In his primarily economic and political analysis, it was asserted by Smythe (1974: 3) "the unique function of the mass media of communication stand first among equals amidst other institutions in the business of reproducing a particular
kind of human nature". The prime item on the agenda of such institutions in the context of monopoly capitalism is to produce people who will be motivated to buy "new" consumer goods and services, as well as being compliant in paying the taxes needed to support the military sector of the economy. A second item on the agenda set by the capitalist mass media is to act as an "hegemonic filter" vis-à-vis the conscious and unconscious behaviour of the population. For example, the media pervasively reinforce certain underlying premises basic to the ideology of the capitalist system: "Human nature is necessarily selfish and possessive. It has always been this way: You can't change human nature. Therefore, look out for number one; let the other fellow take care of himself. ... Private property is virtually sacred; public planning which would interfere with it is inherently bad." (Smythe, 1974: 7).

In arguing that the analysis of fictional films seemed to be especially suited to the study of modern societies, Weakland (1966; 1971a; 1971b) has repeatedly emphasized that fictional films because they are a mass medium aimed at an extremely wide audience, are most likely to deal with basic cultural themes in a relatively simple manner. Since such films are group products, they are likely to reflect the most general and common background of their makers. It seems reasonable to assume that fictional feature films provide basic commonly shared interpretations of their
societal context and are greatly consonant with the basic orientations of the majority of their audience in crucial aspects:

... since films ordinarily are projective depictions of social concerns and situations from within (unless the subject is foreign to the makers), rather than descriptive accounts from without, (that) they also provide a basis for studies that go beyond their own intended or conscious interpretations. That is, the content and form of films necessarily reflect unconscious as well as conscious cultural premises and preoccupations of their makers...

(Weakland, 1971a: 240)

Film materials can therefore be examined for patterns at this deeper level.

Given that fictional feature films perform ideological functions, the problem arises of specifying how these films operate ideologically i.e. in what way do they accomplish their ideological functions? It has been argued by Wood (1972: 3) that "social and political systems tend to institutionalize certain conceptions of man by favouring, rewarding, or placing a premium on certain exemplary types". Congruent with this larger view is the position that through the mass media "mass civilization increasingly proposes undercoded texts, freely interpretable patterns of public behaviour, permissive models" (Eco, 1976: 139). The role of villains would be to demarcate prohibited behaviour. If this view is accepted, then the problem of characterization in films
assumes a primary significance as a locus of investigation since it will be mainly here that "exemplary types" or "role models" will be found. The purpose of this study is to investigate ideological aspects of characterization in fictional feature films produced in advanced Western capitalist countries.

THE SEMIOTIC APPROACH

The Semiotic Perspective

The approach taken in this study to the problem under investigation is an approach from the theoretical perspective of semiotics, which can be roughly defined as the study of signs:

Semiotics is concerned with everything that can be taken as a sign. A sign is everything which can be taken as significantly substituting for something else. This something else does not necessarily have to exist or to actually be somewhere at the moment in which a sign stands in for it.

(Eco, 1976: 7)

In Western thought, the theory of the sign was first formulated by the Stoics and "semiotics" is etymologically descended from the Greek word for sign, "semeion". More or less contemporaneously, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) and Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) posited a science of semiotics. For Peirce, who was primarily a philosopher, semiotics was an independent discipline but synonymous with logic (1897, rep. 1955: 98). De Saussure was primarily a
linguist and revolutionized linguistics. He postulated a science of semiology of which linguistics would be a part:

A science that studies the life of signs within society is conceivable; it would be a part of social psychology and consequently of general psychology; I shall call it semiology (from Greek semeion 'sign'). Semiology would show what constitutes signs, what laws govern them. ... Linguistics is only a part of the general science of semiology; the laws discovered by semiology will be applicable to linguistics ...

(Saussure, 1907-1911, rep. 1915: 16)

For Saussure however the linguistic sign is not to be just a part of semiology, it is to be the master pattern for all branches of semiology (Saussure, 1907-1911, rep. 1915: 68).

The link between semiotics and the study of communication has been stated by one of the researchers in the field (Sebeok, 1974: 211-212) as lying in the placement of semiotics within the communication disciplines because "The subject matter of semiotics - ultimately a mode of extending our perception of the world - is the exchange of any messages whatever and of the systems of signs which underlie them". A central concept in the semiotic approach to the study of communication is the concept of text. Because of the complexity of the communication process, what is commonly called "a message" is in reality a set of intertwined messages. As has been pointed out by Birdwhistell (1971: 38), it is only recently that we have been forced to re-evaluate a monochannel
theory of communication, and to come to the theoretical position which stresses the multichannel structure of human communication. This conception of the communicative situation has been described as follows:

Communication is seen as a complex system made up of interdependent codes that can be transmitted along all sensorily based channels that can be influenced. It is seen as a continuous process made up of overlapping discontinuous segments which, in multisensory arrangement, maintain the interactive process. Spoken language is regarded as essential to human society as we know it, but is not, in a priori fashion, assigned priority of function in any particular interactive situation. The communicative situation is seen as one in which there is not a message in transmission but several messages, of different shapes, composition, and durations. On the basis of data derived from linguistic and kinesic (the study of communicative body motion) analysis, this theory extrapolates to the assumption that not only is speech behaviour organized and codified, but so also is the information carried over an indeterminate number of other channels. Furthermore, not only is spoken language not treated as the communicative system employed by man, but it is regarded as infracommmunicational. That is, language does not stand alone but is interdependently meshed with structured infracommmunicational behaviour from other channels in the communicative situation.

(Birdwhistell, 1971: 38-39)

The concept of text as representing the result of the integrated coexistence of several intertwined codes is based on a recognition of the complexity of the communication process.

Within a semiotic perspective, fictional feature films are treated as texts\(^1\) and it is a basic premise of this
study that such texts constitute a paradigm of human communication. Through fictional feature films, the filmmakers communicate to the viewing audience what can be essentially considered as a series of communicational exchanges between imaginary persons or "fictional selves". This conception of characterization as the structure and presentation of a fictional self is by no means new, but is one commonly accepted by practitioners of screenwriting. For example, a popular manual on screenwriting advises budding screenwriters:

Your characters must not be puppets patently manufactured by another. They must be credible human beings with all the physical and emotional wrinkles, warts, and freckles that disfigure most people - so that what they do is the result not of the author's expert plot manipulation, but of an inherent drive within the "real person" character.

(Herman, 1963: 27 Emphasis added)

And again

... there must be reasoning and emotion and often submerged memories behind your characters' actions.

(Herman, 1963: 26)

It is an initial premise of this investigation into the ideological aspects of characterization in fictional feature films that characterization can be conceptualized as the structure and presentation of fictional selves according to certain underlying premises of an ideological nature. It is not being asserted this ideological structuring
of characters by filmmakers is necessarily the result of conscious intention.

Toward a Semiotics of Character

When one considers the recent upsurge of interest in semiotics and the study of ideology, it is striking how little has been done on the semiotic study of character in general, and especially on the semiotic study of ideological aspects of character, particularly in films. For example, though Vladimir Propp's *Morphology of the Folktale* (1928) deals extensively with character it is essentially an analysis of the formal organization of folkloristic texts. The analysis describes the structure of a text by following the temporal order of the linear sequence of the text as reported by an informant. Such an analysis is concerned solely with the internal structure of the text and ignores its societal context, and so never considers the problem of ideology in relation to the text. Semiotic analyses of the cinema such as those carried out by Metz (1967; 1974) have ignored the problem of characterization completely and have not related the text to its societal context. In response to criticisms pointing out these deficiencies of his work, Metz (1975) attempted to strike out in the direction of psychoanalytic study of film, drawing upon the work of Jacques Lacan. Lacan is a French psychoanalyst who returned to the texts of Freud to discover in them a theory of language and communication and to demonstrate Freud's theories can be translated into the
categories and terminology of modern structural linguistics

At present, most work done on the study of ideology and character in film (as exemplified in the pages of Screen), a prominent British journal devoted to film and television criticism) is done in a piecemeal fashion as part of a larger analysis of a text and partly draws on this psychoanalytic framework. There are also found in the pages of Screen, as well as Film Quarterly and Jump Cut (two North American journals), some attempts to study the ideological aspects of characters from a feminist viewpoint, utilizing insights and concepts taken from semiotics and psychoanalysis.

The reason research in this area has been severely hampered is due to the conceptual framework of the semiotics which has so far prevailed in semiotic studies of films. This conceptual framework is structuralism. The starting point of structuralism is language and structuralism takes from linguistics a set of concepts which it seeks to extend to other areas of its interest such as literary texts, and other texts that are non-literary (television, films, still photographs, paintings, even fashion and the culinary arts). The linguistics with which structuralism is concerned is structural linguistics which would appear to encompass most of modern theoretical linguistics. The inspirational father of structural linguistics is Ferdinand de Saussure whom we have already mentioned as postulating a science of semiotics. The general assumption of structuralism is the
linguistic model of language is the master model for the systematic investigation of other sign-systems. The structuralist conception of semiotics and of the relation between structuralism and semiotics has been concisely put by Pettit (1977: 33) in his brilliant dissection of structuralism:

Semiology is the general science which would come of treating all sign systems in the way linguistics treats of language. Structuralism is the movement of thought which presses and formulates the case for semiology usually at a conceptual level but also in attempts at empirical analysis. Roughly speaking, the terms are interchangeable.

(Emphasis added)

The preferred use of linguistic analytic devices has been criticized on various grounds. These criticisms have been summarized by Merrell (1976: 339-340). Two of these criticisms are especially relevant to this study: (1) the approach tends to abstract in extreme form the characters and events of the text; (2) some structural methods of analyses fail to develop a satisfactory model with which to analyse the relation between reader and text. The important theoretical question concerns whether structuralism (as Pettit appears to think) offers the only conceptual framework for a science of signs, a semiotics. Once it is granted there could exist a possible alternative framework for semiotics, it begins to become apparent that semiotics has been the prisoner of structuralism.
Indeed, as has been noted by Sebeok (1974: 212, note 3) there exist two tendencies in contemporary semiotic researches. The tendency distinct from the structuralist approach starts from the communication situation. Such Marxist philosophers as Adam Schaff (1962: 155-162) take the communication process as the starting point in the analysis of the sign, even when dealing with the linguistic sign. Another communication theorist, Wilden (1972) has drawn on a diverse number of sources, such as general systems theory, cybernetics, psycho-analysis of the Lacanian type, the communication theory formulated by the theorists of the Palo Alto school i.e. Bateson (1972) and Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967) as well as many other disciplines, in his attempt to formulate a new conceptual framework for semiotics.

The communicational approach to semiotics is slowly gaining some adherents. A tentative model of a semiotics of character in the literary narrative text has been put forward by Merrell (1976: 339-360). This model is based on paradoxical communication and Merrell shows he is conversant with both the Palo Alto school and Wilden (1972). Concepts drawn from the work of Wilden (1972) and Bateson (1972) have been utilized by Nichols (1975) in a short filmic analysis. Finally, work has been done on ideological aspects of film characterization by a member of the Palo Alto school, Weakland (1966; 1971a; 1972; 1975). All of Weakland's work is concerned with the study of Chinese films, primarily films
from the People's Republic of China but also from Hong Kong and Taiwan.

A large gap consequently exists in the application of a communicational semiotic approach to the study of the ideological aspects of films, and especially to the study of character. The nature of this gap is twofold: there does not exist a coherent yet fairly comprehensive model of character; secondly, there does not exist work analogous to that conducted by Weakland in the area of the ideological aspects of character with regard to fictional feature films drawn from Western advanced capitalist countries. This study represents a tentative step toward closing this gap.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

THE IDEOLOGY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM

INTRODUCTION

Broadly speaking, this study is concerned with the relationship between ideology and characterization in the movies from a communicational perspective. Within this wide area, we are specifically concerned with narrowing the topic to consider only movies made in advanced Western capitalist countries and consequently, we are restricted to the ideology of individualism prevailing in Western culture since the end of feudalism.¹

It is important to make it clear the study is not concerned with asserting or investigating a causal relationship between the ideology of individualism and the structuring and presentation of character in the movies. In other words, whether the ideology of individualism has caused the nature of characterization to be what it is in the movies of Western advanced capitalist countries is simply outside the bounds of this study. It ought to be obvious that before a theory of causal explanation between the ideology and characterization can be reasonably supported, it ought to be demonstrated that indeed there does exist some kind of congruence between the ideology of individualism and characterization in relevant films. The focus of this study is therefore on providing a preliminary empirical investigation aimed at finding out whether there does exist
congruence between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic characterization.

This chapter is therefore aimed at accomplishing the following tasks:

a) the construction of a schematic portrait of the psychological type implicit in the ideology of individualism;

b) the short description of the epistemology (i.e. the theory of the relation between the process of knowing, knowers and the known) that is supportive of this kind of psychology.

A Definition of Individualism

We think of ourselves as people with frontiers, our personalities divided from each other as our bodies visibly are. Whatever ties of love or loyalty may bind us to other people, we are aware that there is an inner being of our own; that we are individuals. To the Western reader it may come as a surprise that there is anything unusual in this experience. ... Nevertheless, it is true that Western culture, and the Western type of education, has developed this sense of individuality to an extent exceptional among the civilizations of the world. ... The student of the Greek Fathers or of Hellenistic philosophy is likely to be made painfully aware of the difference between their starting point and ours. Our difficulty in understanding them is largely due to the fact that they had no equivalent to our concept "person", while their vocabulary was rich in words which express community of being ... The Asiatic and Eastern tradition of thought has set much less store by the individual than the West has done. ... Western individualism is therefore far from expressing the common experience of humanity. Taking a world view, one might almost regard it as an eccentricity among cultures.

(Morris, 1972: 1-2. Emphasis added)
The ideological logic that has prevailed in Western culture since the end of feudalism can be summed up in two words "metaphysical individualism" (the term is used by Wood, 1972). What exactly is "individualism"? According to Furst (1969: 55) the term is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as "tendency to regard oneself as the paramount interest in one's life; egoism; social doctrine which emphasizes the rights of individuals rather than those of society and of the State as a whole". The English term is derived from the French word "individualisme" which, according to Moulin (1955: 181) is first definitely found in French usage in Auguste Comte's Le Producteur of 1825. However, it seems the word may have been used by Saint Simon before 1820. The word crossed over into English through Henry Reeve's 1840 translation of Alexis de Tocqueville's Democracy in America. As late as 1835, de Tocqueville regarded it as a "novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth". Again according to Moulin (1955: 183), at first the word was used in a pejorative sense but towards the end of the second half of the nineteenth century in France the word "entered into current political usage - incidentally with an increasingly favourable connotation".

The fact that the word "individualism" had to be imported into English points to a certain problem, namely, what are we to make of the absence of a corresponding English term? This absence indicated to Moulin (1955: 184) that "the concept of individualism, in the very special sense in which it existed
in France from 1820 to 1850, was unfamiliar to English political thought and feeling". According to Lukes (1973: 32-39), in the latter half of the nineteenth century in England the term was used primarily in reference to English liberalism in contrast with "socialism", "communism", and, especially, "collectivism". The most influential usage equated individualism with Benthamism and utilitarian liberalism. Thus the term came to be widely used to mean "the absence or minimum of state intervention in the economic and other spheres". With regard to the special French usage, we can turn to Moulin (1955: 185):

For Continentals, trained in the school of pure rationalism, the word "individualisme" means an inexhaustible determination, unbridled and unlimited, to 'break away' and 'excel' in the Nietzschean sense ... the rise to fame of certain exceptional individuals ...

It is no doubt this distinction between the English and Continental usages, pointing to perhaps underlying differences in epistemological premises, that stimulated Hayek (1945, rep. 1948: 1-32) to distinguish between "true individualism" and "false individualism". The "true individualism" for Hayek is that of the British empiricists, such as John Locke, Bernard Mandeville and David Hume; the "false individualism" is that of the French and other Continental writers and is dominated by Cartesian rationalism. The major representatives of this school are the Encyclopedists, Rousseau and the Physiocrats. To the degree that the Benthamites and philosophical radicals of the nineteenth century came under the influence of the Continental
school, they were influenced by "false individualism", in Hayek's view.

Yet Durkheim, coming from the tradition scorned by Hayek, was himself anxious to distinguish between two kinds of individualism and to denounce the one he did not see himself as supporting. This was none other than "the narrow utilitarianism and utilitarian egoism of Spencer and the economists", "that narrow commercialism which reduces society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and exchange", (Durkheim, 1898, rep. 1969: 20). What is advocated by Durkheim is "the individualism of Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualistes, that which the Declaration of the Rights of Man sought more or less successfully to translate into formulae".

Both of the traditions described above met and mingled in the figure of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), whose essay On Liberty (1859) shows clearly the influence of the German Romanticism in its cult of self-development and the exceptional personality. In this regard, Rousseau is a precursor with his announcement in the Confessions:

I am made unlike anyone I have ever seen; I will even dare to believe I am like no one in the whole world. If I am no better, at least I am different.

(as cited in Furst, 1969: 57)

This cult of the exceptional individual advocated by the Romantics therefore was not original with them. It was their
innovation to turn "individualism into a whole Weltanschauung":

The basic - and perhaps only - unifying factor underlying all these disparate ideas is just their very individuality, by which is meant not so much their idiosyncrasy as their essential subjectivity. It is a fundamental trait of the Romantic that he invariably apprehends the outer world through the mirror of his ego as against the objective approach of the Realist. What matters to the Romantic is not what is but how it seems to him. ... The ego thus forms the centre and pivot of the Romantic's universe ...

Through this choice of the inner being as the point of departure Romanticism becomes a form of egoism in the most literal sense of the word: self-centredness.

(Furst, 1969: 58)

Despite Hayek's and Durkheim's disclaimers to the contrary, the fact of the matter is these two traditions of rationalist and empiricist individualism, while seemingly opposed to each other, in fact depend at a deeper level on one basic common assumption: the dichotomy of subject and object and what can be called a fundamental subjectivism.

For example, Locke's empiricist theory of knowledge and of the self is essentially subjectivist. Here then was the latent germ in British empiricism which could enable Mill to wholeheartedly embrace the Continental Romanticism.

THE SECRET SELF

The Epistemological Dimension

Before we discuss the psychological theory congruent with the ideology of individualism, it will be useful to consider the
epistemological theory supportive of this ideology. This epistemological theory is termed epistemological individualism:

... a philosophical doctrine about the nature of knowledge which asserts that the source of knowledge lies within the individual. ... the paradigm epistemological individualist is perhaps the empiricist, who holds that (individual) experience is the source of knowledge, that all knowledge arises within the circle of the individual mind and the sensations it receives.


The empiricist theory of knowledge is based on a "fundamental subjectivism". This "fundamental subjectivism" was earlier asserted to lie at the base of both the "true individualism" and the "false individualism" of Hayek (1945, rep. 1948: 1-32). In this doctrine of epistemological individualism we find an important link between Locke and Descartes. These two thinkers have frequently been antithetically opposed to each other. Nevertheless, in certain crucial ways, Locke is dependent on the Frenchman.

What is the link between Descartes and epistemological individualism? For a brief summary, we turn to Lukes (1973: 107):

Descartes' thought began from this position, from the individual's certainty of his own existence - cogito ergo sum - from which he derived knowledge of the external world and the past via the transcendental route of assuming God's veracity.

What is the link between Locke and Descartes? For that we
turn to a classic work on the theory of knowledge expounded by Locke and Locke's doctrine set in its historical context. The work in question is by Gibson who pointed out that the general point of view of Locke's Essay on Human Understanding and many of its special doctrines have their historical basis in the Cartesian treatment of knowledge and self-consciousness. (Gibson, 1917: 207).

Like Descartes, Locke finds in the conscious subject immediate certainty of existence. Not only this, but, as Gibson has pointed out (Gibson, 1917: 223), Locke accepts the priority which Descartes had assigned to our knowledge of our own existence compared with that of the objective universe. For whereas we know our own existence by intuition, we only know other things by sensation, and for Locke intuition is the highest form of knowledge:

intuitive knowledge (sic) ... is certain, beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any; this being the highest of all human certainty.

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 407. Bk. 4, Chap. 17, Art. 14)

So far we have pointed out the similarities between Descartes and Locke. But we do not wish to give the impression we are not conscious of the differences. It is in fact precisely in this priority assigned to the conscious subject that, according to Gibson (1917: 223), a critical difference is to be found between the two thinkers. If the priority is found in Descartes, it is "little more than an incidental device of
method". Locke however treats the point of view of the conscious subject differently and in this consists one of the ways in which the Essay is original.

It remains true, nevertheless, that in the Essay the attempt was made for the first time to work out a theory of knowledge from the standpoint of conscious experience. Instead of adopting the point of view of the conscious subject as a temporary expedient ... Locke sought to make it the permanent centre from which his survey of the whole contents of knowledge should be taken.

(Gibson, 1917: 223)

Strangely enough, though it is on the ground of the subject in experience that empiricist theory is based, as we have just seen, yet this theory, as exemplified by someone like John Locke, also conceives of the role of the subject as passive and receptive, and of objects in experience as given, not in any way constituted. The only activity of the mind consists in combining the simple ideas given to it. This is an active passivity, (see Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: Bk. 2, Chap. 1, Art. 25). In this theory, humanity was conceived as an effect, an object of external forces, a passive receptacle:

... external and internal sensation are the only passages I can find of knowledge to the understanding. These alone, as far as I can discover, are the windows by which light is let into this dark room (sic). For, methinks, the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little openings left, to let in external visible resemblances, or ideas of things without ...

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: Bk. 2, Chap. 11, Art. 17)
There is a basic inconsistency at the root of empiricist theory. Notwithstanding the almost derogatory conception of the human mind (that "dark room", "closet shut from light"), nevertheless it is precisely on this ground the empiricist theory of knowledge is based.

The theoretical position of epistemological individualism is also based on a certain rigid dichotomy between subject and object. This dichotomy has its roots in the specifically modern Western form of the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. It is with Galileo the modern doctrine appears first in a pronounced form. A distinction is made between what "in the world is absolute, objective, immutable, and mathematical; and that which is relative, subjective, fluctuating, and sensible" (Burtt, 1932: 73). Galileo makes a further supremely important assertion: the primary qualities are alone real in nature, the secondary qualities are essentially subjective. In the ancient Greek doctrine, both primary and subjective qualities were objective and there was no dependence on the human mind.

The step taken by Galileo in thus transforming the distinction between primary and secondary so that it is suitable for the mathematical quantitative view of nature, and thus for the new science, is nevertheless "a fundamental step toward that banishing of man from the great world of nature and his treatment as an effect of what happens in the latter" (Burtt, 1932: 78. Emphasis added). Humanity is not really suited to that kind of
mathematical study and what is precisely most real for humanity (our loves, our hates, our griefs) does not easily lend itself to quantitative measurement. The implication of the modern distinction is the real world must be outside of humanity and we must be torn from nature. Since the external world is more real, it is more valuable. Galileo's distinction sets the stage for the Cartesian dualism: here, the primary real, that of mathematics; there, the secondary, that of humanity. The new distinction is worked out by other thinkers. In 1666, it is found in a work published by Robert Boyle, who belonged to the same scientific circles at Oxford as John Locke. Locke's version of the distinction is found primarily in Book II Chapter 8 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. For Locke too only the primary qualities are real (Book 2, Chap 8, Art. 17).

Behind Locke's version of the theory of primary and secondary qualities lay a certain metaphysical assumption, as has been pointed out by Gibson (1917: 101). This assumption was that real qualities had to belong to a substance "in itself", separate from any relation in which the substance stands to anything else (including our sense organs and the perceptions we get through these organs); since these qualities, to be real, had to be either constitutive of the essence of the substance or flowing from the essence, they thus had to belong to the substance in all times and all conditions. Any aspect of a thing which belonged to it at one time but not another could not therefore belong to the substance "in itself". What is critical
about this theory of substance is an epistemology based on this theory is basically a theory of things, of entities taken in isolation, not of relations and interconnections; a theory of stasis, unable to deal with change and history.  

The essential core of this theory of knowledge has been characterized as follows:

... they (i.e. philosophers, J.M.) view knowledge as a capacity, attribute, possession or other mysterious inner quality of a "knower"; as residing in or at a "body"; they view the body as cut off from the rest of the universe by a "skin"; "Inner" and "outer" are ever present distinctions, ... in conventional speech-forms and in the traditional terminology of psychology. What holds "inner" and "outer" apart? ... Bluntly, the separator is skin ... Trace the varieties of description historically, beginning with the early days of "soul". Apart from minor flights of fancy, "soul" reports itself as inhabitant of body, so long as mortal coil endures. Body has skin for boundary, and skin thus fences off the mortal residence. ... The later "actors" of psychology are all modelled on soul ... Psyches, minds, personalities, all belong in this class; skin is what holds them "in".

(Bentley, 1941: 1-3)

One further point remains to be made regarding the mind's knowledge of itself in Locke's theory of knowledge. Let us first note that recognition of real existence stands in his theory in a certain formal contradiction to the way he defines knowledge in general. For Locke,

Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. In this alone it consists.

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 325-326. Bk. 4, Chap. 11, Art. 1)
Thus, as Gibson points out (1917: 167), "throughout his (i.e. Locke's, J.M.) treatment of knowledge there has been involved an implicit reference to a real world distinct from our ideas".

How then do we prove real existence? The answer given by Locke is "real existence can be proved only by real existence" (cited in Gibson, 1917: 169).

Now as Gibson (1917: 169-172) has clearly shown, the consequence of such a view is such that "the possibility of such a proof must rest upon a direct apprehension of real existence, which does not itself stand in need of mediation". (Emphasis added). Where are we to find such an immediate certainty of existence? This is found by Locke in the existence of the conscious subject and only on that ground. The point is stressed throughout the Essay. For example,

I think it is beyond question, that man has a clear idea of his own being; he knows certainly he exists, and that he is something. ... This then I think I may take for a truth, which everyone's certain knowledge assures him of, beyond the liberty of doubting, viz. that he is something that actually exists. (sic)

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 307. Bk. 4, Chap. 10, Art. 2)

The point involved here is of critical significance for our study. The point is precisely that for Locke the self is involved in every mental function because to think is to be conscious that we think
In every act of sensation, reasoning or thinking, we are conscious to ourselves of our own being ...

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 305. Bk. 4, Chap. 9, Art. 3)

and furthermore, in our consciousness of self we are directly aware of real existence. The way in which the mind knows itself is unique in that it is the only case in which the mind knows something without the mediation of an idea. In other cases "It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them" (Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 228. Bk. 4, Chap. 4, Art. 3. Emphasis added). The distinction between the way the mind knows other things and the way it knows itself can be seen in the following passage:

For, since the things the mind contemplates are none of them, besides itself, present 'to the understanding, it is necessary that something else, as a sign or representation of the thing it considers, should be present to it: and these are ideas (sic).

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 461-462. Bk. 4, Chap. 21, Art. 4. Emphasis added)

Now if the mind is "present to the understanding", this presence can only be taken to mean that in some way the mind in this situation is an object to itself. But because of the peculiar, that is, unique way in which this occurs, the mind is not only subject and object, but the subject/object relation is direct and unmediated. This is the one mental act in which it is not necessary to have an idea serving as a sign or representation of the real existent which is being comprehended. It is impossible to over-emphasize the point. The matter can best be
summarized by citing from Gibson (1917: 170-171):

In designating the judgment by which the existence of self is affirmed as "intuitive" knowledge, Locke claims for it a no less immediate and absolute certainty ... in the special case we are concerned with, we have an apprehension of real existence which is immediate in the sense that the real existent is itself directly known, and does not stand in need of any idea, as a tertium quid, to connect it with the knowing mind. As the only judgment which thus asserts existence with immediate certainty, it is indeed sui generis.

The Psychological Dimension

It is commonly agreed the modern conception of the self begins with the Cartesian cogito (Frondizi, 1953: 3; Perkins, 1969: 11). We have already seen Locke, like Descartes, assigns a priority to the conscious subject but that, unlike the French philosopher, attempts to work out a theory of knowledge from the standpoint of conscious experience. Locke not only follows Descartes in the case of accepting the indubitable certainty of our own existence but uses the Cartesian method of doubting. Now there are two other steps which he takes along with Descartes. The first is he subscribes to the view that there can be no thinking activity without a subject. As is pointed out by Frondizi (1953: 22), this is the presupposition behind Locke's statement:

I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence?

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 305. Bk. 4, Chap. 9, Art. 3)
The second step Locke takes along with Descartes is he affirms the substantiality of the subject, i.e. the subject for Locke is an immaterial thinking substance. For example, in that same part of the text from which we have just quoted, Locke goes on to say:

... if I know I doubt, I have as certain perception of the existence of the thing doubting ...

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 305. Bk. 4, Chap. 9, Art. 3. Emphasis added)

This seems to be none other than the res cogitans of Descartes, especially given the context in which it occurs. But if we have doubts on this score we can turn to another passage where Locke expressly uses the word "substance":

We know certainly, by experience, that we sometimes (sic) think; and thence draw this infallible consequence, - that there is something in us that has a power to think. But whether that substance perpetually (sic) thinks or no, we can be no further assured than experience informs us.

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 128. Bk. 2, Chap. 1, Art. 10. Emphasis added)

Locke disclaims all knowledge of the nature of this substance.

It is past controversy, that we have in us something that thinks; our very doubts about what it is, confirm the certainty of its being, though we must content ourselves in the ignorance of what kind of being it is:

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 197. Bk. 4, Chap. 3, Art. 6)

Though Locke thus affirms the substantiality of the conscious subject, nevertheless he proceeds to ground the self
not on substance but on the identity of consciousness, departing from previous philosophy. It is perhaps precisely here, this problematic of the presupposition of the substance of the subject but the grounding of the self in an identity, not of substance, but of consciousness, that lies behind what has been termed by Wood (1972: 48) "one of the fundamental paradoxes of empiricist psychology".

From the above exposition, it is easy to see Locke would find it impossible to conceive of a situation in which thought is not conscious of itself. The conscious subject is taken for granted as a stable and ultimate fact of mental existence. The most certain knowledge is based on the conscious experience of an individual subject and in this kind of psychology the subject appears as a primary and unchangeable fact of mental existence. In this sense the ego seems to be assumed as a constant and active force. Yet, surprisingly, in this psychology the self is conceptualized as passively reflecting or responding to objective reality.

We have already seen in this study the conception of the mind in empiricist psychology is one of passive understanding, and the role of the subject in experience is passive and reflective. The conception of consciousness in Locke's theory is comparatively simple. In Book 2, Chapter 27 of Essay we find most of Locke's thinking on the problem of self-consciousness. Consciousness is "inseparable from thinking" and "essential to
it", and therefore seems to be no more than the simple, irreducible act of awareness that accompanies all perception. In his long discourse on Personal Identity, Locke takes "person" and "self" to have the same denotation but not the same connotation. In other words, the difference is simply in point of view: I am a person to another being, a self to myself. What is a person? It is "a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential to it:" (Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 449. Bk. 2, Chap. 27, Art. 11). A critical question is: is the consciousness involved in ordinary acts of thinking different from the consciousness involved in self-consciousness? For Locke, it is the same consciousness.

For, since consciousness always accompanies thinking, and it is that which makes every one to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things, in this alone consists personal identity, i.e. the sameness of a rational being ... (Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 449. Bk. 2, Chap. 27, Art. 11)

Consciousness of self involves no distinctive act of mind and is essentially involved in any act of sense perception. How does Locke define consciousness? "Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind." (Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 138. Bk. 2, Chap. 1, Art. 19). There is no distinction between natural, direct consciousness and the reflexive act of
explicit recognition by the self, (Frondizi, 1953: 35). As has been pointed out by Wood (1972: 50)

It is not very far from this conception of the self as simply the "consciousness always accompanying thinking" or perceiving to Hume's explicit denial of any distinctive consciousness of self ... Hume's doubts are shared by J.S. Mill, who finds himself unable to construct a more satisfactory conception of the self on the basis of the theory of mind he has inherited from Locke ...

To summarize: in the modern theory of the self, Locke is a pivotal figure. On the one hand, he shares the substantialist presupposition of Descartes and postulates behind the scenes a conscious subject that is a simple, independent and immutable substantial self; on the other hand, since he departs from previous philosophy and grounds personal identity on identity of consciousness rather than of substance he points the way to what Frondizi (1951: 26) has termed "the dissolution of the substantialist conception" of the self. But the substantialist presupposition shaped the development of the modern theory of the self in this way:

The development of an adequate theory of the self has been obstructed by a fallacious dilemma which attempts to force us to choose between a substantial self and no self at all.

(Frondizi, 1951: vi)

Insofar as the conception of the self in classical empiricist theory is simple, independent and unchangeable, it is not surprising to find that the corresponding theory of human nature is similarly static. For example, if we draw upon
Locke's *Second Treatise of Government* published in 1690, we find the theory holds that the transition between the state of Nature (i.e. pre-civil society) and civil society is accomplished by human beings consenting to a special compact (Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 124. Second Treatise: Chap. 2, Art. 14). There is no change in human nature in this transition, no change in human psychology. As has been pointed out by Wood (1972: 82), for all practical purposes there is no nature-culture dualism at the heart of such a social doctrine but if anything, a distinction between pre-political and political.

**The Core Values**

In his lucid analysis of the concept of individualism Lukes (1973) isolated a certain way of conceiving the individual (termed the Abstract Individual) along with certain core values or ideals and other doctrines inherent in the concept. What is meant by the Abstract Individual?

The crucial point about this conception is that the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which social arrangements are held (actually or ideally) to fulfil, whether these features are called instincts, faculties, needs, desires, rights, etc., are assumed as given, independently of a social context. This givenness of fixed and invariant human psychological features leads to an abstract (sic) conception of the individual who is seen as merely the bearer of those features, which determine his behaviour, and specify his interests, needs and rights.

(Lukes, 1973: 73. Emphasis added)

As Lukes argues (1973: 140), epistemological individualism
presupposes the Abstract Individual

... since this doctrine precludes consideration of the impact of social, cultural and linguistic factors on the individual's mind and experience: Descartes, Kant and the British empiricists all begin from the 'individual' abstracted (unsuccessfully, of course) from his social context.

(Lukes, 1973: 140)

The four core values or ideals found by Lukes to be inherent in the concept of individualism were as follows: autonomy, privacy, the dignity of man (i.e. "the supreme and intrinsic value, or dignity, of the individual human being") and self-development. Let us discuss some of these values in turn, beginning with autonomy.

By autonomy or self-direction is understood the idea that an individual's thought and action is his/her own, instead of being the result of causes outside the individual's control (Lukes, 1973: 52-58). At the social level, an individual retains his autonomy to the degree to which he is able to withstand pressures and norms, to subject these to a critically conscious evaluation, and independently reach decisions and form intentions as a result of rational reflection. As a moral value, autonomy is found by Lukes (1973: 58) to be central to modern Western civilization. For example, it was one of the cardinal values of the Enlightenment in the social, and especially political, sphere. Thus, in the doctrine of political individualism, there is a conception of the citizens as abstract individuals, as
'independent centers of consciousness', they are independent and rational beings, who are the sole generators of their own wants and preferences, and the best judges of their own interests...

(Lukes, 1973: 79)

It is not hard to see that underlying such a value is the presupposition of a dichotomy between "inner" and "outer" separated by the human skin as has been described by Bentley in the quotation at the end of the section on epistemological individualism. The "true", the "real inner man" is enclosed within skin which serves as some sort of barrier to protect this inner being from external influences. Poetically, it has been perhaps best summed up by William Ernest Henley (1849-1903) in his famous poem Invictus, especially in that work's last two lines:

    I am the master of my fate
    I am the captain of my soul.

It is closely related to and even sometimes equivalent to the Western conception of "positive" freedom or liberty and is perhaps central to the whole idea that Western civilization in this century has conceived of itself as the "free world". This conception of liberty has been described by Sir Isaiah Berlin as coming from 'the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master' (as cited in Lukes, 1973: 55). A comparison only has to be made between the quotation from Bentley already cited and the following passage from Berlin to understand the way in which the Western concept of "positive" freedom is based on a disjunction between subject and object, and the insertion
of "skin" as a barricade between the "inner self" and the "outer world":

I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not other men's, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside.


The value of self-development finds its most famous liberal exponent in John Stuart Mill in the Essay On Liberty. The value refers to a certain phenomenon of self-cultivation and is typically Romantic in its origin (Lukes, 1973: 67). As it appears in the liberal tradition, it shares with the other values a presupposition of a subject/object dichotomy and is essentially subjectivistic. The value specifies an ideal for the lives of individuals and in the Romantic perspective the inner being was taken as a point of departure. For the Romantics, this ideal of self-affirmation was epitomized by the artist as the paradigm of the creative individual. The artist was conceived as one "who has his centre of gravity within himself" (Schlegel, as cited in Furst, 1969: 321).

There is one crucial point to be made concerning this ideal of self-development: the content of the ideal "varies with different ideas of the self on a continuum from pure egoism to strong communitarianism" (Lukes, 1973: 71). Thus, the Romantic idea of individuality entered into the ethical basis of Marxism and Marx
shared the Romantic view of the artist as the paradigm of the
creative individual. However, unlike Mill, Marx conceived of
self-development as essentially communal. True individuality is
thus achieved through Communism, a form of social organization
which transcends personal independence and antagonistic social
relations. For Mill, self-development is conceived as extra-
social, with the individual pursuing his own path, free from
social pressures. In some early Romantics, self-development is
conceived as anti-social, the individual being set apart from and
hostile to society (Lukes, 1973: 71).

If autonomy is related to "positive" freedom, the value of
privacy is itself related to "negative" freedom. By the idea of
privacy is meant "a sphere of thought and action that should be
free from 'public' interference" (Lukes, 1973: 62):

    In general the idea of privacy refers to a
    sphere that is not of proper concern to others.
    It implies a negative relation between the
    individual and some wider 'public', including
    the state - a relation of non-interference with,
    or non-intrusion into, some range of his thoughts
    and/or action. This condition may be achieved
    either by his withdrawal or by the 'public's'
    forbearance.
    (Lukes, 1973: 66)

This value, according to Lukes (1973: 62) is perhaps the central
idea of liberalism and is based on a conception of the human being
as a being to whom privacy is absolutely essential and who has a
life of his/her own to live. The area of personal relationships
is seen as sacred in its own right. This value of privacy is
obviously highly individualistic and in its modern conception the value is plainly related to the institution of private property. This value is at the base of Pierre Elliot Trudeau's famous statement that the state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation. It is perhaps this same value behind the dictum of "Do your own thing" which became famous in the Western world in the nineteen-sixties and the fashion, in that same decade, of "dropping out". Perhaps its most famous exponent is John Stuart Mill who in his Essay On Liberty argued

The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.


Capitalism as an economic mode of production requires separation of the means of production from the producers, and requires private property of land and resources as well as of labour. Production through wage labour must be institutionalized so that it is the dominant mode of production. The connection between the person and private property has been expressed by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government:

From all which it is evident, that though the things of Nature are given in common, man (by being master of himself, and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour of it) had still in himself the great foundation of property;

(Locke, 1690, rep. 1924: 138. Art. 44)
The connection between individualism and a specific theory of property has been summed up by Wood (1972: 129):

...the fact remains that a particular doctrine of private property plays an essential role in all liberal versions of individualism, and that one of the primary forms that the antithesis between individual and society takes in liberal doctrine is a theory of property. ... theories of property tend to embody conceptions of both liberty and community, together with their underlying concepts of man and the self.

The theory of private property plays a crucial role in the theory of "natural society" and the natural relation between the individual and society, and in the theory of natural psychology complementary to this theory of "natural society". This role is as follows: there is a duality in the Lockean theory of the state of nature marked by the invention of money. There is a pre-monetary state of nature and a monetary state. The invention of money removes the limits on the right of individual appropriation of property which had existed in the pre-monetary state. The removal of these limits means property and class differentials arise in the monetary state of nature, which we should remember, is still pre-civil society. These property and class differentials are legitimized on the basis of a consent theory i.e. consent to money, the root cause of these differentials, means consent to these differentials. But those who have property are constantly exposed to the invasion of others. The monetary state of nature is characterized by fear and insecurity (Locke, Second Treatise, Chap. 9, esp. Arts. 123, 127, 136, 137). Consequently, men are driven to enter civil society to preserve their private
The theory of private property plays a crucial role in the construction of a theory of "natural society" that is individualistic, with social relations that are antagonistic, based on inequalities and conflicting interests, with inherent antagonism between individuality and sociality, between self and other. The theory of private property also plays a role in the theory of natural psychology that is complementary with the theory of "natural society". This psychological theory of ego-assertive, competitive and possessive individualism is based on what has been termed "the principle of privatization" by Wood (1972: 130). According to this principle, human nature is naturally private, the natural form of ownership is private, and the essence of freedom consists in respect of privatism, for the private property of the individual. Sacred to this kind of theory is a view of the individual as having a "personal space" free from intrusion from a "public" sphere, and political society is seen as civil society, the chief end of which is the preservation of property (Locke, Second Treatise, Chap. 7, Art. 85).

As has been pointed out by Wood (1972: 130 et seq.), this view finds its justification in a certain argument which runs as follows:

1. man is by nature an appropriating and possessive animal;
2. men achieve self-identity through appropriation, the
the "I" being defined through the "my";

3. the natural form of appropriation is through the ownership of private property;

4. what is "natural" is good (the naturalistic principle of morality).

However, this argument rests on a certain conception of the proprietary instinct. As we have been reminded by Wood (1972: 139 et seq.), a counter argument was long ago posed by John Dewey in his works *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922) and *Individualism: Old and New* (1929). It is of major significance that Dewey was able to pose his counter argument without challenging the existence or importance of a basic proprietary instinct in human nature or even the naturalistic principle of morality.

What was challenged by Dewey (1922: 110) was the narrow conception of the proprietary instinct and of appropriation which has to be assumed in order to derive the private form of ownership inherent in capitalism from possessive human nature. The counter-argument runs as follows:

1. the existence and importance of the proprietary instinct is not to be denied:

   No unprejudiced observer will lightly deny the existence of an original tendency to assimilate objects and events to the self, to make them part of the "me". We may even admit that the "me" cannot exist without the "mine". The self gets solidity and form through an appropriation of things which identifies them with whatever we call myself.

   Possession shapes and consolidates the "I" of philosophers. "I own, therefore I
"I think, therefore I am" expresses a truer psychology than the Cartesian "I think, therefore I am".

(Dewey, 1922: 110)

2. the proprietary instinct is above all versatile, the capitalistic mode of ownership is not the only means of its realization:

My worldly goods, my good name, my friends, my honour and shame all depend upon a possessive tendency. The need for appropriation has had to be satisfied; but only a calloused imagination fancies that the institution of private property as it exists A.D. 1921 is the sole or the indispensable means of its realization. Every gallant life is an experiment in different ways of fulfilling it. It expends itself in predatory aggression, in forming friendships, in seeking fame, in literary creation, in scientific production.

(Dewey, 1922: 110)

3. appropriation need not be conceptualized as solely individual appropriation for perhaps the proprietary instinct can be satisfied through group appropriation:

We can conceive a state of things in which the proprietary impulse would get full satisfaction by holding goods as mine in just the degree in which they were visibly administered for a benefit in which a corporate community shared.

(Dewey, 1922: 111)

4. furthermore, the theory of motivation based on personal profit as the prime incentive is also based on a narrow conception of gain; Dewey was able to envision

... the elasticity of the idea of gain, and possible equivalences for pecuniary
gain, and the possibility of a state of affairs in which only those things would be counted personal gains which profit a group.

(Prout, 1922: 111)

Finally, there is the value termed by Lukes (1973: 45-51) the dignity of man, that is, the principle of "the supreme and intrinsic value, or dignity, of the individual human being". This moral value has a long history going back as far as the texts of the prophets in the Old Testament and is set forth clearly in the New Testament and the Gospels (Lukes, 1973: 45). During the Middle Ages it had been de-emphasized for various reasons (such as, the importance of law and of the Church as a legal institution and the organic conception of society) but with the Renaissance it was openly proclaimed. This idea has now pervaded modern social and ethical thought in the West and is formally enshrined in certain documents such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man, the American Declaration of Independence and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, which begins by declaring its "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family".

Let us take the slogan of the French Revolution (Liberty, Equality, Fraternity) as the most striking focus of the democratic imperative in the modern conception of the dignity of the individual. The liberal version of democratic theory, of whom Locke
and Stuart Mill are the classical expositors, emphasized liberty and re-interpreted equality and fraternity to agree with their conception of liberty (Lichtman, 1969: 170-208). This conception was one of negative freedom, closely related to the value of privacy, a definition of freedom as the right to protection from incursion by the state into the area of an individual's private property and economic behaviour as well as other areas. When equality was interpreted to agree with this kind of freedom, equality was conceived as formal equality before the law and the equal opportunity of all members of society to compete for the offices of the state (Lichtman, 1969: 177) while fraternity "could only stand for the common condition of competitive men set against each other in a combat for economic and social power" (Lichtman, 1969: 177).

The concept of equality is the site of a tension in liberal democratic theory between the articulated ideal of this moral value and the societal reality of the capitalist economic order. This order is based on the inequality of private property which is a necessary pre-requisite to the institutionalization of wage labour as the dominant mode of production. If Lichtman (1969: 170-208) criticizes liberal democratic theory, he grants that on the one hand proponents of the theory "fully expected to achieve a substantive equality among its citizens through the process of their equal political participation in the system of power"; yet, on the other hand, as we have seen in our discussion of the role of Locke's theory of private property, it was asserted that the
reason for men entering civil society was to preserve inequalities in private property ownership. This contradictory tension is manifested in both Locke and Mill by the fact both theorists first abstractly posit an egalitarian directive which is later withdrawn through specific modifications to the theory. The "equality" component exists as an abstract ideal to serve the function of moral justification. The "inequality" part continues to exist, inevitably, because the basic cause of the inequality pervading liberal democratic theory has its roots in the unequal economic power underlying the political institutions of liberalism. Insofar as classical liberal democratic theory emphasized negative freedom and formal equality it had to do so within the framework of capitalist property relations. If democracy was advocated, it had to be done in such a fashion that private property could be protected; if formal equality was emphasized, equality had to be conceived in such a way the capitalist class could retain its superior power:

... all the versions of liberal democratic theory are rooted in the existence of the capitalist system and its distinctive maldistribution of power. Whatever the differences among its manifestations, the political theory of capitalist-democracy extends equality up to the point at which the citizenry would possess the opportunity, the motive, and the means in power, to overthrow the distribution of property that obtains in the capitalist system.

(Lichtman, 1969: 204)
Summary

We have described the major dimensions into which Lukes (1973) analysed the concept of individualism: the abstract individual, and the core values of autonomy, privacy, self development and the dignity of man with its correlative value of equality. Furthermore, we have described the epistemological, psychological and political theories intertwined with these dimensions of the ideology of individualism. At this point it may be useful to briefly summarize the critical points of the epistemological and psychological theories.

Epistemological individualism

(a) is fundamentally subjectivist, based on a priority of the conscious subject, the latter appearing as a primary and unchangeable fact of mental existence;
(b) is based on a rigid dichotomy of subject and object, between inner experience and outer world;
(c) is based on a biological skin-bound view of the conscious subject or "knower";
(d) is a theory of entities or things taken in isolation and not a theory of relations and interconnections, because it is based on a theory of simple, immutable substance;
(e) is an epistemology in which the mind's knowledge of itself is seen as direct and not mediated. In other words, in the case where the mind is conscious of itself, where the mind is both subject and object,
this relation is not mediated by even a sign. At its very base, therefore, this theory of knowledge excludes a theory of mediated knowledge.

The psychological theory of the self interlinked with this theory of epistemological individualism

(a) conceives of the conscious subject in terms of a substance, as a simple, independent, immutable substantial self;
(b) conceives of the self as an entity, a thing existing within the boundaries of the skin of a biological organism;
(c) conceives consciousness of self as direct and not mediated by anything outside of the self, not even a sign;
(d) conceives of an individualistic self existing outside of any social context. Social, cultural, historical, linguistic, any such factors are considered to have no influence on the individual's mind and experience.

Such a theory of the self is essentially an isolation theory of the self. In view of this (and bearing in mind the extensive discussion of the underlying basis of such values as privacy and autonomy) it seems quite appropriate to summarize this whole conception of the self in the term the "secret self".
CHAPTER THREE

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Much of the recent work in the study of film and ideology has proceeded within the framework of Marxist theory of knowledge, especially the theory of ideology and theory of class struggle. The brief general exposition of Marx's theory given below depends on a most persuasive reading by Avineri (1968) and Wood (1972) who rely heavily on Marx's Theses on Feuerbach and the remarks on Feuerbach made in The German Ideology (Marx and Engels, 1845-46).

The contention is made that Marx's epistemology attempts to transcend the rigid Western dichotomy between subject and object by conceiving the relation between these two terms as mediated by a third term, practice, specifically revolutionary practice. This third term becomes the central concept of Marx's epistemology. The gap between subject and object can only be closed to the degree that humanity can change the objective world and by doing this, change itself (the subject). In Thesis II of the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx argues for the "verificatory nature of human action" (Avineri, 1968: 74). Once the gap between subject and object is closed through revolutionary practice, the problem that plagued the classical idealist philosophers (namely, whether ultimate reality is accessible to human thought) is solved. As Marx states in Thesis II, "Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-worldliness of his thinking"
Marx's epistemology is therefore natural insofar as Marx, by taking the principle of active mental subjectivity from idealism, nevertheless locates this active mental subjectivity in the real objective world. The gap between subject and object is closed, as Wood (1972: 34) put it, in "the reunification of subject and object by means of man's active participation in the world through use of all his faculties". Marx is not content to rest there. As Wood (1972: 32-36) has argued, Marx treats the problem of the subject/object relation as a problem of existence and not merely of epistemology and reunifies subject and object, thought and existence via the mediation of human practice. As Engels (1876-78: 52) put it, Marx explains "man's 'knowing' by his 'being' instead of, as heretofore, his 'being' by his 'knowing'". Marx's epistemology is therefore social and Marx makes his theory of mind into a doctrine of social change:

He views cognitive action as the whole process of the development and evolution of reality: getting acquainted with reality constitutes shaping and changing it. Epistemology ceases to be a merely reflective theory of cognition, and becomes the vehicle for shaping and moulding reality ...  

(Avineri, 1968: 68)

Finally, Marx's theory of mind is historical. In Theses VI, VII, and IX, Marx criticizes Feuerbach for abstracting from the historical process and presupposing an abstract individual outside of a particular form of society. Marx distinguishes
his own "new" materialism from that of Feuerbach because he sees himself as acutely aware of the historical process and takes the view of consciousness as a social product occurring within history. Marx's materialist conception of history differs from idealism, in its turn, in that "it does not explain practice from the idea but explains the formation of ideas from material practice" (Marx and Engels, 1845-46: 54) and it shows

... each stage (i.e. of history, J.M.) contains a material result, a sum of productive forces, an historically created relation to nature and of individuals to one another, which is handed down to each generation from its predecessor; a mass of productive forces, capital funds and circumstances, which on the one hand is indeed modified by the new generation, but on the other also prescribes for it its conditions of life and gives it a definite development, a special character. It shows that circumstances make men just as much as men make circumstances.

(Marx and Engels, 1845-46: 54)

In the view of Avineri (1968: 75), since Marx takes the position that the qualities of the external world are shaped by the active human consciousness but in turn this external world makes possible certain historically created modes of human cognition, Marx links history and epistemology, with this link leading to nothing less than an historicization of epistemology itself.

This leads us to Marx's theory of class struggle as the basis of all social formations and transformations. The central concept of Marx's epistemology, revolutionary practice, is placed in the forefront of human history:
... all forms and products of consciousness cannot be dissolved by mental criticism, ... but only by the practical overthrow of the actual social relations ... not criticism but revolution is the driving force of history, also of religion, of philosophy and all other kinds of theory.

(Marx and Engels, 1845-46: 54)

Consequently, the relationship of the material base to the superstructure is the relation between the activity involved in the economic activity of a certain mode of production and the ideological forms of consciousness which deform our understanding of our historical social relations and which furnish "reasons, rationalizations and modes of legitimization and moral justification for the specific forms that (economic) activity takes" (Avineri, 1968: 76). Ideology performs an economic function insofar as it helps to assure the reproduction of the labour force and the existing social relations of production.

The above has been a brief oversimplified exposition of the general framework within which a Marxist film researcher works. How is this applied to the study of film? In order to answer this question, we will draw on James MacBean who has taken an explicitly Marxist position in his book Film and Revolution, published in 1975. The central focus of Marxist film criticism is the Marxist theory of class struggle and its censorship/repression in ideology:
... our continuing efforts in the theory and practice of Marxist film criticism must implacably bring to light the class struggle that is going on all around us but is so insidiously glossed over and hidden by the cinema and the mass media in general. And this means that we have to think not merely of the class struggle in the U.S.A. or in whatever country we happen to live, but of class struggle on a global scale.

At the same time that we think globally we must also think personally, for the division of society into classes and the struggle between classes are not mere abstract concepts in some disembodied and depersonalized thinking machine. We too are caught up in class struggle. And our revolution will not be liberating if it is aimed only at liberating someone else (the working class, the Third World, etc.). For each of us there needs to be a healthy, lucid coming together of the political and the personal. Revolution will only be genuinely liberating if it enables each of us to relate more freely in our own actual lives to men, women and things.

(MacBean, 1975: 325-326)

Marxist film theory and research is therefore aimed at investigating the ways films are used to produce (i.e. maintain or change) the societal relations within which they are embedded. Filmmakers are conceptualized as workers who are engaged in the social practice of producing knowledge about reality which is itself a product of social practice. The actor's task is seen not as one of identification with the character but a task in which the actor uses a character as a vehicle through which to present to the audience certain issues and problems (MacBean, 1975: 77). Since the actor does not pretend to solve these issues and problems, the role of the audience is to participate in the attempt to solve
these issues and problems. Consequently, in Marxist film theory and research, the audience (viewers of the film) is seen not as a passive contemplator of something revealed by films but as actively engaged in the production of knowledge of the social reality and in the use of this knowledge. Finally, the Marxist film researcher, as we have seen from the quotation already taken from MacBean, consciously attempts to engage in social struggle. Research on film is seen as part of this ongoing struggle which extends to every domain of the researcher's life.

From the point of view of this study, however, one of the major problems with the greater part of this work on film and ideology is the fact the research and theory is not conducted from a specifically communicational perspective. To the degree these theorists try to integrate Marxism and semiotics, they use a structural linguistic approach to semiotics. This fact has already been noted in respect to one of the most ambitious and well known examples of Marxist film research, by Nichols (1975). The text in question is John Ford's "Young Mr. Lincoln" written collectively by the Editors of Cahiers du Cinéma, a French film journal with an avowedly Marxist perspective. Like the authors of the French text, Nichols also avowedly wishes to bring about a merger of Marx and Freud, the personal and the political; however, he does so from a communicational perspective drawing heavily on the work of Gregory Bateson (1972) and Wilden (1972). It is from this perspective he criticizes the work of the Cahiers' editors:
Cahiers' errors can be linked to absolutely fundamental theoretical errors, namely the subscription to a structural linguistic model of arbitrary signs that can generate identities and oppositions (articulated according to a system ...), the absence of a theory of logical typing in communication, and the absence of a theory of mediations within historical process.

(Nichols, 1975)

Work done by Weakland (1966; 1971a; 1972) on films of the People's Republic of China, Taiwan and Hong Kong has been focused on thematic analysis of fictional feature films. In this approach, the most basic premise is that films are cultural documents and that any film or group of films from a single cultural source will "constitute in some form and to a significant degree an ordered whole, will exhibit a pattern made up of recurrent thematic elements related in characteristic, recurrent ways" (Weakland, 1975: 242). The task of thematic analysis is to discern increasingly general and comprehensive patterns accurately and to relate these film observations to observations made on their surrounding culture. In view of the emphasis on form and organization, such research seeks congruences and parallelisms between the filmic patterns, instead of cause-and-effect relationships (Weakland, 1975: 246). His work has been placed by Weakland himself within the context of anthropological analysis, and he has been careful to point out fictional feature films in such an analysis are frankly viewed as fictional:

... although fictional films may at times portray aspects of behaviour accurately in a factual or documentary sense this is not the main focus of their study. Rather, these films are taken as
projecting IMAGES of human social behaviour, and these images are the first object of study.

(Weakland, 1975: 233)

Two observations remain to be made about Weakland's work. The first is that he has not been content to remain at the level of "manifest political themes" in Chinese Communist films but has sought to go deeper to latent content, to less conscious and more underlying cultural themes in the films. Consequently, he has compared and contrasted different methods displayed by the Chinese Communist films, Taiwanese and Hong Kong films in their respective treatment of themes basic to Chinese culture as a whole. His treatment of characterization has proceeded from his finding that the family is a very important image in all Chinese films, and the theme of The Liberation of Women is very prominent in Chinese Communist films. His treatment of female characters is undertaken from this focus of illuminating how a given theme may be concretely presented. His work therefore neither needs nor develops a specific theory of character. The next observation is that this work does not appear to be undertaken from a specifically communicational perspective, even though Weakland has long been associated with the Palo Alto school and their "interactional" view. It is true that in a recent volume titled The Interactional View: Studies at the Mental Research Institute Palo Alto, 1965-1974 an editorial comment claims a piece by Weakland (1972, rep. 1977) illustrates the use of the interactional view in research on the content of modern Chinese films. However, an examination of this article does not reveal any use
of specifically communicational concepts stemming from this framework. In fact, it is very different indeed from the "interactional" analysis of Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf in Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967).

From the above discussion of the work done in the area of film and ideology, it is clear hardly any work has been done from the perspective of communicational semiotics. It is this gap that the present study is aimed at investigating. Like other work in the general area, the study accepts as a basic postulate that an ideology can be manifested in films and that this manifestation may be both due to conscious designs on the part of filmmakers and to unconscious cultural premises. Further, the study postulates that ideological premises can be manifested in the communicational exchanges between characters, and in the use of camera angle, size of the image and other such filmic techniques.

There are three basic ways of studying films: one can study how they are related to their makers, how they are related to their content or depicted subject matter (this is really a study of how the filmmakers are related to the subject matter), and how they are related to their audience (this is essentially a study of how filmmakers are related to their audience through the films). What this means is there are two basic levels of analysis: the analysis which confines itself only to what occurs between the fictional characters within the text (intra-textual
analysis) and the analysis which is primarily concerned with the relationships at the level of filmmakers-text-audience (extra-textual analysis). This latter analysis does not ignore intra-textual analysis but is only concerned with the intra-textual level insofar as it illuminates what occurs at the other level. The work done by Merrell (1976: 339-360) on the semiotics of character in literary narrative texts is confined solely to the intra-textual level. Similarly, the work done by Weakland has to be judged as an example of intra-textual analysis. This is because the analyses themselves are confined to the films while implications from these analyses are related to the larger culture within which the filmmakers and audience are embedded.

It would appear that any research into films from a communicational perspective must take as its major focus of investigation the level of extra-textual analysis. The rationale for this is as follows: within a communicational framework, a film must be conceptualized as a text (i.e. complex interrelated sets of messages); an audience viewing the film must be conceptualized as engaging in a communicational exchange, in the "decoding" of a text; this text cannot be considered authorless, but the result of communicational "encoding" activity on the part of the filmmakers (here extended to mean all those engaged in the making and even distribution of the film), an activity, to some degree, a conscious choice on the part of those involved. Finally, it is a major postulate of communication theory as outlined by Watzlawick et al (1967: 83-93) that the self is
social, formed within communicational activity. If this is accepted then the filmmakers, whether they consciously recognize this or not, through the film, extend to members of the audience certain definitions of themselves and of their relationships with each other. It is by no means asserted here that the audience (either all of it or any one particular segment) must accept these definitions, or does in fact accept all the definitions. Whether they do or not, is a question to be settled by empirical analysis. But certainly, an empirical study of the definitions proffered by films appear to be the logical starting point of any communication analysis.

Consequently, the present study attempts to explore precisely this area by attempting to describe and analyse the nature of communication between filmmakers and audience and the ways in which such communication may manifest conscious and/or unconscious premises of the ideology of individualism, as these premises have been already specified. Actual communicational exchanges between characters in the fictional feature films are analysed and described only insofar as this helps to illuminate the nature of the communication at the extra-textual level; visual stylistic analysis will be similarly treated. The study limits itself to investigating only the definitions of self proffered to the audience and does not attempt to find out whether audiences actually accept these definitions, which segments accept which definitions and other questions of this nature, as this is beyond the scope of the study. At the level
of intra-textual analysis, characterization has been selected as a key avenue through which to approach extra-textual analysis, but only for this reason. Consequently, a major question with which the present study is specifically concerned is finding out whether (as may be predicted generally by a Marxist theory of ideology for example) characterization in the films of Western advanced capitalist countries is structured and presented in ways congruent with those ideological dimensions already described: abstract individual, autonomy, privacy, self development, and the dignity of man (with its correlate of equality).

This kind of task presents two major difficulties. It has already been noted that there does not exist a theory of character from the perspective of communicational semiotics. In order to provide some kind of theoretical framework for the study of character from the desired perspective, it is necessary to take a small step toward forming a coherent ordered theory by integrating some key concepts from diverse theorists. The second difficulty is concerned with method. It is obvious the method used should satisfy two criteria at least. It should represent a communicational model in the sense that it should be based on and take account of the basic elements found in any communicative situation. Second, it should be linked to the key concepts in the theoretical framework. Since such a method did not exist it was necessary to devise one. This was done by making suitable modifications to a classic communication model of the functions of a text as formulated by Jakobson (1958, rep. 1972: 85-122).
CHAPTER FOUR
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
THE SEMIOTIC SELF

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION

Communication and Epistemology

Western thought since the Renaissance has been based on a profound dichotomy between subject and object. The view outlined in this chapter attempts to transcend this dichotomy via an approach termed "transactional". This view has been formulated by Dewey and Bentley in their work Knowing and the Known first published in 1948. This point of view "systematically proceeds upon the ground that knowing is co-operative and as such is integral with communication" (Dewey and Bentley, 1948, rep. 1973:89). The type of inquiry associated with the subject/object dichotomy was termed "inter-action", "where thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection", (Dewey and Bentley, 1948, rep. 1973:121). In this view, certain "elements" are presumed "independent" at the outset and these "elements" are then seen as entering into "relations" with each other. In contrast, in the point of view outlined here, "subject" and "object" are assumed to be intimately interrelated at the outset and are regarded as aspects of relevant transactions.

Western thought since the Renaissance has also depended on a disjunction between primary and secondary qualities with a concomitant theory of knowledge which excluded the knower and
the process of knowing from the known. The doctrine of primary and secondary qualities was linked with a theory of substance such that the primary "real" qualities must belong to a substance "in itself", separate from any relation in which the substance stands to anything else. However, since the nineteenth century, advances in various sciences, especially those of physics and evolutionary biology, have dethroned the traditional theory of substance. In the new view, substance has become resolvable into function. The old view was that of classical mechanics and was based on a conception of nature as a machine. Since a machine has to be constructed before it can do anything, it is not surprising the view of classical mechanics holds structure and function separate, with function presupposing structure. In the new view, the essence of being is becoming, structures are really complexes of functions, and the essence of being is acting.

A discussion of the modern theory of matter may perhaps help in clarifying the point. The discussion is based on Collingwood (1945:145-147). The modern theory of the atom conceives of the atom as a moving pattern of electrons. The quantitative aspect of the old atomic theory is retained by the physical unit of the electron. Yet the concept of pattern reintroduces a qualitative aspect into the theory (the mechanistic view ignores qualitative differences) while "moving" means the pattern is not static but dynamic, constantly changing in a definite rhythmic way. This rhythmic motion is the link
between quantity and quality, and makes time significant in a new way, for rhythm is the organization of time. In the view of mechanics, a specific piece of matter is what it is permanently.

The discussion of the element of time brings us back to the relationship between knower, knowing and the known. The new view of structure as resolvable into function gives rise to corollary principles of minimum space and minimum time. The following discussion is dependent on Collingwood (1945: 16-27). The principle of minimum time states that different orders of substance take different orders of time-lapse to exist. If we define substance as activity, then the activity-processes unique to a given "substance" must take a certain length of time to occur. How the natural world appears to us will depend on how long we take to observe it. This does not mean we must embrace a position of subjective idealism. We are not observing mere "appearance". When we observe the natural world for a certain length of time, we observe whatever processes require that particular length of time to occur. In this way we are limited in our scientific empirical and experimental observations to the upper and lower limits of our human knowledge-creating and processing capacities. These capacities, even though extended by modern scientific apparatus, are still constrained by our being bioenergetic beings of a definite size and living at a definite rate. It thus seems unreasonable to argue what we observe is a fair sample of nature in its entirety. It appears more theoretically sound to argue what we observe is
only a fair sample of whatever processes, observable or unobservable to ourselves, have the same order of extension in space and time. Within a given magnitude of space and time natural processes will have one type of character, but they will have another type when the space-range or time-lapse is different. This has been noted for Newtonian laws of motion which hold for velocities observable within the ordinary range of human experience but break down as velocities approach the speed of light.

The implications of the principles of minimum space and of minimum time were applied by Collingwood (1945: 25-27) to the techniques of the science of history. His application has implications for all the social sciences. As he emphasized, different historians could produce different answers to the question: "What kinds of events happen, or can or might happen, in history?" Their answers would vary depending on if they defined an event as a happening taking an hour, a decade, a century or a millennium.

The shorter our standard time-phase for an historical event, the more our history will consist of destructions, catastrophes, battle, murder and sudden death. But destruction implies the existence of something to destroy; and as this type of history cannot describe how such a thing came into existence, for the process of its coming into existence was a process too long to be conceived as an event by this type of history, its existence must be presupposed as given, ready-made, miraculously established by some force outside history.

(Collingwood, 1945: 26. Emphasis added)
As Rue"sch (1960, rep. 1972: 471-472) has demonstrated, a particular problem of the social sciences is that the space-time scales of the observer are the same as those of the observed. This means in many cases it will be impossible for the observer to tell whether any change in the field of observation has resulted from a change in the observer or in the observed. The observer is always therefore an integral part of the field of observation, and is himself/herself part of the object of investigation.

The conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that if we are even to begin to understand a scientific report about events occurring in a social situation, we must know as a starting point how the observer took up his/her position within the field of investigation. It has been pointed out by Collingwood (1945: 176-177) that no one can understand what a scientific fact is unless it is understood what an historical fact is. "The fact that the event has happened" is interpreted to mean "The fact that the event has been observed". This involves the reports of others and the consultation and interpretation of records which are characteristic of historical research. In this way, a "scientific fact" is most appropriately conceived as "a class of historical facts".

The same is true of theories. A scientific theory not only rests on certain historical facts and is verified or disproved by certain other historical facts; it is itself an historical fact, namely, the fact that someone has propounded or accepted, verified, or disproved, that theory. ... natural science as a form of thought exists and always has existed in a context of history, and depends
on historical thought for its existence.
(Collingwood, 1945: 177)

The critical point here is that all thought, not only scientific thought, involves communication and history. Even science is a discourse, a specific type of historical communicative activity interconnecting communicators and existing in a specific context of survival, selection, adaption. In examining scientific research and theory we must not fail to ask in what ways they are influenced by ideological values. Consequently, in the transactional point of view, "transaction" may be defined as the full ongoing process in a specific field of inquiry into which the knower, the process of knowing and the known all enter fully and are intimately interconnected.

Communication: A Conceptual Framework for Semiotics

A transaction essentially involves sign-process in that, following the use of Dewey and Bentley (1948, rep. 1973: 134), we may define sign as "process that takes place only when organism and environment are in behavioral transaction", such that "the organism involved in a situation accepts one thing as a reference or pointing to some other thing" (Handy and Harwood, 1968, rep. 1973: 224). In this usage, the term "sign" is not restricted to naming the thing that is taken in reference to something else, but refers to the whole transaction. Accordingly, "sign" is used to refer to "characteristic adaptational behavior of organism-environment; the 'cognitive' in its broadest reaches when viewed transactionally as process" (Dewey
and Bentley, 1948, rep. 1973: 112). The conceptualization of sign used here may be illuminated by pointing out that sign as a characteristic adaptational behavioral process was identified at a point far down in the life scale by Jennings (1906, as cited in Dewey and Bentley, 1948, rep. 1973: 134). In his study of the sea-urchin, Jennings noted that it tends to remain in dark places and light is apparently injurious to it. Nevertheless, it is responsive to a sudden shadow falling on it by pointing its spines in the direction from which the shadow comes. Such a defensive action helps to protect it from an enemy which in its approach may have cast its shadow. The significance of this was grasped by Jennings and formulated in the following insightful remark: "The reaction is produced by the shadow, but it refers, in its biological value, to something behind the shadow" (Jennings, 1906, as cited in Dewey and Bentley, 1948, rep. 1973: 134).

The critical aspect of all organisms (from the least to the most complex) in their behavior was noted by Jennings (1906, rep. 1962: 296-299; 332-335) to consist in the fact that they react appropriately to "representative stimuli". This means they react not simply to stimuli that are injurious or beneficial in themselves but to stimuli which lead to injurious or beneficial results. This is true of both positive and negative reactions. For example, it was Jennings' view (Jennings, 1906, rep. 1962: 332) "In fear there is then a negative reaction to a representative stimulus - one that stands (sic) for a really
injurious stimulation". In the case of the sea urchin, the response to the change in the sea urchin's environment (i.e. introduction of a shadow) is not due to any direct injurious effect of this change, the shadow itself. This actual change merely represents or stands for a possible change behind it which in this particular case can be expected to have injurious results. Organisms respond as if to something else than the change actually occurring. Such a change has the function of a sign and thus stimuli of that sort could properly be termed "representative stimuli" (Jennings, 1906, rep. 1962: 297).

It was clear to Jennings (1906, rep. 1962: 297) that such a reaction to "representative stimuli" is obviously, from the biological standpoint, of the greatest value. Such semiotic behavior enables an organism to flee from injury even before it occurs or at least to engage in some preparatory behavior. Semiotic behavior also enables the organism to move toward a beneficial agent that is at a distance. Such semiotic behavior reaches much more complex development in higher animals.

The sea urchin's behavior is contextual, for the shadow has to be "sudden". Though light appears to be injurious to the sea urchin and it prefers shade, yet shadow "in itself" is not "good" for the system. Shadow must be considered in relation to previous patterns of light and shade falling on the system. It is not the shadow alone to which the sea urchin responds but the shadow-in-context.
As has been already noted, in the transactional point of view, the essence of being is becoming. Consequently, time achieves a new significance in the explanation of empirical data. In noting that the sea urchin responds to the shadow as to a "representative stimulus", we may note such semiotic behavior is future-oriented. The future may be said to be in the present because the shadow portends "something" that may happen at a later moment and yet it is to that future "something" to which the sea urchin is responding in the present. The defensive action of extending its spines in the direction of the shadow is an action taken in anticipation of the future consequences of that "something" occurring. The past is also in the present because the shadow, as a "representative stimulus", is taken in relation to other patterns of light and shade that were present in the situation up to that moment. Not just any shadow portends danger but a "sudden" shadow. Even such a simple system as the sea urchin has to be able to detect change or novelty in the situation, that is, to be responsive to sameness and difference. Since the past is operative in the present, we may attribute a rudimentary memory to sea urchin system, noting such a memory would have to be dynamic as distinct from the kind of memory as static storage in data banks. For example, if the shadow remained without injurious results, after a certain period of time, it would lose its character of novelty, changing from something pointing forward to a possible future occurrence into something pointing backwards to a stable secure sameness. If in its first character as difference in the system's lifespace, it
served as an indicator, in its second character as **sameness** it also serves as an indicator. From this an important fact about the semiotic world can be inferred. It is a world where **what is critical is difference** (change, novelty) but where sameness can also be operative in the system's behavior because sameness is different from difference. Even zero can be a cause because zero is different, for example, from one; in the semiotic world it is impossible not to communicate. In the world of sea urchin system and its environment, even when "nothing" happens, when the patterns of shade and light remain the same, these patterns still serve as an indicator of "stable security". At the human level of communication, the letter we do not write may perhaps provoke an angry response.

The case of the sea urchin is offered as a simple paradigm to illustrate the approach to semiotics taken in this study. The sea urchin's survival is contingent upon its being **open** to its environment in a constant interchange of communication. The characteristic adaptational behavior of organism-environment has been referred to as **sign-process**, because of the crucial role played in this process by a **representation** (i.e. the shadow). What distinguishes a specifically communicational approach to semiotics as distinct from a structuralist linguistic approach is precisely this focus on the role of sign-process in adaptation and survival behavior.
From the perspective of communicational semiotics, a theory of the self must focus on the sign-process of the adaptational behavior of the self in its communicational exchange with its environment. Consequently, such a view of the self will not regard it as something residing within the skin but will stress the interrelatedness of the self with its environment. This emphasis on communicational interrelations is central to a number of scientific theories such as general system theory, cybernetics, hierarchy theory. Such theories offer valuable contributions to a specifically communicational semiotics.

A CONTEXTUAL MODEL OF HUMAN COMMUNICATION

The minimal elements of the communication process are the relations between an addresser, an addressee, a channel, a goal, a code and a message. From the perspective of general system theory, either the addresser or the addressee may be designated system or environment. As described by Kremyanskiy (1968: 78), systems can be broadly defined on the basis of their relationship to their environment: isolated systems, closed systems and open systems. Systems absolutely isolated from their environments are hypothetical and purely abstract. Closed systems are those in which the effects of an exchange of matter/energy with the environment do not matter for a considerable period of time and these systems grow in disorder and are incapable of renewing themselves. Open systems are typified by necessary transactions (either periodic or continuous) of both matter and/or energy
and signs between the system and its environment. These transactions are necessary to the system's maintenance, continuity and ability to change (Buckley, 1967: 50). A further distinction may be made between open homeostatic systems and open adaptive systems (Buckley, 1968: 490 et seq.) A homeostatic system is one such as a biological organism (if any higher cortical functioning is temporarily ignored). Such a system is open and negentropic, that is, a distinguishing characteristic of this kind of system is its ability in its functioning to maintain the given structure of the system within certain pre-established limits. It is characterized by both energy and sign exchanges among its component parts but these function towards structure maintenance, rather than structure change. On the other hand, an open adaptive system is able to use its matter/energy and sign exchanges to change a given structure of the system if this is necessary for survival. This study is concerned with open adaptive systems and their interrelations with their environments.

Open adaptive systems are cybernetic systems. The term "cybernetics" comes from the Greek word Kubernetes or "steersman" and has achieved its popular status due to the work of Norbert Wiener, who is especially concerned with the theory of messages, and how this relates to problems of communication and control (Wiener, 1968: 31). Central to cybernetic theory is the concept of feedback, which can be loosely defined as control of action through incorporation of information about the effects of action.
In other words, a portion of the output of a system is fed back or recycled to the system as input. This input is used to affect the functioning of the system such that it can regulate its performance to reach a preset or adaptive goal.

Cybernetic systems are goal-directed, which, as Buckley pointed out (1967: 53), must be distinguished from goal-orient edness since "it is the deviations from the goal state itself that direct the behavior of the system, rather than some predetermined internal mechanism that aims blindly". Goal-directed systems operate by detecting errors and deviations (differences) in order to counteract, equalize or eliminate such errors. Such systems are traditionally termed negative feedback systems. Negative feedback acts to stabilize the status quo because it counteracts error or deviations from normative behavior (the desired goal). It serves to create an apparent steady state with maintenance processes involving reversible changes in support of the existing structures and processes. Within this framework, the concept of control is defined as a special kind of relation between, say, x and y such that x regulates y. Goal-directed systems are characterized by control loops (negative feedback loops) whereby the system output may be modified on the basis of information inputs regarding system performance, and the comparison of this performance with a criterion value or "goal".

As originally applied to human communication, the concept
of feedback implied a one-way process and a source-oriented view of the communication process. Sources (or senders) were thought of as initiating messages and sending them to receivers, thus causing certain effects in the receivers. Feedback was the information about the effects of the communication which was fed back to the source so these effects could be monitored and thereby controlled. Such an approach has certain attendant problems. For example, it cannot account for such processes as creativity or goal invention nor can it account for those cases where deviation increases instead of being "damped down", such as the accumulation of capital in industry, the evolution of living systems or profound personality change. A significant modification of the traditional feedback model which solves some of these problems has been offered by Maruyama (1968: 304-313). The new model was termed the "second cybernetics" since positive rather than negative feedback is involved. Put simply, positive feedback maximizes existing tendencies of the system and may introduce irreversible changes which alter existing structures and processes. Negative feedback processes are called deviation-counteracting and positive feedback processes are called deviation-amplifying by Maruyama. The former processes act to promote morphostasis and the latter act to promote morphogenesis. The system, by means of morphogenetic processes, may manifest growth, learning or evolution in time but it may also manifest disintegration processes.

In Maruyama's framework, feedback implies at least a two-directional mutually causal relationship between an inter-
connected system and environment. The control functions of the mutually causal processes are not localizable in any particular spot of the "feedback" loops. Events at any position may be expected to have effect on all positions at later times, or, as Maruyama (1968: 312) puts it, "In a loop, therefore, each element has an influence on all other elements either directly or indirectly, and each element influences itself through other elements".

The concept of environment has been defined in many ways by different researchers but the two most suitable definitions relative to the kind of systems with which this study is concerned are the following:

By 'environment' we shall understand those surrounding conditions which affect the organism or the results of its actions.

(Sommerhof, 1969: 155)

and

... the term environment is ambiguous. We are not interested in describing some physically objective world in its totality but only those aspects of the totality that have relevance as the 'life space' of the organism considered. Hence, what we call the 'environment' will depend upon the 'needs', 'drives', or 'goals' of the organism, and upon its perceptual apparatus.

(Simon, 1969: 215)

In the transactional perspective used in this study, there must be an inclusion of the observer within the field of observation. Therefore, it is no surprise to find system and
environment are relative concepts, and intrinsic to the definition of a particular system or environment is some "person" or "observer". For example, Hall and Fagen (1968: 83) take the position that a system together with its environment make up a specific universe of interest in a given context. Subdivision of this universe into system and environment can be done in many ways and is quite arbitrary, ultimately depending on the intentions of a particular observer. This position is by no means isolated among researchers, but in fact is taken by all embracing a "systems" framework. For example, it is held by Buckley (1967, 1968), Bateson (1972: 459) and Ackoff (1969: 332).

It is also necessary to make a distinction between the concepts of system and structure. This is because the kind of system with which this study is concerned (i.e. open adaptive systems) is able to utilize its energy and communicational exchanges with its environment to change a given structure of the system if this is necessary for survival. The point has been made by Buckley (1968: 493; 1968: xxiv) who has emphasized a given adaptive system may stabilize in any of a number of different internal organizations of varying significance for the system itself and its surroundings. The distinction between system and structure has also been made as follows:

The concept of structure concerns the types and the number of relationships or connections between the components (the subsystems) of the system. The concept of system concerns the way in which these regulations are used and the relations between the relations. This distinction follows in part from the fact that
highly complex systems (societies, for example) are capable of changing structure.

(Wilden, 1972: 204)

A tentative definition of a complex open adaptive system can now be put forward: a totality of coordinated activity bounded by a set of interrelated essential variables selected by an observer and kept within certain assigned limits compatible with a specific set of environmental conditions. A definition of such a system in terms of its varying structures is as follows: that set of all possible structures in which interrelated essential variables selected by an observer are kept within certain assigned limits compatible with a specific set of environmental conditions.

The final concept to be defined here is context, the unity within which system and environment are introduced as methodological distinctions. The system-environment exchanges with which we are concerned are processes occurring within a phasespace defined by time and space boundaries. A defining factor of such a phasespace is the system's semiotic capabilities in space and time. However, the phasespace is also defined by the capabilities of those factors in the general environment that are significant for the system's survival. For example, let us construct an hypothetical predator who could swim by, allow the shadow to fall on the sea urchin, wait out the duration of time required for the sea urchin to treat the shadow as an indicator of security and then pounce on the sea urchin.
Clearly, the survival phasisspace of the sea urchin system would be different in a situation where there was such a predator from a situation where there was not. This behavioral phasisspace is therefore the context of both system and environment in that both system and environment are parts of this whole.

The basic paradigm of sea urchin system and its environment has so far been considered from the point of view of the sea urchin. If we shift and look at it from the point of view of a predator (real or hypothetical), then we realize that this predator is also acting in response to "representative stimuli". Consequently, the phasisspace is a domain where the most critical factor for survival is the flow of representations, a continuous interchange of such representations. Yet such an interchange is obviously not random or unstructured. It is selective because of certain adaptively semiotic capabilities of both the system and its environment and these capabilities define the phasisspace. The phasisspace can be seen as a communication network which is organized, an organization of meanings. This clarifies why communication was defined by Ruesch (1953, rep. 1972: 83) as "an organizing principle of nature".

If the hypothetical predator became a constant factor in the survival phasisspace of sea urchin systems, then either sea urchins would die out or else they would have to evolve some new successful means of dealing with this kind of predator in order to survive. In defining communicational semiotics as the study
of survival, we can draw upon von Foerster (1968: 178). What is particularly interesting about his viewpoint is his discussion of survival in terms of communicational logic:

To survive is to anticipate correctly environmental events. The logical canon of anticipation is inductive inference, that is, the method of finding, under given evidence \( E \), the hypothesis \( H \) which is highly confirmed by \( E \) and is suitable for a certain purpose.

In von Foerster's viewpoint, a mutation is an hypothesis posed by a genetic structure and tested through the vehicle of a specific organism. This hypothesis is posed to a specific environment and if the mutation is successful it can be seen as a confirmation by the environment of the hypothesis. If it is not successful, the hypothesis can be regarded as disproved.

In much looser terms, it is possible to say that any system, whether mutation or not, is a vehicle for a question of survival posed to an environment and answered by means of yes or no. But neither the question nor the answer makes any sense without the other. What survives is the relationship linking system and environment. This relationship is empirically manifested in what we have termed the context of both system and environment, their survival phasespace, and it is this that evolves and survives:

... the evolution of the horse from Eohippus (sic) was not a one-sided adjustment to life on grassy plains. Surely the grassy plains themselves were evolved pari passu with the evolution of the teeth and hooves of the horses and other ungulates. Turf was the evolving response of the vegetation to the evolution of the horse. It is the context (sic) which evolves.

(Bateson, 1972: 155)
If system and environment are considered as parts of a whole, the context, this leads to the problem of organization and the relations, not only between the parts, but between the parts and the whole. It is necessary to point out the whole is on a different level of organization from the parts. According to Edel (1959: 167), the concept of levels originally referred to the emergence of qualities in the process of historical development. The concept of emergence is used to indicate the notion of lower order wholes becoming the building blocks of higher order wholes. The higher order wholes emerge from the integrated action of the lower order components. A higher order whole has qualities which its parts lack.

What of the relation between the whole and its parts? As a whole, the context is in an hierarchical relation to its parts. The most general definition of "hierarchy" is a "set of ordered levels". The definition used by Simon (1973) seems acceptable to others (Grobstein, 1973; Richards, 1976):

> In application to the architecture of complex systems, "hierarchy" simply means a set of Chinese boxes of a particular kind. ... Opening any given box in a hierarchy discloses not just one new box within, but a whole small set of boxes; and opening any one of these component boxes discloses a new set in turn.

(Simon, 1973: 5)

We must notice that the definition of "a set of ordered levels" tells us nothing about relations between levels. Some researchers use "hierarchy" so it requires a governing-governed relation between levels but not all of them do. According to Gerard
(1969) the vertical relations in an hierarchy are not symmetrical but are not unidirectional either, because "the whole influences the parts and the parts influence the whole". Presumably it would be up to the investigator to specify how this influence is different in quality or intensity, depending on the direction of the influence.

To summarize: system and environment as parts, are on a different level of organization from the whole, that is, the context, and the context is in an hierarchical relation to the system and its environment. However, another observer with different goals could have come along and elected to study what we have called "context" as a system in its own right. Relative to what we have termed "system", the other observer's "system" (i.e. our "context") could be termed a "supersystem". In turn, this "supersystem" would have to be studied in relation to its own environment, thus yielding a new context. We may postulate an hierarchy of systems, environments and contexts. To sum up, we can take a quotation from Grobstein (1973: 31):

In its simplest sense hierarchical order refers to a complex of successively more encompassing sets. In hierarchies a given set must be described not only for itself but in terms both of what is within it and what it is within.

A crucial question is the nature of the relationship between the parts (i.e. system and environment) in a whole (i.e. the context). Put succinctly, these relations are mediated relations. In order to understand what is meant by mediated
relations, it is necessary to turn to the valuable work of Angyal (1941, rep. 1969: 17-29). The starting point is the whole, the holistic organization within which the parts are embedded. In a whole, it is significant that the parts are arranged. In arranging parts within an holistic organization, one presupposes more than one part since one part alone cannot be arranged; secondly, one presupposes separation of the parts.

For these two presuppositions, one needs to postulate a "dimensional domain". The clearest examples of dimensional domains are space and time. As Angyal pointed out (1941, rep. 1969: 21), in the case of an holistic organization, the dimensional domain not only separates the parts but participates in the formation of the whole. The parts of an holistic organization do not become constituents of the whole primarily by means of their immanent qualities but rather by their arrangement within the whole. An element or part of an holistic organization does not participate in the whole by means of an inherent quality but rather by its positional value in the holistic organization. These positional values cannot be defined apart from the dimensional domain in which they are arranged. Consequently, the parts of an holistic organization are NOT objects or elements but the positional values of these elements or objects i.e. the parts are LOCI. Of course, Angyal went on to point out, elements or objects of an holistic organization may need to have certain attributes without which they could not possibly fill the positions assigned to them.
For example, if we consider a triangular geometrical arrangement it is obvious the elements have to be lines. Furthermore, the greater the organization of the whole, the more the inherent properties of the elements are utilized in the occupancy of the positions. In other words, the greater the degree of organization, the greater certain elements are "custom-made" for certain positions.

It was the nature of the interrelations between the parts of an holistic organization that preoccupied Angyl, who felt this problem could not be solved by conventional scientific logical thinking, but required a new logic. He distinguished between "relationships" or "relations" (those conventionally studied by science) and the connectedness between the parts of an holistic organization. His major contention was that whereas a "relation" required only two relata between which the relation was established, and a complex or compound "relation" could always be analyzed into pairs of relata (dyads), an holistic organization could not be so analyzed. This is because the whole imparts to its constituents a positional value which the given constituent does not have in itself but only when it forms part of the given whole. Consequently, whereas the parts of a "relationship" (i.e. the relata) were directly connected, this kind of connectedness was not applicable to the parts (relata) of any holistic organization. The constituent parts of a whole cannot be considered in their connectedness except with reference to a superordinate factor more inclusive than the parts, namely, the
holistic organization in and by means of which they are connected. These connections are therefore not direct, but mediated by the whole to which they belong, or to put it more clearly, by the principle of organization of the whole to which they belong. We can say that within the holistic organization of a context, system and environment are mediated in their connectedness by their relation to the principle of organization of the context. Consequently, the relations between system and environment are not dyadic but triadic.

The nature of triadic relations has also preoccupied Girard (1965). As a literary critic concerned with novelistic textual analysis, Girard deals with inter-character relations. He is therefore involved in social psychological discussion. His work is titled Deceit, Desire and the Novel and he deals with the self in relation to an object of desire in the context of mediated relations. At an abstract philosophical level, he deals with the subject/object dichotomy by claiming that the subject and object are in a triadic (i.e. mediated) relation hidden by modern seemingly oppositional philosophies.

The objective and subjective fallacies are one and the same; both originate in the image which we all have of our own desires. Subjectivisms and objectivisms, romanticisms and realisms, individualisms and scientisms, idealisms and positivisms appear to be in opposition but are secretly in agreement to conceal the presence of the mediator. They all depend directly or indirectly on the lie of spontaneous desire. They all defend the same illusion of autonomy to which modern man is passionately devoted.

(Girard, 1965: 16)
In Girard's model, the Subject (self) pursues an Object of desire only because the Object is already the Object of another's (the Mediator) desire. The Subject (self) acts in imitation of an Other. The starting point for Girard's analysis is Cervantes' novel, *Don Quijote*. The hero, Don Quijote, wishes to live the most perfect existence as a chivalric knight errant and models his life on Amadis de Gaul "the pole, the star, the sun for brave and amorous knights". As Girard says, (1965: 1):

Don Quijote has surrendered to Amadis the individual's fundamental prerogative: he no longer chooses the objects of his own desire - Amadis must choose for him. The disciple pursues objects which are determined for him, or at least seem to be determined for him, by the model of all chivalry. We shall call this model the mediator of desire. Chivalric existence is the imitation of Amadis in the same sense that the Christian's existence is the imitation of Christ.

As a paradigm of this threefold mediational model, the triangle was first proposed by Girard who explains:

The mediator is there, above that line (i.e. line of desire between self and object of desire, J.M.), radiating toward both the subject and the object. The spatial metaphor which expresses this triple relationship is obviously the triangle. The object changes with each adventure but the triangle remains.

(Girard, 1965: 2)
This basic model of mediated relations has been adapted by Wilden (1976: 192) to provide a basic model of the minimal requirements of a communication system. This model draws directly from general system theory, cybernetics and hierarchy theory and in the application of the model Wilden (1976) draws from many other disciplines as well. The model used in this study is chiefly an elaboration of the basic model offered by Wilden (1976: 192) applied specifically to the human communication process. The model is diagrammed below.

The addresser and addressee are goal-directed communicators. They can be conceptualized as system and environment. It is somewhat arbitrary and dependent on the person making the decision as to which one is to be treated as system and which as environment. The communicators are mediated by the various codes of their societal and cultural context and the different
communication media operating in the communicative situation. A code may be minimally defined as a set of rules governing the permissible use of representations (i.e. construction of messages) in a given situation. Examples of communication media are natural language, cinema, television, painting, literature, music, gesture. A message is minimally defined as a structured set of signs selected and combined according to the rules of various codes. In the diagram, dotted lines represent message channels while solid lines represent coding channels. The referent is that to which a sign "points". It bears a relationship to the sign comparable to the relationship of a territory to a map or of a meal to a menu (Nichols, 1976). The arrows indicate the mutually causal processes (both deviation counteracting and deviation amplifying) between the components of the model.

The context, considered as a human society, can be viewed as a complex adaptive learning network. It is organized by the different codes of economic relations and the dominant and subordinate ideologies operative in that society. Society has been defined by Buckley (1967: 94) as "an organization of meanings", and social organization as "a set of common meaning-based constraints in the ensemble of possible interactions of social units". Yet not every learning network is a society. The characteristic of restructuring has been seen by Deutsch (1951: 250-1) as a basic feature distinguishing society from an organism or a machine.
A learning net functions as a society, in this view, to the extent that its constituent physical parts are capable of regrouping themselves into new patterns of activity in response to the internally accumulating results of their own or the net's past. The twin tests by which we can tell a society from an organism or a machine, on this showing, would be the freedom of its parts to regroup themselves, and the nature of the regroupings, which must imply new coherent patterns of activity ...

Our conceptualization of society as a context makes society synonymous with survival phasespace. As Deutsch (1951: 252) argued, the natural environment still independent of a given society at a specific time limits the range of "patterns of culture" which that society can afford, or the range of societies which could survive:

Societies throughout all internal rearrangements slight or fundamental, always remain subject to a yardstick outside themselves: the test of survival and growth in independent and inexhaustible nature.

(Deutsch, 1951: 252. Emphasis in original)

In the diagram, the X represents the environment with which the society is relating. The environment can be considered as biological, physical, or the environment of other societies.

This capacity for restructuring is no doubt based, as George Herbert Mead argued (Mead, 1934, rep. 1962: 227-244) in similar vein, on the fact that, unlike insect social organizations which are based on an organizing principle of physiological differentiation, human societies are based on functional differentiation. If we agree with Deutsch (1951: 251-252) the
essential fact about a human society is "its members have learned to work together, to transmit to each other goods and services which are drawn, directly or indirectly, from the outside world of physical nature", then the basic organizing principles of human society are economic relations, kinship and language. But what makes such integrated activities possible? The answer suggested by Mead (1934, rep. 1962: 253-254) was as follows:

The principle which I have suggested as basic to human social organization is that of communication involving participation in the other. This requires the appearance of the other in the self, the identification of the other with the self, the reaching of self consciousness through the other. ... In the human group ... the person who ... communicates assumes the attitude of the other individual as well as calling it out in the other. ... It is through taking this role of the other that he is able to come back on himself and so direct his own process of communication.

Finally, in the diagram, the break in the solid lines indicated by = represent a change in the level of constraint between whole and part and between code and message. The concepts of organization, code and constraint are closely interrelated. According to Ashby (1962, rep. 1968: 108), an essential component of the concept of organization is that of "conditionality". By this it is meant that if a relationship between two variables A and B becomes conditional on the value or state of a third variable C, then a necessary component of organization is present. In considering conditionality, it is necessary to postulate a product space of possibilities within which some subset of points indicates the actualities. If for
any given event at A, all possible events at B may occur, then there is no organization between the variables. In short, there is no constraint operating in the product space of possibilities to limit the actualities that occur.

Communication between A and B implies there is some sort of correlation between A and B. The presence of communication indicates the presence of some sort of constraint, and organization can be conceptualized as restriction or constraint. The concept of conditionality can also be related to the notion of communication by considering the notion of information. Information is essentially related to a set of possibilities or alternatives and Ashby points out that communication necessarily demands a set of messages since the information that can be generated by means of a particular message partly depends on the set from which it is chosen, and is not a totally intrinsic property of the given message.

There is another point to be made about the concept of constraint. The product space of possibilities so prerequisite to formulating the constraint operative in a given situation partially represents the uncertainty of the observer. Given an actual set of events (i.e. actualities), two observers may quite legitimately utilize two different product spaces of possibilities within which to record the same actual set of events. A substantial part of the theory of hierarchical constraints concerns the relation between observer and observed.
The concept of code may be defined in terms of constraint:

A code may be defined as a set of constraints on the relative semiotic freedom of a set of goal seeking subsystems within a wider system. The code constrains the kinds of differential relations and/or selections and combinations making up messages (and therefore the kinds of behavior) permissible within the system.

(Wilden, 1976: 191)

THE SEMIOTIC SELF IN CONTEXT

In outlining a theory of the self from a communicational point of view, there are four major questions to be considered. These bear on the existence of the self, its nature, its knowledge of itself and self-other relations. One of the distinguishing characteristics of human beings is their cultural mode of adaptation. This should not be taken to imply that cultural adaptation must be opposed to biological adaptation. It can be held culture is precisely the human biological mode of adaptation. More precisely, this can be expressed by saying humans are biologically fitted for culture. In this view, the self is inherently social rather than simply socialized.

Human sociocultural order is dependent upon role differentiation. Consequently, at any level, the general principle underlying human sociocultural organization is the predictability of role behavior on the part of individuals in a wide variety of situations. Such predictability occurs of course within limits. In humans these behavioral regularities are implemented by means of what has been termed the "normative orientation" character-
istic of all human societies (Hallowell, 1960, rep. 1968: 225).

A normative orientation or "value system" performs an ordering function in human transactions. It promotes the broad expectations which are of the essence of role differentiation in human sociocultural systems. While at the phylogenetic level human beings were the creators of culture, at the ontogenetic level we are the products of culture. At the latter level we play an integral part in the perpetuation of specific sociocultural systems to the degree that variations in personality structure and certain roles which we are groomed to play become a necessary condition for the survival and functioning of such systems. The perpetuation of a specific sociocultural system demands a psychological structuralization of individuals in an organized system of social action. All human individuals become psychologically structured through a learning process for participation in specific sociocultural systems. Consequently, viewed in this perspective, the existence of the self or "personality structure" is dependent on membership in an organized sociocultural group just as much (if not more) as it is on inherited organic equipment.

The functioning of a normatively oriented sociocultural order requires certain psychological capacities on the part of individuals. A value-oriented social order means there is a common framework of socially recognized and sanctioned standards of behavior. Individuals operate within this framework by utilizing a capacity for self-objectification in the appraisal
of their own conduct and that of others, and by identifying with their own conduct over time. This leads to the problem of how the self can know itself. How can the self be both subject and object?

A communicational answer to this question was given by George Herbert Mead (1934: 138). In Mead's point of view, the self does not know itself directly; its knowledge of itself is mediated by an "other" in a communication process. In other words, in self-objectification the self regards itself through the eyes of an "other". The essential criterion of self-consciousness is a certain reflexiveness, a turning back, a recognition of appearance of a self as object. Within the concept of the self, there is a certain duality. An individual speaking of his/her self may be referring to himself/herself as an active agent or doer (an active dynamic subject) or to his/her attitude about himself/herself, the self-concept or self-image. For Mead, the term "self" included the duality, both the "I" and the "me". In this framework, a distinction is made between consciousness per se and self-consciousness. The latter carries with it that differentiation of the individual from the others surrounding him/her. The ability to distinguish difference is linked with the ability to detect sameness because sameness is different from difference. Differentiation of the self can only be carried out with reference to "something" apart from the self, an "other". Such a reference point is necessary for us to "turn back" on ourselves:
It is just because the individual finds himself taking the attitudes of the others who are involved in his conduct that he becomes an object for himself. It is only by taking the role of others that we have been able to come back to ourselves.

(Mead, 1924-25: 268)

But how is it possible to take the role of an other? For Mead, the medium of communication by which this is made possible is language as vocal gesture (Mead, 1924-25: 271). Gestures are "the early stages in the overt social act to which other forms involved in the same act respond" (Mead, 1924-25: 271). A distinction is made between significant communication and non-significant communication. Humans are distinguished by their ability to engage in significant communication. Communication becomes significant to the individuals engaged in the act when the individual who makes a gesture calls out in himself/herself the same tendency to act that is called out in an other. It is because of this that vocal gestures are so important, because the vocal gesture is heard also by the person who makes it.

By means of significant communication human sociocultural systems can function as normatively oriented social orders because of the commonly shared value-orientation of self-conscious individuals. These self-conscious individuals appraise themselves and others in relation to sanctioned moral conduct. All organisms develop internal representations (cognitive maps) of the life-space significant for their adaptive survival. The human mode of cultural adaptation means
that humans depend for their survival on other humans. Because of this, certain other humans (e.g. parents, dominant humans) become internally represented in our cognitive maps. These are Other. The other human individual whose state of being and existence (past, present and future) is important is Self. In this context of this totality of Self and Other, the experiencing, internalizing self becomes other-conscious and self-conscious (Mark; 1978: 109). The self can be considered an information-processing system which, in communication with itself and others, attempts to achieve congruency between its adaptively significant life-world and its own "internal representation" or "cognitive map" of this world. Such a system is called self-conscious or self-aware because it must monitor its own "internal" representations and its own state of being and behavior. Such a system is open, adaptive and self-correcting (Barkow, 1978: 101).

If the self can only know itself through the mediation of an "other", who is the "other" on whom the self is dependent for its self-image and self-appraisal? The answer to this question was given by Mead (1924-25 and 1934) in the concept of the "generalized other". A two-stage theory of the development of this process of "taking the role of the other" in the individual child was developed by Mead (1924-25: 269). These two stages are play and the game. In play, the child rehearses taking the role of the other by imitation. This means the child excites in himself/herself the same responses that he/she calls
out in the other. At this stage the activity is one where the child simply assumes one role after another. The game differs from play in that it is a regulated procedure with rules. Here the child must assume the various roles of all the participants in the game, and govern his/her action accordingly. These roles organize into one unit and it is this organization that controls the acts of the child.

It may be appropriate here to point out Mead's theory of the "generalized other" is founded on an ambiguous use of "organization". (Quarantelli and Cooper, 1966: 285-286). In one passage Mead speaks of the "generalized other" as the process whereby the person "takes the attitudes of the organized social group to which he belongs" (Mead, 1934: 155). This formulation stresses the actor's organizing of attitudes toward himself. It is a formulation from the social actor's viewpoint and it is somewhat popular in the literature dealing with this subject. For example, Miller (1973: 49) defines the "generalized other" as "the organized set of attitudes, and their corresponding responses which are common to the group", and on the same page, "an organization of the attitudes of members of the community, whether actual or ideal". Kolb (1944: 293) speaks of the "generalized other" as "the generalized pattern of attitudes or generalized other which make up the personality of the individual". Finally, Quarantelli and Cooper (1966: 288) also choose to emphasize the social actor's perceptions. This part of the ambiguous Meadian formulation
can be severely criticized on the grounds it ignores a world of events and structures existing independently of the social actor's consciousness or perceptions. As Niebuhr (1945: 352) has pointed out, the self does not freely choose and freely represent the "other" to itself. The "other" presenting itself to the self may be aggressive or friendly and the self may not have power to fashion it in the self's own image. Furthermore, there seems no reason to subscribe to the assumption the "other" is an impartial disinterested spectator. The "other" is profoundly attached to certain beings, values or modes of conduct.

The second way in which "organization" is used by Mead emphasizes the structure of social activity and is from a viewpoint external to the social actors under consideration. This is the formulation emerging from Mead's famous example of the baseball team. In the case of such a social group as a ball team "... the team is the generalized other in so far as it enters - as an organized process or social activity - into the experience of any one of the individual members of it" (Mead, 1934: 154). From this perspective, human communicators within society take the roles of other members of the society (who may be distinguished as particular others, significant others, authoritative others) and of the generalized other or "Other". The Other is a transindividual organized relational pattern of the social process as a whole within which human communicators are embedded. This societal context mediates the formation of
human selves and of self-other relations in the society. It also mediates the processes in which communicators use communication media to produce messages. Furthermore, this formulation does not necessarily exclude consideration of the attitudes, and/or perceptions of the social actors but will not ignore the degree to which these attitudes and perceptions are constrained by the particular social positions of the different social actors.

Another criticism that can be levelled against the formulation which stresses the attitudes and perceptions of the social actors is it dissolves the concept of "false consciousness". Partly this is due to the fact that for Mead the generalized other is the rational cognitive part of the self (Miller, 1973: 53). Such a position is open to attack, particularly if a link is made between the social psychological parameters of human nature in general and unconscious defense processes. There is some evidence for some kind of discontinuity between "what we feel" and "what we know". It may be that while human abstracting intellectual activity is greatly influenced by the neocortex of the brain, the human emotions are dominated by an older part of the brain, the "visceral brain" (Freedman and Roe, 1958: 459-460).

This generates a predisposition for conflict and anxiety in humans. In any case, conflict and anxiety may be generated by the fact that all human societies are characterized by a "normative orientation" or sanctioned moral order. This culturally constituted moral order may impose a burden on the individual self because it is not always easy to reconcile...
societal demands with idiosyncratic needs.

Unconscious defense processes appear then as adaptive means for relieving conflict and anxiety. The defenses can be viewed as instances of social control being imported as self-control. In this connection, a valuable point has been made by Swanson (1961: 335) on the origin and nature of each defense process in an individual self. Basically, Swanson is urging the social nature of the defense processes:

Each first exists as a relation between persons, becoming internalized in the course of learning to participate in such relations. In each case, the whole relationship, which includes the influences that actors exert on one another, is imported. Thus what are often called the "dynamics" of the relationship are internalized along with the actors concerned.

(Emphasis added)

There is yet another way of tackling this problem of conscious and unconscious processes. A communicational theory of knowledge drawing upon cybernetics and general system theory cannot view the mind as co-extensive with consciousness. It has been argued by Bateson (1972: 432) that the networks of mind must include all networks of unconscious mentation such as autonomic and repressed, neural and hormonal, and unconscious habits of perception. An illustration is drawn from television. A television screen cannot give total coverage or report of the events which occur in the whole television process because to report on any extra part of the total process would require extra circuitry. Reporting on the events in this extra circuitry
however would require still more circuitry and so on. The whole of the mind cannot therefore be reported in a part of the mind. In this theoretical perspective, not only is the mind not considered co-extensive with consciousness, but the primacy of consciousness is called into question. Consciousness is not only a part of the total mind, it is "constructed". We have to settle for a very limited consciousness and we must ask ourselves how it is selected out of the total mind:

... the obvious can be very difficult for people to see. That is because people are self-corrective systems. They are self-corrective against disturbance, and if the obvious is not of a kind that they can easily assimilate without internal disturbance, their self-corrective mechanisms work to sidetrack it, to hide it, even to the extent of shutting the eyes if necessary, or shutting off various parts of the process of perception. Disturbing information can be framed like a pearl so that it doesn't make a nuisance of itself; and this will be done, according to the understanding of the system itself of what would be a disturbance. This too - the premise regarding what would cause disturbance - is something which is learned and then becomes perpetuated or conserved.

(Bateson, 1972: 429)

Consciousness is not to be located within the biological skin-bound organism. In the approach used here, consciousness is conceived as knowledge processes concerning the state of the system in its relationship to its environment, i.e. the state of the context at a given time. Learning is impossible without memory and self-correctiveness. In turn, self-corrective behaviour presupposes consciousness as it is defined here. In our view, consciousness is not "internal" to the system alone,
but is a characteristic of the context, that unity within which system and environment are parts. The grounds for making this assertion are as follows: self-corrective behavior of necessity is conscious behavior; conscious behavior is made possible by mutually causal processes between an interconnected system and environment which form a network or interconnected loop (a context); since events at any position in the loop may be expected to have an effect on all positions at later times, consciousness is not a characteristic of one "control centre" but rather is a characteristic of the entire loop or learning network. This view of consciousness regards it as essentially holistic in contradistinction to an "individualistic" view of consciousness.

An example drawn from human communication can reveal the conceptualization of mind and consciousness within the theoretical perspective of communicational semiotics. The example is drawn from Bateson (1972: 459), and it is of a blind man using a stick to help himself through the streets. The stick is a pathway organizing the blind man's relationship to his environment and serving as a communication medium by means of which he can orient himself in space. If an observer is trying to explain the locomotion of the blind man, for example, then the stick, the street, the man and so on must be included in the mental process. However, as soon as the blind man sits down to eat his lunch, then the stick is no longer relevant if the observer is trying to explain how this eating occurs. From this we may conclude
that the networks of mind are not bounded by boundaries of the physical skin-bound biological individual. The networks of mind must include all communicative pathways (internal and external to the skin-bound organism) relevant to the goal-directed decision-making activity.

It has probably been noticed in the discussion of the blind man that whether the stick was to be included in the mental process depended on the purpose of the observer. This of course is in line with the transactional perspective taken in this study in which it is considered necessary to include the observer and the process of observing in the field of observation. Contexts, systems and environments are delimited empirically by a process of punctuation, i.e., the placing of a boundary by an observer. Different researchers may locate boundaries differently and at different levels. The function of a boundary is one of regulated admission and exclusion; boundaries constitute some kind of "break" and when functioning normally act as a selective filter.

In the perspective of communicational semiotics, a "personality trait" can be seen as a kind of "transaction" between the system and its environment, or "self" and "other" (Bateson, 1972: 279-308). Every transaction between persons is a learning context. No one can be "dominant", "conservative", "anxious" in a vacuum. Such words are descriptions of patterns of relationships between system and environment. Because such
descriptions inevitably involve punctuation, such words can only take on definable meaning in referring to segments of transactions. Whether a particular pattern is to be labelled "dominant" or "submissive" will partly depend on who is making the punctuation. From our point of view, the locus of the self is not to be considered within the biological skin-bound organism but in the patterned processes interrelating the system and environment.

There is one further point to be made about the nature of this Other who mediates the formation of human selves and self-other relations. The criticism has been levelled against Mead that his conception of the "generalized other" depends on the assumption that the self lives in only one homogeneous society for the generalized other incorporates the whole society, (Gerth and Mills, 1953; Niebuhr, 1945). This emphasis on the genesis of shared values through communication and participation tends to hide sources of conflict in society. However, it seems the notion of "generalized other" or Other may be kept without necessarily holding to the idea of a homogeneous and totally cooperative society. We can acknowledge there must be a Dominant "Other" in any given sociocultural system. It is this Dominant Other which may be equated with the "generalized other". In other words, this Dominant Other can be taken to refer to the dominant social relations of production and appropriation of the social surplus and the dominant "normative orientation" or ideology serving to perpetuate and legitimize these relations.
The differentiation of the self from the other arises within a social process of recognition of others and the Other in ourselves, and the recognition of ourselves in others and the Other. If human society is essentially a society of individual selves who take the attitude of the other and toward themselves, then it follows the most important function of human communicative activity is precisely the continuous creation, maintenance and change of these selves. According to this view, people are constantly offering each other and to the Other definitions of their social relationships and of their selves in these relationships. Broadly speaking, there are three possible responses to such proffered definitions. The recipient may confirm the definitions; or the recipient may reject them. Rejection presupposes some recognition, however limited, of what is being rejected. In fact, certain kinds of rejection may be more adaptive than some kinds of confirmation. A therapist may choose to reject certain maladaptive definitions proffered by the client. Rejection may therefore even be a necessary prerequisite for the client to come to a realization that alternatives exist for him/her. Finally, the recipient may disconfirm the proffered definitions. Whereas rejection amounts to "You are wrong", disconfirmation does not recognize the other as a person and in effect says "You do not exist as a person, as one of us". Disconfirmation may occur in conjunction with a confirmation of existence as an object, with full statement amounting to "You are not a person, you are a thing". Once a self is not granted the full value of personal recognition,
the self may be granted recognition of varying value in a process of objectification. Such a self may be treated as a non-human or a stone.

In order for us to recognize an other as a person, it is necessary to recognize ourselves in that other. We treat that other as we treat ourselves. We attribute to that other a certain personal agency that we ourselves experience as an "I"; we attribute goals, hopes, fears. Now, as MacKay (1962: 89-103) has pointed out, each of us could never embody an up-to-date and complete description of our own total state. This is due to the limited nature of consciousness. Each of us therefore remains to a degree necessarily unspecifiable in full detail to ourselves. A personal account of a situation is inevitably an underspecified one. In so far as two people engage in a communicational transaction and form a new whole, each individual's underspecifiability affects the other, and each becomes incapable of representing the other as a fully-specified object. But personal recognition is in a sense "optional" because there is always the possibility of a refusal of recognition.

The granting of personal recognition appears to depend on what has been referred to by MacKay (1962: 100-101) as a "curious logic - a blend of deduction and commitment". If we use the terms "subjective" and "objective" to refer to the phases of personal recognition, we can see that the deductive part of
the recognition deals with the "objective" and the commitment part with the "subjective". We grant personal recognition because the situation is such that we deduce it admits of and supports a certain underspecification. We attribute "goals" and "fears" to the other because it assists us in understanding and regulating the situation. But the granting requires us to adopt the appropriate standpoint from which the situation acquires a certain underspecification. It is obvious that in certain societies there may be individuals who will be denied recognition as persons because the organized social process is so structured its maintenance requires they be treated as objects.

Ideology: A Cybernetic Approach

We can make a methodological distinction within the Other to enable us to talk of the Ideological Other and the Economic Other. By the Economic Other, we simply mean "the social relations of production and appropriation of the social surplus". This distinction is somewhat analogous to the well known "Superstructure" and "Base" metaphor in Marxist theory. In our perspective, the Ideological Other and the Economic Other both operate at conscious and unconscious levels of communication. The distinctions are viewed solely as methodological in that neither one is assigned a genetic chronological priority over the other and the existence of each one is seen as pre-supposing the other.
The refusal to assign either chronological genetic priority or even logical priority to the Economic Other is due to the fact that if this were done insurmountable obstacles would appear. The reason for this is quite simply that the social relations of production and appropriation of the social surplus (i.e. the Economic Other) are of necessity communicational relations and therefore inherently ideological. Not to conceive them in this way means giving rise to two untenable theoretical implications: (a) it would be necessary to postulate ideological "ideas" existing outside language and communication (this is rank idealism); or (b) it would be necessary to postulate the social relations of production and appropriation of the social surplus as non-communicational. At this point, we can anticipate an objection: given two societies, one socialist and one capitalist, with two distinct "Others" but both speaking "English", how can we say that "English" is ideological? Within the confines of a theory of communicational semiotics, there can be no equivocation on this point. The answer must be that other disciplines may have for their objects of investigation the specificity of a "language" or "communication medium" but communicational semiotics must be primarily interested in the use to which the communication medium and texts constructed within it are put. This is not to deny that the nature of a communication medium affects the way it can be used and the way it is used affects its nature.

We can illustrate our conceptualization of ideology by
drawing on the notion of the "family myth" as this is utilized in psychotherapy theory and research. The "family myth" is described in the literature by Watzlawick et al (1967: 172-178) and Ferreira (1963: 457-463). It does not seem far fetched to use this metaphor to conceptualize ideology for it is already a custom to refer to ideology in terms of myth (Camargo, 1974: 8; Barthes, 1957: 109-159). According to Ferreira (1963: 457), the "family myth" designates a set of fairly well-integrated beliefs shared by all family members concerning each other and their position in the family. It refers to the definitions of the selves and the relationships, the identified roles of the family members, as these have become stabilized. The family myth represents the "nodal resting points in the relationship", the boundaries or defined limits of stability within which the relationship definitions can remain. It is a part of the inner image of the family group, the way the family appears to its own members. The content of the myth represents a group departure from reality, but the very existence of the myth is real, and by this reality, shapes and shapes the children born into the family and the outsiders who come into contact with the family. It modifies the perceptual context of family behavior and imposes upon the members a certain necessary limitation on awareness. The myth ascribes roles and prescribes behavior which in turn will strengthen those roles.

According to Ferreira (1963: 457), the function of the myth is primarily homeostatic. It serves to perpetuate the
family and protect it from dissolution. It legitimizes and consecrates the ongoing relationships and provides ready made "explanations" of the directives and rules that govern the relationships. It therefore "explains" the behavior of the individual family members while at the same time hiding the motives for this behavior. The myth has primarily a survival value. It is a self-corrective device that is called into play when deviations from the relationship norms reach a certain level that threaten to disrupt the ongoing relationships. Thus it often becomes a formula for action, a survival strategy, to be taken at certain defined points in the relationship. As Ferreira (1963: 462-463) observes:

The struggle to maintain the myth is part of the struggle to maintain the relationship - a relationship that is obviously experienced as vital, and for which, it seems, the child may have no choice in reality, while the parents have no choice in fantasy.

(Emphasis added)

The above description of the "family myth" in its nature and function is strikingly similar to what has been commonly theorized about ideology. Like the "family myth", ideology is seen as having the function of maintaining and legitimizing the social relations existing between members of society. And like the "family myth", the content of ideology is seen as false and imposing a certain amount of insightlessness. Like the "family myth", ideology can be considered a self-corrective societal strategy to ensure the survival of the status quo. As a survival strategy, it becomes a "formula for action", a problem-solving
logic that governs what can be defined as a disturbance to the relationship, the solutions that can be envisioned for these problems and the solutions that are considered acceptable.

So far we have been talking about "ideology". It is useful to note that the cybernetic approach can handle both the existence of dominant and subordinate ideologies within the same society. What we have basically done is conceptualize the dominant ideology as a "negative feedback" or "deviation counteracting process", occurring within a societal context. Such a context is a complex adaptive goal-directed learning network. At the societal level, the goal will be maintenance of the economic relations i.e. the social relations of production and appropriation of the social surplus. However, since the societal context is adaptive it must be self-corrective. This means that there must always be some deviation from the goal state because the deviation is depended upon to bring about the corrective flexible behavior. It does not seem unreasonable to hypothesize that the subordinate ideologies operate in this space of deviation. The objective of the dominant ideology as a negative feedback or deviation counteracting process is to make the deviations from the desired set of conditions as small as possible. On the other hand, the objective of the subordinate ideologies is to amplify the deviations, thus they are deviation amplifying processes or examples of positive feedback.

We have talked about the "family myth" when it is operative.
What happens when the "family myth" becomes seriously threatened by developing events or perhaps even inoperative? First of all, it was noted by Ferreira (1963: 458-460) the "family myth" generally emphasizes one of two general themes: (a) the theme of happiness, that "all is well"; and (b) the theme of unhappiness of one or more of the family members. The distinction between these themes is important because the themes are directly related to the kind of action taken when the myth begins to lose its effectivity in constraining the family relationships. The myth is related to the action taken in that it governs the motives for seeking "help" and defines what kind of help is expected, i.e. "acceptable". The theme of happiness aims to keep the status quo by doing nothing to actually change the relationships and seeks from the psychiatric "expert" the pronouncement that "you have nothing to worry about". Any action to actually change the daily living relationships will be blocked by the family members. The theme of unhappiness aims at promoting action that "something will be done" to "improve" or "cure" or "help" a certain person who is "suffering" or "has a problem". This person is usually already identified as the "patient" before the family even sees the psychotherapist. This theme is especially dangerous because the very procedures of psychotherapy can become an integral part of the myth.

If we extend this to ideology, we may expect that a given ideology may manifest certain "themes" but in the final analysis it is not sufficient to detect these "themes" but rather to
detect how they function in a given societal context. Furthermore, because of the level structure of communication processes, what is deviation counteracting at one level (e.g. the family or society) may be deviation amplifying at another level (e.g. the individual family member develops a "symptom" or a social group engages in more "crime").

The patterns of relationship between self and other will vary according to the form of the Other. The Other varies according to the specific society. In a society where the social relations of production are based on competitive and individualistic relations, the Other will demand such relations between self and other. Broadly speaking, we may identify two major patterns of self-other relations: symmetrical (based on equality and the minimization of difference) and complementary (based on the maximization of difference). In a symmetrical relationship, the self and other tend to mirror each other. Two different positions characterize a complementary relationship (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 67-71). The behavioral gestalt in this pattern of relationship is formed by dissimilar but fitted behaviors evoking each other. Each of these patterns of relationships may occur within a frame set by the other pattern. For example, a dominance-subordinate relationship is a complementary relationship taking place within a larger context of symmetry. A loving relationship between parent and child is complementary in that the communicators exhibit different behaviors to form a nurturing-nurtured relationship. Yet parent and child may choose
to take part in a game such as tennis. Their relationship, if it is a loving one, within this game would be symmetrical, taking place within the larger context of complementarity. In this model, the paradigm of a humane non-oppressive relationship between adults would be one characterized by both complementary (nurturing-nurtured) relationships and symmetrical relations (based on equality) with optimum flexibility in switching from one mode to another within a larger context of complementarity. The pattern of symmetrical relationship within a larger context of symmetry may be exemplified (with reference to North American society, for example), by two white, Anglo-Saxon male executives from the same socio-economic class competing for the same job position.

Where the Other is Capitalism

Capitalism may be defined as a particular societal mode of production in which labour is treated as a commodity (something produced to be exchanged on the market) and is bought and sold on the market like any other object of exchange; and this commoditization of labour is the major structuring principle of economic organization. The historical prerequisite for capitalism was the separation of the producers from the means of production and the concentration of the latter in a few hands. As a mode of production, capitalism may be distinguished from slavery and feudalism by the purely contractual relations between the worker and the owner of the means of production.
According to Edwards, Reich and Weisskopf (1972: 88-92) the four basic institutions of capitalism are as follows:

1. private ownership of the means of production
2. a market in labor
3. private property i.e. legal relations of ownership providing to owners the right to control the property's use and disposition
4. Homo Economicus, a partly idealized personality type motivated by individual gain incentives, the belief that an individual's happiness and welfare is increased by income increase and the human's natural proprietary urge can only be satisfied by the ownership of private property. Homo Economicus in short is the psychological type corresponding to the ideology of possessive individualism and the "secret self" that we have outlined in a previous chapter. The organization of society by means of the wage labor contract is individualistic, because Homo Economicus faces the market alone, stripped of counteracting supportive traditions of community and kinship ties. In this kind of society, there is always the possibility of individual starvation in the midst of group plenty.

(a) Class

Since there is unequal capital ownership in a capitalist society, inequality is functionally necessary to the society. Such a society is of necessity a class society and a class may be
defined as a social group whose members stand in common relationship to the production and appropriation of the social surplus. Inequalities in capital ownership and in income thereby derived, as well as inequalities in income deriving from the market in labor, create inequalities in power; that is, "the ability of groups to resolve the outcomes of social conflict processes in their own favour" (Edwards and MacEwan et al, 1970, rep. 1972: 136), and in freedom. The wage labourer who sells his labor power to an employer on the market for a wage does not meet on equal terms with his capitalist employer. There is no real freedom of contract operating here. While the wage labourer is not compelled to work for a specific employer, his/her labor power must be sold to someone because this is the sole means of gaining subsistence, of survival. On the other hand, capitalists enter the wage bargain solely to enhance their profits. It can be argued that it is impossible for a generalized quantitative method of exchange to ever match the value of what is essentially qualitative i.e. the worker's life; for in selling his/her labor power, the worker sells not only energy and creativity but time, his/her lifespan, and time is the non-renewable resource par excellence. Capitalist society is therefore of necessity an oppressive society:

It is important to realize that, so far as capitalist society is concerned, "class domination" and "the protection of private property" are virtually synonymous terms. . . . Capitalist private property does not consist of things -- things exist independently of their ownership -- but in a social relation between people. Property confers upon its owners freedom from labour and the disposal over the labour of others, and this is the essence
of all social domination whatever form it may assume.

(Sweezy, 1942, rep. 1972: 134-135)

(b) Racism

Capitalist society is also a society characterized by racism. Racism can be defined as "the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of race for the purpose of subordinating a racial group and maintaining control over that group" (Carmichael and Hamilton, 1967, rep. 1972: 291) or "the systematic oppression by one race of another" (Boggs and Boggs, 1970, rep. 1972: 306). The rise of capitalism was paralleled with the quickened rise of racism as people from various strata of society on both sides of the Atlantic profited from the slave trade (Boggs and Boggs, 1970, rep. 1972: 306) and the extension of the American Empire was historically founded on the racist extermination of American Indians (Reich, 1972: 316).

Individual racism means the attitudes and prejudices of individuals towards the socially oppressed groups. This is a form of racism to be distinguished from institutional racism, the normal functioning of institutions in such a way that, often without conscious intent on the part of the actual individuals involved, a certain social group is subordinated.

The advantages of racism to the colonial powers are somewhat obvious: the plunder of the wealth in raw materials and people belonging to the colonies. Less obvious is the
continuing institutional advantage of present-day racism against blacks in such a country as the United States. It has been strongly argued by Reich (1972: 314-321), who brought forward empirical evidence to support his hypothesis, that racism is in the interests of capitalists and rich whites and against the economic interests, not only of blacks, but of poor whites and white workers. Areas demonstrating higher degrees of racism also manifest lower unionization rates and a greater degree of schooling inequality among whites. Racism also has been held to play a stabilizing function in the maintenance of capitalism. For example, by contributing to the antagonisms between members of the society, it thereby weakens antagonism to the capitalist class and helps to hide the shared class interest of black and white workers. The inequalities of capitalist society and the pressures of alienated labour tend to generate certain socio-psychological pressures which gain an outlet against a pariah group. For example, after surveying the evidence, Brown (1965: 744-753) conceded:

In the impoverished counties where the Negroes were a small minority they were also economic competitors with the poor whites and it was the poor whites who were the usuallynchers.

It seems probable that the Negro because of his second-class citizenship has often been the recipient of aggression generated by frustrations of which he was in no sense the cause.
(c) **Sexism**

While it is true that *sexism* predated capitalism, nevertheless capitalist society is sexist and it can be argued strongly that sexism is functionally necessary to maintenance of capitalist society. An adaptation of the definition of racism that was offered can serve as a definition of sexism: the predication of decisions and policies on considerations of sex for the purpose of subordinating a sexual group and maintaining control over that group. Like racism, sexism may be individual and/or institutional, conscious and unconscious, and multidimensional in its practices and effects i.e. operative in economic, physical and such social-psychological spheres as intellectual, moral and affective. Though women comprise roughly half the population, nevertheless their systematic oppression is such that they can be considered a "minority group".

A systematic application of the usual sociological theory and methodology used for investigating such "minority groups" as Jews, Blacks, and immigrants was applied to women by Hacker (1951: 65) who commented:

The relation between women and Negroes is historical, as well as analogical. In the seventeenth century the legal status of Negro servants was borrowed from that of women and children, who were under the patria potestas, and until the Civil War there was considerable cooperation between the Abolitionist and woman suffrage movements.

This line of interpretation was continued by Freeman (1974) who compared the findings of Gordon Allport in his well known
study of The Nature of Prejudice with a review of the literature on sex differences. "Feminine" traits manifested by female subjects were found to bear a close resemblance to those "traits due to victimization" which Allport had found manifested by Jews and Blacks:

This combination of group self-hate and distortion of perceptions to justify that group self-hate are precisely the traits typical of a "minority group character structure". ... These traits, as well as the others typical of the "feminine" stereotype, have been found in the Indians under British rule, in the Algerians under the French, and in Black Americans. There seems to be a correlation between being "feminine" and experiencing status deprivation.

(Freeman, 1974: 26)

The link between the family and societal economic organization has been argued by Morton (1970, rep. 1972: 121) to be as follows:

The family is a unit whose function is the maintenance of and reproduction of labor power, i.e., that the structure of the family is determined by the needs of the economic system, at any given time, for a certain kind of labor power ...

(Emphasis in original)

The family not only biologically produces the workers of the next generation but helps to socialize these workers to become productive members of the work force. In addition, the family maintains the present workers because the wives labour every day so their husbands can produce efficiently on the job. Wives feed their husbands, clean their clothes, reinforce their need (both economic and motivational) to compete in the market and
provide them with psychological support. In this way, though housewives work outside the money economy, they perform socially necessary labour. In fact, a 1970 Chase Manhattan Bank study has estimated that a married woman's average working week is around 99.6 hours a week, (Mitchell, 1975: 65-66), and it has been estimated in Sweden that 2,340 million hours a year are spent by women in housework compared with 1,290 million hours spent by women in industry (Mitchell, as cited by Benston, 1969: 13-27).

Under capitalism the nuclear family appears to be separated from production and the wife's labour appears as a "private" service to her husband. In reality however the wages of the husband-father "pay" for this socially necessary labour. Thus under capitalism labour power is consistently undervalued because wages are paid for the labour of one person while they purchase the labour of two people. Again, by making children the personal responsibility of the husband-father, capitalism makes the family shoulder the costs of education. Yet education is nothing other than part of the production of labour power because its primary function is to give the workers the skills and values suitable for industry. Finally, the economic oppression of women provides a convenient reserve supply of cheap labour. All these economic benefits to the owners of capital have been elaborated by Dixon (1965: 56-68).

It has been strongly argued (Dixon, 1965: 56-68), sexism
also serves to stabilize capitalist society in other ways. For example, it serves to hide class interests shared by both male and female workers. It reduces the male’s ability to withhold his labour from the market by making his wife his personal responsibility. It serves as a means of psychological displacement of male hostility engendered by the competitive pressures of the marketplace by providing a source of gratification to men who can exert power over their family. Thus in an article dealing with sexism and violence in the family, Straus (1976: 54) found that evidence existed to justify calling the marriage licence a "hitting" licence. Evidence that violence in the family is linked to economic conditions was cited. Males must demonstrate their superiority over women by superiority in "resources" such as material goods and services as well as valued personal traits. Where this cannot be done, men fall back on the "ultimate resource" of physical force, with the collusion of the legal and economic systems, as well as cultural norms legitimizing such violence. Statistical evidence was cited by Straus (1976: 63) to show that there was no correlation between power and violence among working class husbands who were high in "resources" but a correlation of .49 between male power and violence among working class husbands low in resources. In summary, there are strong grounds for agreeing with Reich (1972: 355) that the sexist structure of the family under capitalism serves to maintain the ideology of possessive individualism.

From the above discussion we can see that where the Other
is capitalism, the Other is hierarchical, competitive, individualistic, classist, racist and sexist. Since the Other is nothing more than principles or organizing relations (codes) among people, such are the social relations in a capitalist society. And since selves arise in the social process of taking the role of the other and the Other, these are the social relations that constitute the context for the formation of selves in capitalist society.
CHAPTER FIVE

THE METHOD: CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with the transactional approach used in this study, the unit of investigation in contextual analysis is considered the transaction, that is, the observer, the process of observing, and the observed. These terms can be translated into interpreter, the process of interpreting and what is interpreted. Once the unit of investigation has been delimited in this way, certain canons regarding the interpreter/interpreted relation follow.

One such major canon is that there is no longer the expectation that the process of interpretation should result in one "true" interpretation, a "restoration of meaning". It has been demonstrated by Ashby (1956, rep. 1968: 129) that communication necessarily demands a set of messages and the information carried by a particular message is not an intrinsic property of the individual message but depends on the set from which it comes. This is extended by Veron (1971: 66) who argues in a similar vein with respect to meaning:

Any message determines its connotative meaning in a given situation in relation to other messages that could have been transmitted instead, and in relation to different combinations of the same elements integrating the message.

Obviously, the set of alternatives within which a given message is placed depends as well on the communicator dealing with the
message. Two communicators, for any number of reasons, may not at all construct the same set of alternatives within which to place a given message.

The process of constructing a message has been described as follows:

... the sender has, in each concrete situation, a number of ALTERNATIVES open to him for constructing the messages, and these options are not decidable in terms of the syntactic-semantical rules of the system. A sender within a system of communication with certain degrees of freedom performs two basic operations to send a message: among the repertoire of units composing the code of the system he SELECTS those that will compound the message, and he COMBINES the selected units in a certain way within the message. The connotative meaning of the message, i.e. its metacommunicational dimension, depends then on the selective and combinatory options at the disposal of communicators.

(Veron, 1971: 64. Emphasis as in original)

The decision-making process on the part of the sender generates messages having two levels of meaning. Denotative meaning refers to the "content" and operates at the level of communication. However, the fact the sender has made particular decisions of selection and combination generates a second level of meaning, the connotative (i.e. communication about communication) which therefore operates at the level of metacommunication.

This is summed up by Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967: 54):

Every communication has a content and a relationship aspect such that the latter classifies the former and is therefore a metacommunication.
At the level of interpersonal relationship, connotation (level of metacommunication) is the dimension through which the communicators propose/confirm/maintain/disrupt norms for their relationship, thereby defining their relationship and, implicitly, their selves.

Following from the above canon, we are led to another: it is necessary to include explicitly in the interpretation the decisions or choices which were made by the interpreter and the framework of goals within which those decisions were formulated. Since alternative interpretations of the text are always possible, it is necessary for the interpreter to indicate the existence of interpretations which he/she decided not to choose and the conditions under which the choices that were exercised took place. The interpreter must take explicit account of what information is being generated by his/her process of interpretation, how it will be most likely used, by whom, for whom and against whom. Since the world of communication is a world ruled by difference in which doing nothing is a form of action that will produce certain effects, the interpreter cannot avoid taking a stand on issues of societal conflict.

In contextual analysis, the unit of the observed is the context. Within the general theoretical perspective outlined here, the notion of context is a relative one. Within the narrower confines of contextual analysis, the context is considered to be limited to four basic units: the Other, the
filmmakers, the text and the audience. We have already conceptualized the context as a complex adaptive learning network, an ongoing phasespace of organized societal behavioural process, within which individual members of society take the roles of the other and the Other. Following from this delimitation of the unit of the observed; and this conceptualization of the context, it follows that the primary research question for contextual analysis is: what are the functions (both possible and actual) of the text within the context? By this question is meant, what kind of relationships between members of the context does the text help to establish, maintain and perhaps disrupt? For contextual analysis, the discovery of the internal structure of the text, or even of the specificity (unique characteristics) of the communication medium within which the text is constructed, is of secondary importance. What concerns contextual analysis is the status and function of the text as a societal fact: the relationship between the filmmakers and the audience; the stance of the filmmakers to the Other; the possible and actual effects of the filmmakers' stance on the audience's own stance to the Other and consequently each other; the occurrence of the text in real time and real space; the relationship of the text to societal institutions and societal values.

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE TEXT

Since contextual analysis focuses on how the text can function within a communicational transaction between members of society to establish/maintain/disrupt their societal
relationships, it follows that it seeks the organizing centre of a text not in the text itself but in the societal context of the text. Contextual analysis will not expect to discover one stable "ideological dimension" of the text. The text can function in a different ideological way at different levels. The text, as a real product of real societal relations, points to something beyond itself, it refracts social existence. If this social existence is an existence of struggle (of class struggle, racism, sexism), these struggles will reappear in some form within the text.

Since we are especially concerned with the functions of the text we can take as a starting point the well-known model of six linguistic functions put forward by Jakobson (1958, rep. 1972: 85-122). This was based on a simple model borrowed from mathematical communication theory. The elements of this model were an emitter, a receiver, an object or thing spoken about, i.e. the referent, a code, a message (a set of signs selected and combined according to the rules of the code) and a means of transmission or channel. This model of the functions of a text must be modified to bring it in line with the general theoretical model of communication used in this study. The primary function of the text concerns the effect it can have on the ongoing relationships between the communicators. The various functions must be considered as distinctions within this primary function.
The first difference between our model and Jakobson's concerns the number of communicators involved. In Jakobson's model, there are only an emitter and receiver. The contextual model, however, must integrate the Other. Contextual analysis will therefore consider such questions as how the Other mediated the relationship of the authors (filmmakers) to the text (film) they created; how the Other mediates the relationship between the filmmakers and the audience and how this is manifested in the text; how the Other mediates the relationship between the audience and the interpretation of the text. The functions outlined by Jakobson will now be discussed. A given text will display some or all of these functions but the structure of the text may depend on the predominant function.

(1) The referential function defines the relation between the text and "something" to which the text refers. This "something" can be taken to be an "object" or "referent" or some kind of extra-textual reality. This has been called the "denotative" level or "content" of the communication. If every communication is a report on a state of affairs, then in its referential function the text points back to the state of affairs.

Consideration of the referential function leads to certain questions concerning characterization, a special concern in this study. We may ask: from what class are the characters drawn? Are the characters shown in their class context? Is class shown to be an influential factor in their interrelations and their
motivations or are they portrayed as autonomous selves, independent of their societal context? Are their patterns of relationship (symmetrical or complementary) in the text in accordance with the patterns in the societal context? These questions have been framed with regard to class but similar questions would be suggested regarding racism and sexism.

(2) The emotive function indicates the addresser's attitude toward what he/she is communicating about. According to Guiraud (1975: 8), the referent of the text here in this function is the addresser. A lyric poem would for example be considered a text predominantly centered in the emotive function. In attempting to discover the emotive function of the text, we ask such questions: to which characters are the filmmakers sympathetic and to which unsympathetic? at what levels? in what ways? what kind of evaluative attitude do the filmmakers take to the different characters and their actions?

(3) The injunctive function defines the relationship between the text and the addressee. This function is also called the conative or imperative function. The purest linguistic expression is something like "Come!" This function is concerned with the effect of the text on the addressee's behaviour. If every communication is both a report on a state of affairs and a command to do something about this, then the injunctive function concerns the "command" aspect of the communication.
One important point has to be made here. The emotive function concerns the filmmakers taking an attitude to "something". However, since the basis of human communication involves taking the role of the other, then a given emotive attitude by its very existence "invites" the audience to take that attitude toward that "something". Similarly, the filmmakers take the attitude of the audience (at least presupposed) within the injunctive function. In this way, the emotive function is not really limited to the addresser, nor is the injunctive function limited to the addressee.

(4) The phatic function serves to establish, maintain, or discontinue communication in a specific transaction, or to check whether the channel works (e.g. Hello; can you hear me?). According to Guireaud (1975: 8), the referent of the phatic function is the communicational transaction itself, the communicational relationship. The phatic function is directly concerned with the definitions of ongoing communicational relationship patterns (e.g. symmetry, complementarity) and of the selves involved in those patterns. Other functions are also involved in this but more indirectly. In its phatic function, the text is a statement of relationship between author and audience. Within the text, messages between characters in the phatic function state relationships between the characters. If character relationships can be easily described in terms of patterns of symmetry and complementarity, how the text operates in its phatic function between filmmakers and audience is a little more subtle.
The audience cannot be considered homogeneous. It consists of members of different classes, whites and blacks, men and women, adults and children, to name a few distinctions. The filmmakers may have different relationships with different members of this audience. In this way, a film that is, say, anti-union or anti-working class is a statement of symmetrical relationship between the filmmakers and the ruling class, but a statement of complementary relationship between filmmakers and the working class, with the working class in a one-down position. Similarly, a film that is sexist is a statement of relationship of symmetry between filmmakers and men but complementarity between filmmakers and women, with women in the one-down position.

An examination of the text to reveal its phatic function must take into consideration the non-homogeneous structure of the audience and ask questions concerning the kind of relationship obtaining between the filmmakers, the characters and the various sectors of the audience.

(5) The aesthetic function was first termed by Jakobson the poetic function. It is important to realize this function is present in all communication because it is concerned with the selection and combination of "signs" from a code to construct a message or text. This is the area of style and it was here that Veron (1971: 64) located the metacommunicational dimension of the message, or text. The selections and combinations made to create this function were connotative decisions on the part of
the addresser. When the aesthetic function is predominant, the

text is considered primarily an art object which focuses on
itself. The referent of the text in this function is the text
itself. This may be clarified if we agree with Eco (1976: 264)
that an aesthetic text violates norms (everyday norms and/or
aesthetically established norms) on the levels of the signifier
and the signified. This violation forces the addressee to
reconsider the codes operative in the text as these codes are
no longer the same usually foreseen. In this way, the text
calls attention to itself, and to the communication medium in
which it is constructed.

Contextual analysis takes account of the aesthetic function
in all communication in the following way: the text refracts
within itself the societal context within which it is created;
but in the process of refracting this context in the creation
of the text, the producers of the text create, in their use of a
communication medium, new products of ideological communication.
These communication products are a part of the functioning
societal reality, and assume a type of ideological refraction of
this reality in a way that is distinctive to them. Contextual
analysis becomes interested in the problem of style only in
order to discover this distinctive type of ideological refraction.
It is in regard to this function that questions such as lighting,
camera angle and movement, setting, become explicit. In consid-
ering the other functions, questions of style cannot be ignored.
Indeed, all functions of the text constitute an intertwined
totality and what we have been doing for the sake of analysis is making purely methodological distinctions. For example, it is through the use of camera angle or lighting that the film-makers' attitude to their subject matter, that is, the emotive function of the text can be inferred.

(6) The metalingual function defines the meaning of any signs in the text which may not be shared by the addressee. When the addressee and the addressee need to check up on whether they share the same code, the text is oriented to the code. Examples are "You know what I mean?" or "What's the meaning of democracy?" The conceptualization of this function is based on the distinction made in modern logic between two levels of language, "object language" (speaking of objects) and "metalinguage" (speaking of language). In the metalingual function, the referent of the text is the code(s) within which the text itself is constructed.

(7) The above functions are the ones listed by Jakobson. Within the framework of this study, it is necessary to add three more functions. One of these functions is the metaphatic function. In this function, the text would refer to the phatic function. If in its phatic function the text is a statement of relationship, in its metaphatic function the text is a statement about relationship. For example, an addressee may use a loud tone of voice in speaking and this may be accompanied by a flushed face. Within the communicational situation, these may
constitute statements of relationship, statements of anger. If the addressee then says "Why are you angry with me?", then this would constitute a statement about relationship, a metaphatic statement.

(8) Since the notion of the Other as an omnipresent communicator within any communicational situation has been introduced, a category for the function of the text when it is oriented to this communicator must also be introduced. Since the Other is another name for the societal context, this function may be called the contextual function. The contextual function therefore refers to those societal codes constraining the relationship between the communicators, addresser and addressee. It is important to note that communicators cannot engage in any communication without necessarily engaging in contextual communication. Contextual communication constitutes all socioeconomic and ideological codes constraining relationships between communicators. Class relations, racism and sexism are examples of contextual communication. Since all functions of the text are interrelated and have an effect on each other, contextual function permeates all other functions.

(9) The last distinction to be made concerns the meta-contextual function of the text. By now it should be clear that in this function the text would refer to the contextual function. Communicators engaging in metacontextual communication attempt to transcend the Other. An example of this would be a man and a
woman consciously attempting to free themselves from sexism in their relationship. The charge has been brought against psychiatry that it oppresses women by refusing to acknowledge the constraining factor of sexism and using the cultural stereotype of women against their female patients (Chamberlin, 1975: 39-46). In the terms of the distinctions here, it may be said that psychiatry engages in metaphatic communication but not metacontextual communication. Its metaphatic communication occurs within the constraints of contextual communication.

A modified version of the functions of the text first proposed by Jakobson (1958, rep. 1972: 85-122) has been outlined. Perhaps it should be pointed out any text must demonstrate all functions except the metaphatic, metalingual, and the metacontextual. These may or may not be present in a given text.

METACOMMUNICATION : A CONFUSING CONCEPT

One further point remains to be made. Unlike some communication theorists (Bateson, 1972; Ruesch and Bateson, 1968; Veron, 1971: 59-76; Wilden, 1976) we have refused to use the concept of metacommunication. The reason for this is that the concept is so broadly defined it becomes totally confusing. A brief look at the way the concept is used in two works on communication theory reveals it is hopelessly overworked. For example, in Watzlawick et al (1967: 51-54) the concept is used in at least four different ways:
it is used to refer to "the conceptual framework and to
the language the communication analyst must employ when
communicating about communication" (Watzlawick et al.,
1967: 53). At this level, it refers to scientific
communication in the discipline of communication.

2. it is used to refer to the "command" aspect of any
communication, what has been termed the injunctive
function.

3. the "command" aspect is then assimilated to a "relation-
ship" aspect:

Every communication has a content and a
relationship aspect such that the latter
classifies the former and is therefore
a metacommunication.

(Watzlawick et al., 1967: 54)

This is what has been termed the phatic function.

4. it is used to refer to communication about relationship
patterns (Watzlawick et al., 1967: 179), what has been
termed metaphatic communication.

It should be noticed the first use occurs at a different
level of analysis from the other three uses. An attempt by
another theorist is no more successful in gaining any kind of
analytic precision:

Metacommunication may be defined either as
communication about communication (the most
general sense), or as a communication about a
particular communication (the most usual sense).
It is a purely relational term, and dependent
on punctuation. What is a metacommunication in
one context may be a communication in another
(and vice versa). What metacommunication.
denotes is that whenever communicators go through the equivalent of moving up one or more levels of communication or whenever they switch modes (whether intentionally or not), and where the change in level or mode has the effect of contextualizing (sic) the original messages, then we can say that they are metacommunicating...

Since its effect is to contextualize what is decontextualized - or relatively so - then metacommunication may simply involve supplying the spatial, hierarchical, historical or organizational context of an activity or situation. What makes this process equivalent to a higher level of communication is that any context is necessarily of a higher level of logical type than the 'text' embedded in it.

(Wilden, 1976: 261-262)

While all the above may be true, we submit that it is at the same time far too general. The concept of metacommunication appears to be vastly overworked in the literature and perhaps would be better abandoned. The methodological distinctions introduced here appear to have more analytic precision and for that reason their use is preferred.
I. Congruence will be manifested between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of individualism (the "abstract individual" or "secret self") and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic characterization in the movies of Western advanced capitalist countries; the relevant features of characters (e.g. their needs, their desires, traits and actions) will be shown as given, independent of various societal constraining codes.

According to the various core values of the ideology of individualism, this will be demonstrated in various ways. For example, both autonomy and privacy are based on a common conception of the individual as generator of his/her own wants and preferences, as an independent centre of consciousness, in accord with Stuart Mill's dictum "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign". But because autonomy and privacy represent two different faces of this same coin (autonomy standing for "positive freedom" and privacy standing for "negative freedom") they will be demonstrated in slightly different ways.

A. (i) The autonomy of characters will be demonstrated by a failure to depict characters as acting within hierarchies of constraint such as social positions assigned to them on the basis of class, race and sex.

(ii) The autonomy of characters will be demonstrated by a failure to depict inter-character relations as mutually causal processes.
B. (i) The keynote of privacy is there is a sphere within the individual, a "private" sphere, quite distinct and separate from society, from a "public" sphere. The privacy of characters will be demonstrated by a failure to indicate the character as engaged in a relationship with the (Generalized) Other such that even the most secret part of the self is formed in a trans-subjective relationship with this Other.

(ii) Inter-character relations will be depicted as direct and dyadic (i.e. not mediated) instead of being depicted as triadic i.e. taking place within the constraint of the mediating principle of the (Generalized) Other.

Within the ideology of individualism, the dignity of man, as a core value, is closely related to the value of equality. In communicational terms, equality between characters is manifested as symmetrical relations and unequal relations between characters are termed complementary (dominant-submissive) relations, with one character assigned to the one-up position and another character assigned to the one-down position.

It has already been indicated there is a tension between the articulated ideal of equality and the real inevitable inequalities in capitalist society. This tension means there are two ways in which the capitalist ideology may transform what exists as real unequal relations. Consequently, the next hypothesis is dual.

C. The dignity of man, as an ideological value, will be manifested by the treatment of equality between characters so that
(i) real inequalities in the society (complementary relations of the dominant-submissive type) will emerge as equal (symmetrical) relations between characters; or

(ii) real inequalities in the society (complementary relations of the dominant-submissive type) will emerge as unequal relations between characters but with a reversal of the occupancies of the dominant and submissive positions.

What this means, for example, is as a general feature of sexism in the society, men occupy a dominant position, with women occupying a submissive position. According to C (i), such a relation would re-emerge between characters showing the man and woman equal; according to C (ii), showing the man and woman in a complementary power relationship, with the woman in the dominant position.

Hypothesis I constitutes the major hypothesis of the study. It is designed to offer a means of empirically investigating, in a neglected area of filmic communication, and with a degree of analytic precision not yet obtained in the relevant literature, a topic of increasing concern to researchers in the area of mass communication: namely, the manifestation of ideological premises in filmic communication. It represents an obvious, though surprisingly often overlooked, prerequisite to a stronger hypothesis outlined below.

II. There exists an associative relationship between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic characterization in the movies of Western advanced capitalist countries.

Partial support would be generated for this hypothesis if it could be shown that in non-capitalist countries with ideologies
different from the ideology of individualism, the filmic communication of those countries is congruent with their ideologies. While this study does not test Hypothesis II directly, it examines suitable data in the work of Weakland (1966a; 1971a; 1971b) in order to see if this related data supports Hypothesis II.

As suggested by Kerlinger (1973: 356-373), because of the non-experimental nature of the study, it was decided to investigate an alternative "control" hypothesis.

III. Any presence of the "abstract individual" as the psychology underlying filmic characterization in the movies is not to be taken as evidence for an associative relationship between the ideology of individualism and filmic characterization in the movies of Western advanced capitalist countries but is an artifact of the dramatization techniques of fictional feature films in general; since they use characters to depict people, they are incapable of representing abstractions such as class position.

The existence of a fictional feature film from a Western advanced capitalist country using characters to depict such abstractions as class, race and sexist relations would constitute empirical evidence for a refutation of this hypothesis. The manifestation of ideological premises different from those of individualism in the fictional feature films of non-capitalist countries would constitute empirical evidence for a refutation of this hypothesis. While this study does not directly examine films from non-capitalist countries, it examines suitable data in the work of Weakland (1966a; 1971a; 1971b) in order to see if this related data provides empirical evidence for a refutation of Hypothesis II.
CHAPTER SEVEN

RESEARCH DESIGN

THE NONEXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

In a broad sense, there are two ways of conducting research: the experimental and the nonexperimental methods. According to Abdellah and Levine (1965: 45) the simplest and most useful distinction between the two designs is in terms of two key words "controlled conditions"; that is, an experiment can be defined as simply observation under controlled conditions. Consequently, nonexperimental research is observation without controlled conditions:

... the critical distinction between experimental and non-experimental research is the fact that in experiments the researcher consciously manipulates (controls) the conditions for the study - he actually interferes with "nature". In nonexperimental research "nature" is let alone - it is uncontrolled.

(Abdellah and Levine, 1965: 45)

Despite the fact the experimental design is considered the classic research design, there are situations when it is commonly recognized such a design would be highly inappropriate. Many questions, especially in the area of descriptive studies, can only be answered by describing the existing situation in its natural state as accurately as possible. The purpose of the study would be destroyed by trying to "manipulate" conditions. The present study is one where no manipulation of the variables was attempted because the focus is on investigating the
manifestations of ideological premises in existing filmic communication.

Moreover, there is a definite criticism which can be levelled at the experimental design. It is true some researchers consider such a design the only scientifically valid design because "it permits greater control over the phenomena under study, thus enabling the drawing of more valid inferences of causal relationships among the phenomena studied" (Abdellah and Levine, 1965: 48). However, the emphasis on manipulation has been criticized as having become outdated in the behavioral sciences:

It is worth noting, however, that the usual emphasis on manipulation derives from the characteristics of the logic-in-use in an earlier state of science. The mathematics and statistics of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could conveniently manage only two changing variables at a time, and the ideal experiment was therefore conceived as an experiment in which all the variables but two were held constant. One, the "independent variable" was then manipulated, while observations were made on the other, the "dependent variable". ... But contemporary mathematics no longer imposes this constraint, and manipulation - whether to hold "everything else" constant or to introduce changes in the one factor - is correspondingly no longer absolutely essential.

(Kaplan, 1964: 162)

Finally, there is one supremely important argument against seeking causal explanation (the commonly conceded major advantage of experimental design) in communication research. The argument stems from the basic distinction between causal explanation and
Causal explanation is usually positive. We say that billiard ball B moved in such and such a direction because billiard ball A hit it at such and such an angle. In contrast to this, cybernetic explanation is always negative. We consider what alternative possibilities could conceivably have occurred and then ask why many of the alternatives were not followed, so that the particular event was one of those few which could, in fact, occur.

(Bateson, 1972: 399)

What this means is that in cybernetics the focus is on limitations on behavior, that is, constraints. Consequently, the observable behavior or empirical data is considered a function of a set of constraints. Apart from such constraints, events would occur with equality of probability. Cybernetic explanation constitutes a search for those constraints i.e. factors which determine inequalities of probability.

MATERIALS STUDIED

The research is based primarily on four fictional feature films made in Western advanced capitalist countries: one film from France, one from West Germany, two from the United States. The film from France, Weekend directed by Jean Luc Godard, was released in 1968. The film from Germany, The Merchant of Four Seasons, directed by Rainer Werner Fassbinder, was released in 1971. The two films from the United States were Lipstick, directed by Lamont Johnson and released in 1976, and Network, directed by Sidney Lumet and released in 1976. Both Godard and
Fassbinder have been prolific filmmakers and have gained international recognition as very important filmmakers. While the film Lipstick has not been directed by someone of such stature as Godard and Fassbinder, nevertheless the movie can be considered to enjoy a certain distinctive measure of societal recognition because it was made under the sponsorship of the U.S. National Association for the Prevention of Rape and Assault. With regard to Network, this film has gained societal recognition through the avenue of commercial success.

The primary obstacle to studying filmic materials is the difficulty in obtaining the films, particularly if they are recent commercial fictional feature films. None of the films studied belonged to Simon Fraser University. The French film Weekend was made available through the University of British Columbia. The other three films were made available through the cooperation of Cinema Simon Fraser, the campus film society which had obtained them for commercial viewing. Basically, because of the economics of film distribution, film distributors wish to keep a recent film in constant commercial circulation to generate as high profit as possible. Consequently, attempts to obtain such recent commercial films for study purposes are usually met with refusals from distributors who state the films are not available for that kind of classification.

Obtaining research materials through the campus film society meant the choice of study films had to be made within
the choices already scheduled by the society. Nevertheless, some effort was made to match the choices in certain ways. For example, Lipstick deals with rape events and there is also a rape event in Weekend, which means that the treatment of rape in these two films can be compared. Similarly, Network deals with, among other things, black revolutionary groups espousing Marxist theory of class struggle in the U.S.A., while Weekend also touches on black revolutionaries espousing Marxist theory of class struggle. However, in the case of Weekend, the black revolutionaries are from the "Third World", as they are Arab and African Black. The German film, The Merchant of Four Seasons, was chosen because it could be compared with the others with regard to class, sex and race relations.

PROCEDURE

Even when the films are purchased for commercial viewing, they are usually obtained for only about three to five days. Obviously, not all of this time is available for research purposes as each film has to be cleaned and checked to make sure it is suitably ready for viewing, and then of course, it has to be actually screened for its commercial audience. These activities all slice considerably into the time available for research. Since films are materials of enormous richness of information, this short period of availability puts considerable limits on the degree of detail in their examination.
Prior to the private screenings needed for study, all the films had been viewed in large audience situations: Weekend three times in campus screenings at UBC and once at SFU in a class situation, and the others in ordinary commercial situations: Lipstick three times, Network twice and The Merchant of Four Seasons once. In the private screenings the films were screened from start to finish about three to four times, with re-running of some scenes. During screening, extensive notes were taken to record the structure, development and content of the film plot, as nearly scene-by-scene as possible. Any striking visual, aural or technical details were noted. Finally, within the framework of choices already outlined e.g. the decision to compare the films Lipstick and Weekend on their presentations of a rape event, a sequence was selected for frame-by-frame analysis. This sequence was then run through a viewer and each frame was schematically drawn on an index card, with careful notations of such information as camera angle, position of subject in the frame and others too numerous to mention here. In addition, for Network, some cassette audio tape recordings were made of some of the dialogue where the verbal messages seemed particularly fruitful for analysis. A film script is available for Weekend. Close attention was given to visual stylistic analysis of the image. After the frame-by-frame analysis was completed, the sequence was usually re-run about three times.
CHAPTER EIGHT

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED FILMS

STATEMENT OF POSITION

As has been previously pointed out in Chapter four, it is an axiom of communicational epistemology that the observer, the process of observation and the observed all enter fully and are intimately interrelated in a specific process of inquiry. Taken as a totality, these factors constitute the unit of investigation in communicational research. In order to understand a scientific report about events occurring in a communicational situation, it is necessary to know how the observer took up his/her position within the field of investigation. Consequently, it is incumbent on the researcher to be as explicit as possible about the framework of conditions within which the inescapably value-laden choices constituting research proceeded. This means being clear about motives on the part of the researcher in conducting the inquiry, and the nature of the knowledge expected to be produced, as well as any pertinent preconceptions.

The unit of the observed is the context i.e. the four basic units of the Other, the filmmakers, the text and the audience. The researcher must also be explicit about the conception of the observed operative in the inquiry. In this inquiry, the filmic text is seen as pointing to something beyond itself, refracting social existence, because it is a real product of real societal relations. Both the filmic
texts studied and the researcher are situated in a capitalist context in which social existence is an existence of struggle: class struggle, racism, sexism. These struggles will be represented in some form within the text (if only by being present through their absence) and the researcher is in some stance to these struggles. These two factors are crucial in regard to the nature of the knowledge to be produced in the inquiry. A related third factor is that the filmmakers and the audience will also be situated vis-à-vis these struggles. This researcher's aims in this inquiry were to generate knowledge concerning the functions of the text with regard to these struggles.

If the last paragraph clarifies the nature of the information which the researcher hoped to uncover in the inquiry and which influenced certain research choices, there still remains the questions of the motives regarding how this knowledge would be used, by whom, for whom and against whom. These questions are made imperative by the very nature of communicational inquiry:

... the semiotic approach is ruled by a sort of indeterminacy principle: in so far as signifying and communicating are social functions that determine both social organization and social evolution, to 'speak' about 'speaking' to signify signification or to communicate about communication cannot but influence the universe of speaking, signifying and communicating... all enquiry is 'motivated'. Theoretical
research is a form of social practice. Everybody who wants to know something wants to know it in order to do something. If he claims that he wants to know only in order 'to know' and not in order 'to do' it means that he wants to know it in order to do nothing, which is in fact a surreptitious way of doing something, i.e. leaving the world just as it is (or as his approach assumes that it ought to be)...

If semiotics is a theory, then it should be a theory that permits a continuous critical intervention in semiotic phenomena. Since people speak, to explain why and how they speak cannot help but determine their future way of speaking. At any rate, I can hardly deny that it determines my own way of speaking.

(Eco, 1976:29)

It is hoped this inquiry will shed some light, however small, on these struggles within which the inquiry is embedded and provide some assistance in resolving them in the direction of greater equality and freedom, because it is recognized

... the researcher can be "outside" a group only to the degree that s/he is "inside" another group...

(Sartre 1960, trans. 1968:76)

Research is a living relation between (wo)men... Indeed, the sociologist and his (her) "object" form a couple, each one of which is to be interpreted by the other; the relationship between them must be itself interpreted as a moment of history.

(Sartre, 1960 trans. 1968:72
Female terms added).
What follows constitutes the analysis of the filmic texts. Wherever appropriate, the influence of the general position on specific research choices will be made clear.

**THE MERCHANT OF FOUR SEASONS**

This West German film, dated 1971, is directed by Rainer Werner Fassbinder who also wrote the script.

There were various reasons for the choice of this film for study purposes. The first was its nationality, because what was wanted was some degree of variation in the nationality of the films. This particular director was chosen because of two interrelated reasons: on the one hand, some of his films had made an aesthetic impression on the researcher because of their striking visual style and the director's preoccupation with master-slave relationships; on the other hand, the researcher was familiar with the director's work. This particular film was not the most preferred choice for study. Such a choice would have fallen on *Fox and his Friends*, because of the way that film interrelated the political and the personal, namely class struggle and male homosexuality, around a common core of dominance-submission. Unfortunately, the film was not available. *The Merchant of Four Seasons* was studied because it was available when there was time for research, but it also offered an opportunity to investigate
Fassbinder's preoccupation with dominance-submission relationships. Furthermore, there is one aspect to the film in which it actually is very appropriate for the purposes of this study: this is the rich variety of roles in which the major character is portrayed.

The film is about Hans Epp, a fruit peddler, and his social relationships. Hans is portrayed in his roles as husband, father, son, brother and brother-in-law; as lover in an extra-marital affair; as "one of the boys" and close comrade to another male; as young lover rejected because of his low social status. His occupational status is similarly varied. As a youth, his job aspirations are to be a mechanic. This is strongly opposed by his mother. As a consequence of his unhappiness, he runs away to join the Foreign Legion, returns home and becomes a cop, is dishonorably discharged, becomes a fruit peddler and ends as capitalist employer. The plot is non-linear and significant segments are told by means of flashbacks.

The film is not "psychological" since it does not dwell on the personal motivations of the characters. We are not treated to any extensive exploration of "inner space". This avenue is blocked by the construction of the central character, Hans, as neither introspective nor articulate. And Hans is indisputably the core of the film, for we only
see the other characters in relation to him. It can be said the film is a study of role. The mere enumeration of the rich variety of roles in which Hans (and Hans alone) is presented suggests such a reading which gains support from the end of the film. Hans suffers a heart attack which leaves him unable to push his heavy peddler's cart and carry sacks of fruit. As a result, he must change his way of business. In the end, he hires an old Foreign Legion friend of his to do the work. Yet this had the effect of making him superfluous. Since he has only existed for others in his role, as a function (both in the sense of use and in the sense in which one speaks of a mathematical function), there is literally nothing for him to do now that his place has been taken honestly and competently by his friend. Just when he begins to succeed and to please his family because he no longer works in the streets, his despondency grows unchecked until he sets out deliberately to drink himself to death. After the funeral, his only friend, the Foreign Legion comrade, steps into his shoes "for the sake of the child". The social cycle continues.

It would be a mistake however to assume that because the film is not "psychological" and is concerned with "role" that it is a film explicitly concerned with such factors as social class or politics. The social context in which we see Hans is primarily, but not exclusively, his family. The family, in its turn, is not placed with its social context.
The stance of the film to such factors as class, race and sex must be questioned and the structuring principle of the characterization must be sought. Specifically, we must attempt to find out whether any of the "themes" or "dimensions" of that conception of the self governed by the ideology of individualism are present. These dimensions were, we may recall, autonomy, privacy, the dignity of man (equality), self development, and the "abstract individual".

The sequence selected for a detailed analysis is the one in which Hans recounts to his cronies the incident that caused his dishonorable discharge from the Police Force. This sequence is interesting for several reasons. It is the only one in the film in which we see Hans in a social role in his own society that extends beyond his own family. In the terminology adopted here, what this means is that it is the only sequence in the film where the Other of Hans' society is explicitly represented by a Police Superior who is in the film by virtue of that role only. It is a sequence in which we can examine power relations as well as male/female relations, for it concerns Hans in his relations with an arrested Prostitute as well as in his relations with his Superior. Because the incident of the Prostitute, the cause of his dishonorable discharge, is told by a flashback the sequence is three-levelled: the scene with the Prostitute and Superior constitutes one level; this scene is embedded within
the scene of Hans' recounting the incident to his cronies in a bar as they all sit drinking; finally, of course, the third level is that of filmmakers, text, audience and Other, i.e. filmmakers' account of Hans' account. In the course of the discussion of this sequence references will of course be made to the film as a whole and to other sequences and characters within the film. In examining the pattern of communicational exchanges at the various levels, the analytic categories adapted from Jakobson's model of the functions of the message will be utilized. Our description of the scene of Policeman Hans in his relation with the Prostitute and his Superior is of course a description of the aesthetic function of the text at the level of filmmakers, text, audience, Other relations.

We enter the flashback scene via a cut from the scene of Hans drinking with his cronies.

Shot #1

Policeman Hans is on the left side of the screen with the Prostitute on the right. This is a chest shot of Hans as he is seated at a typewriter, looking down at it. The camera is placed so that we cannot get a view of his face. All we get is the back of his head with a slight view of the right side of his nose. The Prostitute is standing and we get a full front shot of her. She is looking down at Policeman Hans. Though she is still fully dressed the shot is dominated by the locus of her genitals for the lines of vision
lead to that spot. Policeman Hans is of course dressed in dark clothes but his left hand is light in colour and rests on the typewriter at the same level as her genitals but in different spatial planes along the axis of centre foreground to background. If we begin at Policeman Hans, the line of vision pulls us to his hand and then to her genitals and then upward to her face. She is however looking at Policeman Hans so if we begin at her and follow her line of vision we begin to travel the same trajectory as if we had begun at Hans. The alternative line of vision in the shot also leads to her genitals because if we resist following her line of vision and instead travel down the vertical line of her blouse we come back to the genitals just above the typewriter with its white paper. If we follow her arm, we come to her hand resting where her blouse meets her skirt, and back to her genitals.

The camera is shooting slightly down at Hans Epp.

Hans raises his head to ask her name. The slight side view of his nose disappears. Due to camera placement we still cannot see his facial expression but we can see hers. As she answers, she tilts her head up slightly: Mariele Kosemund. Policeman Hans looks down, types. He reaches out with his right hand to adjust paper in the typewriter. His right arm obscures her arm. He looks up at her but we still cannot see his expression. Date of Birth? Her right hand remains at where her blouse meets her skirt. She answers: 31 September 1932, Munich. He looks down, types. As he is typing her date
of birth, her right arm moves up to the top button of her blouse. He is still looking down typing. Her left hand which has been hidden comes up to join her right hand. She has a hint of a smile. He adjusts the paper. She is smiling more openly now, and begins to unbutton.

CUT TO

Shot #2

A head shot of Policeman Hans. The camera is placed in a new position to demonstrate the point of view of the Prostitute. The camera angle still shoots down slightly on Hans. We get a left three-quarter view of Hans who is looking down. He begins to raise his head and eyes. His expression is serious. His eyes begin to look to their left i.e. frame right. His head continues to move up. His eyes widen a bit. CUT TO

Shot #3

Close up on the Prostitute's hands undoing a button on her blouse. Her hands open the blouse, reveal the bra in close up. Her left hand moves up and out of frame right. It comes back down and both hands drop down to lower edge of the frame, right hand barely visible at frame left. The visual focus is on the bra close up. CUT TO

Shot #4

Hans as in the shot before except that his mouth is slightly open now. CUT TO
Shot #5

This is actually, in its composition, a return to the first shot. Again we cannot see the expression on Hans' face. The Prostitute looks at him. She smiles and walks toward Hans. This means that at a certain point the back of his head blocks her face from us. At that instant he half rises (still back to us), and pulls his chair around to face the Prostitute instead of his typewriter. As he does this, Mariele's face becomes visible. She is smiling. The camera angle is as before, shooting slightly down on Hans. She is also looking down at Hans. He settles back in his chair. She moves forward to him and kneels down. She looks up at him and begins to smile more openly, showing her teeth. The camera is zooming in ever so slowly on her face. Her eyes drop briefly. The shot ends on almost a chest shot of the Prostitute. C U T TO

Shot #6

A two-shot of Hans and the Prostitute. We see the back of her head and a chest shot of Hans facing us. The camera angle is upward. His mouth loosens. His face suggests a smile by deeper creases at the side of his nose. Her head moves down and to frame left until it disappears. Hans remains in the centre of the frame but his eyes have dropped down to watch her. We are given a full frontal view of Hans. The camera begins zooming in on his face. As his face comes to Extreme Close Up (his eyebrows are at the top of the frame),
his eyes close and his face tilts up in the frame. His mouth opens, we see a little of his teeth, his face fills the whole frame. **CUT TO**

**Shot #7**

We see the back of the office door with wanted posters pasted over it. The door opens inward, frame right. Through the opening we see a chest shot of a Police Official entering. The camera tilts up. The Police Official looks frame left and slightly down. He advances into the room. **CUT TO**

**Shot #8**

A long shot of Hans and the Prostitute. Her back is to us and she is kneeling. Hans is reclining back in the chair. The shot is from the Point of View of the Police Official. We are not able to see the expression on Hans' face. Startled, Hans half rises, hesitates, continues rising, stammers "I'm sorry". The Prostitute begins to rise as well, her back still to us. As they rise, the camera is zooming in. Hans rises faster than the Prostitute but then she comes into the frame. There is a fairly tight two-shot of Hans and the Prostitute. She is looking at Hans but he is looking past her toward the Police Official (who is not in the frame). We see a full face of Hans but a left profile of the Prostitute. She turns in the frame to look at the Police Official. The placement of the Prostitute in the foreground to the right of the frame means she is taller than Hans, who is short anyway. In any case, Hans is not fully
standing up as he is cringing. The shot ends with the
Prostitute fully turned toward the camera looking in the
direction of the Police Official. CUT TO

Shot #9

A Waist Shot of the Police Official looking toward frame
left. The Official closes the door, then reopens it to say
something to the effect of "This little matter will cost you
dear". He closes the door. The shot ends on the door, a shot
similar to the shot at the beginning of the entry of the
Police Official, that is, Shot No: 7. CUT TO

Shot #10

This is similar in composition to the end of Shot No. 8.
Hans begins to turn in the frame toward the Prostitute who is
still looking toward frame right. He brings up his right hand
and gives her a backhanded slap from below. She jerks back and
puts her hand up to her face. Her face turns to Hans and we
cannot see her expression. She withdraws slightly. Hans turns
from her in the frame, looks down to frame left and sits down.
His head is a little below her bust. We get a three-quarter
view of her face as she still looks frame right (toward the
door, out of the frame), her hands still touching her cheek.
The shot ends with her hands coming down to rest, clasped,
almost on her genitals, just a little higher.

This is the end of the scene.
What we have done so far is to provide a description of the aesthetic function of a scene from the text. This is at the third level of communication: the level of filmmakers, text, audience, Other. We have not yet provided an interpretative evaluation of this function. In order to do this we need to examine all the levels of communication.

Let us start with the first level of communication: the scene in which there are three characters, Policeman Hans, the Prostitute and Police Official. In the totality of this communicational exchange involving all three participants there are three important communicational events: the Arrest, Fellatio, and what may be termed Discovery/Punishment. However, it is important to note that only the last two are presented on the screen. The first is a logical deduction on the part of this interpreter. Within the theoretical perspective of this study, the focus is on the system/environment interrelations occurring within a context. This context is a behavioral phase space i.e. actions occurring within it occur within certain spatial and temporal boundaries. The context is at a different level of organization from system and environment. Logically, the spatial and temporal boundaries of the context (the totality of the communicational exchange between the Policeman and Prostitute) must include an Arrest at another place and time prior to the "booking" in the Police Station. But the filmmakers have not delimited the context (i.e. placed their spatial and temporal boundaries) to include this part of the communicational
exchange between Policeman and Prostitute. This exclusion on
the part of the filmmakers is a choice (conscious or unconscious).
Similarly, it is a choice on the part of this interpreter to
reject the way the filmmakers have punctuated the exchange and
to ask what would be the result of framing the exchange within
different spatial and temporal boundaries. This interpreter's
choice stems from the deliberate attempt to question the text
regarding its stance vis-à-vis sexism. This omission, a gap,
a lacuna in the story as told to the viewers, must be invest-
igated. Since in the world of communication an omission has
communicational value, we will ask what is the significance of
this omission. The question will be answered after we have
examined the communicational exchange in terms of our analytic
functions.

Our primary goal is to ascertain the nature of the
pattern of relationship between the characters. We depart from
a sender / receiver model of communication (the model underlying
Jakobson's (1958, rep. 1972: 85-122)) theory of the functions
of a message in that we recognize that each participant in a
communicational event is at once both "sender" and "receiver".
The implication of this theoretical point for our analysis is
that we must analyse the communicational event from the point
of view of each participant as "sender" and/or "receiver" in
turn.
We begin our discussion of the communicational exchange defined by this sequence with a punctuation of the exchange at the point of the Prostitute and her "message event", Fellatio. What is the referential function of the Fellatio? It does not seem unreasonable to state that the referential function, "what the Fellatio is about", is her Arrest. What is the injunctive function? And to whom is the Fellatio addressed? It is immediately obvious that the Fellatio is not addressed to Hans as a person but Hans as a policeman, as a representation of the Law. Thus the Fellatio is addressed to the Other, and the Prostitute is "speaking" as a legal "subject", both in the double sense of "subject to the Law" and "subject of an act before the Law". The injunction of the Fellatio is something to the effect of "yes, I submit. Let me off easy". This acknowledges the statement of power of the Law which lies behind the Arrest itself. What is the emotive function of this Fellatio? This amounts to asking the attitude of the Prostitute toward her Arrest. Now here arises the problem of inference from the aesthetic function of the "message" that is, its style. And the style of the Prostitute's action is that it is accompanied, not as could have been expected by some kind of "cringing" behavior, but by a smile which could be readily interpreted as "seductive", or "provocative". Already our interpretation may appear to be in some danger of being inaccurate. The thrust of our interpretation was toward defining the relationship between the Prostitute and the Law (and therefore Hans, solely in his function as representation of the Law) as
a complementary relationship of dominance and subordination with the Law in the dominant position. Perhaps we may be able to resolve this apparent contradiction by seeking some aspect of the communicational exchange that constitutes the phatic function. Now we may recall that the phatic function refers to the communicational exchange itself, it is a defining statement of relationship between the communicators. Could this part of the communicational event be a piece of clothing, namely, her bra, which rated a close up in Shot 3? But how are we to interpret the bra? As signifying sexual submission? Or sexual seduction? To consider this we must punctuate the exchange to begin with Policeman Hans. Before we do that, we may note that other functions are absent. The metaphatic function is not present because Policeman and Prostitute do not engage in any statements about their relationship. But here we notice a certain peculiarity in this exchange. The phatic function has become assimilated into the contextual function since the Prostitute speaks only to the Law, the Other. The metacontextual function is also absent as is the metalingual.

Let us delimit the context so as to include the Arrest of the Prostitute by Policeman Hans. The referential function of the Arrest is the power of the Law, of which at that moment Policeman Hans is the representation. So Hans speaks not for himself, but for the Other, and all his "speech" is contextual in the sense in which we have defined it here. But we cannot know or even infer certain other functions, such as the emotive,
We can notice that the phatic function of his communicational event is defined quite clearly by his uniform. We may say that it is his uniform which as a sign, a representation, defines at the phatic level (and here this means the contextual level as well) his relation to any ordinary citizen as a complementary one of dominance and subordination, in which he occupies the dominant place. But is it possible the ambiguity which we have seen surrounding the bra as a significant piece of clothing also surrounds the uniform? In order to disentangle this potential ambiguity, it is necessary to specify two levels: intra-textual and extra-textual. So in the extra-textual world, the world outside of the movie as text, policemen are in fact in dominant-subordinate relationships to citizens. The question is how is this relation represented within the text? This question cannot be answered without discussing the third level of communication: filmmakers, text, audience, Other.

The Arrest takes place logically before the Prostitute's actions in the Police Station and logically these actions occur in response to the Arrest. Yet by not showing this Arrest on screen, the Prostitute's actions begin to appear as originating with her. A careful examination of the six shots that comprise that part of the communicational event labelled "Fellatio" reveals that in fact these shots are so constructed as to support this impression of the Prostitute as originator of this action and of Policeman Hans as simply a respondent. In Shot No. 1,
we get a full view of the Prostitute's face but we do not see Hans' face. We never see any expression of his that may have contributed to her action in that it could have made her feel her action would be favourably received. The shot is dominated by the locus of her genitals and she begins unbuttoning before we get to Policeman Hans' face. In Shot No. 2, we get to see Hans' face but first we see him looking down towards his typewriter with a serious expression. When we get to see his face looking up, he sees her already unbuttoning and his eyes widen. Though this shot is dominated by Policeman Hans, it is dominated by him responding to the Prostitute. Shot No. 3 is dominated by the Prostitute unbuttoning her blouse to reveal her bra which rates a close up. Shot No. 4 is similar to the end of Shot No. 2 except that now Policeman Hans has his mouth open. This shot is therefore dominated by Policeman Hans but like Shot No. 2 it shows him responding to the Prostitute.

Shot No. 5 is like Shot No. 1 in that we cannot see Policeman Hans' face but we see the Prostitute walking toward him. The shot is dominated by the Prostitute. She acts within the shot and the Policeman's action within the shot occurs in response to her action. The camera zooms in on her and the shot ends on a Chest Shot of her. The final shot, Shot No. 6 is dominated by Hans in his now familiar role of responding to the Prostitute. Even though we can only see the back of her head she is still active within the shot. The full frontal view we get of Policeman Hans is one of surrender to sexual pleasure.
The consequence of this method of filmic presentation of the communicational exchange between Policeman Hans and the Prostitute is that the Prostitute's actions seem to be entirely her own, she appears to be autonomous and independent. Since Policeman Hans only responds to her, she appears to be initiator and control centre of their exchange, the aggressor for whom Policeman Hans is a victim. The model of human behavior here is one of unilinear causality between two selves separated by their barriers of skin. This kind of presentation of character is distinct from that conception of self termed "the semiotic self". In this latter conception, human behavior is seen as a mutually causal process in which no one character can be seen as "the control centre" because the control is not localizable in any one part of the communicational network. In addition, the film presents an inversion of extra-textual relations in that it presents Policeman Hans and the Prostitute in a complementary relation of domination and subordination with the Policeman in the one-down position.

The third communicational event in the flashback scene is the Discovery/Punishment. Policeman Hans is discovered by another Police Official who makes it clear that Hans will pay for the illicit act. Hans slaps the Prostitute in retaliation for her "aggressive" behavior which will now cost him his job. The Discovery/Punishment of Hans raises the question of the accuracy of our interpretation of Hans being presented as the victim and the Prostitute as the aggressor. This is because
whereas, relative to the Prostitute, Policeman Hans represents the Other, when Police Official enters the scene he becomes the sign, the representation of the Other relative to Hans. The entry of Police Official gives us a change to evaluate Hans' attitude to the Other and the allocation of responsibility for the exchange with the Prostitute. When we ask what is the contextual function of Policeman Hans' communication with Police Official, we see that it is one of apology, conveyed both verbally ("I'm sorry") and by his cringing body communication. Since Police Official makes it clear that Hans will pay, and since Hans apologises, it seems that Hans is presented in the end as the "aggressor" and the one responsible for the illicit act. Two things weigh heavily against this interpretative evaluation.

The first concerns the slapping of the Prostitute.

If Policeman Hans indeed accepts the responsibility, why does he slap the Prostitute? The second concerns the roles of men and women within the film as a whole. If we briefly examine the other women in the film, we see that all of them are presented in unfavourable light. The Mother is presented as cold and unloving, caring only for money and status. His wife is unfaithful to him while he lies seriously ill in hospital. His mistress, the "Love of his Life", is the same woman who rejected him as a young lover because her father did not want her to marry someone of such low status. As a mature woman, she still will carry on an affair with Hans but does not want
her husband to find out. His sister, Anna, is cold and
controlled. Even though she speaks as the "conscience" of
the film ("People haven't always treated your father right"
is what she says to his young daughter), she is too wrapped up
in her own concerns to pay great attention to Hans. When
towards the end of the film, he goes to see her in a great
depression, she offers him no consolation. Finally, there is
the suggestion that even his young daughter, Renate, is going
to grow up like all the rest because already at that age she is
shown lying to Anna.

When we turn to the role of men in the film, we find that
they are presented in a much more favourable light. First of
all, there is the communicational omission concerning Hans'
father. There is absolutely no mention of him at all. This
makes it appear as if the Mother is the one controlling, or
attempting to control, Hans. Antil, the man with whom Hans'
wife is unfaithful while Hans is in the hospital, is presented
as being foolishly duped by Hans' wife. The only friend that
Hans has is Harry, honest and so loyal that after Hans' death
he steps into Hans' shoes "for the sake of the child", that is,
Renate. This brings us to the Police Official and the cronies.
It is significant that Hans accepts the ruling of the Police
Official by which he eventually loses his job. In the flash-
back scene itself, he stammers "I'm sorry". How sincere is
this apology? Very sincere, it would seem. To evaluate
Hans' attitude, it is necessary to move to the scene in which
the flashback is embedded.

In this scene Hans is giving his Cronies his account of the event that led to his dishonorable discharge from the police force. The referential function of this communicational event between Hans and his Cronies is this discharge. The emotive function, that is, Hans' attitude to the occurrence, is one of regret at how it turned out but also a memory of enjoyment. The phatic function of the communicational event is signified by the drinking situation, the glasses on the table, the men sitting around in male camaraderie. The injunctive function of the event is "Do not despise me". In other words, Hans appeals to his Cronies to accept his perception of the situation as an unfortunate occurrence, an understandable yielding to temptation. The contextual function is expressed by his insistence "I was a good cop". In other words, insofar as Hans reflects on his discharge he sees it as perfectly in order. The Cronies, as they sit around, are silently complicit. It is reasonable to assume that by their silence the injunctive function of this silence is "Hans, be excused." Therefore, the emotive function of their silence is really the same as Hans'. In this, they take the role of Hans toward his regrettable "firing". The pattern of their communicational relationship with Hans is a complementary nurturing/nurtured relationship where they are supportive of Hans and accept his definition of himself as a "good cop".
We have set ourselves the task of assessing the function of the text as a real societal product in its own context. The level of communication that is primarily concerned in the completion of this task is the third level: filmmakers, text, audience, the Other. In order to shed light on this level, it has been necessary to consider other levels. We are now in a position to interpret and evaluate this third level via our analytic functions as applied to the text in its relation to the participants of the communicational event. We must regard the referential function of the text as its treatment of the societal variables of class, race and sex. In other words, we are concerned with how the filmmakers have treated the extra-textual variables of class, race and sex within the text. Let us take the issue of class first. We have already noted, in Chapter 4 of this study, that capital dominates labor in capitalist society. This is an actual extra-textual relation to be distinguished from how this relation may be represented in a fictional intra-textual situation. When we ask how this relation is treated in _The Merchant of Four Seasons_ we observe that within the text it is represented as a relation of equality rather than one of dominance and subordination, and what is essentially a class relation between employer and employed is treated as a matter of personal friendship between Hans and Harry. In other words, what is a complementary pattern of relationship is rendered as if it were a symmetrical one.
Turning to the question of race, we observe another distortion. We can recall that Hans ran away to join the Foreign Legion and it was in the Legion that he met Harry, a fellow companion-in-arms. In the scene in which Hans sets out deliberately to drink himself to death, there is a flashback to a scene ostensibly in Morocco. Hans, as a legionnaire, is shown being mercilessly whipped by a black Moroccan. He is rescued by Harry. The extra-textual relations between white legionnaire and black African are in fact relations between colonizer and colonized, a complementary one of dominance and subordination with the white in the position of dominance. Yet as an intra-textual relation, it has been transformed into a complementary relation of dominance and subordination with the black in the dominant position. The flashback is shown in isolation from any kind of inquiry into the context of the whipping. We are given no information concerning the reason for the presence of the Legion in Africa at all nor even of the particular situation surrounding Hans’ capture. If the extra-textual class relation between capital and labor became symmetrized in its intra-textual representation, the intra-textual representation of white/black complementary relationship has become inverted.

Another distortion of inversion occurs in the treatment of relations between the sexes. Whereas the extra-textual relations between men and women is one of complementary dominant/subordinate relations with men in the dominant role,
this relation is inverted in the film so that Hans is made to seem the victim of women. What is significant about these intra-textual representations of extra-textual relations is the distortion involved. In the treatment of race and sex, the groups actually oppressed by the Other are treated as oppressive representations of the Other.

What is the emotive function of the text? This means, what is the attitude taken by the producers of the text to class, race and sex? We have seen that Hans is the intra-textual representation of Capital, White Colonizers and Men. Insofar then as Hans is portrayed in a sympathetic light, it must be admitted that the producers of the text, as far as this text is concerned, are sympathetic to capital, racism and sexism. If we consider the aesthetic function of the text, its style, particularly in regard to its structuring of characterization, we must conclude the structuring principle is that of individualism. The characters are "abstract individuals", isolated from the formative influences of a societal context. If Hans is the victim of women, we are not told how it is that these women come to be cold and uncaring. The characters are simple, independent and immutable, in that they undergo no development. Even the "success" of Hans in not having to push his cart in the streets anymore is the result, not of any action on his part or communicational exchange, but of the accident of illness. In any case, his illness poses the problem of who is to push the cart and the problem is solved not by Hans
but by his wife. In line with this, there is no critical reflexivity in the film's style, that is, the film does not call attention to the fact it is a product of decision-making. It is true that there is a metalingual function of the text, in that it parodies the cinematic code of melodrama. This metalingual function serves a comic function and also serves to perpetuate the presentation of Hans as a victim. For example, when Hans drunkenly beats his cold wife and she escapes to her in-laws, Hans is first shown in panic and grief at finding her gone. He then drives over to his family. When he is spotted, there is a comic scene of exaggerated terror against his "brutality".

In its contextual function, the film is clearly in accord with the ideology of individualism and there is no attempt at metacontextual communication. What about its injunctive function? Insofar as the producers of the text, by means of the text, construct a certain "space" for the audience to occupy vis-à-vis class, race and sex, (or we may say, vis-à-vis the Other) this "space" is one in accord with capital, racism and sexism. If it is in the nature of a communicational event that the participants take the role of each other, then, to the degree that the producers of the text are sympathetic to capital, racism and sexism, then should the audience take the role of the producer, this is the attitude
Finally, what is the phatic function of the text? What patterns of relationship between filmmakers and audience and between different sectors of the audience does the film propose? If we divide the audience into Capital and Labour, then we would have to say that the filmmakers are in symmetrical relationship with Capital. If we divide the audience into White and Black, then the filmmakers are in symmetrical relationship with White. If we divide the audience into Men and Women, then the filmmakers are in symmetrical relationship with Men. Let us consider how this film proposes members of the audience should relate to each other. In a very real sense, it proposes via its distortions a misrecognition, a discrepant punctuation, of such relations. If men and women in the audience take the attitude of the filmmakers toward women, they will view women as the source of oppression, ascribing to women a power that is not theirs in spite of such ideological nonsense as: "It's a woman's world, ask any man" or "The hand that rocks the cradle rules the world". In a similar way, the film proposes between blacks and whites the familiar myth of "black brutality". Perhaps most damaging of all, the film proposes that capital and labor are equal and mutually supportive.
Two Differing Representations of a Rape Event

**WEEKEND**

The French film, *Weekend*, directed by Jean Luc Godard who also wrote the script, was filmed on location in the Paris region, September-October 1967, and was first shown in Paris, 29 December 1967.

This researcher was familiar with much of Godard's filmic work as well as the critical literature on Godard as a whole, and on this particular film.

There were various reasons for the choice of this film for study purposes. As a French film, it gave some variation in the nationality of the films, and, in addition, it was readily available. For a researcher into filmic communication, the work of this director poses an interesting problem partly because, as it was put by Robin Wood (1972: 5) "Of the established major filmmakers, only Godard has consistently, and indeed increasingly, sought directly to face contemporary reality". Godard has occupied a key position in contemporary culture and his position in the world of filmmaking has been compared to that of James Joyce in the world of literature by Pauline Kael (1968: 143), or as Mayersberg (1968: 23)
phrased it "His films are in themselves personal grammars of the cinema". Of all the corpus of Godard's work, *Weekend* represents the richest and most complex work.

The theme of *Weekend* has been conceded to be the disintegration of Western civilization by critics as far apart politically as Robin Wood (1972: 8) and James Roy MacBean (1968/69, rep. 1975: 45). The theme was summarized more sharply by Henderson (1972: 57) as "the dehumanizing character of advanced capitalism and its irreconcilable contradictions", and Henderson (1972: 72) described the plot as follows:

A bourgeois husband and wife, after consulting their lovers, set out to murder her mother for money; after many obstacles and interruptions they accomplish their task but are prevented from collecting their gains by the intervention of unexpected outside forces. ... (the) plot is not well made; more precisely, the plot is never finished. The film ends only half through it. We know from the early scenes - the husband's call to his lover, the wife's meeting with hers - that the real struggle will begin only after the money is obtained from the wife's mother. Husband, wife, wife's lover, and husband's lover will then plot and scheme to control the money and to eliminate their competitors.

However, the film does not explore these subsequent details for they are prevented from reaching their destination. In the course of the pursuit of their economic quest by husband (Roland) and his wife (Corinne), the wife is raped in a ditch by a tramp. This is the sequence from the film
selected for analysis.

The choice of this sequence was governed by its theme, and by the treatment the sequence received in the review literature. This choice is in line with the researcher's aims in this inquiry to generate knowledge concerning the refraction of societal struggles (class struggle, racism and sexism) in filmic texts. The study of rape as a societal event is central to any investigation of sexism. It has been strongly argued by Reynolds (1974)

...rape is a means of social control aimed at constraining the behaviour of women, a way of keeping women in "their place"
... laws against rape operate, in practice and application, primarily to punish those men who do not rape appropriately. ...

Furthermore, in modern Western capitalist society at least, there is a definite relationship between private property, the economic aspects of female sexuality and the societal rules constraining rape events as these rules are codified in the legal system. Evidence for these interrelations can be found in an article in the Yale Law Journal (1952: 55-83) where the legal regulations surrounding the crime of rape were discussed. The article is important because of its frank admissions of the views taken by society toward the woman and the role of the consent standard in the social structure. Because "Rape consists of sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent" (Yale Law Journal, 1952: 55),
the matter of the woman's consent becomes a crucial standard in judging whether or not a crime has been committed. Yet the article admitted that such a standard seems in some cases to be a nebulous standard of criminality (Yale Law Journal, 1952: 70).

In demonstrating the male expectation that a woman's sexuality is to be used for economic purposes, a passage was quoted from Guyon:

When calculating her chances in the struggle for existence, a girl puts on the credit side her personal attractions, the 'sex appeal' which will induce a man to work for her so that, forthwith or by degrees, she will secure money, status, leisure. Far from being ashamed of her sex (as some facile theorists would have us believe), woman is extremely proud of her genital organs. They are the centre of her power to give men incomparable pleasure. She would be amazed if they were neglected, undervalued, despised; and she counts on them to provide for her future, and perhaps to lead her to unexpected heights.

(Yale Law Journal, 1952: 71)

Further on, there is a succinct statement of the reduction of woman as person to woman as body, the commoditization of sexuality, woman as sexual object:

The consent standard in our society does more than protect a significant item of social currency for women; it fosters, and is in turn bolstered by, a masculine pride in the exclusive possession of a sexual object. The consent of a woman to sexual intercourse awards the man a privilege of bodily access,
a personal "prize" whose value is enhanced by
sole ownership.

(Yale Law Journal, 1952: 72)

An additional reason for the man's condemnation
of rape may be found in the threat to his
status from a decrease in the "value" of his
sexual "possession" which would result from
forcible violation. ... the disgust may
spread to the body of the victim who is some-
how thought to be contaminated by the experi-
ence. Words like "ravaged" and "despoiled"
used to describe the rape victim reflect the
notion of a stain attaching to the body of
the girl.

(Yale Law Journal, 1952: 73)

With regard to the legal presumption of non-consent in cases of
statutory rape, the article discussed the "treasure theory"
underlying the usual statutory rape law:

A popular conception of a girl's sexual
indulgence or virginity as a "thing" of social,
economic and personal value explains, in part,
the law's concern with her capacity to "under-
stand".

(Yale Law Journal, 1952: 76)

This sequence received scant mention in the reviews of
Weekend. Of seven reviewers (Adler, 1968; Mayersberg, 1968;
Kael, 1968; Dawson, 1968; Price, 1968; Kauffmann, 1968; Genet,
1968), only Adler mentioned it. Nor has it been discussed in
such critical studies as Henderson (1972: 57-92) and MacBean
(1968/69, rep. 1975: 45-60). With regard to the rape event,
Adler (1968: 32) had this to say: "At one point, as the couple
sit by the side of the road, the woman is casually raped in a
ditch. No one even bothers to mention it. This would not work
in the theater or in prose. It works on film". The reviewer is referring to the fact neither Corinne, Roland nor the Tramp, nor any other character within the movie at any time, refers to the rape. The scarcity of reference to the event on the part of reviewers could be termed, from a Freudian point of view, a "collective repression". Furthermore, Adler's interpretation of the rape event as a "casual" event is highly debatable. One of the results of the present analysis will be to provide an assessment of the validity of her interpretation.

The other film selected for a comparative analysis of rape event representations was Lipstick. It was directed by Lamont Johnson and there was no previous acquaintance with any of the director's other work on the part of the researcher. The significant factor in the choice of the film was that it was made under the sponsorship of the U.S. National Association for the Prevention of Rape and Assault. Margaux Hemingway plays Chris McCormick, the hottest model in the country. She is raped by Gordon Stewart, played by Chris Sarandon. Against the advice of her boyfriend, who works for an advertising agency and who is very conscious of her as a commodity, Chris McCormick decides to testify against the rapist. This rape event is central to the entire film and a large part of the movie is taken up with a court trial of the rapist. Prior to the analysis of the film in this study, it was viewed three times.
Let us begin our comparative analysis of the rape event in Weekend. While the analysis will concentrate on the rape event this will be placed in the context of the sequence in which it occurs and any other sequence which seems appropriate for clarifying the significance of the rape event. Because of the complexity of the sequence, the analysis will not discuss the shots and/or scenes in the sequence in linear order as they actually occur in the sequence but rather as it seems appropriate. Our analysis of the total communication exchange is governed by the researcher's aims in this study. We have already noted the delimitation of a system from its environment depends on the placing of a boundary. This placement depends on the purposes of the observer. When an observer is engaged in a transaction with a certain context (system/environment relations) at a certain level, the observer gets data to describe that level. If the observer picks a context at a different level, data suitable to the second level will be generated. This will not necessarily invalidate the data obtained at the first level. We are simply reaffirming here the dictum that the observer must always be included in the field of investigation.

The film Weekend was examined by Henderson (1972: 57-92) who concluded that Roland and Corinne really illustrated the bourgeoisie as a class. He therefore made no distinction between Roland and Corinne, and treated them always as a unit (we could say "system" though Henderson himself does not use
such terminology). Since the present researcher has different purposes from Henderson, by being specifically interested in sexism, Corinne and not the couple was chosen as the system. Delimiting the system differently generates different system/environment relations, thereby altering the context. This procedure would generate different data without necessarily invalidating Henderson's points. An examination of Henderson's textual analysis reveals that Henderson's position as observer vis a vis the observed is structured by two positions: Henderson as Marxist critic with interest in class relations, Henderson as someone not interested in sexism (at least for the purpose of that analysis of Weekend). The present researcher, however, is interested in generating information on the representation of how sexism, by no means specific to capitalist society, nevertheless functions specifically within that society to maintain it. Analysis of these rape events is particularly useful for investigating the definition of the self formed through the circulation of representations in sign process. We are concerned with how members of society are defined not only by communicating to others (as senders) or by being communicated to (as receivers), but also by being communicated about in the messages of others.

The sequence begins with a struggle between Roland and Corinne. She loses and is forced to submit to Roland who rides on her piggy back. After two title cards and the
Italian actors (in this shot Roland and Corinne are not piggy back) there is another scene where Corinne staggers into view (carrying Roland) at extreme screen right. She finally throws him off cursing and disappears behind the huge overturned lorry which dominates the shot. Roland remains in camera view. The camera pans (its tempo slightly ahead of Roland's) and we see Roland take the jacket from the dead lorry driver. He continues walking, putting on the jacket and Corinne emerges from behind the lorry. She sits head bowed, tired and dejected. Roland looks along the road to screen right, thereby guiding the eye of the viewer to Corinne, but he dominates this part of the shot because the viewer's eyes are guided past Corinne. Then comes the incident with the white Spitfire which is handled by Roland. Roland fails the examination and they fail to get a ride. After this incident Roland wishes to press on with their "economic quest" but Corinne gives in to weariness and disappears behind the ditch. Roland looks down at her and, while still looking down, sits down and pulls out a cigarette. He faces the camera but is still in long shot. The little grassy rise of land on which he sits down is his physical base of operations for the rest of the sequence.

The next event is the communicational exchange between Roland, the Tramp and Corinne. The totality of this exchange can be broken into two events: the Cigarette Light Request and the Rape. It is necessary to start by carefully looking at the power relation between Roland and the Tramp before
The Tramp enters from screen left. He walks along the road to about two thirds of the screen width before he turns around and looks back at Roland who however is looking down. The Tramp turns around, moving diagonally back to Roland, blocking Roland from the camera and coming to a halt screen left of Roland. He asks Roland for a light. The asking is not only verbal but he bends from the waist down. In this interaction with the Tramp Roland hardly speaks but mostly communicates non-verbally. His deliberate refusal of the Tramp's innocuous request is emphasized by the way it is done: remaining seated, he looks up, then looks away to screen left and his right arm throws away the match. At this the Tramp straightens up, and walks away again, without any indication of protest.

If we analyse this communication exchange in terms of our analytic functions, the referential function is of course the light for the Tramp's cigarette. The emotive function is desire on the part of the Tramp. The injunctive function is "Please give me a light". The phatic function is a statement by the Tramp of a complementary dominance-subordination relationship with Roland in the one-up position. The relationship between the Tramp and the object of his desire, i.e. the light for the cigarette, is mediated by Roland. What is important here
is not just that Roland is exercising power over the Tramp, but the fact the Tramp does not rebel in any way. The Tramp accepts the power structure. But what precisely is the organizing principle of this power structure? In other words, what is the contextual function of this exchange? Where and what is the Other? If Roland mediates between the Tramp and the Cigarette Light, what is mediating between Roland and the Tramp? The answer to this question lies in the fact the Tramp is walking. Roland is hitchhiking. He behaves very differently with the people who have cars. The Tramp is of no value to Roland in trying to achieve his own immediate object of desire. Roland needs a car ride in order to achieve his economic quest. It is none other than Capital that organizes Roland's relationships with other people by conferring value on them. Consequently, it is really the power of Capital to which the Tramp meekly submits. The triadic relation between Roland, Capital and the Tramp can be diagrammed in a triangle of mediation:
The base of the triangle has been altered to indicate that the Tramp and Roland are not on the same level of power in the society. Let us turn now to the rape event itself, now that we have seen how, even before the rape, Roland is in a power position over the Tramp.

When the Tramp walks away from Roland he comes to a halt near the spot where he had halted the first time. Now, looking to his left, he spots Corinne in the ditch. He turns to face into the ditch. Meanwhile Roland faces the camera, but slightly obliquely to screen right. His hands are folded. The Tramp turns to face Roland (this is done diagonally because the Tramp is in foreground, screen right of Roland). We see a half view of the Tramp's face as he looks screen left, and a three-quarter view of Roland who looks screen right towards the Tramp. With eye contact established, the Tramp comments on a woman being in the ditch. He turns his head to look into the ditch again. Roland answers "So what?" The Tramp then explicitly asks Roland if the woman belongs to him. Roland turns his head away to face the camera but looks down. His hands are crossed at the wrist (certainly not the gestures of one preparing to fight in any way). The Tramp descends into the ditch. Clearly the Tramp has asked permission of Roland and received it. As if to underline this point, after the Tramp disappears from view, Roland still sits with arms crossed at the wrists. His cigarette is in his mouth. He turns his head
to his left (screen right) and looks over his left shoulder
toward the ditch. He stretches his body a bit, then turns his
head back and looks down.

After a brief pause, Roland, still seated on the grassy
bank, looks screen right. With his right arm he hitch-hikes,
still seated, his arm moving rhythmically to screen left and
down. Then comes the incident with the red saloon, the second
interrogation. When this is ended, Roland returns to his
grassy bank. He looks to screen right as the Tramp climbs out
of the ditch. Roland and the Tramp look at each other, along
the same oblique diagonal line of sight, for the third time. The
Tramp stands buttoning up his coat, eventually looking down
as he continues to button. The camera pans slowly left,
duplicating the Tramp's earlier retracing. It loses the Tramp
but even then Roland continues to look in the direction of
the Tramp (now absent to the camera). The camera continues to
pan slowly left and when Roland is located in the right third
of the frame, he looks down. The camera continues panning left,
loses Roland, halts briefly to consider the landscape, then
begins to retrace itself (as the Tramp had done earlier). It
pans right and, like the Tramp, after it encounters Roland
(now at edge of screen right) it too discovers Corinne. She
comes into view, crossing in front of Roland. He looks at her.
It is not certain whether she is looking at him or not. She
sits on his right. She flops down, nursing a bruised shoulder.
There is a pause. After this comes the incident of the dark
blue Citroen.

What is especially interesting about the treatment of rape in Weekend is that even though it is the Tramp who physically rapes Corinne, the act is more Roland's than the Tramp's. Weekend focuses on the societal context of the rape event. The Tramp's question attempts to ascertain to whom Corinne belongs, the owner of the "property rights". Roland throws Corinne away. If we look at the triadic relations in this rape, we see that Roland is the Mediator of that violent and sexual message exchanged between the Tramp and Corinne. Roland does not attempt to prevent the rape and the camera fittingly shows us not the rape itself but Roland the Mediator.

Let us examine this rape communication to see how the exchange helps to re-produce the three persons involved and to define their relationships with each other. Using our analytic functions, we will examine in turn the various relationships between all the communicators. We can see that Roland is defining Corinne as a self even in his acts of speaking about her to the Tramp, thus speaking to her. In this message to Corinne, Roland maintains his definition of himself as homo economicus whose primary object of desire is the consummation of his economic quest. He continues to hitch-hike. This is what is important for him. The referential function of Roland's exchange with Corinne is the reification of her as a sexual
object. The emotive function is one of contempt, she is an object to be used or rather abused. The injunctive function is "Submit because you are inferior, a thing not as important as the money". This communication is in line also with Roland's forcible piggy back mounting of Corinne which can be reasonably seen as a symbolic rape. In its phatic function, the rape established a complementary relationship of dominance and subordination, with Corinne in the one-down position. She is an object to be consumed at someone else's decision and she must submit to this. Her submission is shown in two ways. First, in her political interrogation she cannot answer for herself but seeks confirmation of her reply from Roland. Then when she has failed the interrogation and they resume piggy back walking, Roland blatantly cheats her. She does not protest but instead puts her left arm around his shoulder. Finally, we must ask about the contextual function of the rape event. What is the Mediator between Roland and Corinne, in other words, what is the principle of organization constraining their relationship? Roland abandons her to the Tramp because she lets her human feelings of weariness overcome her determination to press on with the pursuit of money. At this point her immediate object of desire is to rest. But Roland wishes to press on for the money. It is Capital as the Economic Other which is mediating the relationship between Roland and Corinne. After they have murdered Corinne's mother at another point in the film, they say "I love you" to each other over the murdered
body as they contemplate living happily ever after with the fifty million. When Corinne falters in her economic quest, Roland punishes her for her failings. She screams for help but is denied it.

We turn to the physical rape of Corinne by the Tramp to find out how this communicational exchange defines the relationship not only, as may be expected, between Corinne and the Tramp but between the Tramp and Roland, and the definition of the Tramp as self and rapist. In order to fully appreciate this communicational rape event it is necessary to make some points about criminal behavior in general.

Our approach draws primarily from an excellent discussion by Fattah (1976: 29-53) concerning how a criminal uses a victim to legitimize the criminal behavior and how it is that certain individuals or organizations are more popular targets for victimization than others. According to Fattah (1976: 29), the approach used here differs from most approaches in that it is dynamic rather than static, viewing criminal behavior as action that can only be explained by considering the delinquent, the act and the victim as "inseparable elements of a total situation which conditions the dialectic of the anti-social conduct." What is the process that actually makes the anti-social behavior possible? According to Fattah
(1976: 10), "Delinquent behavior results from the way in which the individual conceives of himself/herself in relation to others and conceives of others in relation to himself". The behavior is made possible by means of a mental redefinitional process through which the social controls serving to check or inhibit deviant motivational patterns are rendered inoperative and the situation is conceived as one in which the rules are no longer binding.

This "mental redefinitional process" involves techniques whereby the act, the law, the victim and the perpetrator are re-defined by the delinquent and rendered legitimate. What interests us is those techniques in which the victim is used as an agent of self-legitimization. One such technique is the denial and reification of the victim and as Fattah himself agrees (1976: 39) "In the case of rape, the girl is negated as an equal human being, and is regarded as a sex object". Another technique is the devaluation of the victim's personal worth:

In their study of victim stereotypes, the Schwendingers observed from the very beginning what seemed to be a tacit agreement among the delinquents that the victim was a worthless human being. Their data reinforced the assumption that delinquents tacitly hold a common attitude toward the victim, and that there exist among them stereotypic definitions and consensually validated images of victims. ... This is corroborated by the findings of many other studies. In studying collective rape, Hijazi noticed that the majority of the delinquents have a depreciated image
of the female. She is an object to consent, submit and suffer. There is never any sentimental or emotional attachment towards her. She has to be possessed. Even thefts from the victim, which sometimes accompanied collective rape (such as taking the money out of the victim's purse) seemed to be motivated more by contempt than by greed.

(Fattah, 1976: 41)

A technique that is important for our study is the one in which the victim is blamed, and the injury is defined as an act of justice. This is linked with the criminal's recognition of appropriate and inappropriate targets for the criminal act. The victim is seen as being a legitimate or deserving victim, and the criminal conceives of his criminal action as an act of justice. This redefinition of the situation serves as self-legitimization for the criminal. The criminal does not conceive of himself as criminal but rather as a victim. In many cases the criminal may have had a very real experience of being victimized and the consequent feelings of injustice and a sense of victimization provide a strong justification capable of transforming the victimized individual into a criminal:

... the victim is transformed into a delinquent as a result of the process of auto-legitimization based on actual victimization. ... The passage from the state of victim to the state of offender, from the state of injured to the state of aggressor, from the state of oppressed to the state of oppressor seems quite easy. The perceived injustice, the sense of victimization, the retaliatory feelings (which are not necessarily directed toward the
victimizers), the legitimization of the act
(which is seen as a rightful reprisal) are all
mechanisms which facilitate such passage.

(Fattah 1976: 48)

If we analyse the rape as a communicational exchange
between the Tramp and Corinne, it is immediately obvious
that its injunctive function is a message to Corinne "You
are worthless, an object to consent, submit and suffer".
Its phatic function is clearly one of complementarity of
dominance and subordination with Corinne in the one-down
position. From our above discussion of criminal behavior,
it is clear the emotive function (i.e. the attitude of the
Tramp toward the rape) is one of self-legitimization in which
the Tramp is blameless and the act is legitimate. We must
remember the Tramp explicitly questioned Roland about the
"property rights" to Corinne. What is the referential
function of the rape? We must also remember that the
Tramp is a victim of Roland. When the Tramp seeks his object
of desire i.e. the light for a cigarette, Roland treats him
with contempt because the Tramp does not have a car and cannot
help him in his pursuit of money. In line with our discussion
of criminal behavior, we can see the referential function of
the rape as a retaliation against Roland deflected on to
Corinne. As Fattah (1976: 32) pointed out, the perpetrator
of the criminal act redefines himself not as a criminal
but as a victim of injustice, of society, of evil forces
or of the victimized object, but retaliatory feelings are
not necessarily directed toward the victimizers. From a political point of view, very often the victim's retaliatory feelings are prevented from being directed toward the true victimizers because the latter hold the positions of power and are prepared to use physical coercion to maintain these positions. However, a serious ideological and political effect is that very often the victimized at one level (e.g. the Tramp as victim of Roland) may not correctly perceive who are their true oppressors. In such cases, blame is deflected onto others.

According to Fattah (1976: 32), since the basic components of criminal behavior (the act, the law, the victim and the perpetrator) are "social constructions, it is essential to understand them to compare society's definition with the delinquent's own definition". In the rape event, the representation of the Law is Roland who sanctions the rape. Consequently, the contextual function of the rape is the Other as Sexism. This is the organizing principle constraining the exchange between the Tramp and Corinne. We can now apply the triangle of mediation to the social relationships of the rape event:
Yet we have already observed that, though Roland is the Mediator of the message between the Tramp and Corinne, his relations with the Tramp and with Corinne are in their turn mediated by the constraining principle of Capital. Consequently, this situation shows a hierarchy of constraints within which three communicators are acting. This hierarchy of constraints can be diagrammed in two ways. The first way is by means of triangles of mediation in relation to each other:

- **CAPITAL** as Economic Other
- **ROLAND** as the Other, Sexism
- **TRAMP**
- **CORINNE** (object of desire)

The base of the triangle has been modified to indicate men and women are not on the same equal level of power in this society.
Four Triangles of Mediation are operative in this situation:

a) Roland as Mediator between Tramp and Corinne
b) Capital as Mediator between Roland and Corinne
c) Capital as Mediator between Roland and the Tramp
d) Capital as Mediator between the Tramp and Corinne (because the Sexism mediating between the Tramp and Corinne is in its turn mediated by Capital).

The second way is the more abstract way in that it expresses the general principle:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{Capital as Economic Other} \\
\text{Sexism as Other}
\end{array}
\]

One final point remains to be made here. Elsewhere in this study a cybernetic approach has been taken to ideology. Instead of "feedback" processes we preferred to speak of "mutually causal" processes: deviation counteracting and deviation amplifying. We are now in a position to apply this to the rape event. Corinne, at the beginning of the sequence, gives in to her weariness andretires into a ditch to rest. She does not heed Roland's insistence to press on with the economic quest. This communicational exchange therefore opens up a deviation amplifying loop, which, if it were not corrected, could lead further and further away from the
consummation of their pursuit of Capital. Roland's victimization of the Tramp is a potentially deviation, amplifying process because there is a possibility the Tramp will rebel and attempt to change the status quo distribution of power between him and Roland. The rape event, constrained by sexism and the corresponding ideology, serves as a deviation counteracting communication network between the communicators. It serves to deflect the Tramp's retaliation against Roland and to maintain the Tramp's position in the status quo. It serves to interrupt Corinne's attempt to rest so she submits to Roland and takes up the economic quest once more.

**LIPSTICK**

The immediate research aim is to examine the film Lipstick in order to see whether the psychology of human nature underlying the characterization is congruent with the psychology of human nature underlying the ideology of "possessive" or "metaphysical" individualism and, if so, how this is achieved. A useful method of procedure is to examine the prevailing conceptions of the basic components of a rape event (act, perpetrator, victim, Law) to find out the degree to which they are based on the ideology not only of sexism but, more pertinently, on the ideology of individualism. This is important because though sexism as a code organizing male/female relations has pre-dated and can
exist outside of the capitalist social order, nevertheless the specific form it takes and its corresponding ideology will be constrained by the economic system and the ideology of individualism unique to capitalism. The second step in the procedure is to examine the movie for how it is related to these prevailing conceptions of the basic components of the rape event insofar as these conceptions have been demonstrated to be individualistic. The examination of the film will be undertaken by questioning the film in the terms of our analytic functions.

The Juridico-Political Ideology

To the extent that a prevailing conception of any component of the rape event is not supported by evidence, it can be termed an ideological myth. The following discussion of prevailing conceptions and the evidence offered against them is based primarily on Reynolds (1974: 62-67). A popular conception of the act is that it is irrational. Related to this conception of rape is the image of the rapist as an autonomous instance of individual pathology, a unique particular idiosyncratic result of pathological circumstance. However, evidence shows men charged with rape and attempted rape differ little on standard personality measures from their class counterparts. Furthermore, from 15% to 20% of rapes involve more than one man.
A rape victim is required to perform certain acts in order to have her claim to the victim role accepted and endorsed. Generally, a medical examination is required to obtain physical evidence, pictures may be taken of bruises and injuries, she is required to demonstrate her good character and that her actions could not in any way be construed as anything but negative to the suggestion of sexual acts. If the victim cannot meet such criteria, it is highly probable she will be denied victim status and the popular consensus will be "she had it coming to her", or "he was unreasonably provoked". From this and other supporting evidence too detailed to mention here, Reynolds (1974: 62-67) strongly argued that rape serves as a means of social control preserving the sexual double standard and the dominant position of males, especially in the erotic sphere. Her position was that there is a kind of woman who, as far as society is concerned, may be justifiably sexually assaulted. The act of rape, in such a context, may be seen as punitive action directed against women who give the appearance of wishing to usurp the dominant male role. Evidence for this is the fact rapists are selective as to their victims, frequently plan and make arrangements for the rape, (sometimes long in advance of the actual event), and tend to be men who most strongly believe in the sexual double standard.
In view of all this, Reynolds (1974: 64) came to the conclusion that in a criminal case what a woman is required to prove is not that she was raped but that she was raped unjustifiably. It was argued laws against rape operate, in practice and application, primarily to punish men who rape inappropriately. This conception of the Law is sharply at odds with the prevailing image of the Law or what may be termed legal ideology or juridico-political (state and law) ideology. The arena for the clash between the popular conception of the Law and the conception of the Law put forward by Reynolds is the ideological component of the ideology of individualism: the dignity of man and its correlate of equality. What Reynolds is contending is the Law, at least where men and women are concerned, is nothing other than institutionalized inequality, and a means of social coercion, directed primarily against women.

The arguments advanced by Reynolds strike to the heart of the juridico-political ideology's core postulate: the abstract equality of all citizens before the Law. This postulate has been judged to have such major importance in the maintenance and regulation of the capitalist social order that the juridico-political ideology was judged by Poulantzas (1975: 195-224) to be the most important sector of the total ideological domain. Below is a condensed exposition of the nature and crucial function of the juridico-political ideology.
The capitalist mode of production is defined by the dominance of wage labour. This requires separation from the means of production on the part of the labourers. The individual is forcibly thrown into an atomistic economic market where he/she must face the market alone, deprived of any communal ties. There is a perpetual threat of individual starvation amid group plenty. The socioeconomic relations are individualistic and marked by an effect of isolation. Such an individualistic economic order demands an ideology that will legitimize the effect of isolation as well as performing certain other mystifying functions, especially hiding class domination. According to Poulantzas (1968: 213), the sector of the total domain of the dominant ideology of capitalism best equipped to perform these functions is the juridico-political ideology. In order to achieve the effect of isolation, its first step is to separate and untie (in the sense in which Marx says it "frees") the agents from "natural ties" such as those obtaining under feudalism. It creates citizens as political "individuals-persons", "subjects of law" who are "free" and "equal" one to the other. It thereby both legitimizes and helps to regulate those juridico-political structures which permit the wage labour contract (buying and selling of labour power), capitalist private property relations, competition. Since it is an individualistic ideology, the effect of isolation it creates serves to mask the real societal economic relations, the existence of classes, and various
institutionalized inequalities.

In its political role, this ideology operates with a certain conception of the citizen and the state which can be termed political individualism. As has been pointed out by Lukes (1973: 79), this doctrine is a conception of political society whose (politically relevant) members are "abstract individuals" given independently of any social context. Congruent with this theory of the political individual or citizen is a theory of political society as a set of "actual or possible social arrangements which respond more or less adequately to those individuals' requirements" (Lukes, 1973: 73). The concomitant theory of the state is that the primary principles underlying the legitimacy and proper operations of the state must be deduced from the inherent features of the individual taken as an autonomous being independent of any social or political attachment. The legitimacy of government is based on the consent of individuals. The role of government is to protect the rights of individuals and satisfy individual wants and interests, especially allowing maximum scope for these individuals to pursue their private interests.

Consequently, even as political individual, as citizen, the individual is essentially private and the relations between
citizens unequal with respect to private possessions must be antagonistic and conflicting. There is inevitably a split between each citizen's private interest and the public interest. This means there is a split between the citizen's "private" self and "public" self. The public interest is represented by the state which must somehow reunify the "private" individual atoms:

The political role of the dominant bourgeois ideology dominated by the juridico-political region is to attempt to impose upon the ensemble of society a 'way of life' through which the state can be experienced as representing society's 'general interest', and as the guardian of the universal vis à vis 'private individuals.' These latter are a creation of the dominant ideology, which presents them as unified by an 'equal' and 'free' participation in the 'national' community, under the protection of the dominant classes who are held to embody the 'popular will'.

(Poulantzas, 1968: 214)

Consequently, in this ideology the function of the state is to maintain stability and the conception of Law is "a body of rules established through consensus by those who are governed or rather by the 'representatives' of the governed" (Quinney, 1973: 87). In actual fact, however, the split between the citizen's "private" self and "public" self means the citizen's "public" self is separated from him/her in the form of an alien political power represented by the state, which "embodies" the citizens' "fictional public beings".

It has been persuasively argued by Quinney (1973: 95-99), a
critical view of state and Law must take the position they are systems for the maintenance of the ruling class and criminal law is a coercive means in establishing domestic order. An important function of the juridico-political ideology is to mask the reality of state and Law as coercive means for preserving class domination and institutionalized inequalities.

Let us sum up the major points regarding the prevailing conception of rape and Law in the juridico-political ideology:

(1) Rape is an irrational act.
(2) The rapist is a case of autonomous individual pathology and not a product of societal codes such as sexism.
(3) All citizens are free and equal before the Law.
(4) Since men and women are equal before the Law, all rape victims are treated equally by the Law. If a claimant to the status of victim is denied such status, it is because by definition she was not a victim.
(5) Since the legal system is essentially equitable, failures of justice are accidental errors.
(6) These "miscarriages of justice" can be righted within the prevailing legal order.
(7) The function of the Law is to protect the citizen's "private" interests and it must be subservient to these interests.
The counter-conception (it can be called a "subordinate ideology") is as follows:

1. Rape is a coercive means of social control, aimed at maintaining the dominant position of males by restricting the freedom and mobility of women.

2. For a man to be recognized as rapist by law, it must be shown not that this man has raped but that this man has raped inappropriately.

3. To be accorded the status of victim, a woman must show that she has been raped unjustly i.e. she is of good character and her behaviour cannot be construed as provocative in any way.

4. All citizens do not stand 'free' and 'equal' before the Law.

5. The Law is a coercive means of maintaining institutionalized inequalities.

6. "Failures of justice" are not accidental, but are inherent in the system.

7. These "miscarriages of justice" cannot be righted within the system since, as we have seen, functionally necessary to the capitalist socioeconomic order.

The Filmic Analysis

The Intra-Textual Level

Let us examine the film to see what degree it is based
on the prevailing conceptions of the juridico-political ideology. In Lipstick character and plot are dynamically interrelated. The plot can be viewed as an exercise in problem solving: a question will be posed and answers will be given. In Lipstick the question asked is: is it possible the legal system does not "work"? Is it possible some citizens are not equal before justice? Can it be the scales of justice are tipped in favour of men and against women? The suspense involved in the plot development consists in the working out of this problematic. The plot develops through a linear chronological sequence of five major communicational events: Rape No. 1: Chris McCormick, currently the hottest model in the country and who appears in advertisements for lipstick, is raped by Gordon Stewart, a nice well mannered music teacher and composer of avant garde music. She has met Gordon Stewart through her little sister (about 13) who is in Stewart's music class and idolizes Stewart.

Trial No. 1: Against the advice of her boyfriend who argues the negative publicity caused by a trial could ruin her career, she decides to press charges. She is encouraged to do so by a lawyer (played by Anne Bancroft) who assures her every woman has the right of consent and she will make an excellent witness. This trial takes up a major part of the film. At the end, Gordon Stewart is acquitted.

Rape No. 2: Gordon Stewart rapes Chris McCormick's little sister.
Vengeance Killing: Chris McCormick, in a moment of utter rage at Stewart's rape of her little sister, snatches a gun and kills Stewart.

Trial No. 2: The Lawyer (Anne Bancroft) who has unsuccessfully prosecuted Stewart in the first trial resigns from the District Attorney's Office to defend Chris McCormick. McCormick is acquitted. This second trial is very short, consisting mainly of the tail end of Bancroft's speech and the verdict of the jury. It constitutes the last sequence of the film.

We must now analyse the events in terms of our analytic functions. What is the referential function of Rape No. 1? If we look at the event from the point of view of the rapist the referential function appears to be the punishment of McCormick for being a sexual commodity, a Prostitute. When McCormick is on the witness stand in the first trial, she is asked by the Prosecutor (Anne Bancroft) if she sells herself. She replies "No." "What do you sell?" "Lipstick". "To men?" "No, to women." But Gordon Stewart does not hold this view. He tells her "You fuck to get what you want." In its emotive function, the rape expresses contempt on Stewart's part toward McCormick. In its injunctive function, the rape event tells McCormick "You must be punished." Stewart sees himself as an agent of a moral order violated by McCormick. In addition, there is the implication he wants her to help advance his career by "pushing" his music to some of her highly placed
influential friends. But she does not seem to like his music and is bored with it. In its phatic function, the rape communication defines the relationship between McCormick and Stewart (in Stewart's point of view) as a complementary one in which Stewart occupies the one-up position because of his greater moral integrity. Consequently, as far as Stewart is concerned, he is operating with contextual (societal) codes of "fair play" and socially approved moral contempt, or, we may say, the Ideological Other as Sexism codified in a legal system that allows men to rape suitable women. From Stewart's point of view, the act "stands for" and "re-presents" punishment. It is not seen as rape per se.

The impetus for the plot development comes from the refusal of McCormick to accept the definition of herself and their relationship proffered by Stewart. From her point of view, she is a worker who sells lipstick to other women. Consequently, for her the meaning of the rape is a crime and as far as the emotive function is concerned, in her attitude she is angered and aggrieved. Within the rape as a communicational exchange, the injunctive function of her part in this exchange is "Don't do this." From her point of view, in its phatic function the rape defines her in the one-down position in a complementary power relationship of domination and coercion. Defining herself as a victim, she sees the event as being organized in its contextual function by the codes
of the Ideological Other as juridico-political ideology. She sees herself and Stewart as both 'free' and 'equal' before the Law and expects him to be punished. Her definition of the meaning of the event, of Stewart and herself, and their relationship is supported by the fact the Lawyer shares these definitions.

These contrasting definitions naturally reappear in the communicational event of Trial No. 1 which ends in the acquittal of Gordon Stewart. Since the meaning of a message is a function of the relationship between the communicators involved, the "Not Guilty as Charged" pronounced by the jury is bound to be different for McCormick and Stewart. The situation is made more complex because the meaning, i.e. significance, of the "Not Guilty" will vary depending on whether it is placed as coming from the jury as representations of the real legal system or of the Ideological Other of the juridico-political ideology. Now, more than ever, we can see the meaning of communicational event is a function of the set of alternatives within which it is located. The "Not Guilty" performs a dual function. This dual function lies in the simultaneous intertwining of the reality of inequality and the myth of equality. The inequality is the real unequal relations between men and women existing in the social relations, codified in the legal system as institutionalized sexism. The mythical equality is the false representation
of sexism as equality in the juridico-political ideology.

It is interesting to construct schemas of the varying significances of the "Not Guilty" depending on whether it is viewed as coming from The Other as Sexism codified in the real legal system or the Juridico-Political Ideological Other.

The first schema analyses the various functions of the "Not Guilty" as addressed to Gordon Stewart.

**"NOT GUILTY" AS ADDRESSED TO GORDON STEWART BY THE OTHER**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>INEQUALITY</th>
<th>EQUALITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>The Other as Sexism codified in the law</td>
<td>The Juridico-Political Ideological Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential</td>
<td>The rape as an act of physical coercive punishment</td>
<td>No rape occurred; the physical sexual act as one of mutual consent or of undue provocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotive</td>
<td>Approval; he has raped appropriately</td>
<td>Neutrality; the state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injunctive</td>
<td>In your &quot;public&quot; self, i.e. your social role, you can continue to act this way.</td>
<td>In your &quot;private&quot; affairs you may do as you please</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phatic</td>
<td>As a Representative of the Other, Stewart is in a symmetrical relationship with the Other</td>
<td>Complementary relation of Protector/Protected with Stewart in position of protected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From these intertwined functions emerge the following definitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Def. of Self</th>
<th>Gordon Stewart as agent of social coercion</th>
<th>Gordon Stewart as law abiding private citizen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Def. of Self</td>
<td>Chris McCormick as social offender</td>
<td>Chris McCormick as consenting adult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Def. of Rel.</td>
<td>Stewart/McCormick as complementary dominance/subordination with Stewart holding power of punishment</td>
<td>Stewart/McCormick in symmetrical relationship of equality between two private consenting adults</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EQUALITY**

Communication between McCormick and the Juridico-Political Ideological Other.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FUNCTION</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION TO THE OTHER (Pressing Charges)</th>
<th>COMMUNICATION FROM THE OTHER (Verdict of 'Not Guilty')</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contextual</td>
<td>Juridico-Political Ideological Other</td>
<td>Juridico-Political Ideological Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Referential</td>
<td>Rape occurred i.e. crime occurred</td>
<td>No rape occurred. Physical sexual act was one of mutual consent between free and equal adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotive</td>
<td>Anger and desire for retribution</td>
<td>Neutrality: state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phatic</td>
<td>Complementary of protector/protected with Law in role of protector</td>
<td>Definition similar to McCormick's but with denial of need for protection in this situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injunctive</td>
<td>Protect me by punishing the offender</td>
<td>(You got what you wanted) and you may do as you please in your private affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following definitions emerge:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>McCormick as victim</th>
<th>McCormick as consenting adult</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self</td>
<td>Stewart as social</td>
<td>Stewart as law abiding citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>offender</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relation</td>
<td>Stewart/McCormick as</td>
<td>Stewart/McCormick in symmetri-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>complementary relation</td>
<td>relation of free and equal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>of dominance/subordin-</td>
<td>consenting adults</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ation with Stewart in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>coercive role</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In this same schema, with the contextual function still
the juridico-political ideology, the "Not Guilty" Verdict (acquittal of Stewart) entails a disagreement between the
meaning of the verdict to the Other and to McCormick in her
role as private citizen, (in her role as public being, she must
accept the definitions given by the Other). In its referential
function, the "Not Guilty" stands for a miscarriage of justice
since rape, in her point of view, did occur. In its phatic
function the verdict is seen as a failure to assume, or rejec-
tion, by the Law of its complementary role of protector. The
Law's definition of her as consenting adult is rejected and the
definition of herself as victim is maintained.

At this stage in plot development there is still an
ambiguity in the portraits of the characters. Stewart's
caracter is still not resolved clearly. On the one hand,
the rape makes him look bad and his outburst in the courtroom
makes him look violently emotional. On the other hand, he must
have very good qualities for McCormick's little sister previously looked up to him and he appears to enjoy good standing in the community. If his outburst in the courtroom appears violent, this may be due to the strain brought on by the trial. Then too there is the fact that McCormick is a sex model and in her role as model very seductive. And he sees her, for example, in a photograph session while she is working. With Rape No. 2 comes the turning point. McCormick's little sister by accident wanders into the auditorium where her (previously worshipped) ex-music teacher Gordon Stewart is wrapping up a rehearsal of the production of a new composition with choreography. When the attempt is made to apply analytic functions to this rape of a child who is clearly innocent of any sexual invitations on her part, we discover the rape can only be rendered meaningful (from the knowledge generated by the film at the intra-textual level of analysis) by one interpretation. This interpretation was in fact voiced in a hushed voice of dawning awareness by a member of the audience at one of the public screenings: "He's sick!"

After Rape No. 2, little sister eventually finds her way back to the room where McCormick has been completing a last model assignment before they leave for a vacation in the country. When McCormick discovers what has happened, she goes berserk with rage. She rushes out to the parking lot, snatches a rifle from the car and shoots Stewart as he is preparing
to leave the parking lot. The Vengeance Killing is over, she is so "out of it" she continues firing the trigger even when the gun is empty. Eventually the cops arrive and arrest her as she stands still and dazed with shock.

Finally, Trial No. 2. We are only given the tail end of the speech by the Lawyer defending McCormick. This Lawyer turns out to be none other than the Lawyer who had encouraged her to press charges against Stewart and had been Prosecutor in that case. She has resigned her job with the District Attorney's office to defend McCormick. Since the Lawyer's speech is practically all we get of the second trial and is very short, it is quoted below. As it is delivered, the Lawyer's face is in close up.

**LAWYER** I did not leave the District Attorney's office to extenuate the crime of murder. I'll tell you what Clarence Darrow wrote some time ago: Crime is to be expected since humans are never perfect. But the failure of justice may be more damaging to society than crime itself. Then where is law and order? I say your verdict to acquit Chris McCormick is law and order. And justice. Thank you, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention.

The verdict is acquittal: "We, the Jury, find the defendant not guilty as charged."

We are now in a position to compare the filmic conceptualization of the act, victim, rapist and Law with the popular
conceptualizations. The act i.e. the Rape Event is rendered irrational. Even if it can be argued that McCormick rejected his music, or was seductive, neither of these explanations hold in the case of the little sister. This image of rape, is in agreement with the prevalent conception. In line with this image of rape, the rapist is portrayed as a sick individual, an isolated incidence of pathology. Since the societal codes constraining his behaviour are not shown (i.e. it is not shown how rape can only be a social act), this creates a barrier between rapist and society. The barrier, as we now know, is nothing other than the skin of the biological organism. Behind this barrier of skin, the autonomous subject of consciousness rules full blown in its subjectivity, however pathological. Furthermore, this "sickness", this intrapsychic entity, is totally private as the film does not even delve into any circumstances that may have brought this about. The only explanation we get is explanation by association i.e. since the rapist is also a creative artist and artists are "known" to be neurotic or worse, the fact he is an artist explains him as "isolated", "weirdo", "unstable". Lurking behind this is perhaps the association of creativity and pathology in a psychoanalytic framework. But even if this is the framework within which the character is constructed, the framework encourages exploration of the "sick" individual's past history in order to understand the pathology. The portrait of the rapist Gordon Stewart is accordingly in agreement with the
Turning to the image of the victim, we find a similar agreement. There are two victims but whereas there is an ambiguity concerning McCormick's status as victim, there is none concerning the status of her little sister. But the granting of victim status to the little sister poses no problem for the Law because this is precisely the kind of female who fulfills the requirement posed by the Law. It must be remembered that the Law does not ask a woman to demonstrate that she has been raped but that she has been raped unjustly i.e. she is of good character and her behaviour cannot be construed as provocative in any way. What about the filmic conception of the Law itself? Again, this is in accordance with the dominant ideological conception of the Law as inherently equitable. The acquittal of Stewart is in the end resolved into one of those errors that are both "accidental" and "inevitable" since no system is perfect. But serious "miscarriages of justice" can be righted within the legal system. It may not be perfect but "it's the best of all possible worlds." Finally, there is that intriguing matter of the Vengeance Killing or "taking the Law into her own hands". The film does not reveal clearly on what ground the Defence actually rests its case for the acquittal of McCormick. The concluding part of the Lawyer's speech implies that McCormick ought to be
acquitted simply because it was demonstrated clearly (thank God for virtuous-beyond-reproach little sister) the first trial tipped the scales of justice wrongly and now the proper thing is to re-align the scales. This would conform with the dominant ideological conception of the Law as protection for the citizens' "private" interest and its subservience to these interests. We must remember the disjunction between the citizen's "private" self and "public" self. The Law, as it is conceived in the juridico-political ideology, serves a role as unifier and mediator of diverse interests at the level of the citizen's "public" being. Since it has failed in this capacity to protect McCormich's "private" interest and "public" interests only exist to better promote "private" interest, it is justifiable that McCormick should "re-take the Law into her own hands". This is essentially an individualistic solution.

The above analysis has been carried out at the intra-textual level and it has been demonstrated that in all major areas the filmic text has been in remarkable agreement with the dominant juridico-political ideology.

**The Extra-Textual Level**

The foregoing material allows us to uncover the relations obtaining at the level of the filmmakers, text, audience and Other (i.e. societal context). It seems to
be very clear that in their construction of the text the filmmakers were mediated by the juridico-political ideology. The agreement between the filmic conception and the conception in that ideology supports this view of the text as constructed within the constraining codes of the juridico-political ideology. This relation can be diagrammed as follows in our triangle of mediation:

```
                     Juridico-Political Ideological Other
                        /     \
                      /       \
                     /         \
Filmmakers           Text
```

The relationship between the text, audience and Other is of special importance. If it seems reasonable that McCormick serves as some kind of role model, we must ask what is this role model. It is clear this is primarily as a specifically legal citizen. At the extra-textual level, Lipstick can be viewed as a text that offers to the members of the audience a specific image of themselves as legal selves. Chris McCormick offers the members of the audience a model of the legal subject in advanced Western capitalist society. This model is constructed within the constraining codes of the Juridico-Political Ideological Other. McCormick becomes simply a representation of this Other.
The relationship between the text, Other and audience can be shown in a triangle of mediation.

*Juridico-Political Ideological Other*

(Here, represented by the specific other, Chris McCormick)

Member of Audience

Legal Self

If we remember that the text is simply one element in a communication network, we view the text as an excellent example of the way any text, insofar as it agrees with the dominant ideological discourse, may serve to unify and hide the real contradictions in the socioeconomic context. Women are increasingly more militant about rape laws, about the contradictions between the real conditions of their existence and those conditions as re-presented by the dominant ideological discourse. Their protests act as deviation amplifying processes taking the context away from its norm. In return, deviation counteracting sign processes arise to "bring it back". The context must make some adaptations at varying levels. The most important implication of the movie is the inherent equitability of the Law. This is the cornerstone of the juridical ideology because, without it, there would be a recognition of
the impossibility of righting "miscarriages of justice"
from within the prevailing legal order. No amount of
legal tinkering can render the system equitable, based as it
is on unequal property and class relations inherently functional
to the socioeconomic order.

From this point of view, it is reasonable to say that
while at the surface structure of the film we are shown the
trials of Gordon Stewart and Chris McCormick, at the deep
structure level it is not they who are on trial but the
juridical ideology itself. Yet, since this trial has been
arranged within the constraints of this very ideology, it is
of course a fixed trial. The juridical ideology must be
acquitted. In such a reading, the filmic hero (the word
"hero" is used deliberately) is in fact none other than the
Lawyer. If we have earlier in this study characterized an
ideology as a kind of logic, a way of posing problems and
solving them, this film is a very clear illustration of such
a conceptualization. And the final analysis must be made of
the Lawyer's concluding words.

Let us take this sentence "Crime is to be expected
since humans are never perfect." In this statement, rape, a
specific kind of crime, (and this means a specific kind of
societal construction committed by specific social agents
located at a particular historical place and time, occurring
within historical and therefore changeable circumstances) is transformed and re-presented as "crime in general". This fiction of "crime in general" is claimed to be ahistorical and unchangeable because it is then based on the inherent imperfection of "human nature". As with "crime in general" the nature of humanity is re-presented as existing outside of societal relations and history. Similarly with the sentence "But the failure of justice may be more damaging to society than crime itself". Specific inequalities in the real societal relations are codified and re-presented in the legal system in the form of specific historical verdicts regulating societal relations. These regulatory verdicts functionally required by the socioeconomic order are transformed and re-presented in the phrase "failures of justice" with the implication that such "failures" can be fixed. In the same way, a specific historical form of society (i.e. capitalism) is absorbed, hidden and re-presented as "society in general". In this context, what is hidden is that there are specific forms of society e.g. non-class societies as well as class societies, and even within class societies such distinctions as slave, feudal and capitalist class societies. Within each of these forms of society "crime in general" takes on specific forms.

Finally, a critical analysis of the Lawyer's speech uncovers the underlying irony of "Then where is law and order?"
I say your verdict to acquit Chris McCormick is law and order. And justice." For indeed, if Chris McCormick is nothing other than a representation of the juridical ideology, this amounts to saying nothing other than "law and order" is identical with "law and order". This is re-stated when the verdict is given: "We, the Jury, find the defendant not guilty as charged", the "defendant" being none other than the juridico-political ideology itself. In this perfectly sealed world, Jury, Defence Lawyer, Prosecutor and Defendant are all surface structure representations of the identical deep structure Juridico-Political Ideological Other. In this world turned back upon itself, all speech is merely the speech of this dominant Ideological Other muttering to itself its closed logical formula "All is A and all A is A."

Weekend and Lipstick

Ideological Aspects of the Aesthetic Function of Two Texts

In investigating the kinds of relationships between members of the societal context which texts help to establish, maintain, disrupt, a central problem is finding out the part played in this process by the aesthetic function of the text. In other words, the question concerns the nature of the relationship between the stylistic choices exerted by the authors of the text (filmmakers) and the extra-textual relations between the four major terms of the communicative process: filmmakers, text,
audience and Other.

In our analysis of *Lipstick*, it was revealed that on all major components of a rape event (act, victim, perpetrator and Law) the conceptualizations offered by the text were in agreement with the conceptions offered by the dominant ideology. From this the conclusion was drawn that the film-makers, in the process of the construction of the text, had been mediated (constrained) by the Juridico-Political Ideological Other; furthermore, the text was so constructed in its characterization that the ostensible heroine of the text (i.e. McCormick, on the surface structure level) could be considered to be nothing other than a representation of the Juridico-Political Ideological Other. Consequently, the text (by means of this character) served in its turn as a Representation of the Juridico-Political Ideological Other mediating the relation between members of the audience and an image of themselves as legal selves.

When we turn to *Weekend* we find a very different situation. In its conceptions of the four major components of the rape event, the text differs from the dominant Juridico-Political Ideological Other. The rape is not an irrational act nor is it "casual" or "accidental". It is carefully considered since the Tramp asks permission of Roland. Through the character of Roland, the Law is seen as social coercive
control with the rapist as its agent rather than as an impartial judge of innocence and guilt and protector of the innocent. Corinne is seen as a social offender punished by the Law for refusing to pursue the economic quest. The rapist is not presented as an isolated incidence of pathology. We are not given any evidence of "sickness" on his part. In fact, discussion of the rapist brings out a peculiarity of the way characterization is structured in Weekend as a whole. We are not supplied with any details about the Tramp as an individual and this holds for most of the "characters" in Weekend. They appear briefly and disappear. Sometimes they reappear but in a totally different situation which would require, in the ordinary course of characterization, some kind of explanation of their "motivation" or their "course in life" that has led them to this point. But this is not given in Weekend. The only two screen characters continuing through the film from start to finish are Roland and Corinne. They have been referred to by one reviewer as "two picaresque characters (for they alone in the film have any density or consistency) moving through a landscape peopled with actors." (Dawson, 1968: 151).

In Weekend therefore there is a disjunction between the filmic conceptualization of the rape event and the Juridico-Political Ideological Other. But if Weekend is not constrained by this Other, by what is it constrained? And in what way
will the Other constraining the filmmakers in their production of the text affect the relations between audience, text and Other? If, as we have found, characterization in Lipstick is structured according to the principles of "possessive" or "metaphysical" individualism, what is the principle structuring characterization in Weekend?

According to Henderson (1972: 57), Weekend marks a revolution in dramatic form i.e. the method of character formation, or human figuration. This revolution is intertwined with other characteristics of the text e.g. its visual form, its plot, relation to history, its mode of signifying (i.e. its aesthetic codes and rhetorical devices) and its relations to its authors and its audience. The method of character formation in Weekend is extreme class typage.

The characters are constructed from the social point of view and Roland and Corinne stand for the bourgeoisie itself. They are general class types, and could have been called M. and Mme. Bourgeois. If we take the text as a whole, then the referential function of the text is the bourgeoisie, its fate as a class. In order to represent this class, Godard has used character typage and plot. In Lipstick the plot can be viewed as an exercise in pseudo-problemsolving: a question is posed, and the suspense involved in the plot development consists in the working out of the answers to this question.
But it is a pseudo-problemsolving exercise in that the way the question is posed, the method of seeking the answer, and the means of presenting the findings have all been defined so they are congruent with the dominant ideological discourse. In Weekend the plot "constitutes an argument or demonstration, constructed by the filmmaker through extreme class types, concerning the contradictions and destiny of an entire class (Henderson, 1972: 64)."

The question of human development in Weekend is foreclosed in advance because the husband and wife (treated as a unit) do not struggle for human development. Any possible question of the development of the bourgeoisie as a class is also foreclosed by the continual interruptions and obstacles which the couple face on their journey to the fifty million.

These differences between characterization and plot construction in Weekend and Lipstick are part of an overarching difference: their modes of signifying (aesthetic codes and rhetorical devices). A mode of signifying holds implicit within it a view of the nature of reality, the nature of art, of the filmmakers' relation to the real, and to the text, and the relation obtaining between filmmakers and the audience. The dominant aesthetic code of Lipstick is realism. As an aesthetic code, realism is founded on a mimetic theory of art: art should imitate, reproduce or reflect reality. The term "realism" at first was widely used for any faithful
representation of nature but around the mid-nineteenth century in France it was formulated as a definite literary creed:

Art should give a truthful representation of the real world: it should therefore study contemporary life and manners by observing meticulously and analyzing carefully. It should do so dispassionately, impersonally, objectively.

(Wellek, 1973: 52)

Accordingly, realistic criteria were (a) truth of observation; (b) depiction of commonplace events, characters and settings; (c) the minute description of details in costumes, and customs. The term "naturalism" constantly competed with "realism" and was often identified with it. In contemporary French usage, "naturalism" now appears as a later state of the realist movement (Wellek, 1973: 54). Naturalism was based on an analogy between the artist and social facts and the naturalist and zoological facts. A major spokesman for naturalism was Zola who declared that critic and novelist should be scientists. Consequently, naturalism is the doctrine of Zola and implies a scientific approach and a philosophy of deterministic materialism. Older realists had been less clear and unified in their philosophical affiliations.

If the aim of dispassionate objective observation of social mores distinguishes realism, it also reveals the hidden assumptions on which such an aesthetic code rely.
These assumptions separate knower and the process of knowing from the known. Objectivity is assumed possible because of the belief that an order (the real) exists independently of the observer whose cognitive processes and values do not affect the nature of what is known. The observer's process of observation is "neutral" and "value free". The intellectual failure of such a position is that it is not reflexive. It does not turn any activity of investigation onto its own modes of investigation. The knower takes for granted the process by which knowledge is obtained. The truthfulness of the observation is determined by the correspondence between "independent objective reality" and the observation. The findings of this activity of observing are limited to conforming to a world of objects assumed to have self-evident and self-identifying characteristics. It is no surprise the political failure of such a position is acceptance of the status quo, of the official and dominant reality.

Carried over into filmmaking, the realist position must maintain a belief in the filmic text's "neutral stance". A certain dominance must be accorded the reality presented by the film, the dominance of seeming to be the only possible reality, "the way things really are". The filmmakers, as producers of the text, must be effaced. Even though every element on the screen is only there because someone made
a decision (conscious or unconscious) to place it there, this decision making process must be hidden from the audience. The audience, in its turn, is both privileged and deprived at the same time. It is "privileged" in that it is privy to a "pure real" discovered for it. It is deprived in that the only activity possible for it is an active passivity. The audience does not have to look at the screen. The screen is a transparency through which the audience will receive the "pure real". Consequently, the basic ideological aesthetic code in realism governing the relationships between film-makers, text and audience is the code of denial of existence of the screen. It is perhaps reflections such as these which have led a contemporary theoretician to assert

one will speak of the verisimilitude of a work according to the degree in which this work attempts to induce us to believe that it conforms to reality and not to its own laws. In other words, verisimilitude is the mask donned by the laws of the text, a mask which we are supposed to take for a relation with reality.

(Todorov, as cited in Willemen, 1972: 53, note 5)

The political failure of Lipstick to challenge the juridico-political ideology is undoubtedly linked to its failure to challenge the dominant aesthetic code of realism. This code is challenged by Weekend, which rejects the notion of art as reflection of reality. Weekend is non-imitative. It is a constructed, synthetic work that furthermore self-consciously declares its status as such. According to Henderson
Weekend is an allegory. But it is an allegory about history ..." The film combines both realist and non-realist elements. At the narrative level, Roland and Corinne stand for the bourgeoisie as a class. Their encounters on their journey have reference to the destiny of the class. At the level of acting, they dress and speak like typical Parisians. In its rejection of realism as the aesthetic structuring principle, the film asserts the existence of the screen. By its own declarations it is an entirely synthetic construction. These declarations are made filmically in various ways.

One way is by breaking the continuity of plot and character action; another way is by obliquely alluding to the economic circumstances constraining the production of the film. At the end of the first shot of the sequence there is a fade out on Corinne carrying Roland piggyback. We next see a title card (with text manifestly incomplete i.e. "One Friday Far From") followed by a short shot of Roland and Corinne walking separately toward us in a wood glade. There are four other figures in the shot, two of them sitting on a log, another sitting on a separate log and one standing at the end of the larger log. Corinne's voice is heard off screen asking "What are those people doing?" and Roland, also voice off, replies "They are Italian actors in the co-production." Weekend is of course an Italian-French co-production. This shot is followed by a
title card that gives the complete message only begun by 
the first title card. The next shot after this shows Corinne 
staggering into the frame carrying Roland piggyback, thus 
resuming the interrupted character action.

The next relevant incident is of course Roland's 
interrogation by the occupants of the white Spitfire car. 
The female passenger asks him if he is in a movie or real 
life. He replies he is in a movie. The driver of the car 
pronounces him a damn liar and drives off, not giving him 
a ride. What is important here is that Roland's statement 
is accurate not at the intra-textual level i.e. within the 
fictional screen world (in this spacetime, the Driver is 
right and Roland is a liar) but for the space between the 
screen and the audience, the relationship of the audience 
to the text. The statement is a communication about this 
relationship and about the ideological code of denial of the 
screen.

Rhetorical devices such as these achieve an effect of 
"aesthetic distancing" between the audience and the text. The 
principle of distanciation has also been called the "principle 
of alienation in art" and its effects the "alienation effect" 
or "A-effect". Though in this century this principle has 
been most clearly articulated by the German playwright Bertolt 
Brecht, this principle was not invented by him. According to
Delany (1976: 77), aesthetic distanciation has been practised in various arts of different historical periods. It will be useful to any artist who wishes to have his/her work actively judged by the audience instead of being passively received according to automatic or intuitive response to conventional forms. Such artists have a conscious awareness of their role and of the artificiality of their medium. The use of alienation effect re-emphasizes the importance of consciousness. The artist wishes to reassert the primacy of his/her conscious aim and requires from the audience a critical judgment achieved through conscious will. At the extra-textual level, the injunctive function of such a text can be stated as follows: "Remember you are watching a film, a product of decision-making activity. Use conscious critical judgment. Take sides in this argument." Questioned about Weekend in an interview, Godard said:

This is not a Hollywood movie. In a Hollywood movie, after the movie is over, there's nothing more. There is no relationship between the screen and the spectator. There's just a duration. If you don't like it, you go to sleep, the way I do. But in other movies, you can't forget about it. You have to talk about it afterwards.

(Godard, 1969)

In its aesthetic function, Weekend, combining realist and non-realist elements to construct its dominant mode of signifying as an allegory about history, uses distanciation effects such as its revolution in dramatic form (extreme
class typage) and a revolutionary visual form which has been commented on elsewhere by Henderson (1970/71: 2-14). It is no accident the filmic text has a metalingual function in which it critically comments on the aesthetic codes that have been ideologically dominant in the cinema. As Henderson (1972: 60) has noted:

Weekend is a meta-film or meta-narrative, as well as a narrative in the ordinary sense. It problematizes its own relationship to its subject, the bourgeoisie, and its own relationship to the tradition of the bourgeois film and to the tradition of bourgeois narrative.

At the level of narration, the film critiques the bourgeois plot. The principle of typage operates not only at the level of characterization but also at the level of plot construction. The plot with which the film begins, this tale of husband and wife, lovers, money and murder, is not simply a plot involving a bourgeois man and woman but it is the bourgeois plot. This plot is not taken for granted, it is interrupted and left incomplete. Completion of such a plot would have to rest on the premise on which the husband and wife act and on which bourgeois drama and narrative rest: the existence and continuance of bourgeois society itself, its class rule. It is precisely this premise that is undercut in Weekend. As we have observed before, in its referential function, Weekend is concerned with the history and destiny of the bourgeoisie but the historical stage of this destiny represented in the film is the end of the bourgeois epoch. There is another way...
in which the film, through its metalinguual function, is a meta-
film. As MacBean (1968/69, rep. 1975: 45-60) has persuasively
argued, Weekend is a critique of the "cinema of spectacle". By
pushing spectacle to its limits, it demonstrates the inadequa-
cies of spectacle. It questions the ritual of spectacle.
Though it begins by acknowledging our voyeurism and passive
consumption of spectacle, it in the end forces the audience
to choose between revolution and materialism, Mao and Johnson.
It denies the "privileged neutrality" of the spectator. Another
look at the rape sequence which we analysed will shed some
light on this.

While the rape is taking place, Roland is politically
interrogated in sexual terms. The interrogation is charac-
terized by what may be termed a reversal of ordinary sign
values. A large chauffeur-driven red saloon drives into
the frame from screen right. It stops. Roland gets up and
the camera pans slowly with him as he walks to the car.
He walks around the car so his back is to the camera. His
body communication is obsequious; he squats down at the window
with his hands on the window edge. As the middle-aged woman
in the back asks her question, her head leans out a bit.
"Would you rather be fucked by Johnson or Mao?" Roland, taken
in by the appearance of the situation (chauffeur-driven car)
answers in favour of Johnson. Appearances turn out to be
deceiving and the car drives on with the woman calling Roland
Corinne is also interrogated. In her incident with the dark blue Citroen, she hitch-hikes flamboyantly, in contrast with the way Roland has hitch-hiked from his grassy knoll. She waves both arms, walks backward a bit, rotates her whole right arm. The flamboyance of her gestural communication echoes the way Roland had made her lie down in the road and spread her legs to stop the lorry driven by the pianist in the previous sequence. As the Citroen drives into the frame from screen left, Corinne walks to meet it. She bends to look into the window; her knees are bent and she also bends from the waist. Her left hand is on the edge of the window. The driver, on the other side of the car, leans toward her as he asks his question: "Who attacked first — Israel or Egypt?" Corinne replies "Those bastards the Egyptians ...." At the end of her answer, she leaps up straight into the air so she can see Roland over the car to get confirmation from him for her answer. "Isn't that so, Roland?" The Driver says "Ignorant fool!" and drives off without giving them a ride.

The political interrogations help to prepare us for the next sequence which is subdivided into two sections, Monde 3 (Third World) and L'Occident (The West). In an earlier Analyse sequence we had been told about Corinne's
sexual activities and in the event with the Tramp we had heard her scream voice off. It is only in the Monde 3 section that we actually see Corinne engage in a sexual act on screen. She is forced to kiss the Arab for bread and this can viewed as another "symbolic rape". But the act is quickly translated into political terms as the Arab explains he simply wishes to demonstrate the law practised by the big oil companies in Algeria. In this particular sexual event, the sign values of the communicators are reversed. The Arab takes the place of the exploiter and Corinne represents the exploited country. This makes it possible to read the film backwards and re-define the rape event between Corinne and the Tramp as political metaphor of the violation of an oppressed country by an oppressor. In short, if we first read the rape event as an intra-societal incident, it is now possible to read it retrospectively as inter-societal.

In its referential function, the film is about capitalism and the destiny of the bourgeois class at the end of its historical epoch. The referential function of the text therefore coalesces with its contextual function, the relation of a text to the dominant Other of its society. This by itself does not mean that the film transcends this dominant Other, nor does the use of "aesthetic distancing" by itself to undercut conventional form and conventional responses. In examining the
use of techniques of alienation in Chaucer's *Troilus and Criseyde*, Delany (1976: 94) concluded:

(Yet) the case of *Troilus* makes it clear that subversive art, as technique, is not necessarily subversive in the ideological sense, for it may subvert a conventional art form in order to return us to an obsolescent ideology. What Chaucer shows us in *Troilus* is the subversion of courtly romance, in the service of a Christian ideology which had already begun to crumble under the weight of history.

In its emotive function, *Weekend* is critical of capitalism and the bourgeoisie, demonstrating a scourging contempt for its principal representatives, Roland and Corinne. Nevertheless, Henderson (1972: 66-70) has argued the text is a contradiction because it criticises the bourgeoisie from a point both inside and outside the class at the same time. In one sense, it is the final stage of bourgeois self-critical art. By demonstrating the impossibility of human development at the end of the bourgeois epoch, by leaving no room for ethical conflict between individual and society, since the characters are united with their society in values, *Weekend* brings all the traditions and themes of bourgeois self-criticism to their completion, ending with the total elimination of human interest in the bourgeoisie. By seeing the bourgeoisie as a class and examining the political, economic and moral conditions of this class in history, it sees the bourgeoisie from outside itself and that can only mean from a working class perspective. Yet the film does not reveal the
basis for this perspective, it does not make an explicit commitment to the working class and its ideology.

Insofar as the film does turn a working class perspective on capitalism and the ruling class, it transcends the dominant Other of capitalist society and has a metacontextual function, to the creation of which all the other functions contribute. In particular, there is close relationship between the injunctive function and the contextual and metacontextual functions. A filmic text that transcends the dominant Other of its society (contextual function) by engaging in metacontextual communication with its audience must of necessity reformulate its own relationship to this Other and then provide its audience with the opportunity to do the same.

From a communicational point of view, the steps in such a process can be briefly described as follows:

1) Let us assume, for the sake of convenience, that filmmakers, while still not critical of the codes of the dominant Other, construct a filmic text. The process of construction of the text will be mediated (i.e. constrained) by the codes of the Dominant Other. This means that the text will be constructed within the framework of premises of the Dominant Other. The relations between the three terms
of this process can be diagrammed:

\[ \text{The Societal Context} \]
\[ \text{i.e. Dominant Other} \]

\[ \text{Filmmakers} \]
\[ \text{Text} \]

This has the result that when the filmmakers engage in a communicative process with the audience through the text, the relation between filmmakers and audience is mediated by the Dominant Other:

\[ \text{The Societal Context} \]
\[ \text{i.e. Dominant Other} \]

\[ \text{Filmmakers} \]
\[ \text{Audience} \]

This situation is exemplified, as we have already shown, by Lipstick.

2) The filmmakers, through engaging in critical theory and practice, begin to develop a critical awareness of the contextual codes previously constraining their filmmaking activity. Instead of taking these codes for granted, the filmmakers begin to interrogate the contextual codes by means of other metacontextual codes. In other words, the filmmakers engage in an hierarchical contextualization of the
contextual codes so this contextualization of the contextual
codes produces a new discourse in which what were previously
coding channels become message channels. For example, we have
seen that a dominant ideological aesthetic code in Western
cinema is the "denial of existence of the screen", hiding
the fact the text is an historical, socioeconomic and ideo-
logical product. A critical filmmaker does not take this
code for granted but interrogates it: questioning the
assumptions on which the code rests, asking in what society
and at what point in history this code assumed ideological
dominance and the nature of its ideological effects. The
process can be schematized:

3) As a result of this process, when the filmmakers engage in
the production of a new text, the process is mediated by
metacontextual codes.
4) The new text, constructed within metacontextual codes, and offering a new perspective on the societal context, now mediates between the filmmakers and audience.

![Diagram](The Text Mediates Between Filmmakers and Audience)

5) The new information generated by the filmmakers through the text offers the audience the opportunity to become critically aware of the Dominant Other, the contextual codes constraining its behavior. The audience is given an opportunity to engage in a new discourse where what were previously coding channels become message channels. Viewing the film becomes a productive activity in which members of the audience engage in a critical reformulation of their awareness of themselves, their relationships with each other, the filmmakers, the film, their historical socioeconomic context. The situation can be schematized (for convenience we will use an example referring to the juridico-political ideology):

![Diagram](Metacontextual Codes)
Such a situation would indeed be critical in the sense it offers an opportunity for the audience to enter a crisis of change.

That Weekend achieves a metacontextual function through its negative judgment on capitalism and the bourgeoisie is quite clear. For example, here is a clear honest statement by one reviewer (Wood, 1972: 11-12):

It is insidiously flattering to the liberal-humanist ego to be able to equate the end of western civilisation with the end of the world. But Weekend is not about the end of the world - it is simply about the end of our world. Just to dare to imagine Weekend is an act of heroism of a kind only possible to an artist who has achieved an exceptional degree of personal freedom. The film postulates, rather convincingly, the irrelevance, uselessness, and ultimate disintegration of everything I have always believed in, worked for, and found worth living for, and I don't think I can be unique or even unusual in this:

The question to be asked now concerns the nature of the text in its phatic function, whether it has metaphatic function and how these are related to its metacontextual function. It is first necessary to remember that every text must have a phatic function since this is the "contact" function, referring to the fact the communicators are in a communicative relationship, and helping to define this relationship. Every text is a statement of relationship. Yet not every text will have a metaphatic function, since this function is concerned with statements about relationship.
As a negative judgment against the bourgeoisie and capitalism, Weekend helps to define certain phatic relationships between filmmakers and audience, but because it does not make an explicit commitment to the working class and revolutionary theory and practice, it does not communicate about the phatic relationships, it does not reveal their basis.

In discussing the phatic function of the text, it is useful to remember the audience is not homogeneous. Members of the audience belong to different classes, some are male, some female, some black, some white. Inasmuch as Weekend criticises capitalism and the ruling class from a working class perspective, the filmmakers enter into a symmetrical relationship of equality with the working class members of the audience, and a complementary relationship of domination and subordination in a power struggle with the members of the ruling class. Since the societal context of the film is still one organized by capitalism, this must mean the filmmakers are in the one-down position. That the issue is class struggle is quite clear to a spokesman of the ruling class such as James Price (1968: 62):

Jean-Luc Godard's Weekend ... is an activist film, a political as much as an artistic act, and it is useless to pass it off as superior entertainment. ... I'm not at all sure that the film as a whole is not an invitation to pick up one's guns and certainly its forecasting of the events in Paris this May is unmistakable. In the end, therefore, since Godard
insists on our either rejecting Western civilization or rejecting his film, I am bound to decide against the film.

To have drawn the battle lines clearly, placing the audience in a confrontation with the necessity for choosing sides in the struggle, is no mean achievement for a filmic text.

NETWORK: An Ideological Who-dunnit

What is finished is the idea that this great country is dedicated to the freedom and flourishing of every individual in it. It's the individual that's finished. It's the single, solitary human being that is finished. Because this is no longer a nation of independent individuals ....

HOWARD BEALE, 'Mad Prophet of the Airwaves' in the film, Network

In the above quotation from a speech by an important character in Network, we can see the presence of one of the core values of possessive individualism: the dignity of man. If in the analysis of Lipstick attention was focused on the component of equality in this value, in this analysis we will focus on the component of liberty or freedom. A useful method of procedure will be to examine the features of this concept as it appears in the ideology of possessive individualism. The second step will be to investigate the film to see how it is related to this conception of freedom. To the degree that the filmic text is in agreement with such a conception of freedom, we can conclude that it is constrained by the ideology of individualism unique to capitalism.
of individualism unique to capitalism.

THE FAÇADE OF FREEDOM

In the analysis that follows we draw principally on a brief but clear exposition of contemporary concepts of democracy by Macpherson (1965). Modern Western society and politics are organized on the principle of freedom of choice. This is the organizing principle, not only of the realm of politics, but of the societal economic relations, the "free market". Individuals are "free" to offer whatever services they have, their products, their savings, their labour on this market and to get the market price. This price is determined by the totality of their independent decisions. With the income obtained from their sale, they are "free" to make more choices i.e. how much to spend, how much to save, what to spend on and what to invest in. All of these decisions are made in relation to the going prices on the market. This is a market economy. When most individuals in the society must offer their labour on the market to those who have accumulated capital through which they can employ other people's labour, it is a capitalist market economy (Macpherson, 1965: 6-7).

The essence of such a society is competition between individuals who are "free" to choose what they will do with their energies and skills. They are "free" to acquire by their own exertions enough land or capital to work on themselves or
else to bargain in the open market for the best price they
can get for their labour. As long as competition is free, the
market gives each individual exactly what his/her contribu-
tion to production is worth. This is done impersonally or
objectively by the market through a system of "free contracts"
i.e. "freely" made bargains between individuals. Such a soci-
ey is based on individual mobility, contract, and impersonal
market allocation of work and rewards in response to indivi-
dual choices.

The principles of "freedom of choice" and "freedom
of contract" as they occur in a capitalist market society
cannot be implemented without a pre-requisite: the institu-
tion of private property and the freedom to use it or dis-
pose of it according to the wishes of the individual owner.
It is therefore no accident that liberty and property (to be
understood as private property and not communal property)
appear as two of the interrelated components of "the dignity
of man" or "the rights of man".

There were different Declarations of the Rights of
Man during the French Revolution. In the Declaration of 1789,
"Men are born and remain free and equal in their rights"
(Art. 1). In Article 2, these "natural" rights are defined
as liberty, property, personal safety and the right to resist
oppression (Soboul, 1962, trans. 1974: 176). In the Declaration
of 1793, the rights are defined as liberty, equality, security, and property. According to Soboul (1962, trans. 1974: 468), the Declaration of 1795 "marks a definite regression compared with the 1789 Declaration". For example, Article 1 of the 1789 Declaration was abandoned. The most radical Declaration was that of 1793.

The important question is how these rights are defined. What constitutes liberty? It is primarily a negative conception. Liberty consists in being able to do anything that does not harm others (in the Declarations of 1789 and 1791) or that does not harm the rights of others (Declaration of 1793). The limiting factor on it is the liberty of others. As Karl Marx (1843, rep. 1975: 162) pointed out, "it is a question of the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself ... based not on the association of man with man, but on the separation of man from man". Liberty is liberty of the person and of private property. How is the right to private property defined? In 1793, it is "The right of property is that which every citizen has of enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labour and industry" (cited in Marx, 1843, rep. 1975: 163). This right had not been defined in 1789. The 1793 definition was retained in 1795. Consequently, the practical application of the right of liberty is closely intertwined with the right of private property.
Equality was also very closely related to liberty. But it was only a formal equality, equality before the law. "The law was to be the same for all, with all equal in its eyes, and honours, offices, and public employment available equally to every one without distinction on the basis of birth" (Soboul, 1962, trans. 1974: 177, commenting on Art. 6 of the 1789 Declaration). According to Article 3 of the Declaration of 1795, "Equality consists in the law being the same for all, whether it protects or punishes", as cited in Marx (1843, rep. 1975: 163). As has been pointed out by Soboul (1962, trans. 1974: 178-179), these conceptions led to contradictions. For example, the Declaration of 1789 recognized only equality of taxation and equality before the law, while inequality stemming from wealth was totally untouched. In a similar vein, while property was declared to be a natural and inalienable right, there was no concern shown for the huge mass of people who did not have any property. Finally, the right of security was defined as consisting "in the protection afforded by society to each of its members for the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property". This conception of security was bitingly criticised by Karl Marx (1843, rep. 1975: 163) for the fact it is basically the concept of police because the whole of society only exists for the protection of each member's person, rights and property.

Inequalities in property constitute an inherent necessity of capitalism. It is necessary for some to have a lot
of capital (i.e. private ownership of the means of production) and others to have none so they will have to sell their labour to others on the market through the wage labour contract. Calling such a contract "free" when one of the parties to the contract has no alternative is an obvious contradiction. A given wage labourer may be "free" to choose whether to work for a specific employer but there is no freedom at the greater level of constraint: the wage labourer must in the end work for some employer. If the police only exist to protect the person, rights and property of each member of society, it can be argued the police exist to preserve inequalities in property and wealth. Consequently, the police do not exist to preserve every member's freedom but rather to prevent a large portion of the members from obtaining their freedom.

The concept of liberty or freedom in capitalist society is revealed to be contradictory. Freedom of choice is a basic organizing principle of such a society yet there are vast inequalities in this freedom. Freedom of contract is the major means by which the majority of the populace gain their livelihood yet this vast majority is not free to decline the wage labour contract. Everyone is equal before the law but there is actual institutionalized inequality in real living conditions, one of which is the power to formulate the law. Everyone is equal in the sense of being in the competitive economic race for the "best bargain" or "the higher price" but everyone cannot be in the race on equal terms. The
The central contradiction in the concept of freedom in capitalist society is that everyone has the freedom to acquire material possessions (private property) but freedom of acquisition must of necessity end in no freedom of acquisition for the majority of the people, with all of this organized by a principle of freedom of contract.

It should come as no surprise to learn the theory of society embedded in these conceptions of the rights of man is a theory of society by contract. It must be noted that the Declarations are not simply Declarations of the Rights of Man but also of the Rights of Citizen. The rights we have discussed are the "natural" rights of man. They are the rights of members of civil society, not of political society. The distinction is based on the disjunction between "public" and "private". "Private" individuals, existing outside of society, in a state of nature, come together to preserve their property. To do this they enter into an agreement to form a society. They consent to a special compact to preserve inequalities in private property ownership. As it was put by Wills (1969: 419), this is the myth of "society as a juridical entity brought into being by grant and codicil, by definition and subscription."

This picture of free, autonomous and formally equal agents bargaining to enter society is based on a mechanistic conception of society, society as a machine "preformed parts are assembled (atomic individuals brought into contact with each other) and the machinery is tinkered with to make free interaction
possible, eliminating friction" (Wills, 1969: 420). The myth of the Social Contract is based on the idea of the ultimate sovereignty of the individual over himself. This is "natural" man and natural man is egoistic man.

In this theory, political society is not intrinsic to the nature of humanity. It is basically something imposed on it from without, since individuality underlies social existence. In a theory of society as juridical entity, the concept of law and the police assume a paramount importance. Power relations between people must be maintained and enforced by way of some legal institution of property. The function of the State is to provide the conditions for a capitalist market economy: to protect and enforce the system of "free contract" and the right to property. In a way, it can be said the government is put in a kind of market situation. It must supply certain political goods demanded by the rulers of society i.e. certain kinds of laws and regulations, tax structure, state services, e.g. education, military defence and perhaps expansion, even some assistance to industry (Macpherson, 1965: 8-9). But if government is conceived as part of an economic equation, how is the demand to call forth the governmental supply? The solution is a system of alternate and/or multiple parties which will hold political power and be responsible to different portions of the class or classes that have a political voice. This is government by representation.
via periodic elections with a choice of parties and candidates. This is the liberal state based on the principle of freedom of political choice. Everything is up for choice or may be up for choice at any time. The ideal is consumers' sovereignty: the voters buy what they want with their votes. It is important to notice in this "politics of choice" there is no choice at a certain level i.e. the level of liberal society itself and of the democratic franchise. It was cogently put by Garry Wills (1969: 414-415):

We do not vote for democracy, for our "way of life" - as if totalitarianism were put up as an alternative. We vote within the particular democracy our history has made us ... The nature of our freedom is not shown by our actual choices in the voting booth but by the kind of questions we have settled before we reach that booth.

(Emphasis in original)

Some choices are no longer "up" for people to vote on e.g. slavery, and some choices prove impossible to settle by elections and are arbitrated by force of arms (slavery).

In a society based on the principle of "freedom of political choice" other "freedoms" are necessary in order for the first "freedom" to be operative. We need "freedom of association" i.e. freedom to form political parties or pressure groups, and "freedom of speech and publication" for otherwise "freedom of association" would be no use. An
ideology of "freedom of political choice" and "consumers' sovereignty" demands a certain kind of citizen: politically active, interested and informed about issues, capable of making independent well-reasoned ethical choices among alternatives for the public good. It also demands a certain conception of politics i.e. politics as technical knowledge of a certain kind, "rational knowledge" of the laws of the functioning of the political order. The practice of politics is then activity based on rational knowledge. Since government must be responsive, ruling only by consensus or the consent of the governed, and politics is rational knowledge of a certain technical kind, the prime political task becomes finding out the content of the citizens' political knowledge. It is not long before a new category makes its appearance: public opinion. This is the modern form of political consent, a category regarded as "scientific", the content of the category to be ascertained through "scientific techniques". However, "public opinion", in a society based on real living inequalities such as ownership of property (capital), education, wealth, must surely be influenced by class interest. Yet how can something influenced by class interest be presented as "universal", "objective" in that it is perceived as "general" i.e. "public opinion"? It is here we note a peculiar aspect of the juridico-political ideology under capitalism. It conceals class exploitation in a very specific manner i.e. all trace of class domination or class operation is systematically absent from its language. How can this be so?
Part of the answer to the question is undoubtedly what we have seen of the ideology of formal equality before the law. Citizens are told they have equal claim to rights and duties of citizenship, and the advantages following from the relationship of citizenship. But there is another aspect to the political ideology which has been analysed by Karl Marx (1843, rep. 1975: 146-174). Political society represents the "unity" of the "private" individuals, it is the sphere of universality, of equal participation in national sovereignty. But how can it do this without interfering with real inequalities in birth, occupation, capital ownership? Political society does this by declaring these distinctions to be non-political. The state as a state abolishes private property when it abolishes the property qualification for the right to elect or be elected to office. Similarly, it politically abolishes private property, education, occupation when it proclaims that these distinctions have no political significance, that every member of the nation is an equal participant in national sovereignty. A radical disjunction between the political and economic spheres is made and all elements of the real living conditions of the nation are treated from the standpoint of the state i.e. from a purely political point of view. This kind of political annulment does not abolish the real distinctions which continue to exert their own specific influences. But from the political point of view, an individual's particular distinct activity and living
situation is reduced to a merely personal private significance.

It is because of this the citizen's "public" being can be termed "fictional", because it is an abstraction. Political liberation is therefore at bottom based on a reduction and bisection of the real living human being into the human being as a member of civil society, an egoistic independent individual, and the citizen, an entity given life by legal compact, a juridical abstract being.

We turn now to an analysis of the film Network, a rich text which deals with economic relations, political struggle by force of arms instead of elections, freedom of choice and freedom of contract, democracy, death, murder, television, madness, rationality, true consciousness and false consciousness ... all this and heaven too.

THE FILMIC ANALYSIS

The intra-textual level

We will let the film speak for itself, taking it at its word but remembering there will be more to it than its word. At the end of the film the voice of the Narrator (for Network is written in the style of a fictional documentary, and all we know of the Narrator is that this person is male from the sound of the voice) tells us "This was the story of Howard Beale, the first known instance of a man who was killed because he had lousy ratings."
In that sentence, we have three explicit terms. If we begin with these three terms we may eventually discover the basic metaphors that intertwine to make up the texture of the film. What we begin with is a man, a killing, and lousy ratings. If the man has been killed deliberately, we have a victim, an act of murder i.e. a crime, and a motive. There are two gaps in the statement: the law is not mentioned, nor is the killer(s). The killer(s) has to be another human being who has not any motive, but this notice. Murder, we do not need to remind ourselves, is the ultimate violation of one of the "natural and inalienable" rights of man i.e. security, the protection due by society to each of its members for the preservation of his/her person, rights and property. To any fan of crime who-dunnits, the structure is already becoming clear; for the solution to a who-dunnit usually consists simply in finding the intersection of notice and opportunity. At this point, if someone has seen the film, it is likely an interjection will be made: "Surely the reason the killer is not mentioned is because we know who ordered the killing and who executed the order. And if the law is scarcely mentioned, it is only because this is tangential to the main purpose of the film. It is primarily concerned with the intricacies of a decision making process in which the issue is whether or not to kill a man." It is true we "know" these things, for the film has "shown" them to us. The camera has "shown" us both the meeting at which the decision is taken and the actual
occurrence of the murder. The soundtrack has "told" us what the decision maker(s) said, the logical process by which the decision is made. We have been privy to the secret deliberations. Perhaps eavesdropping and voyeurism are not the appropriate words. They lack a certain sense of dispassionate observation. The appropriate analogy here is the one-way viewing panel so popular in social science experiments. After all, in its aesthetic function the filmic text uses a style of fictional documentary, in order to gain (like so much "scientific" activity) an aura of "objectivity".

Documentary, like much of science, has mostly attempted to replicate reality to supply evidence or proof in an argument. As Ruby (1977: 5) has pointed out, documentary filmmakers and journalists, just as social scientists, have been influenced by the philosophy of positivism. For the positivist, the world is the repository of meaning that exists in total independence from the observer. The job of the observer is to discover this inherent, objectively true reality of things. The inherent limitations in this view have become recognized (McHugh, 1970: 320-335). We have begun to recognize that meaning and truth are social constructions. So we will be suspicious of the privileged information so easily given to us by this fictional film that dresses itself in the style of documentary. We will conduct our own search for the murderer(s).
Let us start where who-dunnits traditionally start: with the victim. Howard Beale is a newscaster who works for United Broadcasting Systems (UBS), a television corporation that, in the fictional world of the film, ranks fourth and last among existing television corporations. One night Beale suddenly announces to his audience that in one week he will commit suicide on the air. His immediate boss, and very old friend, Max Schumacher, thinks he is having a psychological breakdown. At first the consensus is that Beale must go. But Diana Christiansen persuades a top-ranking company official, Frank Hackett, to let her keep Beale on and remodel the news show. For Schumacher, this is the worst kind of journalism, it exploits Beale who is "ill", it is irresponsible to the audience, the news department should not be expected to make a profit. He is fired. The news show is redesigned "The Howard Beale Show" and Beale is called the 'Mad Prophet of the Airwaves'.

In this title, we have two important terms: madness and religion. The religious reference is specifically to religious possession. What madness and religious possession have in common is they both involve a non-ordinary state of awareness, an altered state of consciousness. This state of consciousness brings us to the question of "true consciousness" and "false consciousness". For example, depending on our religious persuasion, we may see in religious possession the absolute truth guaranteed by revelation. And despite Freud's best efforts,
many people still associate madness with "false consciousness". But, by definition, if someone is declared "mad", then some other person, if only the person making the declaration, must be "sane". The theme rationality must be present, if only covertly. The word "mad" also has a colloquial meaning, one related to anger. On one of his shows, Beale exhorts his audience to start yelling "We're mad as hell and we're not going to take it anymore." It becomes the theme slogan of his show. The theme of rage has made its appearance.

We move now to the act, the killing. Howard Beale, at the end of the film, is gunned down on the air, during the News Show of which he has been the prime star. Death, who has been hanging around in the wings for a long time, has finally received his cue to act out his big scene before the cameras and millions of viewers, perhaps pausing only to shout "Am I on live?". Death's big moment will be extended in an indefinite present punctuated by slow motion instant replays. At last we can distinguish his features: murder. Nonetheless, in keeping with our skepticism of such easy recognition, we doubt. Remembering the meaning of a message is a function of the set of alternatives it comes from and this set can vary with the interpreter, we note there is at least one alternative. Perhaps Death's features indicate not murder but self defense. This possibility will be examined later.
At this moment, it is more useful to focus on the fact that Howard Beale is not Death's only victim, nor even the most important one. As Beale, 'Mad Prophet of the Airwaves', has himself told us" ... at the bottom of all our terrified souls we know that democracy is a dying giant, a sick, sick, dying, decaying, political concept writhing in its final pain." Democracy is dying, the "single solitary human being", the "independent individual" is finished. According to Beale, "the communists are deader than we are" so it's no use being afraid of them or looking to them. Democracy is dying, taking with it the ultimate sovereignty of the individual, the rights of man, of freedom and security. This theme of the death of democracy is at a different level of significance compared to the death of Howard Beale. The film has moved to the level of a scientific who-dunnit. It has diagnosed a major social event and will attempt to find a causal explanation. The attempt is assured of speedy success and we are once again presented with findings that seem certain and clear. It is something that looks human but is not, a humanoid. It is Diana Christiansen. She is told "Everything you touch dies with you." She is also "madness". But of course Diana is not only a representation of death or madness:

If I stay with you I'll be destroyed. Like Howard Beale was destroyed. Like Loraine Hobbs was destroyed. Like everything that you and the institution of television touch, is destroyed. You're television incarnate, Diana.
This is the voice of life and rationality:

You're madness, Diana, real madness. Everything you touch dies with you. Not me. Not as long as I can feel pleasure, pain ...

The voice of life and rationality speaks in the voice of Max Schumacher. The death of democracy is symptomized by the dehumanization of the people of the U.S.A. (they're becoming humanoid) and the cause of this dehumanization is television. But television is only technology. Does it have to be the way it is? Is there some causal agent behind television?

Unwittingly, we have arrived at our third term: motive. The motive for the killing of Howard Beale, we were told, was "lousy ratings". Staying with the theme of madness, we have come to "true consciousness" and "false consciousness", reality and illusion. Now the madness is located in the audience that watches television, "the real people of the U.S.A.", who take television for the "gospel". Television comes in for two scathing denunciations, one from Schumacher and one from Howard Beale. The importance of the status of television can be gauged by the fact that, though the Narrator assures us the story was the story of Howard Beale, the filmmakers titled the film Network. Whatever the ultimate sources of the film may be, it is largely perceived by the filmmakers and lived by the fictional characters on the level of television. And television lives incarnate in Diana
Christiansen. We pass at last to the killers.

In a room at United Broadcasting Systems we see a group of top level UBS executives meet to decide what to do about the Howard Beale show which is dropping alarmingly in ratings. After discussing the pros and cons of the matter, Frank Hackett, Chairman of the Board, sums up the situation: "Well, the issue is, shall we kill Howard Beale or not? I'd like to hear some more opinions on that." Diana Christiansen replies "I don't see we have any option, Frank. Let's kill the son of a bitch." The actual killing is carried out by the Ecumenical Liberation Army, a militant black group that has entered into contractual arrangements with UBS to provide authentic footage of their "illegal" activities for a show called The Mao Tse-Tung Hour. This show has also been the "brainchild" of Diana Christiansen. If Diana and Hackett are seen as the real killers (the other executives are anonymous), how does that affect the film's analysis of the societal problem of mass dehumanization and death of democracy and freedom? Diana, we have seen, is a representation of television. For example, in the following bit of dialogue, Max Schumacher tells his wife he is having an affair with Diana Christiansen:

MRS. SCHUMACHER

Does she love you, Max?
MAX SCHUMACHER

I'm not sure she is capable of any real feelings. She's television generation. She learned life from Bugs Bunny. The only reality she knows comes to her from over the TV set ....

The problem with blaming mass dehumanization on television is that television is not autonomous of human activity, it is the result of human activity. This is recognized by the film, so what is offered in the final analysis is that television is in the hands of "the wrong people":

HOWARD BEALE

Edward George Ruddy died today. Edward George Ruddy was the Chairman of the Board of United Broadcasting Systems and he died at 11 o'clock this morning of a heart condition and woe is us. We're in a lot of trouble .... this tube is the most awesome goddam force in the whole godless world. And woe is us if it ever falls into the hands of the wrong people. And that's why woe is us that Edward George Ruddy died. Because this Company is now in the hands of CCA, the Communication Corporation of America. There's a new Chairman of the Board, a man called Frank Hackett, sitting in Mr. Ruddy's office on the 20th floor.

This kind of analysis ignores a crucial question: is it even possible for the "right people" to survive in television? If not, why not? And, granting that they could, could they change television? Let us take the case of Max Schumacher. He is one of the "right people". What happens to him? He is eventually forced out. What about Ruddy? He too didn't
survive, not because he died, but because UBS had to be bought out by CCA. Finally, let us look at what happens when one of the "right people", in this case Howard Beale himself, uses television to send the "right message". The faultiness of the film's analysis is nowhere more stunningly apparent than in the speech in which Beale indicts the "wrong people" and television. The speech is a masterpiece of confusing communications.

The referential function of the speech is the corrupting influence of television (understood to be in the hands of the "wrong people"). It is driving people crazy and making them dehumanized by divorcing them from their own reality, e.g. "You're beginning to think that the tube is reality and that your own lives are unreal. You do whatever the tube tells you." The emotive function is one of extreme condemnation. The aesthetic function (i.e. style) is one of religious fervour, evangelistic exhortation. It is when we try to distinguish the injunctive, phatic and metaphatic functions we discover the confusion in the speech. Specifically, this confusion consists of paradoxical definitions of self and other and a paradoxical injunction.

According to Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (1967: 188), paradox may be defined as a contradiction that follows correct deduction from consistent premises. A wellknown paradoxical statement is "I am lying". If it is true, then the speaker
is lying, therefore it cannot be true. But if it is a lie, then it is true because it is a lie and so on ad infinitum. As a logical problem, this paradox is solved by postulating a theory of levels of language. The lowest level of language makes statements about objects. This is the level of the object language. The next level of language makes statements, not about objects, but about the object language. This is the level of the metalanguage. If we wish to talk about this meta-language, then we have to use a meta-metalanguage and so forth. If we apply this concept of levels of language to "I am lying" we can see that the three words contain two statements, one in an object language and one in a meta-language. As a logical problem, such a sentence is defined as a meaningless assertion. As a relationship statement, what are we to make of such a paradoxical self definition? This is precisely the kind of paradoxical relationship message that Howard Beale delivers to his audience: "Man, you never going to get any truth from us ... we lie like hell ... We deal in illusions, man. None of it is true."

In addition to paradoxical self definitions, there are paradoxical injunctions. A prototype of this form of paradoxical communication is the "Be spontaneous!" - paradox. This creates an untenable situation because the demand contained in it makes impossible exactly what is demanded, i.e. spontaneity. To obey the command, the addressee would have to be spontaneous within a frame of nonspontaneity. Such paradoxical
communication is contained in Beale's speech. He castigates the audience for their conformity to the tube, he calls their conformity "madness", and he ends by giving them a specific command that is a paradoxical injunction:

HOWARD BEALE

You're beginning to think that the tube is reality and that your own lives are unreal. You do whatever the tube tells you. You dress like the tube. You eat like the tube, you raise your children like the tube, you even think like the tube. This is mass madness. You maniacs, in God's name, you people are the real thing, we are the illusion. So turn off your television sets, turn them off now, turn them off right now, turn them off and leave them off, turn them off right in the middle of the sentence I'm speaking to you, now turn them off!

What is the audience to do? If they do not turn off their sets, they are mad because they are hooked on the tube and only do what the tube tells them to do; but if they turn off the sets, they are mad because they are only doing what the tube is telling them to do. Basically, Beale is saying "Be independent, by doing what I say." To turn off the set is a good thing because it satisfies the demand for independence from the tube, but it is a bad thing because it is an example of dependence on the tube. Beale is demanding independent behavior in the framework of dependent behavior. In terms of symmetry and complementarity, he is demanding symmetrical behavior in a framework of complementary (dominance-subordination) behavior. He is the owner of the "truth", the "inside expert". But if what he is saying is true, then it is
a lie; if it is a lie, then it is true. The problem is Beale has no recognition of the fact his speech and therefore his relationship with his audience is being mediated by the code of television itself. He tries to make metalingual statements about this television code from within the same television code.

The pragmatic consequences of this paradoxical communication for the audience are truly devastating. For in such a situation how can they choose? He asserts they have a choice, and then takes away their ability to choose for there are no alternatives between which they can choose. If the measure of freedom is choice, the situation in which he has placed the audience is none other than a situation of bankruptcy of freedom of choice. He calls them "mad" because they do not choose but he takes freedom of choice away from them.

It is highly significant that Diana Christiansen does not have an experience of choice in deciding whether or not to kill Howard Beale. When Frank Hackett asks for opinions on the issue, she replies "I don't see we have any option, Frank. Let's kill the son of a bitch." Where there is no sense of freedom of choice, there can be no sense of responsibility. Through Max Schumacher and Howard Beale, the film condemns Diana for being a monstrous humanoid, for being madness, illusion, death. But what if Diana were taken at her word
and the word not treated as an utterance of madness? If the meaning of a message is a function of the set of alternatives from which it comes, and if different interpreters construct different sets of alternatives, perhaps it may be revealed that, implicit within the text itself, there are reasonable grounds for coming to a conclusion that Diana has acted in what she perceives as self-defense.

Let us begin by noting that madness implies rationality.

It is a striking thing about Diana as an executive that her decisionmaking is eminently rational in a very specific way: it is "scientifically" rational. When other people wish to take Beale off the air, she urges Hackett not only to keep him on but to make him the star of a remodelled News Show. On what does she base her decision? On the strength of audience research surveys which tell her that the American people want someone to articulate their rage. And on what does she base her decision to kill Beale but on audience research surveys?

DIANA CHRISTIANSEN

The Beale Show Q score is down to 33. Most of this loss occurred in the trial 18 of 34 categories which were our key core markets, and it's the AR department's carefully considered judgment and mine that if we get rid of Beale we should be able to make it a very respectable share in the high twenties, possibly thirties. With a comparable Q level. The other segments of the show, Sybil the Soothsayer, Jim Webbing, the Vox Populi, have all developed their own audiences. Our AR reports show that it is Howard Beale that is the destructive force here.
If Diana's behavior is madness, clearly it goes beyond the individual herself, beyond the institution of television. Audience research surveys are an example par excellence of modern behavioral science, of modern Western rationality, and it is science that is the pride of the modern Western world. And "Democracy". Through science, Diana has learned what the "people" want, and in the true spirit of "Democracy" she will be responsive to them by giving it to them. She is rewarded by the Beale Show's astounding success. If science, we have been tirelessly told, is nothing other than the "scientific method" and the proud boast of the "scientific method" is it works, Diana too can point to her audience research surveys and say "they work".

Yet we must notice this does not say how she must get rid of Beale. She explores various avenues when the ratings begin to drop. She talks to him to change. He doesn't. She talks to his agent, Lou, to try to get him to change. Her behavior is marked by a certain extreme rationality, "This is a breach of contract, Lou". If the remark strikes us as absurd, it is because we recognize that Beale no longer operates within such a framework. But the point is that as long as he does not recognize such a framework he cannot survive on television. His behavior is inappropriate to it. It can be said that behavior not responsive to contract will be inappropriate anywhere in capitalist society for it is a society ruled by "contract". She then tries the obvious solution of getting
a replacement. Here it is important to note, though she is made to represent illusion, she can recognize inauthenticity in the candidates auditioning for the part. It is not that Diana does not know the "truth", it can only be her standards for judging "truth" are different from those of Schumacher and Beale. She is quick to recognize you don't get genuine latter-day Jeremiahs very often. Finally, she would settle for just taking him off the air, but in the end this avenue is closed, for Mr. Jensen, the supreme boss of CCA, the controlling Company of UBS, wants him on the air.

But what are Diana's standards for "truth"? What is the yardstick by which she judges authenticity of performer, or accuracy of research? The answer leads back to the motive for the killing, "lousy ratings". Ratings constitute Diana's criteria of "truth" and "reason" because they are tied directly to advertising revenue and therefore to profit and loss. If we consider United Broadcasting Systems as a system and other broadcasting corporations as its environment, then we see the context of all the corporations is the capitalist market economy. The survival of UBS as a corporation depends on the accumulation of profit. This is due to an economic law of the capitalist market economy and has nothing to do with the individual motivations of the employees, at whatever organizational level, of UBS. The relentless pressure for expanded profit from increased sales is created by the capitalist mode of production itself. This whole question has been well treated
by Edwards (1972: 99-106). This survival imperative facing UBS at the corporation level is replicated at the level facing each employee. If Diana keeps Beale on the air, she will end up getting fired because profits will go down. But if she is known to have fired him, she will get fired because Mr. Jensen wants him on the air. There is a certain ambiguity in Jensen's position:

FRANK HACKETT

I argued that television was a volatile industry in which success and failure were determined week by week. Mr. Jensen said he did not like volatile industries and suggested with a certain sinister silkiness volatility in business usually reflected bad management. He didn't really care if the Howard Beale show was the No. 1 show in television or the 50th. He didn't really care if the Beale show lost money. He wants Beale on the air and he wants him kept on. I would describe his position on this as inflexible. Where does that put us, Diana?

DIANA CHRISTIANSEN

That puts us in the shit house. That's where that puts us.

The film also labels Diana humanoid. The humans are Beale and Schumacher. Diana treats Beale as a thing and this is supposed to be proof of her being a humanoid. Again, we must ask if this kind of treatment extends beyond her at her individual level to the societal level itself. The answer depends on what kind of business television is taken to be. According to Beale, "We're in the boredom killing business". While this is true, it is so only in a relatively trivial sense. In his economic
and political analysis of the role of the mass media in modern capitalism, Smythe (1974: 1-13) contended the main economic function of these media is to produce audiences prepared to be dutiful consumers. Two broad classes of markets exist in which the "Sales Effort" works to generate the surplus which powers the monopoly capitalist system. They are the Military Sales Sector and the Civilian Sales Sector. The mass media "produce people in markets motivated to buy the 'new models' of consumer goods and services and motivated to pay the taxes which support the swelling budgets for the Military Sales". Furthermore, there is always the underlying message that it is necessary to buy, buy, because if you don't, the GNP will fall, unemployment will rise, and you may be unemployed so it is in your interest to buy. What is interesting is that in economic terms the production of the audience is a marketing cost, not an end in itself. The real end is the commodity to be sold and the audience is just a means to that end. When Schumacher equates Diana with television and condemns her because "You even shatter the sensations of time and space into split seconds, instant replays" he is condemning Diana and television for a situation that is beyond their control and is located in the socioeconomic system itself. There is an unconscious irony in his condemnation that for Diana and television "And the daily business of life is a corrupt comedy". Why should daily life be a business?

Under capitalism, however, daily life is a business.
The capitalist market economy must comprise all elements of industry, including labor, land and money. Yet labor is nothing other than the human beings of which every society consists and land is the natural surroundings in which the society exists. To include labor and land in the market system means to subordinate society itself to the laws of the market. The concept of commodity helps us to understand the market system. Commodities are anything produced for sale on the market, where, subject to the laws of supply and demand, they acquire a price. Markets can be defined as contacts between buyers and sellers. The commoditization of labor and land means that human beings and nature are bought and sold freely under impersonal laws of supply and demand. They are handed over to the play of impersonal market forces. The institutional market system controls human beings in their everyday life activities as the "economic sphere" comes to dominate the rest of society. People change jobs, sell their homes and move, according to the play of various markets in labor, in real estate. People are hired and fired, or replaced by machines, according to how this affects their employers' profit and loss. Because of the commoditization of labor, it is now possible to think of Howard Beale not as a man, a human being, but as a commodity which UBS has acquired by means of a free contract. UBS uses Beale to produce the audience which it can sell to advertisers. In fact, as far as UBS is concerned, Howard Beale exists primarily in the form of the Beale Corporation.

Under capitalism, people are compelled to treat each other
as commodities, possessors of commodities or creators of commodities. Their social contact is through the exchange of commodities. Relationships are not calculated on the basis of real needs and capacities, but only on the exchange ratios which the market transaction will produce. The system may be said to be socially irrational in that production priorities are set by the criterion of profitability instead of real needs. For example, money may be spent building unnecessary planes because they sell while many important social services are starved for funds because they do not generate profit.

The commoditization of labor is reification (from the Latin word "res" signifying "thing"), that is, the metamorphosis of a human being into a thing. A society dominated by the principle of commoditization demands that human relationships take on the form of relationships between things and that humans take care of their needs through things. As Kupers (1976: 112) points out, consumerism can be defined as nothing less than a society learning to satisfy all its needs through commodity exchange. Consequently, we see that if Diana treats Beale as a thing, an expendable commodity, again this behavior is eminently rational within the context of capitalism, because it is adaptive behavior within this context. It is true Diana is humanoid, a thing, and we intuitively feel there is something monstrous about her treatment of Beale, but the important point is her madness is not hers in an individualistic sense. It is the madness of capitalism itself.
A related point has to do with the question of reality and illusion. Through Schumacher and Beale, the film tries to make the point that Diana cannot tell illusion from reality. Again, it can be demonstrated that this is a societal problem, not an individual one. The explanation lies in what has been called the "commodity fiction" by Karl Polanyi (1944, rep. 1972: 95-96). Capitalism treats labor and land as commodities. But commodities are objects produced for sale on the market. Yet labor is only another name for a human activity that goes with life itself and land is another name for nature which surely was not produced for sale. Labor and land are not commodities and such a description of them is entirely fictitious. Nonetheless, this fiction is an important organizing principle of all societal life under capitalism. The fictitious commodity "labor-power" cannot be used without involving the human being who happens to "possess" that particular commodity. Thus capitalism rests on a profound illusion, i.e. the commodity fiction, but this illusion is a reality shaping the lives of those within the capitalist society. Capitalism has no choice in its illusion while the members of society, as long as they remain within the context of capitalism, have no choice in reality.

The critical (in the root sense of the word as having to do with "crisis") phrase is of course "within the context of capitalism". While as far as the plot logistics of the film are concerned, the primary function of the Black Revolutionaries
serve the purpose of actually being the hired killers of Beale because the network can't be directly implicated, the ideological significance of the Blacks is vastly different. From the point of view of Max Schumacher, who, as we have seen, is a representation of life, human reality, moral responsibility, the communist Hobbs is destroyed by Diana as "television incarnate." In this perspective, Hobbs is a character who regressed from "true consciousness" to "false consciousness," from reality to illusion. Yet Schumacher does not specify in exactly what way Hobbs is destroyed. From a point of view outside of capitalism, her "true consciousness" could only of course constitute recognition of exploitation under capitalism. But Schumacher does not think in these terms. The economic and political problems are perceived in ethical terms, moral responsibility to his old friend Beale, to simplistic ethical standards of news reporting e.g. they shouldn't be subject to a criterion of profitability. We can only surmise that, in such a point of view as Schumacher's, Hobbs' regression means some kind of fall from "moral ideals," ideals such as Schumacher himself would hold e.g. equality of opportunity, justice for Blacks and so forth. The political views held by Hobbs could therefore be seen as a well-meaning but misguided attempt to rectify the obvious injustices of American society, but these injustices are seen as "fixable" within that framework.

We have already seen the filmmakers' perception of the
societal situation and consequently the level on which they make their fictional characters perceive and live out the societal problems is flawed. An analysis of the ideological significance of the Black Revolutionaries must examine which principles of the capitalist ideology are actually supported by the way these fictional characters are constructed and develop (or, to be more apt, regress).

Within the fictional world of the filmic text, the Black Revolutionaries become significant to the network because Diana is given some film footage of a bank holdup by the Ecumenical Liberation Army. A woman kidnapped by the ELA, Mary Anne Gifford, takes part in the holdup. The whole thing is of course modelled on the Patty Hearst case. Diana gets the idea of building a supershow called The Mao Tse Tung Hour by getting the ELA to submit about ten minutes of authentic footage of some "terrorist" act each week and the rest of the show will delve into the drama behind the "terrorist" act depicted in the film footage. Since the ELA are wanted "criminals", the network can't deal with them directly and must go through someone else. The communist Hobbs is the intermediary between UBS and the ELA. Hobbs actually only appears three times in the film. The first time we are shown Hobbs in a general meeting, the first meeting between her and the network. She introduces herself to Diana as a "bad-ass Commie nigger". It is important to note this style of introduction occurs in response to Diana who has previously introduced herself as "a racist lackey of the imperialist ruling
circles". When Hobbs has introduced herself, Diana caps it with "Sounds like the basis of a firm friendship".

At this meeting, Hobbs demands, through her lawyers, that the political content of the show has to be entirely in her control. Diana's reply is "She can have it. I don't give a damn about the political content". Then Diana proceeds to lay out what she wants and that she expects Hobbs to be a link between the network and the ELA. Hobbs launches into a denunciation of Ahmad Khan and the ELA.

**HOBBS**

The Ecumenical Liberation Army is an ultra-left sect, creating political confusion with wildcat violence, and pseudo-insurrectionary acts which the Communist party does not endorse. The American masses are not yet ready for open revolt. We would not want to produce a television show celebrating historically deviational terrorism.

**CHRISTIANSEN**

Miss Hobbs, I am offering you an hour of prime time television every week into which you can stick whatever propaganda you want.

**HOBBS**

The Ecumenicals are an undisciplined, ultra-left gang, whose leader is an eccentric, to say the least. He calls himself "The Great Ahmad Khan" and wears a hussar's shako.
Miss Hobbs, we're talking about 13 to 15 million people a shot. A lot better than handing out mimeographed pamphlets on ghetto street corners?

HOBBS

I'll have to take this matter to the Central Committee. I'd better check it out with the Great Ahmad Khan.

After the meeting, Hobbs goes to see Ahmad Khan.

HOBBS

Well, Ahmad, you ain't goin believe this. I goin to make a TV star out of you. Just like Archie Bunker. You goin be a household word.

The above dialogue shows that already, at even the second time we see Hobbs, she has already begun to compromise herself by becoming complicit with the same organization which she has bitterly denounced before. Since Hobbs said she would have to take it up with the Central Committee of the Party, the Communist Party has also become compromised.

The third and final time Hobbs appears on screen the rot has set in. The scene is introduced by a short voice over.

NARRATOR

The Mao Tse Tung Hour went on the air March 14th. It received a 47 share. The network
promptly committed to 15 shows, with an option for 10 more. There were the usual contractual difficulties.

When a representative of the network says "We're not sitting still for overhead charges of the cost prior to distribution", Hobbs screams "Don't fuck with my distribution costs" and goes on to yell financial details to "prove" she "isn't making any money". This is countered by another representative of the network, Helen, who says "Come now, Loraine. The Party is in for seventy-five hundred a week production expenses". Insults are hurled at Ahmad by Hobbs "I'm not giving this pseudo-insurrectionary sectarian a piece of my show. I'm not giving him script approval, and I sure ain't cutting him in on my distribution charges". When a white member of the ELA hysterically accuses Hobbs "You fucking fascists" and raves on about the "infrastructure", Hobbs screams in reply "You can blow the seminal (?) infrastructure up you ass. I'm not knocking down my goddam distribution charges". The confrontation between the two women is brought to a halt by Ahmad firing his gun above everyone's heads and saying "Man, give her the fucking overhead clause. Let's get back to page 22. 5 small a. Subsidiary rights".

If we read this scene on the level at which it is given, then the conclusion must be that Hobbs is not against capitalism per se but only wants a share in it i.e. equal opportunity to compete. Given her chance, she is corruptible like anyone else because her motive is private gain. Consequently, in the
contractual situation, she behaves as greedily as anyone else (this is the playing out of the Narrator's statement "There were the usual contractual difficulties".) She dominates the scene not only because of the level of her emotion, her rage and screams, but also because the others give in to her. Taken as they are offered by the filmmakers, the Black Revolutionaries serve to show that capitalism is at least in touch with "human nature". If greed is reprehensible this is nevertheless the way "people truly are". There can be no alternative to capitalism, because any other alternative, such as communism, is purely utopian (e.g. Howard Beale's statement "The communists are deader than we are".). Greed is something inevitable but it must be fought as an ethical dilemma. Furthermore, since Hobbs gets her way, the scene preserves the basic principle of freedom of contract. Because she gets her way, it demonstrates that parties to contract are really free and equal. The film presents the Black Revolutionaries as a defense of capitalism.

It is through the Black Revolutionaries that the final term of the law emerges in relation with "guaranteed freedoms". The members of the ELA are "wanted criminals". Despite their "revolutionary" commitments, Hobbs and Ahmad Khan become parties to a legal business contract with the network. The Black Revolutionaries are the means by which Diana and the rest of the network executives break the law and murder Howard Beale, thereby violating his right to security. Programming The Mao Tse Tung Hour becomes an occasion for Diana and the network to abuse the
freedoms codified in the law.

CHRISTIANSEN

That Mao Tse Tung Hour is turning into one big pain in the ass. We're having heavy legal problems with the federal government right now. Two FBI guys turned up in Hackett's office last week and served us with a subpoena. They heard about our production bank ripoff film and they want it. Hackett told the FBI to fuck off. We're getting around the FBI by collaborating with the News Division. We're standing on the First Amendments freedom of the press and the right to protect our sources.

Finally, it would appear Diana's abuse of "sacred freedoms" can be due to the most appalling irresponsibility as shown by her declaration that Hobbs can have the entire control of the political content of the show because Diana doesn't give a damn about the political content.

The fatal mistake to be avoided in analysing the film is to treat these freedoms as the film does, that is, to take them as irreducible, to view them as having been conceived and implemented solely for themselves, as ends rather than means. Once a perspective different from the film's is adopted, the primary task becomes one of unfolding what underlies these freedoms, the ends for which these freedoms are means. Tackling the question of freedom in this way will clarify questions of power relationships and of who or what is really "calling the shots".

Let us start by investigating Diana's statement "I don't
give a damn about the political content". With this statement, Diana announces a radical disjunction between economics and politics. But far from being a statement of a lack of moral responsibility on her part, it simply states what is already an inherent aspect of life under capitalism, its self-regulating market economy. According to Polanyi (1944, rep. 1957: 195), the disjunction of politics and economics is an outstanding characteristic of market society. By a market economy is meant an economic system controlled by markets alone. A self-regulating market economy implies that all production is for sale on the market and all incomes derive from such sales. Order in the production and distribution of goods i.e. what can be termed the allocation of work and rewards (Macpherson, 1965: 6-7) is entrusted to the self-regulating market alone through prices. Production will be controlled by prices because the profits of those who direct production will depend on them. Distribution will depend on prices, for prices make up incomes, and it is through incomes that members of society can acquire some of the produced goods. All elements of industry (goods, labor, land and money) must be for sale on the market. The prices of goods are called commodity prices, the prices of labor are wages, and of land and money, the prices are called rent and interest respectively. Profits are actually the difference in two sets of prices: the prices of the goods produced and the costs of the goods. By costs is simply meant the prices of the goods necessary to produce the goods to be sold.
It follows that entrusting all production and distribution to a self-regulating market system rests on the assumption that people will always act in their self-interest, this self-interest being defined primarily as economic in nature, the principle of gain and profit. The expectation is human beings behave in such a way as to achieve maximum money gains. This kind of market economy demands a certain role from society. Nothing must be allowed to inhibit the formation of markets, and there must be no allowing the formation of incomes in any way except through sales on the market. Not only must there be markets for all elements of industry but there must be no measures taken to interfere with the functioning of these markets in any way, e.g. prices must be allowed to adjust freely to changed market conditions, neither price, supply nor demand being regulated in any way but by market conditions. The only policies permitted are those which would create conditions to make the market the only organizing principle in the economic sphere and thus ensure its self-regulation. Consequently, as Polanyi (1944, rep. 1957: 71) observed, "A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere". Furthermore, such an institutional pattern cannot function unless the non-economic sphere becomes subordinated to the requirements of the market economy.

The above discussion ought to make it clear why Diana's statement extends beyond her to the socioeconomic context. In a somewhat similar fashion, the same thing obtains with the Black
Revolutionaries: The movie makes it appear that any alternative to capitalism is utopian because capitalism at least recognizes the principle of private gain and profit which is truly "human nature". This is of course none other than the arguments of possessive individualism which were summarized and logically refuted in Chapter Two of this study. It can be further pointed out these arguments have been refuted in research in various fields of social science such as economic history and social anthropology. An excellent discussion of the way in which almost every sociological and anthropological assumption of the philosophy of economic liberalism has been refuted by such research is found in Polanyi (1944, rep. 1957: 43-55; 269-273). Here we will just point out it has been found:

a) the motive of gain is not "natural" to humans  
b) to expect payment for labor is not "natural" to humans  
c) gain is not the usual incentive to labor  
d) economic systems, as a rule, are embedded in social relations: distribution of material goods is ensured by non-economic motives.

Both Diana and the communist Hobbs point beyond themselves to the existence of the self-regulating market economy and the assumptions and conditions required by such an economy in order for it to function. They meet on the trading ground of the market, bound to each other by the terms of the "free contract". But now we are in a position to see freedom of contract is not an end in itself but something that flows from the fact the
market economy cannot function without a wage labor contract. The communist Hobbs does not "get her own way"; she is not a free and equal party to the contract. The contract in its turn is simply the legal aspect of capitalism. It is a representation, at a different level, of the self-regulating market, which is the mediator of the relations between the Black Revolutionaries and the network. This can be diagrammed in a triangle of mediation as follows:

![Diagram of mediation triangle]

The important point to be made here is that freedom of contract and other freedoms granted by the liberal state e.g. freedom of association, freedom of speech, are subordinate to the demands of the institution of the self-regulating market economy. Perhaps the most compelling evidence to support this assertion is the fact that at various times economic liberals have themselves advocated state restrictions on freedom of contract and on laissez faire (Polanyi, 1944. rep. 1957: 148-150), in such cases as trade union law and antitrust law whenever these interfere with the self-regulating market.
In *Network*, the character who stands for (re-presents) the self-regulating market itself is Mr. Jensen. First, this is indicated by the way he describes himself:

I started as a salesman, Mr. Beale. I sold sewing machines, automobile parts, hairbrushes, and electronic equipment. They say I can sell anything. I'd like to try to sell something to you.

(Emphasis added)  

This is nothing other than the essence of capitalism, the principle of unlimited commoditization and the principle of unlimited accumulation. Second, Jensen is the supreme boss of CCA (which owns UBS) and is the mediator of all the other characters. As a representation of the profit principle, he mediates Frank Hackett's behavior. Hackett knows he must get UBS into the black and his decisions are made on that basis. At the end of his triumphant report on the improved situation at UBS, Hackett asks for opinions and naturally seeks Jensen's first. Jensen replies "Very good, Frank. Exemplary. Keep it up". As the principle of profit, Jensen mediates Diana's decisions, especially her hiring of the Black Revolutionaries for *The Mao Tse Tung Hour*. Jensen also mediates between Beale and his television audience, influencing Beale to preach "the corporate cosmology of Arthur Jensen". He mediates between the network executives and Beale in his position as the boss of CCA, because he will not allow them to fire Beale and this is why they decide there is no alternative but to kill Beale. Finally, it is obvious he therefore mediates between the network executives and
the ELA in their new capacity as hired killers.

Yet, there is one thing this master salesman cannot sell: his corporate cosmology. He succeeds in selling it to Howard Beale but Beale cannot sell it to the audience. The message, as Beale transmits it, is that Democracy is dying, the individual is finished, the U.S. "is no longer a nation of independent individuals, it's a nation of some 200 odd million transistorized, deodorized, whiter-than-white, steel-belted bodies totally unnecessary as human beings and as replaceable as piston rods".

Beale's message is rejected by the audience. From the Narrator, we learn that Beale's argument, while perfectly admissible, was depressing because "Nobody particularly cared to hear his life was utterly valueless". The point is that Beale's statement that the individual being is unnecessary as a human being, replaceable as a piston rod is a statement only true within the "commodity fiction" organizing capitalism. But it is precisely the context-bound nature of Beale's statement that is hidden from the audience. What is really only true under capitalism is presented to the audience as if it is inevitably true, and there is no possible hope for things to be any different because "the communists are even deader".

In discussing Jensen, an important question to be answered is: why is he willing to lose money in order to have his cosmology preached to the American people? If Jensen is indeed a representation of the principle of unlimited commoditization and
of profit, why is he willing to lose profit? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to analyse Jensen's articulation of his ideology to Beale.

Jensen stakes a universal and eternal claim for business, and therefore, for capitalism. Business transcends everything for it is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on the planet. Since, according to Jensen, even the communists are caught up in the scientific administration of business, this is the most convincing proof that there has come an end to ideologies for where there is science, there is objective truth, and thus there can be no ideology. This is the kind of reasoning behind Jensen's statement "We no longer live in a world of ideologies". It is important to note that when Jensen claims "The world is a business", his statement is true within the context of capitalism. This is so because, as we have seen, a self-regulating market economy is compelled to commoditize all elements of industry, including the very substance of society, labor and land i.e. human activity and nature. As long as this statement is taken at its face value (i.e. only taken from the point of view of capitalism), its ideological effect is to universalize and eternalize capitalism, placing it outside space and time, making it appear "immutable" and "inexorable". This is what is behind Jensen's statement "The world is a college of corporations, inexorably determined by the immutable by-laws of business". All this is "the natural order of things". The laws of capitalism, in Jensen's view,
are the laws of nature.

The capitalist ideology articulated by Jensen appears to have its roots in William Townsend's *Dissertation on the Poor Laws* written in 1786 (Polanyi, 1944, rep. 1957: 111-129). According to Townsend, hunger is the most natural motive to industry and labor. By approaching human community from the animal side, Townsend introduced a new concept of law into human affairs, that of the laws of nature. Humans are beasts, and therefore only a minimum of government is required. In a free society, there are just two races: property owners and laborers. The amount of food available limits the laborers. As long as property is safe, hunger will drive the laborers to work. Magistrates are hardly necessary because hunger is stronger than any magistrate. In this view, the biological nature of humans appears as the natural, given foundation of a society that is no longer of a political order. Economic society is distinct from the political state and the laws of commerce are none other than the laws of nature and therefore of God. This animalistic approach to society was adopted by classical economists such as Malthus and Ricardo. It is no wonder when Beale says in awe to Jensen "I've seen the face of God", Jensen replies "You just might be right, Mr. Beale".

Asserting that the laws of capitalism are the laws of nature has the ideological effect of making capitalism seem the
only possible economic system. The critical question is what economic situation demands an ideology in which "there are no nations, there are no peoples" as Jensen puts it. In what way can it be asserted there are no Arabs, no Russians, no Americans? The answer lies in remembering what leads Jensen to meet Beale personally, and to attempt to sell Beale and the American people his ideology. As head of CCA, Jensen is preparing to merge with a Saudi Arabian Investment Corporation through a cover consortium of banks and insurance companies known as the Western World Funding Corporation. This is discovered by Howard Beale who tells his audience about the deal and that it can be stopped by the FCC. Beale tells his audience that the Arabs are buying out America. He starts his studio audience chanting "I'm mad as hell and I'm not going to take this anymore. I don't want the banks selling my country to the Arabs. I want the CCA deal stopped now". He urges his audience to get up from their chairs and send telegrams to the White House. He has tremendous clout with the American public and they deluge the White House with telegrams. According to Frank Hackett, the FCC is in a position to hold up the deal for twenty years if they want to, but CCA needs that Saudi money badly and they need it right now. This is the setting in which Jensen tries to sell his ideology to the American people, and seemingly is prepared to lose money in the attempt.

A little reflection on the nature of multinational corporations and their method of operation is enough to clarify this seeming contradiction in Jensen's character. According to
Baran and Sweezy (1966, rep. 1972: 439), what makes a corporation multinational is not that it has a base of operations abroad but that its management bases its decision making in spheres of production, marketing, product research, in terms of the alternatives available to the corporation anywhere in the world. From this it follows that a multinational is not necessarily concerned to promote the national interest of any specific country, even one in which its headquarters may be located. Decisions and actions are undertaken to promote the interest of the company itself and any effects, whether beneficial or harmful, on the countries in which it operates are strictly incidental. Consequently, what multinationals want from nation-states is simply that their laws and institutions be such as to favor the unfettered development of the corporation's capitalist enterprise. In Jensen's view, Beale's appeal to nationalism on the part of the American people to get them to stop the CCA deal by means of the political process, is indeed not only totally unrealistic but could be financially harmful to the tune of two billion dollars. Seen in this context, Jensen's willingness to lose money on the Beale show is simply a willingness to suffer a short-term loss in order to secure long-term profits.

Nevertheless, the above interpretation seemingly clashes with seeing the real murderer of Howard Beale as the self-regulating market in which Beale must be only a commodity and seeing Jensen as the representation of this market. This problem can be solved by using our theory of hierarchical levels
of constraint and mutually causal processes. There are four major hierarchical levels of constraint in the fictional world of Network. The order of these levels can be diagrammed:

```
```

Frank Hackett, Diana, Howard Beale and the Black Revolutionaries all act at the level of contract to UBS with its survival norm of accumulation of capital i.e. profitability. In the beginning, Beale acts as part of a significant deviation-counteracting loop i.e. the loop acts to narrow divergences between the financial performance of UBS and its aim of profitability. Diana is of course a significant part of this loop. When Beale starts to give his "depressing" message to his audience and his ratings begin to fall, his actions begin to turn the loop into a deviation-amplifying one, i.e. it begins to widen the differences between the financial performance of UBS and its survival norm of profitability. Since all elements of this loop are in mutually causal relations with each other, Frank Hackett, Diana and the other executives, feeling the influence of Beale's actions, take
their decisions to convert the loop back into a deviation-counteracting one. The critical point though is that what is a deviation-counteracting loop at one level may turn out to be deviation-amplifying at another level. This is exactly the case in this situation. At the level of UBS, when Beale demands his audience stop the CCA deal, his actions form a part of a deviation-counteracting loop for UBS but those same actions form a part of a deviation-amplifying loop at the level of CCA. As a result of this kind of analysis, Jensen's desire to let Beale continue despite his drop in ratings, can be seen as a willingness to suffer a relatively small short-term loss at the level of UBS in order to generate a much greater long-term profit at the level of CCA.

The extra-textual level

From the foregoing analysis, we can see that, in its referential function, Network has its ultimate sources in economic relations under capitalism and the consequences of applying the "commodity fiction" to human beings. The film correctly perceives the dehumanization and reification of human beings under capitalism but it is inaccurate in its attempt to uncover the cause of this dehumanization and reification. The filmmakers perceive this massive societal problem as attendant on one institution only, television, and further reduce the problem to one of ethical dilemmas facing individuals. Moral values, such as freedom of contract, freedom of the press, the right of the individual to security of person, are taken at face value and their true origins
and functions within the context of a capitalist self-regulating market economy are not pursued and disclosed. As a result, the filmmakers make their fictional characters live societal problems on the level of personal morality, misdirecting the scourging contempt (the emotive function of the text) aroused by the reification of human beings onto television and certain fictional characters.

In its contextual function, the film is supportive of the dominant ideology of capitalism because by its faulty analysis of a massive societal problem, it does not reveal capitalism as the source of the dehumanization and reification that the film itself has noted and condemned in societal relationships. In this way, the film hides the class domination that is at the basis of the commoditization of labor under capitalism. Consequently, in its phatic function, the film sides with the members of the ruling class against the dominated classes. The filmmakers are therefore in a asymmetrical relationship with the ruling class and in a complementary (domination-subordination) relationship with the ruled class.

In this kind of interpretation, the Black Revolutionaries become decisive characters, for with them the question of class struggle is explicitly posed. The answer to the question is such that class struggle is hidden since the presentation of these characters is supportive of the capitalist ideology. They are constructed so they support the fictional psychology of capitalist
ideology i.e. economic personal gain is the strongest motive of human nature. Through them the ideology of freedom of contract is upheld as well as the myth that a lot of what is wrong with the U.S.A. (and by extension, the capitalist system) is that some people are not getting free and equal opportunity to compete in the market. Finally, they serve the ideological function of demonstrating that "there is no alternative" to capitalism for, as an example of a communist, Robbs is just as greedy as anyone else because such behavior is "human nature". Though the film recognizes the existence of rage on the part of the people who, at some level, recognize they are dehumanized and oppressed, in the end its injunctive function is a message of impotence because it closes any alternative to capitalism.

The presentation of the Black Revolutionaries in Network is in startling contrast to how similar characters are presented in Godard's Weekend. In Weekend, the dehumanization and reification that occurs under capitalism is also recognized but it is located in its historical context and not displaced as a matter of personal morality. Through its method of character formation, extreme class typage, Weekend treats the bourgeoisie as a class, making Roland and Corinne stand for the bourgeoisie, and what happens to them represent the history and destiny of the class. When they meet an Algerian and Black African, the encounter becomes one between the European ruling class and the Third World.

In this encounter, the Algerian and the Black African are
allowed to demonstrate a political awareness of history and class struggle. For example, the Black African states:

Optimism in Africa is the direct outcome of revolutionary action by the African masses, whether political or military - and often both at the same time.

The Algerian speaks in defense of guerilla warfare:

We will never obtain our freedom until we can make the world realize that it is our right, yours and mine, to follow the example of all those who have sacrificed their own lives and taken the lives of other men in order to be free; that it is in our power to do this and that we are ready to follow their example ... We, the black people, are at war with the United States and its friends. We cannot actually go to war against them as we have no heavy guns, and even if we had we would not be able to use them ... In addition, we are fewer in number; we have therefore chosen guerilla warfare as the only possible solution. ... The life of every Western city depends on an electronic system; if it is paralyzed, the city is paralyzed also. That is how, city by city, we will bring the West to its knees - by ruining it economically.

Finally, they quote from The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State written by Frederick Engels. This book attempts to give a systematic Marxist perspective on human history and evolution through the analysis of anthropological evidence. In quoting from the book the Algerian and Black African demonstrate their call for revolution is not the result of a simple knee-jerk reflex of rage nor of a desire to get a share in the economic market of capitalism but of a reasoned theoretical reflection on the causes of their oppression and the remedy for it:
To be civilized means to belong to a class society, to a reality full of contradictions in which the development of the means of production is necessarily bound up with the development of methods whereby one group of men exploits another... Slavery, serfdom, wage slavery are the three principal forms of servitude characteristic of the three great periods of human civilization. According to Engels, the development of the class system and of the relations between classes is exemplified in the history of the West starting with the Greeks and ending up with industrialized capitalism.

The Algerian and Black African are allowed to demonstrate their awareness of their historical context of class struggle and their realization that the bourgeoisie is itself an earlier product of class struggle. By presenting its Black Revolutionaries in this way, Weekend, unlike Network, does not proffer to its audience the impotence that comes from thinking there is no alternative to capitalism and no way out. On the contrary, Weekend opens up various pathways for its audience to engage in critical theory and practice.
CHAPTER NINE

DISCUSSION

The primary research question in any textual analysis undertaken from the perspective of communicational semiotics concerns the functions of the text within the societal context i.e. the kind of communicational relationships between members of the society that the text helps to establish, maintain and/or disrupt. This question of the status and function of the text as a societal fact is, more specifically, the nature of the stance taken in a particular text or corpus of texts by the filmmakers to the Other; the possible and/or actual effects of this stance on the audience's own stance to the Other, to each other and to themselves. Treating the text as a societal occurrence in real societal spacetime brings up the question of the relationship of the text to societal institutions and values, as well as, in some societies, societal struggles such as class struggle, racism and sexism.

The research concerns outlined above constitute a vast arena within which diverse research projects can be formulated and executed. Within this arena a major question has to do with the ideological significance of a text(s). Attempting to answer this question with regard to fictional feature films leads to the realization of the importance of the ideological aspects of communication and characterization. Consequently, the purpose of this study was, in a narrow sense, to investigate ideological
aspects of characterization in fictional feature films. Because the study was restricted to fictional feature films of advanced Western capitalist countries, it was decided to investigate the dominant ideology of these countries: the ideology of possessive individualism. The study was therefore a preliminary empirical investigation aimed at finding out whether there exists congruence between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of possessive individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic characterization in the fictional feature films of the countries concerned.

The analysis was specially concerned with how the texts, as events in societal existence, refracted certain struggles (class, race and sex) in this existence. Class struggle, racism and sexism have of course occurred in societies other than advanced Western capitalist societies. In examining the ideological refraction of these struggles in fictional feature films from these countries, it is necessary to find out exactly how the refraction of these struggles occur within the particular ideology of possessive individualism.

The most important finding of the study was that in three of the four films studied (The Merchant of Four Seasons; Lipstick; Network) the major hypothesis (Hypothesis I) was confirmed, i.e. congruence was manifested between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of possessive individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic characterization in
the movies. The sole exception was the filmic text, Weekend. Before discussing in detail the results regarding the various hypotheses, a brief look at the films is in order.

The Merchant of Four Seasons can be considered the most simple film in its relation to the dominant ideology. It is definitely individualistic because (a) it does not show how the formation of individuals is affected by constraining societal codes; (b) it portrays a unilinear model of human behavior (instead of depicting inter-character relations as mutually causal processes). However, it does not directly demand an analysis of ideological conceptualizations of liberty or equality nor such relatively integrated sets of values as can be termed the juridico-political ideology. While this film does portray what is inherently a class relationship (between Hans Epp as employer and Harry as employee), it treats it as a personal one, one of friendship.

The analysis of Lipstick necessitated an examination of the juridico-political ideology, and the film manifests a complex relationship between sexism and the ideology of equality. In this filmic text, also, the dimension of class is not even raised. Characters are treated as autonomous in the sense they are not shown as acting within hierarchies of constraint such as social positions assigned to them on the basis of sex. For example, the conceptualization of the rape event is in remarkable agreement with the conceptualization offered by the dominant
ideology and the rapist is portrayed as an isolated unique instance of individual pathology.

Network provided an example of a text which has its ultimate sources in economic relations and class conflict but in which these are transformed into moral dilemmas. This filmic text necessitated a close examination of the ideological conceptualization of liberty or freedom and the nature and extent of various freedoms (freedom of contract, freedom of the press, freedom of choice) in liberal society. Again, this text is constructed in congruence with the premises of possessive individualism: Diana, who can be described as someone whose behavior is ruled by the market, is made individually responsible for her behavior. Television, as a societal institution, is similarly divorced from its societal constraints of the capitalist market economy. The Black Revolutionaries are similarly an example of the liberal myth of people as motivated primarily by self-interest where self-interest is defined as economic in nature. By reducing economic and political conflicts to dilemmas of individual morality, this film also demonstrates the hiding of the problem of class domination and class conflict.

The only text not constructed on individualistic premises was Weekend which constitutes a radical departure from not only the ideology of possessive individualism but also from prevailing cinematic aesthetic codes of visual form and dramatic form i.e. its method of characterization. In its filmic presentation of a
rape event the film differs radically from that of Lipstick and in its treatment of Black Revolutionaries it differs strikingly from Network. Since its Black Revolutionaries are from the Third World, the way they are portrayed can be compared with the treatment of the black Moroccan in The Merchant of Four Seasons. Again, there is a striking contrast between the presentations offered by Weekend and The Merchant of Four Seasons.

With regard to the hypotheses of the study, the three texts (The Merchant of Four Seasons, Network and Lipstick), all support Hypothesis I, i.e. the relevant features of characters are shown as given, independent of various societal constraining codes. The characters are not shown as acting within hierarchies of constraint such as social positions assigned to them on the basis of class, race and sex. This means support of Hypothesis I A (i).

Similarly, there is support for Hypothesis I A (ii), because inter-character relations are not shown as mutually causal processes. This is particularly clear in The Merchant of Four Seasons. Again, the filmic text Weekend is the only text that does not support Hypotheses I B (i) and I B (ii). Contrary to Lipstick, for example, Weekend shows its rape event to be clearly triadic in its communicational relations between Roland, The Tramp and Corinne. In like fashion, it presents its Black Revolutionaries as clearly acting within the framework of a mediating revolutionary theory and so differs from the film Network. A similar point can be made about its treatment of Third World figures as shown by its Black Revolutionaries compared to the
presentation of a Third World figure, the black Moroccan, in 
The Merchant of Four Seasons.

The three texts (except Weekend) also support Hypothesis I C (i) and Hypothesis I C (ii). In its treatment of the relationship between Hans Epp (representation of capital) and his friend Harry (representation of labor), The Merchant of Four Seasons supports Hypothesis I C (i) i.e. it treats this complementary relation of domination and submission, capital over labor, as one of equality and friendship, as a symmetrical relation. In its treatment of male/female relationships and relationships between a white member of the French Foreign Legion and a member of the Third World, it transforms these intra-societal and inter-societal complementary relations of domination-subordination as unequal relations but with a reversal of the occupancies of the relative positions. The film makes it appear that women dominate men and as if the Third World dominates the white member of the Legion, Hans Epp. Lipstick, in upholding the "equitable" basis of the juridico-political ideology, also transforms a complementary relationship of domination and subordination between males and females before the Law into a relationship of symmetrical equality. Network, by upholding the ideology of freedom of contract and making it look as if the black Hobbs "gets her own way" makes it look as if Hobbs and UBS are free and equal parties to the contract.
In its method of investigating its central hypothesis, the study is an exercise in cybernetic explanation. As already discussed in Chapter Seven of this study, cybernetic explanation considers the observable behavior or empirical data as a function of an underlying set of constraints. This mode of explanation constitutes a search for those constraints. Since the study of communication is essentially the study of messages, communicational explanation must at some point focus on the underlying codes (sets of constraints) governing the permissible construction of messages in a given context.

In his review of the field of nonverbal communication research, Duncan (1969) pointed out that researchers in this area have usually followed one of two broad research strategies. These were termed by Duncan the "structural" and "external variable" approaches. Essentially, the structural approach consists in the application of methods already used by linguists and ethologists to nonverbal communication. This strategy conceives of communication as a tightly organized and self-contained social system operating according to a definite set of rules. The researcher's task is to explicate these rules. In contrast, the researcher who uses the "external variable" approach specifies certain nonverbal behaviors and attempts to link the rate of occurrence of these behaviors to a variety of external variables such as the personality characteristics of the communicators. A major methodological difference between the two approaches is that the "structural" approach is nonstatistical while the
"external variable" approach relies primarily on the use of statistics.

In the "structural" approach, the system used as a model is language. The use of this model prompted Duncan (1969) to ask:

Is the relatively tight structure of language an appropriate model for nonverbal behaviors? Or is the nonverbal organization looser and better characterized by a different sort of model?

(Duncan, 1969: 134-135)

It must be remembered here that this study has explicitly rejected a language model as a conceptual framework for semiotics. The question arising now is whether the use of cybernetic explanation or "structural" explanation is tied necessarily to a language model. The answer is negative, for while all communication is coded, it does not follow that all codes are structured as the codes of language. Consequently, it is possible to use a structural explanation.

A brief but clear exposition of what this mode of explanation involves has been given by Culler (1976: 70-79). According to Culler (1976: 72), what Freud, Saussure and Durkheim shared was an insistence "that behavior is made possible by collective social systems which individuals have assimilated, consciously or unconsciously". This perspective explains an action by treating it as a manifestation of an underlying system of signs. This kind of explanation is not causal but rather structural:
"one attempts to show why a particular action has significance by relating it to the system of underlying functions, norms, and categories which makes it possible" (Culler, 1976: 73-74). This mode of explanation is also to be distinguished from historical explanation. There is no attempt made to discover temporal antecedents and link them in a causal chain:

There is a move from the diachronic to the synchronic perspective, which one might speak of as an internalizing of causation: instead of conceiving of causation on a historical model, where temporal development makes something what it is, the historical results are detemporalized and treated simply as a state, a condition.

(Culler, 1976: 74)

As Culler points out (1976: 76-77), the concept of the unconscious is essential to this mode of explanation. Structural explanation removes origins from a temporal history and internalizes them in the "state" or "condition" being investigated. This creates a new space of explanation called the unconscious where any antecedents having an explanatory value are located. As Culler emphasizes (1976: 76), it is in linguistics that the concept of the unconscious emerges in its clearest form:

The unconscious is the concept which enables one to explain an indubitable fact: that I know a language (in the sense that I can produce and understand new utterances, tell whether a sequence is in fact a sentence of my language, etc.) yet I do not know what I know. I know a language, yet I need a linguist to explain to me precisely what it is that I know. The concept of the unconscious connects and makes sense of these two facts and opens a space of exploration. Linguistics, like psychology and a sociology of collective representations, will explain my actions by setting out in detail the implicit knowledge which I myself have not brought to consciousness.
If structural explanation relates actions to underlying sets of constraints, the concept of the unconscious is a way of explaining how these constraints have explanatory force, how they can be at once unknown and yet effectively present. It is for this reason that earlier on in this study it was emphasized that any manifestation of ideological premises in films is not necessarily the result of conscious intention on the part of filmmakers. If, for example, it is said of *Network* that the film has its ultimate sources in economic relations and class conflict but transforms these into individualistic moral dilemmas, it is not being asserted the filmmakers consciously tried to achieve this transformation.

The above discussion leads to the problem of the "deconstruction of the subject" and by "subject" is meant "the subject of experience, the 'I' or self which thinks, perceives, speaks, etc." (Culler, 1976: 77). The "deconstruction of the subject" involves explaining meanings in terms of underlying sets of constraints or systems of signs which elude the subject's conscious grasp. The "subject" or "self" turns out to appear more and more as a construct emerging through the discourse of culture, by means of transsubjective systems of signs, codes, sets of constraints.

Let us look at how this mode of explanation treats the negative finding of this study, namely, the fact that *Weekend* does not support the major hypothesis. No doubt, some
explanatory value can be adduced from the fact that Godard, since making Weekend, has explicitly committed himself to a Marxist-Leninist ideological position. According to Henderson (1972: 68), Weekend "is simultaneously the last act of a bourgeois artist and the first of a committed one - some overlay of the two, without being precisely either". But the structural mode of explanation is not concerned with Godard as a unique individual. In the perspective used here, the existence of Weekend becomes a question of the existence of subordinate ideological codes relative to a particular mode of production, and the difference between the three other films and Weekend becomes a question of the relationship between dominant and subordinate ideologies. This study (see Chapter Four) takes a cybernetic approach to ideology, whereby a dominant ideology is conceptualized as a "negative feedback" or "deviation countera acting" process and subordinate ideologies are seen as "deviation amplifying" or examples of "positive feedback". Consequently, it becomes possible to explain the films as messages constructed within certain ideological codes operating in the sociocultural systems.

An additional finding of importance is that, while The Merchant of Four Seasons, Lipstick and Network all confirmed the major hypothesis, this confirmation was manifested in various ways. In other words, congruence between the psychology of human nature put forward by the ideology of possessive individualism and the psychology of human nature underlying filmic
characterization in these films was manifested in different ways in the three films. It seems reasonable to explain this by virtue of the fact that the ideology of possessive individualism is in reality a large complex domain. It consists of various intertwined sectors such as conceptions of the individual and society, as well as certain other core values such as autonomy, privacy, the dignity of man. In turn, some of these values are themselves complex, e.g. the dignity of man contains such values as liberty and equality. Then, there are complex interrelations between these ideological sectors. The point has been made by Gellner (1958: 190, n. 1) that systems of ritual or belief do not consist of "easily separable, identifiable, countable 'parts'". This kind of observation can be linked with the theoretical distinction between "well-defined" and "undefined" structures made by Boudon (1968, trans. 1971: 61). "Well-defined" structures are made up of a group of components which are easily detectable and whose number is well-defined. In contrast, "undefined" structures are made up of components which cannot always be identified with certainty and whose number is indefinite. Perhaps it may clarify the situation if the ideology of possessive individualism is seen as a vast semiotic space (to use a spatial metaphor), a complex network of intertwined codes, which cannot be placed in any stable persistent hierarchy, always manifested in every message.

The congruence demonstrated between the premises of the filmic characterization in the texts (except Weekend) and the
The ideology of possessive individualism strongly suggests an associative relationship between the two. This was Hypothesis II. Partial support for this hypothesis could be generated if it could be shown that in countries with ideologies different from the ideology of possessive individualism, the filmic communication of those countries is congruent with their ideologies. This would necessitate a cross cultural comparative investigation which was beyond the scope of the present study. However, while this study did not test Hypothesis II directly, it can examine available data in the work of Weakland (1966; 1971a; 1971b) to see if this related data supports Hypothesis II.

The research carried out by Weakland (1966) was based on seventeen Chinese Communist films seen in Hong Kong and Canada between 1962 and 1964. Of these films, eleven were actually made in China and six in Hong Kong by communist producers. The films dated from 1956 to 1962 and seven different studios were represented. The films covered a wide range in style and historical period. According to Weakland (1966; 480-481), the theme of "anti-individualism" is probably the central positive theme for the New China:

It focuses on the need for and great desirability of social cooperation; this is depicted as the hard but enjoyable, and disciplined yet innovative working together of large numbers of people of all kinds, under the wise and benevolent guidance and leadership of Communist Party cadres and government officials, for economic and social reconstruction.

The negative images, of "individualism", depict persons who seek personal advancement - status,
wealth, power - or immediate satisfactions - ease, sex, with no concern for other persons or society as a whole.

Hypothesis III which was tested in the present study was an alternative "control" hypothesis. Briefly, it postulated that construction of characterization according to individualistic premises in fictional feature films of advanced Western capitalist countries is an artifact of the dramatization techniques of fictional feature films in general: since they use characters to depict people, they are incapable of representing abstractions such as class position. Both the data generated by Weakland (1966; 1971a; 1971b) and the existence of Weekend, a film using extreme class typage as a method of character formation constitute decisive refutations of this hypothesis.

The present study has contributed to textual analysis in the following ways:

1. it has outlined a coherent yet comprehensive conceptual framework for semiotics that is based on a model of the communicative process instead of the language model proposed as a conceptual framework for semiotics by structuralism.

2. utilizing this alternative conceptual framework for semiotics, the study outlined a semiotic theory of the self.

3. in order to proceed with the textual analysis, it was necessary to devise an appropriate method. Such a method, termed contextual analysis, was derived by
making suitable modifications to a classic model of the functions of a text as formulated by Jakobson (1958, rep. 1972: 85-122). This method represents a communicational model in the sense that it is based on and takes account of the basic elements found in any communicative situation. Furthermore, it is linked to the key concepts in the theoretical framework.

The study therefore proposed a theory and a method for the study of filmic communication, with particular applicability in the area of characterization. In its actual investigative research the present study was limited to the examination of the relationship between characterization and the ideology of possessive individualism that is dominant in Western advanced capitalist countries. Within the perspective of the theory and method proposed here, three lines of future research appear likely to yield interesting results:

1. a comparative study of fictional feature films from both Western advanced capitalist countries and countries with a different ideology e.g. Soviet Russia or Communist China.

2. a comparative study of fictional feature films from Western advanced capitalist countries and fictional feature films from countries that have traditionally had an anti-individualist ideology but now have a capitalist economic structure e.g. Japan.

3. a comparative study designed to yield knowledge about
the differences in filmic communication and characterization between films that may represent different variants of capitalist ideology e.g. a comparative study of films from countries dominated by the liberal ideology of possessive individualism and films of Nazi Germany, a country dominated by the capitalist ideology of Fascism.
ROLLAND to CORINNE: It's your turn.

He forces her to give him a piggy back. Music as she staggers away past a field of sweet corn. Fade out.

TITLE blue letters: ONE FRIDAY
FAR FROM

VOICES off: Siamo gli attori italiani della coproduzione...

Walking along a woodland track, ROLLAND and CORINNE pass a trio of Italians, two of them seated on a log, the other standing behind them with an umbrella - it is raining. They raise their hands in greeting.

CORINNE: What are that lot doing?

TITLE blue letters: ONE FRIDAY
FAR FROM
ROBINSON
AND MANTES
LA JOLIE

ITALIANS in chorus, off: Siamo gli attori italiani della coproduzione.

ROLAND off: They're the Italian actors in the co-production.

ONE ITALIAN off: Siamo gli attori italiani della coproduzione.

Cut to black.
Fade in to a shot of a large lorry lying on its side in a ditch; its dead driver is hanging half out of the open door of his cab. It is pouring with rain, and the surface of the road which runs past in the foreground is glistening wet. Beyond the lorry, CORINNE staggers towards us with ROLLAND on her back. She finally throws him off with a curse. ROLLAND jumps over the ditch onto the road and walks along by the lorry while CORINNE disappears behind it.

ROLAND: Hey, come on.

Camera pans with him as he leans into the cab, takes the lorry driver's jacket and walks along the road putting it on.

ROLAND: Are you coming?
CORINNE reappears from behind the lorry and throws herself down on a grassy bank at the roadside.

CORINNE: I've had enough.

ROLAND sits down a little way away from her and starts wiping the mud off his shoes. We hear a car approaching.

ROLAND gets up and flags it down. The car - a white Triumph Spitfire - comes to a halt beside him.

GIRL PASSENGER: Are you in a film or are you for real?

ROLAND walking round to the driver's side: In a film.

DRIVER: In a film? Liars! He accelerates off up the road.

CORINNE and ROLAND jumping up and down in fury: Bastard! Bastard! Bastard!

ROLAND walks towards CORINNE, who has jumped down into the ditch at the roadside.

ROLAND: Come on, we'll find the way in the end.

CORINNE shaking her head: No! I'm fed up. I just want to sleep. I'm going to croak.

She disappears into the ditch.

ROLAND: Go ahead and croak then.

He sits down at the roadside again and pulls out a cigarette as we hear the Spitfire accelerating away in the distance. Music as a TRAMP wearing a long overcoat with a haversack over his shoulder comes into view, plodding along the road. He has an unlit cigarette in his mouth. He passes ROLAND, who is just lighting his Gitane, halts, goes back and bends over him.

TRAMP: Got a light?

ROLAND putting out his match: Nope.

The TRAMP looks at him for a moment, then walks on a bit. He pauses, looking down into the ditch where CORINNE is lying, out of sight.

TRAMP to ROLAND: There's a bird down here.

ROLAND belligerently: So what?
TRAMP glancing down into the ditch again: She your bird?

ROLAND looks away but doesn't reply. The TRAMP climbs down into the ditch, disappearing from view.

CORINNE screaming off: No, ouch, no, help! No, ouch! No, help!

A plane drones overhead, and we hear another car approaching. ROLAND starts thumbing, then gets up as a large chauffeur-driven American saloon comes to a halt in front of him. He comes round to the driver's door and squats down with his back to us. ELLEN - a middle-aged, conservative looking woman - leans out of the back.

ROLAND: Are you going through Oinville?

ELLEN: Would you rather be fucked by Mao or Johnson?

ROLAND: By Johnson of course!

ELLEN to the chauffeur: Drive on, Jean. To ROLAND: Dirty fascist!

The chauffeur operates his electric window-winder and drives off up the road. Shoulders hunched against the rain, ROLAND goes wearily back to the roadside, cursing.

ROLAND: Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ, Jesus Christ!

He sits down and yells after the departing car: Jesus Christ!

He drags at his cigarette.

Music as the TRAMP hauls himself out of the ditch and stands glancing at ROLAND while he buttons up his coat. Camera tracks left along the road, losing first the TRAMP then ROLAND. Then it moves slowly back to ROLAND as CORINNE flops down beside him and sits there nursing a bruised shoulder. A pause, then CORINNE leaps up and flags down a passing Citroen.

CORINNE to the driver: Are you going through Oinville?

TITLE blue letters:

OO / OO AND / FOOTIT AND

0 0 CHOCOLATE CHOCOLATE

MOTORIST off: Who attacked first - Israel or Egypt?

CORINNE off: Those bastards the Egyptians ...
Resume on the scene. CORINNE gives a little jump to address ROLAND over the roof of the car.

CORINNE: ... Isn't that so, Roland?

MOTORIST: Ignorant fool!

He drives off.

CORINNE beckons wearily to ROLAND.

CORINNE: Isn't that a road over there?

She starts to walk on up the road, camera tracking slowly with her.

ROLAND coming up behind her: Your turn.

He leaps on her back.

CORINNE counting the steps: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. Your turn.

They change places.

ROLAND cheating and gabbling the numbers: 1 - 23456789 - 10.

He tips her off his back. At that moment a lorry is heard approaching. They both stand in the middle of the road, waving. A yellow dustcart appears from the left and halts in front of them.

CORINNE to the DRIVER: Are you going to Oinville?

DRIVER: Yes, climb in.

They leap onto the lorry, helped by a couple of dustmen on the back. Camera pans right as the vehicle moves off up the road. Fade out.
APPENDIX 2

MAX SCHUMACHER

You need me. You need me badly. Because I'm your last contact with human reality. I love you. And that painful decaying love is the only thing between you and the shrieking nothingness you've lived the rest of the day.

DIANA

Then don't leave me.

MAX SCHUMACHER

It's too late, Diana. There's nothing left in you that I can live with. You're one of Howard's humanoids. If I stay with you I'll be destroyed. Like Howard Beale was destroyed. Like Loraine Hobbs was destroyed. Like everything that you and the institution of television touch, is destroyed. You're television incarnate, Diana. Indifferent to suffering, insensitive to joy, all of life is reduced to the common rubble of banality, war, murder, death is the same to you as bottles of beer. And the daily business of life is a corrupt comedy. You even shatter the sensations of time and space into split seconds, instant replays. You're madness, Diana, real madness. Everything you touch dies with you. Not me. Not as long as I can feel pleasure, pain, .... And it's a happy ending.
Edward George Ruddy died today. Edward George Ruddy was the Chairman of the Board of the United Broadcasting Systems and he died at 11 o'clock this morning of a heart condition and woe is us. We're in a lot of trouble. So... a rich little man with white hair died. What has that got to do with the price of rice, right? And why is that woe to us? Because you people... you people and 62 million other Americans are listening to me right now; because less than 3% of you people read books; because less than 15% of you read newspapers; because the only truth you know is what you get over this tube. Right now, there is a whole, an entire generation that never knew anything that didn't come out of this tube. This tube is the gospel, the ( ? ) of revelation, this tube can make or break Presidents, Popes, Prime Ministers, this tube is the most awesome goddam force in the whole godless world.

And woe is us if it ever falls into the hands of the wrong people. And that's why woe is us that Edward George Ruddy died.

Because this company is now in the hands of CCA, the Communication Corporation of America. There's a new Chairman
of the Board, a man called Frank Hackett, sitting in Mr. Ruddy's office on the 20th floor. And when the 12th largest company in the world controls the most awesome goddam propaganda force in the whole godless world who knows what shit will be painted for truth on this network? So you listen to me, listen to me. Television is not the truth, television is a goddammed amusement park, television is a circus, a carnival, a travelling troupe of acrobats, storytellers, dancers, singers, jugglers, sideshow freaks, lion tamers, and football players. We're in the boredom killing business. So if you want the truth, go to God, go to your guru, go to yourselves because that's the only place you ever going to find any real truth. Man, you never going to get any truth from us. We'll tell you anything you want to hear, we lie like hell. We'll tell you that Kojak always gets the killer and that nobody ever gets cancer in Archie Bunker's house and no matter how much trouble the hero is in, don't worry, just look at your watch, at the end of the hour he's going to win. We'll tell you any shit you want to hear. We deal in illusions, man. None of it is true. But you people sit there day after day, night after night, all ages, colours, creeds, we're all you know. You're beginning to believe all the illusions we're spinning here. You're beginning to think that the tube is reality and that your own lives are unreal. You do whatever the tube tells you.
You dress like the tube. You eat like the tube, you raise your children like the tube, you even think like the tube. This is mass madness. You maniacs, in God's name, you people are the real thing, we are the illusion. So turn off your television sets, turn them off now, turn them off right now, turn them off and leave them off, turn them off right in the middle of the sentence I'm speaking to you, now turn them off!
You've meddled with the primal forces of nature, Mr. Beale. And I won't have it. Is that clear? You think you merely stopped a business deal. That is not the case. The Arabs have taken millions of dollars out of this country and now they must put it back. It is ebb and flow, tidal gravity, it is ecological balance. You are an old man who thinks in terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations, there are no peoples. There are no Russians, there are no Arabs, there are no Third Worlds, there is no West. There is only one holistic system of systems, one vast and (? ?), interwoven, interacting, multivariate and multinational dominion of dollars. Petrodollars, electrodollars, multidollars, Reichmarks (? ?), rubles, pounds and (? ?). It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of life on this planet. That is the natural order of things today. That is the atomic and sub-atomic and galactic structure of things today. And you have meddled with the primal forces of nature. And you will atone. (Am I getting through to you, Mr. Beale?) You get up on your little 21 inch screen and howl about America and democracy. There is no America, there is no democracy. There is only IBM, ITT, and AT & T, and Dupont, Dow, Union Cable Carbide
and Exxon. Those are the nations of the world today. What
do you think the Russians talk about in their councils of
state? Karl Marx? They get out their linear programming charts,
statistical decision curves, minimax solutions and compute the
price-cost probabilities of their transactions and investments,
just like we do. We no longer live in a world of nations and
ideologies, Mr. Beale. The world is a college of corporations,
inexorably determined by the immutable by-laws of business.
The world is a business, Mr. Beale. It has been since man
crawled out of the slime. And our children will live,
Mr. Beale, to see that perfect world in which there is no war
or famine, oppression or brutality, one vast and ecumenical
whole in which all men will work to serve the common good,
in which all men will hold a share of stock, all necessities
provided all anxieties tranquilized, ( ? )
And I have chosen you, Mr. Beale, to preach this evangelism.

MR. BEALE

Why me?

MR. JENSEN

Because you're on television, dummy. Sixty million people
watch you every day of the week, Monday to Friday.

MR. BEALE

I have seen the face of God.
MR. JENSEN

You just might be right, Mr. Beale.

VOICE OVER NARRATOR

That evening, Howard Beale went on the air to preach the corporate cosmology of Arthur Jensen.

MR. BEALE

Last night I got on the air and asked you people to stand up and fight for your heritage and you did and it was beautiful. Six million telegrams were received at the White House. The Arab takeover of CCA has been stopped. The people spoke, the people won, it was a radiant eruption of democracy. But ... I think that was it, fellas. That sort of thing is not likely to happen again. Because at the bottom of all our terrified souls we know that democracy is a dying giant, a sick, sick dying decaying political concept writhing in its final pain. I don't mean that the United States is finished as a world power, the United States is the richest, the most powerful, the most advanced country in the world, light years ahead of any other country. And I don't mean the Communists are going to take over the world, because the Communists are deader than we are. What is finished is the idea that this great country is dedicated to the freedom and flourishing of every individual in it. It's the individual that's finished. It's
the single, solitary human being that is finished. It's every single one of you out there is finished. Because this is no longer a nation of independent individuals, it's a nation of some 200-odd million transistorized, deodorized, whiter-than white, steel-belted bodies totally unnecessary as human beings and as replaceable as piston rods. Ah. Well, the time has come to say, is dehumanization such a bad word? Good or bad, that's what is so. The whole world is becoming humanoid, creatures that look human but aren't. The whole world, not just us, we're just the most advanced country so we're getting there first. The whole world's people are becoming mass produced, programmed, numbered, (?).... (VOICE FADE OUT)

VOICE OVER NARRATOR

It was a perfectly admissible argument that Howard Beale advanced in the days that followed. It was however also a very depressing one. Nobody particularly cared to hear his life was utterly valueless. By the end of the first week in June the Howard Beale show had dropped one point in the ratings and its trend in shares dipped under 48 for the first time since last November.
CHAPTER 1

1. This is a point of view currently predominant in modern film theory and research. Consider the following statement made by the Editors of Camera Obscura: A Journal of Feminism and Film Theory, Number One, Fall 1976:5. "Textual analysis considers the text (the film) as a dynamic process of the production of meanings, inscribed within the larger context of social relations. The text is seen not as a closed work but as a discourse. ... Textual analysis examines the status of the text as production, in which both the originator of the text (filmmaker) and the spectator actively participate in the production of meaning. ... The text is seen as a social space through which various languages (social, cultural, political, aesthetic) circulate and interact. Semiology treats film as a discourse, a text which is structured by various signifying systems."

The following is the definition of "text" in John Mercer's Glossary of Film Terms, University Film Association, Monograph No. 2, Summer 1978:84. "A matrix of codes (or of messages) which the semiotologist maintains must be read as a whole. A single film (a single "system") is usually the basic text; however, a semiotic/auteur study of many films by one director may consider all of those films as a single text. Likewise, single sequences from films can be considered texts."

CHAPTER 2

1. The ideology of individualism has been the prevailing dominant ideology of Western capitalist countries. While this ideology is unique to capitalism, it is not the only capitalist ideology. For a discussion of the relationship between fascism and capitalism, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944, reprinted 1957), especially Chapter 20. Also see the same author's "The Essence of Fascism" in John Lewis, Karl Polanyi and Donald K. Kitchin (Eds), Christianity and the Social Revolution (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1935).

2. In her book, Mind and Politics: an approach to the meaning of liberal and socialist individualism, Ellen Wood is specially concerned to make the point that the prevailing tendency to associate the term "individualism" with liberal democratic theory and to oppose "individualism" to "socialism" or "collectivism" is in itself ideological. This is because
what pretends to be a purely formal objective definition of the term "individualism" contains certain doctrinal assumptions about human nature and society. Proceeding from the idea that "individualism" as a social doctrine means a commitment to the moral primacy of the individual in society and the right of the individual to freedom and self-realization, Wood is concerned to delineate two conceptions of individualism, liberal and socialist. These distinctions are made to correspond with the Marxist distinction between "metaphysical" and "dialectical" thinking, so that liberal individualism corresponds to metaphysical thinking and socialist individualism corresponds to dialectical thought.

Wood draws on the schematic outline of the differences between these two modes of thought as given by Frederick Engels in his Socialism: Utopian and Scientific published in 1880. Briefly, metaphysical thinking considers individual things as isolable entities, fixed, given once for all. It is marked by irreconcilable antitheses, i.e. either a thing exists or it does not exist, it cannot be at the same time both itself and something else; positive and negative exclude each other and cause and effect are in rigid antithesis. By fixing on individual things, this kind of thought forgets the connections between things, in contemplating the existence of these things it forgets the beginning and end of this existence, in fixing on the repose of these things, it cannot see their motion. In summary, it cannot see the wood for the trees. On the other hand, dialectical thinking comprehends the relations between things, change and history. It reunites rather than only separates, unites and synthesizes opposites and sees things in process rather than static rigidity.

3. There are sound reasons for regarding Locke and his theoretical writings as crucial to the concerns of this study. First, even though psychological theory occupies a subordinate place in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), nevertheless Locke is regarded as the father of English psychology. His approach to psychological problems was the one which dominated subsequent thought. Secondly, Locke's Second Treatise of Government has been extraordinarily influential in Western political theory and practice. At the close of the seventeenth century, it was immensely influential in England. Furthermore, the principles of the American Revolution were to a large extent based on the ideas it contained. Also, Locke is the earliest and foremost exponent of the liberal conception of property. Indeed, it has been asserted (Wood, 1972:130, note 4) that Locke's successors simply take for granted many of his conclusions even if they disregard some of their philosophical underpinnings. Finally, the most important reason is that this very old theory of mind crops up even in the midst of an attempt to formulate a new epistemology.
Reference is being made here to General System Theory and its "father", Ludwig von Bertalanffy. The following passage from his book General System Theory (New York: George Braziller, 1968: 52) is an astonishing example of the way theorists may be unable or refuse to follow through to the conclusions required by their own theory: "Man is not only a political animal; he is, before and above all, an individual. The real values of humanity are not those which it shares with biological entities, the function of an organism, or a community of animals, but those which stem from the individual mind." (Emphasis added) This kind of statement is nothing other than an example of epistemological individualism which is described in detail in this chapter.

4. This should be read in relation to what was said in Note 2 above concerning metaphysical and dialectical thinking.

5. The cardinal principle of empiricism is that all knowledge is to be gained from sense experience. For example, here is a passage from Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 1690: Bk. 2, Chap.1, Art. 2: "Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas:— how comes it to be furnished? ... Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself." And again, from Bk. 2, Chap.4, Art.4: "If anyone asks me, What this solidity is, I send him to his senses to inform him." This is the position of classical empiricism, as stated by the father of British empiricism. It is absolutely important to realize that not every kind of empiricism will take the same conception of experience exemplified by Locke. Lockean empiricism has been cogently summed up by Piaget: "But there is more to empiricism than just an affirmation of the role of experience: Empiricism is primarily a certain conception of experience and its action. On the one hand, it tends to consider experience as imposing itself without the subject's having to organize it, that is to say, as imposing itself directly on the organism without activity of the subject being necessary to constitute it. On the other hand, and as a result, empiricism regards experience as existing by itself and either owing its value to a system of external ready made "things" and of given relations between those "things" (metaphysical empiricism) or consisting in a system of self-sufficient habits and associations (phenomenalism)" (Piaget, as cited in Wood, 1972:57).

6. This is the central tenet of Locke's individualism and the core of its "possessive quality". An outstanding work on
the theory of possessive individualism is C.B. Macpherson's The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). The following is a definition of possessive individualism as given by Macpherson on page 3. Macpherson is referring to the original seventeenth century individualism. "Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole, nor as part of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself. The relation of ownership, having become for more and more men the critically important relation determining their actual freedom and actual prospect of realizing their full potentialities, was read back into the nature of the individual. The individual, it was thought, is free inasmuch as he is proprietor of his person and capacities. The human essence is freedom from dependence on the wills of others, and freedom is a function of possession. Society becomes a lot of free equal individuals related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have acquired by their exercise. Society consists of relations of exchange between proprietors. Political society becomes a calculated device for the protection of this property and for the maintenance of an orderly relation of exchange."

7. According to Louis Dumont, "The Modern Conception of the Individual" in Contributions to Indian Sociology, No. VIII (Oct.) 1965, pp. 13-61, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen marks in a way the apotheosis of the Individual. This is because in France it was first made the basis of the Constitution of a leading nation. It was proposed as an example to Europe and the world and this example was to work powerfully through the 19th and 20th centuries. The idea of the Declaration was consciously taken from America, from the Bills of Rights adopted by certain States and especially from that of Virginia of 1776, which was known in France before 1789.


CHAPTER 4

1. Note the nearness of this conception to the definition of
sign by Charles Sanders Peirce in his 1897 paper titled "Logic as Semiotic: The Theory of Signs", reprinted in Philosophical Writings edited by J. Buchler (New York: Dover, 1955): "A sign, or representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity. It addresses somebody, that is, creates in the mind of that person an equivalent sign, or perhaps a more developed sign."

2. Considerable work has been done on the concept of levels by Bunge (1963, 1969). He examined nine meanings of the notion of level, raising questions in connection with each.

3. To give an adequate definition of hierarchy is very troublesome. Yet, this is perhaps to be expected since, according to Whyte (1969), the concept derived from a Greek called Pseudo-Dionysius and has had a long history. It has been influential in Western thought from Plato and Aristotle right up to the present. The concept was defined by Bunge (1963) in the sense of its ancient meaning. It was restricted to cases where the relations between levels is not one of emergence; the levels are ordered by a one-sided, asymmetric dependence relation; and all levels are under the control of "one boss" or "control centre" at the top. According to this definition, the staircase pyramid is a picture of an hierarchy. If the notion of hierarchy is thus defined, then perhaps it is possible to agree with Bunge: "It would seem that hierarchies are a human invention; in nature reciprocal action, rather than unidirectional action, seems to be the rule. ... Hierarchical structures are found in society, e.g. in armies and in old-fashioned universities, but there are no clear cases of hierarchy in physics or in biology." (Bunge, 1969) The problem with this position is that in modern usage the concept is not used according to this stringent definition by most scientists working in the area of hierarchy theory (see the collections edited by Pattee, 1973 and by Whyte, Wilson and Wilson, 1969).

4. In Wilden's model, instead of "level of constraint" the notion of "level of logical typing" is used. The concept of logical typing is not used here because it did not seem necessary, i.e. no further analytic precision appeared to be gained by introducing this concept. In addition, it can be argued that coupling the two concepts of levels and types leads to conceptual confusion. For example, it has been argued that levels are not the same as types as in Russell's Theory of Logical Types. "In the latter, any set or class is of a higher type than the members of the set or class. In the present definition of levels, however, the set is of a higher level if and only if it shows

Chapter 5

1. Readers familiar with Jakobson's paper (reprinted in The Structuralists: From Marx to Levi Strauss edited by Richard and Fernande DeGeorge) may be at first confused by the fact that Jakobson's first schema of the factors involved in communication listed one factor as "the context" (page 89). The "context" in that sense was described as being the same as the "referent". In the present study, however, the term "referent" is kept separate from "context" because here the term "context" refers specifically to the dominant Other of the societal context.

Chapter 8

1. "Commoditization" refers to the treatment of a thing or a relation as if it were a commodity. Commodities are anything produced for sale on a market, where, subject to the laws of supply and demand, they acquire a price.

2. Robin Wood in "Godard and Weekend", published as an Introduction to Weekend and Wind from the East, two films by Jean-Luc Godard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972) also mentions the rape and the fact that neither the husband nor the wife discuss it after it has happened. The important thing about Wood's view of the rape is that he sees it as an example of "a savagely caricatured depiction of the essential nature of materialistic society." The analysis carried out in this study refutes this interpretation of it as a caricature.

3. A script of the entire sequence is published in Appendix 1.

4. The exchange between Max Schumacher and Diana Christiansen is published in Appendix 2.

5. The entire speech is published in Appendix 3. Since the speeches from Network were recorded on audiotape, and not taken from a film script, in places it was impossible to distinguish certain words. Wherever this happened, a blank
space was left with a question mark.

6. The relevant exchange between Mr. Jensen and Howard Beale is published in Appendix 4, along with Beale's speech on television.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abdellah, F., and Levine, E.

Ackoff, R.L.

Adler, Renata.

Aiken, Henry D.

Althusser, Louis.

Althusser, Louis.

Angyal, A.

Ashby, W. Ross.

Ashby, W. Ross.
1962 "Principles of the Self-Organizing System." In

Avineri, Shlomo.


Baran, Paul and Sweezy, Paul.


Barkow, Jerome.


Barthes, Roland.


Bateson, Gregory.


Bateson, Gregory.


Benston, Margaret.


Bentley, Arthur.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
Camargo Heck, Marina.


Carmichael, Stokely and Hamilton, Charles V.


Chamberlin, Judi.


Collingwood, R.G.


Culler, Jonathan.


Dawson, Jan.


Delany, Sheila.


Deutsch, Karl W.


Dewey, John.

Dewey, John and Bentley, Arthur.


Dixon, Marlene.


Duncan, Starkey, Jr.


Durkheim, Emile.


Eco, Umberto.


Edel, Abraham.


Edwards, Richard C.


Edwards, Richard C., MacEwan, Arthur et al.


Edwards, Richard C.; Reich, Michael; Weisskopf, Thomas E. (Eds.)

1972 Introduction to Chapter 3, "The Capitalist Mode of Production." In Richard C. Edwards et al (Eds.).
Engels, Frederick.


Fattah, Ezzat.


Ferreira, Antonio.


Foerster, Heinz von.


Freedman, Lawrence Z., and Roe, Anne.


Freeman, Jo.


Frondizi, Risieri.


Furst, Lilian R.


Gellner, Ernest.

### Genet, Jean.


### Gerard, Ralph W.


### Gerth, H. and Mills, C.W.

1953  Character and Social Structure.  London: RKP.

### Gibson, James.

1917  Locke's Theory of Knowledge and its Historical Relations.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

### Girard, Rene.


### Godard, Jean-Luc.


### Grobstein, Clifford.


### Guireaud, Pierre.


### Hacker, Helen.


### Hall, A.D. and Fagen, R.E.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Details</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacBean, James Roy.</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Film and Revolution</td>
<td>Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MacKay, Donald.</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>&quot;The Use of Behavioural Language to Refer to Mechanical Processes.&quot;</td>
<td>Br. J. Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIII, No. 50, August: 89-103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macpherson, C.B.</td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>The Real World of Democracy</td>
<td>Toronto: CBC Publications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McHugh, Peter</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>&quot;On the Failure of Positivism.&quot; In Jack Douglas (Ed.) Understanding Everyday Life; toward the reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of sociological knowledge. Chicago, Ill. : Aldine</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merrell, Floyd</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>&quot;Communication and Paradox in Carlos Fuentes' - The Death of Artemio Cruz: Toward a Semiotics of Character.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Semiotica, Vol.18, No. 4: 339-360.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Title/Work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Polanyi, Karl</td>
<td>The Great Transformation, Chapter 6. Condensed and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title/Reference</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ruby, Jay.

1977 "The Image Mirrored: Reflexivity and the Documentary Film." Journal of the University Film Association, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Fall: 3-11.

Ruesch, Jurgen.


Ruesch, Jurgen.


Ruesch, Jurgen and Bateson, Gregory.


Sartre, Jean Paul.


Saussure, Ferdinand de.


Schaff, Adam.


Sebeok, Thomas.


Simon, H.A.

Simon, H.A.


Soboul, Albert.


Sommerhof, G.


Smythe, Dallas.


Straus, Murray A.


Swanson, Guy E.


Sweezy, Paul.


Veron, Eliseo.


Watzlawick, Paul; Beavin, Janet; Jackson, Don.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Journal / Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Title</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>