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POLITICAL CULTURE:
A CASE STUDY OF MODERN GREECE

by

John Costouros

B.A., University of Alberta, 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Political Science

John Costouros 1979

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

May 1979

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the relationship between political culture and political stability by focussing on a specific case: that of modern Greece. In particular, the attempt is made (a) to analyze the nature of modern Greek political culture; (b) to explain the conditions and factors under which it evolved over time, and, (c) to draw the connection between this political culture and the prospects for stable democracy in Greece.

The theoretical framework for the study of Greek political culture relied heavily on the "civic culture" approach of Almond and Verba (The Civic Culture, 1963) and the closely-related "cultural fragmentation" approach of Rosenbaum (Political Culture, 1975). The applicability of these approaches to the Greek case was examined with the aid of historical, socio-logical, and anthropological works on modern Greece and, where appropriate, on studies of the cultures of other Mediterranean societies. Material on contemporary Greek politics came from secondary sources in both Greek and English as well as the recent newspaper and periodical literature.

The basic finding of this study is that modern Greek political culture possesses most of the characteristics of the "fragmented" type. Accordingly, there has been an "incongruence" between the political culture and the political system since the birth of the modern Greek state in the 1820's, when western democratic institutions were first introduced into the predominantly "parochial" Greek society.
From the 1820's to the present, under the influence of significant historical events, modern Greek political culture was further transformed and fragmented. Such events included many territorial and civil wars, military dictatorships, abrupt population expansion and a continuous involvement in the political and economic affairs of the country by Great Britain and latterly, by the United States.

Another important finding of this study is that political orientations are strongly associated with the socio-economic characteristics of the population. Among the peasants and pastoralists of Greece, parochial and non-participant attitudes and values such as mistrust, suspicion of the motives of others, lack of cooperation, selfishness and patronage seemed to result from a traditional culture which had been adapted to the ecological conditions of the country. Alienated political orientations of individuals from the working and lower middle classes were shown to be influenced by the relative scarcity of economic opportunities, the lack of effective labour organizations and the growing income inequalities. Conversely, the existence of allegiant political orientations among many upper class individuals was explained in terms of their high socio-economic position and of the privileges and economic advantages that they enjoyed within society.

Political socialization was, also, found to be a very conservative process. The political culture is mostly transmitted rather than shaped by such agents as family, school and mass media. The family encourages the maintenance of traditional and parochial values and the use of clientage networks.
and connections in reaching political goals. The school, as a result of the political elite's stubbornness to do away with an unpopular form of language and an anachronistic educational curriculum, enhances allegiance to the nation while neglecting to cultivate positive orientations toward the state and its institutions. The mass media, through its subjective and distorted fashion of news coverage and its biased interpretations of political events, contribute to the maintenance of fragmentation and dissensus in the political culture.

Finally, the perpetuation of fragmentation and political instability was seen as the direct result of many failures of the Greek political elites to respond successfully to rising political demands and to direct the nation's political culture toward integration. Since the War of Independence (1821), the political elites have been divided in their attitudes toward vital political questions and toward the role of the masses in the political system. Thus, the legitimacy of the political system has been and is constantly challenged by the clashes of the political elite members and by the frequent interference of the army in the political scene.

Taking into account the fragmented nature of the Greek political culture, the thesis concluded with the observation that future political stability in Greece would greatly depend on the ability and willingness of the politicians to unite and cooperate with each other and on the extent to which new political and economic developments, such as the accession of Greece to the EEC, would trigger further integration among the masses. However, the overall prognosis was not optimistic in this respect.
To my wife, parents and the people of Greece.
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I would like to thank my senior supervisor, Dr. Paul Warwick and my second supervisor, Dr. Lenard Cohen, for their patience, continued support and assistance toward the completion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This study is about modern Greece. It is the study of a southeastern European country that emerged from foreign subjugation in the 1800's, after spending crucial centuries outside the pale of western civilization. Although modern Greece possesses political institutions similar to those found in western democratic states, it has not yet succeeded in developing institutions which are strong and able to cope with social change and the demands of a participatory democracy. Modern Greek political history is marked by a climate of political instability consisting of swift changes in government, constitution, military revolts, and dictatorships, civil wars, elections and referenda.

In the present work, I shall examine this phenomenon of political instability by using a political culture approach. The concept of political culture is a recent term in political analysis that has been used in a wide variety of ways and for a wide variety of purposes. It has been described as "a particular pattern of orientation to political action"¹, a sector of general culture "concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it should try to do"², or as consisting of "the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place."³

In this study, political culture will be used to refer to the collective attitudes, beliefs and feelings of people toward...
the basic elements of their political system. Political
culture will, thus, include such things as: (1) orientations
toward governmental structures, (2) orientations toward others
in the political system, (3) orientations toward one's own
political activity.4

Almond and Verba attempted to describe the relationship
between political culture and a democratic political system in
their influential work The Civic Culture (1963). Based on
national surveys, the authors examined the political cultures of
five nations with democratic institutions and provided a number
of suggestions regarding the future of democracy in those
countries. Following Parsons and Shils,5 the authors suggested
that individuals are oriented toward a political system in terms of
cognitions (knowledge and beliefs about the political system,
its officials, and its inputs and outputs), affects (emotions
about the political system, personnel and performance) and
evaluations (judgements and opinions of political objects).6
Three ideal types of political culture (parochial, subject,
participant) were defined on the basis of frequency of different
kinds of cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward
the political system in general, its input and output aspects,
and the self as a political actor. (See Table 1).

The authors of The Civic Culture described these three
types of political culture as follows:

Parochial Political Culture ... In these societies there
are no specialized political roles: headmanship,
chieftainship, "shamanship" are diffuse political-
Table 1

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Political Culture</th>
<th>System as General Object</th>
<th>Input Objects</th>
<th>Output Objects</th>
<th>Self as Active Participant</th>
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<td>Parochial</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subject</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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0 means that citizens are very weakly oriented towards the system while

1 indicates strong involvement with it.

Source: The Civic Culture, p. 17.

Economic-religious roles, and for the members of these societies the political orientations to these roles are not separated from their religious and social orientations. A parochial orientation also implies the comparative absence of expectations of change initiated by the political system. The parochial expects nothing from the political system. Similarly, in the centralized African chiefdoms and kingdoms, the political cultures would be predominantly parochial, although the development of somewhat more specialized roles in these societies might mean the beginnings of more differentiated political orientations.

Subject Political Culture... Here there is a high frequency of orientations toward a differentiated political system and toward the output aspects of the system, but orientations toward specifically input objects, and toward the self as an active participant, approach zero. The subject is aware of specialized governmental authority: he is affectively oriented to it, perhaps taking pride in it, perhaps disliking it; and he evaluates it either as legitimate or as not. But the relationship is toward the system on the general level, and toward the output, administrative, or "downward flow" side of the political system; it is essentially a passive relationship...

Participant Political Culture... is one in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and to both the political and administrative structures and processes...
other words, to both the input and output aspects
of the political system. Individual members of the
participant polity may be favorably or unfavorably
oriented to the various classes of political objects.
They tend to be oriented toward an "activist" role
of the self in the polity, though their feelings
and evaluations of such a role may vary from accep-
tance to rejection.

Almond and Verba also, noted that political cultures may
be allegiant, apathetic or alienated from the dominant political
system according to the quality of the cognitive, affective and
evaluative orientations. An allegiant political culture is
characterized by positive orientations toward the system; an
apathetic one by indifference to the system, while an alienated
political culture is characterized by negative or hostile
orientations toward such a system.  

In addition to these categories, Almond and Verba distin-
guished four types of "systemically mixed political cultures".
For example, a parochial-subject culture would be one in which
a considerable portion of the population would favour "a more
complex political system with specialized central governmental
structures".  This type of culture, also, includes a number of
parochials who still maintain loyalty to tribal and local
authorities. From the type of cultural mix (that is the
combination of parochials and subjects) one can usually tell
whether or not a political culture is on its way to becoming a
predominantly subject culture.

Many developing nations today are faced with the problem
of cultural development. While their political culture tends to
be predominantly parochial, institutions and practices of
democratic nature that require a participant culture are being introduced. This is the parochial-participant culture. In this case, the population, being predominantly parochial, is very weakly oriented toward the system while at the same time the system lacks the support of a strong body of responsible and competent citizens. This means that the political culture is not congruent with the structures of the political system which accounts for much of the instability of such a system. In the period after the War of Independence (1832), modern Greece resembled a parochial-participant culture for western democratic institutions had been introduced into a country in which the native population was predominantly parochial.

Another type of mixed culture is the subject-participant one. Here, "a substantial part of the population has acquired specialized input orientations and an activist set of self-orientation, while most of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations." This type of culture is characterized by a climate of political instability produced by the alternation of authoritarian and democratic regimes. The participant portion of the population cannot usually gain the type of confidence and experience seen among citizens of participatory democracies, for the democratic governments of this culture tend to be of short duration. Authoritarian or dictatorial regimes enjoying the support of subject-oriented populations frequently succeed such democratic governments. Under these conditions, democratically
oriented elements of the population tend to remain only "democratic aspirants". The structural instabilities that accompany such a culture usually produce alienative tendencies among the democratic elements. As it will be shown later in this study, modern Greece possesses some of the characteristics of the subject-participant culture.

Unlike the other ones, the final type of mixed political culture is supportive of a stable democracy. This is the civic culture which has some of the following characteristics: 'it is "an allegiant participant culture" in which the individuals although participating in the political process, have not given up "their orientations as subjects nor as parochials". But these subject and parochial orientations are congruent with the participant political orientations. What we are dealing with here is "a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values." A citizen within a civic culture is not constantly involved in politics, as this would be the case with the pure form of participant culture. "The citizen is not a constant political actor. He is rarely active in political groups. But he thinks that he can mobilize his ordinary social environment, if necessary, for political use. He is not the active citizen; he is the potentially active citizen."  

Even when the civic culture is congruent with the structures of the political system (a democratic political system), Almond and Verba cautioned that stability cannot always be
assured. Political issues of great importance may create instability in a democratic political system if the government fails to respond to the demands stimulated by such issues.¹⁵

Perhaps more appropriate for this study, is the classification of political cultures used by Rosenbaum in his Political Culture namely integrated and fragmented political cultures.¹⁶ According to him, an integrated political culture, which in many respects, resembles a civic culture, is characterized by a high historical-political continuity and civic stability with political violence and national disorders being practically absent from the scene.¹⁷ A fragmented political culture possesses in many respects the reverse characteristics of an integrated one. It is a culture "whose population lacks broad agreement upon the way in which political life should be conducted. At the political culture level, the population separates (that is "fragments") into groups isolated from one another by contradictory and incompatible orientations, or other conflicts". Generally speaking "a fragmented culture increases the feeling of isolation and disagreement among social groups, erodes consensus on political fundamentals, and inhibits the development of conditions necessary for a true national community."¹⁸

It shall be a major theme of this study that modern Greece resembles more a fragmented than an integrated or civic culture. As we shall see later, most of the conditions, usually present in fragmented cultures, are found in modern Greece. Some of these conditions include 1) a dominance of parochial political
loyalties over national ones, 2) the lack of widely accepted and operative civil procedures for conflict management, 3) the prevalence of political distrust between social groups and 4) national governments tend to be unstable in form and duration. Indeed, in modern Greece, parochial ties are formed to family unit while national institutions seem alien and illegitimate in the eyes of many individuals. Political conflicts are not usually resolved according to abstract rules based on more or less impersonal standards, but rather according to traditional ways. Thus, "new rules and rulers derived from (the) national government ... collide with other rules: local government officials (do) contend" with powerful patrons. Also common to modern Greece is the distrust between major social groups which "involves a conviction that others wish to deprive one's own social group of political liberties, economic advantages or historically enjoyed social privileges". Finally, Greece presents a classic example of a country in which social group hostilities and clashes between members of the political elite have led to civil wars, military dictatorships, succession of constitutions and general political disorder.

A good knowledge of any political culture is not obtained unless the researcher or writer undertakes to investigate the conditions under which that particular culture originated, developed and changed over time. In order to understand the frequent occurrence of political instability and the existence of fragmentation in the Greek culture, I deem it necessary to examine four of the major influences upon such a culture:
historical experiences, direct political socialization experiences, socio-economic variables and political variables.

The historical events and experiences of a country in many cases have a tremendous impact on the political beliefs of the people. A civil war or a military disaster may lead the members of a nation to share a common sense of community or they may initiate or perpetuate distrust among the various social groups. Also, failure of the government to respond to demands made by the people may produce alienative tendencies among the masses. Economic crises, for example, may lead a number of people to question the value and effectiveness of their governmental institutions, etc., etc.

Direct political socialization experiences are also very important in shaping a political culture. Political socialization has been defined as "the study of political learning". Through the process of political learning, a nation's political culture is shaped and transmitted from one generation to the other. The political culture of a nation is maintained when political values, views, norms and beliefs of the older generation are passed to the younger generation. Changes in the economic and social structure of a society as well as changes in the religious beliefs or the international relationships can bring about changes in the political culture as well. A new political culture may be created in some newly emerged nation composed of people of different race, religion and history. On the leadership, falls the task of creating new economic and political institutions and appropriate cultural values. Through
the integration of old values with new ones, a new political culture may be generated.\textsuperscript{24}

An examination of the socio-economic and political conditions of a nation is also of tantamount importance for the study of political culture. Political orientations are often strongly associated with the socio-economic position of an individual within a society. The political elites as well as the privileged classes usually feel more attached to dominant institutions and values of a society than the lower echelons of the population. Since social status in most societies is tied to education, which is usually received by middle or upper class people, it is often the case that such people feel more confident of their political skills and tend to be more aware and interested in political life than the less educated (lower class) people.\textsuperscript{25}

Political elites and political parties are also responsible for the development and direction of the political culture of a nation. By controlling the major institutions of political socialization (schools, mass media), governmental elites can influence and reshape the political culture of the country. In some cases, political parties, whether in collaboration with, or in opposition to the dominant regime, can shape mass political orientations by either penetrating "all major social, occupational, cultural and political aspects of life" or by submitting members to "intensive indoctrination with political values, loyalties, and attitudes quite hostile to the dominant regime."\textsuperscript{26}

Although there are undoubtedly many other factors which may
be important in shaping a political culture, for purposes of this research, I shall deal mainly with the four major influences described herein. First, I shall refer to the historical experience variables in an effort to find out how the Greek political culture was influenced and changed over time by civil wars, dictatorships, economic crises, etc., etc. Second, I shall examine this culture in its totality and attempt to point out the differences in political orientations among the various classes or social groups. Here, it will be my intention to prove that some of these differences have been the product of what I shall call environmental and socio-economic conditions. Third, I shall look at some of the agents of political socialization, hoping to show how the political culture of the nation is shaped and transmitted from one generation to the next. Fourth, I shall present a portrait of the Greek political elites in history and the present time for the purpose of finding out the extent to which they have been or are integrated in their attitudes toward political life, the democratic institutions and the masses. Finally, based on the results of these chapters I shall provide various suggestions regarding the stability of the political system and the future of democracy in Greece.
Notes

7 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
8 Ibid., Figure 3, p. 22.
9 Ibid., p. 23.
10 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
11 Ibid., p. 25.
12 Ibid., p. 32.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
14 Ibid., p. 481.
15 Ibid., pp. 483-84.
16 Rosenbaum, Political Culture, pp. 36-57.
17 Ibid., p. 64.
18 Ibid., p. 37.
19 Ibid., pp. 43-47.
20 Ibid., p. 45.
21 Ibid., p. 46.


24 The task of integrating old values with new ones is a very difficult one. This seems to be the problem with the parochial-participant cultures of emerging nations where old values resist the introduction of new ones. Almond and Verba suggested that there is still a hope to succeed in generating a new political culture: "The problems are to penetrate the parochial systems without destroying them on the output side, and to transform them into interest groups on the input side." (The Civic Culture, p. 26).


26 Ibid., p. 20.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE VARIABLES

This chapter is designed to point out some of the historical events which, I feel, had an important influence on the course of modern Greek politics. Although the roots of Greek political culture undoubtedly go back to the years of antiquity, it is in the beginning of the 19th century that certain events occurred which influenced the nature of this culture in a manner that set the foundation for subsequent cultural fragmentation and political instability. Therefore, the historical account will start with the years immediately before the Greek revolution of 1821.

The Setting for Fragmentation: 1800-1862

Signs of a Greek Renaissance and the possibility of a successful revolution leading to national independence were already on the horizon at the time of the outbreak of the Greek revolution (1821). By the end of the 18th century a number of forces had generated a tremendous economic and cultural revival of the Greek world. Following the Russo-Turkish treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (1774) and Jassy (1792) through which the Greek merchants were allowed to fly the Russian flag on their ships, the Greek merchant marine succeeded in rising to first place in Black Sea commerce. Also, the Greek merchants had taken advantage of the situation that was created by the Anglo-French wars that followed the French Revolution. The British and the French had succeeded in destroying each other’s merchant marine in the
Mediterranean leaving the Greeks with a golden opportunity to lay hands on the trade of the area. By 1813, the Greek merchant marine had increased to 615 ships totalling 153,580 tons, equipped with 5,878 cannons, and manned by 37,526 seamen.1

These commercial developments which also had their effect on Greek agriculture (by increasing the demand of such Greek products as wheat, silk, cotton, grain and oil) were mainly responsible for the appearance of a new middle class, both in Greece and in the mercantile communities abroad. Certain cities such as Vienna, Venice, Trieste, Odessa and Ioannina in Epirus became famous as economic and cultural centres. In these cities, a number of high quality Greek schools flourished. Between the middle of the 18th century and 1821, about two and a half thousand books were published in Greek, all of them abroad.2 Ideas from the French Revolution and the European Enlightenment were now able to make a significant impact on the young minds of Greeks studying abroad.

The Greek Revolution was planned by a secret organization called Philike Hetairia (Society of Friends) which was founded in 1814 at Odessa by Greek merchants. It first broke out in the Danubian principalities in the spring of 1821. Ypsilantis, a former general of the Russian army led the revolution with his famous "Sacred Battalion" composed of young Greek patriots of the middle and upper classes. But this revolt, which was followed with the uprising of the Rumanian peasants, was doomed to failure. The anticipated Russian support did not come and the Turks succeeded in crushing the rebels. Less than a month
later the revolution broke out in Peloponnesos. On March the 25th (April 6th), in the monastery of Aghia Lavra, Bishop Germanos raised the standard of the cross as a symbol of revolt.3

The revolution that followed was by no means a unified effort on the part of the Greeks who were deeply divided in their attitudes and actions towards the cause. The traditional elite comprised a number of various groups with divergent interests: 1) The Peloponnesian notables or primates who enjoyed immense power, wealth and status in the Ottoman empire. Heading local bodies of government, the primates controlled the tax collection apparatus and owned most of the Christian-held land. This Greek ruling class was often referred to by other Greeks as the "uncircumsized Turks".4 2) The Church establishment which had doctrinal authority over the Christian peoples of the Ottoman empire, and was also the main vehicle of Greek education. 3) The military chieftains of Peloponnesos and Roumely (klephs and armatoloi). The klephs were lawless men who lived on plunder. They represented opposition to authority and enjoyed the support of the common peasants. The armatoloi differed from the klephs. They were an official Christian militia that existed since the time of the Byzantine empire. 4) The merchants of the Aegean Islands: shipowners and capitalists, the wealthiest class in Greece.

5) The Phanariots at Constantinople occupying high administrative positions in the Ottoman empire. They had risen to power because of their European cultivation and their knowledge and
language. They occupied positions such as executive deputy of the commander of the Ottoman navy, governor-general of the Aegean Islands and prince of the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia.⁵

All of the above groups differed in their attitudes towards the revolution. Some of the primates and the high clergy were opposed to it because they already enjoyed power, wealth and status under Ottoman rule. This was also true for a number of Phanariots. From the traditional elite, the klephts and the armatoloi for whom violence had become a way of life were most eager in joining the revolution. Members of other groups such as primates, merchants, lower clergy, and Phanariots joined the revolution with mixed feelings. For some the revolution was a chance to win wealth and power while for others liberating their fellow countrymen was a duty as well as a necessity.

The westernized Greeks conceived the Greek nation as a community encompassing all Greek speaking Christians living within its boundaries. These Greeks were drawn from the following groups: 1) The mercantile elements, including those living in commercial centres within the Ottoman empire as well as in other European cities. 2) The Phanariots who were familiar with European institutions and 3) graduates of European universities, usually sons of merchants and primates such as doctors, lawyers, secretaries, writers and journalists.⁶

The war of independence was carried by the local elites not for the creation of a national state with a centralized government, but rather with the intention of inheriting power
from the Ottomans, while maintaining the traditional system of unequal status, arbitrary rule of the powerful and affective and intensely personalistic social relations. Therefore, these elites, in their efforts to acquire greater local and regional power for themselves and their clients, did not only fight against the Turks but also against other competing elites. On the contrary, the westernized elite who entered the revolution had in mind the following four objectives: 1) the creation of a constitutional state in which a popular elected assembly would protect individual liberty and the public good guaranteed by a constitution; 2) the creation of a secular state, in which the Church would simply constitute one of several state institutions; 3) the creation of a legal-bureaucratic state in accordance with western law codes and administration; and 4) the creation of a state with a regular army, organized along western lines.8

With the exception of the first, all the other objectives encroached upon the established rights of the powerful local elites. The westernized Greeks found much opposition among these groups. An observer of the Greek scene, Emile Desages, gave a good description of the indigenous elites when he said that they are "alien to the doctrines and enemies of the forms that the demagogues of the new school would like to transport in a soil so little prepared to receive them ... Having overthrown the yoke of the Turk," Desages added,

these men regard themselves as the latter's natural and legitimate successors. They also care little for a central authority, for a popular constitution and for legislative assemblies; or else, while admitting the need for a common tie and for a sort
of general leadership, each would no less desire to remain absolute master within his district. Their aim in one word, is neither a republic, nor a monarchy, but an oligarchical confederation more consistent with their ways, their tastes and former life, and perhaps also with the needs and the degree of civilization of the clans which they would govern.9

From the beginning of the revolution, the traditional elite fought to establish effective control over their districts and direct the local struggles in their own ways.10 In their efforts to secure and solidify political power, the primates fought against the various military chieftains who meanwhile had gained the support of the peasants. The first proclamation of the Peloponnesian Senate (an obedient organ of the primates) that declared all former Turkish lands "national" caused adverse reaction among the land-hungry peasants which in turn resulted in a further alienation of the population from the primates.11 The armatoloi also were facing similar problems. The revolution had brought about a disintegration of the Greek society into its component parts. These parts were now bidding for power, challenging the rule of the armatoloi in their respective districts (armatolikia) and wanting to enjoy the benefits of such a rule.

Taking advantage of the internal struggles of the traditional elites, the westernizers transformed the revolution from a closed family affair of primates and chieftains into a national one and directed it towards the main goal - the establishment of a constitutional democratic state along western lines. Having a cultural and ideological unity, the westerni-
izers had a tremendous impact upon the nature of the political culture. Under their influence a participatory aspect was introduced into political thought. The ideas of participation and democracy that the ancient Greeks had valued so much returned once again to the land of their origin. The peasants and pastoralists of Greece after many centuries of foreign subjugation were once again given a taste of the glory that Greece was. With the addition of the participatory feature the political culture was more or less transformed into a parochial-participant one.

The first constitutions drafted under the direction of the westernizers were mostly borrowed from Europe and especially from revolutionary France. But as Kaltchas points out "the principles of representation and the methods of election ... did not depart materially from indigenous custom." The First National Convention was composed of delegates of the Aegean Islands and the three sectional assemblies (Peloponnesos, Eastern Continental Greece, and Western Continental Greece) that had been elected "by the customary methods prevalent in each section under the Ottoman system of communal autonomy." Taking into consideration the nature of the society and the particularisms of the various sections, the adaptation of a system of local government (communal autonomy) was to bring about a greater national unity. The revolution had succeeded in transforming the political culture, but not substantially enough. Institutions of local government inherited from the past would have to be combined with western imports in such a
manner as to avoid alienation of the traditional elite and the population from the political system. Although introducing many new features like the Bill of Rights and the idea of a unitary state (a federal state might have been a better solution) the first constitutions remained quite close to the social reality of the country. But true political independence and stability were not ensured.

The westernizers gained the upper hand in the revolution and succeeded in crushing the traditional elite in an ensuing civil war, after they received some financial assistance from one of the Great Powers, Britain. Using part of a British loan to hire Rumeliot irregulars, the westernized faction defeated the Peloponnesian primates and enjoyed "temporary but unquestionable supremacy and acceptance in the land". The British loan and the subsequent Act of Submission of July 18, 1825, though, by which Greece placed its liberty, national independence and political existence under the absolute protection of Great Britain, brought an end to all prospects for economic and real political independence. The Third Constituent Convention took place in the midst of great tension and anxiety. The traditional elite (the Kolokotronis faction) was able to secure the nomination of Kapodistrias as the Governor of Greece, while the westernizers obtained the Convention's assent to the appointment of two Englishmen, Sir Richard Church and Alexander Cochrane as Commanders of the Greek army and navy, respectively.

Britain and the other two powers, France and Russia that had originally responded to the Greek uprising with marked
hostility got extensively involved in the Greek affairs when they signed the Treaty of London (6 July 1827) which recognized Greece as an autonomous state under Ottoman suzerainty. The Battle of Navarino that followed in which the united fleets of the Great Powers and Greece defeated the Turko-Egyptian one marked the beginning of a new era. The Greeks had to pay a high price for their liberation. Foreign domination became a reality. The London Conference (3 February 1830) issued a protocol by which an independent Greek state was established under the guarantee of the Three Powers. Decisions were taken by the Conference without consulting the Greeks. An absolute monarchy with the Bavarian Prince Otho in the throne was installed in Greece by the Great Powers.

As a result of the chaotic conditions prevailing in revolutionary Greece, the arrival of the Bavarian Prince created a feeling of security and inspired great expectations among the people. General Makriyannis noted:

Today our country ... for so long lost and wiped out, is born again and stands up once more. Today there stand upon their feet the veterans, the statesmen, the clergy and the soldiers, for our King has come, whom we have gained through the power of God. Glory be to thine all good Name, Lord Almighty, most merciful, most compassionate.

The Bavarians were vested with unlimited power for the administration of a country that they knew very little about. At the time of their arrival, Greece was a tiny state (30,000 square miles area) with a population of about 750,000. The war of independence had already cost 185,000 lives. Everywhere there were ruins, burnt homes, orphans and disabled men. The
economy was badly hit with agriculture, shipping and trade having come to a standstill. At the political level, things did not look promising either. The Great Powers had arbitrarily drawn the boundaries of the new state, leaving outside the country more than two and one half million Greeks under Ottoman or British (Ionian Islands) rule. The arbitrary decision was of great importance for the future of the young country for, as we shall see later, Greece was to suffer humiliating defeats in her efforts to realize the Megale Idea (Great Idea) - the aspiration to liberate from Ottoman rule all Greek inhabited territories. The failure of the Kapodistrian government to meet the needs of the Greek people also created a number of problems. His assassination was followed by the complete breakdown of the administrative structure. "The year 1832 had been the most miserable of all the war; the Greeks had suffered more from the cruelty and rapine of their own countrymen than in all the Ottoman invasions, more even than they had endured at the hands of the armies of Ibrahim; and now, at the end of the year, the country was utterly exhausted ..."

Another important feature of the political system of post-revolutionary Greece was the complete absence of modern political parties. The so-called political parties at the time were in fact loose conglomerations of factions, alliances of families "each with its own dependencies or clienteles" that would "place itself under the patronage of a single family (powerful by virtue of wealth, prestige, temporary possession of an important public post)." Following the civil war (1832),
the existing parties were blamed by the public for the terrible chaos and anarchy that such internal strife had produced. The foreign monarchy was thus seen as the only solution.

Foreign domination was the main characteristic of the Othonian period (1832-1862). The political parties retained their foreign orientation ("English", "French", "Russian" parties) and their traditional character (extended families organized hierarchically into clienteles). Also, during this period in matters of civil administration, in setting up a judicial system and in dealing with educational affairs, the Bavarians introduced mostly western models without even making an attempt to adapt such models to the special needs and conditions of the country.25

All these historical events centering around the struggle for independence as well as the struggle for power in post-revolutionary Greece had their impact upon Greek political culture. The revolution broke out in a society whose political culture was predominantly parochial and characterized by great inequality of status, wealth and power, isolation, fragmentation, factionalism and extreme insecurity. Social relations sprang from a system of clientage based on extended kinship inherited from the corporate tradition of the Ottoman empire.26 The impact of these events was such that this type of political culture underwent a certain transformation. 1) Under the influence of the westernized elite a participant feature was introduced into the culture and western democratic institutions were superimposed on a highly traditional society.
These institutions failed to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the parochial population and were temporarily suspended by Kapodistrias and later by the absolute monarchy imposed by the Great Powers. 2) The suspension of these institutions produced alienation among the participant elements of the population and the westernized Greeks. In this way, the political culture was changed into an alienated parochial-participant one. 3) After the absolute monarchy of Otho (1833-1844) the democratic institutions were reintroduced with the 1844 and later the 1862 constitution but the desired result of political stability did not come about. The political culture had not changed significantly enough to be congruent with the political system. In addition to this, by the 1860's, the democratic institutions came to be manipulated by the traditional elite and they became "an arena for the satisfaction of personal and local wants on the pattern of the clientage system."27

The Road to Modernization 1863-1940

After the 1862 rebellion which resulted in the dethronement of King Otho, the Great Powers chose Prince William George of Denmark as the new King of Greece. Then as a gesture of friendship, the British-occupied Ionian Islands were handed to Greece (1864). Also, by the end of the century, Greece increased territorially with the addition of Thessaly and part of Epirus (1881).

In the economic sphere, the modernization efforts of the
various Greek governments were basically successful, especially in the latter part of the century. Between 1863 and 1909, road mileage was multiplied tenfold, railway construction was under way, ports suitable for large steamships and banks operating with a modern credit system were opened. But the increase in public expenditure due to the multiplication of public works forced the Trikoupian governments to turn to extensive borrowing of foreign capital (especially British). By 1914, the Greek public debt had reached the level of 1.25 billion francs. In this way, Greece became more dependent on Western Europe and especially Britain where most of the government loans were obtained. Also, due partly to overwhelming population increases, certain changes in the lifestyle of the Greek peasantry took place. The population increase forced the demand for agricultural products to increase as well. The predominantly pastoral economy was therefore changed to an agricultural one. By the end of the century, a significant number of peasants were producing primarily for the market in order to make profits to pay and buy commodities such as coffee, tea, salt and sugar. The traditional economy gave way to a money economy which started affecting the pattern of village life. The increase in the means of communication and transportation also, made possible village contacts with the outside world.

The peasant sensed that literacy was essential under the new order if he were to be able to deal with the townsmen. Hence, he readily accepted elementary schooling for his children whenever it was made available. Once reading and writing became common, new ideas and ethics, new tastes and ways of living, began to alter the age-old
peasant traditions. "The younger generation was soon questioning the assumptions and attitudes upon which peasant life had been based. Age was no longer regarded as sacrosanct. A new spirit of individualism and a desire for self-advancement and for personally owned possessions undermined the solidarity of village life and even of the family."

This willingness on the part of the peasant to accept elementary schooling opened up a new world for him. He would now get to know his nation, its history and its "constitutional" characteristics and form opinions about them. The process of transformation from parochials to subjects which had started in the first years of the revolution had now sped up. Greek political culture was losing its traditional character to a certain extent. It was now composed of a mixture of parochials, subjects and participants. But with parochialism still being predominant and participant political orientations at a very low level, this type of culture was far from becoming a civic culture. Fragmentation and alienation were still present. The western institutions of the country were operating in a poor fashion. An outstanding example of this is the fraudulent elections of 1874 conducted by the Prime Minister Dimitrios Voulgaris which almost led the country to civil war.

Due to the economic developments and the various reforms of Prime Minister Trikoupis, the social structure experienced major changes as well. A rise in the middle class (professionals, nouveau-riche merchants, bankers, bureaucrats and technocrats) took place which in turn affected the political structure of the country. The Trikoupian governments were backed by the new industrial and financial bourgeoisie and the
measures taken by them favoured these classes rather than the peasantry. In this way, the majority of the population remained alienated from the political system.

Following the Cretan revolt against the Turks, Greece, despite economic depression and poor military preparations, declared war on Turkey (1897). Greece suffered a humiliating defeat and was forced to pay four million pounds indemnity to the Turks and also to accept an International Financial Commission of Control designed to collect certain specified taxes for the payment of such debt. After the defeat, worsening economic conditions coupled with over-population led to a large scale emigration which had some serious repercussions on the economic and political system of the country. On the positive side, emigration made a substantial contribution in the relief of the problems of unemployment and of the balance of payments but, on the negative side, it drew from the ranks of the productively employed population. Due to emigration that continues to the present day, Greece has been constantly deprived of a considerable amount of its most dynamic elements of the population. Such elements are the ones that a particular traditional society needs desperately if it is to modernize its political culture and its economic and political system.

From the beginning of the 20th century and up until the Second World War, Greece went through a period marked by military dictatorships, constitutional revisions, referenda, expansionary wars and economic depressions. By 1909, when the Military League carried out a coup d'état and entrusted the
political leadership to Eleftherios Venizelos, the country was in the midst of economic chaos. Heavy taxation on essential goods and the current trade crisis of 1898 had reduced large masses of the workers, lower middle classes, and the agrarian population to misery. The dissatisfaction of the people with the various governments had become quite evident through the demonstrations of the trade union workers and the peasant revolts in Thessaly. The Venizelos government of the new Liberal Party that came out triumphant in the 1910 elections proceeded with solving the economic problems of the country and constructing a modern democratic state along western lines. Under the leadership of Venizelos, the reorganized Greek army was victorious in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913. After the Treaty of Bucharest (1913) Greek territory was increased, immensely through the acquisition of Crete, Epirus, most of Macedonia (including Thessaloniki) and the Aegean Islands except Imbros and Tenedos. World War I found the political leadership of Greece divided as to whose side the country should be on. Believing in a final victory of the allies and hoping for further territorial gains, Venizelos opted for an alliance with Britain and France but the pro-German King Constantine was against it. The dispute led to the resignation of Venizelos who, encouraged by the allies, established a Provisional Government in Thessaloniki in 1916. King Constantine was finally obliged to abdicate in favour of his second son Alexander (June 1917) and Venizelos returned to Athens in triumph. At the end of the war, Greece was given Western and
Eastern Thrace and the islands of Imbros and Tenedos and it was also entrusted with the administration of Smyrna and a big chunk of the Anatolian hinterland, through the Treaty of Sevres (1920). Following this treaty, Venizelos returned to Greece to find a country divided between royalists and republicans, between supporters of a "small but honourable Greece" and those of Venizelos proclaiming a "Greater Greece" spanning to two continents and five seas. The November 14th, 1920 elections surprisingly enough signalled the defeat of the Liberals. Venizelos himself was unseated and only 120 Liberals were returned to a house of 370 (although the Liberals received 52 percent (%) of the popular vote). King Constantine returned to Greece through a subsequent plebiscite.

As soon as they obtained power, the royalists were faced with the problem of enforcing the Treaty of Sevres. Un fortunately, for Greece, they switched their own platform ("small but honourable Greece") and chose to pursue the Liberals' policy "apparently mesmerized, as Venizelos had been, by the vision of a Greater Greece in the eastern Mediterranean". Having no support from the Great Powers, Greece launched an offensive war against Turkey with the intention to make the dream of the Megale Idea a reality. Despite initial gains, the Greeks finally suffered what was to be probably the most humiliating defeat in their history by the Turks under the leadership of Mustapha Kemal (1922). Smyrna was set afire and thousands of civilians and soldiers were slaughtered with their remnants pursued into the sea. Through the Treaty of Lausanne (1923)
that followed the disaster, Greece lost Eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, Smyrna and the Anatolian provinces. Cyprus, although promised at the beginning of World War I to Greece, was retained by Britain. The islands of the Dodecanese had a similar fate: they were retained by the Italians until 1947 at which time they were finally ceded to Greece. A separate clause of the Treaty provided for the compulsory exchange of Greek and Turkish minorities. The population exchange involved some 400,000 Turks and 1,300,000 Greeks.

The population exchanges produced a great shock to the political and economic system. Northern Greece was greatly hellenized with the arrival of refugees and thus problems of minority populations in Greek territory were largely reduced. But at the same time, the urban population was largely augmented which in turn created problems of unemployment. The political culture of the country was also affected by this new situation. Some of the refugees who came from the cities of Asia Minor already had experience in local government and thus they had developed a high degree of political consciousness. Others who lived in remote areas were less politicized and more traditional. Modern along with traditional elements were therefore added to the Greek political culture. But, most important of all, the newcomers presented a challenge to the political system. Their demands for immediate solution of their needs for survival were of primary importance. Failure of the government to satisfy such demands in turn produced alienation
among the refugees. Poverty-stricken areas of refugees around the main cities became the breeding ground of leftist ideologies. Fragmentation of the political culture was thus furthered and feelings of hostility toward the political system and its actors increased tremendously. \(^{42}\)

Another repercussion of the military disaster in Asia Minor was the new coup led by General Nicholas Plastiras. The Revolutionary Committee formed by him accused and found guilty of sacrificing military interests for party considerations. Ministers and Generals out of which 7 were put to death. \(^{43}\) The military, unable to solve the economic problems of the country, asked Venizelos to form a government backed by all factions and groups. This was to be short-lived also. With the advice of Venizelos a plebiscite was held to decide the form of government. The republicans won by a big margin and Greece was proclaimed a Republic (1924). In the years that followed up to World War II, Greece experienced one of the worst periods of economic and political instability. The Liberals of Venizelos who ruled Greece up until 1933 and the Populists of Tsaldaris that followed up to 1935 failed to solve the economic problems of the country. Their rule was interrupted a number of times by the military which launched a series of coups, the last of which was that of August 4th, 1936 by General Metaxas.

The Metaxas regime directed its attention in crushing the organized workers and the Communists by arresting and deporting labour leaders, dissolving most militant trade unions and ceasing their funds and finally by declaring general strikes.
illegal. Metaxas made clear the nature of his regime when he stated that:

I took the minimum of power necessary to face the Communist danger, but I am not going to relinquish it until the country is cleared of Communism and the social order made unshakeable. The Greek press as well as all the Greeks will have to abide by rational discipline ... For the time being there is no question of new elections being held ... Those of you who in the past have belonged to parties are now under the obligation of forgetting them utterly; there are no more parties in Greece ... The old parliamentary system has vanished forever ... 45

Through its policies, the Metaxas dictatorship perpetuated the separation of the state from society by further alienating the politicized portion of the population. Feelings of hostility towards the government were found among the intellectuals, the politicians, the professional people, and the class-conscious workers led by the Communists.

Post World War II Greece

The outbreak of World War II signalled the end of the Metaxas regime. After holding the Italian offensive successfully for eight months, the Greek forces failed to resist a second attack by Germany. Due to a failure to coordinate the Greek and Yugoslav defense plans for the Balkans, to the limited military support received from the allies, to the betrayal of the country by certain Greek generals46 and the German military superiority, Germany succeeded by 1941 to occupy the whole of Greek territory. In the years that followed until the liberation (fall 1944), the Greek population suffered the trials and exactions of enemy occupation and above
all the horror of hunger. 47

In their struggle for survival, the Greeks turned their attention to organizing an effective resistance against the enemy. Among the many resistance organizations that sprang up in Greece, during the occupation years, the Communist-controlled National Liberation Front (Ethnikon Apeleftherotikon Metopon-EAM) was the strongest one. It was originally created in September of 1941 by the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) in collaboration with various smaller socialist and agrarian parties. Having aims such as the national liberation and the establishment of a new democratic regime at the end of the war, EAM succeeded by 1944 in becoming a truly national organization in its composition. Despite the fact that the Communists were the leading force of EAM, Communism as such was never seen as an immediate aim. The policies stated by EAM were actually no different from such other nationalist bands as the Greek National Democratic League (EDES). The main difference was that EAM through its National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), carried out a higher number of coordinated attacks and sabotage operations against the enemy than any other group. Also, EAM, more than any other organization, succeeded in mobilizing the peasants and transforming parochialism into a whole-hearted participation in the common struggle. Colonel Woodhouse, who was sent to Greece with the purpose of breaking EAM politically, described the situation in the following manner:

Having acquired control of almost the whole country, except the principal communications used by the Germans, they had given it things that it had never
known before. Communication in the mountains, by wireless courier and telephone, have never been so good before or since; even motor roads were mended and used by EAM-ELAS ... The benefits of civilization and culture trickled into the mountains for the first time. Schools, local government, law courts and public utilities, which the war had ended, worked again. Theatres, factories, parliamentary assemblies, began for the first time. Communal life was organized in place of the traditional individualism of the Greek peasant. His child was dragooned into the EPON (youth body), his nest-egg levied into EA (relief work), his caique commandeered to equip ELAN (EAM's naval army) ... Followed at a distance by the minor organizations, the EAM/ELAS set the base in the creation of something that the Governments of Greece had neglected; an organized State in the Greek mountains.48

Through all these measures taken by EAM, the peasantry awoke to a new political consciousness. For the first time in modern Greek history, truly democratic principles were implanted in the rural areas. For the first time, democracy meant for the peasants something more than a vote in general elections. The peasantry was in this way politically modernized.49 Unfortunately, after liberation, through the intervention of the British the progressive forces of EAM were prevented from building a truly democratic society. Britain intervened to tilt the balance in favour of the nationalist groups and the collaborators of the Germans who had been fighting against EAM for political supremacy since 1943.

The British originally supported the policies of EAM and were fully satisfied with the guerrilla warfare conducted by ELAS. But later on they switched their policies for the following reasons: 1) British investments in Greece, 2) Greece's strategic position in the Mediterranean and 3) British fears
than an EAM government would not cooperate fully with them. The willingness of Britain to maintain her political supremacy in the Mediterranean and her influence over the direction of Greek politics was epitomized with the secret arrangement that Churchill made with Stalin in the fall of 1944 regarding who would take the lead in Greece. Churchill did not hesitate to use troops to crush the ELAS army and even to support the various nationalist bands such as the hated "Security Battalions" (collaborators of the Germans) and the EDES of Zervas. Before the civil war begun, Churchill had decided to restore King George to the throne with EDES being used to achieve such restoration.

The Cairo mission composed of representatives of the resistance groups failed to come to an agreement regarding the return of the king and the formation of a national unity government. Two months after the failure of the Cairo mission on October 9th, 1943, ELAS attacked EDES in the Greek mountains. General Saraphis of ELAS explained that the attack was ordered because of a long series of provocations by the EDES and because of their collaborationist activities in Epirus as well as in Athens. Meanwhile, the British under the leadership of Colonel Woodhouse (who had replaced Myers) gave their full support to EDRS. ELAS was now fighting on two fronts: against the Germans and against EDES and the other collaborationists. The peace settlement that was reached on the Plaka Bridge on February 15, 1944, did not settle any political issues. EAM had proposed that steps be taken to form a national unity govern-
ment. After failing in that, EAM set up its five man Political Committee of National Liberation (PEEA) in March 1944 "to administer the territory liberated by ELAS and to press for the formation of a broader and more representative government." Failure of the Tsouderos government-in-exile to cooperate with PEEA in the struggle for the liberation of the country and the formation of a national unity government led to a mutiny involving the Greek Navy and the First Brigade of the army in Alexandria. The British intervened and put an end to the mutiny and they sent ten to twelve thousand rebels to concentration camps in Egypt, Libya and East Africa.

The Cairo mutiny led to the Lebanon Conference at which representatives of the Cairo government, of the political parties in Greece, and of the three resistance organizations (EAM, EDES and EKKA) met to decide on the cessation of the civil war and the formation of a national unity government (May 17, 1944). Despite the animosity shown by Papandreou (who had replaced Tsouderos with Churchill's initiative) towards the EAM, an agreement was finally reached to form a government of national unity.

This new government led by Papandreou did not work towards the goal of national unity. As soon as it was made obvious to Papandreou that the EAM/ELAS controlled most of Greece, he decided to ask the help of the British forces to alter the political situation. So, through the Caserta Agreement, all guerrilla forces were put under the orders of the British General Scobie. On December 1st, 1944, General Scobie ordered
the dissolution of all guerrilla forces, which led to the resignation of the six leftist cabinet ministers. EAM had agreed "to demobilize the ELAS, on the condition, however, that the other armed volunteer forces, EDES, the Mountain Brigade, the Sacred Battalion and the Army formations in the Middle East be dissolved also." They even went as far as to suggest a mixed national corps which would comprise all armed forces. The Papandreou government refused the EAM proposal and decided to retain the Mountain Brigade and the Sacred Battalion while maintaining their position on the disbandment of the other guerrilla groups. Following the breakup of the negotiations, the Central Committee of EAM decided to hold "an all-people's" meeting at Constitution Square on December 3rd, 1944 in order to explain to the public what was happening. A general strike was also to be organized for Monday, December 4th. The peaceful demonstration turned out to be a bloody one with the police firing at the crowd killing twenty demonstrators and injuring.

The next day's unanimous general strike showed EAM's popular strength:

In Athens, the people took to the streets in the early morning and converged on Constitution Square. Hundreds of thousands of Athenians invaded the centre of their city. There was not a single British uniform to be seen. The coffins of the previous day's victims arrived, carried on the shoulders of demonstrators. The partisans' Funeral March swelled from the crowd, echoed and multiplied in all the neighbouring streets, loud, grave and menacing. When it ended, between four and five hundred thousand people knelt together, solemnly, and observed several seconds' silence. It seemed to last forever, a solid silence pressing against the walls of the Hotel Great Britain, dense as stone, stifling.
But even this demonstration had its victims: "As the unarmed people were returning from the funeral, a new murderous attack was opened against them by the gendarmes, the men of the Security Battalions, the followers of EDES and of the monarcho-fascists of the "X" organization." After this Papandreou decided to resign and Sophoulis was asked to form a new government. At that time, Churchill intervened once more in the internal affairs of Greece. Through the British Ambassador he informed Sophoulis that a new government was out of the question and that Papandreou was to remain in his post. General Scobie was also ordered to proceed immediately to a final confrontation with EAM and "act as if (he) were in a conquered city where a local rebellion (was) in progress".

The new situation found the EAM leadership divided on what policy to follow and on how extensive the fighting should be. Obviously, they were not prepared to seize power through an armed rebellion for otherwise they would have considered doing that back in September and early October (1944) when they controlled most of the country. So despite initial gains, EAM/ELAS lost the war in Athens in the hands of the British and the collaborators. Finally, an armistice was signed with the British appointing Plastiras to the premiership and Archbishop Damaskinos to the Regency.

The Varkiza Agreement did not bring an end to hostilities and political instability. A systematic persecution of the communist press, mass arrests of democratic citizens, and terrorism in the countryside by armed gangs of extreme
rightists and war collaborators (appearing after the demobilization of ELAS) were amplified every day. The government that came out from the 1946 elections (in which most of the progressive and left wing forces abstained) failed to solve the pressing problems of the country. The king returned (after a phony plebiscite) to a country torn by civil strife in the midst of economic chaos. Faced with persecution the communists had resorted to open rebellion and their bands were getting stronger and stronger every day. But once again they were prevented from seizing power due in part to the intervention of an outside force. This time it was the United States.

Great Britain had already announced (February 1947) that she was unable to continue to assist Greece and that she would have to withdraw her troops from that country. This meant that the government of the Right was now left without the military and economic support that it badly needed to preserve its position. At this critical moment the United States entered the picture through the Truman Doctrine, prepared to "contain" any left-wing threat by force, if necessary. So, when the Greek regular army failed to put an end to the Communist guerrilla activities, the U.S. Military Mission assumed the strategic leadership of the Joint U.S. - Greek Staff. The regular army was enlarged and supplied with modern weapons, artillery, napalm bombs, tanks and air crafts. As a result of this, and due to the fact that the Communists failed to receive any support from the Soviet Union, they were beaten and the civil war ended with the Communist Party announcing its decision to cease fire on
October 16th, 1949.

As we have seen, back in the 1820's, the modernizers, in order to secure their position of power and implement their programmes, had invited British capital into Greece and they also went as far as signing the Act of Submission which brought death to the political and economic independence of the country. History repeated itself during the civil war of the 1940's. The establishment of the Right, in order to preserve its position, also asked the support of Britain and later the United States. But the latter time dependence was to be slightly different. The money channelled into Greece for reconstruction and economic development (e.g. through the Marshall Plan) had the following consequences:

Through bargaining over the amount and the use of the money given, the USA had a stronger hold over Greek governments than Britain had ever managed to get. An implied threat to stop, reduce or even postpone the aid was enough to make Greek ministers fall flat on their faces. This goes far to explain the ease with which the USA could impose governments, policies and personalities even after the civil war was over. This was a change from the past. British influence had been based on an elaborate and carefully developed system of 'agents' - either paid or, more often, unpaid - who possessed or acquired key positions in the decision-making processes of Greece. Under normal circumstances, British intervention was never blatant or explicit, since it was channelled through diplomatic and 'covered' activities. American influence, on the contrary, soon became a recognized institution.

In the years that followed the civil war, the Greek governments under American direction worked towards reconstruction and development and above all towards the permanent exclusion of Communism from the political arena. Their external policy
highlights included: the induction of Greece into NATO (1952), a failure to bring forth a union with Cyprus which became independent (1960), and a formal association with the European Common Market (1962).

The National Radical Union (ERE) under the leadership of Karamanlis who succeeded Field-Marshall Papagos (1955), ruled the country until 1963. In the economic sphere the government of the Right succeeded in changing the face of Greek economy by devaluing the currency, tripling public investment expenditure, and encouraging production of agricultural goods.

Between 1952 and 1962, the GNP grew by an average of 7 percent (\%) annually in constant prices. Due to the rapid economic growth that the country experienced in the late 50’s and early 60’s, Greek social structure was transformed with the emergence of new professional groups of technicians, executives, administrators and intellectuals. An important feature of this period though, is the fact that the economic benefits went mostly to the commercial classes. The government failed to improve the economic position of the working people, the number of which was tremendously augmented due to a major increase of urban population. Unemployment remained in high levels although it was partly relieved by a large scale emigration abroad. At the same time, the position of the peasants was also altered. The countryside was opened through the building of roads. Patterns of life of industrial society shattered the traditional peasant world. Modern values and ideas in many cases replaced or existed right along with traditional ones.
Despite its efforts, the government failed to modernize agriculture and to do away with the system of exploitation that was based on the wholesalers paying miserly prices to the producers. This system of exploitation drove a number of peasants to towns to find work to improve their livelihood. Urban emigration in turn produced further unemployment. The new emigrants were thus transformed from poor peasants to alienated, unemployed workers.

In the political sphere, the government of ERE succeeded through a number of measures in maintaining an apparent stability. These measures included: the use of favourable electoral systems, fraudulent elections, psychological coercion of the peasants by right wing bands and the National Defense Battalions (TEA), control of the trade union movement, control of the army, and winning the support of the Palace. In a few words, through the use of favourable electoral systems, the Right won three subsequent elections (1952, 1956, 1958) and formed majority governments while its popular vote remained below the 50 percent (%) level. The 1961 elections were considered by the opposition parties as fraudulent. In addition to the complicated systems introduced in these elections, systematic oppression of the peasantry by the TEA and the police was reported. The oppression of the workers was also made possible through a mechanism by which the government controlled the trade union movement. The system of trade union representation was organized in such a manner that radical labour leaders had very little chance of success. Strike demonstrations were most of the time
repressed by the police. The Right during this period also took control of the army which was used to fight "the internal enemy" (communists) and intervene in favour of the establishment when necessary (e.g. the intervention in the 1961 elections). The Palace also supported in various ways the government of the Right. Karamanlis, himself, had risen to his post partly by royal favour. The fall of the ERE government was finally due to a certain extent to a change in the policy of the Palace. Karamanlis had become increasingly independent and was unwilling to accept orders from the court. So, according to one source, the resignation of Karamanlis came as a result of the pressure put forth by King Paul.

The ascendance of the Centre Union (EK) to power in 1963 was due to a number of factors. The government of ERE had been under attack by Papandreou's EK since the fraudulent elections of 1961. ERE had failed to control the growing income inequalities and they were not willing to propose any income redistribution. This was partly due to their association with business. Papandreou through his Anendotos (Unyielding Fight) was every day exposing to the Greek people the underlying structure of political power. Having the unrivalled ability to talk to the masses, Papandreou was advocating a programme of social justice with emphasis on old-age pensions for the peasants, free medical service and above all free education for their children.

By 1963, discontent of the people with the government had increased greatly as it was shown by the various rallies and strikes taking place all over the country. The final blow to
the ERE government was given in May 1963 when Grigorios Lambrakis, a popular deputy of the United Democratic Left (EDA) was killed by a motorcycle while speaking at a meeting of the local Peace Committee in Salonica. It was soon proved that the event was an actual assassination committed by members of an extremist right wing military organization in collaboration with the police. In this way, with the popularity of ERE decreasing, theEK party went into the election campaign with more confidence.

Meanwhile, American policy towards the ERE government had also switched. The Americans had by now become aware of the growing political consciousness and militancy on the part of the Greek population. The polarization of the political forces had to be stopped if American interests were to be protected. The Centre Union seemed to provide the answer to their problem. By supporting it they would prevent polarization. Their intention was to cut down the strength of the ERE while increasing that of the Centre Union. What they expected from the elections of 1963 was an ERE minority government with the support of at least part of the Centre Union. This was also the wish of the king for he did not want Papandreou to form a government, because he was afraid that Papandreou might try to curtail his powers. After all, Papandreou had made it obvious during his Anendotos that a king was only to reign and that the people were to rule. Therefore, both the king and the Americans favoured a limited victory of the Centre Union, hoping that such change would "contribute to the relaxation of political tensions."
The elections of 1963, surprisingly enough, brought the party of EK to power. Papandreou, despite the fact that he did not gain an absolute majority in the elections, succeeded in getting a vote of confidence from the parliament with the support of EDA. But refusing to depend on EDA support, Papandreou finally resigned and asked the king to appoint a caretaker government to conduct new elections. The 1964 elections returned the Centre Union Party to power, this time with a comfortable majority.

In the short period of time that the EK party was in power (1963-1965), some important changes were introduced in the Greek economy. "A major effort was made to redistribute income: agricultural subsidies and support prices were increased, minimum wages rose, and the result was a considerable rise in the incomes of both peasants and workers." But the economic policies pursued by the government did not hurt the Greek bourgeoisie either. Fiscal and tariff privileges were maintained and profits increased considerably. Efforts of the left-wing of the party (dominated then by the son of George Papandreou, Andreas) for more vigorous reforms did not materialize. Despite the changes introduced, the government remained basically conservative in its policies.

In the first year in power, the Papandreou government was also faced with a severe crisis: a renewed outbreak of violence in Cyprus. In 1959, Cyprus had become independent. But unfortunately its constitution was designed in such a manner as to encourage the separation of the two communities.
(Greek and Turkish). According to Greek observers, the Turkish community despite being a minority, frustrated all administration through their Vice President who had the right to veto any decisions made by the Greek President of the Republic. So, when Makarios decided to amend the constitution unilaterally, communal violence broke out. The action taken by Makarios was seen by the Turkish minority as the first step towards enosis (union) with Greece. The Turkish air force, claiming that they were protecting the rights of the Turkish-Cypriot community, got involved in the fighting and bombed Greek positions in the north of the island. Greece threatened to pull its forces out of NATO and the crisis was halted temporarily with the establishment of a UN peace-keeping force on the island. Papandreou meanwhile refused any compromise that would exclude the possibility of enosis and insisted that the solution should be decided by the UN.72

With the Cyprus crisis still unresolved, Papandreou sought to replace senior officers of the army, believing that they were responsible for the army intervention in the 1961 election.73 The Right responded with the ASPIDA conspiracy according to which left-wing officers were planning to take over the army. Papandreou proceeded to dismiss the Minister of Defense Garoufalias who refused to resign without a writ from the king. The king refused to issue such writ on the argument that the Prime Minister was not being objective with the ASPIDA investigations since Papandreou's own son Andreas was allegedly involved in the conspiracy. The Prime Minister threatened to
resign and King Constantine accepted the threat as a fact and swore in as Prime Minister - designate Athanasiadis-Novas. This manoeuvre on the part of the king marked the end of democracy and the beginning of chaos and political instability. Between July 1965 and April 21st, 1967, when the colonels took over, five premiers had been sworn in and five governments had fallen.

It was early morning of April 21, 1967 when the military seized power with the official justification "to save the nation from communism". The king had already dissolved parliament and the caretaker government of Kanellopoulos was to carry out general elections on May 28th, 1967. Meanwhile, the militancy of the masses had reached its peak and a victory of the Centre Union Party that was to start its campaign on April 23rd, in Salonica seemed imminent. The possibility of such victory along with anticipated riots in the Salonica rally were two of the reasons that forced the colonels to act quickly. Without consulting the General Staff or the king, the trio of colonels (colonels George Papadopoulos and Nicholas Makarezos, and Brigadier Stylianos Patakos) with the support of other officers put the coup into operation. By using the king's name the colonels originally succeeded in receiving the necessary support from the various military officers. The king was forced later to sponsor the coup after he was faced with a fait accompli.

The initial steps taken by the military junta included the arrests of the political leaders and thousands of alleged
communists and key members of political organizations on the very first day. Various articles of the constitution were suspended and martial law was proclaimed. What followed was censorship of the press, of antiquity plays and all modern theatrical plays. The music of Russian composers and Greek leftist composers (such as Theodorakis) was also banned. In a few words all the measures that the colonels took were reminiscent of the fascist-type dictatorships of Mussolini and Metaxas.

Some of the highlights of the junta's seven year rule included: the failure of a royal counter-coup on December 13, 1967 with the king leaving Greece; the formulation of a new constitution in 1968 that was to curtail partly the powers of the king; the proclamation of a Republic in 1973 and the assumption of the Presidency by dictator Papadopoulos following the failure of a mini-coup by the pro-royal navy; the ratification of a new republican constitution through the July 29th, 1973 referendum; the ousting of dictator Papadopoulos through a new coup from within the junta in November 1973. (It followed the student demonstrations of the Polytechnic School and of the University of Athens which the army stopped by the use of force and the killing of a number of students); and finally the collapse of the military junta in July 1974 with the outbreak of a new Cyprus crisis that led to the invasion of the island by Turkey.

Since that time, a significant stability seems to be present. New political parties have developed (most of which
came out of the pre-1967 political parties) and democratic elections have taken place twice (1974, 1977). The government at the moment is in the hands of Mr. Karamanlis, leader of the New Democracy Party that won both elections. A new constitution has come to light (1975) which defines the form of government as that of parliamentary democracy. Democracy at last may have a chance to survive in the country of its birth, provided that unfavourable pressures of internal or external nature remain relatively absent.

Post World War II developments seem to have altered the nature of Greek political culture. As we have seen, in the 1940's under the leadership of EAM, a number of peasants acquired a considerable degree of political consciousness and for the first time they started participating in politics. The traditional individualism of the Greek peasant gave way to communal organization. Modern democratic institutions were set up in remote regions and democracy became operative in the Greek mountains. But unfortunately, the civil war destroyed all this. The right-wing forces with the help of the British first, and the Americans later, put a halt to this process of political modernization. After the defeat of the left-wing forces, the peasantry returned to their pre-war passivity and assumed their traditional roles while the intellectuals became alienated and frustrated with the order of things.

Children that were brought up during World War II and the civil war became victims of their environment. Their basic political beliefs were affected by the memories of political
violence, propaganda and deceit. They were frequently suspicious of their neighbours, of their fellow-citizens and above all suspicious of the competence of their political leaders. Some developed a militant character and became particularly receptive to such extremist ideologies as fascism or anarchism. But above all, the children of the 40's became the adults of the 60's, the members of political organizations and radical movements, the organizers of strikes and demonstrations, the leaders in the battle for democratization and social justice. The military dictatorship brought only a cease-fire to this battle and not an end to the war. During the years of political suppression, the left-wing forces continued underground to grow stronger and stronger every day. The return of civilian rule in 1974 signalled the beginning of new struggles. Once again, new demands were made to the political system. The maintenance of political stability in Greece will, up to a certain extent, depend on how successful the present government will be in satisfying such growing demands.

Summary

This chapter was intended to provide the reader with an account of the historical events that exerted a significant degree of influence over the direction of Greek political culture and over the operation of the political institutions in that country. The introduction of western democratic institutions into a highly traditional society in the 1820's marked the beginning of what was to be a long era of political
instability, parochialism and fragmentation. Efforts of the modernizers to establish a democratic state along western lines, to reconstruct the Greek countryside and economy already ruined by the long years of the revolutionary war and to secure Greek independence led to the intervention of the Great Powers into the economic and political affairs of the new-born state. Independence from Turkey meant economic and consequently political dependence on Great Britain and the other European countries.

Lacking the necessary economic resources and political competence, the first governments of Greece were unable to work within a democratic framework and failed to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of the parochial population. By the 1860's the traditional elite had taken control of the modern institutions and the traditional system of clientage and favouritism had penetrated all spheres of public life. The process of modernization was thus slowed down considerably. It was not until the beginning of the new century that Greece started acquiring some of the features of a modern bourgeois state. But expansion of territory, wars, defeat and population increases by the 1920's produced a further shock to the political system. Economic depression in the late 1920's and the early 1930's coupled with a current of political unrest highlighted the mid-war period.

In the post World War II years, the Greek political culture was further transformed. Under the influence of the civil war of the 1940's, the British and American interference in the internal scene, the economic crisis of the early 1960's and the
1967 military dictatorship, it became more fragmented. Alienated and non-participant political orientations flourished during this period.

It will be the object of the next chapter to attempt to find out more about the various components of this fragmented political culture and the extent to which existing political orientations are influenced by environmental and socio-economic factors.
54.

Notes


3 This is the legendary explanation of how the revolution started. Some writers say that Bishop Germanos was forced to declare revolution by other revolutionary leaders. In actuality, the revolution had broken out in various parts of Peloponnese before the aforementioned historical date. See George Finlay, History of the Greek Revolution (London: Zeno Booksellers and Publishers, 1971), I, pp. 145-50. For an explanation of certain events see also Th. Kolokotronis, Memoirs from the Greek War of Independence 1821-1833 (Chicago: Argonaut Publishers, 1969), pp. 129-189.

4 Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 280.


6 Ibid., p. 38.

7 There are a number of theories regarding the nature of the Greek revolution, and the roles that the various elites and peasantry played in it. Kordatos, for instance, emphasizes the roles of the westernized elite (the Greek bourgeoisie) while Vassilis Philias after recognizing the role of the westernized elite in mobilizing the peasants in the initial stages of the revolution, argues that ultimately it was the local elites who controlled the revolt. See, John Kordatos, Historia tes Neoteras Helladas (History of Modern Greece), 5 vols. (Athens: Aion Publishing House, 1958). V.I. Philias, Koinonia kai Exousia sten Hellada. I. He Notha Astikopolese (Society and Power in Greece. I. The Fraudulent Embourgeoisement) (Athens: Synchroina Keimena, 1974).

8 Petropoulos, Politics, p. 41.


10 See for instance, Kolokotronis, Memoirs, pp. 129-309.

11 Diamandouros, "Political Modernization", p. 150.


14 Diamandouros, “Political Modernization”, p. 228.

15 The decision regarding the Act of Submission was taken by the Third Constituent Convention despite strong objection by a number of Greek patriots. Due to such objection, the Minister of Justice Ioannis Theotokis was in prison while D. Ypsilantis lost his Greek citizenship and his military post. See G.D. Katsoules, To Katesteneno sten Necellenike Historia (The Establishment in Modern Greek History) (Athens: Nea Synora, 1975), pp. 85-92.


17 Petropulos, Politics, p. 48.


19 The ignorance of the Bavarians about Greece is certified by Maurer’s (one of the regents) own words. Maurer informed the world in one of his works that Greece produces dates, sugar and coffee. See Finlay, History, II, p. 135.


22 For the Kapodistrian period, see Petropulos, Politics, pp. 107-24.


24 Petropulos, ibid., pp. 61-62.

For more information on the clientage system see Chapter III.


Modernization is defined by C.E. Black as "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution". Black also argues that modernization also involves "a worldwide transformation affecting all human relationships". See C.E. Black, The Dynamics of Modernization (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), P. 7.

Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 419.

From 1829 to 1912 the Greek population increased from 750,000 to 2.75 million. Considering the fact that the area of Greece grew only from 18,346 to 24,558 square miles, the population per square mile jumped from 41 to 114. Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 420.

Ibid., p. 422.

See for instance Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 31-32 for definition.


Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 473.


Ibid.
Actually the decision on the Aegean Islands was taken by the London Conference of February 13, 1914 through which Greece was to withdraw its troops from Albania (that was made independent through another Conference in 1912) in exchange for the Aegean Islands. But Turkey disputed such decision and the case remained open until World War I.

Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 587.

A similar idea regarding the shock that the arrival of the refugees produced on the political system is expressed in Legg, Politics, pp. 59-60. See also D. Pentzopoulos, The Balkan Exchange of Minorities and its Impact Upon Greece (Paris: Mouton, 1962).

Those put to death were Generals Stratos and Hadjianestis, Admiral Goudas, and Ministers Gounaris, Theotokis, Zrtopapadakis, and Blatozzi. See The Times (London), September 28, 1922, p. 10.

Regarding the philosophical justification of his regime, and its official ideology, Metaxas gave a number of speeches. Also, through his Minister of Press and Propaganda, Nikoloudis, the regime published an official ideology according to which Greece had experienced only three periods of greatness all of which were under authoritarian regimes. The third period was that of Metaxas! See Katsoules, Katesdeno, pp. 309-312.

Stavrianos, Balkans, p. 672.

General Tsolakoglou, who later became the first quisling Premier of Greece is an outstanding example of high treason. After disregarding instructions from the Koryzis government Tsolakoglou concluded an armistice with the Germans. With part of the Greek army surrendering, it became impossible for the remaining Anglo-Greek forces to resist the German attack successfully.

Due to the hunger in the winter of 1941-42, almost 300,000 people died.


Samuel Huntington says that "political modernization involves the extension of political consciousness to new social groups and the mobilization of these groups into politics". See Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 266.

According to the arrangement, Britain in accord with the United States was to have 90% influence over Greece. See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), VI, p. 227.

S. Saraphis, Ho ELAS (The ELAS) (Athens, 1946), pp. 169-78.

Stavrianos, Greece, p. 105. See, also Chapter 3 of his for the policies of PEEA in Free Greece.


This agreement was signed by General Saraphis of ELAS under the impression that General Scobie's orders would involve only military operations against the Germans. See National Liberation Front, White Book: May 1944-March 1945 (New York: Greek American Council, 1945), Documents 6, 7.

Ibid., Document 54.

A number of men of these forces were at one time collaborators of the Germans. The government had violated both the Lebanon and the Caserta Agreements by not carrying out a systematic arrest of collaborators and war criminals. For more information see, Dominique Eudes, The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece 1943-1949 (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1972), pp. 175-89.


Eudes, Kapetanios, p. 191.

EAM White Book, Document 57.

Churchill's own justification shows that he was not aware of the actual facts. The Communists are portrayed as murderers: "On learning that the Communists had already captured all the police stations in Athens, murdering the bulk of their occupants not already pledged to their attack ... I ordered General Scobie ... to intervene and fire upon the treacherous aggressors ... The mob violence by which the Communists as the Government demanded by the Greek people could only be met by firearms ..." Churchill, Second World War, VI, p. 288.

Ibid., p. 289.

For the full text of the armistice and the events that followed it see EAM White Book, Documents 87, 88, 89.
Stalin had made it obvious in a conversation with Djilas that he was not prepared to assist the Greek Communists: "No they have no prospect of success at all. What do you think that Great Britain and the United States - the most powerful state in the world - will permit you to break their line of communication in the Mediterranean Sea? Nonsense, and we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be stopped and as quickly as possible." Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962) pp. 181-82.


Tsoucalas, Greek Tragedy, p. 106. For more information, see Elias Thermos, "Conflict and Prospects in Greek Politics", East European Quarterly, 8, No. 2 (June 1974), 206.

According to one source both Papagos and Karamanlis rose to power through the support of the U.S. See Andreas Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint: The Greek Front (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), p. 94.


Papandreou, Democracy, p. 114.

This view is borrowed from Papandreou, ibid., p. 115.

Tsoucalas, Greek Tragedy, p. 182.

Both Papandreou and Makarios favoured a "real" independence for Cyprus first, with the issue of enosis to be decided later.

Before this decision took place, the Papandreou had visited President Johnson in Washington to discuss the Cyprus case. After failing to find a solution, the elder Papandreou accepted an invitation from Moscow to negotiate the purchase of weapons for Cyprus. This decision found a strong opposition among the United States, NATO and the Right in Greece. Actually after that the leader of ERE Kanellopoulos called for the resignation of Papandreou for siding with the Communists. As a retaliation Papandreou uncovered the Pericles Plan (a plan.
for the use of the Army to rig the elections of 1961) and decided to purge the Army of the officers involved. For details see Stephen Rousseas, The Death of Democracy: Greece and the American Conscience (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1967), pp. 25-31.

74 For a detailed account of the royal coup of July 1965 and the actual reasons behind the abolition of democracy in Greece see Jean Meynaud, Rapport sur l'abolition de la démocratie en Grèce (Montreal: Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec, 1970), Volume I, Part I.

CHAPTER III
SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL CULTURE

I have attempted to establish in the previous chapter that as a result of certain historical experiences, Greek political culture evolved to become a fragmented one. In this section, I shall examine in greater detail the major components of this culture and some of the conditions under which fragmentation and dissensus developed in it. First, I shall concern myself with the pastoral and peasant political attitudes and the reasons for their particular development, and second, I shall look briefly at the attitudes of workers and members of the lower-middle classes. Third, I shall refer to the political orientations of the advantaged groups of Greek society, such as lawyers and doctors, journalists and intellectuals, businessmen and members of the upper classes. Finally, I shall end this chapter by making some general comments in regards to other possible categories of this culture.

The Disadvantaged Groups

One of the major components of the Greek political culture is the pastoralist-peasant one. Since the birth of the modern Greek state, this group has exhibited a value system which in many respects is conflicting with the political culture model that the modernizers attempted to introduce. Pastoralists and peasants can be said to have developed a kind of parochial and subject political orientations branded with mistrust and lack of allegiance to the state and its institutions. It is my
intention to show that this pastoralist-peasant culture pattern is not only the direct consequence of the historical experience factors outlined above, but also the indirect result of environmental and cultural conditions of these people.

The nomadic populations of Greece were always faced with the same set of problems typical of pastoral societies; "regulating access of men and animals to natural resources". In such societies, limitation of natural resources leads, in many cases, to intra-community conflict. Conflict usually focuses "on strategic resources: arable land, grazing rights, routes of access to land, rights to utilize water." The use of force or the credible use of force tends to be the determinant of access to such vital sources of livelihood. In this case, might becomes right. In an effort to secure resources, individuals or groups are primed to take advantage of each other.

As far as social organization is concerned, pastoral societies exhibit a remarkable flexibility. Some of them emphasize contractual affiliations, friendship and ritual kinship while others emphasize the host-guest relationship, the patron-client relationship, and herding partnerships. In some instances, organizational flexibility is the result of environmental constraints. Concentration or dispersement of a herding group is-usually determined by the quality and quantity of grazing land or the availability of water. Segments of a herding group (households), if capable of dispersing, are constantly looking for new pastures and water sources. In this
struggle for survival, the immediate household's interests take priority over those of kinsmen and friends. The presence of selfishness among pastoralists has been attributed by some writers to such things as environmental conditions.\(^3\)

Given the highly segmented nature of pastoral societies and the daily necessity of herd movements, all adults and especially heads of households have to be decision-makers in economic and political matters. A successful pastoralist will have to gather intelligence on the condition of pastures and water sources, on the markets available in settled areas and on the movements of potential competitors for grass and water.\(^4\)

As a result of the wide-spread distribution of the decision-making powers, a pastoral society tends to appear as anarchic and egalitarian with every man being his own master. In fact, though, this type of egalitarianism is considerably limited due to such factors as ascribed kinship rank, differences in managerial skills and differences in household wealth which fluctuate from generation to generation. In any case, pastoral societies differ from each other in the degree to which they are fragmented and competitive.\(^5\)

Schneider's comparative evidence shows that pastoralist societies in the European Mediterranean are highly fragmented and competitive. My view is that fragmentation and competition among the extended family groups as opposed to the existing intragroup solidarity and cooperation are the consequence of a cultural behaviour pattern which has been, to some extent, influenced by physical environmental variables such as scarcity of water
and pastures. Attitudes of mistrust, lack of cooperation and hostility existing among the unrelated family groups of the Greek pastoralists seem to have resulted from a traditional culture which has been adapted to special ecological conditions.

The Sarakatsan shepherd community in Northern Greece described by J.K. Campbell is a typical example of such a case. First, the Sarakatsani are faced with the problem of regulating access of men to natural resources. Scarcity or the belief in the scarcity of resources and wealth leads to hostility between unrelated families. To the Sarakatsani the success and prosperity of other families is necessarily a threat of the very existence of one's own. Therefore, mutual distrust exists between unrelated families which makes cooperation of such families in the community almost impossible. Second, in order to protect his family and his own interests, the Sarakatsanos must come to terms with other persons or groups in the village or other villages and towns if he feels that those interests are threatened. One way of influencing the goodwill of a particular individual or group is the form of spiritual kinship between the bridegroom and his wedding sponsor (komparos). This relationship (koumparia) later gets even stronger when the komparos becomes the godfather (nounsos) of the children of the new family.

Third, friendship and patron-client relationships are also emphasized in the Sarakatsan community. Friendship usually begins when a man accepts a favour from another and which he later returns. It is mostly developed between equals and it remains in essence a kind of contractual relation ""a form of
cooperation in which services of various kinds are exchanged and accounted.\textsuperscript{9} Patron-client relationships exist between the individual Sarakatsan family and a political authority, some influential and wealthy merchant, lawyer or person of higher social status. Each shepherd family, in order to deal effectively with the various levels of government, tries to discover a patron, who in return for a man's political allegiance places his case before a friend in the right place.

Campbell notices that patronage converts impersonal and ephemeral connexions into permanent and personal relationships; for in Greek society it is generally only in established personal relationships, of which the archetypal forms are found in the family that any considerable element of moral obligation exists. The initial motive is utilitarian, protection and assistance on the side of the client, political power and social prestige on the part of the patron. But when such a relationship endures for any length of time, it takes on a strong moral quality. The patron feels obliged to assist and take a general interest in all the client's affairs, and in doing so, he is able to both sense his superiority and approve his own compassionate generosity. The client is conscious of a duty to support his patron politically without undue concern about his protector's party allegiance, and to give free expression to his feelings of gratitude and indebtedness.\textsuperscript{10}

Similar arguments in regards to values and political orientations can be made about the peasants of modern Greece. Kroeber described peasants to be rural people who live in relation to market towns. They are, he has said, "a class segment of a larger population which usually contains urban centres, sometimes metropolitan capitals. They constitute part-societies with part-cultures."\textsuperscript{11} Peasant societies differ from primitive or tribal societies, for they tend to be more
differentiated both socially and culturally than the latter. Peasant societies are also less differentiated than the modern industrial ones. The primary units in a peasant world are the household and the local community while in industrial societies the occupational structures are more important.

Like the pastoralist, the peasant believes that all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and love, manliness and honour, respect and status, power and influence, security and safety, exist in finite quantity and are always in short supply, as far as (he) is concerned. Not only do these things and all other "good things" exist in finite and limited quantities, but in addition there is no way directly within peasant power to increase the available quantities ... (so) an individual or family can improve a position only at the expense of others.12

This is what Foster has called "Image of Limited Good". If one's position can be improved only at the expense of others, it follows that any significant improvement in anyone's position should be viewed as a threat not only to the individual but to the community as a whole. By applying this model of Limited Good to the Mexican village of Tzintzuntzan, Foster found out that economic behaviour, social relations, friendship, love and jealousy patterns, concepts of honour and masculinity are all directly influenced by such peasant attitudes as described above.13

Many of the economic activities in peasant societies do not require much cooperation and so it becomes easier for mutual distrust and extreme individualism to develop with each family and individual competing for possession of scarce resources. In this struggle to secure the means of livelihood
though, the peasants, like the pastoralists, are many times forced to maintain a wide network of contacts through whose help they can minimize life's dangers and maximize its opportunities.\(^\text{14}\)

These contacts are usually attained through specific institutional means such as marriage, coparenthood and adoption or through such things as dyadic contracts between partners of about equal socio-economic status (friendship), and (or) patron-client contracts tying together individuals of different socio-economic position and power.

Greece, as far as this study is concerned, possesses many such features of peasant activities and social organization. In the 19th century Greece, the word "family" denoted many households bound together by ties of blood. Such institutionalized ties as described above, usually united families into an association of equals or in a hierarchic relationship of dependency (clientage) or both.\(^\text{15}\) Prominent families, through marriages (which in many cases brought about a merging of economic resources) quite often created strong political alliances. Also, through the institution of koumparia, which is similar to the Latin-American compadrazgo, the family succeeded in advancing or protecting the group's wealth and interests.\(^\text{16}\)

But most important of all the family ties that existed in revolutionary Greece and survived down to the present day are the patron-client ones. The clientage system existed in that country since the days of the Ottoman empire.\(^\text{17}\) The primate-peasant relationship was a typical example. The primate by
virtue of his socio-economic status, played the role of mediator, linking the local infrastructure of the village to the superstructure of the outside world.

The importance of patron-client relationships has been emphasized as well as criticized by sociologists, anthropologists and political scientists. As Mouzelis pointed out there are those who when dealing with the problem of clientelism in the third-world countries emphasize the fact that imported western institutions cannot be altogether successful. "The persistence of personalistic-clientelistic parties, the institutionalization of large-scale corruption, the disrespect for basic parliamentary principles and the frequent intervention of the army in politics ... are explained basically in terms of incongruities between imported and indigenous institutions." Also, there is another group of anthropologists who limit their analyses to the village level without any serious considerations of the larger and ever-changing socio-economic context. Both of these categories of writers fail, for different theoretical reasons, to deal with classes. Class analysis is replaced by the study of social stratification, "by an ahistorical static examination of how certain traits are distributed within the village community or nationally."

Mouzelis is also critical of some Marxists like Luciano Li Causi who frequently try in mechanistic fashion to establish too direct a link between classes and political conflict, thus denying the possibility that in certain types of society political cleavages do not directly reflect class divisions but are more closely
connected with divisions in the religious, ethnic, caste or patronage spheres. 23

Li Causi in studying Mediterranean politics and particularly Southern Italy found the landlord-peasant relationship not just a patron-client one but rather an exploiter-exploitee relationship. Therefore, from a theoretical standpoint, patronage was considered a non-existent problem. Gilsenan, also, from a study of North Lebanon concluded that "the horizontal (class) dimension ... is structurally (more) significant (than) ... dyadic links and cross-cutting connections." 24 In his view 'patrons' attempt by every available means, including force, to maintain monopolistic control over access to resources and information. So, there is always an alliance and consolidation at the top. The most important element, according to Gilsenan, is the cementing of ties between the favour givers who have a common interest (and structural position) in excluding favour seekers and keeping them dependent, and incidentally making sure that everyone thinks in terms of 'gaps' which those big men so providentially fill. In other words, we are dealing with the crystallization and consolidation by the dominant group of shared class position at either end of the stratification scale. There is a reinforcement of the horizontal dimension rather than a cross-cutting. 25

According to Mouzelis every successful study of clientelistic politics must always include social classes at the centre of analysis. 26 But political conflict does not always have a class character in all countries. In countries where the capitalist mode of production is not yet dominant, conditions are less favourable for a shift from patronage to class politics ... (for) it is the
Entrance of capital into the sphere of agricultural and industrial production, i.e. the separation of the direct producer from his means of production and the creation of wage labour, which leads to work contexts (factories, modern plantations) which are conducive to the development of class consciousness and organization.27

Unlike Western European countries where industrial capitalism was a relatively indigenous process and managed to link itself "organically" with the rest of the economy and society, in developing countries like Greece this was not the case. In such societies despite the development of the industrial sector, there are still large sectors in which small-commodity production prevails. As a result of this, one will find in these countries not only the usual inequalities between labour and capital of the industrial sector but also "inequalities resulting from the persistence of vast productivity differentials between technologically advanced and backward areas of the economy."28

In these countries, the organization of the disadvantaged classes for the reduction of inequalities is not that easy to come about. The reason given by Mouzelis is that a serious reduction of inequalities and the establishment of welfare state would destroy the existing 'favourable climate' for private investment and would result in the flight of indigenous and a fortiori foreign capital, on the dynamism of which the growth of the economy largely depends.29

Thus what usually happens is that either the masses fail to organize themselves politically in which case their vote is manipulated through clientelistic networks controlled by traditional parties of the dominant classes; or if they manage
to establish autonomous political organizations such organizations are at some point in time forcibly suppressed for they present a threat to the status quo. 30

I find the arguments and comments presented by Mouzelis very relevant and useful for this section of my work. Actually, my own research has led me to some similar observations concerning the importance of patron-client relationships in Greece. I feel that after the introduction of western institutions in the country and the advent of modernization in the economic and political sphere, it became imperative for the old clientage relationships to be gradually transformed and adapted to modern circumstances. As Legg rightfully pointed out what has happened in Greece is that on the one hand

traditional patrons - village notables, landowners, and the like - have found clientage ties useful for the acquisition of modern, social, economic and political roles. On the other hand, the incumbents of some occupations introduced into traditional society, such as lawyers, doctors and newspaper owners among others have also found clientage relationships advantageous. For their part, traditional clients and even more 'modern' elements have found the continuance of such relationships equally satisfactory for gaining advantages that cannot be met through kinship ties or on the basis of individual achievement alone. 31

Also, as a result of changes in the socio-economic sphere in the 1920's came the emergence of new political parties. One of them was the Communist Party which, unlike the other bourgeois parties, attempted to organize the masses along class lines. But, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, the defeat of the left-wing forces during the civil war ended for the time being all possibilities for the peasantry and the
workers to develop an autonomous non-clientelistic political organization. In the post-war years with the exclusion of the left-wing forces from the political arena clientelistic politics were once again strengthened.

Therefore, it is not unusual to find in Greece today various clientage networks extending from the local level, through any number of intermediate ones, to the incumbents of top political offices and roles. In many cases, some economic and social assistance is given to individual peasants and pastoralists in return for political support - eg, votes. The traditional political parties themselves are basically extended cliques, inoperative formal groupings organized to a great extent along clientage lines. This means that the peasantry is "related to the political system not through the vehicle of party loyalty, but through loyalty to individual political figures." These political figures have actually been successful in controlling and incorporating the peasantry into the central institutions of the country. This, in turn, has prevented any major challenges to the stability of the political system by the peasantry.

In the future, though, the failure of the peasantry to modernize itself and learn to operate within a democratic framework without the assistance of patronage agencies may prove to be a negative factor to the political stability. What I believe, will happen is that the level of peasant demands to the political system will rise to such an extent that it will become difficult for the patrons (traditional politicians and
others) to satisfy them in the "old" ways. Indeed, the traditional politicians will be less willing to satisfy such demands in a patron-client manner out of fear that they may alienate the more modernized sections of the population whose support they may need if they are to survive in politics. Also, as the whole society modernizes, political demands will become more and more complex, which means that they will have to reach the political system through channels other than the traditional ones and to receive attention and satisfaction in a number of ways different from the old ones. Therefore, in order to avoid possible future alienation of the pastoralists and peasants (and thus jeopardize the political stability) ways have to be found to raise their confidence toward the state institutions and the "new" rules of the game of politics. One suggestion for a "smooth" transition from traditionalism to modernity may be the introduction of general economic reforms that favour the already underprivileged peasantry. For confidence of the peasantry toward the state will by and large increase if political democracy is accompanied with a system of economic justice.

Another component of the political culture includes members of the working class and small entrepreneurs. The majority of workers are usually very low on the social scale. In many cases, they cannot influence a bureaucrat except through a patron. One reason for this is the lack of effective labour organizations and trade unions in the country. The existing organizations are usually controlled by the state which makes access to the bureaucracy more imperative if an individual is
to benefit at all. The workers tend to be misinformed about their rights, and their efforts to acquire economic benefits or job security through strikes and demonstrations do not basically produce any results. The scope of union organization in Greece has been limited by the dominance of agriculture (which involves 43 percent (%) of the economically active population) and by the multitude of occupations in which self-employment has been the rule. (Self-employed workers comprise 38 percent (%) of the economically active population).

Despite attempts by left-wing parties to mobilize the workers into active participation in the political system, the Greek working class has usually lacked the unity and the organization needed to establish itself as a strong political force. This phenomenon is partly due to the fact that "industrialization in Greece is relatively weak and of a type which does not favour the development of a strong and class conscious industrial proletariat (persistence of artisanal forms of production, of numerous familial, small-sized firms, etc.)." As a result of this, labour demands have received minor attention at the parliamentary level of Greek politics.

Depending on occupation and working environments, the workers exhibit different features of political culture. It is assumed that parochialism appears in cases in which access to the political level is attained only through a powerful patron, a lawyer or a bureaucrat. Subject political orientations are also found among workers when a kind of a "passive relationship" exists between them and the political system. The
workers, although aware of the existence of democratic institutions, do not take up an active role in them for they feel incapable of influencing the decision-making process. Such views tend to be very legitimate if one considers the fact that in their dealings with the state the workers have mostly been the losers. 36

In the last decade or so increasing income inequalities within the labour force and the lower-middle classes have created an acute dissatisfaction and frustration against the political system. Most of the non-skilled workers have seen their wages rise at a much slower pace than those of the highly skilled ones employed by industries. Also, "certain white-collar categories (executives, professionals, employees working on advertising, communications or other fast-growing sectors) have seen their incomes rise rapidly beyond those of the rest of the white-collar sector and the 'old' petty bourgeoisie (small shop-owners and craftsmen)." 37 Therefore, due to this "demonstration effect", one may argue that the confidence of the labour force and the lower-middle classes toward the government and its institutions has diminished substantially.

The Advantaged Groups

After looking at patterns of political culture among the disadvantaged groups of Greek society, it is now appropriate to inquire into the political culture of the advantaged ones. For much of Greek history, the only occupations that enjoyed the highest status are those of law and medicine. Statistical
figures show that Greek parliamentss have been dominated by lawyers and doctors. People in the law profession get the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the political and administrative process of the state and thus they are more likely to follow political careers than it is the case with other occupational groups. Familiarity with the workings of a political system in most cases leads to the development of strong political attitudes about such a system. Depending on the operation of the political institutions, in turn, such individuals may develop allegiant or alienated political orientations. In Greece, lawyers and doctors tend to identify more with the state than it is the case with manual workers or peasants.

In rural areas, doctors and lawyers frequently play the role of an intermediary between the peasants and the state. Through such intermediaries the ordinary peasant succeeds in influencing decisions to his advantage. A lawyer, because of his status, usually has a number of friends of similar status in governmental offices. In many cases, for the sake of friendship, favourable decisions are made on behalf of the lawyer's client.

Lawyers and doctors, by virtue of their education, are very likely to develop positive political orientations. By virtue of their profession, also, they possess the necessary skills to create a political following. But the relationship between them and their followers is usually one of a very traditional nature: a patron-client one. Unfortunately, most of them do not use
their know-how to politicize their followers and create positive feelings toward the state. They simply help perpetuate a traditional system of clientage by their own behaviour as patrons in such a system.

Finally, in the group of the advantaged fall all those Greeks who have personal connections with major political groups. Such individuals come from the ranks of leading professors, state officials and politicians, bankers, publishers and ship-owners. A politician needs political support which he receives from those around him in return for favours and special legislation. Special legislation in many cases amounts to governmental grants or tax concessions to corporations or ship-owners.

In Greece, the taxation system has been organized in such a manner that it favours only a few - an oligarchy of the upper classes. As Katris points out, direct taxes represent only 16 to 17 percent (%) of the total public tax revenue. Indirect taxes in turn which come primarily from the lower economic groups (because their numbers are the greatest) provide 72 to 73 percent (%) of the tax revenue. Also, hundreds of millions of dollars in taxes are evaded every year. Of course, the perpetrators of tax evasion are not the factory workers, the bakers or the peasants, but the ship-magnates and the big businessmen who actually declare no more than "one-tenth of their actual income on their tax statements."

In return for political support and personal wealth (through briberies) the conservative governments of Greece have always closed their eyes to such happenings as tax evasion.
Even the present government in the formulation of new tax laws have failed to switch the tax squeeze from the lower and middle economic classes to the upper ones. Through the new tax laws, it is "the class of the professionals that is asked to lift the weight of tax-evasion of the big capital which finally remained untouched."42

Regarding the political orientations of the advantaged groups of Greek society, one would have to make the following observations: These individuals are definitely aware of the existence of western institutions in the country and they support the continuous operation and existence of such institutions with some limitations. They will support any government provided that their economic interests are not threatened and that their political advantages are maintained. This means that they are in favour of a system of rules with many exceptions and "loopholes". In this sense, one may consider these groups to present a kind of a "potential threat" to the new democratic regime. Such a view is based on the assumption that as the level of democratization and political participation rises it will become increasingly difficult for such individuals to maintain their patronage networks of their economically advantageous positions. Therefore, it may be necessary for them to opt out for an authoritarian regime so that they may prevent any radical reforms that might hurt their interests.

The Others

In addition to all the categories mentioned above, there
are many Greeks who possess other kinds of political orientations and are in favour of some type of a regime change. Some of them, who range from class conscious workers to university students, professionals or politicians, are aware of the economic injustices in the system, the low level of political participation and the existence of patronage networks. This broad category includes individuals who still have hopes in the parliamentary process and believe that truly democratic institutions can evolve in Greece provided that the right political party comes to power (that is—through peaceful means). Others, who are more alienated and disillusioned with the present political order seem to be ready to support a kind of political revolution in an effort to "free" society from the "evils" of capitalism, parochialism, economic deprivation and foreign domination. Finally, another threat to the political system comes from all those individuals closely associated with and having received benefits from the previous military regime of Papadopoulos. One of their main tasks is the abolition of democracy and the return of military rule in the country.

Summary

Not only historical experience variables, but also ecological, cultural and socio-economic variables account for the presence of fragmentation in the Greek political culture. Among the pastoralists and peasants, parochial attitudes and values such as mistrust, lack of cooperation, selfishness and patronage that are hardly needed in a participatory democracy
are mostly the product of a traditional culture that has been adapted to an environment characterized by scarcity of grazing land, water and other resources.

For explaining the presence of alienated political orientations among other groups such as workers and members of the lower-middle classes, one may refer to the scarcity of economic opportunities, to the lack of effective labour organizations and to growing income inequalities. Conversely, the existence of allegiant political orientations among other individuals may also be explained in terms of their socio-economic position, of the privileges and economic advantages that these people enjoy within society.

In the next chapter, I shall discuss the ways in which this fragmented political culture has been maintained or changed and transmitted from generation to generation through the agents of political socialization.
Notes


2 Ibid., p. 2.

3 Ibid., p. 5.


5 Schneider, "Vigilance", p. 6.


7 Ibid., p. 204.

8 Ibid., p. 218.

9 Ibid., p. 230.

10 Ibid., p. 259.


13 Ibid., p. 306.


16 Ibid., p. 58.

17 Ibid., p. 53.

18 For definition and different views on patron-client relationships see the following articles from the work of Ernest Gellner and John Waterbury, eds., *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies* (London: Duckworth and Co. Ltd., 1977);


21 Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics", p. 473.


23 Mouzelis, "Class and Clientelistic Politics", p. 474.


25 Ibid.

26 For the importance of class see another article by Mouzelis, "The Relevance of the Concept of Class to the Study of Modern Greek Society", New York Academy of Sciences Annals, 268 (1976), 395-409.


28 Ibid., p. 479.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid.


32 Ibid., p. 238.


34 Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1974, p. 81.

35 Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 113.
36 I refer here to the results of strikes. In Greece, the common result of a strike has been "no result". Statistics from the Ministry of Labor show that most strikes end without mediation or negotiations. See, Statistical Yearbook of Greece, 1961, p. 158.

37 Mouzelis, Modern Greece, p. 123.

38 Legg, Politics, p. 281.


40 Katris noted that "Stavros Niarchos, shipping magnate who owns a fleet larger than that of Aristotle Onassis, drew a few laughs at the tax office when he declared the annual profits of his shipyard to be 13,000 drachmae ($4331)", p. 76.

Ibid., p. 76.

CHAPTER IV

AGENTS OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

The Family

Writers on political socialization tend to agree that the process begins first in the family and that these learning experiences influence to a great extent later political orientations. Although one cannot say that youthful political socialization completely determines adult political attitudes, it has been proven through various studies that "adult attitudes and behaviour may generally be a function of earlier orientations."¹ For instance, it has been noted that if an individual participates in making decisions within his family, and later in school and at work, his sense of political efficacy will be greater.² In addition to this, the child's relationship with the parents and particularly with the father has been shown to have an impact on later political behaviour.³

In a study of the Greek peasant,⁴ McNall found out that certain peasant values transmitted through the family are indeed an impediment to change in Greece. Such values included a fatalistic world outlook, the tenets of a particularistic religion and a set of attitudes that can be labelled amoral familism. A fatalistic outlook runs parallel to the belief that the world is not explainable and controllable and that an individual cannot achieve results by his own efforts alone. In Greek society, a person tends to blame others, not himself, for failure since solution to his problems does not depend only
on individual efforts. Also, through its traditional rituals, the church transmits such values of honour, pride, shame and secrecy that separate one family from another. In many cases, "the individual locates explanations for his problems and the solutions of them outside of himself, putting the blame on Fate, the Gods, or his Saint ...".5

The concept of amoral familism is also used by McNall in an effort to explain the Greek peasant’s difficulty in changing from traditional to modern ways of behaviour. Banfield first defined an amoral familist as one who acts with this rule in mind: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family, assume that all others will do likewise."6 Banfield outlined some seventeen implications of this rule in an attempt to show how amoral familism leads to distrust and suspicion of the motives of others and an inability for cooperation in the community.7

Another study of a small agricultural village by Du Boulay tends to concern itself with "the values and attitudes which are derived from a long tradition in which even in the present time sustain the villagers in a sense of purpose and destiny ...".8 These attitudes and values are adaptations from the past and therefore they are not considered appropriate in the modern world. Despite this, Du Boulay does not think that such values inhibit modernization any longer. The reason given is that through time all these "beliefs and customs ... have survived as forms only, of which the intellectual content has been lost" and therefore, the surrender of traditional ways "to a philo-
sophy with a more readily comprehensible rationale" is easy. Unlike McNall, Du Boulay points out that competition and lack of cooperation are not part of the traditional way of life but rather they are a reflection of the disintegration of such a life as a result of pressures from the outside modern world. By being more orientated to the outside world and less materially dependent on the community, the family becomes more competitive and selfish in pursuing its own interests.

Du Boulay's view that the peasant attitudes of competition, lack of cooperation and selfishness are not part of the traditional way of life is questionable. It has been already established in the previous chapter that such attitudes are not only present in peasant, but also in pastoralist societies and they are mostly influenced by a traditional culture which has been adapted to the environment of the country. What is important to notice, though, is that both writers admit that there are certain attitudes and values namely, competition, selfishness, honour and shame, etc., which are transmitted from generation to generation through the family. I maintain, following McNall, that these values are an impediment to modernization in Greece. In order to understand better the importance of this statement, I deem it necessary to further elaborate on this subject.

In the Greek peasant family, according to McNall, a young person is socialized by teasing and deception and learns to be ashamed when caught in misconduct or in exhibiting bad manners. In this way, the child grows up to suspect the behaviour of others. "He begins carefully to hide his feelings for, if
others knew what he felt, he would be more vulnerable to attack ...\(^{10}\)

Suspicion, shame, secrecy and lack of cooperation are, thus, the product of such a socialization process. Also, in all Greek families, whether peasant or not, the father is an authority and he must be obeyed by all. He is the agent of discipline and instruction through whom the child learns that in his behaviour, he has a responsibility towards the whole family. In families dominated by an authoritarian father who provides few opportunities for participation in decision-making, children are conditioned to be generally submissive to authority. Later, in adulthood, they may be inclined to manifest deference towards persons in positions senior to theirs, but dominance over those below.\(^{11}\)

Greeks value freedom and self-dependence but they tend to identify themselves more as members of a group and very rarely as autonomous individuals. This phenomenon of strong loyalty to the family is explained by Adamantia Pollis in the following manner:

In the case of Greece, the priority of loyalty owed to membership groups is more than a statement about values; the very person exists only because of these groups. Self-definition is in terms of group relatedness and not as an individual: existence as an individual separate from these groups is inconceivable. Nothing demonstrates more dramatically the absence of the notion of an autonomous individual than the absence of a word in Greek for privacy ... A view of self inter-individually defined, precludes the very idea of personal goals or aspirations. Who and what one is, is answered by referring to one's position within membership groups. ... Self-worth is judged by the person and by others in terms of how well the prescribed obligations and loyalties are fulfilled, and self-fulfilment is attained by performing well the assigned role within membership
In Greek culture, shame is the psychological device employed to ensure conformity, and shame is the emotion a person's transgressions engender in him. A Greek is not responsible to himself, but to the group of which he is an integral part. And shame is the psychological penalty for behaviour inappropriate vis-a-vis the group. ... self-fulfilment in the West is attained through success in achieving personally defined goals within a particular ethical system. In Greece, self-fulfilment is attained through the successful implementation of one's role within a greater whole.  

In many cases, this "greater whole" does not extend beyond one's immediate family or a closely knit group of interrelated families. That is, a Greek feels himself a member of a family first, a member of his village second, and a Greek third. Thus, one may find that quite often clubs or organizations of national or universal character are looked upon with suspicion and mistrust by a Greek socialized in the above described manner. It seems that one is not willing to join in any type of activity, or any organization or political party unless immediate gains for oneself and one's family group are clearly existing.

In many families, especially in the rural areas, children grow up believing that the national government in Athens is an impersonal, remote control authority whose laws are an interference and a threat to personal freedom. This non-confidence toward the state institutions is often carried into adulthood. Family influence is, therefore, primary as far as the formation of political orientations is concerned.

The formation of political orientations implies a growing awareness and understanding of political events, processes and
roles. According to Legg, in the transitional settings, many roles tend to merge and each might have a political aspect. "The Greek emphasis on clientage structures means that individual roles in the economic, social, and political spheres coincide. Status in one area is transferable to another. Patronage roles originating in an economic setting, may be easily transferred to the political sphere. Membership in a clientage structure is itself evidence of political interest; and both patron or client inevitably direct their attention toward political roles. In the traditional setting, the patron seeks to formalize his position by acquiring the legal status of deputy."14

Legg's study showed that almost half of the Greek parliamentarians came from families with relatives active in politics.15 Also, the deputy with family political ties and personal clients was most likely to be an important figure in the Greek parliament and in the major political groups.16

One may conclude this section by saying that on the one hand, the modern Greek family encourages the maintenance of a value system suitable for the needs of people living in pastoral or peasant societies rather than in modern ones. On the other hand, it is through the family and its clientage networks that an individual first learns about politics and aspires to reach the top levels of the political system. But what is important for this study to note is that the political culture transmitted through the family in the forementioned manners is indeed incongruent with a modern democratic system for mistrust, lack
of cooperation, selfishness and patronage are not the kind of values and attitudes needed in a modern society.

The School

Along with the family, the early school experiences of the child are very important as far as the formation of political orientations is concerned. Easton and Hess suggest that the process of political socialization begins most clearly at about the age of three. From this age, and until about thirteen, political learning in the family and later in school takes place very rapidly. The importance of education in the process of political socialization has been pointed out by many writers. Almond and Verba, for instance, in their five-nation study found out that there is a positive correlation between education and political cognition and participation. Their data showed that "educational attainment appears to have the most important demographic effect on political attitudes. Among the demographic variables usually investigated - sex, place of residence, occupation, income, age and so on - none compares with the educational variable in the extent to which it seems to determine political attitudes. The uneducated man or the man with limited education is a different political actor from the man who has achieved a higher level of education." Other studies by Key and Hyman have shown that high levels of political participation and political efficacy occur far more frequently among persons with higher rather than elementary education. Di Palma's study also showed that political
orientations are more positive among people with higher education. But this is not always the case. Almond and Verba, again, noted that "the orientations that distinguish the educated from the relatively uneducated tend ... to be affectively neutral ... Educated individuals (do not) necessarily support the political system more ... (They are), in a sense, available for political participation. Education, however, does not determine the content of that participation."21

The socialization task of the school seems to differ from country to country. In Western countries, for instance, the school mainly supplements or embodies "influences plentifully available outside school" while in developing countries "schools are expected to carry a much heavier load of socialization ... whatever they accomplish they will make a proportionately larger marginal effect upon the lives of the residents compared to the impact of the aggregate of other agencies than do most schools in the West."22

The political content of the educational curriculum as well as the atmosphere of the school affect the formation of political attitudes. The educational system in all societies is usually defined in such a manner as to produce through citizenship training and indoctrination such attitudes among the young that will support the society which they live in.23 Of course societies tend to differ significantly in the degree to which they use the school curriculum in order to reinforce a particular set of values among the pupils. So, in some societies, the school tends to be more influential than the
family or any other agent of political socialization. "Manifest teaching about politics can increase an individual's sense of political competence, depending of course on the content of the teaching. In other societies, the school simply reinforces values and attitudes already learned at home.

In Greece, the schools tend to play this last role: reinforcing the values learnt in the family. Civic training in schools is designed in such a way as to simply make the pupil love the particular system or form of government he is born into. There is no effort on the part of the teachers to assist the pupil to develop some type of criteria for judging current or past political events. The subjects of civic education and history, for example, are only used to teach the pupils basic definitions on government or politics or to emphasize such things as the glories of the Byzantine Empire and the role of Greek Orthodoxy in preserving Christianity and Hellenism during the years of the Turkish domination.

Civic education as a subject was first introduced in secondary schools in 1931 and it was not until 1956 that it was finally introduced at the level of the elementary school in grade six. From a survey of textbooks on civic education in the past forty years, Psomas found out a surprising similarity in a number of important aspects. For example, the material was written in an abstract form and in a style and vocabulary far removed from the spoken language and it was centred around a long series of formal and mostly incomprehensible definitions on such things as the organs and the functions of the Greek
state or the rights and the duties of the Greek individual. In addition to this, all these textbooks were full of eulogies addressed to the system of the time, whether monarchy, republic or dictatorship.  

The students had to learn by rote all these definitions and the eulogies addressed to the regime in power. The teachers expected the students to more or less memorize their homework like a poem. But more important than this, in the confines of the classroom, there were hardly any questions raised to test the understanding of the student, no efforts made to help the student consolidate the "acquired" information or stimulate his interest. In one word, students lacked the proper civic training necessary to help them develop political attitudes expected of a democratic citizen. The situation has been even worse if we consider the fact that teachers have usually been very authoritarian. In schools, the decision-making process is left entirely to the teacher whose will and viewpoint have always been supreme and basically unchallenged. Student participation in classroom discussions and school debates is usually minimal. One may, therefore, assume that low levels of political efficacy observed among some Greeks today may be the direct result of non-participation in school activities.

Another important subject taught in Greek schools is that of history. The expressed intention of the Ministry of Education has been "to cultivate the identification of the young with the Greek nation and also help them to become useful citizens." Unfortunately, though, the majority of the history
textbooks are designed in such a manner that they fail to contribute to the development of any form of allegiance towards the modern Greek state. History has been divided into sections (classical, byzantine, modern). At least up to the 1960's, the last part of modern Greek history (from the formation of modern Greek kingdom (1832) and up to the present) had been reserved exclusively for the last grade of secondary school (equivalent to Grade 12 in Canada). From the statistical table for the year 1961 (See Table 2) we deduce that over 9.4 percent (%) of the total population aged 10 years and over ever got the chance to learn something about their history in school. But even this percentage is partly misleading if we consider the fact that by the time the school year ended the history teachers had barely managed explaining the causes of World War II. The civil war of the 1940's for instance was hardly ever dealt with. It was usually mentioned very briefly without any attempt on the part of the teachers to explain its causes. Of course, conveniently enough for the conservative regime, there was always time before the end of classes to mention the atrocities committed by the "bad guys", the communists and their sympathizers.30

In addition, the Greek educational system has also failed in other aspects as well. Greek students, up to a large extent, have been deprived of the rich heritage of the ancients. The subject of Ancient Greek has been taught in schools of secondary education in a very superficial manner. It has mostly centred around some of the works of Plato and Homer's poems
Table 2
Total Population Aged 10 Years and Over
by Sex and General Level of Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MALES Absolute Figure (% of Total)</th>
<th>FEMALES Absolute Figure (% of Total)</th>
<th>BOTH SEXES Absolute Figure (% of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>95,988 (2.8)</td>
<td>28,080 (0.7)</td>
<td>124,068 (1.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>152,420 (4.3)</td>
<td>58,100 (1.5)</td>
<td>210,520 (2.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>295,304 (8.9)</td>
<td>227,078 (6.3)</td>
<td>522,382 (7.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>419,700 (11.9)</td>
<td>370,500 (9.8)</td>
<td>790,200 (10.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,688,144 (50.9)</td>
<td>1,292,447 (36.3)</td>
<td>2,980,591 (43.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,956,860 (55.4)</td>
<td>1,656,860 (43.9)</td>
<td>3,613,720 (49.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who have not finished Primary School</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>1,222,481 (36.8)</td>
<td>1,996,409 (56.0)</td>
<td>3,218,890 (46.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>937,700 (26.5)</td>
<td>1,493,460 (39.6)</td>
<td>2,431,160 (33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Those who have not declared level of education</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>12,288 (0.3)</td>
<td>19,283 (0.5)</td>
<td>31,551 (0.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>64,480 (1.8)</td>
<td>192,480 (5.1)</td>
<td>256,960 (3.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>1961</td>
<td>3,314,185 (99.7)</td>
<td>3,563,297 (99.8)</td>
<td>6,877,482 (99.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,531,160 (99.9)</td>
<td>3,771,400 (99.9)</td>
<td>7,302,560 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

with some minor references also to such historians as Herodotus, Xenophon and Thucydides. But the works of these writers for many years had not been available in translation. Instead the students had to waste valuable time in learning the syntax, the vocabulary of irregular and regular verbs of ancient Greek and how to translate into modern Greek rather than concentrating on the ideas expressed in those writings. So, ideas on democracy, rights and duties of the citizen, the law and the state and other things valued so much in the western world as part of the ancient Greek heritage have only touched the minds of the young Greek students rather than become part of their educational knowledge.

Translated works of the ancients became available to students of the first three grades of secondary school (Gymnasium) in 1964 with Papandreou's educational reform. Unfortunately the colonels in 1967 reintroduced the old educational system concentrating on the mechanics of ancient Greek language rather than the content of the writings. Finally, the Papandreou tradition was followed once more in 1974 by the civilian government of Karamanlis. Through a new educational reform the Gymnasium students were to study ancient Greek writings in translation. This new reform included also the reintroduction of the demotiki as the language used in schools of elementary and secondary education. Demotiki is the spoken language of the modern Greeks which in the past has been suppressed in favour of the Katharevousa, an archaic form of modern Greek.

Since 1849, katharevousa has been used in all written
communication between the state and the Greek citizens. It has been the official language of the state as declared by the Constitutions of 1911 and 1958 (Article 107 in each case). Also the Constitutions of 1911 (Article 2), 1928 (Article 1), 1952 (Article 2) and 1975 (Article 3) required that the text of the Holy Scriptures be maintained unchanged thus forbidding its translation into demotiki without the consent of the Church. This is an example of how the Greek state has always associated itself with an artificial language rather than the language in which most of its modern poets and writers wrote and communicated their messages to the people. But above all this shows how much the Greek state is separated from the Greek nation.

Diglossia (bilingualism) has been a serious chronic illness of the Greek education. Demotiki has been welcomed in Greek education whenever a "liberal democratic" government came to power, only to be suppressed as soon as a conservative one took over. The conservative, right-wing governments of Greece that have held power for most of the time in modern Greece managed through propaganda to create false impressions about the quality of both forms of language. The katharevousa, based on a utopian nostalgia for ancestral glory (Hellenic and Byzantine) has often been correlated with patriotism, nationalism and religion. On the other hand, the demotiki has been portrayed as a threat to national ideals and its supporters have many times been suspected of leftist or communist orientations.

Despite all the measures taken by the Greek state in favour of the katharevousa and the thousands of hours wasted
on learning two different forms of modern Greek, the Greek pupils can understand, read and write better in the demotiki form. At least one study done by Christos Frangos, professor at the University of Ioannina, showed the general superiority of the demotiki in all classes and all categories of pupils. The Greek pupils presented a picture of backwardness in katharevousa, especially in comprehension. Their attainment was higher in the demotiki.

As a final comment on the language question, one has to make the following observations: an excessive amount of time is spent on learning different forms of Greek at the expense of other subjects which are directly related to socialization into a modern democratic society and specifically to the development of participant values and orientations. Also as a result of the stubbornness of the Greek state in maintaining a purist form of language in its official publications and communication with the people, the Greek population in its majority is being alienated and separated from the political system. Statistical figures (See Table 2) show that by 1961, 46.8 percent (%) of the total population aged 10 years and over had not even finished primary school. How could they therefore understand a form of language that not even high school graduates could really master? This was true to a lesser extent with an additional 43.3 percent (%) of the population also that had acquired only primary education. This means that over 90 percent (%) of the population had definitely problems in communicating in the official language of the state. The
### Table 3

Literate and Illiterate Population of Greece
Aged 10 Years and Over (1907-1971)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Population Aged 10 Yrs. and Over</th>
<th>Literate</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
<th>Percentage Literate</th>
<th>Illiterate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,912,540</td>
<td>755,213</td>
<td>1,157,327</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>952,990</td>
<td>567,706</td>
<td>385,284</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>959,550</td>
<td>187,507</td>
<td>772,043</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,766,832</td>
<td>1,807,473</td>
<td>1,959,359</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>1,859,834</td>
<td>1,229,431</td>
<td>630,403</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>1,906,998</td>
<td>578,042</td>
<td>1,328,956</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4,672,028</td>
<td>2,718,153</td>
<td>1,953,875</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2,304,942</td>
<td>1,755,909</td>
<td>549,033</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>2,367,086</td>
<td>962,244</td>
<td>1,404,842</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,140,405</td>
<td>4,692,218</td>
<td>1,448,187</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>2,958,774</td>
<td>2,633,788</td>
<td>325,566</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3,181,631</td>
<td>2,059,010</td>
<td>1,122,621</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,140,405</td>
<td>5,655,001</td>
<td>1,222,481</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3,314,185</td>
<td>3,062,712</td>
<td>251,473</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3,563,297</td>
<td>2,592,289</td>
<td>971,008</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,877,482</td>
<td>5,626,260</td>
<td>1,040,000</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>3,531,160</td>
<td>3,308,460</td>
<td>222,700</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3,771,400</td>
<td>2,954,100</td>
<td>817,300</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


corresponding figure from the 1971 Census although smaller than the previous was still very large indeed (83%).

On the positive side, Greece has succeeded in the last sixty years or so in raising the literacy rate from about 20 percent (%) to 86 percent (%) of the total population, aged 10 years and over. (See Table 3). Also between the years 1961-1971, Greece experienced an increase of about 34 percent (%) in the number of graduates of secondary education and 41 percent (%) increase in the number of graduates of higher education.
Compared with other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Greece shows some very interesting results as well. For example, in the period 1951-1961, Greece's average annual compound growth rate in per capita educational attainment of the population aged 25-64 was the highest among 12 OECD countries (2.2). The corresponding rate for higher education was 5.2 followed by that of France 3.2 and Belgium 2.6. A similar pattern of rates appears for the period 1960-70. The average annual compound growth rate in higher education increased to 7.7 that was only second to Portugal (11.6), followed by that of Denmark (6.1) and Norway (4.9). (See Table 4 and Table 5). Those figures are more significant if one takes into consideration the fact that higher education in Greece is limited to the small number of students. More than 80 percent (%) of students competing to enter university or higher schools are denied entrance every year. Some of those students (if their families can afford it), seek entrance in foreign educational institutions. In 1971, for instance, Greek students represented over 19 percent (%) of the entire number of foreign students following courses in all European universities. Other OECD estimates also show that by 1985 Greece might have up to 94 percent (%) of its youth enrolled in institutions of higher education, followed by the United States with 75 percent (%) of the equivalent age group, and, at a distance, by all other developed countries.

This phenomenon of high propensity towards higher education in Greece has been given a number of explanations by
Estimated Change in Average Per Capita Educational Attainment of the Population Aged 25-64 Between 1950-1960

Average Annual Compound Growth Rate In:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1948-58</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K.</td>
<td>1951-61</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1950-60</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - Age group 20-59
b - Age group 25-59
c - Excluding Northern Ireland

Table 5

Estimated Change in Average Per Capita Educational Attainment of the Population Aged 25-64 Between 1960-1970

Average Annual Compound Growth Rate In:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium - a</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark - a</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1958-68</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1956-66</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway - b</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>1957-67</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. - c</td>
<td>1961-71</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>1960-70</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AVERAGE</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a - Age Group 20-59
b - Age Group 25-59
c - Excluding Northern Ireland

certain writers. Recent anthropological studies on Greece, have underlined the willingness of poor peasant families to undergo great economic sacrifices in order to ensure higher education for their children. As Friedl points out, villagers tend to respect an educated man and they believe that their status and social environment can be changed radically through "education (that) enables a person to pursue occupations which ... have greater prestige than farming ...". This belief in higher education is a result of the special environment of the village and of the place it occupies in the total Greek social structure. The teacher and the doctor who command high respect and prestige in the village represent direct models for social imitation to the peasants.

These attitudes towards education are explained by C. Tsoucalas in a socio-economic study in a slightly different manner: during the entire 19th century a constant flow of money into Greece, originating from rich Greeks abroad, accelerated monetarization which in turn accounted for the emergence of an extended "rentier class" - a vast petty bourgeoisie. This new class of urbanites that was in constant expansion featured a different ideological and cultural background from that of the peasantry. For the poor peasants to enter this new social world there was a need to develop certain capacities that would enable them to function properly in an environment so different from their own. With the family being unable to provide them with a new value system, education became more important.

Education provided the basic mechanism for ascending
mobility on a massive scale precisely because of the objective rapidity of the expansion of social categories in which educational prerequisites were of paramount importance. The traditional readiness of poor families to assume untenable financial burdens in order to ensure their son's education, and the global propensity towards education among the Greeks cannot be explained if one does not consider the vast professional outlets education provided for almost a century.39

As far as the educational opportunities are concerned Greece is shown to be a "relatively open society with a not too marked inequality of (such opportunities) ... between regions and social classes."40 Higher education is, for instance, more open in Greece to those of the working and the peasant class than is the case of other societies with important agrarian sectors such as France.41 This, of course, is partly due to such reasons as the peasant's attitude towards education or such historical conditions as the embourgeoisement of the peasantry via higher education described above.42 What has to be pointed out here is the fact that educational "openness" is not always a good indicator of social mobility unless those who acquire this education are absorbed by the economy. As Mouzelis and Attalides noted

Greece, like many other developing countries, has a pool of frustrated university graduates who cannot find jobs appropriate to their training. Thus, while the educational system is relatively open, the fierce competition for jobs among graduates means that those lacking wealth or social influence will find difficulty in gaining social promotion.43

In terms of the political culture of the nation, these last educational statistics seem to be of important value. Following Almond and Verba, one can say that the high rate of
increase in enrolment in schools of higher education is a positive sign for the level of political cognition and participation. The chances that these higher school graduates are going to develop participant political orientations are definitely greater than those with elementary school education. So, what can actually happen as educational attainment rises is a gradual replacement of parochial orientations in favour of participant ones. But in the case of Greece this development is not as harmonious as it may sound. Failure of the economy to absorb those who acquire higher education results in frustration and alienation of such graduates. In this particular case, higher education serves as a means of increasing the level of negative evaluations toward the political structure. Incongruence between political culture and structure becomes greater as negative affects and evaluations grow in frequency. The end result of this is an increased level of political instability.

This section has shown that the school as an agent of political socialization performs two main functions: first, schools of elementary and secondary education are simply reinforcing traits and values learned in the home. The educational curriculum is designed in a poor fashion. Valuable time is wasted on a type of Classical-Byzantine education that in many cases has no relevance to the job market. A good knowledge of the glories of the Byzantine Empire, the love affairs of Cleopatra or the life stories of the Great Emperor X or Y is not going to provide the student with the necessary qualifications to find a job in a modern industrial world. Also, the super-
ficial teaching of civic education which concentrates on definitions rather than a critical interpretation of past or present political events is hardly the way through which political knowledge and positive political orientations are acquired by the future adult citizen of a democratic state.

Second, schools of secondary and higher education for the most part perform what we can call an anti-state, anti-government function. This phenomenon is basically due to a failure of the political system to keep pace with modernization. For instance, the various governments have consistently failed to direct the students towards productive occupations (by not making vocational schools more attractive and easier to follow). The result of this has been a tendency towards traditional education. In 1965, 44.5 percent (%) of students of higher education enrolled in legal and social sciences which was the highest percentage among selected OECD countries. At the same time, the percentage of students enrolled in technological sciences was the lowest among these countries (6.5%). Failure of the government to provide jobs for these social and legal sciences graduates results in their frustration and alienation from the political system. Therefore, with the government failing to reorganize the educational structure (by not putting emphasis on productive education) and with the percentage of higher education graduates increasing every year, the level of alienation rises proportionately.

From the above observations, one may conclude that in Greece the state apparatus has consistently attempted to enhance
allegiance to the nation (by putting emphasis on cultural heritage and classical education) while neglecting to cultivate positive orientations towards itself, (by retaining an anachronistic educational structure). Consequently, it should not come as a surprise to anyone if the average Greek citizen today tends to be more proud about his/her cultural heritage or Greekness rather than his/her political institutions or leaders.46

The Mass Media

Attitudes and beliefs about the political system and the role of the self in that system are being shaped and changed throughout the life of an individual. An individual forms opinions about politics at an early age. But such opinions are constantly modified according to the information the individual receives as he grows up. Writers such as Hirsch maintain that the media "are generally more salient agents of information transmission than the parents, peers or school."47 So, acceptance of values and political or economic systems within a society, as Seymour-Ure would also agree, owe something to "the sustained attention given to them in the mass media."48

In Greece, the mass media (especially newspapers) usually perform one function: reinforcing previously held opinions that pertain to basic orientations to politics. In some cases, though, it can be said that the Greek newspapers may contribute to the formation of certain orientations in regards to matters which the readers have little or no familiarity with.
latter case, what usually happens is that the readers acquire the wrong information from their papers. As one study has shown the Greek newspapers tend to highlight empty political talk while being reticent with respect to concrete issues. Also, they fail to communicate unbiased information that will enable the public to understand the limits of politics.

Historically, the newspapers have been preoccupied with how "to establish grounds on which to attack, defame, discredit and reject political opponents; justify and praise one's own favourite party." Instead of reaching out to the public with common messages and suggestions as to how people with different orientations can arrive at working arrangements on fundamental political questions, the newspapers have contributed to the maintenance of a fragmented political culture by encouraging the readers to believe in terms of black and white. In the past, "people were told that all evil haunting their lives was to be attributed to the present or previous government, and false hopes for immediate gratifications when the 'good guys' would come in were instilled in the minds of many naive believers."

This type of political reporting has usually been appealing to the less educated and less informed citizens while it has been looked upon with suspicion and mistrust by the more politically minded and highly educated individuals of Greek society. In the latter case, other alternative sources of information and communication rather than the newspapers may have been sought. In addition to newspapers, the radio and lately television have
also failed to provide sufficiently objective political information to their audiences:

Radio has been a harassed institution ever since its inception. In Greece, the radio always was and still is "his master's voice". It is always subjected to the political mentality of the incumbent party. The radio in Greece does not inform; it propagandizes awkwardly and gracelessly...
Governments consider the radio as their personal property to be used as a channel of praise for them and for anathema to opponents ...

Similar comments could be made about television as well. The fact of the matter is that both radio and television according to the 1975 constitution, article 15, paragraph 2, are supposed to be "under the immediate control of the state". Today, radio and television are actually under the control of the governing party for propaganda purposes. Article 15 of the constitution that refers to the "objective transmission, on equal terms, of information and news reports ..." has been violated many times.

In all, as an agent of political socialization, the mass media in a subjective and distorted fashion of news coverage and in an inefficient and often false interpretation of political events, have contributed to the maintenance of fragmentation and dissensus in the political culture.

Summary

All three of the most important agents of political socialization described in this chapter seem to contribute to the cultivation of negative and parochial orientations in the political culture. In the family, the Greek children acquire
the parochial values of the peasants and pastoralists while at the same time they learn to reach political positions through the use of clientage networks and family connections. In the school, they learn mostly how to be allegiant to the nation rather than the state institutions. Finally, the mass media also contribute to the maintenance of dissensus among the Greek citizens through their insistence on distortive, inefficient and false interpretation of news and political events. It shall be the scope of the next chapter to find out the extent (if any) to which the carriers of the dominant political orientations (the political elite) have attempted in the past or are attempting in the present to mold and transform this fragmented culture into a civic or an integrated one.
Notes


5 McNall, The Greek Peasant, p. 75.


7 Ibid., pp. 89-104.


9 Ibid., p. 257.


One may want to compare such attitudes with what the French call incivisme, lack of civic spirit. Much like the Greeks the French are known to mistrust their national government. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, pp. 53-57.

Legg, Politics, p. 251.

Ibid., p. 251.

Ibid., p. 273.


Coleman, ibid., p. 23.


Ibid., pp. 352-56.

Authoritarianism in schools is, also, observed in other western countries such as France. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, p. 68.
28 Almond and Verba found out that adults who remembered taking part in classroom discussions and school debates tended to score high on political efficacy. *The Civic Culture*, pp. 323-74.


30 Some of the information presented here is based on my personal experience in a secondary school in Greece.

31 According to the new reforms, free education at all levels that had started under Papandreou (1964), is guaranteed for all students. Also the 1975 constitution (Article 16, Paragraph 3), defines that "The number of years of compulsory education shall not be less than 9".

32 Katharevousa is, in fact, an artificial language that was developed by a Greek intellectual named Korais during the 18th century. To preserve Greek nationality under Turkish domination, he believed it necessary to make over the Greek language on the model of classical Greek. Katharevousa became a mixture of ancient Greek and the spoken language of the educated middle classes.

33 Christos P. Frangos, *He Epidraze tes Glossikes Morphes tou Keimenou sten Anagnose ton Matheton kai sten Katanoese (The Influence of the Language Form of the Text Upon Pupil Reading and Comprehension)* (Ioannina: Psychological and Educational Laboratory of the University of Ioannina, 1972).

34 For 1979 the figure of literacy rate is actually higher (over 90%).

35 Percentages here have been computed on the basis of the statistical figures of Table 2.


39 Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", p. 426.

National Center of Social Research, 1974).

41 Lambiri-Dimaki, "Inequality of Educational Opportunities", p. 392.

42 See Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", pp. 419-28. See also the article by the same writer, "He Anotate Ekpaideuse sten Hellada hos Mechanismos Koinonikes Anaparagoges"("Higher Education in Greece as a Mechanism of Social Reproduction"), Deukalion, 4, No. 13 (March 1975), 18-33.


45 Tsoucalas, "'Over-Education'", p. 422.

46 The French are, also, known to be more proud about their cultural heritage and nation than their political system and politicians. See Ambler and Scheinman, Government and Politics of France, p. 56.

47 Herbert Hirsch, Poverty and Politicization: Political Socialization in an American Sub-Culture (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 120.


50 Ibid., p. 131.

51 Ibid., p. 132.

52 For more information, see Eleftherotypia, a monthly journal, issues of October 1963-March 1967.
CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL ELITE

In political culture studies elites are usually the focus of attention for their political values, attitudes and behaviours are most likely to set the dominant political style and tone of a nation's civic life, to determine the system's response to internal and external stress, to define the critical political values of a nation, and to shape the future political orientations and experiences of the masses.¹

By comparing elite and mass political culture patterns one may draw useful conclusions regarding the stability of a political system. In such a case, it is commonly assumed that the smaller the gap between elite and mass political culture, the greater the stability of the political order may be.

The concept of elites has been defined in a number of various ways by classical and contemporary elite scholars. Both Mosca and Pareto advanced the thesis that all societies can be divided into two classes - a class that rules and a class that is ruled. Mosca stated that "the first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first."² Pareto who designated the ruling group as a "governing elite" thus distinguishing it from a non-governing elite noted that in the so-called democratic governments such a group is the parliament.³

Contemporary scholars described elites in some of the following ways. C. Wright Mills wrote of a "power elite"
meaning those "political, economic and military circles which as an intricate set of overlapping cliques share decisions having at least national consequences." T.B. Bottomore considered elites as "functional, mainly occupational, groups which have high status (for whatever reason) in a society." G. William Domhoff defined the American power elite as "persons who are in command positions in institutional hierarchies controlled by members of the American upper-class."  

For purposes of this study, the term political elite is used to refer to a group of individuals who possess most political power, are most active in political affairs and who make most important political decisions. The political elite, therefore, includes top political leaders and cabinet ministers, parliamentary deputies and higher civil servants.

The Pre-1974 Political Elites

As it was shown in Chapter II, during and after the Greek revolution of 1821, out of which the modern Greek state was born, two distinct elites with divergent interests competed for power: the traditional and the modernized elite. In the struggle for power, this last group originally succeeded (with the help of the Great Powers) in imposing their will and introducing western governmental institutions to a predominantly traditional society. But their excessive dependence on the Great Powers in their war against the Turks and the traditional elite brought about their own destruction. The absolute monarchy imposed by these powers in 1832 curtailed the moderni-
izers' attempts to establish truly democratic political institutions in the country. This failure was also caused by strong opposition from the traditional elite who were interested in perpetuating their rule and by the parochial population who could not accept the legitimacy of such "foreign" institutions. Thus, by the 1860's, the westernized political elite lost power to the old traditional elite. The Peloponnesian notables, the mountain chiefs, the Aegean merchants and all those leaders who participated in the war of independence eventually occupied the parliamentary institutions. The imported state institutions continued to exist but unlike their western counterparts, they were used by the elite for patronage purposes. The incumbent of a public office became in reality a patron to whom each voter owed loyalty. Confidence of the people toward the office holder was, thus, enhanced at the expense of confidence toward the state structure or the democratic process.

But this type of non-confidence towards the institutions did not produce any major shocks to the political system at least not until the latter part of the century. The elite political culture was fairly compatible with the nation's political culture. There were no serious attempts made by the ruling elite to politicize the masses and to create positive political orientations towards the state. The traditional value systems of the peasants and pastoralists remained basically unchallenged while patron-client relationships continued to flourish under the dome of participant institutions. As long as the level of demands to the political system remained low,
and such demands could be satisfied through patronage networks the stability of the system was ensured.

In the last decades of the century, though, as a result of changes in the social structure the composition of the political elite changed as well. An increase in the new class of professionals (especially lawyers) graduating from the national university in Athens and a rise of the level of peasant demands to the political system, set the scene for crisis in the traditional elite. Practicing lawyers and members of the business sector started replacing old revolutionary leaders' children in a number of political offices. The acquisition of new land, the development of an extensive transport system, and the creation of a unified internal market also brought about the appearance of new groups in the political arena, especially members of the rising bourgeoisie. Unlike the old elite, the political culture of the transformed elite had acquired to a great extent, "westernized" or participant features. Leaders such as Trikoupis and later Venizelos "were motivated by a powerful desire to 'westernize' Greece and made serious efforts to realize their vision."

In the beginning of the 20th century, the political elite was further transformed due to changes in the domestic and international scene. The 1897 unsuccessful campaign against Turkey led to a defeat and to the establishment of an International Finance Commission that supervised the payment of the indemnity (to the Turks) and of other economic loans. This meant an increase of taxes on an already heavily burdened
population. The poor peasants and workers were once more hit much harder than their rich countrymen. Much of the government revenue was to come from indirect taxation on consumer goods.

Opposition to the political elite grew stronger with the appearance of certain daily newspapers such as Astrapis, Athenai, Esperini, Chronos and Akropolis that spoke out against the old parties and attempted to politicize the masses. Also, a significant increase in the spread of socialist ideas took place with the emergence of such journals as Erevna (Inquiry) and Epitheoresis ton Koinonikon kai Nomikon Epistemon (Review of Social and Legal Sciences). Criticism of the existing political practices had in turn its impact on the nature of Greek parliamentary politics. An energetic opposition to the old parties led by Stephen Dragoumis emerged in the Boule (parliament) which demanded "efficiency and high-principled methods in politics and public administration". 9

Failure of the Greek parliamentary system to deal effectively with such critical problems as a worsening economy, the Cretan issue and other irredentist programmes led to frustration and disenchantment of the people expressed in street demonstrations, petitions, journalistic criticism and appeals to the king. 10 This situation was followed by the intervention of the Military League in politics with the intention to "devote themselves to the immediate and speedy rectification of the evil state of affairs, especially as regards the army and navy". 11
The composition of the political elite up to 1940 changed significantly with the addition of new men with military and professional backgrounds. Also, unlike the previous periods, the top political leadership’s character of education changed considerably. According to Legg, 77.4 percent (%) of the top leadership had studied law, most of them abroad (61.3% of the total), which means that they usually came from rich families that could afford to send their children abroad for study. The traditional political elites gave way to the "new" men: lawyers, doctors, and nouveaux riches merchants.

The political culture of this new group was a mixed culture but of the fragmented type. There was no consensus among the country’s leadership on such basic questions as the form of government, economic policies to be followed or even the notion of what Greece is or should be. The political elite was deeply divided among royalists and republicans, traditionalists and westernizers, authoritarians and democrats. The legitimacy of the political system was, therefore, constantly challenged by the clashes of the political elite members and by the frequent military coups of the mid-war period.

In the post World War II years, the composition and the nature of the political elite was somewhat altered. After the defeat of the left-wing forces in the Greek civil war of the 1940’s, the political elite was originally composed of old traditional elements, politicians whose major concerns were still patronage and the pursuit of office. In the late 1950’s, though, social mobilization and the expansion of education
produced more citizens who sought political careers as well as others whose demands could not be satisfied in a traditional manner. This resulted in further pressures for elite transformation and the accommodation of new groups in the political system.

The early 1960's signalled the advent of new forces in the political arena. Leftist and progressive individuals who questioned the legitimacy of the entire political system begun slowly to occupy legislative positions. Unlike their colleagues who mostly advocated political democracy only in words while operating through clientage networks, these new members of the Greek parliament sought to eliminate the essential element of Greek politics - the clientage system.¹⁴ Their emphasis was on the formation of modern organizations, rapid economic development, expansion of education, income redistribution, raising the standard of living of the peasants and other lower economic groups through tax benefits and social insurance schemes, etc., etc.¹⁵

Competition between traditional and new parliamentary forces led to a climate of political instability in the mid-1960's that facilitated the intervention of the Greek military in April of 1967. At that time, the military viewed itself as a threatened group existing in a society mesmerized by corrupt politicians who were supported and abetted by their respective clientele groups. The political instability resulting from fragmentation of political opinions into hostile political factions created for them the opportunity for intervention.¹⁶
Greece's new military elite was dedicated to the defense and preservation of a rather nebulous ideal called "Greek Christian Civilization". The members of this elite, who lacked educational and cultural refinement, were actually opposed to any real change despite the fact that they talked about a "revolution of modernity". Judging from their actions, one may suggest that their political culture and the mass culture they sought to produce was that of the subject kind. The ruling elite expected the citizens not to actively involve themselves in the political process but rather to obey and conform to the directives of the organs of the state. Of course, as a result of such policies many progressive individuals were ultimately alienated from the political system.

The Contemporary Scene: An Evaluation of the Political Elite

In the post 1974 period, new political groups with ideologies stressing new goals and institutions emerged in the political arena. Also, most of the old traditional parliamentary parties reappeared under different names and with slightly modified goals. The legislative elite underwent a number of significant changes, especially after the 1977 election. For the first time in ten years, a polarization of political forces took place. In Greece, today, there is a ruling Conservative Party (New Democracy) and a radical social democratic opposition (Panhellenic Socialist Movement-PASOK) that could provide a credible alternative government. According to some political observers this last election "has changed the fragmented
political scene into something much closer to the two big parties system known to the British, the Germans and the Americans.¹⁸

This is a very optimistic view which is based upon one particular event: the 1977 election results. As we shall see later, the present political elite is polarized only in the sense that its actors are classified into "good guys" and "bad guys" (governmental and counter-elites). Otherwise, the political elite continues to be fragmented. From the past to the present, there has never been a consensus among the Greek elites concerning their attitudes towards institutions of government or their attitudes towards social and economic reforms. The governmental elites which have been dominated by traditional parliamentary groups tend to see Greece as a kind of a modern liberal state and their own group as an integral part of western civilization. In explaining the contrast between the operation of Greek institutions and the operation of those in western states, these elites put the blame on the peasantry and their parochial value systems. Other times, they may offer another reason such as the problem of scarcity in Greek society. Although admitting the existence of such a problem, these members of the elite have consistently failed to solve it by avoiding to implement the necessary reforms.

The majority of the politicians of these traditional groups reach the top through such channels as family ties or patron-client affiliations. Family ties have tended to play an important role in political recruitment¹⁹ in developed and developing
societies such as Morocco, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Ireland, Republican China, Holland and U.S.A. For example, 43 percent (\%) of the cabinet ministers who ruled Holland between 1848 and 1958 were bound by kinship to other ministers, while 1/13th of all U.S. Congressmen from 1790 to 1960 had relatives who also served in Congress.20

In Greece, members of left-wing political groups usually reach positions of power through different political avenues from those of the traditional parliamentary groups. Deputies of these political parties acquire a substantial local party experience before becoming electoral candidates. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that for some left-wing deputies, political family ties are also important. In the case of these elites, dissatisfaction with the political system and a sense of obligation enunciated in class terms tend to be the major components of their personal predispositions.21 Their attitudes and beliefs towards the political system are also different from those of the traditional conservative parties. These counter-elites feel that the political institutions of the country are malfunctioning and that modernization can be achieved not through empty speeches about democracy and western civilization, but rather through some real social and economic reforms.

The traditional political parties derive most of their support from the advantaged groups of Greek society and from many peasants and non-class-conscious workers. In the latter case, the traditional parliamentarians have been successful in
manipulating the vote of the underprivileged through a number of clientelistic networks thus preventing, to a great extent, the organization of these groups into autonomous political parties. The main characteristic of these traditional parties, New Democracy and EDEK (Union of Democratic Centre) for instance, is that they are particularly strong in the rural areas, especially in such regions as Peloponnesos, Central Greece and Thessaly.

The more modernized left-wing political parties (PASOK and the two Communist ones) are mostly appealing to the urban working classes, university students, intellectuals and small entrepreneurs. Unlike the two communist parties which are particularly strong in the Athens-Piraeus area and Salonica, PASOK has also succeeded in the last two elections, to increase its support among many peasants in the rural areas. One explanation to this phenomenon is the growing dissatisfaction of the masses toward the present government that has failed to do away with inflation and raise the standard of living of the lower socio-economic groups. Thus, PASOK with its emphasis on radical socio-economic reforms has become more appealing to the underprivileged groups of Greek society.

In the battle for votes, PASOK has had a clear advantage over the communist parties, not because it had to offer a better programme or it was better organized than the communists, but rather because of the following two reasons: First, many of the PASOK candidates were either old parliamentary deputies from the party of Centre Union (EK) or relatives of such
politicians who already possessed strong political followings. Second, PASOK never had to be the victim of false propaganda and persecution that the communists went through after their defeat in 1949 and up until the legalization of their party in 1974. The younger Papandreou had to start only where the older had left off.

Looking at the present political parties in Greece, one may safely say that the two communist ones are the only parties that are organized along class lines. The other traditional parties and to a much lesser extent the more modernized party of PASOK are still organized along vertical clientelistic lines. As discussed elsewhere (Chapter III), patron-client relationships continue to be the very element of Greek politics.

In an attempt to further evaluate the contemporary political elite one may also notice that this elite is in some ways polarized. Its actors are sharply classified into "good guys" and "bad guys". Compromising with one's opponents is usually considered dangerous because it inevitably risks the betrayal of one's own side. This is partly due to the fact that the members of the elite differ in their political world views, ideologies and programmes. For instance, the opposition party of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement preaches a totally different ideology from that of the government party of New Democracy. The socialists have repeatedly maintained that if they were to form a government in the future, they would introduce a number of changes in some of the following areas: foreign policy, economy, and the political system.22
The PASOK would ensure the final and total withdrawal of Greece from NATO. This would be based on the principle that such military alliances are a threat to world peace and to national self-determination. The entrance of Greece into the European Economic Community would also be prevented for under such an arrangement Greece would be unable to follow a truly independent foreign policy.

According to PASOK, the correct solution would be a development of relations with the EEC in the framework of a new special arrangement (of the Norwegian kind) that would allow Greece to go ahead with its national, social and economic programmes and to control the movement of its goods and capital.

The PASOK also promises to give moral, political and economic support to the Cypriot people and their government for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Their emphasis is on the creation of a truly independent Cyprus where Greek and Turkish Cypriots would co-exist and cooperate within the framework of one state. And finally, in other areas of foreign policy, a PASOK government would, according to their programmes, recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization as a true representative of the Palestinian people; they would support any liberation movement against alleged racist regimes and they would recog-
nize such governments as those of Vietnam and Cambodia. 25

For the realization of economic democracy, PASOK promises to introduce a number of measures among of which are the following: a gradual socialization of basic economic sectors such as banks, insurances, mass transportation and communication, big industries such as those of ship, steel, cement, fertilizer and all others that are concerned with such things as national defense. Big foreign industries would be subject to such a "socialization" with proper indemnity and would also be subject to a number of new laws designed to strengthen the Greek economy. 26 New measures would be introduced with regard to agriculture, fisheries, industrial production, tourism, energy and transportation, all designed to improve the economy.

For political democracy PASOK would propose a new constitution that would guarantee mass participation in the exercise of power through decentralization to strengthen the role of local administration. This new constitution would also improve and change the relations between Parliament and the Executive and transfer the powers of the President to the government that enjoys the support of the people. Changes would also be introduced in the areas of public administration, regional organization, the security corps, mass media, etc., etc.

These are some of the areas in which the socialists differ from the present governmental elite of the New Democracy party, 27 the most important being the policies concerning EEC, NATO, the constitution and the socialization of basic economic sectors. The present governmental elite is, of course, in
favour of the accession of Greece to the EEC, the continuation of membership in NATO, the total support for the 1975 constitution (which it introduced and approved) and finally it is not prepared to take any decisions or measures that would be directed against private enterprise or foreign capital such as the socialization of basic economic sectors proposed by the socialists.

The forementioned discussion poses some interesting questions: are the socialists going to get the support needed in the next general elections to form a government? Provided that they do, how much of their programmes are they going to implement? Will they have all the necessary resources to go about implementing their goals? **Will they be able to further democratize the political institutions and increase the level of confidence of the population towards such institutions?** What will the reaction of the traditional parliamentary forces be toward the reformist policies of a socialist government? And finally, will a new, transformed political elite be successful in maintaining a climate of political stability while working towards the creation of a mass political culture compatible with the regime?

These are some of the questions that will probably be answered in the not too distant future. The reality of the present, though, is that the country's political leadership is more or less divided with regard to basic political and economic questions. Both governmental and counter-elites assume that conflict is the essence of politics and that public affairs
is inevitably a kind of a "zero-sum" game in which the gains of one person or group are the losses of another. For the Greek elites, the size of the social pie is fixed and therefore conflict about the slices is inevitable. According to them, economic policies do inevitably favour some groups or classes at the expense of others.

There are a number of explanations for this type of cognitive orientations on the part of the political elite. One may search for the origin of such orientations concerning conflict in the way Greek individuals are socialized in the family. We have already seen that the Greek child growing up in the family acquires many peasant values and beliefs. One of such beliefs is the so-called "Image of the Limited Good" according to which goods exist in finite quantities and are always in short supply. Based on this idea, it seems logical to expect that a class can improve its position only at the expense of others. Another explanation for the sensitivity of the political elite to conflict may be sought in the Greek economy itself. The socio-economic "pie" in Greece seems to be small and very unequally distributed. According to a recent estimate, 40 percent (%) of the lowest income groups received 9.5 percent (%) of the national income (after deduction of taxes and social benefits), whereas 17 percent (%) in the top income brackets received 58 percent (%). 28

The cognitive predispositions of politicians in many cases may also be the product of changes in the social environment. Future politicians who are just reaching adulthood now may bear
the marks of a present conflict when they assume positions of leadership at the turn of the next century. On this assumption, the Greek politicians of today, may have been influenced by certain historical events or conflicts that were taking place at the time they were entering adulthood. The civil war of the 1940's seems in some respects to have influenced the attitudes of many older members of the contemporary political elite.

Finally, cognitive orientations regarding conflict may be related to a politician's ideological or social background. It is assumed here that members of left-wing parties might be more sensitive to conflict, namely class conflict, than members of other parties. On the same token, "the lower a politician's social origins, the more likely he is to have a conflictful image of society." From the above discussion, one gets the impression that the political orientations of the elite much like those of the masses seem to have been influenced by historical experience, socialization patterns and socio-economic variables. As a result of all these influences, the elite political culture is also a fragmented one. The political elite, although preaching participatory democracy, is not in actual fact practicing it. In many respects, it seems to operate in a semi-modern and at times a very authoritarian non-democratic fashion. This can be easily depicted by looking at the structure of the political parties.

Most of the political parties, with the exception of the
left, consist of "political oligarchs and factional leaders, each with his own set of parliamentary deputies as clients and with similar ties of mutual obligation reaching into other sectors of the society: banking and industry, the bureaucracy and the academic world." These parties are nothing else but formal unions of personal local interests that are more or less forced into becoming parties due to the existence of parliamentary institutions.

Common characteristic of all parties with the exception of the two communist ones is that they are not membership parties. They do not have any real long run objectives, they are not manned with any experts in or out of the parliament and in reality they receive their information on dealing with the every day problems from the daily press. All of the political parties, with the exception of PASOK and the Communist Party of the "Interior" (KKE es), constitute old party formations with different titles. Three of the parties, New Democracy, EDEK (Union of Democratic Centre) and the newly born EN (National Camp) are of bourgeois character, while PASOK preaches a peculiar socialism and EDA (United Democratic Left) appears as a moderate socialist party. In addition, the two communist parties present deep ideological and political differences followed by other groups such as "Initiative", a social democratic Scandinavian type group, and the "Socialist Course" that has been deeply influenced by the teachings of Rosa Luxemburg.

One of the main declarations of the three biggest parties (New Democracy, PASOK, EDEK) when they were first established
in 1974 was that they would be organized in such a way as to guarantee the operation of democratic proceedings within them (intra-party democracy). None of these parties kept their promise. Today all of them are "leader-dominated". Their programmes and their principles are decided basically by the leader and other persons who have been selected by him and enjoy his absolute confidence. The leader constitutes the main source of power which is reflected to his confidants and the people who surround him, always according to the interdependence principles between the politician, the party official and the citizen.34

The absence of intra-party democracy and the monopolization of power by the leader have significant impact on the nature of the democratic institutions. Policy decisions of the governing party are actually taken by the leader and his small group of confidants. In this sense, one notices an evolution of parliamentary democracy into an autarchic "prime minister's democracy." Attempts for the formation of genuine and realistic alternative solutions to any problem are rarely made, for the Parliament itself and the public soon get used to this authoritarian way of governing and being governed.35

Also, in anything but a modern democratic manner, the governing party selects those who are going to fill key positions in the administration of public offices and organizations. Criterion for selection is not merit or expertise, but rather the total devotion of the appointee to the person (leader) who appoints him and to all those who surround such a person. Thus,
top political positions are filled by people from the governing party. These individuals come from many classes and they do not necessarily represent the interests of any social class in particular. Most of them have usually reached a position of high status in society and they are bound together by common interests and mutual obligations.

What often happens is the transformation of these persons into a kind of "servants of authority" with a highly developed elasticity toward the "master" they serve. This is indeed a phenomenon of a clientelistic polity where the tie with central authority tends to be personal, at the end of a big chain of personal relationships. The institutions and generalized rules, whose acceptance forms the basis of legitimate authority in western democratic systems, remain with little or no legitimacy in Greece.

This last analysis of elite behaviour shows that the political elite is highly responsible for the perpetuation of clientage relationships and the failure of the democratic institutions to acquire legitimacy in the country. Through their actions, the politicians have reinforced peasant values in regards to the importance of "connections" in society while at the same time they have alienated the democratically oriented portion of the population.

Summary

In the historical section of this chapter, we have witnessed a parade of political elites who have been confused as to what the form of government should be, what policies to take
regarding the economy, how to react to foreign domination and interference in the internal scene and how to maintain stability and order in society.

We have also noticed from the other section that fragmentation was not only a thing of the past but that indeed it is present in the contemporary scene as well. Today, the members of the political elite are highly sensitive to conflict, they despise cooperation and in many respects, they do not do very much to increase the confidence of the population toward the state institutions. For the people, this fragmentation means that they are left without a single political culture model for imitation or a united political leadership for direction.
Notes


7 Legg, *Politics*, p. 311.


10 Ibid., p. 46.

11 Ibid., pp. 190-91.

12 Legg, *Politics*, p. 303, Table 12-3.

13 This is particularly true with the legislative rather than the governmental elites.

14 Legg, *Politics*, p. 313.


Political recruitment refers to the processes through which a small number of socially favoured and politically motivated citizens reach positions of significant political and national influence.


Legg, Politics, p. 263.


Ibid., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 23.

Ibid., pp. 32-33.


Ibid., p. 129.

Legg, "Clientelistic Polity", p. 239.

36 Ibid., p. 252.
37 Legg, "Clientelistic Polity", p. 234.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study, Greece presented a classic example of a highly traditional society upon which western democratic institutions were imposed. The problems of political instability and legitimacy crisis that this country has been confronted with, since its birth as a modern state, have been in many respects typical of societies in which the political culture is incongruent with the political structure.

Here, we have seen how a predominantly parochial culture acquired additional participant or subject features under the influence of certain historical events. Also, we have seen how foreign interference in the political life of the country, economic crises and civil wars have contributed to the development of alienated political orientations among certain members of the population.

The present work has been useful for it has helped us confirm some of our propositions regarding the complexity of the development of political orientations. It has been demonstrated that the political orientations of an individual are influenced not only by his historical experience, but also by his socio-economic position in society. So, the unequal distribution of wealth, power and status in Greece can be seen as another reason for the existence of fragmentation in that culture.

Political culture writers agree that a political culture is usually shaped and transmitted from generation to generation through the agents of political socialization. We have noticed
that in Greece socialization is a conservative process. The political culture is mostly transmitted rather than shaped by such agents as family, school and mass media. Mistrust, lack of cooperation, selfishness, and extreme individualism are some of the orientations that are usually passed on to the new generations.

Part of the responsibility for the maintenance of such orientations in the political culture lies with the political elite of the country. They have failed to find ways of increasing the confidence of the populace toward the state institutions. The school system is one example of such a failure. The elite have been preoccupied with the preservation of a totally unpopular form of language and an anachronistic educational curriculum. As we have seen, some of the results of such tactics have been the divorce of state from society and the enhancement of negative orientations toward the state institutions.

The elite have also failed in many other areas such as to respond to the demands and needs of the populace, to define the critical political values of the nation and to provide a dominant political culture model for the people. Some of their failures can be explained by the fact that the elite themselves have been brought up in the same fragmented culture and therefore, their behaviour and attitudes may in many ways, resemble those of the masses. Indeed, most of them have reached top political positions through the use of clientage networks: yesterday's clients have become today's patrons.

From such positions of power, most of the members of the
political elite have been unwilling or unable to democratize the state apparatus and do away with the clientage system. The reason is that in all clientage relationships, there are rules and obligations that both patrons and clients must keep and fulfil. Therefore, turning against such a system would almost mean the end of a person's political career for he would alienate his clients and aggrieve other most powerful patrons above him. This may explain why most of the politicians of the traditional or governing parties who reach political positions through family and other connections are unwilling to democratize the political structure. Conversely, politicians of the left who reach the top through other routes are most eager to abolish the very elements of Greek politics - the clientage system.

What we have talked about, here, is indeed a case of how a political culture can influence the development of political institutions and vice versa. On the one hand, the existence of clientage networks is a good proof of the fact that the imported western institutions failed to develop and become legitimate due to the parochial and extremely fragmented nature of the political culture. On the other hand, the permeation of modern institutions by patron-client ties, resulted in a slowing down of the modernization process, a perpetuation of parochial and subject values and in an increased alienation of the modern and participant elements of the population. After adding to all this, the historical experience factors, the socialization patterns, the elite fragmentation and all the other aforemen-
tioned variables, it becomes easier to understand why after more than 150 years of development, the Greek political culture continues to be fragmented.

For this study, the political culture approach has been useful in making us realize that the attitudes and beliefs of the elites and the masses in regards to the political system and the role of themselves in that system determine to a large extent the development and stability of such a system. Greek history has shown that the elite political culture has been much more of a direct threat to the political stability than the mass political culture. Many of the political crises have taken place as a result of hostile clashes between members of the elite. Also, military coups have occurred partly due to the fact that the various political elites have failed to keep the army at the barracks rather than the political arena. There are, of course, many other crises of economic and political nature that took place in Greece which cannot be explained simply by the use of a political culture method. Some of those have been influenced by international events, by foreign interference in the internal political scene, by world economic crises, etc., etc. Others, again, have been associated with problems of underdevelopment or they have been the product of growing intensity of class struggles. For those cases, a developmental or a class analysis may be more appropriate than a political culture one.

Based on the proposition that a fragmented political culture poses a threat to the stability of the political system,
one may attempt to predict the political future of Greece by looking at the present political culture. The question here is as to whether or not this apparent stability which exists since 1974, is going to endure for a long time. This is where the political culture approach can be put to a test. Taking into consideration, the fact that both elite and mass political cultures are fragmented, one should expect the present stability not to last for very long. This, of course, is based on the principle that political instability is often the rule in countries in which there is an incongruence between political culture and political structure.

Will today’s political elite sort out their differences and change their attitudes and beliefs to such an extent as to prevent future clashes among them? Will they help transform this fragmented culture into a civic one through a successful “fusion” of traditional and participant orientations? And finally, will they learn that cooperation with a political opponent is not a vice but an essential virtue of every democratic citizen?

It is very doubtful that such a change will take place in the near future. Unfortunately, there are already enough signs showing that Greece may be headed into a new political crisis. I am referring specifically to certain events that took place in the last two years. For example, between February 16th, 1976 and December 17th, 1978 at least seventy bombs were set in different areas of Athens and Piraeus by the members of a fascist terrorist group called Organization for National Restoration.1 As of February of 1979, there were indications that
key army officers were also involved in these activities. Following the arrest of some of these officers, the government turned its attention against left-wing sympathizers. The assassination of a key witness regarding the terrorist conspiracy was blamed on "leftists and anarchists". According to representatives of the opposition parties, this move on the part of the government had been intentional in order to cover up the fascist and terrorist activities which officers from the Army and the Security Corps were involved in.²

The present government has actually been criticized many times in regards to its policies concerning the military and the former supporters of the 1967 junta. Since 1974, the opposition parties have been complaining for the failure of the Karamanlis government to "de-juntize" so to speak the state mechanism. New evidence on the activities of the military shows that such accusations have been correct. A new military plan called "EPSILON" similar to the plan "PROMETHEUS" of the 1967 coup, that provides for the military intervention - "in times of need" - in the political life of the country, was recently discovered.³ It is difficult to say to what extent this new discovery will alarm the present government to take the necessary steps to prevent a new coup.

We can only hope that future stability will somehow be assured and that true democracy will once again evolve in its place of birth. Some of the more optimistic political observers feel that the realization of this task is very near. Greece is expected to become a full member of the EEC by 1981, a move by
which democracy is to be consolidated in that country.

Approximately eight months after Greece's request for membership of June the 12th, 1975, the Council of the European Communities stated on February 9th, 1976, that it was "in favour of this request." The adoption of such a request was based on the following:

Firstly, that the Greek request represented a remarkable affirmation of the overriding importance that the Greek Government and people attached to their country being committed to the cause of European integration; secondly, that the consolidation of democracy in Greece, which is fundamental concern not only of the Greek people, but also of the Community and its Member States, was intimately related to the development of Greece's relations with the Community.4

By February 1979, the accession negotiations between Greece and the EEC were near completion. Agreements had been reached on most issues. On December 24th, 1978, a compromise agreement was reached on the transitional period for Greek agricultural products and the free movement of Greek labour into EEC states. With relatively minor issues to be settled it is expected that the Treaty of Accession could be signed as early as the first half of 1979. This will be followed by the ratification of the treaty by the Parliaments of Greece and the EC member states before the expected accession date of January 1st, 1981.

To what extent is this type of enlargement going to "bolster" the fragile democracy in Greece? The Community derived its mandate for action from the principles enshrined in the EEC "being resolved ... to preserve and strengthen peace and liberty (called) upon the other peoples of Europe who share their ideal to join in their efforts."5 These are indeed
beautiful words but can they be translated into action? As far as I know, the EEC does not possess any power mechanism by which it can guarantee Greece its political stability. A close look at Italy, one of the EEC members, should be enough to convince any non-believer that membership in the EEC does not necessarily imply absence of political violence and instability. But the entrance of Greece into the EEC should also be judged from a different standpoint, namely that of the economy. Opinions as to whether or not membership in the EEC will have some favourable economic implications in the future seem to be split. If general economic benefits for the people of Greece follow the accession, then one should expect their confidence toward the democratic institutions to rise. Reversely, abrupt modifications of prices of various Greek goods to bring them at par with those of the Community might create imbalance in regards to incomes of different categories of consumers and producers. This might, in turn, increase negative feelings toward the state institutions and the government.

It seems that future political stability in Greece will depend a great deal on the evolution and direction of its political culture. If future developments such as the accession of Greece to the EEC are favourable, the nation's political culture might be influenced to such a degree that further integration will occur among the masses. Also, political stability will depend on the extent to which traditional and modern politicians will learn to co-exist and cooperate with each other, thus avoiding such hostile clashes that have in the
past given the army the opportunity to resort to military coups. And finally, future political stability will be made more secure if the present political elite is successful in solving a growing number of pressing economic problems and in raising the standard of living of the lower socio-economic groups. For allegiance and confidence of the masses toward the political institutions will by and large increase if political democracy is accompanied with a system of economic and social justice.
Notes

1 For the story see *Rizospastes* (An Athens daily), January 23, 1979, p. 3.

2 See relevant articles in *Eleftherotypia* (Athens), February 2, 1979, p. 1 and 16.

3 See the article "Plan EPSILON: A New 'PROMETHEUS' That Plots Against the Political Life of the Country" (in Greek), in *ANTI* (an Athenian bi-weekly political review), January 20, 1979, pp. 12-13.


5 *European Community* (Ottawa), February 6, 1979, p. 3.

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