NAME OF AUTHOR/NOM DE L'AUTEUR: Nicholas George L. Petryszak

TITLE OF THESIS/TITRE DE LA THÈSE: The Sociology of Human Nature

UNIVERSITY/UNIVERSITÉ: Simon Fraser University

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE: Ph.D.

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DU GRADe: 1978

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE: Dr. Karl Peter

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LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE NOUS L'AVONS RÉCU
THE SOCIOLOGY OF HUMAN NATURE

By

Nicholas George Ladislaus Petryszak

B.A. (Honors), Simon Fraser University 1974
M.A., Simon Fraser University 1975

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
Sociology and Anthropology

Nicholas George Ladislaus Petryszak 1978
Simon Fraser University
March 1978

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APPROVAL

Name: Nicholas George Ladislaus Petryszak
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
Title of Thesis: The Sociology of Human Nature

Examining Committee:

Chairman:

Dr. Karl Peter
Senior Supervisor

Dr. Heribert Adam

Dr. Fulton Fisher

Dr. Pierre L. van den Berghe
External Examiner
Professor
University of Washington, Seattle, Washington

Date Approved: 5/1/1978
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Title of Thesis

The Sociology of Human Nature

Author:

Nicholas George L. Petryszak

This thesis attempts to analyze some aspects of sociological and anthropological theory construction. Every sociological and anthropological theory, implicitly or explicitly, uses assumptions about the nature of human nature and employs them in a causal and deductive fashion. The selection and the formulation of such assumptions are by no means arbitrary. They are, it seems, derived from the larger ideological orientations of social theorists. One of the most influential forces to either directly or indirectly influence and shape the general orientation of sociological theory has been the ideology of liberalism.

This thesis hypothesizes that the various assumptions about human nature, formulated by the major social theorists since the Enlightenment, have been derived from the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology to which these theorists adhered. It hypothesizes further that the differences in the assumptions about human nature, formulated by these various theorists, are a reflection of the divergent social and historical circumstances within which each theorist found himself. Lastly, it explores the hypothesis that the variation in the assumptions about human nature evidenced in social theory since the Enlightenment has been facilitated by the processes of immanent ideological change inherent with liberalism as an ideology.

The social theorists who have played a major role in the historical development of sociology and anthropology, since the Enlightenment are reviewed chronologically as well as in terms of the schools of thought to which they belonged. The data utilized for testing the hypotheses were derived from a content analysis of these major sociological and anthropol-
logical theories. This content analysis of the major social theorists, abstracted their particular views of the nature of human nature. Also through this content analysis, data were obtained regarding the liberal ideological assumptions under which these theorists worked. A third set of data was generated by investigating the particular historical and socio-cultural circumstances within which each of these theorists lived.

All of the above stated hypotheses were verified. It was found that the assumptions about human nature, which have been formulated by social theorists since the Enlightenment were derived from the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology to which these theorists adhered. Secondly, it was evident that the differences in the assumptions about human nature formulated by these various theorists, are a reflection of the divergent social and historical circumstances within which each theorist found himself. It was also demonstrated that changes in these assumptions were concomitantly related to immanent processes of change inherent with liberal ideology.

Finally, the question is considered whether human nature can be understood from a scientific point of view utilizing the theories of socio-biology and ethology. An alternative biosociological framework of analysis is suggested as a tentative theory which attempts to define the complex interrelationships between human nature and culture on an empirical basis. It is also proposed that biosociology may serve as a useful means for coming to terms with the problem of human nature within the context of sociological and anthropological theory.
For my parents.
Judged strictly, there does not exist a science without its "hypothesis," the thought of such a science is unconceivable, illogical: a philosophy, a faith, must always exist first to enable science to gain thereby a direction, a meaning, a limit and method, a right to existence. (He who holds a contrary opinion on the subject - he, for example, who takes it upon himself to establish philosophy "upon a strictly scientific basis" - has first got to "turn up-side-down" not only philosophy but also truth itself - the gravest insult which could possibly be offered to two such respectable females!)

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Karl Peter for his thoughtful advice and intellectual guidance.

Also, I would like to thank Dr. Heribert Adam for his many suggestions and criticisms with regard to the final draft of this dissertation.

Finally, special thanks must be extended to Miss Janice MacLellan for her patience and diligence in the typing of this thesis.
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CHAPTER I  HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

1) Introduction

What is the nature of man? It is this very question which has been one of the major concerns of social philosophers and theorists since the time of Hellenic Greece. In comparing Plato's view of human nature with those of the later Hellenistic writers such as Epicurus or Zeno, we realize that theories of human nature have differed from historical epoch to historical epoch and from social theorist to social theorist. Most historians of ideas, sociologists and political scientists will admit that assumptions about the nature of human nature played a determinate role in the shaping of religious beliefs as well as classical social philosophies. The practice of social theorists to make assumptions about the nature of man was not discontinued with the fall of Rome and the ending of classical Western civilization. Speculations about human nature continued to pervade philosophical and theological writing during the Middle Ages. Even many of the social philosophies originating in the Enlightenment were not exempt from making explicit use of such assumptions. At the same time, there is little reason not to believe that a similar practice of utilizing assumptions about man's nature also continued to play an ostensible part in shaping the general orientation of social thought after the Enlightenment right up to the present.

Man, as a species, has always been faced with the problem of determining his place in nature. The evolution of the human species has been characterized by the wide diversity of the behavior of its members, as well as their ability to adapt to divergent ecological situations. At the
same time, man's quest for self-knowledge and self-awareness has ensured that the question of the nature of human nature would come to constitute the major focal point in the development of religion, philosophy, social theory and political ideology. Man's lack of a set and uniform place in the natural world, as well as his obvious curiosity about himself, has facilitated the development of various means to rationalize and legitimize his existence throughout the history of Western civilization.

Religion has historically been the primary institution responsible for the guidance as well as for the explanation of human existence. With the gradual secularizing of religious institutions following the Reformation, philosophy, social theory and political ideology have together inherited the formidable task of the traditional religions. In this regard, the basic beliefs of the Christian religions have always been founded upon explicit and determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature. The belief in 'Original Sin' maintained by the Roman Catholic Church is, in itself, an explicit assumption about man's nature. Also, the Christian religions have utilized assumptions about human nature to legitimize themselves as necessary social institutions to be maintained at all costs. For example, it was only by insisting that 'Original Sin' was an essential feature of human nature that the Roman Catholic Church was able to legitimize its existence through its offering of such services as repentence, atonement and absolution.

Since the Reformation, philosophy, social theory and political ideology have served as the chief instrumental means for the rationalization of human self-awareness and identity. The use of concepts and assumptions about human nature have always played a major role within these particular
processes of rationalization. Many philosophers and social theorists have defined their role as social critics, whose task it is to weigh the suitability of particular social situations in terms of various preconceived notions about human nature and its basic needs and attributes. Philosophers and social theorists have found that the use of assumptions about human nature provides an apparently convincing and irreducible standard by which to judge human society, both in the past as well as in the future. Thus, philosophy and social theory, as means to rationalize man's self-awareness and identity, have dealt specifically with the question of the nature of human nature. In addition, philosophers and social theorists have made extensive uses of assumptions about man's nature in their attempts to evaluate, criticize, as well as complement many aspects of human society during its various phases of development.

The use of concepts and assumptions about human nature within the context of political ideologies has provided man with a means of coming to terms with his own self-identity and awareness. Political ideologies have constituted a means for bringing about social change, as well as for rationalizing and legitimizing the particular social conditions which characterize a society at any given time. In either case, political ideologies utilize assumptions about human nature as a convincing and seemingly irrefutable means of gathering public support in accepting specific programs of action. Concepts of human nature defined within the context of political ideologies also provide individuals with a common reference point with which they may identify and work towards.

The specific role of human nature in social theory is not to be underestimated. Assumptions about man's nature explicitly utilized in
social theory could very well contribute to the selective choice of data by the theorist in his attempt to legitimate and justify his preconceived notions about man and society. In this respect, assumptions about human nature within social theory could, in this fashion, seriously inhibit the overall development and scope of social theory. Social theorists who use only certain limited assumptions about human nature as criteria in evaluating particular social problems would contribute to providing a rather one-sided and biased picture of social reality. The use of assumptions about human nature within the context of social theory would noticeably contribute to the restriction and inhibition of the analytical scope of the social sciences. The recognition of this fact holds important implications for any evaluation of the objective nature of the social sciences, its ideological orientations, as well as its possibilities for development in the future.

Today, within the context of modern sociological and anthropological theory, there exists significant differences of opinion between social scientists about the role which assumptions about man's innate nature play in the structuring and influencing of social theory. Many social theorists contend that the idea of an "innate human nature" is irrelevant to the conducting of social scientific investigations. On the other hand, such social theorists as Dennis Wrong and C. Wright Mills have argued that assumptions about human nature continue to have an effective role in influencing contemporary sociological and anthropological thought.

The sociological view which maintains that assumptions about human nature are irrelevant to the development and construction of social theory
is the more popular of the two contrasting viewpoints described above. Undoubtedly the most widespread opinion about human nature shared by sociologists and anthropologists today is that man is essentially 'a social animal'. Man is typically perceived by modern social scientists as living in a web of social relationships, dependent on others for support and responsive to the norms and standards of society. In short, most social scientists understand that human behavior is largely formed through social relationships between individuals, acting together as members of larger groups in the context of societal institutions. Contemporary social theorists emphasize that man's nature is a tabula rasa, which is dependent for its development on both the processes of social interaction and socialization, which together ensure the internalization of society's prescribed values and goals. Radcliffe-Brown has accurately summed up the prevailing attitude of many of today's social scientists towards the concept of human nature when he stated that

...no amount of investigation can explain the characteristics of society by simple reference to the nature of human beings.

The pervasiveness of such an opinion is, however, not necessarily a guarantee of its truth.

Most sociologists today are convinced that they can safely ignore the question of the nature of human nature within the construction and elaboration of their various social theories. In the opinion of many, the determinate role which "social interaction" plays in the structuring of human behavior and culture, automatically precludes the necessity of dealing with the nature of human behavior in any other causal context, especially in relation to man's innate nature. Their emphasis on the social deter-
mination of human behavior is at least generally justified. In this regard, the development of the human personality through the process of social and symbolic interaction cannot be ignored. To some extent, many social theorists have demonstrated a strong adherence to the liberal belief in the unlimited modifiability of human nature through social processes, inclusive of education and rehabilitation programs. Their support of this general and widespread belief has deterred a significant number of social theorists from admitting that man's innate nature has anything to do with determining human behavior. It is for this same reason that social theorists are reluctant to admit that assumptions about human nature play a role in the development of social theory. In their opinion, any admission to the existence of specific features of man's innate nature would lend support to the argument that the possibility for man to change his behavior through the processes of social reform and education is limited by his innate organic constitution.

What social theorists have failed to consider to date, is the extent to which the currently popular theory of the social determination of human behavior rests on explicit assumptions about man's innate nature which have been formulated to lend support to the liberal belief in the modifiability of human behavior and society through social reform and education. Nor have social scientists considered the possibility that the use of these assumptions may effectively hinder the consideration of the nature of human nature in a more objective light, on the basis of evidence provided by other scientific disciplines.

Presently, a formidable bulwark of opinion exists among social scientists which prevents them from admitting or even considering the possibility
that man's innate nature has any relevance to the structuring and development of social theory. There are a number of exceptions, however, to this large body of opinion. A few sociologists, inclusive of Dennis Wrong, have indicated that assumptions about man's nature continue to play an effective part in influencing the development of contemporary sociological and anthropological theory. Wrong, in discussing the general orientation of many current sociological theories has argued that

...their particular selective emphasis is generalized -- explicitly or, more often, implicitly -- to provide apparent empirical support for an extremely one-sided view of human nature.8

C. Wright Mills, in a similar vein, has pointed to the relationship which exists between the innate characteristics of human nature assumed by John Dewey and the general ideals of liberalism of which Dewey was an ardent advocate. Dewey has been one of the leading figures whose insights continue to influence the general theoretical trends of modern sociological thought. In summarizing Dewey's perspective of human nature, Mills noted that...

he will always take a view that leaves man's inner nature plastic enough to make social reforms possible, but he will try to keep it unitary enough to be the seat and the implicit standard of certain values...human nature will be good if it is left alone, but to be good it must have a good society. A good society is one 'congenial' to the 'potentiality,' 'growth,' the workings of human nature.9

Similar assumptions of human nature continue to underly many of the more up-to-date sociological analyses.

The distinctive contrast of opinion which exists between C. Wright Mills and Dennis Wrong on the one hand and the majority of contemporary social theorists on the other, constitutes in itself, the major problem
which faces social scientists today. When we consider the effects which assumptions about human nature might have in facilitating or inhibiting the overall scope of social theory the problem, as it has been defined above, takes on significant dimensions.

Despite the provocativeness of Wrong's and Mill's contentions, a review of the literature reveals that the formidable task of examining the role which the assumptions about the nature of human nature have played in the development of sociological and anthropological theory since the Enlightenment has been relatively neglected to date. Only minimal attention has been paid to the question of whether sociologists and anthropologists have relied upon assumptions about the nature of man in the justification and elaboration of their theories of social organization and culture. Equally as important, no one has attempted to investigate the degree to which differing assumptions about human nature formulated by social theorists have been based upon empirical investigation and research. Nor has the possibility been considered that assumptions about human nature have been used as a means to justify the particular world-views of social scientists.

The reason for the continued neglect of this specific problem by sociologists and anthropologists, at least in North America, might in fact be attributed to the current orientation of the social sciences. As Pitirim Sorokin has described

...sociological research of the younger generation of American sociologists shifted from a cultivation...and study of its basic problems to an 'operational', 'quantitative', 'experimental', 'precise' research of special narrow problems of psychosocial sciences.10

Questions addressed to examining the historical origins and empirical
credibility of the existing assumptions about the nature of human nature are not fashionable. It seems that many social scientists have been content either with denying the existence of such assumptions altogether or, alternatively, have taken these assumptions for granted.

The failure of sociologists and anthropologists to study the role which assumptions of human nature have had in shaping the general theoretical orientations of the social sciences complements a criticism which W.R. Runciman has made of the modern social scientific community. Runciman has noted that social scientists have forgotten that sociology and anthropology are "historical sciences". He claims that sociologists and anthropologists have neglected to consider the fact that most sociological laws which have been formulated, "must always be justified from beneath." 11 By this, Runciman implies that sociological laws inevitably rely on meta-assumptions about man and society for their justification and legitimization. That is to say, that social theorists use assumptions about man's nature in an explicitly causal manner to explain the development and underlying dynamics of social phenomena. He also implies that social theorists are guilty of the most general form of reductionism, in that they attribute the original cause of a particular aspect of human behavior or social phenomenon to being a characteristic trait of human nature. In respect to the implications of Runciman's argument, it is necessary to point out that it is the question of the origins and nature of these assumptions which social scientists today have failed to consider. The popularity of the belief that assumptions of human nature have no place in sociological or anthropological theory construction is no guarantee, nor convincing proof, that previous social theories have not been unduly
biased by doubtful assumptions about human nature.
2) The General Problem

In the previous discussion it was pointed out that social scientists today are faced with a basic dilemma. This dilemma, in short, consists of deciding whether or not assumptions about man's nature have played a determinate and causal role in the development of sociological and anthropological theory. The problem to which this analysis is addressed is related to the gaining of a better understanding of both the conceptual and ideological foundations of sociological and anthropological theory as a whole.

This study attempts to conduct a content analysis of the major sociological and anthropological theories since the Enlightenment. In this respect this study shall endeavor:

1) To elicit from these theories:

a) the specific nature of the assumptions about human nature found in these theories.

b) the explicit and implicit uses of these assumptions in the construction of sociological and anthropological theory.

2) To correlate the above stated variables with the ideological orientations shared by intellectuals since the Enlightenment, and used by sociologists and anthropologists in the formulation of their various theories.

This study treats the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists since the Enlightenment as a sociology of knowledge problem. That is to say, it reviews the use of assumptions about human nature in the construction of social theories within the particular ideological and historical context of the various social theorists responsible for their formulation.

If it is true that the construction of social theory and the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists may be understood from
a sociology of knowledge perspective, the question remains whether or not it is possible today to develop a view of human nature that is scientific rather than ideological. Within this context, this study shall also attempt to determine the extent:

1) To which the use of assumptions about the nature of human nature yields to a sociology of knowledge framework.

2) To which it is possible to make the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists more scientific by using empirically supported data about human nature which is available from other scientific disciplines.

The detailed examination of the role which assumptions about man's innate nature have played in the construction of sociological and anthropological theory since the Enlightenment can clarify several heatedly debated issues. First, whether or not the rejection by sociologists and anthropologists of any biological or ethological considerations about the innate features of human nature is in fact warranted? Secondly, how are sociological theories constructed historically and how do they evolve? For these purposes we shall focus on:

a) the various changes which assumptions made by social theorists of human nature have undergone since the Enlightenment.

b) under what specific intellectual and historical conditions these changes have occurred.

Lastly, by ascertaining the extent to which assumptions about man's innate nature are empirically justified, it will be possible to resolve the question of whether sociology and anthropology actually constitute a science, or whether the assumptions that social theorists have made use of are merely a reflection of a specific ideological world-view adhered to by social theorists since the Enlightenment.
3) **The Implications of the Problem**

A) **The Dynamics of Sociological and Anthropological Theory Construction**

The problem of determining to what extent the use of assumptions about human nature in social theories may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective, holds significant implications for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the general processes by which social theories are constructed. In this light, we may also better understand to what degree social theories are formulated in a manner similar to those constructed in the natural sciences. In addition, we may come to see how the use of assumptions about man's innate nature has been influenced by the particular ideological and social circumstances of the various social theorists themselves.

Current opinions expressed by philosophers of science as to the manner in which scientific theories generally, social theories specifically are formulated, are by no means consistent. On the one hand, such philosophers of science as Alvin Gouldner insist that underlying assumptions about man's nature do, in fact, play an influential role in determining the development and formulation of social theories. Conversely, social theorists inclusive of Kuhn, Popper and Mannheim have argued that the construction of social theories is affected by factors quite apart from the particular assumptions about man's nature which social theorists may maintain.

The suggestion that assumptions about human nature have been utilized in sociological and anthropological theories since the Enlightenment is not inconsistent with Alvin Gouldner's description and argument about how
social theories are constructed. As Alvin Gouldner has explained, all
social theory may be understood as being immersed in a sub-theoretical
level of "domain assumptions". Gouldner has defined domain assumptions as
consisting of those assumptions about the nature of man and about the basic
characteristics of human society. He has further indicated that...

Domain assumptions about man and society might include,
for example, dispositions to believe that man are rational
or irrational; that society is precarious or fundamentally
stable; that social problems will correct themselves without
planned intervention; that human behavior is unpredictable;
that man's true humanity resides in his feelings and senti-
ments. I say that these "might be" examples of domain assump-
tions made about man and society, because whether they are or
not is a matter that can be decided finally only by determining
what people, including sociologists, believe about a given
domain.12

In addition, Gouldner has pointed out that these domain assumptions inhibit
or facilitate the ability of a particular theory to explain the aspect of
the social world with which it is concerned.

The sub-theoretical level of domain assumptions which is said to
characterize every theory within sociology and anthropology has been
defined as the infrastructure of social theory. Gouldner has emphasized
in this regard that...

The infrastructure is important not (just) because it is
the ultimate determinant of the character of social theory
but because it is part of the most immediate, local surroundings
from which the theory work eventuates in theory performances and
theory practices.13

For example, if a social theorist were to assume that man by nature is
rational, his analysis and interpretation of such social phenomena as crowd
behavior, deviancy and crime would, in all probability, be quite different
than if he were to assume that man by nature is irrational. From this
perspective it may be argued that the meta-assumptions of any sociological
or anthropological theory must eventually influence the overall scope of
the theory, its choice of subject matter and even its purposes and practical
impllications. The task of analyzing the degree to which assumptions
about the innate nature of human nature have constituted important infra-
structural components of social theory historically, takes on major impor-
tance when it is realized that meta-assumptions of all sorts play a signif-
icant role in influencing the general dynamics of theory construction
in the social sciences.

The concept of 'theory' is often referred to and utilized in an
ambiguous manner in the social sciences. The idea of theory as it is
defined in anthropology and sociology is meant ideally to be a

device for interpreting, criticizing and unifying established laws, modifying them to fit data unanticipated
in their formulation and guiding the enterprise of dis-
covering new and more powerful generalizations.14

A theory, in short, constitutes a system of laws ordered in a meaningful
manner. Laws in turn are generalizations based upon empirical evidence
and subject to empirical control in terms of their verification or falsi-
fication according to the empirical data available.15

The question of the extent to which social theory is in fact a system
of laws based on empirical evidence remains generally unsettled among
philosophers of science. Gouldner insists that domain assumptions rather
than empirical evidence plays the most significant role in the formulap-
tion of social theories. Other philosophers of science continue to argue
that the use which social theorists make of empirical evidence in the
construction of social theory is "scientific" in nature.

In this respect, it is maintained by at least some philosophers of
science that most social theories conform to the hypothetico-deductive method of science proper -- the universal method of all sciences. This method consists of five steps:

1) tentatively propose as an hypothesis a provisional statement obtained by induction from experience and previously established through experimentation in the field;

2) refine and structure the hypothesis;

3) draw logical conclusions or predictions from the structured hypothesis which have promise of experimental check;

4) check the predicted consequences against experience by free observation or experimental arrangement;

5) if the deduced consequences are found to correspond to the observed facts within expected limits the hypothesis or initial statement then may be said to be scientifically established. 16

It should be noted that all of these steps outlined above are subject to extensive documentation in order to demonstrate to the rest of the scientific community that they have been accurately made. At the same time, the documentation of these steps allows others to repeat them. In this manner other theorists are able to determine the significance of the original theory by seeing whether or not they come to similar conclusions.

Within the context of the hypothetico-deductive method of theory construction, it is argued that changes in scientific theories are related to the discovering of new empirical data which was unanticipated in the original formulation of the theories. In a similar light, Karl Popper has emphasized that the scientific credibility of the social sciences is dependent on the willingness of anthropologists and sociologists to attempt to falsify the theories which have been formulated, in reference to all
available empirical data. In Popper's opinion, sociology and anthropology as scientific disciplines are only interested in those theories which can be properly tested. It is the rigorous testing of such theories in terms of their verification or falsification which will ensure the acceptance of social theories by the rest of the scientific community. According to Popper, the dynamics of sociological and anthropological theory construction are directly related to the testing, verification and falsification of the data utilized and interpreted by social theories. This is the method of all sciences that have empirical reality as their basis. As he notes

... just because it is our aim to establish theories as well as we can, we must test them as severely as we can. That is we must try to find fault with them, we must try to falsify them.}

In brief, Popper's argument is that changes in social theories are brought about by the method of selection by elimination, of which standard and criteria is the empirical credibility of the theory in question. However, while Popper's argument emphasizes the role which empirical data plays in the formulation of social theories, it does not consider the possibility that the domain assumptions of social theorists might have a considerable effect in influencing the selection or rejection of particular types of data.

Another view of how social theories change has been outlined by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn's views on the scientific process have gained wide favor and acceptance among social scientists today. In his major work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn has maintained that scientists form closed communities with particularistic intellectual and
normative traditions. Members of a specific scientific community, inclusive of the social sciences, are concerned essentially with the search for solutions to well-defined, consensually determined and agreed upon problems. They are not necessarily concerned with the establishment or refutation of "major" theories. Kuhn refers to this process as being "normal science". The rigor and precision of normal science, as he argues, leads to the continual discovery of anomalous findings which cannot be properly reconciled with the prevailing interpretive scheme. Eventually these anomalies weaken confidence (especially among the younger scientists) in the existing paradigm. The loss of confidence in turn, leads to a period of crisis which results in a scientific revolution that ultimately leads to the formulation of a new interpretive paradigm. Kuhn, like Popper, gives little or no consideration to the question of what extent meta-assumptions within various social theories facilitate different interpretations of conflicting data. Nor does he deal with the possibility that these meta-assumptions might be significantly related to general assumptions about human nature.

In many respects, Kuhn's views on the dynamics of normal science and scientific revolutions which underly the construction and change of social theories, provides an added dimension to Karl Mannheim's theories and insights on this subject. In contrast to Kuhn, Mannheim places a stronger emphasis on how theories are influenced by the historical and sociological environment in which the social theorist in question finds himself. From Mannheim's perspective, social theories change in response to a changing social problematic. More specifically, Mannheim has noted that every social theorist historically
...finds himself in an inherited situation with patterns of thought that are appropriate to this situation and attempts to elaborate further, the inherited modes of response or to substitute others for them in order to deal more adequately with the new challenges out of the shifts and changes in his situation.20

By this, Mannheim implies that social theories are affected by, and respond to, economic, social and political changes as well as to new theoretical developments in the discipline itself. In brief then, according to Mannheim, there exists a general correspondence between changes in social theories and changes in the social problematic with which social theorists are confronted.

Summarily, the arguments of Popper, Kuhn, and Mannheim indicate that changes in sociological and anthropological theory may be intimately tied up with:

1) the discovery of new empirical data and the empirical credibility of the theories themselves;

2) alterations in interpretive paradigms due to the workings of normal science and scientific revolutions, and finally,

3) changes in the historical and intellectual situation of the social theorist himself.

Significantly, neither the idea of the hypothetico-deductive method of science as a means to explain the processes by which social theories are constructed, nor Popper's, Kuhn's or Mannheim's explanations of the processes by which social theories change, take into critical account the role which assumptions about the nature of human nature might have in influencing and mediating such processes. Within the context of at least North American sociology, we have only to compare the Social Darwinist theoretical movement and its corresponding view of human nature with that of the later Pragmatic theoretical movement to realize that, not only have
social theories changed historically, but in many cases assumptions about man's nature have also changed along with them.21

In respect to the specific problem with which this study is concerned, it is obvious that with the exception of such philosophers of the social sciences as Alvin Gouldner, there exists a significant lack of understanding as to the role which assumptions about human nature play in the construction of social theories. By outlining from an historical perspective, the extent to which social theorists have utilized assumptions about men's nature, as well as the changes in those assumptions from the Enlightenment up to today, it will be possible to determine to what degree the construction of anthropological and sociological theory has actually been based on the hypothetico-deductive method. Further, it will be possible to determine if changes in sociological theory in terms of both their general orientation and the problems with which they are concerned, have been concomitantly related historically, to changes in views of human nature assumed by social theorists. Such an analysis also makes it possible to measure how intensively changes in assumptions of human nature have influenced other processes which have played a part in altering the general theoretical orientations of social theory. The careful examination of assumptions of human nature that have been explicit in social theory since the Enlightenment, is an insightful and original means to gain an understanding of the nature and dynamics of theory construction in the social sciences.

In short, by looking at these various factors outlined above, it will be possible to determine the extent to which the question of human nature, as it has been dealt with by social theorists, may be understood from a sociology of knowledge perspective. Furthermore, such a study as
This also constitutes the first step in gaining a more scientific or at least a more comprehensive view of human nature, as it has been defined in the sociological and anthropological literature since the Enlightenment.

It has been recently argued by William Cotton that since the Enlightenment, social theories have become increasingly "naturalistic"; that is to say, they have increasingly come to rely on objective empirical research. Additionally, it is maintained that social theorists today shun teleological and reductionist explanations which rely on vague psychological and biological concepts relating to such notions as the innate features of human nature. The examination of whether or not assumptions of human nature have comprised infrastructural components of social theory in the past, as well as at present, will contribute towards ascertaining the credibility of such a contention. It is for this reason that this study will not utilize a structural analysis in the strict sense. On the contrary, because of its general concern with the changes in the external logic and underlying assumptions in social theory, since the Enlightenment, a multi-dimensional framework of analysis will be employed. This framework of analysis will attempt to indicate and outline a large number of contributory factors which will be defined as causal in only the most general sense.
B) The Scientific Nature of The Social Sciences

The problem of analyzing the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists since the Enlightenment holds particular relevance for the gaining of a more comprehensive understanding of the scientific nature of both sociology and anthropology. More simply, the question of whether or not assumptions about human nature as formulated by social theorists may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge framework is intimately linked with the problem of the scientific nature of the social sciences as a whole.

Social scientists continue to debate among themselves as well as with representatives of the natural sciences, the question of whether or not sociology and anthropology may be considered as sciences. By the term science is meant, a logically coherent body of generalizations concerning interdependent relationships between observable, predictable and empirically verifiable phenomena. Many social scientists insist that sociology and anthropology together comprise

...the effort to apply scientific principles to the study of man in groups.

A significant number of social scientists, in spite of their humanistic training which has stressed the uniqueness of social phenomena, nevertheless maintain that their discipline is as scientific in nature as the natural sciences. As pointed out by the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, the concept of Realsoziologie, used by many German sociologists, was a means to emphasize that sociology as a discipline consists of a pure science of societal forms. Others have argued that the social sciences may be considered equivalent in scientific and empirical credi-
bility to the natural sciences if one assumes that the belief in the sovereignty of reason, acceptance of the rules of the logic of inquiry, and adherence to the virtues of responsibility and objectivity are the hallmarks of science. 26

Much of the history of sociology and anthropology has been characterized by the attempts of social theorists to come to terms with the problem of the scientific nature of their discipline.

While there are those who would maintain that the social sciences are in fact scientific in nature, there are others who support a contrary opinion. In this respect, many sociologists and anthropologists point out that the social sciences can never hope to gain the degree of scientific objectivity and empirical certainty displayed in the theories and discoveries of the natural sciences. A number of sociologists attribute the failure of the social sciences to achieve scientific status to the fact that the social sciences "...stand within and not outside the realm of culturally patterned values". 27 Calverton has explained that scientific objectivity in sociology and anthropology is impossible not so much in the collection of facts but in their interpretation.

No mind can be objective in its interpretation and evaluation of social phenomena. One can be objective only in the observation of detail or the collection of facts - but one cannot be objective in their interpretation. ...Any man living in any society imbibes his very consciousness from that society. 28

In many instances, sociologists and anthropologists seek to formulate theories which can take into account and explain the "meaningful" connections between the emotion, attitudes and purposes of the individual actor on the one hand, and his social, economic and political situation on the other hand. Social scientists deal with values and norms that must be subjec-
tively interpreted and evaluated in relation to the actions of the individuals whom they are studying. Many philosophers of science, as a consequence, insist that the goals and methods of the social sciences are fundamentally different from those of the natural sciences.29

The argument that sociology and anthropology are sciences similar in nature and character to the natural sciences is based on one basic assumption. It assumes that essentially the same general mode of reflective inquiry, explanation and verification that is used by scientists when the subject matter is biological, chemical or physical may be used in a similar fashion when the subject matter consists of symbols or other culturally defined entities. In short, the argument which maintains that sociology and anthropology are sciences assumes that the construction of social theories will be guided by the empirical credibility of the facts which such theories seek to organize.

The determining of the extent to which sociological and anthropological theory historically has relied on empirically verifiable data, and the extent to which assumptions of human nature have been utilized as a means of verification could throw light on the question of the scientific nature of the social sciences. Moreover, the estimation of the degree to which assumptions about human nature made by social theorists are in themselves empirically justified, could further help to resolve this debate.

The use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature by social scientists adds a further dimension to the problem of whether or not sociology and anthropology are sciences in the sense discussed above. Making assumptions about man's species - specific nature necessitates
that the sociologist or anthropologist utilize data and theories reserved for the interpretation of psychologists, physiologists, biologists, and more recently, ethologists. All natural and social scientists are repeatedly confronted with the necessity of incorporating facts and theories that are usually defined and researched by other scientific disciplines into their own theoretical structures. The procedure by which sociologists and anthropologists summarize, simplify and incorporate data, concepts and theories from other disciplines into their own explanatory frameworks will be referred to here as the process of abridgement.

If an anthropologist abridges research, previously documented and summarized by the appropriate specialists of another discipline, such an abridgement may be referred to as validated. However, where in the absence of research by specialists of another discipline, the anthropologist or sociologist has to make a judgement on some factual or theoretical complex and at the same time must incorporate his conclusions into his own theoretical structure, such a process may be defined as postulated abridgement. As Ely Devons and Max Gluckman point out, the utilization of postulated abridgement in theory construction is valid only insofar as the theorist does not base more of his analysis on it than is warranted.

In explaining the complexities of cross-disciplinary cooperation in theory construction, Devons and Gluckman emphasize that the anthropologist is permitted to make naive assumptions about the complexes of events which normally lie at the boundaries of his circumscribed field only insofar as such assumptions, whether validated or postulated, do not play a noticeably determinate or causal role in his own analysis and explanation. If however, the anthropologist does in fact utilize such naive assumptions in a
determinate fashion within the context of his theoretical framework, he commits what is referred to as "the error of ignoring the limits of his own naivety". In this context, the assumptions may be classified as unjustifiably naive ones. In turn, the use of such unjustifiably naive assumptions undermines the empirical credibility of the analysis within which they are made. An accurate test in establishing an understanding of the causal role played by naive assumptions in any theory is to see to what extent the theory would stand by itself if other assumptions were adopted.

Thus, by examining both the extent to which the assumptions of human nature formulated by social theorists are supported by empirical data and theories, and the degree to which such assumptions play a causal and determinate role in the verification of the theories themselves, we may be better able to decide whether the social sciences have adhered to the scientific tradition of empirical verification or have stepped outside of that tradition. Instances where it can be shown that a social theorist has abridged in his own theories, assumptions about man's innate nature that are empirically unjustifiably naive shall be understood as being an example where the scientific tradition has been revoked by the social theorist, for other more "immediate interests". The more immediate interests which may influence the choice of a particular assumption about human nature by a social theorist may in turn be effectively interpreted from a sociology of knowledge analytical perspective. Such a framework of analysis would consider the ideological basis of the specific assumptions about man's nature which various social theorists have made use of.
C) Liberalism, Ideology and The Social Sciences

The examination of the use of assumptions about human nature in social theory, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, introduces another directly related problem. The problem, in short, consists of determining whether or not the theories formulated by social scientists have an ideological basis. In terms of defining a particular ideological orientation that may characterize the social sciences as a unified discipline, it has frequently been asserted that sociologists and anthropologists (at least as it is reflected in their theories) share together a liberal world-view.

Many critics of the social sciences have pointed out that liberalism is a pervasive ideology that has influenced the general trends of social theory both in the past and at present. For example, Stephen Rousseas and James Farganis have contended that those social scientists who seek in their theories to emphasize the need as well as the possibility for social consensus, stability and integration in North America provide a justification of traditional liberal ideals and values. As they state...

This growing litany in the United States, on the European Continent, and in England, in praise of the status quo continues to remain, in its own image, inherently liberal.\textsuperscript{31}

A number of social historians and sociologists have also observed that there has existed a dynamic interrelationship historically between the social sciences, on the one hand and liberalism on the other. In reference both to the history of liberalism and the social sciences, Ellen Wood has commented that...

It is perhaps no coincidence that a strong faith in an exact social science was so often associated, from Hobbes to J.S. Mill, with advocacy of doctrines central to the growth of liberalism.\textsuperscript{32}
Liberalism has recently been the target of a vast array of criticisms, especially in North America. In this respect, many critics have argued that most of the liberal ideals are no longer relevant to the changing social reality and unique needs of today. C. Wright Mills, probably one of the leading critics of liberalism has, in emphasizing liberalism's shortcomings, implied that there exists a relationship between liberalism as an ideology and social theory. He has stated that...

As an articulation of ideals, liberalism remains compelling, but on each of the other three aspects of political philosophy - as ideology, as designation of historical agencies, and as a set of theories about man, society and history - its relevance is now largely historical only. . . . As a set of theories - or better, of assumptions about man, society and history - liberalism today is at a dead end. The optative mood has so thoroughly taken over that liberals often appear out of touch with the going realities.

Similar criticisms of liberalism have also been voiced by members of the New Left as well as members of different minority groups.

Other critics of liberalism have noted that there exists a number of differences between classical and contemporary liberalism. Harry Girvetz has maintained that one of the major differences between these two types of liberalism is their corresponding assumptions of human nature. He sees the social sciences as having played a major role in supplying evidence which warranted the alteration of the assumptions about man's nature that had been central to the early period of the growth of classical liberalism. In his major work, The Evolution of Liberalism, Girvetz argued that liberalism as an ideology

...borrowing heavily from recent psychological and anthropological studies and from the relatively new science of social psychology, begins by demolishing the theory of human nature from which classical liberalism took its start.
According to Girvetz' argument, liberalism has notably influenced the social sciences. At the same time, changes in the social sciences have had a marked influence in altering the general orientations of liberalism as an ideology.

It seems that most students of liberalism consistently agree that there exists a definite relationship between liberalism and the social sciences. Similarly, students and critics of liberalism also argue that liberalism is in fact an ideology. K.R. Minogue, for example, in his characterization of the liberal mind has identified liberalism as an ideology. Paul Wolff, in an extensive critique of the shortcomings of the conservative tendencies inherent within liberal theories of political pluralism, noted that liberalism within a pluralist context

functions ideologically by tending to deny new groups or interests access to the political plateau. It does this by ignoring their existence in practice, not by denying their claim in theory. The result is that pluralism has a braking effect on social change, it slows down transformation in the system of group adjustments but does not set up an absolute barrier to change. For this reason, as well as because of its origins as a fusion of two conflicting social philosophies, it deserves the title 'conservative liberalism'.

Wolff's description of liberalism indicates that it is more than an ideology. He implies that it is an ideology which is also able to incorporate conservative values which are normally thought to be antithetical to the liberal tradition. The nature of liberalism as an ideology has also been analyzed in terms of its dynamics of development and decline. John Hallo- well, in this context, has described liberalism:

As a political ideology born of a particular historical period in a specific sociological environment... [which] is subject, like all such systems of ideas, to development, decline and death.
Hallowell, like Girvetz and Wolff, sees liberalism as a dynamic and evolving ideology that has changed its ideals and norms repeatedly during the course of its evolution.

The concept of ideology has been subject to divergent interpretations and definitions by sociologists. In outlining a general working definition of ideology, we may understand it to constitute a prescriptive or cognitive map, encompassing the most general set of beliefs held by members of a society. An ideology tells the individual how to look at, and interpret events and peoples which he encounters in his day to day life situation. Also an ideology provides a simplifying perspective through which the observer can make sense of otherwise complex phenomena. In short, an ideology is a statement of belief about the right ordering of life. 38

In attempting to understand the nature of liberalism as an ideology, and its relationship to the social sciences, it is necessary to come to terms with the meanings, values and norms that have characterized the historical development of liberalism. Most social theorists, social historians and political scientists in defining the characterizing values and norms of liberal ideology mention that one of its central ideals is the overriding belief in individualism and the natural rights of the individual. In this sense, Ramsay Muir has depicted liberalism as

...the belief in the value of the human personality, and a conviction that the source of all progress lies in the free exercise of individual energy. 39

Other students of liberalism, including J.H. Hallowell, L.T. Hobhouse and Leo Strauss, have emphasized in a similar manner that the belief in indi-
individual libertarianism forms one of the major cornerstones of the liberal world-view. The quality of tolerance which is often said to be characteristic of liberals may be directly related to the reverence which liberals display in protecting and fostering individualism at all costs.

Liberalism as an ideology is characterized by the ideal of individuality. Many critics argue that liberalism also embodies beliefs about social integration in at least two respects. In the first instance sociologists and social historians have indicated that liberalism, at least in specific intervals of its development, has supported the belief in the need to maintain the state, institutions, religion, tradition and the social community. According to Karl Popper, one of the major principles that has manifested itself repeatedly in the history of liberal thought is the confirmed belief that...

Institutions alone are never sufficient if not tempered by traditions ... Traditions are needed to form a kind of link between institutions and the intentions and valuations of individual men.

The definition of libertarian liberalism as compared with those definitions stressing liberalism's integrationist aspects is indicative of the ambivalence of liberalism as an ideology. Other critics have stressed that liberalism has at various times been characterized by a number of rather "illiberal" beliefs and values. In an historical account of the decline of American liberalism, Arthur Eckirch has commented on the fact that liberal values, especially at the beginning of the twentieth century in the United States, were directly related to the belief in social conformity, religious piety, national loyalty and community involvement.
From this perspective we may understand that liberalism, at least at specific stages in its development, encompasses what we normally assume to be the meanings, values and norms of 'conservatism'. Referring to the changes which liberalism has undergone since the Enlightenment, Girvetz goes so far as to argue that...

Classical liberalism, which took on its characteristic form in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has with modification become the conservatism of our time.\textsuperscript{43} Conservatism, then, as a particular stage of the growth of liberal ideology is in fact a philosophy of community. In this sense, conservatism constitutes an adaptation of the liberal world-view to changing historical circumstances. These particular circumstances characterized the aftermath of the French Revolution and according to C. Wright Mills, characterize our own times today.\textsuperscript{44} The conservative tendencies of liberalism do not deny the original ideals of individualism maintained by liberalism but rather these tendencies seek to

...support and enfold the individual in a warm affective community stretching backwards and forward in time and bearing within itself the accumulated wisdom and values of generations of human experience.\textsuperscript{45}

Thus, according to a number of sociologists and social historians who have closely examined the growth and development of liberalism, the dichotomy which many have assumed to exist between conservatism and liberalism is in fact no dichotomy at all. Conservatism is a recurrent feature of liberalism's evolution and adoption to new social, historical as well as theoretical developments which have emerged since the Enlightenment.

According to some critics, liberalism has also at particular times embraced collectivistic orientations and beliefs. From an historical
perspective, many students of liberalism have maintained that collectivism generally, socialism specifically, is also an inherent feature of liberal ideology. In this sense collectivism within a community context is understood as one of the fundamental means for the securing of individual freedom. As Hobhouse elaborates

...the collective acting of the community does not necessarily proceed by coercion or restraint. The more securely it is founded on freedom and general willing assent, the more it is free to work out all the achievements in which the individual is feeble or powerless while concerned action is strong.46

Socialism, insofar as it is representative of collectivist aspirations, has been interpreted as constituting one particular facet of liberal ideology as a whole, as well as one stage in the development and evolution of liberalism.

Collectivism in the context of socialism has often been described as a central facet of liberal ideology. Erich Fromm, for example, has noted that there exists a close affinity between socialist doctrine as outlined by Marx and the liberal humanist ideal of individual libertarianism in the sense that

...the very aim of Marx is to liberate men from the pressure of economic needs, so that he can be fully human; that Marx is primarily concerned with the emancipation of man as an individual, the overcoming of alienation and the restoration of his capacity to relate himself fully to man and to nature.47

Similarly, C. Wright Mills has maintained that the emphasis which Marxist doctrine has placed on the liberation of the individual through collectivist cooperation is indicative of the fact that...

What is most valuable in classic liberalism is most cogently and most fruitfully incorporated in classic Marxism... Karl Marx remains the thinker who has articulated most clearly...the basic ideals which liberalism shares.
The liberal tradition, in its scope and historical variations, has embodied not only the ideals of libertarian individualism but also their antithesis, in the form of the ideals of conservatism and collectivism. Together, all of these variations of liberalism as an ideology express the ideal of humanism, that man is the measure of all things - an ideal which has characterized Western thought since the Renaissance.

From this discussion of the nature and scope of the liberal ideals, we may understand that liberalism as an ideology has not been a static ideological structure historically but rather a dynamic and multivariant one. Its historical variations have come to incorporate divergent ideals which are both contradictory to one another as well as mutually complementary.

In attempting to comprehend the basic meanings, values and norms of liberalism we may generally define liberalism as an ideology of ambivalence in that its basic variations have comprised the belief in individuality on the one hand and social integration on the other. A working definition of liberalism such as that given above, is a useful preliminary means to come to terms with the problem of the ideological basis of the social sciences. To date, a number of criticisms have been made of the fact that social scientists historically, have sought to legitimate the liberal world-view within their theories and that their corresponding assumptions about the nature of human nature have constituted a basic means of exemplifying liberal ideals. It will be possible to more accurately gauge the ideological basis of the social sciences by looking at both the degree to which assumptions of human nature formulated by social scientists correspond to the basic liberal ideals (as they have been defined here), and
the extent to which the spectrum of changes in assumptions of human
nature, evident in social theory historically, corresponds to the overall
spectrum of liberal ideals and their variations. Within this form of an
analytical framework we may more precisely estimate whether social
theory, in its use of assumptions about human nature, complements the
liberal world-view.

This study will attempt to correlate the use of assumptions about
human nature by social theorists, with the general liberal orientations
used by sociologists and anthropologists in the formulation of their
various theories. More specifically, this study shall endeavor to inter-
pret the assumptions about human nature defined by social theorists from
a sociology of knowledge perspective. This does not mean to say that this
analysis will only deal with the structural relationships which may exist
between the individual theorists and their material and social circum-
stances. On the contrary, such a structural analysis is secondary to the
overall purposes of this discussion. The purpose of this study is to out-
line the changes in the internal logic and underlying assumptions of the
major social theories since the Enlightenment. This analysis does not seek
to indicate the specific causes of these changes but rather will consider
a large spectrum of causal factors, which dynamically interact with one
another. A generalized structural analysis will only be used in reference
to the more contemporary sociological and anthropological theories which
play a significant role in shaping the theoretical orientations of the
social sciences today.
D) Contemporary Issues

Essentially, this study is concerned with the problem of determining to what extent the use of assumptions about the nature of human nature in social theory yields to a sociology of knowledge interpretive framework. In addition, this analysis is also addressed to the question of whether it is possible to make the use of such assumptions about human nature more scientific by using empirically supported data about human nature which may be available from other scientific disciplines.

Today there exists a sizeable body of information, mainly developed by ethologists and sociobiologists, from which social scientists could possibly draw in attempting to come to terms with the role which man's innate nature might play in the determination of human behavior and culture generally. The beginnings of ethology as the scientific study of animal behavior grew out of Darwin's studies of the natural history of animal species. In North America, the emerging science of ethology was, until recently, overshadowed by behaviorism, a brand of psychology. However, in the last fifteen years a distinct North American ethology has flourished under the leadership of T.C. Schneirla. In Europe on the other hand, ethology had become an established and recognized science by the 1930's. Already both Konrad Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen had started to make objective observations of animals in their natural environments. At Cambridge, W.H. Thorpe, a comparative psychologist, with the cooperation of Robert Hinde, have established a sub-department of animal behavior. In the British and North American schools of ethology, field and laboratory studies are mutually complementary. The question remains however, whether or not it is justifiable to
utilize the interpretive investigations of animal behavior as a guide to examining the possible biological determinants of the behavior of man. Since Aristotle's *De Anima*, men have maintained an insatiable interest in exploring the possibility of their kinship with animals. It has long been a practice among scholars to identify many of the behavioral traits of men with those of specific species of animals. From a historical viewpoint, many of the classics of the literature of Western civilization used analogies of animals to illustrate different instinctive types of human behavior. In the *Divine Comedy*, Dante used certain animals to symbolize man's passions and vices. In *The Prince*, Machiavelli allegorized the qualities required for political power in relation to the strength of the lion and the cunning of the fox.

Recently, a number of ethologists inclusive of Ardrey, Lorenz and Morris, have made some provocative theoretical generalizations between animal and human behavior from an evolutionary point of view. All of these theorists, writing from a biological perspective, see man as a product of evolution, sharing a common evolutionary heritage with other animal species. The ideas contained within these works, as well as the fundamental questions with which they deal, have been subjected to crude popularization by the entertainment industry. The media has transformed ethology into *kitsch*. As S.A. Barnett described...

Naked apes and Homo pugnax are involved in confused melees, ineffectually referred by editors of colour magazines and publishers of best sellers. Witticisms bad enough for *Punch* are sold as ethology. This discredits the science of animal behavior...and misleads a large reading public.

At the same time, serious studies, outlining and describing the general
behavioral mechanisms of animal species and their adaptiveness to evolutionary processes, have received little attention from the popular magazines and television. The well-documented studies of child behavior, however, carried out by J. Bowlby, S. J. Hutt and C. Hutt, N. Blerton Jones, and W. C. McGrew, have effectively demonstrated that the newly emerging field of human ethology holds much promise for a more comprehensive understanding of the biological basis of human behavior. 59

The recent studies of animal and human behavior are not without their critics, the most ardent of whom advocate 'environmental action' and education to ensure the development of social rather than antisocial behavior. More simply, these critics are convinced that the social processes of education and social reform are capable of structuring human nature in a manner which will ensure the individual's progressive development and maturation. They believe that human nature itself is completely unstructured by any innate characteristics which would inhibit the processes of social reform from being able to influence the human personality. Most of these critics, in their general unwillingness to accept such ethological categories as 'instinct', 'innate propensity' or 'drive', embrace a vague Rousseauian belief in the perfectability of man through education and appropriate socialization. There is evidence that the rejection of ethology is rather widespread among contemporary anthropologists and sociologists.

The existence of a definite trend in anthropology and sociology directed towards the rejection of utilizing ethological categories in considerations of human behavior is evidenced in the statement made by M. F. A. Montagu...
There is, in fact, not the slightest evidence or grounds for assuming that the alleged 'phylogenetically adaptive instinctive behavior' of other animals is in any way relevant to the discussion of the motive forces of human behavior.... the human being is entirely instinctless.  

Assertions of this type are often only supported by general and often contradictory statements which are as imprecise as they are vague. As the ethologist, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, has noted...

Lack of facts is compensated for by the pungency of the antibiological expression of opinion. Rather than being challenged by objective arguments we encounter emotional involvement of a kind hardly beneficial to the objective study of man...

Most of the objections raised are based on the traditionally liberal belief that man's behavior is said to be almost entirely culturally determined. This view is reinforced by anthropologists such as Leslie White, who has insisted that the biological component of human behavior may be ignored since culture evolves via its own set of rules. Similarly, biologists, inclusive of Huxley and Waddington, have suggested that culture transmission is a new form of information transfer for which biological interpretations are irrelevant.

Rather than postulating a human nature that is distinct and separable from society, social scientists are at present convinced that all the characterizing attributes of human nature are produced by society, including such social phenomena as crime, juvenile delinquency, and suicide. Throughout the whole discipline of sociology, with few exceptions, man is thought to be the least biologically determined species of all. Human society is felt to be completely distinct from all forms of animal social organization. As Parsons has succinctly explained, a sociological frame of reference need not take into account the interdependence of social
action processes and the biological and physiological factors of their
determination. 67

Parsons' argument contains a certain degree of validity insofar as
the effects of the social action processes cannot be ignored. All avail-
able sociological and anthropological literature demonstrates at least to
some degree, that human behavior is effected by social institutions and
the processes of social interaction within which the individual finds
himself. At the same time however, Parsons' disregard of the role which
psychological and biological factors might play in the determination of
human behavior was not supported by a careful weighing of the available
literature which points out that specific factors of human nature might
very well have an influential role in structuring human behavior. In this
respect, we may understand that Parsons' views as outlined here are more
dogmatic than they are critical.

Viewpoints directed against any form of the biological reductionism
of human behavior are not merely opinions which have characteristically
evolved within our own contemporary situation. On the contrary, these
types of antibiological points of view have deep historical roots,
stemming from the philosophical perspectives of the Enlightenment as arti-
culated by such social philosophers as John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau.
It was the seventeenth century English philosopher John Locke in An Essay
Concerning Human Understanding who provided the ideological building stones
upon which most of the viewpoints maintained by today's anti-ethological
critics are founded. Locke argued that the human mind at birth was 'an
empty shell', capable of unlimited possibilities of development. His
theories in this regard have provided the main assumptions as to the nature
of human nature, which continue to be supported by most contemporary sociologists and anthropologists. The belief of Rousseau and the French *Philosophes* in the perfectability of men through education and socialization became the organizing principle of L'Ecole Polytechnique, the school within which the idea of a science of society originated.

Within the realm of contemporary anthropological and sociological theory, the more recent onslaught against evolutionism initiated by Franz Boas, later to be extended by Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead, have together created an intellectual climate which is generally not conducive to the unemotional appraisal of the biological determinants of human behavior. It seems that most anthropologists and sociologists have been reluctant to detach themselves from this committed adherence to the liberal dictums of human perfectability. Still fewer social scientists are willing to examine the possibility that cultural development is not as independent from man's biological nature as we might at first assume.

Among the very recent attempts in North America to equate various aspects of human behavior with evolved biological components, writers such as van den Berghe and Wilson have met with extensive criticisms from those who maintain that biology has nothing to do with human behavior. Pierre L. van den Berghe in his book, *Man and Society: A Biosocial View*, has argued that the family, kinship and inequality are all biologically based. The family for example is understood to be the product of the "mother-infant dyad and pair bonding". Additionally, van den Berghe has attributed the universality of human inequality to being a product of a complex interplay between biological predispositions and socio-cultural factors. Van den Berghe has not gone unchallenged by those who assume a non-biological
position in relation to the understanding of the nature of human society. 72

In a similar light, the ethologist Edmund O. Wilson in his work, *Sociobiology - The New Synthesis*, has attempted (at least in the last chapter of the text) to describe and interpret many facets of human social organization from a sociobiological perspective. Wilson defines such characterizing features of human behavior inclusive of territoriality, tribalism, the family, sport, indoctrinability, reciprocal altruism, warfare, and genocide as being "phylogenetically adaptive" from an evolutionary perspective. 73 Wilson's critics who include among others the radically oriented 'Study Group of Science for the People' from Harvard, accuse Wilson of misrepresenting both genetic and sociological facts. They point out that Wilson's sociobiological views may be used to legitimate aggression, competition, domination of women by men, defense of national territory, individualism, status, and wealth. 74 We may understand from the nature of such criticisms that the whole debate as related to the biological determinants of human behavior is as heated today as it was in the time of John Locke. Many social theorists continue to uncompromisingly argue against any suggestion that man's social life and habits may be effected by certain characterizing features of human nature. 75

The question which social scientists are faced with today and with which this analysis shall deal, is whether or not to accept the existing consensus of opinion that man's behavior is not influenced by his innate nature, insofar as it is solely socially determined. Apart from simply uncritically accepting the existing consensus of opinion, how can sociologists objectively be sure that the human personality is nothing more than a product of society which excludes all determinate biological factors
innate to man as a species being? There are a number of alternatives available to the social scientist who is seriously interested in coming to realistic terms with the dilemma of deciding to what extent biological considerations might have sociological relevance. One alternative would be for the sociologist or anthropologist to deal with this problem on the basis of his own knowledge of evolutionary biology, psychology, genetics, and human ethology. Unfortunately, most social scientists have only a semblance of a background in such biologically-oriented areas of knowledge. Any decision which a social scientist would make in this regard would only contribute to the mountain of vague and unverifiable biological speculations that have been made by social scientists to date.

Probably the most realistic alternative that a sociologist or anthropologist could follow, would be to re-evaluate the existing assumptions and theories within sociology which maintain that human nature is exclusively socially determined. Such a process of re-evaluation would involve looking at what the notion of the social determination of the human personality really means, and examining at the same time how widely the idea is shared by sociologists within the discipline at present. It would also involve analyzing the social and political milieu from within which this general idea originally emerged and how it became the dominant orientation. Finally, it would be important both to review those major theories that have been used to legitimate the idea that 'man is a product of society' and determine whether or not these theories have been altogether successful in excluding and refuting all implications that aspects of human individual development and action might in fact have a biological basis.

The current uncritical belief in the notion of the social determina-
tion of the human personality is a guarantee that any serious effort to examine the possible biological basis of man's social development will receive only restricted consideration by the social scientific community. However, the demonstration of how social-deterministic theories are themselves deeply immersed in biological assumptions would question the conventional wisdom about the irrelevance of biological factors as determinants of human behavior. At the same time, it would point to the necessity of making the existing assumptions about human nature more scientific by making use of empirically supported data about human nature from other scientific disciplines inclusive of ethology and sociobiology.
4) The Theory and The Hypothesis

A) The Specific Formulation of the Problem

From reviewing the implications of the general problem with which this study is concerned, it is possible to formulate the problem at a more detailed level of analysis. Specifically, this study shall be addressed to the problem of investigating the degree to which sociological and anthropological theory as an historical and developmental problematic has made explicit use of assumptions about man's nature in the definition of human behavior and culture generally. Further, the dynamics of sociological and anthropological theory construction will be outlined from a sociology of knowledge perspective in relation to the use which social theorists have made of assumptions of human nature. Additionally, it will be determined to what extent these assumptions of human nature are empirically justified. Also to be examined will be the degree to which liberalism as a pervasive ideology is related to both the history of the development of social theory generally and to the assumptions of human nature formulated by social theorists. Finally, the reliance of social theorists historically, on assumptions of human nature will be dealt with in terms of its implications for the future orientation of the social sciences. The question concerning how existing assumptions about human nature may be made more scientific through the use of empirically supported data from other disciplines will be discussed.

Together, all of these problems necessitate that the relationships between three specific variables be explicited in full. These three variables include:
i) assumptions of human nature formulated by social theorists since the Enlightenment.

ii) sociological and anthropological theory as an historical and developmental problematic.

iii) liberalism as an ideology.

In order to come to terms with the specific interrelationships between these three variables, it is necessary to place them within a coherent theoretical structure. Such a meaningful theoretical structure will allow for the generation of an interpretive framework through which the interrelationships between these three variables may be more clearly understood.
B) The Theory

It has been argued by Girvetz, Mills, Rousseas, Farganis, and Hallo-well among others, that there exists, historically, a definite relationship between anthropological and sociological theory on the one hand and liberal-ism on the other, in terms of:

1) the general theoretical orientation of social theory and liberal ideals;
2) the assumptions of human nature formulated by social theorists and liberal ideals.

Insofar as liberalism is an ideology, it has been shown here to be charac-terized by basic variations which have comprised the belief in individual-ism as well as the belief in social integration. The fact that liberalism as an ideology is subject to divergent and often contradictory changes and variations corresponds closely to what Pitirim Sorokin has defined as the essential features of any and all major ideologies.

In one of his most well known studies, Society, Culture and Person-ality, Sorokin presented an analysis of ideological systems in terms of their relation to the dynamics of socio-cultural processes. Sorokin noted that an ideology, as a meaningful aspect of a society's cultural system "...inevitably changes as long as it continues to exist and function even if it is placed in a wholly static environment". At the same time how-ever, Sorokin emphasizes that any socio-cultural system as well as the ideology that characterizes it is wholly finite. Therefore, as he explains, an ideology is capable of only a limited number of basic vari-ations or types of changes.

Having exhausted these types, the system either disinte-grates or repeats these types in a new setting, with different secondary characteristics.
In this regard, individual libertarianism as well as the two aspects of social integration inclusive of conservatism and collectivism, constitute the basic variations of liberalism which have manifested themselves in new social and historical situations. Sorokin, in discussing the limited possibilities of the basic variations of an ideological system, defined this general process as the Principle of Limits. The principle of limits expresses the basic fact that because almost all ideologies are limited in their variations, their variations must, in turn, reoccur in time.

Additionally, Sorokin indicated that the basic variations of an ideological system may not necessarily be logically consistent with one another, that is, they may be contradictory. Any ideological system, according to Sorokin.

...is never static and always contains in itself tensions that, demanding resolution, produce continual change and new creation.78

Liberalism, insofar as it embodies contradictory ideals ranging from libertarianism, conservatism and collectivism bears within itself the seeds of incessant change. In this sense Sorokin illustrated the fact that the causes of change in a social or ideological system are inherent in the system itself. He has defined this specific feature of ideologies as the Principle of Immanent Change...

To reiterate, the cause of the changes is inherent in the system itself. Whether the system is scientific or religious, aesthetic or philosophical, whether it is represented by a family, a business firm, an occupational union, or a state, it bears within itself the seeds of incessant change, which mark every action and reaction even in a fixed environment.79

This fundamental principle characteristic of all socio-cultural phenomena, inclusive of ideologies does not exclude, as Sorokin emphasizes, the
influence of external factors. These external factors include the influence of social, political, economic as well as theoretical and scientific developments on the general evolution of the ideology in question. However, the measure of influence which such external factors have on an ideology consists largely:

a) in the acceleration or retardation of the immanent change of a system.

b) in facilitating or hindering the realization of the immanent change of a system.

c) in the suppression, distortion, or overdevelopment of some of its characteristics.

d) in a modification of its external traits or in its mutilation or destruction.

External factors cannot transform a given system into something fundamentally different from its essential nature, cannot make it unfold properties which it does not possess, cannot radically alter its immanent course.

From this perspective there exists the possibility that the evolution of liberalism while it may have been due to its adaptation to changing external influences, may also have been the consequence of attempts to resolve contradictory ideals inherent within liberalism as an ideology.

A last feature, which Sorokin defines as being characteristic of all ideologies, is the fact that they require a means or a vehicle for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of their meanings, values and norms. As Sorokin has described...

As long as a system of meanings remains at the stage of a mere mental conception, it does not constitute a part of empirical sociocultural reality. It must first somehow be objectified through vehicles and then socialized through becoming known to other human beings. If the conception of an ideological system may be compared to the conception of an organism, its objectification may be likened to the birth of an organism.
Every socio-cultural system, in order to retain any form of integration, must have vehicles that objectify and manifest the meanings, values and norms of its dominant ideology.

Sorokin's general theoretical principles are supported by a large range of theories, data and general insights already widely accepted by the sociological community at present. His principle of imminent change indicates that socio-cultural phenomena generally, ideologies specifically, are in themselves self-regulating and goal-directed. The origins of this particular principle are predicated on the insufficiencies of the "externalistic approach" to completely account for the dynamics of change inherent in all socio-cultural phenomena. Sorokin understood the "externalistic approach" to constitute forms of explanations, inclusive of the environmentalistic theory of change, which define the independent variable as one external to the dependent. In criticizing the externalistic approach, he points out that...

If a partisan of the externalistic principle protests saying any such system or organism does not exist in a vacuum but in a certain environment to which it incessantly reacts and through which therefore it is changed, the answer is that the existence in an environment of a given system is one thing and the imputation to that environment of the whole or major part of the change of the system is quite another thing. If of two variables no matter what they are one is changing while the other remains constant no logician or statistician would ascribe the change of the first variable to the other, the constant one. Insofar as socio-cultural phenomena may in itself be goal-directed and self-regulating it becomes necessary to describe the influence of external factors as facilitating or inhibiting rather than determinate.

The idea that an ideology or nearly any other socio-cultural system may be self-regulating and goal-directed corresponds closely to what gen-
eral system theorists (using a cybernetic model of a living organism) have defined as "homeostasis":

The ability of living things to balance themselves is called homeostasis, discovered by Cannon in 1939, and usually defined as the process by which living systems restore themselves, or maintain steady states within a range of variation, offsetting inputs which would otherwise greatly change or destroy them.84

Some biologists have also adopted the idea of immanent change to explain the processes of evolution. For example, Hardy and Waddington, using Goethe's idea of "archetypes", maintain that evolution can only run in archetypal grooves, gradually actualizing potentialities which are already present in the amoeba.85

There is also much evidence available to support the general credibility of Sorokin's principle of limits. The principle of limits is most clearly illustrated by the limited types of economic, political and social organizations which have characterized the growth and evolution of human civilization. These types have been restricted to hunting and gathering, pastoral, agricultural and industrial forms of social organization. The fact that socio-cultural systems are limited in their basic variations has also been argued by sociologists inclusive of Herbert Spencer. It was Spencer who noted that human societies are limited to the military or industrial forms of social organization. Similarly, Auguste Comte also emphasized that human society is limited in its evolution to the development of the theological, metaphysical and positivistic stages. Additionally, Ferdinand Tönnies maintained that human society is restricted to Gesellschaft or Gemeinschaft forms of social relationships.86 In summary then, the principle of limits has constituted an explicit element of a wide
number of well known and influential sociological and anthropological theories.

Lastly, Sorokin's idea that vehicles are required for the objectification and manifestation of an ideology's meanings, values and norms is well supported in the literature dealing with the nature and sources of ideology. Apart from the available evidence, it is logical and obvious to assume that any system of meanings, values and norms of which an ideology consists must have some means external to it, in order that its meanings may be communicated and related in some manner to the everyday life experiences of the individual. The question which this analysis is concerned with, is to determine how extensively social theory and the assumptions of man's nature explicit in it, have constituted a vehicle for liberal ideology.

From the evidence provided here, it would appear that the use of Sorokin's principles of immanent change and limits as well as his idea of vehicles are useful for coming to terms with the nature of liberalism as an ideology. Most of Sorokin's ideas, concepts and theories dealing with the characteristics of ideology are supported by other theories and arguments which are commonly referred to and agreed upon in the social sciences today. Sorokin himself reviewed the predecessors of his own integralist philosophy and made no claims for its novelty or originality. Among the various forerunners of Sorokin's theories one may particularly notice the influence of Aristotle's ideas. In defining the credibility of Sorokin's theories in this regard, Joseph Ford has pointed out that...
In noting the parallels between Aristotle's and Sorokin's thought one should not neglect the fact that Sorokin makes reference to numerous other predecessors of his own use of the principles of Immanence and Limits and, hence, explicitly and implicitly, parts of his integralist philosophy. These references include numerous examples from Chinese and Hindu thought, as well as from Western thinkers from ancient to modern times.89

In short, Sorokin's theories dealing with the characterizing features of ideology provide a concise and systematic means to come to terms with the nature of liberalism as an ideology utilizing many of the insights and theories which have formed an inherent part of Western intellectual development.

Apart from understanding the inherent structural characteristics of liberalism as an ideology, it is also important to review what has previously been discussed in relation to the elementary features of social theory. Philosophers of science, inclusive of Popper, Kuhn and Mannheim, have indicated that social theory historically changes in response to:

i) the falsification of original theories through the introduction of new empirical data. - Popper

ii) paradigm shifts due to operations of normal science and scientific revolutions. - Kuhn

iii) influence of external factors including new social, economic, political and theoretical developments. - Mannheim

It has also been argued that the assumptions of human nature which social scientists have relied on in their theories have likewise changed in response to new social and theoretical developments. Other than the obvious differences between the Social Darwinistic and Pragmatic views of human nature there are, in addition, many other examples of how assumptions of human nature explicit in social theory change in response to an evolving social problematic.90 Such changes in assumptions about human
nature for example are clearly evidenced in those major theories which emerged as a reaction to the chaotic effects of the French Revolution. The theorists involved in this particular reaction included Hegel, de Bonald, de Maistre and Burke. Zeitlin has accurately characterized this situation when he noted that:

Generally deploiring the disorganizing consequences for Europe of the French Revolution, the Romantic and conservative thinkers attributed these consequences to the folly of the revolutionaries, who had uncritically accepted Enlightenment assumptions and had attempted to reorder society according to rational principles alone. An essential feature of the reaction by these theorists to the Enlightenment was the rejection of the libertarian assumptions about the nature of man and their consequent acceptance of assumptions which emphasized man's need for social integration and control.

Summary

The theoretical framework upon which this analysis is based has attempted to outline and interpret the following interrelationships:

1) between the general orientation of social theory historically and liberal ideals.

2) between the assumptions of human nature formulated by social theorists historically and liberal ideals.

3) between liberalism as an ideology and the essential structural characteristics of all ideologies inclusive of:
   a) vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of its meanings, values and norms.
   b) the principle of limits
   c) the principle of immanent change.
C) Towards the Formulation of Hypotheses

Given the general theoretical framework of this analysis the following hypotheses will be suggested, concerning the nature of the interrelationships since the Enlightenment between assumptions of human nature, social theory and liberalism as an ideology:

1) Assumptions about human nature as they have been formulated by social theorists since the Enlightenment have constituted vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology.

2) Assumptions about human nature utilized in social theory since the Enlightenment have changed in response to new historical and theoretical developments.

3) The changes of assumptions about human nature evidenced in social theory since the Enlightenment are limited to the exemplification of the basic variations of liberal ideology.

4) The specific assumptions about human nature explicit or implicit in social theory since the Enlightenment have changed concomitantly with the immanent processes of change inherent within liberalism as an ideology.
D. Diagrammatic Representation of Hypotheses

Graphically, the dynamic relationships between the variables dealt with in the four hypotheses may be represented as follows:

ASSUMPTIONS OF HUMAN NATURE UTILIZED IN SOCIAL THEORY

Variation over time

Hypothesis #1

Hypothesis #2

Hypothesis #3

Hypothesis #4

LIBERALISM

EVOLVING SOCIAL PROBLEMATIC

Trends of Influence
The general orientation of these hypotheses is directed towards the interpretation of the dynamic and multi-dimensional relationships over time between assumptions of human nature, social theory and liberalism. More explicitly, these hypotheses are directed towards revealing the nature of the functional, meaningful, and concomitant relationships between these three variables. A functional relationship is implied in relation to the possibility that assumptions of human nature in social theory have constituted vehicles of liberal ideology. Meaningful relationships are implied in terms of the exemplification of the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology by social theory historically. Finally, positive concomitant relationships are implied in terms of the accompanying interdependent variations between the three variables in question over time. Specifically, the idea of concomitant variation (concomitanza) may be defined as the relation between two or more variates in time, especially of the variation of two or more time-series in the same direction (positive concomitance) or in opposite directions (negative concomitance).  

By emphasizing the idea of concomitant variation in relation to the analysis of the interrelationships between the three variables with which this analysis is concerned, it is possible to avoid the problem of causation. It has been argued convincingly by George Theoderson that...

The major weakness of most attempts to maintain the causative framework in sociology is that they involve a persistence of the assumption that science can find absolute and final causes. Implicit within the use of such concepts as concomitant variation is the recognition that the applicability of causal laws in the social sciences
are limited to the explanation of dynamic interrelationships between socio-cultural phenomena. This point made here is of course completely opposite to that maintained by Emile Durkheim. He argued that sociology as a scientific discipline requires

...that the principle of causation be applied to social phenomena.94

By recognizing that causal laws are in fact limited, at least in the case of this study, to concomitant variations it is not intended that they are thereby more relative or less accurate portrayals of reality.95 Causal laws stated in the context of concomitant variations still depend for their validity on empirical verification and the consensus of agreement of the social scientific community.96 This analysis will endeavor to emphasize the dynamic interrelationships between a large number of contributary factors in the explanation of the general changes in the assumptions about human nature which have been utilized historically by social theorists. In this manner the question of the specific structural relationship between the ideas of the various social theorists and their material and social circumstances will be avoided. The provision of a strict structural analysis, within a sociology of knowledge context, is only secondary to the general purposes of this discussion.
5) The Nature and Scope of This Study

A) The Problem of Macro-Sociological Theories

The general orientation and problem with which this study is concerned necessitates that all the major theoretical trends and theories in sociology and anthropology be closely scrutinized, interpreted, and evaluated in light of the hypotheses which have been suggested here. To many, the scope of this study will appear as theoretically impractical and overly general. Sociological analysis today, rather than facing the task of reviewing its own historical and theoretical development, has immersed itself instead in the exacting study of small-scale problems and issues. Of course, these types of analyses are in themselves creative and are essential for providing new, though limited, insights into the subject matter. However, there exists another significant form of sociological analysis which may be seen as equally creative. This type of analysis as Theodore Abel explains

...involves the systemization of its [sociology's] content, which includes its presentation in historical perspective and its critical analysis.  

It is within this particular context that this study will be carried out.

Any scientific discipline, or discipline that at least hopes to be scientific, must at some time turn back upon itself and reflect on its own development and the origins of those assumptions on the basis of which it is currently conducting research. No doubt what will be discovered will be found to be unpopular by those who are already convinced of the scientific status of sociological and anthropological theory at the present time. Additionally, the general methods by which such a self-
reflective study is carried out may be subject to question by those social scientists trained in strictly experimental and quantitative methods, who have focused their analytical attention on problems of a much smaller scale. Nevertheless, it is only when we remember that much of the development of sociology has been based upon a great many macro-generalizing theories that we can appreciate their importance for the discipline as a whole.

The theories of Comte, Durkheim, Marx and Weber together constitute proof of the contributions which can be obtained from a macro-theoretical approach. These types of far-reaching, generalizing and often philosophical social theories which have dealt with the elementary structural and dynamic properties of socio-cultural reality, have constituted turning points in the progress and evolution of the social sciences. As Pitirim Sorokin, one of the leading exponents of this type of theoretical approach has contended...

Despite the unpopularity of these sort of sociologies and social philosophies among the contemporary American sociologists, their momentous practical influence in the past as well as at present can hardly be seriously questioned or disdainfully passed by in silence. In my personal opinion it is the most important use of sociology out of all technical uses of specialized sociologies. And the social role of the authors of generalized sociological theories appears to me to be the most significant among all the roles of sociologists. This particular study is based upon the recognition of Sorokin's own contributions to sociology in his use of a macro-theoretical approach, as well as upon his firm conviction in the value and practicality of this method of analysis as a whole.
B) The Data

Any historical and interpretative study of a scientific discipline, whatever its purpose, is always confronted with a number of fundamental problems in terms of the selection of those theorists who are seen to be major contributors to its development as a discipline. The various theories which will be examined in detail here, were chosen on the basis that their importance to the discipline and their influence on other thinkers has already been commonly recognized and agreed upon within the existing reviews and summaries of the history of sociology and anthropology. While a consensus of opinion is not of course any final criterion of truth, it at least partially relieves the writer of this analysis from the burden of the responsibility for the selection of those theorists to be dealt with. More importantly, the inclusion and review of social theorists, whether they are sociologists or anthropologists whose importance to the discipline has already been emphasized, contributes towards the integration of this study into an already existing body of fact and opinion.

Despite the necessity for the selection of individual theorists, we shall concentrate more in this study on the relationship between the theories of specific theorists as related to larger complexes or schools of theories. For the sake of brevity, the systematization of analysis and logical consistency, the social theories to be examined shall be reviewed within the larger context of separate and definable theoretical complexes, schools or trends. It is important to emphasize that both Marvin Harris and Don Martindale have already established a well recognized precedent with regards to this type of methodological approach in their summarization and interpretation of the development of anthropology and sociology.
respectively.

Again, following the format of analysis already defined by Marvin Harris, among others, this study will examine the interrelationships between assumptions of human nature, social theory and liberalism as an ideology with respect to the various major theories contained in the following 'schools' of anthropological and sociological thought:

1) Schools of Anthropological Thought
   a) Racial Determinism
   b) Evolutionism
   c) Historical Particularism
   d) Culture and Personality
   e) French Structuralism
   f) British Social Anthropology

2) Schools of Sociological Thought
   a) Theories of the Enlightenment
   b) Theories of the Reaction to the Enlightenment
   c) Positivism
   d) Positive Organicism
   e) Phenomenology
   f) Marxism and Conflict Theories
   g) Elite Theories
   h) Social Darwinism
   i) Pragmatism
   j) Symbolic Interactionism
   k) Micro and Macro Functionalism
   l) The New Left

The actual analytical procedure to be followed in this interpretative review of anthropological theory might be criticized by some as amounting to nothing more than a tiresome collection of unintended statements taken out of context. The exegesis of statements by theorists, it should be pointed out, is neither the intended goal nor method of this discussion. While a detailed examination of each particular theory is necessarily required, the method, however, to be employed will not merely consist of the collection of statements made by each anthropologist and sociologist
which conveniently throws light upon, or lends support to, the focal point of this analysis. All in all, the method of approach shall be a holistic and systematic one. A significant statement made by a particular social theorist shall be related to the larger structure of his own theories as well as to the still larger theoretical framework of the school of thought with which he has some degree of affinity. By employing such an analytical procedure, it is hoped a more complete contextual understanding of each theorist will be achieved. Also, it is felt that such a method of analysis will provide a sound basis upon which to judge the significance of each theory in relation to the hypotheses as they have been defined here.

Both primary and secondary sources were consulted throughout this study. Secondary sources were used essentially as a means of providing a general orientation to each of the major social theorists that were examined. By consistently using secondary sources in this manner it was possible to obtain a general and preliminary overview of both the contributions and shortcomings of the major theories dealt with, as well as an understanding of the relationship of each theory to the development of the discipline as a whole. The original writings of each of the major theorists were also carefully analyzed. In this regard it was noted to what extent the secondary sources originally referred to had accurately portrayed the scope and implications of the particular theory in question. By using both primary and secondary sources in such a comparative manner it was possible to gain both a clearer understanding not only of the specific characteristics of each of the major theories in sociological and anthropological thought, but also how those theories have been interpreted
and evaluated by other social scientists.

The chapters of this study dealing with the presentation and analysis of data are arranged chronologically insofar as they begin with an examination of the social theories of the Enlightenment and end with the review of contemporary sociological and anthropological theories. Specifically, each of these chapters deal with a number of 'schools' of sociological and anthropological thought. In each chapter the theories of an original school of thought is examined as well as those schools of social theory which emerged in reaction to it. In this fashion it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the underlying dynamics of the evolution of sociological and anthropological theory. The arrangement in chapters of the major theoretical schools of the social sciences facilitates a more comprehensive examination of the immediate similarities and differences between each of the social theories in regards to specific issues and changing social and theoretical circumstances. Further, it provides a framework by which the detailed comparison of the major social theories may be systematically conducted and evaluated in relation to the hypotheses which have been formulated and which serve as the basis for this study.
1. For a brief discussion of the contrast between the Epicurean and Stoic views of human nature see: Runke, Gerald; A History of Western Political Thought (Ronald Press; New York; 1968) pp. 43-9.

2. See:
   ii) Wallas, Graham; Human Nature in Politics (Constable; London; 1920) p. 12.

3. Forcuser, Dennis and Stephen Richer; 'A Sociological Perspective' in Forcuser, Dennis and Richer, Stephen (eds.); Issues in Canadian Society - An Introduction to Sociology (Prentice-Hall; Scarborough, Ontario; 1975) p. 7.


8. Wrong, Dennis A.; 'The Oversocialized Conception of Man' in Barron, L. Milton (ed.); Contemporary Sociology (Dodd, Mead; New York; 1964) p. 555.


13. Ibid.; p. 46.


15. Ibid.; p. 100.


19. Kuhn, Thomas S.; *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1962) p. 82.


23. van den Berghe, Pierre L.; *Man In Society* (Elsevier; New York; 1965) p. 3.

24. Bruckner, M.B.A.; *Social Science and Society* (McCutchan; Berkeley, California; 1968) p. 44.


29. Nagel, Ernst; 'Problems of Concept and Theory Formation In the Social Sciences' in Natanson, Maurice (ed.); Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Random House; New York; 1963) p. 201.

30. For a precise definition of abridgement, validation, postulated abridgement and naive assumptions, see: Gluckman, Max (ed.); Closed Systems and Open Minds (Aldine; Chicago; 1967) pp. 173-184; 212; 232.


32. Wood, Ellen M.; Mind and Politics (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1972) p. 175.

33. Mills, C. Wright; The Marxists (Dell; New York; 1962) p. 28.


36. Wolff, Robert Paul; The Poverty of Liberalism (Beacon Press; Boston; 1968) p. 156.


38. For more detailed discussions of the nature of ideology, see:
   i) Turner, Ralph H. & Lewis M. Killian; Collective Behavior (Prentice-Hall; Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; 1972) p. 270.
   ii) Pochoda, P.M.; Concepts of Ideology in Sociological Theory (University Microfilms; Ann Arbor, Michigan; 1970) p. 3.


40. See:
   ii) Strauss, Leo; Liberalism Ancient and Modern (Basic Books; New York; 1968) p. 263.
41. Popper, Karl; Conjectures and Refutations (Basic Books; New York; 1963) p. 351.


44. Mills, C. Wright; The Marxists; Op. Cit.; p. 16.


47. Fromm, Erich; Marx's Concept of Man (Frederick Ungar; New York; 1971) p. 5.


51. See, for example:
   i) Lorenz, Konrad; On Aggression (Harcourt, Brace & World; New York; 1960).
   ii) Tinbergen, Niko; The Study of Instinct (Oxford University Press; New York; 1951).


54. For a concise history of ethology as well as a comprehensive outline of recent advances in the field, see:
   Fox, M.W.; Concepts in Ethology (University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis; 1974) pp. 3-27.


   ii) Lorenz, Konrad; Evolution and Modification of Behavior (University Press; Chicago; 1965).
   iii) Morris, Desmond; The Naked Ape (McGraw Hill; New York; 1967).


61. See, for instance:


64. Refer to:


66. Worsely, Peter; Introducing Sociology (Penguin; Middlesex; 1970) p. 25.

67. Parsons, Talcott; The Social System (Free Press; New York; 1951) p. 488.


69. For an insightful description of the rule and influence of L'Ecole Polytechnique in the shaping of contemporary social theory, see:
70. See, for example, the comments made by Ruth Benedict on the non-existence of human instincts:


74. Sociobiology Study Group of Science for the People; 'Sociobiology - Another Biological Determinism' in BioScience (Vol. 26; March; 1976) p. 182.
See also for a brief review of the ongoing debate between Wilson and his critics:

75. See:
i) Blacking, John; 'Comments' in Current Anthropology (Vol. 2; 1972) pp. 558-59.
ii) Cohen, Yehudi A.; Man In Adaptation - The Biosocial Background (Aldine; Chicago; 1974) p. 273.
vi) Handelman, Don; 'Comments' in Current Anthropology (Vol. 14; 1973) p. 381.
vii) Larson, Roger; 'Review Symposium' in Contemporary Sociology (Vol. 5; 1975) p. 5.

76. Sorokin, Pitirim; Society, Culture and Personality (Cooper Square Publishers; New York; 1962) p. 696.

77. Ibid.; p. 701.

78. Ibid.; p. 660.


80. Ibid.; p. 697.

81. Ibid.; p. 555.

83. Ibid.; p. 594.


85. See:

86. For a concise overview of Comte's, Spencer's and Tonnies's views on the limited types of social organization, see:
   Martindale, Don; The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory (Houghton Mifflin; Boston; 1960) pp. 64, 68, 83.

87. See, for example:


90. Mills, C. Wright; Sociology and Pragmatism (Paine Whitman; New York; 1964) p. 447.


92. For detailed discussions on the nature and meaning of concomitant variation, see:
   i) Kendall, Maurice G. & William R. Buckland; A Dictionary of Statistical Terms (Oliver & Boyd; Edinburgh; 1971) p. 29.


96. For a well documented argument against the use of idea of causation in social sciences, see:
   Burge, Mario; Causality - The Place of The Causal Principle In Modern Science (Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass.; 1953) p. 279.


1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

The intention of this chapter is to analyze a number of Enlightenment social theories inclusive of those formulated by John Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius. By reviewing the works of all these theorists it will be possible to see to what extent they were able to remain aloof from the incorporation of liberal meanings, norms and values into their interpretations of the nature of human society. Also to be examined in this chapter is the degree to which all of these theorists might have utilized, in a causal and determinate fashion, assumptions about human nature in objectifying, manifesting and legitimizing their liberal ideals. Equally as important, the reaction to the theories of the Philosophes by a number of leading social theorists of the nineteenth century, including Burke, Hegel and de Maistre will be studied. These theorists belonged to a theoretical movement which is commonly referred to as 'The Romantic Conservative Reaction'. By noting not only the essential features of the major theories of the Enlightenment, but also the initial characteristics of those theories which sought to criticize its consequences, it will be possible to come to a clearer understanding of the evolution of a particular stage of social theory. A more systematic and definite framework by which to comprehend the dynamics of sociological theory construction will be obtained by studying the assumptions of human nature formulated by the theorists of the Enlightenment and the Romantic Conservative Reaction in relation to both liberalism and to the changing social situation of European society.
This study as a whole is concerned with the examination of the interrelationships between three distinct variables. The variables consist of social theory, liberalism and the use of assumptions about human nature within the context of social theory. The Enlightenment holds special significance in relation to gaining an understanding of the interrelationships which may exist between these variables. It was within the period of the Enlightenment that liberalism as an ideology came to have a great deal of influence on intellectual development. At the same time, social theory became one of the chief means by which liberal intellectuals attempted to lend credibility to both their liberal beliefs and to the notion of a "science of society". Various concepts and assumptions about human nature came to play an important part within the various social theories formulated by many liberal intellectuals within this period of social thought.

A number of social historians and social scientists have contended that social theory as we know it today, first emerged in the period of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment, as a process of the assertion of rationality against institutionalized religion and mysticism, can hardly be defined in exact periodic terms. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the formulation of the major social theories and ideas of the Enlightenment comprised a period which began in 1690 and ended with the outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789. Marvin Harris argued that the idea of "a science of culture" may be attributed to the social theories developed by the well-known Enlightenment thinkers. As the great intellectual movement of the age, the Enlightenment provided a whole constellation of
unique and unprecedented insights into the nature of human society. George Rudé, in commenting on the scientific contributions of the theorists of this historical period, noted that...

The Enlightenment...expressed itself in various guises - in scientific treatises, philosophical and political tracts, the social sciences, sensational psychology, and the writings of physiocrats, free-traders, and economists. But in all these guises it had a general tendency to explain the universe, nature and man in secular and rational terms, to eschew mysticism and the belief in sin, to see man with all his imperfections as susceptible -- of indefinite improvement, and to imply the laws of science to human psychology and society. Subtly combining rationalism, with empiricism, it was militant, didactic, and widely influential.

The articulation of reason and rationality through the application of the methods of the natural sciences to social phenomena have been understood as the essential characterizing features of the Enlightenment.

The Age of Reason was shaped by the writings of the Philosophes who, as it is assumed by social historians today, built their systems of thought upon the combined bases of rationalism and experience. The leading theorists of the Enlightenment included Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Helvetius, as well as such notable figures as Voltaire and Diderot, among others. Together all of these theorists questioned and criticized the traditional legal, moral and religious foundations of Western culture generally, French society specifically. Nothing was exempt from the pervasive scrutiny of 'Reason'. The 'spirit of the Enlightenment' as it was articulated by the social theorists of this period, expressed various forms of inquisitive skepticism towards all traditional beliefs and institutions.

One of the most intense intellectual debates during the Enlightenment was over the question of religion. The debate was between those who called
themselves deists, those who believed in the power of Reason, and finally those who were orthodox and conventional Christians. The criticism of Christianity and political Absolutism by the Philosophes was, in part, a reflection of the inability of these institutions to deal with a changing French society. In a similar light, the historian Brumfit has maintained that the crisis of consciousness in the eighteenth century would never have developed its distinctive anti-Christian tone if the Church had not been in some sense a political as well as an intellectual force. Still less would it have developed a critique of political society, if that society had not itself manifested its inadequacy.

The social theories which emerged from the Enlightenment facilitated the destruction of the Church and the traditional forms of political power.

The social theorists of the Enlightenment sought to eliminate everything which did not conform to the dictates of reason. At the same time they envisaged an extensive reconstruction of French society. The criteria and guide for the reconstruction of society which the French Philosophes chose was one of the central ideals and basic variations of liberal ideology - the belief in individual freedom. The guarantee of individual liberty was to be the measure of a just society.

The philosophers all agreed, too, on the right to dissent, the right to free speech for all reasonable men, an end to arbitrary government, an end to cruel treatment of accused persons, an end to torture as an instrument of interrogation or punishment. In short, men of the Enlightenment everywhere were, in the broad sense of the word, political liberals.

In this sense the liberal ideals of individualism constituted an essential part of the theories of the Philosophes. Through examining their various social theories we may gain a clearer understanding of the nature of the relationship between liberalism on the one hand and the general orienta-
tion of their theories on the other. The problem with which this study is concerned is related to the question of whether or not the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists since the Enlightenment yields to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. Only by first recognizing the general ideological milieu in which these theorists wrote can we then assess the extent to which their use of assumptions about man's nature were linked with their particular liberal world-views.

The belief of the Enlightenment thinkers in a natural science of society was also intimately related to their liberal ideals and the orientation of their values. In this sense, the Philosophes' idea that society was ruled by predictable, mechanistically determined processes in the form of natural laws was closely tied up with their belief in individual freedom and the exemption of man from all forms of arbitrary authority. Ellen Wood explained that one of the most striking accomplishments of the Enlightenment theorists was that in maintaining their liberal ideals of individuality they seemed

... to have found a concept of social freedom that could reconcile a faith in the orderly, predictable, mechanistically determined operation of society - comparable to the operation of physical forces - with a commitment to individual liberty. In its definition of freedom, liberalism, ideally frees the individual to a great extent from human authority by subjecting him to the impersonal authority of mechanistic social forces.

The social theories of the Philosophes, their liberal ideals and their concurrent belief in a natural science of society were closely interrelated and dependent on one another.

Natural law, a prominent element of Enlightenment social theory, was thought to be the underlying basis of a rational society. According to many of the Philosophes, the perception and definition of natural law
required no aid other than the rational forces of knowledge, which communicated their findings to scientists through sense perception and its supplementary process of logical judgement and inference. In this sense the Philosophes argued that the realm of nature was opposed to the realm of divine grace. They were convinced that it was through the application of the methods of science rather than the adherence to divine grace that would ultimately give the individual control over his environment.

The importance of the social theories of the Philosophes to the central purposes of this study lies in the fact that they conceived of their theories as scientific. As it has been suggested in the previous chapter, one of the essential concerns of this analysis is to determine to what extent the use of assumptions about human nature in social theory since the Enlightenment has conformed to the hypothetico-deductive methods of science proper. At the same time, the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists will also be considered from a sociology of knowledge perspective. The social theories of the Enlightenment constituted one of the first attempts to conceptualize man and society within a scientific perspective. The examination of these theories provides the opportunity of determining the extent to which the theorists responsible for their formulation utilized assumptions about human nature which reflected the particular liberal ideals and values to which they adhered.

There existed a distinct relationship between the liberal ideals of the Philosophes and their belief in a science of society. The same liberal ideals came to play a significant part in shaping other elements of their social theory. The Philosophes were critics of the constraining forces of traditional institutions and customs insofar as they were
thought to be impediments to the realization of individual liberty. However as Irving Zeitlin has suggested, explicit within the social critiques formulated by the Philosophes was the assumption

...that the prevailing institutions were contrary to man's nature and thus inhibitive of his growth and development.

The Philosophes assumed man's nature to be innately good and that it was the social environment which was responsible for man's aggressive and unjust actions, as well as for the inequalities that could be observed between men. The very ideal of progress which most of the social theorists of the Enlightenment supported was structured around the assumption that through education and the elimination of inadequate institutions man's innately good nature, based on the qualities of individual freedom, could be facilitated and realized. More simply...

The positive tenets of the Philosophes...may perhaps be summarized a trifle vaguely as devotion to liberality and toleration. They believed as Lord Morely said, 'that human nature is good, that the world is capable of being a desirable place and that the evil of the world is the fruit of bad education and bad institutions'.

There exists a general consensus of opinion among at least some critics and historians of the Enlightenment, that there was an interdependent relationship between the liberal ideals of the thinkers of the Enlightenment, their theories of man, society, social reform, and their explicit assumptions about man's innate nature. This particular chapter of this study shall be concerned with the examination of the interrelationships between those variables outlined above. The importance of studying these interrelationships gains significance when we recognize the lack of attention which has been given to them by social historians and social scientists.
A large number of social historians and social scientists have somewhat ignored the possibility that the theories of the Philosophes were characterized by a determinate ideological bias. Relatively little attention has been given to the extent to which the Philosophes utilized assumptions of human nature to exemplify and legitimize their own liberal worldview within the context of their social theories. At present, many scholars concerned with the problem of evaluating the overall significance of the Enlightenment insist that the social theorists of this period were the founders of the modern social sciences: Frederick Artz, a social historian who is concerned with the implications of the ideas of the Enlightenment, persistently argues that...

Many of the ideas of the Philosophes had been stated or suggested by earlier thinkers, especially by those of the Seventeenth Century, but the Philosophes in giving these ideas an order and a practical application can be considered the founders of the modern social sciences: political science, economics, sociology, ethnology, anthropology, history and psychology. Don Martindale has explained that positivism "as a movement of thought which rests all interpretation exclusively on experience," and which takes its point of departure from the natural sciences, was initiated by the early Enlightenment thinkers.

The opinions of Artz and Martindale have been complemented by the extensive arguments of Marvin Harris who insists that the general theory of the cultural determination of human behavior was originally formulated by the Philosophes. The theory of the cultural determination of behavior, according to Harris, excludes the influence of man's innate nature in its explanation of human behavior and society generally. It emphasizes how the processes of enculturation and other social influences determine human
action. As Harris states

...from our vantage point, it is apparent that a nascent version of the concept and theory of culture was the major theme in the intellectual ferment that preceded the French Revolution. Not only is the modern culture concept implicit in the ideological antecedents of the French Revolution, but the very substance of the revolutionary program proclaimed the validity of the concept and testified to its importance. 14

The arguments of Artz, Martindale and Harris are convincing to some extent. However, they fail to consider that the liberal world-view of these theorists might very well have influenced their theories of a science of society. It seems that at least Artz, Martindale and Harris, in their zealously to link the social sciences with the Enlightenment, neglected to account for, or recognize the possibility that the theories of the Philosophes were statements of a particular aspect of liberal ideology, Nor have they dealt with the possibility that the liberal ideals of these theorists were ultimately related to their choice and use of assumptions about human nature within their various social theories.

By analyzing the use of assumptions about human nature by these social theorists as well as their liberal beliefs we shall be in a more comprehensive position to evaluate the credibility of Artz', Martindale's and Harris' contentions. It will also be possible to determine to what degree the various assumptions about man formulated by these theorists yields to a sociology of knowledge interpretive framework of analysis. In addition, the use of assumptions about human nature by the Romantic-Conservative critics of the Enlightenment will be examined. On the basis of the evidence provided from this analysis, we shall be able to closely estimate whether the Enlightenment theorists as well as their Romantic-
Conservative critics were responsible for establishing a science of society or were in fact guilty of attempting to legitimate the particular liberal beliefs to which they lent support.
2) John Locke

By the beginning of the eighteenth century Cartesianism dominated philosophical thought in France. As a form of methodological inquiry, Cartesianism was applied to a wide range of subjects inclusive of history, ethics and religion. In explaining the nature of the Cartesian paradigm, J.H. Brumfitt pointed out that...

We can describe Descartes' method as one of cautious and systematic inquiry aimed at the reductive analysis of complex phenomena into their simplest constituent parts which can be explained in terms of truths which are self evident. Descartes' discourse of methodological reasoning given in his famous Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One's Reason and Seeking Truth In the Sciences (1637), essentially denied the validity of the axiomatic truths and syllogisms of the Scholastics.

Descartes sought to establish a system of rationalism deduced from clear and innate intuitions. His support of the validity of scientific research was complemented by his belief in the existence of fixed and immutable laws of nature, inertia and the conservation of energy. The material universe, according to Descartes, was ordered by the laws of motion which were determined once and for all by the Divine Intelligence. In his opinion, man was unique insofar as his nature was characterized by the union of soul and body. Mind, which Descartes saw as equal in importance to man's soul contained a number of innate ideas. He admitted that ultimately the existence of these innate ideas could be attributed to the hand of God.

The whole force of the argument lies in this -- that I now would not exist, and possess the nature I have, that nature which puts me in possession of the idea of God, unless God did really exist, the God, the idea of whom is found in me.
Descartes ascribed the laws of nature and man's essential innate nature and ideas to the workings of a Divine Intelligence. He felt that the "idea of God" was innate to the human consciousness. By showing the interrelationship between natural law on the one hand and God on the other, Descartes was able to reconcile the interests of science and the Church.

Descartes' ideas were subjected to severe criticisms by many social theorists in the late seventeenth century. The criticism of Descartes originated in the growing discontent of Enlightenment thinkers with all forms of metaphysical idealism, especially that type of idealism which legitimated the authority of the Church in acting as a mediator between man, the laws of nature and the ideas which were believed to be innate in human consciousness.

The practical-minded, freedom seeking bourgeoisie of the eighteenth century found Descartes' metaphysical system at once too speculative and too authoritarian. It became common to dismiss Descartes' philosophy as a chimera of fiction. "Un roman ingénieux," Voltaire fresh from his trip to England pronounced. 18

Enlightenment social theorists increasingly came to believe, contrary to the opinions of Descartes, that man was an individual who played an active role in determining his own behavior and thoughts.

One of the chief figures responsible for shifting the general orientation of social thought away from the theories of Descartes was John Locke. Locke, an English social theorist who wrote in the latter half of the seventeenth century, was the son of a Puritan who took his formal training in medicine and later gained access to public circles through becoming secretary to Lord Shaftesbury, founder of the Whig party. His general theoretical perspective was directed against metaphysical speculation and
the reliance of social thinkers on ideas of Divine Will to explain the origins of human thought and action. This did not mean, however, that Locke was intent on undermining all of the credibility of Christian religion. He set himself the task of understanding how human knowledge was gained without having to rely on the notions of innate ideas directed by God. The general intention of his social theories was to demonstrate that man himself, although inevitably under God's influence, played an important part in the development of human knowledge.

Locke's major theoretical contributions were formulated in his well known, *An Essay on Human Understanding* (1690). In this essay he explained that the mind of a child at birth, rather than being characterized by a number of innate ideas attributable to Divine Will, was in fact a *tabula rasa* -- a blank slate upon which experience and reflection, derived from the senses, wrote their effects. The creation of human knowledge was attributed not to the Divine Will, but to experience and its individual interpretation by man. The emphasis which he placed on the active role of the individual in the creation of human knowledge was a reflection of his liberal beliefs in individuality and his disillusionment with those theories that had posited an overly rigid control of man's behavior by God. Locke's liberal values have been interpreted by some social historians as being an essential element of all his theoretical discussions.

Theodore Artz, in this context, has written that...

In Locke, political ideas first became associated closely with the scientific movement. He approached social and political questions from the point of view of a seventeenth century physicist... All in all, Locke covered many fields - politics, religion, psychology and education - and in everything his emphasis was on the Liberal side of things.
In this regard, we may understand that his rejection of the Cartesian notion of innate ideas was a reflection of his liberal world-view by which he sought to establish man as a relatively independent actor, able to determine his own affairs and actions. The question nevertheless remains to what extent Locke might have made use of specific assumptions about the innate features of human nature in order to confirm and legitimize his liberal belief in the autonomy of the individual in the creation of human knowledge.

Locke’s theories are significant to the general purposes of this analysis in a number of respects. First, his theories comprised one of the first attempts to deal with the nature of human behavior from a secularized perspective. Thus, one would expect that his theories would be more sociologically oriented than many of the social theories formulated in the seventeenth century. It is for this reason that his theories have been seen as being the major forerunners to the establishment of a secularized theory of society which ultimately resulted in the development of the social sciences as a discipline. From reviewing Locke’s theories it will be possible to determine to what extent Locke was able to successfully go beyond the religious deterministic notions of the day. Also, from this perspective, it will be feasible to consider whether or not Locke merely replaced the Cartesian notion of a human nature defined and directed by God, with less religiously deterministic assumptions about man’s innate nature. Furthermore, the question of the relationship between his particular liberal views and his choice of specific assumptions about man’s innate nature will be discussed. The examination of Locke’s social theories presents the opportunity of seeing to what extent
his use of assumptions about human nature may be interpreted from a soci-
ology of knowledge perspective and to what degree it was based on the care-
ful weighing of empirical evidence available to him at that time.

The purpose of Locke's Essay on Human Understanding, was to inquire
into "the origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with
the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion and assent". In rejecting
the notion of innate ideas, he argued that

...to say, that there are truths imprinted on the soul,
which it perceives or understands most; imprinting, if it
signify any thing, being nothing else but the making of
certain truths to be perceived. For to imprint any thing
on the mind, without the mind's perceiving it, seems to me
hardly intelligible.21

Locke added that not only are there no innate ideas, but also there are no
innate moral principles.22 He maintained further, that knowledge rather
than being based on innate ideas, comes instead from experience in that
all human knowledge is factual.23 The "human soul" accordingly, is only
able to form ideas when it is able to perceive and sense the external
world.24

Locke defined the development of ideas as a dynamic process in that

In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations
about the ideas got by sensation, and thereby stores itself
with a new set of ideas...25

Despite his denial of the existence of ideas innate in the human conscious-
ness since birth, he nevertheless admitted that the human mind was charac-
terized by a number of innate faculties which enabled the individual to
retain "those simple ideas which from sensation and reflection it hath
received."26 These faculties included: perception, contemplation,
memory, attention, repetition, pleasure and pain, discerning, comparing and abstraction. 27 He believed that the sensing of pleasure and pain played a significant role in the development of the passions which all men share insofar as

...we love, desire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect to pleasure; we hate, fear and grieve, only in respect to pain

...all these passions are moved by things only as they appear to be causes of pleasure and pain... 28

The idea of pleasure was central to Locke's theories. He argued that the "necessity of perceiving true happiness is the foundation of liberty" and is "the greatest good" of intellectual beings. 29

Locke denied the existence of innate ideas as elementary and innate features of human nature. He admitted however that the essential faculties of reason which make sense of experience were part of man's innate nature shared by all members of the human species. It is important to emphasize that Locke was not against the use of assumptions about the nature of human nature within his various social theories. On the contrary, he was only intent on arguing that man's nature consisted of innate faculties of reason, directed by the individual, rather than man's intelligence and ideas being directly controlled by God. His choice of these specific assumptions about human nature were in turn a reflection of his general liberal world-view and belief in individual freedom and autonomy. It is exactly within this context that we may begin to understand Locke's use of assumptions about human nature from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

Stromberg, an historian of European intellectual development, commented on Locke's explicit use of assumptions about the innate nature of human
nature.

Our mind is a tabula rasa, he says, and everything comes to it from sensations. And yet somehow, it has the facility of finding general laws, of attaining to "clear and certain" truth. ... Between Locke's empiricism and his rational clarity lay in actuality a logical hiatus... Locke was sure that "the understanding has a native faculty to perceive the coherence or incoherence of its ideas and can range them right." It can reason. Is it then really a tabula rasa, getting everything from experience? 30

In this respect, Cassirer has complemented Stromberg's argument in emphasizing that...

Locke successfully attacked innate ideas but he permitted the prejudice regarding innate operations of the mind to survive. 31

Locke assumed that man by his innate nature is a reasoning creature endowed at birth with the necessary faculties to interpret sensory experience. He also assumed that man by nature is pleasure seeking. In this context, he articulated a classical Epicurean view of human nature which maintained that man is innately motivated by the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. 32

In other major works, Locke relied on a number of assumptions about the innate features of human nature. His Essays On the Law of Nature (1663) was an attempt to define the degree of obligation which the individual had towards natural law. By natural law he meant, a "law promulgated by God in a natural way". The binding force of natural law according to this argument was predicated on the interdependent relationship between God, natural law and human nature. W. van Leyden, who analyzed this particular essay, outlined the fact that Locke assumed that the individual has a moral as well as a natural obligation to natural law. He explained that

...
on the one hand, there are moral obligations, which are binding because they arise from the commands of a superior will, which as Locke puts it, is the final cause of all obligation. On the other hand there are natural obligations which are binding because they arise from man's nature...

Locke defined the essential character of natural law as being implanted in men's hearts by God so that reason can only discover and interpret it. According to this idea, the laws of nature are not created by individual reason or experience. These laws are realized only insofar as they are innate features of man's nature implanted by God which reason can only "discover and interpret". By maintaining this line of argument Locke was able to avoid overt conflict with the more traditional Church doctrines which asserted that human action was ultimately controlled by the hand of God. At the same time he was able to lend credibility to his liberal belief in the active role which the individual played in determining his own thoughts and action.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective it is obvious that Locke's choice of specific assumptions about human nature was ultimately related to his liberal beliefs and his concurrent critical attitudes towards those theories which had emphasized the complete determination of human behaviour by God. This point is especially helpful in understanding the extent to which such Enlightenment social theorists as John Locke were influenced in their choice and use of assumptions about man's innate nature by their liberal ideological biases.

In Essays On the Law of Nature, Locke contended that all men are compelled to search out and discover natural laws "...since man is very much urged on to this part of his duty by an inward instinct." It was
added that man is driven by his own innate nature to seek out the existence of natural law and is compelled by his own nature to obey it. As he explained this point...

For in the first place, it cannot be said that some men are born so free that they are not in the least subject to this law, for this is not a private or positive law created according to circumstances...rather it is a fixed and permanent rule of morals, which reason itself pronounces, and which persists being a fact so firmly rooted in the soul of human nature.36

Locke, in this argument, was again able to reconcile the belief in individual freedom of action with the idea of obedience to natural law by emphasizing that obedience to natural law is dictated by man's individual reason which is in turn an inherent element of human nature. In this instance we see the specific interrelationships which existed between his use of assumptions about human nature and his adamant belief in the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

Probably the most articulate expression of Locke's belief in the liberal ideals of individualism and his use of assumptions of human nature in the objectification of such ideals is given in his Two Treatises of Government (1680). In this essay it was argued that in order to understand political power it is first necessary to understand that the natural state of men

...is a state of perfect freedom to order their action and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit.37

In this fashion it was asserted that individual freedom is a natural and innate feature of man's nature. The desire to seek out the company of others in political society was likewise understood as being an essential feature of human nature. Locke interpreted man's sociability in terms of
...strong obligations of necessity, convenience and indoctrination which...drive him into society...\[38\]

He believed that the participation of the individual in society did not jeopardize his individual freedom, but rather guaranteed the continued protection of his personal property.\[39\]

Marvin Harris, in dealing with the theoretical significance of Locke's works, has contended that...

Locke's, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* was the midwife of all those modern behavioral disciplines, including psychology, sociology and cultural anthropology, which stress the relationship between conditioning environment and human thought and action.\[40\]

Harris' argument that Locke was responsible for originally outlining the relationship between environmental conditioning and human thought and action is in truth an overstatement and a misinterpretation of the facts. Contrary to Harris' opinion, Locke did in fact utilize a whole number of assumptions about man's innate nature to justify his theories about man's ability to reason, his willingness to obey natural law, his right to individual liberty and his sociability. In general, the social theories of Locke exemplify a basic interrelationship between his liberal views on individual liberty, his Christian background and the assumptions of human nature which he utilized in an explicitly determinate fashion to objectify, manifest and legitimize his liberal ideals.

Locke's theories, contrary to Harris' opinion, were ostensibly directed towards demonstrating that man by nature is a free individual who utilizes his innate faculties of reason to determine his own behavior and perception of the world. His rejection of the Cartesian theory of innate ideas did not, in itself, mean that Locke accepted the idea that man is...
without any form of an innate human nature. He insisted that man's ideas, rather than being determined by his innate nature as controlled by God, were instead developed by man as a free-acting and free-thinking individual. It was nevertheless admitted that the various faculties of man's reason, which make sense of experience were part of man's innate nature shared by all members of the human species. His attempts to emphasize that man was a self-motivated actor was related to his theory that man by nature was compelled to search out the existence of natural law. At the same time, he reconciled his belief in God by admitting that these natural laws are innate features of human nature defined by God which man, in turn, through his use of individual reason, attempts to discover and interpret.

The general orientation of the assumptions about human nature which Locke made use of are indicative of the close association which existed between his social theories and his liberal beliefs. From a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis, it is obvious that the particular assumptions about human nature which he utilized were not chosen on the basis of their empirical credibility. Rather, they were chosen in relation to the degree to which they served as a means to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals to which he adhered. The question remains to what extent Locke, as a forerunner of the social sciences, set the precedent for the use of assumptions about human nature in a similar ideological context for other social theorists of this period.
3) **Montesquieu**

Another major Enlightenment theorist who has been seen as a fore-runner of modern social science is Montesquieu (Charles Louis de Secondat). Raymond Aron has observed that Montesquieu wished

...to make history intelligible. He sought to understand historical truth. But historical truth appeared in the form of an almost limitless diversity of morals, customs, ideas, laws and institutions...One might say that Montesquieu, exactly like Max Weber, wanted to proceed from the meaningless fact to an intelligible order. This attitude is precisely the one particular to the sociologist.41

In *Spirit of the Laws*, originally published anonymously in Geneva in 1748, Montesquieu attempted to outline more than a simple treatise on government. Instead, he endeavored to analyze the laws operating in social life, and to place politics, morals, religion and economics into a vast and meaningful sociological synthesis in the hopes of reducing the social behavior of man to scientific laws.42 Sociologists, inclusive of Margaret Wilson Vine, have seen in this synthesis "the beginnings of a descriptive social science".43 Irving Zeitlin has insisted that because Montesquieu recognized that the elements of human society were interdependent, he may for this reason be regarded as an important precursor of sociological thought.44

Apart from Montesquieu's contribution to the development of modern social theory, other aspects of his general theoretical framework have received attention by contemporary social scientists and historians. In this respect, the relationship between Montesquieu's general theoretical orientation and his liberal world-view has been carefully studied. Thomas L. Pangle, for example, attempted to evaluate the interrelationship between Montesquieu's general theories and liberalism as an ideology. As
Pangle comments...

Of the handful of thinkers who truly stand at the origins of the liberal tradition - Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke and Montesquieu - Montesquieu emerges as the most helpful and relevant for us. Montesquieu adopted the principles of his great predecessors. But he subjected those principles to a new analysis based on a comprehensive investigation into political experience as revealed by the history of the European nations.45

Montesquieu, as one of the leading figures of liberal thought, was among the first Enlightenment theorists to advocate individualism within a republican context.

Emile Durkheim observed that much of Montesquieu's analysis of social institutions was based on pure speculative psychology. He asserted that The Spirit of the Laws

...sets forth laws which follow from the nature of man, regardless of the particular form of society in which he lives, and thus pertain to the realm of pure psychology.46

Other major critics of Montesquieu's theories, inclusive of Waddicor, have also found in his major works numerous examples of empirically unjustified a priori assumptions about the nature of human nature.

This impression is confirmed when we realize that Montesquieu has made various gratuitous assumptions. The fact that primitive man could feed himself and would mate is indisputable...On the other hand the first and fourth natural laws, of peace and the desire to live in society, are not so obviously scientific, not so clearly deduced from man's physical or instinctive nature.47

Durkheim and Waddicor, in reviewing and evaluating Montesquieu's theories, asked a fundamental question about the assumptions which he has made about man's innate nature. If Montesquieu was truly scientific in the formulation of his theories, is his evidence for the assumptions he makes about man's nature based on observation, statistics and experiment? It
is exactly this question which must be kept in mind when studying
Montesquieu's major theoretical works. The question of the relationship
between Montesquieu's assumptions of human nature and his belief in the
liberal ideals of libertarianism should likewise be carefully considered.

The question which Durkheim and Waddicor has asked, in relation to
Montesquieu's assumptions about human nature, holds significant impli-
cations for effectively dealing with the central problem with which this
study is concerned. Locke's use of assumptions about human nature has
already been demonstrated here. In this respect, the examination of
Montesquieu's use of assumptions about human nature will provide an indi-
cation of the extent to which the rise of such assumptions was character-
istic of the Enlightenment social theorists as a whole. Moreover, by
reviewing the relationship between Montesquieu's liberal beliefs and his
choice and use of specific assumptions about man's nature, it will be
possible to determine whether his theories, like those of Locke, were
ideological expressions of his particular liberal beliefs.

In one of his earlier and lesser known works, Considerations of the
Course of the Greatness of the Romans and Their Decline (1734), Montes-
quieu indicated what he believed to be the innate qualities of human
nature. According to Montesquieu, the Roman Emperor Trajan, in both tem-
perament and character, was the best representative of the human virtues.
He felt that virtue in itself was a basic feature of human nature. Trajan
was said to be

...a great statesman and a great general. He had a good
heart, which inclined him toward the good, an enlightened mind
which taught him what was best, and a soul that was noble, great,
and beautiful. He possessed all the virtues without being ex-
treme in any, and was, in short the man most suitable for
honoring human nature and representing the divine.
Montesquieu's assumptions about man's nature are revealed in his characterization of the Stoic sect in Rome. The central tenet of Stoicism was that virtue constituted not only the highest but the sole good for man. Virtue, as the Stoics believed, consisted of the realization of the ideal of autonomous individual freedom through self-control and courage. With regard to the Stoics and their ideal of virtue, Montesquieu emphasized that it

...seemed that human nature had made an effort to produce this admirable sect out of itself - like those plants the earth brings forth in places the heavens have never seen.

The Stoic ideal of autonomous individuality directly complemented Montesquieu's own liberal ideals of individualism. In turn, his assumptions about the characterizing features of human nature were directly complementary to his liberal ideals.

In his major work, The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu made use of a number of additional assumptions about man's innate nature. According to this theory, there exist laws of nature which "derive their force entirely from our frame and existence." It was explained further that there are four such laws:

The law, which impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us toward Him is the first in importance, thought not in order of natural laws.

...peace would be the first law of nature.

...another law of nature would prompt man to seek for nourishment.

...the attraction arising from the differences of sexes would enhance this pleasure, and the natural inclination they have for each other would form a third law.

...a fourth law of nature results from the desire of living in society.

In making explicit use of such assumptions, he was able to justify his belief that man was, by nature, peaceful, religious and sociable. From
this perspective it is apparent that, at least in some instances, Montesquieu's liberal orientation combined both the belief in individualism, as well as the belief in social integration. His ambivalence in regard to his liberal beliefs and values is reflected in the variety of assumptions about human nature of which he made use.

Montesquieu resorted to utilizing assumptions of human nature to justify the liberal ideal of individual freedom within the context of a republican form of government. He argued that in a monarchy people are ruled by honor, while in a despotic government they are ruled by fear. However, in a republic, a form of government which he believed could ensure individual freedom, people are ruled by virtue. Virtue, as he insisted, is not something which is acquired by men through knowledge, but is a characteristic of human nature which is experienced as a sensation.

Virtue in a republic is a most simple thing; it is a love of the republic, and not a consequence of acquired knowledge, a sensation that may be felt by the meanest as well as the highest person in the state.  

While Montesquieu admitted that the virtue of a republic was a common emotion shared by all men, he also recognized, and attempted to account for the diversities of governments which characterized human societies.

One of the main purposes of *The Spirit of the Laws*, was to lay down the fundamental principles of legislation. These were found to consist of:

1. the close adaptation of institutions and legislation to the character of the peoples for whom they are intended.
2. the harmonious interaction of the various institutions, laws, and other devices for ensuring social control which are applied by any group.
In maintaining this general theoretical orientation, Montesquieu was led to investigate the factors responsible for producing the diverse differences between the various peoples of different societies in terms of their physical and cultural characteristics. He asserted that climate was the main cause for producing the diversities of such characteristics among human types. In turn, the physical differences produced in various societies by different climates gave rise to divergent forms of government. Montesquieu elaborated that...

It is the variety of wants in different climates that first occasioned a difference in the manner of living, and this gave rise to a variety of laws.54

Despite this rather relativistic and environmentalistic approach in attempting to account for the different characteristics of various human societies, Montesquieu nevertheless did not ignore the essential features of human nature shared by members of all cultures.

Montesquieu's belief in a universal human nature, while evident in his defense of republicanism, is also obvious in his explanation and defense of the origins of religion. To put it simply, he believed that man was by his innate nature, religious. In this respect it was observed that...

Men are extremely inclined to the passion of hope and fear; a religion therefore, that had neither could hardly please them.55

Additionally, in endeavoring to account for the origins of religious reverence, he noted that...

The natural desire of pleasing the deity multiplied ceremonies. Hence it followed, that men in agriculture became incapable of observing them all and of filling up the number.56
It appears that Montesquieu, while sharing the liberal ideals of individual libertarianism at least in respect to particular types of government, was nevertheless unwilling to completely forego his belief in religion as a basic complement to the innate needs of human nature.

Lastly, Montesquieu relied on utilizing assumptions of human nature to explain the processes of socialization, especially in regards to the family. He believed that...

Fathers, always employed in preserving the morals of their children, must have a natural aversion to everything that can render them corrupt.57

The tautological nature of the above statement by Montesquieu is obvious. He implies that parents, especially the father, bring up children correctly because by their innate nature they are able to bring them up correctly.

The accusations made by both Durkheim and Waddicor, that Montesquieu relied on assumptions of human nature within his various analyses appear to be warranted. His use of assumptions about man's innate nature, at least in relation to his explanation of republican virtue is a reflection of his liberal ideological bias. His use of such assumptions in fact constitutes a means to objectify and legitimize the liberal ideal of individual libertarianism. At the same time, he attempted to justify, although to a lesser extent, the ideals of social integration in his elaboration of the relationship between human nature on the one hand, and-religion, sociability and the family on the other. The speculative nature of such assumptions about human nature as "the natural desire for pleasing the deity" is complemented by Montesquieu's failure to empirically justify the contention that virtue in a republic is an emotion shared by all men.
Similar in many respects to Locke, Montesquieu is not aloof from utilizing assumptions about man's innate nature to complement and in fact justify many of the liberal ideals to which he adhered, especially the ideal of individualism.

The revealing of the use of assumptions about the nature of human nature by Montesquieu holds significant implications for coming to terms with the problem with which this overall study is concerned. His use of assumptions about man's nature in relation to his description of the Stoic sect and the republican form of government served to objectify, manifest and legitimize the libertarian ideals of individualism which he strongly supported. To a lesser extent, his utilization of assumptions about human nature in his explanations of the peaceful, religious and sociable traits of human behavior contributed to the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. While Montesquieu was committed to the liberal ideals of individualism, he was nevertheless convinced that the human individual required some degree of social stability and integration. Margaret Vine's and Irving Zeitlin's contention that Montesquieu was an important forerunner to the development of an objective and descriptive science of society is an underestimation of the general ideological intentions of his theories. In fact, Montesquieu's theories represent one of the original attempts by a social theorist to legitimize a particular constellation of liberal values through the use of empirically unjustified assumptions about man's nature.
4) **Rousseau**

Probably one of the most influential social theorists of the Enlightenment responsible for the development of the social sciences, as well as of liberal thought, was Jean-Jacques Rousseau. His writings provided inspiration for the participants in the French Revolution as well as for the 'Romantic Generation' of German theorists from which Hegelianism and the Historical School of Law originated. Rousseau's most notable works included *The Origin of Inequality* (1755), *The New Heloise* (1761), *The Social Contract*, *Emile* (1762), and *Considerations On The Government of Poland* (1782). All of his writings reflected his basic concern with the search for the essence of man. Late in life Rousseau was to describe himself as "the historian of human nature."58

Rousseau's ideas are as complex as they are problematic. It has even been said by one of his critics...

That nuances of his thought permit no complete systemization, but in so far as one can analyze that thought, it appears to embody the leading ideals of Stoicism, metamorphosed under the heat of imagination and brought to lengths of which the Stoics could not have dreamed.59

The essential themes which run throughout Rousseau's works are: the natural goodness of man, the infallibility of uncorrupted instinct, the vanity of speculative philosophy and the equality of men and individualism.60 Critics of Rousseau's theories, such as Lester Crocker, have noted that he assumed a number of qualities about the innate nature of man. He explained that the...

"original man" had only two traits that distinguished him from animals: freedom and "perfectability"...But there is also another part of human nature, that which man possesses in common with other animals. This common stock of animal behaviour includes the desire for self-preservation, the
need to seek pleasurable satisfactions and to avoid pain, all of which Rousseau summarized under the term, 'amour de soi'.

The basic themes of all of Rousseau's theories are generally related to these assumptions about the nature of human nature.

Rousseau attempted to achieve a synthesis between the Christian, Rationalist and Materialist styles of thought within the context of what he referred to as "theism". However, Rousseau has not so much been recognized by contemporary scholars for his achievements in this respect. Rather, he is noted for his contributions to the development of both the libertarian tradition in Western liberal thought, as well as the modern social sciences. In response to Rousseau's articulation of liberal ideals as contained in his social theories, Harry Girvetz has commented that on

...one score Rousseau is quite clear, and it is in this respect that his work has particular significance for the growth of liberalism. He takes his stand with Locke in contending that the sovereignty of the people is unalienable.

It is felt that Rousseau provided a number of major insights into the relationships between man and society. Some critics even go so far as to suggest that modern social theory, as we know it today, is constructed on the basis of these insights.

Levy-Bruhl claims that Rousseau's philosophy emphasized the antagonism between what is natural to man and what is artificial. The evils of human conduct were believed to be derived from this antagonism.

Rousseau's achievement lies in making of this opposition the principle of a whole moral and social doctrine, and of finding therein a means of distinguishing between what is and what ought to be, by declaring nature to be good, and evil to
have sprung from human conventions. Therefore, if the evils under which we labor are of social origin, the finding of remedies depends upon us. 63

Rousseau sought to combat the pernicious teachings of Christianity without necessarily denying the existence of God. 64 He, no more than any of the other Philosophes, denied the existence of God. In accordance with the general principles of the rest of the Philosophes, he sought a solution to human problems which included both the active participation of God as well as man himself.

Many students of Rousseau's writings have emphasized the liberal ideals of libertarianism inherent in his work. So too have a number of his critics pointed out the authoritarian implications of many of his writings. Rousseau's views on education expressed in both Considerations On the Government of Poland and Emile have been interpreted by the contemporary educational theorist M. Sahakian as being relatively authoritarian and conservative in character.

He believed that only free men can derive proper benefits from education, which he viewed as a means of providing 'souls a national foundation', developing citizens whose beliefs, emotions, loyalties and inclinations are inevitably patriotic ... For free men meaningful life would cease without a fatherland to bind them together in a community governed by the rule of law. 65

The ambivalence and uncertainty which Montesquieu often demonstrated towards supporting the liberal ideals of other libertarianism or social integration is even more strongly evidenced within the context of Rousseau's theories. It would appear that while many of the Enlightenment social theorists were committed to legitimizing the liberal ideals of individualism, they were nevertheless reluctant to completely abandon the belief that society required at least some constraining forces to
ensure social integration. They felt that the individual, in order to realize his individuality and freedom required some form of a stable and integrated social environment.

Rousseau's social philosophy was primarily oriented towards the legitimization of individuality and the individual's control of his environment. He nevertheless recognized the need for the individual to be accountable to the "General Will". The authoritarian aspects of his argument does not, however, rule out his strong belief in individual spontaneity and freedom. In general, most students and critics of Rousseau agree that his overriding intentions were to legitimate the ideal of individual liberty and to outline a course of social action and education in order that each person might "become an individual and a good man in every station of life." In this sense, his educational theory may be interpreted as emphasizing "the spontaneous development of the whole personality rather than formal discipline or the mere acquisition of knowledge."

Rousseau has been described as a social reformer, an advocate of the liberal ideal of individual libertarianism, a forerunner of modern social theory and a theorist who utilized assumptions about the nature of human nature. The question remains of determining to what degree all of these characteristics are centrally interrelated and complementary to one another within the context of his social theories.

One of Rousseau's most well known and popular works is The Social Contract. In many respects this work constitutes a defense of the ideals of individualism. At the same time, it maintains a general orientation towards collectivism. Ernest Barker has observed that
...the argument of the *Contrat Social*, if studied more closely, shows a rapid transition from an initial individualism towards collectivism.68

Nevertheless, even in Rousseau's idea of collectivism, his explicit belief in a general idea of individualism is clearly obvious.

According to Rousseau, man by nature is free and equal. He insisted that...

If some men are by nature slaves, the reason is that they have been made slaves against nature. Force has made the first slave, cowardice has perpetuated the species.69

As he believed, insofar as might may not produce right, "the only foundation left for legitimate authority in human societies is Agreement."70

Thus, when a man renounces liberty against his will:

...he renounces his essential manhood, his right, and even his duty as a human being. There is no compensation possible for such complete renunciation. It is incompatible with man's nature...71

In Rousseau's opinion then, man was originally endowed with a fully independent existence. However, a point was reached in the history of mankind, when the obstacles preventing man from living in a "State of Nature" were stronger than the forces which each individual could employ against them. For this reason the original State of Nature could no longer endure. As a result,

Some form of association must be found as a result of which the whole strength of the community will be enlisted ...in such a way that each, when united to his fellow renders obedience to his own will, and remains as free as he was before.72

Through such an act of association, a person of each of the contracting parties is substituted by a moral and collective body made up of as many
members as the assembly has votes.  

This assembly Rousseau defined as the General Will. The General Will becomes individualized and takes the status of an independent self through the social contract. This body "received from this very act of constitution its unity, its dispersed self and its will." According to this theory, the General Will as an independent collective entity was equivalent in its autonomy and freedom to the individual in a State of Nature. Rousseau defined the liberty of the General Will as Civil Liberty. In his opinion, civil liberty and individual liberty were equivalent to one another.

What a man loses as a result of the Social Contract is his natural liberty and his unqualified right to lay hands on all that tempts him, provided only that he can compass its possession. What he gains in civil liberty and the ownership of what belongs to him.

Rousseau indicated that the individual through civil liberty gains moral freedom "which makes him his own master"...

For to be subject to appetite is to be a slave, while to obey the laws laid down by society is to be free.

Civil liberty ensures the substitution of the physical inequalities between men for legal equalities.

Without having to review here the whole of Rousseau's argument presented in *The Social Contract*, it is possible to interpret the logic of his theoretical framework as well as the assumptions upon which that logic rests. The freedom of the General Will is of course legitimized by the fact that it is shown to be equivalent to what Rousseau described as the innate quality of human nature -- man's freedom and perfectability.
Thus, we may understand from this logic of argument, that an individual who contributes to the General Will contributes to the realization of his own innate nature insofar as it is represented by the General Will. As he stated...

Nature gives to each man complete power over his own limbs, so, too, the social compact gives to the body politic complete power over its members.77

Rousseau defined 'Freedom' as an innate quality of human nature -- a basic need and drive which all men desire. He then utilized this feature of human nature as a means to legitimize the civil liberty of the General Will by showing it to be equivalent in worth and character to the freedom enjoyed by the individual in a State of Nature.

Rousseau's other works, especially Emile, Discourses on the Sciences and Arts and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality are commonly referred to by contemporary social theorists. In all of these writings Rousseau sought "to distinguish Nature from Society" and accused Society of having "perverted man".78 He felt that it was the duty of educators to recognize "that the child develops according to certain laws whose natural progression must be respected".79 He believed that the analysis of man's essential nature

...represented the possibility of creating a new nature and slowing down the processes of decline.80

The argument set forth in Emile asserted that the natural tendencies of the child are "warped by our prejudices".81 It was pointed out that the child is drawn one way by his own inner nature and the opposite way by the forces of culture. For this reason, it was claimed that for the
child to grow up normally these "two aims must be resolved". Accordingly, he suggested that in order to resolve this tension "the internal impulses of the child should be allowed movement." The spontaneous development of the child was possible because "Nature will provide for the child's growth in her own fashion." From Rousseau's point of view, the type of happiness which is characteristic of human nature consisted "in the enjoyment of liberty." The innate characteristics of man such as parental affection were thought to be "the natural provision" against a child's weaknesses. At the same time, self-love as a natural passion should be fostered in the child insofar as it is guided by Reason. Self-love requires that we not only love ourselves but those about us in that our own security depends on our relations with others.

Rousseau was convinced that any form of "rational" education must permit the spontaneous development of the child according to his nature. A statement made by Saint Pireaux, a character in Rousseau's New Heloise reflects this particular view on education.

I resolved that as far as possible I should spare my child all constraint, leaving him the full use of his petty strength, and never checking any of his natural impulses. By this course, I have already gained two great advantages. The first is, I have been able to keep his infant soul from lying, vanity, anger and envy, the vices resulting from subjection, which are usually provoked in children by getting them to do what is exacted of them. The other advantage is that he has been left free to strengthen his body...

Rousseau's opinions about education are clearly indicative of his belief in the liberal ideal of individual libertarianism.

In Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Rousseau explained why
the human individual could be left to his own devices in adjusting himself to the external world. Man's ability to realize himself apart from social institutions is based on his

...faculty of self-improvement, which by the help of circumstances, gradually develops all the rest of our faculties, and is inherent in the species as in the individual.89

Man is a creature driven by the instinct of self-love and self-preservation.90 However, man's own self-interest is tempered by an innate compassion towards other men.

I think I need not fear contradiction in holding man to be possessed of the only natural virtue, which could not be denied him by the most violent detractor of human virtue. I am speaking of compassion, which is a disposition suitable to creatures so weak and subject to so many evils as we certainly are: by so much the more universal and useful to mankind, as it comes before any kind of reflection.91

It was not man's natural depravity that caused social injustices. On the contrary, he believed that inadequate social institutions naturally resulted in irrational behaviour and relationships between individuals.92 For Rousseau, man was naturally good and individual liberty was his natural condition.93

In his enthusiasm to legitimize the ideals of individuality, liberty and equality, Rousseau neglected to utilize the basic tenets of the scientific method of argument. Zeitlin, parallel in this instance to Levy-Bruhl's observations, has commented that "Rousseau may be regarded as a forerunner of sociology."94 It is true, in reviewing Rousseau's writings, that he did attempt to develop an explanation of how culture and social institutions generally affected human behavior. He also en-
desired to outline the relationship between human behavior and education as a basic process of socialization. Finally, he provided a justification for both social reform as well as for popular democratic government. Of course, all of these concepts and general concerns are central to North American social sciences today. Nevertheless, what is also important to realize is that all of these concepts and ideas as elaborated in detail by Rousseau were predicated on, and in fact justified by, references to assumptions about the nature of human nature. In turn, as it has been demonstrated in this analysis there existed an interdependent relationship between Rousseau's assumptions of human nature which he utilized in his social theories and his liberal world-view, characterized by its libertarian idealism. Within his theories dealing with man and society, he made explicit assumptions about man's nature in the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of his own liberal world-view.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, we may understand that Rousseau's use of assumptions about human nature were intimately related to the general liberal beliefs which he maintained. It is clear that at least in the case of Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau, the use of assumptions about human nature to legitimize specific liberal beliefs was a common and wide-spread practice during the whole course of the Enlightenment. With respect to the general problem with which this study is concerned, it would seem that the forerunners of the social sciences during the Enlightenment utilized assumptions about human nature within a definite ideological context rather than a scientific one.
5) **Helvetius**

The theory that the social and physical environment influences man's character gained wide popularity during the course of the Enlightenment. One of the most well known representatives of this type of environmentalism was Claude Adrian Helvetius. Most social theorists during the Enlightenment were intent on demonstrating that man's behavior was autonomous from the directions elicited by the 'Divine Will'. The liberal belief in individual freedom maintained by Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau was reflected in the general orientation of their various theories. The idea that man's character was influenced by his social and physical environment, rather than directly determined by the hand of God was one of the chief theoretical arguments used to demonstrate man's relative individual freedom.

Helvetius' two chief works included *De l'esprit* (1758) and *De l'homme* (1771). In both of these treatises he developed the theme that all man's faculties may be reduced to physical sensations which all men share. He believed, for example, that self-interest founded on the love of pleasure and the fear of pain was the spring of judgement and reason. His contention that man's environment mainly affects his character constitutes a basic assumption of social theory today. In this sense he set the precedent for the use of the environmentalist framework of analysis for the interpretation of variations in social phenomena, complementing Montesquieu's opinions on this subject.

Helvetius' theories were frequently criticized in France during the latter half of the eighteenth century. His theories which maintained
that man's nature was dependent on the environment challenged Catholic doctrines of free will. He attempted to explain that the subject of morality must be treated as a science based on experience. It was argued that man on the basis of his sensations pursues his interests as he knows them. Many of his views were quickly accepted and utilized by other social theorists and philosophers. Owing to the pressures of persecution from Rome and the Jesuits, the Philosophes who had adopted his theories were forced to meet in secret and drew together "in sect-like solidarity" at the salons or at the homes of D'Holbach or Helvetius. Together, these theorists (under Helvetius' direction) advocated the radical policy of "l'éducation peut tout". Underlying their belief in the possibility of providing education to all classes of individuals was the assumption that human thought was directed by sensation experienced within the environment rather than being wholly directed by God.

Insofar as Helvetius' theories on environmentalism have influenced the development of modern social scientific thought, it is important to ascertain the logical basis for his arguments. More simply, it is necessary to examine the extent to which this theorist was able to exclude assumptions about man's nature in elaborating his environmentalist theory which he used to explain the nature of learning, motivation and inequality. It is likewise essential to deal with the question of whether there exists a relationship between the general orientation of his theories and the liberal ideals already adhered to by most of the Philosophs in this period.

By reviewing Helvetius' use of assumptions about human nature it will be possible to determine whether he, like other theorists of the Enlight-
ement viewed human nature in an ideological rather than a scientific and objective context. In this fashion it will be feasible to deal conclusively with the possibility that the original forerunners of the social sciences developed their theories in response to particular liberal beliefs and values. It is in this sense that the question of Helvetius' use of assumptions about human nature has direct relevance for the general problem with which this overall study is concerned.

In his Treatise on Man, Helvetius supported the point of view that "the virtue and genius of man is a product of instruction" and "that education has more influence over the genius and character of men, and of nations than was imagined."100 The purpose of this treatise was to inquire into the reasons for the intellectual differences between men and to examine whether those differences were due to factors of innate biology or education. The central problem of the treatise was stated as follows:

Is the difference in the minds of men the effect of their different organizations or education? That is the object of my inquiry.101

Similar to Locke in many respects, he explained that ideas and tastes are socially determined.

Is a man born without ideas? He is born also without tastes. We may, therefore regard them as acquisitions arising from the situations in which we are placed. Genius then, is the remote product of incidents and chances nearly similar to those I have cited.102

In this manner an environmentalist framework of analysis was utilized to demonstrate how society and other forces external to the individual, influence behavior. Helvetius however was still left with the problem of accounting for the basis of human motivation. A simple solution was
provided to this problem. Motivation was defined as consisting of the enjoyment of

...the pleasures attached to the gratification of bodily desires...Corporal sensibility is therefore the sole mover of man...103

Thus, human thought while it could be influenced by the environment, nevertheless originated in man's innate desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The pleasures and pains which men experience consisted of bodily pleasures and pains as well as those of foresight and memory. 104 More specifically, Helvetius understood the pleasure principle to mean that a supreme self-sacrifice, such as risking your life for someone else, was motivated by the expected narcissistic rewards of praise as well as anticipated fear of being criticized for cowardice. So even a supreme "unselfish act is based on selfishness - rather than merely self-interest."

According to Helvetius, ideas not only originate in man's innate desire for pleasure. Such passions as remorse may also find their origins in "the foresight of bodily pain, to which someone has imposed us." 105 It was argued further that friendship originates in the desire for bodily pleasure. 106

When a man enters into himself, when he examines the bottom of his soul, he perceives nothing in all these sentiments but the development of bodily pain and pleasure. 107 In man all is sensation. Self interest and want arising from man's love of himself are those principles which unite all men and constitute the basis of man's sociability. Helvetius pointed out that

...the love of men for their brethren is the effect of the necessity of mutual assistance, and of an affinity of wants dependent on that corporal sensibility, which I regard as the principle of our actions, our virtues, and our vices. 108
Slightly more metaphorically, he argued that

...man is a machine, but being put in motion by corporeal sensibility, ought to perform all that it executes. 109

The origins of the inequality of intelligence were defined as consisting of the differential modification of self-love by the variable environments in which men dwell. By self-love, Helvetius meant simply the innate corporeal sensibility to pursue pleasure and flee from pain. He believed that "self-love makes us totally what we are." 110

It is therefore to this sentiment, variously modified according to the education we receive, the government under which we live, and the different situations in which we are placed, that we are to attribute the amazing difference in the passions and characters of men. 111

It was implied in this argument that the notion of the environmental determination of man's intellectual abilities constituted in fact the environment's realization or inhibition of man's corporeal sensibility of the desire for pleasure and the avoidance of pain.

This emphasis on pleasure or pain as being the basis for human motivation has direct parallels with some aspects of Locke's theories as well as with the classical Epicurean assumptions about man's nature. Whatever the extent of these parallels, it is nevertheless obvious that Helvetius' environmentalist theory is posited on definite assumptions about man's innate nature. These assumptions were utilized in a determinate and causal fashion to justify: that man's knowledge is not directly acquired from God; that man as an individual is an active participant in determining his own knowledge, and that all man's intellectual capacities divorced from their particular environment and social context are, in the final analysis, equal. By utilizing the assumption that man by nature is
a pleasure seeking creature, Helvetius was able to confirm the view that man, while he may be influenced by external forces, social or otherwise, is nevertheless a self-motivated actor who as an individual is free to pursue his own pleasures. Through his use of such an Epicurean view of human nature Helvetius objectified, manifested and legitimized the liberal ideal of individual libertarianism, an ideal to which all of the Philosophes had attempted to lend credibility. Inevitably it was the French Revolution that provided for the ultimate objective realization of this ideal.

From the evidence cited above it is quite apparent that the specific assumptions about man's nature, which Helvetius made use of, lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. His particular brand of environmentalism was developed in order to demonstrate that man's behavior and conduct were not strictly determined by God. His desire to undermine the theory of the Divine determination of human behavior did not at the same time mean that he was not willing to admit to the existence of at least some features of man's innate nature. Helvetius, similar to Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau made use of assumptions about human nature, inclusive of man's quest for pleasure and avoidance of pain as a means to demonstrate that certain aspects of the individual's personality operated independently of God's will. This does not mean to say that he denied that God was responsible for the creation of man. All of the theories formulated by these Enlightenment thinkers were not directed towards the establishment of an objective science of society. This fact becomes obvious when we review the lack of empirical evidence which they provided to justify the particular assumptions about man's nature.
which they utilized. On the contrary, their primary intention was to lend credibility to the liberal ideal of individualism and to de-legitimize the belief that the Divine Will was the ultimate determinate of human behavior.
6) The Reaction and Counter-Revolution

The rationalistic social theories which were developed during the course of the Enlightenment were not without their critics. The events of the French Revolution brought with them a general disillusionment with the rational ideals of the Philosophes. Reason and the Reign of Terror stood in close association with one another in the eyes of many social theorists. Those theorists who objected to the ideas and concepts which had been suggested by the major intellectuals of the Enlightenment argued that on the contrary, society was not based on rational principles alone.

Many theorists insisted that the individual required the support of traditional beliefs and values as well as religion in order to develop a complete and mature personality. The Philosophes had believed that traditional values and religion were the means by which unenlightened and superstitious individuals could gain a sense of security from their irrational fears. The reconsideration, by many European intellectuals, of the social benefits of traditional institutions and values had a number of consequences. One of the most significant consequences was that during the early part of the nineteenth century, the belief in the liberal ideal of individualism was subjected to an extensive amount of skeptical inquiry.

In reaction to the eighteenth-century exaltation of reason, then, the nineteenth century extolled instead emotion and imagination, leading to a great revival of religion, poetry and art. In addition, the group, the community, and the nation now became important concepts. Historical memories and loyalties were viewed as binding the individual to his nation.112

Tradition, religion, the state and community came to be seen by many intellectuals as necessary prerequisites for the establishment of society and
the preservation of individuality.

The Romantic and Conservative reaction to the social theories of the Enlightenment was initiated in Britain, Germany, as well as in France. The chief theorists within this movement included Burke, Hegel and de Maistre, respectively. In noting the shift of orientation of social theories after the Enlightenment in relation to the Romantic and Conservative reaction, it is important to analyze the degree to which such a change in the ideals of social theorists could be related to basic changes in their assumptions about the nature of human nature. For this reason, the theories of Burke, Hegel and de Maistre will be examined here in terms of their alternative theoretical perspectives in comparison to the Enlightenment thinkers. Also, these theories will be reviewed in terms of both their relationship to liberalism as an ideology, as well as to what degree their assumptions of human nature were different from those maintained by the *Philosophes*. 
7) Burke

In England, the defense of radical politics and the support of the ideals of libertarian individualism more or less ended with the writings of John Locke. The libertarian ideals expressed by such French Philosophes as Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius found a rather restricted audience among British intellectuals.

The temper of English writers throughout the eighteenth century, in respect to both politics and religion, was markedly conservative. In a country where both church and government, though admittedly subject to serious abuses, served well the interests of the classes that were politically vocal, the system of natural law had lost its immediate practical utility.\[13\]

Owing to the general support of both government and traditional institutions by many British intellectuals, it is not surprising that one of the most adamant critics of the Enlightenment world-view was a British social theorist.

Edmund Burke was one of the original theorists to articulate the growing conservative reaction to both the rationalistic and individualistic ideals of the Enlightenment. He was also one of the first social critics to recognize the devastating effects which the French Revolution had on the continued maintenance of the traditional forms of social order. Bertram Newman, a theorist who has thoroughly analyzed his writings, has argued that Burke's theories

...indeed provide the most literary illustration of the organic connection of the past and the present life of institutions, the most powerful vindication of those human sentiments which crave that government should be embodied in visible and appealing symbols.\[14\]

Burke believed that the theories and assumptions about the natural rights of man, to which all of the theorists of the Enlightenment had adhered,
were false. He was convinced that the libertarian ideals expressed by the *Philosophes* were an outrage and were antithetical to the basic characteristics and needs of human nature. 115

By reviewing Burke's theories it will be possible to determine to what degree he made use of assumptions about human nature and whether or not such assumptions were empirically substantiated. In this respect, a clear understanding will be gained of those features of his social theories which are similar to those formulated by the *Philosophes*. The possibility must be considered that Burke's reaction to the libertarian ideals of the *Philosophes* was based upon his differing orientation to liberalism for which he used empirically unjustified assumptions about human nature to support.

Through his rejection of the libertarian elements of Enlightenment thought and his later criticisms of the French Revolution, Edmund Burke became recognized as the voice of English conservative opinion. 116 His chief works included among others, A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757), Thoughts On the Cause of the Present Discontents (1770), and Reflections On the Revolution In France (1790).

To Burke, civil society rather than the state of nature was the natural condition which conformed most suitably to man's basic nature. He drew all of his political norms and standards from the classical conception of Natural Law as embodied in a nation's civil constitution. 117 It was argued that man was a social creature who had rights insofar as those rights did not jeopardize the continued existence of civil society.
The rights of the individual were not seen as existing over and above society. He was convinced that the desire by the French libertarians to enjoy in civil society the hypothetical "rights" of an original state of nature would end by destroying man's "real" civil rights. Burke was not against the ideal of individualism. He wished merely to define the ideal in a socially integrative context. As was admitted...

Far am I from denying in theory...or from withholding in practise...the real rights of men...As to the share of power, authority, and direction which each individual ought to have in the management of the state, that I must say to be amongst the direct original rights of men in civil society, for I have in my contemplation the civil social man, and no other.118

In his eyes, man was not immediately good. On the contrary...

Leave a man to his passions and you leave a wild beast to a savage and capricious nature.119

Only when reason and emotion were together integrated with one another did they constitute a safe guide for human conduct.

Burke was convinced that human nature was inherently fallible. For this reason he lent support to the idea of original sin. He nevertheless thought it possible with the help of reason and God to realize man's nature in a more perfect way. In fact, his theories expressed an explicitly dual view of human nature. Man was seen as corruptible and subject to fits of animal passion. At the same time, man was understood as being perfectible insofar as he existed within the context of social institutions and traditional values. Without civil institutions it was...

...a difficult thing to the corrupt, grasping, and ambitious part of human nature...to put a bond on its power and submit to the rules and principles of laws.120

According to this argument, God had willed the state and man was by nature a political animal. Legislators could thus be regarded as God’s instru-
ments. In short, Burke sought to justify the need for government and law according to the assumptions of human nature which he believed to be dictated by God. Within this moral philosophy a harmony was posited between reason and instinctive feeling insofar as it was felt that it was natural for men to want instinctively that which is reasonable. 121 It was understood that the feelings of the people were always the best guide for the legislators

...though he must guard against using this guide when people have had their passions roused and their true moral-social instincts dulled by passion. 122

The more that traditional laws and customs withstood the pressure of time, the more likely it was that those laws and customs corresponded to basic traits of human nature.

Often in his writings Burke mentioned that spontaneous moral affections were the well-spring of moral principles. Furthermore...

These moral affections are so many instincts implanted by God in human nature, to lead man in the right way and to prompt them to defend themselves against evil. They are not themselves moral virtues but are rather natural inclinations to moral action. 123

However, he mentioned the fact that these moral affections are corruptible and could be perverted to false ends. 124 For this reason, it was asserted that man required an education which must aim "at improving instincts into morals, and at grafting the virtues on the stock of natural affections." 125 It was explicitly pointed out that there is something already innate in human nature upon which the virtues can be "grafted", given that the individual is provided with an appropriate education, traditional values and adequate social institutions.
In explaining the basis of civil obedience, Burke intimated that the individual is willing to obey customs, traditions and laws insofar as they embody "those original ideas of rectitude to which the mind is compelled to assent." Owing to man's innate willingness to obey such ideas of rectitude, all types of governments must have a knowledge of human nature in order that legislation may be passed which was in accordance with the innate needs of man.

Government is a contrivance of human wisdom to provide for human wants. Men have a right that these wants should be provided for by this wisdom. Among these wants is to be reckoned the want, out of civil society, of a sufficient restraint upon their passions. Society requires not only that the passions of individuals should be subjected, but even in the mass and body, as well as in the individuals, the inclinations of men should frequently be thwarted.

Burke commented that man is by his natural constitution a religious animal in that atheism is against "not only our reason, but our instincts; and that it cannot prevail long." In his opinion, religion aids the individual in emptying himself of the "lust of selfish will, which without religion it is utterly impossible they ever should".

In reviewing the general orientation of Burke's writing, it is quite evident that he maintained a dual view of human nature. This view in brief consisted of the idea that man had innate within him, "evil and greedy" passions, as well as positive social sentiments inclusive of religious feelings and needs. It was felt that it was the duty of government to restrain man's passions and to facilitate instead his social and religious character. His basic theoretical intentions were centered on the attempt to define man's individual nature within a socially con-
structive context. Human nature was in this respect understood as being dependent on institutions, customs and norms for its realization. He was convinced that as long as men thought that the social was "true and rational", they would accept it. In his opinion, the Philosophes, in their failure to recognize the need for a socially integrative network of institutions and morals, were the architects of ruin. Burke asserted that...

In that very short space of time, they had completely pulled down to the ground their monarchy, their church, their nobility, their law, their revenue, their army, their money, their commerce, their arts, and their manufacturers.

For this reason it was believed that man's individualistic traits required some form of restraint "to keep man from falling into the habit of vagabonds." As Burke indicated, man had certain social characteristics exclusive of his religious yearnings that required facilitation by society. Tradition, custom, law and religion generally were defined as being both a means to restrain the passionate elements of man's innate nature, as well as means to realize man's moral and social character. In comparing Burke's theories with those of the Philosophes we can see that the evolution of social theory from the eighteenth to the nineteenth centuries involved the concurrent evolution and change of assumptions about human nature.

Burke relied heavily on assumptions of human nature to legitimize his belief in the need for the social integration of the individual. He was not, however, a supporter of the liberal libertarian tradition that
had been defined and developed by such theorists as Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius. Nevertheless, Burke was a liberal in the sense that his theories reflected one of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. He did not deny the possibility of individual autonomy. However, he would only accept individuality as a meaningful ideal when it was understood to exist in a social and civil context where it was dependent upon institutions, tradition and law for its regulation and guidance. Many of his theories presented the view that...

Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites -- in proportion as their love for justice is above their rapacity -- in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumptions -- in proportion as they are more disposed to listen to the councils of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves.133

It was also argued that people, when left to themselves, could easily fall victim to their own passions or to the dominating will of opportunistic political leaders. On the basis of this belief Burke felt that restraint guided and enforced by responsible government was the only reasonable way of preserving the liberty and freedom of the individual. The assumptions about human nature, upon which he based his social theories, took their origin in the intellectual circumstance of Europe. These particular circumstances were the direct consequences of the unchecked attempts to realize the liberal ideals of libertarianism during the course of the Enlightenment as well as later, in the French Revolution. In this regard, Burke's assumptions about human nature, were limited to the exemplification of the liberal ideals of individualism within a
socially, legally and economically integrated context.

It is important to emphasize that the majority of Burke’s writings were published prior to the French Revolution. In this regard, the chief intentions of his social theories were to undermine the legitimacy of the libertarian ideals which were articulated by the Philosophes. His critique of these libertarian ideals was based upon empirically unsubstantiated assumptions about human nature. Burke argued that human nature was fallible, but through the proper forms of government, education and religion, man’s innate "virtues" and natural affections could be developed and nurtured. By pointing out that man has a dual nature consisting of unrestrained passions, as well as religious and sympathetic features, he was able to suggest the need which man has for traditional values, religion and a strong government. It was only through these means that man would be able to control his passions and, at the same time, realize the social and sympathetic elements of his nature. Such self-restraint in his opinion was synonymous with individual freedom. Burke explicitly utilized assumptions about the nature of human nature to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals of social integration and the realization of individual freedom within a socially integrative context. Not only did his assumptions about human nature differ from those of the Philosophes, but also his orientation towards liberalism stood in marked contrast to that taken by the Enlightenment social theorists.
8) Hegel

The majority of Edmund Burke's writings were written prior to the French Revolution. The devastating consequences of the French Revolution gave many other social theorists definite and concrete reasons for criticizing the libertarian ideals of the Enlightenment. Many social theorists in Western Europe, in reaction to the militant excesses of the Revolution set a new value upon traditional nationalism, customs, and law which all the revolutionaries had previously scorned. The Napoleonic Wars had left both the constitutional and economic systems of all the countries in Europe in shambles.

Their reconstruction was a major problem and one which, as the events proved, could not be solved by a further appeal to the abstractions, like the rights of man...More and more the Revolution was felt to be destructive and nihilistic, and its philosophy was pictured as a doctrinaire effort to remake society and human nature according to caprice. Substantially this was the estimate of which Hegel came to hold of the Revolution and the individualism of its political philosophy.

Hegel, who stood at the center of German philosophical and social thought in the nineteenth century, also attempted to initiate a significant re-evaluation of many of the ideas, concepts, and theories which had been formulated by the Philosophes and articulated in a violent form by the French revolutionaries.

Like many other European intellectuals at that time, Hegel wished to justify the need for reestablishing the continuity of national institutions and affirming the interdependence between the individual and his national culture. He did not want to completely deny and delegitimize the liberal ideals of individualism, but rather only to redefine them in a meaningful social and national context. The ideals of nationalism
which were later to spring from his theoretical arguments, represented a new variation to the liberal world-view. It was a variation which emphasized social integration and the realization of the individual through the Volkgeist. This nationalism was above all a reaction to the Napoleonic conquest. At the same time, Hegel's concept of the state may be understood in relation to the interests of a rising German bourgeoisie. Their aim was the unification and integration of a hopelessly fragmented market and trading sphere in a single nation state.

The examination of Hegel's social theories holds major implications for clarifying the general problems with which this study is concerned. It is important that Hegel's use of assumptions about human nature be thoroughly reviewed. Also, the relationship between those assumptions and his more conservative orientation to liberalism must be studied. From this sociology of knowledge framework of analysis, it will be possible to determine the extent to which Hegel, like Burke, based his criticisms of the libertarian ideals of the Philosophes on assumptions about human nature which were empirically unjustified.

Hegel's first confrontation with liberal libertarian idealism was in the development of an epistemology in reaction to 'Critical Philosophy', the intellectual heritage of Kant. Kant had claimed that the a priori categories of the mind of the individual gave form, coherence and understanding to the outside world. It was thought that all individual cognitions about reality were constructed in terms of these a priori categories which were innate to the human mind. These categories included: space, time, substance and causation, among others. Kant outlined the fact that it was
only by means of these ideas that things of which one becomes aware can be comprehended or that one can think about an object. The classification is systematic and is based on a principle used in common with the list of functions of judgement...136

Hegel, contrary to Kant's theories, wished to demonstrate that the acquiring of knowledge by the individual was not confined merely to filling the innate categories of mind with the relevant facts. Instead, Hegel pointed out that the individual and his cultural environment dynamically interacted with one another in the "process of becoming" -- the process whereby knowledge was inevitably produced.

Hegel believed Kant's psychology to be defective insofar as

...its categories were of a type that "neither can nor do contain truth." Essentially the old psychology approached the soul as a fixed and static "thing" to which it sought to apply the abstract categories of the understanding.137

Additionally, he felt that Kant's psychology was deficient in that it was incapable of grasping the nature of "Spirit", the essence of which was believed to be the absolute unity of opposites within the Nation. Hegel published four major works: Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807); Science of Logic (1812); Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1816) and Philosophy of Right (1818). These particular writings have been subject to a great number of emergent interpretations.138

In reviewing Hegel's general theoretical orientations one is struck by the emphasis which is placed on man's freedom. In fact, he considered the history of philosophy to constitute the history of free concrete thought.139 He criticized all limitations imposed on human thought and believed freedom to be the seat of the political as well as the spiritual life of man. Freedom in the mental life of the individual represented
in turn the manifestations of Reason. Only through the transformation of
an individual's natural impulses, affections and desires, could the human
spirit realize its freedom. It was further suggested that man has
within himself a basic inclination which, given the proper circumstances,
can erect him above nature and in turn enable him to recognize his affinity
or oneness with the "eternal Spirit" for which both Nature and the indi-
vidual exist.

Generally, his philosophy of mind sought to demonstrate
the stages by which man explicitly attempts to realize his innate nature.

In many respects Hegel's philosophy of the state was a direct con-
tinuation of his philosophy of mind. Both systems of thought were di-
rectly concerned with the realization of the freedom of man's innate
nature. His theory of the state began with the premise that freedom is
the practical and political expression of the human capacity for free
will. Within this theory the general historical development and evolu-
tion of political structures were conceived of in terms of the unfolding
of the innate elements of the human consciousness and spirit. The final
stage of this evolutionary process was the national state which was, in
its perfected self-realization, the most comprehensive expression of free-
dom and rationality - the basic elements of the human will. As it was
stated in the Philosophy of Right:

The state in and by itself is the ethical whole, the
actualization of freedom, and it is an absolute end of
reason that freedom should be actual. The state is
mind on earth consciously realizing itself there...The
mind of God is the world, that is what the state is.
The basis of the state is the power of reason, actualizing
itself as will.

Hegel believed freedom and rationality to be the chief characteristics
of human consciousness.
Hegel's view of the nature and role of the state holds many similarities to Rousseau's idea of the General Will. Like Rousseau, he saw the state as the embodiment of Reason, the chief function of which was to give direction and guidance to individuals living within its sphere of influence. He felt that the state would guarantee and protect the freedom of the individual. However, Rousseau, unlike Hegel, was not willing to specifically define the state as the chief means to realize this liberal ideal.

Hegel defined both the structure of the human consciousness and the state to be the same. He argued that rationality and freedom are, or should be, crucial aspects of the state. More simply, the nation state was seen as the emergent product of human consciousness. The state was understood as existing

...immediately in custom, immediately in individual self-consciousness, knowledge and activity, while self-consciousness in virtue of its sentiment towards the state finds in the state, as its essence and the end and product of its activity, its substantive freedom. 143

From this perspective, it was also argued that the individual human being must direct his self-consciousness to the state rather than to his own immediate needs

...because to be confined to mere physical needs as such and their direct satisfaction would simply be the condition in which the mental is plunged in the natural and so would be of savagery and unfreedom. 144

Equally as important, Hegel endeavored to show in the Philosophy of Right, that the state, in that it represents the inherent characteristics of human consciousness, takes the form of an abstract self represented by the monarch.
The ultimate self in which the will of the state is concentrated is, when thus taken in abstraction, a single self and therefore is immediate individuality. Hence its 'natural character' is implied in its very conception. The monarch, therefore, is essentially characterized as this individual, in abstraction from all his other characteristics, and this individual is raised to the dignity of monarchy in an immediate natural fashion, through his birth in the course of nature. It was felt that the state represented the inherent characteristics of the individual and that the monarch was the abstract personification of those characteristics. The relationship between the monarch and the individual existing within the state was conceptualized as being both dynamic and organic. Through his support of the monarch and the nation state, the individual would be able to realize his own innate capacities for freedom.

History, for Hegel, represented the unfolding of the inherent features of human consciousness which consisted of the elements of freedom and rationality. He legitimized the logic of this assertion by arguing that

...since mind is explicitly and actually, reason is explicit to itself in mind as knowledge, world history is the necessary development...of the movements of reason and so of the self-consciousness and freedom of mind.

History, as it was interpreted, constituted the process whereby the human mind realized its inherent characteristics of freedom and rationality within the context of the state, as well as in terms of the interaction between states. It was also observed that the knowledge of what man should be in essence, is contradicted by the condition of man in his immediate existence. He defined the dynamic of world history as being made up of the dialectical process of the negation of existence by its
essence in the realization of man's essential being and nature.

The dialectical process which consciousness executes on itself -- on its knowledge as well as on its object -- is precisely what is termed Experience.147

With regard to the actual workings of the dialectical processes of world history it was argued that Reason, in the immediate context of historical development, is realized by persons who seek to appease their own "private" aims, passions and the satisfaction of selfish desires."148 He went on to contend

...that these natural impulses are closer to the core of human nature than the artificial and troublesome discipline toward order, self-restraint, law and morality.149

Thus, as Hegel described, selfish passions as features of the innate elements of human nature characterize the individual as a separate and autonomous human being concerned about his own individual welfare as opposed to others.

Both Hegel's theory of mind and especially his theory of the state constituted refined variations of basic liberal ideals in terms of their exemplification of social integration. This does not mean to say that he intended to deny the liberal ideals of individualism. On the contrary, he sought in fact to redefine the liberal libertarian ideal within a social and civil context. This, he believed, was a definition of individualism which would provide for the development and realization not only of the inherent characteristics of human nature, but of the state and civil society as well, which as he thought, were the natural embodiment of those human characteristics. It was assumed that freedom and reason were the inherent characteristics of human nature.150 These characteristics were in turn defined as the essence of mind. The mind
in this context was believed to be represented by the state in the actualization of its inherent characteristics.

Hegel has been seen by many critics as the representative of a more conservative and at times authoritarian ideological tradition within the history of German social philosophy in particular. It is nevertheless true that his theories of the state and mind have contributed towards the redefinition of liberal libertarian ideals within a socially integrative context. His conservatism in this sense may be interpreted not as being antithetical to the liberal libertarian tradition but rather as being a basic variation and a socially integrative adaptation of those libertarian ideals. Marcuse has succinctly described the nature of the relationship between the individual mind and the state as it was conceived by Hegel.

The state creates an order that does not depend...on the blind interrelation of particular needs and performances for its own perpetuation. The 'system of wants' becomes a conscious scheme of life controlled by man's autonomous decisions in the common interest. The state therefore can be denoted as the 'realization of freedom'...for Hegel the state's fundamental task is to make the specific and general interest coincide, so as to preserve the individual's right and freedom.151

In short, Hegel saw that insofar as we may understand the nature of the state so too may we understand the nature of the individual.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it is obvious that Hegel's use of assumptions about human nature were intimately related to the specific liberal ideals to which he adhered. These assumptions, outlined above, served as vehicles in the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of his rather conservative beliefs. His use of assumptions about human nature is similar to Burke. The objections which these two theorists had to the libertarian ideals which had been originally defined
by the *Philosophes*, were expressed through their use of differing assumptions about human nature. Despite the differences of opinion which existed between the *Philosophes* on the one hand and Burke and Hegel on the other, all of these theorists shared one common similarity. Together, these theorists were intent on legitimizing their differing liberal ideals through the use of empirically unsubstantiated assumptions about human nature.
9) **de Maistre**

The libertarian principles of the Enlightenment which had led to the revolution were criticized not only by Burke and Hegel. In Germany the reaction to the Enlightenment took the form of a strong upsurge in nationalism. This was likewise true, although to a much lesser extent, in Britain. Conversely, in France much of the reaction to the libertarian ideals of the Enlightenment and to the consequences of the French Revolution found expression within a Catholic counterrevolutionary philosophy. Roman Catholic traditionalist theorists such as de Bonald and de Maistre attempted to outline both a critique of the consequences of the French Revolution as well as to reintroduce and legitimize many of the principles and ideals of the Old Regime. In short...

These men were traditionalists who idealized the lost medieval order and who yearned for its providentially arranged harmony. Contradicting the ideas of the Enlightenment, they posited the inferiority of individual reason as compared with revealed and traditional truth. They put forward a religious and philosophical doctrine in which man acquired knowledge not by means of his individual reason, but rather as a social being through tradition...

The writings of de Maistre found an enthusiastic audience among the emigrés who left France in protest against the Jacobin terror.

De Maistre's major works included: *Considerations On France* (1796); *Studies On Sovereignty* (1804) and the *Saint Petersburg Dialogues* (1817). Jack Lively has clearly described both the popularity of his works as well as their general orientations and intentions. As Lively states...

...in recompense the Revolution gave him European fame, for the writings of his long years of exile caught the imagination first of the emigrés and then of a Europe disillusioned with the revolutionary message. In the fierce and mordant irony of his books, he embodied all the hatred of the lonely and dispossessed for the authors of their
suffering... his thought always remained a protest against
the revolutionary present.  153

His social and political philosophy embraced the belief that society was
a collective unit which has its own properties and values which are
superimposed upon the purposes and wills of its members. In many respects
his theoretical perspective complemented that of Hegel's.  154 Rather than
being directly opposed to individualism as an end in itself, de Maistre
wished, as had Burke, to see the individual placed within a religious
integrative milieu which would ensure the realization of man's inherent
religious and social nature.

The question which must be reviewed here is whether or not de Maistre,
like the other theorists who reacted to the libertarian ideals of the En-
lighterment and the French Revolution, made use of assumptions about
human nature to lend support to his various arguments. It has been
argued that the revival of conservative opinion by de Maistre and others
after the French Revolution held major implications for the subsequent
development of social scientific thought. Zeitlin, for example, has
suggested that in

... developing their ideological standpoint, however, de
Bonald, de Maistre, and other representatives of the Conser-
vative Reaction advanced a number of ideas which have since
been incorporated into sociology as important working con-
cepts and assumptions.  155

In recognizing de Maistre's contributions to the development of modern
social thought, the task of analyzing his writings takes on special signi-
ficance. By reviewing his works in detail, it will be possible to ascer-
tain the logical and factual basis by which he was able to delegitimize
the libertarian ideals of the Enlightenment. The examining of the
assumptions about man's nature which were used in his theories will provide a closer understanding of the degree to which his views of human nature complemented those formulated by other members of the Romantic and Conservative reaction. It is also important to determine the degree to which his assumptions about human nature are empirically justified.

De Maistre interpreted the French Revolution's doctrine of the Rights of Man as anarchistic. His plan was to restore the monarchy back to its former position of power and to free the church from state control and from its subordination to the political ambitions of Napoleon. The social theories which he formulated lent support to the doctrines of Bossuet who had contended that all power was ultimately derived from God. A great many exiled French intellectuals were...

Terrified by the anarchy of individualism in politics and in religion, they revered the doctrine of authority and divine right. They emphasized tradition and dogma, rather than reason, believing that the will of the state should reflect the mind of God rather than the theories of men.156

De Maistre was antagonistic to the idea of unrestrained individualism. He was, nevertheless, deeply concerned with the problem of the realization of human individualism and freedom through the mediums of society, tradition and most importantly, religion.

De Maistre was intent on defending the irrationalism of the Catholic faith. A number of sociologists and historians of ideas have argued that his theories were also directed against the a priori reasoning of the Philosophes.

He complained persistently of the philosophes that they based their political ideas on psychological or contractual or natural-rights theories which they believed could be discovered independently of any study of society as it existed.157
For this reason, he criticized the concept of natural law. Despite arguments to the contrary, it is quite evident that his theories relied heavily on a priori assumptions about the nature of human nature to justify man's need for social integration generally, religion specifically. As he intimated

...the nature of man was thus to be a cognitive, religious and social animal.\textsuperscript{158}

Parallel to his belief in man's sociability was his equally as strong conviction in the existence of man's pride and independent will. Only when man worked under the direction of religious authority was he able to realize himself as a creature of free will. It was argued, in relation to this point, that man

...in harmony with his Creator is sublime, and his action is creative; equally, once he separates himself from God and acts alone, he does not cease to be powerful, since this is the privilege of his nature, but his acts are negative and lead only to destruction.\textsuperscript{159}

Also, it was observed that

...men cease to draw their inspiration from God, they and their works are condemned to error, decay and sterility.\textsuperscript{160}

Thus, de Maistre saw man as both a creature of free will as well as a creature of God, who was only able to realize his more positive and creative potentialities under God's guidance.

De Maistre fervently rejected the idea that man's nature was a \textit{tabula rasa}. In his opinion, there existed in every individual a number of "simple ideas" granted by God, which allowed a person to interpret and appreciate his surroundings. The idea was also put forward that the religious and upright individual
...is very commonly informed by an inner sentiment, of the truth or falsity of certain propositions before any examination, often even without having made studies necessary to be in a position to examine them with a full knowledge of the case.

Individual freedom in his opinion, consisted not of the total absence of authority and constraint, but rather of its continued presence and expansion. Ironically, his theories were similar in some respects to those of the Philosophes, which he had been intent on condemning. Thus,

...it can be seen that Maistre shared many basic assumptions and emotional attitudes with Rousseau, and with the eighteenth century tradition of thought of which Rousseau was the most positive and influential spokesman. His ultimate object, like Rousseau's was to resolve the conflict between man's self-will and his social nature, to release the capacity for virtue frustrated by existing civilization.

De Maistre's explicit use of assumptions of human nature within his social theories constituted a basic variation of liberalism as an ideology.

De Maistre was devoted to the belief that order was the "natural element of man", and in order "you will find in it the happiness you vainly seek in disorder". Only under a sovereign who was guided by the wisdom of God could man's innate nature of sociability be realized. For this reason, the idea was proposed that "monarchy is the form of government that gives the most distinction to the most people". This belief in man's innate sociability and religiosity was justified by arguing that...

The nature of a viper is to crawl, to have a scaly skin, hollow and movable fangs which exude poisonous venom; and the nature of man is to be a cognitive, religious and sociable animal. All experience teaches us this; and to my knowledge nothing has contradicted this experience.

Similarly, he justified the obedience of the people to a monarch by emphasizing that the monarch as an unique individual was
...gifted with an extraordinary penetration of, what is more probable, with an infallible instinct... which shape a nation's character, the means of bringing them to life, putting them into action, and making the greatest possible use of them.164

He insisted that it was only through participating in a coherent social order which was ruled by a monarch that man as an individual could have the freedom to realize the essential characteristics of sociability and religiosity which were innate to his nature.

De Maistre in reaction to the social theories of the Enlightenment made explicit use of assumptions about man's nature to objectify, manifest and legitimize his own counterrevolutionary ideals. His accusations that the Philosophes used unjustified a priori assumptions in their elaboration of the Rights of Man were contradicted by his own use of assumptions about man's innate nature. The evidence which he provided for empirically justifying his assumptions about the nature of human nature was lacking to say the least. At most times he merely asserted that these assumptions were based on experience and observation. De Maistre, both in terms of his use of assumptions about human nature, as well as in regard to his basic philosophical orientation, stands in direct continuity with the other theorists of the Romantic and Conservative reaction, inclusive of Burke and Hegel. His assumptions about man's nature were utilized as means to legitimize the more conservative variation of liberalism as an ideology. Robert Nisbet has argued that this conservative variation of liberalism, in its emphasis on social stability, integration and its shift of emphasis from the individual to the group, provided a basic theoretical orientation for a wide number of social
theorists. These social theorists, inclusive of Saint-Simon and Comte were to become the chief exponents of the notion of a "science of society". 167

From a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis, it is apparent that de Maistre's use of assumptions about human nature was intimately related to the specific liberal values and ideals to which he adhered. Like all of the other liberal theorists who have been reviewed in this chapter, de Maistre was concerned more with supporting and legitimizing his own liberal beliefs than he was with developing and outlining a set of empirically substantiated social theories. In short, we may understand that the forerunners of the social sciences who developed their theories during the course of the Enlightenment, as well as in reaction to it, were decisively influenced by a number of dominant orientations within liberal intellectual thought. The extent of this influence is reflected in the use which all of these theorists made of assumptions about human nature.


10) **Summary and Evaluation**

Together, the social theories of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and Conservative reaction represent the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. It is contended that the theories of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius lent support and gave credibility to the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism. These libertarian ideals were centered on the belief that man by nature was free and required only minimal restraints or guides for living in society. The theories of Burke, Hegel and de Maistre constituted the more conservative variation of liberalism as an ideology. These theorists believed that man by nature required the constraints provided by law, social institutions, the state and religion. These social theorists did not, however, disregard the basic ideals of individualism. On the contrary, they merely attempted to redefine these ideals within a meaningful, socially integrative context.

Hegel, for example, argued that the realization of individual freedom on the one hand, and the development of the state on the other, were mutually complementary processes. One process did not exclude the other. This view was contrary to the Enlightenment social theorists who emphasized that man through his own individual actions was capable of realizing the innate characteristics of his own nature. The *Philosophes* supported the belief in education and social reform. They assumed that these types of social improvements conformed to the dictates of Reason rather than to the irrationalities of traditional customs or the arbitrary authority of monarchs. Locke and Helvetius were convinced that man's innate desire for pleasure would ensure his choice of the proper means for the reali-
zation of his nature. Montesquieu asserted that once man was placed within a republican form of government which would guarantee his individual freedom, his innate virtues would consequently unfold in accordance with his nature. Rousseau likewise argued that man's innate faculty of self-improvement was in itself a guarantee that man's nature would develop according to the dictates of reason and rationality.

The theorists of the Romantic and Conservative reaction interpreted the nature of human nature from a dualistic perspective. They believed man's nature to be dependent for its realization on the traditional forms of law and authority which had existed before the French Revolution. Only through these forms of institutionalized constraints could man's innate greedy, selfish and lustful characteristics be denied. These traditional forms of authority were defined as means by which man's individual and creative character could be facilitated in its development. Burke and de Maistre believed that religion as a social institution ensured that man's innate selfishness would be inhibited. Religion was also understood as a means by which man's innate sociability could be realized.

The theorists of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and Conservative reaction formulated their ideas and concepts about man and society within a liberal world-view. The theories of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius originally established the theoretical precedent for the libertarian ideals which constitute one basic variation of liberalism as an ideology. The relationship between the social theories of the Enlightenment and liberalism was in this sense both a functional and meaningful one. It was functional insofar as these theories served as vehicles for
the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of the libertarian ideals which have remained particular to liberal ideology right up to the present time. The relationship between liberalism and these Enlightenment social theories was meaningful in the sense that they served as a means for the exemplification of the meanings, values and norms of the libertarian variation of liberalism. In particular, the functional and meaningful relationships between the social theories of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius and liberal ideology were reflected in the assumptions about human nature of which all of these theorists made explicit use. Likewise, the relationship between the explicit assumptions of human nature and liberalism within the theories of Burke, Hegel and de Maistre, also was functional and meaningful. However, the variation of liberalism to which these conservative theorists adhered was fundamentally different to that which was exemplified in the theories of the Philosophes.

The general reorientation of social thought after the Enlightenment was first brought about by Burke through his criticisms of the libertarian ideals which had been maintained by the Philosophes. Most of Burke's criticisms were later complemented by those of Hegel and de Maistre, who had reacted strongly to the chaotic events of the French Revolution. The Reign of Terror, and the social, political and economic instability in Europe which followed in the wake of the Revolution, prompted these social theorists to reevaluate the ideas, concepts and values which had originally been suggested by the philosophers and theorists of the Enlightenment. The change in the meanings, values and norms expressed in the theories of the Romantic and Conservative reaction constituted a new orientation to liberalism as an ideology. Despite many of the authori-
arian and conservative implication of their theories, Burke, Hegel and de Maistre together defined a basic variation of liberal thought. Liberalism has been understood as an ideology of ambivalence in its emphasis on the ideals of individualism on the one hand, and of social integration on the other. It was the theorists of the Romantic and Conservative reaction who originally demonstrated the fact that liberalism, as an adaptive ideology, was characterized by ideals, other than those related to the belief in libertarian individualism.

The dynamics of immanent change, particular to liberalism are directly related in their origin, to the ambivalent character of liberalism as an ideology. The theories of both Montesquieu and Rousseau for example are representative of the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism. They are also indicative of the concern which these theorists had with the question of the nature of man's religious and social character. The Enlightenment theorists placed a heavy emphasis on the ideals of individualism. However, their theories often reflected their concern with the problem of social integration as well. It is the dualistic perspective of liberals that has provided for the processes of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology. The processes of immanent change and the concomitant variations of assumptions about human nature as related to those processes are much more obvious when the social theories of the Enlightenment and their assumptions about human nature are compared with those of the Romantic and Conservative reaction. From this perspective it is not surprising that the Romantic and Conservative reaction should have followed the Enlightenment. Its emergence as a notable theoretical movement reflected the basic processes of immanent change
inherent within liberalism in its attempts, through the explicit use of assumptions of human nature, to counterbalance the libertarian ideals which had gained popularity during the French Revolution.

The problem of interpreting the interrelationships between the specific ideals held by a social theorist and his social circumstances is complex. Typically, many Marxist scholars have argued that the ideas articulated by a social theorist are a general reflection of the material conditions within which the theorist finds himself as well as an indication of his class background and class interests. The argument which has been presented in this chapter suggests an alternative point of view, but one which does not, at the same time, necessarily exclude a conventional Marxist interpretation of the data.

It is contended here that the social theorists who have been discussed in this chapter, developed their ideas and theories in response to a number of historical events. The events included the Enlightenment as a whole, as well as the French Revolution. The majority of social theorists reviewed here did not formulate their theories in terms of their class interests. In fact, many of these theorists developed ideas which were exactly opposite to the interests of the classes to which they belonged. Locke, a son of an upper-class attorney; Montesquieu, the son of a baroness, and Helvetius, the son of the chief physician to Queen Maria Leszynska, the wife of Louis XV, all were leading advocates of the more libertarian ideals particular to liberalism. These ideals were directly opposed to the maintenance of a traditional power and class structure to which all of these theorists belong. At the same time Hegel, the son
a government clerk and Burke, the son of a rural village lawyer were
staunch advocates for the need to maintain a traditional power and class
structure which was antithetical to the lower class positions within which
they found themselves.

The ideological perspective of these theorists was shaped by the
particular social circumstances with which they were faced and the various
intellectual orientations popularly shared and made use of by social
theorists and intellectuals alike during the specific years in which they
wrote. As the historical circumstances changed, from the time of the En-
lightenment to the period following the French Revolution, so did the
liberal world-views of social theorists change. It might be argued that
the two differing orientations to liberalism taken by social theorists
during the Enlightenment and after the French Revolution was indicative
of the opposing class backgrounds of the various theorists discussed in
this chapter. As argued above, the differences between the liberal ideals
of the Philosophes and the more conservative ideals of the members of
the Romantic and Conservative reaction were not directly related to the
differences between the class backgrounds of these various theorists. On
the contrary, the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism on the one
hand, and social integration on the other, were formulated not as elements
of antagonistic class ideologies but as variations of one ideology, in
response to changing social circumstances. This is not to say, however,
that these divergent liberal ideals did not later come to serve mutually
opposed class interests. The possibility of this fact is of course quite
distinct.
What is important to emphasize here is that the variation in the ideological perspectives of social theorists during these periods was directly related to the changing historical circumstances with which they were faced. This insight provides not only a clearer understanding of how liberalism as an ideology has developed and changed, but also provides the theoretical basis for comprehensively outlining the dynamics of social theory construction. Similarly, by dealing with the wide range of assumptions about human nature which all of these theorists made use of, a more detailed understanding of the variation of the liberal views of these theorists may be achieved.

The recognition of the extent to which assumptions about human nature were utilized by the Philosophes and members of the Romantic and Conservative reaction constitutes a sound basis upon which we may critically evaluate a leading theory maintained by many social theorists at present. One of the most popular theories entertained by sociologists and anthropologists today contends that culture plays a major part in determining human behavior. Anthropologists such as Marvin Harris have argued that the notion of the cultural determination of human behavior originated in the social theories of the Enlightenment. From the evidence provided in this chapter it may be pointed out that Harris' argument is both misleading and ill informed.

It has been shown here that the environmentalism expressed in the theories of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius was predicated on the assumption that man had already inherent within his nature certain innate characteristics that could be facilitated or inhibited by external forces, social or otherwise. Their sole intention as advocates of social
reform was to structure the environment generally, culture specifically, according to the basic limits of Reason and the Laws of Nature. In this fashion, they believed that man's "just" and "virtuous" nature could be realized, undistorted by "evil" and "inadequate", social institutions, laws and religious practices. Even Locke, in his attempts to rationalize the idea that man's nature was in some aspects a tabula rasa, did not believe that this was true for the whole of human nature. In fact, he argued that only certain ideas which the Cartesian philosophers had assumed to be innate to man, were absent in the human imagination at birth. Locke's theories indicate the fact that he believed certain innate faculties of Reason to exist which were innate to human nature and which he understood to be the means by which man acquired ideas. He considered various passions related to man's innate desire for pleasure and his fear of pain to be the underlying forces of human motivation and social action.

The theories of the Enlightenment as well as those which followed in reaction to it, have been interpreted by many social theorists today as the forerunners of the modern social sciences. It has been shown here that the theories of Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau and Helvetius, as well as those of Burke, Hegel and de Maistre are characterized by the explicit use of assumptions about human nature. The empirical credibility of many of these assumptions is questionable. In short, all of these theorists provided little or no proof as to the empirical basis upon which their assumptions about human nature were based. It was found that many of these assumptions made about man by these theorists in question, constituted means to objectify, manifest and legitimize particular liberal ideals rather than being the products of objective scientific study and
investigation based upon the provision of evidence through observation and experiment.

Liberalism, whether it constituted the variation of libertarian individualism or social integration stood in an ultimate relationship with the social theories which emerged out of the Enlightenment, as well as those theories which followed. Social theory during this specific historical period, while being affected in its general orientations by changing historical circumstances was nevertheless restricted to exemplifying either of the two basic variations of liberal ideology. The relationship between social theory on the one hand and the particular variations of liberal ideology is illustrated in the nature and types of assumptions of human nature that were formulated by the theorists in question. Ultimately, the debates between the Philosophes and their more conservative critics over the effects on man's social behavior, of the environment, social institutions, authority, tradition and religion were all reducible to contrasting and divergent speculative assumptions about man's innate nature. These assumptions were in turn complementary to particular variations of the liberal world-view. As forerunners of the modern social sciences, the social theories of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and Conservative reaction reflected basic variations of a coherent ideological perspective which in turn were intimately related to definite assumptions about the nature of human nature.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER II


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17. Descartes, René; 'Objections and Replies' (Orig. 1641) in Wilson, Margaret (ed.); The Essential Descartes (Mentor; New York; 1969) p. 260.


22. Ibid.; p. 34.

23. Ibid.; p. 82.

24. Ibid.; p. 86.


27. Ibid.; pp. 134, 137-8, 144-8.


32. For an explanation of Epicurianism's view on pleasure, see: De Witt, Norman Wentworth; Epicurus and His Philosophy (University of Minnesota Press; Minneapolis; 1964) pp. 216-48.


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72. Ibid.; p. 255.
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74. Ibid.; p. 257.
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76. Ibid.; p. 263.
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Emile (Dent; London; 1966) p. vi.
79. Ibid.; p. vi.
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88. Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; 'The Education of Julie's Children: The 
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(Orig. 1754) in Rousseau, Jean-Jacques; The Social Contract and 
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96. For a contemporary example of this theory, see: Broom, Leonard & Philip Selznick; Sociology (Harper & Row; New York; 1963) pp. 77-8.


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107. Ibid.; p. 129.

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160. de Maistre, Joseph; 'Studies on Sovereignty'; Ibid.; p. 12.

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CHAPTEIII HUMAN NATURE, POSITIVISM AND THE GERMAN CRITIQUE

1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

This chapter attempts to analyze two major intellectual traditions of social thought. These two traditions include French Positivism and the sociological counterpart to the philosophical tradition of German Idealism. A sociology of knowledge framework of analysis shall be utilized to evaluate the degree to which the major social theories of French Positivism, as well as those which grew out of the philosophical tradition of German Idealism, reflected the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. Also to be considered will be the extent to which the French social theorists inclusive of Saint-Simon and Comte, and the German social theorists, inclusive of Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber, made explicit use of assumptions about human nature in their attempts to legitimate particular liberal ideals and values. The relationship between the social and historical situation of each of these theorists and their concurrent orientations to liberalism will be noted. Finally, both the assumptions about the nature of human nature formulated by all of these theorists, as well as their particular orientations to liberalism will be compared with those expressed in the social theories of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and Conservative reaction.

The disagreements and debates that took place between the French Positivists and the German Idealists were related to the differences between the various liberal ideals to which the members of each of these two major intellectual movements adhered. Their divergent orientations to liberalism as an ideology were complemented by the emphasis which the
German social theorists placed on the unique spiritual character of socio-cultural phenomena and conversely, the insistence by the French Positivists on the reducibility of human behavior and culture to scientific principles and laws. What has not been considered to date, however, is the role which assumptions about the nature of human nature might have played in the social theories formulated within both these intellectual movements. Further, the extent to which assumptions about man's innate nature might have served as a means to legitimize the differing orientations of these theorists to liberalism as an ideology has not been examined.

By reviewing the extent to which assumptions about human nature characterized the theories of the French Positivists and German social theorists, as well as recognizing the differences between those assumptions, it will be possible to determine the degree to which those differences are correlated with their divergent liberal perspectives. Equally as important, by comparing those differences of assumptions about human nature and liberal values with those already found to exist between the social theories of the Enlightenment and the Romantic and Conservative reaction it will be possible to more clearly understand the extent to which assumptions of human nature in social theory have constituted vehicles for liberal ideals historically. Such a comparison will provide general insights into both the basic variations of liberalism that have characterized the historical development of social theory, as well as the processes of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology.

French Positivism as well as the social theories which emerged from the philosophical tradition of German Idealism, had a major influence on the development of the social sciences as a whole. French Positivism as
a school of thought, emerged in the beginning of the nineteenth century. Intellectuals during the course of the Enlightenment had demonstrated a general enthusiasm towards the methods of analysis and discoveries which had been provided by the natural sciences. Through the work of such well known scholars as Lagrange, Laplace, Lavoisier, Buffon, d'Alembert and Turgot, France was able to lead the world in all of the important fields of natural science. The leadership of French intellectuals in this period provided the incentive for French social theorists to extend the methods and insights of the natural sciences to the study of human society generally. In this context, positivism as a method and an ideal, sought to extend scientific methods of analysis to the phenomena of society. Don Martindale has defined positivism as

...) that movement in thought which rests all interpretation of the world exclusively on experience...positivism takes its point of departure from the natural sciences, seeking a unified view of the world of phenomena, both physical and human, through the application of the methods and extension of the results of the natural sciences.

Positivism, in short, was based on the belief in the unitary character of both the natural and cultural world.

During the nineteenth century in France, Cartesian rationalism as a dominant intellectual orientation had been gradually replaced by a Lockian form of empiricism. Theorists such as Condillac had begun to view man's nature as consisting of a bundle of sensations. Other intellectuals such as Vig d'Azyr modified Condillac's general psychological views and came to regard man's rational life as a purely biological function which could be studied by way of the methods of empirical physiology. The positivistic approach of these theorists was formally institutionalized with the
founding of the École Polytechnique in 1794. The faculty of this school conceived of science in purely instrumental terms and maintained the belief that social problems could be solved on the basis of scientific knowledge. This same perspective was supported by their colleagues at the École de Medicine, the Jardin du Roi, the Académie des Sciences and the École normale. The consensus of all these institutions was that the natural and social sciences were

...an instrument serving to increase man's control over the conditions of his natural and social life.\(^5\)

France, which was recovering from the unsettling circumstances of 1789 and the Reign of Terror, entered at the beginning of the nineteenth century into the period of the Second Empire. As a time of both dissension and instability, great public support and enthusiasm was nevertheless given to all those who attempted to realize the scientific ideal, whether it be in the realm of the natural or the social sciences.

Various representatives of the human sciences in France fought to demonstrate that the study of social phenomena was equal, both in its empirical credibility and practical use-value, to those analyses that were being undertaken in the natural sciences. The attempts to define social theory within a natural scientific framework engendered two major beliefs about the nature of science and the possibility for social reform. These beliefs came to be shared by a wide number of intellectuals. As D.G. Charlton has observed, these two beliefs emphasized

...the reliability and fruitfulness of the scientific methods, and secondly...the possibility...of creating a 'science of man' that shall immeasurably ameliorate human life and human nature.\(^6\)
In this period, Christian and other traditionalist philosophers and social theorists were forced to take account of science and the attacks which it continued to deliver on religion, metaphysics and ethics. Many of the advocates of the idea of a science of society sought to replace the traditional Christian ethical standards with ones based on the idea of scientific knowledge. Intellectuals of the early nineteenth century were faced with the urgent problems of resolving the relationship between science and religion, free will and determinism, and finally Christian ethics and ethics based on scientific knowledge. 7

The concern of social theorists in the first half of the nineteenth century with questions relating to political philosophy and social reform was in many respects a reaction on their part to the consequences of the French Revolution. The social theorists who attempted after the revolution to rationalize that the idea of the inevitable progress of human society was scientific, had to contend with such incongruent realities as the memory of the old French monarchy, the yearly alterations of national boundaries all over Europe, as well as the fall of Napoleon. 8

The significance of the belief maintained by these social theorists that a scientific study of society was a real possibility is not to be underestimated. 9 The idea of a science of society was to come to represent for many social theorists in the nineteenth century a promise for the possibility of initiating constructive social reform as well as providing the basis for a system of ethics to which all individuals were expected to religiously adhere.

Two of the leading advocates of the idea of a science of society in
France at this time were Saint-Simon and Comte. Saint-Simon, whose major writings were published between 1807 and 1825, proposed the scientific reorganization of society and the promotion of scientific studies. He was convinced that human progress was entirely dependent on the growth of scientific knowledge. Many social theorists, inclusive of Durkheim, have bestowed on Saint-Simon "the honor of having founded both positivist philosophy and sociology." He is also recognized as the founder of French socialism. In this regard, Karl Marx dubbed him an "utopian socialist".

Saint-Simon believed that scientific knowledge would provide the basis for a substitute religion. Such views as these place Saint-Simon within the ranks of the more conservative social theorists such as Burke and de Maistre, who were equally as intent on reintroducing religion and religious traditions into society. Saint-Simon argued that the study of human behavior which he referred to as "social physiology", could serve as a means to reconcile the antagonisms between social classes as well as providing the foundation for the growth of a unified organic society. His theories combined the conservative belief in order and hierarchical organization with the socialist ideals of equality, economic opportunity, social planning and reform.

Saint-Simon's conception of a new religion based on the tenets of science was an expression of the basic ideals underlying positivism as a whole. Frank E. Manuel has commented that Saint-Simon defined the religion which he wished to introduce to society as being

...that ideal expression of the human spirit which afforded the optimum formal order for contemporaneous scientific knowledge.
Positivism, as it was conceived by Saint-Simon, constituted both a method of scientific inquiry as well as a faith in the whole body of scientific thought.

Auguste Comte held somewhat parallel views to those of Saint-Simon. He also believed that science could play a positive role in the reconstruction of society. He defined the "positive stage" of human development as that period in which

"...the human spirit recognizing the impossibility of obtaining absolute conceptions, abandons the search for the origin and goal of the universe and the inner causes of things, to set itself the task merely of discovering by reason and experience combined, the effective laws of phenomena, that is to say, their invariable relations of succession..."

Comte, like Saint-Simon, utilized the idea of positivism as a means to criticize both the Enlightenment and its revolutionary aftermath. He saw positive philosophy, based on the ideal of science, as being the intellectual foundation for a new form of social organization. At the same time, he was set against those forms of social criticism that had been popularized by the Philosophes. He felt that true moral order was not to be predicated on the unchecked liberty of individual minds. Instead, it was argued that liberty could only be recognized through the authority of "true" positive principles which were in accordance with the dictates of science complemented by a traditional integrative institutional framework. Many of Comte's views were similar to those that had been maintained by theorists who were part of the Romantic and Conservative reaction to the Enlightenment.

Evans-Pritchard, in evaluating the contributions of Comte to the development of the social sciences, insisted that Comte's theories re-
flected his rejection of all forms of religious and metaphysical ideas about social causation and his acceptance of the idea of the development of a rational and scientific study of social life. He argued that Comte was fervently against the idea that social phenomena could be explained in terms of innate "needs", "drives" and "faculties". From a similar point of view, F.A. Hayek has intimated that Saint-Simon's theories were confined to the scientific procedures of analysis and discussion and avoided the utilization of all forms of a priori assumptions. Hayek has stated that Saint-Simon's writings...

...combine, for the first time, nearly all the characteristics of the modern scientific organizer. The enthusiasm for physics...and the use of 'physical language',...the contempt for all...anthropomorphic reasoning...and the wish to plan life in general on scientific lines... What Evans-Pritchard and Hayek have not examined is the question of whether or not Comte and Saint-Simon utilized assumptions about human nature despite their belief in the scientific study of social phenomena. Nor have they considered the possibility that their use of such assumptions might have been related to the particular liberal beliefs which these two French Positivist theorists shared. It is exactly this possibility which will be carefully analyzed in this chapter.

The idea of positivism and the reduction of human behavior to scientific principles was widely accepted by many intellectuals all over Europe. Nevertheless, it was also subject to severe criticism. A great number of social theorists, especially in Germany, objected to the reduction of man's basic behavior and motivations to rationalistic laws similar to those that had been formulated in the natural sciences. In Germany,
during the latter half of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century, a popular intellectual world-view based on the general orientations of Idealism had gained new credibility. Supporters of the German Idealist philosophy...

In emphasizing the importance of emotion and will at the expense of reason...often felt called upon to treat reason as relatively superficial. Science was dismissed as a shallow affair...while a true analysis penetrated 'deeply' into human feeling.

German Idealism, in its initial stages of development, was a philosophical movement, rather than a strictly sociological one. During the second half of the nineteenth century, a number of German social theorists used the insights of the Idealist philosophers in the attempt to give them a more precise sociological dimension.

The German philosophers, chiefly responsible for defining German Idealism as a recognizable school of thought included Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Together, all of these philosophers, under the influence of Kant's writings, argued that man's intellectual and social life could not be interpreted from a natural scientific framework of analysis. They were convinced that the basis of all human behavior was related to the human spirit which comprised the essence of human nature. All of these philosophers made explicit use of assumptions about human nature in their various theories. In this regard they maintained that the human spirit, as the basic element of human nature, was manifested within two separate spheres of reality:

1) The conscious world of observable phenomena and social action;

2) The unconscious world of noumena which constituted the real basis of the human spirit.
It was the "homin?a" which these philosophers believed could not be understood through the use of the conventional methods of scientific observation and interpretation.

Central to German Idealism was the belief that the self-fulfillment of the individual required the humanistic cultivation of the mind. This belief was in fact the basis for the Prussian school system which was organized around the ideal of a general education - 'allgemeine Bildung'. The exaltation of culture by the German Idealist philosophers also brought about the gradual secularization of religion through culture. The belief in the possibility of realizing individual freedom through the medium of culture constituted the 'lebensgefühl' of many German intellectuals and social theorists in this period. This belief in many respects had a great similarity to the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism despite its distinct aesthetic and aristocratic character. Specifically, the notion of Bildung referred to the ideal of the encyclopedic, cultured mind. The expression of this ideal was related to the devotion of the individual to a bourgeois lifestyle as the optimal fulfillment of human potential, including the arts and a true "savoir vivre", as the opposite of barbarism. Alexander von Humboldt gave this ideal organizational justification in the German universities. Bildung, above all, was an end in itself. Most of the university teachers were Privatdozenten, who lectured without pay, due to their own wealth.

Fritz Sterns observed that the veneration of the ideals of culture and personality by the German Idealist philosophers, as well as their belief in the self-realization of the individual through culture, provided a
general liberal orientation to German social life.

...this Humanitätsideal served as a spur to the creation of a liberal society. Indeed, in the pre-1848 movement, most academics sought to translate the inner freedom of man into external freedom as well, and the liberals of those days fought the establishment, the court, the nobility, and the church as...tyrannical institutions that inhibited the growth of the free individual. However diverse the liberals' programs, they all demanded the legal freedom of the person...his liberation from economic and social disabilities, and his spiritual freedom.18

While adherents to the German Idealist world-view were to take on a new orientation after the failure of 1848 and the success of Bismarck, they nevertheless continued, despite their later nationalistic commitments, to be centrally concerned with the problem of how to realize individual freedom through a cultural context.

During the latter half of the nineteenth century many of the ideas of the German Idealist philosophers were adopted by a number of German social theorists. These theorists were equally convinced that the scientific methods of analysis advocated by the positivists were insufficient for gaining a full understanding of the nature of human behavior and society. Their general critique of positivism was carried out on three distinct theoretical fronts. These theoretical movements included:

- phenomenology represented by Husserl and Scheler,
- neo-Kantianism represented by Simmel,
- and the idea of Geisteswissenschaften represented by both Dilthey and Weber.

Together, all of these social theorists articulated their conviction in the Idealist belief that a cultural phenomena, especially religion, could not be interpreted by methods and frameworks of analysis equivalent
to those used in the social sciences. Their unwillingness to relegate cultural phenomena such as religion, to interpretation by static natural laws and rationalistic methods of inquiry was partly owing, as Raymond Aron has pointed out, to the fact that unlike many French intellectuals a great number of the later supporters of German Idealist philosophical views were typically the sons of clergymen. For this reason they retained

...a certain feeling for religion as the highest form of spiritual aspiration. They are attracted by non-dogmatic religiosity, and they distinguish science, what is objectively true, from religion which is humanly valuable, even though it cannot be proved or refuted.19

The belief maintained by German social theorists during the nineteenth century in the uniqueness and scientific irreducibility of socio-cultural phenomena, inclusive of religion, added a definite sense of 'spiritualism' to their work. This theoretical spiritualism was especially promoted by Husserl, Dilthey, as well as a number of other social theorists living in Germany at the time.20

The concern of these German social theorists with the uniqueness of culture and the freedom of the individual spirit, set them distinctly apart from the theories and methods of positivism which had been formulated by Saint-Simon and Comte. It is clear that the German social theorists adopted many of their ideals and beliefs from the Idealist philosophers. The question which remains to be examined is the extent to which they also adopted and made use of the assumptions about human nature which had been formulated by these philosophers. In addition, the possibility exists that these theorists utilized assumptions about human nature to justify the particular liberal ideals which they supported.
By analyzing the assumptions about human nature which were utilized by
the French Positivists and German social theorists it will be possible
to determine the extent to which their liberal beliefs influenced their
choice of particular assumptions about man's nature. The reviewing of
the theoretical differences between these two schools of social thought
in relation to their differing liberal ideals and assumptions about human
nature will provide a general insight into the dynamics of social theory
construction. This overall study is concerned with the specific defini-
tions of such dynamics.
2) **Saint-Simon**

Saint-Simon (Claude Henri de Rouvroy) was a social theorist noted for both his eccentricities and his colorful personal background. He was born in 1760 into one of the most ancient noble families of France which claimed descent from Charlemagne. As a youth he fought in the War of American Independence and was imprisoned in the Palais de Luxembourg during the Terror for his activities in land speculation, an activity through which he was later able to amass a small fortune. Apart from these accomplishments, he is recognized as a major social theorist whose writings have influenced the development of both socialism as well as sociology in general. His publications included: *Letters of an Inhabitant of Geneva to his Contemporaries* (1803); *On the Reorganization of European Society* (1814); *On the Industrial System* (1820-1); *Industrial Catechism* (1823-4) and *The New Christians* (1825).

As an intellectual and social theorist, Saint-Simon has not been noted for either the clarity or the systematic presentation of his ideas. Alexander Gray has explained in relation to this point, that...

Saint-Simon’s writings are a confused jungle, partly because as a grand seigneur he somewhat despised the literary arts; and also in part because for him time was always urgent...

Despite the confusing presentation of his ideas, he was nevertheless clear in articulating his belief in the need for establishing a "science of society". He was convinced that the insights gained through the application of scientific principles to the study of social phenomena would provide the basis for constructing an integrated social order. His belief in the need for promoting social integration was similar to the views of
de Bonald and de Maistre. Like these traditionalist theorists, he attempted to demonstrate that the stability and progress of society was dependent upon the adherence of the individual to a universally accepted religion. This religion was to be based on scientific principles.

The central topic of discussion in this section of this study is related to the question of whether Saint-Simon was able to successfully apply scientific methods of analysis to the study of social phenomena. It will be possible to assess the scientific credibility of his theories as a whole by analyzing whether he made use of assumptions about human nature and whether those assumptions were related to his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration. The examination of Saint-Simon's use of assumptions about human nature will provide a clear indication of how much his social theories lived up to the scientific ideals to which he adhered.

According to Saint-Simon, it was possible for social theory to use the same methods which were employed in the social sciences. This would necessitate that the logic and reasoning of social theories would be based on facts derived from observation and experiment. He maintained that...

In all portions of my work I shall be occupied with establishing series of facts, for I am convinced that this is the only solid part of our knowledge...Once all our knowledge is uniformly founded on observations, the direction of our spiritual affairs must be trusted to... the power of positive science.22

Social development, as he argued, was characterized by the realization of the immutable laws of progress. For this reason "men are mere instruments before the omnipotent laws of progress".23 Progress was understood as being absolute in that it effected the development of all the human sensi-
bilities at the same time, during the course of the emergence and expansion of any civilization. Progress was so absolute that...

whenever a people become static the germs of progress compressed in their bosom are immediately carried elsewhere to a social setting where they thus can be developed. 24

The elements of progress were defined within this context as being an inherent feature of man's nature.

Central to Saint-Simon's idea of progress was the belief that man, if he was not directed towards the goal of social progress, would fall victim to his own egoistical nature. This belief was to become one of the central tenets of the educational philosophy proposed by the Saint-Simonians. The Saint-Simonians were disciples of Saint-Simon who sought to establish a religion based upon his teaching and theories. Two of the better known Saint-Simonians were Olinde Rodrigues and Prosper Enfantin. They were convinced that...

Nothing can take the place of education during youth. Once thrown into the active life, man no longer has the moral flexibility necessary for the assimilation of the culture he lacks. ...Since his desires must be translated into action, the result is that when they are not directed towards the good, ...toward social progress, but are left alone, they lead to evil, namely egoism. 25

In the opinion of Saint-Simon, as well as the Saint-Simonians, man's nature when unchecked by institutional constraints, was in itself evil. It was man's innate egoistical nature which was seen to be the ultimate cause of the French Revolution. 26

Saint-Simon's view of human nature was a dualistic one. On the one hand, man by nature was believed to be egoistical and selfish. On the other hand it was felt, that once placed in a socially integrative environment, man was capable of high degrees of altruism. This integrative
environment was to be constructed around an hierarchical organization of the business and scientific elites. A society structured in this manner could "strive towards the amelioration of the moral and physical existence of the poorest class". The concern which Saint-Simon demonstrated towards the poor, the working classes and the dispossessed linked him with the socialist tradition. Conversely, his emphasis on the hierarchical organization of power placed him within the same context as the more conservative theorists of the time.

Social physiology, the scientific study of man, was believed by Saint-Simon to be the only way through which his socialist and conservative utopia might be realized. In Letters From An Inhabitant of Geneva, he commented that...

The elementary needs of life are the most imperative. The have-nots can only satisfy them inadequately. ... I believe that all classes of society would benefit from an organization on these lines: the spiritual power in the hands of the scientist; the temporal power in the hands of the property owners; the power to nominate those who should perform the functions of humanity...

Science in this fashion was seen as a secular God. An utopia, characterized by the fusion of science, industry, and universal love was promised to all those who followed the Saint-Simonian religious doctrine. In this manner, through the guidance of science, man would be able to realize his religious, altruistic and social nature. The singular purpose of social physiology was to foster man's innate feeling of sympathy for other men. It was also pointed out by his disciples that...

... science has an important role to fulfill. It is called upon to verify those inspirations, revelations and emotions of feelings and to furnish man with the insights to take him more rapidly and securely toward
the goal discovered for him. But it is again feeling, which, by making him desire and love this goal, can alone give him the will and the necessary strength to attain it. 28

Man's own inner 'feelings' of sympathy complemented by the insights of science would ensure that man would realize the inevitable laws of progress. In addition, scientists insofar as they were willing to follow their "scientific instincts", as Saint-Simon described them, would be able to discover the laws of progress in accordance with man's nature. 29

The new social order which Saint-Simon had in mind, while it was designed to ensure the freedom of the individual according to his nature was not at the same time based on the principles or ideals of equality. He contended that human inequality was a characteristic inseparable from the very nature of human social organization. Society, from this perspective, was divided into three basic social and occupational categories: the scientists; the industrialists and manual workers; and the artists, poets, religious and ethical teachers. Ultimately the differences between individuals in these different social categories were not related to economic, social or political factors, but rather to physiological causes. Each of these categories were supposed to correspond to the natural endowments of the individuals particular to them. Frank E. Manuel has argued that Saint-Simon as .

The new philosopher of society approached the whole problem with the initial preconception that the physiological and psychological differences of men were the very brick and mortar of his perfect social edifice. 30

What men desired, as Saint-Simon assumed, was not equality with other men, but the expression of their true social natures which were founded upon innate psychological and physiological aptitudes.
As Saint-Simon saw it, the recognition of the organic inequality that existed between men both in terms of their psychological and physiological character, would ensure the just and appropriate realization of the individual's talents in accordance with his nature. Many of his theories came to justify a rather conservative ideological orientation. The elite which he intended to have as the spiritual guide of his utopian society was one whose legitimacy to power was based not on the democratic will of the people, but rather on their innate psychological and physiological capabilities to rule. The rule of society by a "natural elite" was justified by asserting that the need to dominate was a need experienced by all men and should be nurtured in those who are capable.

It is a fact established by a long series of observations that every man experiences to a stronger or lesser degree the desire to dominate every other man. It is obvious that every man who is not in a state of isolation is in an active or passive state of domination in his relations with other men. Not only was the natural elite capable of ruling according to the innate abilities and talents of its members, but also the very act of domination constituted in itself the satisfaction of a basic need particular to human nature.

Saint-Simon was optimistic that his utopian society would inevitably be created. For him, history was governed by the immutable laws of progress and it would be these natural laws that would provide the opportunity for the establishment of such a society. While studying the history of human civilization, he came up with the idea of the existence of organic and critical stages of social progress. As it was pointed out...
Humanity is infinitely perfectible and it increasingly progresses. But while progressing it follows a law of perfectibility. That is humanity progresses, not by one momentous forward movement, but by an alternating movement in two phases.34

While the law of perfectibility was an inherent element of human society, man nevertheless at set intervals found himself in a critical epoch which was characterized by a general atmosphere of scepticism, disorder and destruction. The French Revolution and the immediate events which followed represented such a period. According to this theory, every critical period was an organic epoch where

...the religion of the times offers an adequate explanation of all the known facts of life; all men are therefore united by a common belief which is reflected in their institutions, and they all march together toward a common goal.35

It was only a matter of time, as it was believed, until the new social order based on the positive principles of science would be established. Human nature ruled by the inherent law of perfectibility was its ultimate guarantee.

It is obvious that much of Saint-Simon's arguments relied for their legitimacy on assumptions about the nature of human nature. He was able to legitimate the need for authority by asserting that man without such guidance would fall victim to his own egoistical nature. This argument was predicated on the belief that although man was by nature egoistical, his nature was also characterized by the law of perfectibility. Moreover, it was contended that men were by nature innately unequal. In this manner the control of a society by a natural elite who were born with the necessary physiological and psychological characteristics of rulers was justified. George Iggers has accurately summarized Saint-Simon's assump-
tions about man's nature:

Man by nature was a social being who withered in isolation from social direction in the three modes of existence, the physical, the intellectual, and the moral. The human need for order was the driving force of history...the Saint-Simonians saw the aim of history in the establishment of an hierarchy based upon the natural rather than the conventional inequalities among men. 36

In many respects, Saint-Simon's theories embodied the liberal ideals of individualism and individual freedom. This fact is clearly illustrated by his last words...

Do not forget that to accomplish great things you must have enthusiasm; all my life is comprised in this one thought: to guarantee to men the most free development of their individual faculties. 37

The overall orientation of his theories were directed towards the legitimization of the ideals of social integration under the auspices of promoting a religion based upon the positive scientific understanding of humanity and the natural world.

Saint-Simon's writings have a great deal in common with those that emerged from the Romantic and Conservative reaction. His belief in the realization and perfectibility of man's nature in an organic society, characterized by a religion founded on scientific principles and controlled by an hierarchical natural elite is similar to the conservative and social integrationist ideals which constitute a basic variation of liberalism as an ideology. These social integrationist ideals were predicated on the assumption that man's feelings, complemented by his own inner nature of perfectibility and the immutable laws of progress (the "seeds" of which are contained in man himself) would together provide for the realization of the organic society. The purpose of social theory in this respect was
to realize the innate talents of the individual within the organic society. Saint-Simon conceived of science as a vehicle for the realization of man's nature. Also, he saw science as being an inherent part of human nature in that all scientists relied on their "scientific instincts" to discover the laws of progress in accordance with man's nature.

Saint-Simon's use of assumptions about the nature of human nature served as a means to objectify, manifest and legitimize the meanings, values and norms that made up his liberal world-view. The liberal ideals which he supported were related to his belief in the need for establishing some form of social integration within a social and religious context. His theories were indicative of the fact that positivism, at least as he defined it, was related to liberalism as an ideology as well as being dependent for its justification on determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature.
3) **Comte**

Auguste Comte derived many of his ideas and theoretical insights from his close collaboration with Saint-Simon. After his dismissal from the École d'Polytechnique in 1814, Comte came into contact with Saint-Simon. Until 1818 Comte worked with him in close collaboration, helping to organize and edit his writings. During these years Comte came to accept the positivist belief in the need for the social theorist to be committed to the reorganization of the moral, religious and political systems of society according to scientific principles. He also came to see the need for an organized and systematic scientific philosophy which would endeavor to apply the scientific method to the study of society. The central element of his views consisted of the relatively simple contention that

...the fundamental character of all positive philosophy is to regard all phenomena as subject to invariable natural laws, whose precise discovery and reduction to the smallest number possible is the aim of all our effort.  

Like many of the Philosophes of the Enlightenment, Comte attempted to give support to the idea that science was an instrument which gave men control over the conditions of his natural and social life.

As an advocate of the positivist method, Comte argued throughout his writings that only through the insights derived from positivism would it be possible to define the fundamental laws of human development. By adhering to the positive principles, an individual would be able to gain a degree of personal freedom. Individual liberty was defined as the "rational submission to the preponderance of the laws of nature." While he was supportive of the idea of individual liberty, he was also committed to the ideal of social unity and integration. In conjunction with this
point, Raymond Aron has emphasized that...

Auguste Comte may be considered as, first and foremost the sociologist of human and social unity. Human history is a single entity in his eyes: He would have trouble re-discovering and accounting for diversity, because there is according to his philosophy only one type of society which is absolutely valid and all mankind must arrive at this exemplary type. 40

Comte's ideal society was to be both progressive as well as orderly. By order he meant the harmony which should necessarily prevail among the various conditions of social existence. The ideal of progress referred to society's orderly development according to natural social laws. 41

Similar in many ways to Saint-Simon, Comte directed his social theories towards resolving the social crises which post-revolutionary Europe was experiencing owing to the destruction of traditional religious and social beliefs. De Maistre and de Bonald had hoped to reconstruct society on the basis of the Roman Catholic faith. Alternatively, Comte hoped to use his positive philosophy as a means to redefine a number of indispensable moral bonds and principles which the traditional religions of Europe had formerly provided. As he declared in 1825...

The object of all my labors has been to re-establish in society something spiritual that is capable of counter-balancing the influence of the ignoble materialism in which we are at present submerged. 42

Thus, the establishment of social integration based on the faith in science was the primary purpose of his positivist method.

Comte's views on science, sociology and positivism were developed throughout the course of his writings. His major works included among others: A Plan for the Scientific Works Necessary to Reorganize Society (1822); Considerations on the Spiritual Power (1826); Course of Positive
Philosophy (1830-42), and System of Positive Polity (1851-4). The contributions of positivism are not to be underestimated. Even Herbert Spencer, despite his criticisms of Comte's work, admitted that...

In working out this conception he has shown remarkable breadth of view, great originality, immense fecundity of thought and unusual powers of generalization. Considered apart from the question of its truth, his system of Positive Philosophy is a vast achievement. Other students and critics have noted the value of Comte's contributions to modern sociology. George Simpson has explained that positivism provided social theory with a scientific basis.

It aims to validate hypotheses by resort to facts; it aims to predict future occurrences on the basis of the analyses of past uniformities of relationship; it aims to discover the laws of statics or coexistences of regularities in the social organism and the laws of succession from scientific study of factors inducing change.

Comte has been endlessly acclaimed as the "father" of sociology, responsible for the final separation of social theory from speculative and reductionist explanations.

Other critics have interpreted Comte's theories in a much less positivist light. Stanislav Andreski noted that there exists a contradiction between his belief in the applicability of scientific method and his actual use of it.

When (Comte) after expostulating at great length about the need to study society in a positive (that is scientific) manner,...comes to deal with a substantive problem,...forgets all his methodological arguments and rushes headlong into gratuitous pontification which contravenes every canon of methodology which he has persuasively advocated a few pages back.

Additionally, Lezek Kolakowski has observed that Comte consistently relied on assumptions about man's innate nature to support his general positivistic
theories. Kolakowski has argued that

...Whereas the thinkers of the Enlightenment assumed that human solidarity and cooperation existed only because they were useful to individuals, Comte asserted the existence of a social instinct at least as strong as selfish aspiration...The harmonious co-existence of human beings is possible only thanks to this instinct.  

Another critic, Edward Caird, has intimated, parallel to Andreski's and Kolakowski's contentions, that Comte assumed the existence of certain "feelings of the natural man" in many of his explanations...

... feelings which are prior to and independent of, the exercise of man's reason, and which supply all the possible motives for that exercise.  

At least on the basis of these arguments, it appears that Comte did not completely conform to the use of the positive methods which he nevertheless advocated.

From these criticisms of Comte's work, two questions may be justifiably posed:

1) To what extent did Comte make determinate use of assumptions about the nature of human nature?

2) To what extent may these assumptions be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis?

It is these questions to which this particular portion of this analysis will be addressed.

Similar to Saint-Simon, Comte defined human nature as having a dualistic character. According to this definition, there are two sets of "innate" feelings and desires between which man's life is divided. These consist of the egotistic instincts and the altruistic tendencies, each separate from the other and having their origin in a different part of the human brain. In System of Positive Polity, it was contended that if
physical wants were removed from man's life situation, man as a result would come to realize his inner sympathetic feelings. Comte stated that...

The natural course of human relations would dispose us all to cultivate the only instincts, which admit of a perfectly universal and almost boundless expansion. We should then find out that characteristic quality of the sympathetic feelings, that a great and continuous exercise of them would make up for their natural inferiority of force.

It was argued that the family, through the fostering of the individual's "domestic affections" could facilitate the general transition in the individual personality from egoism to altruism. The effect of the family on the individual in this manner was due to

... the general law... as drawn from any theory of the Brain, as to the special relations of the Egoistic instincts and the Altruistic inclinations... the domestic affections become the only natural medium between Egoism and Altruism; and thereby we obtain the essential basis of a real solution of the great human problem.

The altruistic tendencies could likewise be nurtured by the appropriate religion whereby "the external Order of the world shall regulate the internal Order of human nature, without interfering with its free action."

One of the primary goals of Comte's theories was to define the appropriate means that could regulate the inherent tendencies and instincts of human nature. Positivism was defined as a means "to regulate and develop the natural tendencies of the people." The object of positivism was to

...comprehend human life under every aspect, social as well as individual... the growth of Humanity is spontaneous; and the basis upon which all wise attempts to modify it should proceed, can only be furnished by an exact acquaintance with the natural process.

It was felt that 'Positive Science', in its general orientation would dis-
regard the supremacy of 'Reason' insofar as

...the question of co-ordinating the faculties of our nature will convince us that the only basis on which they can be brought into harmonious union, is the preponderance of Affectation over Reason, and even over Activity. 54

Intellect was considered to be the servant of man's social "sympathies" and "instincts". 55

Positive science was to be addressed to the discovery of social laws of development by which man's social instincts were called into being. Comte declared that "by this means our self-regarding instincts are rendered susceptible of discipline". 56 The submission of man's innate egoistical nature to his social "benevolent affections" would only be achieved by the organized conscious effort provided by positive science.

Comte outlined the fact that only if man was able to live in a stable social state could he be sure to deny his innately selfish nature for the benefit of developing his altruistic sentiments. In attempting to legitimize this idea, he asserted that a basic and universal biological principle proved that

...functions and organs are developed by constant exercise, and atrophied by prolonged inaction. Now the effect of the Social state is, that where our sympathetic instincts are constantly stimulated, the selfish propensities are restricted. 57

Positivism as it was believed would find ready acceptance among the working classes in that

...those who had been, left untrained in the present worthless methods of instruction...and...who are animated by strong social instincts, consequently have the largest stock of sense and good feeling. 58

The possibility that people would develop selfish ambitions and strivings even after the "Religion of Humanity" had been established would be
checked by the "natural sympathies" of women as well as by the appointed priests (sociologists) whose first duty would be "to contend against the ambitious instincts of its own members." 59

The final realization of the "Positive Polity" and the "Religion of Humanity" according to Comte was dictated by immutable laws of progress, the phases of which corresponded to phases of the development of the mind of the human individual. It was explicitly assumed that the various stages of the progressive development of human civilization corresponded exactly to the basic characteristics of the development of human nature. These three stages of the evolution of the human race consisted of the Theological, Metaphysical and Scientific (positive) phases of development. In addition, it was indicated that...

As it was further argued...

...each of us is aware, if he looks back upon his own history, that he was a theologian in his childhood, a metaphysician in his youth, and a natural philosopher in his manhood. 60

The task of positive philosophy was to reveal the logical laws of the human mind "which had hitherto been sought by unfit methods." 62 In accordance with this idea, it was asserted that in all social phenomena we may perceive the workings of "the physiological laws of the individual." 63

Biological and social phenomena as Comte thought were intimately related with one another. For this reason the synthesis of all the sciences was proposed. Raymond Aron has commented that this idea of the
synthesis of the various sciences, natural and social, "has its center or origins in sociology itself." Positive science, as Comte conceived of it, was based on the recognition of the intimate relationship between man's innate biological propensities and inclinations and the laws of social development by which human civilization progressed. In many respects we may understand positivism as it was proposed by Saint-Simon and Comte to constitute the means for the discovery and realization of the innate elements of human nature.

In analyzing Comte's writings it is obvious that positivism as both a method and an ideal was constructed on explicit assumptions of human nature. These assumptions were in turn used to justify and legitimize the goals and overall purposes of the Positive Polity. His many assertions about man's innate nature were characterized by the almost complete absence of any form of empirical justification. With respect to this fact it could be argued that positivism, as it was represented in his theories, consisted of the manipulation of assumptions about man's innate nature in the support of a particular ideological world-view. The central theories upon which Comte based his "positive philosophy" dealt with the role of the family, the three stages of social development, the priesthood and human sympathy. All of these theories were explained and justified in relation to a number of determinate assumptions about human nature. The idea that man was characterized by a dual nature, egoistical on the one hand and altruistic on the other was in truth a theoretical device to justify that man required both religion and authority to check his more selfish tendencies. In this manner he successfully lent credibility to his basic belief in the need for social integration. This belief, as it
has been explained previously, constitutes a basic variation of liberalism as an ideology.

Positivism, for Comte, was an ideal which he ardently supported. Nevertheless, it held little relevance for him in guiding the development and formulation of his own theories. Ultimately his determination to justify the overall credibility and applicability of the methods of analysis and political goals of positivism necessitated that he use means completely antithetical to the very nature of positivism itself. The practice of referring to man's innate nature, of which the Enlightenment theorists had already provided a precedent, was based on the desire of social theorists to demonstrate that there existed social laws of development equivalent in their predictability to the laws which had been formulated in the natural sciences. Unfortunately, what Comte in this case neglected to consider is that such laws of human nature required some form of empirical justification equivalent in extent to that provided for the justification of natural scientific laws. Lacking empirical evidence, the assumptions about human nature which Comte made use of may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis. These assumptions provided the logical basis for the legitimization of both positive philosophy and for the liberal ideals of social integration which were an inherent element of positivism.
4) Prelude to the German Critique

The developmental process whereby German Idealism emerged as a definite school of philosophical and social thought may be divided into two parts. The first stage of its development from 1770 to 1840 was largely philosophically oriented. The leading philosophers of this period included Kant, Fichte, Shelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The second stage of the development of German Idealism was characterized by the attempts of many social theorists to articulate and refine the ideas of the Idealist philosophers within a sociological context. This second period lasted from the middle of the nineteenth to the first decades of the twentieth century. The major theorists of this second period included Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber. Many of the social theories formulated by these individuals have had a major influence on the development of the social sciences as a whole.

The analysis of the theories of Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber holds a central importance for the clarification of the problems with which this overall study is concerned. By reviewing the extent to which the liberal beliefs of these social theorists were adopted from the German Idealist philosophers, it will be possible to evaluate the general ideological intentions and orientations of their social theories. In this manner a clearer understanding of the dynamics of theory construction will be achieved. Equally as important, the outlining of the degree to which these German social theorists made use of assumptions about human nature, will provide the added opportunity of determining whether their assumptions were related to their particular liberal beliefs. The utilization of a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis in this manner
will contribute to the clarification of the role which assumptions about human nature and liberal beliefs played in the development of sociological theory during this historical period.

German Idealism between 1770 and 1840 was mainly a philosophical movement. During this period, German philosophy radically diverged from the mainstream of Western European intellectual thought. In many respects, German Idealism in its initial stages began as an attempt by German philosophers to realize a new religious meaning in life. Unlike the French and Enlightenment theorists, few Idealist philosophers were willing to express ‘anti-religious’ ideas and slogans. The German Idealists rejected the mechanistic positivism and rationalism of the French Enlightenment thinkers. Nevertheless, they did not believe that their ideals required the traditional religious institutions for their realization. Instead, they insisted that culture, art, philosophy and even the state constituted the essential vehicles which would ensure the development of man’s religious spirit.

The reason for the German Idealist’s emphasis on these various different means for the realization of man’s religious character was related to the effects of the secularization of German society during the nineteenth century. As Fritz Sterns has described, this process of secularization resulted in the elevation of the aesthetic and intellectual aspects of culture, of philosophy, literature, and art, to be the supreme revelations of the human spirit, and the substitution of the moral canons of German Idealism of Kant in particular, for older universal and religious commands.85

Together, all of the German Idealist philosophers were convinced that man was by nature an unique and independent personality. Like Kant, they all
tended to emphasize the need to realize and protect the libertarian ideal of human freedom. They also believed that philosophy, religion and art could be utilized as revolutionary forces in providing for the liberation of man. Their general intentions were to promote

...a revolution in the consciousness of the middle classes so that they might become worthy and capable of political freedom. These philosophes believed during their student years that the chief impediments of political freedom in their own society were not the laws but the servile attitudes of the citizenry, and they hoped that a new philosophy, religion and art would liberate men from their mental chains.66

While the German Idealist philosophers were libertarians, their beliefs were significantly different from those which had been expressed by the Philosophes.

Unlike the Philosophes in many instances, the German Idealists were unwilling to rely simply on the insights of science to provide for the liberation of man. They felt that art, philosophy, religion and the state were the most appropriate means by which such freedom could be realized. For many German Idealists, inclusive of the poet Schiller, the 'Classical Greek Experience', rather than the asocial and acultural 'State of Nature', was the ideal of human freedom with which they identified themselves.67 It was the ideal of individualism as represented by the devotion of the classical Greeks to the arts, philosophy, the deities and the state which these German philosophers sought to portray in their writings. In turn, their belief in the classical Greek ideals of individualism noticeably influenced the assumptions about human nature which they frequently made use of in their work.

One of the leading German Idealist philosophers was Emmanuel Kant
Kant (1724-1804) fervently criticized those theories of the Enlightenment which had striven to legitimize the tenets of positivism. Many philosophers in Germany, at this time inclusive of Kant, adhered strongly to the ideals of libertarian individualism. They found that the Enlightenment social theorists had neglected these ideals in their attempts to demonstrate the reducibility of human behavior to natural scientific-like laws.

In this context, Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781) and *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) were written for two specific purposes:

1. to demonstrate the ultimate unity of empirical and logical knowledge in the attempt to refute Hume's logical skepticism.

2. to lend support to the role which the independent individual played in society in the realization of his freedom, in contrast to Leibniz's theory of monads as related to the existence of innate ideas defined by God.

Kant's work embodied both the ideals of science as well as the ideals of libertarian individualism. Don Martindale in this context has written...

Kant had received the liberal theory of society from his eighteenth-century predecessors. Society for him was not an organic form but an ordered community of independent wills. "Freedom," not "stability," was the watchword. History represents the development of the principle of freedom.

The synthesis of both rationalism and empiricism by Kant, as well as his legitimation of the liberal ideals of individuality provided a general theoretical orientation for other German philosophers who had become increasingly sceptical of positivism and its neglect of the idea of individual freedom, as well as its reduction of socio-cultural phenomena to principles and methods of analysis particular to the natural sciences.
It was Kant's writings which initially influenced the development of German Idealism as a philosophical movement. One of the major German philosophers to be affected by Kant's ideas was Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814). Like Kant, Fichte believed that the essential requirement of human nature was the full development of the individual's abilities and talents. He was convinced, as was Kant, that man was destined through the dominating influence of his inner passions to be free. In his Lectures On the Vocation of a Scholar (1794), Fichte argued that it was the duty of the philosopher and scholar to guide the individual in order to ensure that he did not become over-specialized through the intensification of the division of labor. It was understood that human freedom was an essential characteristic of human nature as was the need for the individual to develop the full use of his faculties.

Many of Fichte's views were adopted by other German philosophers, inclusive of Schelling and Hegel. Schelling, similar in many respects to Hegel, insisted that it was the artist through his creative efforts who would ensure the free expression of the "human spirit" -- the essence of human nature. In a slightly different context, Hegel contended that the progressive unfolding of history would facilitate the self-realization of man's free spirit. He likewise believed man's "free spirit" to constitute the essence of human nature. Together, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel argued that the methods of natural scientific analysis as advocated by the French Positivists, could not even begin to provide the necessary insights or guidelines which would ensure the development of the free human spirit.

The anti-scientific views of Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were
extended and elaborated by other German Idealist philosophers during this period. In this respect both Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) attempted to give a more specific definition of the essence of human nature which the other Idealist philosophers had understood in terms of man's "free spirit." 71

Schopenhauer and Nietzsche pointed out that the "will" constituted the real essence of human nature. The will as a basic element of man's emotional character was understood by these philosophers as being the basis of all social action. Schopenhauer however, believed that the realization of the will through the individual attainment of power would only lead to the suffering of those who fell victim to such power. For this reason he advocated the involvement of the individual in the arts as a means to escape the suffering and frustrations experienced during the process of attempting to realize and develop the will. 72

Nietzsche's view of the will was more optimistic than that expressed by Schopenhauer. He felt that the will consisted of man's ability to express his creative nature in art, philosophy and literature. His philosophical works outlined the idea that the essence of human behavior could be reduced to one basic drive - "the will to power". The condition in which man was able to express the essence of his nature was defined as "Übermensch". The overman was understood as being an individual who has developed his faculties to the fullest extent. That is to say, someone who has mastered his passions through the creative expression of his faculties of Reason in the arts, philosophy and literature. 73 Nietzsche also criticized the condition of man at present, whom he saw to be represented by the "otherman" - an uncreative conformist and complacent
hedonist. He explained in the Anti-Christ that Christianity in its protection and idealization of the mediocre individual was a guarantee of the continued existence of the otherman. Like Shopenhauer, he was convinced that the methods of scientific analysis as advocated by the French Positivists would not be able to provide a complete understanding of the emotional and irrational elements of human nature embodied in the will.

The ideas expressed by the German Idealist philosophers came to influence a wide number of German social theorists who developed their theories during the second half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century. Such social theorists as Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey, and Weber played a prominent role in extending and elaborating the philosophical ideas of the German Idealists during this period. German idealism provided the incentive for the development of such theoretical movements as phenomenology, neo-Kantianism, as well as the belief in the autonomy of the cultural sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Central to this age of neo-criticism was the theoretical movement known as phenomenology. Kant's dictums, "back to the things themselves" and "subjectivism triumphs", were two of the major themes of the phenomenological movement both in France and Germany. Phenomenology was, in turn, to have an effect in influencing the views of these theorists maintaining a neo-Kantian perspective as well as those advocating the need of establishing an independent cultural science.

Phenomenology as a theoretical perspective was based on the notion that all phenomena, whether of the natural or social world, were facts derived from the consciousness of the individual and in this sense, man's personal intuition of phenomena constituted the real essence of external
realities. Charles Renouvier, the founder of phenomenology, provided a logical critique of the positivist method as well as attempting to justify the individual's role in the determination of knowledge and action. The French antagonists of positivism, inclusive of Renouvier himself, as well as such eclectics and spiritualists as Ravaisson, Carv, Jonet, Lachelier, Saisset and Vacherat, were complemented by the anti-positivist views of many German intellectuals. It was these German intellectuals who attempted to express many of the ideals of the German Idealist philosophers within a more precise sociological context.

From reviewing the ideas and theories of the German Idealist philosophers, it is obvious that they had distinct assumptions about the nature of human nature which they utilized in a determinate fashion to legitimize their particular liberal beliefs. The question remains however, whether or not the German social theorists who adopted many of the ideas of these philosophers also made determinate use of their assumptions about human nature. This section of our analysis shall be specifically concerned with the above question.
5) **Husserl**

The phenomenological method outlined by Husserl during the first decades of the twentieth century represented a new philosophical approach in the definition and description of the "genuine essence" of conscious data (eidias). The purpose of phenomenology, as he saw it, was to give scientific credibility to philosophy and metaphysics in general. He believed that positivism, despite its popularity and influence, represented "an indifferent turning away from the questions which are decisive for a genuine humanity." Phenomenology was defined as a new facet of scientific investigation which could promote the realization of

...man as a free, self-determining being in his behavior toward the human and extrahuman surrounding world...

Husserl was intent upon providing the guidelines which would aid the individual in maintaining and extending his freedom and ability to shape his surrounding environment.

The liberal ideals of individual freedom which Husserl supported were similar in many respects to the liberal ideals which were articulated by the German Idealist philosophers. The German Idealists, as discussed in the previous section, utilized determinate assumptions about human nature to justify their belief in the need to extend and develop individual liberty. The question remains whether Husserl, who was deeply influenced by the views of the Idealist philosophers, also adopted their practise of using speculative assumptions about human nature to lend credibility to his liberal beliefs. Only by reviewing Husserl's theories in detail will it be possible to determine how and to what extent he did in fact make use of such assumptions. Equally as important, the analysis...
of his use of assumptions about human nature will contribute to clarifying how social theories were constructed during this period.

Husserl's subjective idealism was reflected in all of his major works inclusive of Philosophy of Arithmepic (1897); Lectures on Phenomenology (1901); The Idea of Phenomenology as Rigorous Science (1913); Ideas (1931); The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (1936). His basic theoretical orientation stressed the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism and German Idealism insofar as these ideals embodied the belief that the "transcendental self" was absolute. He agreed that there existed two worlds, the known world and the life-world. The understanding of the known world was dependent on individual consciousness. Consciousness itself was dependent on the motivation provided by the life-world. The life-world existed a priori to the individual consciousness of the human world and in fact constituted its "essence". This a priori consciousness was referred to as "the natural attitude". David Carr has attempted to explain the specific meaning of this concept.

Husserl uses the term "natural" to refer to what is original and naive, prior to critical reflection...what is described here is "natural to life itself, or rather waking life" i.e. consciousness. The naive, pretheoretical life is not totally devoid of critical reflection, of course, but its criticism is always practical, relative to the end in view...

The natural attitude is that which exists in individual consciousness prior to all external influences.

Husserl was convinced of the necessity of establishing some definite level of objectivity in the social sciences by utilizing the phenomenological method of analysis. He recognized that the most significant deterrent to achieving an objective level of analysis in the social
sciences was the influence which the scientific observer's own subjective biases had on his interpretation of the particular subject matter which he was studying. An individual's conscious interpretation of social phenomena was understood as being subject to the influences of his own personal interests, values, and prejudices. The consciousness of an individual was seen to be determined by his life circumstances and his relation to the external world. Only the "natural attitudes" remain unaffected. The phenomenological method consisted of defining the natural attitudes of the individual consciousness in relation to its interpretation of particular natural and social phenomena. In this manner the true essence of a particular phenomenon could be understood through recording the natural attitude taken towards it which was unaffected by any external influences. By studying the world in this fashion, Husserl believed that the ideal of scientific objectivity could finally be realized. It was believed that such a method of objective scientific analysis would contribute to the development of a "theory of the essence of pure experience".

Husserl's phenomenology also constituted a critique of psychology. He maintained that natural attitudes transcend and occur a priori to the scientific psychic functions of consciousness. In relation to this point, Kockelman has noted that

...moreover, if the concepts which are in man's consciousness are independent of its psychic functions, then consciousness itself must transcend the sphere of these psychic functions too.

According to Kockelman, Husserl explicitly assumed the human mind to be characterized by a number of a priori concepts which were the primary
basis of consciousness and the elementary structures of the human mind.

The notion of "natural attitude" was central to Husserl's phenomenological theories. His theories expressed the belief that...

The explanation of the presuppositionless is essential for the foundation of any cognitive discipline whatever, and is the only path to certainty.84

He introduced the idea of "epoche" in attempting to outline the methods by which the natural attitudes of particular phenomena could be discovered. This method of epoche or bracketing required the separation of the values and interests of the individual from the essence of the phenomena itself. The essence of the phenomena in the context of the natural attitude is entirely presuppositionless and apprehended through an "act of pure intuition". As a result, the subject matter of such a method

...consists of experiences whose essential universality is to be analyzed in intuition and not of experiences as events occurring in the rational world. The essences apprehended in essential intuition and the connection between them and to be described by means of concepts and laws. These concepts and laws, insofar as they refer to essences, must have an a priori character. This realm of the a priori precisely is the sphere whose investigation critically prepares and philosophically clarifies the foundations of logic.85

The definition of these a priori natural attitudes through the method of the epoche, constituted the means by which the life-world could be understood and interpreted.

Husserl believed that the life-world was the essential basis of human nature at least in terms of the innate elements of man's psychic structure which were shared by all races of men. This belief in the universality of natural attitudes was based on the fact that if

...we set up the goal of a truth about the objects which is unconditionally valid for all subjects, beginning with that in which normal Europeans, normal Hindus, Chinese, etc.,
agree in spite of all relativity - beginning that is, with what makes objects of the life-world, common to all... such as spatial shape, motion, sense-quality, and the like - then we are on the way to objective science. 86

Through utilizing the methods of personal and subjective intuition, Husserl sought to discover the universal principles which formed the basis of human imagination and consciousness. 87

The concept of intuition referred to the self-examination by the individual of the underlying innate basis of his own consciousness. More specifically...

Universal and essential self-disclosure, however, implies command over all the ideal possibilities that are inborn both in the ego and in a transcendental intersubjectivity. 88

It was assumed that the a priori laws of human consciousness would be revealed through this type of subjective self-realization. 89

Through outlining these and similar methods particular to phenomenology, Husserl endeavored to establish a strict empirical psychology which was capable of defining and explicating...

...certain general structures which are given in our original experience namely the structure of the Lebenswelt... an unconditional a priori. This is the positive side of this reduction. 90

Many students and critics of Husserl have agreed that his most significant contribution to the human sciences consisted of his recognition of the existence of an immanent consciousness which may be understood as comprising at least one aspect of men's nature. 91

Husserl insisted that phenomenology would eventually become the empirical foundation of the human sciences. The methods of the natural sciences as he argued were completely irrelevant to gaining a full under-
standing of the human psychological realm. The phenomenological method of intuition whereby consciousness becomes consciousness of itself (Erlebnis) was the only means by which an understanding of man's inner psychic structure could be realized. Man's spirit which characterized all races of men was understood in terms of

...a being in itself and for itself; it is autonomous and is capable of being handled in a genuinely rational, and thoroughly scientific way only in this autonomy.

The phenomenological method reflected Husserl's belief in the ideal of subjectivity. It was also indicative of his support of the liberal ideal of autonomous individualism.

The phenomenological method in general, the ideas of natural attitudes, epoché and erlebnis in particular, were all predicated on the assumption that human consciousness was constructed on the basis of certain a priori concepts, ideas and motivations which were universally shared by all races of men and which existed apart from all cultural influences. The legitimization of Husserl's phenomenology as a theory and method of scientific analysis was ultimately dependent on certain assumptions about the innate features of human consciousness. Nowhere within his writings was any empirical evidence provided in ascertaining the scientific credibility of the assumptions about human nature of which he made use. The ideals of scientific objectivity received only minimal recognition within the formulation of his own theories. In his failure to live up to his own self-proclaimed ideals of scientific objectivity, Husserl may be ranked with other theorists such as Comte whose theories were characterized by similar shortcomings. Those ideals which he did recognize were related to his own liberal belief in the need to protect and extend the freedoms
of the individual. The various assumptions about human nature which he made use of served as a means to justify these ideals. Husserl's liberal ideals which were derived from the perspectives of German Idealism and neo-criticism, emphasized the uniqueness of cultural phenomena, and the importance of individual subjective experience in the determination of knowledge.

In the final analysis, Husserl had to choose between utilizing a scientific method of analysis based upon empirical evidence derived from observation and experiment, or lending support to the belief in the individual determination of knowledge and history. It appears that he chose the latter. The exclaimations which he elicited about phenomenology being the truly scientific method of analysis for the human sciences made this choice less obvious and more credible to the other philosophers and social theorists at the time. His use of assumptions about human nature contributed towards the exemplification of the ideals of libertarian individualism - ideals which were in direct contrast to those objectified within the theories of the French Positivists. Nevertheless, like the French Positivists, Husserl did not hesitate to use assumptions about man's nature in attempting to legitimate his own particular liberal beliefs and values. We may understand from this fact that the interpretation of assumptions about human nature from a sociology of knowledge perspective is not restricted solely to those formulated by the French Positivists, but also includes those utilized by their critics inclusive of such theorists as Husserl.
Phenomenology as a theoretical movement was not restricted to the writings of Husserl. Max Scheler was another prominent phenomenological thinker who developed his theories in the first decades of the twentieth century. His theories admit to many of the basic ideals, values and motivations which were expressed by Husserl as well as the earlier German Idealist philosophers. The major works in which Scheler developed his theoretical insights included: *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (1913-16); *The Nature of Sympathy* (1923); *On the Eternal in Man* (1924); *Forms of Knowledge and Society* (1926) and *Man's Place in Nature* (1928).

Don Martindale has pointed out that the chief importance which Scheler's theories held for the development of modern social thought was his popularization of the sociology of knowledge (*Wissenssoziologie*). However, his theories have also been judged as valuable sociological contributions for quite different reasons. Other critics have observed that his efforts to define the human emotional states of sympathy, love, shame, repentance and joy, provided a useful understanding of man's "eternal uniformities of feelings and emotions". In this regard, Lewis A. Coser has commented that...

Feelings, claims Scheler, far from being blind as the mechanistic interpretation maintains, are actually means of knowledge which reveal through their intentionality the situation of man in the universe and the ethical *a priori* of a distinct realm of eternal values.

Coser suggests that Scheler, apart from his desire to define a sociology of knowledge was also concerned with the question of man's innate nature
as reflected in the symbolic "realm of eternal values".

The question may be posed whether Scheler's opinions about human nature in this regard were a continuation of those views which had originally been articulated by the Idealist philosophers and later by Husserl himself. It may also be asked whether he formulated his assumptions about man in response to liberal beliefs which were similar to those that had been supported by the German Idealists. The possibility that his use and choice of specific assumptions about human nature may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective holds direct significance for coming to terms with the overall problem with which this study is concerned. It is for this reason that Scheler's theories will be examined in the particular section of this analysis.

Many of Scheler's theories were a response to specific social conditions in Germany during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The German middle class at this time was faced with the situation of being economically successful but were becoming increasingly powerless within the political realm. Scheler came to recognize the frustrations of the middle class as well as the growing conditions of cultural decadence in Germany which many attributed to the deterioration of the German aristocracy. Much like Husserl and other adherents of the basic values of German Idealism, he was primarily concerned with countering the restraining and decadent social conditions that were apparent in Germany in the hopes of realizing the essence of man as an individual free spirit. In this sense, he strove to demonstrate the real possibility of creating the ideal or "total man":
The ideal man which hopefully will emerge in the dawning "era of adjustment" is the new "total man" (Allmensch) who transcends narrow limitations and strives to achieve a balanced harmonization of all the different potentialities inherent in man. 97

He wished to prove the existence of the individual spirit. It was through "spirit" that man would be able to reshape himself in the realization of his own free individual nature. In this respect, Scheler adhered to the basic liberal ideals of individuality and the belief in the uniqueness of the human spirit which Husserl had supported. The methods of analysis particular to the natural sciences, he felt, would be unable to provide for the comprehension and realization of such ideals.

In seeking to justify his views on the perfectibility of the individual human spirit, Scheler became concerned with a basic question that has always been central to all forms of philosophical thought - the question of the nature of man. This problem was approached from a specific phenomenological perspective, defined as "Philosophical Anthropology".

Manfred Frings has elaborated on the general goals of Philosophical Anthropology.

Philosophical Anthropology, Scheler's primary concern, deals with the analysis of the question: What is man? It is for Scheler the philosophical discipline which is the foundation for all the sciences having man as their object (e.g., biology, medicine, characterology, psychology, ethnology, sociology, history, etc.) and which deals with the metaphysical, psychic, physical and spiritual origin of man, the fundamental directions and laws of his biological, psychic, social and historical development... 98

The outlining of the "physiognomy and pathognomy" of inner states (Innesein) was of essential importance in understanding the essence of the individual spirit. Spirit was understood as being unique to the human individual in that it "elevates man above the world and above himself. "99
Much like Husserl, Scheler was concerned with defining the essence and nature of man, free of all natural, social and psychological pre-suppositions. He addressed himself to the problem of defining the "Being of Man". "Being" constituted the essence of a person's individuality. It was that particular feature of human nature which characterized all men as members of the human species and which separated them from all other living things. The human individual or "person" was defined as

...the concrete and essential unity of being of acts of different essences which in itself...precedes all essential act differences (especially the difference between inner and outer perception, inner and outer willing, inner and outer feeling, loving and hating, etc.). The being of the person is therefore the "foundation" of all essentially different acts...in all investigations of acts made in pure phenomenology we are concerned with genuine intuitive essences, never with empirical abstractions.\textsuperscript{100}

The outlining of the essential being of all individuals which represented the essence of human nature was attempted in this fashion. As it was argued

...there exists a strict and immediate unity of identity of the inner consciousness which everyone has of the lived body...\textsuperscript{101}

This phenomenological approach was addressed to the problem of uncovering man's essential nature as it was intuitively experienced by the individual.\textsuperscript{102}

Ernest Ranly, in summarizing Scheler's philosophical anthropology, has pointed out, that as an analytical approach it had two general goals:

1. to extricate the unique essence of man from the context of the natural sciences.

2. to re-unite and combine the scientific concept of man with the theological and philosophical.\textsuperscript{103}
The act of isolating man's essence constituted the attempt to emphasize the unique position of man's place in nature. Scheler's theoretical goal was to create an idea of man which recognized the uniqueness of the individual spirit. At the same time he incorporated traditional, theological, philosophical and natural scientific considerations into his definition of human nature.

The most systematic and detailed statement of Scheler's philosophical and anthropological views are contained in Man's Place in Nature. This work was concerned with the question of whether "we can assign to man unique characteristics not comparable to those of any other species". According to his arguments, the psychological and physiological life of plants, animals and man may be divided into a number of distinct stages. By examining the overall physiological and psychological structure of the organismic world, it was hoped that man's actual place and role in nature would be clarified. The lowest form of psychic life was described as being the "vital feeling", drive or impulse (Gefühlesdrang). This impulse was devoid of consciousness, sensation and physical representation.

The first stage of inner life, the vital feeling or drive, is present in all animals and also in man. There is no sensation, no perception, no representation behind which there is not the dark impulse striving continuously through periods of sleeping and waking...At the same time, this impulse is the unity of all the highly differentiated drives and affects in man.

Vital feeling is the essential basis of all life.

The second essential stage of the psychic life of the organismic world was referred to as instinct. An instinct must be:
1. meaningful, must be purposive for the whole of the living organism.

2. must have a definite unchanging rhythm.

3. responds only to typically recurring situations which are significant for the life of the species.

4. is capable of specialization through experiment and learning.107

Instincts, when compared with the vital impulses, are much more specific in content, and represent an increasing specialization of the vital drives and its qualities. Instincts are said to characterize all higher forms of animals including man. However, man has instincts which are either poorly developed or in many instances arrested.

Out of the instincts two other modes of behavior arise, the habitual and the intelligent. The habitual mode of behavior forms the third stage of psychic life. Habit characterizes only those types of living organisms whose behavior is modified slowly and continuously on the basis of earlier behavior with respect to a purposeful and useful end.108 Habit is based on trial and error, in that an animal or man will repeat those movements which have proven to be successful.

Whenever we find such facts we speak of "training" when it is merely a quantitative matter of "habit," when it is qualitative matter, and depending upon whether men intervenes or not, of self-training or conditioned training.109

Habit as a level of psychic life characterizes the behavior of both animals and men.

The last level of psychic life which characterizes higher forms of animals was defined as intelligence. Contrary to the opinion of many biologists, Scheler argued that intelligence was not solely unique to man.
It is a mistake to deny that animals have the capacity to choose and to suppose that they are always moved by the stronger impulse. Further, he noted that...

In its affects the animal is still much closer to man in its intelligence. We find in animals the capacity for generosity, help, reconciliation, friendship, and similar phenomena. While intelligence was attributed to animals, it was nevertheless insisted that human nature was characterized by a fourth level of psychic life which is completely unique to man as a species.

This unique feature of man's psychic life constitutes what Scheler understood as spirit. However, this feature of human nature still belongs to the psychic and vital functions and capacities which falls into the presence of psychology and biology.

Spirit in its unlimited capacity to grow and to change is characterized by its "world-openness". To become human is to acquire this openness to the world by virtue of the spirit. Spirit...

...is "motivated" by a complex of sensations and ideas raised to the status of an object. It is in principle, independent of the...sensuous surfaces in the environment. The second act of the spirit consists in the voluntary inhibition or release of a drive and of the corresponding reaction. The third act consists of a final and intrinsic change with regard to the objective nature of a thing.

It is from spirit that man derives his sense of self-consciousness and his capacity to objectify his psychic states. Spirit allows man to go beyond himself, as an organism and to transform everything including himself into an object of knowledge.

While spirit is unique to human nature, it nevertheless is dependent for its basic motivation and energy on man's instincts through the acts...
of repression and sublimation. Scheler admitted that

... in its pure form spirit is originally without power, energy or activity. In order to gain the smallest degree of energy and activity, asceticism, the repression and sublimation of instincts must be added to the pure form of spirit. 114

According to this explanation, spirit has its own autonomous nature. Nevertheless, it lacks an original energy of its own. The negative acts of inhibition which originate in the "spiritual act of willing" provide it with energy and motivation

... which to begin with, is impotent and consists only of a group of pure "intentions". 115

Scheler added that the differences between individuals to which they owe their unique personal character is based upon the differential capacity of individuals to suppress their instincts in the realization of spirit. In many instances, this theory of the spirit has direct parallels to some of the insights about man's nature outlined by Freud and Shopenhauer.

Scheler's theory of the nature of man and his place in nature embodies the liberal ideals of individualism which had been originally supported by the German Idealists of the nineteenth century. His primary intention was to demonstrate the uniqueness of man's character, as well as the existence of spirit which allows man to develop his capacities and talents to an unlimited degree. It was maintained that the individual's ability to sublimate his instincts in the realization of spirit, was the primary factor responsible for the separation of man from all other animal species. Only when the individual develops his total self through the medium of the spirit, does he at the same time realize his freedom as a complete person and "total man". Like Husserl, as well as the German Idealists, Scheler
argued that all aspects of human behavior cannot be deduced and interpreted through the methods of the natural sciences. Husserl, Scheler and other theorists who shared the value-orientations of German Idealism, were not willing to relegate the idea of the uniqueness and importance of the individual spirit to the calculus of natural scientific investigation based upon immutable laws and principles. In this sense, Scheler's theories are antithetical to the ideals of positivism as they were suggested by Saint-Simon and Comte. It was not his intention to show the integration of man into the natural world. Instead, he wished to demonstrate that man occupied an unique place in nature and played an unprecedented role in realizing himself as a species.

Scheler's theories have a number of other similarities to those formulated by the German Idealists. Like a wide number of the nineteenth century German philosophers, many of his ideas were based on determinate assumptions about human nature. His contentions about man's individuality, freedom and his spiritual separation from other species were predicated on a number of empirically unverified assumptions about human nature. He insisted that the energy for the motivation of spirit was dependent upon the sublimation or repression of instincts. The process of sublimation was said to be "willed" by the spirit. While the idea is a provocative one, it is not necessarily original. More importantly, Scheler provided no evidence based on observation or experiment to lend credibility to this argument.

The purpose of phenomenology, as it was defined by Husserl, Scheler and others, was to provide a scientific basis to philosophy and the human sciences in general. These theorists had intended that phenomenology
would act as a bulwark against those social scientific approaches, inclusive of positivism which had attempted to reduce human behavior to natural scientific-like laws. Phenomenology was conceived of as a method of analysis to justify the unlimited possibilities for the realization of the unique potentialities and talents of the individual. In the case of Husserl's and Scheler's theories, we find that their support of the liberal ideals of individualism, the uniqueness of human nature, and the freedom of unlimited personal development took precedence over the provision of empirical data to support such contentions. From this sociology of knowledge framework of analysis we may conclude that Scheler's and Husserl's libertarian ideals were objectified, manifested and legitimized through their explicit use of empirically unverified assumptions about the nature of human nature.
7) **Simmel**

Phenomenology was only one of three basic theoretical movements which developed in the early decades of the twentieth century to counteract the influence of positivism. Many of the philosophical insights of the German Idealist philosophers continued to provide inspiration to German social theorists. Kant's philosophical writings during the latter part of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth centuries gained a wide degree of popularity. Kant's emphasis on freedom and the independent will of the individual provided a suitable philosophical complement to the basic liberal world-view maintained by many German intellectuals at the time. The result of this attempt to incorporate Kant's philosophical ideas into the existing theoretical paradigms was the development of a new intellectual movement often referred to as neo-Kantianism. This particular school of thought was the second of the three theoretical movements which attempted to provide an orientation to social theory in counter-distinction to those theories that had been outlined by the French positivists.

One of the leading representatives of the neo-Kantian movement in Germany during the first part of the twentieth century was Georg Simmel. The most significant contribution of this social theorist to the development of social theory is felt by a number of critics to be his study of the dynamics of social interaction within the specific realms of politics, economics and aesthetics. Don Martindale has explained that Simmel had the liberal's objection to the organic theory, particularly its frequent postulate of a group mind. Society seemed to him to be a function manifested in dynamic relations among individuals and in interactions between individual minds. Society exists wherever a number of individuals enter into reciprocal relationships. It is a process.
The ideal of individualism and the belief in the autonomy of the individual within the social community were central to Simmel's writings.

Simmel's major writings on sociology include: *Über sociale Differenzierung; Sociologische und psychologische Untersuchungen* (1890); *Philosophie des Geldes* (1900); *Soziologie Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellshaftung* (1908) and *Frundfragen der Soziologie (Individuum und Gesellschaft)* (1912). With regard to the basic ideological orientation of all of his writings, Donald Levine has noted that...

Extensive discussions of freedom and individualism appear in each of the four books by Simmel specifically devoted to sociology. Indeed the crowning achievement of his life's work was to have been a comprehensive treatment of the concept of freedom, including an interpretation of its significance in history.\(^{117}\)

Simmel attempted to analyze and note the significance of at least three major forms of individual freedom;

1. freedom in the sense of liberation from obligations to others.

2. freedom in the sense of the development of personality according to the demands of one's own nature.

3. freedom in the sense of power to express one's will within the state.\(^{118}\)

Paul Honigsheim has emphasized that Simmel like many other German social theorists of this period, believed that man by nature was good.\(^{119}\) Another view has been given by M. Lipman who noted that the leading idea of this popular social theorist was that "individualization is both a basic mental habit and a tendency to distinctiveness and discreteness in events."\(^{120}\)

Simmel had much in common with the phenomenologists and the earlier German Idealists in his belief in the inapplicability of the positive method in the studying of social phenomena. He felt that he could refute
positivism and its denial of individuality and the uniqueness of human nature by demonstrating that history was the product of the workings of individual subjective thought. However, he was not willing to completely abandon the idea of society, social integration and the need for individuals to associate. For this reason, his theories attempt to resolve the antagonisms between the individual and society and how the human being is able to preserve his individuality without jeopardizing the forms of social association within which he finds himself. The question which remains to be dealt with however, is the extent to which Simmel, like many other German social theorists who shared similar values and ideals, made use of assumptions about the nature of human nature in his efforts to resolve the problem of individuality and social integration. It is this question which will occupy the attention of this section of our study.

Simmel, in emphasizing the importance of human consciousness as a determinate of human behavior and the historical development of culture, endeavored to describe man's existence prior to the emergence of culture. He argued that man, before the development of self-consciousness within a cultural context, existed in a state of "Erleben". The concept of Erleben referred to the condition or state where

...the self and its object still remain undifferentiated, in which impressions or representations fill up consciousness, while the bearer of these contents has not yet separated himself from the contents... As long as this condition existed, basic needs which arose in the life of man were satisfied before man became aware of their existence. It was added that it was only through the inevitable frustration of "impulses"
that self-consciousness was born. While man existed at the level of Erleben he was reduced to blindly following his basic instincts. Through denying the satisfaction of these instincts, man was forced to realize and become aware of the needs and "contents" of his life experiences.

Man's own understanding of his instincts is, according to Simmel, influenced by the interaction of the individual with other men. He explained that society as a whole is based upon the processes of social interaction. However, these processes of interaction have in themselves an instinctual basis in that the willingness of the individual to interact with others is related to his desire to satisfy certain elementary needs. Interaction gives meaning and relevance to these basic instincts and needs. As he pointed out

...society itself, in general refers to the interaction among individuals. This interaction always arises on the basis of certain drives or for the sake of certain purposes. Erotic instincts, objective interests, religious impulses, and purposes of defense or attack, of play or gain, of aid or instruction and countless others cause man to live with other men... "Association" in this context was defined as the means or process by which the basic needs of the individual are realized.

It was also contended that the organization of man's desires, instincts, and impulses into forms of which the individual is aware of, and has control over, is aided by the operation of two basic drives inherent within every individual. These drives are the systematic and progressive drives.

The history of any form is ruled by "two mutually exclusive themes" the "systematic" one which seeks to close out and bring to completion a particular form and the "progressive drive" of life which demands adjustment
to new situations as they arise. The two principles pass through cultural history, engaging in the most variegated struggles, repressions and compromises. 126

The existence of consciousness was said to be due to the frustration of instincts. In turn, consciousness necessitated that instincts be provided with new means for their satisfaction. For this reason, man enters into interaction with other men. Through social interaction (which is complemented by the automatic operations of the systematic and progressive drives) man is able to satisfy and gain control over these basic needs.

Additionally, Simmel maintained that man's desire for social interaction constituted a basic drive on the part of human nature. He stated that...

in addition to their specific contents, all these situations are also characterized, precisely by a feeling, among their members, of being sociated and by the satisfaction derived from this. Sociates feel that the formulation of a society as such is a value; they are driven toward this form of existence. In fact, it sometimes is only this drive itself that suggests the concrete contents of a particular sociation. 127

Individual freedom, as it was explained, constituted the ability and opportunity of the individual to satisfy the basic needs of his nature. In this sense, Simmel was able to demonstrate, through positing certain features of human nature (including the drive for association), that man's individual freedom was only realized in a social context. In discussing the problems which philosophy as a human science faced, he indicated that the task of separating the particular problems of the individual from the general problems of man, is governed by certain instinctive abilities of the philosopher himself. As it was asserted...
A feeling in us distinguishes often with great instinctive sureness, between those convictions and dispositions which we modestly recognize as purely personal and subjective and those which we believe to be shared by some or perhaps all other men.\textsuperscript{128}

Even in the realm of philosophy he resorted to assumptions about human nature in arguing that philosophers have an instinctive ability to distinguish universal from individual and particular problems. Likewise, he insisted

...that the aspects of the sociohistorical life that we can understand are nothing but psychic concatenations which we reconstruct by means of an instinctive or methodological psychology.\textsuperscript{129}

Within his general theories, Simmel attempted to resolve the antagonisms between individuality and social integration which occurred in a wide number of social situations.

In this respect, a great deal of Simmel’s theoretical attention was devoted towards the analysis of the nature of groups. He felt that membership in a group provided both the basis for social development and for the realization of individuality. The individual by belonging to a group was able to preserve his unique personal character insofar as the group or community

...provides an organizational form for his activities, and it offers in this way all the advantages of group membership. On the other hand, the specific qualities of the individual are preserved through the combination of groups which can be different combinations in each case.\textsuperscript{130}

The question of the realization of man’s individuality through his membership in groups was of significant concern to Simmel. He insisted that the differentiation between groups, through conflict, as well as through the differences of customs and histories provided satisfaction to the
individual's basic "need for accentuation". It was suggested that hostility between groups and between individuals within groups was instinctual by the very fact that

...the first instinct with which the individual affirms himself is the negation of the other.

According to this theory, the individual who belongs to a group and who participates actively in group conflict contributes at the same time to the realization of certain needs innate to his nature.

Other needs of the individual were defined as being innate and were said to be only capable of achieving satisfaction in a social context. One of the most important of these needs or "impulses" is that of an individual's vocation where the "a priori of the individual's social existence is the fundamental correlation between his life and the society that surrounds him". To this point, was added the argument that

...society within itself produces and offers to the individual a place....this place, in spite of its general character, is nevertheless taken by the individual on the basis of an inner calling, a qualification felt to be intimately personal. For such a thing as vocation to be possible, there must exist that harmony...between the structure and development of society and individual quality and impulses.

Again, Simmel was able to resolve the dualism between individuality and social integration by positing the existence of such individual "impulses" as vocation which could only be realized in a social context.

Simmel's reliance on assumptions about the innate nature of human nature in his attempts to demonstrate the compatibility between individualism and social integration is evidenced throughout the whole course of his sociological analyses. Hugh Dalziel Duncan, both a critic and student of Simmel's work, has declared that...
The value of (his) model of sociation may be summed up by saying that he keeps our attention focused on the specifically sociological aspects of social experience.

It is important to qualify Duncan's rather misdirected assertion here by pointing out that these "sociological aspects" of social experience included, in many instances, definite assumptions about man's innate nature. These assumptions in turn were noticeably lacking in any form of empirical qualification or proof. Simmel's general belief in the liberal ideals of individualism was of more importance to him than other, more objective and scientific considerations. For this reason his work stands, at least in some respects, in direct continuity with those theories formulated by many other German intellectuals of this period, inclusive of Husserl and Scheler. Together, these theorists shared the basic liberal beliefs of German Idealism, and were intent on demonstrating how the positivists had underestimated individuality as an essential element of both human nature and society. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that Simmel differed in at least one respect with those theorists associated with German Idealism. His general emphasis on both the liberal ideals of individualism, as well as social integration, provided an unique orientation to all of his major writings.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective, we may understand that Simmel's theories in general, and his assumptions about human nature in particular, constituted vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal ideals of individualism as well as the belief in the compatibility between social integration and individual freedom. In many respects, his explicit use of assumptions about human nature exemplified the ambivalency of liberalism as an ideology in its emphasis
on the ideals of individuality on the one hand and social integration on the other. His attempts to resolve this inherent ambivalence through the use of unverified assumptions of human nature resulted in his forfeiting of the possibility of defining his social theories within a more objective and scientific context.
8) **Dilthey**

Many of the liberal libertarian ideals, originally supported by the German Idealist philosophers of the nineteenth century found expression in a number of schools of thought during the first decades of the twentieth century. Apart from neo-Kantianism, one of the most notable schools of social thought to express many of the philosophical insights of German Idealism was that of the neo-Idealists. The neo-Idealists objected to the use of the methods and theories of the natural sciences in the interpretation and analysis of human behavior and culture. One of the more ardent advocates of the neo-Idealist point of view was Wilhelm Dilthey. In his writings, Dilthey attempted to draw a sharp and definite distinction between the natural and cultural sciences insofar as he believed the physical sciences deal with facts and the cultural sciences deal with subjective meanings. His chief publications included: *Leben Schleissmachers* (1870); *Einleitung in die Geisteswissenschaften* (1883); *Die Jugendgeschichte Hegels* (1905); *Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung* (1905); *Das Wesen der Philosophie* (1907); *Der Aufbau der geschichtlichen Welt in den Geisteswissenschaften* (1910).

For the purposes of this study as a whole, it is important to determine whether Dilthey as a neo-Idealist adapted from the German Idealist philosophers, the practice of making determinate use of assumptions about the nature of human nature. The possibility must also be considered that Dilthey, like other theorists who were influenced by the German Idealist world-view chose, as well as utilized, assumptions about human nature on the basis of the fact that they lent credibility to his own beliefs in the liberal ideals of individuality. The extent to which Dilthey's use of
assumptions about human nature may be interpreted from a sociology of
knowledge perspective will constitute the primary focus of this particular
part of our analysis.

All of Dilthey's works are characterized by his

...reverential awe for the mystery of life, the sense of
the sacred in human experience. Art, religion and philosophy
could point the way to man who expresses himself in them.136

One of his central concerns was with the "meanings" of social acts and
the way by which they could be given order and form. Like many social
theorists in Germany at the time, he criticized the positivist method of
analysis insofar as he believed that human behavior was unique in its own
right. In reaction to what he felt was the neglect by the Positivists to
consider man's unique individual nature, he endeavored to base his theories
on psychological insights and concepts. H.H. Hodges has observed that
for Dilthey...

Psychology is to be the basis of all work in natural
science, that is, as all explanatory concepts in physical
science approximate to a mathematical form, so all formulae
of interpretation in the human studies must be drawn from or
assimilated to those of psychology.137

His emphasis on the establishment of psychology as a method for the inter-
pretation of human behavior indicates the influence which both empirical
philosophy from Britain and France, as well as German Idealism had on the
development of his thinking.

The psychology which Dilthey intended to formulate was to be of such
a nature that it would completely avoid the use of all metaphysical ab-
stractions and be based instead on an empirically verifiable method of
analysis. At the same time, he shared a deep sympathy with many of the
German Idealists in his belief in the romantic ideal of life. This ideal was predicated on the belief in the uniqueness of the individual personality, as well as the conviction that cultural phenomena such as art, history, music and religion were not reducible to natural scientific principles and laws. According to Dilthey, the knowledge of the natural and physical world was to be left to the interpretation of the natural sciences (Naturwissenschaften). On the other hand, he felt that analysis of man's inner world of consciousness and culture ('meanings') was to be restricted to the Geisteswissenschaften.

Central to Dilthey's hope of establishing a new and humanly relevant psychology, was the concept of "verstehen". Verstehen, as a method of analysis, was to be utilized in understanding the motivations of individuals who played a significant role in human history. It was to be used as a means by which the social theorist could "understand" the motives, ideas and feelings which composed an historical action through the identification of the theorist with the actors involved. Howard Tuttle has explained, that verstehen as a method of analysis implied that...

We do not understand this action historically by reference to its physical dimensions, but to the inner meanings, consequences and values that composed the act...

Only by using the method of verstehen, as Dilthey insisted, would it be possible to gain a level of objectivity in the human sciences equivalent to that already achieved in the natural sciences.

Dilthey was convinced that his psychology was a basic aspect of philosophy in general. He believed that the task of gaining insights into man's historical development and the underlying basis of human action
within history provided for the satisfaction of a basic human need. As he described...

This drive of thought springs from its rationality and meets needs of human nature which well nigh defy reliable analysis: the joy in knowledge, ultimate security in relation to the world, the endeavour to release life from its restricted conditions. Thus, he attempted to legitimate his new method of analysis by referring to the fact that it constituted a basic need of human nature -- "the need of the...mind for reflection on its behaviour".140

Underlying Dilthey's idea of a new human psychology based on the methods of verstehen was his deep belief and adherence to the libertarian ideals which emphasized the spontaneity of the individual mind. In this regard, he claimed that...

The mind knows that it is essentially different and separated from any physical causality...This free power of the mind over itself is then also tied with its relation to other persons, not physically but because of an ethical norm obligation. Out of this connection originates the ideal of a realm of personality, in which the individuals are tied together by norms and are inwardly free.141

It was because of the fact that individual thought and motivation is inwardly free and unbounded by natural law that he continued to argue that only the methods of verstehen could interpret and come to terms with the nature of human behavior and history.

Many critics have emphasized Dilthey's commitment to the tenets of scientific objectivity. Hodges has commented that Dilthey refused to recognize any type of speculative and empirically unsubstantiated a priori notions about human nature and the human mind.142 It was further insisted that all of his theories were exempt from using assumptions about the nature of human nature.143 R.A. Makkreil, another critic, has also
emphasized that his theories were free of any type of reductionist explanations. Dilthey himself explained that his psychology was reductionist only insofar as it reduced all social phenomena to the particular "life-consciousness" of the individual. It was stated that...

The subject matter of understanding is always something individual.... But analysis and understanding of our own experience show that the individual is an intrinsic value in the mind affected world; indeed it is the only intrinsic value we can ascertain beyond doubt.

For Dilthey, the problem of the objective historical interpretation of human action was directly related to the question of determining the nature of the whole constellation of individual experiences which comprise human history. He dealt with this question by defining a new concept, "Erlebnis". Erlebnis constitutes the "inner experience" of a particular historical personality. Verstehen, the method by which the theorist sympathetically identifies with the historical personality, is the means by which Erlebnis is inferred. This psychological method consisted of the social theorist or historian reliving the Erlebnis of the historical personality whom he was studying. By this method it was believed that an objective understanding of the actions and the inner motivations of the individual in question could be obtained.

In using this particular psychological method, Dilthey attempted to outline the role which the individual's "inner states" played in determining social action and history generally. He contended that in order for the social theorist to be aware of the inner states of an individual, he must be able to relive and experience them in a fashion similar to that experienced by the individual himself. In order for an historian or social theorist to be able to relive the inner experiences of any other individual...
act in the past or at present, the inner experiences of the actor must be essentially the same as those which the historian is capable of reliving. This general argument was based on certain assumptions about man's innate nature. Tuttle has elaborated, that the underlying assumptions about human nature upon which this concept of Erlebnis is founded

render life expressions understandable because we can assume that they are expressions like our own; and thus this identity provides an objectively valid basis for historical knowledge... The historian, then, can understand another's life expression because he can identify it in the sameness of his own inner nature. One "lives" the human nature of another in himself.147

Dilthey explicitly assumed that...

A common human nature and arrangement of individuation in constant life relations...and these are always and everywhere the same...148

Erlebnis referred to the inner, subjective experiences of the individual. These were assumed to be basic elements of human nature. As basic elements of human nature, it was possible to experience the Erlebnis of anyone else through using the methods of verstehen.

Contrary to the arguments of Hodges and Makkreil, Dilthey was in fact not able to avoid relying on a priori assumptions about the nature of human nature in his explanation of the psychological concepts of "verstehen" and "Erlebnis". As a critic of those theories which reduced human behavior to static a priori notions about human nature, he was himself able to do little better. The explicit use of assumptions about human nature within his social theories served as vehicle for the objectification, manifestation, and legitimization of the liberal ideals related to the belief in individualism and the subjective determination of historical action. His method of psychology was predicated on the understanding that the indi-
individual and his spontaneous actions, thoughts and inner-feelings play an
ostensible role in the formation and development of history. In this
context, Dilthey's notion of Geisteswissenschaften was a reflection of his
belief in the liberal ideals of individualism. Such ideals of course were
completely antithetical to the variation of liberal ideals adhered to by
such positivists as Saint-Simon and Comte.

As a neo-Idealist, Dilthey's use of assumptions about human nature
conforms noticeably to the practices of other theorists sharing a similar
idealist world-view. Like Husserl, Scheler and Simmel, his theories are
indicative of the extent to which the philosophies of the German Idealists
influenced the development of his liberal beliefs, as well as his use of
assumptions about human nature. His reduction of Erlebnis to an explicit
and empirically unverified assumption about human nature demonstrates that
his psychological theories in general and his method of verstehen in parti-
cular were intended as a means to exemplify the liberal belief in the
importance of the social and historical role of the free individual. His
failure to provide evidence that Erlebnis was in fact an innate condition
of human nature testifies to his willingness to sacrifice the scientific
credibility of his theories for the sake of providing pseudo-scientific
legitimization to the liberal ideals which stressed the individual and
subjective determination of human history. It is in this sense that we
may interpret Dilthey's use of assumptions about human nature from a
sociology of knowledge point of view.
9) **Weber**

Max Weber was probably one of the most well known and influential of the German social theorists to emerge out of the latter half of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries. Like Dilthey and others before him, he was critical of many of the ideas and values expressed by the French positivists. For this reason he attempted to expand upon, and further legitimize the concept of *verstehen*, although in a more cautious and less dogmatic fashion than Dilthey. He felt that the main task of social theory was to explain observable social phenomena and action by reducing them to the subjective plans and motivations of the particular individuals who initiated such actions. L.M. Lackman has observed that... 

*This is what Weber meant by the explanation of action in terms of the meaning attached to it by the action.*

As it was argued, the possibility of understanding the subjective element of human action was warranted by the purposive character of human behavior. Its purposive character was said to originate in the consequences of the action as they are imagined by the individual who initiates it. It is this imagined consequence which may be empathetically understood by the sociologist.

The influence which the German Idealist philosophers had in shaping many of Weber's ideas is at least partially indicated in his view of the purpose and role of sociology. He believed, as Julien Freund has described, that all human science

...necessarily proceeds by means of interpretation. This is the method we use to understand the meaning of an activity or a phenomenon and the significance of various elements in their relationship to each other...
Like other theorists who had adhered to at least some aspects of the world-view of German neo-Idealism and neo-Kantianism, he held that sociology was not a natural but a cultural science. In *The Theory of Economic and Social Organization*, he added the point that...

Sociology... is a science which attempts the interpretive understanding of social action in order thereby to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects. In "action" is included all human behavior when and insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to it.

The scope of his writings was reflective of his interest in the cultural, historical, political and economic aspects of human society. These major writings included: *Roman Agrarian History and Its Significance for State and Private Law* (1891); *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1904-5); *The Sociology of Religion* (1920-1); *On Law In Economy and Society* (1921) and *The Methodology of the Social Sciences* (1922).

Max Weber sought to draw a sharp distinction between the validation of scientific knowledge on the one hand and of normative knowledge and value judgements on the other. He proposed to separate social research from political propaganda by claiming that the purpose of sociology as a master science was to establish empirical and normative laws of social life. For this reason he came to emphasize the ideal of value-neutrality within the context of social scientific research. He argued that social theories and analyses should not attempt to provide the basis for the making of political decisions.

There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure of any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision here. The social sciences which are strictly empirical sciences, are the least fitted to presume to give the individual the difficulty of making a choice...
Despite his emphasis on the need to suspend political opinion and choice within social analyses, many critics argue that his theories demonstrate a basic political and ideological commitment. From these criticisms we may begin to appreciate the formative role which the liberal ideals of the German Idealist philosophers played in influencing his opinions about man and society.

In criticizing Weber's adherence to certain ideological values and ideals, Bendix and Roth have observed that he gave avid support to the liberal ideals of individualism. They note that he perceived a massive threat to individual spontaneity and liberty and became much concerned with rescuing some conditions for their preservation. He rejected the view popular among the "literate" that there was too much personal and political freedom in Imperial Germany and especially in more democratic countries...he enlarged his liberal inheritance by giving attention to some of the major critics of liberalism. 136

Weber ardently took a stand against all forms of authority which may have unjustly prevented the realization of individual freedom and spontaneity. For similar reasons, he became the champion of the idea of the liberal university. He felt that universities should be open to all those who were competent despite their ethnic or class background. 157 During the course of World War I, he also became a strong advocate of republicanism as opposed to the constitutional monarchy. 158 This does not mean to say that Weber was a supporter of an unrestricted form of democracy. In fact, he saw the salvation from rational-bureaucratic authority basically in the rule of the charismatic leader.

While critics and students of Weber's writings have given at least general recognition to the fact that he supported the liberal ideals of
individual freedom, they have not considered the possibility that he utilized assumptions about human nature to justify such ideals. From our previous discussion we may appreciate the fact that Weber inherited many of his liberal ideological beliefs from the intellectual tradition of German Idealism. On the basis of this fact, as well as upon the recognition of the extent to which other German sociologists at this time made use of assumptions about human nature, the question may be justifiably asked if Weber himself utilized similar assumptions. It is this question which shall form the focal point of this section of our discussion.

It is apparent to such critics as Rienhard Bendix, from reviewing Weber's earliest social and economic investigation, that he

...asserted the importance of ideas and of the individual against the collectivism of the Marxists and the social evolutionists but that he also embraced the social foundations of individual action much as Marxism had done.159

While Weber may have given support to the liberal libertarian ideals of individual freedom, this does not mean to say that he lent support to all forms of spontaneous and irrational behavior. On the contrary, his political and social philosophy was founded on the argument that "true moral freedom arises from the rational control over one's instincts". Only through rational self-control could the individual ever hope to satisfy the genuine needs of his own nature as well as those of the polity.160

His contention that human society was subject to endless rationalization and bureaucratization was indicative of his general disenchantment with modern society in its tendency to deny the worth of the free individual. This disenchantment in the opinion of Gerth and Mills
...embodies an element of liberalism and of the enlightenment philosophy that construed man's history as a unilinear 'progress' towards moral perfection, or towards cumulative technological rationalization.181

The use in his theories of the "ideal type" as a measure of human behavior was a testimony to his commitment to the liberal ideal of individuality insofar as

...the goal of an ideal type construct is always to make clearly explicit not the class or-average character but rather the unique individual character of cultural phenomena.162

Ideal types as an analytical category were constructed on the basis of the assumptions that human behavior contained at least some aspect of rationality.

Weber distinguished between four types of human action: rational goal-oriented conduct, rational value-oriented conduct, affectual conduct and traditionalist conduct.163 It is important to stress that Weber's definition of rationality, as a means-end relationship, is quite different from the notion of rationality used in the Enlightenment which was often meant to refer to the common good. Owing to his emphasis on rational forms of behavior, a dichotomy was established between irrational and rational types of action. The irrational elements were viewed merely as "deviations" from the rational in that they were "affectually" (emotionally and/or instinctively) determined.164 In this sense, the emotional or instinctual elements of man's nature resulted in nothing more than the deviation of human conduct from its rational course of intentions. He explicitly rejected the possibility that the aspects of man's instinctual and emotional life might have larger implications for the determination of human behavior - apart from diverting the individual from realizing
his "rational goals".

Human behavior, as it was assumed, was based on four types of action. Human nature was so constructed that it would inhibit the development of any other more irrational, emotional and instinctual forms of behavior. Talcott Parsons in criticizing this typology of action has pointed out that...

The isolation of rationality and the treatment of affect as only a factor of deviation from rational norms is clearly incompatible with the findings of modern psychology.165 Weber's tendency, as Parsons has argued, "to create a false, theoretically unwarranted antithesis" between rational and irrational behavior deprived the instinctual and emotional aspects of man's nature of the possibility of being understood as positive and creative motivational forces.166 Nevertheless, Weber essentially contradicted his own belief in the rational orientation of human action within the context of his discussions on the nature of charisma. In describing the specific origins of charismatic authority, he emphasized that it was a natural development, originating in the special "gifts of the body and spirit" of the charismatic leaders themselves. In other words, he explicitly assumed that charisma was an inherent feature of the nature of certain individuals. He stated...

...that the 'natural' leader - in terms of psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, political distress - have been neither officeholders nor incumbents of an 'occupation'...that is, men who have acquired expert knowledge. The natural leaders in distress have been holders of specific gifts of the body and spirit.167 Charisma, as he also emphasized, was not socially determined insofar as it
can only be 'awakened' and 'tested'...it cannot be 'learned' or 'taught'.168

Moreover, charismatic authority was seen to be "outside the realm of everyday routine" and is "sharply opposed to rational authority" of all forms.169 The willingness of individuals to obey charismatic authority was said to be related to a basic craving. He noted that individuals "crave for a characteristic which would define the characteristically qualified ruler."170 The only basis of legitimacy for personal charisms, Weber insisted, was related to a basic need felt by the followers or disciples which it was "able to satisfy."171 In this sense, charisma was defined not as a product of reason but rather as a "subjective, internal reorientation."172

Weber conceived of charisma as a revolutionary force. Charisma was irrational in that it had its basis in the affectual elements of man's nature, both in terms of the holders of charisma as well as those who adhered to it. The charismatic leader in this fashion would provide a new bulwark against the processes of rationalization, bureaucratization and industrialization - processes which threatened to deny the individual's natural spontaneity and freedom. Such processes of rationalization were seen as antithetical to man's nature. By being exposed to these processes...

The individual is shorn of his natural rhythm as determined by the structure of his organism.173

Through implying that the existence of charisma, as well as the willingness of individuals to adhere to it, constituted essential features of human nature, Weber was able to reaffirm the liberal ideals of individuality in the face of the threatening forces of rationality.
Gerth and Mills have maintained that it is possible to deduce from his analysis of charisma that...

A genuinely charismatic situation is direct and interpersonal. In the contrast of the everyday life of institutions with the personalized and spontaneous nature of charismatic leadership, one may readily discern the heritage of liberalism that has always confronted such dichotomies. 

This dichotomy was resolved through asserting that there existed above and beyond the influence of the processes of rationalization, certain inherent features of the human personality embodied in particular individuals which were able to act upon and change the existing social situation. The notion of charisma lent support to the ideal of individuality and gave it new meaning. On the basis of charisma, the "monumentalized individual becomes the sovereign of history."

Charisma, which constitutes in its various implications, a basic assumption about the nature of human nature, was for Weber a means by which he was able to add legitimacy to the ideal of individualism within the context of his own social theories. Raymond Aron has pointed out...

Weber could see no escape from this rationalization of human life except in a total and non-rational liberty, which he ardently claimed.

It was in the irrationalism of charisma that he was able to provide a refuge for individualism against the effects of bureaucratization and industrialization. In order to show that charisma was able to transcend the determinism of the rational processes of action, he had to rely on analytical categories which were able to demonstrate that human action in some specific cases was ruled by processes and motivations which remained unaffected by the constraints of rationality. By rooting charisma in the physiological makeup of specific individuals he was able to indicate
that certain aspects of individuality have an autonomous and independent existence. Weber's willingness to resort to assumptions about human nature to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals of individualism points to the extent to which he adhered to such ideals above all other considerations.

Weber strongly supported the idea of establishing an objective science of culture and human behavior, even more so than the phenomenologists Simmel or Dilthey. To this end, he attempted to give credibility to such concepts as *verstehen*. He also outlined a typology of basic, rational forms of behavior. The emphasis which was placed on the need for maintaining value-neutrality in the social sciences points to the strength of his commitment to the ideal of scientific objectivity. At the same time, he adhered to the liberal belief in individual freedom. In one sense, his efforts to objectify the study of human behavior and culture were distinctly antithetical to his own liberal ideals. The emphasis of his theories on the fact that rationality constituted a basic underlying dynamic of social life tended to rule out the possibility of there existing spontaneous and irrational forms of behavior that were purposeful and meaningful in their own right. His reliance on assumptions about man's nature in his discussion of charisma constituted a means to dispel his own disillusionment with the consequences of the operation of the processes of rationality within all aspects of social and economic life. These assumptions were a means by which Weber could effectively reintegrate considerations about man's individual and unique nature into his own social theories.
From a sociology of knowledge frame of reference, we may understand that Weber's belief in the liberal ideals of individuality necessitated that he, at some point in his intellectual development, refute his own belief in the ideals of scientific objectivity and rational explanation. His reduction of the phenomenon of charisma to a basic assumption about the nature of human nature was the ultimate consequence of this necessity.

In the final analysis, Weber's social theories, like those of many other German theorists of the early twentieth century, proved to be a vehicle for the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of the liberal ideal of individualism which has constituted, historically, one of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.
10) **Summary and Evaluation**

Social theory as it developed in France and Germany during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, reflected the whole spectrum of ideals, particular to the liberal world-view. All of these ideals were dependent for their justification on specific assumptions about the nature of human nature. The social theorists who have been reviewed in this chapter, inclusive of Saint-Simon, Comte, Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber, all used explicit assumptions about man's nature. At the same time, all of these theorists, to some extent, gave their support to the belief in the need for maintaining some level of objectivity within social scientific explanations. Nevertheless, their use of assumptions about human nature directly contradicted their ideal of scientific objectivity insofar as these theorists failed to provide empirical evidence of any sort that would justify their various contentions with regard to human nature. In relation to the general problem with which this study is concerned, it is obvious that the use of assumptions about man by these theorists can be most appropriately understood from a sociology of knowledge point of view.

The nature of the relationship between both the French positivists and German social theorists on the one hand, and liberalism on the other, is a complex and multi-dimensional one. In the first instance, the assumptions about human nature formulated by these theorists were used as vehicles for the legitimization of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. The assumptions made by Saint-Simon and Comte as to man's dual nature of egoism and altruism served as a means to justify the need for the establishment of some form of social integration based on the theories
and tenets of science. As it has been pointed out previously in this analysis, the ideals of social integration defined within the context of religion, the community and tradition, constitute the more conservative variation of liberalism as an ideology. Saint-Simon and Comte stand in the same intellectual tradition as the theorists of the Romantic and Conservative reaction. Their intentions were to outline the necessary requirements for the establishment of an integrated social order. Neither of them were intent on denying the validity of the ideals of individualism. On the contrary, they wished to show that the realization of individuality was dependent upon the fact that the individual must exist within a cohesive and integrated social structure.

Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber also relied heavily on assumptions about human nature in their attempts to lend credibility to the basic ideals of individualism to which they all strongly adhered. The methods of interpretation of human behavior related to such concepts as "Erlebnis" and "Verstehen" suggested by Husserl and Dilthey, represented an attempt to establish some degree of objectivity in the human sciences. These methodological devices were means by which the subjective and individualistic aspects of human behavior could be recognized and evaluated. Both of these concepts were based on explicit assumptions about human nature. Scheler's notion of spirit, as an unique feature of man's nature, was dependent for its legitimization on definite assumptions about man's instincts and the ability of the individual to suppress them. In the case of Simmel, we see that the various theories which he suggested in the attempt to resolve the contradictions between social integration and individuality were likewise conspicuously dependent on assumptions about man's
nature. Finally, Weber's theory of charisma utilized assumptions about man's nature in order to lend justification to the possibility that individuality could exist despite the determinate effects of rationalization.

The general orientations of the theories of the French positivists and the German sociologists were related to the social, economic and political circumstances in which they found themselves. The overall conservative views of Saint-Simon and Comte were a reflection of their reaction to the chaotic consequences of the French Revolution. These consequences included an extensive degree of political and economic instability that swept across Europe in this period. Conversely, the attitudes, values and ideals expressed in the theories of the German sociologists were directly related to the social and economic conditions of Germany at this time. The progressive scientific and industrial advances which characterized Germany engendered a political, economic and social atmosphere of optimism. This optimism was embodied in the general liberal orientation of German intellectuals. As supporters of the liberal ideals of individuality, a number of German social theorists came to oppose differing forms of arbitrary authority and the reduction of individuality to static scientific principles. Many of their liberal ideals, as well as their tendency to utilize assumptions about man's nature to support them, were adopted from the philosophical writings of the German Idealists of the nineteenth century.

The influence of social and economic circumstances on the theories of the French positivists and German sociologists were subject to definite limitations. The assumptions of human nature which were formulated by all these social theorists were related in a concomitant fashion to their
specific social circumstances. At the same time all of these assumptions conformed noticeably to the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. It is evident that social and economic circumstances may play a role in determining the nature of the assumptions of human nature which a social theorist might formulate. However, the choice of assumptions by the theorist is limited to a definite set of possibilities. From this we may understand that unstable economic, political and social circumstances facilitate the development of social theories which emphasize the need for social integration. Such theories legitimize this need by referring to specific aspects of human nature that can only be developed and realized in a coherent and stable social structure. Conversely, more stable social situations contribute towards the formulation of social theories which emphasize the ideal of individuality. These theories give this ideal credibility by referring to man's autonomous and independent nature.

The variations of assumptions of human nature outlined in the social theories of the French positivists and German social theorists were related to the immanent processes of change inherent within liberalism as an ideology. The French positivists developed their theories in reaction to the theories of the Enlightenment which had placed a great deal of emphasis on the ideals of individuality. In turn, the theories of Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber in many respects, were formulated for the purposes of providing a critique of the French positivists' neglect of the ideals of individuality. The assumptions about human nature utilized in these social theories are indicative of the ambivalent nature of liberalism as an ideology. This ambivalence is related to the emphasis which liberalism places on the ideals of individuality on the one hand
and on social integration on the other. The emphasis by Saint-Simon and Comte on the ideals of social integration and conversely, the attention given by the German social theorists to individualism, is a testimony to this ambivalence.

Liberalism, as an ideology, constitutes a socio-cultural phenomenon which contains within itself its own inherent dynamics of change. This immanent process of change consists of the contradiction between the two essential ideals of liberalism. As soon as one ideal receives emphasis in the social theories of a particular liberal school of thought, another group of social theorists will try to counterbalance this emphasis by supporting an alternative liberal ideal. This was the case in relation to the reaction of the German sociologists toward the theories of the French positivists. This dynamic process of "action and reaction" as related to the formulation of alternative liberal ideals by social theorists constitutes the specific operation of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology. It is also an indication of the limited variations to which this process of immanent change is restricted.

The belief in attaining a significant level of scientific objectivity within the human sciences was supported by the French positivists, as well as the German phenomenologists, neo-Kantians, neo-Idealists, and advocates of the idea of Geistswissenschaften. A number of contemporary social scientists have assumed that the arguments between the French positivists and their German critics was over the question of the applicability and choice of specific methodological devices for the objective interpretation of human behavior. These debates and arguments, however, were in fact a reflection of the differing orientations of these social theorists to the
liberal world-view - orientations which in turn were legitimated by differing assumptions about man's innate nature. All of the assumptions to which these social theorists referred, in their attempts to legitimate a particular method of analysis as the key to the "scientific study of science", were noticeably lacking in any form of empirical verification based on the typical scientific procedures of observation or experimentation.

A certain contradictory situation is evident when assumptions about human nature in the theories of the French positivists and German sociologists are carefully examined. It is on the basis of this contradiction that we may evaluate their use of such assumptions from a sociology of knowledge point of view. This contradictory situation consists of the fact that in the case of German and French social theorists alike, their attempt to establish the human sciences as an objective and scientific study of human behavior was based on arguments, theories and contentions which relied on empirically unsubstantiated assumptions about man's innate nature. However, what is credible about their theories from a sociology of knowledge perspective, is the degree to which they demonstrate the adherence of the social theorists themselves, to the basic ideals of liberalism as a pervasive world-view in reaction to fundamental changes in the social structure of nineteenth century Europe.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER III


7. Ibid.; p. 16.

8. For a discussion of the effect of these social circumstances on the social theories of this period, see: Levy-Bruhl, Lucien; History of Modern Philosophy In France (Burt Franklin; New York; 1971) pp. 352-3.


10. Gouldner, Alvin A.; 'Introduction' in Durkheim, Emile; Socialism (Collier; New York; 1967) p. 11.


19. Aron, Raymond; German Sociology (Free Press; New York; 1964) p. 114.


33. Saint-Simon, Henri De; 'Physiologie sociale X' cited in Durkheim, Emile; Socialism; Op. Cit.; p. 139.


40. Aron, Raymond; Main Currents In Sociological Thought, Vol. I (Anchor Books; Garden City, New York; 1965) p. 73.


43. Spencer, Herbert; Reasons For Dissenting From the Philosophy of M. Comte (Glendessary Press; Berkeley; 1968) p. 5.

44. Simpson, George; Auguste Comte (Thomas Y. Crowell; New York; 1969) p. 47.

45. For an argument which supports the view that Comte's theories were non-reductionist and used testable knowledge in understanding the nature of society, see: Fletcher, Ronald (ed.); 'Introduction' to The Crisis of Industrial Society - The Early Essays of Auguste Comte (Heinemann; London; 1974) pp. 21-4.


50. Ibid.; p. 155.

51. Ibid.; p. 25.


54. Ibid.; p. 11.

55. Ibid.; p. 11.

56. Ibid.; p. 18.

57. Ibid.; p. 73.

58. Ibid.; p. 103.


61. Ibid.; p. 27.

62. Ibid.; p. 32.

63. Ibid.; p. 45.

64. Aron, Raymond; Main Currents in Sociological Thought I; Op. Cit.; p. 120.


67. Ibid.; p. 4.


71. *Ibid.*; pp. 100-1, 224.


73. See:
   - Brinton, Crane; *Nietzsche* (Harper & Row; New York; 1965) pp. 138-141.

74. See:
   - Renouvier, Charles & L. Prat; *La Novelle Monadologie* (A. Colin; Paris; 1899).


81. Kockelmanns, Joseph J.; *A First Introduction to Husserl's Phenomenology* (Ducqasene University Press; Louvain; 1967) p. 11.


91. For a general overview of those elements of Husserl's theories which have been considered to be major contributions to the development of modern social and philosophical thought, see:


96. For a general overview of this period and Scheler's interpretation of it, see:
   Delmos, Otto E.; *The Concept of Ressentiment as Developed by Max Scheler and Its Occurrence Among the Black Minority Group* (Unpublished M.A. Thesis; Simon Fraser University; 1971) pp. 6-7.


100. Scheler, Max; *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values* (Northwestern University Press; Evanston; 1973) p. 383.

101. Ibid.; p. 400.

102. Lacklerman, David R.; 'Introduction' to Scheler, Max; *Selected Philosophical Essays* (Northwestern University Press; Evanston; 1973) p. xx.


108. Ibid.; p. 22.


110. Ibid.; p. 33.

111. Ibid.; p. 34.

112. Ibid.; p. 36.


114. Ibid.; p. 56.

115. Ibid.; p. 57.


117. Levine, Donald N.; 'The Structure of Simmel's Social Thought' in Wolff, Kurt (ed.); *Georg Simmel 1858-1918* (Ohio State University Press; Columbus; 1959) p. 16.

118. Ibid.; pp. 16-7.

119. Honigshelm, Paul; 'A Note on Simmel's Anthropological Interests' in Wolff, Kurt (ed.); Ibid.; p. 177.


123. Wungartner, Rudolph H.; 'Form and Content In Simmel's Philosophy of Life' in Wolff, Kurt; Ibid.; p. 44.

124. Simmel, Georg; 'Philosophie des Geldes' cited in Wolff, Kurt (ed.); Ibid.; p. 44.


132. Ibid.; p. 29.


134. Ibid.; p. 354.


139. Dilthey, Wilhelm; *The Essence of Philosophy* (University of North Carolina Press; Chapel Hill; 1961) p. 75.

140. Ibid.; p. 73.


143. Ibid.; p. 76.


146. For a detailed elaboration of Dilthey's concept of "Erlebnis", see:


156. Bendix, Reinhard & Guenther Roth; Scholarship and Partisanship (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1971) p. 21.


164. Ibid.; p. 92.


166. Ibid.; p. 16.


175. Aron, Raymond; German Sociology; Op. Cit.; 106.
CHAPTER IV THE HUMAN NATURE OF COLLECTIVISM, EQUALITARIANISM AND ECLITISM

1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

The problem with which this study as a whole is concerned, is to determine to what extent the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective. In relation to this overall problem, this chapter shall deal specifically with the theories of Karl Marx on the one hand and those of the elite theorists inclusive of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim on the other. These theories shall be examined in terms of their use of assumptions about human nature. At the same time this study is also concerned with the role which liberalism as an ideology has played in influencing the choice, as well as the use of assumptions about human nature by social theorists since the Enlightenment. As a consequence, the liberal views of these particular theorists will be carefully considered in this chapter in relation to the possibility that their use of assumptions about human nature served as a means to legitimize their liberal ideals.

The use of assumptions about man's innate nature by Marx as well as by the elite theorists has received only restricted attention by students and critics of their theories to date. A number of contemporary social theorists have pointed out that the original intention of the elite theorists was to establish an objective science of human political behavior. Livingston, for example, in reviewing the general implications of Mosca's theory of the ruling class has noted that...

Mosca confronts the problem of constructing a political science. The context of that science will be the discovery of the constant tendencies or laws that determine the be-
behavior of the human masses and regulate the organization of political authority. These tendencies or laws can only be discovered from a study of "social facts"...1

These elite theorists have also been accused of having relied on empirically unverified assumptions about man's nature to support their various theoretical contentions. James Meisel has emphasized that Pareto, in outlining his idea about the circulation of elites, "predicated his law on biological constancies of behavior which defy analysis".2 It is on the basis of such criticisms as those given above, that we may seriously question whether the "realistic science" proposed by the elite theorists was in fact a science at all.

Similarly, Marx's theories, which many of the elite theorists had been intent on criticizing, have also been interpreted as having been based on explicit and determinant assumptions about man's innate nature. From this perspective, Graeme Duncan has commented that...

The vision of men on which Marx's hostile analysis of capitalism rested, and which he presented sometimes indirectly, sometimes directly, is of a free, creative, self-determining social being...Illusions and, of course, the realities which sustained them...had to be destroyed if men were to...fulfill their human nature or to realize their capacities, which meant expressing powers and satisfying needs which were by and large, frustrated, hidden or non-existent in pre-communist societies.3

These criticisms bring up the specific question of the extent to which both Marx, as well as the elite theorists, made explicit use of assumptions of human nature throughout the whole context of their various theoretical arguments.

By reviewing both the use of assumptions about human nature as well as the liberal biases of these theorists, it is hoped that a clearer understanding will be obtained as to the nature of the dynamics of theory con-
struction. The choice of Marx's social theories on the one hand and those of the elite theorists on the other, as the subjects for analysis in this chapter was determined by a number of considerations. These considerations consist of the contributions of these theorists to the development of the social sciences as a whole, as well as their particular orientations to liberalism as an ideology.

Many aspects of Marxian socialism were rooted in the ideals and values defined within the intellectual movements of German Idealism and Romanticism. The Marxist doctrine reflected the spirit of crisis as revealed in increasing mass poverty which characterized European civilization in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Marxism as a theoretical movement constituted a synthesis of these two intellectual traditions. As David Gasman has described...

In addition to this Janus-like character of the 'Generation of Materialism', it is important to recognize that the writings of such representative authors of the age as Marx and Darwin, contain along with their realistic, secular and mechanistic appraisals of life and society, also a strain of romanticism...

Marx's utopian vision, although never completely articulated, consisted of the belief that a communist society, representing the transformation of human existence, would emerge from the struggle of all classes. Such a vision was formulated as an alternative to the harsh political injustices which the processes of industrialization had facilitated in Western Europe.

Marxism as a political philosophy, as well as a method of social analysis, was founded on many of the insights and theories of Hegel. Hegel's contention that human history constituted the struggle between nations was, however, reinterpreted by Marx. Marx emphasized that the
dynamic of historical development was related to the struggles between social classes. In this fashion he was able to transform the distinctive nationalistic and conservative elements of Hegel's thought into a "new and more powerful type of revolutionary radicalism". The sociological aspects of Marx's writings were an inherent part of his general political philosophy. He sought to demonstrate scientifically "what was for him the inevitable evolution of the capitalist system."

Marx's social and historical analyses played a dominant role in contributing to the development of German economic and social theory. It is alleged by a number of sociologists today, that the theories of such prominent individuals as Max Weber were formulated in direct response to the various theoretical and political contentions that were put forward by Marx. Albion Small has argued that his theories have had a significant effect on the development of the social sciences.

Marx was one of the few really great thinkers in the history of social science...I do not think that Marx added to social science a single formula which will be found in the terms he expressed it...In spite of that, I confidently predict that in the ultimate judgement of history Marx will have a place in social science analogous with that of Galileo in physical science.

Becker and Barnes have stressed that many of his insights into the role of economic factors in historical development; his amplification of the "internal conflict" theory of the state; his critique of capitalism; and his ideas about alienation and class all continue to play an important part in influencing the development of modern sociological and anthropological theory.

Many critics and students of Marx have attempted to point out the "scientific" nature of his theories. T.B. Bottomore has asserted that
"there runs unmistakably through all of Marx's work... a profound commitment
to the investigation of social facts". Marxian social science is defined
by its advocates, not as an independent body of knowledge but as an integral
part of "scientific socialism". Marxists argue that scientific socialism
is based on the principles of dialectical and historical materialism. These
principles, according to this view, constitute the first empirical and sys-
tematic attempt to relate the proletarian class struggle to the facts of
history rather than to abstract principles of justice and morality. Marxist
theory is accredited as being a scientific theory of history and society,
as well as being a basic program of political action for the initiation of
the proletarian revolution. Also, Marxist social science has been inter-
preted as being the chief means by which the proletariat is given knowledge
about the origins and consequences of the economic struggles with which
they must contend.

Historical materialism is a theoretical perspective, attempts to out-
line the material and economic determination of both the immediate social
conditions of human existence as well as the historical process as a whole.
Many students of Marxism maintain that historical materialism constitutes
the essential cornerstone of a Marxian social science. Bukharin has noted
that...

The practical task of a reconstruction of society may be correctly solved by the application of a scientific
policy of the working class, a policy based on scientific theory; this scientific theory, in the case of the prole-
tariat is the theory founded by Karl Marx. Likewise, Lichtheim has insisted that Marx endeavored to demonstrate that
the positivistic methods of science and a scientific world-view in general,
were not incompatible with a politically oriented theory of nature and
history. Students of Marx's social theories and disciples of his political doctrine, contend that the intentions of all of his writings was to outline a scientific theory that explained the development of the economic and social structure of capitalist society in terms of the natural laws of production. These laws are understood as being related to the underlying antagonisms between classes. Inevitably, as many advocates point out, the primary goal of Marx's social science and political program was to free the individual from "the inhuman constraints" of the capitalist mode of production.

The emphasis which Marx placed on the need to emancipate the individual from the alienating and dehumanizing structure of capitalist society has been interpreted as being indicative of his adherence to the liberal values and ideals of individualism within a collective context. Marx believed that the establishment of a communist society would represent the realization of the original and natural condition of man. Arthur Koestler commented that his utopian classless society "was to be a revival, at the end of the dialectical spiral, of the primitive communist society which stood at its beginning." It is exactly such utopian elements of Marx's theories which are a testimony to his belief in basic liberal values and ideals. Adam Ulam has pointed out that...

The "other side" of Marxism is in effect a kind of integral liberalism of the early variety, liberalism unmellowed by absorption in democratic politics and untempered by conversion to social legislation. Marxian socialism may have embodied the liberal belief in man's individual freedom. However, the Marxian ideal of individualism presupposed that the natural state for the realization of such individuality consisted
of an integrated collectivistic social milieu.

Howard Parsons has clearly described how Marx defined individualism within a social context. For example, Parsons has observed that the Marxist idea of productive labor, "presupposes a social and communicative life as its origin, content and end." He added that for Marx...

To be a man, to develop one's power's to create - all of that means to engage in productive labor with other men and in transaction with nature.

Marx ardently shared the liberal belief in the need for the individual to express his personal powers and talents. He nevertheless assumed that such a form of individualism was only rendered meaningful through collectivized productive labor and social interaction with other men. It is for this reason that C. Wright Mills felt that...

What is most valuable in classic liberalism is most cogently and most fruitfully incorporated in classic Marxism... Karl Marx remains the thinker who has articulated most clearly...the basic ideals which liberalism shares.

Marx's emphasis on the realization of individual freedom in a collective context through the medium of productive labor, constitutes one of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.

In this respect, this study will endeavor to examine the extent to which Marx's liberal beliefs influenced the development and formulation of his social theories. Moreover, the possibility will be considered of whether his liberal beliefs played a role in his utilization of assumptions about the nature of human nature.

Marxism gained popularity all over Europe during the latter half of the nineteenth and earlier part of the twentieth century. At the same time it was not without its critics. A number of social theorists in this period
became quickly disillusioned with the essential principles of the Marxist philosophy. Many were sceptical about the possibility of realizing the utopia of a classless society. Such social theorists as Pareto, Mosca and Michels became the most articulate critics of the shortcomings of the Marxist interpretation of society and history. Rather than viewing history in terms of class conflict, these theorists interpreted the dynamics of historical and social development in relation to the existence and circulation of elites. They were convinced that the existence of an elite in any social situation was inevitable. Bottomore indicated that this "realistic science" which Pareto, Mosca, Michels and others helped to fashion was directly "intended to refute Marx's theory of social classes."20 Irving Zeitlin likewise contends that the elite theorists developed their ideas and arguments as a means to reveal the utopian illusion upon which Marx's theory of a classless society was constructed.21 Other elite theorists such as Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim, rather than directly criticizing the collectivistic ideals of Marxism, provided an ostensible critique of the equalitarian ideals particular to liberal-democracy.

The ideological orientation of the elite theorists (despite their criticisms of the ideals of collectivism and equalitarianism) was not conservative but rather "counter-revolutionary".22 They were counter-revolutionary in the sense that they believed "the mass" which constituted a group of equal individuals cooperating in a collectivist fashion was not, as Marx asserted, the vehicle for the realization of human freedom. A number of these theorists viewed the mass as being nothing more than a "common herd" whose behavior is governed by "sentiments" and "passions" and by "irrational forces".23
It was the emergence of the mass, facilitated by social democracy, industrialization and urbanization which the elite theorists saw as the essential disintegrative force of history. At least Durkheim, Mosca, and Ortega Y Gasset believed that the ideals of individuality, social differentiation and the realization of the unique talents and abilities of the individual had been forfeited by the prevailing social democratic and Marxist doctrines which emphasized the need to guarantee the welfare and security of "all mankind as a whole". Mosca explained that the ideals of socialist collectivism were irrational in that they were predicated on "the passions and blind faith of the masses".24

Many of the elite theorists were convinced that small "moral and intellectual aristocracies" throughout history had enabled man to raise himself above the level of primitive barbarism.25 Civilization could only be attained by an elite which was able to check the "impulsiveness" of the mass. They argued that the elite embodied the ideals of individualism in that it was able to direct the realization of individual creativity among the subject population. It was maintained further by at least some of these theorists that the progress of human civilization was fostered by the competition between elites as well as between talented individuals who attempted to secure elite positions. Talcott Parsons observed that the ideals of individual freedom, creativity and progress were essential elements of Pareto's elite theories.

He was above all else, a lever of this civilization. That is, he was in the aristocratic "cultural" rather than the bourgeois sense a liberal, a connoisseur of the good things of life, a lover of freedom in thought and action. But to him freedom in thought and personal conduct was far more important than in business. ...Pareto nowhere delivers any attack on liberal values.26
Mannheim, as an elite theorist, explained that the opportunity for the individual to realize his own freedom and individuality through free competition with other individuals was an impossibility in mass society.\textsuperscript{27} It was only through social planning directed by an elite, that an individual could gain some degree of freedom.

A number of these elite theorists were generally critical of mass liberal democracy. Nevertheless, they were not skeptical of the basic liberal ideals of individualism. They appreciated the need for the protection of civil liberties and government reform. However, they felt that these essential democratic processes could be guided most efficiently by responsible elites.\textsuperscript{28} The orientation of the elite theorists, at least in the case of Pareto and Mosca, towards an individualist, laissez-faire point of view is evidenced in their

\ldots firm belief in the "free" interplay of economic forces, and, concomitantly, a distrust of extraeconomic intervention, whether it originates with the government or with strong "intermediary associations"\ldots .\textsuperscript{29}

For these theorists, individual competition for elite membership embodied the ideals of economic individualism as a refinement of the liberal policies of social laissez-faire.\textsuperscript{30} The condition of an "open elite" as it was believed would allow for the social mobility of the individual on the basis of his talents and capabilities for leadership! In this fashion it was hoped that the liberal ideal of equality of opportunity according to merit would be realized. The realization of this ideal, however, was to be restricted in its control and direction to a selected group of competent individuals.

The orientation of these elite theorists to the liberal ideals of
individualism holds specific importance for clarifying the overall problem with which this analysis is concerned. By examining the various liberal ideals of these theorists, it will be possible to determine whether the general orientation of their theories, as well as their use of assumptions about human nature were at all related to their liberal world-view.
2) **Marx**

Marx, as a philosopher, sociologist, economist and social historian, attempted to outline the essential interrelationships between private property, the division of labor, capital and the antagonisms between classes. His specific goal was to demonstrate both the inevitability of overcoming the constraints of private property and the possibility of securing the liberation of man from the alienating impositions created by religion, the family and the capitalist state. All of his writings constituted attempts to come to terms with the laws of capitalist development, as well as to understand the inherent contradictions of the capitalist mode of production.

His major works included: *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right* (1842-3); *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (1844); *The Holy Family* (1845); *The German Ideology* (1846); *Poverty of Philosophy* (1847); *Communist Manifesto* (1848); *Wage-Labor and Capital* (1848); *Class-Struggles In France* (1850); *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (1852); *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations* (1857); *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (1859); *Capital* (1867); *Theories of Surplus Value* (1867); and *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875).

The question with which this section of the study shall be directly concerned is whether Marx, in his effort to define the inherent laws and contradictions of the capitalist mode of production made use of determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature. The extent to which these assumptions were related to his collectivistic ideals shall also be carefully examined. In this fashion it will be possible to determine to what degree his theories of "scientific socialism" were predicated on assumptions about the nature of human nature. Also, a careful analysis of his
writings may help us in determining whether his assumptions about man lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

The purpose of analyzing the socio-economic structure of capitalist society and its historical antecedents, according to Marx, was to provide a basis for social action. This social action would be channelled towards the changing of the existing relations of production. To understand his conception of philosophy and its intentions is to understand the sociology of Marx. Social criticism for this theorist was not merely an end in itself. It was a means by which those elements of the socio-economic reality which he thought promoted the self-alienation of man, might be refuted. As he stated in the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right...

Criticism is no longer an end in itself, but simply a means, indignation is its essential mode of feeling and denunciation its principle task. 32

He believed that the final consequence of his sociology would be to "overthrow all those conditions in which man is an abased, enslaved, abandoned and contemptible being". 33

Marx's 'political economy' has been seen by C. Wright Mills as the only framework of analysis suitable for the objective study of society. He has contended that...

Neither the truth nor the falsity of Marx's theories confirm the adequacy of his model. It can be used for the construction of many theories, it can be used in correcting errors in theories made with its aid. It is itself open to modifications, in ways that make it more useful as an analytic tool. 34

Marx's theories have gained a wide degree of popularity among social theorists today. His ideas and insights have played an important role
in the development of theories formulated by the New Left and by other "radical" members of the contemporary social scientific community.

For Marx, all social criticisms must necessarily begin with the subject of religion. Religion, as he explained, was part of the superstructure which serves to mystify and rationalize objective exploitation. Apart from the capitalist mode of production, religion is seen as the first social force that promotes human alienation. He insisted that it was religion which sanctioned "the separation of man from himself, the cleavage between the sacred and profane, between the supernatural and nature". In his critique of Hegel's philosophy of right, it was pointed out that the criticism of religion has a specific function insofar as...

The abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of men is a demand for their real happiness. The call to abandon their illusions about their condition is a call to abandon a condition which requires illusions. His overall theoretical intentions were directed towards determining the degree to which the social and material relations of production of the modern capitalist state contributed to the denial of human freedom. To this end he was convinced that his general method of analysis was...

...not without presuppositions but it begins with the real presuppositions and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in some imaginary condition of fulfillment or stability, but in their actual, empirically observable process of development under determinate conditions. Social criticism must effectively prescribe social action. As an aspect of revolutionary praxis, such criticism must reveal those aspects of the socio-economic situation which are incongruent with men's productive capacities and needs. In this sense the realization of philosophy was synonymous with the social emancipation of man.
In defining the materialist conception of history, it was maintained that the processes of production set the general precedent for the condition and development of society. Marx emphasized that...

The mode of production of material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being which determines their consciousness.

Within this definition of the materialist conception of history, it was argued that the economic structure of society (the sum total of the relations of production) provided the basis or substructure for the legal, political and cultural superstructure. It was also the ultimate determinant of social consciousness. For Marx, human activity and consciousness were processes determined at least indirectly by the natural conditions of society in relation to specific class needs and class interests.

Within the course of his intellectual career, Marx proceeded from a critical analysis of Hegelian philosophy, to dealing with the economic, political and social problems of modern bourgeois society. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 the "young Marx" first demonstrated his concern with the problem of man's relationship to the processes of production. He explained that...

The consideration of the division of labor and exchange is of general interest since they are the perceptible, alienated expression of human activity and capacities as the activity and capacities proper to a species.

It was later, in Capital, that Marx presented the idea that money was not an autonomous entity. Instead, it was defined as a social unifying force within capitalist society. Money was said to link both producer and consumer in an exploitative union of interests.
Marx's evaluation of the operation and effects of the mode of production particular to capitalist society was predicated on specific assumptions about the nature of human nature. It was contended that it is productive activity which constitutes the essence of human nature. Productive activity is the essential element of man's "species-being" insofar as productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The character of a species - its species character - is contained in the character of its life activity; and free conscious activity is man's species-character. According to this argument, the product of labor constituted the objectification of man's species-life, the objectification of his innate human nature. Capitalism was condemned because it estranged man from his essential "species-being" by not allowing the worker to share in the products of his labor.

By tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor tears from his species life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his unorganic body, nature, is taken away from him. The individual's participation in the alienating conditions of labor in capitalist society turned man's "species being, both nature and his spiritual special property; into a being alien to him, into a means to his individual existence".

It is at this point in our analysis of Marx's general theoretical orientation that we may begin to come to terms with the role which assumptions about human nature played in the development and formulation of his theories. In addition, the ideological basis of these assumptions, as they are related to his liberal beliefs becomes increasingly obvious. Erich Fromm has indicated that Marx's assumption, that the "essence" of
human nature constituted free, productive and creative labor by the individual was shared by other social theorists inclusive of Spinoza, Goethe and Hegel. 45

For Marx, there existed a dual human nature. One nature was subject to modification by the external material conditions in which the individual found himself. Alternatively, he assumed that man's primary nature, his species-being, was constant. This constant human nature could only reach its full level of development in a communist society. It was believed that capitalism was not produced by the basic needs or tendencies of human nature. On the contrary, Marx argued that capitalism was able to alter the more modifiable aspect of human nature to suit its own purposes. He further suggested that only when man's essential human nature, his species-being was allowed full development would it then be possible to rid human behavior of its negative, selfish and greedy characteristics. 46

Human nature was assumed to be modifiable in the sense that capitalism, through the production of alienation within the work sphere, was largely responsible for causing the urban proletariat to take up so many vices. It was only on the basis of assuming that man had a constant, unchangeable and essential human nature, that he was able to criticize capitalist society. His critique of capitalism was founded on the assumption that the capitalist mode of production alienated man from his essential "species-being". Conversely, communist society was defined as being generally compatible with this "species-being".

Only by assuming that man's nature was essentially good, socially congenial and productive were Marx and Engels able to assert that it was colonialism, as a feature of capitalist exploitation, which was respon-
sible for producing "treachery, massacre and meanness" amongst men. 47

Similarly, only by believing that human nature was modifiable as well as having certain positive constant features could Marx contend that...

What characterizes the division of labor in the automatic workshop is that labor has there completely lost its specialized character. But the moment every special development stops, the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual begins to be felt. 48

It was suggested that the specialized constraints of the shop molds man's character to suit its practical purposes. However, when the shop and the mode of production which characterized it, ceased to exist it would be possible for the individual's "need for universality" to come into play. The "need for universality" constituted the individual's desire to develop and realize his species-being through productive labor. In Capital, Marx alluded to the fact that man is unable to realize his essential human nature so long as capitalism continues to exist. Capitalism was blamed for producing such irrational forms of behavior as the fetishism of commodities. 49

Only by the collective appropriation of the means of production, as Marx explained, could man come to realize his essential species-being—the constant and unchanging features of human nature. Within a collectivistic form of social organization, as it was asserted,

self-activity coincided with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting off of all natural limitations. 50

The necessity of revolution was justified in that, through revolution, the proletariat could "succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew." 51 Marx assumed that
...In place of old bourgeois society - with its classes and class antagonism - we shall have an association in which the free development of each is a condition for the development of all. 52

This argument was predicated on the understanding that once the constraints and injustices are removed, people by their very nature would be willing to enter into collectivistic relationships. This type of assumption corresponds exactly to Marx's theory about men's natural state, prior to the emergence of capitalism.

For Marx, man's true species-character, removed from the distorted influences of capitalism, expresses itself in the unity of all men. To this assumption was added the contention that...

Man is only individualized (vereinzelt) through the process of history. He appears originally as a generic being, a tribal being, a herd animal...Exchange itself is a major agent of this individualization. 53

The existence of man's essentially cooperative and collectivistic nature was evidenced according to this argument, by the members of the Paris Commune who neither indulged in murder, association, theft or personal assault. 54 The collectivization of the workers was believed to be inevitable. It was argued in Class Struggles in France, that the proletarian masses in Paris,

...even after the victory, were still absolutely in the dark as to the path to be taken. And yet the movement was there, instinctive, spontaneous, irrepressible...how could they be less susceptible to ideas which were the truest reflex of their economic position, which were nothing but the clear, comprehensible expression of their needs, of needs not yet understood by themselves, but only vaguely felt. 55

Marx explicitly assumed that it was man's own basic and "instinctive" needs which would draw the individual inevitably towards the goal of over-
throwing the capitalist power structure.

It is quite clear at this point of our analysis that Marx made extensive use of assumptions about human nature. Also, it is obvious that his use of these assumptions in many respects was directed towards the legitimization of his collectivistic liberal ideals. This concomitant relationship between his liberal beliefs and his assumptions about human nature becomes even more clear when his theories relating to dialectical and historical materialism are considered. Man's species-being as Marx believed would be realized through the destruction of capitalism brought about by the contradiction between socialized production and capitalist methods of appropriation. His whole notion of dialectical and historical materialism was predicated on the belief in the inevitable occurrence of such contradictory relations. The dialectical relationship between the relations and forces of production, which characterized the evolution of bourgeois capitalist society was in turn complemented by "the inner necessity of man to make the world available to himself".

Graeme Duncan has commented that in Marx's case

...history was seen to be a process in which man's powers were gradually drawn out and developed so that ultimately, after many ups and downs, he becomes fully human in Marx's sense of the term. Communism seemed feasible given assumptions about man's technological skills and achievements, his versatility, and his collective and large-scale industrial enterprises.

To these observations outlined above, should be added the fact that the feasibility of establishing a communist society according to Marx emphasized his technological skills. In this respect, his belief in the possibility of establishing a communist society, as well as his critique of capitalism, were based on explicit assumptions about the nature of human
Marx wished to demonstrate the inhuman nature of capitalism. He made the explicit assumption that man by nature was a socially oriented being who was cooperative and free of aggressive tendencies. The idea of man's self-alienation as being a consequence of the process of production particular to capitalism, was based on the assumption that the essence of man's species-being constituted free, productive labor. In legitimizing the possibility of establishing a communist society, it was assumed that man by nature was collectivistic. Marx's view of human nature was both absolute and relative. It was absolute in the sense that it was believed that man had a species-being which was unchanging and which was only suited to a communist form of social organization. On the other hand, he was faced with the problem of explaining why individuals living in society appeared to deviate so much from what he had assumed to be man's true species-being. As a consequence, he viewed human nature as also being modifiable by the immediate material world. That is to say, by the relationship of the individual to the capitalist mode of production.

It is important to realize that all of these assumptions were used by Marx in a determinate manner with little or no consideration as to the provision of any form of empirical justification. Marxist scholars, like Karl Korsch, for example, have uncritically asserted that...

Marx's new socialist and proletarian science, which further developed the revolutionary theory of the classical founders of the doctrine of society in a way corresponding to the changed historical situation, is the genuine social science of our time.59

Korsch's argument relies for its justification on the unquestioned belief that Marx's method of analysis, his notion of historical materialism and
his prescription of a communist society were all based upon verifiable
and demonstrable empirical data. This, however, is just simply not the
case.

Marx's critique of capitalism, as well as his proposal for the estab-
lishing of a communist society, were rooted in assumptions about man's
innate nature -- assumptions for which he failed to provide any form of
empirical credibility. In this light, it may be argued that his theories
of dialectical and historical materialism were posited on a distinct
metaphysic. This metaphysic consisted of assumptions about human nature.
R.N. Carew Hunt has pointed out that Marx, through his frequent reliance
on such abstract principles of historical development inclusive of the
dialectic, as well as his use of empirically unsubstantiated assumptions
about man's nature

...exposed himself to the charge of endowing his material
universe with qualities which transcend its physical nature
and belong to the order of metaphysics.60

Pitirim Sorokin likewise has suggested that his general theoretical argu-
ments

...are expressed in an obscure and ambiguous form, and
they are not so much the results of any inductive study
or factual study as (they are) of speculative and dogmatic
deduction.61

Marx's disregard for the basic scientific principle of empirical verifi-
cation demonstrates the degree to which he was committed to the task of
legitimizing the ideal of individuality within a collective context. His
adherence to the ideal of individuality and his consequent emphasis on
the collectivistic realization of such an ideal, place him in the centre
of the liberal tradition of social thought.
Marx, like the Philosophes, the positivists, and many of the German sociologists of the nineteenth century, supported the essential liberal belief in the freedom of the individual. This ideal of freedom was based on the assumption that man's essential species-character and individuality existed only insofar as he is freed from the shackles of exploitation. His emphasis on collectivism expresses a general affirmation of the liberal ideals of social integration; which constitutes a basic variation of liberalism as an ideological world-view. Marx, like other social theorists who have lent support to this particular variation of liberal ideology, although in a slightly different context, utilized determinate assumptions about human nature as a means to provide for its objectification, manifestation and legitimation. In this sense we may understand that his use of assumptions about human nature conforms noticeably to a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis and interpretation.
3) From Collectivism to Elitism

The next section of this chapter will deal with the elite theorists, inclusive of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Ortega y Gasset and Mannheim. It was these theorists who together provided an extensive critique of many of the collectivistic and social integrationist ideals which had been supported by Marx. The question which will be analyzed in this portion of the discussion is whether the criticisms of Marx by these theorists were related to their differing liberal beliefs and values. The use of assumptions about human nature by the elite theorists will also be reviewed in terms of the degree to which these assumptions provided justification for their liberal beliefs. In this fashion a clearer picture will be obtained of the dynamics of theory construction relative to these elite theorists, as well as the extent to which their use of assumptions about human nature may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge point of view.

The particular theoretical and ideological orientation of the elite theorists must be understood in terms of their specific historical circumstances as well as in relation to their criticisms of Marxism. By the end of the nineteenth century, social theories which advocated the ideals of progress, man's perfectability and the use of positivistic methods in the study of social phenomena came to be increasingly questioned by many European intellectuals. This scepticism was complemented by the increasing disillusionment of many individuals with parliamentarianism, especially in France and Italy. During this period, the French political system grew more and more unstable. Its instability was rooted in the conflicts which occurred between the clerical and conservative opposition on the 'Right', and the socialist and syndicalists on the 'Left'. In Italy, the political
situation was as equally disorganized. The Italian government, under the leadership of Crispi, had come to be manipulated by a small group of politicians that were leading Italy into financial ruin. Given these conditions it is not surprising, as S.E. Finer has noted, that by the beginning of the twentieth century

...the very assumptions on which the philosophies of reason and progress had been erected were under attack. From the 1890's onward, voices began to grate out certain things which if true, demonstrated that the seemingly solid and unshakeable foundations of the mid-century world outlook were so many deceptive quicksands, and the whole gigantic fabric, a vast and ponderous mistake. 62

It was within this general period of disillusionment that the intellectual movement known as "the revolt against reason" emerged.

Such intellectual movements as German neo-Idealism, neo-Kantianism, as well as phenomenology, all represented divergent attempts by social theorists at this time to come to terms with the subjective and irrational elements of human behavior. These theorists, unlike the Philosophes and the positivists, were not convinced that human behavior could be interpreted by methods of analysis equivalent to those used in the natural sciences. The French positivists who had attempted to legitimize the idea that human behavior was reducible to scientific laws, were fervently criticized by such German social theorists as Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber. This belief in scientific laws of social development was shared by many Marxists as well. The Marxists suggested that history was determined by the laws of dialectical and historical materialism. Similarly, the Marxists were rebuked by another group of theorists. These theorists maintained that the main factor to be considered by the social sciences was the existence of elite groups within all societies. At the
same time they were not convinced that human behavior could be reduced to the rationalistic interpretations of so-called scientific laws.

The leading elite theorists included Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim. These theorists were of divergent nationalities. Pareto and Mosca were Italian, Ortega Y Gasset was Spanish, while Michels and Mannheim were German. It has been suggested by G. Lukács, that both the question of political leadership and the recognition of the permanence of elites in society were outlined by those sociologists who had lived in countries which had not succeeded in establishing a genuine bourgeois democracy.

The elite theorists were opposed to the forms of democracy that had developed up until the beginning of the twentieth century. They nevertheless were not anti-liberal. All of these theorists were concerned with the problem of social organization and the best means to achieve it. They felt that the "mass" left to itself was directionless and unable to define its goals and purposes. At the same time they believed that human behavior was ruled by certain motivations that were irrational and which were based not on man's reasoning power, but rather on his instinctual nature.

The intention of the elite theorists was not to legitimate elite domination. Like many other intellectuals at this time, they were strong supporters of the liberal ideals of individualism and individual freedom. Yet, they realized that the existence of the mass, as the final product of social democracy, industrialization, and urbanization, was incongruous and in fact antithetical to the ideals of individualism. As it was argued, individuals were innately unequal in that each person had a
particular set of talents and capabilities. Only by recognizing this fact and by organizing society in light of it, as they were convinced, would it then be possible to fully develop the capacities and talents of the individual. They insisted that the absolute expression of individual freedom by everyone in society was an impossibility, as it would inevitably result in social chaos. For this reason, individual freedom was to be restricted to those "capable few". These persons, being in a position of authority, could express their own individual freedom for the benefit of the whole society. This elite would be responsible for guiding social development so as to ensure the realization of the freedom of individuals within the subject population.

The elite theorists expressed the view that equalitarianism and social homogeneity were incongruent with the liberal principles of freedom and individuality. The theory was presented, that it was only through the competition between individuals for the attainment of elite positions that human freedom and individuality in accordance with each individual's capacities could be developed. They insisted that equalitarianism, the ideal of both socialism and liberal democracy, relegated the superior individual to a life of mediocrity, conformity and unfulfilled talents. They were of the opinion that...

Democracy... does not automatically work for progress, nor does the great cause of freedom necessarily benefit from the equalitarian tendency... For both Mosca and Pareto, the criterion of a 'higher stage' of civilization was social differentiation and both authors praise aristocracy in this sense as a liberating and progressive force...64

Those critics who have emphasized the cynical or anti-liberal views of the elite theorists have in many respects misinterpreted their overall inten-
tions. The aim of these theorists was to provide a new orientation to the liberal ideals of individualism and individual freedom. At the same time they wished to give objective recognition to the subjective and irrational elements of human behavior. It was Pareto who first contributed a number of theoretical insights related to these and similar considerations.
4) **Pareto**

The term "elite" owes much of its popularity to the writings of Pareto, an Italian sociologist and political theorist. Pareto, at least in his later writings, was mainly concerned with the development and function of political and governing elites. Irving Zeitlin has indicated that Pareto directed his theories against many of the arguments that had been made by Marx, as well as against the ideals of Reason which had been formulated in the Enlightenment. Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, his most notable works included: *Cours d'économie politique* (1897); *Systemes socialistes* (1903); *Manuale di economia politica* (1906) and *Trattato di sociologie generale* (1916).

Pareto is recognized today for his contributions to mathematics, economics, as well as sociological theory. Talcott Parsons, in estimating the value of his sociological contributions, observed that...

It is of great significance that at the very beginning of his substantive treatment, Pareto explicitly includes the subjective point of view. Parsons refers to the fact that for this Italian social theorist, logical actions were those in which the objective and subjective aims of the individual coincide. Additionally, he insisted that the importance of Pareto's contributions may be measured by the insights which he provided into the "role of the value element in nonlogical action". His sociological contributions in this sense are believed to consist of his attempts to outline the nature of normative action from a non-reductionist standpoint.

The degree to which Pareto was in fact concerned with the nature of normative action and the extent to which his theories were non-reduc-
tionist, has been seriously questioned by a number of sociologists. Suzanne Keller has contended that one of the major shortcomings of his work was that "elements of human nature were used to account for social arrangements." William McDougall found that his notion of "residues" (which were defined as instinctual drives and as elementary factors of human nature) were empirically unfounded insofar as the word residue cannot be defined. It stands merely for a muddle in the mind of its author.

Sociologists, like Parsons, have denied both the existence and importance of Pareto's reductive assumptions about human nature. Other social theorists have maintained that empirically untenable reductionist conceptions about man's nature were central to all of his theories. Still other critics have expressed the opinion that his reductionist ideas were the most positive contributions of all his theoretical insights. Lawrence Henderson, in this respect, has stated that his theory of residues and derivations as aspects of human nature is essential for the study of any of the interactions of men, and that it is indispensable, until improved upon, in the study of all subjects of the first class.

We may understand from the extent and variety of these criticisms that the question of whether Pareto did in fact utilize reductionist assumptions about human nature in his theories remains highly controversial.

Equally as controversial is the question of Pareto's ideological orientation as it is reflected in his social theories. Talcott Parsons has insisted that his theories embodied the basic liberal ideals of individuality and individual freedom, at least in an aristocratic sense. Conversely, critics like Irving Zeitlin, have contended that the ideas and
Values expressed in his theories lend general support and legitimization to a totalitarian and fascist world-view. Zeitlin is convinced that Fascism for Pareto, seemed not only to confirm his theories but also to hold out hope for a "new era." Among sociologists today there exists no common ground of agreement about the contributions and implications of his writings. In light of this obvious confusion, the purpose of this section of the analysis will be to determine to what degree Pareto explicitly utilized assumptions about human nature. Also, the nature of the relationship between such assumptions and his consequent liberal beliefs in individualism and the role of elites will be considered.

Pareto's sociological insights and theories are contained in The Mind and Society - A Treatise on General Sociology. In this work, he declared the need to establish a logico-experimental method of analysis which would neither moralize, speculate nor reason beyond the objective facts available. Such a method would reject all a priori reasoning. He pointed out that social scientists...enjoy no such a priori enlightenment. We have no knowledge whatever of what must or ought to be. We are strictly looking for what is. 76

The objectivity of this logico-experimental method of analysis, as it was explained "starts with facts to work out theories, and we try at all times to stray from the facts as little as possible." 77 The task of social analysis in relation to this method was to discover theories which are able to "picture facts of experience and observation" in an objective and systematic manner.

In attempting to define the proper subject matter of sociology,
Pareto noted that human experience exists entirely at a subjective level and for this reason

...sentiments are among the most important elements with which sociology is called upon to deal.78

These sentiments warrant sociological consideration insofar as...

The sentiments or instincts that correspond to residues, along with those corresponding to appetites, interests, etc., are the main factors in determining the social equilibrium.79

It was within this context that he attempted to explain the importance of non-logical actions in the development of history. He indicated that human behavior is governed by a certain number of "residues" which consist of instincts and drives innate to the individual. These residues are arranged in specific classes and consist of:

Class I - Instinct for combination
Class II - Group persistences (persistence of aggregates)
Class III - Need of expressing sentiments by external acts
Class IV - Residues connected with sociality
Class V - Integrity of the individual
Class VI - The sex residue80

In direct conjunction with the idea of residues within Pareto's theory was the notion of derivations. By derivation was meant the rational explanation which people give to their own instinctively based actions, needs and motivations. He gave an example where

...we studied a large group of derivations that were designed to "explain" certain manners of dealing with storms: and we found they originated in the human hunger for logical developments, or developments considered logical (residue I).81

All social life, action and sentiments were viewed as being rooted in certain specific tendencies on the part of the individual. The typology of residues, as Pareto believed, would provide the basis for the objec-
tive and scientific interpretation of human behavior. He was convinced that man's behavior could only be understood at the subjective and individualistic level of experience.

Pareto's theory of residues as innate aspects of human nature was directly related to his theory of elites. He contended that individuals are "physically, morally, and intellectually different". For this reason the elite of society must consist of those people who have the abilities in those types of activities that are necessary for good government. The elite was divided into two parts consisting of a "governing elite", comprising individuals who have a place in government, and a non-governing elite, comprising the rest. Society was further divided into two basic strata: the non-elite and a higher stratum, the elite, which in turn was divided into a governing and non-governing section.

Pareto noted that the residues were not evenly distributed among the various strata of society. There was a predominance of Class I residues in the higher stratum and a significant quantity of Class II residues in the lower. On the basis of this assumption, it was argued that social change and the "circulation of elites" occur when the higher stratum, that is to say, the elite or aristocracy... decline in proportion of the residues which enabled them to win their power and hold it. The governing class is restored not only in numbers - but... in quality, by families rising from the lower classes and bringing with them the vigour and the proportions of residues necessary for keeping themselves in power.

Not only were Class I and II residues differentially distributed throughout the population of a society. It was also maintained that the residues of sociality (Class IV) and individualism (Class V) were likewise found
to be unequally allocated among a society's population.

Pareto believed that it was those individuals, characterized by the sentiment of individuality, who were ultimately responsible for social progress. Conversely, it was those who were socially-oriented, owing to the effect of the Class IV residue, who would ultimately ensure the continuation of social stability. As he elaborated

...if the requirement of uniformity (residue IV) were so strongly active in all individuals in a given society...such a society would have no internal cause for dissolution; but neither would it have any causes for change, whether in the direction of an increase or decrease, in the utility of the individuals or of society. On the other hand, if the requirement of uniformity were to fail, society would not hold together...societies that endure and change are therefore situated in some intermediate condition between these two extremes. 84

Pareto tried to resolve the essential contradictions between the liberal views of individualism and social integration. He argued that sociality and individualism were instincts which were differentially distributed in the population. These residues were said to counter-balance one another, ensuring that society remained both progressive and stable. It was felt that the solution of social problems were better left to those individuals who, because of their Class I residues, had the innate ability to deal with such problems in an effective and creative manner. 85

The theoretical intentions of Pareto were neither to legitimate fascism or totalitarianism. On the contrary, he wished to legitimize the fact that the basis of human behavior and motivation was rooted, not in some abstract natural law of progress but rather in the subjective experiences of the individual. It is obvious that he had little faith in the ideals of Reason. What he did believe in, however, was the liberal
ideal of the freedom of the individual to realize his own unique capacities and talents. The notions of residues and derivations constituted theoretical means by which he sought to demonstrate the importance of the unique, subjective and often irrational elements of human behavior. His theories dealing with the nature and role of elites in society exemplified the ideal of free competition between individuals for the attaining of elite positions. In this manner, persons were allocated a position in the social structure in terms of the particular residues that characterized their individual natures.

This idea about the circulation of elites was meant to demonstrate that a society could be flexible enough to allow for the constant upward mobility of those who have innate talents suitable to deal with a changing social situation. The theory of the circulation of the elite was a guarantee that competent individuals would replace those elite members who had lost the talents and capabilities necessary to lead. In no manner did he attempt to lend credibility to the idea that an elite should exist whose members were unsuited to deal effectively and creatively with the problems of a society. He added that individualism itself was an innate element of certain individual personalities. The whole progress of a society depended on the expression of such individualism by those who occupied elite positions.

Pareto's theories dealt with: the nature of human behavior; the role of elites and their circulation; as well as the dynamics of social progress. Together, these theories lent credibility to the liberal belief in the need for the individual to express and develop his particular talents and capabilities. Nevertheless, these liberal ideals were predicated on defi-
nate and determinate assumptions about human nature. His general definition of residues lacked empirical qualification. Also, his typology of residues required more extensive verification than he was able to provide. In most instances his method of empirical verification consisted of the citing of several historical incidences which were asserted to be, in themselves, convincing proof of the existence of the various instincts or residues which were defined. For example, in attempting to legitimize the instinct of combination, it was pointed out that...

No reader of Pliny's *Natural History* can fail to be struck by the vast numbers of combinations that have been tried for curing one disease or another. It would really seem as though every combination conceivable had been thought of.

By asserting that a particular classical work reflected the tendency of its author to make various combinations between different medicines, Pareto felt justified to argue that this tendency was in fact an instinct which characterized all individuals. From this example we may understand that he failed to adhere to the logical requirements of scientific argumentation. Nor did he recognize the necessity of providing verifiable empirical support for his theoretical contentions.

Pareto's theoretical attempts to demonstrate the importance of the subjective basis of human nature, as well as the unequal structuring of society, served as vehicles for the legitimization of the liberal ideals of individualism. The theories of the phenomenologists, neo-Kantians, Idealists and advocates of *Geisteswissenschaften* had already added an unique dimension to the liberal ideals of individuality, relative to the particular socio-economic situation of the various theorists involved. Pareto's theories dealing with residues and elites added yet another
dimension to these same ideals. It is in specific relation to these ideals that we may view his use of assumptions about human nature from a sociology of knowledge perspective.
5) **Mosca**

Pareto's writings, at least in their emphasis on the existence and function of elites in society, were complemented by the theories formulated by Gaetano Mosca. Like Pareto, Mosca was disillusioned with the failure of the principles of popular sovereignty and political representation in Italy during the latter half of the nineteenth century. At the same time he was critical of all forms of collectivist social organization, especially the type suggested by Marx. His entire theoretical output was intended as a refutation of Marx's classless society. Against the Marxist utopia, he posited his own theory which advocated the existence and necessity of a ruling class. 87 This belief in the inevitable development of an elite in society was not indicative of the rejection of liberalism. On the contrary, his criticisms of democracy reflected his disbelief not in the democratic ideal but in the fact that democracy as it had developed in Italy

...had lost sight of the need for those virtues which (he) believed, had been the greatness of nineteenth century liberalism. 88

Mosca's basic views and theories on elites are contained in his well-known work, *The Ruling Class* (1923).

In his theory of elites, Mosca emphasized the idea of an "open" ruling class. It was argued that the appropriateness of a ruling class to retain political power could be evaluated by the degree of juridical defense which was provided to the individual citizen. 89 Both of these ideas testify to his commitment to the belief that a society must necessarily provide the individual with opportunities for personal development as well as political justice through an adequate juridical system.
In addition, he contended that...

A high grade of juridical defense depends also... upon a sufficient division of wealth to allow of the existence in fairly large numbers of people of moderate means...90

The establishment of a strong middle class which had sufficient access to educational opportunities was suggested. This would ensure the discovery and utilization of the resources of talent which, quite independently of race are forever developing in the human masses at large.

It is obvious from Mosca's views on the juridical and educational systems and their functions in society, that he was deeply committed to the democratic ideal.

Mario Delle Piane, in reviewing Mosca's writings has observed that Mosca's theories...

ultimately led to a liberal position, mainly via the conception of juridical defense but also via the acknowledgement of the value of an "open" ruling class Mosca's formulation of a liberal position... (was) reached...primarily by theoretical reasoning.92

The question of the relationship between his theory of elites and his liberal world-view is an important one. Equally as significant, from a sociology of knowledge perspective is the nature of the connection between his liberal ideals, theory of elites, as well as his use of assumptions about the nature of human nature.

With regard to Mosca's assumptions about human nature, James Meisel for example has argued that...

What Mosca calls the political formula - the ideology by which the rulers justify their governance - not only "must respond to a true need of human nature"...In its institutionalized form it becomes "juridical defense".93
Meisel suggests that Mosca relied at least to some extent on assumptions about human nature to support his theories of juridical defense. Arthur Livingston has noted that this elite theorist, in dealing with the problems of political organization, had to take account of many of the facts which were basic to Pareto's own theoretical structure, inclusive of assumptions about man's nature.94 The possible interrelationship which may exist between Mosca's assumptions about human nature, his liberal views and his theory of elites will constitute the focal point of analysis for this section of our discussion.

Mosca critically reacted to the ideals of Reason and the natural laws of social development maintained by the Positivists and Marxists alike. He argued that social phenomena and human behavior must be analyzed in a subjective context. In the introductory portion of The Ruling Class, it was asserted that social phenomena are the products of the "constant psychological tendencies" of human nature.95 Moreover, the theories of environmental or racial determinism were rejected as a means to explain the nature of human political organization. Evolutionary theory as a method of explaining human political behavior was also criticized.96 He felt that Darwin's idea of the struggle for existence had

... been confused with the struggle for preeminence, which is really a constant phenomenon that arises in all human societies...97

It was this basic psychological law of the struggle of men for preeminence that always resulted in the victory of the organized minority over the unorganized majority. The eternal existence of elites as an "organized minority" was due to the fact that men under all conditions
will struggle for preeminence. However, only a select few who are capable, will achieve it. This struggle for preeminence between individuals

...is focused upon higher position, wealth, authority, control of the means and instruments that enable a person to direct human activities. Mosca's theory about human nature in relation to the idea of man's need for preeminence is complementary to the liberal laissez-faire view of individualism and the free competition between individuals for access to power and wealth.

Mosca was willing to admit to the inevitable existence of elites in all human societies. This did not mean that he lent support to the idea of political domination by an elite. In order that a "political formula" or set of laws suggested by an elite, would be adhered to by the subject population it must,

...answer a real need in man's social nature; and this need, so universally felt, of governing and knowing that one is governed not on the basis of mere material or intellectual force, but on the basis of a moral principle has beyond any doubt a practical and a real importance.

The process of government in Mosca's opinion was a dynamic and reciprocal affair. The elite, while maintaining control over the population must nevertheless recognize and satisfy through the appropriate legislation, certain basic needs of human nature as they are experienced by the citizens at large.

In this sense, Mosca did not try to defend the right of an elite to rule society simply on the basis of its ability to monopolize the power of the state. As it was pointed out, when an hereditary caste becomes established in a country and comes to monopolize political power, we may be sure that such a status de jure was preceded by a similar status de
More simply, because a member of the ruling class is exposed at an early age to hearing about and dealing with political affairs, he will as a consequence, be more competent to hold office than someone who is merely elected by means of broad-based suffrage. In this sense "there is no eliminating that special advantage in favor of certain individuals which the French call the advantage of positions deja prises".

Mosca believed that the ideal ruling class, in order to meet the changing needs of a society and its citizens should be characterized by its openness to members of the lower classes. By remaining open to individuals in the lower classes, the elite would be able to gain new life and inspiration.

A ruling class is the more prone to fall into errors of this kind the more closed it is, actually if not legally to elements rising from the lower classes. In the lower classes the hard necessities of life...keep the primordial instincts of struggle and the unfailing ruggedness of human nature alive.

In outlining the necessity of maintaining an open elite, at least some degree of legitimation was given to the liberal ideal of individuality. In order for members of the lower classes to enter into elite positions, they would have to freely compete with one another in demonstrating their individual capacities for leadership. The ability of a member of the lower class to attain an elite position would be based on his unique abilities for leadership as compared with everyone else. The achievement of an elite position by the exemplary individual would provide him with the added opportunity for the complete realization of his unique talents and capacities. Mosca's theory about the possibility of members of the lower classes gaining access to the elite was predicated on an assumption
about "man's primordial instinct for struggle". This instinct was said to be related to man's need for preeminence. These instincts as they are referred to within Mosca's theory, constitute elementary features of human nature. They were also defined as essential means by which the individualistic nature of man may be expressed and realized. It is in relation to this point that we may begin to understand the degree to which Mosca's assumptions about human nature lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

The abuse of power by an elite or by individuals struggling to attain political control of a society according to Mosca, is prevented by the fact that man's nature is characterized by the altruistic instinct. More specifically,

...the natural propensity of human beings, to satisfy their appetites and impulses, to command and to enjoy is curbed by a natural compassion...103

Those who were more successful in life and who were able to gain a position in the elite were described as individuals who not only had a strong desire for preeminence but also a strong instinct for altruism. The altruistic tendencies of the elite ensures that the impulsive and selfish desires of the subject population are kept in check. Through its control of social organization, the elite

...provides for the reciprocal restraint of human individuals by one another and so makes them better, not by destroying their wicked instincts but by accustoming them to controlling their wicked instincts.104

Man, despite his selfishness and vanity, "rarely fails to keep two great aspirations before his eyes, two sentiments that enoble, uplift and purify him. He seeks the truth, he loves justice".105 The political success of
any ruling class is dependent on its ability to address itself to, and satisfy the sentiments of truth and justice which "are most widely diffused and most firmly rooted in the public". Mosca's theory of the ruling class did not constitute a legitimation of the right of the elite to dominate society. On the contrary, it emphasized the responsibility of the elite to provide for the realization of certain innate needs, subjectively experienced by individuals in the lower classes.

Mosca was of the opinion that any type of political organization without an elite is doomed to failure. Failure was the inevitable fate of socialism. Political control, as it was asserted, has always been exercised by a ruling class insofar as the very existence of an elite is governed by certain innate needs of human nature. Human nature, as he argued, guarantees the denial of the effective realization of socialist principles. It is the small, moral and intellectual aristocracy which keeps humanity from rolling in the "slough of selfishness and material appetites". The "open" ruling class permits the realization of the innate needs of the individual in both the lower and upper classes. Also, it provides for the free competition between individuals in the expression of their individual talents and desire for preeminence.

The liberal ideal of individualism constitutes the belief in the freedom of the individual to develop his character and nature to the fullest extent through competition with others. According to Mosca, the existence of a ruling class, as he defined it, is the most effective means of achieving and protecting such an ideal. From a sociology of knowledge point of view, it is quite apparent that his theory of the ruling class and the assumptions about human nature particular to it, served as a
vehicle for the objectification, manifestation and legitimation of the liberal ideals of individualism. His primary theoretical intentions were to outline the necessary requirements as well as the positive consequences of creative leadership.

Mosca, like Pareto in some respects, failed to provide any extensive empirical validation of the assumptions about human nature which he made. His argument about the existence of the altruistic instincts in man was based on the assertion that...

For our purposes here, it is sufficient to assume that they are innate in man and necessary for social living.\textsuperscript{109}

His theories were also similar to those of Pareto in other respects. Probably the most conspicuous similarity between the analysis of elites outlined by these two theorists is revealed in the extent to which Mosca's idea about the "continual renewal of the ruling class" by the incorporation of members of the lower classes, was complementary to Pareto's theory of "the circulation of elite".\textsuperscript{110} For Pareto and Mosca, the liberal ideals of individualism were embodied in the ruling class, the existence of which was predicated on specific assumptions about the nature of human nature. Together their assumptions about men lend themselves extensively to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.
6) Michels

Criticisms of Marx's theories, especially in regard to their collectivistic and equalitarian aspects, were not restricted to the writings of Pareto and Mosca. Another popular European social theorist who took a firm stand against the various ideals expressed in the Marxist doctrine was Robert Michels. As a former member of the German Social Democratic Party, Michels had a theoretical as well as a practical understanding of what he believed to be the essential shortcomings of socialist collectivism. His personal relationship with Max Weber also contributed to his disillusionment with the goals and programs of Marxism generally, the Social Democratic political program specifically. As Juan Linz has elaborated...

The contrast between the revolutionary statements that were made by the Social Democratic party...and August Bebel...and the cautious policy they actually pursued was brought home to him by the failure of the Ruhr strike in 1905. 111

His major objection to Marx's theory of collectivism was that he felt Marx had never considered the possibility that new social distinctions and a new ruling class might emerge once the communist society had been established. These social distinctions would have their origin, according to Michels, in the differences of power and prestige that would exist between party and non-party members. 112

The general question, which is of direct relevance to this study as a whole is whether Michels, like Pareto and Mosca, utilized assumptions about the nature of human nature to justify: his criticisms of Marxist collectivism; his theory of elites and his belief in the liberal ideals of individualism. It is the above set of related questions which this study
shall specifically analyze. In this manner it will be possible to gain a clearer insight as to the extent to which all of the elite theories, inclusive of those formulated by Michels may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

Michels' major works included: Political Parties (1911) and First Lectures In Political Sociology (1922). In both these works Michels attempted to outline and justify the reasons for his scepticism of the socialist world-view.

Michels had less confidence in the majority...he drew rather gloomy conclusions from his analysis of mass political parties. Inevitably he warned that delegation of responsibility to selected leaders will lead to self-perpetuating elites and to despotism. He believed that the development of an elite was inevitable. Nevertheless he did not abandon the belief in the liberal ideals of individual freedom. By revealing the reasons why elites often become anti-democratic, he thought he could contribute to ensuring that such anti-democratic trends could be prevented in the future. As he described...

It is in fact, a general characteristic of democracy, to stimulate and to strengthen in the individual the additional aptitudes for criticism and control...Nothing but a scientific and frank examination of the oligarchic tendencies of democracy will enable us to minimize these dangers, even though they can never be entirely avoided.

Through endeavoring to provide theoretical insights into the oligarchic tendencies of human social organization, Michels felt confident that he was in some respects contributing to the protection of the liberal ideals of democracy and individual freedom.

His emphasis on the emergence of an oligarchy in any type of social organization was a reflection of his opinion of the mass. In Michels'
view, the mass was unable to generate any type of organization on its own. It was incapable of looking after its own interests as a whole and the interests of its individual members. The very apolitical nature of the mass ensured that the freedom and interests of the isolated person who existed within its midst would not be represented or protected. As it was stated in *Political Parties*:

In the mass, and even in the organized mass of the labor parties there is an immense need for direction and guidance. This need is accompanied by a genuine cult for the leaders, who are regarded as heroes.115

It was only through the leadership of an elite that the individual would realize the ultimate relationship between his own individual welfare and the welfare of the collectivity of which he was a member. Again in this context, Michels demonstrated his concern with the protection and extension of individual freedom as it was realized through an elite.

There exists today extensive disagreement among social theorists as to the empirical credibility of Michels' theories of elites and his "iron law of oligarchy" as outlined in *Political Parties*. James Burnham has argued that Michels, in analyzing the oligarchic tendencies in social organizations did not resort to the use of abstract "first principles" or empirically unjustified speculations. Rather, he based his theories on observable facts.116 Burnham is convinced that his theories are devoid of a priori assumptions of any sort. Completely opposite to these opinions are those expressed by Irving Zeitlin. Zeitlin adamantly maintains that...

Like Pareto and Mosca before him, Michels rested his general argument as to the inevitability of oligarchy on a conception of human nature precisely the opposite of that held by Marx.117
In Zeitlin's opinion, the idea that democracy requires organization which in turn leads necessarily to oligarchy, was founded upon the assumption that it is man's inherent nature to crave power and perpetuate it once it is attained. In light of these divergent interpretations of the empirical credibility of Michels' theories, the problem of estimating the degree to which he made determinate use of such assumptions takes on considerable importance.

Michels, in describing the tendencies which oppose the realization of democracy, noted that these tendencies in general were related to the nature of:

1. social organization
2. political struggle
3. the human individual

Together, these factors as he understood them were responsible for the "iron law of oligarchy". This law states that all forms of social organization including democracy, inevitably lead to oligarchy. In that this law is said to be an elementary feature of all human aggregates, it is as a result, believed to be beyond good and evil.

Michels indicated that the "iron law of oligarchy" was rooted, at least in one respect, in the nature of human nature. The tendency of a small group of individuals, as a political oligarchy, to monopolize power is related to the

innate tendency of man, as soon as he has attained a certain degree of economic well being to transmit his possessions to his son... The same tendency pervades in politics where it is kept active by all the peculiar and inherent instincts of mankind.

It is obvious that from the very inception of his analysis, he purposely attributed the oligarchic features of social and political organizations
to the workings of certain innate features of human nature. He provided little empirical proof as to the existence of man's instinct to transmit his possessions to his son. It was merely asserted that this feature of human nature has always been "strongly manifest throughout historic time".

The political representation of the mass by the elite, as Michels pointed out, is based in many respects on the personal self-interests of the elite. We may understand individualism as the promotion of one's personal interests over all other considerations. From this perspective, the existence of an elite which attempts to look after its own welfare is the very embodiment of such an ideal. For this reason, it was declared that...

To represent in this sense, comes to mean that the purely individual desire masquerades and is accepted as the will of the mass. 120

Nevertheless, the ethic of individualism which such a ruling group represents is a determinately limited one. The existence of any oligarchy is based on more than its desire to secure its own self-interests. Its existence is also indicative of another set of conditions - the willingness of the mass to submit to directives of a ruling class and

...the gratitude felt by the crowd who speak and write on their behalf. 121

The elite in this sense must ultimately provide for the realization of the rights and freedom of the individual because of the masses' own inherent indifference and apolitical nature. 122 The lack of concern by the members of the mass for their own individual rights and freedom is compensated for by their veneration and adoration of the individuality, prowess and talents displayed by the members of the ruling group. As Michels
where the individuality of the leader is truly exceptional...the latent fervor is conspicuously manifested with the fervor of an acute paroxysm.123

The real nature of this "cult of veneration" was believed to consist of an "atavistic survival of primitive psychology".124

Michels attributed the existence of the ruling elite as

...having as its counterpart in the leaders' natural greed for power. Thus the development of the democratic oligarchy is accelerated by the general characteristics of human nature.125

Similar in many respects to Mosca, he attempted to legitimize the liberal laissez-faire ideal of individual competition and struggle for power. Like Pareto, he related this individualistic ideal to the nature of human nature.

The desire to dominate, for good or for evil is universal...We see from this that every human power seeks to enlarge its perogatives.126

As it was added, this instinct to dominate and to compete for individual power was complemented by the "desire" of men who have attained leadership "for the gradual establishment of their own sovereignty at the expense of popular sovereignty".127 The struggle for power and the winning of public recognition was said to be the foundation of all forms of human social and political organization.

For Michels, the very existence of elites in human society was rooted in man's own instinctual needs. It was for this reason that he contended that "leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of social life".128 He endeavored to explain why man's need to gain power over other men was felt more strongly by some individuals as compared with others. In this
context it was maintained that most leaders are "older" than the general mass of followers. Extreme old age or the erotic concerns of the young were supposed to contribute to their political apathy.\textsuperscript{129} Political apathy was defined in this fashion as being the product of the organic and biological process of aging, which was responsible for mediating some men's desire for individual power.

An inherent element of Michels' theories is the belief that the ideal of individuality is embodied in the existence of a ruling group. According to this argument, the individual uniqueness of the leader plays a large part in determining his charismatic qualities. Charismatic legitimacy is based on...

> the spontaneous and voluntary submission of the masses to the rule of persons endowed with extraordinary congenital qualities...\textsuperscript{130}

Charisma was believed to be the irrational bond between the mass and the oligarchy.

Michels' liberal world-view is a curious one. At first appearance, his theories and, for that matter, those of the other elite theorists all have the characteristic of comprising the most "illiberal" doctrine that one might well imagine. Nevertheless, relative to their particular interpretation of human nature and their characterization of the mass, all of these theorists were sincerely concerned with the problems of individual freedom equal to that shown by such libertarians as the Philosophes. The essential difference between the libertarian ideals of the Philosophes and those ideals expressed by Pareto, Mosca and Michels is that the ideal of individualism as it was defined by these elite theorists was restricted to a particular class of persons. In turn, the elite was understood as
being responsible for directing the realization of individual freedom for the rest of the population.

Michels believed that the ideals of individual freedom and equality were not necessarily compatible with one another. In reaction to a number of historical events, including what he felt to be the failure of the Social Democratic movement in Germany, he disregarded the liberal ideal of equality. Instead, within the context of his theories he sought to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideal of individual freedom. Similar to Pareto and Mosca, he was convinced that significant aspects of socio-political phenomena could only be understood in terms of the nature of human nature which, in turn, reflected the basic characteristics of human social organization. His emphasis on the subjective and irrational features of human behavior as related to his use of assumptions about human nature is parallel in many respects to the orientations towards human behavior taken by the phenomenologists, neo-Kantians, neo-Idealists and advocates of Geisteswissenschaften. In general, Michels made determinate use of assumptions about human nature to legitimize his theories dealing with the iron law of oligarchy, the cult of veneration, the desire to dominate and gain power and charismatic legitimacy. These assumptions about man's nature served as vehicles for the exemplification of the liberal ideals of individualism which constitutes a particular variation of liberalism as a world-view. In this sense these assumptions may be effectively interpreted from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis.
7) The Mass - Ortega Y Gasset and Karl Mannheim

The elite theories of Pareto, Mosca and Michels represent only one dimension of the divergent orientations which social theorists took towards analyzing the significance of elites in human societies and criticizing the Marxist theories of collectivism. Conversely, a number of elite theories were also developed by Ortega Y Gasset and Karl Mannheim. Their theories were formulated in reaction to what was believed to be "the crisis of culture" in liberal-democratic society. These theorists were concerned with a phenomenon unique to modern democratic industrial society - the emergence of "the mass man". The mass man as they explained, was the individual who supported the ideals of equalitarianism over and above all other considerations. Leon Branson has described that Ortega Y Gasset's and Mannheim's views on elites were developed...

...in conjunction with their preference for a Standesgesellschaft, a hierarchically organized social order, the ideal for which is often sought in medieval models, or in the extremely rationalized version of the modern division of labor. The rise of the masses signals the breakdown between the different ranks of society and results in cultural and political decline and degeneration.131

The decline of the cultural and political spheres had, in the opinion of these theorists, a political source.

Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim attributed the cultural disintegration of modern liberal-democratic society to the decline and modification of the cultural elites as well as other socially-functional elite groups in society. Mannheim indicated that...

The crisis of culture in liberal democratic society is due in the first place to the fact that the social processes, which previously favoured the development of the creative elites, now have the opposite effects and
have become obstacles to the forming of elites because wider sections of the population still under unfavorable social conditions take an active part in cultural activities. Bottomore argued that the ideas of both these elite theorists were based on the belief that "the advancement of civilization has depended and will always depend, upon the activities of small minorities and exceptionally gifted people". Complementary to this point of view was Mannheim's idea that the inevitable result of the decline of cultural elites through the democratization of culture was the emergence of fascist and communist dictatorships. According to these theorists, without the Standesgesellschaft, the maintenance of civilization and culture as a consequence was impossible.

José Ortega Y Gasset was Spain's leading philosopher of the twentieth century. Among all of his writings dealing with the nature of philosophy, love, individualization and the universe, his work The Revolt of the Masses (1930) provides the most explicit statement as to his opinions on role and functions of elites. Karl Mannheim, on the other hand, is usually noted for his contributions to the sociology of knowledge. However, his work Man and Society In An Age of Reconstruction (1935) is representative of a major shift in his later intellectual development. It was a shift towards a concern with the problems of social disintegration in modern mass society and its relation to elite structures.

A number of critics have contended that both these theorists were pre-occupied with the question of the freedom of the individual. In reference to Ortega Y Gasset's ideological orientation, Howard B. Wescott has noted that his theories were founded on the belief that...
Life is the dynamic interchange between the individual and his surroundings, and his surroundings include his own emotional and intellectual responses to life's problems. Thus knowledge for Ortega, is knowledge how to act, knowledge of what to hold on to, and pay attention to, in the face of life’s demands. It is argued that Ortega Y Gasset's philosophy was centrally focused on the problem of defining the nature of the human individual. The purpose of his social theory was to provide knowledge to aid the individual in realizing his freedom and in developing himself to the fullest extent possible in his interaction with the environment. Essentially, Ortega Y Gasset perceived all forms of social organization as being finally reducible to "Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia" - I am I and my surroundings.

Mannheim was likewise concerned with analyzing the relationship between individual freedom and the general social and cultural processes that were developing within liberal-democratic society. He felt that the highest form of individual freedom could be achieved by democratic planning, initiated by an elite. Mannheim stated...

At the stage we have just reached, it seems to be a greater slavery to be able to do as we like in an unjust or badly organized society, than to accept the claims of planning in a healthy society which we ourselves have chosen. The realization that...democratic planning does not involve the surrender of our freedom is the mainspring of those arguments which show that a capitalist society is not the basis of the highest form of liberty.

It is obvious that both these theorists were concerned with the question of individual freedom. At the same time what is not obvious is how their theories of elites were related to this particular question. Nor is it entirely clear from a sociology of knowledge perspective, to what extent their theories which defined both the nature of the elite and mass were empirically credible. By reviewing in detail Ortega Y Gasset’s The Revolt...
of the Masses and Mannheim's *Man and Society*, it will be possible to determine to what degree they, like other elite theorists, utilized explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature to justify the liberal ideals of individualism as related to their views on elites and the mass.

Ortega Y Gasset, in the introduction to *The Revolt of the Masses*, emphasized that the relationship between the masses and their social situation was not merely based on political criteria. "Intellectual, moral, economic (and) religious" factors as well as the "collective habits...both of dress and amusement" were equally as important. It was asserted that the nature of the mass must be interpreted in terms of objective as well as subjective data. His emphasis on the subjective elements of behavior bears a general similarity to the theories of Pareto, Mosca, and Michels. He defined the masses as

...the assemblage of persons not specially qualified.

By masses, then, is not to be understood, solely or mainly, the "working masses". The mass is the average man...not undifferentiated from other men.

The mass, in this argument, was contrasted with the "minority", which comprises a specially qualified group of people. Society was defined as consisting of the dynamic unity of minorities and masses. Normally, only minorities exercised control in cultural, political and economic affairs, owing to their special abilities. At the same time, the masses

...asserted no right to intervene in (such activities); they realized that if they wished to...they would necessarily have to acquire those special qualities and cease being mere mass. They recognized their place in a healthy dynamic society.

For this reason, it was asserted that human society, if it is to be progressive, must allow for the existence of an aristocracy. The functions of culture, economy and social organization would in this fashion be
left to the control of those with special abilities.\textsuperscript{140} In relation to justifying the need for elites, Ortega Y Gasset cautioned that the major danger facing modern society was the "revolt of the masses". This revolt consisted of the increasing encroachment of the mass into those areas of social management, formally monopolized by the minorities.

Ortega Y Gasset, in outlining the elementary dynamics of history, commented that

...the reality of history lies in biological power, in pure vitality, in what there is in man of cosmic energy, not identical with, but related to, the energy which regulates the sea, fecundates the beast, causes the tree to flower and the star to shine.\textsuperscript{141}

The innate biological vitality embodied in the human individual was defined as the very basis for historical development and progress. However, at the present period in history, this innate biological vitality is suppressed by the decadence of society and the flight of the individual from his own personal fears and insecurities. According to this theory, the advancements of liberal-democracy and technology have motivated the mass to become overly content and complacent about their life situation and personal well-being.\textsuperscript{142} As a result, the "mass-man" true to his nature, was unwilling to recognize all forms of authority except his own. Conversely, the "excellent man", who usually is a member of the minority is neither content with himself or his own existence and

...is urged, by necessity, to appeal from himself to some standard beyond himself, superior to himself, whose service he freely accepts.\textsuperscript{143}

Ortega Y Gasset explicitly assumed that the excellent man is by nature driven by an inner need to go beyond and transcend his own self-interests.

It is the tragedy of modern civilization, as Ortega Y Gasset pointed
out, that the "excellent man" is becoming more and more rare, owing to the growing control by the mass of government; the economy and culture. The excellent man is denied credibility by the mass because he does not live up to the ideals of equalitarianism. His unique and individualistic abilities represent the total negation of such ideals. It is the mass which reduces everyone to the equalitarian standard. For this reason, the mass ensures that the realization of the liberal ideals of individualism is denied. More specifically

...a homogeneous mass weighs on public authority and crushes down, annihilates every opposing group. The mass does not wish to share life with those who are not of it. It has already hatred of all that is not itself. 144

The mass man, as Ortega Y Gasset argued, is against anyone who is unique or otherwise stands apart from the equalitarianism of the mass. He added that a social condition where the mass man was allowed to control public opinion was contradictory to the true nature of human life as characteristic of man as a species.

The form most contradictory to human life that can appear among the human species is the "self-satisfied man." 145

Similarly, he indicated that an essential aspect of human nature is the dedication of the individual to a cause whereby he can realize his own individual nature and personal talents and capacities. "Human life by its very nature has to be dedicated to something." 146

For Ortega Y Gasset, the concern of the individual with only his own interests is not synonymous with individual freedom or liberty. Rather, it is reflective of cultural decadence and personal selfishness - features of general social degeneration. This ideal of individual freedom and
creativity was said to imply a regime of strict mental health, of high conduct, which keep active the consciousness of man's dignity. A creative life is energetic life, and this is only possible in one or other of these two situations: either being the one who rules, or finding oneself placed in a world which is ruled by someone in whom we recognize full right to such a function...I do not mean mere submission...but on the contrary, respect for the ruler and acceptance of his leadership, solidarity with him.147

Like the other elite theorists, Ortega Y Gasset had no intentions of legitimizing elite domination. On the contrary, he felt that it was only through allowing an elite to exist (composed of "excellent men") that individuals in the mass would gain a degree of freedom and cultural creativity, unprecedented in their homogeneous situation at present.

Ortega Y Gasset believed that the existence of a definite leadership in society was necessitated by the nature of human nature. The leadership was urged on by the innate biological principle of vitality and the inner necessity of proving themselves. The elite was understood for this reason as being the very embodiment of the ideal of individuality. It was the complacency and egoism of the mass which he thought to be the antithesis of man's human nature. In the midst of such complacency, man's nature as an individual, in his need to be dedicated to something larger than himself, remained undeveloped and unfulfilled. Ortega Y Gasset's criticisms of the mass and his advocacy of an elite was predicated on his belief in the need for the full development of the individual according to his nature. The elite represented in this context, the objective embodiment of this ideal. It also provided the opportunity for those driven by "inner necessity", to demonstrate their dedication to the elite or, if
competent, to join its ranks.

It is clear from this overview of Ortega Y Gasset's theories dealing with elites that he made extensive use of assumptions about human nature to justify his belief in the liberal ideals of individualism. From this perspective we may understand that his use of assumptions about human nature conforms to a sociology of knowledge interpretive framework of analysis. The question remains to what extent a similar analytical framework may be applied to those assumptions about the nature of man formulated by Karl Mannheim.

Mannheim, like Ortega Y Gasset, was disillusioned with the nature of mass society. His major work, *Man and Society In An Age of Reconstruction*, was an attempt to outline the reasons for this disillusionment. Its purpose was also to indicate what he considered to be the possible solutions to this situation. He was convinced that "laissez-faire in the old sense would no longer work" and "that at the present stage of industrial society, planning in some form or other was inevitable." Social planning did not mean the restriction of individual liberties. Rather, it implied the discovery and implementation of social controls which would determine how far individual liberties should be left unrestricted in order to preserve both the freedom of the individual and the efficiency of the community. Mannheim faced a dilemma which most liberal theorists have had to deal with since the Enlightenment. The problem consisted of the definition of the most efficient means which would provide for the maximization of individual freedom, as well as ensuring social integration. The possibility that Mannheim utilized assumptions about human nature to resolve this
dilemma will be given careful attention in this section of our analysis.

In attempting to outline a method which would ensure the objective analysis of contemporary social problems, Mannheim emphasized the need of integrating sociological analysis with psychological insights. It was asserted that...

Today it is impossible to make a systematic and historical study of religion, art, or law, without considering their social implications, or to investigate the history of psychology and the inner life without relating the reactions of the individual psyche in its dealings with its fellows to the social situation as a whole. 150

Like all the other elite theorists, he placed a great deal of emphasis on the subjective aspects of human behavior. This concern with the subjective elements of human motivation is illustrated in his definitions of the problem facing modern liberal-democratic society. He observed that...

As a large scale industrial society, it creates a whole series of actions which are rationally calculable and which depend on a whole series of repressions and renunciations of impulsive satisfactions. 151

At the same time, it was indicated that...

As mass society, on the other hand all the irrationalities and emotional outbreaks are characteristic of amorphous human agglomerations...an accumulation of unsublimated psychic energies which, at every moment threaten to smash the subtle machinery of social life. 152

Mannheim assumed that within human nature there are certain impulses which are facilitated in their development through the individual living in a mass situation.

As Mannheim believed, "Life among the masses of a large town tend to make people much more subject to suggestions, uncontrolled outbursts of
impulses and psychic regressions". \(^{153}\) Those impulses which are characteristic of the behavior of an individual who has lived in a socially unintegrated situation are

...set free by the disintegration of society and are seeking integration about a new object... \(^{154}\)

It is clearly evident that he explicitly assumed that an essential element of human nature consists of "impulses" and psychic regressions which are in themselves rooted in the need of the individual for social integration. The releasing of such impulses by individuals in the population is indicative of the emergence of mass society. They are likewise, a testimony to the failure of the traditional elite to provide some degree of social integration. In relation to this theory, the breakdown of elites was due to the operation of at least four factors:

1. the growing number of elite groups and their consequent determination of power
2. the destruction of the exclusiveness of the elite groups
3. the change in the principle of selection of these elites
4. the change in the internal composition of the elites. \(^{155}\)

Owing to the breakdown of the elite structure in modern mass society, the liberal method of mass democracy would be unable to reach the stage where it could produce "the organic articulation" (Gliederung) which a complex society required.

In explaining the nature of the impulses to which members of mass society fall victim, Mannheim noted that the individual in a socially unstable situation experiences "a regression to an earlier stage of behavior". \(^{156}\) The general effect of social and cultural dissolution was to increase the degree of social insecurity as experienced by the individual in the mass. Further, the implications of social dissolution
lies not merely in the disappearance of external opportunities for work but also in the fact that (the individual's) elaborate emotional system, intricately connected as it is with the smooth workings of social institutions, now loses its object-fixation.\textsuperscript{157}

Mannheim assumed that there are certain emotional tendencies within human nature that are directly related to the individual's need to work, as well as his need to live in a situation characterized by at least some degree of integration. He explained that the result of depriving the individual of the realization of these needs, was that he tends to seek satisfaction in substitute goals which are often only symbolic in nature. It is the manipulation of such symbolic substitute goals by a dominant elite which provides the necessary groundwork for the development of totalitarianism.\textsuperscript{158}

Mannheim outlined a solution as to how these psychic regressions and impulses might be re-integrated into society. His solution was a simple one, consisting of the suggestion of a definite program of planning. The overall intentions of this program were indicative of his belief in the liberal ideals of individual freedom. The goals of social planning were to give the individual in the mass a point of view which would enable him to see

...his place within the larger historical situation, and this in turn in its place in the field of forces at work in the total science process. In this way he can at least perceive the connection between his own actions and the collective actions...The individual discovers...in his own conduct, those aspects of dependence on the larger context...which in the liberal order were so hidden...\textsuperscript{159}

The goal of social planning in a democratic order was to maximize the freedom and individuality of each member of society and to guarantee the integration of society as a whole. Within the context of such social planning
Mannheim asserted that the need for social planning reflected a basic propensity of human nature which was "the desire of the human mind to control, not merely its environment but also, through the latter, itself."

The specific individuals who were to be responsible for the direction of social planning would be members of a small democratically elected group. They would be members of an elite whose right to govern and lead, was agreed upon in a democratic and collective fashion. In this respect Mannheim stated that...

From now on men will find a higher form of freedom in allowing many aspects of their individual lives to be determined by the social order laid down by the group, provided that it is an order that they themselves have chosen.

In the final analysis, this elite would consist of a democratically selected planning committee which was capable of working out the optimum balance between centralized authority and the delegation of power to local agencies. The individual was intended to apply his individual skills and knowledge within small local planning groups. As a consequence, the individual through his contributions to the group would also contribute to the full development of his own personality. As it was perceived...

The middle classes...supplemented by free lancing groups of intellectual elites and skilled groups of expert planners, (would be) the spearheads of the transition towards the new society.

Mannheim's theory of an elite, as related to his ideas about social planning, constituted a means by which the democratic ideal of government and the liberal ideal of individual freedom could be realized.
Both Mannheim and Ortega Y Gasset maintained the view that social
and cultural progress were entirely dependent on the existence of a ruling
group. Their evaluation of mass society was a pessimistic one. They
interpreted the emergence of the mass man as the primary contributory
factor to the denial of the realization of the ideal of individual free-
dom. The emergence of the mass would result in only one consequence -
the manipulation of the mass by a dominant and totalitarian elite. Their
own theory of elites was suggested as a means to prevent such a possibil-
ity occurring, in the hopes of preserving the democratic freedoms of the
individual within mass society. The justification for establishing an
elite rested, in both cases, on determinate assumptions about human nature.

Ortega Y Gasset's explicit use of assumptions about man's innate
characteristic of vitality and his need to be dedicated to a cause, served
as a means to exemplify the liberal ideals of individualism, as those
ideals were symbolized by the existence of an elite. Similarly, Mannheim
utilized assumptions about human nature in his discussions about the
regressive and impulsive qualities of the mass. In dealing with the
question of the empirical credibility of Mannheim's assumptions about
human nature, Leon Bramson has pointed out that...

The entire discussion in Mannheim is marked by a
free transferring of concepts from psychology into
the sociological sphere, and abounds with psychological
analogies which are suggestive but quite confusing.\textsuperscript{164}

Bramson has indicated that Mannheim provided little empirical justifica-
tion for his psychological oriented assumptions about the nature of human
nature. His notions about "unsubliminated psychic energies" and "im-
pulses" seeking integration, remained vaguely defined and empirically
unsubstantiated. Mannheim, like Ortega Y Gasset, paid only a general 'lip-service' to fulfilling the necessary requirements for the presentation of an objective scientific discussion. The assumptions about human nature formulated by both these theorists conform, in short, to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

Mannheim's primary concern was not to achieve an objective level of social analysis. On the contrary, his major intention was to demonstrate the necessity of instituting social planning directed by an elite, as an effective measure to preserve the freedom and rights of the individual living in mass society. The elite in the opinion of both Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim, was a guarantee that the ideals of equalitarianism, which mass society by its very nature embodied, would be effectively mitigated.
8) Summary and Evaluation

The relationship between Marxism and the elite theories is a complex one. The nature of this relationship is indicative of certain fundamental features of the dynamics of social theory construction, as well as of the evolutionary processes of liberalism as an ideology. Marx's theoretical efforts were directed towards the legitimization of the ideals of collectivism and the possibility of the realization of individual freedom in a collective context. The general orientation of Marx's theories was indicative of his belief in the need for a specific form of social integration which was based on the socialist equalitarian ideals of collectivism. It is in this direct sense that his theories served as a means to exemplify the liberal ideals of social integration.

Marx, like other social theorists who have lent support to the ideals of social integration, did not neglect to consider the question of individual freedom. However, he felt that such freedom was most appropriately and effectively realized through the medium of collectivized labor. He outlined what he believed to be the chief characteristics of man's species-being. In this fashion he attempted to show how the dominant modes of production characteristic of bourgeois capitalist society contributed to the denial of man's species-need for collectivized productive labor. Only in communist society, as it was explained, could the realization of man's human nature be completely achieved. In this respect, the methods of analysis as well as the political goals of dialectical and historical materialism were rooted in determinant assumptions about man's innate nature. Scientific socialism was in essence a pseudo-science in that Marx's assumptions about human nature were provided only with a minimum
degree of empirical verification. His assumptions about human nature con-
form directly in this manner to a sociology of knowledge interpretation
insofar as they were related to the liberal ideals of social integration.

The elite theories constituted a reaction to the equalitarian ideals
which had received support from Marx. Pareto, Mosca and Michels endeav-
ored to de-legitimate Marx’s theories of collectivism. They argued that
collectivism as a method of social organization was contrary to the nature
of human nature. The differences between the opinions of the elite
theorists and Marx were, in the final analysis, related specifically to
their widely divergent assumptions about man’s nature. At least in the
case of Pareto and Mosca individuals were conceived as being innately un-
equal in terms of their talents and capabilities. Equalitarianism in
the eyes of these theorists represented a means to reduce the superior
individual to a life of the mediocrity of the mass. It was for the sake
of preserving and protecting individualism that they suggested the
necessity of society being controlled by an elite. The existence of an
elite in their opinion was the objectification of man’s innate need for
preeminence and power, as well as the need of the individual to acquire
power so that it might be inherited by succeeding generations. Pareto
and Mosca endeavored to provide legitimation to the liberal laissez-faire
notion of individual competition. Pareto’s idea of "the circulation of
elites" and Mosca’s theory of an "open" elite emphasized the competition
between individuals for the attaining of elite positions. Both these
theories pointed to the possibility that individuals with superior talent
would be recognized and able to gain a position in the social structure
that would correspond to their unique capabilities. These talented
individuals would comprise the ruling class.

The emphasis which Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim placed on the homogeneity of the mass and its denial of the basic needs and characteristics of human nature served to legitimate the liberal ideals of individualism. It was the existence of an elite which would ensure the effective denial of the realization of the equalitarian ideals which had come to increasingly characterize mass society. Similar to the overall intentions of Pareto, Mosca and Michels, their support of the idea of the need for elite control was predicated on the assumption that it was only through social planning as directed by a responsible elite that the rights and freedoms of the individual in mass society could be developed.

The emphasis of all of the elite theorists on the importance of the subjective elements of human behavior as determinants of social action is in itself, indicative of their liberal individualistic values and orientations. Unlike the positivists or the Marxists, the elite theorists were unwilling to admit that the determination of human behavior could be reduced to the operation of objective laws of progress or those of dialectical and historical materialism. The elite theorists were similar to the German sociologists of the nineteenth century who had reacted to the theories of the French Positivists. They were also convinced that the human individual and his personal needs and desires played a significant part in the determination of human behavior. For this reason they placed an emphasis on the subjective components of social action through their reliance on assumptions about human nature which they believed to be innate and characteristic of the species as a whole. The belief held by the elite theorists in the subjective determination of human behavior
embodied the liberal ideal of individualism, in that it made the individ-
ual rather than natural law, the initiator of social action.

The theories of Marx, as well as those of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, 
Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim, were all formulated in reaction to particu-
lar socio-economic circumstances. Marx's theories were directed towards 
the demonstration of the "dehumanized" condition of the industrial prole-
tariat within the confined of bourgeois capitalist society. His theories 
were a direct response to the emergence of an industrial proletariat in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, who as he believed, lived in 
an exploitative relationship with the owners of the means of production. 
His ideas about collectivism and the assumptions about human nature on 
which they were based, were addressed directly to the unstable and 
unintegrated social conditions of the proletariat. These conditions were 
evidenced, as he thought, in their distinct lack of class consciousness.

All the elite theorists formulated their ideas not in reaction to the 
dehumanizing conditions of bourgeois capitalist society, but rather to 
the emergence of the mass which had been facilitated by the processes of 
industrialization, urbanization and the workings of liberal-democracy. 
Their theories, which lent support to the existence of elites in society, 
were meant to demonstrate the possibility of alleviating these disillusions-
ing social circumstances. Together, these elite theorists make explicit 
use of assumptions about human nature in justifying the need for social 
planning under elite control. The theories of Marx and those of the 
elite theorists were formulated in response to changing social and eco-
omic circumstances. However, they were restricted to the utilization of 
assumptions about human nature which exemplified one or the other of the
basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.

The interrelationships between Marx's theories and those of the elite theorists, provides an understanding of the processes of immanent change inherent within liberalism. From reviewing the variations of assumptions about human nature explicitly utilized in social theory during the course of the early eighteenth through to the beginning of the twentieth century, it is obvious that the dynamics of social theory construction follow a basic pattern of variation. This pattern or rhythm is indicative of the processes of immanent change inherent within the liberal world-view. This rhythm of variations exemplifies the ambivalent nature of liberalism. It is evident that as soon as one major school of social thought comes to objectify, manifest and legitimate one of the basic variations of liberalism, another trend in social thought and theory will develop. This new trend will in turn emphasize an alternate variation of liberal idealism. These two variations consist in the belief in social integration on the one hand and in individualism on the other. The formulation of the elite theories with their emphasis on the ideals of individualism, in reaction to the social integrationist and collectivist views of Marx, represents a specific example of the operation of such processes of immanent change. We may tentatively recognize that the evolution of these social theories and the variations of assumptions of human nature particular to them is concomitantly related to the dynamics of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an evolving and changing ideology. Moreover, the variation of liberal ideals as reflected in the use of assumptions about human nature by Marx and the elite theorists is indicative of the fact that these assumptions comply with a general sociology of knowledge interpretation.
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CHAPTER V  RACE, EVOLUTION AND THE SOCIAL DETERMINATION OF HUMAN NATURE

1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

This chapter shall deal specifically with the development of anthropological theory from the time of the Enlightenment up to the twentieth century. Anthropological theory during the process of its emergence and development has been characterized by two distinct theoretical orientations taken towards the nature of man. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, anthropologists conceived of human nature in terms of race or in relation to the dynamics of evolution. Alternatively, during the latter half of the nineteenth century right up until today, most anthropologists believed and continue to believe, that the key to understanding human behavior lay in the structure of society rather than in man's racial nature or in vague evolutionary laws of social development. In short, they came to regard all notions about man's innate nature as irrelevant, in that they were convinced that human behavior was culturally determined. In this regard, this chapter shall endeavor to outline the reasons for the ultimate replacement of the anthropological theories dealing with race and evolution, by those which emphasized the social determination of human behavior.

The history of anthropological thought is a testimony to the concern which anthropologists have shown towards the question of the nature of man. Human nature in this respect has been interpreted by anthropologists from a racial, evolutionary and social deterministic perspective. At the same time anthropologists have utilized assumptions about man as a means to lend credibility to their liberal ideals and beliefs about human
society. The specific interrelationship between the liberal ideals and assumptions about human nature formulated by the major anthropologists maintaining either a racial, evolutionary or social deterministic point of view will be carefully considered here from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis. These considerations shall constitute the specific focal points of this chapter.

Within the history of anthropology, probably the most rigorous attempt to come to terms with the question of man's innate nature is evidenced in those theories that dealt with the idea of race, as well as those which outlined the processes of evolution in relation to the history of human society. It was in response to the question of the racial as well as the evolutionary development of man that the discipline of anthropology first emerged as a coherent body of theoretical ideas and insights. Marvin Harris, in discussing the origins of anthropological theory as the science of culture, has argued that...

Racial determinism was the form taken by the advancing wave of the science of culture, as it broke upon the shores of industrial capitalism. It was in this guise that anthropology first achieved a positive role alongside of physics, chemistry and the life sciences...

The ideas of race, as well as those related to the notion of evolution, were explicitly biological concepts.

The theories of race were formulated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries by such anthropologists as Blumenbach, Smith, de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Knox, Hunt and Gumplovicz, as well as the later eugenic theorists. All of these social theorists attempted to outline the interrelationships between the biological and cultural characteristics of members of differing human societies, both primitive and modern. The
willingness of the early anthropologists to use the concepts and methods
of the natural sciences, specifically those of biology, is from an his-
torical viewpoint, clearly illustrated in the effect which the idea of
evolution had on the consequent reorientation of anthropological thought.
The very idea of evolution as it was proposed by Darwin and Spencer,
allowed anthropologists to demonstrate that man was related to the rest
of the natural world and was governed by the same laws of organic develop-
ment which dictated the movements of all Nature. Loren Eiseley has
contended that...

Coincident with the development of evolutionary
philosophy has been the rise of anthropology as a
science. Although of late there has been a tendency
for social anthropology to pursue its tasks without
reference to the field of biology, this specialization
is not entirely desirable without at least some know-
ledge of the relationship of these two subjects in the
past. 2

With the coming of Spencer and Darwin, many anthropologists merely changed
their analytical categories from those which relied on the idea of racial
heredity to those concepts centered around the idea of evolution. The
chief evolutionary anthropologists of the late nineteenth and twentieth
centuries included Maine, McLennan, Tylor, Morgan, Frazer and White.

Today there exists a definite consensus of agreement among social
scientists as to the validity of Tylor's well known definition of culture.
Culture at present is understood to be

...in its wide ethnographic sense,...that complex
whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals,
law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits
acquired by man as a member of society. 3

It is assumed that culture is learned. Culture is also understood to
include material objects in addition to the spiritual/ideal forms of
human reproduction. There would seem little room for any form of biological reductionism in such a definition of culture. This in fact has not always been the case. Early liberal, social philosophers, inclusive of Locke and Rousseau, believed that man was a product of his cultural situation. The cultural processes of socialization and education were believed to be responsible for the realization of the perfectability of man. These early social theorists were faced at the same time with the rather striking problem of accounting for the bio-physical differences that existed between many cultural groups. Students of culture during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were confronted with the task of solving a number of fundamental questions directly related to the innate nature of man within a cultural context.

For many social theorists at the time, and continuing right up through the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth century, the two problems of the explanation of physiological and cultural diversification were understood as interdependent. Physiological diversity was seen as contingent upon the obvious cultural differences that existed between groups of people all over the world. That is to say, bio-physical or 'racial' differences could be accounted for in terms of the effects of dissimilar cultural and environmental situations. Conversely, other anthropological theorists pointed out that cultural differences could be explained in terms of racial or bio-physiological differences. The former opinion was primarily limited to the eighteenth century. The latter point of view was most conspicuously maintained during the nineteenth century. At the present time within anthropological theory, the concept of race is restricted to the research endeavors of physical
anthropologists, who argue that the idea of race has neither biological nor cultural validity.\(^5\)

The notion of race, at least during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was conceived of as a biological category. Race was defined as being directly correlated to the physical, and what were assumed to be the instinctual behavioral traits of differing populations of individuals. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, race as a bio-physiological analytical construct, played an undeniably prominent role in anthropological theory. It was interpreted as an effect or as a cause of culture. Alternatively, most of the anthropological writing since the time of Franz Boas and the First Universal Races Congress (1911), has ostensibly constituted a reaction to the idea of race as a viable biological or cultural concept.\(^6\) The differing biological and ethno-cultural orientations towards race in the historical periods indicated here were indirectly a reflection of the prevailing socio-political conditions.\(^7\)

The variations in the orientations of the anthropological theories dealing with race were indicative of the differing points of view which the racial theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries took towards liberalism as an ideology. In the case of the eighteenth century, such racial theorists as Blumenbach and Smith used the concept of race in defense of the libertarian ideals of the Enlightenment, which included the belief in progress, environmental determinism and the equality of all men. Conversely, the racial theories of the nineteenth century, including those formulated by de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Gumplovicz, Knox and Hunt, reflected the more conservative elements of the liberal worldview. These theorists maintained a belief in the social hierarchy of
races. This hierarchy was based on the supposedly innate inferiority and superiority of the races of mankind. For these theorists, such an hierarchy of races was expected to ensure the progressive social integration of society. The question of the relationship between the liberal ideals of these theorists and their views on race shall be examined in detail in this analysis.

The nineteenth century racial theorists tended to support the liberal ideals of social integration. Also, at this time, a number of anthropological theorists made use of the idea of evolution. Their evolutionary theories lent support to the liberal ideals of individualism and individual competition. It has been contended that the idea of man's "organic perfectibility", originally suggested by such libertarian theorists as Condorcet, provided the basis for the development of the idea of evolution. 8 Huxley and Kettlewell have noted that the anthropological theory which grew out of the evolutionary insights formulated by Spencer and Darwin, provided "justification and glorification" for the ideas of free-enterprise and laissez-faire, which were the economic counterparts of the liberal ideals of individualism. 9

It was Spencer, and not Darwin, who first popularized the ideas of evolution and the "survival of the fittest". Spencer applied himself to the elaboration of these concepts and became one of the most prominent figures in social theory during the course of the nineteenth century. 10 Darwin's writings provided Spencer with further incentive to study the concept of evolution in a human and social context. The idea of the evolution of species outlined by Darwin, and Spencer's Social Darwinistic policy of noninterference with the processes of individual competition,
were rooted firmly in the liberal belief that individualism, realized through competition

...draws out the highest achievements. It makes the advantages of capital, education, talent, skill, and training tell to the utmost.  

Ultimately, the idea of evolution and the complementary concept of individual survival and competition contributed to the definition of individualism within a biological context.

Darwin's and Spencer's theories became widely known by social theorists during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Within sociology, advocates of Social Darwinism, such as William Graham Sumner, John Fiske, Benjamin Kidd and Walter Bagehot, all attempted to further elaborate the theories of Spencer and Darwin. A common practice in social anthropology in this period was to explain any part of human culture by arranging the phenomena particular to it in an evolutionary sequence

...allowing each successive stage to flow spontaneously from the preceding...without cause. At bottom this logical procedure was astonishingly simple.

What anthropologists did in fact absorb from Darwin's and Spencer's writings was not the whole complex theory of evolution, but merely the vague idea of it.

The major evolutionary anthropologists at this time did not restrict themselves to merely adopting the biological principles of evolution. They also abridged a large variety of other biological concepts and categories as infrastructural components of their general theories of culture. The other biological concepts which these theorists made use of were related to notions about the innate nature of human nature. Eric Wolff has explained that the other biologically-oriented explanatory categories
which the evolutionary anthropologists utilized

proved unhappily clumsy, and their assumptions
that clusters of these categories taken together would
serve to define unequivocable stages of cultural develop-
ment, proved oversimplified and unwarranted.15

Many historians of Darwin's century have indicated that the greatest blind
spot in the theories of the Social Darwinists and other evolutionary
theorists, was their habit of using instincts as a justification for
their various arguments. Noticeably, these theorists lacked, at the same
time, any empirical proof (whether from observation or experiment) as to
the empirical verifiability of the various instincts which they imaginat-
ively defined.16 The general interrelationship between the assumptions
about human nature formulated by these theorists, and their liberal
ideals shall be carefully examined in this chapter.

The racial determinist theories, as well as those maintaining an
 evolutionary perspective within the context of anthropological theory
were met, at the beginning of the twentieth century, by an increasing
degree of criticism. As Albion Small has explained, towards the end of
the nineteenth century the general methodological progress in social
theory, especially in America, was characterized by a gradual shifting
of effort from the biological analogous representation of social struc-
tures to the "real" analysis of social processes.17 Under the leadership
of Lester Ward, sociologists and anthropologists began to draw upon
psychology instead of biology in the explanation of social phenomena.18
More and more, European and North American anthropologists tended to
develop a theoretical orientation towards social behavior which emphasized
the dependence of the individual on society. Conversely, those theorists
who had made use of Spencer's and Darwin's ideas

...had seen society as the more or less automatic result of the characters and instincts of its individual members; and this had given colour to (the) conclusion that the experience of society must be a slow evolutionary process waiting upon the gradual increment of personal characteristics "adapted" to the life conditions of modern industrial society.19

The theory of the social determination of behavior was to come to play a prominent role in the development of contemporary social theory.

The refutation of the "biologic individualism" particular to evolutionary theory was conducted on three distinct theoretical "fronts" within the context of anthropology. The first of these fronts consisted of the theoretical movement known as Historical Particularism and included such well known anthropologists as Boas, Kroeber and Lowie. The second major school of social thought which endeavored to undermine evolutionary theory comprised what is known as French Structuralism, to which belonged such theorists as Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss. Finally, the third major theoretical trend which took a stand against the individualistic ideals and biological concepts of evolutionary theory was initiated by a number of British social anthropologists, inclusive of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard. These theorists endeavored to define a functionalist framework of analysis for the interpretation of social phenomena.

All of these major anthropological schools of social thought contributed towards the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. In a period of growing social reform, both in Europe and America, the ideal of the autonomous individual who depended on the processes of competition, natural selection and the slow-moving laws of evolution to
bring about social change, was no longer tenable. Only by proving that human nature was ultimately dependent on society and social reform could the promise of adequate and rapid social change be provided and legitimized to meet the growing demands of a discontented urban proletariat both in North America and in Europe.

Especially in America, social theory became the philosophy of a society which believed that its salvation lay in providing social integration and social reform for the urban and rural poor, and in the legitimization of existing social institutions. The period in America between 1850-1920 within which the theories of Historical Particularism grew, while being a time of expansion and abundance, was also a period of accelerating mass discontent and disillusionment. With the growth of slums, urban crowding and poverty, the life-situation of the working classes in America grew slowly worse. It had become evident to those who had settled in the urban areas between 1850-1890, that the long sought-after liberal ideals of equality and opportunity were no longer realizable. In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, personal insecurities, frustrations and anxieties increased among the populations of the major North American cities. These insecurities finally erupted into major violent conflicts between big business and organized labor. Social unrest, mob action, riots and strikes became prevalent in the larger cities. The notorious Orange Riot of 1871 in New York, the great railroad strike of 1877 and the anarchist Haymarket bombings represented the culmination of a whole series of national disturbances over wage disparities and political inequalities.

Given these sets of conditions at this time in American history, it
is not surprising that a number of theorists within anthropology and sociology attempted to come to terms with the problems of social integration and to redefine the idea of individuality within a more socially constructive context. It is for this reason that Boas, Kroeber and L owie emphasized the liberal ideals of the equality of all races, as well as the dependence of man on society. These anthropologists argued that man developed his nature through the medium of culture, rather than according to his innate racial biological character or evolutionary law.

The French Structuralists and the British social anthropologists shared the views and social integrationist ideals of the Historical Particularists. Most of Durkheim's theories, for example, were directed towards the legitimization of the need for organic solidarity as a means to counter the growing division of labor within an industrializing and modernizing France. His social integrationist views served as a buffer between the idea of "a science of society" and the political and industrial revolutionary agitation which characterized France in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Marvin Harris has observed that

...the use of the concept of social solidarity by Saint-Simon, Comte and Durkheim provides an unbroken line of politically conservative theories leading directly to the main varieties of "functionalism" among contemporary British, French and American social anthropologists. 21

The British social anthropologists who maintained the perspective of functionalism sought to legitimize the ideals of social integration as they applied to the colonial experience of Britain. 22

Similarly, all of these theorists, American, French and British alike, firmly believed anthropology to be a distinct science of culture,
with a subject matter that was entirely separate from the realm of biology in terms either of race or evolution. As Durkheim emphatically argued in The Rules of Sociological Method (1895)...

We must seek... the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself... it (society) uniformly surpasses the individual in time as well as in space; it is in a position to impose upon him ways of acting and thinking.

By denying the importance of the individual and the emotional, psychological and biological aspects of his behavior, the Historical Particularists, French Structuralists and Structural Functionalists hoped to lend credibility to the idea of a science of society which had as its focal point the concept of "social structure". At the same time, they hoped to demonstrate that the individual was dependent on culture for the full development of his personality.

The theoretical orientations of racial determinism, evolutionism and social determinism have constituted the three basic stages of the development of anthropology as a discipline. The major theorists, particular to each of these developmental stages made explicit use of assumptions about human nature to justify the various liberal ideals to which they adhered. By reviewing in detail their use of such assumptions, as well as the liberal ideological context in which they were formulated, it will be possible to gain a clear understanding of the dynamics of anthropological theory construction. Moreover, the examination of the extent to which changes in these assumptions about human nature were complemented by significant alterations in the liberal beliefs of anthropologists, will provide a clearer understanding of the degree to which these assumptions conformed to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.
2) The Racial Biology of Culture

This specific section of this chapter will deal with the racial theories formulated by Blumenbach, Smith, de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Knox, Hunt, Pearson and Gumpowicz. The assumptions about human nature defined by these theorists in relation to their views on race will be considered. In addition, their racially oriented assumptions about human nature will be analyzed in terms of their particular liberal beliefs. In this manner a clearer understanding will be gained of the degree to which the anthropological racial theories which developed between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries lent themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

In the eighteenth century, students of culture found themselves in a curious dilemma. In Europe and North America, the traditional view of Christian revelation was commonly assumed. It was popularly believed that God created man in a single pair, Adam and Eve, with whom all humanity shared a common ancestry. Scientific versions of the belief in an original pair came to be known as 'monogenesis'. If the basic tenets of monogenesis were accepted, all the biologist and anthropologist had to do was in some way explain the variation among Adam's descendants. At the same time a prominent element in the thinking of intellectuals of this period was the guiding liberal libertarian principle of the equality of human nature among all people, the ideals of progress, as well as the belief in environmental determinism which had been the doctrine of the French Philosophes. Faith in the moral and spiritual equality of mankind generally complemented the belief that all races had descended from Adam and Eve.
One of the most important of the monogenesis theorists of the eighteenth century, who used the idea of race as a central point of his analysis, was J.F. Blumenbach. Blumenbach successfully combined the popular belief in monogenesis with the environmentalism of the Philosophes through his explanation of the bio-physiology of race differences. In his major work, On the Natural Varieties of Mankind (1775), he endeavored to show, (contrary to the popular belief that Negroes were part animal in nature), that all races inclusive of Negroes were human. He wished to convince others that the assumed differences between races had been exaggerated.

The basic intention of his writings was to demonstrate that the bio-physiological traits particular to members of primitive societies did not render these 'ruder peoples' inferior to the European. When such peoples were given the opportunity for a proper education, they would immediately be able to develop their "higher faculties" equal to that of the Caucasian races.

Blumenbach elaborated a five-fold classification of races according to color, inclusive of the Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American and Malayan. He explained that all men were born white but changed color quickly after birth owing to the effects of climate. The idea of degeneration was central to his theory of race in explaining the bio-physiological differences between cultural groups. The differences of constitution, stature and color that were observable through the comparison of racial groups were attributed to the effects of harsh climates. He stated...

That in hot countries bodies become drier and heavier, in cold and wet ones, softer, more full of juice and spongy is easily noticed.
In the elaboration of his theory of degeneration, he was able to show that all men of whatever race originated from a single pair and that we are all related and only differ from each other in degree.  

At the same time, his emphasis on the effects of climate reaffirmed the environmentalism of the Philosophes. In this regard it was asserted that the bio-physiology of racial changes which were modified by the environment and climate eventually became "hereditary and constant". Clearly, his theories were the unsubstantiated perursors to the later speculations of Lamarck.

Most of Blumenbach's theories were not based on available ethnographical or biological evidence. Instead, they were founded on ideological and theological beliefs, which his selection of the appropriate data was meant to confirm. All of his theories rested on certain unjustifiably naive biological assumptions. Their proof was determined by bold assertions rather than concrete evidence gained through direct or documented observation. The theories of degeneration and the inheritance of acquired characteristics contained definite assumptions about man's innate nature. These explicit assumptions about man's innate nature, as revealed in Blumenbach's analysis are an example of the determinate role which naive assumptions played in those early anthropological theories concerned with the explanation of the cultural and physiological differences of races. What is also obvious, is the extent to which his assumptions about human nature complemented the liberal beliefs in human equality - ideals which had been originally articulated by the French Philosophes.
Blumenbach's theories were extended and elaborated in North America by Dr. Samuel Stanhope Smith, professor of moral philosophy and president of Princeton University. His *Essay On The Causes of the Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species*, published in 1787, is considered to be the first ethnological work to be produced in North America. This treatise was addressed to the believers in the liberal ideals of equality and to the disciples of the Christian faith. In order to give scientific credibility to the assumption "that all men were created equal under the eyes of God", he made the effort to show that the differing appearances of the various races were the results of the effects of climate and extreme environments.

That the coarse...features, resembling those of the Tartar race, naturally result from the constant action of intense cold, will be obvious even on a slight inspection of the countenance of those exposed to a keen and frosty air.

Similarly, he attributed the dark hue of the North American Indians to the effects of "the vapor of rivers and the exhalations of marshes and gases evolved from decaying vegetables". Assuming with Blumenbach that Negro children were born white, Smith contended that the Negro did not exhibit his true complexion until he had been exposed to the atmosphere for some time.

The growing popularity of the polygenesis theory which maintained that racial differentiation was an act of creation was another compelling factor which forced Smith to account for the observable physiological differences between races. In order to maintain the integrity of the monogenesis position, he adopted certain biological principles. The lack of empirical verifiability of these principles was outweighed by their
convenience in defending his own point of view. His emphasis on the effects of climate on "racial character" constitutes in fact a basic principle of evolutionary biology - the principle of environmental adaptation. The uses to which he put this principle were of course unjustifiably naive by any standards. His theories were not merely the consequence of the lack of empirical evidence on the racial question. Rather, they were the product of the distorted postulated abridgement of evidence to defend his own ideological and theological position. In order that he might verify his basic assumption that, "climate is the principle agent in creating the variety of complexion which distinguishes mankind in the different regions of the globe", Smith utilized a biological theory of environmental adaptation, the manipulation of which appears almost comical by today's standards. Nevertheless, his manipulative and unjustifiable use of the theory of physiological adaptation conveniently explained the differences among the varieties of man and in turn, verified the monogenesis position to an increasingly disbelieving audience.

The object of both the treatises of Blumenbach and Smith was to

...establish the natural unity of the human species by tracing its varieties to their natural causes...by bringing in science to confirm the authority of the 'Mosaic history'.

Blumenbach and Smith had attempted to defend the basic premises of liberalism as well as the Christian belief in human equality and the origin of man from a single pair. They defended these premises by using what were assumed to be the facts and principles of natural history and biology. Despite the questionable validity of these "natural principles", both of these theorists had managed to secularize the idea of equality. Men were conceived of as equal before their environment rather than as equal be-
fore God. The evidence for man's equality as dictated by the Supreme Being now lay in man's own physical being. As Winthrop Jordan has noted...

...the translation of man into a biological entity had occurred within the very fortresses of religion.  

It was the anthropological theories of Blumenbach and Smith which had effectively accomplished such a translation.

The works of these two theorists provide us with the clear indication that the origins of anthropological theory consisted of speculative attempts to deal with the fundamental problem of racial differentiation and the question of racial nature of human nature. It is important to realize that the theoretical structures erected by these early anthropologists consisted largely of biological principles and facts. The credibility of these principles could be justifiably questioned then as they can be today. Likewise, it is clear that these theorists utilized racial assumptions about human nature as a means to confirm their liberal as well as their Christian beliefs. It is in this context that we may interpret their racial theories from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

The earlier period of anthropological theory was not just confined to finding racial justifications for the ideals of human equality. A number of trends within anthropological thought after the French Revolution attempted, through the use of racial assumptions about human nature, to justify the innate inequality of races. The French Revolution had provided a social and political forum for the realization of the ideals of the Philosophes. At the same time it also gave the incentive to a significant number of social theorists, to turn away from what was thought to be the naive optimism and rationalism of the eighteenth century. Social
theorists such as Edmund Burke, Hegel, de Bonald and de Maistre believed that the social changes following in the wake of the Revolution had undermined and destroyed fundamental social institutions upon which human society was dependent for existence. Irving Zeitlin has observed that tradition, religion and established social institutions came to be regarded by many students of society as necessary and natural prerequisites for civilization; all of which the results of the Revolution had effectively denied. The group, the community and the nation became for many, important concepts and ideals. Arthur de Gobineau who is often termed the "father of racism" belonged to this particular tradition of liberalism which supported the belief in social integration over and above all other considerations. It is in relation to his particular liberal ideals that we may begin to understand his choice and use of racial assumptions about human nature.

It was within an atmosphere of profound social pessimism towards the events of the French Revolution and the later experiences of 1848 in France, that de Gobineau wrote his anthropo-racial treatise, Essay on the Inequality of Races (1850). He adhered to the basic liberal tenets of individuality. Nevertheless, he was strongly set against any crude form of possessive individualism veiled by the doctrines of liberty and equality. He regarded this doctrine as the "leprosy of modern times"; despising the hedonistic egoism and material acquisitiveness which were often its inevitable consequences. At the same time, he was fearful that France, as well as the whole of Europe, would deteriorate culturally and politically because of the popular trend towards the rejection of the former nobility and the conveying of power into the "irresponsible"
hands of the middle and lower classes. As he was the descendent of a
bourgeois family of the seventeenth century, he wished to prove the nobility
of his own social and family background. His writings are representative
of his efforts to justify the innate superiority of his own 'caste'.

Gobineau's racism is not a nationalist but a class
concept of aristocracy, to defend the latter's position
against a bastard proletariat. The concept of race was adopted by this French theorist to illustrate the
innate qualities of the aristocratic class.

De Gobineau argued that a lack of social initiative and courage was
the result of racial interbreeding. This interbreeding accounted for the
cultural decline of a nation or a whole civilization. Human races, as it
was pointed out, were unequal. Races were said to differ among themselves
as to their innate capacities for progress and civilization. Utilizing
an extensive amount of ethnographical data, he argued that the persistently
low state of development of many primitive societies was not the result of
either environmental or geographical factors.

It was the growing demands of the underprivileged which de Gobineau
sought to undermine through attributing an innate status of inferiority
to the 'lower races'. Ruth Benedict has indicated that...

He was caught up in a world in which the unwashed mob
were in despair and were demanding some means to live. It
could not be denied them on the basis of Rousseau's Social
Contract...or even of Hobbe's idea of the state; it could
be denied them however, on the basis of hereditary inferiority;
that is on the basis of race.

De Gobineau was faced with the task of explaining the factors of cultural
degeneracy and at the same time, legitimizing the social value of the
aristocracy. In so doing he had to show that the inequality of races was
a natural condition ruled by biological law. To accomplish this theoretical feat, he adopted the biological principle of heredity. By utilizing a principle of natural science, he hoped that this would constitute sufficient proof that there did in fact exist a pure-bred class, the 'Aryan' race. This race was said to be a superior, select and innately privileged minority group born to govern and guide the "inferior cross-bred masses" in any nation. He originally conceived of the idea, using the biological principle of heredity, that there are particular ethnic groups which are inferior and that there are other racial groups upon which all social and cultural development is ultimately dependent.

The dedication of the Essai to the reactionary George V of Hanover is ample testimony to the fact that de Gobineau's theoretical orientations were derived from his political concerns. In the initial stages of developing his theory of race, he addressed himself to the question of why great civilizations and cultures decay. In order to resolve the problem he carefully reviewed the reasons suggested by the existing theories of the day. These theories had attributed cultural decline to such factors as the loss of religion, corruption of morals, bad government and despotism. Using historical examples from Rome, Greece, Persia and Judea, he argued that none of these factors necessarily led to decay. These factors might lead to cultural degeneration only when they were manifestations of a deeper cause. He finally attributed the cause of cultural degeneration to the racial factor and the mixing of the separate blood of races.

The word degenerate, when applied to a people, means that the people has no longer the same intrinsic value
as it had before, because it has no longer the same blood in its veins, continual adulterations having gradually affected the quality of that blood. 50

By "continual adulterations", de Gobineau referred to the idea of racial inter-mixture through cross-marriage.

De Gobineau, after ascertaining the cause of cultural degeneracy went on to illustrate the capacities of the various types of races: white, yellow and black. 51 Also, it was asserted that these races were unequal in intelligence and in their ability for creating great civilizations. 52 The European white race, as it was explained, was the "most beautiful" in that great civilizations have always been derived from these "races germéniques". The Germanics were a branch of the Aryan race who were responsible for no less than six of the great civilizations of the Old World. The Negroes could only acquire civilization when they mixed their blood with the Aryan race. 53 While great civilizations often resulted from other races mixing their blood with that of the pure Aryan stock, this led at the same time to the degeneration of the racial purity of the Aryan race, "an evil that nothing can balance or repair". 54 If mixtures of blood are beneficial to the mass of mankind, if they enable it, this was merely at the expense of mankind itself. Its "noblest Aryan sons" through a mixture of blood would become debased, stunted and enervated.

Accelerated cultural decadence was not the only result of such racial intermixiture. A more drastic side effect was the reduction of population. Again, basing his theories on unfounded racial assumptions about human nature, he maintained that the children of racially mixed marriages were sterile and incapable of reproducing. Consequently the growing accelera-
tion of racial intermarriages would ensure the extinction of the whole of mankind. 55 Fatalistically, he foresaw a time

...when the earth, silent and without us will continue to describe its impassive orbits in space. 56

It is not because of de Gobineau's racism that he drew little sympathy from other European intellectuals. It was because of this element of fatalism which was implicit in his racial theories.

Most of de Gobineau's theories of cultural decline rested on assumptions about the innate characteristics of human nature as related to racial heredity and the idea of sterility as produced by racial intermarriages. These racial principles as infrastructural components of his larger theory of culture and race, played a determinate role in the verification of his overall liberal beliefs. Similar in this respect to the theories of Blumenbach and Smith, his racial assumptions were not founded on empirical observation or deduction. Instead, they were based on the need to justify, in any manner possible, the natural inequality of the races and that the remaining French nobility were the last remnants of the Aryan stock. The racial principles implemented by de Gobineau in his cultural theories were chosen not because of their empirical verifiability. Rather, they were chosen in order to lend a pseudo-scientific credibility to what was essentially a political doctrine. Like de Maistre, he was intent on demonstrating the necessity for instituting the hierarchical organization of France, and for that matter all of Europe, according to race. It is in this context that de Gobineau's theory may be understood as supportive of the liberal ideals of social integration. De Gobineau advocated the liberal ideal of meritocracy, as opposed to the
traditional notion of hereditary status allocation by defining the concept of merit within a biological and racial context. Like the other racial theorists reviewed in this analysis, his racial assumptions conform directly to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

Racism, as a system of beliefs which asserted the innate superiority of a class, changed in Europe at the turn of the century into a doctrine of the racial superiority of nations. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, as an anthropo-racial theorist, was largely responsible for this shift in theoretical orientation. The most well known of his theoretical works is *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century*, which appeared in print in 1894. His writings were similar to those of de Gobineau in their methods and character. Both theorists believed strongly in the liberal ideals of social integration. They were convinced that innate racial characteristics were the chief features around which a society should be organized. It is the specific relationship between Chamberlain's liberal ideals and his racial assumptions about human nature which is of direct concern to this analysis.

Chamberlain, a son of a British admiral, was educated in Germany and became fascinated with German culture; studying avidly the philosophy and music of Wagner. In Germany, he was a member of the "academic proletariat". That is to say, a member of a class of private scholars who either were unable or refused to enter academic professional life or any other profession for that matter. This class had traditionally constituted a strong intellectual bloc of scholars, set against the rising tide of modernity and liberal libertarian idealism which had swept across Europe after the French Revolution. Unable, or unwilling, to use their
knowledge and intellectual training within the confines of existing academic institutions, this class of scholars sought instead to become social critics and prophets.

As disgruntled outsiders with little money at their disposal...such men opposed present society, indeed all of modernity, and sought instead to connect their knowledge to the glorious future of the race to which they did belong (as many professors did not). 59

The main intention of Chamberlain in writing *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* was to lend credibility to the liberal notions of progress and social integration by extolling the virtues of the German race and promising them a glorious future. As we shall see, the basis of his promise was related to specific racial assumptions about human nature, defined within a liberal ideological context.

Chamberlain began his analysis by pointing out the necessity of revealing the racial foundations of the nineteenth century. After reviewing a vast range of historical and ethnographic data, he concluded that the contributions to the development of contemporary civilization came from four principle sources - the Greeks, Romans, Jews and Teutons. However, it was noted that the Teuton race (Germans, Celts and Slavs) had the important vocation of being the founders of world history. The realization by the Teutons of their destiny constituted the turning point of the history of civilization.

The awakening of all the Teutonic peoples to the consciousness of their all important vocation as the founders of a completely new civilization forms this turning point; the year 1200 can be designated the central moment of this awakening. 60

In Chamberlain's view, the 'Middle Ages' that had started in 1200 A.D. were not at an end. This period extended into the nineteenth century
which was only a time of preparation for a new age that would inevitably succeed it.

In justifying the historical destiny of the Teutonic races, Chamberlain indicated that all races are innately unequal. His assertion about man's racial nature was the central building stone of what he referred to as his "rational anthropology". He was convinced that racial intermingling in any degree created moral and social chaos. Innumerable historical examples were cited in proof of this point. It was only nationalism and the state which could create the conditions necessary for race purity. Through the binding and affirmative ties of nationalism, the five natural laws of race breeding could be effectively enforced in the realization of the ideals of both progress and social integration. These natural biological laws consisted of:

1. the presence of excellent racial material
2. continual inbreeding
3. artificial selection of the inferior types
4. crossing of blood with homogeneous racial groups
5. limiting the mixture of blood

Chamberlain emphasized the necessity for Teutons to become "race conscious" in light of the growing Jewish influence in Europe. Race consciousness was defined as the realization of a natural instinct. Unless race consciousness was fostered, the future of the Teutons would be that of the Greeks and Romans who

...without ever becoming conscious of themselves... descended slowly into Hades full of life to the last...

For Chamberlain, the "racial struggle" was an inevitable fact.

Like other anthropo-racial theorists, Chamberlain was not exempt from using racial assumptions about human nature in the justification of a par-
ticular world-view. In this instance, he used such assumptions in the exoneration of the Teutonic races, with the hopes that the Teutons would ensure the social integration of Europe. Neither at the time at which Chamberlain wrote nor today, has there ever been empirical evidence produced to show the factuality of either his principles dealing with the innate inequalities of races, the five 'natural laws of race purity', or the race instinct. The selection of such principles was based on their convenience in supporting his larger anthropo-historical and ideological framework of explanation. The conscious distortion and unjustifiably naïve postulated abridgement of these racial assumptions about human nature (most of which were the product of Chamberlain's own imagination) were directed towards achieving one purpose: the influencing of European intellectuals, who had defined their faith in Progress and in the tenets of natural science since the Revolution. It is ironic that the liberal ideals of the Enlightenment as related to the belief in natural science and biological laws should be used to deny the ideals of human equality which likewise owe their origins to the Enlightenment. Within this framework of analysis we may come to fully appreciate the ideological basis upon which Chamberlain's racial assumptions about human nature rested.

Chamberlain, like de Gobineau, was convinced that race rather than the individual was the basic factor of human history as well as the essential motivating force of human behavior. It was through the expression of his innate racial characteristics that the individual came to realize the essential and unique features of his human nature - a nature which nevertheless was race specific. Only by organizing society on the basis of racial characteristics would it be possible to achieve a pro-
gressive level of social integration which both the consequences of unchecked individualism and racial impurity had denied. It was in this fashion that Chamberlain legitimated the ideals of social integration as a variation of liberalism within a biologized-racial context.

Theories of race and culture were to take a new orientation following the industrial revolution in Europe, where there had developed an increasing demand for servile labor in the form of slaves. Owing to the industrial revolution and the demand for the extraction of natural resources inclusive of cotton

slavery which was breaking down in America and might have vanished of itself, automatically became a sacrosanct institution on which the prosperity of the Cotton Belt depended.66

Many anthropologists and sociologists in the American South and elsewhere found themselves in a perplexing position. On the one hand, they recognized the value of slavery to economic development in America and in Europe. On the other hand, most social theorists claimed at least formal adherence to the liberal values and ideals of equality and individual freedom. This dilemma was essentially dealt with through at least two different channels of theoretical rationalizations. These rationalizations served to justify the continued maintenance of slavery and the colonial control of native peoples. At the same time the liberal ideals of individual freedom were not disregarded. Essentially, these theories consisted of proving that:

1. the Black races were a threat to White civilization and must be controlled or

2. the Black races were in need of parental care by the White races.
Both of these theoretical justifications of slavery and colonialism were based on a number of specific assumptions about the nature of human nature. The postulated abridgement of these assumptions, as shall be pointed out, were unjustifiably naive. These assumptions enabled many theorists to reconcile the liberal ideals of individual freedom with the praxis of colonial oppression.

Dr. Robert Knox referred to by many as the founder of British racism, was the first theorist to legitimize slavery and colonialism from an anthropological perspective. In his major work, *The Races of Man*, published in 1850, he attempted to demonstrate, utilizing his anthropo-racial theory of "transcendental anatomy", that race determined culture.

Race is everything: literature, science, in a word, civilization depends on it. 67

For Knox, the main focal point of analysis in understanding the nature of a particular culture must be that of race and the recognition of the innate capacities which may be attributed to each race. 68 In addition, he explained that the consequences of the innate physical and mental qualities of any race were naturally manifested in its culture, as every race had its own form of civilization which was unchanging. 69 In his opinion, the Africans were innately incapable of civilization.

Knox, in his defense of both British colonialism and American slavery, indirectly introduced a new theme to British racial thought. Earlier generations of social theorists have sometimes despised the Africans and even pitied them because of their "savage ways", but they had never found grounds to fear them. 70 Nevertheless, as he asserted, the Africans' "natural" warlike qualities and their innate ability to survive in the most
severe and inhospitable environment, provided them with the capabilities of threatening the continuation of British control of Africa.

If there be a dark race destined to contend with the fair races of men for the portion of the earth, given to man as an inheritance, it is the Negro. 71

The suggestion that the Negro was naturally endowed with capacities, which in the long run might prove a threat to the maintenance of British hegemony in the colonies, was enough evidence in the eyes of the Colonial Office and the British public to prove that the intensification of control over these darker races was completely justified. His assumptions that races were endowed with innate qualities in relation to the extent of their aggressiveness and abilities for environmental adaptation, were of course mere speculations about the racial nature of man. The postulated abridgement of the principle of "innate capacities" as well as the belief in the racially hereditary basis of culture, were presented within the context of his theoretical discussion without any form of empirical qualification or evidence. 72

Typically, the attempts of early students of culture to come to terms with the nature of cultural differences appeared to be anything but scientific in their general unwillingness to verify their theories with empirical observation. Most early anthropo-racial theorists believed that their explanations of the racial biology of culture would contribute towards the justification of a specific liberal world-view. They used a wide array of principles dealing with man's innate nature. It was hoped that the use of such principles of "natural science" would lend a degree of authenticity and finality to their theoretical endeavors and ideological intentions. The theories of Knox must be understood exactly in this con-
text. His use of fear to justify colonialism and slavery and the basing of such assertions on categories such as "innate capacity" was nothing more than a means to dispel the guilt of liberal consciences. Such guilt was the result of the realization of the economic value of colonialism and slavery which conflicted with the belief in the liberal ideals of human dignity, equality and individual freedom.

Fear was not the only means by which colonialism and slavery were legitimized by theories utilizing racial assumptions about man's nature. The idea of paternalism was also a prevalent view in the middle decades of the nineteenth century; allowing liberals who adhered to the ideals of individual freedom to come to moral terms with the very illiberal institutions of slavery and colonialism. It should be added that paternalism while being a consciously adopted attitude was also a practical relationship which grew out of an interdependency on the plantations between a landowner and slaves. The feudal relationship in Europe between master and servant was equally paternalistic. James Hunt, the founder and first President of the Anthropological Society of London, was one of the first advocates of the paternalistic perspective. In an attempt to resolve the heated debate over slavery from a "scientific point of view", Hunt chose as the subject for his Presidential Address to the Anthropological Society in 1863, The Negro's Place In Nature.73 Similar to Knox, he relied on a number of racial assumptions about man's nature in order to prove the natural inferiority of the Negro race.

Hunt began his analysis by drawing out and dramatically emphasizing the curious, but nevertheless undeniable resemblances between the Negro and the apes in terms of the Negro's cranial and pelvic structure and in
the habitual use of his toes. He explained in detail the natural passivity of the Negro race as well as its innate inability to develop a culture equivalent to that of a higher civilization. In comparing the Negro to apes and young children, it was declared that the behavior of the Negro was governed by the "instinctual impulse" for sensuality and rest. Finally, he concluded that because of the invariable and unchanging biophysical constitution of the Negro, which resembles in many ways, as he thought, the character of an ape or an immature child, the Negro must be assumed to be inferior to the European. More importantly, however, he made the observation that the Negro may become "more humanized" when he is in contact with, but in a naturally subordinate position to, the White race. It was intimated that because Nature arranged races in a natural hierarchy of subordinate and dominant position, slavery was in fact not incongruous with natural law. Hunt's emphasis on the childlike qualities of the Negro served as justification for adopting a paternalistic attitude towards the Negro and for the continuation of slavery.

Like other anthropo-racial theorists already examined here, Hunt based his conclusions, and for that matter the whole of his theoretical structure, on the belief that the physiological and cultural characteristics which the Black race displayed, were innate and fixed by heredity and that culture was "in the blood". The justification for the postulated abridgement of these race-specific notions about human nature were largely imaginative theoretical deductions from eye-witness accounts and from other documented observations which were themselves guided and influenced by equally erroneous theories about race.
For example, his assertion that the Negro was innately lazy and greedy was based on a number of observations made by other theorists and collectors of ethnological data. These ethnologists were already convinced of the fact that the African was dictated by his hereditary constitution to be utterly incapable or unwilling to undertake any form of physical toil. 78 Mythical concepts about men's racial nature were used to support other equally unjustifiably naive principles related to race. It was on the very basis of these unverified assumptions about the racial nature of human nature, that a racial theory of culture was constructed during the early stages of the growth of anthropology as a discipline.

Through the definition of human nature in relation to the proportioned inferiority and superiority of the different races, anthropologists were able to legitimate the economic programs of British colonialism and American slavery. At the same time, they did not totally contradict the liberal ideals of individual freedom and liberty. Through the utilization of race-specific assumptions about human nature, liberal anthropologists were able to demonstrate that the need for individual freedom was a feature relative to the innate racial features of the individual in question. They felt that the Negro, owing to his racial character, was less qualified to enjoy the privileges of individual freedom than members of other races. In this rather indirect manner, the racial assumptions formulated by these theorists may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

Many of the racial theories of the nineteenth century were adopted by a number of anthropo-racial theorists in the first decades of the twentieth century. By 1890, a growing body of anthropological theories of race and culture had come to center around the eugenics movement which
made avid use of many of the already established racial assumptions. Developments both in genetics, the extended use of statistics and the increasing anthropological interest in defining the racial basis of culture, contributed effectively to the founding of the eugenics movement. The principle theorist of this movement was Karl Pearson. He firmly believed that it was unwise to disregard the concept of race and heredity when analyzing the differences between specific cultures.

Like many of the liberal anthropologists of the nineteenth century, the adherents of the eugenics movement were concerned with the problems of social integration. They were convinced that through the recognition of the innate differences between races, a coherent and integrated society might be constructed which would allow for the development of the individual according to his racial character. At the same time, they felt that cultural development and social integration were related to the maintenance of racial purity. By examining the innate differences between races, they believed that they would be able to institute an effective program that would ensure the purity of race among the members of society. This program would also prevent cultural and social disintegration, which they saw as being the natural consequence of the interbreeding between races. For the members of the eugenics movements, the realization of the ideals of social integration was dependent upon the segregation of races in the attempts to ensure racial purity. In this respect their racially oriented assumptions about human nature were intimately related to their liberal beliefs.

In a study of Jewish immigrants in Britain (using methods of statistical analyses, which by today's standards are quite questionable), Pearson
found that...

Taken on the average, and regarding both sexes, this alien Jewish population is somewhat inferior physically and mentally to the native population.

In making such conclusions, he recommended that all Jewish immigration into Britain be stopped in that

...the welfare of our country is bound up with the maintenance and improvement of its stock, and our own researches do not indicate that this will follow the unrestricted admission of either Jewish or any other type of immigrant.

Underlying his recommendation were two basic assumptions about human nature:

1. racial heredity determines intelligence and character

2. racial interbreeding contributes to cultural decline and social integration.

It is important to note also that he explicitly admitted that certain races, owing to their hereditary endowment, were innately inferior.

Many eugenists who after reviewing what they assumed to be the lack of cultural development in primitive societies became convinced, similar in this sense to de Cabineau, that cultural development and social integration was dependent on racial purity. A number of these theorists advocated the removal of "inferior racial elements" from society. They suggested sexual selection programs and sterilization for those deemed to be hereditarily unfit.

One advocate of the eugenics movement went so far as to assert that the falling birth rate in France was the direct consequence of the rising level of sterility in French males. This rising level of sterility was said to be the result of the increasing intermarriage of the different racial stocks which had traditionally composed the French nation.
At the present time the eugenics perspective within anthropological theory has few supporters with the exception of Lt. Col. Robert Gayre, geneticist, anthropologist and editor of the journal, *Mankind Quarterly*. For the most part, lacking any substantive evidence to validate his contentions, Dr. Gayre is nevertheless insistent in claiming that both Jews and Negroes are genetically unsuited to a parliamentary type of government. 

The racially oriented assumptions about human nature, employed by the eugenists were in fact adopted from many of the earlier nineteenth century racial theories. It was argued on the basis of these assumptions that intelligence was a function of racial heredity; racial intermixtures contributed to cultural decline and social disintegration, and the capacity of parliamentary government was genetically determined. All of these assumptions were based on empirical data that was and remains nonexistent. These assumptions were also justified through the deliberate distortion of available information so that a larger social theory might conveniently be proven to be valid. The unjustifiable naivety of the eugenist theorists may not be ascribed to the lack of data available to them. Rather, it may be attributed to their enthusiastic willingness to fit the data to the liberal principles of social integration. By understanding the commitment of these theorists to the liberal ideals of social integration, we may appreciate the extent to which these assumptions conform to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

The final anthropo-racial theorist whom we shall consider here is Ludwig Gumplowicz. Gumplowicz differed from other racial determinists in
that he did not believe particular races to be innately inferior or superior. Nor did he feel cultural progress was dependent on the innate capacities of any one race. He was convinced that cultural progress and social integration were only realized through the struggle between races, where only the fittest would be allowed to survive. The core of Gumplovicz's theoretical system was the understanding that socio-cultural evolution was wholly the product of the struggle between social groups. Inter-group competition was for this theorist the social analogue of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest as it took place in the natural world.85

Gumplovicz was a Social Darwinist. He nevertheless did not support the ideas of individualism particular to the Social Darwinist world-view. It was the racial group, rather than the autonomous individual, that was the center-point of history and social development. As he believed, it was the most highly integrated racial group which was able to attain power over other races. In this respect, Gumplovicz's theories and racial assumptions reflected his adherence to the liberal ideals of social integration.

In his major theoretical work, Der Rassenkampf (1875), he described racial conflict as the acting out of an "instinctive hostility" between human social and racial groups.86 As a result of the continued conflict between groups there was said to occur frequent changes and shifts in their membership. The vanquished were continually absorbed into the ranks of those groups who were the stronger and more intelligent. Consequently, in any given dominant racial or social collectivity there exists two classes - the victors and the vanquished. New classes are continually arising out of the changing juxtapositions of heterogeneous racial elements.87
Gumplovicz postulated that while the racial struggle was instinctive, economic differences served as a catalyst to the initiation of this fundamental, innately human characteristic. Such conflict was seen to occur in primitive societies on a tribal level, while in advanced societies conflict was conducted between classes. Social progress, to his way of thinking, was the inevitable result of the innate propensity of groups to maintain a high level of social integration at all costs. According to his theory of progress through racial struggle, the highest social achievement and direct result of the instinctual competition between groups was the emergence of the state. The state, as he asserted,

... was not a union or community for securing the common good, for realizing justice... No, the state was never founded with one of these ends in view.

Social development and progress which were dependent on the existence of the state, were the result of the innate struggle between races and the subjection of one race by another. The existence of the state satisfied the economic self-interest of the dominant racial group. It also helped to maintain a high level of social integration so that such economic self-interests might be protected.

It is quite evident that Gumplovicz's whole theory of race and social progress was related to the basic assumption that hostility existing between groups and races was innate to the human species. Other theorists, inclusive of Sir Arthur Keith, have made similar suggestions. However, while the instinctual foundations of group and/or racial conflict may in fact be a realistic possibility, the ascertaining of such a possibility within anthropological theory must rely on more than mere assertion. Gumplovicz, as far as it can be determined, failed to go beyond the
unsubstantiated level of assertive speculation. He nevertheless utilized such speculations in a major causal fashion within his whole theoretical framework. The determinate causal role which assumptions about man's nature played as infrastructural components in his justification of the liberal ideals of social progress was exceeded only by their unjustified naïveté. It is in this context that we may evaluate the ideological implications of Gumpowicz's assumptions about human nature.

Since Franz Boas' *Mind of Primitive Man* (1948), a work devoted to divorcing race from culture, there has been a persistent effort within anthropological theory as a whole to dispose of and delegitimize those racist determinist theories which have been discussed here and to ground the concept of race in more empirically sound fact. Today, the question of race is one of the primary concerns of many physical anthropologists. Most anthropologists studying race and its biological and cultural implications have substituted the concept of race with the idea of "breeding population". Currently, many anthropologists agree that there is no evidence for believing that there are any racial differences in terms of character or temperament. The only acceptable evidence which has been found pointing to genetic differences between breeding populations is limited to the discrete and relatively rare genetic conditions of color blindness, certain forms of infantile idiocy and the sickle-cell trait. A few physical anthropologists have suggested the existence of other genetic differences existing between populations, inclusive of differing responses to the stresses of heat, cold and altitude. Recently physical anthropologists, through genetic studies, have found marked differences in frequencies in the ABO blood system of populations in various parts of
Apart from these few measurable genetic differences between populations, it is maintained that the employment of the concept, race, is inapplicable owing to the ever increasing degree of mobility, hybridization and diffuse social selection which occurs between, and within, separate breeding population units.

In the case of the anthropo-racial theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, racial categories as related to assumptions about human nature played a major causal role in their speculative explanations of the interrelationships between race and culture. The idea of race for the early anthropologists was synonymous with the belief that culture and intelligence were part of the hereditary make-up of man. It was understood that while such a capacity for genetic inheritance was shared by all men, the cultural content of what was biologically inherited differed from racial group to racial group. Culture was subsequently defined as being a manifestation of inherited racial characteristics, where an individual's capacity for culture was dependent upon his membership to a particular race.

Most of the racial categories and principles as related to assumptions about human nature were utilized in the racial theories of culture and human behavior to give them a pseudo-scientific credibility in the legitimization of a particular cultural group or nationality. Also, these assumptions were used to justify certain exploitative relationships carried on within the context of colonialism or slavery. The use of racial assumptions about human nature was carried on within an intellectual milieu characterized by an unwavering and rather uncritical belief in natural and biological laws, regardless of the empirical verifiability
of such laws.

The content and orientation of the various racial assumptions about human nature underlying all of the racial explanations of culture changed with the demands of the social milieu within which they evolved and the specific ends they were meant to justify. Complementing this point, Michael Banton has indicated that...

The views of race espoused by different writers have depended in large measure on their ideas as to man's place in nature and the extent to which it is legitimate to study man's social behavior by the methods of science.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were periods when the credibility of all the social sciences, inclusive of anthropology, was dependent on the degree to which explanations of society and culture resembled the natural sciences in their methods and scope of analysis. In light of this fact it should not be surprising, as this analysis has revealed, that the original explanations of culture by early anthropologists should be based on the biologically-loaded concept of race. The use of race as a concept which was founded on premises about human nature, reflected the conviction of intellectuals during this period of time, that man's social behavior could be reduced to the imperative of Natural Law. In essence, the utilization of racial explanations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is a testimony to the determination of early students of culture to establish the discipline of anthropology as a science equal in importance to that of the natural sciences, regardless of the empirical authenticity of the methods used.

The use of racial assumptions about human nature by the anthropological theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was indicative
of their general liberal world-view. In the case of Blumenbach, Smith, Hunt and Knox the concept of race was utilized to resolve the contradiction between their liberal libertarian ideals of human freedom and equality on the one hand, and their sympathies with American slavery and British colonialism on the other. Conversely, de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Gumplovicz and the theorists of the eugenics movement used the concept of race and race purity as a vehicle for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the belief in social integration which also constitutes a basic variation of liberalism as an ideology. It is clear that the concept of race and the assumptions about human nature that were related to it, played a fundamental role in the early development of anthropological theory. It is also obvious that race as an assumption about the innate features of man's nature served as a means for the exemplification of the basic variations of the liberal world-view during the course of the initial development of anthropological thought. It is in this ideological context that the racial assumptions about man formulated by anthropological theorists historically may be fully comprehended from a sociology of knowledge perspective.
3) **The Evolution of Human Nature - Darwin and Spencer**

Anthropological theory since the eighteenth century has developed within a liberal ideological framework. At the same time it has, as a discipline, consistently relied on assumptions about man's innate nature. Apart from the racial assumptions formulated by anthropologists, human nature was also defined in an evolutionary context. The purpose of this section of this chapter will be to outline the interrelationships between the evolutionary assumptions about man originally formulated by Darwin and Spencer and the liberal ideals and beliefs which these assumptions served to legitimize.

The theory of social evolution did not begin with the writings of Herbert Spencer or Charles Darwin. On the contrary, the idea of evolution had always been an inherent element of the liberal world-view since the time of Rousseau. It was Rousseau who had maintained the belief that man was characterized by an innate faculty of perfection. This notion of perfectibility referred to man's capacity to improve his situation through collaborating with other men who shared the common goal of controlling nature. The idea of the inevitable progress of the human species was also developed by the French Positivists and by Marx. Marx, like Comte, thought that history constituted a continual advancement towards the ultimate perfection of human nature.

Many liberal social theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries believed that the purpose of social science consisted of the study of the laws of historical development. By 1851, Spencer had published *Social Statics*. This work contained, in embryo, most of his later views as related to the idea that social evolution was a continuation of bio-
logical evolution, based on tribal and racial competition. It was in response to Spencer's more general ideas of social evolution, that Darwin, in his *Origin of Species* (1859), came to expand upon the concept of natural selection. Darwin tried to convince the scientific community that early man was simply an anthropoid, equipped with a more developed brain than most other animals. In this major treatise, he attempted to explain the operation of both artificial selection by man and natural selection through the struggle for existence. He outlined some of the causes of variation and modification other than those determined by natural selection. In providing empirical support for his theories, he used evidence obtained from paleontology, geographic distribution, comparative anatomy and embryology. Other major publications by Darwin, including *The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex* (1871) and *The Expression of Emotions In Man and Animals* (1872), constituted further amplifications of the theory of evolution and natural selection in relation to the origin of man.

Darwin, urged on by the theories and insights of Spencer, gave the liberal ideals of progress and perfectibility a natural scientific basis. Some aspects of his theories also contributed to giving credibility to the liberal *laissez-faire* ideals of individualism, and individual competition for survival. The idea of evolution was complementary to liberal *laissez-faire* ideals insofar as Darwin, Wallace and other evolutionary theorists argued that

...the noblest faculties of man are strengthened and perfected by struggle and effort; it is by increasing warfare...and in the midst of difficulty and danger that energy, courage, self-reliance, and industry have become the common qualities of the northern races.
The Darwinists were convinced that it was through individual struggle and the struggle between races that the individual, as well as the human species as a whole, was perfected. Darwin explained that the single dynamic of social progress was comprised of the survival of the fittest. Likewise, the advocates of the liberal ideals of laissez-faire support the belief in

...self-interest and freedom of action limited only by sanctity of contract and criminal code...It offered freedom with too little justice and judged excellence with too little reference to what is human and culturally excellent.

Darwin's theories, however, were not limited to merely supporting the ideals of individualism.

Many aspects of Darwin's theories tended to be based on specific assumptions about man's innate nature. It was Darwin who legitimated the use of assumptions about man's innate nature in the explanation of social phenomena. Loren Eiseley has pointed out that the

...Darwinians...were essentially biologists. They were accustomed to dealing with the lower animals, with instincts, with inherited habit, with the study of organisms responding to change rather than the observation of creatures controlling their own environment. They tended to confuse cultural behavior with the inherited behavior with which they were more familiar.

The use of assumptions about human nature by Darwin contributed to the exemplification of the liberal ideals of social integration. It is in this sense that his evolutionary theories about man may be interpreted from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

Unlike Spencer, Darwin was not unconditionally committed to the ideals of individualism. His theories of the survival of the fittest and natural selection were illustrative of the belief that human evolution
was a process of increasing individualization. Nevertheless, he also later came to use certain assumptions about human nature in order to emphasize the social orientation of man. In this context, he stated in the *Descent of Man* that...

Although as he now exists, (man) has few special instincts, having lost any which his early progenitors may have possessed, this is no reason why he should not have retained from an extremely remote period some degree of love and sympathy for his fellows. He added further, that insofar as...

...man is a social animal, it is almost certain that he would inherit a tendency to be faithful to his comrades, and obedient to the leader of his tribe. Man, in his opinion, while achieving a high level of individuality as realized through the processes of natural selection, was also able to retain his basic social orientation, owing to certain features of his innate nature. Darwin's theories, because of their emphasis on both the ideals of individualism and social integration, reflect the basic ambivalence of liberalism as an ideology.

Spencer's writings, on the other hand, were not ambivalent in their general ideological orientation. In short, Spencer fully supported the liberal *laissez-faire* ideals of individualism, over and above all other considerations. His writings and the particular ideals which they legitimized had a much wider influence on the public, especially in America. His books were written in a style generally comprehensible to most classes of individuals. The popularity of his writings developed to the extent that he became "the metaphysician of the homemade intellectual and the prophet of the cracker-barrel agnostic."
Spencer was a devout adherent of the idea of free, private enterprise, unhampered by government regulation. He believed that the ideals of liberal laissez-faire were synonymous with Nature's "stern discipline" in the realization of progress in the natural world. Also, he insisted that just as nature ensured the survival of the fittest races by subjecting all to a harsh struggle for existence, so society should compel its members to develop self-reliance, thrift, foresight and industry by exposing them to the rigours of economic competition.

It was only through competition, as Spencer maintained, that the individual would be able to fully develop his capacities and talents. He predicted that ultimately, the "discipline of racial conflict, would develop a higher breed of men capable of living without government". Like Darwin, Spencer developed many of his theories dealing with man's nature on the basis of his liberal ideological biases.

Assumptions about man's innate nature were extensively used by Spencer in the elaboration of his general evolutionary point of view. Caneiro has suggested that

...if Spencer saw societies as something more than mere aggregations of individuals behaving instinctually, he nevertheless did not regard the behavior of social animals and that of man as sufficiently different to warrant making a categorical distinction between them...he almost never used the word "culture" to label "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, laws and customs".

Spencer's utilization of assumptions about human nature were indicative of his concern with the definition of final causes. He conceived the purpose of social theory as being directed towards the definition of the necessary and final causal relationships that exist between man, nature
and social phenomena.

Spencer's major publications included: Social Statics (1851); First Principles (1962); The Principles of Biology, 2 vols. (1864-67); Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1855-72); The Principles of Sociology, 3 vols. (1876-96) and the Principles of Ethics, 2 vols. (1892-3). In all of his works, he endeavored to show that human institutions were not based on an accidental assembly of customs and beliefs. Instead, he argued that institutions consisted of a system of structurally related parts, the functions of which are adjusted to each other and to the environment, within the context of the struggle for existence. His emphasis on the priority of the individual over society was a testimony to the fact that his closest affinity was

...with those outrunners of the Enlightenment - Priestly, Paine and Godwin - and with the Scottish moralists; and like them he was more concerned with progress than with order, which indeed seemed to him less of a problem, and with the condition of the individual's emancipation from social repression.

The recognition of Spencer's belief in the liberal ideals of individualism holds central importance to the purposes of this study. The relationship between his liberal ideals, assumptions about human nature and his general theory of evolution will be examined here within a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis.

In Social Statics, he maintained that the individual in order to realize his full potentialities, had no need of the guidance or constraints provided by society. The claims of the individual to act as he pleases are to be held valid against the claims of other individuals who control him...other individuals may most advantageously leave him to self-
guidance, rational and instinctive...left free within these bounds...each citizen...will become adapted to the requirements of social life more rapidly than when subject to additional restraints by the reason of Society, as embodied in law..."

For Spencer, man's accommodation to society and to the interests of other men, could most appropriately be carried out by allowing free reign to man's individual instinct. The realization of the freedom of the individual, would never contribute to the denial of the interests of other individuals because

"...there exists in us an impulse...a 'Moral Sense', the duty of which is to dictate rectitude in our transactions with each other, which receives gratification from honest and fair dealing..."

He assumed that this innate impulse of a "moral sense" would ensure that the complete freedom of the individual would not impinge on the liberty of all.

Spencer stated that such a cohesive relationship between individual and collective liberty

"...is that fundamental truth of which the moral sense is to give an intuition and which the intellect is to develop into a scientific morality."

In relation to this point, he added that the encroachment of one individual on another would be impossible, owing to the fact that there exists

"...in man what may be termed an instinct of personal rights - a feeling that leads him to claim as great a share of natural privilege as is claimed by others..."

The "instinct of personal rights" would ensure the personal freedom of the individual. Also, man's innate "faculty" of sympathy would provide for the respect of the freedom of others.
Economic individualism was understood as a fundamental feature of human nature. He believed there existed, innate in each individual, "the instinct of accumulation" of which "no change in the state of society will alter its nature and its office". This instinct of accumulation was said to be complemented by the instinct of approbation. "After those instincts immediately connected with the preservation of life, love of approbation exercises the greatest influence upon human conduct". A society which allowed the individual to express his freedom in economic matters, as well as in terms of developing his personal capabilities in other areas, was defined as being the best indication that such a society was conforming to the "natural order of things".

In Spencer's eyes, the maintenance of "a natural order" guaranteed that society

is constantly excreting its unhealthy, imbecile, slow, vacillating and faithless members.

Owing to the tendency of societies to naturally exclude the less fit individuals there was, as a result, no need for any form of philanthropy. Such social welfare practices would deter society from the natural and purifying benefits which are the inevitable consequence arising from the survival of the fittest. For this reason, he argued that state intervention in the industrial development of society was antithetical to human nature. In this sense, "the industrial system is a product of existing human nature and can be improved only as fast as existing human nature improves". All forms of assistance to the poor could amount to nothing more than being "a kind of social opium eating, yielding temporary mitigation at the eventual cost of extensive misery".
Spencer advocated the "natural" adaptation of the individual to his social environment. He justified the right as well as the ability of the individual to conduct his life without the influence of external intervention by noting that

...the constitution of all organic matter specially adapts it to receive and produce the internal changes required to balance external changes.121

Cooperation between men was inevitable, as Spencer believed, without the necessity of having it imposed on the individual by government regulations. In *Principles of Psychology*, it was pointed out that sympathy was innate. It was through the survival of the fittest individuals that this instinct would be naturally strengthened; ensuring that the less fortunate would not be neglected. Moreover, he outlined the fact that sociality and sympathy

...having thus commenced, and the survival of the fittest tending ever to maintain and increase it, it will be further strengthened by the inherited effects of habit.122

The realization of individuality through the evolutionary process of competition, according to this theory, contributed to the development of the innate sentiments of sociality and sympathy.123 The possibility of social progress was understood as being directly rooted in the freedom of the individual to compete with others for his survival.124 In *A Plea For Liberty* (1897), he observed that...

Though the many who revile competition strangely ignore the enormous benefits resulting from it - though they forget that most of all the appliances and products distinguishing civilization from savagery, and making possible the maintenance of a large population on a small area, have been developed by the struggle for existence.125
It is obvious that the primary purpose of Spencer's theories, as well as his explicit assumptions about human nature, were to justify the liberal ideals of individualism.

In his Principles of Sociology, Spencer began with the premise

...that social phenomena depend in part on the natures of the individuals and in part on the forces the individuals are subject to...126

In this context, he related most of his interpretations of specific social phenomena and events to certain innate characteristics of human nature in their interaction with external forces. For example, in explaining the origins of ceremony, he argued that it "preceded human evolution: (and is) traceable among the higher animals".127 It was added that "spontaneous manifestations of emotion initiate formal observances".128 For this reason, the idea that observances of ceremonies had social causes or were related to "conscious symbolization" was rejected. He was convinced that such superstitions as the belief in ghosts by primitive peoples have natural causes. Moreover,...

Differences among the ascribed powers of ghosts soon arise. They naturally follow from observed differences among the powers of living individuals.129

He explained that all of social evolution paralleled biological evolution in its manner of development.130

In Spencer's opinion, such features of social evolution as the division of labor, corresponded directly to the evolutionary processes of natural selection. People were selected for occupations according to the innate characteristics of their personality.131 As he elaborated,

...(in) the average of cases, conquered peoples have been formed mainly of captives and their descendants; and since, in the average of cases, conquered peoples have
been in some way or other inferior to their conquerors
...we may consider the division of labour between the
slave-classes and the ruling classes as having a
psycho-physical origin. 132

He supported the view that in all human societies the division of labor
and the formation of classes in general corresponded closely with the
psycho-physiological differences of the individuals occupying each specific
occupational category. 133 Spencer justified the existing form of social
organization insofar as he believed it conformed to the general laws of
evolution and the innate capacities of human nature. 134

Darwin and Spencer utilized the theory of evolution as well as assump-
tions about the innate nature of human nature. Darwin's theory of evolu-
tion, in its emphasis on individual competition, natural selection and
survival of the fittest, contributed towards the exemplification of the
liberal laissez-faire ideals of individualism. His use of assumptions
about the nature of human nature was also indicative of his belief in the
need and the possibilities for social integration. In many respects, his
use of assumptions about man on the one hand, and his theories of evolu-
tion on the other, illustrated his generally ambivalent attitude to lib-
eralism as an ideology. Conversely, Herbert Spencer's reference to the
idea of evolution, as well as his assumptions about the innate nature of
human nature, contributed in a straight-forward manner towards the objec-
tification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal ideals of
individualism within a laissez-faire context. Together, the theories of
evolution and assumptions of human nature formulated by Darwin and Spencer,
provided a basic theoretical and ideological framework for the development
of anthropological theory in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
will be discussed. From this sociology of knowledge perspective it

turns about man's intrinsic nature and the liberal ideals of individualism-
while will be reexamined. Further, the relationship between their assump-
respect the theories of Hume, Lyman, Whewell, Morgan, Freezer and
assumptions about human nature was empirically justifed. In this the-
thorites' of the idea of evolution as well as a number of related
whether the argument made by the major anthropologists evolution-

The purpose of this section of this analysis shall be to judge

tions about human nature received serious consideration.
has the question of the empirical credibility of these various assump-
theory of evolution as well as the liberal individualistic ideals. Not
assumptions about human nature in the development of both the
except to which anthropologists in the nineteenth century made use of
commonly observed. What has not received special attention is the
idea of evolution and the liberal ideals of individualism has been
the complementarity relationship between the
they were incorporated into the anthropological theories of the nine-
notions of evolution, natural selection and survival of the fittest as
society in a specifically biological context. At the same time, the
ideas of evolution were indarctive of their willingness to view human
enthusiasm which many anthropologists demonstrated in the use of the
extend the idea of evolution to the study of human society. The
whole movement in anthropological theory developed which endeavored to
with the advent of Darwin's and Spencer's theories of evolution, a

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will be possible to understand more clearly: the dynamics of anthropological theory construction; the degree to which anthropology as a discipline has made use historically of assumptions about human nature, and the relationship between those assumptions of human nature and the ideals particular to liberalism as an ideology.

The enthusiasm displayed over Darwin's discoveries was avidly demonstrated in the theoretical trends and orientations of the anthropological studies of natural law.135 Probably one of the most outstanding contributors to the study of comparative jurisprudence, utilizing the basic premises of evolutionism, was Sir Henry Sumner Maine (1822-1888). Maine, in his most well known work, Ancient Law (1861), attempted to explain...

...some of the earliest ideas of mankind, as they are reflected in Ancient Law, and to point out the relation of those ideas to modern thought.136

His contribution was acclaimed by other notable anthropologists such as Morgan, who believed that Maine created "the natural history of law for mankind".137 What must be considered here is the extent to which Maine utilized assumptions about human nature within a liberal ideological context in formulating his theories dealing with the evolution of ancient law.

According to Maine's theory, law has always existed even in the early infancy of human civilization. Law was defined in its early evolutionary stages as "habit" and not a conscious volition of reason, which preceded the development of customs.138 We can only assume from his description of the origin of law that he conceived of it as an inherent or innate element of human nature. He related the social source of all
law to the family, where the obedience of the sons to their father is a "natural fact". Such assertions were explicitly based on the assumption of certain constants of human behavior which were presumed to be natural or innate. These determinate assumptions about the innate features of human nature lacked any form of evidence other than mere speculation.

Maine's evolutionary scheme of the development of law began with the Roman *Patria Potestas*. As he explained, small social groups (the *Patria Potestas*) were the original basis of Roman social and legal organization. Law, as it was defined by the *Patria Potestas*, had its roots in instinctual parental authority. He went on to describe how parental authority was replaced by a military and religious oligarchy, which came to monopolize the knowledge of all laws. This period was referred to as the epoch of Customary Law. The epoch of Customary Law was replaced by the Era of Codes and the Twelve Tables of Rome. This was the period when the history of civilized jurisprudence began.

The Roman Code itself was nothing more than a formal documentation of the existing customs of the Roman people which was known as Civil Law. Rome and all Roman nations were originally governed by Civil Law. To briefly summarize Maine's argument and theory, because of the influx of immigrants into Rome, as well as the absorption of foreign nations, Roman jurists were faced with the problem of deciding what code of laws to use to govern these foreign peoples. If the Romans allowed these immigrants to be ruled by their own native civil law, it would give the impression to these foreigners that Rome was willing to make concessions to the demands of its subjects. On the other hand, if the Romans
governed the immigrants by Roman law they would in fact be granting them the status of Roman citizens, a privilege reserved for only the native citizens of Rome. It was asserted that the "instinct of self-preservation" compelled the Romans to find some method of defining the legal rights and duties of foreigners

...who might otherwise...have decided their controversies by armed strife.

Compelled by the instinct of self-preservation and the individualistic need for survival, the Romans devised the idea of the Jus Gentium. The Jus Gentium was the "Rule of Law Common to all Nations", a collection of rules and legal precedents common to all the social institutions among all of the Italian tribes. Jus Gentium, the Law of Nature, replaced Roman Civil Law and became the basis for the legal codes of modern Western civilization. Later, it was used by the Liberal jurists in their theory of the Social Contract.

Maine's theory of the origins of law contains within itself a determinate assumption about the innate characteristics of human nature. According to Maine, "instinct" was the natural imperative that necessitated the development of Natural Law which, in turn, inevitably led to the development of our own modern legal system. The idea of instinct was a well recognized biological concept during the time that Maine wrote as it is now. We may understand the concept or category of instinct to refer to an innate behavioral mechanism which functions as, an adaptive element of action and which is largely independent of learning. Its fundamental elements are innately organized (part of the genetic structure of the species) and require no specific type of experience as back-
ground information for effective performance. The proof of the existence of an instinct requires a complex series of observational studies where the behavior of a large number of human individuals or animals as members of the same species, are compared.

Maine, himself, gave no evidence to show that his use of the instincts which he defined were, in fact, based on the observations deduced from similar experimentations. His explanation that the practice of legal contract was the extension of the "instinct of community" which had held together archaic societies, similarly lacks empirical justification and evidence. His final argument in _Ancient Law_ represented an attempt to rationalize the death penalty. He justified the death penalty by referring to "two great instincts which lie at the root of law": the community's need for revenge and, secondly, the community's need for a deterrent against the imitation of a crime.

The definitions of parental authority, Natural Law, contract and the death penalty were all conceptualized by Maine within a framework of explanation that utilized determinate assumptions about man's innate nature. These assumptions were not provided with any form of empirical verification other than that of blatant assertion. The convenience of the various assumptions of human nature to his larger theoretical framework is obvious. They lent the support and credibility of natural, biological law to a theory which could only pretend to imitate it.

A heated debate arose later between Maine, Morgan and McLennan over the question of the original form of family and kinship. This debate provides another vivid example of Maine's willingness to use unsubstantiated assumptions about man's nature whenever convenient, in order to
give "scientific" authority to his own anthropological theories and arguments. In another of his notable works, *Dissertations On Early Law and Custom* (1883), Maine attempted to prove, contrary to the arguments of Morgan, that it was only the "Patriarchal Theory" which would enable anthropologists to trace the 'real' history of the institutions of human society. He contended that the "Matriarchal Theory", which was based on the belief in an original state of promiscuity was false. On the contrary, he asserted that the origin of the family was related to the existence of separate families, held together by the eldest male who exerted his "instinctive" influence of power over the other members. The males of the family kept particular control over the females and children because of their own instincts of sexual jealousy and love of offspring. Not wishing to be overly dogmatic, he was open to the suggestion that Matriarchal societies might in fact exist. If they did exist they were simply in a transitional stage, changing towards the natural state of the Patriarchal society.

Our final appraisal of Maine's theories differs considerably from Lowie's opinions on this subject. Lowie described Maine as

Neither a mystic like Bachofen nor a romanticist like Rousseau, through the incorruptible medium of his common sense, he sees things as they are and were...

We must finally conclude that the conceptual foundations of Maine's theoretical structures consisted for the most part of assumptions about human nature which were empirically unjustified. He failed to present any evidence that such assumptions were any more than mere speculations of his anthropological imagination. We may see from this analysis of Maine's theories, that the tendency to use empirically unjustified
assumptions about human nature was not restricted solely to the racial determinists within the history of anthropological thought.

From a sociology of knowledge perspective it is apparent that there is a distinct parallel between at least some of Maine's assumptions about human nature and the liberal ideals of individualism. In this regard he explained that the origin of Natural Law was rooted in the instinct for "self-preservation" as it was experienced by the Roman citizens. The instinct of self-preservation is complementary to the liberal laissez-faire belief in the ideas of free individual competition, the struggle for individual survival, and the survival of the fittest. The notion of the preservation of one's own self-interests exemplifies the liberal libertarian ideal of individualism. In this sense the survival of the individual or the group is interpreted as being the most important factor in the determination of social development and progress. Similarly, Maine's emphasis on the instinctive influence of the individual male within the context of the family lends support to the liberal ideal of individualism and individual self-assertion. The relationship between the use of assumptions about human nature defined in an evolutionary context and the liberal ideals of individualism, is evidenced in other anthropological theories of the nineteenth century, apart from those developed by Maine.

Another anthropologist who developed an evolutionary view of social development and wrote during the same period as Maine, was J.F. McLennan. McLennan's interest in the origins of "survivals" led him to write *Primitive Marriage* (1865), in which he tried to explain the specific survival of the ritual symbol of marriage by capture. His original
interest in this subject stemmed from his early readings in Greek and Roman history where he had noticed a number of references to the practice of marriage by capture. 154 He firmly believed that the actual practice of bride capture might well have existed everywhere at one point in the evolution of human society. 155 As he stated, "all fictions once had their germs in fact".

In the introduction to Primitive Marriage, McLennan argued that the practice of bride capture was not based on an instinctive desire as other theorists had been led to believe. 156 This practice, as he saw it, had a deeper source, related to the circumstances, ideas and systems of kinship arrangements of primitive peoples. The original state of human society was described as consisting of a number of tribes which were in a perpetual state of war, owing to the "impulse to feud", which was an innate characteristic of all groups, tribes or nations. 157 It was explained that group membership (that is, membership to a tribe or a clan) was instinctive, while kinship relationships were merely the extension of group relations through time. Early primitive society was held together by the instincts of gregariousness and self-preservation. 158 Owing to the instinctive hostility between human groups and the need to preserve the group, male children were preferred. Males rather than females could become warriors and ensure the defense of the tribe. 159 For this reason, females were killed. As a direct result of the practice of female infanticide the rule of exogamy - compulsory marriage outside the family - was established. Since "savages" were in a constant state of war with one another, a male could only take a wife from another tribe by force. 160 He went on to suggest that marriage by capture
may have evolved from an earlier state of polyandry. Exogamy and bride capture were a response to polyandry in order to relieve the shortage of females.

McLennan's theory was a subtle and intricate one. Most of his causal premises however, were related to assumptions about human nature. Their empirical credibility at least from the evidence which he presented, can rightly be questioned. The practice of infanticide, exogamy and bride capture are, according to his theory, the indirect consequences of two instinctual motive forces: the instinctual hostility between tribes, and the instinctual maintenance of group membership. The point was made in the beginning of his analysis, that bride capture was not instinctual. This idea should in fact be qualified with the understanding that according to his own theory, bride capture is the derived consequence of a number of interdependent instincts. The reasons he chose to use unjustified assumptions about human nature were similar to those which had motivated other anthropologists to use similar principles. Assumptions about man's innate nature were relied on in order to demonstrate that his theories consisted of the articulation of primary and natural biological laws - the basic imperatives of human nature. By using such assumptions, McLennan hoped to remove his analysis from the level of philosophical speculation and place it instead in the realm of the natural sciences, where social facts could be shown to be of the same irreducible nature as the organic elements of the natural world.

Many of McLennan's assumptions about human nature may be interpreted as a justification of the liberal laissez-faire ideals of self-preservation and free competition. He believed that the dynamics under-
lying social development and the emergence of specific cultural practices, like exogamy, were directly related to both man's individual need for self-preservation, as well as the free competition between human individuals and groups. Liberal laissez-faire attitudes and values were widely held by members of the business as well as the academic communities. In this respect it is not surprising that McLennan utilized assumptions about human nature which complemented such a liberal world-view. It was in this fashion that his theories were able to gain wide acceptance and popular support.

The use of assumptions about human nature in the legitimization of the liberal ideals of individualism characterized many of the major evolutionary theories in the nineteenth century. The theories of Sir Edward Burnett Tylor are a case in point. He was one of the more influential evolutionary anthropologists of this period. It was Tylor who was responsible for introducing the definition of culture to anthropology which still forms the core of any modern theory of culture today. He is recognized by contemporary anthropologists as having provided the essential and valuable conceptual distinction between physical inheritance and cultural acquisition as a social process. As an unilinear evolutionist, he was interested in specific peoples and cultures only insofar as the nature of a particular culture exemplified stages of a larger evolutionary process. His writings were directed towards explaining the necessary origins of culture and modern civilization. Indeed, as Stocking has indicated, his central purpose was to prove that savagery and barbarism, as reflected in existing primitive societies, were manifestations of the early stages of civilization. The basic focal points for all
of Tylor's analyses were: religion, folklore, social organization, technology, art, linguistics and gestures.

His comparative method of analysis was common to most of the evolutionary theorists. The high degree of creativity and thoughtfulness with which he used a comparative framework of inquiry is a substantial demonstration of the fact

...that the comparative method applied to dubious but abundant ethnographic material under the guidance of a sufficiently critical intelligence, was capable of producing enduring results. 164

Most of his theories, especially his definition of culture, have long received popular attention. Many of his other insights however, as related to his assumptions about human nature, have all but been ignored. It is commonly believed that he achieved the explicit conceptual separation of culture from ideas about man's innate nature. What has not been recognized, is that in many ways he achieved exactly the opposite results in his theories. If one critically reviews the assumptions and implications of many of his theories, it is clear that Tylor did more than most of the traditional anthropologists to demonstrate the complementarity between man's innate nature and culture. At the same time, the interrelationship between his assumptions about human nature and his liberal individualistic beliefs becomes obvious when his theories are closely examined from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis.

In reviewing Tylor's earliest work, Researches Into the Early History of Mankind (1865), 165 we find that he did not admit to the relationship between human nature and culture. Nevertheless his various theories do in fact suggest distinct assumptions about the innate nature of human
nature. Stating this point more cautiously, it is quite evident that Tylor in his theories, did not deny the possibility that many aspects of human behavior and culture were related to certain innate aspects of human nature.

Tylor, like all evolutionists, believed that there were universal laws of evolution related to the idea of competition and the struggle for survival which were applicable in interpreting the stages of the development of human societies. Within his *Researches*, he attempted, in a roundabout fashion, to ascertain the general developmental laws of specific features of human behavior and culture inclusive of gestures, language, pictorial representations and writing.\(^{166}\) He addressed himself to the fundamental problem of independent invention as opposed to diffusion. In the concluding remarks to the *Researches*, he combined these two differing possibilities for the explanation of the invention of cultural phenomena. It was contended that an invention, if it was carried from one place to another

...by mere transmission from people to people, then the smallness of the change it has suffered in transplanting it is still evidence of the like nature of the soil wherever it is found.\(^{167}\)

Tylor in this statement attempted to justify the theory of psychic unity.

Psychic unity refers to the idea that all men of all races have similar mental capabilities and are able to produce the same technological inventions and forms of culture. This belief was in turn, directly related to the liberal ideal of human equality, originally expressed by the *Philosophes*. Tylor's notion of psychic unity was also predicated on a major assumption about human nature. The view that like inventions may
occur in dissimilar and unrelated situations, but which share a common level of evolutionary development, is similar to a commonly held and empirically substantiated set of observations and deductions currently maintained by contemporary ethologists. Ethologists assume that all animal species inclusive of man, possess what is referred to as innate dispositions to learn or "learning programs". More simply, animal species are understood to be genetically programmed to learn specific sets of information at "critical periods" of the ontogenesis or maturation of the individual organism.

Tylor's view of psychic unity implies very much the same idea, but from an evolutionary perspective. The concept of "critical periods" would correspond to his idea of evolutionary stages of progression, where specific inventions and sets of information are recognized by all cultures that share a similar level of social evolutionary development. As Eibl-Eibesfeldt explains...

Many aspects of behavior mature during ontogeny, others are acquired by learning. How both processes interact has been studied in many instances. Innate learning dispositions ensure the animals modifying their behavior, adopt and learn the right things at the right time.168

The theory of psychic unity implies that man's capability of generating the same ideas cross-culturally, might be a product of an innate program of learning to which the various stages of cultural development and the corresponding cultural inventions of such stages are merely a fixed response.

Other explicit assumptions about man's innate nature are evident in Tylor's theoretical arguments. In the Researches, he expressed the
opinion that if the origins of culture are to be understood, then the basic systems of communication and symbolism which underly all cultures must be examined. He reviewed the origins of the basic mediums of communication and expression shared by all cultures. These included gestures, language, picture-writing and word-writing. On the basis of a cross-cultural study of gestures, it was pointed out that the methods of the symbolic representation of certain animals, which were found to be commonly shared in the pantomines and gesture language of a large number of primitive societies, were surprisingly similar to the methods of symbolic gesture representation as employed spontaneously by deaf and dumb children. Additionally, he made the observation that the gesture language of deaf and dumb children was exactly parallel in form to the gesture language of Cisterian monks who had taken the oath of silence. It was demonstrated that the lowest class of salutations and greeting postures universally shared by primitive societies were similar to those salutations and postures of appeasement exchanged between lower animals. A basic gesture language, as it was concluded, is one and the same for all cultures and human groups and is proof of the like workings of the human mind. He made similar conclusions with regard to picture-writing. Picture-writings of "savages" were found to be not only similar to one another cross-culturally, but were in many respects identical with the pictorial representations of unschooled children in "civilized" countries.

Tyler complemented these basic insights with a number of observations which he made in a second book, Primitive Culture (1871). Here he sought to illustrate the fact that the phonetic systems of primitive peoples, as well as of young and unschooled infants, consist of emotional
and imitative sounds which are spontaneously articulated.\textsuperscript{174} These forms of expression, as it was explained, which lie at the basis of all language systems are "the natural action of man's body and mind". He saw that all languages despite their detailed differences represent the same intellectual art. Modern language was understood as being nothing more than "an old barbaric engine" added to and altered.\textsuperscript{175}

Tylor also looked at the origins of myth-making, and compared both the content and methods of the mythical expressions of primitive cultures with the myth-making of children. Primitive peoples and young children were found to attribute personal life experiences to nature through their identification with animals in a mythical context. The mental processes of mind involved in the formulation of myth were believed to constitute, not merely an impulsive habit, but a "formal enacted Law" of the human mind which remains unchanged even in modern society.\textsuperscript{176} He emphasized that the myths of "children and savages" (which are essentially founded on the analogy between the objects of nature and man) constitute the basic subject and concern of contemporary intellectuals and scholars.\textsuperscript{177}

Finally, in the second volume of \textit{Primitive Culture}, entitled \textit{Religion} In \textit{Primitive Culture}, Tylor revealed what he felt to be the underlying origin of animism or the belief in souls.\textsuperscript{178} He defined animism as the product of dreaming, where the association between animal forms and the soul is made. He described it as being neither a consequence of learning nor contact.\textsuperscript{179} It was asserted to be a universal and spontaneous tendency, common to all men.\textsuperscript{180}

Tylor's explanations of the nature of gestures, picture-writing, language, myth and animism were based on certain assumptions about the
innate nature of human nature which have gone essentially unrecognized. In attempting to reveal the universality and spontaneity of specific aspects of culture, he explicitly assumed certain species-specific behaviors of human beings. The concept of species-specific behavior refers to those forms of behavior which are commonly shared by all members of a species uniformly. Such behavior may be elicited spontaneously in a similar form by any members of the same species when a common stimulus is presented. This type of behavior, while it may vary from individual to individual is assumed to be rooted in the genetic constitution of the species which all its members share.

In his detailed observations of gestures and the articulation of certain sounds which were assumed to be universal and spontaneous, Tylor unintentionally defined forms of behavior which may be referred to as fixed-action patterns. Fixed-action patterns are typically discerned in the early behavior of children and in greeting behavior. Specifically, the concept of fixed-action patterns refers to the first component of an instinctive act - Erbkoordination. They are the form-constant movements and sounds which do not have to be learned. Also, they constitute the essential morphological characteristics which distinguishes one species from another. A fixed-action pattern is an extremely stereotyped set of actions, particularly in acts of communication and which are alike in all members of the species. We may also understand that a fixed-action pattern is a more specifically designated aspect of species-specific behavior.

There is a subtle irony in Tylor's researches of human culture. This irony consists of the fact that his goal was to divorce culture from man's
innate nature. Nevertheless, he managed to reaffirm the essential relationship between human nature and certain features of culture. What he suggested was that the basis of culture is organic in nature and is exemplified in a number of fixed-action patterns which he assumed to be fixed in the genome of the human species. At the same time, he assumed that culture develops according to fixed learning patterns which are facilitated by critical periods in the evolutionary growth of culture as a whole. Apart from these specific implications of Tylor's theories, his use of assumptions about human nature may be interpreted from a distinct sociology of knowledge framework of analysis.

The emphasis which Tylor gave to the idea of evolution as related to individual competition and the struggle for survival, as well as to the notion of the cross-cultural similarity of certain features of human behavior is indicative of his general liberal orientation. The theory of evolution, complemented by the notions of individual competition and the survival of the fittest to which he provided his general support, exemplified (as it has already been argued) the individualistic ideals particular to the liberal laissez-faire world-view. His assumptions about human nature as related to his emphasis on the universality of particular gestures, language and pictorial representations is illustrative of his belief in the ideals of human equality - ideals which originated within the libertarian tradition of the French Philosophes. Like the theories of the other evolutionary anthropologists of the nineteenth century, Tylor's theoretical arguments, and the assumptions about human nature that were related to them, served as a means to objectify, manifest, and legitimate the liberal ideals of individualism and equality.
The empirical credibility of many of Tylor's assumptions about human nature hold some serious implications for modern anthropology. This is especially true in regard to his assumptions about fixed-action patterns. Contemporary behavioral scientists ascertain the existence of a particular fixed-action pattern by measuring the extent of its universality and determine whether it may be elicited in circumstances of deprivation. Deprivation experiments are those situations where, for example, in the case of human behavior, very young infants as well as blind, deaf and dumb children are studied in isolation in order to observe those types of reflex actions which they elicit. These responses are believed to be based neither on prior socialization or learning. His comparative studies of the elementary forms of cultural behavior satisfy the first criterion of universality in determining the existence of fixed-action patterns. The observations and deductions which were made in his studies of the spontaneous behavior of deaf and dumb children also satisfy the criterion of deprivation. This is the second condition necessary for the definition of a fixed-action pattern. If Tylor is at least partially correct as to his cross-cultural observations and conclusions, as well as those resulting from his deprivation experiments, the implications of his studies as a result take on significant importance. These implications may be fully appreciated when we recall that the various forms of behavior which Tylor has described lie at the basis of all human cultures. In this fashion we may recognize that his assumptions about human nature, while conforming to a sociology of knowledge interpretation also point to the possibility of providing a more objective and scientific understanding of the nature of human nature.
Apart from Tylor, other evolutionary theorists of the nineteenth century made use of assumptions about human nature in the effort to justify the liberal ideals of individualism. Probably the most controversial, as well as the most widely recognized, of the many evolutionary anthropologists was Lewis Henry Morgan. The popularity of Morgan's *Ancient Society* (1877) was not due so much to his own scholarly abilities. Rather, it was owing to the fact that he had attracted the attention of Marx and Engels, who utilized his theories as a confirmation of their own materialistic conception of history. The synthesis of his evolutionary views with the theories of Marx and Engels was attempted in *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and The State* (1884). Morgan's theoretical emphasis on the evolution of the processes of production in terms of fishing, hunting and gathering, agriculture and the domestication of animals was directly in conjunction with the Marxian conception, that production and the tools necessary to it, are the chief factors determining the course of history. The use of Morgan's analytical framework by Marx and Engels provided a total picture of social evolution according to the tenets of historical and dialectical materialism.  

Despite the overwhelmingly positive appraisals of Morgan's work, many anthropologists agree today that his suggestive insights into the influence of technology in determining property relations were clouded by his vague and erroneous applications of these ideas. Other anthropologists emphasize that he was not a materialist at all, but a theist who believed that all of life was guided by God's hand. Humorously, Martin Opler has described those Marxists who wish to emphasize Morgan's materialism as comprising a
revivalist cult whose practitioners claim to be able to transform a Christ into a materialist by the very rapid turning of the pages of Ancient Society to the accompaniment of suitable incantations. This analysis will attempt to provide a somewhat less dogmatic interpretation of Morgan than is normally outlined by those anthropologists who have taken an interest in the implications of his theories. In light of the tendency of other evolutionary anthropologists to utilize assumptions about man's innate nature to legitimize their liberal beliefs, it is necessary to establish an understanding of what degree Morgan himself, conformed to such a general tendency.

In reviewing Morgan's Ancient Society, we discover that his so-called evolutionary stages of human society, inclusive of savagery, barbarism and civilization, were defined as being connected by a "natural" and "necessary" sequence of development. At the same time, he provided no explanation as to the causation of this necessary sequence, other than attributing it to the "natural logic of the human mind". It was explicitly assumed that social evolution consisted of the natural unfolding of certain innate human potentialities. He further indicated his reliance on assumptions about human nature by arguing that these potentialities are in fact innate "germinal ideas", inclusive of government, the family and property. Extending from this, he implied that each stage of evolutionary development facilitates the emergence of particular sets of behavior, cultural patterns, customs, institutions, inventions and property relations. According to this theory, any society at a particular evolutionary stage, will be able to realize and develop the institutions, conventions and cultural patterns exactly parallel to any
other society at a similar level of evolutionary development. As he
described...

Progress has been found to be substantially the same
in kind, in tribes and nations inhabiting different and
even disconnected continents while in the same status,
with deviations from uniformity in particular instances
produced by special causes. 194

Each technical invention that is produced at any evolutionary stage is
said to be necessarily accompanied by specific constellations of mental
and moral developments. 195

In his description of the transition from sex-classes to gens, it
was emphatically pointed out that sex-classes originally contained with-
in themselves, the "germinal" ideas and conditions of gens which were
inevitably realized by the process of natural selection. 196 Related to
this point, he went on to assert that

... the institutions of mankind (which) have sprung up
in a progressive connected series represents the workings
of unconscious reformatory movements. 197

In order to explain the evolutionary development of society, Morgan
repeatedly relied on such concepts as "unconscious reformatory movements"
which were understood to be innate to human nature. "Out of a few germ:
of thought have evolved all the principle institutions of mankind."

Morgan explained that government, as a social institution, neces-
sarily developed with the emergence of gentes. Government was defined as
being the result of "the natural tendency" for tribes which are both
kindred and contiguous to confederate. 198 Confederations grew naturally
out of the previously existing germinal elements existing within the
phratry and tribe. Conversely, the phratry developed from the gens.
Their growth was guided by the innate "logic of the human mind." 199 The
gen, phratry, tribe, confederation and nation were seen as an organic sequence motivated by natural necessity in the realization of germinal ideas. Even the growth of the family, through its various stages of the Consanguine, Punaluan and the Monogamian, was said to represent the growth of the "germinal idea" of the family - each stage having "sprung" successively one from the other. It was maintained that all facets of human society and culture have grown according to the dictates of human intelligence. However, he was careful to note that the human mind

although conditioned in its powers within narrow limits seeks ideal standards invariably the same. Its operations consequently, have been uniform through all the stages of human progress.

Social evolution for Morgan, was a product of human intelligence. He nevertheless believed that intelligence was merely the reflection of certain innate uniform sequences and ideal standards to which all minds conform.

In reviewing the theories contained in Ancient Society, we are confronted with the realization that Morgan's whole evolutionary schema was based on the assertion of the existence of a number of germinal ideas, innate to man, which naturally unfold during the evolutionary process. Secondly, we find that his evolutionary principles were rooted in the belief that any society existing within a specific evolutionary sequence will develop institutions, conventions and customs exactly particular to that sequence. In this respect, he insisted that there corresponds a determinate set of inventions, institutions and cultural patterns to each stage of human evolution. He further assumed that individuals living in a society that has developed to a certain evolutionary stage, are innately
capable of learning and developing those cultural patterns and institutions which correspond to that specific evolutionary level.

Apart from the obvious speculative nature of Morgan's assumptions about human nature, it is important to appreciate from a sociology of knowledge perspective, the degree to which such assumptions were essentially complementary to the liberal ideals of individualism. Evolution was conceived of as a process which was based not on the workings of abstract laws, but rather on the realization of certain innate or "germinal" ideas particular to the individual. By emphasizing that evolution was rooted in the "natural logic of the human mind", credibility was given to the liberal ideal of individualism insofar as specific aspects of the individual mind were designated as being the prime movers of human evolution. The other evolutionary theories, inclusive of those formulated by Maine, McLennan and Tylor, legitimized the liberal laissez-faire ideals of individualism through the outlining of assumptions of human nature which complemented the evolutionary notions of the individual struggle for self-preservation and the survival of the fittest. Morgan, conversely, chose to justify the liberal ideals of individuality through describing how the human individual as an active and reasoning being was the chief factor in the determination of the evolutionary process.

Other anthropologists apart from Morgan were also not exempt from the utilization of assumptions about human nature within a liberal ideological context. Perhaps the most dramatic as well as the most detailed of the anthropological approaches, in the explanation of social evolution was taken by Sir James Frazer in his twelve volume work, *The Golden Bough*, published between 1890 and 1915. *The Golden Bough* constituted an
extensive attempt to account for the evolutionary process by which "the
thoughts and efforts of man have passed through the successive stages of
Magic, Religion and Science". Frazer related his whole theory of social
and cultural development to the myth of the Golden Bough with which he
had become fascinated, through his study of the ancient classics. What
must be specifically examined here is the extent to which he utilized
assumptions about human nature to lend credibility to, and justify the
liberal beliefs to which he may have adhered.

The myth of the Golden Bough was concerned with the rule of priestly
succession at the Sacred Grove of Diana at Nemi, in the Alban hills of
Italy. The Priest-King of this sacred grove would have to be constantly
on guard for his life. He had originally gained his position by murdering
his predecessor with a sprig of mistletoe. The ultimate fate of the
Priest-King was to be put to death in the same manner by a more success-
ful challenger. Frazer sought to explain this "barbarous custom of
the priesthood of Nemi" and determine whether the motives leading to the
inevitable murder of the Priest-King were universal.

By the time of the third edition of the Golden Bough, Frazer was
willing to admit what is obvious to anyone who undertakes the task of
reading this ponderous achievement of anthropological theory and data
collection. He declared

...that his explication of the Golden Bough myth
was just a dramatic device for setting forth all the
information he had gathered on primitive thought and
culture.

His ability to maintain a consistent theoretical unity throughout the
work is strained, owing to his imposition of a rather complex hypothesis
on an even more complex collection of data. Although the Golden Bough is characterized by an overwhelming number of theoretical inconsistencies, it nevertheless contains a number of insightful contributions. Probably the most important of these insights is the distinction which was made between magic, religion and science. This distinction nevertheless was predicated on explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature.

According to Frazer, magic was based on two fundamental principles of thought.

1. **The Law of Similarity** - the production of an effect by its imitation.

2. **The Law of Contact or Contagion** - whatever is done to a natural object will affect any person who comes in contact with it. 205

The real origin of magic, as he asserted, lies in "the mental framework and constitution of mankind" - a fundamental category of human nature. 206

At least by implication, this explanation of the origins of magic rests on the assumption that it is innate not only to the human species, but to "the beasts" as well. He described how the lower animals are also capable of recognizing the law of association, of which both the laws of similarity and contagion are manifestations. 207

According to this theory, religion is distinctively human. Religion constitutes man's belief in a power superior to himself. However, underlying all religious beliefs is "a belief in the efficacy of magic". 208

All religions ultimately then, according to Frazer, are blended with, and based on, magical practices. These magical practices were, and always will be, directed towards the satisfaction of two primary wants or needs of man - food and children. 209
Frazer related how the acceptance of religious doctrines by man is mediated by man's own "natural sentiments of humanity" and of "self-preservation". That is to say, the process of the accommodation of individuals to the religions of Buddhism and Christianity, which demanded both celibacy and self-denial, was moderated by man's own innate sentiments of self-preservation. These sentiments ensured that self-denial and celibacy would not be realized to their fullest extent. As religion develops, it is inevitably superseded by science. Religion, according to this evolutionary theory, replaced magic only to be displaced by science upon which man must now depend for an explanation of nature.

It is important to realize that Frazer could only explain such an evolutionary sequence by assuming certain innate tendencies of human nature. Marvin Harris has already made note of the fact that...

The whole process of the alleged transition from magic through religion to science depends on nothing but an inherent tendency of thought to perfect itself. Frazer's reliance on assumptions about the nature of human nature, is evidenced throughout his theories on social evolution. These assumptions include such concepts as "inherent tendency", "instinct", and "fundamental wants". Most notably, these concepts play a definite causal role as infrastructural components within his larger theoretical schema.

It appears that his willingness to use such concepts is distinctly contradicted by his own denunciation in another of his voluminous studies, Totemism and Exogamy, of all those who would use exactly the same type of unjustifiably naive assumptions about human nature. He had little reservation in criticizing Westermarck's instinctual theory of exogamy as constituting an attempt
...to explain...too exclusively from physical and biological causes without taking into account the factors of intelligence, deliberation and will. According to his own argument, any anthropological explanation which must rely on irreducible categories related to human nature ...

is, as I have already said not science but a bastard imitation of it.

Using his own criticisms, we can only conclude, by the very nature of the assumptions about man, so frequently utilized throughout the *Golden Bough*, that Frazer himself produced nothing more than a "bastard imitation of science". The extent to which he failed to maintain an objective type of analysis is evidenced in the distinct relationship which existed between his assumptions about human nature and his liberal ideals.

Frazer's theories dealing with the origins of magic, religion and science were characterized by determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature. These assumptions served to justify the liberal ideals of individualism in at least two respects. First, the subjective features of human evolution were outlined in relation to the development of magic insofar as he asserted that the origin of magic, "lies in the mental framework and constitution of mankind". In this fashion, he was able to give recognition to the role which the individual, through the application of his intelligence, played in determining the evolutionary process.

Secondly, like Maine, McLennan and Tylor, he lent support to the liberal *laissez-faire* ideals of individualism through his emphasis on the role which man's instincts for self-preservation played in determining the evolutionary transition from religion to science. Thus, Frazer's whole theory of the evolutionary development of magic, religion and science was
based on explicit assumptions about human nature which conformed to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. These assumptions in short contributed to the legitimization of the ideals of individualism particular to liberalism as an ideology.

The use of assumptions about human nature within a liberal ideological context is also characteristic of at least one contemporary evolutionary anthropologist. Any comprehensive appraisal of the evolutionary school in anthropology must make at least brief mention of Leslie White, who is its most contemporary member. Leslie White's essential purpose in both of his major theoretical arguments, The Science of Culture (1949) and The Evolution of Culture (1959), was to demonstrate that the study of culture must be treated as a separate science - the science of culturology. He posited the idea that culture is an independent entity, containing within itself its own laws of evolutionary development. It was further maintained that neither a biological, psychological nor economic interpretative framework was sufficient to understand the nature of culture.

In The Science of Culture, White exclaimed that human nature has nothing whatsoever to do with the determination of culture. Man, in his opinion, was completely unrestricted by his own innate nature to develop in any way possible. As he argued, it was the unlimited nature of culture itself which allowed man to develop in an unrestricted fashion. In short, culture was seen as the guarantee of the unlimited potentialities of human growth. However, as one reads through the text closely, it is immediately apparent that White was quite confused as to the degree of interdependency or independency that might exist between the innate nature of man and culture. At one point in his analysis he pointed out
that the formula for the explanation of human behavior is:

\[ \text{Human organism} \times \text{Cultural stimuli} \]

\[ \rightarrow \text{Human behavior} \]

Within this theoretical context he admitted to the possibility that man's innate needs play at least an indirect role in the determination of culture.

White was willing to point out the cultural significance of human nature in one chapter. However, he was reluctant to admit to it in the next, emphasizing that "all human behavior originates in the use of the symbol". Again, in another chapter, he reasserted that human behavior must be considered distinctly apart from man's innate nature and be explained solely in terms of culture (symbols). In the following chapter, he reestablished his former position. In describing the complexity of human behavior, he concluded that it is determined both by man's innate nature as well as by culture. There are sufficient examples at hand to maintain the position that White's inconsistency as to the role which man's innate nature plays in the determination of culture and human behavior is a conspicuous and characterizing feature of his entire analysis.

Other aspects of White's argument appear even more contradictory and incomplete. One of his more dubious arguments, in terms of its reference to man's innate nature must be stated here in full, in order that it might be more completely appreciated. It was argued that

...the general character of culture is an expression of the biological properties of the human species. But,
when it comes to an explanation of any particular culture - and all the cultures of the world are particular - or to an explanation of the process of cultural change ... a consideration of the human organism, either in its collective or individual aspects, is irrelevant.

By logical implication, what follows from this argument is that the members of any particular culture are in fact not members of the human species.

A curious conclusion to say the least, but one which necessarily follows from his logical line of argument. Obviously, his overly dogmatic belief that culture is only explained in terms of culture and not in terms of human nature, leads him to maintain some rather embarrassing theoretical positions.

In some parts of his analysis, White demonstrated his belief in the cultural determination of human behavior through emphasizing the unlimited possibilities for human development. His sporadic insistence on this point in his enthusiasm to exclude man's innate nature from any consideration of human behavior, contributed to other contradictory theoretical consequences. The well known and often quoted essay, "Energy and the Evolution of Culture", contained in The Science of Culture, suggests a number of explanatory ambiguities, which have definite implications as to his assumptions about human nature. In this chapter, the following formula was constructed in attempting to account for the process of cultural development.

\[ E \times T = C \]

(In which C represents the degree of cultural development, E the amount of energy harnessed per capita per year, and T, the quality or efficiency of the tools employed in the expenditure of energy.)
This very impressive looking equation was assigned the status of being the basic law of cultural evolution.

White, in the working out of his culturological law, admitted that the first source of energy, upon which both technology and culture is dependent in the process of evolution, is that of human energy. Keeping this point in mind, and at the same time referring back to his formulation that $E \times T \rightarrow C$, the question arises as to the origin of the motivation for the expending of human energy in the creation of culture. We must remember also the important point which he made in referring to the idea that culture is the determinate of human behavior. Again, by logical implication within the context of his own theories and premises, we are left with making the rather absurd conclusion that the original human energy expended in the production and utilization of tools and which contributes to the processes of cultural development, is in fact not an aspect of human behavior. Further, we must conclude that any human energy utilized by men in productive relationships with technology is not human behavior.

We have reached this level of absurdity owing to the fact that White, in formulating his universal law of evolution, did not have the foresight to specify feed-back loops between human energy, technology and cultural development. A more realistic formula for his purposes should have resembled the following:

$$E \times T \rightarrow C$$

As a result of this failure to indicate a set of feed-back loops, it may be assumed that there is nothing within his universal law of evolution
which contradicts the possibility, that the original determination of
human behavior in the evolutionary process of cultural development is not,
in some degree, related to certain aspects of man's innate nature. This
possibility is further supported by certain admissions White made in his
second major work, The Evolution of Culture. In this particular study, it
was emphasized that culture must ensure, at a minimum level, the fulfill-
ment of basic human needs. Secondly, it was contended that a social
system as a whole, of which culture forms a constituent element, is deter-
mined by the way people nourish, protect and populate their kind. In
this context, he admitted that certain human species' needs play a secondary
role in the determination of social organization and culture.

In finding these numerous contradictions and shortcomings in White's
analysis and theoretical defense of culturology as an autonomous and
independent science, we can agree with him that...

The discerning of his class of determinants, and the
isolation in logical analysis of these extra-somatic cul-
tural determinants from the biological - in their group
aspect as well as individual - has been one of the most
significant advances in science in recent times. This
assertion will no doubt strike some as extravagant.

White is for once quite correct here. It is indeed a most extravagant
and unfounded assertion.

In developing various theories on evolution, White had one intention
- to show that the science of culture was separate and autonomous from
other sciences. He argued that man by nature was determined by culture
and insofar as culture is unlimited as to its possibilities for develop-
ment, so too is man's nature essentially unlimited. In this sense, he
was unwilling to admit to the existence of innate features of human
nature which might restrict man's development. His theories of culturology as a consequence may be seen as embodying the liberal ideals of individualism. We may understand individualism to mean the unrestricted development of an individual's capacities. Nevertheless, in his attempt to justify man's unlimited potentiality for growth as related to his dependence on culture, White came to admit indirectly to certain general assumptions about man's innate nature in relation to the determination of human behavior. It is in this indirect sense that we may interpret his use of assumptions about human nature and his belief in the liberal ideals of individualism from a sociology of knowledge perspective.

The evolutionary anthropologists, inclusive of Maine, McLennan, Tylor, Morgan, Frazer and White, through their use of explicit assumptions about human nature legitimized the liberal ideals of individualism. All of their anthropological theories of cultural evolution admitted to certain explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature in general, and cultural evolution in particular. In brief, nothing of what any of the cultural evolutionists have written in terms of their theoretical constructions, denied that man's innate nature is a basic underlying force of all cultures. With the exception of Tylor, these theorists lacked proof (either from observation or experiment) as to the empirical verifiability of the various instincts which they imaginatively defined. The theoretical and empirical irresponsibility of Maine, McLennan, Frazer and White cannot be ignored if any of their theoretical insights are to be used in future theory construction within the discipline.
5) **Human Nature and Historical Particularism**

The belief in the cultural determination of human behavior characterizes the current stage of the development of anthropology in the twentieth century. In North America, this tradition was most notably represented by such theorists as Franz Boas, Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie. At the same time these theorists strongly supported the liberal ideals of social integration. This particular section of this chapter will review the theories of these three anthropologists in detail. Specifically, their use of assumptions about human nature will be examined. Utilizing a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis, the relationship between their assumptions about human nature and their liberal ideals will also be outlined. By maintaining this particular type of analytical framework, it is hoped that the dynamics of theory construction as related to this specific period in the development of anthropological theory will be revealed.

Franz Boas stood at the center of the circle of those who criticized the "orgy" of evolutionary thought and diffusionist speculations which had developed at the beginning of this century. Aside from Tylor, Boas may be seen as the most influential figure in the determination of the direction and goals of modern anthropological and ethnological thought. His theoretical emphasis centered on four points of reference:

1. the insistence on a thoroughgoing description of all cultural data
2. that race, language and culture were independent variables
3. the suspicion of all premature generalization
4. the explicit belief that culture determines human behavior.
Much of Boas's influence is related to the fact that he was a teacher and supervisor of many of the most prominent and well established anthropologists in this century. His students included such individuals as Benedict, Mead, Sapir, Kroeber, Lowie and Radin. He also played a prominent role in the founding and administration of The American Anthropologist (1898), The American Anthropological Association (1900), The American Ethnological Society and The American Folk-Lore Society (1888). Most of Boas's theoretical and methodological insights continue to influence the development of modern anthropological and ethnological research.

Boas, together with Robert Lowie and Alfred Kroeber, are often seen as indicative of a period of anthropological thought which has commonly been labelled as "historical particularism". This label itself reflects their concern with the accumulation of ethnographic data in the provision of an empirical basis for anthropological theory. It was hoped that this empirical basis would act as a bulwark against the continuation of the speculations of the grand theorists of the nineteenth century. All of these theorists, writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, supported the liberal belief in social integration. In this respect they were extremely critical of the ideals of individualism which underlay the evolutionary and Social Darwinistic approach. Their general theoretical intentions were to justify the possibilities for the realization of social integration. They adhered strongly to the belief in the equality of all races and man's dependence on culture. Also, they were convinced that no innate factors of human nature, whether they be racial or otherwise, could inhibit man's integration into society and the development of his character and potentialities in a cultural
context.

The emphasis which these theorists placed on the idea of social integration was indicative of the general attitudes of North American intellectuals at the beginning of this century. The increasing demand for social reform by the lower classes in the major American urban centers and the growing need for an integrative cultural framework was reflected in the overall concerns and theoretical orientations of most social theorists in this period. The liberal belief in equality and in man's necessary dependence on society came to replace the more individualistic ideals which had stressed the survival of the fittest and the limitation of man's development by his innate nature.

The question remains whether or not those anthropologists who were intent on refuting any theories that gave recognition to the determinate role of man's innate nature were, themselves, able to remain aloof from utilizing such assumptions. The idea of the cultural determination of behavior as it was purported by such theorists as Boas, Kroeber and Lowie remains as a dominant paradigm within contemporary social theory. In this respect, the task of revealing to what extent the original cultural determinist theorists made explicit use of assumptions about human nature takes on considerable importance.

It was Franz Boas who presented one of the first ostensible critiques of the racial determinists. His book, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, published originally in Germany in 1914 as *Kultur und Rasse*, was an extensive effort to illustrate that the relationship between race, personality and culture was empirically unfounded. He argued that all races shared the same physiological and psychological bases of mental traits and abilities.
Because of the essential unity of all races, as he thought, the association between race and cultural differences was logically untenable. He believed that there were no superior races. It has been indicated by a number of biographers of Boas, that his concern with race was a reflection of his staunch liberal views on the question of human equality and his belief in the ideals of social integration. The possibility which must be considered here is whether his liberal ideals of social integration affected his choice and use of the particular assumptions about human nature which he formulated.

In The Mind of Primitive Man, Boas intimated that there was no evidence available to demonstrate that any race was a separate species, or that one race was innately superior to another. Owing to this lack of evidence, it was necessary for anthropologists to disregard the notion of race altogether and study mankind as a whole. He endeavored to prove the psychological and biological commonality of all races and that various cultural groups were not on different evolutionary lines. Moreover, he set out to demonstrate that there did in fact exist specific mental traits and abilities shared by all members of the human species. These characteristics included the abilities of "the inhibition of impulses", "the power of attention", "logical thinking" and "originality". In addition, it was argued that at least two other forms of behavior are common to all cultures and all races:

...the ability to form conclusions from premises and the desire to seek for causal relations - and the ever present tendency to value thought and action according to the ideas of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, individual freedom or social subordination.

All of these traits were understood as constituting the human species'
In his general enthusiasm to deny the fact that races are separate species with innate repertoires of behavioral and cultural characteristics, Boas came to maintain the idea that all races belong to one species. In this sense, he believed that all men shared a number of universal mental and psychological traits which formed the basis of all cultures historically. In emphasizing the cultural universality of such traits, their automatic development and the fact that they were characteristic of the whole of the human species, he indirectly defined what may be referred to as an ethogram.

The concept of an ethogram refers to a set or pattern of behaviors and capabilities which, when taken together, define a species apart from other species. The behavioral patterns particular to an ethogram are said to be species-specific, interrelated, presumed to be innate, independent of learning and in fact lie at the basis of all learning. Lorenz has defined the ethogram as an unitary collection of interrelated species-specific behavioral actions - Instinkhandlung. Tylor had outlined a number of species-specific behavioral sets, which might be seen to constitute elements of a human ethogram. Nevertheless, he had failed to show the dynamic interrelationships and interdependencies between such patterns as a homogeneous constellation. Boas, on the other hand, described the interrelationships between the specific behaviors which he observed. It is on these grounds that he gave a provisional definition of an human ethogram.

The recognition of Boas's definition of an ethogram which constituted certain assumptions about human nature, consequently provides his own
definition of culture with a distinctly new orientation. According to Boas...

Culture may be defined as the totality of the mental and physical reactions and activities that characterize the behavior of individuals comprising a social group. In that he has already defined certain mental reactions to be universal and aspects of species-specific behavior assumed to be innate, we are led to the belief that culture itself must be comprised of certain fundamental constants of human nature. This point is even more strongly emphasized in recalling the analogies which he made with respect to the commonly shared elements of animal and human behavior in terms of the quest for food, protection of young, gregariousness, ranking and ownership.

In another work, General Anthropology (1938), Boas went on to emphasize that both the dynamics of cultural change as well as certain facets of any individual's mental behavior may be innately determined. It was also maintained that the original basis of cultural inventions and the human ability to store food and provide artificial shelter originated in a fashion not...

...in any way different from the manner in which they developed among animals. He implied that the imperative of cultural invention has its roots in the elemental drive of species-survival shared by all species of animals.

As a theorist, as well as a collector of ethnographic data, Boas admitted that human behavior...

...in relation to certain aspects of life may be governed by fundamental concepts and that these are amenable to objective observations. From the nature and content of his theoretical structures (all of which
include substantial and easily recognizable assumptions about human nature) we may conclude that his idea of "fundamental concepts" might in fact be inclusive of certain innate constants of human nature.

In Race, Language and Culture (1940), Boas reaffirmed the link between innate elements of human nature, individual behavior and cultural development. There was asserted to be a definite association between the biological makeup of the human individual and his consequent psychological and behavioral capabilities. In outlining the aims of anthropological research, he insisted on the cooperative integration of the biological and cultural sciences in order that anthropologists may come to understand

...the steps which man has come to be what he is, biologically, psychologically and culturally.

He likewise emphasized the need to study the behavioral constants of men and animals in relation to parental love, the subordination of the individual to the group, social property, the capacity for inventions and the appreciation of beauty. In concluding his analysis, he insisted on the value of cross-cultural research in defining those psychological traits which are shared by all human beings. Owing to the complexity and uniqueness of cultures, it was felt that the only 'laws' which anthropologists will ever be able to generate shall be based upon the definition of species-specific traits. Boas contended that the assistance of all sciences (inclusive of, as we might assume, biology and ethology) would be required in the construction and elaboration of such laws within anthropological theory.

In one of his more popularly read books, Anthropology and Modern
Life (1928), we may find many substantial indications supportive of the argument that he relied on assumptions about man's nature within his theoretical frameworks. In this particular work, it was emphasized that many aspects of the mental behavior of men are not entirely due to learning and experience within a cultural context. The activities and behavioral sets which were designated as instinctive or organically determined, included: breathing, chewing, retreating from a threat, speech, the faculty of developing motor habits, using and making tools and modesty. Boas added that...

Conformity to instinctive activities is enforced by our organic structure, conformity to automatic actions by habit.

Human action was conceived of as operating through the medium of culture, which is at the same time directed and determined by certain innate feature of human nature.

As Ruth Bunzel has described, Boas endeavored to reveal in his research and studies

...the unity of man as a species, the universality of the basic pattern of his culture - the human biogram, as it came to be called - and human ingenuity in finding solutions to the problem of living.

Bunzel affirms what has already been pointed out here - that Boas did in fact achieve the definition of a human biogram or ethogram. It might also be emphasized that the recognition of this biogram by contemporary anthropologists has for the most part gone unrecognized, despite the avid attention which has been paid to his ethnographic insights. His belief that man's nature was dependent on culture, was indicative of his support of the liberal ideals of social integration. His definition of
a biogram was ultimately a consequence of his adherence to this liberal ideal. The belief that man's innate social character was irrelevant in determining the behavior of the individual led him to search for evidence to prove that all races were of the same nature. By disproving the role of man's innate racial nature as a determinate of human behavior, he hoped to justify the liberal ideals of social integration. In demonstrating the existence of certain cross-cultural behaviors, he ultimately defined certain characteristics which, owing to their universal existence in all individuals and in all cultures, must justifiably be assumed to be innate and species-specific. Boas replaced the idea of man's innate racial nature with the conception of man's nature as a member of a unified species. The liberal ideal of social integration as legitimized in his theories on race and culture rested on determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature insofar as man was conceived of as a single species.

The ethnographical approach outlined by Boas was adopted by many of his students, as were his assumptions about human nature. Kroeber was one of the more prominent students of Boas. He may also be linked to the Historical Particularist tradition. Like many of his contemporaries, Kroeber took a strong stand against the belief that it was possible through anthropological theory to discover "historical laws" of cultural development. He argued for the complete "subordination of the individual to his cultural milieu" in the explanation of human behavior. In his opinion, human behavior could only be understood in terms of the effects which culture had upon it. His theories served as a means to legitimate the liberal ideals of social integration. These theories
emphasized that the individual was completely dependent on culture for the development of his personality. With such a strong reliance on cultural determinism as an explanatory device, we would expect there to be little or no room for assumptions about human nature within Kroeber's various arguments and theories. On the contrary, on reading his main theoretical treatises closely, one is led to make quite the opposite conclusion. At the same time it is important to understand the close relationship which existed between his use of assumptions about human nature and his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration.

Kroeber, in his well known work *Anthropology* (1923), emphasized that the role of human nature in the formulation of anthropological theory was problematic. He nevertheless utilized assumptions about man's innate nature throughout the text in explaining different manifestations of cultural development.

The propensity of Kroeber to make use of certain assumptions about human nature is evidenced in his declaration that the "play impulses" are the chief motivators of human behavior and responsible for no less than all of the cultural achievements of the arts and sciences. Taking at times an evolutionary perspective, he attributed the invention of the first tools by man to the "drive of destructiveness". This was a drive which man is supposed to have shared with the apes. Originally this drive forced man to chip and grind stones in order to relieve his destructive urges. The products of such destructive tendencies were then, as he described, used by man as the first tools. Kroeber's explanation of other facets of human behavior and culture are certainly not exempt from assumptions about human nature. For instance,
the changes which have taken place in the human language, as well as the origin of the "aesthetic emotions", were ascribed to certain "impulses" which are unconscious. The capacity of all people to maintain certain social opinions and convictions in any culture was asserted to be the direct result of the "herd instinct".

Kroeber’s theories displayed varying degrees of conviction as to the innate basis of human behavior and culture. He nevertheless insisted that all human action was learned and that there was no relationship between man's organic needs and his cultural activities. Culture must only be understood in terms of itself. Through culture

...habits become channelled, facility and skill are acquired and this skill can then be extended to larger situations...

While he explicitly reaffirmed his belief in cultural determinism, he was only too quick to resort to notions about man's innate impulses in the explanation of specific aspects of culture, inclusive of: fashion, sports, humor, relaxation, science, the arts and the domestication of animals. Diffusion as a process of cultural change was understood as a "basic impulse" which may either be blocked or facilitated. In essence, Kroeber's entire theory of culture as it is presented here, rested on assumptions about human nature. Either the processes of cultural change or the essential phenomena intrinsic to all cultures were conceived of in terms of some rather ill-defined impulses which he assumed to be innate to man.

The Nature of Culture (1952) was another major theoretical attempt to deal with the origin of culture. In this work, Kroeber reasserted his support of the theory of the cultural determination of human behavior.
The fundamental error of the common anthropological method of investigating origins is that it isolates phenomena and seeks isolated specific causes for them. In reality, ethnic phenomena do not exist separately; they have their being only in culture.\textsuperscript{263}

His belief in cultural determinism was reinforced by his overall view of the order of the natural and social world which was conceptualized as an hierarchy. This hierarchy consisted of:

1. matter and force \hspace{1cm} - \hspace{1cm} inorganic
2. life \hspace{1cm} - \hspace{1cm} organic
3. consciousness \hspace{1cm} - \hspace{1cm} mentally organic
4. social life \hspace{1cm} - \hspace{1cm} superorganic\textsuperscript{264}

Each of these levels was understood as having its own laws of existence and causation.

The ultimate consequence of his typological division of the natural and social world was the separation of the superorganic from any objective considerations about man's nature. The empirical credibility of the division which he made was based on the following argument:

In the year of our Lord 1936, it appears that this distinction of the four levels should be, and in the main is, a commonplace needing no substantiation.\textsuperscript{265}

He attempted to remove the superorganic from all biological possibilities. It was openly stated that culture cannot be explained in terms of drives, needs or impulses. Human nature as a causal factor was to be held constant within any theory that hoped to explain any type of cultural form or event.\textsuperscript{266}

Kroeber's theme of culture as the superorganic constituted the major focal point of his interpretations in \textit{Configurations of Cultural Growth} (1944).\textsuperscript{267} Within this macro-analysis of the cultural achievements of human history, culture was treated as an epiphenomenon, lacking any
fixed laws. The major products of culture, inclusive of philosophy, science, philology, sculpture, drama, literature, painting and music, were seen as having no fixed relation with one another. 268

In another study, co-authored with Kluckhohn entitled, Culture - A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions (1952), Kroeber again explicitly admitted to the role which human nature plays in the determination of culture. In a number of places in the book, they less dogmatically suggested that a joint cultural and psychological approach could further penetrate the nature of cultural causality in the hopes that anthropologists might be able to discover the minimal causal chain of culture. 269 They intimated that while cultural values and phenomena in general are variable and relative, there nevertheless appears to exist certain universals of human biology and psychology which have created constants in cultural adaptations. At least indirectly, it was admitted that cultural phenomena may be linked with the ten constants of human nature which include:

- the existence of the two sexes
- the helplessness of infants
- food, sex and warmth
- cooperation to obtain subsistence. 270

These constants according to this theory, may provide essential evaluatory criteria and focal points for cross-cultural analysis. 271 Also, in this work, it was suggested that the cultural universals of the prevention of lying, stealing and violence in the in-group, the incest taboo and the dramatization of death may correspond "to the deeper recesses of human nature". The most marked denial of Kroeber's normally held theory of the superorganic and the cultural determination of behavior is their re-
vealing statement that "cultural differences are nothing more than variations or themes supplied by raw human nature". 272

In examining Kroeber's most important theoretical endeavors, it is obvious that there exists a marked inconsistency between his assumptions related to the cultural determination of behavior on the one hand, and the extent to which he believed culture was founded on certain innate features of human nature. At least in Anthropology, he directly attributed the formative processes of culture to certain innate "impulses" and "instincts" which were only speculatively defined and substantiated. The "play impulse" was of significant causal importance to his explanations of cultural phenomena and change. The recognition of his reliance on assumptions about man's innate nature has largely been ignored, owing to most anthropologists' rather one-dimensional emphasis on his theoretical contribution of the idea of the superorganic.

Like so many other anthropologists already dealt with here, Kroeber's assumptions about human nature are in truth nothing more than assumptions. His theories, owing to the fact that many of them were based on unsubstantiated assumptions about man, take on the distinct resemblance of the speculations of a social philosopher. It is obvious that his concern with the legitimization of the theory of the cultural determination of behavior took precedence over more objective and scientific considerations. He defined the following forms of behavior in relation to specific assumptions about human nature: the herd instinct, fashion, sports, humor, religion, science, art, cooperation, prevention of lying, stealing and violence in the in-group, and the incest taboo. It is obvious that all of these assumptions lent support to the belief that man is innately
socially oriented and depends for his existence on an integrated social structure. In this respect his use of assumptions about man's innate nature served as a means to justify the liberal ideals of social integration. Like Boas, Kroeber was convinced that the need for social integration was a basic requirement of the human species. The definition of man's nature in a liberal ideological context was not restricted to the theories of Boas and Kroeber. Robert Lowie also made use of assumptions about human nature to justify the liberal ideals of social integration.

The final major theorist of the historical particularist trend in anthropological theory to be considered here is Robert H. Lowie. As a student of Boas, he took a strong stand against evolutionism. He advocated that if anthropology was to be publically recognized as a science, it must base its theory on a sound and detailed collection of ethnographic data. He insisted that

"cultural anthropology is a science requiring the same logic as the natural sciences."

Lowie could not tolerate any form of scholarship that went beyond its data. He demanded the exact and careful use of research methods in the field and elsewhere. Similarly, Robert Murphy has written that...

"Lowie's anthropology derives... from the meticulousness of the field worker and the reserve of a man who always wore a vest and jacket."

He shared with Boas and Kroeber, the opinion that the essential determining factor of human behavior was culture.

Lowie, much like Kroeber, emphatically argued against any reference to man's innate nature. Nevertheless, his own arguments had little effect on the elaboration and construction of his own theories. His formal
denial of the importance of man's innate nature as a determinate of human behavior was indicative of his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration. This belief was predicated on the understanding that there existed no innate characteristics within man which might prevent him from integrating into society and developing his personality through the influence of education and culture. It is in this sense that his theories dealing with the cultural determination of behavior contributed towards legitimizing the liberal ideals of social integration.

In one of his earlier publications, Culture and Ethnology (1917), Lowie presented the view that culture is a thing in itself sui generis, which may only be interpreted by the science of ethnology. Culture could not be explained in terms of psychological phenomena. Psychology, as he defined it, dealt specifically with innate biological traits particular to man.275

We cannot reduce culture to psychological phenomena any more than we can reduce biology to mechanics or chemistry, because in either case 'the very facts we desire to have explained are ignored in the more generalized formulation.'276

As he perceived it, one cultural trait is the determinate of the next. He insisted that cultural phenomena owing to their diversity, could only be understood in terms of the unique course of their past history.277 Lowie's apparent emphatic belief in the idea of the cultural determination of behavior was entirely inconsistent with the rest of his major writings. In many of his other works, causation was attributed, not to culture but rather to a large number of varying and supposedly fundamental features of man's innate nature. At the same time it is clear that these assumptions were formulated as a means to give credibility to his belief in
the liberal ideals of social integration.

An example of Lowie's theoretical inconsistency is contained in Social Organization (1948). The book itself is an account of the principles of social organization and grouping. He specified that the principles of groupings which underly all social organizations are: sex, age, kinship, correspondence, voluntary association and consciousness of kind. The principles of kinship, sex and age were said to be elementary features of human nature. Alternatively, he reduced "consciousness of kind" to a level of a "sentiment", psychological in nature. When we recall his earlier definition of psychology as the study of innate behavior, it is obvious that he assumed the sentiment of "consciousness of kind" to be innate. In unveiling the basic motives for marriage and the family, Lowie resolved his own inability to explain these motives by relating them to the basic "need for cooperation".

Lowie's reliance on assumptions about human nature is clearly evidenced in his description of social stratification, the causes of which, as he suggested, are the innate psychological motives of "consciousness of kind", in addition to the deep seated human drives of "the desire to excel one's fellows" and the "powerful sense of kinship". Regardless of his earlier denial of the significance of innate behavior, it appears that he posited much of his theory of social organization on some rather generalized assumptions about man's drives, sentiments and needs. The empirical plausibility of these assumptions about human nature may be rightly questioned. Their lack of empirical credibility is directly related to their ideological orientation. All of his assumptions about man's innate nature contribute to legitimizing the belief that man is a
socially oriented creature, whose natural condition consists of an integrated and stable social structure.

A problem which has traditionally concerned anthropologists is once more brought up by Lowie in his examination of *The Origin of The State* (1927). The problem is a simple one, while its implications are overwhelmingly complex. This problem is based on the following question:

Have the simpler peoples psychological equivalents of the main cultural manifestations found in more complex societies? 284

The question deals then with ascertaining whether the germs of modern cultural institutions and practices are latent in primitive societies. In explaining the social and political organization of the tribe or state, Lowie noted that such organizations were directly or indirectly deductible from the psychology of the "territorial sentiment" and the "blood tie". 285

Remembering that his original notion of psychology was synonymous with the definition of innate behavioral traits, we may conclude that his notion of the nature of social organization rested on explicit assumptions about the innate nature of human nature.

Lowie also depicted the transition from a primitive state to a modern one, as being characterized by the transformation of a government of personal relations based on the kinship tie to one of territorial contiguity. 286 In describing the various aspects of the kinship tie, particularly the parental sentiment, he presented an explanation as to why parents in primitive societies are able to extend their affection to adopted children. As he suggested, the

... generic love of children - no matter whose - merely needs to be particularized in a definite instance by constant association in order to develop into a full-flowered parental sentiment. 287
What he actually attempted to account for here is the facilitation of innate sentiments by the sociological factors of association. According to this theory, the stability of primitive social organization is dependant upon the malleability of the parental sentiment. Such a sentiment is related to the ability of members of the tribe to extend such an instinctual bond to children and other individuals in the tribe who are not necessarily related by birth. In this sense, Lowie implied that association was a "sign stimuli." This stimuli facilitated the response or "release" of an innate species-specific behavioral pattern consisting of the parental sentiment.

Lowie continued to insist in another of his books, *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* (1939), that culture "includes all of those capabilities acquired by man as a member of society", excluding all biological or racial determinates. Nevertheless, he explicitly relegated the major cultural achievements of human civilization, inclusive of the domestication of animals, religion, and art, to "a deep urge for recreation" or amusement. Art, while being conceived of as a manifestation of the urge for amusement, was also understood as being the product of a "universal-longing" and a deep seated human urge for beauty. Lowie explained the courageous behavior of Plains Indians in battle and their relatively small number of casualties in terms of the contradiction between the socially defined imperative of the "quest for valor", and the stronger instinctual demand of "self-preservation".

The question of why individuals rather than satisfying their innate urges such as those of sex, are instead willing to submit to social authority, was answered by Lowie in a simple and unjustifiably naive
The powerful urges of sex, acquisitiveness and self-preservation are constantly repressed by the still more powerful wish to be appreciated by one’s fellows. Anthropologists can rightly question where he might have found proof of such an innate urge as "the need to be appreciated by one’s fellows". In reality, the only proof for such an assertion lay in its convenience to his overall theoretical structure.

The fact that Lowie used assumptions about human nature as convenient theoretical devices to legitimate his various anthropological analyses and explanations is generously indicated in one of his most important theoretical endeavors, Primitive Society (1952). In this work, he was completely willing to define the horror of incest as "instinctive" while at the same time criticizing social evolutionists for equating biological evolution with social change. Features of primitive cultures such as taboos were shown to be merely "the spontaneous outgrowth of incest horror". Likewise, he reduced the fear of menstruation to the causal level of primitive psychology which may be understood as innate. Finally, all forms of human associations were interpreted as manifestations of the "gregarious instinct". He described associations as direct outgrowths of the political state. From this we may conclude that his whole conception of the organization of primitive society was deduced from a number of assumptions about human nature, the proof for which was as unknown to Lowie then, as it is to anthropologists today.

Religion was not exempt from Lowie’s habit of generalization about human nature. In Primitive Religion (1948), the origin of religion and religious art was said to be directly related to the "aesthetic impulse"
which was defined as the basic impulse of the human mind. Almost ironically, he cautioned anthropologists to be on

guard against 'fake' laws that do not result from a synthesis of the facts but from an artificial simplification by selection of those facts that fall in with the investigator's fancy.

Not to be overtly critical of Lowie as a theorist, it seems distinctly possible that during the course of his maturation as an anthropologist he became aware of the rather empirically inconclusive assumptions about human nature on which his theories were founded. He came to admit that anthropological theory would be able to find a place for at least 'psychology'. By using psychology more specific definitions might be provided for often loosely used concepts referring to man's innate nature.

Scientific psychology will not solve all our sociological problems. It will not only act as a corrective in a speculative interpretation, but will lend greater rigor to our formulation of fact and open new prospects of inquiry and explanation.

It is unfortunate that Lowie did not heed his own advice.

Lowie's assumptions about human nature were formulated within a distinct ideological context. Such forms of behavior as kinship, consciousness of kind, cooperation, territoriality, blood ties, the parental sentiment, domestication of animals, religion and art, gregariousness, the incest taboo and the aesthetic impulse were all based on specific assumptions about man's innate nature. It is quite clear, in reviewing this list, that all of these assumptions lend support to the belief that man by nature is socially oriented. In this fashion Lowie utilized assumptions about human nature to justify his belief in the liberal
ideals of social integration.

Lowie's theories, as well as those of Boas and Kroeber, are perfect examples of the reliance of anthropologists on explicit assumptions about human nature. These theories are also a testimony to their irresponsible and empirically unverifiable application of such assumptions. Their scientific irresponsibility in the use of such assumptions was exceeded only by the strength of their commitment to the idea of the cultural determination of behavior. The intention of the theory of the cultural determination of behavior was to demonstrate man's dependence on society and culture, in the realization of his own personal development and self-fulfillment. The personal development of the individual was conceived as being unlimited or unconstrained by his innate nature. However, Boas, Kroeber and Lowie utilized determinate assumptions of human nature to justify the fact that man's behavior was determined by culture. Obviously, the intentions of these specific theories, and their ultimate implications, were entirely contradictory with one another. What is not contradictory, however, is the complementary relationship between their assumptions about human nature and the liberal ideals of social integration.

We may understand that Historical Particularism was a theoretical movement which endeavored to refute the "biological individualism" of evolutionary theory. At the same time, from a sociology of knowledge point of view, it is obvious that the theorists of this school of thought relied on explicit assumptions of human nature in order to objectify, manifest and legitimize the ideals of social integration which constitute a basic variation of liberalism as an ideology.
6) The Social Facts of Human Nature

Other schools of anthropological theory apart from that of Historical Particularism have also attempted to refute any consideration of man's innate nature in the explanation of culture and human behavior. One such school is that of French Structuralism. This school of social thought included such notable anthropological theorists as Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss. It is upon the theoretical works and insights provided by these three theorists that most of French anthropology is founded. In relation to this point, Harris has commented that...

Emile Durkheim led French social science to its emancipation from biological reductionism.

What shall be closely examined here is the degree to which such an emancipation from the use of assumptions about human nature was in fact carried out by Durkheim, Mauss and more recently Levi-Strauss.

All of these theorists, similar in many respects to Boas, Kroeber and Lowie, criticized the liberal individualistic values and ideals particular to social evolutionary theories. The French Structuralists sought to legitimize the theory of the cultural determination of behavior. Their emphasis on the dependency of the individual on culture and social institutions served as a means for the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. What must be considered then, is the extent to which these theorists made use of assumptions about human nature. Also the degree to which such assumptions were complementary to the liberal ideals of social integration must be closely examined from a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis.
It was Durkheim who first asserted that the social sciences in general must necessarily be autonomous from both psychological and biological assumptions about the innate nature of human nature. In one of his earlier theoretical works, *The Rules of the Sociological Method* (1895), it was emphatically maintained that human behavior was not to be explained by the concepts of human nature or individual psychology. Rather,...

We must...seek the explanation of social life in the nature of society itself...it (society) uniformly surpasses the individual in time as well as in space; it is in a position to impose upon him ways of acting and thinking... Social facts as it was believed were derived not from individual psychology but from the social facts preceding them. In his opinion, the determinate use of bio-psychological constants or needs related to human nature by sociologists or anthropologists in their explanations, was nothing but mysticism disguised as empiricism.

Notions about innate needs were not to be used in a causal fashion within the construction of any social theory. On the contrary...

...the fact that we allow a place for human needs in sociological explanations does not mean that we even partially revert to teleology. These needs can influence social evolution only on the condition that they themselves, and the changes they undergo, can be explained solely by causes that are deterministic and not all purposive.

Social facts, as it was asserted, must be explained in terms of their social cause and function and not as products of bio-psychological imperatives, innate to human nature. Such needs in this sense were understood not as the cause, but rather as the result of social facts and organization. French Structuralism as defined by Durkheim, consisted of the affirmative belief in social causation as related to the structural...
interrelationships that exist between social facts. He assumed that biological or psychological constants of human nature were of no relevance and should be dispensed with.

The degree to which Durkheim recognized and made use of the basic tenets of French Structuralism in terms of the explanation of social facts by social causes is indeed questionable. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915) is a testimony to the fact that he ignored his own methodological and theoretical principles. In this particular work he presented the idea that

...religion is something eminently social. Religious representations are collective representations which express collective realities. 313

At the same time, he forgot the former statements he had made in the Rules with regard to the causal position of needs in the construction of social theory. He asserted that the rites and practices of religious belief, even the most

...barbarous and the most fantastic, translate some human need, some aspect of life. 314

Durkheim believed religion to be a collective representation. He also felt that the "fundamental categories of religion" inclusive of rites and myths were a collective expression of certain needs, the origin of which he left obscured. 315

At another point in his discussion, the propensity for religion and religious belief was attributed to an innate sacred principle which is only realized in certain circumstances. As Durkheim noted

...it is useless to multiply examples. Those already given are enough to prove that there is something in man which holds profane things at a distance and which possesses a religious power; in other words, the human organism...
conceals within its depths a sacred principle, which only comes to the surface in certain determined cases. This statement admits to definite assumptions about human nature which cannot be ignored. He implied that the social causation of religious beliefs and practices is causal only insofar as it facilitates the realization of some sort of sacred principle which is innate to man. The proof for the existence of this principle as could be expected is not to be found within his analysis.

Durkheim's reliance on assumptions about human nature was not limited to his assertion about the existence of innate needs and sacred principles. His whole theory of totemism also relied on an explicit assumption about man's nature. In this instance, he explained that members of a primitive society represent their totems in geometrical designs drawn on the ground, on rocks or on their own bodies. This practice was said to be based on

...the need of presenting the idea which they form of it (totemic animal) by means of material and external signs, no matter what these signs may be.317

He conceived of other religious practices of primitive peoples as merely being the workings of "intuition". In accounting for the systems of classification in primitive society, it was argued that the ability to relate sets of objects with one another is dependent upon

...a certain intuition of the resemblances and differences presented by things...318

The origins of this intuition of classification was assumed to be innate. Both its universality, as well as the inability of social facts to account for it, were stressed.
In reviewing Durkheim's writings, Levi-Strauss has noted that...

...in the last analysis Durkheim derives social phenomena as well from affectivity. His theory of totemism starts with an urge and ends with a recourse to sentiment...instinct is thus the basis of a system which reaches its consummation in an affective theory of the sacred. 319

He refers here to Durkheim's theory of totemism which attempted to explain the reasons why men should have come to symbolize their clan affiliations by signs. As Durkheim stated...

When men of an inferior culture are associated in a common life, they are frequently led, by an instinctive tendency, as it were, to paint or cut upon the body images, that bear witness to their common existence. 320

It is quite apparent from this statement that Durkheim himself was indifferent to his own structuralist principle that social facts are to be explained by other social facts. Totemism, then, as the elementary form of religious life is to be interpreted as the acting out of an instinctive tendency.

Religion according to Durkheim constituted the realization of an instinct and the denial of certain other "natural tendencies and appetites". Religion...

Though exalting the strength of man...is frequently rude to individuals; it necessarily demands perpetual sacrifices from them;...we must be prepared to do violence to our instincts. 321

Religion was seen as a synthesis of the realization and denial of certain aspects of man's fundamental innate nature.

Durkheim, regardless of the postulated abridgement of assumptions about human nature, continued to insist that the...

...eternal objective cause of these sensations sui generis out of which religious experience is made, is society. 322
In reality, his theory of religion, as related to totemism, is based on the assumption that religion constituted the social realization of an innate sacred principle. Religion was also coupled with the instinctual proclivity of individuals living a common existence to symbolize their clan affiliations by sacred signs. The realization of these innate principles and instincts necessitates at the same time the sublimation of other natural appetites. Durkheim, in his theory of religion, made no use of evidence of any type to lend empirical support to its basic premises about man.

Other works by Durkheim are also not exempt from similar criticisms in their use of assumptions about man's innate nature. In another of his more important publications; *Primitive Classification* (1901) written with Marcel Mauss, Durkheim again contradicted his own structuralist theory of the social determination of social behavior. Together, they directed their attention to the explanation of the origin of the cultural expression of the categories of classification. They assumed that the capacity for classification is neither a spontaneous attribute of the human mind nor is it innate.

It was maintained that classification was nothing more than a reflection of society, in that "the classification of things reproduces the classification of men". The first logical categories were social categories. Ideas and their organization were said to parallel society and its social organization. Their illustration of this point included examples of the
classification systems of the Mount Gambier and Queensland tribes of Australia, as well as the Zuni and Sioux tribes, and even of traditional Chinese culture.

The empirical validity of Mauss' and Durkheim's hypothesis has rightly been questioned by many anthropologists and sociologists. Rodney Needham has indicated that there is much ethnographic data available to show that...

Different forms of classification are found with identical types of social organization, and similar forms with different types of society. \(^{324}\)

Apart from the rather erroneous nature of their theories in terms of available ethnographic data, it is important to note other major shortcomings of this work.

Mauss and Durkheim suggest, for example, that it is through education that the individual learns the ability of classification. However, prior to education they point out that the human mind is innately capable of distinguishing right from left, past from present, as well as the resemblances between objects and the grouping of them. \(^{325}\) It is obvious that their preliminary definitions of what the human mind is innately capable contributed to defeating the whole purpose of their analysis. While these theorists had hoped to justify the lack of an innate capacity to classify, they instead demonstrated an innate capacity to learn to classify. \(^{326}\)

Their analysis was also directed to the question of why individuals in a primitive society see certain objects as being intimately associated. In the explanation of this phenomenon, they made use of some rather curious interpretative categories. They suggested that there are affinities
"between things as there are between individuals, and that things are classified according to these affinities". 327 As they explained, the sentimental affinities that exist between things are the same sentiments which characterize and determine many aspects of human social organization. 328

Robert Lowie has commented that the scholars who rallied round Durkheim's banner closely adhered to his principles. 329 There is a great deal of truth to this, at least in relation to the theories of Mauss. Mauss continued to rely on vague assumptions about human nature as explanatory devices in his efforts to elaborate upon Durkheim's major thesis of the social determination of social facts. "In this regard, we must give brief attention to Marcel Mauss' major theoretical achievement, The Gift (1925). This particular study consisted of a systematic, cross-cultural analysis of the custom of exchanging gifts as an elementary form of transaction which contributes to the maintenance of all group relationships. He proceeded to describe the universality of gift giving. Examples were provided from the cultures of the Andaman Islands, Ancient Rome and India, as well as from the classical Germanic civilizations. 330 His use of cross-cultural data displayed both careful scholarship and abilities of imagination.

Mauss' final explanations of the origins of gift giving seem noticeably devoid of such scholarly qualities. He defined the exchanging of gifts as being one of the "fundamental motives of human activity", the origin of which is

...part social, part animal or psychological no doubt. 331
Additionally, gift exchange was seen as a principle of evolution, which is devoid of moral "rationalism." From all of these direct and indirect indications, we might conclude that Mauss himself considered the basis of gift giving as being an innate element of human nature.

The earlier theorists of French Structuralism relied on the postulated abridgements of assumptions about human nature which were unjustifiably naive. The Durkheimian dictum that society is to be explained by social causes appears, in the light of these investigations, as a curious anomalie. Durkheim interpreted the idea of religion as a basic facet of human nature. Mauss utilized assumptions about man's nature to justify that man was innately capable of classifying and conceptually ordering the world around him. Additionally, Mauss argued that gift giving was an elementary feature of human nature. In all cases, the specific assumptions about human nature defined by these theorists were essentially complementary to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. In this sense their assumptions lent support and legitimization to the liberal ideals of social integration. Religion, classification and gift giving, in the opinions of Durkheim and Mauss, were basic means to achieve social order and to structure the social interaction which takes place between individuals.

Contemporary French Structural theorists also have not remained aloof from incorporating assumptions about human nature into their anthropological theories. Claude Levi-Strauss is probably the most notable contemporary representative of French Structuralism. Like Durkheim and Mauss, Levi-Strauss's main analytical concern has been with the definition of "elementary forms" - the fundamental and irreducible components of
social life. Durkheim's interest in totemism, and Mauss' interest in gift exchange and classification are examples of the degree to which the members of l'Année Sociologique directed their theoretical efforts towards the understanding of the basic underlying structures of human society.

The question which must be reviewed here is whether Levi-Strauss, like the forerunners of French Structuralism, utilized assumptions about man in an ideological context to confirm and justify the liberal ideals of social integration.

Levi-Strauss has been interested in analyzing and revealing the elementary structures of the human mind. For this theorist, these elementary structures are not based on certain factors of the historical and cultural development of human society. On the contrary, the historical and cultural developments of society are themselves understood to be reflections of these elementary structures of mind. As he has explained

Structure is not historical; it is natural, and in it resides real human nature. It is a return to Rousseau...333

Other critics of Levi-Strauss have also commented on his obvious philosophical affinity with Rousseau in his overall concern with the nature of human nature.334 As will be pointed out here, his theoretical perspectives can only be fully appreciated by realizing the philosophical conjunction that exists between himself and Rousseau in relation to their concurrent views on the nature of man. The unjustifiably naive assumptions about man's nature on which Levi-Strauss's theories rest, are a direct reflection of his philosophical affinity with Rousseau.
between himself and other men as well as the difference between himself and nature.

In continuing this theory, he explains that in order for man to have

an earlier work by Leul-Streus.

This same theory is expanded upon and clarified in *Population* (1962), which

to decern... "survival" by species, humanity from humanity.

into a paradox: The apparent contradiction between

their ability to know how to differentiate himself, but only

to differentiate himself, also forced every individual

number of human beings also forced every individual

selves at the same time to different environments. The increase in the

increase, where men had to move and spread over the earth, adapting them-

increase. This divergence was the result of population

identity. The divergence is the result of population

diversity and rear themselves away from the original sense of compassion

t he beginning of human evolutionary development, men had to

and will in the future always attempt to recreate.

experience of compassion as differentiation which men will never forget

other men and to the animals of the natural world. It is this primitive

before the invention of culture, experienced himself as identical to all

society. As both Rousseau and Leul-Streus believe, men originally

companion with the interests of others is the underlying motivation of human

According to Rousseau's theory, compassion and the willingness to identify

based on the recognition of an innate human capacity - compassion.

sciences of men are founded. In essence this fundamental principle is

Rousseau was responsible for discovering a principle, upon which the

founder of the sciences of man..." 339

Second, a more revealing essay, entitled "Jean Jacques Rousseau,"

The Second Volume of *Structural Anthropology* (1976) written by Leu-

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It is because man originally felt himself identical to all those like him (among which, as Rousseau explicitly says, we must include animals) that he came to acquire the capacity to distinguish himself as he distinguishes them...to use the diversity of species as conceptual support for social differentiation.

Levi-Strauss points out that by applying the differentiations of the animal world to society man was able to differentiate himself as a member of a particular group from other groups. However, human groups by using categories of differentiation taken from the animal or natural world which were opposite from one another (e.g. eagle, crow), used at the same time natural categories of identification which had something in common. Both the eagle and the crow are birds. In the use of natural symbols of identification which were opposed and complementary, man was able to differentiate himself from other men or groups, as well as realize his common compassionate identification with all men. The use of different animals of the same species as totemic emblems allowed groups to differentiate themselves according to the different varieties of animals as well as to establish a bond between these groups in that these different animals were members of the same species. This almost dialectical relationship between differentiation on the one level, and identification on another constitutes Levi-Strauss's whole theory of "binary opposition". Binary opposition as a theoretical category is used to explain the structure of such things as myth, kinship, and totemism. It is a concept which incorporates Rousseau's notion of an innate faculty of identification and compassion. At the same time, it encompasses the idea of diversification and opposition as related to Rousseau's theory of evolution.
The metaphysics of Levi-Strauss's theory of binary opposition constitutes the philosophical assumption that innate in man is a faculty for compassion and identification, which must give way to the forces of opposition in order that man may diversify and survive. In reality, his theory of binary oppositions is based on explicit assumptions about the existence of certain faculties innate to man. His theory leads us to believe that all aspects of human society operate in relation to the binary opposition of its elementary units. Opposition and identification are said to be the universal and the elementary structures of the human mind to which all dimensions of human behavior and culture must conform. As a result of his emphasis on the universality and the permanence of this characteristic of man's mental structure, we might agree with Edmund Leach, who has noted that

...if these structures exist, they must, at some rather deep level, be considered innate. In that case, we must suppose which in the course of human evolution, have become internalized into the human psyche along with the specialized developments of those parts of the human brain which are directly concerned with speech formation.341

Levi-Strauss's entire career as an anthropological theorist has been directed towards the verification of the principles of identification and opposition.

In Totemism, Levi-Strauss has illustrated that the animals which are chosen as totemic emblems are classed in pairs of opposites. Those animals chosen have at least one characteristic in common which allows them to be compared.342 In terms of this theory, the primitive institution of totemism is defined as nothing more than a cultural manifestation of the innate processes of binary opposition. In Structural Anthropology.
Vol. I (1958), it was asserted that

...practices and beliefs referring to animal or plant names...or species can be explained as vestiges of an earlier totemic system or in terms of...the logico-aesthetic tendency of the human mind to classify and to categorize the physical, biological and social realities which constitute its universe. 343

This logico-aesthetic tendency is believed to be the universal law which makes up the unconscious activities of the mind 344 and which determines the structure of cultural organization. 345

In another book, The Savage Mind (1962), Levi-Strauss has argued that both science and magic require the same sort of mental operations and that they differ only in terms of content. 346 Also, he contends that the principle of binary opposition pervades the logic of the classification of kinship. 347 He has elaborated on the idea that man draws on the diversity of nature in order to establish the diversity of human groups. At the same time, man establishes relations of complementarity and cooperation by utilizing those species of animals which have at least one feature which is commonly shared by them. 348

Levi-Strauss's almost obsessive preoccupation with the ascertaining of the existence of binary opposition as an elementary structure of the human mind as reflected in myth, 349 kinship, 350 totemism and social organization, is in truth an indication of what he believes to be the initial purpose of anthropological theory as a whole.

In any one of its practical undertakings anthropology thus does no more than assert a homology of structure between human thought in action and the human object to which it is applied. 351

Human behavior in his eyes is governed by the limitations of man's innate mental processes.
The major insight which is gained in the review of the most important of Levi-Strauss's theoretical efforts is that his theories are based on a single idea - binary opposition. This principle in turn implies that there are certain mental structures, innate to the human mind, by which human behavior and culture are organized. At least a part of this principle is justified by the idealistic Rousseauian belief in an innate faculty of compassion. In being aware of the obvious speculative philosophical nature of the concept of binary opposition, we may only conclude that its concurrent use as a causative factor in his explanations of culture and social organization is unjustifiably naive. The emphasis which Levi-Strauss has placed on man's faculty of compassion is in itself directly indicative of his adherence to the liberal ideals of social integration. He assumed that man naturally desires to enter into some form of a cooperative relationship with other men within an integrated and stable social environment.

The postulated abridgement of assumptions about man's innate nature within the theories of Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss were in all instances unjustified, in terms of the distinct lack of empirical verification provided for such concepts. In revealing the existence, as well as the distinctive superficiality of the assumptions about human nature upon which all the theories of the French Structuralists are constructed, it is hoped that their insistence on the existence of irreducible "social facts" will now appear in a new light. It has been shown in this analysis that those social facts, inclusive of the elementary forms of religious life, primitive classification, gift giving, and binary opposition have been reduced by the theorists of French Structuralism themselves. They
have relegated social facts to certain assumptions about human nature which are as dubious as they are vague. What is not vague about their theories, however, is the extent to which they lend support to the liberal belief in social integration and man's dependency on society. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it is obvious that the social facts which the French Structuralists were able to define were conspicuously related to basic mechanisms of social integration. Religion, classification, exchange and binary opposition all ensure, according to their definitions, the integration of the individual into the social environment.
7) **The Structure of the Functions of Human Nature**

French Structuralism led by Durkheim, constituted a distinct reaction to what was seen as the speculative theoretical premises of the social evolutionists. In this sense, the French Structuralists shared an affinity with the Boasian school of thought. Durkheim and his followers, as well as Boas and his students, were not the only anthropologists who have attempted to rid anthropological theory of what Harris terms "the accumulated liabilities of the search for diachronic, evolutionary regularities".352

The movement to reestablish the heritage of the ideals of scientism in anthropology also formed the general orientation of British social anthropology.

Traditionally, the most prevalent theoretical assumptions in British social anthropology have been those defined within a synchronic functionalist framework. Functionalism, however, has not constituted a uniform body of theories and assumptions, especially in relation to the use and recognition of principles and concepts dealing with man's innate nature. Bronislaw Malinowski, who originally defined the concept of function within the context of British anthropological theory, avidly admitted to the possibility that man's innate needs have a central role in social life. On the other hand, the equally as prominent structural functionalists, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown and E.E. Evans-Pritchard adamantly denied any place for the consideration of man's innate nature in the understanding of social organization or culture. Taken together, the theoretical perspectives and orientations of Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard may be defined as ideographic macro-functionalism.353
All of the British structural functionalists sought to demonstrate the functionally interdependent relationships that exist within the structure of society. Their view of society was predicated on the belief that all social phenomena were functionally integrated. In this respect their structural functionalist theories were complementary to the liberal ideals of social integration.

The obvious differences between the various functionalist theorists in British social anthropology in terms of their contrasting views on the subject of the innate nature of human nature should not be taken for granted. The purpose of this section of our analysis shall be to ascertain whether the theories of Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard do in fact contradict an interpretation of human behavior and culture in terms of specific aspects of man's innate nature. Furthermore, for the purposes of this analysis, it is necessary to ascertain the degree to which their assumptions about human nature served to exemplify the liberal ideals of social integration. With respect to the theories of Malinowski, it is also important to outline his basic assumptions about man's innate nature and to measure their relevance to anthropological theory as a whole.

Malinowski was responsible for influencing the general theoretical orientations of British social anthropology. He also has done much to determine the methods of ethnographic fieldwork. His most notable ethnographic study, The Argonauts of the Western Pacific (1922), set the general precedent for his later detailed considerations of the part which man's innate nature plays in the formation of culture within any particular society. The Argonauts of the Western Pacific consists of an
ethnographic study of the Trobrian Islanders of the Archipelagos in Melanesian New Guinea. The focal point of the study centered on the custom of the Kula. As an extensive form of inter-tribal exchange, the Kula is maintained by a set of traditional rules and customs, accompanied by a number of elaborate magical rituals and public ceremonies. The Kula is not an indiscriminate form of exchange. It is carried out according to fixed dates and rules of procedure.

Sociologically, through transaction between tribes differing in language, culture and probably even in race, it is based on a fixed and permanent status, or a partnership which binds into couples some thousands of individuals. This partnership is a lifelong relationship.

From Malinowski's explanations of the Kula, we begin to understand the origins of his interest in the innate aspects of human nature.

In describing the pervasiveness of the custom of the Kula, Malinowski admitted that the social codes which surround and enforce the giving and receiving of gifts, "far overrides the Kula native's acquisitive tendency". He interpreted the Kula as an innate human tendency - a fundamental facet of human nature. It was believed to be a testimony to the existence of

...the deep tendency to create social ties through exchange of gifts.

Likewise, the display of food, a practice related to the Kula, was attributed to an

...indirect sentiment rooted of course in reality in the pleasure of eating.

The Kula was understood as being indicative of the fundamental human impulse "to display, to share, to bestow". In describing the reactions of
the donor and the recipient of gifts in the exchange of the Kula, it was noted that...

In the case of the donor, the histrionic anger with which he gives an object might be, in the first place, a direct expression of the natural human dislike of parting with a possession. Because the Kula is in fact so deeply connected with "the fundamental layers of human nature", he was certain that it also should be found in other societies, although possibly in different forms. Of course, his assertions that the Kula is a reflection of a fundamental and innate capacity can only be verified by intensive cross-cultural studies. Nevertheless, we may at least see the early, though rather generalized and speculative interest which Malinowski took in the idea that certain cultural institutions were a response to a number of innate human propensities.

Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927) was indicative of Malinowski having reached a much higher level of theoretical maturity in regard to his understanding of the innate basis of human behavior. This study was concerned with showing the non-applicability of Freud's theory of the Oedipus Complex. It was also addressed to the problem of outlining those complexes of behavior which were believed to be the result of the emergence of culture and the suppression of man's animal existence. In analyzing Melanesian women, he discovered that they achieve their highest degree of emotional satisfaction when their innate biological forces and instincts are endorsed and strengthened by society rather than inhibited by it.

This harmony between social and biological forces ensures full satisfaction and the highest bliss.
Undoubtedly, one of Malinowski's most important insights into the innate nature of human nature in this work, was his explication of the relationship between cultural behavior and man's instinctual life.

Malinowski recognized that in animals, marriage is induced by selective courtship, concluded by the act of impregnation and maintained by the forces of the innate matrimonial attachment. In men, on the other hand, he insisted that marriage is

...induced by cultural elements, concluded by sociological sanction and maintained by the various systems of social pressure.

From this perspective, the modes of behavior as related to human marriages were believed to be determined by man's innate nature in terms of their ends - selective mating. The release of the sexual impulse, the inducement to courtship and the motives for mate selection are culturally determined. He explained, however, that culture accomplishes the same ends of preferential mate selection, essential for the survival of the human species which in other animals is accomplished by sheer instinct. What he implied here is that beneath the cross-cultural variability of customs and practices there exists certain innate imperatives to which all complexes of cultural-customs must inevitably conform. The cultural apparatus, as he saw it, works very much in the same direction as natural instinct and attains the same ends, although the mechanisms are entirely different.

In concluding his analysis, Malinowski provided another insight into the nature of human nature. On the basis of observing the demands which the socialization process of the child makes on the adult members of a culture, he concluded that the lineal transmission of culture is based
on a strong emotional foundation.

As we know, society can draw upon only one source for such sentiments - the biological endowments of parental tendencies. Hence transmission of culture in all these aspects is invariably associated with the biological relation of parent to child...365

In this sense it was felt that the socialization process of the human being is dependent on the innate guarantees of the parental instincts.

Malinowski provided three insights into the relationship between human nature and human society. These insights include: the recognition of the innate basis of emotional satisfaction; the indication that all cultures despite their variability and uniqueness must conform to certain innate imperatives, and finally, that cultural transmission is ensured through the medium of instinctive parental tendencies. The distinct plausibility of these insights is evidenced in the unobtrusive and logical manner in which they were presented. These assumptions about human nature were not presented in a self-assured, causal context, but in a cautious hypothetical one, where the need for their further elaboration and verification in the future was recognized.

By 1929, Malinowski had been influenced by the theories of Freudian psychoanalysis with its concurrent emphasis on both the sexual implications and determination of human behavior. As a result, he became interested in the role which sex played in the determination of the cultural life of primitive peoples. His popular publication, *The Sexual Life of Savages in North Western Melanesia*, represents an investigation of a primitive society from this point of view.366

Probably the most impressive contribution which Malinowski made to anthropological theory in the elaboration of the role which human nature
plays in culture was his book, The Scientific Theory of Culture (1944). The major hypothesis of this work was that the problem of the satisfaction of the innate needs of men is solved through the construction of a secondary environment - culture. The maintenance of culture, in his opinion, engenders a secondary set of needs, the satisfaction of which must be maintained if culture itself is to remain in existence. In this sense, he recognized the products and processes of culture, the relationship of culture to the essential elements of human psychology, and the influential cultural role of the organismic needs of man. The gratification of the basic innate needs of man as he argued, depends on the culture itself. Consequently, culture must be permanently reproduced and managed. Furthermore...

A cultural standard of living...means that new needs appear and new imperatives or determinants are imposed on human behavior. His cultural theory was one which linked man's needs and cultural satisfactions with the eliciting of new cultural needs.

The relationship between culture and a human need, either basic or derived according to his theory, may be termed a functional one.

For function cannot be defined in any other way than the satisfaction of a need. Inventions are merely the conscious attempt by culture to satisfy a specific need in a direct fashion. As Malinowski saw it, human nature consists of the needs of breathing, rest, nutrition, excretion and reproduction. These are biological conditions which must be fulfilled if the individual and the human group are to survive. He pointed out that the cultural responses to such biological imperatives create secondary needs
which must also be satisfied in that they are

as indispensable under the ultimate sanction of the
biological imperative of self-preservation as are any pure
physiologically determined elements. 371

Cultural needs as he explained, are not secondary to innate biological
ones. Such cultural needs are characterized by an equivalent degree of
urgency in that they are instrumentally related to the satisfaction of
the direct wants of the human organism.

Malinowski's conception of the role and function of culture may be
defined as

...essentially an instrumental apparatus by which man
is put in a position the better to cope with the concrete
specific problems that face him in his environment in the
course of the satisfaction of his needs. 372

His theory outlined a dynamic interactional process between human nature,
the cultural satisfaction of the needs which arise from human nature
and the needs which develop from the imperative to maintain the configura-
tions of cultural satisfactions. Malinowski provided anthropology with a
theoretical framework through which the interrelationship between culture
and man's innate nature might be investigated.

As Malinowski believed, "anthropological theory must take its stand
on biological fact". 373 His functional perspective was a biological and
cultural one. The function of culture was understood within the context
of need satisfactions particular to human nature. 374 A number of his
critics have noted that his studies provide the essential conceptual back-
ground for seeing culture as a series of vital sequences intimately
linked to the nature of human nature. 375 His assumptions about human
nature were essentially directed towards showing that culture as well as
the organization of social institutions are functionally related to the satisfaction of the direct wants experienced by the human organism. In this sense, he strove to illustrate that the ideal condition of a society consisted of the integration of the direct needs of human nature with the existing social and cultural environment. From a sociology of knowledge point of view, it is quite apparent that his assumptions about human nature were generally supportive of the liberal ideals of social integration. Like many other theorists in this period, Malinowski wished to demonstrate that the individual depended upon his social environment for the development and realization of his distinctively human needs and attributes.

Within the tradition of British anthropology, Malinowski may be considered as a definite exception in his willingness to admit to, and realistically consider, the possible relationships between man's innate nature and culture. British social anthropology as a whole, is characterized by a fervent negative attitude set against any form of reductionism in relation to considerations of human nature in the explaining of culture or social organization. Radcliffe-Brown, a contemporary of Malinowski and probably the most influential figure in the development of British social anthropology, refused to recognize the possibility of there existing certain innate elements of human behavior. Instead, he emphasized the value of synchronic studies. He had little sympathy for the use of conjectural history by anthropological theorists. His main goal, similar to Boas, was to provide social anthropology with the same degree of empirical and theoretical credibility as that of the natural sciences. As Fortes describes...
By following principles well proven in the natural sciences he has created a framework of an unified and rigorous discipline within the many-sided field of interests covered by the anthropological sciences.

In this respect, he understood social anthropology to be "the science of comparative sociology", based on the inductive method which endeavored to reveal the functional integrative relationship between man and society.

The concern of social anthropology, according to Radcliffe-Brown, was to discover laws rather than to define the origins of social phenomena. He commented that

...social anthropology is an independent science, with its own subject matter, its own distinctive methods directed at the discovery of laws that are in no sense laws of psychology...378

Leaving little room for either history, psychology, or the considerations of the origins of social phenomena, one would expect that there would also be little place in his structural functionalist framework for the use of assumptions about human nature. However, in reviewing his major theoretical explications, there does in fact exist major gaps in his arguments and explanations of social structure. These arguments are based on certain assumptions about man's innate nature which he formulated in the attempt to lend support to the liberal belief that society was a functionally integrated whole.

Radcliffe-Brown's functional explanation of ritual admits noticeably to assumptions about human nature. He pointed out in "The Present Position of Anthropological Studies" that there is a "strong marked tendency" in cultures engaged in intensive subsistence activities, for those things which are of vital importance in relation to subsistence, to become
Extending this theory, he explained that the function of ritual is synonymous with the function of socio-cultural integration. It was argued that the behavior or the psychology of an individual human being is largely determined by the culture which has been imposed upon him. There exists within this theory of ritual and totemism a fundamental contradiction or at least a noticeable explanatory gap. His explanation emphasized that culture determines human behavior. Yet we see that the tendency for objects of subsistence to become objects of ritual is defined as a 'pre-cultural tendency'. This particular tendency, which forms the basis of ritual, is understood as an aspect of culture which provides for both social integration as well as determining behavior. What he failed to illustrate in this theory, is the existence of a feedback loop between the cultural determination of behavior and the tendency of objects of subsistence to become objects of ritual. The fact that such a feedback loop is non-existent within his theoretical structure is indicative of the fact that he assumed this particular tendency to constitute a basic element of human nature.

Other assumptions about the nature of human nature are readily evident in another of Radcliffe-Brown's essays, "Ethnology and Social Anthropology". According to this theory, custom forms a constituent element of culture. Culture in turn determines human behavior. However, despite these assumptions, the basis for the development of culture was attributed to "the need for action". Again, we may understand that this need exists a priori to culture, in that he did not indicate a feedback loop between the cultural determinism of human behavior and this need for action. His argument as to the basis of culture consequently
readily admits to an explicit assumption about the nature of human nature.

Radcliffe-Brown's theory of opposition as related to the origins of the "joking relationship" is yet another example of his use of assumptions about human nature. In the essay, "The Comparative Method in Social Anthropology", he asserted that...383

The expression of this universal feature of the human mind is found in the cultural institution of the "joking relationship" where members of opposite tribal divisions are permitted to indulge in teasing each other through verbal abuse.384 The function of such joking relationships is "a special bond of social integration" which deserves systematic study.385 Radcliffe-Brown 'explained' in a causal fashion, a cultural institution - "the joking relationship", by referring to "an universal feature of human thinking". He did not explain the origin of this universal feature. This universal feature of thinking was presented without an explanation of its origins in terms of its cultural determination. As a consequence, we may argue that it was assumed to be an innate feature of human nature. Nothing of what was presented in his theory would contradict such a possibility.

In his well known work A Natural Science of Society (1948), Radcliffe-Brown defined a social system as constituting specific social relationships.

When a relationship exists between two human organisms such that there is some convergence of their interests we have a relationship we call a social relationship.386
At a later point in the same analysis, the origins and determinate causes of social relationships were described in terms of "the need for the adjustment of interests between individuals." \(^{387}\) We may understand from this that he believed all social relationships to be determined by a fundamental need, the origins of which he again failed to reveal. It may be argued that this need was assumed to constitute a basic characteristic of human nature.

In the most popular and well known of Radcliffe-Brown's publications, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (1957), we find other examples of his use of assumptions about man's innate nature as related to his analysis of certain aspects of culture and social organization. In this work, Radcliffe-Brown provided his most explicit definition of social structure. He regarded as a basic part of social structure, "all social relations of persons to persons." \(^{388}\) In turn, it was argued that all social behavior and social phenomena

...are not the immediate result of the nature of human beings, but are the result of the social structure by which they are united. \(^{389}\)

Conversely, he felt that the study of social structure leads inevitably to the study of interests or values as the determinates of social relations.

When two or more persons have a common interest in an object, that object can be said to have a social value for the persons thus associated. \(^{390}\)

Summing up Radcliffe-Brown's theory of social structure, we will logically assume that interests and values between people determine social relations. Social relations alternatively determine the social structure. Finally, social structure most noticeably influences the molding and
channelling of human behavior as a whole.

What Radcliffe-Brown failed to explain in his theory of social structure is what exactly determines these values and interests which contribute towards the formation of social relations. At one point in his discussion, he implied that social activities as related to social relations are carried out by individuals in a society because they provide some sort of "gratification". His use of the term gratification naturally implies the gratification of a need. Nevertheless, he omitted any form of explanation as to the nature of such gratifications in terms of needs, values or interests. Nor did he relate the determination of these causal factors of social relations to the social structure. As a direct and undeniable consequence of the vagueness and lack of specificity in his theoretical argument and because of the neglect of defining a causal feedback loop between social structure and values and interests, we again are led to consider the possibility that these values and interests might be part of human nature, innate to the human species. Nowhere can we find within his discussion, an argument that would undermine the applicability of such a consideration.

It should be noted that Radcliffe-Brown's functional theories of kinship and marriage are not devoid of assumptions about human nature. In African Systems of Kinship and Marriage (1950) he maintained that the function of the rules of marriage

...is to maintain the continuity of the general system of institutional relationships, either, by preventing marriages which would be disruptive or by encouraging marriages which would enforce the existing arrangements of persons. The disruption of which the function of marriage rules is meant to prevent
is that of the emotional reaction of repugnance to the incidence of incest. The reaction to incest, as he elucidated, is instinctively based on "a certain logic of the emotions which is the same in all human beings and is therefore inborn and not 'acquired'." In light of his recognition of the instinctual roots of the incest horror, we might conclude that the function of marriage regulations is to prevent an instinctual emotional reaction, the consequences of which contribute to social instability. Function, in this context, may be defined as the suppression of disruptive instinctual emotional reactions.

Radcliffe-Brown was the most ardent critic of the utilization of assumptions about human nature in anthropological theories of culture and social organization. He failed, nevertheless, to significantly refute the role which innate elements of human nature might play in determining certain facets of human behavior. Many of his theories of structure and function were based on the abridgement of assumptions about human nature. The gaps and vagaries implicit in many of these arguments are indicative of both his use of assumptions about man's nature as well as his reluctance to admit to them. From a sociology of knowledge perspective, all of Radcliffe-Brown's assumptions about man's innate nature contributed to the justification of the liberal ideals of social integration. He attempted to show that ritual, custom, joking relationships and the social structure generally are functionally related to the gratification of certain innate needs and features of man. Like Malinowski, he sought to demonstrate that the ideal condition of society constituted the functional integration of man's innate nature with the existing structure of social institutions.
Finally, in our review of British social anthropology, mention must be made of the theories and ethnographic studies of Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard. Evans-Pritchard, very much like Radcliffe-Brown, shared an undying suspicion of evolutionism as well as any form of explanation made in reference to man's innate nature. Maintaining an explicit ideo-graphic perspective, he was of the opinion that it was quite unlikely that anthropologists would ever develop laws comparable to those of the natural sciences. He felt that the unique qualities of the human species inclusive of sentiments, purpose, will, reason and chance were too capricious to admit to the regularities necessary for the formulation of social laws. The task of social anthropology was to study social institutions as interdependent parts of social systems. Social institutions were not to be investigated as functionally integrated parts of the social structure. Arguing against the inclusion of psychology within anthropological theory, he emphasized that the individual has no place in ethnological research. The individual must be recognized only insofar as he plays a social role. Like other British social anthropologists, Evans-Pritchard strongly adhered to the liberal belief that society constitutes a functionally interdependent and integrated web of social institutions.

Evans-Pritchard understood that societies are natural systems in which all aspects of society are interdependent and integrated. He argued that the history of the parts or variables of a social system was irrelevant in inquiring into their nature. Social anthropology, as he asserted
...deals with relations, not with origins.398

His strong emphasis on the functional role of social factors in the explanation of social phenomena would appear to effectively exclude the possibility that his theories were based on explicit assumptions about human nature. When we critically examine his most important ethnographic study, The Nuer (1940), we find that his whole analysis of this particular culture relates directly to certain fundamental assumptions about man's innate nature. These assumptions in turn contribute to the legitimization of the liberal ideal of social integration.

The Nuer consists of a description of the modes of livelihood and political institutions of the Nuer peoples of the Sudan. The Nuer are described as herders whose sole preoccupation is cattle. All their social institutions and processes of organization are defined singularly in terms of cattle as a source of subsistence. The whole social organization of the Nuer is related to the satisfaction of one basic, primary and innate need - nutrition. What Evans-Pritchard has accomplished in this ethnographic study is the demonstration of the functional interdependency that exists in a culture between certain of man's primary biological needs and their concurrent cultural satisfaction. It is in this sense that he lent support to the liberal ideals of social integration.

He argued in the initial stages of his analysis that the...

Nuer's devotion to the herdsman's art is inspired by a range of interests far wider than the simple need for food and why cattle are a dominant value in their lives.399

This qualifying point was made to emphasize that the Nuer's preoccupation
with cattle is a determinate function of their environment as well as the needs of the cattle. It is both the innate biological needs of men, the environment as related to the satisfaction of such needs and the needs of cattle as related to the environment (in terms of water pasturage and protection from carnivorous animals) which together...
determine human routine and effect social relations. 400

Human hunger was conceived as being the innate constant of human nature to which all social activities are related. Consequently, the Nuer social organization, as he indicated, is also mediated and directed by those needs and imperatives which arise out of the needs of cattle and their dependency for satisfaction on changing ecological conditions.

Within his ethnographic account of the Nuer, whenever any individual emotional condition is discussed, it is always defined in terms of the physiological condition of the cattle. For example, because cattle are chiefly useful for their milk...

In Nuer eyes, the happiest state is that in which a family possesses several lactating cows, for then children are well-nourished. 401

In this explicit context, human happiness was defined as a function of the physiological condition of the cattle as related to their ability or inability to satisfy the biological needs of hunger. Features of social relationships between Nuer individuals such as prestige were likewise defined in terms of the physiological condition of the cattle as related to the satisfaction of the hunger drive. Thus, the highest criterion of prestige for a Nuer herdsman is "the bigness and fatness of his cattle".

The Nuer admire a large hump which wobbles when the animal walks, and to exaggerate this character they often manipulate the hump shortly after birth. 402
The interdependent relationship between the Nuer's inclination for intergroup aggression and war was related to the degree to which the primary biological need of food had been gratified.

Nuer say that hunger and war are bad companions and that they are too hungry to fight in the full dry season...

The herds of cattle as he pointed out, are the primary nucleus around which kinship groups are organized. In short, cattle, as an instrumental means to satisfy an innate requirement of human nature, contribute to the mediation of human social relationships.

According to Evans-Pritchard, the seasonal movement and migrations of the Nuer are determined by the effects of the changing weather on the availability of pasturage. Time is measured by the regular accommodations of the Nuer people to seasonal shifts in weather in order that the nutritional needs of cattle will continue to be satisfied with abundant pasturage and water. The needs of cattle in this sense...chiefly translate oecological rhythm into the social rhythm of the year, and the contrast between modes of life at the height of the rains and at the height of the draught which provides the conceptual poles in time-reckoning.

As a whole, the cultural orientation of the Nuer as depicted in this analysis is a reflection of the dynamic processes of the satisfaction of biological necessities innate to the natures of both men and animals.

Evans-Pritchard's description and analysis of the political organization of the Nuer is also characterized by significant assumptions about human nature. To understand the underlying nature of the Nuer political system, we must, as it was pointed out, be aware of "oecological distance". Oecological distance, that is the distance between individual huts, village and tribal areas, is determined by the character of the country
intervening between local groups and its relation to "the biological requirements of their members". Complementing this fact, we are led to understand that the structural distance, or the distance between groups or persons in a social system as expressed in terms of values, is always influenced in its political dimension to a large extent determined by ecological conditions.

The interdependent relationship between ecological distance as defined by man's innate biological needs and structural distance is important to recognize. Its importance is emphasized by the admission that the whole organization of any political group in Nuer society is "...controlled by the structural distance between the groups".

Political organization, according to Evans-Pritchard, is indirectly related, or at least a function of the innate biological requirements of the political group concerned. We might also assume that the chief property of the Nuer political group to segment is an indication of the tendency for a human group to differentiate itself in the protection of a suitable ecological niche required for the nutrition of cattle and for the ultimate satisfaction of human hunger.

A characteristic of any political group is hence its invariable tendency towards fission and the opposition of its segments, and another characteristic is its tendency towards fusion with other groups of its own order in opposition to political segments larger than itself.

Such a tendency towards segmentation, in the opinion of this British social anthropologist, is a fundamental principle of the social structure and is a reflection of the social distance between individuals or groups in a social system.

Evans-Pritchard explained that the blood-feud which characterizes
Nuer society is a "structural movement" between political segments. Its function is the maintenance of the Nuer political system as a whole. The intensity of a feud is dependent on the structural relationships of the persons involved. Structural distance is a reflection of biological requirements. In turn, the feud constitutes nothing more than a means to ensure that all political segments have sufficient resources to satisfy the biological needs of their cattle so that the nutritional requirements of the groups may be maintained. Thus, the institution of the blood-feud in Nuer society, and its frequency is a measure of the incongruency between biological needs and social structure. Equally as important, he indicated that both the lineage and the age-set systems of the Nuer constitute examples of the pervasiveness of the principle of segmentation.

Evans-Pritchard described the Nuer and their society in terms of their emotional responses; propensity to go to war; conceptions of time and space; political, kinship and age-set systems, and the institution of the blood-feud. All these factors were directly or indirectly related to, or mediated by, certain innate needs. These requirements may be based on human organismic needs or on the nutritional demands of the cattle. A sophisticated analysis was presented of both the interactional processes existing between man as a biological entity and his cultural situation. Further, he showed how such processes are mediated by ecological circumstances. It was his intention to simply elaborate on the social and political structure of the Nuer. However, he managed to present a comprehensive examination of how the social structure is the reflection of more elementary and innate biological and environmental processes. In outlining the interdependent relationships between the basic human needs
of the Nuer and their ecological circumstances, Evans-Pritchard lent support to, and justified the liberal ideals of social integration. He demonstrated that the life of the individual Nuer was closely dependent upon his social and ecological environment.

Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard provided several notable insights into the nature of the interrelationships between the innate nature of man, and his participation in a cultural milieu, as related in turn to the constraints of the physical environment. Malinowski defined function in terms of the fulfillment of certain biological and psychological needs innate to human nature. Radcliffe-Brown, on the other hand, defined function in terms of the fulfillment of the innate necessities of social integration. Finally, Evans-Pritchard perceived the operations of both the functions of biological satisfaction and group integration within a context of environmental adaptation. It is only by synthesizing their different theoretical orientations, as related to their definitions of function, that we may begin to appreciate the dynamic relations between the social structure, the environment and man as an organismic being, with certain innate aspects of behavior.

All of these structural functional theorists explicitly assumed that man's innate nature is not antithetical to the idea of society but, in fact, is directly dependent upon it. In this respect, Nadel has briefly commented that

...the satisfaction of the given needs of any human being is facilitated or rendered possible by his existence in that ordered togetherness we call society.\footnote{413}

In recognizing the dynamic dependencies between innate needs and their social satisfaction, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard
subsumed the two dimensions of the innate and social aspects of human behavior into one common framework of analysis. Like the French Structuralists, these British social anthropologists insisted that man's development was dependent on his integration into a structured social environment. By assuming the existence of specific features of man's innate nature they attempted to demonstrate the necessity for man to live in a socially integrated milieu. In this fashion, they hoped to delegitimate the individualistic ideals particular to the evolutionary theorists which had gained so much popularity in the nineteenth century. Also, they endeavored in this manner, to define social anthropology as an independent cultural science, the subject matter of which was to be restricted to the study of the structure and function of social phenomena. The primary consequence of the theories formulated by Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard in their use of assumptions about human nature was the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of liberal ideals of social integration.
8) **Summary and Evaluation**

The history of the development of anthropological theory is rooted directly in assumptions about the innate nature of man. Assumptions about man's innate racial character played a conspicuous role in the formulation of anthropological theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In the case of the theorists of the eighteenth century, inclusive of Blumenbach and Smith, different behavioral and cultural characteristics of various races were not believed to be innate or race-specific. Rather, they were understood to be the result of man's exposure to differing environments. Most racial theorists in this period supported the more liberal libertarian ideals of equality.

Conversely, the racial theorists of the nineteenth century, including de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Gumplowicz, Knox and Hunt, argued that race was a determinate of human behavior. Each distinct social and cultural group was said to be characterized by innate racial features. Most of these theorists maintained the belief in the innate inferiority and superiority of particular races. For this reason, they insisted that an hierarchical organization of races, according to their innate inferiority or superiority, would provide for the maximization of social integration and progress. To a large extent, the racial theorists of the nineteenth century were adherents of the liberal ideals of social integration as those ideals were related to their belief in the hierarchical organization of races. It is also useful to point out that the racism of the nineteenth century was a reaction to the liberal ideas of equality which had to be reconciled with a contrary reality - colonialism. Before lib-
eralism and the idea of equality had emerged there was no need for racist ideologies. In recognizing the different orientations to the idea of race taken by anthropological theorists in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, it is obvious that race as an assumption about man's innate nature served as a vehicle for the legitimization of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.

The development and change which anthropological theory underwent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, corresponded with the emergence and decline of the laissez-faire form of liberalism. At the height of the period of "economic individualism", especially in America, there developed a general theoretical orientation within anthropological theory that was essentially complementary to the ideal of autonomous individuality. The idea of evolution as it was utilized by anthropologists, conveniently served as a means to legitimate, from a supposedly scientific point of view, the ideals of individualism. These liberal ideals had gained popularity throughout North America and Europe, within the spheres of economics and politics during this period. The anthropological evolutionary theories, formulated by Maine, McLennan, Tylor, Morgan, Frazer, and more recently, White, made use of other distinct biologically-oriented concepts apart from that of evolution. In this regard, they also utilized explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature. Their assumptions about man's innate nature in turn, served as vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal laissez-faire ideals of individualism.

It was only with the emergence of general social instability and class inequalities in America, the intensification of the division of labor in
France, and unsettled colonial conditions in the British Empire that social
theorists began to be more critical of the belief in unlimited individual-
ism. Urged on by the objective requirements of the social situation in
which they found themselves, anthropologists increasingly began to dis-
cover a great number of shortcomings in the utilization of the evolu-
tionary perspective with its emphasis on individual competition and the
struggle for survival. Many anthropologists grew suspicious of the
increasing reliance of social theory on the biological notions of evolu-
tion and natural selection. The anthropological theorists who belonged
to the theoretical movements of Historical Particularism in America,
French Structuralism and British Structural Functionalism respectively,
sought to establish anthropology as a distinct science of culture.
Theorists such as Boas, Kroeber, Lowie, Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss,
Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Evans-Pritchard all sought to justify
the idea that man's behavior was determined by society and not by his
innate nature, racial character or the inevitable laws of evolutionary
development. Despite their emphasis on the idea of the social deter-
mination of human behavior, all of these theorists made explicit use of
assumptions about human nature in their attempts to justify the idea of
man's dependency on society.

When the history of anthropological theory, from the eighteenth to
at least the early part of the twentieth century is reviewed, it becomes
obvious that the explicit use of assumptions about human nature was not
merely restricted to the racial or evolutionary anthropological theories.
In fact, the use of such assumptions even characterized those theories
which were intended to refute the idea that man's innate nature deter-
mines the behavior and capabilities of the individual. The use of assumptions about human nature was continuous between the eighteenth and early part of the twentieth century. However, the general ideological orientation of these assumptions was not.

The assumptions about human nature formulated by the racial theorists of the eighteenth century were concomitantly related to the social and historical developments of that particular period, insofar as those assumptions reflected the liberal libertarian ideals of equality. This belief itself was a product of the general disillusionment experienced by many intellectuals, with all forms of traditional authority. It was this belief, in turn, which provided the underlying rationale for the French Revolution. On the other hand, the assumptions about human nature as related to race in the nineteenth century were indicative of the growing scepticism of social theorists towards the individualistic ideals of the Enlightenment. The scepticism expressed towards the liberal ideals of individualism was a direct consequence of the unstable social and economic conditions in Europe, which many believed were the result of the French Revolution.

With the advent of increasing economic opportunity, and the development of the laissez-faire form of liberalism, in North America as well as in Europe, assumptions about human nature as they were utilized in anthropological theory again took on a new orientation. The theoretical insights of both Darwin and Spencer became widely popular, and were used as a means to justify the liberal ideals of individualism within the context of the evolutionary processes of natural selection and the survival of the fittest. Finally, by the beginning of the twentieth century, in
response to the growing discontent of urban populations (most notably in America, with its laissez-faire form of capitalist development) assumptions about human nature formulated by anthropologists were given an entirely new emphasis.

From a sociology of knowledge point of view, it is obvious that the variations in the assumptions about human nature which were evident in anthropological theory between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, corresponded closely with the changes that had occurred in the socio-economic conditions of this period. While these assumptions about human nature were concomitantly related to specific socio-economic changes in this period, they were nevertheless restricted in their scope to the exemplification of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. The basic variations of liberalism have constituted the belief in the ideals of individualism on the one hand, and the belief in the ideals of social integration on the other.

In observing the variations of assumptions about human nature within anthropological theory during this time, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of the dynamics of immanent change inherent within liberalism. It has already been pointed out that the variations of assumptions about man's innate nature within other social theories have followed a basic rhythm or pattern of variation. As soon as one particular school of thought comes to emphasize the liberal ideals of individualism, then almost immediately another school of thought attempts to legitimize the opposite ideals, those of social integration. This basic rhythm of variation was also evident in the divergent orientations of the assumptions about human nature taken by those anthropologists dealing
with the question of race. Likewise, this rhythm characterized the inter-
relationships between the evolutionary anthropological theories and those
which attempted to present a social deterministic interpretation of human
behavior and culture. The basic dynamics of theory construction as related
to the development of anthropological theory historically, were character-
ized by the operation of the processes of immanent change particular to
liberalism as an ideology.

Anthropologists have historically relied on assumptions about human
nature. They have failed nevertheless to provide such assumptions with
any form of empirical justification. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and
early part of the twentieth centuries most anthropologists had been willing
to defend the scientific nature of anthropological theory. However, very
few of them adhered to the basic tenets of the scientific method in their
use of empirically unjustified assumptions about human nature. The dy-
namics of anthropological theory construction during this period were
not entirely dependent on the scientific processes of objective observation
and theoretical deduction. Quite the contrary, it is evident that the
dynamics of theory construction in terms of those anthropological theories
studied here, were based to a large extent on the processes of immanent
change, inherent within liberalism. These immanent processes were
reflected in the variations of assumptions about man's innate nature which
were related, in turn, to changing socio-economic circumstances.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER V


6. See:


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37. Ibid.; p. 94.

38. Ibid.; p. 32.


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52. Ibid.; p. 124.

53. Ibid.; p. 144.
54. Ibid.; p. 139.
56. Ibid.; p. 176.
61. Ibid.; p. 534.
65. Ibid.; p. 577.
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68. Ibid.; pp. 9-10.
69. Ibid.; p. 46.
74. Ibid.; pp. 204-12.
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76. Ibid.; p. 243.
77. Ibid.; p. 245.
78. Ibid.; p. 237.
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88. Mitchell, Duncan; A Hundred Years of Sociology; Op. Cit.; p. 36.
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103. \textit{Ibid.}; p. 103.


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113. Ibid.; p. 84.

114. Ibid.; p. 86.

115. Ibid.; p. 89.

116. Ibid.; p. 120.

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118. Ibid.; p. 289.

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123. Ibid.; p. 577.


125. Spencer, Herbert; A Plea for Liberty - An Argument Against Socialism and Socialistic Legislation (John Murray; London; 1892) p. 4.


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133. Ibid.; p. 355.
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142. Ibid.; p. 28.
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150. Ibid.; p. 216.
152. Ibid.; p. 221.


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211. Ibid.; p. 712.
213. Frazer, James George; Totemism and Exogamy - A Treatise On Certain Early Forms of Superstition and Society, Vol. IV (Dawsons of Pall Mill; London; 1968) p. 98.
214. Ibid.; p. 98.
216. Ibid.; p. 18.
217. Ibid.; p. 22.
218. Ibid.; p. 100.
219. Ibid.; p. 121.
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221. Ibid.; p. 149.
222. Ibid.; p. 368.


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246. Ibid.; p. 311.

247. Ibid.; p. 637.


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   See also the collection of revised essays taken from Anthropology; Kroeber, A.; Biology and Race (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.; New York; 1948).

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257. Ibid.; p. 246.


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266. Ibid.; pp. 136, 147.


270. Ibid.; p. 338.


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328. Ibid.; p. 85.
331. Ibid.; p. 63.
332. Ibid.; pp. 69, 73.


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347. For some rather imaginative examples of binary oppositions, see: Levi-Strauss, Claude; The Savage Mind; Ibid.; p. 61.

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373. Malinowski, Bronislaw; The Dynamics of Cultural Change (Yale University Press; New Haven; 1965) p. 42.
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387. Ibid.; p. 140.
390. Ibid.; p. 199.
391. Ibid.; p. 197.
393. Ibid.; p. 70.


397. Ibid.; p. 46.


400. Ibid.; p. 31.


402. Ibid.; p. 27.

403. Ibid.; p. 84.

404. Ibid.; p. 96.


408. Ibid.; p. 137.


410. For another example of the segmentary principle as defined by Evans-Pritchard, see:


412. Ibid.; pp. 198, 255.

CHAPTER VI - HUMAN NATURE AND THE LIBERAL DILEMMA

1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

Social theorists, especially in North America, by the beginning of the twentieth century had become disillusioned with the biological orientation and individualistic ideals which had been explicit features of the various theories formulated by the Social Darwinists. At the same time, most social theorists were convinced that what American society required was a "science of society" which could outline the guidelines for the realization of an integrated cultural milieu within an increasingly industrialized and urbanized social environment.

A number of schools of sociological and anthropological thought emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. Together, the social theorists particular to these various theoretical trends, strove to legitimize the need for social integration, as well as to account for the necessity of preserving some degree of individual freedom. Such schools of anthropological and sociological thought inclusive of Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism, and Culture and Personality were intent on demonstrating that the individual was dependent on society for the complete development of his personality. Conversely, these same social theorists also wished to show that the processes of social change and reform were directly related to the needs of the individual personality. It is in this context that many American social theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century lent support to the liberal ideals of individualism as well as those related to the belief in social integration. The dilemma which all of these liberal theorists faced was the choice of
an appropriate theoretical framework and set of explanatory categories which would allow them to integrate both sets of ideals within a holistic theory of man and society.

Most students and critics of Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism, and Culture and Personality have failed to examine the conceptual and theoretical means by which the various members of these schools attempted to resolve this specific "liberal dilemma". Those scholars and critics who are familiar with the Pragmatist, Symbolic Interactionist and Culture and Personality theorists have emphasized that they were chiefly responsible for setting the trend for the disregarding of any considerations about man's innate nature. Specifically, such critics as Conkin, Feibleman, Gallie, Reilly and Wells have argued that common sense and creative intelligence nurtured in a social context were the leading concepts made use of by the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists. Similarly, Victor Barnouw has indicated that the theorists of the Culture and Personality school of thought were convinced that...

One cannot make 'human nature' as an explanation for man's activities, for human nature is extraordinarily malleable and is shaped and guided by different cultures. Those who have been generally concerned with these major theoretical trends have recognized that the various social theorists involved, placed a great deal of emphasis on the idea of the social determination of human behavior and culture. No one to date, however, has seriously analyzed the extent to which any of these particular theorists were able to exclude all assumptions about the innate nature of man from their various theories. Nor has anyone considered the role which such assumptions about man's innate nature may have played in contributing to the incorporation of the
liberal ideals of social integration and individuality within the various theories, particular to these major schools of sociological and anthropological thought.

Contemporary social scientists such as H. Warren Dunham have maintained that

"...what a given social scientist holds or has to say about the nature of man will determine the character of the sociology that he tends to develop."

The ascertaining of the degree to which Dunham's contention is applicable to the Pragmatic, Symbolic Interactionist and Culture and Personality theories necessitates that the use of assumptions about human nature within these particular theories be closely reviewed. In this respect the formulation of assumptions about human nature by these theorists as related to their belief in the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration will constitute the primary focal point of analysis in this chapter. This chapter will also be concerned with examining the theories of John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen. These theorists originally set the precedent for the incorporation of both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism within the context of sociological and anthropological theory. By outlining the methods by which these two theorists were able to incorporate both these liberal ideals within their respective social analyses, we may more clearly understand their similarity to the sociologists and anthropologists writing within the theoretical traditions of Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism, and Culture and Personality.

The Culture and Personality school of anthropological thought utilized many of the insights and theories which had been outlined by the
Historical Particularists, inclusive of Boas, Kroeber and Lowie. Lowie's formal recognition of psychology set a distinct precedent within anthropological theory. As a result of the growing awareness by anthropologists of the need to come to terms with the interrelationships between the individual personality and culture, there emerged a distinct branch of anthropological theory, commonly referred to as Culture and Personality. The major forerunners of this 'school' were Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead. They intended to demonstrate that the individual was not merely a passive reflection of his cultural milieu. On the contrary, they were convinced that the individual played a determinate role in the formation of culture. Their theories were directed towards the discovery of, as Margaret Mead writes,

...where and in what ways men could shape their culture closer to their highest vision.

While emphasizing the active role of the individual in the formation of culture, the early Culture and Personality theorists also recognized the need for interpreting human behavior in its cultural context, rather than relying on the 'vaguer concepts' attributable to an absolute human nature. They pointed out that the moral codes, systems of values and cultural behaviors of one society are not necessarily those of another. Each culture was held to be unique, having its own carefully defined worldview. Thus, while they emphasized the need to recognize the important part played by the individual within any culture, they also stressed a particular brand of cultural relativism.

The Culture and Personality school is not restricted solely to Benedict and Mead. Contained within the school are a number of other
theorists who have given attention to differing aspects of the processes of socialization, basic personality structure and psychoanalysis. John Whiting, another important member of this school, was concerned with the stages of socialization, child-training and personality growth in relation to developing a theory of learning. Finally, Abram Kardiner has explored the extent to which the individual personality is a mediator of cultural institutions and the degree to which, in turn, the basic personality structure is a reflection of such institutions. All of these theorists, in their own right, have endeavored to provide a theoretical framework, within which the relation between the cultural determination of human behavior and the individual may be more realistically viewed in greater detail.

The idea maintained by Culture and Personality theorists as well as Pragmatists that man is a social animal and a creature of culture, has a long history which begins ultimately with the Enlightenment. The theory of the social determination of behavior enjoyed varying degrees of popularity, right up until the middle of the nineteenth century. It was only with the advent of Darwin's writings that the social nature of human nature first came to be seriously questioned. Social Darwinism, which emerged as the sociological reply to Darwin's biological speculations was not however without its critics. Many of the criticisms of evolutionary theory were centered at the denial, made by Social Darwinists, of the possibility for social reform, their reliance on instincts in the explanation of social behavior and finally, their belief in the racial determination of culture. Pragmatism as a distinct theoretical orientation was probably the strongest theoretical bulwark that emerged at the
beginning of the twentieth century to counter the Social Darwinistic idea that man was nothing more than a passive pawn of evolutionary laws.

The Pragmatist movement in North America included many well known sociologists and social philosophers such as: Peirce, James, Dewey, Cooley and Mead. George Herbert Mead's insights into society and the self in turn gave rise to another closely related theoretical movement in sociology referred to as Symbolic Interactionism, which has included such figures as Thomas, Blumer and Gerth and Mills, among many others. As Dennis Wrong has explained, all of these social theorists saw it as their major task "to expose the unreality" of the Social Darwinist image of man.

Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism and the Culture and Personality schools of thought constituted an extended reaction to Social Darwinism and the liberal laissez-faire ideals of individualism and individual competition. In this sense these theoretical movements emerged in response to the unique social, cultural and economic conditions of American society during the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. By understanding the general conditions of American society in this period we may come to more fully appreciate the reasons for the concurrent reorientation of social theory from a Social Darwinist perspective to a more social deterministic framework of analysis.

The period of 1850-1900 was a time of development and abundance. It was also a period characterized by growing mass discontent and disillusionment. The growth of slums, urban crowding, poverty, and the worsening of working conditions at this time, have led many historians to conclude that the real life situation of the working and laboring classes of North
America grew worse, rather than better, as a consequence of industrialization and urbanization. It became more and more evident to those who had settled in the urban areas between 1850-1900, that the millennial liberal ideals of equality, opportunity and individuality which they had held, were quite unrealizable dreams. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the contrast between the North American immigrant's dreams of unlimited opportunity and abundance, and the lack of opportunity and abundance in real life, had become frightening to many and was a continual source of discontent among the American urban populations.

Prior to 1890 in the United States, the liberal ideals of equality, freedom and unbounded individual opportunity had been dependent upon the opportunities and life chances afforded by the seemingly limitless American frontier. Up to 1890, the history of America had been to a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an extensive area of free land, its continuous recession and the advancement of American settlement explains the intensity of the American liberal libertarian ideals and the nature of the institutions which shaped them. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner has maintained that the most important effect of the frontier was the promotion of extreme democratic and individualistic ideals in both America and Europe. He remarked that

...the frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated by wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The frontier contributed significantly to the development of the ideals of unlimited democracy and individualism.
Turner went on to contend that the fluid frontier situation which facilitated a vast flow of new and unprecedented problems with which the settlers had to deal, without the support of any form of traditional institutional networks, resulted in the promotion of individual innovation to a high level. Individual innovation was developed to the degree that it became more than just a way of life. It also became an ideal or value to be protected at all costs.

Not the constitution, but free land and an abundance of natural resources open to a fit people, made the democratic type of society in America. American institutions are peculiar in that they have had to adapt to the requirements of a people crossing a whole continent and to the primitive economic conditions of the frontier. The Westerner believed he was able to defend himself and resented all governmental restriction. It was the West which was the vehicle for the objectification and manifestation of the liberal ideals of individualism and it was these same ideals that were to live on when the frontier ceased to exist after 1890.

The West was of great importance to liberalism in the Jackson era. During the 1830's, the West exemplified the Jacksonian doctrines of individualism and the equality of political and economic opportunities. Between 1880 and 1896, the American frontier had reached its end. The migrations of the late 1880's were overly large. There were more settlers on the Great Plains than the plains could hold. The first century of American independence, as described by F.L. Paxson, had been dominated by the influence of the frontier. The second century was shaped by industry and urbanization. For immigrants coming to North America, the frontier had symbolized the possibility of tearing themselves away from the bondage
of their traditional cultures and of creating their own values in an empty land.

The end of the frontier did not foretell the end of the migration of the European nations, but the end of a form of equality whose tradition was nevertheless to remain with America. 18

While, after 1890, the structural reality of the frontier ceased to exist, the ideals which had been shaped by it continued to influence the thinking and attitudes of immigrants coming into the large metropolitan centers. 19

New inhabitants of the urban centers in North America grew increasingly frustrated and desperate in their efforts to grasp the few opportunities afforded them. The promise of the city was a promise of isolation, personal estrangement and overcrowding.

...the city dweller...expresses not only anxiety and estrangement but also an ahistorical character in which men experience themselves solely as objects of opaque processes and torn between sudden shock and sudden forgetfulness, are no longer capable of temporal continuity. 20

In the city the individual was as equally estranged from the realization of the promise of unlimited opportunity as he was divorced from any sense of community or group membership as represented in distinct cultural institutions.

The possibility in American cities for there to have developed a cultural framework with a precise system of values and norms was effectively negated by the individualistic ideals and beliefs of American liberalism itself. American society, historically, from the beginning of the eighteenth century had been characterized by an extremely populistic and evangelical tradition. It was this anti-intellectual evangelistic spirit which had effectively deterred the possibility of there developing
in North America a cultural elite which could have defined and promoted an integrative cultural tradition. Cultural elites, like many social institutions, were antithetical to the robust, independent, frontier liberal spirit. This frontier spirit was based on the suspicion of all elites and all forms of institutional authority and tradition no matter what their function. It was the liberal libertarian ideals in America which had provided the ideals and dreams which the individuals in the cities at the turn of the century found were unrealizable. Their adherence to such liberal values ensured their continued frustration and disillusionment. At the same time, it was the frontier libertarian beliefs which contributed to the denial of the emergence of representative cultural elites and institutions within early American urban society.

Historically, culture in America found other mediums through which it might develop. Owing to the lack of a cultural elite, cultural definition was left to the large-scale commercial interests which quickly developed after 1850. The broadside bulletin, the newspapers, the department store catalogue, the radio and later, the television provided the North American mass with what was equivalent to cultural values and traditions and an overall integrative framework based on one essential building stone - the commodity. Such an integrative framework gave the city dweller an extremely limited and superficial basis for social interaction and for the development of a concept of self.

For the mass of people in the North American city, there existed no substantial cultural precedents or systems of traditional values by which they might interpret their own position in the world and come to understand their relationships with others. Nor did these urbanized popu-
ulations have any institutionalized cultural framework through which they might mediate their day to day frustrations and anxieties. As Mannheim has described, the chief difficulty of modern urban North American society lies not so much in its vastness as in the fact that the liberal method of organization has not yet reached the stage where it can produce the organic articulation (Gliederung) which a vast and complex society needs. 22

In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, personal insecurities, frustrations and anxieties increased among the masses of the major American metropolitan centers. These emotional instabilities were a response to the lack of an integrative cultural structure. They were also indicative of the growing inequalities and disparities in the economic and political spheres of American life.

Political and judicial authority in the United States at this time was divided and fragmented among the interest of the federal government, the states and the municipalities. Such a fragmentation of federal power and the weakness of federal laws, facilitated the quick and prosperous development of large, national business concerns. Almost uncontrolled, these business interests had been able to build up huge national commercial industries. Through their disproportionate representation in political office, owners or representatives of major commercial enterprises were able to maintain a significant amount of political control and influence in the determining of the direction which American society would take. An aggressive plutocracy dominated the political institutions of the United States, ensuring the maintenance of the growing disparities in wealth and income between the different sectors of the American population. In 1900, one-eighth of American families possessed
seven-eighths of the national fortune. Andrew Carnegie's income was over $20,000,000 per year as compared to the national average income of $500 per year.

Capital began to consolidate in ever greater proportions. For the laboring individuals of the urban areas, the disparities between wages and hours worked intensified as did the harshness of working and living conditions. The middle-classes had about the same social position as they do today, but the condition of the factory worker was much harsher than it is at present. Immigrants who arrived by the thousands in this period were both culturally estranged in their new surroundings as well as politically powerless to defend their rights. The poor in the cities slowly began to give up the liberal illusions of the inevitability of success and the belief that America was a land of unlimited individual opportunity. Faith in the millenial ideal of progress and the Manifest Destiny also began to fade.

Conflicts between big business and the vast but largely unorganized labor force characterized the period of North American history between 1870-1900. Stripped of their illusory hopes and dreams, the working populations of such cities as New York began to take note of the striking contrasts between the conspicuous opulence of Fifth Avenue and the squalor and slums in which they found themselves confined. Social unrest, mob action, riots and strikes became prevalent in the larger cities. The notorious Orange Riot of 1871 in New York was a blatant example of the discontent, frustration and resentment experienced by sectors of the urban American population. Such incidents as the great railroad strike of 1877 were characterized by an even more intense level of violence,
necessitating the calling in of Federal troops. The anarchist Haymarket bombings were the culmination of a whole series of national disturbances over wage disparities and political inequalities.\textsuperscript{24} The Populist Party movement also emerged in the 1890's, under William Jennings Bryan. It represented an attempt on the part of urban laborers and farmers to gain mass support for promoting the cause of government intervention in big business. They demanded that the institutional organization of American society be democratized through the government ownership of the agencies of communication and transportation. Also, they called for the construction of more effective means to express public opinion over political issues.\textsuperscript{25}

The times were characterized by both the experiences of frustration and resentment on the part of the urban working classes and the aimless and unconstrained gaiety and frivolity of the middle and upper classes. Economic life became one long series of crises, booms and recessions; denying the individual any sense of predictability, continuity or security. People longed to escape. Mass culture was quick to respond.

The people's avidity for a rapid succession of images, for syncopated music, for dancing, and cars contained within it a great longing for escape.\textsuperscript{26} Andrew Jackson's greatest fear, that when people "...get piled upon one another in large cities, as in Europe, shall become corrupt as people in Europe and go to eating one another as they do there", had come true in the American metropolises of the early twentieth century.\textsuperscript{27}

It was within the context of these rather unsettled social, economic and political conditions that the social theorists particular to such
schools of thought as Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism and Culture and Personality, attempted to give new impetus to the idea of social integration as related to man's need for, and dependency on culture. The Pragmatists, followed later by theorists of the other major social theoretical trends, strove to replace the Spencerian notions of evolution, autonomous individuality, unchecked competition and the limitations of man's instinctually determined nature with more socially oriented ideals. The ideals which all of these social theorists tried to develop, portrayed man as a social individual whose nature was not controlled by instincts or directed by evolutionary laws. They believed that man could be completely modified through his exposure to education, social reforms, scientific knowledge and other types of socially cooperative effort. By outlining the possibility of modifying the human personality through social processes, these various theorists endeavored to restore hope to the poor and dispossessed.

At the same time, many of these theorists were unwilling to completely give up the liberal ideals of individualism. Insofar as the quest for the realization of such ideals had constituted the basic motivating force for the historical development of American society, it could be expected that American social theorists would be unwilling to completely reject the applicability and value of such ideals. It is for this reason that many social theorists, writing in the first part of the twentieth century outlined a view of human nature which would allow for the possibility of social reform as well as provide the individual with some degree of autonomy from his social surroundings. The essential dilemma which liberal social theorists have faced since the beginning of the twentieth century has been the selection of methods and concepts which would allow
for the incorporation of both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism, into their respective sociological and anthropological analyses.

The question of how this liberal dilemma was resolved by these various schools of social thought will constitute the central concern of this chapter. More specifically, the possibility that these theorists made use of assumptions about human nature to aid them in incorporating the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration into their theories will be given close attention here. From this perspective, we will be able to determine whether the assumptions about man defined by the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists conformed to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. In order to appreciate fully the methods by which these schools of thought made use of assumptions about human nature, the theories of John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen will be analyzed first. These two theorists hold a central importance to this chapter, since in many respects they provided a precedent for other theorists in using assumptions about human nature to resolve the contradictions inherent within the liberal world-view.
2) John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen - The Resolution of the Liberal Dilemma

This section of the chapter will analyze the extent to which John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen successfully incorporated the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration into their theories. Their use of explicit assumptions about human nature shall also be reviewed in relation to their adherence to both sets of liberal ideals. From examining the assumptions about human nature formulated by these two theorists it will be possible to more fully appreciate the theoretical efforts of other sociologists and anthropologists who as liberals, faced similar methodological and ideological problems. The particular use of assumptions about human nature by Mill and later by Veblen was a clear indication of the manner in which many other social theorists, belonging to major schools of thought, would utilize similar assumptions about man, in resolving the inherent contradictions of the liberal world-view.

John Stuart Mill has been recognized as one of the most prominent British philosophers, economists, logicians and ethical theorists of the nineteenth century. His major writings included: *A System of Logic* (1843); *Principles of Political Economy*, 2 Vols. (1848); *On Liberty* (1859); *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861); *Utilitarianism* (1863); *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1965), and *Three Essays on Religion* (1874). Mill has been referred to as "the archetype of the liberal". However, his brand of liberalism, as it was reflected in his social theories was unique. His ideological orientation combined the conservative belief in social integration with the libertarian belief in individualism.

In this respect Gertrude Himmelfarb has stated that 'while Mill's
liberalism is familiar enough, his peculiar brand of conservatism is not. On the one hand, as D.A. Lindsay has pointed out, Mill supported the libertarian view

...that as the most valuable element in human life is spontaneous choice, anything which is done by a compulsory power, diminishes the scope of that choice and thus infringes liberty.

At the same time, his idea of liberty was said to be

...not merely negative but quite clearly implied society. He (saw) that without considerable state interference, liberty (was) impossible.

Similarly, Maurice Cowling has maintained that his doctrine of liberalism was "less libertarian and less simply individualistic than other writers have been willing to allow". According to a number of Mill's more informed critics, his major writings constituted one of the original attempts to incorporate and synthesize within the context of social theory, the liberal ideals of individualism as well as those liberal ideals related to the belief in social integration.

Many students and critics concerned with Mill's writings have made mention of his attempts to resolve the inherent contradictions of the liberal world-view. Other critics have noted his efforts to provide social theory with an empirical basis. Sir Isaiah Berlin has argued that Mill was an empiricist who believed that truths about man and society must rely "on the evidence of observations". In addition, Bruce Mazlesh has commented that this British social theorist primarily intended to develop an empirically based ethology insofar as he insisted that...

We are to take general laws from psychology, deduce their consequences when conjoined with particular circumstances, and emerge with exact laws whose status is causal rather than merely empirical.
However, other critics of Mill's work have maintained a contrary opinion.

Many scholars who have examined his social theories have argued that the psychological laws which he made use of, in attempting to develop an empirical ethnology, were predicated on speculative assumptions about the innate nature of human nature. Karl Popper has pointed out that Mill, in reference to the analysis of such social phenomena as the rules of exogamy,

...would try to explain these rules by an appeal to 'human nature', for instance to some sort of instinctive aversion against incest... and something like this would also be the main or popular explanation.35

In a similar light, Alan Ryan has explained that Mill sought to deduce truths about the actual course of human nature, by seeing whether "middle-level propositions" about history

...are derivable from the laws of human nature or whether at any rate they are compatible with those laws. 36

These divergent interpretations and evaluations of Mill's writings suggest a number of basic questions which warrant further consideration. The most obvious one, which has received little attention to date, is the question of the extent to which his ambivalent liberal views, which emphasized the ideals of individualism as well as those of social integration, were predicated on specific assumptions about man's innate nature. The second question is related to the degree to which his assumptions about human nature were empirically justified. It is to these questions that this specific portion of this analysis shall be addressed.

Mill, in his essay "Civilization" (1836), contended that the characterizing features of a civilized society were
...where the arrangements of society, for protecting the persons or property of its members, are sufficiently perfect to maintain peace among them; i.e. induce the bulk of the community to rely for their security mainly upon the social arrangements, and renounce for the most part, and in ordinary circumstances, the vindication of their interests...by their individual strength of courage.

According to this argument, the most notable feature of a civilized society was the willingness of its members to "sacrifice some portion of individual will, for a common purpose".

Human nature was viewed by Mill as being innately social as well as individualistic. In his essay, "Nature" (1874), he stated that both the feelings of "selfishness" and "sympathy" were "natural to man". He believed that the purpose of education was to inhibit "the evil instincts of man". In another essay, "Utility of Religion" (1874), he added that the "intrinsic capacities of human nature", which he believed to consist of "the sense of unity with mankind and a deep sense of common good", may be cultivated through "habitual exercise".

It was explained in some of his other writings, that restraint as developed through education, was necessary to curb man's evil instincts. So too was it essential for the individual to express his spontaneous and inherent emotions of justice and sympathy. As Mill elaborated in his essay "Utilitarianism"...

And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself...widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements, the feeling derives its morality; from the former, its peculiar expressiveness, and energy of self-assertion.

Thus, as he saw it, by allowing the individual to express his innate
capacity for enlarged sympathy...

The same powerful motives which command the observance of these primary moralities, ensure the punishment of those who violate them; and as the impulses of self-defense, of defence of others, and of vengeance are called forth... retribution, or evil for evil becomes closely connected with the sentiment of justice...

Mill was convinced that the restraint of the "evil" portion of man's nature, as well as the spontaneous expression of his positive instincts of justice, was necessary for the maintenance of progressive social stability and integration.

Mill stated in his essay "On Liberty", that the spontaneous and unhampered expression of certain innate features of human nature was essential insofar as...

The same strong susceptibilities which make the personal impulses...powerful, are also the source from whence are generated the most passionate love of virtue, and the sternest self-control.

This quote is a very good example of how Mill endeavored to justify both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism through the use of specific assumptions about human nature for which he failed to provide any empirical verification.

Unlike many of the liberal social theorists before him, John Stuart Mill did not choose to lend support to only one of the basic variations of the liberal world-view. Instead, he strove to resolve within a holistic, theoretical structure, the basic ambivalence that had traditionally existed between the liberal belief in social integration on the one hand and in individualism, on the other. Assumptions about human nature were used by him as a means to justify the need for social restraint and individual spontaneity. By using such assumptions in the resolving of
the essential contradictions inherent in the liberal ideology, Mill provided a general guideline to those social theorists who were dissatisfied with the liberal *laissez-faire* form of individualism. These theorists also did not want to portray man as being completely dependent on the restraints and controls provided by society.

Apart from Mill, other social theorists, especially in North America, strove to combine the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration within their various analyses of society and human behavior. Thorstein Veblen was one of the original American social theorists to try to resolve the inherent contradictions of the liberal world-view. Like many other sociologists and anthropologists writing in America in the latter half of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, Veblen experienced a general disillusionment with the *laissez-faire* form of capitalist development. Davis has described how the writings of this theorist were formulated at a time when...

The American Midwest..., was the scene of repeated agrarian revolts and urban labor struggles. Many people were receptive to the reformist ideas of Henry George and Edward Bellamy, and scathing attacks on the great corporations by social critics like Henry Lloyd and Upton Sinclair were widely applauded.

Veblen's writings, as a whole, reflected a period in the development of American society which was characterized by Populism, radical unionism, and socialism, as well as other social movements which attempted to exemplify the ideals of collectivism.

The period in which Veblen lived was an age of transition. America, in the early part of the twentieth century, changed from a primarily rural agricultural society, to an urban and highly industrialized nation.
The disruptive nature of these processes of modernization was interpreted by a number of social theorists as being the consequence of the injustices of the laissez-faire form of capitalist organization. Many social theorists, economists and politicians became increasingly convinced that America required a constructive form of social development other than that provided through the laissez-faire form of individual competition. In this regard, Veblen took

...Spencer's attack on socialist society and stood it on its head, making it an attack on capitalist society. 45

He was against any form of social organization that would deny the liberal ideals of equality in allowing "one individual (to take) precedence over another. 46

Veblen's major writings included, among others: The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899); The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904); The Instinct of Workmanship and The State of the Industrial Arts (1914); The Higher Education In America (1918); The Place of Science In Modern Civilization and Other Essays (1919), and The Vested Interest and the Common Man (1919).

All of his writings indicate his strong belief that society existed in a continuous state of change. Nevertheless, he was unwilling to accept the Social Darwinistic concepts of natural selection, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. Veblen expressed his support of the liberal ideals of individual freedom through his relentless criticism of all forms of authority. 47 His adherence to the ideal of individualism is evidenced within his subjectivist theory of knowledge. As Dobriansky, a well known critic of Veblen, has indicated...
Joined with this evident inclination on the part of Veblen toward active experience is his subjectivist theory of knowledge, so clearly revealed in his essay on Kant's 'Critique of Judgement'.

Conversely, other critics of his works, inclusive of Wesley C. Mitchell, have maintained that he placed a great deal of emphasis on the idea of man's dependency on society insofar as he asserted that...

The human environment is of critical importance because through tradition, training and education, "the young acquire what the old have learned". His support of both the liberal ideals of individualism, as well as social integration, has been commented on by a number of his critics. Also, his use of assumptions about human nature has received scholarly attention. Douglas F. Dowd has observed that he...

...used the term instinct to cover much of what is loosely called "human nature". The area of thought and behavior thus referred to would include the values and ingrained habits of man, both of which are subject to change, but only slowly and under substantial stress.

Other students and critics, like Joseph Dorfman and James Burnham, also have studied Veblen's use of assumptions about man's innate nature.

What has not been examined in Veblen's writings is the interrelationship between his views on the nature of human nature, and the liberal ideals which he held in respect to his belief in both individualism and social integration. It is the nature of this specific interrelationship which will be examined within the context of this analysis.

It was in his major work, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, that Veblen gave his most articulate definition of what he believed to be the innate nature of human nature. In the introduction to this work, he emphasized that for mankind as
...for the other higher animals, the life of the species, is conditioned by the complement of instinctive proclivities and tropismatic aptitudes with which the species is typically endowed. Instincts, were defined as "complex elements of the constitution of the individual person which vary from one individual to another". It was added that while human institutions change, and instill as a consequence, new forms of conduct, "the typical human endowment of instincts, as well as the typical make-up of the race in the physical respect" remains intact. Also, it was assumed that while...

Change in the institutional structure is continuously taking place in response to the altered discipline of life under changing cultural conditions...human nature remains specifically the same...

He believed that while culture determines man's general habits of behavior, it was nevertheless man's instincts, when they became incongruous with "imbecile" social institutions which provided the basic motivation for social and cultural change.

In the same work, Veblen defined two specific instincts which he felt to be characteristic of man's innate human nature. These so-called instincts included the "parental bent" and the "instinct of workmanship". As he elaborated...

Chief among those instinctive dispositions that conduce directly to the material well-being of the race...is perhaps the instinctive bias...here spoken of as the sense of workmanship. The only other instinctive factor of human nature...would be the parental bent.

The "parental bent" in his opinion provided for the continuation of the individual's race and society. The instinct of workmanship, on the other hand, was
...concerned with the ways and means whereby instinctively given purposes are to be accomplished. According, therefore, as one or another instinctive disposition is predominant in the community's scheme of life, or in the individual's everyday interest, the habitual trend of the sense of workmanship, will be bent to one or another kind of proficiency..."59

Such socially-oriented instincts as he believed, were not merely automatic responses. In fact, they involved a high degree of intelligence on the part of the individual. It was argued that instinct "aims to achieve some end and involves some degree of intelligent faculty." Veblen believed that the instincts of workmanship and the parental bent were socially-oriented. He also saw them as constituting individualistic expressions of a person's unique capacities for reason and intelligence.

Veblen made explicit use of the idea of "instinct of workmanship" in Theory of the Leisure Class. The instinct for workmanship was said to facilitate the emulative tendencies in individuals which inevitably led to conspicuous consumption. In this sense...

Wherever the circumstances or traditions of life lead to an habitual comparison of one person with another in point of efficiency, the instinct of workmanship works out in an emulative or invidious comparison of persons.60

As Veblen believed, the instinct of workmanship through its facilitation of comparisons between individuals, contributed to the process of individualization. That is to say, it contributed to the accentuation of the individual differences that exist between persons.

Similar in many respects to John Stuart Mill, Veblen's use of assumptions about human nature served to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals of individualism as well as those of social integration. Both the instincts of workmanship and the parental bent which
he defined, were socially-oriented. They also involved the subjective elements of individual intelligence. It was through utilizing specific assumptions about the nature of human nature, that he contributed to the resolution of the inherent contradictions between the basic ideals of liberalism within his holistic theoretical framework. In this fashion, he was able to give recognition and justification to the need for social integration. The need for some form of social integration had become an objective requirement of American society at the beginning of the twentieth century, owing to the development of increasingly unstable social and economic conditions. At the same time, through his use of specific assumptions about human nature, he was able to lend credibility to the liberal ideal of individualism. The ideal of individual freedom and autonomy had always constituted an important consideration on the part of American social theorists during the whole course of the historical development of American society. The use of assumptions about human nature by both John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen, in their resolving of the inherent contradictions of the liberal world-view were clear examples of the way many American social theorists in the early part of the twentieth century would deal with similar methodological and ideological problems.
3) **Pragmatism and Human Nature**

Pragmatism, as a distinctly American philosophical orientation, emerged during the early part of the twentieth century in reaction to the Social Darwinistic theories which had stressed the ideas of competitive individualism and evolutionary determinism. The major sociologists and social philosophers of the Pragmatic movement included Peirce, James, Dewey and Cooley. As a theoretical movement, it developed in the same social context as such theoretical trends as Historical Particularism. All of the Pragmatic theorists, in response to the growing demand for social change by the urban populations, had become increasingly sceptical of the liberal ideals of unchecked autonomous individuality and individual competition which the Social Darwinists had sought to legitimate. The large number of incidents of social unrest which came to increasingly characterize American society at this time, served as a blatant indication to these theorists of the need for legitimizing a political and social philosophy which placed an emphasis on the more conservative liberal ideals of social integration.

The Pragmatists were convinced of the need for establishing a socially integrative cultural milieu within American society. They likewise wished to show that the individual and not some vague evolutionary laws, was the primary initiator of constructive social change. These theorists in their dualistic emphasis on the liberal ideals of individuality, as well as social integration, shared the basic theoretical and ideological orientations which had been defined by John Stuart Mill and Thorstein Veblen. All of the Pragmatists in their efforts to illustrate man's dependency on society lent explicit support to the general idea of
the social determination of human behavior. The view that man's nature was fixed and determined by some unmodifiable instincts innate to human nature was rejected. By emphasizing the plasticity of human nature, the Pragmatic theorists hoped to justify the liberal belief in the unlimited possibilities for social reform. In short, not human nature but social factors were thought to be the primary determinates of human behavior and culture. At the same time, they wished to point out that the individual acted as the initiator and guide of the processes of the social determination of behavior.

Most critics and students of the Pragmatic theoretical movement agree that these theorists were primarily responsible for the development and expansion of the theory of the social determination of human behavior. It is important to realize that the idea of the social determination of human behavior and culture, constitutes the basic orientation of contemporary sociological and anthropological theory. However, no one to date has seriously considered the extent to which these Pragmatic theorists were successful in excluding assumptions about human nature in their elaboration of the idea of man's dependency on society. Nor has anyone examined the interrelationship between the use of assumptions about human nature by Peirce, James, Dewey and Cooley, and their consequent attempt to legitimize and combine both the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration, within their respective social analyses. It is exactly these considerations which shall be given particular attention here, in the attempt to outline the dynamics of theory construction particular to Pragmatism as a whole. Also, by utilizing this framework of analysis, it will be possible to determine whether the assumptions about human nature formulated by the
Pragmatists lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation. Any evaluation of the Pragmatic theoretical world-view must begin with the work of Charles Peirce (1839-1914). It was Peirce who, as both a mathematical logician and philosopher, founded American Pragmatism. He was one of the first American philosophers to try to remove human action from the dictates of evolutionary law and provide it instead with a degree of self-determination. While he strongly supported the ideals of individualism, he nevertheless believed that individualism itself could only be realized in a social context. The question of the extent to which he utilized assumptions about human nature, to incorporate his varied liberal belief into his analyses will be given specific attention here.

From Kant, Peirce adopted the view that the human individual contributes to determining experience rather than experience being controlled by some set of inevitable and universal natural laws, like those of evolution. As he stated in his essay "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined" (1892)...

If my argument remains unrefuted, it will be time, I think to doubt the absolute truth of the principle of universal law; and when once such a doubt has obtained a living root in any man's mind, my cause with him, I am persuaded, is gained.63

In another essay, "The Place of Our Age in the History of Civilization" (1863), he expressed the conviction that the progress of civilization was dependent on the freedom achieved through innovations in scientific thought and religious conviction.64 Amelie Rorty, a well known student and critic of Pragmatism, has indicated that Peirce's theory of progress encompassed the belief that the task of social philosophy and social theory was to set the stage for science by providing a system of ethics
for the guidance of human thought. Nevertheless, to Peirce freedom was not synonymous with unchecked individual liberty. In his opinion, freedom could only be realized through service to the community and through any form of creative action directed towards that end. Man's struggle on earth was said to constitute in truth, his struggle for the attaining of belief and fixing that belief in the community. He assumed the "need" for belief to be a constant, unchanging and ignate feature of human nature. In his essay, "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), he explained that...

The feeling of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions. In this context, Peirce made use of assumptions about human nature to emphasize man's need to be socially integrated into the community through the medium of a strong belief system.

According to Peirce's theories, belief is the only means to overcome doubt. The origin of doubt, as he argued, was based on "the social impulse" to regard the opinions of others and compare them with one's own opinions. It was further maintained that the "shock of contrary opinions" leads men to forsake the trusting of their own individual points of view. Instead, they will seek the affirmation of belief through scientific fact which is defined cooperatively by the community of scholars. The "social impulse" which was the reason for doubt, is also the reason why the individual will seek the security of belief in the community of scholars. He added that man, who is driven by "the need to believe" and the "social impulse" comes in this way to acquire beliefs which are in harmony with "natural causes". By this was meant that only by developing belief in a social context within the community of scholars is it possible
to negate the individualistic characteristics of thought and allow for the uninhibited development of man's social instincts. As Peirce elaborated...

The discourse of reason is requisite because men are so intensely individualistic and original that the instincts...become smothered in them. ...the sole function of this logical deliberation is to grind off the arbitrary and individualistic character of thought...72

Finally, he attempted to answer the question of what shall act as a guide for the "community of scholars" in selecting facts to be used to confirm beliefs. In this regard, he explained that all that is necessary is critical commonsense which consists of "innate ideas" and "natural sentiments of the heart".73

C. Wright Mills has noted that Peirce attributed the existence of doubt, belief and scientific knowledge to social causes.74 Other critics including Charles Morris, have likewise indicated that the significance of his brand of Pragmatism was its anti-reductionist stance and its subsequent emphasis on the social definition of human thought and behavior.75

Contrary, however, to the opinions of Mills and Morris, it may be argued that Peirce was not able to remain aloof from utilizing reductionist assumptions about the innate nature of human nature in his efforts to elaborate a theory of the social determination of belief.

Peirce made use of at least four assumptions about the innate characteristics of human nature to justify his social deterministic viewpoints. Looking critically at his theoretical explanations, we find that he relied on the positing of a socially a priori "need to believe" to explain why people search for beliefs in the first place. Secondly, the willingness of individuals to enter into a community of scholars to confirm their
beliefs, according to his arguments, was based on the realization of a "social impulse". Thirdly, the scientific verification of a belief in a social context as he explained, promoted the realization of those "instinctual" beliefs that had been denied by individualistic tendencies of thought. Finally, he pointed out that the selection of empirical data to confirm beliefs was guided by common sense comprised of "innate ideas". Peirce made use of assumptions about human nature in order to explain the motivation and guidance of human conduct and to evaluate the results of such action in relation to the quest for knowledge.

Human belief and knowledge, as Peirce understood it, is based upon the realization of specific socially orientated needs, assumed to be innate to human nature. At the same time, he emphasized that the selection of facts to confirm human beliefs, defined in a social context, is an individualistic affair. He was convinced that the development of belief is dependent on critical commonsense, which is comprised of ideas and sentiments of the heart, innate to the individual. Through the use of assumptions about human nature which were both socially and individualistically oriented, he was able to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals of social integration as well as those of individualism. It is within this specific ideological context that his assumptions about man's nature, lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

Pragmatism as a consistent and multi-dimensional body of thought was directed towards undermining the various reductionist points of view including materialism, naturalism and the grand evolutionary schemes which pervaded much of the social thought at the beginning of this century. Arthur O. Lovejoy, in this respect, has pointed out that the
principle quarrel of the pragmatists was with

...mechanistic "naturalism", the dogma that the laws of the more complex and later-evolved processes of nature can be "reduced" to, and may eventually be deduced from the laws of the simpler processes.76

Apart from Peirce's work, the second orientation to be developed within the Pragmatist movement which served to refute the popular trend towards reducing human action to universal principles was that outlined by William James.

James rejected any form of theory which relied on reductionist assumptions about human nature. He was not willing to admit that man could be reduced merely to "survival orientated needs". Instead, he maintained an interactionist perspective. Human behavior was defined as the emergent product of the interaction that occurred between the autonomous individual on the one hand, and society on the other. Patrick Dooley, a major student and critic of his work, has observed that

...although James has not yet determined which "things" interact or how they interact, he provisionally adopts at the outset an interactionist view of man in which consciousness is efficacious in directing behavior.77

It was Peirce who had first outlined the influences which society had on human action and thought. Alternatively, it was James who indicated the important role which the individual played as an independent actor living within a social context.78 The possibility must be closely examined of whether James, like Peirce, made use of assumptions about human nature in justifying his interactionist theoretical approach.

In his major works, including Principles of Psychology (1890); The Will to Believe (1897), and Varieties of the Religious Experience (1902), James endeavored to show that the individual and the choices that he was
able to make played an important role in the determination of his own behavior. Mind was said to consist of a dynamic process through which the individual was able to adjust to his environment. 79 The purpose of his psychology was to prove that the human mind was not just a passive recipient of sense impressions which many associational psychologists today continue to believe. His psychology consisted of a subjectivist and interactional framework of analysis. On the other hand, his philosophy portrayed man as a rational animal. 80 According to James, it is the rational aspect of man's nature that allows for the directing and guiding of human behavior in relation to its practical consequences. The truth and value of human action, as he pointed out, may be measured only in terms of its effects.

Rationality was described by James as a "sentiment" which the individual recognizes "by certain subjective marks with which it affects him". 81 In the essay "The Sentiment of Rationality", he added that rationality and the theoretical function was "one of the most invincible of human impulses". He remarked that the

...craving for rationality is appeased by the identification of one thing with another... 82

It was noted that the survival of any human idea or larger philosophical system was related to the degree to which it could satisfy these organic cravings and active impulses.

Of two conceptions equally fit to satisfy the logical demand, the one which awakens the active impulses, or satisfies other aesthetic demands better than the other, will be accounted the more rational conception, and will deservedly prevail. 83

Christianity, as he saw it, was doomed to extinction because of its
inability to satisfy all "organic impulses", especially the "impulse for striving". James insisted that the

...impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible in the race. Moral creeds which speak to that impulse will be widely successful in spite of inconsistency, vagueness, and shadowy determination of expectancy. Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not given him.84

It is in order to satisfy these organic impulses of rationality, as it was explained, that people seek knowledge and develop ideas as active individuals.85

In another essay, "The Dilemma of Determinism" (1884), he contended that the criteria for measuring the truth of a proposition was the degree to which it satisfied the "indomitable desire" of rationality.85 Ideas and the motivations for human action as he emphasized are based on the individual associating his various impressions of the environment with one another and with his own inner "impulses". In yet another essay, it was maintained that man's ability to experience certain spiritual emotions such as peace, serenity, simplicity and veracity

...are quite inexplicable except by an innate preference of the more ideal attitude for its own pure sake.86

James was convinced that men has an innate preference to maintain and favor particular types of values, ideas and activities as opposed to others.

James was opposed to the Spencerian view of the evolutionary pre-destination of human action and expressed these criticisms in his essay "Great Men and Their Environment" (1880).87 Despite his adversity to the Spencerian world-view, he was not aloof from listing a number of needs
and instincts, inherent within the individual which he considered to be the foundations of moral conduct and social life. For example, he referred to the need for immortality as being the basic need of human nature and that the Church was the essential means by which such a need was fulfilled. As he stated in his essay "Human Immortality" (1893)...

Immortality is one of the great spiritual needs of men. The Churches have constituted themselves the official guardians of the need...

In his Principles of Psychology (1890), what were believed to be the innate tendencies and emotions of human nature were listed. Greediness, suspicion, curiosity, timidity, coyness, desire, vanity, bashfulness, sociability and pugnacity were said to be innate characteristics specific to the human species. However, he qualified his reliance on instinct theory by explaining that man is susceptible to "the law of the inhibition of instinct". This law stated that an instinct may be modified through the combining of the instinctual tendency with habits, learned from experience.

Primarily, James sought to demonstrate that the philosophy of evolutionary determinism was a metaphysical creed. In order to justify the idea that the individual also played an important role in determining his own life situation, it was asserted that human nature consisted of a number of innate tendencies which required fulfillment. In this fashion the individual, through fulfilling the specific needs of rationality, immortality and social self seeking among others, was portrayed as playing a major part in defining his own circumstances, over and above the adherence to vague materialistic or evolutionary laws. In order to remain aloof from the Spencerian view of the predestination of human action, he defined human nature as being independently active, socially oriented and
progressive. Nevertheless, as we can see, James's theories which attempted to justify man's rational sociability and independence were unquestionably predicated on often rather reductionist appearing assumptions about the innate nature of human nature.

His use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature served to legitimize both the liberal ideals of individualism as well as social integration. James's reference to rationality and the "active impulses" as innate features of man's nature emphasized the subjective and individual element of human behavior. His argument about man's need for immortality, as well as his need for the control of the human will by the Church, was indicative of his belief in the ideals of social integration. Through a very imaginative manipulation of specific assumptions about human nature, he was able to integrate and to resolve the essential contradictions between the basic variations of liberalism. It might also be added from a sociology of knowledge point of view that James neglected to provide any form of empirical justification for the various assumptions about human nature which he defined.

The Pragmatists were not only concerned with proving that man was a social being who, as an individual, actively contributed to determining his own self-development. John Dewey, probably the best known of the Pragmatists, was able to provide another valuable dimension to the Pragmatic world-view. His contributions consisted of the attempt to indicate that human nature could be significantly modified by the processes of education and social reform, rather than being dependent on the slow-moving laws of evolution and natural selection. Dewey's theories will be studied here in the attempt to determine whether his assumptions
about human nature were formulated in a liberal ideological context.

Dewey, professor of philosophy at the Universities of Michigan, Chicago and Columbia from 1888 to 1946, has had an overwhelming influence on American intellectual and political life. His most popular works include, *Psychology* (1887); *How We Think* (1910); *Democracy and Education* (1916); *Human Nature and Conduct* (1922), and *Freedom and Culture* (1939). All of his publications were expressions of the liberal faith in man, the belief in the value of social reform and the demand for the protection of individual rights. Horace Kallen has described that

...Pragmatism is the philosophical expression of the sober faith in man and his works which the democratic faith embodies, and John Dewey is at once the greatest as well as the most venerable and most influential living prophet and teacher of this American faith.

The essence of Dewey's philosophical message, as Richard Berstein has noted, consisted of the belief in the liberation and expansion of the individual through education. Most critics usually mention that he was completely hostile to static categories in explaining human behavior. Similarly, the majority of those who read his works are inclined to think that his major contribution consisted of pointing out that the quality of the individual's behavior depends on the social forms of education and the cultural transmission of values, while the quality of society depends on whether it fosters the development of free creative individuals.

In *Philosophy and Civilization* (1931), Dewey maintained that human nature was not merely comprised of a collection of reflexes. He added that...

The assumption that the nature of behavior is exemplified in a simple reflex is a typical case of the fallacy of neglecting development (and) historical career...
He insisted that behavior was "longitudinal", in that it was affected by the history and autobiography of the individual in interaction with the environment. As it was pointed out in *Problems of Men* (1940), any theory which asserted that human nature was unchangeable was "the most depressing and pessimistic of all possible doctrines". He realized that if human nature was in fact unchangeable, then there was little hope for education having any effect in altering the social situation for the better.

Admitting to such a pessimistic fact would involve the denial of the liberal belief in progressive social change. As the representative of liberal idealism, Dewey saw that it was necessary to outline a social and philosophical guide for social change by defining an image of human nature that was compatible with those ideals.

The life of an individual, as Dewey asserted in *Democracy and Education* (1926), is a self-renewing process. In outlining the dynamics of human action, he emphasized that between the stimulus and the overt act and between the overt act and the source of satisfaction there exists innumerable 'indeterminate influences' from the social environment and the subjective aspects of personality. More specifically, ...

Man no longer defines his end to be the satisfaction of hunger as such. It is complicated and loaded with all kinds of technical activities, associations, deliberations and social divisions of labor, that conscious attention and interest are in the process and its content.

In his opinion, the purpose of liberalism as a method of social organization was to implement policies for the maximization of individual freedom through the collective development of appropriate social controls and institutions. In *Problems of Men*, it was contended
...that, instead of using social power to ameliorate the evil consequences of the existing system, it shall use social power to change the system.  

Like many other social theorists at this time, Dewey was a strong supporter of the liberal belief in progressive social reform.

Dewey consistently emphasized the plasticity of human nature in attempting to justify the unlimited possibilities for social change and reform. At the same time, he noted that the individual is not merely a passive recipient of the educational process. The educational system itself was said to be subject to guides and checks elicited independently by the individual. These guides consist of the innate tendencies and needs of the individual which must be recognized, fulfilled and directed in a creative fashion by the educational system. He mentioned that the neglect or suppression by the educational system of specific instincts or impulses innate in the individual is the primary cause of most major social ills. Furthermore

...neglect, suppression, and premature forcing of some instincts at the expense of others are responsible for many social ills, there can be no doubt. But the moral is not to leave them alone to follow their own "spontaneous development" but to provide an environment which shall organize them.

In this sense, the innate capacities of human nature must necessarily act as guidelines for the directing of the processes of nature. As it was additionally elaborated...

It means, in effect, that great as is the significance of nurture, of modification, and transformation through direct educational effort, nature or unlearned capacities, affords the foundation and ultimate resource for such nurture.

Dewey argued in Human Nature and Conduct (1922) that roles can be recog-
there is much evidence to support the view that 

rather contradictory viewpoint of respecting the idea of human

There is much evidence to support the view that healthy mental and emotional development requires the

social integration of the individual. II. Together, these features of man's nature contribute towards the

basic human tendencies as "appropriation, emulation, and the need of work". Later, he outlined the existence of such

element of human nature. III. Closely were also defined as a "nature from a sense of solidarity." II.0
direction in their relations with one another and the support that comes

at least the need of "collective authority" to give individuals both

actually required. He nevertheless briefly mentioned the existence of

characteristic this discussion as to what these "needs" and "impulses"

also symptomatic of repressed impulses. 109

also manifested in the tendency to repress personal dispositions are

acuteness. 106 Rebelliousness and insubordinate personal dispositions are

imprisonment was the result of "an impulse which is repressed and forget for

and a highly developed imprisonment. He argued that the workings of the

theory, may be released through social activities such as art, play, fantasy,

can be the release of the productive impulses, according to this

change and personal liberation. 107

one of these impulses constitutes a indispensable source of social

human "impulses" are the "prides", upon which the reorganization of society

in human nature and conduct, the idea was put forward that human

beguine of individuality in mind. 105

impulse asserts itself deliberately against an existing custom in the

Israel asserts existing custom. In this sense, he believed that when

accounted for in the educational process, it will deliberately assert

an active response. 104 Also, when an impulse is institutionalized,
behavior and at the same time, supporting the possibility of the existence of such innate human tendencies. This fundamental contradiction is a reflection of the essentially unresolved dilemmas contained in Dewey's liberal world-view. The history of liberalism, especially in America, has been predicated, at least in one respect, on a firm belief in individualism. Pragmatism as a whole constituted a conservative reaction to the over-emphasis which had been placed on the individualistic trends of the pre-1890 period in the United States. Nevertheless, it was unwilling to completely forego the belief in the value of the autonomous individual.

The task which Dewey faced was to present an image of human nature that was malleable enough to be responsive to the processes of education and reform. At the same time, such a conception of human nature would have to be independent enough that the individual could also be understood as an effective actor capable of determining his own life situation. For this reason, Dewey's portrait of human nature was a contradictory one. His definition of human nature emphasizes its instinctlessness, as well as its innate instinctual qualities. In his opinion, the existence of innate tendencies of human nature are a guarantee that the human individual has the capability and desire to act upon the environment, rather than being an inert object totally subject to the manipulations of the socialization processes. The ultimate criterion for the judgement of such social processes rested on whether they are able to satisfy basic needs assumed to be innate to the human species as a whole.113 As a liberal sociologist, Dewey defined man's nature as being plastic enough to make social reform possible. It was also said to be unitary and biologically basic enough to allow it to be the explicit standard and guide of society.
From a sociology of knowledge perspective, it is clearly apparent that Dewey explicitly utilized assumptions about human nature to resolve the inherent ambivalence which existed within his own liberal world-view.

One of the direct consequences of Dewey's efforts in trying to resolve the problem of presenting a caricature of human nature that fitted both the liberal ideals of social reform and individualism, was the development of the notion of "social interaction". One of the most well-known promoters of this concept was Charles Horton Cooley. Cooley was one of the major pioneers of sociology in the United States, teaching at the University of Michigan from 1892-1929. His most notable theoretical contributions included: *Human Nature and The Social Order* (1902); *Social Organization* (1909); *Social Process* (1918), and *Sociological Theory and Social Research* (1930). Talcott Parsons has pointed out that it was Dewey and Cooley, along with George Herbert Mead, owing to their social psychological insights, who were able to refute the popular forms of biological reductionism maintained by the advocates of Social Darwinism. What has not been considered to date however, is the extent to which these social interactionist theorists utilized explicit assumptions about human nature to resolve the contradictions between the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration which they supported.

Cooley argued in *Sociological Theory and Social Research* that it was necessary to appreciate Spencer's contribution to sociology as a discipline. More importantly however, he felt it was also important to realize the extent to which social interaction affected and, in many respects, determined social phenomena. In his opinion, Spencer's notions in many instances were purely biologically and individualistically oriented and
held little sociological significance. 116

Philip Reiff has noted that Cooley was one of the original theorists to realize the importance of examining the degree to which social communication and interaction affected human behavior. 117 While Cooley believed the self to be socially based, he argued that the basis of society was an "affair of consciousness that is necessarily social". 118 As he explained in Human Nature and The Social Order, the consciousness that a person has about himself is directly a reflection of the ideas about himself which he attributes to others. The three elements of the human self which he outlined consisted of: the imagining of our own appearance to the other persons; the imagining of the other person's judgement of our appearance, and lastly, our experiencing of some sort of resulting "self-feeling".

In brief, by generating the idea of social interaction and the social determination of the human self, he showed that the development of human nature and ultimately of society was the outgrowth of cooperation and face-to-face interaction within the primary group. 119

Cooley's conception of human nature may be interpreted as being dependent on the existence of a socially oriented mind, the family and the neighborhood life. In this regard, Cooley has explained quite simply that the "individual and society are inseparable". 120 He was sure that it was only through social development and social interaction, "that mankind has emerged from animal bondage into...organic freedom". 121 Society was perceived by him as being the collective aspect of personal thought and intercourse. The growth of individual ideas through such intercourse was thought to imply an expanding "power of sympathy" and of entering into the minds of other persons. Through social interaction, as it was
asserted, human communication becomes possible because the mind is stimulated by social symbols. As he emphasized in Human Nature and The Social Order

...it is the act of intercourse, the stimulation of the mind by a personal symbol, which gives a formative impulse to the vague mass of hereditary feeling-tendency and this impulse in turn, results in a larger power of interpreting the symbol.122

Cooley defined human nature at least in a portion of his analysis as being devoid of any innate basis.123 "Man's adaptability, power and growth," as he believed, as well as his abilities in the arts and sciences "is bound up with the indeterminate character of human heredity."124 In short, man's capacity to realize himself in a social context, according to Cooley, excludes all forms of instinctual determinism.

Sociologists, such as Krich and Lindesmith, when describing Cooley's contributions, usually refer to his idea of the looking-glass self.125 They emphasize that Cooley's most significant insight was to show that what we think depends on how we see ourselves reflected in the responses of others to us. Implicit in this notion of the looking-glass self is the belief that without the responses of others and in the absence of any form of social interaction, the self will fail to develop.126 What most critics of Cooley do not realize is that his theory of the social self was posited on definite assumptions about the nature of human nature.

In Human Nature and The Social Order, Cooley explained that man's ability to exist in society is directly related to his individual qualities of reason. However, he defined reason as "an instinctive disposition" which allows men "to compare, to combine and to organize the activities of mind."127 Similarly, the feeling of self (which most
of his readers have assumed to be socially determined) was described as being "instinctive". In dealing with the behavior of children, he noted

...the child by instinct, has a generous capacity and need for social feeling.

Additionally, he explained that the willingness of the human individual to take on the attitudes of others, was rooted in the "force of an impulse springing directly from the delicacy of his perceptions". Self-aggrandizement was also asserted to be a "constant but plastic passion". This passion served an essential role in the development of the self, which

...may become morally higher by attaching itself to a larger conception of what constitutes the self.

With little hesitation, he insisted that the "repression of non-conformity is a native impulse". However, Cooley maintained that there exists a tension often within the human personality between conformity and the impulse for creative self-assertion or "an outburst of the primordial need to act".

Many of the impulses upon which Cooley predicated his theories of the human self had rather specific purposes and directions. For example, he mentioned that the scientist's quest for knowledge was, in truth, motivated by his attempts to "appease the instinct of the need to make things consistent to the intelligence". Even in accounting for the origins of deviancy, assumptions about the nature of human nature were made use of. As he explained in Social Progress

...the mere need of companionship; the very element in which human nature lies cooperates with a bad environment to entice us into all kinds of evil courses.
Thus, for Cooley, while deviancy was a product of social interaction, it was also related at least indirectly to certain innate needs on the part of human nature.

The ideas of social interaction, the looking-glass self, and his broader view of the social determination of human behavior were related to determinate assumptions about human nature. Cooley implied in his analysis that the development of man's social self constitutes the realization of specific needs innate to man's nature. His use of assumptions about human nature contributed to the resolving of certain contradictions inherent within the liberal world-view. The use of such assumptions about man's nature enabled him to legitimate the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism. With regard to the liberal ideals of individualism, he asserted that human nature was characterized by the impulse of creative self-assertion and the primordial need to act. He added that the individual's self-feeling was instinctive. The willingness of an individual to take on the attitudes of others, in order to gain a sense of self, was said to be rooted in man's impulsive nature.

In Cooley's opinion, the individual owing to certain needs of his innate nature would have to enter into social relations with others in a community context to achieve a sense of individual identity. By utilizing assumptions about human nature, he was able to demonstrate that social integration and individualism were mutually dependent on one another. Like the other Pragmatists, he was not willing to forfeit either of the basic liberal ideals in his explanations of man and society. From a sociology of knowledge framework of analysis, it is quite obvious that he relied on assumptions about human nature, to ensure that both ideals
would receive adequate attention within his theories.

C. Wright Mills has indicated that Pragmatism was able to replace the Social Darwinistic ideals of biological individualism and instinctualism by making man's human nature dependent on society and social interaction, as well as on social education and social reform. While there is some truth to Mills' observations, he has nevertheless failed to notice that the Pragmatic idea of the social determination of the human self relied upon a definition of human nature which depicted man as being motivated by socially-oriented instincts. In short, assumptions about human nature, though different in content when compared to those made by the Social Darwinists, nevertheless played a major role in the development of the Pragmatic world-view. These assumptions contributed towards the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the basic ideals particular to liberalism as an ideology. In addition, the assumptions about human nature formulated by the various Pragmatic theorists were utilized in order to resolve the essential contradiction that exists between those liberal ideals.
4) **The Symbolic Interactionism of Human Nature**

The belief that the human self is determined by processes of social interaction was not restricted to the writings of Charles Horton Cooley. An even more elaborate definition of the idea of the social generation of the human self was developed by a number of theorists working together in the departments of sociology and philosophy at the University of Chicago. As Coser has explained, the sociological and philosophical insights and ideas generated at the University of Chicago dominated the general orientation of North American sociology until the late 1930's and continue to influence many of the assumptions underlying contemporary sociological theory today. One of the most influential members of the Chicago School was George Herbert Mead. It was Mead who was responsible for initiating the theoretical movement in sociology known as Symbolic Interactionism. This particular movement encompassed many of the ideas and values of the Pragmatists, including the liberal ideals of individualism as well as social integration. The possibility will be considered in this section of the chapter, whether Mead's Interactionist approach was also predicated on determinate assumptions about man's nature as a means to incorporate both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism into his theories.

Mead, in his major work *Mind, Self and Society* (1934), attempted to explain individual conduct within a social context. According to his argument, a person can develop a sense of self only as he is known in the reflected appraisal of others. He argued that the human child gradually learns to participate in the experiences of his associates through role-taking. In this fashion, the individual comes to see himself in their
place and to see himself as they see him. The individual as a self arises out of people interacting 'within a community of selves'. In this sense the self is thought to be thoroughly social in constitution. The evolution and development of the self reaches a climax only insofar as the person is recognized as an organic part of the social whole.

The analysis of the social act, as presented in *Mind, Self and Society*, began with an interpretation of the significance of gestures. Gestures have an idea behind them and if they arouse the same idea in other individuals then these gestures may be called 'significant symbols'. Significant symbols constitute the basis of language. The conversation of gestures is the effective mechanism of mutual adjustment between individuals within the social act. Mead tried to show in his analysis that the individual's consciousness of the meaning of gestures, depends on his being able to take the attitude of the other toward his own gestures. The human gesture initiates a process which arouses in oneself the reaction that will be aroused in others. Through this process of self-stimulation, the individual learns to think of himself as a person along similar lines to the conceptions others have of him. According to Mead, the self which can be an object to itself is essentially a social structure which arises in social experience.

In attempting to depict how the human self is constituted by the organization of all the attitudes of the generalized other, Mead pointed out that the human personality is divided into two interacting elements, the "I" and the "Me". The "I" is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others. The attitudes of others make up the organized "Me", and then one reacts towards that as an "I". The "Me"
represents a definite organization of the community. A person attains self-consciousness only as he finds himself stimulated to take the attitude of the other, upon which the very organization of a self-conscious human society is dependent. 146

In a supplementary essay to Mind, Self and Society, entitled "The Biological Individual", Mead outlined what he thought were the innate elements of the "I". He argued that human nature is characterized by at least ten "reflexive impulses" which include: adjustments to motion or rest; responses toward distant objects; adjustments to contact with objects; attack and defense; flight and escape; the sexual process; securing and ingesting food; nourishment and care of children; withdrawal from heat and cold, and the formation of habits. 147 At the same time, it was asserted that man is almost entirely instinctless, apart from these reflex-type of actions. 148 However, he seriously contradicted himself as to this belief in the instinctless nature of man. In another essay, he admitted that man's ability to take the role of the other person springs from his capacity to be "sympathetic". Sympathy in turn has its roots in the "parental impulses" which are innate in man's nature. 149 Within the context of Mead's theories, the "social self" has its basis in the innate parental impulses of sympathy.

The very idea that the self is created by taking on the attitudes of others, presupposes a willingness on the part of human beings to recognize the attitudes of others in the first place. This willingness which Mead presupposed, exists logically a priori to the socialization process itself. He also made other admissions as to the innate basis of human behavior. In explaining the possibilities for the development of individuality, over
and above the influence of the "Me", he admitted that there are certain values which "attach" themselves to the "I". Typically, these values are expressed by the artist and the scientific inventor. These values at a more general level also belong to the "experience of all selves" where there is an "I" that answers to the 'Me'. He explicitly assumed that the "I" is not merely a collection of diffuse impulses which is solely given content and direction through social interaction with the "Me". On the contrary, the "I" as an innate element of the individual has its own values, over and above those given it through the influence of the "Me". These values which characterize the "I", as he believed, are in fact able to resist in a purposeful fashion those elicited by the "Me".

In his emphasis on the social nature of the human self, Mead described how human reason emerges in a social context when impulsive, innately rooted behavior breaks down. However, in justifying personal creativity and individuality, he noted that the biological individual "I" is often able to generate values independent of the "Me". Thus, the human mind according to this theory is not necessarily a product of the social process. The mind is in fact able to react against, and even modify the society. As it was stated,

... it is in such reactions of the individual, the 'I' over against the situation in which the 'I' finds itself that important social changes take place.

At least according to some segments of this theory, the human self is not just an emergent product of social interaction between the "I" and the "Me". It may also be a manifestation of innate elements inherent within the individual. His theory of the social determination of the self rests
on specific assumptions about the innate qualities of human nature. These inherent characteristics ensure that the individual will enter into the socialization process. At the same time, they guarantee that all elements of spontaneous creativity will not be thwarted by the pressures of social conformity. Through the use of specific assumptions about the nature of human nature, Mead was able to integrate into his analysis both the liberal ideals of individualism, as well as those related to the belief in social integration. It is in this sense that his assumptions about man lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

Mead's insights into the social basis of the human self, as related to the dynamics of social interaction, were complemented by the theories of other members of the Chicago School in this period. One of the more important sociologists to provide a dramatic restylization of the symbolic interactionist model outlined by Mead was W.I. Thomas (1863-1947). Morris Janowitz has described that Thomas at the University of Chicago was exposed to

...John Dewey and...George Herbert Mead and their ideas about the nature of human nature. He was fully aware of the new work in anthropology, particularly that of Franz Boas, which was leading to a fundamental questioning of simple notions of evolution and producing a more empirically based discipline.153

Thomas' major publications included: Sex and Society (1907); Source Book for Social Origins (1909); The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, 2 Vols. (1918-20); The Unadjusted Girl (1923) and On Social Organization and Social Personality (1946).

Thomas was committed to the task of fusing sociology with social psychology. He was acutely aware that the social processes of influence
and control needed to be checked by the active intervention of the individual. In this context, he tended to see

... a certain reciprocal dependence between social organization and individual life-organization. 154

Nevertheless, he maintained that the individual could not be separated from his social environment. The purpose of sociology as a special science of culture, as it was believed, was not to solely study the subjective side of culture, but rather to examine the influence of values on social attitudes and individual behavior. As both he and Znaniecki stated in The Polish Peasant in Europe and America...

Sociology, as theory of social organization, is thus a special science of culture...the values which it studies draw all their reality, all their power to influence social human life, from the social attitudes which are expressed or supposedly expressed in them... 155

Like other Symbolic Interactionist theorists, Thomas was essentially concerned with both the subjective and social elements of human behavior and culture. What will be analyzed here is the extent to which he made use of assumptions about human nature as a device which enabled him to incorporate both the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration into his respective theories.

According to Thomas' and Znaniecki's argument, the social results of individual activity depend not only on the nature of the action itself, but also on the type of social conditions within which it is performed. They explained that...

The cause of a social or individual phenomenon is never another social or individual phenomenon alone, but always a combination of a social and an individual phenomenon. 156
Thomas insisted that the individual

...can indeed develop only under the influence of
his environment, but on the other hand during his
development he modifies this environment by defining
situations and solving them according to his wishes
and tendencies. 157

He also pointed out in On Social Organization and Social Personality,
that a social situation is the set of values and attitudes with which any
human group has to deal. Every concrete activity in this sense is an
attempt to solve a "situation". A situation usually involves three types
of data: the objective conditions; the pre-existing attitudes; and the
definition of the situation. The individual's pre-existing attitudes
consist of a number of innate "wishes" which can only be satisfied by his
incorporation into society. He argued that it is the extent to which
different social situations provide for the opportunity of satisfying
these wishes which will ultimately determine what social situation in
particular the individual will enter. In this context, he explained
that certain general

...influences have been at work throughout life and
these are partly inborn, representing the original nature
of man, the so-called instincts, and partly the claims,
appeals, rewards, and punishments of society... 158

According to this argument, man's nature is characterized by a number of
innate wishes which develop within the social environment. These wishes
consist of the desires for: new experience; recognition; acting and the
will to power, as well as security. 159

Thomas' idea of the social determination of the human self was not
so much based on the interaction of the individual with the environment,
but rather on the process of the realization of specific innate needs which
are socially oriented. The existence of these needs ensure that the individual will not be overwhelmed by the processes of socialization. The individual may also use these social needs as a basis for criticizing and modifying the social environment. It is only by positing the existence of needs innate to human nature which are socially oriented, that the liberal sociologist may legitimize man's dependency on society and at the same time explain how man, as an independent individual, is able to remain aloof, in some respects, from the constraints and demands of society.

Theorists maintaining a Symbolic Interactionist framework of analysis believed that the socialization experience enables the person to employ, reflect upon, and choose symbols. Socialization also facilitates the development of the individual's sensitivity to the opinions and attitudes of others which makes the emergence of self-feeling possible. Hinkel, a sociologist concerned with the development of social theory in the first decades of the twentieth century, has pointed out that Mead, Thomas, and the other Symbolic Interactionist theorists were alike

in insisting that each person in a social situation is an independent personality with his own separate and internal sphere of consciousness, imagination and will by which he can initiate and control his own action and influence the conduct of others. 160

The most articulate definition of this basic tenet of Symbolic Interactionism has been elaborated by Herbert Blumer in *Symbolic Interactionism - Perspectives and Methods* (1969). His theories are also a vivid illustration of how a liberal sociologist may resolve the inherent contradictions of the liberal world-view by making use of assumptions about the nature of human nature.

In his various essays, Blumer described that people act toward
social objects mainly in terms of the meanings which they attribute to them. These meanings are in turn "derived from social interaction which are handled and modified through an interpretative process". He assumed that

... in the first and last instance, human society consists of people engaging in action. Symbolic interaction in this sense "forms human conduct rather than being merely a means for the expression or release of conduct". Human beings have to take into account what other individuals are doing. Also, he insisted that because human actions are shaped by actual or interpreted responses of others, such actions cannot be accounted for by background characteristics, impulses, structural requirements or external stimuli.

Symbolic Interactionism generally, Blumer's theories specifically, originally represented a reaction to Lester Ward and the Social Darwinist members of mainstream North American sociology. Sociologists such as Ward, Giddings and Ross regarded man as having a monogenetic origin, with a common, but modifiable, "organic-psychic human nature" that required structural forms of association for its development and maturation. Such forms of association were thought by these theorists to be subject to evolutionary change in terms of the struggle for existence. They also believed that human nature was fixed in terms of man's innate needs that defined the kind of purposes and objects which men in society seek.

These theorists viewed both the human "individual and society as discreet and therefore separable units". Contrary to the opinions of Ward and the rest, Blumer emphasized the processes of unified interaction that existed between the individual and
society. He also pointed out the positive role which the social group had in influencing individual behavior. Tamotsu Shibutani has intimated that Blumer conceived of human beings as

...neither creatures of impulse nor heedless victims of external stimulation (but as) active organisms who guide and construct their line of action while continuously coming to terms with the demands of an ever-changing world as they interpret it. 167

Implicit in Blumer's theory of symbolic interactionism is the assumption "that people must have a makeup or innate ability that fits the nature of social interaction". 168 His view of human nature presupposed the innate ability and willingness of human beings to take in and be responsive to the attitudes of others. Also, his views on symbolic interaction presupposed the need for individuals to be socially cooperative. Without cooperation there can be no type of "meaningful" interaction.

It was suggested by Blumer that the origins of the mechanisms through which symbolic interaction takes place were innate to human nature. He argued that

...sociologists and psychologists with their instincts ignore that social interaction is a primitive process in its own right... 169

In relation to this point, Shibutani has insisted that Blumer viewed human nature as a unique combination of the biological and social values of man, in which innate tendencies in the form of diffuse tensions had their ends or goals of satisfaction defined by the social order. 170 We must qualify Shibutani's description. According to Blumer's own speculations these so-called diffuse tendencies in fact constitute determinate and innate social needs. These needs can find expression only within the processes of symbolic interaction.
Shibutani's assertion that Blumer's view of human nature assumed only
the existence of vague indeterminate tendencies is further refuted when we
review his theoretical writings dealing with aspects of collective be-

... 

171 In a well-known essay, "Outline of Collective Behavior" (1969),
he designated collective behavior as an important sub-field of sociology
which included a wide range of social phenomena such as the study of public
opinion, social movements, crowds, and the mass. 172 When his overview of
the genesis of collective behavior is closely examined, it becomes obvious
that he assumed man's innate human nature to consist of much more than a
collection of diffuse impulses.

Elementary types of collective behavior, according to his theory,
occur when "dispositions" and "needs" cannot be satisfied by the existing
cultural definitions. It was further indicated that

... when people have impulses, desires, or dispositions
which can not be satisfied by the existing forms of living
they are in a state of unrest...their experience is one of
feeling the need to act but in being baulked in doing so. 173

From this description it is obvious that he assumed man to have basic
impulses, which are socially oriented and normally satisfied in a cultural
context. At the same time, he implied that these basic impulses are
discriminating. They may not be satisfied in any cultural context, but
only in that with which they are compatible. The very fact that these
impulses are discriminating demonstrates that they are not wholly modi-
ifiable by the environment. On the contrary, they have a definite struc-
ture of their own.

From Blumer's description of social unrest we see he assumed that
human action was not totally a construct of symbolic interaction. At
least according to his own description, there exist impulsive elements in human nature which demand release and which are elementary, natural and spontaneous, operating independently of the governing framework of values and attitudes. 174

He admitted that even in the mass (which is different from the crowd in that it lacks all form of social interaction), people are able to respond and act "on the basis of impulses which are aroused" by objects that have some intimate relationship with them. 175 In describing the active and expressive crowd, the "impulses" by which the crowd is motivated were depicted to be of a kind that are normally constrained and channelled. 176 He nevertheless cautioned that such impulses are not destructive ones or asocial. Rather, the appearance of elementary collective groupings is indicative of a process of social change. Such a process implies the disintegration of the old and the appearance of the new. The expression of such impulses, facilitated by the collective excitement of the crowd, according to Blumer, plays an important part "in the development of new forms of social life." 177

Blumer's ideas about the processes and dynamics of social change and reconstruction are intimately linked up with certain assumptions about the nature of human nature. According to his argument, the expression of those "impulses" by collective groupings which are normally satisfied in a cultural context, provide an indication of the need for social change as well as the essential motivation to bring such change about. Within his various theories, the conceptualization of the human individual as a self-motivated and independent actor, who is at the same time a social being, is achieved by attributing specific constants to human nature which
are socially oriented. Like many of the other Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionist theorists already reviewed here, his use of assumptions about human nature served to objectify, manifest and legitimize the basic ideals particular to the liberal world-view. These assumptions also contributed to resolving the inherent contradictions that exist between these liberal ideals.

Blumer's insights into the operations and effects of symbolic interactionism have noticeably influenced other well-known North American sociologists. C. Wright Mills, a social theorist who has played a major role in shaping the general orientation of contemporary sociological analysis, has made extensive use of the general liberal ideological premises of Symbolic Interactionism. As Ernest Becker has observed, Mills' theory of personality closely paralleled that of Marx, Dewey and Mead. 178 His view of man emphasized that the human individual is an actor with intention and purpose. Mills had little patience with a Freudian interpretation of human nature. In an early paper, "Situated Actions and Vocabularies of Motive" (1940), he vehemently attacked Freud's instinctual drive theory. He argued instead, that if man is an historical actor and a symbolic creature, he must be able to be motivated by words, images and symbols rather than being forced by narrow, innate biological drives. 179 We must examine here whether Mills was in fact successful in avoiding the use of assumptions about human nature in the attempt to lend credibility to his liberal ideals.

In Character and Social Structure (1953), which Mills co-authored with Hans Gerth, we find an elaborate expression of the belief that man is a social animal. As Mills and Gerth have described, the debate over
the existence of fixed biological elements or drives within human nature.

...is no longer a problem engaging all our energies. We did not solve the problem; we outgrew it. At best, all we learn when we study man as a mere animal are his limitations...we learn also that his dispositions are open-ended and capable of development.180

These sociologists expressed the conviction that the objects and goals of human behavior are not innately given. Rather, they are "derived from the environment in which men act".181 They also emphasized that what a person is aware of through his bodily senses is limited by the specific society in which the individual is born. Man's inherent or innate senses and abilities only limit or facilitate behavior and do not determine man's actions. The specific innate features of man as a species, which they were willing to admit to, consist of

...undefined impulses, which may be defined and specified by a wide range of social objects. What these objects may be is not determined by man as an organism.182

Man's psychic structure was portrayed as "an integration of perception, emotion and impulse".183 These theorists felt that for these impulses to become purposeful, the objects which elicit them must be learned. Impulses are specified and directed in terms of the expectations of others and are said to be "socially linked with socially available goals which sustain the individual in the enactment of his roles".184

For Gerth and Mills, cross-cultural regularities of human conduct did not hold any sort of implications for the understanding of human nature. On the contrary, they felt that regularities in human action and experience were keyed to "the role configurations" that make up institutions.185 In addition, it was maintained that the central ideas and
beliefs of a society, as well as its methods of communicating symbols, contribute to the formation of the motivation necessary for the enactment of socially defined roles. 186

A central point which Gerth and Mills endeavored to make in their analysis is that...

The internalization of social values and objectives gives direction to impulses and, to some extent, even sets the intensity of these impulses. 187

However, it was admitted that in

...severe organic deprivation the impulse that is deprived of an object of gratification may temporarily dominate and shape the entire psychic structure. It may even operate autonomously, casting off the social inhibitions, patterning, and pose of the person. 188

In such cases, the social norms which have been internalized and which have controlled these innate "psychic impulses" may no longer be effective. The individual's sensitivity to what others will think may, as a result, be drastically minimized. 189

The use of the term "deprived" in their description of human irrational behavior holds significant implications for understanding the assumptions about human nature underlying their analysis. By pointing out that "irrational and asocial" behavior is a consequence of deprived impulses, they were able to explain the origins of deviancy for which their general theory of symbolic interaction simply could not account. Symbolic Interactionism as a theory, was meant to emphasize the social cooperative character of human behavior and the dependence of the individual on the processes of social integration.

Because symbolic interactionism produces integrative behavior, it cannot, at the same time, logically give rise to deviant actions. Another
set of explanatory terms is required. By positing the existence of deprived impulses that are normally satisfied in a social context, it becomes possible to explain the motivational basis of asocial behavior. At the same time, the emphasis on the fact that these impulses are deprived, indicates that they are selective or discriminatory and play a determinate role in the choosing of what culturally defined objects they will or will not be responsive to. The existence of such impulses within the nature of the individual provides him with some autonomy over and above society. They ensure that he will not be passively moulded by the processes of socialization. Instead, the possibility becomes open for the individual to be able to reform and change his social situation according to his needs.

Garth's and Mills' willingness to make use of the notion of deprived innate social impulses was in fact a means to ensure that the three major concerns which have traditionally occupied the attention of Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists would receive appropriate attention. These three concerns have consisted of: the need to legitimize the fact that man is a social being; that his behavior may be changed by social reform, and that the individual is capable of acting as a guide and a check to the socialization processes.

The various attempts by the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists to legitimize the theory of the social determination of the human personality and self are marked by a number of significant inconsistencies. These inconsistencies have consisted of the determinate utilization of certain assumptions about the innate characteristics of man to justify a conception of human nature that was completely antithetical to the very
idea that man had an instinctually given nature of any sort. These assumptions were used to legitimate the idea that man has no significant innate nature insofar as man's character and self were believed to be completely socially determined.

Most of the theories maintaining a Pragmatic of Symbolic Interactionist perspective are characterized by what may be described as the dialectic of denial and admission. This particular dialectical relationship may be defined as the tendency for many theorists to deny the identity of man as a species being who has certain innate species-specific habits, capabilities, and motivations. Their denial of this fact is complemented at the same time by their explicit admission that many aspects of human behavior and personality do, in fact, have a basis which is innate to human nature.

There are a number of diverse reasons why theorists such as Peirce, James, Dewey, Cooley, Mead, Thomas, Blumer, Gerth, and Mills have been willing to admit to various explicit assumptions about human nature. The major reason; from a sociology of knowledge perspective, is that while these sociologists were able to generate a theory of social determinism and social integration, they were nevertheless unable, using the same social deterministic assumptions, to come up with a theory explaining and legitimizing individuality. It was their strong belief in the liberal ideals of the rights of the autonomous individual which necessitated that they give recognition to the significance of the individual actor within their own social deterministic paradigms. The unstable nature of the social situation at the beginning of this century necessitated that these same liberal sociologists come to terms with the fact that social inte-
gration as well as social reform were basic human requirements.

The social deterministic assumptions of Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism rationalized the need for social integration. Their various assumptions about the innate human nature ensured to all concerned, that man was to some degree aloof and autonomous from society as a self-motivated actor within the social process. By using assumptions about man's nature, these theorists were able to legitimize the liberal ideals of individualism, as well as those ideals centered around the liberal belief in social integration and the dependency of the individual on society.
5) **Human Nature in a Cultural and Personal Context**

The theoretical school, particular to anthropology, referred to as Culture and Personality was an outgrowth of the general insights formulated by such anthropologists as Boas, L. Kroeber. Like the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists, the Culture and Personality theorists were interested in understanding the interrelationships between the individual and his social situation. The more prominent Culture and Personality theorists included Benedict, Mead, Whiting, Child and Kardiner. Together, these anthropologists recognized the dependency of the individual on society as well as the ability of the individual to independently modify his own social environment. The theorists involved in the Culture and Personality school of thought, like many other social theorists writing in the first part of the twentieth century, were acutely aware of the need for a science of society which could provide theoretical guidelines for the provision and legitimization of some degree of social integration within American society. They were concerned with outlining a general theory of man and society which would be able to demonstrate the possibility, as well as the need for, the freedom of the individual in a social context.

All of the Culture and Personality theorists were set against the use of assumptions about human nature in the explanation of human behavior and culture. They felt that any theory which emphasized the existence of innate elements of human nature contributed to the denial of the liberal belief in the unlimited possibilities for social change and reform. Also, they believed that any reference to man's innate human nature was complementary to the formulation of a racial theory of society to which they
were essentially opposed. Anthropology, as they were convinced, constituted an autonomous science of culture which was independent in its methods and topical orientation from all of the natural sciences. In this context, they insisted that any reference to man's innate nature by anthropologists would ensure the unwarranted dependency of anthropological theory on the categories of explanation and analysis which had been defined by both evolutionary biologists and psychologists.

The general theoretical goal of the Culture and Personality theorists was to present a more sophisticated interpretation of the idea of the social determination of human behavior and culture. In this fashion, all of these theorists contributed to the justification of both the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration in the development and formulation of their theories which dealt essentially with the nature of the social relationships within various primitive societies. In light of this fact, the question arises as to what extent any of the Culture and Personality theorists made use of assumptions about human nature in their attempts to outline the effective role which both the individual as well as society plays in the development and determination of human behavior and culture. More specifically, this section of this study shall review, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, the extent to which the Culture and Personality theorists made use of assumptions about human nature as a means to incorporate the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration into their respective analyses.

One of the leading and still widely recognized anthropologists within the Culture and Personality school is Ruth Benedict. Benedict understood culture in terms of 'how it was lived' by individuals and the role which
custom played in shaping the individual's life experiences. In her most
important and pioneering work, Patterns of Culture (1934), it was stressed
that social behavior could not be reduced to simple instincts. Human
behavior, as she argued, could only be interpreted within the context of
the particular customs and folkways of the culture in which the individual
is found.\footnote{190}

No one item of his tribal social organization, of
his language, of his local religion, is carried in his
germ-cell.\footnote{191}

She was quick to emphasize that universal traits shared by persons of dif-
ferent cultures are in truth "cradle traits". These traits are very
early inventions of the human race but have long since become automatic.
Her explanation of the reasons for the lack of any form of relationship
between man's innate nature and cultural institutions, rested on a
questionable set of analytical categories.

In the first place, the institutions that human
cultures build up upon, the hints presented by the
environment as by man's physical necessities do not
keep us close to the original impulse as we easily
imagine. These hints are, in reality, mere rough
sketches, a list of bare facts.\footnote{193}

She reduced the possibility of the innate determination of human behavior
to "hints", "rough sketches" and "lists". What Benedict gained in terms
of conceptual clarity from such a prosaic explanation, she immediately
lost in terms of its scientific credibility.

In attempting to deny the relationship between man's innate nature
and culture, she argued that cultures must be studied as integrated
wholes. As it was stated...

A culture, like an individual, is a more or less
consistent pattern of thought and action.\footnote{194}
The individual behavior of members of a particular culture must be interpreted in terms of the holistic cultural configuration in which they live. Benedict elucidated this point by using the cultural behavior of the Southwest Pueblos of New Mexico as an example of a particular cultural configuration which was designated as being Appollonian in character. In contrast, she explained that the cultural behavior of the Dobrians of New Guinea, reflected a type of cultural configuration which places emphasis on the traits of lawlessness and treachery. Lastly, the Indians of the Northwest Coast of North America were given as an example of a type of society which was chiefly motivated by the need to demonstrate the greatness of the individual and which was at the same time lacking in cultural integration. The lack of cultural integration effectively denied the existence of a characteristic psychological response which could dominate the culture as a whole. 193

Benedict firmly believed that...

If we are interested in human behavior, we need first of all to understand the institutions that are provided in any society. 196

Human behavior, as she thought, will take the form and the characteristics which these institutions suggest. She described a cultural pattern as consisting of a specific selection from a certain segment of the great arc of potential human purposes and motivations. 197

Exactly how this selection process occurs is never explained. It was only indicated that in order for a culture to be a culture, it must select from "the great arc". Once the selection process has occurred, the institutions of the culture will then foster the expression of its selected segments of human potentialities and motivations and, at the same time,
inhibit opposite expressions.

An explanatory framework such as this, noticeably excluded the determinate role of the individual. Benedict was, however, able to make room for the individual personality, at least in relation to her depiction of those individuals who are found to be "misplaced" within a particular cultural pattern. We are led to believe from this theory that there is, in any society, a number of individuals whose

...congenial drives are not provided for in the institutions of their culture.198

Being slightly more specific in accounting for the uncongeniality of these people with their own culture, she described them as persons

...whose native responses are at variance with those of their civilization.199

What exactly she meant by "congenial drives" and "native responses" is a question which we may all ponder over together. Previously in her analysis she had emphasized that all human behavior is cultural behavior. Nevertheless, in her concluding remarks she posited the determinate existence of certain responses and drives which obviously are not culturally determined or, at least, she did not indicate that they were so.

The question remains: what is the origin of such responses and drives? Of course, according to Benedict, their origin must lie in the "uniqueness" of the individual. What, however, is the origin of such uniqueness, when we have already been led to understand that the behavior of the individual is culturally determined? Here then is evidence of a definite theoretical inconsistency in her overall theory of culture: an inconsistency which has too long been overlooked. The contradictions revealed in her theoretical structure suggest that she made use of
explicit assumptions about human nature. There exists the possibility that she assumed that these congenial drives and native responses constituted a reaction of man's "species nature" to the particular cultural constraints with which he is faced.

A similar contradiction is found in another of Benedict's more important publications, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (1946). In this work, after making considerable efforts to explain and rationalize the cultural determination of Japanese behavior and their participation in the last war, she concluded

...social pressures in Japan, no matter how voluntarily embraced, ask too much of the individual. They require him to conceal his emotions, to give up his desires...They have to repress too much for their own good.

In reacting against the harshness of Japanese militarism, she placed herself in a theoretically contradictory situation. In presenting a theory of the cultural determination of the Japanese personality, she admitted (in the above statement) that there are other emotions and desires, "the genuine ones", which must be concealed. These genuine desires in the sense that they are defined as antithetical to traditional Japanese culture, may be assumed to have not been produced by that culture. Again, her explanation suggests that she believed such values to be elements of man's innate nature, insofar as they exist a priori to the processes of the cultural determination of behavior.

Benedict, in another of her well recognized and publicly acclaimed books, provides the critical reader with evidence of yet another major contradiction within her overall theoretical system. In *Race, Science and Politics* (1945), an argument was developed against the myth of racial
heredity. Instead the plasticity of man’s instincts was emphasized. In accounting for the reasons why culture is such an overwhelming force in the moulding of human behavior, it was admitted that its effectiveness must be related to the fact that by nature...

Man is a highly gregarious animal and he always wants the approval of his fellows...he will try to get approval in forms which his society recognizes. Thus, according to this theory, the malleability of human instincts and the ease of their cultural moulding is dependent on the a priori and acultural characteristics of man as a gregarious animal, who is constantly in need of social approval. These types of blatant contradictions in Benedict’s theories strongly suggest that she assumed such acultural conditions to be ‘innate to the individual, as elements of species-specific behavior.

Those individuals who maintain a belief in the fundamental liberal tenets of individuality, equality, freedom and the unlimited potentialities of human nature are usually unwilling to ascribe any innate characteristics to man. Admitting to the existence of such innate characteristics would deny the belief that man has unlimited potentials for self-realization. It would also bring into question the liberal belief in man’s self-determination of his own behavior through culture. It is a paradox of liberalism, that its adherents are usually reluctant to admit to the existence of innate factors of human behavior. Nevertheless, they will not hesitate to justify the ideals of liberalism by emphasizing the innate goodness and equality of all men. In an obituary to Franz Boas, Benedict herself indicated the existence of this latent conceptual contradiction within her own liberal world-view. She emphasized that there is
a need for men such as Franz Boas, who believed in the "innate dignity of individual men or groups of men". 203

The various theoretical dilemmas which are evident in Benedict's writings were the conspicuous results of her adherence to a liberal interpretation of the world. Her main theoretical intention was to reveal the cultural relativism of individual human behavior and values. This point of view itself has been an essential part of liberal philosophy since Montesquieu. 204 In elaborating her theory of the cultural determination of behavior, she put herself in the position of very nearly ruling out the role and importance of the individual altogether. It is exactly this possibility which Benedict, because of her complementary belief in human uniqueness, independence and individuality, could never permit. The problem which she faced was how to account for the autonomy of the individual and at the same time maintain a position of cultural determinism. The answer to such a dilemma was of course found in the vagueness of such terms as "congenial drives" and "native responses", which defined the uniqueness and separateness of the individual apart from the influences of culture. The use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature within an ambivalent ideological context is also evident in the theories of other anthropologists, inclusive of Margaret Mead, who was in close intellectual association with Benedict.

The theories of cultural determinism espoused by Margaret Mead may, in some ways, be seen as a more detailed extension of many of Benedict's insights as well as a repetition of her shortcomings. Mead has admitted to the strong collaboration between herself and Benedict in the working out and elaboration of the idea of cultural configuration. 205 She like-
wise stressed the importance of the cultural heritage in channelling human behavior. 206

The first ethnographic studies conducted by Mead included: Coming of Age in Samoa (1925), Growing Up in New Guinea (1929) and Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies (1935). These studies dealt with the problem of

...how the human character is moulded by the diverse cultural settings into which human beings, - cultureless and flexible are born. 207

The theory of cultural determinism was central to her work. It is important to see to what degree her elaboration of such a theory depended on explicit assumptions about man's innate nature. In addition, for the purposes of this overall analysis, it is necessary to review the degree to which Mead used such assumptions to integrate both the liberal ideals of individualism and social integration into her ethnographic studies.

There are three consistent assumptions about human nature readily evident in Mead's major ethnographic works. These themes are developed partially or in complete form in each of these works. In the first of her analyses, The Coming of Age in Samoa, we find a familiar theme, reminiscent of Benedict's theoretical orientation. In describing the origins of the culture of the Samoans, she explained that they

...selected one set of human gifts, one set of human values, and fashioned for themselves an art, a social organization, a religion, which is their unique contribution to the history of the human spirit. 208

In this instance, she affirmed the cultural configurationalist approach. Her entire analysis of Samoan culture consisted of illustrating the methods and processes by which the Samoan cultural configuration was
imposed on its individual members. The restraints which the culture established and the subsequent behavioral sets which it condoned were also described. Samoan adolescence was portrayed as a time devoid of crisis or stress. On the whole, it was a period of consistent and orderly maturation from childhood to adulthood. The orderly maturation process of Samoan children was attributed to the casual attitudes which are elicited between the sexes. One suspects that Mead wished to provide the reader with some sort of moral lesson in understanding what are the appropriate sexual attitudes which children should learn to adopt.

Like Benedict, Mead admitted to the existence of certain individuals whose natural proclivities are antithetical to the cultural configurations within which they live. Certain young girls were asserted to be endowed with the passionate capacities for violence, deceit and stupidity as well as having "cravings" for affection and attention. All of such behavioral forms were, of course, thought to be atypical of the Samoan cultural configuration.

The origins of these atypical forms of behavior which exist outside of, and resistent to the overall cultural milieu were not accounted for. Not surprisingly, Mead found herself in a similar position to that of Benedict in her attempts to resolve the central tenets of cultural determinism with the belief in the autonomy of the individual. These two approaches we would presume to be mutually exclusive of one another. However, her very adaptive imagination, in fact, is able to exclude our own logical presumptions. Mead accomplished the synthesis of these two analytical perspectives (which emphasize culture and the individual respectively) by the invention of certain forms of asocial behavior.
There exists the possibility that such passions and cravings constitute assumptions about human nature. This possibility is greatly enhanced when we consider that these passions were defined as existing apart from, as well as being opposed to, the processes of the cultural determination of human behavior.

In her autobiography, Blackberry Winter (1972), Mead readily agreed with the suggestion that there are innate personality types around which specific cultures are organized. She argued that each culture is a configurational exemplification of one particular set of innate personality characteristics. Moreover, these innate personality types, which comprise what Benedict defined as "the great arc", from which cultures select their focal point of development, are said by Mead to be limited in number. More clearly

...there are a limited number of temperamental types, each of which is characterized by an identifiable cluster of inborn personality traits...

By giving support to the idea of the innate nature of personality traits, and relating such personality traits to the basis of specific cultures, she unintentionally supported the view that the basis of culture rests on certain innate constants particular to human nature.

In her second study, Growing Up in New Guinea, she revealed another assumption about man's innate nature as related to her definition of the innate basis of learning. Mead believed that the study of any primitive society provides the anthropologist with

...precious evidence on the malleability of human nature.

Her central concern in this examination of the Manus of New Guinea was to conceptualize and explain the stages and processes whereby the Manus
children are gradually subsumed by the cultural configuration of Manus society. She also attempted to propose solutions to the educational problems of North American society on the basis of the insights gained from the study of the Manus' educational system.

In providing examples of the various methods used in the education of Manus children, Mead repeatedly remarked on the importance of both Identification and Imitation to the socialization process as a whole. The method of imitation was defined as being responsible for the child's learning of speech, gestures, dancing, singing, war and fishing. The use of imitation as a learning technique within Manus culture was supposedly an example of

...a natural human tendency given extraordinary play in early childhood and given more stereotyped forms in speech and song of adult life.\(^{214}\)

We may conclude from this theory that the socialization of the individual into a cultural configuration was in fact dependent upon a "natural human tendency". The "natural human tendency" was assumed to be a characteristic of man's innate species-specific behavior.

A second faculty of socialization and learning on which Mead placed great weight was that of identification. In reference to Manus culture for example, the identification between the father and son was deemed to be the primary process responsible for the formation of the child's basic personality structure.\(^{215}\) The process of identification was also thought to be universal in that

...the tendency to identify is found in every fan, every ardent follower of an individual leader, everyone who seeks to reproduce...the behavior of some immensely admired person.\(^{216}\)
The very fact that the spontaneity and naturalness of this tendency was emphasized and that it exists a priori to cultural development, suggests that identification was assumed to be an inherent element of human nature. She also believed that the opportunities for the utilization of such tendencies were noticeably lacking in North American culture. Her thesis of the cultural determination of human behavior was dependent theoretically, on a number of assumptions about human nature as related to her definition of certain innate tendencies of learning. Similar to most of the other anthropologists who maintained the thesis of the cultural determination of human behavior, Mead's whole cultural configurationalist approach ultimately relied for empirical proof on nothing more than the occasional reference to a number of rather vague psychoanalytic concepts and theories.

In the last of her most important field studies, Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies, Mead made use of assumptions about man's nature which she had already explicitly utilized in her previous analyses. In this work, she explained the process whereby a culture selects particular innate personality characteristics and embodies them

...in its structure, in its political and religious systems, in its art and its literature; and each new generation is shaped firmly and definitely to the dominant trends.

Most importantly, within this study she tried to verify the hypothesis that the temperaments which we regard as natural to one sex, might instead be mere variations of human temperaments to which either sex might conform.

Her subsequent discussion of the mild-mannered Arapesh, the violent
and hysterical Mundugumor and finally the lake-dwelling Tchambuli (where males take a passive role) was an attempt to confirm the idea that the standardization of sex temperament is not sex-specific but rather socially conditioned. For Mead, conditioning played the most important part in determining the sexual roles of the members of any culture.

The difference between individuals who are members of different cultures, like the differences between individuals within a culture, are almost entirely to be laid to differences in conditioning. There exist, nevertheless, certain forms of behavior within these three cultural studies that appear, according to Mead, to be exempt from the effects of cultural conditioning. The deviant, whether he be Arapesh, Mundugumor or Tchambuli, because of having certain "innate dispositions" is too estranged from

...the social personality required by his culture for his age, or sex or caste, ever to wear perfectly the garment of personality that his society has fashioned for him.

Mead described that these aberrant types; who are continually battling with their innate impulses which are incongruent with their social milieu, are exempt from the deterministic forces of cultural conditioning to which the rest of the members of their culture are susceptible.

There are three main assumptions about human nature which are developed within Mead's descriptions and interpretations of primitive societies:

1. The origin of a cultural configuration is based on the selection of an innate personality type.

2. The deviant has certain innate personality traits which are incongruent with his cultural milieu.

3. Learning and the processes of enculturation generally,
are based on the innate human propensities for:

a) Imitation
b) Identification.

Whether or not the various assumptions about man's innate nature which are evident in her explanations of culture stand up to empirical testing is another question altogether. The point is, nevertheless, that she failed to provide empirical justification in her postulated abridgement of the various assumptions about human nature which we have noted here.

Her thesis of cultural determination is ironically dependent upon specific assumptions about human nature which remain in dire need of empirical support and substantiation from specialists of other disciplines. Mead's failure to provide such proof seriously undermines the credibility of her whole analysis.

In light of the assumptions about human nature upon which Mead's theory of cultural configuration and cultural determinism is based, her assertion that cultures are solely "systems of learned behavior shared by the members of a culture", seems now no longer tenable. In her later and more mature writings, she has recognized the possibilities for the existence of an innate basis of human behavior and culture. While she is quite correctly aware of the dangers of over zoomorphizing man, she has at least admitted in more recent publications that "man's biological capacities are learning capacities." These capacities are defined as "automatic". Again, she has reemphasized that these capacities include the learning processes of identification and imitation. The idea was also presented that all cultures cross-culturally must satisfy man's basic needs for language, diet, family and the regulation of mating. Equally as important, she has recognized the value
of considering, from an evolutionary perspective, the interrelationships between culturally transmitted experience and genetically patterned behavior. 226

In describing the theories of culture and personality as comprising a distinct school of thought, Mead noted the need for bringing together the findings of the several disciplines which deal with different analytical dimensions of the socialized human being. She even emphasized that the theories of biologists and human ethologists should be considered in that the "socially relevant biological factors", those parts of the organism whose responses are most significantly responsive to and elaborated by social conditions. 227

Like so many of her contemporaries, she is quite willing to make all kinds of grandiose statements as to emphasizing the greater need of cooperation between the various scientific disciplines. At the same time, she is unable to break the habit of utilizing empirically unjustified assumptions about man's innate nature. For example, she continues to speculatively assert that the basis of social cohesion in any culture is human guilt which may be so inherent in the nature of human beings, who live in a culture, that it is ineradicable and will always be both the mainspring of man's spiritual strivings and the guarantee of his humanity. 228

While there might be some truth to this insight, its validity can only be recognized in a scientific context when it is removed from the speculative realm of social philosophy and subjected to scrutiny by social scientists and others, utilizing data acquired from extensive cross-cultural research.
Mead, similar in many respects to Benedict, was able through the utilization of specific assumptions about the innate nature of human nature, to integrate and legitimize both the liberal ideals of individuality and social integration within her analyses of primitive societies. She was able to demonstrate the existence of the individual over and above the constraints of society by asserting that innate, in at least certain persons, there exists a number of passions and cravings which ensure that the individual will remain separate from the conformity demanded by society. It is such passions and cravings, according to her argument, which provide for the development of individualism in a social context. At the same time, she contributed to the justification of the liberal belief in the dependency of the individual on society, by asserting that learning and the processes of enculturation are predicated on the innate human propensities for imitation and identification.

Another Culture and Personality theorist, having somewhat similar views of the processes of cultural determinism as Benedict and Mead, is John Whiting. The question which must be dealt with here is whether Whiting, like the other Culture and Personality theorists, made use of assumptions about human nature in an effort to justify both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism.

In *Becoming a Kpoma* (1941) and *Child-Training and Personality* (1958), Whiting attempted to expand upon the dynamics of socialization in the determination of human behavior. His original work, *Becoming a Kpoma*, was an examination of the processes of socialization in a primitive society in the Mandated Territory of the mountainous regions of New Guinea. The interest which he had in this particular culture stems from his more
general concern with determining the relationship between the transmission of culture and child-training practices. For Whiting, cultural behavior was not instinctive but learned. He emphasized the necessity of developing a theory of learning in order that the intrinsic nature of culture might be understood.

Whiting's theoretical position is that...

Were the transmission of culture a genetic process, it would be expedient to turn to the biologist for a basic theory of socialization. Anthropologists have demonstrated, however, that the behavior of peoples in various societies is not instinctive but cultural; it is a matter of habits...a habit is something which is learned. In his explanation of the processes of socialization in Kwoma culture, he relied on John Dollard's paradigm which consisted of the categories: drive, response, cue, and reward. The paradigm was really nothing more than a rather simple Stimulus-Response model. This model was based on the premise that

...when the organism again experiences the same drives and the same cues it will have a greater tendency to make the same response.

According to his argument, the innate drives which are of the greatest importance in the socialization process include: hunger, thirst, sex, colon distention, bladder distention, heat, cold, fatigue and pain. Acquired drives were also said to be important elements of socialization. They include: fear, anger, the wish for prestige, money and the wish for praise and affection. However, he observed that...

Although these acquired drives are most frequently found to be the immediate impelling force for social habits, their intensity and even their existence depend on a continued relationship with basic drives.
He tended to believe that acquired drives play the most important role in socialization. Nevertheless, his description of the methods and processes of the socialization of the Kwoma, did not contribute to the total verification of this belief.

Most of the essential social habits of the Kwoma which Whiting subsequently discussed are acquired by means of drives, assumed to be innate to human nature. For example, he indicated that the Kwoma children are motivated to learn the economic work habits of their culture by the hunger drive, the quest for sexual satisfaction and the avoidance of pain. The sexual training of the Kwoma children was said to be based on the drive of the avoidance of pain, in that a young boy is beaten if he looks at the body of a young girl in a sexually inclined manner. The avoidance of secret ceremonies by the non-initiated was asserted to be motivated by the drive of anxiety. He pointed out that this anxiety is related to the drive of the avoidance of pain. Severe punishment is usually handed out to those who attend these ceremonies without having gone through the appropriate initiation rights.

Whiting's analytical categories which depicted the "motivation for learning" included such incentives as: punishment, scolding, threatening, and warning. These incentives were in turn all directly related to the drive of the avoidance of pain. Other incentives, such as the provision of guidance and rewards, were also indicated. However, he described the primary emotional groundwork of the learning process in terms of innate features of human nature. Nevertheless, as a cultural determinist, he was not willing to admit from the evidence which he had provided in his own study, that there exists the definite possibility
that the means for the acquiring of culture is founded on incentives and drives inherent in man. There is a subtle irony in the fact that a liberal, cultural determinist such as Whiting should have to rely on the notion of innate drives to prove that human behavior, as mediated through culture, is exempt from such drives. This irony may be fully appreciated from a sociology of knowledge point of view. His use of such assumptions were meant to lend credibility to the liberal belief in the autonomy of the individual. By asserting that the individual realized certain innate needs within the socialization process, he was able to demonstrate that the individual stood above, and in fact mediated this process. At the same time, by emphasizing the dependency of the individual on the processes of socialization, he was able to lend support to the liberal ideals of social integration.

Another important study, Child Training and Personality (1953), which was co-authored by John Whiting and Irwin L. Child, constitutes a serious attempt, from a cross-cultural perspective to deal with personality processes as mediating between certain aspects of culture.

In this analysis, they interpreted child training practices and responses to illness as being two dimensions of culture which are mediated by principles of personality development. They tried to demonstrate that culture is both independent of individuals and dependent upon them. In this manner, Whiting and Child hoped to synthesize their conflicting liberal beliefs in both the cultural determination of behavior as well as the autonomy of the individual.

What these theorists wished to discover was whether or not there
exists a correlation between the child-training practices of any culture and the concurrent type of explanation which is used to account for human illness. They assumed that explanations of illness would reflect the personal characteristics of the members of a society insofar as those personalities have been influenced by particular methods of child-training practices. In order to understand what components of the individual personality are affected by child-training practices, five variables were defined which were presumed to be the essential elements of the basic personality structure. These variables included: the oral, anal, sexual, dependent and aggressive facets of human behavior. The oral, anal and sexual were designated as being innate in that they were understood to be determined by the primary drives of hunger, waste elimination and sex. Conversely, dependence and aggression were defined as acquired drives.

Central to Child's and Whiting's study was their hypothesis that all societies differ as to the extent to which these five dimensions of the basic personality are indulged and provided with satisfactions. Further, they contended that the overemphasis of inhibition of any one particular aspect of the human personality, innate or acquired, will be reflected in the nature of the customs of a society, especially in the society's explanation of illness.

From their cross-cultural study of forty-seven societies they concluded that when a primary or acquired drive is negatively fixated in a culture, such inhibition causes "socialization anxiety". This anxiety will in turn be reflected in the way the members of that culture explain illness. It was observed
...that the custom potential of oral socialization anxiety is indeed associated with the custom potential of responding to illness with oral explanation.

What their conclusions pointed to was how child-training practices, as customs of a society, determine the character of the individual personality. In addition, they demonstrated how the effects of culture on personality influence certain customs of the individual's own culture, inclusive of the way that illness is traditionally explained. The individual was seen by these theorists as determined by culture as well as playing an effective part in its determination. Their explanation of the cultural participation of the individual was based on the assumption that human nature is characterized by certain drives, which in some cases may be innate. The liberal dilemma of accounting for the processes of the cultural determination of behavior and for the autonomy of the individual in the directing of his own life situation was imaginatively resolved within the context of Child's and Whiting's theory. Like other Culture and Personality theorists, they were able to solve this problem through the use of explicit assumptions about human nature.

Other theorists of the Culture and Personality tradition, apart from Whiting and Child have also taken an interest in the idea that the basic personality structure plays an important role in the definition of culture. Abram Kardiner, a well-known member of the Culture and Personality school, holds a theoretical orientation similar to that of Whiting's. He also has recognized a dialectical relationship existing between the basic personality and cultural institutions. The investigative techniques which he uses are the methods of psychodynamics, which reflect the belief that the individual is the necessary focal point of analysis.
He has expressed the conviction that each individual has

...a specific character structure shaped partly by potentialities and by innate dispositions, but also by those specific influences encountered during the process of growth.242

The cultural pattern and the individual are perceived by Kardiner as together constituting a dynamic interactional relationship.243 The possibility will be considered here of whether he utilized determinate assumptions about human nature to integrate the liberal ideals of liberalism and social integration into his various theories and analyses.

In The Individual and His Society (1939), Kardiner attempted to elaborate the idea that all institutions with which the individual is in contact

...during his formative period produce in him a type of conditioning which eventually creates a certain type of personality...this personality type once established, determines the reactions of the individual to other established institutions...244

In addition, he explained that an analysis of the interaction between culture and personality only becomes meaningful when it is linked with "a delimitation of human needs which all cultures must satisfy". These basic innate needs were said to constitute at least the following:

1. the family organization
2. in-group formation
3. tribe or clan based on family organization
4. techniques for deriving sustenance from the environment
5. basic controlling disciplines
6. control of mutual aggression
7. psychological bonds of unity
8. life goals.245

It is these fixed needs (many of which are similar to the lower animals) in his opinion to which all cultures must ultimately respond. These fixed needs in turn, as he insisted, are all specific manifestations of
the primary drives of hunger and sex. Culture is interpreted in relation to these needs as a force which molds and directs them. He pointed out that culture offers placebos and compensations for frustrations arising from its inability to satisfy these biological needs and needs created or accentuated by the culture.246

His theory described the individual standing indirectly between the institutions which mould his adaptation to the outer world and his innate needs which demand gratification.

Kardiner maintained that the primary institutions of a culture are responsible for shaping the personality structure according to the degree to which the individual's biological needs are satisfied. On the other hand, secondary institutions are evolved by individuals themselves to compensate for the degree to which their basic needs remain unsatisfied. The focus of this whole analysis was directed towards the definition and elaboration of those institutions which interfere with man's congenial needs. The effects of this interference on the individual in terms of either the secondary institutions or neuroses were also pointed out.247

Using Linton's data on the Marguesan culture, Kardiner attempted to illustrate how the cultural practise of excessive sexual indulgence acts as a palliative for the cravings of maternal affection which the Marguesan culture did not sufficiently provide for. Their habits of sexual indulgence were defined as a "placebo" for restrictions on pregnancy.248 He added that the Marguesan's anxiety over food, owing to the extensive lack of it,

...creates both rational defensive measure and neurotic defenses based on unconscious hypochondriacal fears.249
The secondary institutions which resulted from the inability of Marguesan culture to satisfy the elementary hunger drive, included such practices as multiple naming, embalming and cannibalism. Kardiner believed that in the case of the Tanala culture, the result of the suppression of sibling rivalry was the institutionalized compensation of blood brotherhood; where mutual fidelity was guaranteed.250

It was argued by Kardiner that the primary institutions of the Marguesan and Tanala cultures respectively, consisted essentially of the restriction of maternal affection and the creation of food anxiety, as well as the repression of sibling rivalry. The secondary institutions of sexual licentiousness and cannibalism in Marguesan culture and the practice of blood brotherhood in the case of the Tanala culture, were supposed to operate as compensations for the unfulfilled innate needs of maintaining family bonds, sustenance, as well as the control of mutual aggression. As he would have us believe, the differences between cultures may be understood to depend on

...the clash between the constancy of fundamental human needs and the variation in the forces that obstruct the satisfaction of those needs.251

It was emphasized that in studying any society, attention must be given to those forces concealed in institutions which compel the individual to repress a given impulse.252

The primary institutions of any society, as Kardiner felt, must attempt to satisfy certain needs and, as a consequence, restrict the gratification of others. Additionally, he argued that the basic personality is itself a measure of the extent to which such needs have been satisfied. Alternatively, the personality structure is an important force
in the creation of new needs which are derivatives of the basic needs which have gone ungratified and which seek compensation in secondary institutions. From the very nature of his general analysis, it is not surprising to discover that he considered Freud's profoundest insight to be the principle of repression. In its practical application, this principle meant that when an "instinct" was denied gratification, directly related phenomena would develop to compensate for the repressed impulse. 253

Kardiner's theory of psychodynamics was an effort to demonstrate that the basic personality structure is a function of the primary institutions by which it is shaped. His theory implied that the relationship of primary institutions in the formulation of personality does not end at this stage. The personality itself goes on to create secondary customs-complexes as a result of the inadequacies and shortcomings of the primary institutions. 254 The theoretical approach which he employed was a phylogenetic one. The phylogenetic approach defines the configurational pattern of a culture as a "by-product of biological force". 255 It endeavors to explain the relation of the individual personality to the adaptational problems of the society as a whole in terms of the development and evolution of secondary institutions. 256 Kardiner, similar to Whiting, hoped to illustrate not only the cultural determination of human behavior but also how the processes of cultural determination are mediated by fundamental needs, innate to the individual. Nevertheless, the needs which he posited require further scrutiny by anthropologists as to their cross-cultural applicability. He presented a detailed argument about how the individual as a species-being, endowed with certain
innate needs may determine the institutions particular to his own cultural milieu. At the same time he explained how such institutions may affect the behavior of the individual. From this perspective, we may understand that his use of assumptions about human nature, in their legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism, conformed to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

The Culture and Personality theorists, much like the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists, wished to emphasize man's dependence on culture as well as his independence from it. The theoretical situation in which they found themselves was as curious as it was complex. In order to justify man's dependence on culture, they had to argue that human behavior was not related to any innate "needs", "drives" or "tendencies" inherent within human nature. To demonstrate man's autonomy from culture and his ability to determine the cultural processes, they had to admit to certain innate features of human nature, of which the purpose of culture was to fulfill. Benedict, Mead, Whiting and Kardiner in their explicit use of assumptions about human nature contributed to the objectification manifestation of the liberal ideals of individualism, as well as those related to the belief in social integration. Their formulation of various assumptions about the nature of human nature served as a vehicle for the justification of the ideals particular to the liberal world-view. It also constituted a method to resolve the inherent contradictions between such ideals. By emphasizing man's dependency on culture, these theorists endeavored to demonstrate man's unlimited potentiality for development and reform. Conversely, by pointing out that there exist certain asocial features of human nature in the form of "passions and cravings", they were
able to illustrate men's individual independence from culture.
6) Summary and Evaluation

The theory of the social determination of human behavior and culture was central to the Pragmatist, Symbolic Interactionist, and Culture and Personality schools of thought. So, too, was the belief that the individual constituted an independent actor who was responsible for the initiation of social change and reform. All of the theorists particular to these various schools of thought were faced with the task of demonstrating that the behavior of the individual was influenced by his socio-cultural environment. At the same time, they wanted to illustrate that the individual was able to effectively determine his own social situation. The emphasis placed by all of these theorists on the idea of the social determination of human behavior, was complemented by their "formal" declaration that man's innate nature played no significant role in the influencing of human action within a social context. Their disbelief in the existence of an innate nature particular to the human species, was indicative of their concurrent adherence to the liberal ideals of social reform. In their opinion, any admission to the idea of the existence of certain innate and unmodifiable features of human nature constituted a denial and restriction of the liberal belief in man's unlimited possibilities for social change. As long as it could be shown that at least some aspects of man's nature were dependent on society for their development, the dream of realizing the liberal ideals of equality, freedom and opportunity for all, remained a real possibility which could be achieved through constructive and progressive social reform.

The belief in the idea of the social determination of human behavior
was maintained by such sociologists as Peirce, James, Dewey, Cooley, Mead, Thomas, Blumer and Gerth and Mills, as well as by such anthropologists as Benedict, Mead, Whiting, Child and Kardiner. Their belief in this idea was concomitantly related in many respects to the social, economic and political circumstances within which many of these theorists found themselves. American society, in the first part of the twentieth century, was characterized by a condition of general social disorder, unrest and popular dissatisfaction. It was at this time that the writings of many of these various theorists gained public recognition. The opinion of intellectuals and the general public during this period, was that American society required some type of constructive social reform which could effectively counter-balance the injustices and inequalities that had been produced by the laissez-faire form of capitalist development and individualistic competition.

Within these specific historical circumstances, many of the theorists belonging to the Pragmatist, Symbolic Interactionist, and Culture and Personality traditions of social thought, came to emphasize the idea of the unlimited modifiability of human nature and man's dependency on society for the development of his personality and character. A significant number of these theorists had received their professional training within the context of the American tradition of liberal thought. As a direct result, they (at least those who were reviewed in this analysis) were also strong supporters of the liberal ideals of individualism. Most of these American social theorists were willing to recognize the need for social integration. They also were acutely aware of the need to legitimize and protect the freedoms and rights of the independent individual. It is in recognizing
these specific historical and ideological circumstances that we may more clearly understand the nature of the 'liberal dilemma' which was dealt with by the theorists particular to the Pragmatist, Symbolic Interactionist, and Culture and Personality schools of social theory. By understanding the nature of their liberal dilemma, we may more fully appreciate the reasons for their use of explicit assumptions about human nature.

In the case of most of the theorists who have been dealt with in this chapter, their use of assumptions about human nature aided them in demonstrating that many aspects of the individual personality were aloof from the processes of the social determination of human behavior. For example, Benedict's and Mead's conflicting beliefs in the idea of the social determination of human behavior, as well as in the autonomy of the individual necessitated that they attribute certain innate qualities to the individual which could be shown to be exempt from the constraints and influences of society. By illustrating that certain individuals because of their innate characteristics (or certain innate characteristics of all individuals), functioned apart from the processes of social determinism, Benedict and Mead were able to confirm their belief in the social determination of human behavior. They were also able to legitimize their belief in the liberal ideal of individual freedom and autonomy. The use of assumptions about human nature by the other Culture and Personality theorists, as well as by the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists, may be interpreted in a similar light.

The theory of the social determination of human behavior is one of the most dominant theoretical orientations within sociology and anthropology today. It was the theories and insights formulated by the Prag-
matists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists which were primarily responsible for the legitimization of this pervasive theoretical orientation. Many of their theories and arguments are still referred to today, as a means to justify the idea that only culture, rather than man's innate nature, plays an effective role in the influencing of human behavior. However, the original theories of the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists are not convincing.

The theory of the social determination of human behavior as it was defined by these theorists was a spectacular theoretical embarrassment. This embarrassing situation consisted of the fact that in order for these various anthropologists and sociologists to prove that human behavior is determined, at least to some degree, by the social and cultural configurations, they had to rely on and utilize explicit assumptions about the innate nature of man. In this sense, the theories which were formulated within these major schools of American social thought were ostensibly characterized by what may be described as the dialectic of denial and admission. The denial of man as a species-being, having certain species-specific habits and capabilities was based on the explicit admission to this fact.

The existence of the dialectic of denial and admission within the Pragmatist, Symbolic Interactionist, and Culture and Personality theories was directly related to the belief of these theorists in both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism. In their attempt to resolve the inherent contradictions between the basic ideals of liberal ideology, they resorted to the use of assumptions about man's nature. By
using such assumptions they were able to show that man was socially oriented as well as individualistic by nature. The ambivalent character of liberalism was resolved within the context of specific assumptions about man's innate nature. In this fashion, man's need for culture, as well as his ability as an individual to change and modify it, were defined as basic features of the human personality.

To date, most students and critics of the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists have only chosen to emphasize the social deterministic aspects of their theories. Only when the historical and ideological context within which these theorists wrote is understood, is it possible to recognize the reasons for their adherence to the idea of the social determination of human behavior. Also, the comprehension of the historical and ideological milieu of these theorists enables one to appreciate the relationship between their social deterministic views and their explicit use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature.

The use of assumptions about human nature by the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists served as vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of all of the basic ideals of liberalism as an ideology. Secondly, the reasons for the legitimization by these theorists, of the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism was concomitantly related to the general historical conditions of American society during the first decades of the twentieth century. Finally, their use of assumptions about human nature reflected the processes of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology. These processes of immanent change
constitute the essential contradictions between the liberal belief in social integration on the one hand, and the belief in individualism on the other. In this sense, the assumptions of human nature defined by those theorists who have been reviewed in this chapter were intended as a means to resolve the immanent contradictions of the liberal world-view.

None of the theorists reviewed here provided any substantial degree of empirical verification for the various assumptions about human nature of which they made use. Most of their assumptions about man amounted to nothing more than being the imaginative products of very flexible and speculative anthropological and sociological imaginations. Their assumptions about human nature were not based on extensive cross-cultural comparative studies nor on evidence derived from the observations and theoretical insights of behavioral psychologists and human ethologists. On the contrary, the origins of the assumptions of human nature defined by the Pragmatic, Symbolic Interactionist and Culture and Personality theorists were concomitantly related to the unique social and economic conditions of American society in the early part of the twentieth century, as well as to the nature of the liberal ideals to which these theorists adhered.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VI

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CHAPTER VII  HUMAN NATURE AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

1) The Aim and Theoretical Implications of this Chapter

In many respects, the general orientation of North American social theory has been formulated by three basic schools of thought. On the one hand, Historical Particularism, Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism, and Culture and Personality developed together as a specific theoretical trend in reaction to the Social Darwinistic world-view. Alternatively, what is referred to as Macro and Micro Functionalism, particular to North American sociology, emerged in its initial stages in reaction to the Freudian interpretation of culture and human behavior. Finally, the most recent development in contemporary social theory, referred to as "Radical" or "New Left" sociology, originated in reaction to many of the theoretical views defined by the Micro and Macro Functionalist theorists. The Macro Functionalist theoretical movement was comprised of such theorists as Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and Edward Shils. Conversely, the Micro Functionalists included such individuals as Kurt Lewin and Leon Festinger.

This chapter will review the extent to which all of these theorists made use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature. The relation of their assumptions about man to liberalism as an ideology will also be outlined from a sociology of knowledge point of view. In this fashion it will be possible to determine the extent to which their assumptions about human nature were related to their particular liberal beliefs and ideals.
It was Freud's rather pessimistic belief in the constraining forces of culture on man's instinctual nature which prompted many of the Macro Functionalist theorists to develop an opposing point of view. Originally, such theorists as Dewey, later to be followed by the Macro Functionalist theorists, came to emphasize the complementary relationship which they believed to exist between the individual and society.\(^1\) Robert Merton formulated his general theory of social structure as a basic criticism of Freud's belief that "non-conformity with the demands of the social structure is...anchored in (man's) original nature".\(^2\) Other Macro Functionalist theorists, like Talcott Parsons, also found major faults with Freud's theories and analysis. Parsons felt that Freud

...failed to consider the fact that the individual's interactions with others form a system.

On the other hand, the social theories of Edward Shils did not constitute a direct criticism of Freud's writings. Rather, they comprised an extended elaboration of the basic insights and theories which had been outlined by Parsons and Merton.

The varying orientations of the Macro and Micro Functionalists were complementary to one another. Micro Functionalist theorists such as Kurt Lewin, shared with the Macro Functionalists the opinion that sociology and psychology "cannot try to explain everything with a single construct such as association or instinct..."\(^4\) Don Martindale, in explaining the general views of both Macro and Micro Functionalism, has observed that...

The differences between macro and micro functionalism are well illustrated by the very different stages at which the problem of personality is raised. It turns up relatively late for the macro-functionalists, who work to it from the problem of society. For the micro-functionalists, on the other hand, it is raised early, serving as a step toward a general sociological theory.
Together, the Macro and Micro Functionalists were concerned with the problem of social integration, either in terms of the integration of social institutions or the integration of the individual within social institutions.

Macro Functionalism had its origins in the social theories of Toynbee, Sorokin and Spengler, who together developed the theoretical tradition referred to as Positivistic Organicism. The restructuring of Positive Organicism into a Macro Functionalist framework by Parsons, Merton and Shils was achieved by their showing that society was an interacting functional system rather than an organism.

Positivistic Organicism left to functionalism (and sociology generally) a whole general heritage of concepts, including "structure", "social organization", "social order", and "function"...as well as a great number of detailed analyses of structures and the activities they sustain.

Prior to 1935, the theoretical perspectives of Pragmatism and Symbolic Interactionism had been significantly influential in determining the general theoretical viewpoints which had come to characterize North American sociology. Most of the more prominent members of the Pragmatist and Symbolic Interactionist schools of thought had resided, or had been trained at the University of Chicago. However, as Lewis Coser has pointed out...

The end of the Chicago dominance may conveniently be dated in 1935 when the American Sociological Society, previously largely though not wholly dominated by the Chicago department or Chicago-trained scholars, decided in a minor coup d'etat to establish its own journal, The American Sociological Review, thus severing the long-time formal and informal links of the discipline to the Chicago department.
It was the publishing of the ASR as well as Parsons's major work, *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), which ensured that the Chicago School would never attain the dominant position it had once held in American sociology.

The Macro Functionalists, much like the Pragmatists and Symbolic Interactionists, emphasized man's dependency on society. They also presented the idea that man was a goal-oriented and active being, whose behavior could only be understood in a social context. Generally, the Macro Functionalists attempted to legitimize the ideal of a social order which was able to regulate the social activities of individuals. At the same time, these theorists criticized...

Positivism...for its reductionism; its propensity to account for individual behavior in terms of physiological, psychological, genetic, or geographical influences, and its consequent inability to account for the voluntaristic, choice-making, goal-striving tendencies of social actors.

Macro Functionalism in general, lent support to the liberal belief in social integration.

Parsons, Merton and Shils, as Macro Functionalist theorists, placed great emphasis on the ideas of social integration, the cultural determination of behavior and man's need for and dependency on society. In this respect...

The collapse of local society that occurred in the Depression years, was giving new magnitude to the "nation" in American social thought. There were some signs that the theoretical unity of American sociology, which had given it the character of variations on elementarism was, showing fracture lines. The first intimations of a naive form of theoretical collectivism were manifest.

The American government came to increasingly rely on social science research programs for the initiation of social reform policies, as well as
for the mobilization of American society in preparation for the Second World War. This reliance was reflected in the emphasis which the Macro Functionalist theorists placed on the belief in the modifiability of human nature, as well as the need to integrate the individual within a system of institutions and cultural meanings.

Freud's theories had maintained that culture constituted a restraint to the instinctual desires of the individual. The Macro Functionalists came to feel that his theories were in fact antithetical to their basic belief in social reform and integration. Paul Roazen has commented that Freud was concerned with legitimizing the freedom of the individual. He pointed out that Freud felt that the only way for the individual to develop his full personality was for him to be liberated from the personal traumas which society produced. Roazen added that, in 1907, Freud

"...maintained that "a social reform allowing a certain amount of sexual freedom would be the best way to render sexual traumata harmless". Freud stood on the side of the individual and looked reluctantly at society; psychoanalysis he warned, "stands in opposition to everything that is conventionally restricted, well established and generally accepted"."

Also, Freud's affinity with the libertarian tradition of liberal thought has received attention.

Whatever Freud's insight into our dark needs, there is never any doubt as to his values - rationality and independence...his theory of ineluctability of human drives also lends empirical support to man's aspiration to freedom.

Similarly, another commentator, Gerald Levin, has insisted that Freud consider the integration of the individual into a group as both infantile
regressive... since the individual returns to the pattern of early parental identifications in forming a relationship to the group. 13

Freud believed that the development of civilization was based on the renunciation of instinctual gratifications by the individual. He was also convinced that the demands of civilization were psychologically unhealthy for the individual. 14 True democracy, as he saw it, consisted of the freedom of the individual to express those instinctual energies which had normally been repressed in his social environment.

Freud's theories dealing with man's instinctual nature, the antagonism between man's innate needs and society, and the necessity for individual freedom of expression, were unacceptable to the American Macro Functionalist theorists. Nevertheless, such theorists as Harold Lasswell and Ruth Benedict among others, came to use many of Freud's insights, although in a modified form. 15 The Macro Functionalist theorists, tended to take "society" as their basic unit of analysis. They conceived of society as a unified and functionally integrated system. In short, they considered society as a whole, rather than the individual, as being the central focal point for sociological analysis and research.

Conversely, the Micro Functionalists, writing in approximately the same period, developed a theoretical framework which placed primary importance on considering the role of the individual within a social context. Kurt Lewin, in this regard, has stated that Micro Functionalist theorists deal with individuals as "wholes". He added further, that a Micro Functionalist analysis
cannot be carried out without taking into account the characteristics of the person, his momentary state, and his psychological environment. 16
Other Micro Functionalists, especially Leo Festinger, were essentially concerned with such problems as the integration of the individual into group life. These theorists like the Macro Functionalists, expressed a basic commitment to the liberal ideal of the social integration of the individual. They also shared the liberal belief in the modifiability of human nature through the social process. It is in this respect that they rejected Freud's notions about the existence of an unmodifiable innate nature particular to the human species, which required some form of repression or sublimination in order for society and culture to develop.

By the beginning of the nineteen-sixties, many sociologists had become discontent with the ideals of social integration which had been traditionally professed by the Macro and Micro Functionalists. A great number of sociologists in North America and in Europe grew dissatisfied with the prevailing forms of social, economic and political organization, particular to modern post-industrial society. The "radical" or "critical" theorists included such individuals as: C. Wright Mills, David and Irving Horowitz, Alvin Gouldner, Norman Birnbaum, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Herbert Marcuse among others. These theorists were convinced that the relationships between individuals, within the prevailing system of material production and consumption, perpetuated significant forms of social inequalities and injustices between the various classes. As Norman Birnbaum has described...

The working class... has been growing absolutely, due to the continuing decline of the rural population. However, career progression within the working class is generally less marked than in the middle class and, most important perhaps, opportunity for the exercise of autonomy and (often enough) a sense of the social importance of the specific
task are appreciably less...the actual work performed by
the working class seems to be intrinsically less gratifying
and often onerous or nerve-racking.\textsuperscript{18}

According to David Horowitz, many of those who embraced a "radical" sociological perspective adopted, at the same time, a point of view

...more in harmony with the interests of those further
down the social hierarchy; (and) saw social conflict as a
reflection of property and power at the heart of the present social order, and their intensification as possible preludes to the overthrow of its...racist and imperialist framework.\textsuperscript{19}

The conventional Micro-Functionalist social theories were generally concerned with outlining, describing and legitimizing the functional maintenance of the social order. Alternatively, the Radical sociologists were intent on restructuring society "in order to better serve the needs of its members".\textsuperscript{20}

The Radical social theorists have been concerned with the liberation of the individual from what they believe to be the social, economic and political oppression which characterizes monopoly capitalist society. As Paul Baran has described, Herbert Marcuse's writings were essentially addressed to the problem of how to go about liberating the individual's "self (and) consciousness...from the reified bonds of capitalist society".\textsuperscript{21}

In this context, Marcuse, in his analysis of post-industrial society, attempted to demonstrate the nature of the

...suppression of individuality in the mechanization of socially necessary but painful performances; the concentration of individual enterprises in more effective more productive operations; (and) the regulation of competition of unequally equipped economic subjects;...\textsuperscript{22}

Marcuse, like most of the other Radical sociologists, has been concerned with the realization of the ideals of individual freedom and spontaneity.
The libertarian ideals maintained by these sociologists are in many respects, contrary to those ideals and beliefs supported by the Macro and Micro Functionalists. Alvin Gouldner has argued that the perspectives of the Macro and Micro Functionalists constitute

...the well financed ideology of a loosely organized but coherent Establishment. It is the dominant ideology of a powerful group that sprawls across the academic community.

The Radical sociologists in many cases, believe that their theories will provide a general guideline for the liberation of the individual from the social, economic and political impositions which they feel have originated through the development of capitalism and which have been legitimized by "Establishment sociologists".

C. Wright Mills has maintained that it should be the chief intention of the Radical sociologist to promote the cause of individual freedom. However, he also insisted that the justification for the need of such freedom cannot "be based upon" (references to) man's basic nature. He implied that sociologists must take into consideration the specific needs of individuals within each particular social situation which they examine, in order to determine objectively the degree to which the persons in question require an extension of their individual freedom and liberty. This was seen as a much more objective and realistic mode of sociological analysis, than simply justifying the need for freedom and liberty through making references to vague concepts about man's innate nature. Sociologists, as he believed, must ask such questions as:

Under what conditions do men want to be free? Under what conditions are they willing to bear the burden freedom does impose...
Mills' insistence that sociologists should avoid references to vague notions about human nature in the legitimization of the liberal ideal of freedom, immediately suggests an important question. This question refers to whether or not the Radical sociologists have in fact been able to avoid the use of assumptions about the nature of human nature in the construction of their theories. This question may also be addressed to the theories of the Macro and Micro Functionalists. No one has considered the degree to which the attempts by the Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists to refute, either directly or indirectly, Freud's theories about man's instinctual and social nature, were in fact based on the use of specific assumptions about man's nature. By reviewing the use of assumptions about human nature by Freud, the Macro and Micro Functionalists and the Radical sociologists, we shall be able to obtain a clearer understanding of the particular liberal ideals adhered to by these various social theorists. Also, by outlining from a sociology of knowledge perspective the relationships between their assumptions about man on the one hand, and their liberal beliefs on the other, we shall be able to gain an insight into the dynamics of social theory construction as they have operated right up to the present day.
2) **Freud**

The theories of Sigmund Freud held many similarities to those theories which had been formulated within the context of German Idealism. Freud, like both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, developed an individualistic psychology which maintained that man's behavior was based on his innate instinctual needs and drives, rather than on his ability to reason. He wrote a great number of major works, including among others: *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900); *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (1904); *Totem and Taboo* (1913); *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920); *The Ego and The Id* (1923); *The Future of an Illusion* (1927); *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930), and *Moses and Monotheism* (1939). This section of the chapter will deal specifically with the relationship which can be found between his liberal beliefs and the assumptions about human nature which he made use of in his various writings.

Throughout the course of his writings, Freud increasingly came to support the rather pessimistic view that when one surveys the aims of cultural development and the means it employs, one is bound to come to the conclusion that the whole effort is not worth the trouble and that the outcome of it can only be a state of affairs which the individual will be unable to tolerate.

One of his basic insights derived from his clinical experience, was into the ill-effects of sexual repression. In his opinion, the general development of culture is dependent on the repression of the sexual instinct. As Kaplan has observed, Freud's view of human nature was similar to Hobbes in that the belief in the innate goodness of man he regard(ed) as disastrous...and the picture of an
innocent childhood corrupted by society as a romanticist
myth. Far more to the point in psychoanalytic theory
are the aggressive impulses which from the outset play
so important a role in patterning behavior.29

Freud believed that it was only through the working of culture that man's
aggressive tendencies were sublimated into social benevolence, ensuring
his mastery over nature.

In many respects, Freud's writings constitute a general criticism of
society's suppression of the individual's innate nature. Paul Roazen has
pointed out that Freud's social criticism

appears extensively in an essay he published in
1908, "Civilized Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous
Illness". It is a concrete plea for greater sexual
freedom. Its premise is that if the sexual instincts
are not gratified in the real world, they will provide
the energy for neurotic substitutes.30

Freud questioned "whether our civilized sexual morality is worth the
sacrifice it imposes on us". In this light, we may understand that his
theories lent support to the liberal belief in individualism and indi-
vidual freedom within the context of a Victorian bourgeois morality.

Freud's idea that civilization frustrates man's innate sexuality and
aggressiveness gave rise to an extensive amount of protest from many of
the more conservative intellectuals in Vienna at the time. The intensity
of the opposition to his theories is not to be underestimated. For
example,

At a Congress of German Neurologists and Psychiatrists
at Hamburg in 1910, Professor Wilhelm Weggandt, when Freud's
theories were mentioned, banged his fist on the table and
shouted: "This is not a topic for discussion at a sci-
entific meeting; it is a matter for the police".31

While Freud argued against the need for the renunciation of all forms of
sexual repression, he was nevertheless by no means a total sexual lib-
ertarian. As Erich Fromm has insisted...

On the contrary he was...a man whose ideal it was to control passion by reason...He was a liberal social reformer inasmuch as he criticized Victorian sexual morality...

At least to some degree, his liberal attitudes towards the question of individual freedom were a reflection of his Jewish background. Friedrich Herr, for example, has described Freud's work as "the achievement of a Viennese Jew who was constantly fighting a heroic battle for his identity in a hostile milieu, in Vienna". Octave Mannoni has also indicated that his belief in the existence of an universal human nature was indicative of his marginal situation as a Jew.

Herbert Marcuse has outlined Freud's vision of the characterizing features of human nature. According to Marcuse, this vision of freedom was one of

...a non-repressive culture... (which) aims at a new relation between instincts and reason. The civilized morality is reversed by harmonizing instinctual freedom and order: liberated from the tyranny of repressive reason, the instincts tend toward free and lasting existential relations - they generate a new reality principle.

Freud felt that a more liberal sexuality would lower the level of aggression and neurosis within society.

There has been a great deal of argument about the empirical credibility of Freud's theories dealing with the innate nature of man. One of his most adamant critics was Pitirim Sorokin. Sorokin argued that Freud's ideas about man's instinctual nature were empirically unjustified in that

...the Freudian libido... or sexuality is a bag filled with everything, beginning with sexuality in a narrow sense and ending with hypnotism, sociality, idealism, parental love, friendship, self-protection...
and what not. It is as broad as the conception of life itself...From a metaphysical standpoint such a philosophy may be all right, but from a scientific standpoint it is fruitless because it is tautological.

While Sorokin, as well as other critics, have extensively commented on the lack of empirical credibility of many of Freud's theoretical insights, what they have not considered is the ideological implications of his concepts, especially in relation to his assumptions about human nature.

Freud believed that the motivation for the development of man's intelligence as well as the basic force, underlying all human behavior was directly related to the operation of the "pleasure principle". He asserted that the pleasure principle was innate in the individual. As he explained in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*

...any given process originates in an unpleasant state of tension and thereupon determines for itself...a path that...coincides with avoidance of pain.

The individual's desire for pleasure, as he was convinced, was understood as the underlying basis for all human action and behavior. In addition, he believed that "the sex impulse operates under the pleasure principle".

Pain was defined as "the perception of the image of unsatisfied instincts". Instinct was said to be "the tendency innate in living organisms unsettling it towards the reinstatement of an earlier condition".

Many students and critics of Freud consider his theory of repression to constitute a major insight into the nature of man. In *On the History of the Psychoanalytic Movement* (1910), it was declared the theory of repression was

...a product of psycho-analytical work, a theoretical inference legitimately drawn from innumerable observations.
Much of the theory dealing with the nature of culture, as it was outlined in *Future of an Illusion*, was related directly to his insights into the operation of the processes of instinctual repression. He argued in *Future of an Illusion*, that "every civilization must be built upon coercion and renunciation of instinct". The need for coercion was the direct result of "men's lack of fondness for work and that arguments are no avail against their passions".

The chief task of culture, as Freud pointed out, was to "reduce the great number that are instinctually hostile to civilization". He likewise recognized that any culture which did not satisfy the individual's innate needs was doomed to failure in that:

...a civilization which leaves so large a number of its participants unsatisfied...drives them into revolt.

The essential responsibility of culture, according to this argument, was the satisfaction of certain needs innate to the individual. Various devices which develop within a cultural context that compensated the individual for the shortcomings of civilization were described. One of the chief compensating devices was thought to be religion. Religion served to "exorcize the terrors of nature, reconcile men to the cruelty of Fate and compensate them for sufferings". Institutions such as religion have "contributed much to the taming of the asocial instincts".

*Civilization and Its Discontents* explained in detail the dichotomy which was believed to exist between the individual's innate desires and culture. Freud expressed the conviction that "the liberty of the individual is not a gift of civilization". It was added that individual liberty
...was greatest before there was any civilization... The development of civilization imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that no one shall escape those restrictions. What makes itself felt in a human community as a desire for freedom may be their revolt against some existing injustice, and so may prove favourable to the further development of civilization. But it may also spring from the remains of their original personality, which is still untamed by civilization and may thus become the basis in them of hostility to civilization.47

In this context, he argued that man's innate nature and its incongruity with the repressive forms of culture was the guarantee that man would continually strive for individual freedom and for the progressive development of social institutions. Moreover, it was explained that man's quest for individual freedom was assured through the operation of the pleasure principle. This principle endeavors to separate from the ego, all culture constraints which are felt to be unpleasurable. Men

...strive after happiness; they want to become happy and to remain so. This endeavour has two sides... It aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and unpleasure, and, on the other, at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure.48

The struggle of mankind as it was contended, was directly centered around the task of finding an "expedient accommodation" which would ensure a relative degree of happiness for both the individual as well as the social group to which the individual belonged.

In a similar context, Freud defined culture as a means to mediate the "life and death instincts". As he described

...besides the instinct to preserve living substance and to put it into ever larger units, there must exist another, contrary instinct, seeking to dissolve those units and to bring them back into their primeval inorganic state... as well as Eros there was an instinct of death. The phenomena of life could be explained from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of these two instincts.49
This theory stated that the instincts of "Eros" ensured the growth of the human community. Conversely, the "death instincts", Thanatos, promoted the increased individualization of man. Freud provided little empirical verification for the existence of these instincts, other than asserting that "... in the course of time they have gained such a hold on me that I can no longer think in any other way". 50

The development of various neuroses were said to be the result of the repression of the "Id" (man's innate sexual and aggressive impulses) by the cultural super-ego. For this reason, Freud supported the view that psychoanalysts "are very often obliged, for therapeutic purposes to oppose the super-ego, to endeavour to lower its demands". 51 He argued against any form of cultural constraint which served to limit the expression of man's individual innate nature.

Freud's theories dealing with the interrelationships between human nature and culture effectively contributed to the legitimization of the liberal ideals of individual freedom. As he confessed...

"I have endeavoured to guard myself against the enthusiastic prejudice which holds that our civilization is the most precious thing that we possess or could acquire, and that its path will necessarily lead to heights of unimagined perfection." 52

Similarly, he gave support to the fatalistic conclusion that the development and advancement of human civilization is "not worth the trouble, and that the outcome of it can only be a state of affairs which the individual will be unable to tolerate". 53 This attempt to legitimize the liberal ideals of individual freedom was predicated on the assumption that...

"...if wishful impulses are suppressed, their libido is transformed into anxiety." 54
According to Freud, the freedom of the individual's innate impulses was a necessary condition for maintaining a sense of personal stability and fulfillment. By indicating the negative consequences of the suppression of man's innate nature, he was able to legitimize and lend credibility to the liberal ideal of individual freedom. In this sense, the assumptions about human nature which he utilized conform to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

Freud's theories were made use of by a number of North American social theorists who were concerned with the emotional and irrational elements of culture. Nevertheless, the Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists who began writing shortly before World War II, rejected his theories of human nature. Instead, these theorists attempted to justify man's dependency on, and need for culture in a more positive context than Freud's libertarian theoretical perspective had permitted.
3. The Macro and Micro Functionalism of Human Nature

Talcott Parsons, Robert Merton and Edward Shils have been three of the main contributors to the Macro Functionalist theoretical perspective within North American sociology. Macro Functionalism as a coherent body of theories and insights is comprised of varying attempts to outline the operation of society, culture and personality as an integrated system of action and meaning. The views of those theorists involved in this particular school of thought, reflect their belief in the liberal ideals of social integration. All of the Macro Functionalists emphasized the functional dependency of the individual on society for the holistic development of his personality system. Like the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists, and Culture and Personality theorists, the Macro Functionalists were opposed to any theory which argued that man's nature was unmodifiable and exempt from the determinate influences of culture and society. In many respects, the theories of the Macro Functionalists embrace a general concern with the questions of social reform and national unification - a concern which has occupied American intellectuals since the end of World War II. Also, they strove to demonstrate, at least in the case of Parsons and Merton, that Freud's idea about the antithetical relationship between the individual and society was misleading. This portion of the chapter will focus specifically on the question of whether the Macro and Micro Functionalists made use of assumptions about human nature to lend support to their belief in the liberal ideals of social integration.

Talcot Parsons was one of the first of the Macro Functionalists to introduce the idea that the underlying basis of human action was related to the individual's interactions with others. Parsons and Shils pointed
out in Towards A General System of Action (1949), that their theory about
the development of individual action within a social context excludes the
individual

...organism as a source of motivation, or in its significance as the Id. The energy which the physiological
organism supplies for action, according to the paradigm of
the theory of action, is incorporated into the modes of
motivational orientation. It does not go into but only
toward the constellation of objects. ...This is essential
to avoid the confusions involved in much of the traditional
biological way of looking at human action. 55

He formally rejected any reference to the Freudian concepts of human
nature, such as the "Id" for example, in the explanation of human behavior.
The possibility nevertheless must be entertained from a sociology of
knowledge perspective, that Parsons utilized assumptions about human nature
to justify his liberal beliefs.

Throughout the context of his major writings, Parsons made the effort
to develop and elucidate what he referred to as the "positivistic theory
of action". The "theory of action" constituted

...a set of categories for the analysis of the relations of one or more actors to and in a situation. It
is not directly concerned with the internal constitution
or physiological processes of the organisms which are in
one respect the units of the concrete system of action;
it's essential concern is with the structure and processes
involved in the actor's relations to his situation, which
includes other actors as persons and as members of
collectivities. 56

Parsons' major work in this regard include: The Structure of Social
Action (1937); Essays in Sociological Theory, Pure and Applied (1949);
The Social System (1941); Toward a General Theory of Action, with Edward
Shils, et. al. (1951); Working Papers in the Theory of Action with Robert
F. Bales and Edward A. Ships (1953); Family, Socialization and Inter-

Parsons' theoretical focus was directed towards the understanding of social systems as being made up of a plurality of individuals, interacting with each other in a distinctly social context. From this theoretical perspective, he rejected the relevance of any consideration of man's innate nature in the explanation of the development and operation of human nature. He explained in The Social System, that the

...concrete organization of motivation cannot for purposes of action theory be analyzed in terms of the organic needs of the organism. The organization of action elements is, for purposes of the theory of action, above all a function of the relation of the actor to his situation and the history of that relation, in this sense of "experience". 57

Culture was asserted to be the product, as well as the determinate of the systems of human social interaction. Contrary to the Freudian view, he argued that social systems

...do not "repress" or "project", nor are they "dominant" or "submissive", these are mechanisms of the personality. But the motivational processes which are involved in these mechanisms also operate in social systems. We are profoundly concerned with these processes, but in their relevance to the mechanisms of the social system. 58

Human action was said to be organized around a number of distinct categories of orientation at the level of the personality, cultural and social system.

Underlying the basis of all human behavior, Parsons believed that there was a set of elementary needs which are highly modifiable. Originally, this idea was developed in The Structure of Social Action and later expanded on in Toward A General Theory of Action. 59 As he stated...
We assume then a set of needs, which, although initially organized through physiological processes do not possess the properties that permit these physiological processes to be exclusively determined in the organization of action...the direction and modes in which these needs can determine action is modifiable by influence emanating from the situation of action. 60

It was explained further, that the "motivational orientation" of the individual action referred to those aspects of the actor's orientation which he took towards his social situation. This orientation was defined in relation to the actual or potential gratification of the individual's 'need dispositions'. These modes of orientation consist of the cognitive, cathetic and evaluative. 61 He also mentioned that the choice of gratifying one need-disposition over another is based on the individual's value-orientations.

The value-orientations which commit a man to the observance of certain rules in making selections from available alternatives are not random but tend to form a system of value-orientations which commit the individual to some organized set of rules. 62

Parsons also did not neglect to consider the role of the need-dispositions as effective determinates of human behavior.

Parsons says that need-dispositions play a fundamental part in influencing the development of the individual's personality system. The personality system was defined as being comprised of the interconnections of the actions of an individual which are organized by a structure of need-dispositions. These need-dispositions are integrated with one another. 63 Conversely, a social system constituted 

...the organization of the values, norms and symbols which guide the choices made by actors and which limit the types of interaction which may occur among actors. 64
Finally, the idea was outlined of how a social system is organized around the unity of the interacting group. He emphasized that the socialization process was carried out within the context of the social system, in relation to the role expectations that are defined by society. The internalized role-expectations and values which provide the basis for the socialization process are directly related to the satisfaction of specific need-dispositions inclusive of esteem, love, approval and response.

In the broadest sense, these need-dispositions include more than role expectations and values. They are dispositions to discriminate and group social objects in certain fashions, to cathect some social objects or groups of them...and thus to behave in certain ways vis-à-vis these classes of social objects. Need-dispositions, while they are the emergent product of the socialization process, also exist a priori to that process.

Parsons attempted to outline how the socially-oriented need-dispositions of esteem, love, approval and response provide the essential foundations for the internalization of role expectations and values. These need-dispositions, in that they occur a priori to the socialization process were assumed to be elementary features of human nature. He admitted that the

...identifying index of a need-disposition is a tendency on the part of the organism to "strive for certain relationships with objects, or for certain relationships between objects." 67

Nevertheless, he insisted that the differences between a need-disposition and a drive is related to the fact that a need-disposition "is formed or learned in action". 68 Parsons was unwilling to admit to the existence of certain constants innate within human nature. However, he explicitly assumed that a number of innate features of man's nature operate in the
determining of certain facets of human social behavior.

The use of assumptions about the nature of human nature by Parsons may be more clearly understood when we review a statement he made in *The Social System*. As he pointed out:

...a social system cannot be structured as to be radically incompatible with the conditions of the functioning of its component individual actors as biological organisms.

Parsons was willing to admit to the innate nature of human nature when it came to explaining the role which the individual played within a social system. Nevertheless, those features of man's innate nature which he referred to, consisted of socially oriented needs and tendencies. By giving recognition to certain needs innate in the individual, he was able to give at least some degree of justification to the liberal belief in the autonomy of the individual. In this context, he defined the individual personality as the essential director and guide of the socialization process. At the same time, he admitted to the existence of certain socially-oriented needs innate in human nature. In this respect he was able to demonstrate the dependency of the individual on society for the realization of those needs.

Parsons' use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature served to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal belief in the social integration of the individual in a social context. As Andrew Hacker has concisely summarized:

Parsons is a liberal: his view of society is the conventional liberal one that has characterized academic thinking in the social sciences.

By interpreting his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration
from a sociology of knowledge perspective, we may at the same time comprehend the reasons for his concurrent use of assumptions about the innate nature of man. 

Apart from Talcott Parsons, other American social theorists also came to share the Macro Functionalist perspective. One of the leading Macro Functionalist theorists is Robert Merton. He was convinced that functional analysis was of central importance to sociology insofar as it primarily applied to standardized theories (such as social roles, institutions, social process, cultural items, social norms, group organization). It operates with some concept of motivation of individuals in social systems. 71

His major writings have included to date: Mass Persuasion (1946); Social Theory and Social Structure (1949); Continuities in Social Research (1950); On Theoretical Sociology (1967); The Student-Physician (1969), and The Sociology of Science (1973).

In most of his works he maintained the view that while psychologists seek to identify the significant attributes of the individual, so sociologists seek to identify significant (social) environments. 72

Like Parsons, he was essentially opposed to the Freudian perspective which supported the belief in the opposition between man's innate nature and society. Contrary to Freud, he insisted that man was a social creature. Irrational behavior in the form of deviancy was not, as the Freudian theorists insisted, the product of the expression of man's asocial nature. Simply, as Merton believed, ...

The first ingredient of a social problem consists of a substantial discrepancy between widely shared social standards and actual conditions of social life. 73
From a similar perspective, he has also argued that the responses of people to social problems are essentially social in nature. Whether 

...the forces disrupting patterns of social life are nature-made or man-made, they will in the end, confront members of the society with the task of responding to them, and the nature of that response is, in sociological principles, greatly affected by the structure of the society, by its institutions, and its values.74

The belief in the social determination of human behavior was central to his analysis of the relationship between the individual and his social environment. The question remains whether Merton adopted the practice of utilizing assumptions about human nature to legitimate the ideals of social integration which constituted an integral part of the Macro-Functionalist theoretical point of view.

Merton's theories referring to the idea of "the social cause of social problems" were most clearly articulated in Social Theory and Social Structure. It was observed in this work that sociologists could profit to some degree, from the utilization of the methodological and theoretical procedures of evolutionary biology in its attempts to deal with the nature of man. However, ...

To profit from the logic of procedure successfully employed in the biological sciences...is not to backslide into accepting the largely irrelevant analogies and homologies which have so long fascinated the devotees of organismic sociology.75

In this respect, much of the analysis presented in Social Theory and Social Structure dealt with the problem of deviancy in a functional context. Immediate objection was taken to the popular Freudian contention that deviancy was the product of the struggle of man's innate nature to express itself over and above the constraints of society. Merton emphasized that
his analysis of deviancy was directed sharply against the fallacious premise, strongly entrenched in Freudian theory... that the structure of society restrains the free expression of man's fixed impulses and that man periodically breaks into open rebellion against these restraints (in order to achieve freedom). 76

Also, he asserted that the Freudian theory dealing with the innate nature of man constituted a naive libertarian or "anarchistic doctrine".

In opposition to the Freudian argument which defined the social structure as "restraining the free expression of hostile impulses", Merton explained that the functional theory of deviancy attempts instead to determine how the social and cultural structure generates pressure for socially deviant behavior upon people variously located in that structure.

It is not man's innate desires which are responsible for deviant behavior. On the contrary, he felt that aberrant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom of dissociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and socially structured avenues for realizing these aspirations. 78

Further, it was argued that the social structure operates to exert pressure upon individuals to adapt to the various conditions of dissociation which exist between cultural goals and institutionalized means to realize these goals.

Additionally, Merton outlined five basic modes of adaptation: conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion. The choice by an individual, of one mode of adaptation over another was class specific. For example, the realization of the culturally-defined goal of success by the lower classes was said to be
limited by the class structure to those of deviant behavior. It is the combination of the cultural emphasis and the social structure which produces intense pressure for deviation. Recourse to legitimate channels for "getting in the money" is limited by a class structure which is not fully open at each end to men of good capacity. 79

The particular adaptation which the individual chose, in relation to his acceptance or rejection of either the cultural goals or the institutionalized means was, as he believed, dependent on the position which the person occupied in the social structure. 80

Merton has explained how each of the five adaptations is socially determined. What he has not pointed out is how the general response of resolving the relationship between cultural norms and institutionalized means is in itself determined by various social processes. It was explicitly assumed that people will attempt to resolve any incongruity which might exist between the cultural norms to which they adhere and the institutionalized means to realize them. The emphasis which was placed on the social determination of the various modes of adaptation, rested on the a priori assumption that man feels a need to resolve any form of imbalance between his cultural beliefs and the objective situation of his social life. What Merton has in fact demonstrated, is not how this general need is socially created, but how the choice of the specific means to satisfy this need is influenced by the individual's position in the social structure. In short, he assumed that man must attempt to achieve some degree of equilibrium between the cultural norms which he is willing to accept and the institutionalized means which he chooses to utilize.

All the various forms of adaptation which Merton outlined are predicated on the assumption that man will willingly adhere to some system of
cultural norms, as well as to a set of institutional practices that will provide for the realization of those norms. This does not mean to say, as he intimated, that the individual must necessarily recognize those norms which are commonly accepted by most persons living within his particular society or group. Even in the case of retreatism as he admitted, (which is a privatized form of adaptation)

...people exhibiting this deviant behavior may gravitate toward centers where they come into contact with other deviants and...they may come to share in the subculture of these deviant groups...81

Man's acceptance of cultural norms and institutional means, whatever their form, was assumed to be a constant tendency particular to the human condition; that is to say, a basic element of human nature.

It was on the basis of a similar assumption about man's nature that Merton and Kitt in "Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," were able to insist that

...excessive psychological anxiety...may also be regarded as a behavioral index of a state of suspended "grouplessness." 82

The above assertion is predicated on the assumption that the normal behavioral condition of man is related to his integration in a group context which has a definite system of norms and values.

Merton's assumption about the nature of human nature, in relation to his belief in man's need for some degree of equilibrium between his cultural norms and objective life situation, lends general support to the liberal ideal of social integration. Merton, even more so than Parsons, was concerned primarily with demonstrating the functional dependency of the individual on society. It is only in revealing his
explicit use of assumptions about human nature from a sociology of knowledge perspective, that we may come to understand the general ideological orientation of his theories, in their support of the liberal belief in social integration.

Macro Functionalism, as it has emerged within the context of North American sociology, has all the characteristics of a social integrationist philosophy. The emphasis which has been placed by Parsons and Merton on the social determination of human behavior and man's dependency on society, was exceeded only by the extent of their reliance on explicit assumptions about human nature. Other Macro Functionalist theorists are not exempt from utilizing assumptions about human nature to objectify, manifest and legitimize the liberal ideals of social integration. Probably the most conspicuous example of the use of assumptions about man's nature to legitimate this particular variation of the liberal world-view has been provided in the social theories formulated by Edward Shils.

It was Shils, in collaboration with Talcott Parsons, who outlined the general theoretical guidelines for the development of Macro Functionalism as a distinct school of social thought. Their general theoretical views and insights are contained in Working Papers in the Theory of Action (1953). He also is the author of a wide number of articles which have recently been published in the form of two books: The Intellectuals and The Powers (1973) and Center and Periphery - Essays in Macrosociology (1975). By closely reviewing Shils' various essays, we may come to more clearly understand the nature of the concomitant relationships which exist between his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration on the one hand, and his explicit use of assumptions about human nature on
the other.

Shils believed that society was an integrated and holistic structure. He was also convinced that societies possessed centers. That is to say, societies had a central value system which was maintained by a distinct leadership. As Shils wrote in the "Introduction" to Center and Periphery:

My own reflections on the tendency of societies to develop centers and the corresponding tendency of human beings to seek and to reject centers disclosed to me certain affinities between the charismatic, the sacred and the center. I also discovered that the disposition to attribute charismatic qualities to persons, roles, and institutions was an element in the process by which centers are formed, maintained and changed.

In outlining the operation of society as a systemic and functionally integrated whole, he assumed that man's nature was characterized by "tendencies" to seek centers, and "dispositions" to attribute charismatic qualities to certain outstanding and talented individuals.

In reviewing the role which a central value system played within a society, Shils observed that:

The existence of a central value system rests, in a fundamental way, on the need which human beings have for incorporation into something which transcends and transfigures their concrete individual existence. They have a need to be in contact with symbols.

Again, he asserted that the integration of society, around a central value system was directly related to certain fundamental needs on the part of human nature. He added that man's need for a central value system was complemented by "the need for established and created order" and "the respect for creativity." Equally important, was the fact that the various institutional, political, economic, kinship and status subsystems
of any society exist because

...they gratify the needs of human beings. The needs for stability, order, and justice, are coped with by the polity; the need for sustenance, shelter and convenience, by the economy; and the needs for instrumental and sacred knowledge, aesthetic expression and reception, and normal judgement, by the cultural system. The needs for sexual gratification, genetic continuity, affection, and convenience are expressed in the kinship system. The status system arises from men's propensity to judge themselves and others in accordance with their value orientations.87

In this context it is obvious that he perceived the existence of all the major institutional subsystems in society to be a direct reflection of man's basic needs, as well as being a means to fulfill and gratify those needs.

Each subsystem, as Shils argued, contributes to the gratification of man's basic needs, as well as providing rules which determine the conditions of gratification. Further to this point, he indicated that the

allocations made by the rules are practically always unequal in some measure among the members of the subsystem. The inequality might be a function of the unequal distribution of genetic properties, of the unequal distribution of power, of significant kinship connections, skill, education, etc.88

According to this theory, it is through the unequal distribution of the gratification of man's basic needs particular to his nature, that the process of individualization is fostered.

One of the central problems with which Shils was concerned, was related to the question of authority within society. He dealt with this particular problem in a rather concise manner. As he clearly stated...

"The propensity to seek contact with transcendent powers and to impute charisma is rooted in the neural constitution of the human organism."89
The individual's need for contact with both a transcendent power and charismatic authority, as he thought, is directly related to the nature of human nature. He pointed out that it is the charismatic leader who is able to provide the individual with a sense of meaning and order. Religion, as he was convinced, serves to satisfy man's need for order.

The need for order, and for meaning in order are too fundamental in man for the human race as a whole to allow itself to be bereft of the rich and elaborate scheme of metaphorical interpretation of existence which is available by the great world religions.

This whole analysis of the functional relationships which exist between the various constitutional subsystems, charisma and religion was based on determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature.

In another of his popular essays, "Society and Societies", Shils maintained that it is

one of the numerous tasks of sociology, and
...macrosociology, to elucidate the mechanisms or processes by which this collection or aggregate of primordial, corporate, and cultural groups functions as a society.

The "mechanisms" by which a society functions were assumed to constitute basic needs and drives innate to human nature. All of the various characteristics of human nature which were defined and explicitly made use of, served as vehicles for the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. Like Merton and Parsons, he maintained that the primary consideration of a macrosociological perspective was to demonstrate the functional interdependence between man and society. His specific view of human nature was completely contrary to that defined within a Freudian theoretical perspective. Freud had attempted to show the antithetical relationship between man and society. Shils, on the other hand,
endeavored to reveal how the institutional subsystems of society provided for the realization of man's innate nature. Within this context it is obvious that his use of assumptions about human nature served to legitimate the liberal ideals of social integration. In this fashion, his assumptions about man lend themselves to a sociology of knowledge interpretation.

The willingness of Macro Functionalists to use explicit assumptions about human nature was complementary to their failure to provide some form of empirical verification for those assumptions. The distinct lack of empirical justification for the assumptions about man which these theorists utilized is a testimony to the ideological role which these assumptions played within their various theories. In this sense, North American sociology, as it has developed since World War II (at least in regard to the theories of Macro Functionalism) has provided a theoretical legitimization for the liberal belief in social integration. This legitimization has been firmly rooted in the empirically unverified use of specific assumptions about the innate nature of human nature.

The Macro Functionalists dealt with large-scale social systems as the focal point of their analyses. Conversely, the Micro Functionalists were more oriented towards dealing with the problems related to the adaptation of the individual to the existing social structure. The most prominent members of the Micro Functionalist school of thought have included such theorists as Kurt Lewin and Leon Festinger. With regard to the central purposes of this overall study, the question must again be asked whether Lewin and Festinger, like the Macro Functionalists, made use of assumptions about human nature to support the liberal ideals of social integration.
Kurt Lewin was a German Gestalt psychologist, who in 1945 founded the Research Center For Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His major works included: A Dynamic Theory of Personality: Selected Papers (1935); Principles of Topological Psychology (1935); The Conceptual Representation and the Measurement of Psychological Forces (1938); Revolving Social Conflicts (1948) and Field Theory in Social Science (1951). He addressed himself to the basic problem of studying the effects of the social and cultural milieu (field) on the individual. 92

In Principles of Topological Psychology, it was maintained that what the social sciences require in order to objectively understand the nature of human behavior are specific scientific concepts and theories, which are able to accurately reveal the underlying forces of behavior. Such a requirement necessitates the close collaboration of psychologists and sociologists. However, Lewin added that social scientists must deal

...with persons as wholes to a much greater extent than in the psychology of sensation. In the psychology of sensation, the individual's ideals, ambitions and his social relationships play no role at all or only a subordinate one. But an experimental investigation of needs, of action, or of emotions cannot be carried out without taking into account the characteristics of the person...and his psychological environment. 93

In this sense, he believed that to deal adequately with the question of the role of the individual in the social system, it is necessary to define the individual's

...social environment, his relationships to other persons, their positions and personalities, and his own place in society, for instance his vocation. At the same time, his longings and ambitions will play an important role, ...is short everything that from the standpoint of the psychologist exists for this person. 94
Within this theoretical context, he sought to define the individual within a systemic totality, consisting of subjective, emotional attitudes and objective, social relationships.

Field Theory in Social Science constituted an attempt to define a specific method of analysis by which both the subjective and social aspects of the individual personality could be determined. This method constituted what Lewin referred to as "Field Theory".

Field theory is probably best characterized as a method; namely a method of analyzing causal relations and of building scientific constructs... expressed in the form of certain general statements about the "nature" of the conditions of change.95

He emphasized that various changes in a psychological field depend only upon internal components of the psychological field at that time.96 Within the field there exists the "life space" of the individual, which consists of his "psychological environment" which is independent from his relationships with his surrounding social situation. The basic tenets of "field theory" consist of the following:

A) behavior has to be derived from a totality of coexisting facts

B) these coexisting facts have the character of a "dynamic field" insofar as the state of any part of this field depends on every other part of the field.97

Lewin was convinced that sociological analysis is of little value if it doesn't provide an adequate description of "the character of the social atmosphere" within which the specific social act occurs.

In relation to the consideration of the subjective relations of the individual within the context of his life-space, he pointed out that one has to take into account such items as goals, stimuli as well as "needs".98
A great deal of emphasis was placed on the effect of needs on the cognitive structure of the individual. Lewin added that a need may be satisfied whether by reaching the desired goal or by reaching a substitute goal.99 It was asserted that needs

...may be changed by changes in any part of the psychological environment, by changes of the inner-personal regions, by changes on the reality level as well as on the unreality level...and by changes in the cognitive structure of the psychological future and the psychological past.100

The goals or values of the individual, as he believed, are closely related to his basic needs. The satisfaction of such needs ensure the incorporation of the individual into society.

The origins of the individual's needs, according to Lewin, are "to a very high degree determined by social factors".101 These needs may be created:

1) in the manner of an altruistic act.

2) may be induced by the power field of another person or group (as a weaker person's obedience of a more powerful one).

3) by belonging to a group and adhering to its goals.102

In his efforts to demonstrate the dependency of the individual on society, he outlined how the needs of the individual are created by the social processes related to: altruism, obedience to authority and group membership. Nevertheless, in describing those processes which he felt contributed to the social determination of human behavior, certain explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature were made.

Lewin predicated the theory of the social determination of individual needs on the a priori assumptions which referred to the willingness of
individuals to commit altruistic acts, to obey authority and to enter into a group structure. Altruistic acts, obedience to authority and group membership were understood as the basis of the socialization process. In this respect, it is obvious that the needs of individuals to be altruistic, to obey authority and to join groups were assumed to exist *a priori* to the socialization process itself. In fact, it is evident that he assumed these various socially *a priori* characteristics to be basic features of human nature. Through revealing his use of assumptions about human nature, we obtain a clearer understanding of the particular ideological orientation of his work as a whole. It becomes quite clear from a sociology of knowledge frame of reference, that Levin's empirically unverified assumptions about man's nature, which formed the underlying basis of his "field theory", contributed to the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. These specific beliefs were shared by Macro and Micro Functionalists alike.

Leon Festinger was another major Micro Functionalist theorist. As the program director of the Research Center for Group Dynamics, Festinger had a great deal of opportunity to elaborate and develop a wide number of theoretical insights within a Micro Functionalist framework of analysis. What must be examined is whether these various insights were predicated on explicit assumptions about human nature. Also, the question of the interrelationship between these assumptions and his belief in the liberal ideals of social integration must be effectively dealt with in this analysis.

The clearest indication of Festinger's Micro Functionalist viewpoint is provided in his major work, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*.
(1955). The hypotheses of this particular study may be stated as follows:

1) The existence of dissonance, being psychologically uncomfortable, will motivate the person to try to reduce the dissonance and achieve consonance.

2) When dissonance is present, in addition to trying to reduce it, the person will actively avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.103

Cognitive dissonance was defined as an "antecedent condition which leads to activity oriented toward dissonance reduction".104 He tried to demonstrate that as soon as dissonance occurs, there will be pressure to reduce it. In this regard, he mentioned that the important point to remember is that there is pressure to produce consonant relations among cognitions and to avoid and reduce dissonance.105

It was further insisted that when persons have cognitive elements which deviate markedly from reality, "the reality which impinges on a person, will exert pressure in the direction of bringing the appropriate cognitive elements into correspondence with that reality."106

In dealing with the problem of dissonance, Festinger examined the specific implications of his hypotheses in relation to a wide range of data. In this regard, he found that...

1) Dissonance almost always exists after a decision has been made.

2) Dissonance almost always exists after an attempt has been made, by offering rewards or threatening punishment, and eliciting overt behavior that is at variance with private opinion.

3) Forced or accidental exposure to new information may create cognitive elements that are dissonant with existing cognition.

4) The open expression of disagreement in a group leads to the existence of cognitive dissonance in the members.107
As it was argued, there are many ways in which dissonance may be reduced:

1) By changing one or more of the elements involved in dissonant relations.

2) By adding new cognitive elements that are consonant with already existing cognitions.

3) By decreasing the importance of the elements involved in the dissonant relations.

In concluding his analysis, he assumed that the evidence of dissonance is probably so prevalent and the circumstances which give rise to dissonance occur so frequently

...that evidence of dissonance and manifestations to reduce it are likely to be found in almost any context.

Festinger's argument as it has been reviewed here, pointed to the existence of a basic feature, not only of human nature but of all living organisms.

General Systems theorists maintain that all living organisms have the ability to "balance" themselves. This ability of living organisms to maintain a steady state is referred to as "homeostasis". It is usually defined as the process

...by which living systems restore themselves, or maintain steady states within a wide range of variation, offsetting inputs which would otherwise greatly change or destroy them.

In a similar context, Festinger has sought to demonstrate the operation of the processes of homeostasis in relation to the reduction of dissonance. The theory of cognitive dissonance represents a general effort to portray the workings of a basic feature of human nature. It is a theory which is at the same time supported by empirical evidence. The theory of cognitive dissonance, insofar as it reflects the propensity of individuals to main-
tain themselves in a balanced and integrated condition, contributes to the legitimate ation of the liberal ideals of social integration.

Festinger's theories, unlike those of the other Macro and Micro Functionalists, has presented a view of human nature which is at least generally supported by the data. Nevertheless, this fact does not over- ride the ideological implications of the particular aspect of human nature which he chose to describe. Like the other functionalist theorists, he was primarily concerned with showing how the individual was able to adapt in a constructive and integrative manner to the changing features of his social circumstances.

Together, the Macro and Micro Functionalists defined the individual and the social institutions with which he had to deal, as an integrated system of meaningful and functional relationships. All of these theorists conceived of social change as the functional adaptation of the individual to a changing social environment. They also supported the view that the individual's character and personality was determined by the social process. However, in each case, these theorists made use of explicit assumptions about human nature to demonstrate the validity of their social deterministic theories.

With the exception of Festinger, the failure of all of the Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists in giving any degree of empirical verifica- tion for the various assumptions about human nature which they made explicit use of, provides, from a sociology of knowledge perspective, a clear indication of the general ideological orientations of their writings. Don Martindale has observed that...
The use of sociological functionalism coincides with the return of the Republican Party to power, the return to religion, the rise of McCarthyism, and other typical manifestations of a positive conservative reaction. The use of assumptions about man's innate nature by Parsons, Merton, Shils, Lewin and Festinger reflect the rather reactionary social circumstances in which these theorists found themselves. Their assumptions about human nature served as vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. However, since the early part of the nineteen-sixties many sociological theorists, in North America and elsewhere, have come to lend at least general support to a much more libertarian variation of the liberal world-view than had been supported by the Macro and Micro Functionalists.
4) **The Radical Nature of Human Nature**

Many sociologists, by the beginning of the nineteen-sixties, had become increasingly critical of the basic social structure and the political and economic organization of American society. The liberal belief in progress had gradually come to be replaced by a general feeling of disillusionment. More and more intellectuals became aware of such social issues as racial and class inequalities, possibilities for ecological disaster, commodity fetishism and most significantly, the Vietnam War. Such "radical" theorists included: C. Wright Mills, David and Irving Horowitz, Alvin Gouldner, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Norman Birnbaum and Herbert Marcuse. These theorists expressed in their writings a general dissatisfaction with the loss, denial and suppression of individual freedom which they attributed to the social, political and economic processes particular to post-industrial society. They were also dissatisfied with the conservative role which they felt social theory had come to play in its support of the dominant institutions of the American social order.

For example, Alvin Gouldner has argued, that the dominant powers within American society have

...all the social mechanisms available...by which it can reward those who tell the wrong truths. In its meaner moments it is an intellectual mafia...Like any other member of the establishment, the sociologist...is expected to lie along with his fellow members of the Establishment, to feel the rightness of their cause and a responsibility for its success.112

He explained that established and conservative sociologists such as Parsons, Merton, Shils, Festinger and Lewin want to legitimate the existing social and political power structure. Conversely, the "radical" or "critical" sociologist wishes to reveal the social injustices per-
punctuated by "the power elites". Rather than maintaining a value-free perspective in relation to social theory, many of the Radical sociologists who were, and remain critical of American society, want to define a type of social theory which expresses their own political commitment. David Horowitz has observed that it is easy

...to see that such a perspective is "radical" in the usual sense, in that it leads directly to the question of how a social order may be reconstructed in order to better serve the needs of its members rather than how its members and institutions may be adjusted and accommodated to the need to maintain social stability and order.

Rather than being committed to the liberal ideals of social integration like the Macro and Micro Functionalists, the Radical sociologists maintain the liberal belief in the libertarian ideals of individual freedom.

Sidney Lipshires has observed that the writings of such theorists as Herbert Marcuse are directed toward the justification of the liberal belief in the need to realize complete individual freedom and spontaneity of expression within post-industrial society.

Marcuse's new determinate negation is instinctual liberation, the liberation of Eros in the form of non-repressive sublimation. "The liberation of Eros" will produce "a destructive, fatal force...the total negation of the principle which governs the repressive reality," a revolutionary force directed against modern, alienated society. This "destructive, fatal, force" would not, however, lead to social anarchy, for under the combined rule of human love and reason...man's work relations themselves would become rationalized.

Critics of C. Wright Mills have also noted his commitment to the defense of the liberal ideals of individual freedom. In describing the general ideological orientation of Mills' writings, Robert B. Nolestein has pointed out that he
...conceived of the "sociological imagination" as designed to examine issues raised by the intersection of history and biography. This conception of the "sociological imagination" was in turn formed by his belief that "it is the felt threat to cherished values such as those of freedom and reason that is the necessary moral substance of all significant problems of social inquiry." 116

Most critics who have reviewed the overall ideological orientation of many of the Radical sociological theorists agree, that their basic intention is to lend some degree of credibility and legitimization to the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

Radical sociologists have insisted that they have nothing whatsoever in common with the theoretical perspectives which have been defined by the various functionalist theorists. For example, it has been argued that...

What is not found in orthodox social analysis... is any insight into the specific features of the prevailing capitalist social structure and the determining effect of these features on social priorities and on the configurations of power, politics, and social conflict that dominate contemporary historical development. 117

Most critics of the functionalists, as well as the Radical social theorists have placed great emphasis on the differing theoretical orientations which characterize these two schools of thought. No one to date however, has examined the extent to which these theoretical differences, as well as the differing orientations to liberalism taken by many of these theorists, are in fact related to the use of opposing assumptions about the innate nature of human nature. By reviewing the analyses of post-industrial society as outlined by such Radical sociologists as Norman Birnbaum, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Herbert Marcuse, it will be possible to determine the extent to which these particular theorists made use of assumptions about human nature. Furthermore, by examining the extent to which their
assumptions about man's nature are empirically justifiable, we may also obtain a clearer understanding of the general ideological implications of Radical sociology in relation to its specific orientation towards liberalism as a world-view.

Norman Birnbaum is one of the leading Radical sociologists. His most notable works include: The Crisis of Industrial Society (1969) and Toward a Critical Sociology (1971). In many respects he maintains a Marxist perspective at least in relation to his criticisms of post-industrial society. He insisted that the value of Marx's theories was their critical emphasis on the need for the liberation of man from his alienated condition. It was asserted in Toward a Critical Sociology, that a number of conditions must be met before man can attain a state of individual freedom. He elaborated that

"...men cannot repossess their world until they recognize in it, their own labour. Before this can occur, specific historical conditions have to be met. A specific human group, a class, must so develop that the conditions of its liberation from ideology are identical with the conditions of human liberation generally."

Birnbaum's understanding of what he referred to as "the conditions for human liberation" is based on determinate assumptions about the nature of human nature which are in turn directly related to his belief in the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

It was within the context of developing a "Marxist anthropology" that Birnbaum came to outline his general assumptions about man's innate nature. As he stated...

"Man is a sensual and active being who can fulfill himself only in the right Praxis. That Praxis in turn, would constitute a medium through which man would reconstitute
himself. Under conditions of capitalist commodity production, the right Praxis was impossible...Only revolutionary Praxis, then, could restore or institute a truly human condition. 119

It was explicitly assumed that only through "revolutionary Praxis" was it possible for man to realize the basic potentialities of his nature. He also assumed that man's nature was essentially incongruous with capitalist society. On the basis of these assumptions, Birnbaum developed a general theory of alienation in conjunction with Marx's views on the subject. 120 The specific nature of his view of human nature was never clearly defined. Nevertheless, he used a vague assumption about man's "real" nature, "free from the constraints of capitalism", as a basic justification for criticizing the short-comings of capitalist society at present. He maintained the belief that there exists capitalism on the one hand, and a truly human condition, synonymous with man's nature, on the other. In this fashion it was possible for him to legitimize the liberal belief in the need to extend and realize the fullest opportunities for individual freedom. Birnbaum, as a Radical sociologist, was not exempt from utilizing assumptions about human nature which were formulated within a liberal ideological context.

Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, as sociologists and political theorists, have played an important role in the development of many of the characterizing perspectives of Radical sociology. One of their chief joint publications was Monopoly Capital (1966). This particular work constituted a critical analysis of the American economic and social order. The concluding chapter of this book dealt specifically with "the quality of monopoly capitalist society" in relation to the characterizing features
of its chief social, political and economic institutions: Their analysis of capitalism in this regard was predicated on explicit assumptions about human nature which served to legitimize the liberal ideals of individualism and individual freedom.

Like Birnbaum, both Baran and Sweezy were convinced that modern monopoly capitalist society contributed effectively to the suppression of individual freedom. They also pointed out the existing inadequacies of the American educational system. It was argued that the American system of education stultified the full development of the individual through its emphasis on specialized training and business-oriented studies. However, as they admitted...

This is not to say that the American educational system does not turn out thoughtful and truly educated people. Their number is, however, distressingly small, and they attain a level of intellectual excellence not because but in spite of the educational system, not as a result of but in a bitter struggle with the prevailing cultural and intellectual climate.121

These two theorists felt that the structuring of the educational system around the objective requirements of monopoly capitalism, served to severely hamper the student's spontaneous expression of his individuality.

In reviewing the various attempts by other contemporary sociologists, especially the functionalists, tojustify the existing social order, Baran and Sweezy commented that...

Powerless to justify an irrational and inhuman social order and unable to answer the increasingly urgent questions which it poses, bourgeois ideology clings to concepts that are anachronistic...Its bankruptcy manifests itself...in the stubborn upholding of old fetishes and half-truths which now turn into blatant lies.122

Conventional functionalist social theory, as they argued, had failed to
recognize that men

...are still being specialized and...imprisoned in
the narrow cells prepared for them by the division of
labor, their faculties stunted and their minds diminished. 123.

They assumed that men has capabilities and potentialities beyond those
already developed in modern capitalist society.

What these "true" human potentialities actually constitute is left
generally undefined within their analysis. Nevertheless, Baran's and
Sweezy's assumptions about the objective existence of such potentialities
provided the underlying basis for their criticisms of the existing social
and economic relations which characterize the processes of production and
consumption particular to monopoly capitalist society. They insisted
that a

...large and growing part of monopoly capitalist
society, if judged by genuine human needs, is useless,
wasteful, or positively destructive. 124.

Again, in this specific case, these theorists gave no indication of what
these "genuine human needs" comprised. Nor was it explained how these
needs were able to remain aloof from the various socialization processes
which operate within monopoly capitalist society.

According to these two theorists, the social and economic relations
of monopoly capitalism contribute to...

Curbing the striving for freedom, subduing the
aversion to toil and self-denial, destroying the
sense of compassion and solidarity with fellow men. 125

It is important to emphasize that Baran and Sweezy explicitly assumed that
all the features of human behavior which they defined above, existed a
priori to the processes of socialization imposed on the individual through
the development of the means of production and consumption particular to
monopoly capitalism. They asserted that monopoly capitalism ensures "the repression of libidinous drives and the inability to experience sensual gratification." In this context, explicit assumptions about human nature were utilized to legitimize the liberal belief in the need for providing a more extensive degree of individual freedom.

Neither of these two theorists provided any empirical evidence to support the existence of the various characteristics of human nature which they explicitly assumed and made use of within their analysis. Nevertheless, they used such assumptions in order to show how monopoly capitalism contributed to the denial of certain fundamental human needs. It appears quite clearly from their use of assumptions about human nature, that these theorists were intent on demonstrating the need for realizing the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

Probably the most widely known of all the Radical sociologists is Herbert Marcuse. His major theoretical writings did much to shape the general ideological orientation of the New Left as it had developed in the nineteen-sixties and early years of the nineteen-seventies. Those works by Marcuse which came to influence the theoretical perspectives of many Radical sociologists included: Eros and Civilization (1955); One Dimensional Man (1964); An Essay on Liberation (1968), and Counter-Revolution and Revolt (1972). The extent to which he utilized assumptions about human nature as a means to justify the liberal ideals of individualism will be closely reviewed in this portion of our analysis.

In all of his more popular writings, Marcuse expressed his general disillusionment and dissatisfaction with the quality of life in modern capitalist society. He felt that the prevailing progressive forms of
material production, acquisition and consumption had resulted in the dissipation of class antagonisms. He admitted that capitalism could provide for the satisfaction of the basic material needs of man. Nevertheless, he believed that it perpetuated the alienation of the individual from his "true human character". While he was willing to recognize the ability of modern post-industrial society to provide varying degrees of individual freedom, he was at the same time convinced that the individual was dominated by intense forms of social control. As he stated in *One Dimensional Man*:

"Today his (the individual's) private space has been invaded and whittled down by technological rationality. Mass production and consumption claim the entire individual, and industrial psychology has long ceased to be confined to the factory.  

His general intention was to legitimize the need for liberation of man from the constraints of "commodity fetishism" and the processes of "repressive sublimination". He felt that these processes contributed to the effective denial of individual freedom.  

Shierry M. Weber has noted that according to Marcuse:

"Man's liberation from alienation was at the same time his realization as a social being (Gattungswoesen)."

Marcuse insisted the present system of social, cultural and economic relationships ensured that man was "exploited and alienated in all aspects of his activity and at all levels of his consciousness". In this sense, he believed that various forms of technological development had contributed to the creation of an apparatus which facilitated the rigid determination of many of the individual's attitudes, values, aspirations and needs."
Marcuse consistently emphasized that man's needs were socially determined. He also indicated that there were specific constants to human nature which were not influenced by the capitalist mode of socialization. In fact, he argued that capitalism at least in its post-industrial form, was responsible for the repression of many of these innate aspects of human nature. It was stated in One Dimensional Man that the distinguishing feature of advanced industrial society is its effective suffocation of those needs which demand liberation.  

In An Essay on Liberation, a theory was outlined which was referred to as a "Biological Foundation For Socialism". This theory maintained that the development of political radicalism in the attempt to initiate individual liberation implies moral radicalism: the emergence of a morality which might precondition man for freedom. This radicalism activates the elementary, organic foundation of morality in the human being. . . .morality is a "disposition" of the organism, perhaps rooted in the erotic drive to counter oppressiveness.  

According to Marcuse, political radicalism in the form in which he defined it, would provide for both the realization of man's innate sense of morality and for the consequent liberation of the individual. 

In considering the possibility for the occurrence of significant social change, Marcuse explained that in order to become vehicles of freedom, science and technology would have to change their present direction and goals in accord with a new sensibility - the demands of the life instincts.  

It was also indicated that the "life instincts" could only be realized when the total liberty of the individual's consciousness was ensured. He outlined how the power of the "life instincts" over aggressiveness and
...would fasten on a social scale, the vital need for the abolition of injustice and would shape the further evolution of the "standard of living"... The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a science and technology free to realize the possibilities of things and men in the protection and gratification of life... A significant portion of Marcuse's analysis, in his attempts to legitimize the liberal ideals of libertarian individualism, was based on explicit assumptions about the innate nature of man. Sidney Lipschries, in this context, has observed that Marcuse's "instinctual argument" had the strongest appeal to the young revolutionaries of the nineteen-sixties, who participated in such events as the General Strike of May, 1968 in France. 135

Marcuse's theories are probably the most extreme example of the explicit use of assumptions about the nature of human nature by a Radical sociologist. Like Birnbaum, Baran and Sweezy, he justified the need of increasing the freedoms of the individual in post-industrial society by utilizing a whole collection of rather vague and empirically unverified assumptions about human nature. The libertarian orientation of all the Radical sociologists originated in their reaction to the integrationist policies and ideals which had been supported by the Macro and Micro Functionalists. The use of empirically unverified assumptions about human nature by these sociologists is a testimony to their obvious ideological intentions. Most Radical sociologists, however, openly admit to their political commitments and their willingness to use social theory as a means to further those commitments.

It is important to realize that the difference between the theories
of the functionalists and the Radical sociologists are not just in terms of their political beliefs. The divergent ideological views of all these theorists are directly related to their differing assumptions about the innate character of man. Their varied assumptions about human nature were used to objectify, manifest and legitimize the basic variations of the liberal world-view. By examining the use of assumptions about human nature by the Macro and Micro Functionalists and the Radical sociologists, we are able to obtain a clearer conception of: the operation of the dynamics of theory construction; the underlying foundation of sociological debate, and the conceptual mechanisms by which contemporary social theory is able to adapt to changing social circumstances.
5) **Summary and Evaluation**

Sociological theory from World War II up to the present has embraced the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology. At least in the case of Macro and Micro Functionalism, social theory has come to emphasize the liberal belief in social integration and the dependency of the individual on society. More recently, within the context of Radical sociology, social theory also has come to embody the liberal belief in libertarian individualism.

The Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists, inclusive of Parsons, Merton, Shils, Lewin and Festinger, extensively utilized assumptions about human nature in the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. Their willingness to support this particular liberal ideal was related to the social circumstances in which these theorists wrote. Social developments, such as the national unification of American society, which followed in the wake of America's preparation for World War II and later incidents, like McCarthyism which facilitated the growth of the belief in the need for national loyalty, together played an effective role in shaping the general theoretical and ideological orientations expressed by the functionalist theorists.

The adherence of the Macro and Micro Functionalists to the liberal belief in social integration was complemented by their unwillingness to accept many of the arguments that had been outlined by Freud. In fact, it was the reaction of Parsons, Merton and Shils toward Freud's instinctual theory of behavior which provided the incentive for the development of Macro Functionalism as a distinctive school of social thought. Freud's theories which had maintained that man by nature had
certain instincts which were incongruous with culture and cultural development, were found by the functionalist theorists to be unsuitable for understanding the nature of American society. They insisted, contrary to Freud, that man was essentially social. Additionally, they pointed out that deviancy could not be explained in terms of the expression of man's asocial instincts. Such theorists as Merton attempted to argue that deviancy was the consequence of certain societal stresses rather than a product of man's innate nature. Nevertheless, he inevitably utilized explicit assumptions about man's nature within the course of his theoretical argument.

All of the Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists generally adhered to the idea of the social determination of human behavior and culture. However, their argument that man was a social animal was predicated on explicit assumptions about the existence of certain features of human nature. As they explained, these innate aspects of human nature ensured the integration of the individual into society. Their adamant denial of the innate basis of human behavior and, at the same time, their contradictory admission to this fact in their explanation of the social determination of human action, is characteristic of the dialectic of denial and admission. This particular dialectic was found to be a prominent feature of other social deterministic theories inclusive of Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism and those related to the Culture and Personality school of thought.

It was only through using explicit assumptions about human nature that the Macro and Micro Functionalists were able to provide a logical argument in justifying the idea about man's dependency on society. For
example, Robert Merton was only able to demonstrate that the various adaptations to anomie were socially determined, by making the a priori assumption that man desired to rectify such an imbalance in the first place. With the exception of Festinger, all of the Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists failed to provide any form of empirical verification for the various assumptions about man which they utilized and relied on within their theories. In short, the various assumptions about the nature of human nature explicitly utilized in the theories of the Macro and Micro Functionalists, served as vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. In turn, their choice of this particular variation of the liberal world-view was concomitantly related to the specific social circumstances in which they found themselves.

The differing orientation of the Radical sociologists to liberalism as an ideology was directly related to their assumptions about human nature which were contrary to those formulated by the Macro and Micro Functionalists. Like the functionalist theorists, the Radical sociologists, inclusive of Norman Birnbaum, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Herbert Marcuse, failed to justify their speculations about man's innate nature through any form of empirical verification. Their belief in the libertarian ideals of human freedom, led these theorists to argue that there exist specific needs, innate to the individual, which remain unfilled within the existing processes of production and consumption, particular to post-industrial society. Their contention that certain innate features of human nature are incompatible with the objective conditions of post-industrial society enabled the Radical sociologists to outline a set of
theories which emphasized the repression and alienation of the individual. The choice of a more libertarian variation of the liberal world-view by the various Radical sociologists was indicative of their reaction to the social, political and economic inequalities which had become increasingly evident to many intellectuals by the early nineteen-sixties.

The differences in the assumptions about human nature formulated by the Macro and Micro Functionalists and the Radical sociologists is illustrative of the processes of immanent change particular to liberalism as an ideology. More specifically, we may understand that liberalism as an historically evolving ideology is characterized by a certain degree of ambivalence. This ambivalence is related to the fact that its basic ideals have constituted a belief in social integration on the one hand and individualism on the other.

The attempt by social theorists to resolve this basic contradiction has resulted in intense intellectual debates from the period of the Enlightenment right up to today. As soon as one school of social thought has posited a theory which lends support to the liberal ideals of social integration, another school of thought has formulated a set of theories which contributes to the legitimization of the more libertarian variation of liberalism. Thus, liberalism, at least within the context of social theory, has evolved through the process whereby various schools of thought have attempted to compensate for the neglect of other social theorists to include all of the basic liberal ideals within their particular theoretical frameworks. From this perspective it is not surprising that the Radical sociologists as liberals have attempted to give support to the ideals of libertarian individualism. It was exactly these libertarian
ideals which had been neglected by the Macro- and Micro Functionalists.

Within contemporary sociological theory, assumptions about the innate nature of human nature have played a fundamental role in the expressing of the basic variations of the liberal world-view. They have also constituted a useful means for resolving the immanent contradictions which are inherent within liberalism as an ideology.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VII


4. Lewin, Kurt; Field Theory In Social Science - Selected Theoretical Papers (Harper Torchbooks; New York; 1964) p. 7.


6. See:
   i) Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Society, Culture and Personality (Harper; New York; 1947).
   ii) Spengler, Oswald; Decline of the West, 2 Vols. (Alfred A. Knopf; New York; 1976).


13. Levin, Gerald; Sigmund Freud (Twayne Publishers; Boston; 1975) p. 131.

15. See:
   a) Lasswell, Harold; Psychopathology and Politics (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1930).
   b) Benedict, Ruth; Patterns of Culture (Houghton Mifflin; Boston; 1934).


17. Festinger, Leon; 'Some Consequences of De-Individuation In a Group' in Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (Vol. 47; 1952) p. 382.


22. Marcuse, Herbert; One-Dimensional Man (Beacon Press; Boston; 1964) p. 1.


25. Ibid.; p. 175.


35. Marcuse, Herbert; *Eros and Civilization* (Beacon Press; Boston; 1955) p. 197.


37. Freud, Sigmund; 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle' in Rickman, John (ed.); *A General Selection From the Works of Sigmund Freud* (Double-day; Garden City, New York; 1951) p. 141.


44. *Ibid.*; p. 18.

45. *Ibid.*; p. 32.


52. Ibid.; p. 91.
53. Ibid.; p. 92.
56. Ibid.; p. 61.
57. Parsons, Talcott; The Social System (Free Press; New York; 1951) p. 5.
59. See:
61. For brief definitions of the cognitive, cathetic and evaluative modes, see:
63. Ibid.; p. 55.
64. Ibid.; p. 55.
65. Ibid.; p. 75.
67. Ibid.; p. 115.
68. Ibid.; p. 115.
69. Parsons, Talcott; The Social System; Op. Cit.; p. 27.


74. Ibid.; p. 802.


76. Ibid.; p. 121.

77. Ibid.; p. 122.

78. Ibid.; p. 134.

79. Ibid.; p. 145.

80. For an elaboration of Merton's typology of the modes of individual adaptation, see:

   Social Theory and Social Structure; Ibid.; pp. 140-60.


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84. Shils, Edward; Center and Periphery - Essays in Macrosociology (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1975) p. xxviii.

85. Ibid.; p. 7.

86. Ibid.; p. 9.

87. Shils, Edward; 'Society: The Idea and Its Sources' in Shils, Edward; Center and Periphery; Ibid.; p. 21.

89. Shils, Edward; 'Charisma, Ritual, and Consensus' in Shils, Edward; Center and Periphery; Ibid.; p. 128.

90. Shils, Edward; 'Ritual and Crisis' in Shils, Edward; Center and Periphery; Ibid.; p. 163.

91. Shils, Edward; 'Society and Societies' in Shils, Edward; Center and Periphery; Ibid.; p. 37.


94. Ibid.; p. 18.

95. Dewin, Kurt; Field Theory In Social Science; Op. Cit.; p. 45.

96. Ibid.; p. 45.

97. Ibid.; p. 25.


100. Ibid.; p. 280.


102. Ibid.; p. 290.

103. Festinger, Leon; A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford University Press; Stanford, California; 1955) p. 3.

104. Ibid.; p. 3.


106. Ibid.; p. 11.


113. Ibid.; p. 5k.


115. Lipshires, Sidney; Herbert Marcuse: From Marx to Freud and Beyond (Schenkman; Cambridge, Massachusetts; 1974) p. 30.


120. For a discussion of Birnbaum's view on alienation and religions, see:
    Ibid.; pp. 170-1.


122. Ibid.; p. 338.

123. Ibid.; p. 343.

124. Ibid.; p. 344.

125. Ibid.; p. 351.

126. Ibid.; p. 351.


129. Ibid.; p. 23.
130. Mattick, Paul; *Critique of Marcuse* (Herder & Herder; New York; 1972) p. 7.


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CHAPTER VIII  HUMAN NATURE, IDEOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

1) Evaluation of the Problem in Light of the Data and Theory

This study has examined the development of sociological and anthropological theory since the period of the Enlightenment. It addressed the problem of investigating the degree to which sociological and anthropological theory historically has been characterized by the use of assumptions about man's innate nature in the definition of human behavior and culture. Further, the dynamics of sociological and anthropological theory construction were outlined in relation to the use which social theorists have made of assumptions about human nature. The extent to which these assumptions were empirically justified was reviewed. Finally, the degree to which liberalism as a pervasive ideology has been related to the assumptions about human nature formulated by social theorists historically, was considered.

The relationships between the following variables were explicated in full:

i) assumptions about human nature formulated by social theorists since the Enlightenment,

ii) sociological and anthropological theory as an historical and developmental problematic,

iii) liberalism as an ideology.

These three specific variables were examined within the context of a wide number of historical periods, encompassing a time span of over 275 years (approximately 1700-1978). It was discovered that the historical development of sociological and anthropological theory since the Enlightenment
is characterized by a number of consistent trends and features. These characterizing features may be summarized as follows:

1) Sociologists and anthropologists have made explicit use of assumptions about human nature since the Enlightenment.

2) Assumptions about human nature have been concomitantly related to the social circumstances within which each theorist wrote.

3) The assumptions about human nature, formulated by social theorists historically have contributed to the legitimization of the basic ideal of liberal ideology.

All three of these general features of the historical development of social theory hold significant implications for understanding the dynamics of social theory construction. At the same time, they reveal a great deal about the ideological orientation of social theory as well as the empirical credibility of the social sciences. The discovery that social theorists have made extensive use of explicit assumptions about man's nature, suggests the question of whether or not sociological and anthropological theory, as aspects of a "science of culture and society", can continue to ignore the role of man's innate nature in determining human behavior and culture.
2) **The Phases of Development of Sociological and Anthropological Theory**

The historical development of social theory has occurred within the context of a series of definite phases. Each phase is comprised of a number of distinct, although differing, assumptions about human nature formulated by various schools of social thought. Dennis Wrong\(^1\) and C. Wright Mills\(^2\) have maintained that assumptions about the innate features of human nature have always played an effective role in influencing the historical development of sociological and anthropological thought. Their arguments to this extent were, however, unsupported by empirical research. Nevertheless, within the context of this study, Wrong's and Mills' contentions as to the use of explicit assumptions about human nature by social theorists were found to be generally accurate.

It has been argued by Girvetz, Mills, Rousseas, Fargars and Hallowell, among others, that there exists a definable relationship historically between anthropological and sociological theory on the one hand and liberalism on the other. This relationship is reflected in the assumptions about human nature which have been formulated by social theorists. \(^3\) Liberalism within this study was defined as an ideology of ambivalence. Its ideals have constituted a belief in individualism on the one hand, and in social integration on the other.

A) **Phase I**

Essentially, the idea of a science of society originated in the Enlightenment. The Age of Reason was guided by the writings of the
Philosophes. These theorists had come to question the traditional, legal, moral and religious institutions and beliefs of Western European culture. The most notable of the Enlightenment theorists included: Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu and Helvetius. These writers wished to eliminate all forms of arbitrary authority which had been maintained and enforced by the Church. In this sense, the Enlightenment theorists generally supported the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

The belief maintained by the Enlightenment thinkers in the possibility of establishing a "science of society" was directly related to the general orientation of their liberal world-view. Their arguments about the workings of Natural Law, as a determinate of human behavior and society, was tied up closely with their belief in the liberal ideal of individual freedom and the emancipation of men from all traditional forms of authority.

John Locke, in this respect, attempted to undermine the theories of Descartes which had served to legitimate the authority of the Church. Descartes had argued that the Church acted as a "mediator" between man, the laws of nature and those ideas which were believed to be innate in the human consciousness. Conversely, Locke, in An Essay On Human Understanding, argued that human knowledge was created by the individual rather than by the Divine Will. The emphasis which Locke placed on the active role of the individual in the determination of human knowledge, was indicative of his adherence to the liberal ideal of individual freedom. It was likewise a testimony to his subsequent disillusionment with those theories that had insisted on the existence of an overly rigid control of human behavior by God. Locke relied on explicit assumptions about human nature. He
admitted that the essential faculties of reason which make sense of experience were shared by all members of the human species.

Montesquieu, in a similar manner to Locke, made use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature in relation to his explanation of the idea of "republican virtue". Assumptions about human nature were used by Montesquieu to criticize the authority of the Church. They were also used as a means of legitimizing the liberal ideal of individual libertarianism.

Rousseau, another of the Enlightenment social theorists, utilized explicit assumptions about man's nature in outlining the relationship between human behavior and education, as a basic process of socialization. In this manner he attempted to justify the popular democratic belief in social reform. Man, as Rousseau portrayed him, is a creature driven by the instincts of self-love and self-preservation. These insights were tempered, however, by man's innate compassion towards other men. Rousseau's arguments, like those of the other Enlightenment theorists, were characterized by the use of explicit assumptions about the innate nature of human nature. These assumptions contributed to the de-legitimization of all forms of authority, as well as to the legitimization of the liberal ideals of individual freedom.

The last of the major Enlightenment theorists who was considered in this study was Helvetius. His formulation of various assumptions about man's innate nature indicated that man was a pleasure-seeking creature. Within this context, he maintained the view that man is a self-motivated actor who, as an individual, is free to pursue his own interests. It was through the use of an Epicurean view of human nature that Helvetius was
able to justify the libertarian belief in individual autonomy.

The first phase of the development of social theory was also characterized by a trend of social thought which was distinctly opposed to the libertarian ideals of the Philosophes and other Enlightenment theorists. The Romantic Conservative reaction to the theories of the Enlightenment was initiated in Britain, Germany and France and included such social theorists as Burke, Hegel and de Maistre. All of these theorists supported the liberal belief in social integration and the dependency of the individual on basic social institutions.

Burke insisted that man was by nature religious. He pointed out that tradition, custom, law and religion were all means to restrain the passionate elements of man's nature as contributing to the realization of man's innate moral and social character. Hegel, on the other hand, assumed that freedom and reason were inherent characteristics of human nature and constituted the "essence" of the human mind. In addition, the mind, as Hegel believed, was represented by the state, which provided for the realization of its inherent characteristics. He argued that in order for the individual to realize his freedom, he must necessarily lend his support to the development of the state. It was in this context that he attempted to legitimize the liberal belief in social integration.

De Maistre, another Romantic Conservative theorist, endeavored to demonstrate man's need for the social institution of religion, through utilizing explicit assumptions about man's nature. He adamantly rejected the idea that man by nature was a tabula rasa. In his opinion, there existed in human nature a number of simple ideas, provided by God, which allowed a person to interpret and appreciate his surroundings. He was
convinced that social order was "the natural element of man" and in order—"you will find...the happiness you vainly seek in disorder".

The first phase of the development of social theory in the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century resulted in the undermining of the legitimacy of the traditional forms of authority, as well as the re-legitimization of those traditional institutions which provided for the control and directing of society. The Enlightenment social theorists utilized assumptions about human nature in their support of the liberal ideals which emphasized the need for individual freedom. The theorists of the Romantic Conservative Reaction used quite different assumptions about man's innate nature to justify the liberal belief in social integration. Differences between these two schools of social thought were not based on differing empirically substantiated interpretations of human nature. Rather, these differences were related to their differing assumptions about human nature. These differing assumptions about man served as a means to legitimize quite diverse orientations to the liberal worldview. All of the assumptions about human nature formulated by the members of both theoretical traditions were utilized to objectify, manifest and legitimize the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology, irrespective of the empirical credibility of those assumptions.

B) Phase II

The second phase of the development of social theory consisted of the school of social thought known as Positivism. It also included the intellectual movement referred to as German Idealism. It was the French
Positivists, especially Saint-Simon and Comte, who attempted to give the social sciences the same objective, empirical credibility as the natural sciences. They hoped to provide European society with a new religion which was to be based on the essential tenets of the "science of society". A science of society, as they argued, would ensure the possibility that constructive social reform would be successfully initiated. It was felt that a science of society could outline the guidelines for the establishment of a system of ethics, to which individuals would be expected to religiously adhere.

Saint-Simon and Comte felt that a proper moral code could not be founded on the unchecked liberty of individual minds. They insisted that such a moral code must be based on the authority of "positive principles" which were in accordance with the dictates of science. These principles were to be complemented by a traditional, integrative, institutional framework. Many of Saint-Simon's and Comte's views were supportive of those theories which had been outlined within the context of the Romantic Conservative Reaction. In this sense the Positivist theorists gave general support to the liberal ideals of social integration. Furthermore, their attempts to legitimate these specific liberal ideals were closely related to their explicit use of assumptions about human nature.

Saint-Simon was intent on providing a new form of social integration which was to be predicated on the insights and principles of the scientific method. He argued that the stability and progress of society was dependent upon the adherence of the individual to an universally accepted religion. This religion was to be based upon the insights and knowledge
derived from scientific analysis. According to Saint-Simon, it is man's own innate feelings of sympathy, complemented by the insights of science which will ensure that man would realize the inevitable laws of progress. In addition, he pointed out that scientists, provided they were willing to follow their "scientific instincts", as he described them, would be able to discover the laws of progress in accordance with man's nature. He believed that a natural elite was capable of ruling according to the innate abilities and talents of its members. The very act of domination, as he felt, constituted the satisfaction of a basic need particular to human nature. It was only a matter of time, as Saint-Simon argued, until the new order, based on the positive principles of science would be established. He asserted that human nature, guided by the invariable law of perfectability, was the ultimate guarantee of that fact. The overall orientation of his theories was directed towards the legitimization of the ideals of social integration, through the use of explicit assumptions about human nature.

Comte, like Saint-Simon, hoped to use his positive philosophy as a means to redefine a number of moral principles which the traditional religions of Europe had provided prior to the French Revolution. He defined Positivism as the essential means to regulate and develop "the natural tendencies of the people". As he argued, only by living in a stable and integrated social order was man capable of denying his inherent selfish nature for the benefit of nurturing his innate altruistic sentiments. Comte's idea that man's nature was comprised of both egoistical and altruistic sentiments constituted a theoretical device which served to justify the contention that man required both religion and authority.
to curb his selfish tendencies.

The Positivist method of analysis and explanation played only a small role in guiding Saint-Simon and Comte in the formulation of their theories. Their determination to legitimize the goals and ideals of Positivism resulted in their use of methods and assumptions which were completely contrary to Positivism itself. It was only through the use of assumptions about human nature that these theorists were able to lend credibility to the liberal belief in the need for social integration. The practice of referring to man's innate nature by the Positivist theorists, was related to their desire to show that there existed laws of social development equivalent in their predictability to the laws of the natural sciences. What they did not provide is a level of empirical verification for their assumptions about human nature which was equivalent to that normally given in the definition of natural scientific laws.

The Positivist social theories of Comte and Saint-Simon were adamantly criticized by a number of German Idealist theorists inclusive of Husserl, Scheler, Simmel, Dilthey and Weber. All of these theorists insisted that man's nature could not be fully comprehended or appreciated through using the methods of analysis particular to the natural sciences. Most of these theorists relied on assumptions about human nature in their attempt to lend credibility to the liberal ideals of individualism, to which they all strongly adhered. The concepts of "Erlebnis" and "Verstehen" suggested by Husserl and Dilthey were defined as theoretical devices, by which the subjective and individualistic aspects of human behavior could be recognized and evaluated. These concepts were in turn based on explicit
assumptions about human nature. Scheler's idea of "spirit", as a feature of man's nature, was also dependent on a specific assumption about man's ability to suppress his instincts. In addition, Simmel's attempt to resolve the contradictions between the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism was likewise predicated on assumptions about man's innate nature. Lastly, Weber made use of assumptions about human nature within his theory of charisma in order to argue that individuality could exist despite the determinate effects of rationalization.

The various assumptions about human nature which the theorists of both these schools of social thought have formulated were noticeably lacking in any form of empirical verification as related to the usual scientific procedures of observation and experimentation. The French Positivists, as well as those theorists influenced by German Idealism, formulated assumptions about man's innate nature which were empirically unsubstantiated.

The general theoretical orientations of the French Positivists and the German sociologists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were concomitantly related to the social and economic circumstances in which each of these various theorists found themselves. The belief in social integration, which was affirmed in the theories of Saint-Simon and Comte, was indicative of their reaction to the chaotic consequences of the French Revolution. On the other hand, the libertarian ideals expressed in the theories of the German sociologists were closely related to the progressive scientific and industrial advances which characterized German society in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
C) **Phase III**

The third phase of the historical development of social theory consisted of the theories of Karl Marx on the one hand, and those formulated by the elite theorists on the other. Marx was one of the most influential of all the nineteenth century philosophers, sociologists, economists and social historians. His major theoretical works are evidence of his efforts to come to terms with the processes of capitalist development. He sought to understand the nature of the inherent contradictions within the capitalist mode of production. Also, his theoretical efforts were directed towards the legitimization of the ideals of collectivism, insofar as he believed in the possibility of realizing individual freedom within a collective context. Marx's theories distinctly expressed his belief in the need for a specific form of social integration which was based on the socialist equalitarian ideals of collectivism.

Marx outlined what he felt to be the characterizing features of man's "species-being". In this respect, he made an effort to demonstrate how the dominant modes of production particular to bourgeois capitalist society contributed to the denial of the human species' need for collectivized productive labor. In addition, he argued that only in communist society could the realization of man's human nature be completely achieved. The political goals of dialectical and historical materialism were in fact rooted in determinate assumptions about man's innate nature. The scientific credibility of "scientific socialism" is questionable, when we consider that Marx's assumptions about human nature were given only a minimal degree of empirical verification.
The elite theorists were opposed to the equalitarian ideals which had received such extensive support from Marx, as well as from the liberal-democratic character of modern mass society. Pareto, Mosca and Michels criticized the Marxian ideals of collectivism. They argued that collectivism as a method of social organization was contrary to the nature of human nature. It was for the sake of protecting the liberal ideal of individualism that these theorists, as a consequence, suggested the necessity for society to be controlled by an elite. The existence of an elite represented to them the objectification of man's innate need for preeminence and power, as well as the need of the individual to acquire power in order that it might be inherited by succeeding generations. In this respect, Pareto and Mosca supported the liberal laissez-faire notion of individual competition.

The emphasis which Ortega Y Gasset and Karl Mannheim placed on the homogeneity of the mass and its denial of the basic needs and characteristics of human nature served to legitimize and exemplify the liberal ideals of individualism. Together, all the elite theorists felt that it was only social planning, as directed by a responsible elite, which would ensure the protection and development of the rights and freedoms of the individual in mass society.

Ortega Y Gasset's assumptions about human nature, such as man's biological principle of vitality and man's need to be dedicated to a cause, were utilized as a theoretical means to justify the liberal ideals of individualism, insofar as those ideals were symbolized by the existence of an elite. Similarly, Mannheim made frequent use of assumptions about human nature in his discussions about the regressive and impulsive qualities
of the mass.

Unlike the Positivists or Marxists, the elite theorists were unwilling to admit that the determination of human behavior could be reduced to the operation of the "objective" processes, said to be characteristic of dialectical and historical materialism. The elite theorists believed that the human individual and his personal desires played a significant part in influencing human behavior. For this reason they placed an emphasis on the subjective components of social action through their reliance on assumptions about human nature. Their emphasis on the subjective determination of human behavior embodied the liberal ideal of individualism, in that it made the individual rather than natural law the initiator of social action.

Both Mannheim and Ortega Y Gasset, like the other elite theorists, failed to provide any significant form of empirical verification for the assumptions about man's innate nature of which they made use. For example, Mannheim's theory about "unsubliminated psychic energies" and "impulses" seeking integration, were only vaguely defined and were empirically unsubstantiated.

The theories of Marx, as well as those of Pareto, Mosca, Michels, Ortega Y Gasset and Mannheim were formulated in relation to the specific social circumstances in which each of these theorists found themselves. The theories of Marx were a direct response to the emergence of an industrial proletariat in the latter half of the nineteenth century and to their dehumanized condition. Alternatively, the elite theorists formulated their theories in reaction to the "mass". The emergence of the mass had been facilitated by the processes of industrialization, urbani-
zation, and the normal operation of liberal democracy during the latter half of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries.

D) Phase IV

Probably the most rigorous attempt to come to terms with the question of man's innate nature is evidenced in those anthropological theories which dealt with race, as well as those which attempted to outline the processes of evolution in relation to the history of human society. It was in direct response to the question of the racial and the evolutionary development of man, that anthropology first emerged as a distinct discipline.

Assumptions about man's innate racial nature played a conspicuous role in the formulation of anthropological theories in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The eighteenth century racial theorists, Blumenbach and Smith, believed that the differing behavioral and cultural characteristics of the various races were not innate to each specific race. On the contrary, they argued that racial differences were the consequence of the exposure of various human groups to differing environments. Most racial theorists of the eighteenth century supported the more libertarian ideals centered on the belief in human equality.

The racial theorists of the nineteenth century, including de Gobineau, Chamberlain, Gumplovicz, Knox and Hunt, maintained that "race" was a determinate of human behavior. Additionally, they insisted that each physically distinct cultural and social group was characterized by innate racial features. They felt that all the races of mankind could be ranked in terms of their superiority or inferiority to one another. In this
respect, the racial theorists of the nineteenth century were adherents of the liberal ideals of social integration insofar as those ideals were related to their belief in the hierarchical organization of races. The different orientations to the idea of race taken by anthropological theorists at this time, were indicative of the fact that "race" as an assumption about man's innate nature, served as a vehicle for the legitimization of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.

The development and change which anthropological theory underwent in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries corresponded with the emergence and decline of the laissez-faire form of liberalism. The notion of evolution, as it was utilized by anthropologists, conveniently served as a means to legitimize, from a supposedly scientific point of view, the ideals of individualism. These ideals had gained wide popularity throughout North America and Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The anthropological evolutionary theories formulated by Maine, McLennan, Tylor, Morgan, Frazer and, more recently, White, were characterized by the use of distinct biologically-oriented concepts apart from those related to the idea of evolution. These particular theorists utilized explicit assumptions about the nature of human nature in lending support to the liberal laissez-faire ideals of individualism.

It was only with the emergence of general social instability and class inequalities in America, the intensification of the division of labor in France, and the development of unsettled colonial conditions in the British Empire, that social theorists began to be more and more critical of the laissez-faire belief which had emphasized the need for individual competition. Many social theorists grew suspicious as well, of
the increasing reliance of social theory on such biological notions as evolution, natural selection and race. The theoretical schools of thought, inclusive of Historical Particularism in America, French Structuralism and British Social Anthropology sought to establish anthropology as a distinct science of culture. Anthropologists who belonged to these various schools of thought included: Boas, Kroeber, Lowie, Durkheim, Mauss, Levi-Strauss, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard. They all argued that man's behavior was determined by society and not by his innate nature, racial character or the inevitable laws of evolutionary development. In spite of their emphasis on the idea of the social determination of human behavior, all of these theorists made explicit use of assumptions about human nature in order to justify the idea of man's dependency on society.

Within the context of the historical development of anthropology, the racial determinist theorists of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the evolutionary theorists of the nineteenth century and the social determinist theorists of the early twentieth century, all utilized assumptions about human nature. With the exception of Tylor, all of them failed to empirically justify their various speculations about man's nature. In the eighteenth, nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, most anthropologists had been willing to support the idea that anthropology was an essential component of a "science of society". Nevertheless, very few of them adhered to the basic tenets of the scientific method in their use of empirically unjustified assumptions about human nature. The dynamics of anthropological theory during this period were not entirely dependent on the scientific methods of objective observation and deduction.
The assumptions about human nature formulated by the racial theorists of the eighteenth century were concomitantly related to the particular social circumstances which these theorists faced. Their adherence to the liberal libertarian ideals of equality was indicative of the general disillusionment experienced by many intellectuals, with all forms of traditional authority. Conversely, the assumptions about human nature used in the racial theories of the nineteenth century were a reflection of the growing scepticism felt by social theorists, towards the individualistic ideals and values of the Enlightenment. This scepticism was related to the belief maintained by many social theorists, that the unstable social and economic conditions of Europe in the nineteenth century were the direct consequences of the French Revolution.

With the development of increasing economic opportunities, especially in North America during the course of the nineteenth century, assumptions about human nature within the context of anthropological theory again took on a new orientation. The theories of Darwin and Spencer contributed toward legitimizing the ideals of individualism as related to the laissez-faire form of capitalist development. In response to growing social discontent, anthropologists came later to define specific assumptions about human nature which lent support to the belief in the social determination of human behavior and culture. The variations in assumptions about human nature which were evident in anthropological theory from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries were concomitantly related to the specific socio-economic changes which characterized this overall period. These assumptions about man's innate nature served to legitimize the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.
E) Phase V

Social Darwinism as it emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century was met with an extensive degree of criticism. Many social theorists, especially in North America, by the beginning of the twentieth century were critical of both the biological orientation and individualistic ideals which were the characterizing features of the theories formulated by the Social Darwinists. At the same time, most social theorists were convinced that what American society required was a "science of society" which could objectively indicate the necessary requirements for the realization of an integrated cultural milieu within an increasingly industrialized and urbanized social environment.

A number of schools of sociological and anthropological thought emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century. These schools of thought consisted of Pragmatism, Symbolic Interactionism and Culture and Personality. The social theorists who belonged to these various theoretical movements included Peirce, James, Dewey, Cooley, Thomas, Mead, Blumer, Gerth and Mills, as well as such anthropologists as Benedict, Mead, Whiting, Child and Kardiner. All of these theorists attempted to legitimize the need for social integration, as well as to account for the necessity of preserving some degree of individual freedom. More specifically, they wished to demonstrate that the individual was dependent on society in order to develop his personality and character. In addition, the processes of social change and reform were shown to be directly related to the needs of the individual personality. Many American social theorists at the beginning of the twentieth century struggled to lend support to the liberal ideals of individualism as well as to those ideals related to
the belief in social integration.

The emphasis placed by these various schools of thought on the idea of the social determination of human behavior was complemented by their insistence that man's innate nature played no significant role in the influencing of human action within a social context. Any admission, as it was felt, to the idea of the existence of certain innate and unmodifiable features of human nature, constituted a denial and restriction of the liberal belief in man's unlimited possibilities for change and improvement.

The belief of these theorists in the social determination of human behavior was concomitantly related to their social, economic and political circumstances. During the first part of the twentieth century, America was characterized by a general condition of social disorder, unrest and popular discontent. It was during this rather unsettled period that the writings of many of these social theorists gained public recognition. Most intellectuals felt that American society required some form of constructive social reform which could effectively counter-balance the injustices and inequalities that had been produced by the laissez-faire form of capitalist development.

The use of assumptions about human nature by the theorists of these various theoretical movements, aided them in demonstrating that many aspects of the individual personality were aloof from the processes of the social determination of behavior. For example, Thomas Horton Cooley's use of assumptions about the innate nature of human nature enabled him to legitimize both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism. With regard to the liberal ideals of individualism, he asserted that
human nature was characterized by "the impulse of creative self-assertion" and the "primordial need to act". He added that the individual's "self-feeling" was instinctive. At the same time, it was explained that the willingness of an individual to take on the attitudes of others in order to gain a sense of self was rooted in man's impulsive nature. According to Cooley, the individual, because of certain needs of his innate nature, would have to enter into social relations with others in a community context, in order to acquire a sense of individual identity.

Through the use of assumptions about human nature, Cooley was able to demonstrate that social integration and individualism were mutually dependent on one another. Similar in this respect to the other Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists and Culture and Personality theorists, Cooley was unwilling to forfeit either of the basic liberal ideals in his explanation of man and society. All of these theorists relied on explicit assumptions about human nature in order to ensure that the ideals of social integration and individualism would receive adequate attention within their analyses.

The theory of the social determination of behavior, formulated and legitimized by the Pragmatists, Symbolic Interactionists and Culture and Personality theorists is one of the most dominant theoretical orientations within sociology and anthropology today. However, the theory of the social determination of behavior as it was defined by these theorists was essentially contradictory. This contradiction consisted of the fact, that in order to show that human behavior, at least to some degree is determined by society, explicit assumptions about the innate nature of man had to be relied on. The theories which were formulated within these
major schools of American social thought were characterized by what may be described as "the dialectic of denial and admission". The denial of man as a species-being having certain species-specific habits and capabilities was based in turn on the explicit admission to this fact. The existence of the dialectic of denial and admission within these various theories was directly related to their belief in both the liberal ideals of social integration and individualism. These theorists, in their efforts to resolve the inherent contradictions between the basic ideals of the liberal world-view, resorted to the use of empirically unsubstantiated assumptions about man's nature. In this fashion they were able to demonstrate that man was socially oriented as well as being individualistic by nature.

F) Phase VI

Most recently, contemporary social theory has been influenced by the insights and concepts formulated by the Macro and Micro Functionalists, as well as the Radical social theorists. The Macro and Micro Functionalist schools of thought developed, to some extent, in reaction to the Freudian theories of culture and personality. Radical social theory on the other hand, emerged in direct reaction to those theories which had been outlined by the functionalists.

It was Freud's rather pessimistic belief that culture acted as a constraining force on man's instinctual nature which prompted many of the Macro and Micro Functionalists to develop an opposing point of view. The Macro and Micro Functionalist theorists inclusive of Parsons, Merton, Shils, Lewin and Festinger, extensively utilized assumptions about human
nature in the legitimization of the liberal ideals of social integration. Generally, the enthusiastic support which these theorists gave to this particular liberal belief originally, was related to their social circumstances. A number of social developments, such as the national unification of American society which followed from its preparation to enter World War II, as well as the growth of the belief in national loyalty facilitated by the 'McCarthy Era', played an effective role in shaping the general theoretical and ideological orientations of these functionalist theorists.

Contrary to Freud, the Macro and Micro Functionalists insisted that man by nature was essentially social. They added that such phenomena as deviancy could not be explained in terms of the expression of man's asocial instincts. Such theorists as Robert Merton tried to point out that deviancy was the consequence of societal stresses, rather than a product of man's innate nature. Nevertheless, Merton like other theorists before him, made use of explicit assumptions about human nature in order to justify his arguments.

The Macro and Micro Functionalists' adamantly denial of the innate basis of human behavior and, at the same time, their contradictory admission to this fact in their explanation of the social determination of human action is characteristic of the dialectic of denial and admission. Only by utilizing explicit assumptions about man's nature were the functionalist theorists able to logically argue that men required society in order to ensure the complete development of his personality structure.

All of the Macro and Micro Functionalists failed to give any form of empirical verification for the assumptions about man's nature which they utilized. Their failure to provide such verification is a testimony that
their theories were, and remain directed towards the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the liberal ideals related to the belief in social integration, over and above all other considerations.

Similar to the functionalist theorists, Radical sociologists such as Norman Birnbaum, Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Herbert Marcuse, failed to empirically justify their assumptions about man's innate nature. Their belief in the libertarian ideals of human freedom, led them to argue that there exists certain specific needs, innate to the individual, which remain unfulfilled within the existing processes of production and consumption particular to post-industrial society. The Radical sociologists in outlining a set of theories which emphasized the repression and alienation of the individual within modern post-industrial society, have assumed that there are certain innate features of human nature which are incompatible within the existing social conditions.

For example, Marcuse, in his theory which he referred to as the "Biological Foundation For Socialism", maintained that political radicalism at least as he defined it, would ensure the realization of man's innate sense of morality and the consequent liberation of the individual. The choice of a more libertarian variation of the liberal world-view by the Radical sociologists, is indicative of their reaction to the social, political and economic inequalities in American society which had become increasingly evident to many intellectuals by the early 1960's.
3) The Verification of the Hypotheses

Social theory from the Enlightenment right up until today has been characterized by a number of dominant trends of development. In the first instance, social theory originated in the reaction of a number of intellectuals to the various forms of authority which had been maintained by the Church. Most of the theorists of the Enlightenment had attempted to delegitimize the authority of the Church, as well as the traditional belief systems which the Church had protected. Later, in reaction to the libertarian ideals which had been expressed by the Enlightenment thinkers, the social theorists of the Romantic Conservative Reaction sought to demonstrate the necessity of maintaining religious beliefs, as well as the various forms of social authority. The Positivists, in another social context, tried to legitimize sociology itself, as constituting the "religion of humanity".

Those social theories which followed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were not so much concerned with the problem of legitimizing or delegitimizing religion, as they were with seeking to justify man's dependence on or independence from society. In any case, the general orientation of social theory historically has been comprised of, either the belief in the uniqueness and independence of the individual from all forms of authority (religious or otherwise), or on the other hand, the belief in the dependence of the individual on all types of social authority.

In this respect, liberalism as it has developed since the Enlightenment has been comprised of two basic ideals. These ideals are related to either the belief in individualism or social integration. The ambivalence of liberalism as an ideology is reflected in the variations of the theor-
ethical orientations taken by social theorists since the Enlightenment. This study has shown that there exists a complementary relationship between the various assumptions about human nature which social theorists have formulated historically, and the basic variations of the ideals of liberalism.

Pitirim Sorokin observed that all ideologies require a vehicle for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of their meanings, values and norms. In direct relation to his theory, the first hypothesis of this study was tested through the examination of the role which assumptions about human nature have played in the historical development of social theory. The first hypothesis states:

Assumptions about human nature as they have been formulated by social theorists since the Enlightenment have constituted vehicles for the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology.

It was discovered that social theorists since the Enlightenment have made explicit use of assumptions about human nature. It was further revealed that the various assumptions about man's innate nature which have been formulated by social theorists historically, have contributed notably to the legitimization of the liberal belief in individual freedom, or conversely, the belief in social integration. On the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis it was found that the first hypothesis as stated here is valid. This hypothesis ought to be accepted with respect to the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the meanings, values and norms of liberal ideology through the use of explicit assumptions about human nature.
It was found in this study that assumptions about human nature defined by sociological and anthropological theorists change in response to new social and theoretical developments. In this regard, Karl Mannheim has observed that social theories are influenced by changes in the social environment in which the social theorist in question finds himself. From this perspective, we may understand that social theories change in response to a changing social problematic. According to Mannheim there exists a general correspondence between changes in social theories and alterations in the particular social circumstances with which social theorists are faced.\(^7\)

At the same time, Sorokin has contended in reference to his Principle of Limits, that all ideologies are capable of only a limited number of variations or types of changes. In this regard, the ideals of individual libertarianism and the ideals of social integration constitute the basic variations of liberalism which have manifested themselves in divergent social circumstances. The Principle of Limits, as it has been defined by Sorokin, expresses the basic fact that almost all ideologies are limited in their variations. As a consequence the variations of any ideology may be expected to repeat themselves.\(^8\)

It has already been shown here that the use of assumptions about human nature, within social theory, has constituted a vehicle for the legitimization of the variations of the liberal world-view. Also, it has been indicated that changes in the assumptions about human nature are concomitantly related to new social and theoretical developments. While assumptions about human nature have changed in response to an alternating social and theoretical problematic, these changes have nevertheless been
limited in their scope and orientation to reflecting the basic variations of liberalism.

The second and third hypotheses which were tested in this thesis, state:

Assumptions about human nature utilized in social theory since the Enlightenment have changed in response to new social developments.

The changes of assumptions about human nature evidenced in social theory since the Enlightenment, in response to new social and theoretical developments, are limited to the exemplification of the basic variations of liberal ideology.

In respect to these two hypotheses, it was found that the assumptions about human nature formulated by social theorists historically, did change in response to alternating social and theoretical circumstances. However, these various assumptions were markedly restricted in their overall scope of change. The spectrum of changes which assumptions about human nature have undergone since the Enlightenment have been restricted to the exemplification of the basic variations of liberalism as an ideology.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis, it was found that the second and third hypotheses, as stated here, are verified and ought to be accepted.

Sorokin, in describing the nature of ideological systems has observed that the primary variations of an ideological system may not necessarily be consistent with one another. That is to say, they may be contradictory. According to Sorokin, any ideological system is "never static, and always contains in itself tensions, that, demanding resolution, produce continual change and new creations." 9
Liberalism, as it has been defined in this study, embodies contradictory ideals which range from libertarianism to conservatism and collectivism. The contradictions between these variations provide liberalism with "the seeds of incessant change". In this sense, Sorokin has illustrated the fact that the causes of change in a social or ideological system are inherent in the system itself. He defined this specific feature of ideologies as the Principle of Immanent Change. This general principle, which Sorokin saw as being characteristic of all socio-cultural phenomena, does not exclude the consideration of the influence of external factors. These external factors may constitute social, economic, as well as theoretical and scientific developments which effect the general evolution of an ideology. Nevertheless, the extent of influence which such external factors have, consists of the facilitation or inhibition of the realization of the immanent characteristics of an ideological system.\(^\text{10}\)

Within this analysis it was discovered that the evolution of liberalism was due to the attempts by social theorists, utilizing assumptions about human nature, to resolve the essential contradictions between the primary ideals which characterize liberalism as an ideology. In this respect, a fourth and last hypothesis was introduced. This hypothesis states:

**The variation of explicit assumptions about human nature utilized in social theory since the Enlightenment is facilitated by the process of immanent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology.**

From reviewing the variations of assumptions about human nature, explicitly utilized in social theory during the course of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it is obvious that the dynamics of
social theory construction follow an elementary pattern, or rhythm of variation. This rhythm is indicative of the processes of imminent change inherent within the liberal world-view. In turn, this rhythm serves to exemplify the ambivalent nature of liberalism as an ideology. It is clearly evident that as soon as one major school of thought comes to objectify, manifest and legitimize one of the essential variations of liberalism, another trend in social thought will develop. This trend will, in turn, emphasize an alternative variation of liberal idealism.

We may recognize that the evolution of social theories since the Enlightenment and the variations of assumptions about human nature particular to them, is concomitantly related to the dynamics of imminent change inherent within liberalism as an ideology. On the basis of the evidence presented, it was found that the fourth hypothesis as stated here is verified and ought to be accepted.
4) The Dynamics of Sociological and Anthropological Theory Construction

The testing and verification of the four hypotheses defined within this study holds significant implications for our understanding of the dynamics of sociological and anthropological theory construction. We may first of all agree with Alvin Gouldner's argument. He has contended that "meta-assumptions" within any sociological or anthropological theory, must eventually influence the scope of the theory, the choice of subject matter, as well as the theory's overall implications, both theoretical as well as practical. This study has revealed that "meta-assumptions" about human nature have played a significant role in influencing the general dynamics of theory construction in the social sciences.

At present, many social theorists understand a theory to constitute a system of laws ordered in a meaningful manner. Additionally, these laws are defined as generalizations based upon empirical evidence and subject to verification in terms of the scientific methods of observation and experimentation. At the same time, a number of philosophers of the social sciences insist that social theories conform, in some respect, to the hypothetico-deductive method of science proper - the universal method of all sciences. The hypothetico-deductive method is predicated on the testing of specific hypotheses which are related to a general theory in terms of the available empirical data.

It is also argued that significant changes in scientific theories (social or otherwise) are directly related to the discovery of new empirical data which was unanticipated in the formulation of the original hypothesis. Karl Popper insists that changes in social theory occur in terms of the falsification or verification of existing theories in relation to
newly available sources of information. He feels that sociology and anthropology as scientific disciplines are only interested in retaining and making use of those theories which have been defined and verified in this manner. 14

Another viewpoint as to how sociological and anthropological theories develop and change has been given by Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn has indicated that changes in sociological-anthropological theories may be intimately linked with alterations in dominant interpretive paradigms. These alterations are due to the operations of "normal science" as well as scientific revolutions. 15 To some degree, Kuhn's views on the nature of normal science and on scientific revolutions, provided an added dimension to Karl Mannheim's arguments. Mannheim dealt with the effects of changing social circumstances on the general orientation of social theories. 16

Many philosophers of the social sciences continue to insist that sociology and anthropology are exact sciences and that their theories are equivalent in empirical credibility to those of the natural sciences. 17 This argument assumes that the construction of social theories is guided by the empirical credibility of the facts, which sociologists and anthropologists seek to organize.

The various arguments presented by Popper, Kuhn and Mannheim, dealing with the dynamics of sociological and anthropological theory construction may in fact be at least partially justified. However, there exist a great many aspects of the processes of theory construction which their various arguments have neglected. It is in this context that the four hypotheses which have been tested and verified in this analysis hold significant implications for our understanding of the dynamics of theory con-
struction with the social sciences.

It would appear from the evidence cited in this study that the development of social theory generally is intimately related to the development and legitimization of liberalism as an ideology. As it has been demonstrated here, the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of the basic ideals of liberalism by social theorists has involved the use of explicit assumptions about the nature of man's innate nature. In the same light, it has also been shown that a notable majority of these assumptions may be characterized as being "unjustifiably naive", insofar as they lack any specific form of empirical verification. Philosophers of the social sciences such as R.B. Braithwaite, continue to point out that sociologists and anthropologists base their causal explanations on social factors rather than on vague notions about man's innate nature. However, it may be argued on the basis of the evidence and the hypotheses verified in this study, that causal explanations in the social sciences, while making use of social factors, nevertheless ultimately rely on explicit assumptions about man's nature.

The hypothetico-deductive method of science has played only a limited role in the development and formulation of social theories. The ambivalence of liberalism as an ideology has posed a constant problem to social theorists. The attempts by sociologists and anthropologists to resolve the contradictions inherent within liberalism provided the dynamics of immanent change to liberalism, as well as to social theory.

Stanislav Andreski, in describing the historical development of sociological theory, has observed that...
What seems to have happened is that sociologists, mesmerized by the wonderful achievements of the exact sciences...have mistaken the external paraphernalia for the essence...\(^\text{19}\)

From examining the history of sociological and anthropological theory since the Enlightenment, it is quite clear that social theorists have been willing to pay homage to the scientific ideals of objectivity and empirical verification. They have nevertheless done very little within their own theories to provide for the objective realization of such ideals. The close association which this analysis has demonstrated to exist, between the use of empirically unjustified assumptions about human nature on the one hand and the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of liberalism on the other, is a testimony to the basic ideological role which social theory has played since the Enlightenment.

Ernest Becker has argued that what the social sciences require

...is a secular moral code... The model that we would use to measure the shortcomings of present social institutions would have to be an ideal image of men. It would have to be an image based solidly on what we know about human nature, an empirical fact; yet it would have to be a constructed model going beyond man as he is, to man as we wish him to be. This would give us something to aim at, something always to be attained; yet because it would be based on known facts about human nature, it would be more persuasive than mere fantasy. We would hold up to men an image of the most developed person, the highest individuality, and at the same time the other image that keeps the tension of the paradox; an image of the most communal, equalitarian society. Thus it would serve as a critique of the present and as a utopian figure to draw out our best efforts.\(^\text{20}\)

While Becker's statement here is an insightful one, it nevertheless requires qualification.

Contrary to Becker's opinion, the social sciences do not need an ideal image of human nature which emphasizes the belief in individualism
on the one hand and in social integration on the other. It does not need such an image of men insofar as it has always had one, at least since the Enlightenment. Becker's ideal model is to be based on empirical data. However, the assumptions about human nature which have been in use since the Enlightenment have been, for the most part, empirically unsubstantiated. The implications of this fact, in the evaluation of the objective nature of the social sciences, cannot be over-estimated.

The objective nature of social theory during the course of its historical development, bears little resemblance to the ideal image of sociology and anthropology as exact sciences. The relationship between social theory and liberalism is, in many respects, similar to the relationship which exists between theology and Christianity. Both social theory and theology have contributed to the objectification, manifestation and legitimization of a particular philosophical and ideological worldview, through the use of explicit assumptions about human nature. Assumptions about human nature have been used by both theologists and social theorists not because of their empirical credibility, but because of the extent to which they justified either Christianity or liberalism.

This study has pointed out that social theory does not have an empirical basis but rather an ideological one. The ideal of a science of society first suggested during the Enlightenment has remained to a large extent unrealized. The recognition of this fact holds serious implications for the future development of the social sciences as a whole. From the evidence cited in this study it is clearly evident that the focal point of the social sciences historically has centered on the question of the nature of human nature. The question of man's innate nature
remains central to sociological and anthropological analysis despite the
denial of this fact by many social determinist theorists. At the present
time, many social scientists continue to argue that the primary concern
of sociology and anthropology is with studying the effects of culture on
the human personality, rather than dealing with the extent to which man's
innate nature plays a part in determining the cultural environment and
behavior of the individual.

In light of the evidence and hypotheses presented in this study, it
is apparent that social theorists can no longer ignore dealing with the
question of man's innate nature. If social scientists hope ever to remove
themselves from the ideological morass in which they find themselves at
present, then they must objectively scrutinize and evaluate the various
empirically unjustified assumptions about man's nature which they have
utilized to date.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER VIII

1. Wrong, Dennis A.; 'The Oversociological Conception of Man' in Barron, L. Milton (ed.); Contemporary Sociology (Dodd, Mead; New York; 1964) p. 555.


3. See:

4. Gay, Peter; Age of Enlightenment (Schenkman; Cambridge, Mass.; 1972).

5. Wood, Ellen Meiksins; Mind and Politics (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1972) p. 177.


10. Ibid.; p. 697.


12. Kaplan, Abraham; The Conduct of Inquiry (Chandler; San Francisco; 1964) p. 100.

13. For a detailed overview of the hypothetico-deductive method of science, see:

15. Kuhn, Thomas S.; The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1962) p. 82.


17. Bruckner, M.B.A.; Social Science and Society (McCutchan; Berkeley, California; 1968) p. 44.


19. Andreaki, Stanislav; Elements of Comparative Sociology (Wiedenfeld & Nicolson; London; 1964) p. 17.

CHAPTER IX  THE QUESTION OF HUMAN NATURE - SOCIOBIOLOGY vs. BIOSOCIOLOGY*

1) The Problem

This study has demonstrated that the question of what constitutes the nature of human nature has been dealt with in a decidedly ideological context, by social scientists, since the Enlightenment. The question remains however, whether man's innate nature and its relationship to culture, can be defined from a non-ideological point of view. With the recent public recognition of sociobiology and ethology, this question has again become of central importance. It is problematic, however, whether sociobiology and ethology, as disciplines directly concerned with the biological basis of animal and human behavior, can in fact provide insights into the complex relationships which may exist between human nature and culture.

At least since the beginning of the twentieth century, most sociologists and anthropologists in North America have maintained that man is "a social animal". Sociologists argue that human behavior is formed through social relationships between individuals, acting together as members of larger groups. It is also emphasized that man's inner nature is fully dependent for its development on the processes of social interaction and socialization. Parsons, in this respect, has claimed that a sociological frame of reference need not take into account the interdependence of social action processes and the biological and physiological factors of their determination.

*Part of this chapter originally appeared as a monograph, co-authored with Dr. Karl Peter.
Within the last fifteen years however, an extremely controversial set of theories has been introduced into the social scientific community. This body of theories is characterized by a sociobiological framework of analysis. Within this framework a number of theorists have attempted to indicate that specific features of human behavior and culture are related to man's species-specific characteristics which have developed within an evolutionary context. The leading contributors to the development of sociobiological theory include among others, Edward O. Wilson, David Barash and Pierre L. van den Berghe. The question of the biological basis of human behavior is also central to the discipline of ethology. Ethologists such as Niko Tinbergen, Konrad Lorenz and Irenaus Eibl-Eibesfeldt have endeavored to define man's innate nature in terms of "fixed patterns of behavior". These innate forms of behavior are said to consist of sequences of coordinated motor actions which do not necessarily have to be learned and which are not mere reflexes. Together, sociobiologists and ethologists have seriously questioned the liberal, social scientific belief in the idea of the social determination of human behavior.
2) **The Basic Principles of Sociobiology and Ethology**

The leading advocates of sociobiology rely heavily on the theories of evolutionary biology in their interpretations of the social behavior of animals and man. A fundamental assumption that underlies the sociobiological theories formulated by Wilson, Barash and van den Berghe, is that the behavior patterns of all living systems are adaptive in an evolutionary sense. Considerations of "individual fitness" constitute the ultimate criterion by which the social behavior of animals and men are evaluated.

The central problem to which sociobiology is addressed has been succinctly stated by Edward O. Wilson as follows: "How can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by natural selection?" The answer which Wilson and others have given to this problem is kin selection. Wilson maintains that "if the genes causing the altruism are shared by two organisms because of common descent, and if the altruistic act by one organism increases the joint contribution to the next generation, the propensity to altruism will spread through the gene pool." Like other sociobiologists, he assumes that all biological organisms, including man, are compelled by the processes of evolution to maximize their "inclusive fitness". According to this argument, the knowledge by the individual of his biological kinship ties is a necessary prerequisite for kinship selection to occur in human society. Wilson asserts that "the human mind [is] already sophisticated in the intuitive calculus of blood ties and proportionate altruism".

The definition of culture which Wilson provides is directly related to his conception of "biological responses, from millisecond-quick bio-
chemical reactions to gene substitutions requiring generations". He views culture as an "hierarchical system of environmental tracking devices," insofar as "the rate of change in a particular set of cultural behaviors reflects the rate of change in the environmental features to which the behaviors are keyed". While he is convinced that human culture evolves in conjunction with changes in the environment, he nevertheless sees culture and man's organic nature as separate. He emphasizes that "the specific details of culture are nongenetic, [in that] they can be decoupled from the biological system and arranged beside it".

David Barash, another leading sociobiologist, has recently indicated in his book *Sociobiology and Behaviour* (1977), that living organisms, through the medium of kin selection are able to "maximize their inclusive fitness - their net genetic representation in succeeding generations". His idea of inclusive fitness refers to the summed consequences of both personal fitness (via offspring) and fitness derived via the representation of genes in relatives. He feels that the chief task which sociobiologists face today is the application of the concept of inclusive fitness in the interpretation of human behavior and society.

In dealing with the relationship between man's innate biological make-up and culture, Barash notes that human beings have an "unique dichotomous nature as both biological and cultural creatures". It is further argued that "cultural evolution is very different from biological evolution". He observes that "the whole range of characteristic disaffections with modern life may well have their roots in the dissonance between the relative complexity of our culturally mediated present". In short, he views
the relationship between man's innate nature and culture as an antagonistic one.

Many of the insights and theories of sociobiology have recently been made use of in a specific sociological context by Pierre L. van den Berghe in his book *Man in Society* (1975). Unlike the sociobiologists however, he gives less emphasis to the relationships between human behavior and evolution. Instead, he attempts to depict what he feels to be the underlying biological bases of human behavior and social organization. Van den Berghe is in search of an answer to the question "how man elaborated culturally in his biological propensities to aggression, hierarchy, and territoriality to create dominance-ordered hierarchies and political systems of extraordinary complexity?" He also emphasizes that man has an innate propensity for: maintaining a family structure; religion, and play. The interrelationships between man's innate nature and culture, as he understands it, is "the product of a complex interplay of biogenetical and environmental factors."

Some ethologists have also tried to define the biological basis of human behavior. Ethology is the scientific study of the species-specific and genetically mediated behavioral patterns of animals and men. In dealing with behavioral homologies and phylogenies, ethologists have come to recognize the need for observing behavioral patterns, within the specific environment in which different behaviors have evolved.

One of the leading European ethologists is Niko Tinbergen. In Tinbergen's opinion, human behavior "is not qualitatively different from animals." Underlying all human behavior, as he argues, there exist
certain fundamental innate drives, such as aggression, sex, foodseeking and the parental instincts. These drives in turn are elicited by "inmate releasing mechanisms" (IRM). He adds that certain human behaviors, such as scratching, sleeping and sperm-ejaculation, constitute innate displacement activities. Group territorialism likewise is an innate feature of human nature. In referring to the relationship between human nature and culture, Tinbergen has noted that "there are good grounds for the conclusion that man's limited behavioral adjustability has been outpaced by the culturally determined changes in his social environment, and that this is why man is now a misfit in his own society". Like other sociobiologists and ethologists, he believes man's innate nature and his capacity for culture to be separate and even antagonistic processes.

Tinbergen's belief in the existence of innate drives and releasing mechanisms in man is shared by the ethologist, Konrad Lorenz. In Studies in Animal and Human Behavior, Vol. II (1971), he indicates that innate releasing mechanisms constitute fixed structural components of human society. At the same time he argues that the processes of domestication, as well as culturally determined changes in human ecology, have resulted in the "dysfunction" of many innate species-preserving action patterns and response norms.

In another work, On Aggression (1960), Lorenz observes that man's social instincts and his social inhibitions, "could not keep pace with the rapid developments of traditional culture, particularly material culture." He asserts that man's innate killing inhibitions, as phylogenetically adapted behavioral mechanisms, are insufficient in controlling human aggression, in view of the invention of weapons utilized in modern
Cultural norms, as he believes, are necessary to keep phylogenetically adaptive behavior under control. However, he admits that the exertion of "moral strength in order to curb...natural inclination into a semblance of normal social behavior" may result in nervous disorders and frustrations as experienced by the individual. In this sense, man's innate behavior is said to be "phylogenetically so constructed, so calculated by evolution, as to need to be complemented by cultural tradition".

Lorenz's Evolution and Modification of Behavior (1965) is an attempt in one respect to describe the interrelationship between innate behavior and learning. He presented the argument that through deprivation experiments, applied to man as well as other species, ethologists would be able to determine 'where, in the species' system of actions, learning processes are biologically programmed, which are the reinforcements affecting them and how the unifying function of learning can be proved experimentally'. At least in this context Lorenz has defined the interrelationships between human nature and culture in a more unified context than many other sociobiologists and ethologists.

Eibl-Eibesfeldt, another well known ethologist, has also tried in a systematic fashion, to deal with the biological basis of human behavior. In one of his major works, Love and Hate (1972), he has contended that just because a behavioral pattern or disposition is inherited, does not imply "that it is not amenable to conditioning, nor must it be regarded as natural in the sense that it is still adaptive". Human tendencies such as aggression are understood by him as being maladaptive, requiring some form of cultural control. He defines man's tendency to cooperate within the group as being an innate human characteristic. Eibl-Eibesfeldt is
mainly concerned with the problem of how man is able to maintain his
decision within individualized groups, and how the anonymous community
which characterizes modern society produces problems of identification.

Like Tinbergen and Lorenz, Eibl-Eibesfeldt is convinced that "drives,
learning dispositions, and innate releasing mechanisms, can influence man's
inclinations in a quite decisive way". Culture, according to his point
of view, is a means to control man's innate drives. Moreover, "the replace-
ment of innate controls by cultural ones meant a gain in [human] adapta-
bility". Ritualized, innate behavioral patterns, as he points out,
contribute towards the integration of the individual into the group and
provide the groundwork upon which human cultures are constructed. These
ritualized patterns of innate behavior include among others: rank and
hierarchy, various sexual signals, greeting gestures and smiling, and the
incest taboo. He feels that the readiness of the individual to form a
bond with his fellows is based on an innate tendency of human nature.
3) **Sociobiology and Ethology - A Critique**

The question of the applicability of the basic principles of sociobiology and ethology in coming to terms with the relationships between man's nature and culture has received wide attention from the social scientific community. Many social scientists remain convinced that sociobiology and ethology are unable to define what the biological implications of man's capacity for culture constitute.

Their main objection to sociobiological and ethological theories therefore is the alleged failure of these theories to describe the interdependency between man as a biological being and the effects of his cultural environment. Owing to the obvious complexity of this relationship, many sociologists and anthropologists insist that man's nature is unique and may not be compared with any other animal species. One critic, W.R. Bates, has emphasized that "the prime goals of biology should be the elucidation of those qualities that set the human being apart from the rest of creation". He is convinced that past and present theories of comparative evolutionary biology have underestimated the uniqueness of the human being. Peter K. Smith, a British social scientist and a cautious critic of sociobiology and ethology, has observed that sociobiological theories "allow too much weight to the deterministic response of genetic change in natural selection and not enough to canalized genetic change greatly interacting with cultural processes". The lack of a clear definition of the mediating processes between human nature, culture and evolution is a much repeated criticism made in regard to sociobiology and ethology.

A significant number of social theorists are convinced that the emphasis placed by sociobiology and ethology on the biological constraints
of human nature lends support to the rather pessimistic idea that the human condition is unalterable.\textsuperscript{52} For this reason, Edward A. Tiryakian has stated that sociobiologists like Wilson should make clear "what is the unique human genotype,... and just how social progress in the future can only be enhanced, not impeded by the deeper investigation of the genetic constraints of human nature".\textsuperscript{53} From a slightly more radical frame of reference, Joseph S. Apler has suggested that sociobiologists have to take into account the fact that individuals, rather than being constrained by their innate nature, have the capacity "for changing their own nature, overcoming their environment and revolutionizing the institutions of society".\textsuperscript{54}

Social scientists at present believe that man's behavior is mediated by social institutions. In the justification of this belief, David W. Paulson as well as other critics, have condemned sociobiology and ethology for not providing "an account for example of the human evolutionary significance of role and status".\textsuperscript{55} Given these various theoretical objections described above, the impact of sociobiology on the methodology of the social sciences remains marginal at best.

Probably what is most seriously questioned today by social scientists is the comparative study of animal and human behavior which a number of sociobiologists and ethologists have undertaken in great seriousness. Sociobiologists have turned to the study of primates, canids and felids in the hope of interpreting human behavior and evolution from a comparative perspective, in relation to other species which are either phyletically or ecologically related. Many of such theorists, in their enthusiasm to examine the social behavior of other species have failed to provide an
analytical framework which would allow for the generation of realistic hypotheses in relation to human societies. A great number of studies have appeared in the last few years which attempt to look at specific species which have certain ecological resemblances to man. These species include the large, social carnivores, such as wolves, lions, hyenas, jackals and African wild dogs. This comparative framework of analysis has been outlined by such theorists as Bartholomew and Birdeell, Schaller and Lowther, and P.R. Thompson.

The logic of these comparative sociobiological arguments consists to some degree of the following deductive steps:

1. A is X  
   (e.g. wolves are cooperative hunters of big game)

2. B was X  
   (e.g. early hominids were cooperative hunters of big game)

3. A is Y  
   (e.g. wolves are allegedly monogamous, territorial, have dominance hierarchies, etc.)

4. Therefore, B was Y  
   (e.g. early hominids should have been territorial)

In evaluating this method of comparative analysis employed by many sociobiologists, Randall Lockwood has noted that "the study of carnivores (or any animal) can tell us a great deal about the range of options available to any species (including hominids) facing certain environmental problems. It cannot tell us what options were necessarily chosen." Many of the cross-species comparative analyses outlined to date are naive and oversimplified. As Lockwood has convincingly argued, comparisons of specific animal species with man are more complex than many sociobiologists assume. The complexity of this problem is attributable to: the intensive vari-
ability within species; their differing learning abilities; as well as the important role of culture in relation to man and the mediating effects which it has on human behavior. This is not to say that there is no value to the type of comparative approaches which have been outlined by sociobiologists. On the contrary, these criticisms have merely been provided in order to illustrate some of the logical pitfalls which have been encountered by sociobiologists who have given only restricted attention to the mediating effects of culture within their comparative studies of animal and human behavior.

It is quite clear, as Robert Bigelow has suggested, that many sociobiologists and ethologists still consider cultural evolution "to be a process in its own right, superimposed upon, but nevertheless distinct and different in kind from, biological evolution." In addition, it is alleged that sociobiology and ethology have paid relatively little attention to "the importance of social custom circulation and the biological survival value of cultural developments making sociocultural evolution possible."

At least some sociologists and anthropologists are convinced that sociobiology and ethology will play a positive role in the reorientation of the social sciences. Despite the optimistic hopes of these social scientists, there are definite grounds to argue that neither sociobiology nor ethology have formulated an adequate interpretive framework, which could effectively explain the complex interdependencies between man's innate nature, culture and the process of evolution. The failure of comparative evolutionary theories to deal with the fundamental complexities of these relationships becomes even clearer when the basic principles of their various theories are subjected to critical scrutiny.
Probably the most significant shortcoming of Wilson's sociobiological approach is his failure to take notice of the fact that kinship selection within human societies is, in fact, mediated and defined by highly variable cultural criteria. This particular point was extensively demonstrated in Marshall Sahlins' book, The Use and Abuse of Biology - An Anthropological Critique of Sociobiology (1977). In reviewing Wilson's basic assumptions, Sahlins has provided a large amount of ethnographic evidence to support the argument that in many primitive societies "each kinship order has (accordingly) its own theory of heredity of shared substance, which is never the genetic theory of modern biology...Such human conceptions of kinship may be so far from biology as to exclude all but a small fraction of a person's genealogical connections from the category of close kin". Owing to the fact that kinship relations are culturally, rather than biologically, defined, "the human systems ordering reproductive success have an entirely different calculus than that predicated by kin selection and sequitur est, by an egotistically conceived natural selection".

Sahlins' argument, as presented here, places the basic theorems of sociobiology in a questionable light. At the same time, Barash's assertion that cultural and biological evolution are two separate and autonomous processes contributes little to gaining an understanding of the interaction which has taken place between man's biological nature, his cultural environment and the processes of evolution. On the other hand, as we have seen, Pierre L. van den Berghe is acutely aware of the need for social scientists and sociobiologists to provide a clear conceptualization of what relationships may exist between human nature and culture. His own insights into the biological basis of aggression, the family, religion, dominance orders,
sexual dimorphism, play and territoriality contribute to the definition of
the "biological structural" components of human behavior and social organ-
ization. However, these insights do not provide a clear indication of what
the dynamic processes of interaction are that take place between human nature
and man's specific cultural situation.

The ethologists, even more so than the sociobiologists, have not been
able to elaborate a framework of analysis by which the dynamic relations
between human nature and culture could be understood. Tinbergen's idea
that human behavior is not qualitatively different from that of many animal
species, does not in itself explain the evolutionary or biological signifi-
cance of man's cultural capacities. Conversely, Konrad Lorenz gave
slightly more attention to the influence of culture on man's innate behav-
ioral dispositions. However, he views this influence in terms of what he
believes to be the dichotomy which exists between certain features of human
culture and man's innate nature. Culture, for Lorenz, is merely a means
to repress man's instinctual motivations, in the place of instinctual
inhibitions which have been selected for during the course of human evolu-
tion. Finally, Eibl-Eibesfeldt has also done little to clarify the inter-
dependent relationships between man's innate nature, culture and evolution.
Like Lorenz, he has simply pointed out that culture serves to control man's
instinctual drives and inclinations. While he has pointed out that certain
fixed behavioral patterns become part of the rituals of many cultures, he
has not indicated how this ritualization process takes place.
4) **The Need of a New Paradigm**

Robin Fox and Usher Fleising optimistically stated that the essence of the sociobiological and ethological approach "is the acceptance of the synthetic theory of evolution as the master paradigm for the analysis of all the life processes, including such uniquely human processes as language and culture". While we may sympathize with Fox’s and Fleising’s contention, it is quite evident that the ideal of sociobiology and ethology being the master paradigm for the analysis of all the life processes has not been realized to date. Neither of these biologically-oriented disciplines was able to generate an interpretive framework which could contribute to a clear understanding of the dynamic interaction which may take place between human nature, culture and the forces of evolution.

For at least the last twenty years, biologists as well as social scientists have recognized the need to outline the ways in which man’s innate nature and the dynamics of cultural evolution are mutually interdependent and complementary. However, as a consequence of the dichotomy which many sociobiologists and ethologists continue to impose on the relationship between man’s innate nature and culture, the study of human culture has been left to social scientists who lack any biological training. At the same time, the belief held by social scientists in the cultural determination of human behavior "totally obscured the suggested complementarity of organic and cultural evolution".

Given the continued concern of social scientists, sociobiologists and ethologists with the problem of defining the dynamic interrelationship between man’s innate nature, his capacity for culture and evolution, the need for a paradigm that will provide concrete insights into these rela-
tionships is obvious. An alternative theoretical paradigm which deals specifically with this basic problem will be suggested here.
5) An Alternative Paradigm of Human Nature, Culture and Evolution

The alternative paradigm to be outlined here closely follows the work of the German anthropologist, Arnold Gehlen. Gehlen is hardly known in the English speaking world, nor were his major works ever translated to our knowledge. His monumental first work: Der Mensch Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt (Man, his nature and his position in the world) appeared in 1940 and went through eleven editions up to 1976. His other writings include such monographs as "Urmensch und Spätkultur" (Archaic man and modern culture) (1964); "Moral and Hypermorality" (Morality and hypermorality) and "Anthropologische Forschung" (Anthropological Research) (1971). Konrad Lorenz in "Studies of Animal and Human Behavior" refers to Gehlen's key concepts frequently and accepts most of them. His discussion of these concepts, however, is of a piecemeal nature. Lorenz's failure to provide a systematic exposition of Gehlen's position is further confused by his attempt to equate some of Gehlen's concepts with his own. This is the case when he draws a parallel between Gehlen's notion of "instinct reduction" and his own concept of "domestication". Gehlen rejects this identity. His research is concerned with the nature of man and its interrelationship with culture. He does not however develop an evolutionary framework of analysis.

Gehlen begins his inquiries into the nature of man by declaring two approaches to a formulation of the nature of man as being inadequate. These approaches first maintain the view that man is nothing but an advanced ape and secondly, that the nature of man can be approached through an investigation of one or several psychological or physiological human traits, such as reason, mind, erect posture and language, etc. Every single human
trait can be found among animals in one form or another. Even creative intelligence and language can be found in primates, as experiments with chimpanzees indicate. These frameworks of analysis are inadequate because they fail to account for the phenomenon of higher human mental life and its contents. Nor, as Gehlen points out, do these approaches provide insights into such questions as: Why do human beings take cognizance of some but not of other things? What is morality and why does it exist? What is fantasy? What is the human will?

Gehlen insists that an adequate view of human nature must be capable of answering these questions. He suggests that this is possible only if one frees oneself from the habit of assigning man a place in the zoological classification of the animal world. Nature, he says, has assigned man a special position. It has realized in man a developmental principle which never before existed in nature nor was it ever tried by nature. The nature of man reveals a new organizational systemic which is decidedly different than anything found in animals. A biological anthropology, or better said, a bio-cultural view of man, cannot proceed from a contextual framework developed in zoology and biology, but must be derived from a study of man and man alone. This by no means implies that the theories of zoology and biology are useless but that they cannot be a starting point for the study of man.

He insists that a bio-cultural concept of man must utilize an holistic perspective on man. Any causal reasoning from one trait to another, such as whether language caused intelligence or vice-versa misses the point. Man, he asserts, is an unique holistic design of nature and man's survival
capacity consists of a number of essential human components standing in mutual relations to each other. What Gehlen calls the bio-cultural nature of man is a system of human traits in interaction, whereby the existence of one or the other of these traits is predicated by the existence of all the others. Any change in one or the other of these traits requires adjustment on the part of all the other traits. He follows essentially a General System perspective long before General Systems Theory found its formulation through people like von Bertalanffy, Boulding and Wiener.

The common mistake made by anthropologists and biologists alike, is to accept Darwin's claim that the increase in the learning ability in vertebrates runs parallel to the zoological development of the species and reaches a peak in the development of man. Gehlen quotes Buytendijk who demonstrated that hunting animals, regardless of whether they are insects, crabs, birds or mammals, have the same general instincts. However, categories like hunting animals, herd animals, tree animals, etc., are performance categories, not zoological ones. Animals belonging to the same performance category show a high degree of similarity in their instinctual equipment, as well as in their learning ability. This is true for such evolutionarily different tree animals as apes, squirrels and parrots. Squirrels have the ability to recover hidden objects according to visual memory data and are capable of reaching them via detours. These abilities are often seen as one of the achievements characterizing those on the higher level of zoological classification, like apes. Dogs on the other hand are incapable of doing so. Animals which are zoologically closely related, like the frog and the toad, show very different instinctual and learning abilities. The frog is a lurking animal, while the toad is a prey-seeking hunting animal.
The systemic conditions under which an animal enlarges its behavioral repertoire through learning in such a way that it increases its survival capacity have been outlined by Gehlen. These conditions consist of the following:

1. With the exception of some social insects, every animal uses successful experiences only under the influence of vital stimuli. This means that a performance surplus for animals, in contrast to man, is only possible within the confines of concrete situations containing vital elements of attraction or avoidance.

2. Animals learn only in concrete present situations and use the experiences only in those situations that contain a release mechanism through which the learned behavior is discharged.

3. Every animal behavior is instinct related. It follows an instinct totally as in the case of a migratory bird that behaves in the direction of some future condition (summer in the south) of which the animal can have no previous experience or...

4. ...its behavior is instinct related in the sense that it builds up learned behavior within the immediate field of its instinct governed, vital life interests. A predator learns better hunting techniques within the instinct governed conditions of existence.

5. All animal learning is strictly limited. What an animal learns, or more importantly, what it fails to learn is...
circumscribed by its species-specific instincts and
the environment to which they correspond. Within
these limits, an animal is able to build up and expand
its behavioral repertoire but it cannot transcend it.
For example, mice learn to run a maze much easier than
following a straight line because they are instinctually
preprogrammed for mazes and mazes are part of their
natural environment while straight lines are not.

The "fitness" of an animal, therefore, is determined by the systemic
integration of its instincts, its learning ability, its senses and organs
and the conditions of its natural environment. Said in a different way, an
animal responds to the environment in such a way that it recognizes those
aspects of the environment which correspond to its vital life interests
which are represented in its instinctual and physiological makeup.

Gehlen emphasizes that man is unique in that he does not fit into this
animal design. Man is not a creature which is definable by the natural
fitness between organism and environment. The world he recognizes and
responds to does not stand in the same relation of fitness to his organic
and mental constitution, as is the case of animals.

As Gehlen claims, man is an "undefined creature" in the sense that he
lacks the animal fitness between organism and environment. Because man
lacks this fitness, he is a creature who poses a problem to himself; a
creature whose survival depends on the position which he takes towards him-
self. Man is an acting creature who is forced to translate the deficiencies
of his "undefined nature" into activities that make survival possible. How-
ever, man is also a "jeopardized" creature; a creature with a high constitutional possibility of failure. Constitutionally, he is an organism with a high degree of improbability whose very existence depends on how successfully he is able to transform the improbability of his existence into chances of survival through his own actions. Finally, man is a creature of foresight. He lives, in contrast to the animal, for the future and not in the present. Man, like animals, is a creature of performance. The type of performance demanded of him however, is qualitatively different from animals. The organization of man's abilities by which this performance is forced out of him required a new natural design.

Let us turn to the evidence which Gehlen presents in support of the above characterization of man and the unique organizational principle of human behavior. If one examines the constitution of man in terms of the components which entered into the bio-structural dynamic of animals inclusive of 1) instincts, 2) learning, 3) animal physiology, 4) the species-specific ecological niche (environment), none can be found in man which is congruent with those found in animals. Nor do they stand in the same relationship to each other. Man's instinctual equipment is characterized by an instinct reduction which has taken the following form:

1. Human instincts have become separated from any behavioral motoric. They are subject to inhibitions, that is to say they can be kept internalized and do not necessarily lead to any actions.

2. Human instincts are non-specific in the sense that they only develop into specific drives and interests in conjunction with culturally defined experience and learning.
3. Human instincts become set in symbols and fantasies which form the content in which they are recognized and memorized. Retained in the mind in terms of these symbols and fantasies, they obtain rational recognition relative to specific needs and interests.

4. Human instincts are subject to cultural symbolic formation and are variable. They are capable of following experiences and learning and grow with them. Lacking such learning, they may not develop at all. Human instincts are diffuse and can be joined or merged.

5. Therefore, there is no sharp division between elementary needs and derived needs.

6. Higher human needs grow out of inhibited lower ones, giving rise to a permanency of interests which carry motivation and behavior into the future and thereby stabilize motivation relative to changing temporary conditions.

7. All needs and interests as soon as they are symbolized and recognized by the mind become subject to rational assessment, and in comparison with other interests, are subject to preferences and rejection.

Turning to man's physiological constitution, in contrast to animals man is characterized by deficiencies which, in the biological sense, appear as non-specializations or primitivisms. Man has no natural protection against climatic change. Nor does he have natural tools of attack or any specialization for flight. His dental equipment is neither that
of a carnivore nor that of an herbivore. In comparison with some primates who are highly specialized, man as a natural creature is deficient. Man requires an extremely long period of physical and mental maturation, longer than for any other animal. Under natural conditions, such a creature would be facing specialized escape animals and dangerous predators, making it highly probable that this creature would be either eaten alive or die of starvation.

Finally, man does not occupy any specific ecological niche. He is not fitted into a compatible nonexchangeable environment, congruent with his organic structure. Owing to the fact that man is physiologically a deficient creature, there is no natural environment that fits his morphological and instinctual constitution. Unlike animals who recognize and respond to a range of stimuli congruent with their vital life interests and thereby ignore others, man is subject to overstimulation brought about by his openess to the environment. Man is a world-open creature. He does not live in an environment of instinctually defined interpretations, but in a world of endless, unforeseen and startling surprises. To live in this overstimulating, unforeseeable and dangerous world, requires an organization of perception and responses.

The lack of concrete instincts, in combination with man's physiological deficiencies and his openess to the total environment, makes for a jeopardized, endangered creature whose first and foremost task is to transform the deficiencies of his existence into chances of survival. Man must unburden himself from the lack of natural fitness, which characterizes animal existence, and ensure his survival through his own actions. These actions are systematized in culture. These two sentences are the
key to the understanding of the structural law which underlies the whole buildup of human performance.

Man's cultural achievements are to be considered from two points of view. First, they are productive activities to unburden himself from his natural deficiencies. Secondly, they are achievements which man must "force out of himself" which, in contrast to animals, constitute an entirely new mode of existence. Seen from this point of view, man's instinct reduction is as much a necessary prerequisite as is the emergence of mind, his physiological deficiencies and his openness to the environment, in the struggle for cultural organization.

The instinct reduction which separated man's behavior from his instincts and led to a deconcretization of their focus and direction, created an hiatus which simultaneously made it possible for the human mind to develop. The reduction of instincts removed the certainty of man's future existence. Man's reliance on his own actions to create the chances for his survival, made it necessary for nature to develop a mental structure capable of functioning in the direction of recognizance and foresight. Human existence depends on man's ability to transcend the immediate and the concrete and to perceive himself in future situations.

It is for a good reason that man's instinct residues are subject to conscious recognition and interference of the mind. Man's instinct residues must be conscious in order to be endowed with culturally invented symbols, fulfillment situations and social relations. Only a creature which is conscious of its instinct residues is able to inhibit or displace them. The permanency of human life interests demands the suppression of the immediacy of the drive structure and its displacement into the future.
Man, as an acting creature who is compelled to force activities out of himself in order to survive, must have a flexible structure of instinct residues which are capable of focussing and attaching themselves to a wide variety of cultural orientations. These orientations do not only contain the satisfaction of vital life interests, but also include the particular variable conditions under which they are being satisfied.

Elaborating somewhat on Gehlen's observations, such instinct residues or innate predispositions exist in three broad categories. There are first the organ related instinct residues such as hunger, sex, speech (not language), etc. Secondly, there are those that make individual human cultural growth possible. These range from the ability to take the role of others toward one's self (e.g. the development of the human self) to those that make human self assertiveness, possible. Finally, there are those broad dispositions that bring human group behavior within the range of high probability. Depending on their cultural orientation and symbolization, these can take the forms of group loyalty, group cooperation and group aggression.

It is important to emphasize that the above definition of man's instinctual residues has been verified by a significant number of theoretical and empirical studies conducted in the areas of human psychology, evolutionary biology, sociology and anthropology. The categorization of the organ related instinctual residues in man have been given extensive attention by psychological and biological theorists. There is also empirical evidence to show that the instinctual residue of individual self-development and maturation and the ability of the individual to take on the attitude of others, are in fact innate characteristics of the human
species. One of the strongest sources of evidence has been provided by Erik Erikson, in his theory of the life cycle and the epigenesis of identity.\footnote{Erikson, on the basis of his own clinical observations, maintains that the maturation of the human being is characterized by a basic program of development or epigenetic principle, which is a species-specific characteristic of man. This epigenetic principle may be summarized as being the innate general plan of the personality from which the parts of the human self arise. This biological principle of self-development is comprised of eight sequential stages. In the order of their emergence in the personality, these stages consist of the development of the senses: trust, autonomy, initiative, industry, identity, intimacy, generativity, and integrity.\footnote{The development of each of these stages may in turn be facilitated or inhibited by the social environment in which the individual finds himself. Probably the most critical stage, according to Erikson, is the fifth, where the child begins to consider the opinions of others and develops role expectations, which in turn facilitate the emergence of a sense of self.\footnote{This epigenetic stage constitutes a species-specific characteristic of man.}}}

Other biosociological evidence is available to demonstrate that man's ability to develop a sense of self is essentially a feature of prestige-striving which is homologous with primate social dominance. Barkow, for example, has argued that during the course of evolution, selection of the human species for "cultural capacity" has transformed the struggle for social dominance into striving for self-esteem whereby the individual endeavors to evaluate his self as being higher in prestige when compared
with others. At least according to the evidence provided by Barkow, there are some grounds for believing that there may well exist a biological basis for man's willingness to take on the attitudes of others.

Apart from the organ related instinctual residues and those related to the development of the human self, there is extensive evidence available to show that group membership is also based on human instinctual residues. This evidence has been provided by a wide number of theorists, including ethologists, sociobiologists, anthropologists and sociologists.

One important consequence of man's instinct seduction, according to Gehlen, is the disposition of free excess motive power. The amount of motive power necessary for man to perform the vital functions for his survival vary greatly from one culture to another. Animal motive power is fitted to both its instincts and the environment, following a natural rhythm in which it is released and acted upon. Such instincts as sex, migration and nest-building are innate releasers of motive power in conjunction with certain conditions of the environment. Conversely, after the animal instincts have been satisfied the energy for its particular performance is withdrawn and the instinct is temporarily laid to rest.

In man, not even the organ related instinct residues follow any rhythmic environmental cues. All human instinct residues are addressable at any particular time. Such a condition creates the existence of a constant reservoir of free energy from which motive power can be flexibly withdrawn whenever man faces adverse circumstances.

An instinct rhythm in man, triggered by environmental influences, would have disastrous consequences. His motive power needs to be oriented toward his cultural achievements but cultural achievements do not uni-
formly follow any environmental cues. For the sake of the permanence of human existence, a ready pool of free energy is necessary. This pool is capable of enlarging itself in the process of its activation and discharge. Excess motive power exists a priori to cultural and social development. The long time period from birth to sexual maturation Geisler argues, is characterized by motive power which is free of sexual desires. That is to say, it is unattached to any concrete sexual symbols which might activate its discharge. The existence of this free motive power in the child is channelled into playful exploration of the social and physical environment. In the course of these activities, the child organizes and systematizes the world of external stimuli in terms of its own personality development. Only when this process reaches maturity and when language, thought, freedom of movement and the perfection of motor skills are completed, does sexual maturity appear. It is at this time that the unattached motive power (which was necessary for the individual cultural growth of the child) is now partially drained into the specific area of sex.

The human motive power which was made available through the reduction of instincts is subject to the cultural influences and societal pressures encountered during the personal development of the individual. These pressures are utilized in the sense that culture provides the symbols on which the motive power orients and organizes itself. These orientations may inhibit instinct residues or they may facilitate them.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the individual human being guides and directs this process in terms of his own unique organization at every stage of his personal development. Structural pressures in the transformation of motive power may be biological, as in the maturation
processes mentioned above, or they may be cultural, as in deferred gratification. Regardless of their origin however, they are always purposeful in making it possible for man to maximize his self-acting capacity. Self-acting is the peculiar human activity which makes survival possible for a creature which lacks the animal fitness and whose survival depends on the type of action which it is able to force out of itself.

Gehlen’s characterization of the nature and role of human consciousness must further be considered. Consciousness is that entity which fills the hiatus created by instinct reduction. It is that vital tool which helps to orient and to endow human instinctual residues with symbols. Consciousness also has some remarkable limitations. These limitations are indicative of how it fits into the bio-cultural framework of man as developed by Gehlen. All vital biological processes of man, for example, proceed outside of human consciousness. We know as little about how we breathe or digest as we know what we have to do to live an am. Nor is the inner world of consciousness itself accessible to the awareness of the human mind. It seems that nature has not intended to inform man about his biological functions, nor about his mental functions, leaving this to more reliable biological control structures.

The capacity of the human mind is exclusively directed toward the structuring of human behavior. It penetrates the totality of human existence only to the extent that it enables man to build up, direct, control and coordinate higher forms of human achievement which are necessitated by his life interests. Due to the variety and complexity of these life interests, an extensive variety of mind functions is necessary to translate them into such action patterns as language, memory, fantasy, the
certificates of the object and lead him to discover previously unrecognized

tations toward the object, their sentiment toward the individual coming to the crux
substitution and aggression. This stable tension represents a mental action

to an object to which the object exerts in an ambivalent position of midpoint.

The result is a new emotional state a mental relation of paying attention

into a something called tension whereby one residue becomes inhibited by another.

It is possible that residues of substitution and aggression syndrome

in the form of stable tension structures.

Instinct residues which open the possibility for stable human interactions

are possible. On the other hand, it is exactly this difference of

reason to suggest that residues their personality conflict and result of

are joined and merged with others. It is only to the simultaneous pace-

a blending of other instinct residues. Conversely, sexual residues

the mind and men, the permeant ability to be sexually expressed lead to

what culture is in this sense is an emergent product of these residues and

these residues to structure the field of human action originated by the

ability of perceivable stimulation led to a constant competition between

residues and their capacity to join or merge in combination with their

these two components, therefore, in structured, the differentiation of instinct

there are growth of the second possible, the relationship between

and in a dialectical relationship to each other. The reduction of the

the reduced human instincts and the capacity of the human mind that

open environment in which life and to the culture within the culture.

inseparable relationship to its psychological constitution, to the world

the environment and on itself. The mind of men therefore stands in an

whole inner range of mental life of men and the power of reflecting an
aspects of the object. At the same time, this stabilized tension allows for the build up of an action pattern through the utilization of these newly perceived aspects and in so doing opens the possibility of a variable, rational and purposefully oriented action pattern. Gehlen agrees with Julian Huxley's observation that man's ability to synthesize or combine every mental trait with any other trait in the area of feeling, knowing and willing makes a unified mental life possible and thereby creates culture.

One further consequence of the reduction of instincts in man is the diffuseness of the original release mechanism of instincts. Konrad Lorenz, who devoted a great deal of scientific effort to the study of innate release mechanisms in animals, isolated two qualities which are characteristic components of releasers: maximum simplicity and maximum improbability. 78 Man retained some releasers insofar as human perception gives preference to those stimuli which contain the qualities mentioned above. In this sense, human attention becomes structured and oriented. At the same time man is relieved of any natural, uniform and inevitable response to this stimuli. It is human culture, as Gehlen and Lorenz indicate, which has taken up the task of providing releasers in the inhibition or facilitation of man's instinctual residues.

What seems to be the case for releasers, seems equally true for inhibitors. Man, it seems has lost some of his inhibitions in the process of becoming human. It is possible that certain inhibitors disappeared because they were compensated for in the form of intelligent action. This might be the case for inhibitors of overindulgence. The fact that historic man is a killer of his own species, may be due to an instinct resi-
which become disinhibited. However, intelligent forms of cooperation for much of man's history have been insufficient to prevent aggression.

In reviewing Gehlen's basic insights and relating them to the known body of data in social psychology, anthropology and sociology, it becomes apparent that his theories fit these data better than any other theoretical argument. They, therefore, hold significant implications for the critical evaluation of sociobiology and ethology. In contrast to these disciplines, Gehlen has been able to outline the dynamic and developmental relationships which seem to exist between human nature and culture. Sociobiologists such as Wilson, Barash and van den Berghe have argued that the biological basis of human social behavior is directly related to the motivation principle that individuals will seek to maximize their inclusive fitness. Some sociobiologists insist that human social organization is directly predicated on the tendency of members of the human species to increase their reproductive potential within the context of kinship selection. While these assumptions seem to be incontestable, when seen in relation to animals, they lack empirical verification when applied to man.

Ethologists have fared little better in coming to terms with this problem. The emphasis which such ethologists as Tinbergen, Lorenz and Eibl-Eibesfeldt have placed on the existence of fixed action patterns of behavior have provided few insights into man's ability to develop highly varied and complex forms of behavior which are culturally specific. In contrast, Gehlen has contributed to the preliminary definition of a four-dimensional framework of analysis within which the dynamics which exist between man's biological nature and his capacity for culture may be interpreted from an holistic point of view. It is this framework which
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may very well provide the groundwork for the development of a new and more
comprehensive biosociological paradigm which may be further elaborated
and clarified in the future by social scientists, sociobiologists and
ethologists.

Gehlen has suggested or implied, that:
1. human behavior and the ability to develop culture is
due to man's lack of a rigid innate behavioral repertoire.
This view is completely contrary to the sociobiological
or ethological approaches which maintain that many aspects
of human behavior and culture are based on certain innate
biological or evolutionary constants which man obeys.
2. culture serves as a mechanism of survival in response to
and in compensation for man's innate biological deficiencies.
3. culture provides the variable symbolic universes which
organize, inhibit and/or facilitate the expression of man's
instinct residues which consist of:
 a. organ related instinct residues
 b. residues related to individual cultural growth
 c. residues related to group behavior.
4. culture generates its own developmental dynamics. It can
depart somewhat from its instinct residual base or stay
close to it. The social problems specific to any parti-
cular culture may very well be related to the mode of
integration or lack of it between man's instinctual resi-
dues and the cultural expressions by which these are
organized.
This shortened version of Gehlen's paradigm comprises the main elements of the biosociological bases of human behavior.
6) The Biosociological Theory of Fitness and the Meaningful Unit of Human Evolution

If Gehlen’s biosociological insights are viewed from an evolutionary perspective, the following questions may be asked:

1) What is the biosociological definition of fitness?

2) What constitutes the meaningful unit of human evolution?

3) What are the biosociological processes of human evolution?

Ethologists and sociobiologists suggest that the chief criterion of fitness constitutes the maximization of human reproductive success. The maximization of reproductive success does indeed play an important role in animal evolution because genetic succession carries the biologically fixed adaptive relation between the animal’s instincts, its physiology and its environment into the future. But from the point of view of human evolution, reproductive success may not necessarily be the most important variable which contributes to the maximization of the biosociological fitness of human society. On the contrary, if we have understood the significance of Arnold Gehlen’s biosociological insights, it is obvious that any discussion of the biosociological fitness of human society, from an evolutionary perspective, must take into consideration the degree of fitness which exists between man’s instinctual residues, his culture and the ecological environment.

The biosociological theory of fitness states that:

The fitness of a human group may be interpreted as a condition of dynamic equilibrium between man’s innate instinctual residues, his culture, and the ecological conditions under which he exists.
It can be argued that the maintenance of this form of biosociological fitness may not necessarily require the maximization of human reproductive success. In fact, extended population growth and the social and environmental pressures which it produces may greatly upset this dynamic equilibrium. Such behavioral phenomena as infanticide, suicide, homosexuality, celibacy, and organized programs of birth control may be seen as means by which some societies limit their reproductive potential in order to maximize their biosociological fitness. The applicability of the Malthusian dictum of population growth is questionable under cultural conditions.

The problem of what constitutes the meaningful unit of human evolution has been given extensive attention by a number of social theorists and sociobiologists. Marshall D. Sahlins and Elman R. Service in Evolution and Culture (1965) have argued that culture constitutes the meaningful unit of human evolution. They have defined culture as "an integrated organization of technology, social structure, and philosophy adjusted to the life problems posed by its natural habitat and by nearby and often competing cultures."79 They view cultural adaptation as both a creative, as well as a self-limiting process. This is an excellent definition, but what Sahlins and Service have not considered is the relationship between man's biological nature and the processes of cultural adaptation and change.

One of the latest attempts to define the meaningful unit of human evolution is contained in William H. Durham's article "The Adaptive Significance of Cultural Behavior" (1976).80 He proposes that biological, as well as cultural, attributes of human beings result to a large degree from the selective traits of human beings that enhance the inclusive...
fitness of individual human beings". It is suggested that "inclusive fit-
ness may prove to be a useful, analytic tool for understanding human cul-
ture behavior". In this sense Durham implies that the individual who seeks
to maximize his reproductive success constitutes the meaningful unit of
human evolution.

The value of the concept of "inclusive fitness", utilized by Durham
to explain cultural evolution may, however, be seriously questioned. While
he has generated some tentative hypotheses dealing with the biological
basis of human culture, he has succeeded at the same time in reducing all
human motivation to the quest for the maximization of inclusive fitness.
This assumption about inclusive fitness is reductionist and one-dimensional,
while its applicability to human groups remains questionable.

From Gehlen's argument it follows that the meaningful unit of human
evolution is that group of human beings which is in a position to act on
itself in the integration of its genetic potential (which includes its
instinct residues as well as the predominance of certain physical features),
its culture (which implies the development of mind) and its environment.
For a group to act on itself implies first a degree of socio-political
control (religious, moral, ideological, political) over intermarriage and
thereby control over its gene pool. Secondly, it implies a degree of
control over the processes of cultural diffusion. Through the exercise
of these controls the human group creates the preconditions for a degree
of self-determination which it realizes through the form of integration
stated above. It is the human group which persistently attempts to ex-
ercise a degree of self-determination over itself which is the meaningful
unit of human evolution.
7) The Biosocial Processes of Human Evolution

The English geneticist C.H. Waddington once used the following metaphor to make a point:

If, for instance, natural selection demands that a horse can run fast enough to escape from a predatory wolf, what matters is not what genes the horse has got, but how fast it can run. It is irrelevant whether it can run fast because it has been trained by a good racehorse trainer, or because it has got a nice lot of genes.81 Whether any particular horse would survive or not, would depend on it being born with good, bad or average genes for speed in combination with good, bad or average training for speed which it would receive. Depending on how many of these separate factors could actually contribute to the horse’s speed, a number of combinations between genes for speed and training for speed would actually be sufficient to let the horse survive. Good genes for speed and average training for speed might be sufficient. However, average genes for speed and good training for speed might do just as well. This is the point Gehlen was making in his argument. The selective pressures of the environment are not on the organism of man (his genes) but on the performance of man which is the result of the interaction of genes and culture. This performance can be achieved through the integration of varying types of genes and culture.

If, what in the previous discussion we called the instinct residues is, in fact, the true innate nature of man (which may differ slightly from one human group to another), we might be justified in labelling this package the genetic makeup of the human species. The processes just outlined may then be represented by the following equation:
BIOCULTURAL INTEGRATION TYPE I

E ----> (G ↔ C)* = Performance to ensure survival

*E  = Environment
G  = The genetic makeup
C  = Culture

The dotted line represents the
----- -> direction of environmental selective
pressures.
The continuous line represents the
<---- = direction of the integration of
genetic and cultural factors.

Under these conditions only the interaction of G and C would be
directly necessitated by the forces of E toward a survival performance.
There would also be degrees of freedom allowed for the nature of G and
the nature of C. Assuming that E represents some particular ecological
niche in which a human group has established itself, the nature of G would
have to be such that its interaction with C would make a survival perform-
ance possible. But, as in Waddington's illustration above, a whole range
of different Gs could conceivably interact with a range of different Cs
to produce such performances. If, for example, the pressures of an environ-
mental situation could be met by close cooperation between the members of
a group, the selection toward group oriented genes (G), as well as the
selection for collective cultural practices (C) in various combinations,
would facilitate the survival of the group. The same environmental situ-
ation could perceivably be met by different cultural practices integrated
with different genetic predispositions.

Some environments are of such a nature as to allow for a great number
of different forms of adaptations. Other environments are so restrictive
as to virtually dictate one form of cultural and genetic integration and
rule out others. This is to say, that human ingenuity and cultural descent, plus genetic makeup play a role in these adaptive processes. As groups migrate or are displaced, cultural descent provides the starting point for cultural readaptations and human ingenuity supplies the creative force necessary for future integration. Whatever the situation, G and C would tend toward a dynamic form of integration to meet the selective pressures of the environment.

This integration of G and C holds a number of significant consequences for a group. The environmental dependency of the group ensures that the environment will exert selective pressures on whatever forms of cultural and genetic elements which the group is in the process of integrating. If the environment happens to be highly specific, as is the case in certain isolated cultures, the integration of genetic predispositions and certain cultural practices would have to be such as to produce performances which would respond to the specific environmental pressures. Therefore, the nature of these cultural practices would tend towards specificity. This selective pressure makes it probable that the members of the group will eventually share a narrow and relatively homogeneous genetic range. The environmental pressures will also influence the group's cultural development. Those practices which have significance for survival are most likely to develop and to be refined. These practices, insofar as they respond to a specific ecological niche and become integrated with a specific genetic composition, ensure that the culture as a whole will develop in a direction which is highly unique. It will be somewhat distinct from other cultures even if their ecological niches and their gene compositions are similar.
The selective effects of such a process of biocultural integration may be summarized in the following equation:

**EFFECTS OF BIOCULTURAL INTEGRATION TYPE I**

\[ E_s \rightarrow (G_h \leftarrow sC_u)^* \rightarrow \text{Survival performance} \]

- \( E_s \) = Environment (specific ecological niche)
- \( G_h \) = Homogeneous gene composition
- \( C_u \) = Cultural uniqueness

The dotted line represents the direction of environmental selective pressures.
The continuous line represents the direction of the integration of genetic and cultural factors.

The simultaneous integration of a certain genetic range with an unique cultural configuration, in response to a specific ecological niche is often referred to as cultural adaptation. This cultural condition also contains the necessary elements and processes for cultural growth. The response of the genetic composition and cultural practices of a group is passive insofar as these genetic and cultural factors adapt to the constraints and demands of the environment. At the same time, this response is also active, in that the group in question obtains a degree of control over the environment, however small this control might be initially. The domestication of animals, the invention of agriculture, and the development of modern science and technology, represent successive stages in man's ability to control his environment. In this sense there exists a feedback relationship between man's performance and the environment which can be presented in the following equation:
BIOCULTURAL-ENVIRONMENTAL FEEDBACK

\[ E \xrightarrow{a} E_s \xrightarrow{\text{surplus performance}} (G \xleftarrow{h} C_u) \]

- \( E \_s \): Environment (specific ecological niche)
- \( G \_h \): Homogeneous gene composition
- \( C_u \): Cultural uniqueness
- \( E_a \): Altered environment due to human control

The dotted line represents the direction of environmental selective pressures.
The continuous line represents the direction of the integration of genetic and cultural factors.
The dotted and continuous line represents environmental feedback loop.

As man's ability to control his environment increases (due to certain crucial inventions which were produced under favorable environmental, genetic and cultural conditions), the relationship between the environment on the one hand and the genetic-cultural integration on the other hand reverses itself. Although it is unlikely that man will ever have total control over all his environment, for conceptual purposes it might be useful to visualize such a situation through the following equation:

**BIOCULTURAL INTEGRATION TYPE II**

\[ [ G \xleftarrow{\text{feedback loop}} C ] \xrightarrow{E \_s} \text{surplus performance} \]

Under these conditions, the interaction of \( G \) and \( C \) would largely determine the nature and the selective effects of \( E \). Control over the
environment would lead to a gradual lessening of the natural environmental effects on man's cultural and genetic integration. As the natural environment is replaced by an artificial, man-made environment, the latter already contains so many culture-adaptive features that its forces of natural selection are largely blunted. It is of course impossible to obtain a total congruency of man's biocultural integration even within a largely artificial environment. This is due to the fact that the environment changes in response to man's control over it and these changes are often unpredictable. If modern medicine, for example, is an attempt to control the effects of the bacterial environment on man's genetic and cultural integration, and if this control is relatively successful, it nevertheless is not total. This is owing to the fact that the bacterial environment constantly changes in relation to the impact which man has on it. That is to say, as the environment is never able to totally determine the interaction of human culture and man's genetic makeup, so human culture and man's genetic makeup can never totally determine the environment. The dialectic of biosociological evolution is contained in the tension between these opposing processes. They give rise to a dynamic which is non-reducible to the total domination of one by the other and therefore designates a continuously ongoing process.

This second type of biocultural integration again holds a number of consequences for the culture-genetic integration of man. A human group which has obtained a degree of control over the environment has greatly altered the selective pressures of the natural environment. The alteration of such selective pressures lessens the dependency of the group on the environment. Being relatively autonomous from selective pressures
of the environment, facilitates cultural and genetic diversity within a human group. These processes may be summarized in the following equation:

**EFFECTS OF BIOCULTURAL INTEGRATION TYPE II**

\[
C_h \leftrightarrow C_d \rightarrow E_a^* = \text{Surplus performance}
\]

- \(C_h\) = Heterogeneous genetic composition
- \(C_d\) = Diversified cultural developments
- \(E_a\) = Artificial environment (within the constraints mentioned above)

The dotted line represents the direction of cultural and genetic selective pressures on the environment. The continuous line represents the direction of the integration of genetic and cultural factors.

A surplus performance which results in a group gaining a degree of control over the natural environment, enlarges at the same time, the cultural scope of the group. With greater cultural diversity there will be selective pressure toward greater genetic diversity. In human populations there are always a great many unusual gene combinations already present in low frequencies. When a performance is required for which a particular gene combination is of great advantage, this can usually be produced through a biocultural integration of gene combinations already present in low frequencies but previously unused by cultural performances. In the second instance, advantageous gene combinations can be obtained through the enlargement of the gene pool by various means.

Assuming that the processes which we have described so far are ideal types (which do not apply to the behavior of any living socio-cultural
group but are only conceptual aids constructed for the sole purpose of understanding a complex phenomena) we may be in a position now to deduce a number of propositions from this typology. These propositions utilize the three variables which were used in the typology above:

a) the environment
b) human genetics
c) human culture.

Referring to those processes enumerated under Biocultural Selection Type I, the following propositions can be made:

1) A performance toward survival is forced out of man when a specific natural environment exerts such pressures on a human group, that the genetic potential of such a group is forced to integrate with cultural practices and where such integration makes the required performance possible. From this general proposition, a number of more specific propositions may be deduced.

2) Under the above stated conditions, the genetic potential of the group tends toward homogeneity and the cultural practices tend toward cultural uniqueness.

3) Under the above stated conditions, a surplus performance (cultural innovation), over and above what is necessary for survival, while being highly original, will be relatively small, and in response to the highly specific environmental pressures.

4) Under the above stated conditions, the homogeneous gene composition exerts little pressure on the social strati-
fication within the group in the direction of change.

5) Under the above stated conditions, a group will tend toward long range stability in the integration between the three variables.

6) Under the above stated conditions, a group is very vulnerable in regard to changes introduced in any of these variables and therefore would tend toward isolation.

Referring to those processes enumerated under Biocultural Integration Type II, the following propositions can be made:

1) A surplus performance over and above mere survival is forced out of man, when man's control over the environment exerts pressures toward diversifying his cultural practices, and where such diverse cultural practices need to be integrated with greater genetic diversity among the members of the group.

2) Under the above stated conditions, a surplus performance (cultural innovation) as compared with Type I, is of lesser cultural originality and of lesser specificity relative to the environment but of greater cultural and environmental generality.

3) Under the above stated conditions, the selective pressures for a more heterogeneous gene composition in combination with greater cultural diversity within the group, will exert a corresponding pressure on the social stratification of the group in the direction of change.
4) Under the above stated conditions, a group will tend toward change in the integration of the three variables.

5) Under the above stated conditions, the adaptive capacity of the group will increase in relation to manageable changes introduced in these variables and therefore would tend toward increased cultural and genetic contacts.

These broad biosocial processes of human evolution typified in Type I and Type II do not stand in a relationship to each other whereby a progression from I to II is assumed, as underlies the evolution from simple to complex human groups. These two types of biosocial integration are seen as necessary processes operating at any time within the whole range of human evolution, from the simplest to the most complex human group. The cultural and genetic contraction of a group stands in a dialectical relationship to the cultural and genetic expansion of other cosmopolitan groups. It is the culturally and genetically contracting group (Type I integration) which is a source of never-ending originality and uniqueness in man's evolution. Some human groups carry their originality forward to such extremes as the Pygmies in Africa. Other rural, religious, ethnic and geographically defined groups engage in less extreme forms of cultural and genetic contraction and focussing. The example of the Hutterites and the Amish in North America indicate that the development of integrative processes of this kind are also possible in highly industrialized societies.
These genetically and culturally contracting and focussing groups are the seedbed of human originality and uniqueness. As such they are indispensable in preventing the Type II groups from degenerating into a faceless and cultureless mass of humanity. The cultural achievements of the cosmopolitan expansive group is made possible through the integration, the reshuffling and the recombination of the unique cultural and genetic elements of the Type I groups. The cosmopolitan group is always in danger of losing form and structure. The progressive loss of human originality and uniqueness within a cosmopolitan group leads to a breakup of this group along its peripheries. Inevitably, the cosmopolitan group disintegrates into smaller, culturally and genetically contracting and focussing groups. Human evolution consists of the dialectical interaction between these two types of integration. Each type of integrative process holds important implications for human evolutionary development. The first type of integration has ensured the cultural and genetic differentiation of the human species, in relation to the formation of specific ethnic groups and races. The second form of integration has facilitated the development of cultural homogeneity and genetic variability among various human groups.

Without the first type of integrative process, the development of the second type would be impossible. Ultimately, the first type of integration must evolve into the second form. Conversely, the second form of selection must evolve into the first. The significant cultural changes which have occurred, during the course of human history, are related to the dynamic and dialectical interaction which occurs between these two types of integration. At the same time, contemporary human society is characterized by the simultaneous operation of both types of integration. While some
cultures, depending on their environmental situation, are characterized by the first type of integration, other cultures are characterized by the second integrative process. The simultaneous occurrence of these integrative processes ensures that continued evolutionary change and development of all human societies.

Insofar as any human society may consist of a number of groups and sub-groups of individuals, it is conceivable that both integrative processes may be operating at the same time within any particular society. This possibility is further accentuated by the fact that many groups in a society have entirely differing relationships with the environment, as well as having divergent levels of cultural integration. These differences, for example, are illustrated in the contrasting relationships which groups of a specific society, living in a rural and urban situation, have with the natural environment. There exists the distinct possibility that the environmental and cultural differences between groups living in rural and urban situations respectively, are complemented by different processes of integration which operate within these groups. There is also the definite likelihood that other sub-groups in a society, such as counter-cultural, deviant and religious groups may be subject to differing types of integration.

The dialectical relationship which exists between the two types of biosociological integration is an indication of the fact that man is shaped by the forces of evolutionary development as well as being responsible himself for determining and guiding these evolutionary forces. In this sense man's place in the evolutionary process is unique. He is at
the same time, the subject and the object of evolutionary development and change.
FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER IX


5. Parsons, Talcott; The Social System (Free Press; New York 1951) p. 488.

6. See:
   ii) Barash, David; Sociobiology and Behavior (Elsevier; New York; 1977).
   iii) van den Berghe, Pierre L.; Man in Society (Elsevier; New York; 1975).

7. See:
   i) Tinbergen, Niko; The Study of Instinct (Oxford University Press; New York; 1951).
   ii) Lorenz, Konrad; On Aggression (Harcourt, Brace & World; New York; 1960).
   iii) Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irenaus; Love & Hate - The Natural History of Behavior Patterns (Holt, Rinehart & Winston; New York; 1972).


9. For criticisms of sociobiology and ethology, see:
   ii) Schneewind, Jerome; cited in Time; Ibid.; p. 54.
   iii) Lev, John; 'A Letter From the Publisher' in Time; Ibid.; p. 2.
   iv) Sociobiology Study Group of Science For the People; 'Sociobiology - Another Biological Determinism' in BioScience (Vol. 26; March, 1976) p. 182.
   v) American Survey; 'Anger Among the Anthropologists' in The Economist (January 1, 1972) p. 44.


12. Ibid.; p. 4.

13. See:


15. Ibid.; p. 560.


27. See:


35. Lorenz, Konrad; *On Aggression*; *Op. Cit.*; p. 239.


40. Lorenz, Konrad; *Evolution and Modification of Behavior* (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1965).


42. Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Irena; *Love and Hate - The Natural History of Behavior Patterns*; *Op. Cit.*; p. 3.


44. *Ibid.*; p. 5.


46. *Ibid.*; p. 32.

47. *Ibid.*; p. 32.


53. Tiryakian, Edward; 'Biosocial Man - Sis Et Non' in American Journal of Sociology; Ibid.; p. 705.

54. Apler, Joseph S.; 'Biological Determinism' in Telos (Vol. 5; Spring, 1977) p. 172.


56. See, for example:

57. See:


59. Ibid.; p. 11.


62. See:

64. Ibid.; p. 57.

65. Ibid.; p. 57.


67. See:


70. This overview of Gehlen's theories is based on his major work: *Der Mensch - Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt* (Athenaion; Wiesbaden, Germany; 1976).


72. See:

73. Erickson, Erik. *Identity Youth and Crisis* (W.W. Norton; New York; 1968) p. 94.

74. Ibid.; p. 94.

75. Ibid.; p. 115.


77. Ibid.; p. 554.


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