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IN WILDEST AFRICA:
THE PRESERVATION OF GAME IN KENYA 1895-1933

by

Nora Kelly

B.A. (Hons.), University of British Columbia, 1972

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
in the Department
of
History

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In Wildest Africa: The Preservation of Game in Kenya 1895-1933

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ABSTRACT

Kenya's wildlife is justly famous. This study examines its survival during the first half of the colonial period, both as an example of the capacities and limitations of colonial rule and as a case study in the history of wildlife conservation.

The unusual success of wildlife preservation in Kenya is attributable to a number of factors, of which the most important were the timing of the establishment of the East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya) and the influx of a small but influential population of white settlers. In 1895, when the Protectorate was declared, British East Africa was already famous as a sportsman's paradise, and the swift destruction of large wildlife populations in South Africa and North America during the nineteenth century was deplored. The Foreign Office displayed a considerable interest in game preservation, and the Protectorate administration supported it as well, in part owing to the financial gains that were obtained through the sale of ivory and the expenditures of rich European sportsmen. As this thesis demonstrates, the wish to ensure the continuation of these sources of income, coupled with a sense of moral responsibility, led to the early promulgation of game regulations. Subsequently, the arrival of European settlers, many of whom had been attracted by the opportunities for sport in the Protectorate and wished to see the game preserved, provided an additional strong influence favouring the policy of preservation. It was true that the settlers did not want the
presence of game to interfere with their own economic concerns, and that the game regulations were accordingly modified for their convenience. But the concentration of the economic development of the Protectorate in the European sector, together with the interest in preservation found among both officials and settlers from the earliest years of British rule, permitted the survival of large wildlife populations outside the White Highlands until the idea of national parks took hold in the early 1930's. The parks were intended to provide permanent protection against the ever-increasing threats presented by development and human population growth.

Unfortunately, the structure of game preservation policy built during the first half of the colonial period lacked the essential foundation of African consent. Regulations were drawn up and reserves designated without consulting Africans and with little consideration of their needs. The government admitted that it would be unjust to forbid hunting entirely without the substitution of alternative means of subsistence, and the hunting peoples - primarily the Dorobo, Boni, and Liangule - were given limited rights to kill game. This thesis shows, however, that the restricted permission given did not embrace the continuation of well-established economic patterns, particularly with regard to the ivory trade. In consequence, the game regulations were widely disregarded, and poaching was a serious problem. Attempts to discourage poaching and smuggling met with little success. The colonial government's resources were limited and could not be stretched to cover the efficient
application of policy in the administration's many areas of concern; hence game preservation received short financial
shift, and law enforcement was sporadic. Preservation policy
was more impressive on paper than in reality.

The construction of a preservation policy capable of attracting African as well as European support would have been
difficult. But, by ignoring African interests in favour of the
maintenance of a "sportsman's paradise," the colonial regime
undermined its own success. African resistance to preservation
policy remains a threat to the survival of Kenya's wildlife
today.

This thesis, which is largely based on early European
accounts of British East Africa, British government sources, and
materials in the Kenya National Archives, examines a number of
related subjects which have not hitherto received study. The
early concern for game preservation in Kenya, resulting in the
establishment of regulations and the creation of the Game
Department, the illegal traffic in ivory which developed in
response to the colonial regime's policies, and the relationship
of game to agriculture should be of interest regarding not only
the preservation of wildlife in Africa, but in connection with
Kenya's administrative history and economic and agricultural
development.
So geographers, in Afric-maps,
With savage-pictures fill their gaps:
And o'er unhabitable downs
Place elephants for want of towns.

Jonathan Swift
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INTRODUCTION

Kenya's wildlife is famous all over the world. Thousands of tourists visit Kenya each year to see it, and concern for its survival is expressed by conservationists everywhere. The extensive system of national parks in Kenya, initiated in the 1940s and maintained and extended since independence in 1963, offers, at least in theory, more protection than is enjoyed by wildlife in many other countries. But economic development, the increase of the human population, and poaching all continue to threaten the existence of game both in and out of the parks.

It is remarkable in itself that such a rich and marvelous diversity of animals survived until the parks were established. This survival was the product of unusual historical circumstances, which it is proposed to examine here.

Wildlife and its preservation received a rare degree of attention in Kenya throughout the colonial period. Government interest was present from the outset, and there subsequently developed a strong current of settler support. On the other hand, there were those among the ranks of both officials and settlers who opposed preservation, usually on the grounds that it interfered with economic development. The conflict was a continuing one, as was that between the game regulations based on European ideas of preservation, and traditional African practices regarding game. The usual result of conflict between wildlife and human economic pursuits has been the demise of the former. In Kenya, however, the forces for preservation won a qualified victory.

This achievement is attributable to a fortuitous
combination of attitudes and circumstances: the strong interest of the foreign office in preservation, the early financial gains that the colonial administration obtained through the ivory trade and the expenditures of rich European sportsmen, and the presence in the East Africa Protectorate of a body of settlers who had been attracted to the region partly by game and who did not wish to see it exterminated.

At the outset, the game regulations promulgated by the colonial government restricted hunting throughout the Protectorate, but this position was modified to accommodate the incoming settlers, who were soon allowed to do such as they liked on their own lands. Those settlers who were disinclined to support preservation were partially pacified by cheap hunting licences and the gradual retreat of game from the White Highlands. The settlers, then, as policy developed, were enabled to support preservation while reducing the associated inconveniences to a tolerable minimum.

Unfortunately, the policy of preserving game outside the White Highlands ignored the presence and interests of the major population group: the Africans. Both the general thrust and the details of game policy were formulated without consulting Africans, whose influence was only indirect and extremely limited. In consequence, the application of the regulations was resented, and evasions were widespread. Africans would not obey regulations imposed without their consent unless they were forced to, and as game preservation was not foremost among the government's many pressing concerns, the necessary force was only sporadically exerted. This situation provides an
illustration of a problem common among colonial regimes: that their resources stretched far enough to apply with tenacity only a portion of the many policies laid down; the remainder were unenforceable without the willing cooperation of the colonial subjects. Such cooperation was not forthcoming with regard to game preservation.

The problem posed by a policy lacking African support and sufficient funds for efficient enforcement was aggravated by a confusion of moral and economic aims at the policy-making level. Game preservation was regarded by the government in part as a moral responsibility, and in part as a means of obtaining revenue. These twin motives were not always easily reconciled, and when, as in the case of the ivory trade, conflict arose, government policy was confused and ineffective. Further, game policy was plagued by inconsistencies of local application. The Game Department's inadequate financial resources forced it, for the most part, to leave enforcement of the regulations to local administrative officers whose interests and approaches varied widely.

The result of the exclusion of Africans from the consensus on preservation was that the success achieved by the colonial regime was limited. Outside the European settled areas, the aims of policy were accomplished only by enforcement, not through cooperation. And as the continuation of the outlawed trade in ivory demonstrated, enforcement did not suffice. More significant in the long run was that when Kenya achieved independence in 1963, the new African government was left a legacy not only of parks and other preservation measures, but of
a general and long-standing resistance to these measures on the part of the African population. In these circumstances, the future of preservation was, and remains, uncertain.

This work attempts to examine the preservation of wildlife in Kenya as an example of the capacities and limitations of colonial rule. It also serves as a case study in the history of wildlife conservation: an analysis of the conditions that facilitated conservation and those that circumscribed it. In this respect, it is hoped that this study will illuminate conservation problems elsewhere in Africa.

It was in the first half of the colonial era that game policy was developed and refined and the associated difficulties became apparent. Thus this study is mainly concerned with the period from 1895, when the East Africa Protectorate was established, to the early 1930's, when the decision was taken to establish permanent national parks. In order to understand African responses to colonial policy, however, it is first necessary to discuss the role of game in the pre-colonial African economy. The trade in ivory and other products, its extent and its value to the various participants, helped to shape African activity, legal and illegal, under colonial rule. The illicit traffic in ivory, for example, was a transformation, brought about by colonial pressures and restrictions, of well-developed pre-colonial patterns.

In this study, ivory has been accorded a greater degree of attention than any other game product; ivory was by far the most valuable and sought-after of these products, and it was upon ivory that the development of trade between the coast and the
interior was founded. Thus the routes taken by the coastal traders, the frequency with which they visited the interior, and the size of the trade are considered in some detail in Chapter i. Other game products are treated briefly in Chapter ii.

In the following chapter, the arrival of European explorers and hunters is discussed. These adventurous men made British East Africa famous as a sportsman's paradise. They were a potent force for the early introduction of game regulations, and the image of British East Africa they created helped to draw the sort of settler who later supported preservation policy.

The subject of game regulations was raised by the Foreign Office in the spring of 1896, less than a year after the establishment of the Protectorate. The regulations promulgated in the early years of the Protectorate's history stood, with minor alterations, as the framework of game policy until the creation of national parks in the latter half of the 1940's. Chapter iv examines in detail the development of these regulations, with reference to the Protectorate's finances and the influence of the International Conference for the Preservation of the Wild Animals, Birds, and Fishes of the African Continent, held in London in 1900. None of this material has hitherto been studied, and it is of particular interest because the genesis and nature of the regulations reveals the government's awkward mixture of motives, while the conference and its disappointing aftermath also provide an early example of the difficulty with which international agreements to limit the exploitation of wildlife are reached.

The absence of an agreement among the colonial powers
regarding the trade in ivory and other game products such as rhinoceros horn invited the development of illicit trade across colonial borders. Poaching and smuggling were extremely difficult to check and threatened the government's preservation schemes while diminishing game revenues. The illegal ivory trade is taken up in Chapter vi, following a short chapter devoted to an administrative history of the Game Department. No account of the department's origins and development has previously been written, and the department's chronic shortage of staff and funds hampered the enforcement of game regulations and the realization of game policy.

The problems pursuant to the preservation of game were not confined to infringements of the game regulations. The coexistence of game and agriculture was fraught with difficulties. Crop damage and the transmission of stock diseases were the most important issues, and they are reviewed in Chapter vii. This chapter is intended to provide a preliminary survey with an eye to the influence of these issues on the development of game policy.

The final chapter concerns the attitudes towards game which allowed its continued preservation and led to the decision to establish national parks. The support and cooperation of the settlers was critical in an era when they dominated the economy and politics of Kenya. Unfortunately, African support was no less important to the long-term value of the colonial regime's achievements, and its absence was the Achilles' heel of colonial preservation policy.
In order to set the discussion of game preservation in context, a brief summary of Kenya's history will be useful. In 1886, Great Britain and Germany drew a line from the East African coast to Lake Victoria, dividing their spheres of influence. To the north of this line, British East Africa extended as far as the unmapped southern border of Ethiopia. In 1888, the British government granted a charter to the Imperial British East Africa Company as an inexpensive means of establishing a presence in the region. The government's interest was in controlling the headwaters of the Nile; the Nile affected Britain's interests in Egypt, which in turn were seen as germane to the control of India. The Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 determined that Uganda would also be in the British sphere of influence, and it was in Uganda that the Company placed its hopes of making a profit. The Company did not do well, however. Within a few years it collapsed, and the Foreign Office stepped in, creating two Protectorates: the Uganda Protectorate in 1894, and the East Africa Protectorate in 1895. The East Africa Protectorate, which became Kenya Colony and Protectorate in 1920, was in the beginning viewed more or less as a highway from the coast to the Uganda Protectorate, wherein lay the Nile's headwaters. An expensive railway was built from the coast to Lake Victoria, and, in consequence, Europeans were encouraged to settle in the East Africa Protectorate in order to build the economy and pay for the railway's upkeep. When the Uganda Protectorate's Eastern Province was transferred to the East Africa Protectorate in 1902, the full length of the railway and the entire region which was destined to become the White
Highlands were brought under one administration.

The presence of the European settlers and their forceful politics exerted a powerful influence on the subsequent development of the Protectorate. The settlers swiftly obtained representation in the government, three members being appointed to the Legislative Council in 1907, when the settlers still numbered only a few hundred. In the settlers' eyes, this was but the first step on the road to self-government and the creation of a white man's country.

As the numbers of settlers increased, so did their political strength. In the period following World War I, settler agriculture dominated Kenya's economy, and Sir Edward Grigg, who became Governor in 1925, found that the elected representatives to the Legislative Council wielded so much influence that "the official majority in the Legislative Council had ceased to have any meaning." The goal of self-government seemed almost within reach, yet it receded even as settler power reached its zenith. For the Africans began to find a political voice, and the British government had already declared in 1923 that Kenya was an African territory where the interests of Africans were to be paramount.

At the outset of British rule, the Africans were politically decentralized and ill equipped to resist British force of arms. Agriculture and pastoralism were the predominant modes of life, although hunting and trading also had their place in the pre-colonial economy. The impact of British rule was gradual, as administrative stations spread along the caravan route and subsequent line of the railway and then outward from
it. The first concerns of the government were to subdue resistance and to find sources of revenue; thus, for many Africans, the colonial government first manifested itself as a demand for payment backed up by a demonstrated military superiority. But tax was introduced in 1902; "as it became systematic, numerous Africans were induced to enter the wage economy, seeking jobs on settler farms or government projects in order to acquire cash to pay their taxes. The settlers still had trouble obtaining sufficient African labour, however, and the government found it difficult to balance settler needs against the protection of Africans from compulsory labour.

The desire for revenue also impelled the administration to formulate a land policy which would attract settlers. The land-hunger of the Europeans and their determination to acquire permanent rights eventually resulted in the creation of the White Highlands, where the settlers obtained virtually exclusive rights to land, plus a system of "native reserves" organized on a tribal basis, beginning with the Nsamui Reserve in 1904.

The effects of this system were far reaching. While the white settlers expanded their holdings and commandeered the greatest share of government assistance, Africans found themselves confined to the increasingly-crowded native reserves. The consequent intensification of land use contributed to soil exhaustion and erosion in some reserves, recognized by the Department of Agriculture in the 1930's as the most serious obstacle to the development of African agriculture.

The establishment of the reserves did not quell African fears of the further expansion of the White Highlands at their
expense. The Kikuyu, in particular, were uneasy, and the development of Kikuyu political organizations was stimulated by the land issue as well as by labour grievances. In 1921, the Young Kikuyu Association was formed, and though its leader, Harry Thuku, was deported to Kismayu in 1922, the organization reappeared in 1925 as the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA). Jomo Kenyatta, who in 1963 became the first Prime Minister of an independent Kenya, rose to prominence in the KCA. This group voiced Kikuyu land grievances, petitioned for the right of Africans to grow coffee, and, in the late 1930's, began to develop political contacts with other tribes, including the Kamba, who were resisting government plans to ameliorate the soil erosion problem in the reserve by the compulsory culling of Kamba cattle.

It was in the 1930's that the African sector of the economy began to receive a larger share of the government's attention, and that plans were made for the admission of African representatives to the Legislative Council. But the first representative, E.W. Mathu, was not appointed until 1944, and the transfer of power from European hands was too slow to satisfy a number of politically-active Africans. The KCA was banned in 1940, but some of its leaders became prominent in a new organization, the Kenya African Union. Kenyatta, who returned to Kenya in 1946 after a long absence in England, became president, but while the Kenya African Union functioned as an open and constitutional outlet for African political expression, other political activity was going on beneath the surface. Kikuyu frustrations reached a pitch in 1952 that led to
The declaration of a State of Emergency in October. British troops were flown in, and Kenyatta was tried and imprisoned. Nevertheless, the bell had been sounded for the era of settler domination. Kenyatta, in prison, emerged as a nation-wide symbol of African resistance while negotiations for Kenya's independence and a new constitution were carried on. After a general election in 1963, the victorious Kenya African National Union party installed Kenyatta as Kenya's first Prime Minister. The achievements and problems of the colonial era had passed into African hands.
The most valuable work on indigenous trade is Richard Gray and David Birmingham, eds., *Pre-Colonial African Trade* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). This book covers a large section of tropical Africa, however, and, within Kenya, only the Kamba are studied.

Also, owing to the value of ivory outside Africa, nineteenth-century European observers took more interest in it than in other game products, and thus there is much more material pertaining to ivory and the elephant in the sources for the period.

The ivory trade of the region that became Kenya has not received much study. An overview of the trade in East Africa is presented by R.W. Beachey, "The East African Ivory Trade in the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of African History*, VIII, 2 (1967), but scant attention is given to trade routes north of Kilimanjaro, and Beachey seems to believe that coastal merchants only penetrated northern Masailand in the wake of European explorers. Trade routes are discussed by D.A. Low, "The Northern Interior 1840-84," in Roland Oliver and Gervase Mathew, eds., *History of East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963). However, although this book and the subsequent volume, Vincent Harlow and E.R. Chilver, eds., *History of East Africa* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), are basic texts for anyone studying East Africa, so much ground is covered that the treatment of most subjects is necessarily brief. The importance of the ivory trade to the various peoples of the interior is not considered, for example. A number of essays in Gray and Birmingham, *Pre-Colonial African Trade*, comment on the ivory trade, but as the focus of these studies is much wider, it forms the main subject of none of them. John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the Northern Urema Coast," pp. 75-101, an impressive portrait of Kamba trade, has been most helpful.


The Protectorate remained under the authority of the Foreign Office until 1905, when it was transferred to the Colonial Office. For a fine administrative history of the Protectorate's early years, see G.H. Burney, *British Rule*
A comparable work exists for later years, although a number of regional studies are available.

Research for the chapter was severely curtailed by the inaccessibility of Game Department files, which have not been deposited in the Kenya National Archives and remain unavailable to scholars.


*Indians in Kenya*, Cmd. 1922 (1923), known as the Devonshire White Paper. Grigg was sympathetic to settler aims, and during his term as Governor, the settlers pressed for a European elected majority to the Legislative Council. But Grigg's successor, Sir Joseph Byrne, was a tough administrator who reasserted official control. Bennett, *Kenya*, p. 78.

*Hungrae*, *British Rule*, p. 90.


Bennett, *Kenya*, p. 64.


Coffee was the most lucrative cash crop, and Europeans
argued that if Africans were allowed to grow it, the reputation, and thus the value, of Kenya coffee would be damaged, and that pests would spread from African to European holdings.

16. Bennett, *Kenya*, p. 98. The Kenya African Union was originally called the Kenya African Study Union when it was formed in 1944 with the help of Mathu.
CHAPTER I. Elephants and Ivory Traders

The elephant, walking his ancient ways, is the icon of old Africa. That lost Africa, beloved of the Victorians, uncrammed and untrdden, is still evoked by the surviving herds. Yet the elephant, bearing his ivory tusks, was fated to draw inland the merchants of the East African coast whose caravans were the heralds of change.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, the interior of present-day Kenya was largely isolated from the outside world. Thinly populated, poor, ill-supplied with navigable waterways, and partly infested with tsetse fly, it was difficult of access and offered little but ivory to entice the outsider. That coveted substance, however, brought traders from the coast to the farthest corners of the interior to buy and led adventuresome inland peoples like the Kamba to journey to the coast to sell. Late in the century, the ivory trade was partially responsible for luring European entrepreneurs to East Africa.

Ivory seems to have been coveted by man from the beginning of time. Its colour is pleasing, it may be carved into the most intricate designs, and its texture delights the touch. This exotic, luxurious substance was sought after by both Asian and European peoples, as well as by some Africans. References to it run like a thin, bright thread through the records of early contact with East Africa.

King Solomon, it is said, built a great throne of ivory, and every three years the ships of Takshish brought gold and silver, ivory, and apes, and peacocks. It has been suggested
that in Ptolemy’s time, Greek ships sought ivory south of
Guardafui. Ivory, as well as cinnamon, frankincense, and
tortoise shell, is mentioned in the Periplus of the Erythrean
Sea, some three centuries later. The Arabs traded along the east
coast for ivory and rhinoceros horn, tortoise shell, amber and
leopard skins. In the ninth century, al-Has’udi told of ivory
from the east coast of Africa going to Oman and from there to
China and India. The Indians used ivory for scabbards and dagger
handles, and to make chessmen and backgammon pieces. By the
twelfth century, the Chinese knew ivory and rhinoceros horn as
products of “Zanj,” as Arab geographers called East Africa, and
kept African slaves. At the same time, the market for luxuries
was expanding in Europe. African ivory and gold found their way
there as well as to the far east, and the coastal trade of East
Africa brought prosperity to its Muslim towns. Then the
Portuguese sailed around the Cape of Good Hope and seized a part
of the trade. During the early sixteenth century the Portuguese
factor at Sofala received an annual average of 51,000 pounds of
ivory. Ivory went to India, to China, and to Europe in large
quantities. In the nineteenth century, America became an
important market.

At this time, much of the ivory reaching the east coast was
exported through Zanzibar, where the tusks were sorted into the
various types required by each foreign market. “Soft” ivory,
which could be cut easily without cracking and splitting, was
more valuable than “hard” ivory. “Ball ivory,” (calasig) the
solid tip of the tusk, was also particularly valuable, as, it was
used to make billiard balls. The hollow end, the “bamboo,” which
hoased the nerve, was worth far less. Tusks were often sawn in half; the ball ivory was sent to Europe, and the bamboo went to India where it was fashioned into bangles. Small tusks were generally preferred for ball ivory; thus the tusks of the female elephant were often more valuable than all but the best large tusks from the male. The latter, called *ulava* (the Swahili word for Europe) because most were sent to Europe, ranged from forty pounds up to more than 200 pounds. In the nineteenth century, when the "big tuskers" had not yet been the object of relentless attention by European hunters in East Africa, tusks weighing 100 pounds were not uncommon, and only tusks over 120 pounds were large enough to merit special attention. Ivory of poor quality - defective, broken, and diseased tusks of all sizes - was sold to China to be carved into small ornaments. This was the least expensive ivory, and was called *china*. The most expensive soft ivory usually went to the United States where huge quantities were required for piano keys.

The appetite for ivory in some countries was gargantuan. During the period from 1884 to 1911, the United States imported nearly 10,000,000 pounds of ivory worth close to $27,000,000. Britain imported a million pounds a year in the 1890's. The demand for ivory had pronounced effects on East Africa.

For most of its history, the ivory coveted in these distant parts filtered out to the east coast ports through African hands; expeditions to the interior by coastal traders played no significant part in the ivory traffic until the nineteenth century when there was a boon in the market. It was then that the Marina (men of the coast) and Zanzibari Arabs and Swahili
began to thrust their way inland, generally following routes already pioneered by men of the interior. The increased demand for ivory in the luxury trade of the nineteenth century, and the dwindling supply from coastal elephant herds, coupled with a good market for slaves in Zanzibar, incited the coastal traders to cast their nets widely.

By 1844, the first Arab traders had reached Buganda, pushing north from a fixed settlement at Unyanyembe, in what is now central Tanzania. From there, penetration gradually extended westwards into the ivory-rich region of the Upper Congo. The traders felt their way north from Buganda until they encountered the rapacious Khartoum traders coming up the Nile. Thus the main channel of trader activity formed a great curving arm around what was to be British East Africa, with fingers reaching Ujiji, the Congo, Buganda, and the Nile.

The large area half-enclosed in the traders' embrace was not itself readily traversed. The land was harsh, water and food were difficult to obtain for long stretches, and some of the inhabitants were hostile and contemptuous of traders. Nevertheless, the coastal traders had begun to tap the ivory resources of this difficult terrain by the middle of the century. The ivory trade of the region that became Kenya did not match that of the main route through Unyanyembe to the west of Lake Victoria, but it was not unworthy of notice. In the 1840's, ivory from the banks of the Juba River and lands to the west reached ports on the Benadir coast of Somaliland in quantities of at least 40,000 to 60,000 pounds per year, and more was sent to Berbera in the north. Nearest Zanzibar, the ports of Mombasa,
Tanga, and Pangani all drew upon the routes branching out from Mount Kilimanjaro, many of which extended north and north-west into present-day Kenya. Mombasa was said to export about 80,000 to 90,000 pounds per year. In the 1850's, Richard Burton estimated that Tanga and Pangani exported, respectively 70,000 and 35,000 pounds per year.

Zanzibar, the great emporium of the east coast ivory trade, imported and re-exported ivory from Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani, as well as from ports further south such as Bagamoyo, through which passed ivory from the regions south and west of Lake Victoria. At mid-century, Guillain reported that local merchants estimated Zanzibar's annual ivory trade as 17,000 to 18,000 frasilas or more. (One frasila equalled thirty-five pounds.) Thus if Guillain's and Burton's figures are accurate, Mombasa's trade amounted to roughly fifteen per cent of Zanzibar's, and the trade of Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani together amounted to over thirty per cent. It is impossible to determine precisely how much of this ivory originated within the boundaries which later defined British East Africa. The Juba River divided what became British territory from Somaliland, and a portion of the ivory reaching the Beadadir ports would have come from the Somali side of the river; some of the ivory reaching Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani would have come from south of the border drawn between British and German territory, and some from Uganda and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the indications are that the bulk of the ivory originated in the region that later became Kenya.

The travels of the coastal merchants in search of ivory are of interest because it was these merchants who in large part
opened the interior of this region to the outside world. The traders' insatiable appetite for ivory made an impact on Africans throughout the interior, particularly in those areas which the traders visited frequently, and where, in consequence, the value of ivory rose most swiftly. In addition, the routes established by the traders were later used by Europeans to penetrate much of East Africa. Without the geographical knowledge, the availability of porters, and the established relations with various tribes of the interior resulting from the development of the ivory trade, European penetration of the hinterland would have been immensely difficult.

The coastal merchants sought out areas in which ivory was plentiful and cheap, and where there were local people willing to collect and trade it. There is no evidence that caravans travelled inland to hunt elephant until the European expeditions of the 1880's. Elephants could be found almost anywhere, from the high, chill forests of Mount Elgon to the dense, sweltering bush of the coastal strip. They were, and are, able to survive in a wide range of habitats and climates. But naturally their preferences and habits distributed them unevenly over the landscape, and they could be driven away by continual harassment. Nineteenth-century travellers commented on the absence of elephant from parts of the coastal strip and Kamba country, where they were hunted relentlessly.

In the latter part of the nineteenth century, when the coastal traders were extending their routes in response to the increased demand for ivory, the largest elephant populations were found in Kavirondo, near the Turkwell River and Lake
Budolf, in Laikipia and the hills north-west and north-east of Mt. Kenya, and along the Juba and Tana Rivers.¹⁰

The trade of the Juba was handled by merchants from the ports north of the river's mouth along the Benadir coast, the chief of these being Mogadishu and Brava. The centres of trade on the Juba were Bardera and Logh, or Ganame. The town of Bardera was situated nearly four hundred miles upstream, and lay roughly due east of Mogadishu. Strong enough to have temporarily subjugated Brava prior to Guillaume's visit to that port in 1846, Bardera was still an important inland centre nearly fifty years later, when its population numbered some twelve hundred.¹² Logh, further up-river near the present boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia, was said by some traders to be more important still. A walled town of about a thousand permanent inhabitants, it was, like Bardera, both a centre of trade and a way-station for caravans travelling to the Boran country west of the Juba. Logh was also visited by caravans from Berbera.¹³

It was easier to reach the Juba towns from the Benadir coast than from Mombasa, or points south. No one travelled on foot from the mouth of the Juba; the way was long and difficult and there were hostile Galla on the south bank. In contrast, Logh was only a fortnight's journey away for a caravan from Brava or Merca, and three weeks away from Mogadishu. Bardera was easily reached from the former two ports; Mogadishu caravans wishing to reach it travelled first along the coast to Brava and then inland. The Shebbeli River terminated in some small lakes a day's journey inland, and from there it was four days to the Juba. The wealthy merchants of the Benadir ports sent slaves in
Encounters with traders and evidence of previous visits by traders collected by Europeans in the interior, 1833-96

Points identified prior to Thomson's journey in 1883-84

Routes of the ivory traders in the nineteenth century
caravans to trade in the interior; the less well-off went themselves, departing in November or December and returning to the coast in February or March. Somali traders from the Juba towns also travelled to the Benadir ports, and possibly Berbera. The Somali trading system was well developed. Professional caravaneers penetrated a wide region beyond the Juba, bringing back ivory and other products. By the end of the nineteenth century, their mercantile activity stimulated the Boran to participate in the caravan trade as well; they sent caravans of ivory and slaves to Logh. 17

The trade of Brava and Mogadishu drew merchants from Muscat and the Arabian coast, Somalis from Berbera, and Indians. In the middle of the nineteenth century about 1,000 frasilas (35,000 pounds) of ivory a year came from the Juba region to Mogadishu. Brava exported about 700 frasilas (24,500 pounds) in a good year, and perhaps only 150 frasilas in a poor one. Rhinoceros horn and leopard skins were also exported, as well as myrrh, gum, and slaves. 18 The commerce between the Juba towns and the Benadir coast continued throughout the second half of the nineteenth century, but Europeans journeying from Berbera to Logh in the 1890's found the northern caravan route disturbed by Abyssinian raiding parties. 19

Between the Benadir ports and Mombasa there seem to have been no trade routes to the interior used by coastal caravans, and only small quantities of ivory were brought to the coast by inland peoples. One might have expected that the Tana, navigable in the rainy season and populated by the agricultural Pokoso who exported food, would have been a route for the ivory traders.
None of the Europeans interested in trade reported caravans on the Tana, however. At mid-century, there was a market at Kau, near the mouth of the river, to which the Galla, the cattle-owning tribe which dominated the region, brought ivory. Forty years later there was still a market there, but the trade in ivory was apparently small enough to be handled by a single Swahili merchant. For at least some of this period, the absence of coastal traders may be attributed to the hostility of the Galla. According to Charles New, a missionary who lived and travelled in East Africa from 1863 to 1870, the Galla were sufficiently hostile that traders who had travelled inland for hundreds of miles south of Galla territory had never ventured into it. What ivory reached the coast was brought by the Galla. They exacted ivory as tribute from Boni and Sania hunters, and from the Pokomo, who were primarily agricultural but acquired ivory from the Boni in exchange for cloth and tobacco. Some Pokomo hunted hippopotamus and elephant, but others refused to, as the Galla took too heavy a tribute from the spoils. The ivory that remained in the Pokomo villages after the Galla had helped themselves was now and then traded to the coast for cloth, wire, and beads.

By the end of the 1880's, power of the Galla had waned considerably. They were caught in a vice: the Somali had driven them south from the Juba, and the Masai and Kamba were pushing them north of the Tana. Their numbers had dwindled. But the Galla were still strong enough on some parts of the river to lord it over the Boni and Pokomo. Sir Robert Harvey, a hunter who had visited the Tana in 1885 and shot over the Kilimanjaro
area in 1887, travelled 150 miles up the Tana in 1888. He had the distinct impression that his Galla guides were attempting to hinder his progress up-river, and his account mentions no Swahili traders at all.24

Where the Galla were driven out or subdued, the Somali proved an obstacle to trade. Visitors to the Tana in the 1890's reported that the Somali terrorized the Tana from Ndera, a few days' caravan journey from the coast, to Korokoro, some 300 miles inland, and plundered the ivory stocks of the villages. The Pokomo possessed a good deal of ivory and were anxious to trade, but were fearful of Somali and Galla marauders.25 That it was the hostility of the Galla and Somali rather than difficulties with the terrain that kept the coastal traders off the Tana was confirmed by William Astor Chanler, hunter and explorer, who journeyed up the Tana on foot in 1892. His caravan of 185 men, including 130 Zanzibari porters, reached Hameye, some 350 miles upstream, in a little over five weeks. Chanler said the route was good and presented no difficulties regarding food and water.26

The Somalis' acquisitive attitude to ivory suggests that they were interested in controlling the trade themselves. Like the Galla, they levied tribute in ivory, and, like the Kamba, they were traders who obtained ivory inland and sold it at the coast. They resisted penetration of the Juba region by Europeans, threatening an exploratory steamship with war and preventing the Imperial British East Africa Company from trading on the river.27 As there appears to be no record of Somali traders at the coast near the Tana, it is likely that the ivory
they acquired was taken northwards and found its way to the Benadir ports.

South of the Tana, coastal caravans penetrated far inland, reaching Kikuyu country at least as early as 1848, and Lake Baringo and the region south of Lake Rudolf by the 1860's.

Routes ran inland from Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani, most, though not all, passing through Taveta, the most important inland base for the traders. In the 1840's and 1850's, the traders travelled west to Kilimanjaro, and then either journeyed further west or turned northwards. The western route ran through Kisongo in Masai country, north-west to the volcano Ol Doimo Lengai near Lake Natron, and west again across the plains to the fertile districts on the eastern shores of Lake Victoria. It took about fifty-five days to reach the fertile area where food was abundant, and another eight days to arrive at the lake.

Once at the lake, the traders bartered for ivory and food on its eastern side. They did not turn southward to trade at the foot of the lake or journey further around it to reach the kingdoms on the western side. They were probably discouraged by the competition of traders from Tabora who enjoyed the advantage of a secure and permanent base, much further inland than Taveta, from which to organize themselves for the long journeys to the lands west of the lake. Thus, as the traders using the Kilimanjaro routes extended their operations, they turned to the north. The accounts of Wakefield and Hew, based on information collected in the 1860's, refer to places like Kisumu on the north-eastern edge of the lake, and Wakefield recorded a route used to reach them: from Tanga via Usambara to
Kilimanjaro, and to Arusha and Ol Doinyo Lengai, as previously known, then north the Ngurumani at the northern end of Lake Natron, to Lake Naivasha and across the Mau plateau to the fertile districts of Lumbwa and Kavirondo. By 1870, the westward route to the lake had crept northward far enough to join with those searched out by the traders who ventured straight north from Kilimanjaro. At that time, Lake Baringo, known to the traders for over a decade, was the furthest northerly point reached by the route up the east side of Lake Victoria; further on, the hostile Suk barred the traders' passage.

Meanwhile, the coastmen had been opening up other routes to the north. These began with visits to Ukambani, the southern border of which was only three days from Taveta. It was then only five days more to Ulu, a centre of trade. Although at least one caravan reached Kikuyu country via Ukambani by mid-century, traders did not habitually use Ukambani as a base for excursions beyond. Ukambani would have been a useful way-station, as in good years there was much food to be had. But the Kamba were themselves long-distance traders in ivory and wished to retain control of their routes. The Kamba consider themselves entitled to the monopoly of the trade of the interior coastwards, in the direction of Mombaz. Nor will they allow the Swahili and Arabs to trade with Ukambani, Kikuyu, Aberre, Hembu, Udaka, and other inland countries.

The arrival of Kamba traders at the coast was first recorded by an English naval officer at Mombasa, who in 1823 found an annual market, held in August, where the Kamba exchanged ivory, cattle, and iron for beads, wire, and cloth. In 1848, the arrival of a
Kamba caravan led by Kivoi, a Kamba trader well known at the coast, was witnessed at Rabai by more than one European.36 According to Dr. Johann Krapf, a missionary at Rabai in the 1840's, the Kamba were the commercial medium between the coast and the interior. Caravans of 200 to 300 people travelled as much as 250 leagues in search of ivory and brought it to the coast, the Kamba thereby attaining "considerable opulence." The Kamba settlement near Rabai helped to reinforce this strong trading link; Krapf said this group was in constant touch with Ukambani.37 The other European witness to the Kamba presence at the coast, Guillain, who made it his business to enquire about trade, also referred to the arrival of Kamba caravans as an habitual occurrence. The greatest number came to Rabai in July and August, bringing ivory and copal; a caravan might carry as much as four hundred frasilas of ivory. The Kamba did not go to Mombasa itself, but to the Nyika villages nearby, principally Rabai, where the Nyika acted as intermediaries between the Kamba and the coast merchants, profiting through commissions on the transactions, or buying ivory from the Kamba and reselling it to the merchants. At the middle of the nineteenth century, the Kamba supplied Mombasa with most of its ivory, and the trade occupied an important place in the Kamba economy, assisting the Kamba to acquire livestock and great quantities of coastal goods.38

If the Kamba stood astride the most convenient route to the elephant country around Mt. Kenya and further north-west, theirs was only one potential channel for the ivory trade, and it was not possible to dam up the coastmen forever. By 1870, they had
flowed around Okambani to the south and west. Routes recorded by Wakefield and Christie at that time were later confirmed by European explorers and hunters who followed the paths beaten by the traders.

The destinations of the routes recorded by Wakefield and Christie were Daitcho, on the east side of Mt. Kenya, Laikipia, the high, grassy plateau north-west of the mountain, and Samburu, beyond Laikipia. The quickest way to Daitcho would have been through Okambani, but as that way was barred, the traders took a more circuitous route to the west. From Mombasa, they went first to Taveta, and then north to Usiri on the east side of Mt. Kilimanjaro. Skirting the mountain's great flanks, they proceeded north-west to Kianzimia, and then struck west north-west across the Masai plains to Mianzini, a Dorobo village where it was possible to buy food grown by the Kikuyu. From there it was a quick step to Lake Naivasha, a cold climb over the Settima Mountains, and they were approaching Mt. Kenya from the west. Pausing at Ndaru, the path then turned north again, hugging the mountain's knees, and passed through Meru to reach Daitcho on the eastern side. Here much food was produced, and Chamler, exploring with von Bohnel in 1892, found the area swarming with caravans.

Another route passed from Taveta northwards around Kilimanjaro to Raribo, (later to be a station on a smuggling route to German East Africa) and Salago Kanga, a Masai settlement where European travellers later found a traders' stockade. This route then followed a north-easterly course to Doiny Orok and on to Ngong on the edge of Kikuyu. Traversing
Kiamasingi, Naivasha, and the Settima Mountains, it then struck north to Laikipia and Samburu instead of turning east to Mt. Kenya. Laikipia was reached in forty-three marching days, although the actual time elapsed was much longer owing to the frequent stops made by the caravans to obtain food and ivory. Christie spoke with the leaders of a caravan from Pangani who made this trip in 1868. One leader had made fifteen journeys among the Masai, the other, nine. Together they led a caravan of a thousand men, leaving Pangani at the beginning of the dry season — the end of November or early December — and they travelled as far as Taveta, where they split into two groups, one of which went to Arusha and the other due north, journeying some five hundred miles from the coast. The outward journey lasted four or five months.*

Until the 1880's, Europeans had not penetrated Masailand, and relied upon Swahili and Arab caravan leaders for information on the network of routes across the interior. Krapf had visited Ukambani, New had seen Taveta and its flourishing trade,** and a few other Europeans had pushed inland here and there, but Joseph Thomson was the first European to follow the traders' tracks across Masailand. Thomson, a young man bitten hard by the exploration bug, had previously journeyed to Lake Nyasa and Lake Tanganyika, taking over command of the expedition when the leader died, and had also prospected for coal in the Kavuma valley for the Sultan of Zanzibar. He was chosen by the Royal Geographical Society to lead his own expedition across Masailand to Lake Victoria.***

At the time he was organizing his expedition, in 1883, the
Kavirondo district was well known. Thomson acquired a guide, Muhiina, an ivory trader who had apparently entered Masailand at least twenty times, and who claimed to know all the routes to Kavirondo. The inhabitants of the district had already achieved a reputation for hard bargaining, and were described as bold hunters of elephant, buffalo, and rhinoceros. Lake Baringo was also familiar to the traders. It had been named and placed with reasonable accuracy on Krapf's map more than two decades earlier. Clearly, both Muhiina and Jumbe Kimaneta, an ivory merchant from Pangani with whom Thomson joined up at Taveta, knew the lake. When Thomson discussed with traders at Taveta what route he should take across Masailand, they recommended precisely the same path that Wakefield and Christie had heard about, and that was the path he followed. Water was not a problem, but the traders had to buy food on the north side of Kilimanjaro, as there was none to be had on the three weeks' journey across the plains.

Although this route had been established for some time when Thomson arrived, it was not a perfectly safe one. The Masai, lords of the plain, determined who might come and go. The traders told Thomson they never travelled through Masailand in numbers fewer than three hundred, implying that smaller caravans were too vulnerable to attack. The route Thomson took had been closed for a while owing to the near annihilation of several caravans by the Masai of Lytokitok and Matumbato. The Masai often levied tolls (hongo) without attacking, however, and some elders told Thomson they were glad to see the caravan, as they were short of iron wire, beads, and chains. The Masai were also
passionately fond of tobacco, which they could obtain from the traders. Large caravans provided a degree of security, and the traders kept together through Masailand as far as Naivasha or Baringo. Then 150 or 300 men would branch off for Laikipia, while others might work further west. The groups would meet again at Misansini, or if really strong, might march back separately to Arusha-wa-Chini or Taveta. There, the ivory would be finally apportioned according to the amount of trade goods contributed by each trader."

In spite of the dangers, the routes across Masailand were reasonably well frequented. Thomson and his guide Muhinna were joined by the enterprising Kimameta at Taveta, and by two more traders from Mombasa while buying food at Rombo. Yet another wrote to request that they await his caravan before crossing the plains. Muhinna met some old friends at Njemps, and on the return journey, Thomson's group encountered another caravan of 1200 at Ngong. The traders were increasingly busy north of Masailand, as was witnessed a few years later by Count Teleki and Ludwig von Hohnel who were the first Europeans to reach Lake Rudolf. Thomson said that Nyaboto, north of Baringo, had been open to traders for only a few years. Later, in the decade, when von Hohnel passed through, that area was alive with caravans. While Thomson sailed out from Njemps to touch base at Lake Victoria's north-eastern shore, Kimameta pressed further inland than he ever had before, reaching Elgumi, which he described as a densely populated region eighty miles beyond Nyaboto and untouched by the caravans. Kimameta also said he had been the first to reach Ngamatak via the Turkwell River; he must have
opened a route hitherto blocked by the Suk. Indeed he later boasting to von Hohnel that he had visited the Suk in 1884, when they were not peaceable; he had been "firm", however, and since then the Suk had been willing to sell ivory.** The traders were also a presence at least as far west as Mt. Elgon and the districts lying between the mountain and Lake Victoria. Thomson's merchant companions tried to discourage him from attempting to reach the lake, but he hastened off regardless, and in Kabaras, south of Elgon, was greeted by the familiar "jambo" (hello) of the coast.**

Thomson followed known trade routes all the way; it was left to two extremely competent and hard-wearing Hungarians, Count Teleki von Szék and Ludwig von Hohnel, to push into territory untouched by the coastal caravans. They led the first European expedition to Lake Rudolf and Lake Stefanie in 1886-1888. They followed Thomson's footsteps as far as Lake Baringo. There, Thomson had been told of two lakes to the north, the nearer one being occupied by both Turkana and Samburu. But at the end of 1887, when Teleki and von Hohnel were poised to depart northwards from Wjempa and discussed their plans with Kimameta (their guide as he had been Thomson's) they could obtain no certain intelligence. No one knew whether there were two lakes or one, or how far away they were.*** Possibly Kimameta was concealing his knowledge, hoping to discourage the Europeans from exploring further. If so, he failed. Teleki and von Hohnel, unlike Thomson, were well aware that travellers were often falsely informed, "the caravan people deceiving them in the hope of preventing them from going farther.*** In the event, they
chose a guide from Wjempa who had been to Pangani with a trading caravan, and claimed to have guided another to lands north and north-west of Lake Baringo.

The experiences of Teleki and von Hohnel at Mt. Nyiro and along the eastern shores of Lake Rudolf to the northern end, convinced them that they had passed beyond the reach of the ivory caravans. At Mt. Nyiro, the capricious tastes which usually accompanied familiarity with the caravan trade were absent. "Their favourite ornament is brass wire; but all our articles of barter were very welcome to them, especially the copper mukufu, [fine wire] which seemed to be quite unknown to them." Moreover, ivory was very cheap along the lake's eastern shores. The El Molo would sell a 24 pound female tusk for 10 strings of Masai beads, and a 166 pound tusk went for 9 small rings of iron wire and a dozen strings of varied beads. Cloth was not asked for; tusks were bought for "ridiculous" prices. Many elephants with large tusks were seen in the neighbourhood, a sure sign that ivory traders were not working the area. The two Europeans found themselves to be the first traders or travellers to visit the Reshia at the north end of the lake. There was a flourishing local trade in coffee, tobacco, red quartz beads and iron, and a north-going trade to Lake Stefanie exchanging ivory for cattle, wool and beads. Furthermore, Teleki and von Hohnel understood that the Rendile were active traders, exchanging wool for ivory. Probably most of the ivory found its way to the Juba or to Ethiopian ports, but long-distance traders had not yet come themselves to collect it.

If the north and south ends of Lake Rudolf were virgin
territory, the Igamatak area west of the lake was already worked by caravans. Kimameta said he had been there twice in 1884. The people living along the Turkwell were anxious to sell ivory, and at Ngaboto, further south towards Baringo, the Turkana had often dealt with caravans (caravans in distress, thought von Hohmel, as he found these Turkana overbearing).

Teleki and von Hohmel spent nearly two years travelling to Lake Rudolf and back, and the frequency with which they encountered coastal caravans attests to a lively trade along the routes to Kilimanjaro and the north.

First of all Teleki paid Kimameta $2000 to guide them, and permitted him to bring his own small caravan to trade in ivory. Then Teleki attempted to hire porters in Pangani. It turned out to be difficult because many caravans were travelling to the interior from that port. For the last fourteen years, wrote von Hohmel, Pangani had been a starting point for large caravans on their way to Masailand to trade for ivory in great quantities.

At Taveta, where Teleki and von Hohmel were based for two and a half months (meanwhile exploring Kilimanjaro and Meru and hunting a great deal) they met a caravan back from Ngaboto bringing some large tusks. Another caravan was encountered at Arusha-wa-Chini; it numbered some 170 men and had collected a lot of ivory in Laikipia.

Von Hohmel learned that there were four routes to Masailand from the coast: (1) through Ukambani to Ngongo Bagas, (2) skirting Kilimanjaro to the east, and then working north, (3) passing between Kilimanjaro and Meru, (4) extending further west to Arusha-wa-Juu and then turning north. The caravans going up
country avoided the last route, von Hohnel was told, owing to the very large hongo demanded. But they used it on the way out, as the tribute then was small, ivory being about all the traders would still be carrying. Usually they paid in weapons, no longer needed on the home stretch from Kilimanjaro to the coast.

As von Hohnel and Teleki moved north, following the second route along Kilimanjaro's eastern flanks, they were joined at Useri by another large caravan. Teleki agreed to join forces, but would not permit any shooting, as it would make the game wild. The assembled caravans carried their own food across Masailand, Ngongo Bagas being the next regular oasis for caravans. The travellers found relations with the Kikuyu very uneasy, but the Kikuyu, happily for the traders, were less fussy than some when choosing trade goods. The Kikuyu had a reputation for hostility to traders, and it is possible that Ngong was not visited often. Miansini was close by, and there the traders could obtain Kikuyu grain and vegetables through Dorobo middlemen.

After passing through Kikuyu to Ndoro, on the south-east slopes of Mount Kenya, where sheep, goats, and cereals were purchased for the next stage of the journey, the caravan crossed Laikipia. A chance meeting occurred with some traders from Musias who astonished the Europeans with the information that the caravan they had encountered at Arusha-wa-Chini heading to the coast was already back again, 170 strong, buying ivory in Laikipia. Mpuji was the leader; he had visited Laikipia every year for a long time.

In December, Wjemps was reached. It was a place all too
accustomed to caravans, von Hohnel reported: the people were spoiled by "constant and long" visits from caravans, and were exacting as to what they would take in trade. No glass beads were acceptable; for grain they wanted cloth, for ivory, cattle. Considerable "tribute" also was required."

Owing to a famine in the area, the caravan had to cast about for food. One group was sent back to Miansini, a Dorobo settlement east of Lake Naivasha on the edge of Kikuyu. There they found only more famine and three more caravans in distress. One, in which Kimameta had an interest, had even failed to acquire ivory. Teleki supported the entire camp by shooting. During the first 50 days after they left Njamps, he killed 113 large animals, including 51 buffalo, 21 rhinoceros, and 10 elephants.

North of Laikipia, no caravans were met on the east side of Lake Rudolf. But west of the lake, traders were familiar to the inhabitants, and a small caravan of 120 men was encountered in southern Ngaboto. It was part of a large expedition under the Mombasa trader Abd-er-Rahman, the main body of which lay at Njamps. This small group was trying to buy donkeys, as the caravan already had more ivory than it could carry, and another group was optimistically adding to the ivory stocks.

Back in Njamps, in July 1888, Teleki and von Hohnel met another big caravan, led by Abdullah, an Arab from Mombasa. He had travelled inland via Urambani and then peacefully through Kikuyu. He was accompanied by the famous Usodi known by New, von der Decken, and Thomson, and had supposedly bought 200 slaves between the coast and Lake Baringo.
Teleki and von Hohnel made their way back to the coast via Ukambani, as had Thomson. The Kamba were well-acquainted with caravans, even bringing cooked food out to meet them. But ivory was wanted for hongo. The reason was that, although the coastal caravans had outflanked them, the Kamba still carried on an ivory trade of their own. In consequence, ivory, hippopotamus teeth, and rhinoceros horn were the most acceptable barter items, after which came brass wire, thick cottons, and then natron, axes, thin copper wire, and lastly, beads.*5

Prior to the prolonged visit and detailed observations of von Hohnel, there is no direct evidence to indicate how frequently caravans reached the remote parts of the interior. Teleki and von Hohnel's experiences in the late 1880's show that a steady commerce had grown up by then. In the course of his narrative of their twenty-months' journey, von Hohnel specifically mentions some dozen coastal caravans (apart from those competing for porters at Pangani) all working the same areas: Njemp's, Laikipia and the Turkana country south-west of Lake Rudolf. On average then, a caravan reached Baringo and points north every seven or eight weeks. And as these caravans generally remained for periods lasting from a few weeks to several months, collecting ivory and bargaining, von Hohnel's remark that Njemp's was the scene of "constant" visits (apart from the seasons when the rains immobilized most travellers) may be taken as substantially accurate.

Another European who spent a long period in the northern interior was William Astor Chanler, who explored the country to the east and north-west of Mt. Kenya. He was based in Daitcho
and saw many caravans, mostly from Mombasa, come and go.

As the Daitcho are a weak people, and consequently not aggressive, they receive frequent visits from the traders of the coast, who go to them for the purpose of purchasing food for their journeys through the desert inhabited by the Wanderobbo, from whom the traders purchase ivory. From these frequent visits the Daitcho have assumed the position of middle-men between the wealthy Embe and the traders in the purchase of donkeys. The donkeys are much in demand among the Zanzibari traders for use as beasts of burden, and are greatly prized by the Wanderobbo, who will exchange a large tusk of ivory, and at times two, for a donkey.66

Immediately following Chamler's departure, Arthur H. Neumann, an elephant-hunter of renown, visited the same regions, spending close to three years in the interior and reaching the settlements on the Omo River at the far end of Lake Rudolf. When he reached the lake in 1895, the Samburu at Mt. Nyiro were "accustomed" to caravans.67 Neumann met Mombasa caravans on the east side of the lake and traders who had been to the northern end. So the regions untouched only a few years earlier were now part of the traders' beat.

Unfortunately, von Hohnel and other travellers rarely recorded any evidence on the amounts of ivory collected by the caravans. The only clues von Hohnel gives are that Kimameta was dissatisfied with 1100 pounds as his share of the proceeds from Laikipia, and that a large caravan at Ijumps had collected more ivory than it could carry. If a large caravan numbered 400 men (one of 120 men was called small) and each man carried one framila, (35 pounds) then 14,000 pounds would be the amount collected and carried away, exclusive of donkeys. Allowing only about 7 successful visits a year by caravans of 250 men, one arrives at a minimal ivory output of 60,000 pounds a year from
the north-western region. Such a figure is consistent with the number of caravans recorded by von Hohnel. Nevertheless, it is merely an approximation, and could be an underestimate. Porters were capable of carrying heavier loads, and many caravans bought donkeys to carry ivory. More ivory came from regions further south, from the eastern shores of Lake Victoria and the Dorobo country which straddled the dividing line drawn by the British and Germans in 1886 to determine their spheres of influence.

By that time, the farthest destinations of the routes in the Lake Rudolf region were sometimes found beyond the borders eventually assigned to British East Africa. Trade routes in the Juba and Lake Victoria areas had long crossed these future borders. It is therefore not possible to state with precision how much of the ivory reaching the coast by the Kilimanjaro and Juba routes originated within the boundaries later defining British East Africa. Nevertheless, 125,000 pounds a year may be hazarded as an approximation: that is, 60,000 pounds from the north-west, plus half the ivory of the Juba region, or roughly 25,000 pounds, plus perhaps another 40,000 from the regions adjoining Lake Victoria and those reached by the traders based at Daitcho.

This trade was not only profitable to the merchants from the coast; it touched the lives of most of the peoples of the interior. Nearly all tribes participated in the trade to some degree, and probably by the 1880's all were aware of ivory as a saleable commodity. The ivory trade was not great enough to have stimulated large-scale economic dependence upon it by Africans in the interior. But in areas where prices reached levels that
enabled Africans to obtain cattle, the trade was clearly of considerable value to them. The ivory trade was also a regular source of luxuries to many Africans, and the traders were a marked presence in the lives of some. The people living at Taveta, Njemps, Daitcho, and Mumias, the bases at which the traders organized themselves for their journeys into the surrounding country, provided food and hospitality for extended periods in return for goods. The people at Njemps and Mumias also sold ivory for high prices. The Kamba obtained ivory from hungry caravans travelling back to the coast, and when they allowed the traders to travel inland through their country, the Kamba dealt extensively in foodstuffs and livestock. The hunting peoples, such as the Dorobo, supplemented their diet with food exchanged for ivory. Even the disdainful Masai, although a hazard, did not constitute an impassable barrier to the caravan trade. In fact, they took part in it. Swahili traders were careful to keep on a good footing with the Masai, not only out of fear, but because the Masai knew where the Dorobo ivory was, and often how much there was.

On the other hand, the dangerous reputation of the Masai was not a mere fabrication. Thomson was intimidated by them, and he was told that a year prior to his arrival at Taveta the Masai had attacked a caravan going from Ukanbani to Taveta and killed forty porters. A party of Europeans, in East Africa on a shooting expedition based at Taveta, heard of a least one attack by Masai on a large Swahili caravan, and were sufficiently intimidated by reports of large numbers of Masai at Mara to abandon a plan to hunt there. Raids took place within a day's
march of Mombasa as late as 1893. They kept the traders out of their country when they chose, but they often preferred to bully the caravans, allowing them through after taking a large toll in trade goods.

The caravan trade reached its height in the 1890's, the coast men pushing always further into the hinterland as ivory rapidly became more expensive. The evidence indicates that scarcity was already a problem in some of the districts closest to the coast. Decades earlier, in 1860, Krapf had remarked that elephants had been driven from the Nyika territories at the coast "owing to their being so much molested since European commerce with Zanzibar has produced so great a demand for ivory." Neumann, setting off on his elephant-hunting expedition in 1893, noted that he saw little game before he reached Okambani, and none at all there. In 1888, the IBBA Company sent an expedition inland to trade for ivory, expecting to extract a profit from large-scale transactions at Baringo, but the caravan had to go as far as Mt. Elgon to buy ivory in quantity. A report on the region including Kavirondo, Mt. Elgon, and lands further north and east, noted that ivory was not especially plentiful in Kavirondo and Suk. On the other hand, it was abundant further up-country, at the northern end of Lake Rudolf, in Turkana, and in Karamoja.

The days when a few strings of beads would purchase a big tusk were gone, however. Prices naturally rose as a consequence of scarcity, competition among the traders, and African familiarity with trade goods. At Ejems, cattle had been demanded in exchange for ivory at least since 1888. By 1890, the
Sebei, north of Elgon, would trade ivory only for cattle. In 1895, one frasila of ivory cost two cows at Humias. Beyond these centres where the caravans fitted up for further excursions, prices were lower, but livestock was required in most areas. In relatively accessible areas, one cow would buy one frasila. Further north and east, in regions more recently penetrated by the traders, ivory could be purchased with sheep and goats. In Turkana, "livestock was invariably required in exchange for ivory." Three to five goats purchased one frasila— with some iron wire, brass wire, and beads thrown in. Moreover, the Turkana used delaying tactics, knowing that the longer the traders stayed, the more food they would have to pay for. North of Elgon, four goats paid for one frasila; as elsewhere, wrote one observer, ivory might only be bought with livestock. Only in the most remote areas in the far north could ivory still be purchased with cloth."

Although details of ivory transactions are scanty, owing to the reluctance of the traders to give away their hard-earned secrets, the general pattern is clear. When the caravans reached a new area, ivory was gladly exchanged by Africans for beads and wire, the cheapest trade goods. Next, cloth was demanded, and as caravans competed and the local people gradually realized what high prices ivory could command, livestock was required in trade. Finally, even sheep and goats were insufficient, and only cattle, the most prized of possessions, would purchase ivory. The traders profited from the variations in value of both trade goods and ivory. Livestock could be bought with trade goods at bases in Ukambani, Daitcho, and Humias, and traded elsewhere for
ivory worth a much larger amount in trade goods. As the price of ivory rose in areas easily reached from the bases, the traders pushed further out, and the pattern was repeated. This system worked until the traders' thrust inland was halted and competition within a restricted sphere drove up the cost of livestock and ivory to the point at which no profit could be made. Then the traders might turn to raiding.75

In 1895, when the British Protectorate was established, the pattern over most of the territory had reached the stage at which livestock was demanded by Africans in exchange for ivory, but the trade was still profitable and peaceful, with rare exceptions. One of the latter was Ketosh, where coastal traders were raiding and stealing cattle before 1890.76 The merchants' profits looked like easy pickings to the casual observer, but Europeans who watched more carefully noticed that both knowledge and patience were required of the traders.

These men travel far into the interior establishing here and there posts and collecting stations, from which they visit surrounding districts in search of some particular tusk or tusks they have heard of, and where afterwards they store the purchased ivory until their return to the coast.

These people possess all the will and patience that are inseparable from the character of a successful ivory trader. It is not an uncommon thing for one or more of them to spend a week or so over the purchase of one tusk. We have on one occasion, and them with no little pride on the part of the exhibitor, been pointed out a tusk weighing some 100 pounds that took six weeks to purchase.

Ivory is fairly plentiful. Its value depends altogether on the demand for it. The native traders are loath to give any information as to where it may be most plentifully found or what they really pay for it, but livestock of sorts is almost always used in its purchase.76
The presence of the coastal traders stimulated a commercial interest in ivory all over East Africa. Wherever they went, their single-minded pursuit of ivory raised its price and made its acquisition by Africans worth some effort and risk. In the 1890's, Abyssinians were raiding for ivory from Somaliland to Lake Rudolf, the Somali and Galla commanded tribute in ivory from weaker tribes, members of the coast-dwelling Giriama tribe were travelling up the Tana in search of elephant, and Kamba hunters and traders were journeying as far up-country as Mt. Nyiro. When the trade was at its height, the tusks of over 3,000 elephants were annually carried to the coast from all parts of British East Africa. No other game animal was the subject of such intense commercial interest.

The Africans who extended hospitality to the coastal merchants, killed the elephants, collected the ivory and in some cases transported it, and the merchants who travelled inland, together forged the first strong links between the coast and the hinterland. These links were useful to the European explorers and entrepreneurs who came to East Africa. But they were to prove resistant to control by European administrators, as was the wider spectrum of African attitudes and practices regarding game.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


3. By the 1890's, one third of African imports to the United States was ivory worth around half a million dollars and weighing some 60 to 75 tons. A generation later, America imported as much as 200 tons a year, but prior to World War II the volume dropped to some 30 to 40 tons. Cyrus Townsend Brady, Jr., Commerce and Conquest in East Africa (Salem: the Essex Institute, 1950), pp. 141-2. Like that of Europeans, American taste in ivory luxuries ran to billiard balls, piano keys, napkin rings, knife handles, combs, brushes, mirrors, and shoe horns, and carved knickknacks.

4. The region that became Kenya produced soft ivory, which sold for one third more per pound than hard ivory. Hard ivory came from Uganda, Ujiji, and the upper waters of the Congo. The difference probably can be attributed to variations in the mineral content of soil and water. On Zanzibar's ivory trade, see George Frederick Kunz, Ivory and the Elephant (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page and Company, 1916), Chapter 12; D.R. O'Sullivan Beare, "The Ivory Trade of Zanzibar," Travel and Exploration I (1909), 370-5; The Gazette for Zanzibar and East Africa III (December 5, 1894); Beachey, "Ivory Trade," pp. 269-90.

5. Kunz, Ivory, pp. 447-8, 455-6. Total annual imports cannot be used to measure the exports of ivory-bearing countries, as the importers re-sold large amounts to each other.


For brevity, the term "coastal traders" will henceforth be deemed to include Zanzibari and Swahili traders.

7. The Khartoum traders were pushing towards Bunyoro in the 1860's. Sir Richard Burton, The Lake Regions of Central Africa (2 vols.; New York: Horizon Press, 1961), II, 193-

The heavily-travelled routes running westward from points further south along the coast are outside the scope of this discussion.


Burton, one of the great nineteenth-century travellers and eccentrics, had already made his famous journeys to Mecca and Harar. He spent six months in and around Zanzibar in 1856-1857 preparing for his expedition to central Africa.

11. Guillain, *Documents*, III, 311. These figures seem high, but a total of 17,000 to 18,000 frasélas, or roughly 600,000 pounds does not appear wildly improbable when compared with the customs returns for 1859, which reported exports of nearly half a million pounds. From that point until the late 1890's, Zanzibar's exports averaged about 400,000 pounds per year. Beachey, "Ivory Trade," p. 287.

12. All the figures are possibly too high, but both Guillain
and Burton were interested and careful observers.

13. Game Department Reports of the 1920's assert that there were many more elephants on the British side of the Juba. On the evidence of smuggling patterns, it was at least true that large numbers of elephants lived on the British side. Further south, ivory transported to the coast by Kamba traders originated largely in what became British territory, though some came from regions south of Kilimanjaro. John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the Northern Nriima Coast," in Gray and Birmingham, Pre-Colonial African Trade, pp. 81-82. Most of the ivory brought by coast merchants to Mombasa, Tanga, and Pangani travelled via routes using Kilimanjaro as an inland base, and according to information given by the traders themselves, nearly all these routes extended into British East Africa, whether northwards across Masailand, or westward to Lake Victoria and then north along the lake. In the 1880's and 1890's, some of these routes extended as far as Uganda and Ethiopia to the west and north of Lake Rudolf, but even then it was not common for the traders to travel so far. See below, pp. 26-35.

14. This conclusion is based on the records of nineteenth-century trade routes, reports of European travellers to the interior, and later evidence regarding the distribution of the elephant population. Such evidence is found in Game Department reports and in the records of districts where elephants were regarded as a problem.

The nineteenth-century ivory traders were attracted to areas where ivory was abundant, and their repeated journeys to Kavirondo, the Turkwell, Lake Rudolf, Laikipia, St. Kenya, and the Juba River indicate that these regions were well stocked with elephants. The evidence concerning trade routes is examined in detail in the remainder of Chapter i. The most valuable accounts of trade routes are found in Guillain, Krapf, Burton, Christie, Wakefield, New, Farler, Thomson, von Hohnel, and Chanler, detailed references to which will be found in subsequent notes to this chapter.

The observations of nineteenth-century European travellers confirm the abundance of elephants in most of the regions mentioned, including the Turkwell, Lake Rudolf, Laikipia, and St. Kenya. The Tana was not frequented by traders, owing to the hostility of the Galla, but European travellers reported that there was ivory in the Pokono villages along the banks and that Kamba and Boni elephant hunters haunted the river. In the colonial period, illegal traffic in ivory was prevalent along the Tana and Juba Rivers. The illegal trade is discussed in Chapter vi.

Further evidence regarding the location of concentrations of elephants is afforded by the complaints
of crop-growers. Elephant damage frequently recurred in Laikipia, in Kajiado near Mt. Kenya, in Nyamira Province, the Tana River District, and on parts of the coast, particularly near Lamu. Crop damage is discussed in Chapter vii.

15. Guillain, **Documents**, III, 37-39; Commander P.G. Dundas, "Exploration of the Rivers Tana and Juba," *Scottish Geographical Magazine*, II (March, 1893), 124; Dundas, "Expedition up the Juba River through Somaliland, East Africa," *Geographical Journal*, I (March, 1893), 219-20. Dundas took a steamer up the Juba to Bardera and a little beyond in 1891, being the second European to do so. The first, von der Decken, was killed near Bardera in 1865. Dundas did not proceed further up-river, but he heard reports of Logh as another important trading centre and crossing.

16. James Christie, *Cholera Epidemics in East Africa* (London: Macmillan and Co., 1876), p. 188. Christie so described a town called "Ganane," another name for Logh, according to Guillain's informants. The Hebbi Ganane was the Somali name for the Juba or the upper waters thereof; Ganane meant division, and doubtless referred to the great fork in the Juba near which Logh is situated. Guillain, **Documents**, III, 2, 177-8. Guillain reported that caravans from Ganane travelled to Berbera carrying ivory, ostrich feathers, and incense, and were surpassed in wealth only by the Abyssinian slave caravans. Cholera travelled with the traders in the 1860's, moving south from Berbera to infest Ganane, Bardera, and Brava. Guillain, **Documents**, II, 482; Christie, *Cholera*, p. xii.


20. Guillain, **Documents**, III, 384; Dundas, "Exploration of Tana," p. 115. Brava merchants obtained a little ivory from the Gallia at Bas Bourgao, a point halfway between Lamu and the mouth of the Juba.

23. Captain Sir John Willoughby, *East Africa and Its Big Game* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1889), p. 268. William Astor Chanler, on the Tana in 1892, saw the Galla at Korokoro in a "very weak state" owing to Kamba attacks; Somali were also ravaging along the Tana. Chanler to IBBA Company, November 28, 1892, Foreign Office (hereafter P.O.) 2/57, p. 64. Carl Peters, who travelled up the Tana in 1889, was told by the Galla that they had been squeezed by the Kamba and Somali. They also said that a trade in ivory was carried on between their part of the river (about 300 miles upstream) and regions further west where there were many elephants. Dr. Carl Peters, *New Light on Dark Africa* (London: Ward, Lock, and Co., 1891), pp. 126, 128.

24. Willoughby, *Big Game*, pp. 269-70. However, a traveller of 1892 saw a Swahili sailing his own dhow up the Tana with the purpose of hunting elephant. J.W. Gregory, *The Great Rift Valley* (London: John Murray, 1896), p. 40. At least one District Commissioner thought there had been "a very great trade in ivory" on the Tana before the British came, and that near the end of the period there were professional elephant hunters on the river, armed with muskets by their Arab masters. L. Talbot-Smith, "Historical Record of Tanaland," unpublished manuscript, Rhodes House.


Some of the data on trade routes collected by various Europeans indicates that the traders went south. On the contrary, as the routes extended, it was always new points further north that were plotted by interested Europeans such as the missionaries New, Parler, and Wakefield.

The evidence indicates that the foot of Lake Victoria was part of the territory covered by traders from Umyanyembe further south. Burton said that these traders travelled north to trade at the foot of the lake and used Sukuma canoes to reach Ukerewe. Dr. James Christie, physician to the Sultan of Zanzibar and the Universities Mission to Central Africa, studied the great cholera epidemic which swept over East Africa in 1864-1871. The epidemic raged south from Berbera along the caravan routes, reaching Laikipia with the help of Masai cattle-raisers and travelling south to Lake Victoria and directly west to Zanzibar with the terrified, fleeing traders. The plague was also carried south to the Ujiji route by traders based in Umyanyembe who had travelled north to the foot of Lake Victoria to trade and had then returned south. Christie, Cholera, p. 237.

No inland base in the northern sphere compared with Tabora, but on a smaller scale, Hjemps, Daitcho, and Mumias filled a similar need.


J.T. Last, "A Visit to the Masai People living beyond the Borders of the Ngoro Country," JRGS, V, N.S. (1883), 561, and Ven. J.P. Parler, "Native Routes in East Africa from Pangani to the Masai country and the Victoria Nyanza," JRGS, IV, N.S. (1882), 731-7, described another route that ran west of Kisingo to Ngorongoro, then across the Serengeti to the country of the Dorobo, an elephant-hunting tribe, on to the agricultural district of Ngoroini east of the lake, and thence north through Kusibo to Kavirondo. The Dorobo "supplied enormous quantities of ivory to the traders," and in Ngoroini, the people were very eager to trade, the women rushing after the caravans with grain and vegetables. But Erhardt said that this route had been abandoned by the middle of the century. Lambheur, "The Kamba," p. 95. Possible reasons were the difficulty of the terrain, the development of more rewarding routes further north, or, as suggested by Lambheur, competition from Tabora or internecine warfare in the Lake Nyasi and Ngorongoro area. Lambheur's illuminating account of the Kamba trade is based largely on unpublished sources from the Church Missionary Society Archives in London. Gerald Hartwig, The Art of Survival in
East Africa: The Kerebe and Long-Distance Trade 1800–1895
(New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 81, suggests that Arabs and Swahili may have visited Ukerewe, travelling via Kilimanjaro, as early as the 1830's, and before traders approached the lake from routes further south.

33. Wakefield, "Routes," pp. 323-7; Darler, "Native Routes through the Masai Country, from information obtained by the Rev. T. Wakefield," PROS, IV, L.S. (1882), 746. Wakefield described a route from Lake Victoria to Lake Baringo, via the Basin Gishu and Elgeyo; Darler stated definitely that the route from Kilimanjaro to Kavirondo continued northward to Kakamega and Bjemps, at the southern end of Lake Baringo. Wakefield collected his information from caravan leaders, chiefly one Sadi bin Ahedi, while he was living in Mombasa; Darler lived in Usambara on one of the main caravan routes from the coast to Kilimanjaro.

Clemens Demhardt, an explorer of the Tana region, also collected information on trade routes and in 1874 drew a map showing two routes across Laikipia, just east of Baringo. Gregory, Rift, pp. 7, 146. At that time, Baringo could be reached by traders via Lake Victoria or by a more direct route running north from Kilimanjaro.

34. Guillain, Documents, III, 289-97. The caravan stayed a month in Kikuyu, trading for ivory with cottons, beads and brass. Its leader said that the Kikuyu had not hitherto traded with Swahili or Arabs, only with Nyika and Kamba, who brought the same trade goods. His general knowledge of the geography and inhabitants extended north of Mount Kenya.

Richard Burton, in 1857, learned of a route to Ukambani and Kikuyu: Mombasa to Babai, Taveta, and then north to Ndi, Tsavo, Mtito Andei, Kikusabu, and Kitui. From there it was four to eight stages to the edge of Kikuyu, the caravans moving very fast owing to the shortage of food and water, and the fear of hostile inhabitants. Burton, Tanganyika, II, 62-63.

35. Krapf, Travels, p. 552. Caravans from the coast were allowed to trade in Ukambani (Lamphere, "The Kamba," p. 91) but the Kamba were doubtless eager to discourage direct links between the coast men and regions further inland where the Kamba obtained their ivory.

36. Trade in ivory was conducted on a large scale at Kwa Jumua, a few miles from Mombasa. The Nyika took heavy tolls and also carried on a continuous trade with Mombasa in ivory, rhinoceros horn, hides, gun copal, and graila. Sir John Gray, The British in Mombasa 1823-26 (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1957), pp. 61-62. Forbes Munro, Colonial Rule and the Kamba (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
There were also Kamba settlements in the Nyika, dating from the 1820's. Lamphere, "The Kamba," pp. 82-83.

Krapf, Travels, pp. 144, 298, 301, 353; Guillain, Documents, III, 211, 272, 378-83. Lamphere, "The Kamba," pp. 88-90. When Krapf travelled to Ukambani in July 1851, he accompanied a Kamba caravan of 100 that was returning from the coast, and he encountered two more caravans on their way to the coast. One of these numbered 300 to 400 Kamba carrying tusks. Some Kamba by-passed the middlemen; Kivoi dealt directly with the Arab governor of Mombasa.

Christie commented that Europeans were apt to discredit information from Africans, but that he had found their testimony reliable. "On comparing notes with the Reverend Mr. Wakefield of Mombasa I found that the general features of the Masai country, as ascertained by us from independent sources, were identical, and that even distances were remarkably accurate." Christie, Cholera, p. x. A reasonably accurate map of the country, based on Wakefield's information, was drawn by Keith Johnston for the Royal Geographical Society. A geologist from the British Museum who mapped the Rift Valley in the 1890's commented that Denhardt's map of the interior, made in 1874 and based only on traders' reports, was very accurate, and more so than many made later by Europeans who had actually travelled in the interior. "It marked every important lake, river, and mountain in Masailand before a single European had set foot in that country." Gregory, Rift, p. 7.

But the return was far quicker, as the traders had heard that the Masai, raiding to the north, had brought a deadly plague to Laikipia. While fleeing south, the traders met another Pangani caravan near Kilimanjaro. This caravan ignored the warnings of plague and proceeded onwards to Arusha, Dasikora further west, and Laikipia. The epidemic was raging by then, and of 150 traders only 7 returned to the coast alive. Fleeing traders brought the cholera with them from the interior to Pangani. Christie, Cholera, pp. 221-30; Wakefield, "Routes," pp. 319-22.

The Taveta had masks and foreign beads, and New saw Suahili, Nyika, Teita, Gogo, Kuavi, and others there.

The general term Kavirondo includes two important and distinct groups, the Luo and the Luuya. Sources for the period do not distinguish the two groups, hence, the unsatisfactory term Kavirondo is used here.


Thomson and his trader companions took about 20 days to cross the plains to Ngong, adding 4 or 5 days to the trip by stopping at Ol Doinyo Orok.

Ibid., pp. 154-66, 171. Thomson and his trader companions took about 20 days to cross the plains to Ngong, adding 4 or 5 days to the trip by stopping at Ol Doinyo Orok.


Thomson, *Masailand*, p. 278. A nearby district, Ketosh, had been devastated five years earlier by some traders avenging previous losses. The traders thus arrived in Ketosh at least as early as 1878; probably they appeared earlier, as Kavirondo was a destination recorded by Wakefield and Christie in the 1860's. The north side of Mount Elgon was reached somewhat later, in the early 1880's. According to a Sebei informant, the traders came to buy food and established a base in Sebei country.

Walter Goldschmidt, *Culture and Behaviour of the Sebei* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 23-24. There is no evidence to suggest that the traders passed westward across the Nile; it is unlikely that they did, since Buganda and Bunyoro had long since been the territory of traders based at Tabora.

Von Hohnel, *Rudolf and Stefanie*, I, 126, II, 47. Certainly the existence of Lake Sambaru (named Rudolf by Teale) had been known to the traders for a long time, whether or not they had reached its shores. Lake Sambaru appeared on Krapf's map between the Juba and Tana Rivers, but placed too far east. Thomas Wakefield had heard of Sambaru; one informant told him it was necessary to cross the cold Settima mountains to get there. A sixteen-day route from Dhaitcho north-east of Mount Kenya via the Gusii Nyiro to Beiga in Sambaru was described. New had heard of Sambaru too, and recorded that caravans from Bombay visited Teita, Chagga, Ukambani, Masai, Lake Victoria, Baringo, and Sambaru, buying ivory, rhinoceros horn, orchilla weed,


It may be that the furthest points of the routes from Mombasa and Brava met south-east of Lake Rudolf before the 1880's. Mombasa traders reportedly reached an area not far south of Marsabit where the people knew Swahili and were "visited often by Brava caravans." Christie, *Cholera*, p. 198. Krapf reported that caravans from Brava traded with the Rendile. Krapf, *Travels*, p. 113. When Chanler encountered the Rendile south of Marsabit in 1893, they told him they had traded with Somali from Brava, acquiring cloth and horses, but that now there was war with the Gallia, Boran, and Somali. They also told of a Kambibari caravan that had reached them and which they had destroyed. Chanler, *Jungle and Desert*, pp. 292-313. However, H. Abir, "South Ethiopia," pp. 130-2, notes other sources which indicate that the Boran did not allow Somali caravans to pass through their country. He suggests that Somalis from centres such as Bardera and Loqha travelled to the Boran country and there met traders from further inland.


58. Von Hohnel, *Rudolf and Stefanie*, I, 202, 165. Arusha-wa-Chini, Lower Arusha (or Little Arusha, as von Hohnel called it) was situated near present-day Mozilla. The Arusha of today was then Arusha-wa-Juu (Upper Arusha).

In this context it is important to realize that only black powder was in use. Consequently, the average range was considerably shorter than in later days: about 110 yards, except for elephant, rhinoceros and buffalo, to which it was necessary to get much closer. The hunter thus had to be more skilled at stalking. If the quarry was skittish, the task of approaching within shooting range was made more difficult. See for example, Sir Frederick Jackson, *Early Days in East Africa* (London: Dawson's of Pall Mall, 1969), p. 127. First published in 1930 in London.

Von Hohnel refers to a caravan from Mombasa said to have been destroyed a few years earlier. Another traveller, Bishop Hannington, who followed Thomson's route in 1885, said that the previous year a caravan had impaired the trading opportunities at Ngongo-Bagas by fighting and taking slaves. E.C. Dawson, ed., *The Last Journals of Bishop Hannington* (London: Seeley and Co., 1888), pp. 206, 162.

By this time, coastal traders were travelling inland via Ukambani, so the Kamba were no longer attempting to hinder their passage, but were extracting what they could from the new situation.

Chanler, *Jungle and Desert*, p. 222. The Dorobo were located to the north and north-west of Mt. Kenya.


As observed by Chanler at Daitcho and von Hohnel in Turkana. Chanler mentions a caravan at Kibuxi, returning coastwards with 35,000 pounds of ivory and 600 donkeys. Another unusually tiny caravan of only 12 porters, was carrying 800 pounds with donkeys. *Jungle and Desert*, p. 424.

Many porters were capable of carrying much more than 35 pounds of ivory, but it is not known whether they did often carry heavier loads when working for coastal traders, as they certainly did when working for Europeans. At mid-century, Guillain reported that porters carried an average of 1 frasila; elsewhere, he noted that one caravan of whose journey he learned in detail consisted of 93 porters who brought 90 to 95 frasilas of ivory to the coast. Guillain, *Documents*, III, 32, 279. Krapf, writing in the same period, said porters to Taveta and the Masai country carried 54 pounds. Krapf, *Travel*, p. 416. Three
or four decades later, when Europeans travelled inland, porters carried vastly heavier loads for them. Loads of 80 to 100 pounds, including everything the porter was carrying, were not uncommon; von Hohenel, Chanler, Neumann, Lugard, and Hobley all reported such figures. Chanler’s porters carried loads of 65 pounds, plus clothing, a rifle, and three to six days’ worth of rations, the total being about 80 pounds. Gregory, who discussed porters and loads in detail in The Great Rift Valley, recorded that his porters carried 110 pounds from dawn to dusk with an hour’s rest. Of this weight, 75 pounds made up the basic load, and to this was added 5 lbs. of packing, 15 lbs. of rations, a rifle and 20 rounds of ammunition, a blanket, and sometimes a cooking pot. The porters, who came from at least fourteen different tribes, considered this “moderate.” Gregory, Rift, pp. 302, 304, 307-8. Thus it is certainly possible that some porters in the caravans of coast merchants carried more than one frasila of ivory. Some may have carried as much as two frasilas (70 pounds) of ivory, and the occasional hefty fellow doubtless shouldered even heavier tasks. The porters of Charles Stokes, an independent ivory trader operating in the German sphere in the 1880’s, generally carried a 75 pound load, plus a muzzle-loader, ammunition, and a water bottle. On the central route (via Tabora) the Nyauwezi were the best porters, carrying the heaviest loads. The head porter, who set the pace, sometimes carried the heaviest task; F. J. Jackson saw a head porter carrying a task of 115 pounds. Anne Luck, Charles Stokes in Africa (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1972), pp. 32, 46, 121-2. Jerome Becker, who also travelled on the central route in the 1880’s, noted that the basic load — excluding packing material, the porter’s personal effects, etc., was about 30 kilos (66 pounds) for Nyauwezi porters, and about 20 kilos (44 pounds) for Kasaikis. But there were porters who carried double or triple loads, who were paid more and given extra rations. Jerome Becker, Le Vah en Afrique (2 vols.; Paris, Brussels: J. Lebogues & Cie., 1887) I, 468.

There is no mention of the Taveta dealing in ivory, but Willoughby was able to engage a Swahili elephant hunter there, and Bandara, the notoriously acquisitive nearby chief, was involved in the trade. Willoughby’s group carried 2000 rupees to Bandara in payment for ivory he had sent to the coast; Willoughby also observed that when the elephants came down the mountain in the rainy season, the Kamba came all the way from Ukambani to hunt, Bandara hiring some every year.


Willoughby and his friends spent four or five months in the Kilimanjaro area in 1887, having been attracted by
Thomson's book. They coincided with Teleki and von Hohnel and with Frederick Jackson, also in East Africa to hunt. Willoughby furnishes evidence of a lively caravan trade passing through Taveta and environs.

Near Mombasa, it was the Iloikop, or Kavai - a Masai splinter who raided the caravans. The names Kavai and Masai were often used interchangeably by coastal peoples. Lanphear, "The Kasa," pp. 94, 98.

71. Krapf, Travels, p. 140; Neumann, Elephant-Hunting, p. 10; Marie J. de Kiewiet, "History of the Imperial British East Africa Company 1876-1895," (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of London, 1955). Jackson, Early Days, pp. 230-49. Even the ivory from Elgon was insufficient to cover the caravan's expenses. This disappointing outcome may well have been caused by lack of experience in ivory trading as much as by scarcity or the competition of the coastal traders.

72. General Report of the Juba (Hacdonald) Expedition, Part II, Foreign Office Confidential Print (hereafter FOCP), 7593 (1901), pp. 98-106. Berkeley to F.O. November 4, 1896, FOCP 6951/34. The expedition was undertaken in early 1897 and was intended to counter the French threat to the upper Nile, but the mutiny of Sudanese troops in Uganda engaged its attention instead.

73. Von Hohnel, Rudolf and Stefanie, I, 435, II, 5; Hobley, Chartered Company, p. 240. Macdonald Expedition, FOCP 7593, p. 98. A single tusk weighing one frasila was in general more valuable than a frasila made up of a number of small tusks. Cattle were more valuable than other livestock such as sheep, goats, and donkeys. In Kavirondo, for example, a cow was worth 30 boes, a bullock 20 or 25, while a sheep or goat was worth only two or three boes. General Report of the Juba (Hacdonald) Expedition, Part II, FOCP 7593 (1901), p. 98; Hobley, Chartered Company, p. 240. In Turkana, 3 donkeys equalled 1 cow; in Karamoja a cow was worth 6 to 10 donkeys. Herbert H. Austin, With Macdonald in Uganda (London: Edward Arnold, Publishers, 1903), pp. 179, 223.

74. This point was reached in Karamoja around the turn of the century, as the ivory hunter "Karamoja" Bell recounted in his memoirs. Traders based at Numias kept going further afield until they came up against raiding Abyssinians in the north. Then prices in Karamoja rose until 8 or 10 cows had to be paid for a large tusk, and cows at Numias cost £2 to £5 each. No profits could be made, and the traders abandoned peaceful trading and took to raiding and plundering. U.D.A. Bell, The Handicaps of an Elephant Hunter (London: Neville Spearman & the Holland Press, 1950), pp. 20-22. (First published in 1923.) During the same period, the Turkana began to acquire fire-arms from the Abyssinians, who encouraged the Turkana to raid their

75. H. G. Ravenstein, "Messrs Jackson and Gedge's Journey to Uganda via Hasainland," *PAGS*, XIII (1892), 199-200. Jackson found Ketosh villages burned and deserted in 1889. Thomson spoke to men who had taken part in the devastation of Ketosh in 1878 when a caravan of 1500 based at Humias attacked, but supposedly the reason was revenge for previous losses suffered by the caravan. In this connection, it is interesting that in 1894 Hobley specifically noted that the Ketosh attempted to obtain rifles and cartridges from porters passing through. Jackson, *Early Days*, pp. 230-1; Thomson, *Hasainland*, p. 298; Hobley, *Chartered Company*, p. 81. One or two isolated raids were reported to have occurred in other places.

76. Macdonald Expedition, FOCP 7593, p. 94.


78. The average weight of tusks reaching the coast was 20 lbs. If 125,000 lbs. were brought to the coast annually, then 125,000 divided by 20 equals 6250 tusks, giving 3125 pairs.
CHAPTER II. Game Products in the African Economy

The commercial network based on the ivory trade developed as a result of a great demand for ivory outside Africa. Among the Africans themselves, ivory was a minor item on a list of many useful products yielded by game animals. The most important and obvious of these was meat. Some animals also yielded useful skins, horns, fat, and sinews. Even the tails of some species were turned to account; for example, giraffe tails supplied hair used to bind the powerful bows of the Liangulo elephant hunters, and wildebeest tails were valued as fly whisk. If a particular tribe made no direct use of a given game product, that product still might be a profitable article of barter with other tribes.

Not all Africans were partial to game meat. The pastoral Masai, who ranged widely over the great, game-filled plains, pasturing their small, hump-backed cattle, left the wild herds undisturbed in their midst. They rarely ate any game at all. At the other end of the spectrum were the hunting peoples: the Dorobo, Boni, and Liangulo. These small tribes were heavily dependent upon game, and sometimes almost exclusively so. The Dorobo lived in small bands scattered over the plains and hills west of Mount Kenya, from the Masai grazing grounds to Lake Rudolf. The Boni were found in the forest country along the Tana, and the Liangulo lived in the dry country behind the moist coastal strip, from the Anglo-German border to Somaliland. In the southern part of the Protectorate they were called the Waliangulo, Wariangulu, or Liangulo; further north, they were called the Sasia, or Sanye. The Liangulo, Boni, and Dorobo all
lived on game meat, and the latter upon honey too. Their favourite prey was the elephant. A single dead elephant provided a lot of meat. Moreover, the elephant travelled through the forest on paths which could be mined with pits and spear traps. Many different methods were used to kill elephant. Some hunters chose heavy, poisoned spears; others used large bows and poisoned arrows. Game was trapped in pits concealed with sticks and dry grass, beneath which might lurk sharpened stakes. Weighted and poisoned spears were suspended above paths, to be released upon the passage of the animal underneath. Every bit of the elephant was eaten. Extra meat was dried in strips, fat was boiled from the bones, and even the bones themselves might be pulverized and eaten.

The Boni were renowned for their elephant hunting. William Fitzgerald, who spent two years working for the IDEA Company on the coast between Mombasa and Port Durnford, described the Boni as "the great ivory hunters of the Tana." C. W. Hobley, who travelled up the Tana in 1891, attributed the scarcity of elephant to Boni (and Kamba) hunters. The Liangulo were also known as elephant hunters and were bartering ivory in the middle of the nineteenth century. They used extremely powerful bows and went after buffalo and hippopotamus when they could not get elephant.

The Dorobo developed more varied habits of livelihood, according to observers. This differentiation probably resulted from their scattered occupation of quite varied terrain. Some pursued the elephant almost exclusively, while others were known to hunt plains game or lay snares for a variety of forest
animals. The rhinoceros, large and easy to stalk, was favoured. Now and again the Dorobo would go after antelope, smearing themselves with mud and sand and painting one or two donkeys with zebra stripes or tying oryx horns to their heads in order to use the donkeys as stalking horses. Blayney Percival, the East Africa Protectorate's first game ranger, saw such a Dorobo donkey. It had painted flanks and legs and was wearing a mask of zebra skin and horns made of sticks. The Dorobo hunter was smeared all over with ashes. Nevertheless, the elephant was, by most accounts, the preferred prey.

The elephant was dangerous to hunt. But to peoples whose livelihood depended on game meat, the quantity obtained was worth the risk. Hunting any animal could be hard work. At times it was necessary to travel long distances to find game, and if the poison on spear or arrow was not strong and fresh, a wounded animal might run many miles before collapsing.

Travellers in British East Africa frequently noticed how marginal was the existence of the hunting tribes. Successful hunting was far from certain; the game moved from one area to another, and the spear and bow sometimes failed to kill even when they hit the mark. In these circumstances, a three-hundred pound zebra looked less tempting than an elephant that might yield a ton of meat. It was also important that the hunter have something to trade for food in hard times. The ivory was a bonus, the more so as its value rose. It was traded by all the hunting peoples for flour, beans, cloth, tobacco, meat, and even livestock. The Dorobo north of Mt. Kenya, for example, would exchange a large tusk, or even two, for a donkey, and in the
1890's were eager to trade ivory for flour and beans as well as sheep and goats. One of the Masai that Chamber met told him that the Dorobo, in former years, had exchanged ivory for the beads, wire, and cloth carried by the caravans. The Dorobo had next traded these goods to the Masai for cattle. This pattern changed when the great cattle plague (rinderpest) came, decimating the Masai herds and dispersing the people. Then the Dorobo found the position of intermediary no longer securely profitable, and they demanded that the price of their ivory be paid in livestock and other foodstuffs.14

The Dorobo were able to barter other game products, though none was so valuable as ivory. They obtained flour, beans, sheep, and goats from the Kikuyu in exchange for skins, and acquired cattle from the Masai in return for skins and shields of buffalo hide.15 The lives of the Dorobo hunters were thus linked to those of peoples less interested in hunting, but desiring certain of its by-products.

Similarly, the lives of the Boni were intertwined economically with those of the other tribes of the Tana River area - the Galla, Somali, and Pokomo. The more powerful Galla and Somali suffered the Boni to hunt in their territories in return for tribute in ivory. The Boni hunter was required to give his Galla or Somali overlord one tusk of each elephant killed. In return, he sometimes received grain and the meat of domestic animals. He also traded giraffe hide, used for sandals, and giraffe and oryx hides for shield-making to the Somali, and he obtained produce from the agricultural Pokomo.16

The Liangulo pattern strongly resembled that of the Boni.
Where the Gallà were dominant, the Liangulo were obliged to part with some of their tusks. The Liangulo economy was also linked to that of nearby agriculturalists, in this case, the Giriana, who furnished the Liangulo with cloth, tobacco, grain, sheep, and cattle in return for ivory.

The hunting peoples were not the only Africans interested in killing elephant. Many others were partial to elephant meat, including the Embu, Turkana, Kavirondo, Pokoso, Teita, and Kamba. Of these, the Teita and Kamba were known to hunt elephant, as were some Pokoso and a few Giriana. Ivory was an added incentive, but some of these groups devoted as much of their attention to elephant as did the hunting peoples. Certain individuals among the Kamba, however, probably did hunt elephant to the virtual exclusion of other game. These men were active in the ivory trade, and Europeans reported meeting them north of the Tana as far as Mt. Nyiro and to the south of Ukambani in the Kilimanjaro region.

All these tribes ate game meat when they could get it, but they were primarily farmers or herdsmen. The amount of game consumed varied with the abundance of animals in the vicinity and the skill of the hunters and trappers; game meat was a supplement, but an important one. In times when crops failed and famine threatened, game often kept people from starving.

The Kamba were reputedly among the most successful hunters in British East Africa. They were destined to become a most troublesome thorn in the side of the Game Department. Although game was scarce in the cultivated hills of Ukambani, the surrounding plains were richly stocked, and the Kamba roamed
far afield in search of elephant, which had been hunted out in Ukasbani. The Kamba were skilful users of the bow and employed poisoned arrows. They also used nooses and suspended spears, and dug pits.21 At times the Kavai and Masai kept the Kamba off the plains; this helped protect game, but could make its meat a perilous treat. Game meat was not the most important food; millet or maize was the staple, and meat of any sort was only eaten once a day as a rule. In frequent times of famine however, hunting increased.22

The Teita, like the Kamba, lived on clumps of hills surrounded by plains rich in game, and were first and foremost farmers. They kept cattle, goats, and sheep. Game meat was important to them, although they were not known to go as far for it as the Kamba. The Teita dug pits in the vicinity of their villages and fields, and caught elephant, buffalo, and other animals. They also made expeditions to the plains to hunt in parties. They might be away for a couple of days to a week. Each group would go in turn, perhaps once a month. Bows and poisoned arrows were used to kill antelope, giraffe, lion, rhinoceros, and elephant. Some groups of Teita held the rights to certain hunting areas, such as the little Serengeti Plains and the country south of the hills towards the Tsavo River.23

The Teita and Kamba were well-placed to obtain large and varied supplies of game meat. Other groups, such as the Kavirondo, loved game meat but obtained it more rarely. The Kavirondo especially enjoyed hippopotamus, common along the shores of Lake Victoria. F.J. Jackson was astonished by their digestive capacities.
The people of Kavirondo were out and away the greatest gluttons for meat I ever met with. The demand for it by men, women and children alike, was insatiable, and quite regardless of its condition. A huge pile of it three days old, a mass of corruption and pea-green in colour, was readily saleable. ... The most remarkable thing about the ravenses desire of the Kavirondo for meat was the fact that they rarely touched it, as they were not sufficiently well off in stock; yet they gorged masses of the most horrible putrefaction without ill effects.

This account may describe an intense craving for animal protein and fat among a largely vegetarian people; it is also possible that Jackson was exaggerating an oft-mentioned difference in taste between Africans and Europeans. Many Africans liked their meat high, and flesh such as that of waterbuck and giraffe, described as too rank for consumption by Europeans, was enjoyed by some Africans.

Other groups to the north and north-east of Kavirondo, such as the Suk and Turkana, trapped game in pits and snares. Von Bohnel remarked that there was no large game in the Turkana area, but the Turkana ate everything there was. He also reported that the Samburu never hunted, but Percival has stated that they trapped rhinoceros.

The Pokomo, who lived on the banks of the Tana, grew maize and rice as their staple foods, but ate hippopotamus shot in the river and crocodile which were speared as they lay sleeping on the banks. This meat was an important article of their diet, and crocodile was considered a delicacy. Some Pokomo hunted elephant and buffalo with spears or bows and arrows.

Closer to the coast, the Nyika - the Giriama, Digo, and related tribes - grew crops as their mainstay and kept goats, sheep and fowls. Hunting was not very important, though the bow
and arrow were used and game was trapped in pits, cages, and nets. The Giriami were skilled at trapping, and a few hunted elephant for the ivory.29

Some important tribes displayed little or no interest in game meat. The Masai did not eat game or hunt ivory. Similarly, the Rendile, who wandered the desert expanses east of Lake Rudolf and north of the Guaso Nyiro and kept great flocks of camels, goats and sheep, hunted only the giraffe, and perhaps antelope, probably for their hides alone.30

Another, quite different group who ate little game were the Kikuyu, an agricultural and stock-raising tribe living in dense settlements in the wooded foothills south-east of Mount Kenya. Little game was seen in their thickly-populated area except hyenas, which were plentiful, and jackals, wildcats, and monkeys.31 Elephants sometimes raided the shambas. Most Kikuyu ate little meat of any sort, being largely vegetarian according to many reports, and preferred mutton or goat-meat to game. Routledge, a missionary stationed in Kikuyu, said that Kikuyu who had not been much in contact with the game-eating Dorobo and Kamba would not eat game. "Nothing but dire starvation will induce the Kikuyu to try to eat wild meat..." In times of hunger, however, game could be very important.32 John Boyes, who lived in Kikuyu country during the 1890's, recounted that when he and a group of Kikuyu stayed for some months with a Dorobo clan, some of the Kikuyu fell into the habit of eating meat, "a thing which they had never done before." This caused a lot of chaff in camp and some of their Kikuyu comrades began to call them Dorobo.33
Though most Kikuyu did not eat game meat, some did, and as L.S.B. Leakey, who grew up in Kikuyu country, has explained, their hunting activities were of some importance to the whole tribe. The hunters provided the Kikuyu people with buffalo hides for shields, and with monkey and hyrax skins for cloaks. They trapped animals that raided crops, including wild pig, bushbuck, and baboon. When they killed elephants, they bartered the ivory to the Kamba, and later to coastal traders, and then sold the trade goods they obtained to other Kikuyu. Some hunters became rich in this manner. A big bull-elephant tusk was worth as much as 100 goats and sheep, or about eight cows.

The related tribes to the south-west and west of Mount Kenya varied slightly in their customs. According to one account, the Embu, Embere, Chuka, Muisbe, and Tharaka were all mainly vegetarian, eating maize, beans, sweet potatoes, yams, sugar cane, and bananas. However, they all ate some game as well, the Chuka eating anything including hyena and monkey, the Muisbe everything but hyena, monkey, and crocodile. Some would not eat elephant, but the Embu did. All refused eggs, fish, and snakes. Interestingly enough, these peoples were said to display a tendency to regard eating game as "somewhat discreditable" directly in proportion to the frequency of their contact with the Kikuyu.

- Although not all Africans killed game for food, nearly every group had some uses for other game products such as skins, horns, and teeth. Elephant hide, for example, was a tough material and was used by the Kikuyu to make shields. Ivory ornaments were popular with the men of many tribes, including
the Turkana, Kavirondo, Dorobo, Rendile, and Galla, as well as the Kikuyu. Snuff boxes and tobacco holders of ivory and horn (buck and rhinoceros) were also valued by many, particularly the Turkana, who took a keen pleasure in tobacco.

Many animals besides the elephant yielded useful products. Rhinoceros hide was made into shields by the Somali (who used oryx hide as well) and into decorative armlets by the Kikuyu. Buffalo hide shields were used by the Masai, Kikuyu, and Northern Kavirondo, while the Southern Kavirondo chose hippopotamus hide.37 Quivers and belts for load-carrying were also made of these strong materials. The hide of the giraffe was also thick and strong. The Boni made sandals from it, and the Somali and Boran made buckets and pots. Giraffe sinews were fashioned into bowstrings and their tail hairs bound the string to the bow. Skins were used for clothing, both practical and ornamental. The men of a number of tribes, including the Masai and Kikuyu, wore lovely, long, warm cloaks of hyrax skins; among the Kikuyu, the old men wrapped themselves in cloaks of monkey skins against the cold of the hills, and the women loved to wear gazelle-skin capes. Kikuyu boys wore handsome spotted serval cat skins and colobus furs when about to be initiated, and warriors sometimes dressed similarly. Items for sale at Kikuyu markets included monkey skins, serval cat skins, and ostrich feather headdresses. The dramatically beautiful colobus skins with their bold stripes were also worn by the Masai as part of their fighting dress, and the Turkana wore monkey and leopard skins. Ostrich plumes, splendidly flamboyant, adorned the hair of the men of several tribes, including the Masai, Turkana, Suk, and
the Narre at the northern end of Lake Rudolf. Skins, horns, and
teeth were put to decorative use by various groups, for example
the Masai, Kikuyu, Nyika, and Kavirondo. Other game products
regarded as useful were lion and leopard and elephant fat, used
as medicine (for example, rubbed on an aching belly) bones for
handles, the sinews of giraffe and zebra for bowstrings,
wildebeest tails for fly-whisks, horns for musical instruments
and storing medicine or honey, and the teeth and tusks of lion,
hippopotamus, and warthog for medicines and decoration.

Game provided Africans with food, warm clothing, footwear,
weapons, medicine, ornaments, useful items such as buckets and
straps, and small luxuries like snuff boxes. An additional
reason and reward for killing game was the preservation of crops
or livestock, and among some tribes, such as the Masai, the
courage and prowess of the young men were demonstrated through
organized hunts of dangerous game such as lion, buffalo, and
elephant.38

All tribes either killed game or bartered to obtain certain
game products. Hunting for meat was the primary occupation of
some tribes, a supplementary activity for others. Likewise, the
trade in game products was a necessity to some peoples,
advantageous to others, and marginal to some. This economic
pattern, which grew out of the distribution of game over the
East African landscape and the uses different peoples found for
various animals, was also influenced by the coastal traders and
their desire for ivory. The ivory trade acquired an established
place in the economic lives of a number of tribes.

At the end of the nineteenth century, European rule,
including European views on game and its use, was superimposed on the existing pattern, and attempts were made both to exploit and to change it. The first Europeans who came, before the establishment of the Protectorate in 1895, were hunters and traders themselves and had little impact on the relationship between Africans and game. But the attitudes and actions of these Europeans influenced the future development of Protectorate policy.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II

1. See for example Thomson, Through Masailand, pp. 247, 251; von Hohnel, Rudolf and Stefanie, I, 246, 250, 261. However, Jackson reported an occasion on which he shot a wildebeest and some Masai drank its blood. Early Days, p. 131.

2. According to Charles New, this tribe was found from Malindi north to the Juba. (New, Life, p. 173.) Hobley, who encountered some "Haliangulo" in 1890 at the Tana waterholes east of Mombasa, said they roamed the hinterland from the Anglo-German border to the Tana. (Hobley, Chartered Company, p. 28.) It has been suggested once or twice that the Boni and Sania are the same tribe, but Hobley and New said they were two distinct peoples, and they are so treated by A. H. J. Friis in The Coastal Tribes of the North-Eastern Coast (London: International African Institute, 1952). See also Captain E. R. Salteld, "Notes on the Boni Hunters of Jubaland," AAA, V (1905) 168-170; G. V. E. Huntingford, "Free Hunters, Surf-Tribes and Submerged Classes in East Africa," AAA, XXXI (1931) 262-6.

3. Some Dorobo were much more dependent upon honey than others. Neumann met some who lived mainly on honey, wild berries, roots, and fruits. Neumann, Elephant-Hunting, p. 79. He also saw one group on the east side of Lake Rudolf who lived on fish. Ibid., p. 256. Jackson described a group living on colobus monkey, honey, and flour. The colobus skins were traded for the flour. Jackson, Early Days, p. 300.


Hobley, "People in BEAP," p. 118. Charles William Hobley (1867–1947) joined the IBNA Company in 1890. He travelled up the Tana in 1891. In 1894 he joined the Uganda Protectorate service and was transferred to the East Africa Protectorate in 1902. He became a Provincial Commissioner, took part in the East African campaign in World War I, and retired in 1921. He was the author of numerous articles and two books.

Barbery Perham's edition of The Diaries of Lord Lugard (London: Faber and Faber, 1959) contains useful biographical notes on a number of Europeans present during the tenure of the IBNA Company.

Chanler, Jungle, and Desert, p. 373. The Llianguolo and the Bodi were less frequently observed than the Dorobo; variations in their behaviour were thus less likely to be reported.

A. Blayney Percival, A Game Hunter on Safari (London: Hisbet & Co. Ltd., 1920) p. 250. Similar descriptions are found in Chanler, Through Jungle and Desert, pp. 373, 393, and Boyes, King of Kikuyu, p. 209.

Arrow poison was used by all the hunting tribes and by many others as well, including the Kamba, Kikuyu, Kabu, and others. Various poisonous plants were used in its manufacture, including acokanthera, euphorbia, and strophanthus. Sometimes snake venom and poisonous insects were added. The speed with which the poisons acted varied with the ingredients, the size of the animal, and the placement of the wound. The plant matter was boiled down to a pitchy, resinous mass and carefully wrapped in small packets of leaves to keep it from drying out and losing its strength. Old and dry poison could be ineffective. The Kamba and Giriama manufactured and sold poison to other tribes, including the Bodi and Dorobo. For a first hand account of the making of arrow poison, see Gerald Hanley, Warriors and Strangers (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1971).

Chanler, Through Jungle, and Desert, pp. 222, 353.

Thompson, Through Camailand, pp. 247–48, 262; Chanler, Through Jungle, and Desert, pp. 350, 353; Jackson, Early Days, p. 306; Ministry of Agriculture, Dep. 4/937, Nairobi Archives (hereafter NA) Colobus skins were worn by both the Kikuyu and Masai, and some Dorobo hunted colobus, eating the meat and trading the skins. The Dorobo also traded honey to the Kikuyu and Masai.

17. New, *Life*, pp. 278-281; Hobley, *Chartered Company*, p. 28. Further evidence of this link exists in the accounts of District Officers stationed in Giriana country prior to World War I, see below, Chapter V.


19. Krapf, visiting Ukanbani in 1849, was offered giraffe and elephant meat. Percival, *Safari*, p. 250, commented, "these people set about the business in too practical a fashion." He described the Kamba technique of erecting a hedge up to two miles long and driving the game towards gaps in it, behind which were bowmen. The Hundi used a similar technique, with pits concealed in the gaps, and waiting spearmen. Lord Hindlip, *Sport and Travel: Abyssinia and British East Africa* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1906), p. 251.


Frederick Jackson (1860-1929) first went to East Africa to hunt in 1884. He joined the IBEA Company in October 1888. He became a first class assistant in the Uganda Protectorate in 1894, and Acting Commissioner in 1897-1898 and 1901-1902. In 1902 he was Deputy Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, where he served as Lieutenant-Governor in 1907-1911. He then became Governor of the Uganda Protectorate from 1911 to 1917.

Blayney Percival also called the Kavirondo "the most meat-hungry natives in Africa." Safari, p. 144. The particular incident concerning a hippopotamus which so impressed Jackson took place near Numias, in Northern Kavirondo. The Northern Kavirondo also fished in Lake Victoria.

25. See for example Percival, Safari, p. 119. Preferences for particular types of game meat varied among Africans and Europeans alike, and the taste of the flesh of a given species was not always the same. The elephant hunter William Finaughty ate giraffe meat and thought it the "best of all," but he described shooting one fat bull giraffe which "smelt so rank that his flesh was absolutely unetable." R.C. Tabler, ed., The Recollections of William Finaughty, Elephant Hunter 1864-1875 (Bulawayo: Books of Rhodesia Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 4, 8. The editor notes that old bulls were called "stink bulls" by Boer hunters. P. 15.

26. Macdonald Expedition, POCP 7593, pp. 60, 68.


The Samburu may have begun to trap rhinoceroses when the value of the horn rose in the twentieth century. Rhinoceroses horn was prized by the Chimpas for its mythical efficacy as an aphrodisiac, and eventually surpassed ivory in value per pound at the coast.

According to a modern survey, the Turkana are not keen hunters, preferring the meat of their own herds. But they do not refuse game meat, except lion, leopard, hyena, and zebra. "Gazelle are the herds of the poor man," one said. Gulliver, Turkana, p. 33.

28. Hobley, Chartered Company, p. 40; Percival, Safari, p. 235; New, Life, p. 276; Prins, Coastal Tribes, p. 15. Percival said the Pokono were the only Africans he knew who ate crocodile; Jackson saw crocodile fishers in Busoga, however. Early Days, p. 259. Gregory described the Pokono method of killing crocodiles, noting how dangerous it was. Rift, pp. 35, 277.

30. Cracknall to F.O., December 20, 1893, in which von Hohnel reported that the Rendile only hunted giraffe. Chanler mentions giraffe-hunting in *Through Jungle and Desert*, p. 312. In a letter to the Royal Geographical Society written at the time he saw the Rendile, he said their chief food was the flesh of camels, goats and sheep, plus milk, and that they hunted only giraffe and antelope. Chanler to RGS, September 20, 1893, *Geographical Journal*, II (1893), 534-40. The Rendile were said to hunt on horseback.

31. IBRA Co. to F.O., May 11, 1894, FOCP 6557/175, enclosing reports from Company officers; Francis Hall, rough draft of paper on Kikuyu, dated March 19, 1894, Hall Papers. Von Hohnel did not mention seeing any game in Kikuyu territory, and he and Teleki were not ones to miss any chances.


33. Boyes, *King of Kikuyu*, p. 213. On the other hand, Richard Meinertzhagen, who spent the larger part of two years in Kikuyu country in 1902 and 1903, said that he had frequently been told that the Kikuyu would not eat game, but this was not true. They love it, and eat masses of it when they can get it.” Colonel R. Meinertzhagen, *Kenya Diary 1902-06* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1957), p. 38.

34. L.S.B. Leakey, *The Southern Kikuyu Before 1903* (2 vols.; London: Academic Press, 1977), I, 441-5, 498. Leakey states that a cow or heifer was worth about twelve sheep and goats. Eight cows for a very fine tusk was a price similar to one mentioned by Bell in Karanoja. See Chapter 1, note 74.


36. Descriptions of tribal dress, weaponry, ornaments, diet, and small manufactures are found in the accounts of many early visitors to East Africa, including Neve, Thomson, von
Hohnel, Chandler, and Neumann. However, most missionaries, game hunters, and administrators took only a cursory interest in such matters, and it is necessary to comb through many sources to collect small particles of information. Some of the more useful are: Austin, With MacDonald, Cagnolo, The Akikuyu; Lord Cranworth, A Colony in the Making (London: Macmillan and Co., 1912); Lindblom, Akamba; Percival, Notebook; Percival, Safari; Hobley, Chartered Company; Jackson, Early Days; Lionel Decle, Three Years in Savage Africa (London: Methuen and Co., 1898); MacDonald Expedition, FOCP 7593; Routledge, Prehistoric People; Hindlip, Sport and Travel. (1906).
CHAPTER III. European Hunters and Traders

At the opening of the nineteenth century the interior of tropical Africa was still a dark mystery to Europeans. The northern coastlands and the temperate southern tip were not unfamiliar, and in-between a shallow coastal zone was mapped, but the interior, from the the Kalahari to the Sahara, remained in the realms of the unknown. Hidden behind Africa's palm-swept coasts lay geographical secrets of magnificent dimensions. They drew explorers from all over Europe. The sources of the Nile, the elusive diagram of the immense lakes in the heart of the continent, the fabled Mountains of the Moon—all these were discovered during the great age of African exploration. White men crossed the Sahara, floated down the Niger, and trekked northward from their farms on the great veldt of South Africa. Burton and his successors found the Coy Fountains, unravelling Africa's greatest secret. Livingstone and Stanley stirred up public fascination with exploration. By the last quarter of the century, the great blank which had reproached geographers was filling up with rivers, mountains, and people.

But the area which is now Kenya still offered opportunities for discovery at a time when explorers were heroes and their adventures were eagerly followed by an admiring public in Europe. Though it was no longer hoped that a mysterious race of headless men might be found lurking in remote African jungles, the adventurous could still win fame by reaching a new lake or marching through new territory. The lands lying beyond
Kilimanjaro, and extending northward to Abyssinia and Somaliland, remained as the last, large, "unopened" section of tropical Africa.

The hazardous fascinations of African exploration were well known by the 1880's. Those who wished to learn the answers to Africa's riddles paid high prices - often the highest. Yet men who had endured the most dreadful sufferings frequently returned to Africa. Mostly, it was glory rather than gold which drew them. Curiosity, an unslaked thirst for adventure and the lure of great fame conquered disease and danger. Moreover, the great age of African exploration was characterized by a persistent belief in the forward march of European science and by the certainty that the rich harvest of information brought back by the explorers filled an abhorrent vacuum.

Of course, the Europeans who quietly slid or rudely hacked their way into unknown Africa, had additional and varied motivations for what they did. Some were Christian missionaries, some chafed at the restrictions of their own societies, and some sought new pastures for European settlers. Richard Burton's personal devils and David Livingstone's horror of the slave trade are well known. A number of Europeans were drawn to Africa by the wildlife. At home, hunting was a glamorous sport of the privileged. To hunt in Africa was a natural extension of the pastime for some bolder spirits; for others, less fortunately circumstanced, it was a hitherto inaccessible amusement. Some of the most famous explorers, such as Speke and Baker, plus a host of lesser figures, came to Africa to kill game. Samuel White Baker, who discovered Lake Albert in 1864, had already hunted a
great deal in India and Ceylon and had written about it before coming to Africa. The son of a wealthy shipowner, he financed his own expedition and spent a year in the Sudan before attempting his Nile journey. Baker shot over a good piece of north-eastern Africa and devoted much of his Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia to detailed descriptions of killing animals with large guns.\textsuperscript{1}

John Hanning Speke made three journeys of exploration in Africa, and it was he who first reached Lake Victoria and named it as the source of the Nile. Yet Speke's interest in Africa, by his own testimony, was born of a desire to hunt, more than to explore. A few years before his famous adventure with Burton in the 1850's, he made a plan to explore central eastern Africa when his furlough came up. The plan was conceived, however, not for geographical interest, so much as for a view I had in my mind of collecting the fauna of those regions, to complete and fully develop a museum in my father's house a nucleus of which I had already formed from the rich menageries of India, the Himalaya Mountains, and Tibet.\textsuperscript{2}

After his first journey in north-east Africa with Burton, Speke was requested to join the expedition to the Central African Lakes. He went, he wrote later, "determining in my own mind, somehow or other, to have my old plans, formed in India, of completing my museum, even if, after all, the funds of the expedition did not suffice.\textsuperscript{3}

Baker's wife Florence apparently shared his absorptions; Burton did not share Speke's. It was not until Speke's second journey to the Lakes that he found a congenial companion: James Augustus Grant, who had been his friend in India, where they had often hunted together.
Both Speke and Baker hunted in north-east Africa, as did many others, including Lord Delamere, one of Kenya's most important settlers. British Somaliland, directly opposite Aden — under the rule of the Government of India — was a playground for officers of the British Army in India, an alternative to hunting tigers in the forests of the subcontinent. Speke was among those who explored the coastal plain and the mountain range sixty miles inland. Delamere was passionately keen on hunting and made four trips to British Somaliland, where he devoted himself mainly to lion hunting, before he travelled south in 1897 through the Ogaden to the Juba River, Marsabit, and the highlands of the East Africa Protectorate.

The other arena for sportsmen or explorers was Africa's temperate, salubrious south. The open country, the invigorating climate, the absence of tsetse fly and malaria south of Delagoa Bay, and the seemingly inexhaustible wealth of game, invited the expansion of the Dutch Community. Hunting and cattle were the livelihood of the frontiersmen, and as the Boers spread out, the game fled before them.

The search for ivory contributed to the expansion of the Boers to the north and east. In 1736, a party of elephant hunters crossed the Great Fish River and entered the Transkei. In 1760, the ivory hunter Jacobus Coetzee became the first white man known to have crossed the Orange River. During the late 1780's and early 1800's, several naturalists roamed about southern Africa bringing back reports and specimens of animals, birds, and plants. Among this group were Anders Sparrman, a Swede, and William Burchell, who in 1811 travelled to the edge
of the Kalahari Desert, and who returned to England in 1812 with
the skins of 80 species of mammal and 265 species of birds.
Burchell’s zebra bears his name.

After the naturalists came a new class of visitors, who
journeyed to South Africa primarily to shoot game. Some shot
anything at all, while others were interested in ivory and
money. Some were trophy hunters who measured their fallen tusks
and horns to the ounce and fraction of an inch, and others, of a
scientific bent, methodically assembled complete collections of
fauna for the enlightenment of science and the public at home.
Most embodied some combination of these characteristics, and it
was the dream of many to discover a new, unknown species.

Many of these sportsmen wrote books, beginning with William
Crawhall Harris, who recorded his uncontrolled passion for
shooting into the brown (firing randomly into a herd of animals
massed together) in The Wild Sports of South Africa, published
in 1839. Harris collected more ivory than he could carry away,
and was the first to bring home the head of a sable antelope. He
was soon followed by others, a number of whom acquired renown.
Gordon Cuning spent the 1840’s shooting in southern Africa, and
opened a large exhibition of his trophies on his return to
England, where zoos and exhibitions of stuffed animals became
very popular in the nineteenth century. Cuming’s adventures
fired others with the desire to visit southern Africa’s peerless
sporting grounds. But the game was soon being driven out by the
expansion of European settlement. The wish to shoot where none
had shot before drew hunters ever further into the African
interior. Always the frontier of exploration was pushed further
north.10 Frederick C. Selous, the most famous English sportsman in southern Africa and for eight years a professional elephant hunter, incidentally travelled through much of what is now Rhodesia. Livingstone discovered Lake N'gami in the company of Cotton Oswell and Hango Murray, who had come for the hunting. While Livingstone pressed further north, Oswell devoted his time to shooting elephants—sometimes killing four large old male a day—and collecting the valuable ivory. Livingstone thought this was no bad thing, as "the inhabitants conceived from it a very high idea of English courage ...."11 On the other hand, Livingstone did not describe himself as an avid hunter; he said that "having but little of the hunting-furor in my composition, I always preferred eating the game to killing it."12

By the time Joseph Thomson was preparing to make the first successful European journey across Basutoland, to open up this route to Lake Victoria, the books of such men as Harris, Cumming, Anderson, Baker, Petherick, and F.C. Selous, had begun to create an attractive image of Africa, or parts of it. This was the image of the sportsman's paradise. The reports from East Africa in the next two decades were to confirm this impression. Big game had drawn Europeans to India and South Africa; now, the unparalleled wonder of the wildlife, the seemingly inexhaustible riches of tusk and trophy, would draw them to East Africa. Explorers and hunters—often one and the same—shot for pleasure and for survival. They returned with tales which brought more Europeans. Nearly all of these were well-to-do; many were aristocrats. The shooting expedition to East Africa was a gentleman's amusement and the charm East Africa held for
these sportsmen influenced Kenya's patterns of settlement. The
tales they told of the sportsman's paradise cast an aura of
glamour around British East Africa which it has never lost.

Thomson himself became an active hunter and indulged
himself by shooting quantities of game in excess of the needs of
the pot, both on the Ngorongoro River and on his journey through
Masailand. He could easily have confined himself to antelope to
provide meat, but he often chose to shoot rhinoceros, and hunted
elephant and the colobus monkey when he got the chance. Accounts
of his sport ornamented his books and articles for the popular
market, and made them sell well. 13

At the very moment of my firing, I became aware of a
-crashing on my left in such startling proximity that
it gave me a feeling of cold water running down my
back. As I quickly looked around, the head of an
elephant was just emerging from the dense bush on to
the small clear area in which I stood. I dropped
instantly behind a very small bush, mentally
concluding that my life was not worth five minutes' purchase if the elephant was vindictively inclined.
The position was, certainly, not without elements of
the thrilling sort. Here I was, on my knee, behind a
small skeleton bush, positively looking up at an
enormous wild elephant, the head of which was almost
over me; one elephant was running away on my right,
some five were behind me, and several on my left. I
was, in fact, in the midst of a herd of
elephants.... 14

The vast herds of game glowing described, the opportunities of
this peerless hunting ground, aroused the predatory instincts of
others.

Count Samuel Teleki von Szek, and his companion Lieutenant
Ludwig von Rohmel, were familiar with Thomson's book, and went
to East Africa to combine big game hunting and exploration.
Moreover, some English sportsmen they met at Taveta had also
been lured by descriptions of the "sportsman's paradise." 15 Von
Mohrnel's book, *Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie*, which begins with that resonant Victorian phrase "The dark continent of Africa...", devotes many pages to descriptions of shooting between Mikocheni, at the northern end of Usambara, and Nyongo Bagas (Ngong) on the edge of Kikuyu, Teliki and von Mohrnel killed at least twenty-five rhinoceros and wounded several more. They seem to have shot at nearly every one they saw, and brought down ninety-nine before they ended their travels. Much other game was killed as well, some of it for sport. No canons of restraint, no notions of preservation or conservation troubled their consciences; females with young were shot, and animals were often wounded when there was no chance of following them up to finish the job.

At the time that von Mohrnel's book appeared in England, the game of East Africa had begun to receive a great deal of publicity. Before the 1890's, popular books about Africa had consisted mainly of explorers' accounts, in which game often figured but was not the centre of interest. Notable exceptions were R.C. Harris's *The Wild Sports of South Africa* (1839), R.C. Cunning's *Five Years of a Hunter's Life in the Far Interior of South Africa* (1856), W.C. Dalvis's *African Hunting* (1863), and P.C. Selous's *A Hunter's Wanderings in Africa* (1881). Cunning and Selous were very famous hunters, and their books enjoyed immense popularity, running to numerous editions. Cunning's was reissued in 1856, and later in 1891, 1900, and 1911. It inspired British boys with the ambition to go to Africa and hunt, and some of them did go - including the famous elephant hunter "Karamoja" Bell. Selous wrote several books and
the forewords to many more: A Hunter's Wanderings was in its fourth edition by 1895, and enjoyed a fifth in 1907.

In addition to the reappearance of these two books, a large number of new works embellishing the image of Africa as a sportsman's paradise were published in the 1890's. The audience for such works had without doubt been recently enlarged by the wild success of H. Rider Haggard's African adventure stories. King Solomon's Mines, published in 1885, won instant popularity. Two years later, She appeared and became world famous: over a million copies were printed by 1925. Hair-raising adventures with the "Big Five" - elephant, lion, buffalo, rhinoceros, and leopard - filled the pages of the sporting chronicles. Hunters were flocking to Africa and rushing into print about it. Hilloughby, who saw Teleki at Taveta, brought out East Africa and Its Big Game in 1889. Baker, who had already written about hunting in The Rifle and the Hound in Ceylon (1854) and The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia (1867), published Wild Beasts and their Ways (1890). Selous wrote a new book: Travel and Adventure in South-East Africa (1893). Frederick Vaughan Kirby published two books: In Haunts of Wild Game (1896) and Sport in East Central Africa (1899). Arthur von Hohnel wrote Elephant-Hunting in East Equatorial Africa (1898). Von Hohnel's book, liberally garnished with hunting episodes, also appeared in England in the 1890's. Moreover, a collection of the hunting adventures of such luminaries as Baker, Selous, Osse, P. J. Jackson and others, was published by the Badminton Library in 1894 and 1895. Also popular were exploration collections, which condensed and retold the explorers' adventures, including shooting episodes.
The popularity of such literature did not diminish at the close of the century, but continued for at least another decade, during which many more books were published. New books continued to appear until the first World War. Selous and Cunning were reprinted, and a biography of Oswell was published in 1900. Some other examples of the genre were C.A. Sykes, *Service and Sport in the Tropics* (1903), A. Arkell-Hardwick, *An Ivory Trader in North Kenya* (1903), Major Powell-Cotton, *In Unknown Africa* (1904), and Lord Hindlip, *Sport and Travel* (1906).

Chauncey Hugh Stigand wrote some dozen books on Africa, including *Central African Game and Its Spoof* (1906), *The Game of British East Africa* (1909), and *Hunting the Elephant in Africa* (1913). Theodore Roosevelt's *African Game Trails* was published simultaneously in New York and London in 1910. Other books of the period included Abel Chapman, *On Safari* (1908), Percy Hadiera, *Hunting in British East Africa*, and Peter Macqueen, *In Wildest Africa* (1910). Lord Cranworth, an example of that particular breed of sporting settler that was attracted to British East Africa, wrote a book for prospective colonists entitled *A Colony in the Making, or Sport and Profit in British East Africa* (1912). A scattering of books on the same theme continued to be published after the War, but the hey-day had passed.

In the 1890's however, the game was becoming famous. It was one of the wonders of Africa (and the world) and judging by numbers of titles, far outranked cannibals and pygmies on Africa's bill of attractions. A part of the earth that was still a dangerous wilderness excited the imagination of orderly
Britain, and readers thrilled to the high drama of the hunt, and to such titles as *In Hidingst Africa*, *Savage Africa*, *Three Years in Savage Africa*, *In the Heart of Sazzaonia*, *The Ban-Haters of Tano*, *In Unknown Africa*, and, of course, Stanley’s famous *Darkest Africa* and *Through the Dark Continent*. Moreover, the exploits of men like Selous and Neumann fostered the attractive legend that a fortune in ivory might await anyone who was a fine shot. Africa looked exciting, even inviting. By World War I, one traveller could write “who has not heard of the game of British East Africa?”

Individuals interested in adventurous sport were not the only Europeans to be attracted to British East Africa in the late 1880’s. The arrival of the first hunters coincided with the intrusion of European commercial enterprise in the shape of the Imperial British East Africa Company, generally known as the IBEA Company.

This Company, a late, feeble descendant of the great East India Company, was the creation of a group of philanthropists, businessmen, and professional empire-builders. The directors, led by William Mackinnon, a rich Scots businessman and humanitarian, hoped to profit by trading in East Africa and at the same time to end the slave trade through the introduction of superior forms of commerce.

The Company’s life was destined to be short. Negotiations with the Sultan of Zanzibar began in 1877 collapsed the next year and the project lay dormant until 1885. Interest then revived, stimulated by a memorandum written by a member of the British Consulate at Zanzibar. The memorandum emphasized the
existence of a trade in ivory that would bring immediate profits, and painted the prospects for development in attractive colours. Hackiman renewed his attempts to hatch a chartered company and this time succeeded. In 1887 he reached an agreement with the Sultan of Zanzibar, and in 1888 the Imperial British East Africa Company received its charter from the British government, the Foreign Office having decided that the Company appeared to present an inexpensive means of laying claim to the region through which ran the shortest route to the headwaters of the Nile.26 Within seven years the Company had ignominiously expired. The Foreign Office took over the reins in East Africa: the Uganda Protectorate was declared in 1894, and the East Africa Protectorate (later Kenya) in 1895.

The Company failed because expenses greatly exceeded income. Short of capital, the Company could not wait for profits while the country was developed; no valuable commodities such as palm oil or gold turned up to finance expensive administrative and military activities, while Hackiman's personal fortune and political influence were not equal to the resources that Rhodes had when he developed the British South Africa Company.27 Besides ivory, the country had limited quantities of grain, hides, rubber, and gums to offer, but these could not keep the Company going. Taxing the Africans in the interior was not possible without the prior establishment of an administrative network, and most of the customs revenue went to pay the Sultan of Zanzibar for the lease of his coastal territory. It had been hoped that trade with the comparatively prosperous country of Buganda would provide revenue, but human transport to and from
the interior was so expensive that only ivory could turn a profit, and the established route to Buganda passed through the German sphere. 15

In these conditions, ivory, wherever it could be gotten, became very important to the Company's finances. The sums of money needed to keep the Company afloat were not easy to accumulate, however. Ivory was more difficult to come by than had been thought. Ignorance and haste, illusory to success in the ivory business, coupled with the hostility of the established merchants, crippled the Company's efforts to trade.

In the first place, ivory was more expensive than reports had led the Company to believe. Thomson's glowing account of lands where "a tusk worth £150 in England may be picked up for nothing, or bought from any native for a pennyworth of beads," turned out to be exaggerated. 16 By the time the Company's caravans were trudging up country in 1888, such prices applied only to the most remote districts. 17

Secondly, ivory in massive quantities was not to be had merely by stationing a few men in the interior. It was necessary to go and look for it, and that entailed the trouble and expense of caravan travel. The comforts demanded by most European travelers made it difficult for them to compete with the Arab and Swahili caravans; living more cheaply, the latter could pay higher prices and still command a profit. Arthur Neumann, who hunted elephant in British East Africa for some years, remarked "nowhere I have yet reached is there any profit to be made by a white man; Swahili and Makamba traders have spoilt it. Moreover, ivory trading is a tedious, pottering business..." 18 Such
patience was required of the ivory trader; transactions were slow, sometimes because Africans enjoyed the social process or hoped to derive an advantage from delay, sometimes for the reason that tusks could be the joint property of a number of owners, all of whom had to agree to the price. European notions of efficiency accorded ill with the African approach to bargaining.

Moreover, the Company lacked the detailed knowledge possessed by the coastal traders, and these men had no intention of assisting an unwelcome competitor with information on the whereabouts of ivory stocks or the prices of tusks. Some traders spread anti-Company propaganda in the interior.

Further, the traders apparently took advantage of the Company's push towards Buganda, following hard on their heels into Busoga and buying up the ivory there. In 1891, one Company officer, Frederick Lugard, complained that in spite of the administration at the coast, coastal caravans were coming to Busoga and Bunyoro "by the back door"—north of Mount Elgon via Turkana. He deplored the presence of the caravans, as they brought trading guns and powder and took the profits of the ivory trade out of IBEA pockets. "He opened the road through Kikuya, by which they dared not previously pass, and also to Busoga, and they follow and buy up all the ivory." Already, he had heard, "the Swahilis are spoiling Nakoli." He recommended that the Company employ more Europeans to buy ivory and suggested stationing an officer at Nakoli's in Busoga, where there was much ivory. Lugard's point was that the Company should be buying, and preferably in the absence of competitors.
Even if the traders paid export duty, a matter of some uncertainty, the revenue derived by the Company would be far less than could be acquired by direct participation in the trade. Lugard had been instructed by the Company directors to recoup expenses by buying as much ivory as possible, but he realized that he had little hope of competing successfully in his spare time against the experienced coast merchants.

The coastal traders were not alone in their hostility to the Company’s trading ventures. Where the Somali controlled the ivory trade, they thwarted the Company’s attempts to break their monopoly. For access to the riches of the interior, the Juba was regarded by the Company as second only to building a railway. But the Company found it difficult to obtain permission to navigate the river; the Somali threatened war if the steamer sent by the Company did not leave, and when it finally was allowed to pass, it returned with only two tusks. After this voyage, relations with the Somali deteriorated further, and the expenditure of several thousand pounds on subsidies, bribes, and a large garrison at Kismayu availed the Company nothing.35

Nor could trade be established on the Tana, owing to the hostility of the Arabs at Lamu and, after 1890, of the Sultan of Zanzibar. The Pokomo were interested in trading, but were intimidated by the Somali. In 1893, the Company abandoned its efforts on the Tana.36

The Company was not altogether unable to obtain ivory. It was soon apparent, however, that a fortune in ivory sufficient to keep the Company in the black was a chimera. Nevertheless, ivory remained important in the Company’s calculations owing to
the absence of other sources of income. So, although the Company found that they were not in a position to collect all the ivory in their large domain, they remained determined to do as well out of it as they could.

With this object in mind, the Company explained to the Foreign Office in 1891 that "in consequence of reports of projected hunting trips and the necessity especially with regard to elephants of checking the destruction of large game and preventing collisions with natives on the part of irresponsible adventurers" the Company had published a notice of their intent to charge a licence fee to every European entering the territory for sporting purposes. In this way, the Company planned to obtain something from the hunters who were profiting from ivory taken in their territory, and to acquire some minimal means of control over them. If the numbers of hunters were controlled, and thus the numbers of elephants maintained, the Company would lose little while gaining the fees for the licences. This line of reasoning left out of account the African hunters, but the Company, with only a handful of inland stations dotted along the route to Buganda, had not a hope of imposing regulations and fees on the indigenous population. It is also probable that the Company directors feared the destructive potential of the rifle more than the continuation of African hunting activities.

The Company's charter, granted in 1888, authorized the Company to license elephant-hunters.

For regulating the hunting of elephants, and for their preservation, for the purpose of providing means of military and other transport in Our Indian Empire or elsewhere, the Company may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, impose and levy within any territories administered by them, other than their
Zanzibar territory, a licence duty and may grant licences to take or kill elephants, or to export elephants' tusks or ivory.\textsuperscript{30}

Nevertheless, the Company's right to impose this taste of bureaucracy upon the untrammeled sportsman's paradise was promptly challenged by some Europeans. In response, the Company solicited Foreign Office approval of a proposal to prohibit absolutely the hunting and killing of game and to "interdict the passage of individuals or parties from the coast ports in search of sport." Not wishing to appear unreasonable, the Company added that the prohibition would be subject to modification as soon as the administration was in a position to control intertribal feuds and intercourse between Africans and Europeans. Moreover, hunting might be allowed in districts "infested to excess" with wild animals.\textsuperscript{31}

The Foreign Office perhaps thought this proposal was a little crude, and suggested that Articles IX and X of the Brussels Act, regulating the introduction of fire-arms into a large part of the African continent, would be a useful source of authority for controlling hunting. The Company would have the right to issue gun licences, and could then issue a notice to the effect that in view of the unsettled state of the interior, licences would not be issued for sporting purposes.\textsuperscript{32} The IBNA Company then of course had what it had originally wanted: the authority to license sportsmen. This the Company proceeded to do, but the talk of banning sportsmen from Company territory had not been without foundation. There were good reasons for adopting such a course. Several Europeans had been killed in German East Africa in incidents connected with ivory and ivory-
The Company wished to avoid such occurrences, which might stir up trouble in the interior and involve the Company in punitive expeditions. It was not unknown for Europeans to act in high-handed ways which aroused anger and provoked violent responses from Africans. Cupidity on both sides and poor communications made situations unpredictable.

Sir William Astor Chanler's adventures exemplified just the sort of behaviour that the Company wished to prevent. These two indefatigable travellers and hunters, Chanler and Ludvig von Hohnel, set off in August 1892 to explore the upper Tana River, to the east and north of Mount Kenya. On the river, when the frightened Pokomo refused to sell his food, Chanler took it by force. He then paid, and "trade became brisk." Chanler took exception to the presence of a Somali raiding party, beating one man and telling him the Somalis must leave the area. Upon returning from the Lorian Swamp, Chanler and von Hohnel forced their way through the mountains north-east of Mount Kenya, engaging in several bloody battles with the Kambara and Kame peoples. Moreover, trouble was carried back to Zanzibar when Chanler's porters accused him of cruelty and homicide. Among other things, porters were allegedly hung by the hands from trees with a heavy tusk of ivory placed across the nape of the neck. Arthur Neumann also "chastised" the Kame, in which adventure he was joined by Dr. Kolb. Kolb, who came to Africa with the Freelander expedition and remained after it dissolved, was a disturbing presence in the territory; drunken and quarrelsome, he was said to go about threatening to shoot people. A few years later, Kolb and a companion, Captain Hans
von Bastineller, were accused by other Europeans of lawless activities and looting, and Bastineller himself wrote of "chastisements" of Africans and the hanging of one. A missionary reported "violent punitive expeditions."**

Other Europeans infuriated the Company by their excesses in the hunting field. According to P.J. Jackson, one Gardner Muir and his Scots ghillie killed over eighty rhinoceros in the Nchakos area in less than three months in 1893. The Company was "so incensed" that they wanted to charge £500 for sporting licences.*** Nevertheless, rather than ban Europeans from the territory, the Company decided after a few years of little or no control to issue some sporting regulations, similar to those in force in the British Central Africa Protectorate.

Everyone coming into IBRA Company territory to hunt game, defined as elephant, rhinoceros, and the larger antelopes, had to obtain a £25 licence. All fire-arms were subject to the Act of the Brussels Conference. Ivory was subject to a duty of fifteen per cent, and rhinoceros horn and hippopotamus teeth to ten per cent. Each licence-holder was required to deposit £100 as a surety of good behaviour, and the fine for taking game without a licence was to be not less than £50.**** Later in the year, the killing of cow elephants was prohibited, on pain of a fine and confiscation of the ivory.***** This rule attempted to protect the reproductive capacities of the elephant against the ravages of the hunters.

The IBRA Company would no doubt have liked to control all elephant hunting in its territory. This they were utterly unequipped to do, and they did not even attempt to regulate
hunting by Africans. What they did do was to levy export duties on the indigenous trade. This action led to squabbles with the coastal traders and with German East Africa. Private traders were not eager to pay duty to the Company, while both the Company and the German administration wanted as big a slice of the customs income as they could get. As the sale of acquired ivory and the duties on exports were among the very few sources of immediate income, there was such irritable correspondence with the Foreign Office. The Germans objected to the IBEA Company duties; the Sultan complained that the Germans were stealing his rightful duties; the Germans accused the Company of sending traders to acquire ivory in German East Africa without paying duty; the private traders of European firms such as Smith, MacKenzie and Company waxed indignant over double charges by the Uganda and coast administrations; and various coastal traders complained of harassment and confiscations. These quarrels continued after the Company left the field to the British Government, and for the same reason.

Customs revenue, while insufficient to support the Company, contributed considerable sums to its beggarly bankbook. Duties collected up to April 1893 amounted to £71,000. More than half the annual collections derived from Mombasa’s ivory exports. Duties on ivory, charged at 15 per cent, thus came to over £35,000, spread over five years, or about £7,000 per year. This would suggest that ivory worth £45,000 to £50,000 - or roughly 100,000 pounds - was annually passing through Mombasa. (Ivory prices were subject to fluctuations but averaged about 8 to 10 English shillings per pound in the 1890’s. It is not possible to
be precise, owing to the confusions created by the changing relationships of the several currencies in use in Zanzibar and by the independently variable values of the different types of ivory. Much of this ivory went to Zanzibar. Of Zanzibar's

TABLE 1

Imports of Ivory to Zanzibar

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total imports value in £</th>
<th>Imports from BHA in £</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
<th>Imports from GEA in £</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1892</td>
<td>148,495</td>
<td>23,153</td>
<td>15.5 %</td>
<td>116,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>150,930</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>7 %</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1894</td>
<td>152,181</td>
<td>20,975</td>
<td>13.75 %</td>
<td>121,206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1895</td>
<td>102,351</td>
<td>17,069</td>
<td>16.75 %</td>
<td>77,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>126,429</td>
<td>20,447</td>
<td>16.25 %</td>
<td>96,982</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>108,592</td>
<td>21,122</td>
<td>19.5 %</td>
<td>87,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>113,164</td>
<td>28,150</td>
<td>25 %</td>
<td>85,014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

total imports, IBBA Company territory contributed an average of about 15.5% from 1892 to 1895. Imports rose after the Protectorate was established (July 1, 1895) but British East Africa's increased percentage of Zanzibar's total imports was also a result of the diminishing amounts of ivory imported through German East Africa.

The IBBA Company had been partially founded upon a hopeful interest in the ivory trade. The trade was there and offered good returns. But lacking the skill, patience, and frugality required, and distracted by other possibilities and problems, the Company simply floundered about. Among the unhappy legacies left to the Protectorate administration which followed, was a fundamentally contradictory policy regarding elephants: that elephants should be preserved, while at the same time ivory
exports should be encouraged. The colliding tenets of this position confused and weakened Protectorate policy for many years.

The administration's infirmity of purpose regarding elephants and other game would doubtless have attracted little attention at another time and place. As it happened, the East Africa Protectorate was established just as concern for the preservation of wildlife in Africa was gathering international momentum. The fame already won by the Protectorate's rich variety of game ensured that the administration's policies would be watched by critical eyes.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III

1. Samuel White Baker, The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia (London: Macmillan and Co., 1867). See also In the Heart of Africa (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1884), a condensed version of Nile Tributaries and The Albert N'yanza, Great Basin of the Nile. The condensation of the Nile Tributaries concentrates on hunting episodes; the publishers must have considered these sections most attractive to the public. In the Heart of Africa has been reprinted by Negro Universities Press, (Westport, Conn., 1970). Baker had earlier published The Nile and Nubia in Egypt (1854).

The literature on the exploration of Africa is large. Most explorers wrote their own accounts, excerpts of their works have been collected, biographies and histories of exploration written. The explorers' own books are the most rewarding, not only for their first-hand information, but because most of them wrote with a vigour that is conspicuously lacking in many secondary sources. Among the biographies, Fawn Brodie's study of Richard Burton, The Devil Drives, is outstanding. Robert I. Rotberg has edited a useful collection of short studies of various explorers: Africa and Its Explorers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), as well as writing a biography of Thomson.


3. Ibid., p. 157.

4. Hugh Cholmeley, the third Baron Delamore, grew up on a country estate in Cheshire and lived for the hunting. He made his first trip to Somaliland at the age of twenty-one. He was probably the second white man to cross into British territory from the north, the first being the American naturalist, Dr. Pownalson-Smith, who journeyed south from Berbera a year earlier. Elspeth Huxley, Whitman's Country, Lord Delamore and the Making of Kenya (2 vols.; Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1935), I, 4-5.


The wild beasts at the Exeter Exchange had long been one of the spectacles of London. The London Zoo in Regent's Park was founded in 1828, and within ten years there were zoos in Manchester, Bristol, and in Dublin. In its first year, nearly 100,000 people paid to visit the London Zoo, and in 1830 attendance was already up to almost a quarter of a million. Philip Street, *Animals in Captivity* (London: Faber and Faber, n. d.), pp. 13, 19. Travelling menageries had been a popular amusement since the early eighteenth century, and in the nineteenth, elephants, giraffes, camels, and lions were the star attractions of well-known menageries like Wombwell's. Circuses also flourished, and included exhibitions of trained lions and other animals.

Harriman Murray, *From Rome to Ringling* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1956), pp. 93, 189-90. The modern circus with its collection of varied acts was largely devised by Philip Astley. Astley's Amphitheatre, in full swing by the 1770's, was one of London's popular entertainments. The first elephant was shown there in 1828.

Examples of the explorer/hunters of the period are C. J. Andersson and Frederick Green in the 1850's, and Thomas Baines and John Chapman in the 1860's.


Ibid., pp. 257-8.


Also C. J. Andersson's *The Lion and the Elephant* (1873), and F. L. Jases's *The Unknown Horn of Africa* (1888).

Horton H. Cohen's introduction to *She* (New York: Collier Books, 1962). Haggard, the son of a country squire, went out to Natal at the age of nineteen to work for the
Lieutenant-Governor, Sir Henry Bulwer. He spent five years in southern Africa, where he hunted avidly and travelled as much as possible.


21. For example, biographies of F.C. Selous (1918), C.J. Andersson, W.C. Barrie, and Samuel Baker, and books by Abel Chapman and W.D.N. "Karamoja" Bell. These lists are not exhaustive.

22. Shooting ivory could be very profitable. Arthur Neumann made £10,000 on one trip at the end of the century, and when he died a few years later, left a fortune of £27,000 amassed solely by a few years' ivory hunting. One of Lord Delamere's expeditions showed a profit of £10,000 after he paid off scores of Somali horsemen, camel drivers, and hunters. Sir Geoffrey Archer, *Personal and Historical Memoirs of an East African Administrator* (London: Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1963), pp. 18, 37-38. Delamere paid duty amounting to £800 on five tons of ivory that he brought to railhead in 1897, according to the Commissioner of the Protectorate. Delamere's activities prompted an angry letter from Harry Johnston in Uganda. Johnston to Salisbury, November 21, 1899, FCPC 7404/4. Dr. Atkinson killed twenty-one elephants in twenty-one days in 1897, and sold the ivory for £1100. Huxley, *White Man's Country*, I, 47.

23. J. Du Plessis, *Three Through the Dark Continent* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1917), p. 188. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, British ideas about Africa were for the most part formed by limited contact with West Africa, where the slave trade and the exploration of the "white man's grave" excited the most attention. For a fascinating study, see Philip D. Curtin, *Image of Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964).

24. Marie de Kiewiet Maphill, "The British Sphere 1884-1894," in Oliver and Mathew, *History of East Africa*, I, 393. The following brief account of the TEA Company is derived
from this chapter and the more detailed account in de Kever, "History of the IBBA." See also John S. Galbraith, Mackinnon and East Africa, 1870-1895 (Cambridge: University Press, 1972).

25. One difficulty was that while the Company attached great importance to the acquisition of the rights to the ivory trade in their potential sphere, the Sultan was unwilling to part with any of his income from this source. He enjoyed an annual revenue of some £20,000 arising from duty on the ivory that came to Zanzibar from all over eastern Africa and the lands west of Lakes Victoria and Tanganyika.

26. Control of this route became desirable once Lord Salisbury, the British Foreign Secretary, had accepted that Britain’s occupation of Egypt, begun in 1882, was going to last a long time. Protection of the Nile then became a matter of importance. John Flint, "The Wider Background to Partition and Colonial Occupation," Oliver and Nathew, History of East Africa, pp. 379-80.

27. Galbraith, Mackinnon, p. 239. In Galbraith’s opinion, not even Rhodes could have made a success of the IBBA Company.

28. In 1892, the Company pressed Charles Stokes, an ivory trader, to use its route from Buganda to the coast, but he pointed out that this route was not established and porters were not readily available. Luck, Stokes, p. 114.


30. For example, the Company established a station at Munias, but in the 1890’s, the number of coastal traders there was actually decreasing because rising prices had cut too deeply into profits. C.H. Hobley’s report on Kavirondo, enclosed in Berkeley to F.O., May 12, 1896, FOCP 6861/85. The traders were passing through to areas further up country, such as Turkana and Karamoja.

31. Neumann, Elephant-Hunting, p. 48. Neumann found hunting (as opposed to trading) very profitable indeed, but the expenses of his individual operation were not at all comparable to the amounts being disbursed by the Company.

John Kirk, Britain’s experienced Consul at Zanzibar, commenting in 1886 on the scheme of the ivory-trading house A. Meyer, in Hamburg, to send their agents inland to purchase ivory, was sure the venture would be a failure, owing to the cost of maintaining Europeans in the interior and the opposition of the Arabs. Kirk was perfectly right. Two agents were shot. Kirk to F.O., March 17, 1886, FOCP 5308/25.

Trade," p. 275.

33. Jackson, Early Days, p. 182.

34. Lugard to Mackenzie, enclosed in IBBA Co. to F.O., July 22, 1891, FOCP 6261/50. Lugard later acquired renown as the High Commissioner of Northern Nigeria and the architect of indirect rule.

35. Dundas, "Expedition up the Juba," p. 211; de Rieviet, "IBBA," pp. 234-40. Not only ivory attracted the IBBA Company; it was rumoured that gold and precious stones were to be found up river.

In 1893, Company prospects on the Juba were still described in glowing terms: ivory, rubber, grain, and hides were to be had, and, supposedly, emeralds were obtainable on the upper Juba and gold at Bardera. Gazette for Zanzibar and East Africa, March 22, 1893, reprinted from The Times, where the information was doubtless placed in an attempt to attract investment.

36. Chanler to IBBA, November 28, 1892, F.O. 2/57; Hobley, "Prospects in IBBA," pp. 99-100, 104; de Rieviet, "IBBA," pp. 242-46. The hostility to the Company sprang not only from competition over ivory, but from ancient Muslim/Christian antipathy and resentment of British pressure to end the slave trade in East Africa.

37. IBBA Co. to F.O., June 19, 1891, FOCP 6127/188.

38. Papers relating to the Mombasa Railway Survey and Uganda, C. 6555 (1892). The Company did not train any elephants. Nor did the Protectorate government, although interest remained alive for some years. In the Congo, an elephant-training project was still being pursued as late as 1925.

39. IBBA Co. to F.O., June 19, 1891, FOCP 6127/188.

40. F.O. to IBBA Co., June 27, 1891, FOCP 6127/200.

41. In 1879, 1881, and 1885. One was murdered in retaliation for an incident in which another European had forcibly wrested ivory from some Africans. The other two were ivory traders whose competition was resented by the coastal caravans. (See also Note 31.) Kirk to F.O., February 28, 1879, F.O. 84/154; Rachel S. Watt, In the Heart of Savorodon (London: Marshall Brothers Ltd., n.d.), p. 97; Dr. Wilhelm Junker, Travels in Africa (London: Chapman and Hall, 1892), pp. 559-62.


Cracknell to F.O., April 13, 1894, FOCP 6557/141. Chanler did not deny shooting a porter or floggings of 150 strokes.


Hardinge to F.O., November 2, 1894, FOCP 6661/156.

Information from Lord Delamere, Dr. Atkinson, and Sir Harry Johnston: F.O. to Hardinge, April 12, 1900; Hardinge to F.O., May 15, 1900, FOCP 7405/103; Hardinge to F.O., August 6, 1900, FOCP 7675/61. The latter contained the response of Herr Gunther Sauberlich, a missionary, to Hardinge's inquiry about Kolb. Sauberlich also referred to two other Europeans who had traded cows for ivory and then repossessed the cows by force. He added that Neumann's caravans were known to rob the country when they passed through Ukambani.


IBEA Co. to F.O., June 8, 1894, FOCP 6557/267.

IBEA Co. to F.O., October 26, 1894, FOCP 6661/82.

The Company also signed a number of treaties with African groups along the Juba, promising protection, arms, and agricultural implements and seeds in return for half of any ivory acquired and one-third of all crops. Papers relating to the *Nobamba Railway Survey and Uganda*, C. 6555 (1892). Some treaties were made along the Tana too, where the Company was in competition with the Germans at Hitu. De Kiewiet, "History of the IBEA", p. 172.

See for example Euan-Smith to F.O., January 28, 1891, FOCP 6124/189; IBEA Co. to F.O., August 7, 1891, FOCP 6261/78; Hsrsrs. Price, Boustead and Co. to F.O., June 4, 1894, FOCP 6557/237#; Hardinge to F.O., November 13, 1894, FOCP 6661/202.


De Kiewiet, "IBEA,", p. 231.

55. But note that according to the Board of Trade, ivory exports from Company territory were worth £35,910 in 1891 and £28,038 in 1892. These figures would indicate exports of about 60,000 to 70,000 pounds per year. The discrepancy may be explained by fluctuations in quantity or quality from year to year, by differing methods of calculation, or by error. There is too little information to be sure.

Total exports presumably included a fair quantity of ivory from Uganda - Busho, Karamoja, etc. The Company
gained almost nothing from the Juba trade, as nearly all the ivory went to the Benadir ports, ceded to Italy in 1889. Ivory worth about £2,000 per year was exported from Kismayu.

56. See Table I. Figures from Board of Trade to F.O., January 15, 1900, F.O. 403/302/95.
CHAPTER IV. The First Game Regulations

When the Protectorate replaced the Company in July 1895, it brought far vaster resources to bear on all aspects of the territory's administration. Less than a year later, the Foreign Office began to discuss wildlife preservation in the new Protectorate. There were several reasons for the Foreign Office's concern. In part it sprang from an established tradition of wildlife preservation in Britain. Among the landed classes, the preservation of wildlife found a deep root: the hunting privileges of royalty and the landed gentry which traditionally had reserved stags and pheasants for the pleasure of kings and severely punished the peasant hunting for meat. In the nineteenth century, the welfare of animals and the prevention of cruelty were popular topics of concern among the well-to-do. The prevention of cruelty and the preservation of wild species were united in the concern for game in Africa. African hunting methods, particularly the use of fire, were considered barbaric and cruel, and African hunters, lacking European notions of sportsmanship, were regarded as wanton destroyers. The fear that the elephant would soon be exterminated was expressed as early as the 1870's.

Public and official interest in the preservation of wildlife in Africa was stimulated by expressions of concern by well-known travellers, sportsmen, and other authorities. The influential Livingstone was among the early observers of the swift disappearance of apparently limitless animal populations with the coming of the gun. He referred to a pair of hunters
who, in the 1840's, killed seventy-eight rhinoceros in a single season, and then observed that "sportsmen, however, would not now [1860] find an equal number; for as guns are introduced among the tribes, all these fine animals melt away like snow in the spring." Dr. Georg Schweinfurth, describing his travels through the region east of Gondokoro in The Heart of Africa (1876) included an account of African elephant hunting, and warned that "since not only the males, with their large and valuable tusks, but the females also with the young, are included in this wholesale and indiscriminate slaughter, it may easily be imagined how year by year the noble animal is fast being exterminated." Gordon, some of whose letters were collected and published in four editions by 1885, also rued the destruction. "This indiscriminate slaughter of these animals will never last, though they seem plentiful enough.... What a number of poor beasts have died for this ivory. It is of slow growth, and there are numbers of very little tusks of little elephants." Sir Charles Wentworth Dilke included in his discussion of the British Empire remarks on the promising territory held by the IBEA Company. He believed the area was favourable to European enterprise, but foretold a swift end to the ivory profits should preservation not be undertaken:

The principal trade of this part of the coast has hitherto been in ivory, but such vast quantities are yearly secured by Arab hunters that, unless the British company should be successful in preserving the elephant in a portion of their territories, no ivory is likely to be obtained after the next fifteen or twenty years."

Hermann von Wissmann, who crossed Central Africa twice in the 1880's, observed that south of the eighth degree of latitude, a
little south of Zanzibar, guns were found everywhere, and the elephant population had vastly decreased in consequence.\textsuperscript{7}

It was well known that game in South Africa - a sportsman's paradise of the past - had practically disappeared from vast areas of the country. As early as 1852, Livingstone noted that the game had largely disappeared from many areas where it had once been abundant; the elephant and buffalo had retreated "hundreds of miles beyond." Arthur Neumann, who arrived in Natal in 1869, found that elephant had long since "been driven far beyond the borders of the colony" and the last buffalo was killed shortly after he arrived.\textsuperscript{8} The quagga and the blue buck were extinct by the 1890's, having been killed by the thousands for their hides.\textsuperscript{9} The recent destruction of the bison in North America was another widely-known example of the ease and speed with which wildlife could be exterminated.

Another source of government interest in the problem was the desire to place limits on the destruction of elephant herds by professional ivory hunters. It was feared that unless government control was exercised, the ivory hunters, in their eagerness for quick profits, would kill off the herds faster than they could reproduce, thus destroying in a short time what might otherwise be a perpetual source of income to the Protectorate. It was not only a question of maintaining the ivory supply. The British government had acquired its experience of elephants in India, where these animals were domesticated and their intelligence and strength were put to use in transport and hauling timber. Indeed, to some men with Indian experience, it seemed a criminal waste to shoot elephants for their ivory. In
the 1890's, the Foreign Office had by no means abandoned the notion that the elephant would prove useful in the development of Africa.

The British government was anxious to control European hunters for another reason: these hunters brought guns and ammunition into the Protectorate. They not only armed themselves, but habitually provided fire-arms to some portion of their caravans for purposes of self-defence. The government, faced with the problem of subduing a large, scattered population not necessarily prepared to accept British rule without a fight, were naturally reluctant to see fire-arms proliferating in the hands of Africans. The hunters' travels might expose the remotest groups to guns, and thefts, carelessness, and runaway porters made it most difficult to control the possession of these increasingly-sophisticated weapons. Coast porters often deserted and carried off rifles and cartridges. These were assets which might obtain them a welcome in some areas, since "native chiefs loved to have a few gunmen in their entourage, as it gave them prestige with their rivals."14

The Protectorate government contented itself at first with adopting the IBNA Company regulations and extending them to the country north of the Tana.15 But in May 1896, Lord Salisbury wrote to the Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, Sir Arthur Hardinge, to express his concern about "the excessive destruction by travellers and others in East Africa of the larger animals generally known as 'big game.'" He continued, "there is reason to fear that unless some check is imposed upon the slaughter of these animals, they will, in the course of a
few years, disappear from the British Protectorate." Salisbury requested a report on the extent to which the IDHE company regulations were being applied, and noted that Hardinge was at liberty to choose a close season, to delineate reserves, and to limit the number of beasts allowed per licence. He added that the fee for such a licence should be high enough to serve as a check.12

Late that same year, the Acting Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate, Clifford H. Craufurd, submitted draft game regulations for the Protectorate. In his covering letter, he pointed out that as there were but "a few officers with large territories inhabited by savages," he had narrowed the issue to licencing of "non-native" sportsmen. African hunters were to be dealt with by local officers - a mere symbolic bow in the direction of control since no specific suggestions were made as to what the officers might do. Craufurd wrote that the idea of establishing the entire Kenya District as a game sanctuary was being discussed with the Sub-Commissioners for Ukamba and Tanaland Provinces. The rules as a whole were designed to favour sportsmen and deter professional ivory hunters, as the latter "are solely motivated by pecuniary interests and are hard to control."

The proposed regulations set the fee for a twelve-month licence at £25 and forbade the giving, lending, or selling of fire-arms and ammunition to Africans. Fees for importing fire-arms increased if more than three rifles were brought in. It was forbidden to shoot females and young of all species, and in particular elephants with tusks under ten pounds each. Any cou
ivory shot in error was to be the property of the Crown. The presumption was that a number of cow elephants would be shot in mistake for males; by confiscating the ivory the administration hoped to discourage hunters from making "mistakes" too often. Special provision was made to allow the killing of females of lions, leopards, hyenas, and crocodiles. This provision illustrates the prevailing attitude to these animals at the time. They and other carnivores were not regarded as game but as "vermin" - destructive beasts which killed the desirable animals and occasionally endangered men. This attitude persisted for many years; the realization that the carnivores played a constructive role in the ecological balance was slow in coming, and did not begin to be recognized in the regulations until the early 1930's. Certain "unsportsmanlike" methods of hunting were prohibited: the use of nets, fire, and large-scale drives. The licence-holder was to deposit £100 as security for good behaviour, and breaches of the regulations could be punished with fines and the confiscation of trophies. A list of animals that might be shot on the licence followed: two each of elephant, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, zebra, buffalo, warthog, giraffe, and each kind of antelope, and unlimited numbers of lion, leopard, hyena, and crocodile. In addition, the hunter was permitted to shoot for food when necessary.

The Foreign Office responded to these suggestions by sending Hardinge a copy of the regulations drawn up by Sir Harry Johnston, which were about to be issued in the British Central Africa Protectorate. It was desirable, the Foreign Office stated, that regulations be as similar as possible in the
various Protectorates. Hardinge was of the opinion that similarity between the German East African regulations and those of the East Africa Protectorate was more important than any such similarity between the East Africa Protectorate and the distant British Central Africa Protectorate; in particular, he wanted to prevent traders from evading the ivory regulations by crossing the frontier. Thus he suggested similar licence fees and minimum tusk weights.

Hardinge submitted a new draft of the proposed regulations in August, 1897. The thought behind the revisions was that "we should keep as close as possible to the German Regulations, but make our own slightly more favourable to wealthy sportsmen who bring money into the territory..." He therefore limited the numbers which could be shot on licence only in the case of elephant, rhinoceros, and giraffe, and he recommended the £25 licence as a little less expensive than an equivalent licence in German East Africa. This exemplifies one of the mainsprings of concern for preservation: game was a resource which could make money for the territory, and was to be preserved in such a way as to maximize this potential. As time went by, differing ideas about the best way to accomplish this object were to lead to struggles over game policy. In 1897, however, Hardinge's draft, with minor changes, was accepted by the Foreign Office and authorized at the end of December. It included the delineation of the Protectorate's first game reserve, comprising most of Kenya District.

Hardinge discussed the regulations in his first Annual Report on the East Africa Protectorate. He concluded that
These regulations, if adopted, will apply in all their strictness to Europeans only; it would be impossible, and even if not impossible, inequitable to enforce them rigorously in the case of natives, though in that of coast people going to hunt for ivory in the interior the imposition of certain conditions, not necessarily so severe, would be no hardship.

It is proposed accordingly to leave natives, for the purpose of hunting or killing game, under the control of the Sub-Commissioners, who would be guided by the special needs and circumstances of the tribe or race to which the native hunter belonged.

This statement acknowledged the largest obstacle to the application of a preservation policy in the East Africa Protectorate at the time: that, aside from the administration's inability to control the African hunter, it would be unjust to suddenly demand from him a large sum of money for the privilege of acquiring food or protecting crops in a traditional manner, and unjust to forbid him to hunt. The inefficiency of indigenous African weaponry relative to the gun, and the rather small numbers of people amid large game populations, gave the government room for tolerance. As John Kirk wrote in 1897, "It is wonderful how little effect natives with spears, traps, and arrows have on game in a country, and how suddenly it disappears before the gun and rifle." Since there were few guns in the Protectorate at the end of the nineteenth century, the government perceived no immediate need to license African hunters. The game regulations simply provided that local authorities, who would presumably know how important a role game played in the economic lives of the various groups of Africans, were to act accordingly. This meant, in effect, that Africans were to be allowed to hunt according to their needs, and nothing was done to force them to conform to the regulations.
the message of the future could be read in the distinction drawn between coastal people who hunted for commercial reasons, and the rest. Commercial hunting, in the view of the government, was neither traditional nor necessary, and would soon be a target of control.

The administration's policy towards African hunters was a sensible one insofar as it acknowledged the injustice of sudden wholesale change and the inability of the government to enforce a rigid set of regulations. But it incorporated a troublesome misconception. The sharp distinction drawn between hunting commercially and killing game in order to eat was an erroneous one in the case of the hunting tribes. The Dorobo, Boni, and Liangulo all depended from time to time upon the commerce in ivory for their survival, a fact which was later to contribute to the difficulty in enforcing the game laws. The Game Department, whose relations with the hunting tribes were destined to be thorny, did not take into account their dependence on ivory, and indeed it would have been difficult to frame and enforce a policy allowing the Liangulo, for example, but not the Kamba, to hunt elephant and sell ivory.

The administration also depended too heavily upon the relative inefficiency of African hunting methods. European hunters were often too enamoured of their own technology to give African weaponry the respect it deserved. The view that the survival of game populations was in little danger from men without guns was bolstered by the presence of great quantities of game, especially when compared to southern Africa where the gun had been a factor. Observations of the hard lives led by the
hunting peoples reinforced the disparaging view taken of their bows and arrows. This view failed to take into consideration the effect of potent commercial stimuli on the hunters. When the administration later grappled with the problem of controlling the ivory trade, it was discovered that African hunters were not as inefficient as had been believed. The government's policy towards Africans and game initially reflected the hope that the mere absence of guns would do the work of preservation. As the human population multiplied and commercial incentives to kill game increased, this approach was to prove inadequate.

Meanwhile, Africans remained unaffected by the new regulations, except in one area. In Tamaland, which was partly populated by Boni elephant hunters, the government laid claim to one tusk of each elephant killed. The grounds for this primitive form of taxation were that the hunters were allowed to pay in this form the licence elsewhere imposed upon European hunters, which they could not themselves, before killing their elephants, afford. The reason this arrangement applied only in Tamaland was its alleged acceptability there, where this claim had "long been made by almost all native African Chiefs," and where the government believed the tax was "deemed natural, and therefore not resented." However natural the tax may have seemed, it seemed more natural to evade it, and soon the administration was talking of extending the tax to Malindi District, in order to prevent the Galla and Boni from avoiding payment by taking their ivory to Malindi or Bamburi. Though the Galla extracted tribute in ivory from Boni hunters, similar claims by the government were bound to be resented by one group
or the other: either the Boni would have to pay two masters, or the Galla would be deprived of their accustomed share.

These regulations regarding European and African hunters merely constituted the first, tentative attempt at control of man's pursuit of game. They were open to revision. The Foreign Office was particularly anxious to be kept informed about the effects of the regulations regarding ivory; cow ivory and tusks of less than ten pounds weight were liable to confiscation, and it was feared that this provision would merely "divert the trade in such ivory to other territory where it was not prohibited." For example, traders returning from the interior via Kilimanjaro might elect to arrive at the coast at Pangani in German territory, rather than at Mombasa.

After such correspondence, revised regulations were put into effect in August 1899. "Game" was defined as "any elephant, giraffe, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, wild buffalo, zebra, wild pig, gazelle, gaz, or antelope of whatever species or variety." The killing of young elephants was specifically prohibited, and the fine for hunting in the reserve was raised from a paltry £5 to £50. The licensing structure became more elaborate. In place of the £25 licence for "non-native" hunters, separate licences were to be issued to sportsmen (375 rupees) and public officers, settlers, and traders (45 rupees). Public officers and sportsmen were permitted to shoot any game, but not more than two each of elephant, rhinoceros, hippopotamus, buffalo and giraffe, unless the licence-holder paid extra fees. It was also specified that settlers might hunt any game on their own lands. Fines for shooting in breach of the regulations could be imposed to a
maximum of 500 rupees, and if more than two animals were involved, to a maximum of 200 rupees each. In addition, offenders could be sentenced to up to two months in prison. Later in the year, the revised regulations were further amended to require submission of returns of game killed by each licence-hold. The less common antelopes such as the sable and greater and lesser kudu were afforded further protection by limiting the allowance on each licence to one animal, and the sale of heads, horns, and skins of antelopes was prohibited.28

One aspect of these new regulations was destined to cause some friction. Upon sorting the non-native licences into three new categories, the government set the cost of public officers' and settlers' licences at 45 rupees, or £3. But the public officer's licence allowed him the same privileges as the £25 sportsman's licence, whereas the settler was only allowed to shoot in his own district four each of several of the more common types of antelope: Grant's gazelle, hartebeest, Thomson's gazelle, impala, and wildebeest.29 These restrictions reflected the government's reason for issuing cheap licences to settlers: that settlers needed to shoot for meat and should not have to pay high fees for the right to do so. The settler's licence was not a licence to shoot for sport; the public officer's was.30 The discrepancy between the terms of the licences was to become a sore point with settlers. Some were keen on hunting, and some would have liked to obtain a little cash by killing one or two elephants each year— but without paying a large sum for the chance to do so.31

At the same time that regulations were being established in
the East Africa Protectorate and the Foreign Office was developing its policy there, the wider issue of game preservation in Africa as a whole was receiving international attention. In a remarkable and unprecedented exhibition of concern, a group of representatives from interested nations gathered in London in the spring of 1900 for the first International Conference for the Preservation of the Wild Animals, Birds, and Fishes of the African Continent.

The genesis of this Conference lay in the intense concern of a few people. The most important were Hermann von Wissmann, African traveller and Governor of German East Africa in 1895-1896, and Sir Clement Lloyd Hill, sportsman and career officer at the Foreign Office, where he was soon to become Superintendent of the African Protectorates Department. It was von Wissmann who suggested the Conference, and whose opinion the German Government relied upon, while the somewhat dogged pursuit of the objective needed to bring it off was supplied by the Foreign Office, where initial discussions of game preservation in Africa had preceded von Wissmann's suggestion. The reasons for the Foreign Office's active interest in holding a conference were similar to those which had led to the promulgation of game regulations in the Protectorates. Those of the public who were interested in Africa often expressed an interest in wildlife preservation as well; this was not surprising in view of the kinds of books on Africa that were popular. Moreover, many people who were anxious on behalf of the wildlife, people who had hunted and explored in Africa for example, were the very people whose opinions on Africa the Foreign Office was likely to
consult, and were of the same class and interests as the men who ran the Foreign Office. Hunting was an upper class sport at home as well as in Africa and India. Then too, there was plenty of support for preservation among the Commissioners in the field, many of whom were keen sportsmen or naturalists. Men like Alfred Sharpe in the British Central African Protectorate, and F.J. Jackson, who served in the East Africa Protectorate, wrote long, careful, and sometimes impassioned memoranda on the subject, deploring the ruthless destruction which had occurred in South Africa, and urging various measures to prevent its repetition throughout the continent.32

Another source of interest in a conference and an international agreement was the Foreign Office policy on ivory exports. As has already been pointed out, the aim of government policy was to preserve the elephant, and, within the limits set by that objective, to maximize the income from ivory exports. In light of the dual nature of the goal, it would naturally be to Britain's advantage to see similar game regulations enacted throughout tropical Africa, thus eliminating the possibility that the ivory exports would gravitate towards the ports of least restriction.33

The first step towards international action occurred in June 1896, when the Foreign Office received a copy of Governor von Wissmann's game regulations for German East Africa.34 The Foreign Office was interested enough to send copies of these regulations to the India Office, the Colonial Office, and their own Commissioners in Africa, with requests for comments and reports on existing regulations in India and the colonies.35
While the Foreign Office was waiting for replies, another communication arrived from Berlin, discussing von Wissmann's plans for German East Africa, and informing Salisbury that "Major von Wissmann is himself in favour of some international agreement being come to between all the Powers on the East African littoral for the protection of game in the interior." He then reported the German government's reaction to the idea, which was sympathetic but wary. The Portuguese, they worried, might agree on paper, but had no means of applying any measures to Mozambique's interior. So if such rules were enforced in German East Africa and British East Africa, the ivory would travel south of the Bovuma River. It was thought to be feasible, however, to declare an international close season for elephant and hippopotamus, and to confiscate at the coast all tusks under a certain weight. They were anxious to hear any suggestions the British might have.26

The Foreign Office, having just received a timely nudge in the shape of a question in the House of Commons respecting the establishment of a sanctuary for elephants in British Somaliland,27 was also anxious to pursue the question of preservation. But the machinery moved slowly. It was not until early in 1897 that the Colonial Office wrote to the Foreign Office, approving the notion of an international agreement and suggesting that such an agreement also be directed towards the enforcement of a system of sporting licences for Europeans.28 A few days later, the Foreign Office wrote to Berlin to inquire whether Germany would be prepared to suggest to the Powers the signature of an international agreement.29
It was against this background, in the spring of 1897, that von Wissmann put forward his suggestion for an international conference. He began by stating his belief that it was Europeans, not Africans, who must be controlled, certainly a more feasible undertaking. He doubted that

the main blame for the extinction of big game in Africa rests with the natives and not Europeans. I have too often seen how every European who possesses a gun on board a Congo steamer fires in the most reckless fashion, especially at hippopotami, without having any regard as to whether or no he can possess himself of the animal when killed. I have seen so much big game killed or mortally wounded in this wanton fashion, and indeed, only by Europeans.**

Von Wissmann was of the opinion that "if the system of sporting licences is strictly enforced, and the first few offenders duly punished, it will be quite possible to ensure a considerable amount of respect for the game reserves." Regarding the slaughter of elephants by African hunters, Von Wissmann averred that Africans in German East Africa had paid the high fees for elephant licences, implying that this was a not unreasonable solution to the problem. He thought that tusks under fifteen pounds should not be allowed on the market, and went on to state his belief that Portuguese cooperation was not crucial. He expected the Belgian Congo and the French Congo to be eager to preserve "their natural wealth, ivory," and thus a wide belt across that part of Africa where most of the elephant lived, would be protected.** He did not discuss the possibility of smuggling ivory outside this zone.

Von Wissmann's views concerning European and African hunters differed from those of several other Europeans who had African experience and who communicated their opinions to the
Foreign Office. One lengthy response came from the British Central Africa Protectorate’s Acting Commissioner, Alfred Sharpe, an experienced hunter. He stated that it was true that the elephant was being gradually exterminated in tropical Africa, and envisaged considerable difficulty in bringing this process to a halt.

It is rather generally, and quite erroneously supposed in Europe that the slaughter of elephants is due to a great extent to Europeans. This, however, is not the case, except in so far as it is the demand for ivory which causes the slaughter. Very few elephants are shot by Europeans in tropical Africa. The number killed annually is trifling compared with the vast number which are constantly being mobbed and followed and killed by Africans.

Sharpe then pointed out that British Central Africa was a small territory with numerous stations, yet it was impossible to prevent Africans from hunting elephant. "...instances have occurred here of elephants being killed within a few miles of a station, and yet nothing having been known of it till long after." In Sharpe’s view, controlling European hunters would only solve a small part of the problem. The sensible way to control African hunting was to remove the commercial stimulus. Sharpe did not go so far as to suggest the prohibition of ivory exports, but did recommend that "all the Powers who hold territory in Africa should agree to prohibit the export of tusks of less weight than, say, 15 pounds each." He added the rider that such a policy would be useless unless all the Powers agreed. He and others in Africa believed that the network of the ivory trade was efficient and extensive enough to move the ivory to wherever it was most profitable to export it.

The difference between the opinions of Sharpe and von
Nissmann was partly a mere matter of emphasis. Von Nissmann correctly stated that preservation entailed putting a stop to the wanton destruction indulged in by some Europeans, and by all accounts he was right in saying that Africans did not entertain themselves in that manner. It was Europeans, not Africans, who had denuded South Africa of its game population. As late as 1896, the Colonial Office reported that the European skin-hunters were a worse danger than the Africans to what game was left.** On the other hand, Sharpe quite sensibly pointed out that as there were not very many Europeans in the interior of tropical Africa, they were not doing a great deal of damage. He did support the licensing of Europeans to check "promiscuous slaughter", but pointed out, as had others before him, that controlling European hunters would not preserve the elephant while guns were plentiful in African hands and there was a market for ivory. F.C. Selous, whose words carried weight in Britain owing to his fame as a hunter, supported this view. Tropical Africa was not the same as Africa south of the Zambezi. While attributing the worst of the destruction in South Africa to Europeans, he stated that further north, at the present time, "997 out of every 1000 elephants whose tusks come to the London market are killed by African natives."** Selous's estimate may well have been exaggerated. Neither he nor anyone else had any means of counting the numbers of elephants killed by Africans or Europeans. Ivory-hunting was a business engaged in by both. Nevertheless, the sheer numbers of Africans in the interior of tropical Africa compared with the small European populations, plus the large trade conducted by the coastal merchants, makes
it certain that most of the elephants were killed by Africans. Licences and reserves would be effective only if the administrations were strong enough to enforce the regulations they made. That von Wissmann played down this intractable problem to such an extent is puzzling, especially as he himself had commented on the destruction of the elephant by Africans with guns in the 1880's, when he travelled across the continent, passing through the Congo to Ujiji and then down Lake Nyasa to Quelimane. But perhaps it may be explained by his anxiety to do something to tackle the difficulties of preservation, rather than to do nothing because it appeared impossible to do enough.46

Another view of the problem was offered by F.L. Sclater, who had hunted in both British Central Africa and British East Africa:

Regulations may be of some good as regards the inordinate slaughter of game by civilized whites; but so long as natives are permitted to possess themselves (by barter or purchase) of fire-arms, I fear the greater danger incurred by the animals from this source will be almost unaffected by such regulations.

He then made a practical suggestion: that international effort should be directed towards "restrictions on the sale of fire-arms of any description to natives" and towards enforcement of heavy licence fees for European gun-owners.47 This view commended itself to the Foreign Office because there were other reasons for keeping guns out of African hands all over Africa, and because in British East Africa, few Africans had guns, and therefore the game regulations could be expected to be effective.48

Von Wissmann, after discussing this issue and others,
concluded his proposals with the suggestion that an international conference be held, perhaps in Brussels, to discuss game preservation, ivory regulations, reserves, and kindred matters such as the domestication of the elephant and zebra.  

The Foreign Office swiftly concurred and proposed that all the Powers having African interests should be invited: the Congo Free State, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Liberia, plus representatives of the British colonies as well as the British Foreign Office. The chief points of interest were restriction of the slaughter of elephants and the provision of breeding reserves, protection of zebra, giraffe, rhinoceros, the larger antelopes, and "other useful or interesting mammals" and some birds. It was hoped that a conference would swiftly achieve a unity of policy in Africa. During the summer, the Foreign Office collected advice from many Europeans with long experience of Africa, among them Kirk, Johnston, Selous, Sharpe, Jackson, and von Hissmann, and distilled from their communications a consensus on necessary measures for game preservation. These measures were:

1. The prevention of the export of elephant tusks of less than a certain weight.

2. The creation of reserves.

3. A close time for all animals or the prohibition of the slaughter of females.

4. A system of licences for natives as well as Europeans.

5. The enforcement of the provisions of the Brussels Act in regard to the supply of arms and ammunition to natives.

6. The complete protection of certain useful animals
and birds.

The Foreign Office's expectations were that probably the utmost which would be obtained from the assembling of a Conference would be the passing of Resolutions engaging the Governments concerned to issue Regulations containing the above or similar provisions, and that the actual terms of the Regulations themselves would be left for each Power to decide...

Lord Salisbury was "disposed to think that this is all that need be attempted." 51

Salisbury suggested that the conference be held in London, in the following spring (1898). But owing to the leisurely pace at which the arrangements proceeded, particularly the slow responses of some other Powers, the conference only took place two years later, in April of 1900. Reactions to the proposed conference were not as uniformly enthusiastic as some had hoped. The French were reluctant, the Congo Free State was not eager to limit its ivory trade, Rhodesia refused to be bound by any determinations that the conference might make, and the Cape Colony and Natal, while approving the aims of the conference for the rest of Africa, wrote that their position as settled colonies was so very different that the same objects and measures could not apply. Cromer, in Egypt, said that the Khedive was totally uninterested. 52

Nevertheless, in spite of diplomatic foot-dragging, the conference did finally take place and succeeded in producing a Convention, which was signed on May 19, 1900. 53

The Convention expressed a profound change in the relationship between man and other animals. It was a change in perception which had developed in the minds of certain Europeans
who, living in a society freed from fears of the wilderness by distance from it, and enabled by their technology to protect themselves, were capable of seeing wildlife as an aesthetic and economic resource, a resource which should be perpetuated. Before Europeans had constructed the technology which allowed them to hunt for luxury, their relationship to the fauna of their continent had been much simpler: domesticate and nurture those which can serve as transport or food or labour, regard the rest as pests or enemies. Aesthetics rarely, if ever, entered into it, except perhaps among the privileged few who hunted for sport. The sophisticated problem of managing and profiting from the products of undomesticated animals hardly arose, owing to the difficulty of killing them. It was primarily the development of the gun which changed this. Suddenly it was possible to kill a great many animals with ease, so for the first time arose the question of preserving them. In some cases destruction ran too far ahead of the idea of preservation, or even the notion that extinction might occur. The passenger pigeon is a spectacular example. Also, many people thought of preservation in purely economic terms, and, since many animals had nothing to offer that was obviously valuable enough to stimulate efforts on their behalf, many animals disappeared. A belief in the value of wildlife simply as a part of the rich diversity of the natural world, a treasure to be preserved for its own sake, came last of all and was only cherished by some people.

The Convention was its international expression, but the realization of the ideal of preservation was hampered by the attitudes of some Powers, reluctant to part with any of their
sources of income. France and Portugal successfully opposed the inclusion of limitations on the exports of hides, skins, and horns in the document, and resisted uniform export duties. Both declared that they would not ratify the Convention until the territories in Southern Africa had done so. France later used the non-adherence of Abyssinia and Liberia as an excuse not to ratify, and Portugal and the Congo Free State were reluctant to ratify if France did not. Moreover, the document ignored the complex problems raised by its central idea. For one thing, Africans lacked the technology which would allow them to sympathize with preservation. In Africa, wild animals were mostly enemies of one sort or another, and some provided badly-needed meat. In addition, from the very local point of view of most Africans, the extermination of such numerous animals would seem too impossibly distant to merit concern by the authorities. The limits on hunting envisaged by the Convention would seem pointless. Another and immensely important issue ignored by the Convention was the largely-unforeseen contradiction looming up between the desire of European governments to preserve wildlife, and the desire to develop profitable colonies. "Settlers and game cannot live side by side" was a cry that would be heard all too soon.

The Convention was a simple document. It proposed to preserve game by licensing hunters, by limiting their methods and the numbers they might kill, and by creating sanctuaries and close seasons. Even these gentle proposals did not achieve ready and universal acceptance. The Foreign Office spent the next few years in a most tedious and frustrating series of attempts to
jog all the Powers into ratifying the Convention.

In spite of the procrastination of other Powers, immediate attention was devoted to enacting game laws in the East Africa Protectorate in conformity with the Convention. The Foreign Office summarized its efforts in a letter accompanying a draft of the new regulations:

Considerable difficulty has been experienced in drafting the Regulations in such a form as to prevent the wanton destruction of animals for profit or any other reason, whilst admitting reasonable killing by sportsmen and persons compelled to shoot for food or to protect their property from injury.

Therefore, local officers were to be allowed considerable latitude in administering the regulations. The new regulations were published in the Official Gazette of October 15, 1900.

The definition of game was expanded to include most warm-blooded animals, but not lions, leopards or baboons, nor amphibians or reptiles. New fees were set for licences: 750 rupees (£50) for sportsmen, 150 rupees (£10) for public officers and settlers. Settlers were permitted to shoot two hippopotamuses a year, several sorts of wild pig, and certain antelopes and gazelles up to a limit of five per month. Maximum penalties for breaches of the Regulations were raised to 1000 rupees, and in the case of multiple breaches, 500 rupees per animal. The old reserve in Kenya District was abandoned, and two new ones were proclaimed. These two reserves were to remain in existence until the creation of national parks in the 1940's, although they grew smaller as various pieces were chopped off to serve other interests.

The northern reserve comprised roughly a square bordering on the Uganda Protectorate, and including Marsabit, the south-
east shores of Lake Rudolf, and all the country south to the Guaso Nyiro River. The Southern Reserve adjoined German East Africa on the south and the Uganda Protectorate on the west, and extended as far east as the source of the Tsavo River in the foothills of Mount Kilimanjaro. To the north, it was bounded by the northern edge of the railway zone, and thus included the railway itself. Near Nairobi, the reserve extended north of the railway zone, but this portion was soon deleted." These two reserves were large, but there was as yet no one to patrol them. A beginning was about to be made, however. The seed of what would become the Game Department may be found in a letter from the Foreign Office to Hardinge written in June, 1900. The letter acknowledged that in order to carry out the intentions of the Convention, a special control system would be needed. There was nothing in the estimates for that year, of course, so the Foreign Office hoped that for the "trifling expense of travelling" some experienced officer might "devote attention" to the matter."

The most important new development contained in the 1900 regulations was the increased attention to hunting by Africans. All persons were to be bound by the regulations. But Africans who "appeared to be dependent on the flesh of wild animals for their subsistence" were to be allowed to hunt locally at the discretion of their District Officer, and under such restrictions as he might prescribe. So far, these instructions were vague, and, interpreted with latitude, might have been little different from the previous regulations. But the new regulations then added that "any permission to hunt would not
authorize the killing of any animal on Schedule I. As female and young elephants, as well as the eland, buffalo, and giraffe, were on the list, this proscription signified the government's intention to restrict African participation in the ivory trade. Moreover, since the elephant was the chosen prey of many of the Africans who lived by hunting, enforcement of the regulations would have a serious impact on their lives.

These regulations, like all other laws enacted in this early period, were limited in their effects by the administration's ability to enforce them. In 1895, the East Africa Protectorate was divided into four Provinces: Coast, Ukamba, Tanaland, and Jubaland. These in turn were composed of a total of eleven districts. North of the Guaso Nyiro, the territory was not organized at all. There were some half-dozen administrative stations, little more than customs sheds, on the coast, at Vanga, Mombasa, Malindi, Lamu, Port Durnford, and Kismayu, and a few more inland, along the line of the future railway. Africans at any distance from this line were hardly aware that the British Government considered itself to be in authority over them. By 1900, there were a few more stations, such as Ngong, Kitui, and Eshirri (Port Hall), and the railway headquarters had moved to Nairobi, but contact with the widely-scattered African population was still minimal. The collection of taxes, a good index of early contact between government and people, had barely begun in 1902. The Sub-Commissioner in charge of Ukamba Province, John Ainsworth, who had supported the imposition of game regulations in principle and from the very beginning, wrote in 1900 that it was impossible to carry out the
regulations effectively at any distance from the government stations. Hardinge, the Commissioner of the Protectorate, hoped to check the slaughter of cow and calf elephants by confiscation of the ivory, but he held out little hope of any further enforcement of the regulations so far as Africans were concerned.

Most of these tribes are, however, too primitive to be made to comprehend or apply a system of game licences, and too nomadic for it to be possible without a force of police throughout their countries, the size and cost of which would be out of proportion to the end in view, really to check their destruction of wild animals, which is in any case not greater now (except perhaps in time of famine, such as last year) than it was in former days, and is never likely to be great enough, as they have only bows and arrows, to constitute a serious danger. Interference with what they have hitherto regarded as a natural right would, moreover, be certain to be resented by them, and in the case of tribes living in dense jungle or forest, far away from our few Government stations, would, I need scarcely observe, be ineffectual.

Even in such districts as Ulu, where our authority is now universally admitted, Mr. Ainsworth agrees with me in thinking that the time is not yet come for us to insist on native’s licences.61

Hardinge’s remarks on licences and the capabilities of hunters using bows and arrows owed nothing to first-hand experience, but as Commissioner, Hardinge did know that the Protectorate was large, the number of stations was small, and the enforcement of any regulations would be difficult.

While the government was unable to apply the game regulations to Africans, it was more successful in its endeavour to obtain revenue through the regulations. It was significant that seven years after the establishment of the Protectorate there was no regular income from taxation. Rudimentary as the administration was, it cost the British taxpayer money. Military
expeditions alone cost more than the Protectorate revenue brought in. There was also the railway to pay for. At the end of the first nine years, Protectorate revenue added up to £598,852 (of which 40% came from customs), and expenditure to £1,954,111 - apart from the £5 1/2 million it had cost Britain to build the railway. Revenue rose each year, but expenditures kept pace. Consequently, the administration was obliged to cast about for sources of revenue. In this context, both the actual revenue contributed by the wildlife resources, and the expectations concerning this revenue, were important.

The game of the East Africa Protectorate contributed to government coffers in several ways. Ivory exports were subject to a duty of fifteen per cent, and hippopotamus teeth and rhinoceros horns to ten per cent. The government also sold ivory it acquired from Africans. Another notable contribution was made by the fees for game licences. In addition, varying amounts, difficult to estimate because they were seldom listed separately, derived from gun licences acquired for the purpose of hunting, the carriage of ivory and other game products on the railway, and import duties on goods brought to the Protectorate by hunters and outfitters. The most important characteristics of all these contributions were that none required such expenditure from the government, and most began to flood or trickle in as soon as the Protectorate was declared. Therefore they made themselves felt at the time they were most needed. What is more, contributions from licences and import duties were expected to increase, and this expectation added to their importance in the eyes of the administration.
The most striking aspect of the finances of the East Africa Protectorate in the early years was the important place held by ivory in Protectorate exports. The value of ivory exports amounted to more than one half the total value of Protectorate exports in 1899-1900, and to fully three quarters in 1902. Consequently, Protectorate officials were most concerned about maintaining the ivory supply. Ivory exports alone contributed more than ten per cent of all Protectorate revenue during the first fiscal year (£2425 of £22,865) and supplied nearly half the export duties. It is thus not surprising that Harding, in his first report on the East Africa Protectorate, thought it important to point out that the two least-known areas of the Protectorate, the interior of Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District, were both believed to be rich in ivory. This had a hopeful ring to it, but as there were no stations in the interior of either region, and the natural outlets for the ivory from Jubaland and parts of the Northern Frontier District were
located on the Somali coast, there was in fact little hope that the administration would profit from the presumed riches of the two districts.

The prominence of ivory among the administration's concerns showed itself again when ivory exports dropped the next year, and a good deal of space in the annual report was devoted to explaining why. The Collector of Customs attributed the decrease to the new Game Regulations, and to the diminished profits for African hunters resulting from the government claim to one tusk per pair. Hardinge disagreed. He noted that the claim applied only in Tangaland and stated his belief that the fall in revenue resulted from a smaller number of coastal caravans travelling to the interior. These anxious speculations subsided as income from ivory duties soon rose again, surpassing £4400 in 1899-1900. The Collector of Customs, who had been trying for several years to make Mombasa the centre of the East African ivory trade, thought it worthwhile to give free steamship passage to Zanzibari and coast merchants in order to attract them to sales at the Mombasa customs house.

Another source of revenue, and one which was certain to increase if the Protectorate guarded its game, was hunting licences. Correspondence between the Protectorate administration and the Foreign Office has made clear the eager desire to attract wealthy sportsmen to the East Africa Protectorate. These men spent considerable sums in the Protectorate. Percival believed that before World War I, visiting sportsmen brought in as much as £100,000 per year. This figure cannot be verified, as much of the money was dispersed with no attempt at record-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1899-1900</th>
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<td>Licences</td>
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<td>1460</td>
<td>1609</td>
<td>3580</td>
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<td>4401</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1767</td>
<td>4825</td>
<td>3606</td>
<td>3588</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5901</td>
<td>3824</td>
<td>3876</td>
<td>9405</td>
<td>8756</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Revenue</td>
<td>68,069</td>
<td>64,275</td>
<td>68,452</td>
<td>95,283*</td>
<td>108,857</td>
<td>121,692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Game % of total</td>
<td>8.75%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>5.75%</td>
<td>9.75%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9.25%</td>
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</table>
keeping, but the amount could hardly have been less than £50,000 in some years. 69

Among other things, the sportsmen paid the administration £25 each for game licences, and £50 after the Regulations of 1900 came into effect. Traders, settlers, and public officers also bought licences. Revenue from hunting licences surpassed the estimate in 1900-01 and brought in £1460. Thereafter, it rose steadily and rapidly until World War I drastically reduced the numbers of hunters visiting the East Africa Protectorate.

Ivory duties and licence fees contributed between five and ten per cent of Protectorate revenue in the years from 1900 to 1905. 70 In the following financial year, 1905-06, contributions from ivory duties and hunting licences alone exceeded £10,000, but in that same year revenue from other sources began to rise steeply. Therefore, the percentage of total Protectorate revenue contributed by ivory and licences became quite small. 71

**TABLE IV**

Game-related contributions to Protectorate Revenue in £, 1905-10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1905-06</th>
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<td>3081</td>
<td>3375</td>
<td>2473</td>
<td>2873</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other game product duty</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>440*</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>10,173</td>
<td>10,587</td>
<td>10,119</td>
<td>9234</td>
<td>13,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total revenue</strong></td>
<td>270,362</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>474,760</td>
<td>485,668</td>
<td>513,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Game % of total</strong></td>
<td>3.75%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.25%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2.75%</td>
</tr>
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</table>
In short, the early game regulations were framed at a time when income from Protectorate resources requiring no development was most necessary, and when it seemed easy to preserve game. The animals were still plentiful, and guns were not. White settlement had not yet been determined upon as the means of developing the East Africa Protectorate, and no one was pressing for the elimination of game in the interests of agriculture. It was logical to encourage the expansion and perpetuation of income from game-related sources while the slower work of development went on. In the Protectorate's second decade, however, other sources of revenue developed, and the importance of income from game diminished. This change was soon reflected in altered game policies.

Game preservation had gotten a flying start in the Protectorate. Game regulations were established at the outset, and the international conference clothed the concept of preservation with new authority. Game brought money to the Protectorate and found champions both in Africa and Britain. As the Protectorate developed, however, the forces supporting preservation faced greater challenges.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals had been founded in 1824; some of its early supporters, such as Thomas Powell Burton, were well known opponents of slavery. The Society opposed the mistreatment of domestic animals and campaigned against cruel sports such as cock-fighting. Policies of educating the public and prosecuting offenders were vigorously pursued. Support for the Society in the nineteenth century was found mostly among the rich, Brian Harrison, "Religion and Recreation in Nineteenth-Century England," Past and Present, XXX (1967), 98-125.

2. For example, the Secretary of the American Geographical Society wrote "...it is thought that a few years more will suffice to extinguish the last vestige of the African colonists." Alvan S. Southworth, Four Thousand Miles of African Travel (New York: Baker, Pratt & Co., London: Sampson, Low & Co., 1875), p. 179.


8. Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 101; Neumann, Elephant-Hunting, p. 2. Colonial Office correspondence with the South African Administrations prior to the game conference in 1890 (discussed below) confirmed the depletion of game resources in that part of the continent.


10. C.E. Hobley, From Chartered Company to Crown Colony (London: L.P. & G. Vithersby, 1929), p. 81. Hobley stated that the Kikosho encouraged porters in Kavirende to desert. In 1892, Lugard had heard that many rifles were robbed from Company caravans; he said the porters often sold them
and then claimed they were stolen. Margery Perham, ed., *The Diaries of Lord Lugard* (London: Faber and Faber, 1959), III, 325. It seems to have been common practice for porters in European caravans to be armed with rifles. Gregory, *Rift*, p. 308; Cusenler, *Through Mungo and Roft*, p. 33.

The Brussels Act of 1890 obliged its signatories, including Britain, to do all they could to suppress the slave trade in Eastern Africa; to this end, the import of fire-arms was to be restricted, but this provision was not easily enforced. See Beauchey, "The Arms Trade in East Africa."

13. In 1933, the leopard was given official protection owing to the severe crop damage caused by increasing numbers of baboon and bush pig. See chapter vii, pp. 225-7.
15. F.O. to Hardinge, February 23, 1897, FOCP 6951/89.
16. He enclosed a critical commentary by Craufurd, who found the SCAP regulations inadequate, in that numbers of animals to be shot were unlimited, some licences could shoot in reserves, licence fees were too low, and no provisions were made to forbid the killing of females. Craufurd to Hardinge, March 31, 1897, Hardinge to Salisbury, April 26, 1897, FOCP 6964/87. The German game regulations had been promulgated through the active interest of Hermann von Wissmann, African traveller, hunter, and Governor of German East Africa in 1895-1896.
17. Hardinge to Salisbury, August 27, 1897, FOCP 7018/211. Hardinge had previously suggested a £20 licence, when he thought a similar licence in German East Africa cost £25. Hardinge to Salisbury, April 26, 1897, FOCP 6964/87. In either case, the regulations were favourable to the sportsman: with the ivory from two elephants he would more than recover the cost of his licence.
18. F.O. to Hardinge, December 30, 1897, FOCP 7032/181. Commissioner P.J. Jackson was authorized to enact the same regulations in the Uganda Protectorate. In the final version, public officers were not required to pay the £25 licence fee.
19. Report by Hardinge 1897, C. 8683, p. 64.
20. Kirk to F.O., July 13, 1897, F.O. 402/302/27. John Kirk (1832-1922) was botanist and medical officer to Livingstone's Zambezi expedition in 1858-1863 and lived at
Zanzibar for twenty years, from 1867 to 1886. He often acted as consul during the first five of these twenty years, and was appointed British Consul General in 1873.

21. Hardinge wrote as much to Salisbury in 1900. He said that the Administration had done practically nothing to bring Africans under the regulations, and that it would and could not until the staff became much larger and communications were much improved. Hardinge to Salisbury, March 21, 1900, P.O. 403/303/4.

22. See Chapter vi on the illegal ivory trade.


27. P.O. to Hardinge, December 30, 1897, POCF 7032/181.

28. P.O. to Craufurd, August 11, 1899, P.O. 403/302/65; P.O. to Craufurd, October 6, 1899, P.O. 403/302/69.

29. Traders' licences, also issued with a view to the necessity of "shooting for the pot" were limited to the same animals, but applied to any district the trader travelled in.

30. This licence to "shoot for the pot" was first suggested by Linsworth. Hardinge to Salisbury, March 31, 1898, P.O. 403/302/43; Salisbury to Hardinge, May 20, 1898, P.O. 403/302/44; Hardinge to Salisbury, June 18, 1898, P.O. 403/302/49; Salisbury to Hardinge, July 22, 1898, P.O. 403/302/51.


The public officers had already gained another concession; when the game reserve in Kenya District was established, the officers serving there were strenuously opposed, as they would have had to travel elsewhere to shoot. The Foreign Office amended the regulations to allow officers permanently stationed in the reserve to shoot there on the payment of £3 for a licence. See the letters of Francis Hall: "The most terrible news we have heard is that the whole of the Kenya District, including all these parts, is to be reserved for game, the regulations strictly enforced & apply to all Government officials as well as others. This is very hard lines and puts an end to
all our shooting unless we apply for leave & go outside the District." Hall to Colonel Hall, January 28, 1897, Hall Papers, Rhodes House. Francis Hall, after whom Fort Hall was named, was a District Officer stationed at Fort Smith.

32. See for example Crawshay to F.O., August 7, 1897, F.O. 403/302/28; Selous to F.O., August 15, 1897, F.O. 403/302/29. For a statement confirming the influence of such men as Selous and Jackson, see Sir Clement Hill's remarks following Burton's paper "The Preservation of Big Game in Africa," Journal of the Society of the Arts, LXI (May, 1903) p. 577.

Jackson, Richard Crawshay, and Burton were not merely avid sportsmen; as naturalists they took a serious interest in wildlife and its preservation. F.J. Jackson wrote two books on birds: Notes on the Game Birds of Kenya and Uganda (London: Williams and Norgate, 1926), and The Birds of Kenya Colony and the Uganda Protectorate (3 vols.; Gurney and Jackson, 1938), completed and edited by W.L. Sclater and published after Jackson's death. Richard Crawshay also produced a book on birds, and Burton published several books, including Two African Trips, with Notes and Suggestions on Big Game Preservation in Africa (London: Edward Stanford, 1902).

33. Sharpe, in the British Central Africa Protectorate, had worried that ivory might be smuggled southward to Portuguese territory. In the East Africa Protectorate, Harding had his problems trying to enforce the ivory regulations. When ivory was not permitted to be exported from the East Africa Protectorate, it was taken by the Africans across the frontiers to German East Africa and Italian East Africa where similar regulations were not enforced. Harding to Salisbury February 19, 1900, F.O. 403/302/106.

34. Martin Gosselin (Berlin) to F.O., June 22, 1896, FOCP 6849/299. Gosselin was another Foreign Office man who keenly supported wildlife preservation.

35. The Foreign Office wanted to draw on the administrative experience of the India Office and asked for a report "as to how far it has been found possible to enforce [regulations] in parts of the Empire which are not within easy reach of administrative centres." F.O. to India Office, July 14, 1896, FOCP 6861/50.

36. Gosselin to Salisbury, July 15, 1896, FOCP 6861/64.

37. Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons), ILII col. 391. The Rt. Hon. James Bryce, Liberal member for Aberdeen, South, wished to know whether a sanctuary would be established to prevent the extinction of elephant in Somaliland. Bryce was something of a
naturalist and was interested in Africa: he published *The Flora of the Island of Zanzibar* in 1859 and *Impressions of South Africa* in 1897. He was Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1886) and Chief Secretary for Ireland (1905-06). A reserve was established in 1898.

38. C.O. to F.O., January 11, 1897, P.O. 403/302/15.


40. Viscount Gough to Salisbury, May 1, 1897, FOCP 6964/40.

41. Gosselin to F.O., July 15, 1896, FOCP 6861/64; Gosselin to F.O., June 22, 1896, P.O. 403/302/2; Viscount Gough (Berlin) to Salisbury, May 1, 1897, FOCP 6964/40.

42. Sharpe to F.O., September 9, 1896, Cd. 3189 (1906). Sharpe did not discuss the methods used by Africans in the SCAP, but in a later dispatch he said that the Africans in the neighbouring territories of the British South Africa Company had "enormous numbers of muzzle-loaders and are fast exterminating the elephants." Sharpe to Salisbury, February 12, 1900, P.O. 403/303/2.

43. Sharpe to F.O., September 9, 1896, Cd. 3189 (1906).

44. C.O. to F.O., August 15, 1896, FOCP 6861/140.

45. Selous to F.O., August 15, 1897, P.O. 403/302/29.

46. He did make one suggestion for controlling African hunting. He had travelled through Tippu Tib's bailiwick in the 1880's and had found that no African would lead him to elephant tracks, because Tippu Tib allowed no hunting unless the hunter had permission and gave him one tusk of every two. Therefore, von Wissmann reasoned, why not forbid one particular tribe in each district to hunt elephant - in return for certain privileges - and make that tribe responsible for preventing all the others from hunting there? Implicit in this suggestion was the admission that European administrations lacked the strength for direct enforcement. Gough to Salisbury, May 1, 1897, FOCP 6964/40.


Philip Lutley Sclater (1829-1913) was a respected ornithologist, a Fellow of the Royal Society, and the author of numerous works on zoological subjects. Other people whose opinions the Foreign Office sought also recommended the restriction of fire-arms as the most important measure, including Selous and Kirk.

48. Very large numbers of cheap fire-arms were found in the interior south and west of British East Africa. They were taken into the interior by coastal traders. The customs returned in Zanzibar for the first half of 1888, for
example, showed imports of 37,441 fire-arms, 1,000,000 bullets, 3,100,000 caps, 70,650 cartridges, and 69,350 pounds of gunpowder. Further large consignments of 5,000 rifles and 200,000 pounds of gunpowder were expected. Col. Evans-Smith to F.O., June 28, 1888, FOPC 5732/52. The Brussels Act of 1890 laid down restrictions on the imports of fire-arms to tropical Africa, but enforcement was loose and there were thousands of guns in the interior already.

49. Gough to Salisbury, May 1, 1897, FOPC 6964/40.

50. F.O. to C.O., May 28, 1897.

51. F.O. to C.O., September 8, 1897, FOPC 7018/123. "Useful" animals and birds were those that destroyed unwanted animals and insects. Included were secretary birds, which killed snakes, birds of prey such as owls, that fed on versia, and rhinoceros birds, which ate ticks.

52. See for example Geoffray to F.O., December 29, 1899, FOPC 7404/1; Plunkett to F.O., December 7, 1899, FOPC 7403/93; C.O. to F.O., June 29, 1898; C.O. to F.O., June 9, 1898, F.O. 403/302/45; Cromer to F.O., November 24, 1899, FOPC 7403/90. Cromer suggested that someone knowledgeable about conditions in the Sudan should be at the conference.

The Cape Colony's position might be summed up as: our laws are sufficient to protect our game, and we have hardly any game left anyway. "With regard to elephants, it is feared that nothing further can be done within the Colony... and the giraffe has long since disappeared within our colonial borders." C.O. to F.O., June 9, 1898, F.O. 403/302/45.

53. The British Representatives were the Earl of Hopetoun, Sir Clement Hill, and Professor Hay Lankester, Director of the Natural History Museum. Hopetoun (1860–1908) had been Paymaster-General in Salisbury's third administration, and Lord Chamberlain in 1898. In August 1900 he was appointed the first Governor-General of Australia.

54. This bird, which ranged in dense flocks over much of North America, numbered in the billions, but relentless shooting and netting caused its extinction by 1900. A. U. Schorger, The Passenger Pigeon: Its Natural History and Extinction (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), Chapter IX.


56. It was settlers who first complained and were listened to. Concern for African problems with game came later.

57. F.O. to Harding, August 28, 1900, FOPC 7675/73.

58. See Map II. The Eastern Province of the Uganda
Protectorate had at that time not yet been transferred to the East Africa Protectorate. Hence, the eastern boundary of the Uganda Protectorate ran down the centre of Lake Rudolf and down the Rift Valley on the east side of Lake Naivasha.

In 1902, the portion of the Southern Reserve north of the railway zone was removed from the reserve; *Official Gazette*, Vol. IV, August 1, 1902. Another portion, adjoining the banks of the Tsavo River, was deleted under the Game Regulations, 1909, Ordinance No. 19 of 1909. The Northern Reserve gained territory in 1903, when the Suguta Reserve, formerly in Uganda, was added to it; *Official Gazette*, Vol. V, May 15, 1903. But it was greatly reduced under the regulations of 1909.

59. P.O. to Hardinge, June 12, 1900, FOCP 7405/106. Richard Crawshay was assigned this duty when he returned from leave in November.


61. Hardinge to P.O., March 21, 1900, FOCP 7405/30.


63. See Table II. Sources: Board of Trade to P.O., January 15, 1900, F.O. 403/302/95; Eliot to P.O., June 10, 1901, FOCP 7867/16; *Report on the East African Protectorate 1903-04*, Cd. 2331 (1904); *Annual Report of the East African Protectorate 1905-06*; figures do not include ivory exported across inland frontiers.

64. Total exports in 1899-1900 were worth £121,685. In eleven months of the year 1902 (January figures unavailable), ivory exports amounted to 831,231 rupees, out of a total of Rs. 1,104,407 for all exports during twelve months. Thereafter, other exports increased, and ivory percentages slowly fell, accounting for half of all exports in 1903, one third in 1904, and one fourth in 1905. Over the next four years, ivory exports accounted for an average of one sixth of all exports. (Calculated by tabulating the value of total exports as published monthly in the *Official Gazette*, and comparing the value of ivory exports, similarly published.


67. No evidence was offered in support of either theory.
Hardinge said that the scarcity of caravans was the result of diminished opportunities for slave-trading, but as there is little evidence to suggest that slave-dealing was ever an important adjunct to ivory-trading in British East Africa, this seems unlikely. Possibly it was an explanation which Hardinge knew would be pleasing to the ears of the Foreign Office. Report by Hardinge 1897-98, C. 9125 (1899). Another possible explanation was that the caravans were finding new roads in and out of the interior in order to avoid paying duty. Collector C.R.W. Lane, in Kitui, had heard that Swahili traders were buying ivory from the Dhaicho and returning to the coast by routes east of his station. *Ibid.*, p. 29. No previous records of caravan routes east of Kitui appear to exist; certainly the country was uninviting. It is possible too that these caravans were doing a little surreptitious slave-trading on the edge of Kitui, a district reputed to run a very small slave trade at the time. If so, the traders would certainly have kept clear of the station.

68. Marsden to P.O., June 12, 1901, POCF 7023/162. The increase was attributed to the poor crops of that year, which prompted the Africans to sell ivory.

69. J.H. Patterson, who became Game Warden in 1907, estimated that £400 would cover the cost of a shooting trip to East Africa for a single hunter, though many would spend more. A frugal man might spend less, but frugality was not the hallmark of visiting sportsmen. In 1910-1911, 124 licences were taken out by sportsmen. If the visitors spent £400 each, they would have left nearly £50,000 behind. (Figures cannot be given for earlier years; prior to the Game Ordinance, 1909, not only visitors took out sportsmen's licences. Residents of the Protectorate whose desires for sport exceeded the provisions of the settler's licence bought sportsmen's licences instead. Figures for 1911 and 1912 show that between 80 and 90 sportsmen's licences were taken out each year, but the Warden said that larger numbers of sportsmen visited the Protectorate, some taking out the cheaper traveller's licence which allowed them to shoot on private land.

70. See Table III. Notes on Table III:
* Probable figure only. The estimate for the following year was £1200, presumably based on a realistic rise from an actual figure of at least £800.
** A conservative guess at the possible combined income from the sale of ivory, duty on game products other than ivory, fees for gun licences taken out for hunting purposes, railway carriage of game products, and relevant import duties. Roughly speaking, to make £500 from ivory sales alone, the Government would need only to acquire some 1500 pounds, or fewer than 40 tanks averaging 60 pounds in weight. Ivory sold for 7 to 8 shillings a pound on the coast at that time. Duty on horns and teeth of wild animals probably amounted to £40 in 1904-05 and to £61 in
1905-06: (10% of exports valued at £441 and £416; wild animal skins added to this figure, but they are impossible to value as they were grouped with hides of domesticated animals.) Revenue from gun and ammunition licences was estimated at £260 for 1900-01, £397 for 1901-02, and £550 for 1902-03. The railway carried over 10.5 tons of ivory in the last half of 1898 and earned about Rs. 4000 (approx. £267), and carried 11.5 tons in 1899-1900, 67.5 tons in 1903, and 73.5 tons in 1904. Carriage of 80 tons in 1909-10 yielded Rs. 52,916 in revenue. The fact that much of this ivory originated outside the East Africa Protectorate is not pertinent to the assessment of income from its carriage on the railway. These scattered figures do not provide actual totals of annual revenue for the Protectorate, but do indicate that the aggregate estimates listed under "other" in Table III are not too high. *Taxes paid by the African population produced this abrupt rise in revenue.


71. See Table IV. Figures in this table exclude revenue obtained from gun licences, import duties, railway charges, and the sale of ivory. This revenue increased with the numbers of visiting sportsmen. *Proceeds of nine months only.


Note: in 1909-10 the railway earned Rs. 52,916 - about £3528 - from the carriage of ivory. Added to the game-related revenue, it brings the proportion of total revenue to 3.25%. Presumably the same is true for several previous years. Percentages of total revenue given to nearest quarter per cent.
CHAPTER V. The Game Department

The East Africa Protectorate was established at a time when the idea of preserving Africa's rich wildlife was gaining support in European government circles. Game regulations were promulgated early in the Protectorate's history and were revised and strengthened in the wake of the international conference of 1900. The regulations would not enforce themselves, however, and district officers already had a formidable list of tasks to deal with. The work of game preservation needed its own staff.

The Game Department originated with the allocation of funds for a single game ranger in 1901. This ranger was Arthur Blayney Percival, a naturalist who had worked in the Protectorate as an Assistant Collector since June, 1900. Percival later became Chief Game Warden and remained with the department for over twenty years, retiring in 1923. For six years, Percival worked alone. Then in 1907, a four-man department was established with Lieutenant-Colonel J.H. Patterson at its head. Patterson was already famous for killing the man-eating lions which had menaced the construction of the Uganda Railway. Percival became Senior Assistant Game Ranger, and two additional assistants were appointed: C.J. Ross and G.H. Goldfinch, both of whom remained with the department until 1922.

The tiny department was not permitted to expand very much in the following decades, although the Protectorate administration as a whole grew rapidly. Patterson soon left and the department was reduced to three men without a chief warden. A temporary assistant was hired in 1909 to fill the gap and
Percival was made Acting Game Warden. A new Warden, R.B. Woosman, finally arrived in October 1910, and at about this time the department began to employ African scouts. It is not known how many there were, but expenditures on scouts suggest that the number increased from perhaps twenty to about thirty before World War I. In early 1912, the department acquired a fifth officer, C.W. Woodhouse. On paper, the department retained a strength of five Europeans for the next six years, but, in fact, the Game Department virtually ceased to exist during World War I. All five officers were drafted to intelligence work in 1914. The next year, only Goldfinch attended to the department’s concerns, and the staff of African scouts was reduced throughout the war. Woosman was killed in 1915; his position lay vacant until Percival was appointed Warden in 1919, and the department was not restored to its full strength until 1925. At Percival’s retirement, there were only three officers. Writing his last report, Percival was angry at the state of the department in 1922. Resources could not be stretched to cover the Northern Reserve; it was a "dead letter" in the department. New roads had been built through it, making it more accessible, and without careful patrol work the game would be shot.

The remnant of the Game Department, despoiled of the hardly collected transport, mules etc. by military necessity during the war and later when permission to expend the money received for mules etc. from the military on a Motor Car, the car commandeered and sold; personnel cut down till during 1923 the Department will probably consist of one man sitting in an office.

While fully recognizing the fact that drastic reductions had to be made in Government expenditure, I am of the opinion that it was false economy to cut down the Game Department expenditure to the extent that it has been.
Percival's successor, A.T.A. Ritchie, "a towering mountain of a man with the face of a genial viking," referred in his first report to the "insignificant size" of the department, and emphasized the shortage of officers by recording on the first page of the department's annual reports the number of men on duty each year. When leave, sickness, and secondment to other departments had taken their toll, the average number available during Ritchie's first six years was four.

In the fifteen years following 1925, however, the department's fortunes did improve. During the late 1920's, a full complement of officers was on duty for much of the time, and, in 1929, the department acquired two additional men to attend to the problems of game control. During the 1930's, the department usually had at its disposal four officers (including the Warden) concerned with game preservation and one full-time game control officer. This position was far better than the enfeebled state of the department in 1914-1924. But, in fact, the department had not grown: it was still the same size as it had been in 1912 when a fifth officer had first been hired. Its responsibilities had increased, however, and the department was further hampered by a Lilliputian budget.

Insufficient funds had been a problem from the days when Percival worked alone. In 1904-1905, expenses were only £145, out of a Protectorate total of £302,560. When the department was organized in 1907, the budget was increased to just over £1800, out of a Protectorate total of £691,677, and rose by an average of £300 per year until World War I. In 1913-14, department disbursements were £3683. These increases were in keeping with
the general rise in expenditure and the expansion of the administration in the East Africa Protectorate: government expenses increased from £703,103 to £1,151,730 in the period from 1909 to 1915. But the Game Department began with so little that it never caught up with the other departments. In 1907-08, the year the department expanded, the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments spent over ten times the Game Department budget. Then World War I disrupted the department's finances and drew off its personnel. Recovery from this blow took some years. After the war, the budget fluctuated uncertainly, and in 1923, the department spent less than it had ten years earlier. The following year, the department appeared to do better, largely owing to a sum of £750 voted for rewards. Rewards were to be paid for information leading to the confiscation of ivory, and were intended to combat the smuggling trade across the border with Italian Somaliland. These sums did not really help the department, however, as they could not be used for operating expenses or to hire more personnel. The reward fund, and the sommes allotted for buying ivory were soon reduced again, as the intention had been to discourage smuggling from Jubaland, and in 1925, a large piece of territory south of the Juba River was transferred to Italian Somaliland.

The department's finances did improve in the latter half of the 1920's, when more money was received for transport and other operating expenses. With annual budgets topping £11,000, prospects looked increasingly bright. Then came the depressed thirties, and the department's brief fling was over. Funds shrank each successive year, reaching a low of £7112 spent in
1937. For the first forty years of its existence, the Game Department was the Protectorate and Colony's Cinderella, hardworking and impoverished. Understaffed and too poorly financed for the tasks assigned to them, the harassed staff tried to prevent poaching, study the game and its needs, control the trade in ivory and other trophies, and protect farmers from the ravages of a large game population. Throughout this period, with the exception of two years during World War I and three years at the onset of the depression, the total revenue of the territory was steadily rising. Total expenditures kept pace. In 1939, both were approaching the £4,000,000 level, yet, in that year, only £9000 was spent by the Game Department, or less than one quarter of one per cent. This was a smaller percentage than the department had enjoyed in 1907-08. As Ritchie summed it up, the department's usual problem was "how to show champagne results on a beer budget." The problem was fundamental. The government paid lip service to a strong preservation policy, but seemed to hope that this could be achieved without expense. Under these conditions, the Game Department staff could not do the work they believed was necessary.

The Game Department's job was to manage the relationship between people and wildlife. First, the department's duty was to preserve game through the enforcement of the regulations. This involved patrolling the reserves, where no hunting was permitted, visiting regions where poaching was a problem in hopes of discouraging or catching poachers, and ensuring that European hunters took out licences and obeyed their conditions. After World War I, it was realized that the aim of game
preservation entailed game control. Neither Africans nor Europeans would tolerate the presence of animals that trampled crops or killed livestock. In order to retain public support for game preservation among settlers and administrative officers, the Game Department was obliged to take on part of the task of game control. Single animals and groups were killed or driven away from farming areas and rangeland.

A further responsibility of the Game Department was the development of the knowledge necessary to frame a general policy for the Protectorate: to learn in detail what animals were found in which parts of the Protectorate; why; how many of them there were; what constituted their minimum requirements for survival; and how best to protect them.

To properly patrol the Northern and Southern Reserves alone would have absorbed the entire staff of the department. Responsible for the game of the whole expanse of the Protectorate, the department was spread very thinly indeed. The ranger operating single-handed in the first years must have wondered where to begin, with some 200,000 square miles to look after. Realizing that knowledge of the game and its habitat was the first requirement for the development of sound and effective policy, Percival began his job by working his way through the Southern Game Reserve, examining the country and noting numbers and varieties of game present. The Northern Reserve merely existed as lines on paper; it was too remote to patrol. The precise boundaries were not delineated until after the department expanded in 1907, nor fully inspected until 1911 when Percival was assigned to the Northern Reserve.
With the establishment of the four-san department in 1907, more territory could be covered. The two new assistants were assigned to areas where the game was plentiful and settlers were moving in: the Rift Valley and the Basin Gishu Plateau. Percival continued to look after the Southern Reserve, and the Warden was based in Nairobi. The departure of Patterson obliged Percival to spend more time in the office. Then, when Noosman arrived in 1910, he took over the administrative duties and the Southern Reserve, while Percival was sent on a tour of the neglected Northern Reserve.

In this period, the Game Department's efforts were confined to the preservation of game. Game populations in the reserves and in some of the regions attracting settlement were monitored and the presence of rangers and scouts was intended to deter hunters from entering the reserves. No control work was done; it was not yet counted among the department's duties, and the rudimentary state of the Protectorate's communications network curtailed the mobility necessary for a small staff to be effective.

The small staff and limited mobility prevented the department from establishing any presence at all in distant parts of the Protectorate such as the Northern Frontier District and the Tana. Noosman foresaw a time, however, when the game in many of the most accessible regions would be driven out by settlement and the preservation of remote shooting grounds would become the important work of the department. He thought the department would have little to do with the settled areas beyond ensuring that European hunters took out licences and assisting
settlers who wished to preserve game on their farms. The department's task would be to guard the sanctity of the reserves and ensure that game, having been excluded from the settled parts of the Protectorate, would survive elsewhere and continue to attract sporting parties.

Without increased staff and funds, supervising the less accessible districts was impossible. In 1911, Woosnam therefore proposed to enlarge the department. He explained the need to have a white ranger and a staff of African scouts for each of six districts where game was most plentiful: Sotik, the Uasin Gishu Plateau, Laikipia, the Tana River, and the Northern and Southern Reserves. In a determinedly reasonable vein, his report stated:

That the game has been a very valuable asset to this country is an indisputable fact, and I am taking it for granted that it is the intention of the Government, as it certainly is the will of the Colonists, to conserve the natural resources of the Protectorate as far as possible. I am, therefore, going to make suggestions for an increase in the expenditure of the Game Department...17

The department did receive an increase, but nowhere near enough to pay for six rangers.

Had Woosnam lived through the War and continued as Game Warden, he would have been forced to revise the ideas underlying his proposals. In 1911, it was still possible for a ranger to think of the management of wildlife in terms of settlers and game. The Africans were merely peripheral. Woosnam's expectations concerning the future shooting grounds took no account of the presence of African farmers or herdsmen with the exception of the Masai in the Southern Reserve.18 The omission was not a startling one at a time when the Department of
Agriculture, for example, saw its duty purely in terms of assisting settlers. Game was to be preserved for the enjoyment of Europeans; it was also to be protected from destruction by Europeans. With the spectre of South Africa's vanished herds before them, the staff of the department intended to prevent a repetition of that sad history.

The war years brought the activity of the Game Department to a standstill, and when the department found its feet again in the 1920's, a different world confronted it with new and complex problems.

A fundamental issue for the department was its role in the developing economy of Kenya. The preservation of game could no longer be the department's sole concern. As development proceeded in the settled areas and more land was farmed, conflicts with free-roaming game increased. Under Ritchie, the department responded by attaching a new importance to game control, in order to retain support for game preservation. In the mid-1920's, for example, the department participated in the destruction of thousands of zebra on the Gashu Plateau. 19

The new demand for game control was not confined to the white highlands. The government's concerns were expanding to include the economic development of the African areas. It was no longer possible for the Game Department to regard all lands outside the settled districts as game preserves. Game control had to be undertaken in the native reserves, and this stretched the department's resources beyond capacity. Finally, at the end of the 1920's, the department acquired two additional officers to undertake the control of game and vermin. These officers
constantly travelled around the country responding to complaints of crop and livestock damage. They undertook to poison, trap, and shoot offending animals in both African and European areas.20

Another important change resulted from the increasing number of automobiles in Kenya, and the continual expansion of the network of roads. By car, it was possible to tour in a few days districts that once had taken weeks to reach. When Hitchie took up the position of Warden in 1924, he was able in his first year to visit areas of the coast, southern and western Kenya, and he travelled as far north as Mt. Kenya and Archer's Post on the Guaso Nyiro. It would have been impossible to cover so much ground before the War. The new mobility of the staff enabled its few officers to extend their effectiveness, but there were also disadvantages. Distant shooting grounds became far more accessible to licensed hunters with automobiles, and it was more difficult for the department to keep track of their activities.

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's, the department staggered along under an increasing workload. Fortunately, the staff did receive help from other quarters. Percival, in his capacity as Warden, had persuaded the government in 1921 to allow the department to accept the assistance of honorary game wardens. Chosen by the Warden and recognized by the Governor, these men held powers similar to those of the paid staff of the department.

The first four honorary wardens were appointed in 1922. Twenty were appointed in the following year, and the number grew steadily, reaching seventy-four a decade later.21 These men took
over much of the responsibility for the settled areas, and worked without pay. They enforced the regulations, were active in game control, and were of immeasurable assistance to the overworked department, freeing the staff to spend most of their time in the African areas. One officer, usually the Warden, was stationed in Nairobi. One assistant was posted in the Southern Reserve, one at the coast, and one in the Northern Frontier District. The strong response to the department's call for help demonstrated the existence of a powerful current of support for preservation in the settler community.

Assistance was also received from local administrative officers who were interested in game preservation. In theory, it was the duty of every officer to enforce the game regulations. In practice, few of them found much time to pursue the matter, but those who took an interest in game helped the department and received its heartfelt thanks. These officers watched the movements of poachers and helped the department catch them, confiscated illegal traps and snares, kept the department informed of game movements, and repeatedly publicized the game laws in their districts.

The day-to-day tasks of preservation and control kept the Game Department fully occupied after World War I. There was little time to contemplate wider issues. The most serious consequence of understaffing and inadequate financing was that no resources were available for research: detailed knowledge of game habits and requirements was essential if the game was to survive. What was known came from a haphazard accumulation of individual observations by hunters and wardens. Much of this
knowledge was valuable, but it was not collected systematically or subjected to scientific scrutiny. Moreover, very little was known about many species, and even the rudimentary work of classification was incomplete.23

Without detailed knowledge, the fundamental question of the inter-war era could not be answered intelligently. The question was: how and where could game be preserved as more and more land was claimed for exclusive human use? As the years passed, the question became increasingly urgent.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V


2. Percival resigned owing to ill-health and retired to farm in Kenya. Goldfinch retired and Ross died of pneumonia. Patterson only stayed a year.

3. In 1909, there were 28 district commissioners and 40 assistant district commissioners; in 1915, their numbers were 44 and 67.

4. Neither the Annual Reports nor the Financial Statements of the department record how many scouts were employed. Expenditure on scouts were £283 in 1911-1912, £302 in 1912-1913, and £464 in 1913-1914. Suggested numbers of scouts are based on £15 expenditure per scout per year. The figures dipped sharply during the War, and the explanation given in the Financial Statements was that the staff had been reduced. During the first years after the War, an average of £500 was allotted to scouts. At £16 to £17 per scout, some thirty scouts may have been employed.

This account of the Game Department's personnel and finances is based on the Financial Reports and Statements and the Annual Reports in C.O. 544 and on the Official Gazette for the period from 1900 to 1939.

5. The appointment was made retroactive to 1915. Woodhouse died in 1918.

6. Game Department Annual Report 1922, C.O. 544/15. The poor spelling (corrected in the quote) and the sloppy system, as well as some of Percival's depression were perhaps due to his failing health. In 1922, the department lost Goldfinch and Ross; officers in 1923 were Percival, P.H. Clarke, who had joined in 1919, and Captain K.P.T. Caldwell, who joined in January 1923.


8. An additional man had been appointed in 1926, but his duties concerned fish only, and the department's responsibilities expanded to include guarding the trout in the streams of the white highlands. A private group, the Kenya Angling Association, had stocked the streams. The success of their experiments, which had been going on for some fifteen years, encouraged the government to take over the duties of maintenance.

10. Financial Report and Statement 1923, Kenya Colony and Protectorate, C.O. 544/16. Expenditure was £3577; revenue from game licences, £8295. In 1924, the budget leapt dramatically to £17,532, of which nearly £14,000 was spent. But this sudden wealth was more apparent than real. Of the total, £13,000 was allocated to the purchase of ivory; such funds had existed in previous years but under a separate account. The Game Department's own funds were thus £4532, a less dazzling sum. This figure represented an increase of nearly £1000 over the previous year, but £750 went to the reward fund. Game Department Annual Report 1924, p. 5, C.O. 544/17; Financial Report and Statement 1924, Kenya Colony and Protectorate, C.O. 544/17.

11. Previous budgetary increases on a scale similar to the reward fund had also reflected the administration's anxiety to control ivory smuggling. The department was allowed an increase of £702 in 1912, for an extra assistant and more African scouts to cope with the illicit slaughter of elephants and with ivory smuggling. Two years later, the budget expanded by a slightly larger amount to allow a mounted patrol to be established in the northern part of the Protectorate. Budget Statement of Treasurer in Legislative Council, November 28, 1911, C.O. 544/4; December 18, 1913, C.O. 544/7.

12. The department's situation did not become as precarious as it had been in Percival's time; at the end of 1934, for example, seventy-three scouts were in the department's employ. Game Department Annual Report for 1932, 1933, and 1934, p. 5, C.O. 544/64. The position of the department in the 1940's, altered by the advent of National Parks, is not within the scope of this discussion. It may be summarized as responsibility for game outside the parks, with emphasis on game control as well as enforcement of the regulations.


15. He also observed that "the Kanha were hunting near the railway, but thought that 'so long as the natives do not obtain rifles they will do but little harm to the game." Eljicot to F.O., December 10, 1901, enclosure 1, F.O. 2/818/32; Eljicot to F.O., March 11, 1902, FOCP 7953/32.

16. Annual Report of the Game Warden 1910-11, pp. 6-12, C.O. 544/4. Percival had travelled north to the Guaso Nyiro eight years earlier, but the trip had taken two
months, so he had not been able to go again.

17. Annual Report of the Game Warden 1910-11, p. 4, C.O. 544/4. In that year, the department expenditure was little more than a quarter of the revenue from game licences alone.

18. They were an asset because the Masai Agreement of 1904, reserving the land for the use of the Masai tribe, kept covetous settlers from compelling the government to abolish the reserve in order to expand the settled areas.

19. See Chapter vii for further details.

20. These officers were: J.T. Oulton, who remained with the department throughout the 1930's, and A. Poule, who stayed less than a year. Poule was followed by two more officers who stayed only briefly, and from the middle of 1932 to 1942, the department had only one full-time control officer.

21. Official Gazette, Vols. XXII-XXV (1921-1923); Game Department Annual Reports 1924-1934, C.O. 544/17-44. By 1941 there were nearly 100 honorary wardens.

22. In 1925, Ritchie wrote, "it is an unhappy fact that the multifarious duties devolving on the too meagre staff of the Department, preclude all but the most superficial research work." He observed that the accepted classification of the hartebeest group was "far from correct" and that "no reasonable attempt" had yet been made to classify the bushbuck family. Game Department Annual Report 1924, C.O. 544/17.
CHAPTER VI. Ivory Policy and the Illegal Trade

Among the many concerns germane to the development of a successful game preservation policy, successive administrations of the Protectorate and Colony devoted their most assiduous attention to the problem of ivory poaching, thus demonstrating the primacy of the financial motive in administrative thinking. The failure of successive attempts to deal with poaching illustrates several issues.

The wish to profit from ivory as a natural resource often conflicted with the aim of preserving the elephants which produced the ivory. The resolution of this conflict demanded research into the effects of any given policy and careful enforcement of the regulations. Only thus could a scientifically-based harvesting policy be designed. Neither requirement could be fulfilled without the expenditure of greater sums than the administration was willing to supply. As a result, policy was devised in ignorance of basic information and was poorly enforced. This was also true of game policy in general.

The Game Department's tiny budget and staff compelled it to rely heavily upon local administrative officers for the enforcement of the law. As these officers held widely differing views on the importance of preservation in general and ivory-poaching in particular, application of the law was extremely inconsistent. A succession of officers in a remote area like the Tana, where the man on the spot chose his own priorities, in fact led to a succession of differing game policies in the
region. This was also frequently true of policy in other areas such as agriculture and exemplifies a common problem in colonial administration in Africa. The poor results also provide an example of how little could be achieved by a paper policy lacking both funds and African support. Both the government's desire for ivory and the limited enforcement of the regulations encouraged Africans to flout the law. Africans saw illicit traffic in ivory as an attractive commercial opportunity and were not slow to take advantage of it. Even when confronted with a zealous local officer, they resisted by outwaiting or outwitting him. There were to be no inexpensive solutions to this problem.

The interest of the administration in ivory revenues dictated a strong interest in ivory poaching within the Game Department. The hunting of game for meat and skins, on which some African subsistence economies were based, was a lesser concern. As was tacitly acknowledged by the section of the game regulations allowing subsistence hunters limited rights to kill game, it was impossible and unjust to forbid all hunting. Hence, local officers were authorized to give Africans permission to hunt on such terms as the officers thought appropriate. In 1906, the qualification was inserted that animals on the first schedule of the game regulations (among them being giraffe, buffalo, and elephants carrying ivory weighing less than sixty pounds) were not to be included in any permission given. In 1909, this provision was removed, but local officers were required to obtain the approval of the Governor before allowing Africans to hunt. The enforcement of any restrictions on
African subsistence hunting was sporadic, but the Game Department could do little more than encourage all District Commissioners to take an interest in preservation.

Poaching pursued for commercial purposes, of which elephant, rhinoceros, and later, leopard, were the chief victims, owing to the value of ivory, rhinoceros horn, and leopard skin, was regarded quite differently. It was this sort of poaching that the department really objected to, on the grounds that Africans had no need to do it in order to live, and that it was far more destructive than hunting for meat and skins. In 1923, for example, the Game Warden's approach to the poaching problem in the Tanga region was to advise that local officers should concentrate on discouraging agricultural tribes, such as the Pokoso, from killing elephants for gain. He suggested that the hunting peoples, "provided they only kill for meat and not for gain, are not nearly so harmful a factor in the situation." It was the trade in ivory the Game Warden hoped to prevent; the ivory buyers and smugglers were the worst enemies of preservation. In making a clear distinction between subsistence and commercial hunting, the Game Department was not entirely correct. Hunters like the Liangulo, Boni, and Doroobo did, at times, need to barter ivory in order to live. When unable to obtain sufficient meat by the chase, these tribes exchanged ivory for grain, vegetables, and stock. With regard to the second point, that commercial hunting was more destructive, the department was on firmer ground. The commercial value of certain game products encouraged Africans to kill game whether they had need of meat or not. Agricultural and pastoral tribes,
who in the ordinary way did little hunting for meat, could be
tempted by cash profits. Given the continual demand and the
rising value of ivory, it was not to be expected that the
elephant would be left in peace as soon as life's bare
necessities had been satisfied for the ivory hunters and
traders. The temptation to acquire wealth and obtain luxuries
such as tobacco was open-ended. Another destructive feature of
commercial poaching was the widespread use of traps and
snares. The paths to waterholes bristled with spears and were festooned
with nooses. In the late 1920's, the department became acutely
concerned by the increasing use of poisoned arrow traps in the
coastal zone. These devices worked indiscriminately on many
types of animals and thus fostered random destruction. The
effect of policy aimed at special protection of rare species
such as the greater kudu was thereby enfeebled.

The most sustained and difficult problem for the department
was ivory poaching. Ivory was in demand all over the world,
particularly in the United States, Europe, India, and China. The
trade was well entrenched before the government attempted to
control it, and the outlawed pursuit of elephants was never
brought to an end. The department was not assisted in its
efforts by the ambivalence embodied in government policy.
Straining to devise rules which would both maximize profits and
preserve elephants, the administration only constructed clumsy
schemes which achieved neither.

The regulation of the ivory trade was nominally begun in
1897, when it was forbidden to shoot cow elephants, and cow
ivory and tusks under eleven pounds (calf ivory) were made
liable to confiscation. Similar provisions were embodied in the Game Regulations, 1900. The administration was ill equipped to enforce them, but the trade in cow and calf ivory was probably hampered somewhat, as in 1902 there were complaints from traders, who insisted that a lot of old cow and calf ivory remained in the hands of Africans and that traders should be allowed to buy it. Early in 1901, the Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, suggested that as Africans were known to hoard ivory, it was unjust to confiscate it without notice and without an attempt to clear out old holdings. He thought that cow and calf ivory should be exported freely until the end of the following June, after which all would be confiscated. Eliot's proposals, if accepted, would have necessitated the alteration of the law, and the Foreign Office was reluctant to alter a regulation only six months old and one which had already been communicated to the other Powers. It was therefore suggested to Eliot that the government might buy up existing stores of small ivory, prohibiting any private trade. Eliot considered this a "promising solution of the difficulty", which was that the ivory stocks in the East Africa Protectorate if threatened with confiscation would be exported to neighbouring territories, inflicting loss of revenue upon the Protectorate. Eliot and the Foreign Office agreed upon a purchase scheme, and in this way an indecisive, contradictory, and weak ivory policy was set in motion. Aware that Africans holding ivory would sell it to traders, and that the prevention of smuggling was beyond its powers, the government hit upon a policy which forbade the further killing of cow and calf elephants while rewarding
Africans for producing stocks of ivory already held. This idea of gathering in all old stocks was not illogical on paper, but in practice, it amounted to tempting Africans to kill elephants in order to sell the ivory. It also made the government appear hypocritical: private traders were not allowed to profit from ivory, but the government was. The policy was in addition difficult to implement because many government officers knew little about ivory, and it was easy to disguise fresh ivory by burying it for a short time.

Nevertheless, the Chief of Customs supported the policy, and Eliot issued a notice in November to the effect that the government would buy at its full value cow and calf ivory until April 30, 1902, provided that it was satisfied that the ivory had been obtained prior to the promulgation of the Game Regulations 1900. Thereafter, the ivory would be purchased for 75 per cent of its value until August 31, and for 50 per cent until December 31, 1902. After that date, all prohibited ivory was to be confiscated. As might have been foreseen, all stocks of ivory were not gathered in by the end of 1902, and the purchase of ivory at 50 per cent of its value was extended until June 1903, then until March 31, 1904, and again until December 1. Then purchase was allowed at 25 per cent. At the same time, illegal possession became subject to penalties of up to 1000 rupees and two months in prison, the tusks in question to be confiscated. First promulgated in 1903, these penalties were not specified in the Game Ordinance 1904, but were reintroduced in the amending ordinance of 1905, when all possession of cow and calf ivory was eventually prohibited.
Until that time, enforcement of the legislation required a clear distinction to be made between old and new ivory. As the appearance of the ivory and the usually unverifiable testimony of witnesses were the only "proofs" of long possession forthcoming from Africans, it was in truth up to the district officer to decide whether or not to accept the ivory. Knowing that frequent confiscation would stop the flow of ivory into government hands, officers commonly bought it without asking too many questions. The policy was designed to gather in old stocks so that the possessors and the government might make their legitimate profits, and so the government could then make a clean start when prohibiting possession entirely. This aim was not accomplished. The policy was also designed to discourage Africans from going to the trouble of smuggling, and here it seems to have enjoyed a measure of success. For example, in mid-December 1903, the Customs House in Mombasa held a sale of 100 frasiles (3500 pounds) of ivory and 30 frasiles of rhinoceros horn. The ivory was classified as viliati and calasie. Calasie, or ball ivory, so called because it was the type used to make billiard balls, was almost invariably cow ivory, and weighed between 10 and 30 pounds. Only three months later, in March 1904, another sale of 110 frasiles (3850 pounds) was held, this time consisting of calasie and amskob, or amskoub ivory, the latter being ivory of 5 to 10 pounds weight, or calf ivory. These sales demonstrate that Africans were selling ivory to the government, especially cow and calf ivory. Nevertheless, any policy which cut into the business of the professional ivory traders could expect to be flouted, and there is little doubt
that these traders, who travelled for the purpose of buying ivory, were able to purchase cow and calf ivory along with their legitimate acquisitions of large, male ivory.

When the new Game Ordinance was passed in 1906, the prohibition of all trade and possession of tusks under thirty pounds in weight was included. Africans who appeared to be dependent upon the flesh of wild animals for their subsistence were allowed to hunt under conditions prescribed by local government officers, but under no circumstances were they to hunt female or young elephants. Under these straightforward rules, a good deal of ivory was confiscated, but reports of hidden stocks accumulating in African hands proved too tempting to the administration. It was decided to purchase "found" ivory from Africans at 50 per cent of its value, the Acting Deputy Commissioner, Hobley, and the Crown Advocate recommending these liberal terms because smuggling was easy and it was necessary to outbid the smugglers. At first, ivory was sent to Mombasa for evaluation before the finder was paid, but the consequent delays discouraged Africans from bringing ivory in, and in 1908 it was decided to pay for all ivory on the spot, at the rate of Rs. 4 per pound.

The administration intended to squeeze the private traders out, and had already curtailed their activities through the application of the Outlying Districts Ordinance, 1902. Traders were required to obtain permits to enter closed districts, including most of the northern half of the Protectorate, and licences were issued on condition that the trader not deal in ivory. Those suspected of illicit trading were denied permits.
Licences were not required in districts that were not closed, but trade in cow and calf ivory was specifically prohibited. The government was also trying once again to gather in all stocks of ivory held by Africans. This aim proved as elusive as formerly. In 1908, Rs. 44,294 was spent, in 1909, more than Rs. 130,000, and in 1910, nearly Rs. 200,000. Ivory exports increased, and the Customs Department was delighted. In August the Chief of Customs recommended that free trade in ivory be reinstated. At this juncture, the Game Department entered a strong protest. As the department saw it, the goal of the efforts to stop the illicit ivory trade was to preserve elephants. In pursuing this goal, the department found itself undermined by the encouragement given to Africans by government officers to bring in ivory for Rs. 4 per pound. The fiction was maintained that the ivory was old or "found" ivory, but the Game Department was sure that much of it was killed and then held just long enough to pass as old ivory. This would be the natural and intelligent response of Africans who had long been involved in the trade, saw nothing wrong with it, but noticed that ivory that was obviously very fresh brought punishment rather than reward. The Game Department was also dismayed because the constant oscillation of the Government's policy regarding the ivory trade and the frequent re-opening of the system of purchase from natives has fostered a very general and not unpardonable expectation that free trade in ivory would one day be re-opened, if only for a limited time. There is little doubt that traders have been storing female and immature ivory and encouraging natives to kill elephants in anticipation of this...
ivory. No decision was reached by the administration in 1909; government purchase of ivory at Rs. 4 per pound was allowed to continue until the entire question had been reviewed. Meanwhile, the District and Provincial Commissioners were asked to assess the situation in their areas and submit their views. Little support for free trade in ivory was found among them, and some officers were strongly opposed on the grounds that it would quickly lead to the extermination of the elephant.

The officers expressed varied opinions regarding the amount of smuggling that was going on. Officers in Jubaland, where the north-going trade was well established before regulations were imposed, had for some years been fully aware that large quantities of ivory was being smuggled into Somaliland. Those in Machakos, Kianbu, and Fort Hall thought few elephants were being killed and little ivory being smuggled out of their districts: these opinions made sense in their localities, since few elephants inhabited these areas. The position in other parts of the Protectorate was less clear. In the north-west, where coastal traders had established a flourishing business before the Protectorate was declared, District Commissioners disagreed about the prevalence of smuggling. The D.C., Baringo, thought that most of the elephants in his district had been killed or driven out. The D.C., Rumuruti, in Borobo country, said there was no reason to suspect that much smuggling was going on, but that if the government continued to pay for ivory, the Africans would kill elephant to sell the tusks. Further west, the D.C., Banana Gishu, whose district included the Turkwell River and the eastern slopes of Mount Elgon, held the opinion that a lot of
ivory was being smuggled out by traders. In Kikuyu country, the D.C., Nyeri, thought that more elephants were being killed since the introduction of the purchase system. This may well have been true, as the Kikuyu had traded less with the coastal caravans than many nearby peoples. Finally, the officer stationed among the Kitui Kamba, participants in the ivory trade for perhaps a century, believed that the system "had broken the Swahili ivory trade with natives to a great extent." This was certainly one of the aims of the policy, and this opinion was probably correct to the extent that Kamba elephant hunters were selling their cow and calf ivory for Rs. 4 per pound to the government. As all trade in cow and calf ivory was absolutely prohibited, private traders could neither buy nor sell cow and calf ivory without breaking the law. Traders offered very low prices for this illicit ivory - Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 per pound. It would therefore behove the Kamba to sell such ivory to the government, so long as not such was confiscated. Conversely, there would be little incentive to sell large ivory to district officers while private traders were still allowed to deal in it and would pay Rs. 5 to Rs. 8 per pound for it. For example, the ivory returns in Malindi District in this period show an average tusk weight of ten pounds. No tusk weighing over thirty pounds was brought in to government. In Machakos, the average weight of tusks brought in was fifteen pounds.

The consensus among officers in the field concerning free trade in ivory buttressed the Game Department's opposition to this policy. But the opinions expressed regarding the intensity of illicit activity and the effects of the purchase system,
were, as the Warden himself acknowledged, founded on very slim evidence. Officers charged with the administration of large tracts of territory through which they could only travel on foot were not in a position to be intimately acquainted with the illegal ivory trade. They had little to go on but rumour and the fluctuations in the amounts of ivory brought to them in exchange for rupees.

There was no doubt that the amount of ivory being sold to the government by Africans was increasing. Thus the Game Department's belief that much of the ivory was not old or found, but was obtained by illicit hunting with the specific purpose of selling the tusks, was probably justified. Reliable statistics demonstrating the effect of the purchase system on the illegal trade were not available, but the department had to work with the information at hand.

The Game Department placed its views on record in the Annual Report of 1910-1911, when it recommended that the government close all trade in ivory and render all private possession illegal except when obtained under licence in accordance with the game laws, or purchased from the government. Government ivory stocks would accumulate through confiscation and the purchase of ivory shot on licence, but the policy of purchase from Africans was to cease. The Game Department's reasons for these recommendations were that the elephant should be preserved where it would not interfere with development, and would be exterminated if the ivory trade in any form were allowed to continue. In response to the usual defence of the purchase system, namely that it discouraged smuggling, the Game
Department expressed flat disbelief, not conceding that the system "checked in the least the smuggling of ivory out of the Protectorate for the obvious reason that the traders who indulge in it were debarred the privilege of selling to Government..." The report overstated the case in that smuggling was checked to the degree that Africans found it more profitable or convenient to sell to the government, but, so far as preservation of the elephant was concerned, this method of checking the illegal trade had nothing to recommend it. Moreover, the traders could often compete successfully with government prices because they paid in cattle or goods, which many Africans preferred to rupees, especially in the northern parts of the Protectorate. The Game Department maintained that smuggling would be stamped out only when the borders of the Protectorate came under closer and more efficient administration.

The question of ivory policy was discussed by both the Legislative and Executive Councils. When the Game Department estimates were considered by the former, late in 1911, fears were expressed that the ivory trade would merely be directed across the Protectorate borders, should the government cease to purchase. The Game Warden was called in, and explained that the government lost money on genuine old ivory when paying a fixed rate of Rs. 8 per pound - that the valuable ivory was freshly killed, probably with the object of selling it to the government. He did not think a few thousand pounds a year in revenue made it worth encouraging the killing of elephants, and stated that smuggling would go on regardless. The Council then supported the termination of the purchase system. The
Executive Council followed suit, but recommended that government officers in the Northern Frontier District be authorized to use discretion in confiscating ivory unlawfully possessed by Africans.28

Government purchase of ivory stopped at the end of March 1912. But the administration proved unwilling to part with its ivory revenues. Later in the year, a reward system was introduced, whereby the government was to pay up to Rs. 2 per pound to "finders or those who give information leading to government possession of ivory."29 This arrangement was intended to encourage Africans to bring in found ivory and to inform on others who possessed illegal ivory. The informer was to be paid by the pound unless he were acting in collusion with the offenders. Rewards for information were in keeping with the government's decision not to buy ivory from Africans. But the inclusion of found ivory in the provisions for rewards meant that the same old game was being played all over again. Government officers were urged to ascertain the origins of "found" ivory, but often could not. Hence, the government continued to buy dubious ivory, merely at a lower price than formerly. And, as before, some local officers regarded the system as intended to produce revenue and asked few questions when ivory was brought in.

The D.C., Kipini, wrote some years later that a vigilant enforcement of the law would constitute a complete reversal of what has been the policy of this and neighboring districts...if too many questions are asked about ivory it is not brought in but taken across to Italian territory.

He estimated that less than half the ivory brought in - 503
tusks that year, of an average weight of 20 pounds—was genuinely found.** The next year, another District Commissioner on the coast, in Digo District, remarked that the government was "condoning a specified offence nine times out of ten when it purchases a tusk of ivory." A circular of 1926 took note of the fact that it had become a custom to pay rewards for all ivory brought in and to make few or no inquiries about it. District Officers were urged not to encourage illicit hunting through "failure to question the provenance of found ivory." Such circulars had been issued before; the situation changed little.

Nevertheless, the Game Department had at first expected positive results. It was believed that much of the ivory hidden away would be reported:

...when one or two men have received large sums of money which they have not worked very hard for, it will dawn on the mind of the Savage that the reporting of hidden ivory is a most profitable occupation and every native who knows that some other native or Baluchi has ivory will hurry in to report the fact and obtain a reward.**

The policy worked occasionally, and when it did it was profitable. According to the Game Warden, it was a success in the Kenya and Mau forests. The D.C., Kakomeni (near Nalindii) induced several informers to come forward, and in five and a half months collected 110 tusks weighing 3644 pounds, which indicated that the illegal trade was a sizeable one.* But reports of such successes were not common. More frequent were complaints that information received was unreliable or that little was offered. Those engaged in the ivory trade were unlikely to turn to wholesale tale-bearing when better profits
for all were obtainable through smuggling. Those who wished to obtain government ruppes were furnished with a loophole in "found" ivory. The Game Department became discouraged with the reward system, and the Warden later wrote of the department's inability to stop poaching so long as the reward system was continued.

Government acceptance of ivory from Africans, whatever form it took, aggravated the poaching problem and was one of the Game Department's headaches. Another was the smuggling of ivory and rhinoceros horn across the Protectorate frontiers into Abyssinia, Italian Somaliland, and German East Africa.

Information on the Abyssinian ivory trade is very scanty. The Northern Frontier District was the least administered of any part of the Protectorate and did not even have a station of its own until 1910. The elephant population which had attracted traders from the coast may have dwindled considerably for a time. In 1909, the D.C., Baringo, reported that most of the elephant in the south Rudolf area had been killed or driven away. An experienced hunter, C.H. Stigand, wrote shortly afterwards of Lake Rudolf that Toleki's elephant experiences in "a country which is now almost elephantless, read almost like a fairy tale to modern hunters."

However, Captain John Yardley's experiences in Equatoria during the campaign of 1917-18 showed that trading and raiding were common all over the northern reaches of the Northern Frontier District, north-eastern Uganda, and the south-eastern Sudan. Abyssinians, armed with modern rifles, raided over the borders to get cattle, slaves, and ivory. They acquired central
over some of the Turkana, who joined in the raiding, pushing south into Suk and went into Karanoja. The Abyssinians also traded arms for ivory, and Baluchi, Swahili, and Baganda traders were found in the area. The poaching parties were sometimes very large; in May 1937, over 100 Abyssinian poachers were caught with 105 tusks. The poaching did not stop with the end of the war. In the 1920s, large quantities of ivory were taken from the southern Sudan; one party of 170 rifles spent two months there killing elephants, buffalo, and giraffe.

The administration in the north was largely occupied by the central problem of controlling local hostilities, especially among the Turkana of Kenya and tribes of other countries, such as the Sertile in Abyssinia, the Topota and Benyirm in the Sudan, and the Dodeth and Karanoja in Uganda. Game did not receive much attention, and the Game Department lacked the staff even to police the Northern Reserve satisfactorily. As late as 1937, a report stated that there was not such poaching detected in the Turkana district because there were only two game scouts.

In contrast to the pattern of ivory trading and raiding between Kenya and Abyssinia, which owed little to the imposition of regulations, there being such scant administration in the region, new smuggling routes sprang up along the coast in direct response to the government's attempts to control the traffic in ivory. Below the Tanaz, ivory and rhinoceros horns were carried south from the coastal areas inhabited by the Shilluans and Digo to German East Africa, where ivory could be easily disposed of.
This general pattern was identified by government officers by 1909. Details accumulated as particular District Commissioners took an interest in the problem. In 1912, the Assistant D.C. in Takáunju, a coastal village halfway between Bombasa and Malindi, reported that the Nyika, specifically the Giriana, were not keen hunters themselves, but purchased ivory from the Liangulo. This hunting tribe occupied the western borders of the district, and were in the habit of obtaining from the Giriana advances of cattle, sheep, food, and rupees, on condition that they brought in the ivory they killed. Much of the "old" ivory brought in to the government was obtained in this way, but the District Commissioner feared that the trade was so entrenched a part of the economy that prosecutions would merely lead to smuggling. The Liangulo would certainly not stop hunting the elephant upon which their existence depended, and the Nyika enjoyed their profits.

An officer in Malindi District, Arthur M. Chawpion, became interested in the problem in 1913, and wrote a detailed report of his investigations. He noted that the trade had existed for some years in secret, and had only been checked occasionally by government officers.

The general rule is that the Wasanya bring in the tusks to the Nangiriana who provide them with grain in exchange. These tusks are buried or otherwise safely hidden until a well-known ivory trader visits the locality. He makes his headquarters in some elder's village, not infrequently that of the Government Headman, and buys up all the ivory he can get. He then makes up his safari and goes through Tsavo and Voi to the German border where he is at once able to dispose of the ivory with very large profits.

Champion knew who the most important traders were: two Baluchistan Indians, Mohamed Khan and Mohamed Haru, residents of
Hombasa. But he found himself unable to procure sufficient evidence against them. It was also known that certain Indian shopkeepers near the border and at Samburu, a station on the railway, acted as go-betweens and exchanged British currency for the German notes received by the traders.  

Champion tried several methods of attack on the trade. He began by issuing warnings, then prosecuted a few Africans. After setting this example, he confiscated all ivory brought in, but pardoned the possessors, informing everyone that if ivory was submitted to the government promptly, no legal action would be taken. After the confiscation of some fifty-five tusks in two months, a number of elders informed Champion that they would prefer that the matter be left in their hands. He agreed, on their promise to "carry out their duties most faithfully." One tusk was produced a few days later; from then on, not one pound of ivory was brought in. The illegal trade flourished, and Champion discovered that one headman at least had sent his sons to watch the government officer while Mohamed Khan lay concealed with his ivory stocks in the headman's village. One effect of Champion's vigilance, however, was that the Nyika became afraid of being caught carrying ivory for the traders. Thus the traders brought in Nyamwezi porters from south of the German border.

Champion was unable to continue his active campaign for very long. He was short of funds and wrote that his efforts had had a distinctly disturbing effect upon the natives. It was found well nigh impossible to catch the Swahili and Baluchi buyers as the Wa-Girirans Headmen for the most part assist them, or at best maintain a position of neutrality.

By "disturbing effect" Champion certainly meant that his efforts
had stirred up a great deal of resentment. In 1913, the year before the Giriamu rising, the Provincial Commissioner reported that there was little doubt that the government's interference with the ivory traffic had accentuated the opposition the Administration was already encountering.**

Nevertheless, the Game Department in cooperation with district officers at the coast and in Taita, made a number of attempts to catch the traders on their way south. The Game Department was anxious to discover the precise routes used and where the ivory crossed the railway. By piecing together information collected by the department itself and by various district officers, a number of points on the routes to the border were identified.** The traders moved south parallel to the coastline north of the Sabaki River, travelling through the bush studded with Nyika settlements, but keeping to the inland parts of the coast districts, where the administrative presence was slight. They then turned south-east to cross the Taru Desert, using known waterholes, finally reaching the border east of Kilimanjaro.**

Even with this knowledge, attempts to catch the traders seldom succeeded, and when they did, the results were sometimes discouraging. The D.C. Rabai, caught a wealthy Baluchi trader in the Taru Desert and sentenced him to nine months in prison and a fine of Rs. 1000. The courts then reduced the penalty to Rs. 200 and six months.* In many instances, cases involving illegal possession of ivory ended in acquittal, as the onus was upon the prosecution to prove that the goods had been acquired in contravention of the regulations.** Even so, if the Game
Department had had sufficient funds to post permanent scouts at the waterholes in the desert region, the trade would have been seriously hindered. As it was, the trade continued until the British took control of Tanganyika after World War I and enforced ivory regulations similar to the East Africa Protectorate's.

The area of greatest concern, however, was the border with Italian Somaliland. The north-eastern part of the East Africa Protectorate contained the greatest concentration of elephant, the frontier was little watched, and the Italian border posts received the ivory gladly and paid good prices. Consequently, the heaviest illicit traffic travelled up the Great North Road, as it was called by one warden. The pattern of traffic across the Juba River, which formed the border, was not entirely a creation of the ivory regulations. In the nineteenth century traders from the Benadir ports, especially Brava, crossed the Juba at Bardera and Logh to trade for ivory in the interior. But the pattern was altered in response to government attempts to control the trade. When the regulations and the presence of customs officials on the coast of the East Africa Protectorate began to put obstacles in the way of exporting through Mombasa, Malindi, and Lamu, the Africans who had been traditionally involved in the ivory trade began to move their illegal goods north. The Kamba, Galla, and Bori, all of whom had participated in the movement of ivory directly to the coast of the East Africa Protectorate before regulations forbade it, all played a part in the new trade pattern, as did the Pokomo and Somali.

After the first ivory regulations were promulgated in 1897,
the flow of ivory probably altered slowly. It is likely that only ivory quite convenient to the border crossed it at first, as smuggling from the coast ports of the East Africa Protectorate only gradually became risky, the government bought small ivory, and traders were allowed to deal in large ivory. Then, as controls tightened, traders were prevented from travelling and dealing in the closed districts, and the price of ivory rose, making government purchase less attractive, the illegal traffic increased. By 1904, considerable quantities of ivory were being smuggled into Italian Somaliland. Five years later, the opinion of the D.C., Kismayu, was that large numbers of elephants were being killed and most of the ivory was secretly transported across the Juba. The Game Warden believed by the 1920's that the Italian trade drained an area of some 50,000 square miles, from the coast to Meru on the eastern slopes of Mount Kenya, and from the border with Italian Somaliland as far south as Machakos, in the heart of Ukambani. The decrease of government payments from Rs. 4 to Rs. 2 per pound at a time when the price of ivory was steadily rising doubtless swelled the volume of the smuggling trade.

The District Commissioner, Afmadu District, Jubaland, who became very interested in the trade in 1917, investigated, and, after discussing the matter with the Provincial Commissioner, who admitted that it was impossible to patrol 400 miles of water, reported the situation in detail to the Game Warden. Elephants were found all over the dense bush of Jubaland, in north-eastern Tanaland, in the bush along the Tana River, and in the swamps of the Gosha District on the lower Juba. Elephants
were mainly killed by the Boni and other small, servile tribes dominated by the Somali, such as the Bidgan and Ribs. These used poisoned arrows, and commonly gave the falling tusk (the tusk nearest the ground when the elephant fell) to the Somali. The Somali also did some hunting themselves, with rifles. The hostile relations among some of the Somali groups affected the pattern of trade. In the north-eastern part of Tanaland, the Abdulla Ogaden and their tributary hunters killed elephant and sold the ivory to the Herti and Magharbul Somalis who then marketed the tusks in Italian territory. The Abdulla Ogaden themselves did not venture to the border, as they would have to pass through the lands of the hostile Mohamed Zubeir. The Herti appeared free to move about and traded as far south as the Tana. Ivory was also carried north from the Tana region by Boni hunters who sold it to Somali traders at Wamiedu near the border between Tanaland and Jubaland.

The main route north began at Bura on the Tana. Ivory from other points on the river was taken to Bura by dugout canoe. From there it went by camel to Sangole and Wamiedu, where there were wells - a necessity in the dry bush of northern Kenya. Herti traders then moved the ivory in the direction of Afsadu, just south of which routes branched out towards many points on the Juba. In 1923, the Game Warden estimated that 70 per cent of the north-going traffic used this route. A secondary route, from the upper Tana, where Korokoro, Watta, and Kamba hunters harried the elephant herds, passed east of the Lorian Swamp to another watering hole at Lake horror. From there the route proceeded towards Afsadu and the ivory was dispersed along the Juba. The
Ivory crossed the Juba anywhere between the mouth of the river, where there existed a small population of Berti fishermen, to Loqah. The Wadero and Gosha tribes, also tributary to the Somali, took the ivory across for a sun, the seller having made previous arrangements in one town or another on the Italian side. The buyer paid in cloth or in British East African rupees by means of a promissory note on a trader in British territory; two such traders were in Gobwen and Kismayu, near the mouth of the Juba.

The tusks, once in Italian territory, were sold on the open market, generally by auction, and African informants reported that the Italian government took a percentage of these sales. Then the ivory was transported to Berca, Brava, and Mogadishu, to be shipped out to the Massawa and Aden markets, and to Zanzibar.

Not all administrative officers were equally interested in the illicit trade, and efforts to interfere were sporadic and ineffectual. Information was occasionally received regarding particular traders, but even so, they were seldom caught. One Hassan Ahmed ferried 648 pounds of ivory to Italian Somaliland in mid-September 1917, and was known to make similar shipments every month. In 1918, the customs superintendent at Kismayu requested the police at Gobwen to patrol that area of the river at night, but nothing came of their efforts. Later in the year, Captain Purves of the King's African Rifles, stationed at Gobwen, directed his attention to the problem and succeeded in seizing nine tusks worth some £6,000 in three days. He then wrote a wrathful letter to the P.C., Kismayu, full of scathing comments on the inefficiency of the local customs and police.
staff who had captured no ivory in the previous eighteen months. Information gathered on his travels in the area between Gobuwa and Port Durnford had convinced Purves that immense quantities of ivory were buried in the Jubaland interior and were steadily filtering across the river. He recorded an estimate of 4000 tusks awaiting shipment at the time. This figure appears high, but it is difficult to assess in the absence of any estimate of the period of time over which these stores were accumulated.

Purves's figure was not incompatible with another given three years later by the Commissioner of the Coast Province. This province was a T-shaped area comprising the coastal strip as far north as Jubaland Province, plus the long, elephant-rich inland tongue of the Tana River District. The Commissioner informed the Game Department that his administration could account for 1000 slaughtered elephant that year and believed that this was not half the total, the larger portion of which went to Italian Somaliland. If the Commissioner was correct, the Coast Province was contributing over half the smuggled ivory. The rest would have come from Jubaland, Ukamba, and part of the Northern Frontier District. Unfortunately, these and other estimates were not made on the basis of accurate counts of elephant populations, hunters, or pounds of ivory smuggled out of the country. They were guesses based on very incomplete information and their accuracy is unverifiable.

Purves's observations led him to conclude that the greater part of the local inhabitants were involved in the trade. Reliable information was extremely difficult to obtain; reports which came in often sprang from personal enmities, or served as
a cloak for the informant's own activities. At this time, Rs. 5 per pound was the standard price paid on the Italian side (market rates at Mombasa were Rs. 6 to Rs. 7.5 per pound for ivory of good quality) and the low price paid by the East Africa Protectorate administration - Rs. 2 per pound - was not sufficient inducement anywhere within reach of the border trade.62

In Jubaland, the government was presented with the ivory problem in its most acute form. The province brought in little revenue but that from ivory sales, a large elephant population was accompanied by experienced hunters and well-organized traders, and the border was long and easy to cross. East Africa Protectorate legislation was impossible to enforce without Italian cooperation. This proved difficult to obtain. In spite of professions of concern emanating from the Italian government, repeated efforts by local officers of the East Africa Protectorate and by the Game Department failed to effect any change for many years. Not only did the Italian administration share in the profits of the trade, the local officers were reported to have threatened to kill or imprison Africans who acted as informants for the East Africa Protectorate.63

As early as 1914, the Game Department tried to reach an agreement with the Italian authorities. At a conference held in May, British, Italian, French, and German delegates agreed that elephants' bearing tusks weighing less than ten kilograms should not be killed and that possession of such tusks would be illegal in all territories. Unfortunately, the Protocol had still not been signed in late July, and the war which began in August
swept aside efforts to complete the agreement.**

Attempts to settle the issue with Italian Somaliland were renewed with vigour in the 1920's. In 1924, an Assistant Game Warden, Keith Caldwell, visited Rome to present Kenya's case and was cordially received.** But cordiality was all the Game Department got for some time. As year followed year, the Warden's increasingly acerbic reports noted that no agreement had been reached with the Italian government. Finally, in 1932, a series of meetings was held in Nairobi. The Italian Consul admitted at the outset that ivory and rhinoceros horn from Kenya had been sold without any hindrance up to that time, and agreed that the Italian government should assist in the suppression of the illegal traffic. An agreement by which the Italian authorities were to cease receiving illicit ivory and rhinoceros horn was reached at last in 1933.** The Game Department was delighted. Its sanguine expectations were to be disappointed, however. The Warden announced indignantly in 1942 - after the British occupation of Italian Somaliland - that it was the first year that the public sale of smuggled ivory and rhinoceros horn had been stopped. Hitherto, the perfidious Italian authorities "while promising to stop acting as receivers of stolen property had yet encouraged the traffic for the gain it brought them..."**

The government in Kenya attacked the illicit trade from another angle as well, the oft-tried purchase policy. Local officers in Jubaland, in despair of ever checking the illicit trade, in 1918 begged to be allowed to purchase ivory. They were granted permission to take one tusk in two while the question
was examined, and were subsequently authorized to offer 50 per cent of the price the ivory brought at auction. But, as before, the administration found that the dual aims of acquiring ivory and protecting the elephant were not compatible. The Game Warden had become discouraged with this approach by 1923, and in 1926, after the policy had been terminated, he wrote that the experiment was a "complete and utter failure" - that the payment of rewards simply made the African think that the government wanted to buy. The aim of an agreement with the Italians was to achieve a situation in which the Kenya government would be able to stop paying anything for ivory. So far as can be determined, none of the government's efforts affected the illicit trade very seriously.

Not all the ivory smuggled across the northern border came from Jubaland. A good deal of it originated in the Tana River area, where elephant existed in large numbers and where Boni, Liangulo and Kamba hunters plied their bows. It was in this district that some of the most strenuous efforts were made to stop the trade.

In 1920, the District Commissioner considered the most serious problem of the Tana River District to be "the wholesale destruction of elephants and the sale of most of the ivory to Somalis who resell to Italians north of the Juba." His concern was understandable: ivory purchased by the local administration - 9742 pounds in 1920-21, 12,527.5 pounds in 1922 - brought in several times as much revenue as all other sources including hut tax. The illegal trade and the inroads on the elephant population thus represented a very significant loss to the
The elephant was the prey of Boni, Galla, Kamba, and Pokomo hunters, the Boni trading their ivory to the Pokomo for grain and tendering a share to the Galla or Somali, while the Pokomo traded ivory to the Somali for sheep, goats, or cash to pay hut tax. According to more than one District Commissioner, the Galla wanted as little contact with the government as possible, and paid their taxes in order to be left alone. There was a ready market for their well-made ghee, but ivory provided such an easy source of income that they obtained their tax money through the illegal trade.

Poaching was fiercest in the dry seasons, from January to March, and from September to November, when the elephants congregated around permanent water. Although Bura was the most important smuggling station on the Tana, ivory from the south bank crossed the river at many points, from Malindi at the coast to Korokoro north of Kitui, where ivory from Kamba hunting grounds began its journey to Somaliland. Traders, usually Herti Somali, then moved the ivory north by camel to the Juba, where, again, there were many crossing points. Some was transported to Tula on the lower Juba and then taken north by dhow.

The loss of revenue to the district disturbed successive District Commissioners. Major A.W. Sutcliffe, District Commissioner in 1925, was the most active. In his view, the easy income from the illicit ivory trade was a fundamental bar to the development of the district. So long as the trade continued on a large scale, there would be little incentive for Africans to
pursue wealth through increased crop production or stock trading. Moreover, ivory trading encouraged people to move about a good deal, making them harder to control. Finally, the administration's inability to enforce its own regulations inspired contempt. Sutcliffe thought the position deplorable.

After a short residence in the district I found that game, owing to the cash value of ivory and the meat value to the natives, dominated the district to the extent scarcely credible. Villages had broken up into family settlements near lakes; to hunt game coming to water. Manyika, Nakamba and Arabs roamed the district trading ivory and supplying hunting needs, powder and shot to gun owning Gallas, and poison to the bow and arrow hunters! Wabom hunters visited villages as "butchers", bartering meat for grain. Gallas and even village elders and headmen had their official hunters who supplied ivory and meat - giraffe and buffalo - for feasts and ceremonies.

All game fled precipitately at the sight of a native.

Elephants were snared, shot, and hunted at every waterhole and the tusks solemnly brought as "found" to Government and the amount of reward claimed. This had, through the years, become such an established custom that tusks were even taken to dukas beforehand and weighed, value at Shs.4/- per lb. calculated, and credit obtained on the prospective sale!! I gathered the impression that Government and its officers were covertly held in utter contempt as a consequence, and that no administration was possible under such conditions. Game dominated everything and everybody; and I determined to take firm and vigorous measures, against the strongest opposition and obstruction.

Sutcliffe believed his firm and vigorous measures were quite successful. He enforced the Outlying Districts Ordinance in order to keep coastal traders and other suspicious characters such as the Kamba out of the district. He held barazas - public meetings - in order to warn as many people as possible of his intentions. The agricultural tribes, the Pokomo and Korokoro, were chivvied back to their villages at the riverside and
encouraged to live in compact settlements and to extend their cultivation. Sutcliffe explored the whole district, locating lakes and waterholes, and confiscating traps and snares. He and Captain Erskine of the Game Department travelled together for two months, trailing poachers. Sutcliffe reported that as a result, the district was "much improved in discipline, moral tone, general orderliness and well being." He considered that government prestige had been enhanced and that the increase in legitimate trade and crop production was also due to his measures.

With the suppression of the illicit ivory trade the cattle trade has developed extensively during the year... Similarly the suppression of hunting has assisted in the revival of agriculture, further assisted by the concentration of villages.

The district, from producing less than its own needs in the early part of 1924, and only a small surplus later, had developed a surplus in 1925 too large for the capacity of the transport system to the coast. Eight hundred tons of maize were exported, more than any previous year's exports of all grains, and another 800 tons were awaiting shipment. In the latter half of the year, over 900 cattle and 1000 sheep and goats were exported to Mombasa."

To his successor, Sutcliffe wrote: "Everything hinges on the ivory and game poaching. If this is vigorously suppressed the rest follows easily - once vigilance is relaxed the whole administration goes to pieces." The new District Commissioner reported in 1926 that cattle sales were up 25 per cent and sheep and goat sales 90 per cent over 1925, and attributed this to the waning of the ivory trade. Sales rose again in 1927." But the
trend did not last, and reports written in 1929 and 1933 make it clear that the illicit ivory trade was flourishing again.°°

District officers of later years did not share Sutcliffe's view that poaching was the root of all evil in the Tana River District. In 1928 there was more concern expressed about game damage to crops than about poaching. The District Commissioner of the following year did not bother himself over the poaching question. He merely paid for ivory brought in, expressing surprise that any at all was brought to the administration, considering the proximity of the border, the ease of crossing, and the low rate of reward in Kenya compared with that in Italian Somaliland, where as much as Shs. 10 per pound was paid. The whole issue of poaching, he believed, was the Game Department's responsibility.°° But the Game Department, small as it was, could do little but visit on occasion and pursue an agreement with Italy. The development of the Tana ivory trade went largely unchecked most of the time.

There is a perceptible correlation between Sutcliffe's suppression of the ivory trade and the expansion of cultivation and stock sales. But the significance of Sutcliffe's work cannot be assessed in the absence of information on climate, transport, and other influences on production and trade. And it is not clear that the effects of his work could have been made to last, even with continued vigilance. It is possible that many Africans abandoned the trade temporarily, on the (correct) assumption that it would not receive such concentrated attention for very long. Had vigilance been maintained, the trade would have been hindered somewhat, but would probably have resumed with greater
stealth. The administration lacked the staff for effective and continuous control.

The ivory trade in British East Africa had developed before the advent of British administration, and was merely altered by government intervention, never stopped. When the government attempted to control the trade, they discovered that tribes such as the Boni, Somali, Kamba, Liangulo, and Giriana had built the ivory trade into the structure of their economies, as a means of acquiring food, livestock, or desirable trade goods. Moreover, ivory was incorporated into the social structure of some tribes. Among the Liangulo, for example, bridewealth was transferred in the form of ivory. Among the Korokoro of the Tana, the payment of a pair of bull elephant tusks afforded entrance to a society of elders who were privileged to commandeer food and honey for their feasts. Where the government developed close administration and gave its attention to the matter, such as at the coast ports, they were able to stifle the illegal trade. But the lengthy borders with German East Africa and Italian Somaliland were not patrolled, and in much of Kenya, particularly the north, the administrative presence was very slight and ineffective. Stopping up the exits at the coast merely turned much of the ivory trade into a smuggler's game.

At the same time, the government unintentionally supplied a new incentive to ivory-hunting in the shape of taxes, which introduced many Africans to the need for cash. The government's efforts to control the trade were additionally hindered by its own unwillingness to give the Game Department sufficient financial support or to sacrifice immediate revenue.
administration not bought ivory from Africans, it would still have remained unable to close the borders to smuggling, but it would not have added to the inducements to kill elephants, nor presented such a paradoxical face to the African population. As the government's preservation policy was in part simply a revenue-producing policy, preservation usually suffered when revenue was at stake. As protection for the elephant, the policy was half-hearted.

Local officers who devoted much time and energy to the ivory question in both the Jubaland and Coast Provinces, were able to discourage smuggling temporarily, but the end result was simply that the trade went deeper underground and burgeoned anew as soon as vigilance was relaxed. So long as a market existed, ivory would be smuggled out of Kenya.
1. The East Africa Game Ordinance 1906, No. 9 of 1906; The Game Ordinance 1909, No. 19 of 1909.

2. Chief Native Commissioner to Commissioners, July 24, 1923, enclosing Game Warden's Report, April 14, 1923, DC/GOS 9/2, NA. The Chief Native Commissioner endorsed the Warden's views.

3. Poaching remains a problem today. The latest effort to stop it is the current ban, dating from 12 March 1978, on the sale of all game trophies and curios in Kenya. It remains to be seen how much ivory, etc., will be smuggled out of the country.

4. Game Department Annual Report 1931, p. 8, C.O. 544/34; PC/Coast Dep. 2/716, NA.

5. The effect of rising prices on hunting practices has been repeatedly documented in Kenya's history. For example, the number of leopards trapped increased dramatically with the rise in the price of leopard skins in 1929-1930. Percival said the Dorobo hunted the rhinoceros more frequently when the price of horns made it profitable. (A moderate pair of horns weighs about ten pounds. In 1927, rhinoceros horn was worth Shs. 35 per pound. Today (1978) the price is £85 per kilo. Game Department Annual Report 1927, p. 21, C.O. 544/23; David Martin, "Threat to the Rhino," The Observer, April 9, 1978, p. 7.


8. F.O. to Eliot, April 19, 1901, FOCP 7823/50. It was already apparent that it would be a struggle to obtain ratification by all the signatory Powers of the Convention of 1900.


14. Sub-Commissioner Mombasa to Ag. Commissioner, Nairobi, March 12, 1907, and attached comments, PC Coast Dep. 1 62/51, NA.

15. Circular, Deputy Commissioner to Sub-Commissioners, December 17, 1906, enclosing memorandum by Crown Advocate of December 14, 1906, P.C. Coast Dep. 1 62/51; Commissioner (F.J. Jackson) to Sub-Commissioners, Collectors, February 7, 1907, PC Coast Dep. 1 62/51, NA. The Trading Ordinance, 1904, No. 5 of 1904.


17. Ibid., p. 19. "There is no question that the prolonged system of purchase from natives by Government has lead [sic] to natives deliberately killing Elephants to sell the ivory to Government ... they know well how easily its maturity can be hastened."

18. Ibid., p. 19.


20. Nyeri station was established in December 1902 after an entire ivory caravan was murdered and a punitive expedition sent. Bungee, British Rule, p. 83.


22. D.C. Malindi to P.C. Mombasa, April 4, 1909, PC Coast Dep. 1 62/51; Mackahos Annual Report 1908-09, DC/HKS 1/1/1, NA.

23. The D.C., Baringo, noted that the Africans around the southern part of Lake Rudolf would only exchange ivory for cows. But the preference for goods over rupees was not confined to the north. A report on the Kajiado District in the Southern Masai Reserve noted that the Loita Masai habitually brought ivory to a local store in exchange for goods of however small a value, but it was difficult to induce them to sell ivory to the government for a better price in rupees. Southern Masai Reserve District Report 1908-11, DC/KAJ 1/1/1, NA.

25. Executive Council Minutes, February 7, 1912, C.O. 544/3. The Northern Frontier District (NFD) was so little administered at the time that it was a fair assumption that many Africans living there had no knowledge of the ivory regulations.

26. Secretariat Circular No. 70, October 23, 1912, DC/KISM 9/1, MA.

27. D.C. Kipini to Ag. Senior Commissioner Coast, January 19, 1923, PC Coast, Dep. 1, 47/1168.

28. Ag. D.C. Kwale to Game Warden, August 13, 1924, PC Coast Dep. 1, 47/1168.

29. Ag. Senior Commissioner, Coast to all D.C.'s, July 19, 1926, PC Coast Dep. 1, 47/1168.

30. Game Warden to Ag. P.C. Mombasa, July 3, 1914, PC Coast Dep. 1 8/172, MA.

31. D.C. Kakoneni to P.C. Mombasa, September 12, 1917, PC Coast Dep. 1 50/1202. The government profit on this ivory amounted to about Rs. 20,000, or £1500.

32. In the absence of data on the subject, one might hazard that community loyalty and the fear of community hostility prevented many Africans from informing on others.

33. Report of Game Warden, April 14, 1923, quoted in Ag. Senior Coast Commissioner to Ag. Game Warden, June 30, 1926, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168; Game Department Annual Report 1929, p. 6, C.O. 544/28.


35. Captain John Yardley, Parergon, or Eddies in Equatoria, London and Toronto: J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1931.

36. Ibid., p. 267.

37. Ibid., p. 261.


39. The German authorities controlled the ivory trade of their own territory, but the existence of the smuggling routes to German East Africa and the ease with which British East...
African Ivory was apparently disposed of there indicate that the German authorities were not averse to allowing ivory from British East Africa to be sold in German territory.

40. Assistant D.C. Takaungu to P.C. Coast, June 17, 1912, PC Coast 3/186, NA.

41. A.H. Champion, Report on Illicit Ivory Trade in the Giriama Country, March 31, 1913, Malindi District Political Record Book 1913-16, DC/HAL 2/1, NA.

42. P.C. Coast (Hobley), Political Report, Giriama District, July 1913, enclosed in D.C. Malindi to Asst. D.C. Giriama, September 23, 1913, DC/HAL 2/1, NA. According to Hobley, Indian traders paid about Rs. 3 per pound for the ivory, and the Giriama spent the money on tembo (beer).

43. Further note of 1915 on Champion's report. See note 41. A similar pattern developed in Digo District, lying between Mombasa and the German border. The Liangulo killed elephant and exchanged the ivory for bullocks and trade goods provided by the Digo. The latter in turn watched the market, and sold the ivory to the government or to traders, whichever was most advantageous.

44. Asst. D.C. Champion, Giriama, to P.C. Mombasa, June 23, 1914, PC Coast 8/172; D.C. Malindi to Asst. D.C. Giriama, September 23, 1913, enclosing P.C. Hobley's political report, DC/HAL 2/1, NA. Champion had written earlier that for years the Giriama had looked upon the trade as perfectly legitimate, "and there is no doubt they very much resent being deprived of it." Report on Illicit Ivory Trade in the Giriama Country, March 31, 1913, DC/HAL 2/1, NA.

45. See Map 3. Sources for map: Sub-Commissioner Mombasa to Assistant District Superintendent of Police Mombasa, November 21, 1906, PC Coast Dep. 1 Add.4; Asst. D.C. Takaungu to P.C. Mombasa, June 17, 1912, PC Coast Dep. 1 3/186; Teita District Political Record Book 1913-1925, Vol. I, p. 135, DC/TTA 3/2; Game Warden to P.C. Coast, May 5, 1913, PC Coast Dep. 1 8/172; Asst. D.C. Habai to P.C. Coast, May 14, 1913, PC Coast Dep. 1 8/172; P.C. Mombasa to D.C. Vol and Game Warden, May 18, 1914, PC Coast Dep. 1 8/172; Report on the Illicit Ivory Trade in the Giriama Country, March 31, 1913, and further note of 1915, Malindi District Political Record Book 1913-1916, DC/HAL 2/1; P.C. Mombasa to Chief Secretary, September 24, 1917, Malindi District Political Record Book 1913-1916, DC/HAL 2/1; P.C. Mombasa to Chief Secretary, February 6, 1918, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA.

Returns of prosecutions 1910-1914, PC Coast Dep. 1 63/246, NA. Very little information on prosecutions is available before 1930. In 1911-1912, 67 persons were convicted of offences against the Game Ordinance. In 1910-1911, 54 Africans were prosecuted, of whom 50 were convicted. Three Europeans were prosecuted, one convicted. There were many more convictions of Africans in 1909-1910, owing to the confiscation of large quantities of ivory in Kitui. Numbers of convictions for 1924, 1930, and 1931 were 311, 495, and 477. From 1932 to 1937, the average number of convictions under the Game, Bird, and Trout Ordinances was 509. Of this total, the average number of Africans convicted was 485. Fifteen to 20 Europeans were convicted each year, and 5 to 10 Asians. In 1934, a year of exceptional drought and famine, African convictions rose to 751. See the Annual Reports of the Game Department in COO. 54/4. Some District and Provincial Annual Reports include numbers of prosecutions and convictions under the Game Ordinances.

This was changed in the Game Ordinance, 1921, no. 58 of 1921. But finding witnesses whose testimony would stand up in court remained a problem. Murphy to McGeagh, August 1933, DC/TBD 2/1, NA.

For evidence of the participation of these tribes in the north-going illicit trade, see DC/KISH 9/1, NA (Somali and Boni); Tana River District Political Record Books DC/TBD 3/2, NA and handing over reports DC/TBD 2/1, NA (Galla, Boni, Pokomo, Kamba, Somali); PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA (Galla, Boni, Kamba).

Stewart to Lansdowne, December 29, 1904, F.O. 403/356/7.


Game Department Annual Report 1924, p. 6, COO. 544/17.

Average prices per pound of ivory exported from the BAP: 1912: 9s 5d; 1913: 10s 5d; 1914: 11s 9d. The price then dropped during the war.

Both the Galla and the Somali possessed guns by the 1920's. The Somali acquired rifles from the Berti traders, according to D.C. S.H. Fazan. (Fazan to Wade, December 11, 1923, handing over reports Tana River District, DC/TBD 2/1, NA.) The D.C. Afmadu (also called M'fudu) recorded in 1917 that the Somali used rifles, and the Bajums at Lasa were able to manufacture coarse gunpowder from the ammonia of coney deposits, the wood of a certain tree, and Gondah, Hindustani sulphur. (D.C. M'fudu to P.C. Jubaland, August 4, 1917, PC/KISH 9/1, NA.) All this was, of course, highly illegal. By law, all fire-arms and ammunition, including gunpowder and especially rifles, were subject to government control. See the Arms Ordinance, No. 15 of 1906. In 1921, the Ag. D.C. Kipini confiscated five muzzle
loaders from the Pokomo on one safari, and suspected that the Galla held a large number of guns, including some government rifles. Ag. D.C. Kipini to D.C. Lamu, January 10, 1921, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA.

55. Ag. D.C. M'fudu to P.C. Kismayu, August 4, 1917, PC/KISH 9/1, NA.

56. Game Warden to Acting Colonial Secretary, April 14, 1923, enclosed in Northcote to Devonshire, June 11, 1923, C.O. 533/295.

57. Ag. D.C. M'fudu to P.C. Kismayu, August 4, 1917, PC/KISH 9/1, NA. The Radhi at Alexandra (on the Juba) reported that the Italian government took Rs. 15 on every Rs. 100. D.C. M'fudu to Superintendent of Police, Kismayu, September 26, 1917, DC/KISH 9/1, NA.

58. D.C. M'fudu to Superintendent of Police, Kismayu, September 20, 1917, September 26, 1917, DC/KISH 9/1, NA.

59. Superintendent of Customs, Kismayu to Chief of Customs, April 17, 1918 enclosed in Chief of Customs to P.C. Kismayu, April 26, 1918, DC/KISH 9/1, NA.

60. Capt. A.L. Purves, KAB, to P.C. Kismayu, October 11, 1918, DC/KISH 9/1, NA.

61. Senior Coast Commissioner to Game Warden, November 14, 1921, PC Coast Dep. 1 29/403, NA. The Acting Game Warden estimated Brava exports at 100 to 300 frasilas per month in 1923, and stated that Somaliland had few elephants of its own. Ag. Game Warden to Ag. Chief Secretary, April 14, 1923, enclosed in Northcote to Devonshire, June 11, 1923, C.O. 533/295.

62. Collector of Customs to P.C. Kismayu, December 9, 1918, DC/KISH 9/1, NA. In 1923, Heri traders were offering Shs. 12 per pound, while the government offered up to Shs. 4.

63. D.C. M'fudu to Game Warden through Ag. P.C. Kismayu, May 29, 1917, May 30, 1917; D.C. M'fudu to Superintendent of Police, Kismayu, September 20, 1917, DC/KISH 9/1, NA.

64. Correspondence between F.O. and C.O. in C.O. 533/145, 390.


67. Game Department Annual Report 1942, p. 4, GA 16/1/9, NA.

68. Ag. P.C. Kismayu to Chief Secretary, Nairobi, October 24, 1918, October 25, 1918; Ag. Chief—Secretary Nairobi to
Government policy in the MPD was to accept one tusk in two, an admission that no other enforcement was possible.

69. Game Warden to Ag. Senior Commissioner Coast, June 21, 1926, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA; Northcote to Devonshire, June 11, 1923, C.O. 533/295.


72. Ag. D.C. Kipini to D.C. Lamu, January 13, 1921, enclosed in D.C. Lamu to Senior Coast Commissioner, January 15, 1921, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA.

73. Fazan to Wade, December 11, 1923, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1; J.H.B. Murphy to W.R. McGeagh, August, 1933, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

74. Sutcliffe to Oldfield, undated (1925), Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

75. D.C. Lamu to Senior Coast Commissioner, June 23, 1921, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA.

76. Extract, Tana River District Annual Report 1925, Political Record Book Vol. II, DC/TRD 3/2, NA. The Game Warden thought Sutcliffe's efforts so important that he quoted extensively from Sutcliffe's report in his own.

As discussed in Chapter iv, the government, in allowing tribes such as the Bomi to hunt, made a distinction between subsistence and commercial hunting. Clearly, in Sutcliffe's view - and as the District Commissioner he had the authority, subject to the Governor's approval, to impose his view - the Bomi were exceeding the bounds of subsistence hunting.

77. Ibid. In 1921, no maize was exported, it was imported. The next year, 78 tons were exported, and 34 tons of rice and maize in both 1923 and 1924. Ibid., extracts from Annual Reports 1921-1924.

78. A.W. Sutcliffe to H.G. Oldfield, undated, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.


80. S.R. Lowder to C.A. Cornell, April 1, 1929; J.H.B. Murphy to W.R. McGeagh, August 1933, Tana River District Handing
81. S.R. Lowder to C.A. Cornell, April 1, 1929, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

82. Ag. D.C. Kwale, Digo District to Game Warden, August 13, 1924, PC Coast Dep. 1 47/1168, NA. The killing of an elephant, rhinoceros, or buffalo was necessary for a boy to attain manhood. According to the Senior Commissioner, the killing of game was essential to practically all their tribal customs. Senior Coast Commissioner to Ag. C.N.C., October 7, 1925, PC Coast Dep. 1 26/292, NA.

83. Sutcliffe to Oldfield, undated, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.
CHAPTER VII. Elephants in the Shambas

When game preservation was first discussed and the earliest regulations declared in British East Africa, no settlers had arrived, and the Protectorate was not yet set upon any particular course of development. With the advent of white settlement, the issue of game preservation became more complex.

The sportsman's paradise had drawn many of the British settlers to the Protectorate, particularly well-to-do, influential ones such as Lord Delamere and Lord Hindlip. It was Delamere who proposed the establishment of the enormous northern game reserve which was gazetted in October 1900.¹ But as one Kenyan observed years later, "However ardent a nature lover a man may be, his passion is apt to cool when his pocket feels the effect of game." The incompatibility of farming and preserving large game populations quickly produced modified preservation policies.

Settlers began to arrive in numbers in 1903, although a few came earlier. A handful of Europeans settled in the highlands before the turn of the century; hardly more than thirty had arrived by the beginning of 1902.² The Commissioner of the Protectorate, Sir Charles Eliot, was strongly in favour of settlement, and the Foreign Office was anxious to encourage economic development in order that the Uganda Railway, completed at the end of 1902, might be able to pay its way. Soon after the policy favouring settlement was put into action, settlers began arriving from Britain and South Africa, but the white population of Kenya never became very large. In late 1905, there were some
600 resident settlers; five years later, Europeans in the Protectorate numbered 3175. There were only 9,651 Europeans in 1921, and in 1946, the total had not yet passed 25,000.

In spite of their small numbers, the settlers constituted an extremely powerful political force in the Protectorate and later in Kenya Colony. They began to take part in the government as early as 1907, when the first unofficial members of the Legislative Council were appointed, and throughout the colonial period enjoyed the greater part of the government's attention and financial help. In the view of most settlers, this was right and natural: they expected from the outset to receive every assistance from a government which had encouraged them to come.

A large number of the settlers took up farming, although farmers did not constitute a majority of the settler population. In March, 1914, the European population, including government officers, settlers, and missionaries, was 5438, and there were perhaps 1000 farmers and planters. In 1921, there were about 1300 resident landholders, and nearly half the settler population was engaged in occupations related to land. The average holding was approximately 5000 acres, although some farms, particularly in the coffee-bearing areas near Nairobi, were much smaller, and some, notably livestock ranches and sisal estates, were far larger. During the 1920's, the number of farmers rose, but the European population rose faster, and thus the farming sector decreased as a percentage of the European total. Nevertheless, European agriculture became the mainstay of the Kenya economy after World War I. In the latter half of the 1920's, settler-produced coffee and sisal contributed an average
of half of Kenya's exports. Maize, grown in the Nakuru, Kasia Gishu, and Trans-Nzoia regions, was also important. In 1930, maize and wheat occupied nearly half the European cultivated lands; coffee and sisal occupied another third. Dairy cattle, and, to a lesser extent, sheep farming, took up large acreages in Laikipia, Nyeri, and Naivasha, but did not contribute significantly to Kenya's exports. Given the economic importance of agriculture, both to the colonial economy and to a significant number of settlers, the voice of the white farmer was bound to be heard by the administration.

Even so, that voice was remarkably loud. Farmers and the issues that concerned them dominated settler politics. In the early years of settlement, the government was anxious to encourage agricultural development, and influential figures like Lord Delamere loomed large on the political scene. After World War I, the farmers wielded great influence through the structure of the Legislative Council. Europeans obtained the right to elected representation in 1919, and the first elections were held in 1920. Eleven Europeans were elected, and of these eight represented rural constituencies. The rural character of settler politics and the importance of farming to the economy influenced many issues, including those related to game. It was inevitable that game would inflict damage on settler property. For a government eager to promote European agriculture, the policy of preserving game in the settled areas soon became untenable.

As soon as the efforts to attract settlers began to bear fruit, it was recognized by the administration that game
preservation would give way before the settlers. As early as 1903, Eliot advised that the protection of game must shortly rest with the reserves alone, and not on hunting regulations applying to the entire Protectorate. Europeans had not yet begun to settle in areas with large game populations, such as the Uasin Gishu and Laikipia Plateaux, but Eliot knew that when they did, it would be impossible to make them obey the regulations as they stood, because game damaged crops. In the instructions received by Sir Donald Stewart upon taking up his appointment as Commissioner of the East Africa Protectorate in 1904, the Foreign Office explained that the existing game regulations were based upon the Convention of 1900, and went on to state that it would "hardly be possible to maintain the Regulations in their entirety" as the country was gradually taken up by white settlers. New regulations were to be drawn up to accommodate the settlers.

Concessions were made in the Game Ordinance, 1904. Landholders were allowed to take out a licence for Rs. 45 (£3) to hunt any game on their own lands, save animals listed on Schedule I and females and young on Schedule II, and any animal damaging crops or livestock could be killed. If a settler took out the more comprehensive settler's licence, entitling him to shoot on crown land, game killed on private land did not count towards the limit allowed. Conditions were further relaxed in favour of the settler in 1909, when the licensed landholder was permitted to kill on private land all animals but those on Schedule I. This provision enlarged his scope to include nearly all antelopes and gazelles of any age or sex, except eland.
few of the rarer species were excluded, and the landholder's licence did not include elephant, giraffe, or, in limited zones, rhinoceros and hippopotamus. Of course, if any of these animals were found damaging the landholder's property, he was at liberty to kill them. The Game Department itself bowed to the inevitable, admitting in a general statement of policy that it was obvious that game would largely disappear in the settled areas, and that to oppose this process would be against the interests of the country. Resistance would "defeat its own ends eventually."

These concessions left many settlers dissatisfied. They had come to wrest prosperity from the East African soil, and were plagued with many difficulties and uncertainties. Experiments were necessary to discover which crops would grow well; similar trials were demanded of stock breeders. Failures brought knowledge but were costly and keenly felt. Unknown diseases attacked crops, rains failed, stock died mysterious deaths. In the midst of all these vicissitudes, the natural lot of the pioneer, the ravages of game were felt most bitterly.

The earliest settlers experienced the greatest difficulties, as their small numbers were insufficient to discourage the presence of game on their farms. The early reports on Ulu District illustrate some of their problems. There were some 125 settlers in 1908 trying ostrich farming, horse breeding, wheat, sisal, and fruit growing, and rubber planting. Game was fairly plentiful, and the district bordered on the Southern Game Reserve. Lions killed half a dozen domesticated ostriches that year. Two years later, the district
In the Quarterly Report for September 1910, the P.C., Ukamba noted that the settlers in the Nua Hills complained bitterly of the "Game Curse." The hartebeest was the chief offender, doing great damage to crops. According to the P.C., no fencing of reasonable cost to the individual settler would keep this animal off the farms. He hoped that the Game Reserve would soon be fenced. The district officer thought it was deplorable that valuable land should be taken from Africans, handed out to white settlers, and then hindered from proper development by game.

One of the reasons for the outburst of feeling in 1910 was the damage done to the ostrich industry by lions. Ostrich farming had been started in 1904 by experienced settlers from the Cape Colony. It was generally agreed that the East African bird was superior to the South African, the quality of feathers in the wild state being nearly equal to the domesticated product in South Africa. By late 1908, 645 birds were being domesticated and hundreds more chicks hatched or caught, and, by early 1910, ostrich farming was regarded as "one of our established industries on which the success of white settlement in the Protectorate will in the future to some extent depend...."
breeding birds, troops of 100 to 150 being not uncommon. Feather prices were high. But in that year, lions did great damage on the Athi Plains, two successful farmers suffering serious losses, one losing 50 ostriches in one night, and another more than half his birds, valued at £3,000.22

During the next two years lions were less troublesome, the rains were good, and the game found plenty of grazing in the reserve and on the untilled Athi Plains. Settlers' complaints diminished, and wheat, ostriches, fruit, coffee, and sheep farming made progress. Then white farmers began to take up land on the Athi Plains for sisal farming, and in 1914-15, an exceptionally dry year, and one in which much of the grazing on the plains had been burned, complaints were universal against the game which had eaten out the hearts of young sisal plants as soon as they were put in.23

On the other hand, in the same year, the Ukamba Province Annual Report noted that "the war has caused one to realize how much grist to the financial mill is brought by the fauna of East Africa." Licence receipts fell precipitously; safari outfitters had been without business since August; railway receipts dropped for lack of hunters' contributions. Thousands of rupees usually distributed among Kikuyu and Kamba porters were not forthcoming, and Somali shikaris and gun-bearers were left without employment.24

Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the true economic position of game in Kenya during the colonial period. Whether the economic gains outweighed the economic losses cannot be determined because the necessary data were never gathered. For
example, the actual cost in £ sterling of game damage to crops, fences, and stock has never been calculated. Moreover, the question is exceedingly complex and includes such imponderables as the attraction of settlers to East Africa and the maintenance of grazing lands. Nevertheless, attitudes and policy were founded upon people's perceptions of the economic role of game, and it is not difficult to understand why the views of settlers and government officials diverged. The settlers felt the economic losses directly: less wheat to sell, fewer cows to milk. They received only indirect benefits, as it was the government which took in most of the game revenue. It was possible for settlers in some districts to make money by leasing the shooting rights on their farms, but in the halcyon days of the sportsman's paradise, accessible hunting grounds on crown land were not shot out and probably attracted most of the visiting hunters. Thus it seemed to many settlers that the government was profiting from game at their expense.

The concessions they quickly obtained did not appear to them to be sufficient. Yet the arrival of the settlers altered the strategy and direction of game preservation policy from the attempt to preserve game all over the Protectorate through hunting restrictions, to an attempt to preserve game only in those areas where it would not interfere with development. The shift in the economic base of the Protectorate was recognized and encouraged by government policy. Hitherto, ivory and the largesse distributed by big game hunters had been important sources of income. But these would pale to insignificance with the advent of settler agriculture. Ivory, the most important
export in the first decade of the Protectorate's existence, represented merely two per cent of the total in 1916-17.

The government's change of strategy established a new principle on which to base game policy: that game preservation should not hinder economic development. Since development was thought of in terms of the European areas, the application of this principle began with the permission extended to settlers to rid their own lands of unwanted game. The settlers were not, however, allowed to carry out the same process of extermination on crown lands adjoining their farms, and settler dissatisfaction with the administration's concessions sprang largely from the troublesome proximity of protected game to their crops and stock.

The basic nature of the problems arising from the presence of game near farmlands did not alter as the White Highlands developed, although the scale, intensity, and location of particular difficulties changed. Briefly, settler crops and livestock were vulnerable to game damage of several types: wild herbivores might devour and trample crops; they might also carry diseases communicable to domestic stock. Carnivores such as lion and leopard were capable of killing cattle and sheep. African crops and livestock were, of course, similarly vulnerable. But African problems received less attention from the government in the early years because African agriculture was considered to be less important to the Protectorate economy than the establishment of white settlers. Plans for development were not based upon the expansion of African production. Even though Africans had contributed most of the agricultural exports during
the first decade after the railway was built, the government, fully occupied by its efforts to facilitate settler agriculture, did not concern itself very much with African problems until the 1930's. The Africans were there, like the hills and stones, and would carry on whether or not the government tried to ameliorate the hardships visited upon them by nature. The settlers competed successfully for the administration's limited funds. They were articulate and practiced at gaining government attention. Moreover, game was more difficult to deal with in African areas, owing to the absence of guns and fencing. Finally, what attention Africans received was concentrated upon the far more serious problem of stock disease.

It was obvious from the beginning that as the number of settlers grew and closer settlement developed in the White Highlands, the density of human population and the use of fences and guns would drive much of the game away. But this process would be gradual, and never complete unless the game were exiled far enough from the borders of the settled areas to prevent periodic invasions. The farmer whose bank balance was suffering did not care to wait ten or twenty years for the game to disperse. Hence efforts were made to combat the immediate problems. The relaxation of the game regulations to allow settlers to control game on their own lands has already been noted. Fencing was useful for discouraging crop damage and attacks on livestock, but was only partially successful. Even very expensive fencing failed to guarantee complete protection. The Agriculture Department experimented with "vermin-proof" fencing. In 1908, a twenty-acre paddock was enclosed by a fence
constructed of posts 6 feet high with shoulders protruding 18 inches outwards. The posts were set 15 feet apart, and barbed wire strands at 4-inch intervals were strung between. This paddock thwarted the efforts of lions and leopards to reach the sheep and cattle within for six months. It was then decided to enclose 600 acres at a cost of £68 per mile. Unfortunately, the fencing inspector reported in 1911 that bomas of even more elaborate construction did not guarantee the safety of stock. Lions managed to get in. The wire was bitten through, and pulled off posts, and the fences were charged. Consequently, the department favoured strong measures for the destruction of lions and leopards.

Fences were also built to protect crops, and the Agriculture Department was anxious to encourage the enclosure of whole farms as a method of inhibiting the spread of stock diseases through the free movement of stock and game. But many settlers were reluctant to invest in fencing on a large scale because game, particularly the zebra, was apt to destroy fences. Percival described the zebra as the settler's worst enemy. The zebra ate crops and trampled them. Other species jumped over or squeezed between wires, but the zebra rushed fences, dragging up half a dozen posts at a time, or forced a passage under the wire snapping the strands. Panicky zebra groups could bowl over huge sections of fence at a time. The Department of Agriculture referred to "mobs" of zebra and urged that they be destroyed or driven into the game reserves. Indeed, the department regarded all game in the settled areas as a danger and a nuisance and believed it must be confined to the reserves or destroyed. The
zebra suffered less than many animals from the presence of settlers. Some settlers would not shoot the zebra, owing to its resemblance to the horse. It was not hunted for meat as frequently as the hartebeest or Thomson's gazelle, two other numerous species, because many settlers did not care for the taste of zebra flesh. At the same time, the natural enemies of the zebra— the carnivores— were driven away from the settled areas, or killed. As a result, the zebra became the most destructive game animal to trouble the settlers, particularly on the Uasin Gishu Plateau. Complaints increased until 1924 when the government was requested to assist in the extermination of the zebra. The Game Department sent five African marksmen, and provided 20,000 rounds of ammunition. By the end of the year some 4,000 zebra had been shot. This was a small number relative to the total but the harassment kept them away from the crops. A market was found for the hides which brought Shs. 3 locally. The next year, the price rose to Shs. 8 or 9. As a consequence, individual settlers shot thousands of zebra and by the end of the year the herds had practically disappeared from the Uasin Gishu. Eager hunters then began to shoot on crown land, far from the farmlands, and limits were again imposed in 1926. In 1930, only a few hundred zebra were to be found on the plateau.36

Although the massacre of thousands of zebra was distasteful, the Game Department staff gave their blessing because they knew that the damage done by zebra soured public opinion on all game, and that farmers forced to defend their crops habitually were liable to shoot any game they found, not only zebra.37
Other animals were less troublesome. Settlers complained about Coke's Hartebeest and some of the smaller buck, such as bushbuck, steinbuck, and duiker. In specific areas, elephant and hippopotamus presented difficulties. But many other types of herbivore were either too rare or too shy to give trouble.38

The hartebeest, though a pest, also provided many settlers with meat in the early days, and continued to supply meat to African labour on settler farms. Some Africans were only willing to work if meat were supplied.39 Hippopotamuses seem to have given little trouble to settlers. These enormous, lumbering animals could devour crops at an alarming rate, and their huge feet left great potholes in soft earth, but their range was limited to areas bordering lakes or rivers, and all but the most hardened crop-raiders were easily discouraged by only a rudimentary fence. A couple of strands of barbed wire, or a simple strand with a few tin cans tied to it sufficed.40

Elephant herds were more problematical. They did not trouble many of the settled areas, but their sporadic appearances in a few districts provoked loud outcries, as elephants were capable of doing enormous damage in a short time. The herds could be driven away by shooting individual animals, leaders and confirmed crop-raiders in particular. But killing elephant required time and skill, and often resulted in failure if the herds were raiding at night. "Crop-destroying elephants grow cunning, and pursuit of them is heart-breaking work."41 Moreover, if the herds were not to return, it was necessary to drive them to an area where they could find food and water and live undisturbed. As the development of Kenya proceeded, such
refuges became increasingly rare. Settlers on the Laikipia Plateau, for example, were troubled by elephant; therefore many animals were shot, and the rest periodically driven northward, into the Northern Game Reserve. This policy succeeded until a group of elephant-hunting Dorobo were removed from Laikipia to the Northern Game Reserve in 1932. G. Colville, the elephant-control officer, then refused to continue shooting elephant in the settled area, for as fast as they were driven into the Reserve, the Dorobo hunters drove them back again.82

The elephant problem on the eastern slopes of Mount Elgon is illustrative of the way in which conflicts between settlers and elephants arose. The migratory habits of elephants are conservative; the herds tend to follow similar patterns year after year. On Mount Elgon, there was a herd that was accustomed to descend to the forest-fringed lower slopes in the wet season, and, while feeding there, to travel every few days to a salt lick and swamp situated on the plain at the mountain's foot. In the 1920's, expanding white settlement gradually impinged on the elephants' route. The settlers tried to drive the elephants off, but the herd insisted on using their habitual path. By 1932, the harassed herd had become aggressive and trouble between the elephants and the settlers "necessitated drastic action." Thirteen were shot by the game control officer and an honorary game warden in 1932, and 11 more in 1933. Even then, the warden expected it to be some years before the elephants finally changed their habits.83

Settler problems with carnivores receded quite swiftly; carnivores were, of course, less numerous than their herbivore
prey, and lion and leopard remained completely unprotected by the game regulations for some years. Cheetah were scheduled game animals under the regulations of 1900 and 1906, but received no protection in 1909. The lion was not protected anywhere until 1913, when limits were placed on the numbers of lion and cheetah that could be killed more than twenty miles from any private land. ** Leopards, fonder of forests and thought to be better able to protect themselves, remained unshielded by law until January 1933.**

One result of the determined extermination of carnivores was that other game was subject to fewer attacks in the settled areas, and the Game Department believed that the numbers of zebra, buck, and other animals rose accordingly. In the early days of settlement, some of these game animals provided food for settlers, and a great deal was shot for amusement as well. As settlement grew more established, the game was not needed for food and people hunted less often for pleasure. But carnivores, perceived as a danger to stock and to human life, were not tolerated. They were shot, poisoned, and trapped. Hence the other game may have increased, little by little, while simultaneously the land became ever more fenced and tamed, with fewer places where game could graze without trespassing. Consequently, the game at times appeared to be a growing problem rather than a steadily diminishing one. ** The true dimensions of the difficulty, increasing or decreasing, are impossible to ascertain, owing to the absence of accurate game counts and assessments of damage. But grave crop damage seems to have been local and sporadic, according to Game Department reports, and
the diminishing importance of the problem may be indicated by the complete lack of interest on the part of the Department of Agriculture after the first decade of settlement, and by the absence of government schemes to tackle the issue, other than in the case of zebra. Farmers were beset by many difficulties including insect pests, unreliable weather and the fluctuations of international markets. Among these intractable problems, game preservation policies provided an easy target for the expression of frustration and resentment. Had game been making life really difficult for the white farmers, it seems certain that a greater hue and cry would have been raised, and more money spent. At the very least, the Game Department would have been permitted to engage an officer for full-time control work in the settled areas. As it was, the department gave sporadic aid to the most distressed areas, having no funds or manpower to do more. By and large, the settlers were simply permitted to look after themselves with poison, traps, guns, and fences.

African agriculturalists were not so well equipped, and until the 1930's, their problems received much less attention than those of the settlers. Game was something the African had always had to contend with, and crop damage was not an issue that leapt into prominence when pacification and tax collection were more than a tiny administrative staff could handle. Even when the administration had expanded, African farming received little help from the Agriculture, Veterinary or Game Departments. As time passed, however, African interests were acknowledged to be important, increasing significance was attached to the development of the Native Reserves, and the
dependence of full tax collection on good harvests contributed to administrative awareness of the depredations of game.**

It is difficult to delineate the pattern of game damage to African agriculture. Neither animals nor acres were counted, and district officers varied considerably in their attitudes to game and the amount of attention devoted to it in their reports. On the evidence available, it would appear that the Coast Province, the Tana River District, and Nyasaland Province suffered damage more regularly than did the rest of the country.*** Complaints were usually loudest when elephants and crop-growers shared the same territory, and elephants were plentiful in these areas, whereas they were relatively rare in Kikuyu country and much of Ukambani. For example, Complaints also flew thickest where individual district officers had devoted their energies to encouraging the expansion of cultivation. Thus the volume of protest increased with the attention given to African agriculture in the 1930's. The problems were not new, but they may have intensified through the twenties and thirties as the numbers of Africans increased, more land was cultivated, and range lands deteriorated under the impact of heavier grazing by larger numbers of domestic stock. Under these circumstances, demands for game control multiplied. But, according to the experience of many district officers, game was not the primary source of crop damage.

The most destructive animals, baboon and bush pig, were not classified as game, and were unprotected by any legislation.** Porcupine and hyena, which caused serious problems in certain areas, were also classed as vermin. Bush pig ravaged crops all
over Kenya, as did baboon in most areas. Complaints came in from all the coastal districts, the Tana River, the Rift Valley and Mount Kenya, and the areas bordering Lake Victoria. These complaints reached a crescendo in the 1930's, and the reason, according to a number of district officers as well as Game Department officials, was the reckless destruction of leopard. Leopard fed largely upon bush pig, baboon and other small animals, although they did raid stock on occasion. Leopard were killed in increasing numbers during the 1920's, and in 1929 and 1930, when the price of skins rose precipitately, so did the numbers of skins exported.

During 1929 and 1930, the demand for leopard skins was considerable and from fifty to a hundred shillings was obtained for them locally. The result was that in certain areas leopard were practically exterminated. In those areas today baboon and pig have increased to such an extent that it is quite impossible to cope with them and the position is really disastrous for native shamba owners.

The relationship of leopard to pig and baboon is important for two reasons. First, the destruction of leopard when the price of skins rose demonstrates how quickly a commercial stimulus provokes extensive slaughter. Second, the disastrous result for cultivators in certain areas exemplifies the complex and delicate articulation between wildlife and man, and how easily it is disturbed by ignorant and greedy blundering.

It was the District Commissioner in Lamu who first urged the protection of the leopard. He noted that the Africans in his area had little stock to protect, and the leopard was "a very real asset in keeping down the numbers of wild pigs and baboons which do a very serious damage to crops." Hundreds of traps were
being set for leopard. In 1928 84 skins had been exported from Lamu; in 1929, 335, and in the first month of 1930, 59. The Provincial Commissioner supported the District Commissioner and condemned the Pokouc and gangs of wandering Kamba, as well as the Lamu District inhabitants, for disturbing the balance of nature. In 1930, two assistant game wardens on duty in different areas - south-west Kenya and the southern coastal region - noted that large numbers of leopards were being killed and that bush pig and baboon were increasing as a result. The matter was subsequently discussed with all the Provincial Commissioners, and it was forbidden to trap leopard except on private land as of January 1, 1933. But as with ivory, smuggling resulted. It remained permissible to sell the skins of leopards killed in defence of stock, or on private land, and this provided a broad loophole through which slipped many illicitly obtained skins. There was, for example, "a considerable trade" in the Rift Valley, the skins being bought from Africans by Indian traders for Shs. 15 to 30, and sold in Nairobi and Mombasa for up to Shs. 100.

John Murphy, a district officer with experience in the Rift Valley, on the Tana, and in Digo District on the coast between Mombasa and Tanganyika, had seen enough to convince him that leopard should be strictly protected and the sale of skins completely forbidden. He estimated that each leopard saved meant 250 fewer pigs per year, not counting potential offspring. He described the drastic situation in Digo District resulting from the greatly increased numbers of pigs which followed the decimation of the leopard population. In spite of a campaign
during which thousands of poisoned baits were laid, the Agriculture Officer reported that some 35 to 40 per cent of all cultivation was destroyed in some areas. Some shambas were completely ruined. The local Native Council's main topic of discussion was pig, and means to combat the menace. Murphy was convinced that the pig had become the most important problem in Digo District. Several locations have given up the planting of maize and the brutes have now started to destroy the rice swamps in the Vanga area on which the inhabitants depend almost entirely for their sustenance. Nhogo [cassava] - our only standby in times of famine - is now being uprooted wholesale. As far as I can see Government will be obliged to spend thousands of £ on famine relief unless a solution to this problem can be found. I can think of none at the moment. Drives have proved useless, poison bait is avoided in areas where it has been used for some time and in other areas only touches the fringe of the problem."}

One plantation had suffered the loss of 400 acres of sisal, and the Assistant Agricultural Officer estimated the damage at £4,944. The severity of the problem may be judged by the plantation's offer of Shs. 5 for every pig's head. Poison worked only temporarily; the Veterinary Department refused permission to introduce swine fever. The manager suggested that the King's African Rifles be employed to destroy pig, and was advised that the best thing to do would be to import and breed some leopards.

Pig and baboon, like other "vermin," were not protected by the game regulations. Any person was permitted to kill vermin in unlimited numbers. Yet, none of the animals classified as game, and thus afforded some protection by law, were as ubiquitous and destructive as pig and baboon. The hippopotamus presented a problem in very limited areas, specifically on the Tana and on
the margins of Lake Victoria, where complaints were made by the Pokomo and Kavirondo. Complaints about the plains game—herds of hartebeest, wildebeest, zebra, and buffalo—were less frequently recorded. Agriculturalists living in forested areas were seldom troubled by plains game, and the pastoralists were not concerned about its presence except in times of drought when game and stock competed for water, and in some cases for grazing.

The Masai herds were raided by lions from time to time, and the Game Department was called in to try to track down and shoot the individual lions implicated. J.A. Hunter, a white hunter with much experience of lions, was engaged by the Game Department for three months in the 1920's to shoot 100 lions in the Masai Reserve.

Elephant were remarkably difficult to deal with. It was a dangerous and exhausting job to hunt them, and while this left many ivory-hunters in pursuit of profits undeterred, less skilful Africans and Europeans found it an unattractive task. When elephants were alarmed, they were capable of travelling all day long, for miles and miles, at a fast pace. Pursuing shamba-raiders was more difficult and dangerous than going after ivory. The ivory-hunter could choose his ground—usually open country—and choose his target. The man doing control work had to follow the elephant herd through whatever terrain the herd chose to retreat into, even if it were bamboo forest where he could not walk silently and could not see ahead. Moreover, he had to attempt to shoot a particular animal in the herd, no easy task when all the elephants were wary and any one could give the alarm to all the others. Elephants that had become habitual
shamba-raiders were elusive and wary, slipping into the fields in darkness and fading way before dawn. The difficulty was exacerbated in many areas by the African method of sowing crops in small, scattered clearings in the forest or bush. The elephant in this kind of country could retreat quickly into impenetrable thickets where he was difficult to follow and impossible to see. Sometimes Africans attempted to drive the elephant off with noise and disturbance, but experienced animals remained unperturbed. "Lighting fires around the shambas and making a noise by beating tins, etc. does not seem to have the slightest effect in driving them away."2

The Game Department was, on principle, reluctant to kill elephant, and was rendered more so by the knowledge that reports of crop damage were sometimes false or exaggerated, the motivation being desire for meat or the wish to drive elephant out of neighbouring areas where wood was collected or goats pastured.

The damage done has always been very slight but exaggerated in the hopes of the Elephants being driven off so that the native women may enter the forest to cut wood and bamboo without fear.3

After some hard work at Lamu, one game control officer wrote: "A certain amount of damage to native crops has been done by elephant but it is very doubtful if it would amount to 1 per cent of the entire crop. Unfortunately, the damage is usually suffered by one individual, but is exaggerated and enlarged upon by the whole village." He added that it was amazing how many people came to claim sole dependence on one small patch of mealies. The District Commissioner commented that it was very difficult to hunt elephant in shambas surrounded by dense bush,
and added, "I do not, however, want you to conclude that the big game do all the damage imputed by meat-hungry natives; the damage, though considerable, is nothing to that done by baboons and pigs."**

The Game Department was short-staffed and often had to grant permission to an experienced European hunter to shoot elephant for a chance to make a profit. These arrangements could only be made with trusted hunters who would not succumb to the temptation to go after the big tuskers, especially as the hunter received no pay but kept the ivory of the elephants shot. The hunter was instructed to drive the offending herd out of the cultivated district, or to kill certain troublesome individuals or groups, regardless of the weight of their ivory. Africans were seldom granted such licence, as they were not trusted. On the coast, Arabs were occasionally permitted to shoot elephant trespassing on their fields, and some local administrators were prepared to allow them to obtain elephant licences within the ten-mile coastal strip, where abuses were relatively easy to detect. Coast administrators had even given some Africans outmoded Sniders or Martini-Henry rifles to scare elephant and buffalo off their shambas.** But this was no guarantee of success. Percival related one instance in which Africans on the coast north of Mombasa were given old rifles to destroy raiding elephant. "They could not; the density of the bush proved too much, even for these hunters." Only three elephants were killed in six months.*** Away from the coast, Africans very rarely obtained guns, although a few in Nyanza occasionally did so, and were given ammunition.**** District officers were even reluctant
to allow organized hunts with spears, for fear that the young men of some tribes might get out of control.**

Elephant reportedly did a good deal of seasonal damage on the coast, uprooting hundreds of cacao nut trees as well as devouring other crops, especially in the Lamu District.***

However, not all district officers who investigated the complaints were satisfied of their validity.

After a careful inspection of many shambas and the surrounding bush I am not at all convinced that elephants are as numerous as they are reported to be or that they have done much damage to the crops—indeed I have rarely seen better and fuller yields. At any rate it is certain that they inflict not a tithe of the damage done by the herds of baboons and pigs and swarms of small birds which are everywhere and which the villagers make little, if any, effort to exterminate.**

Doubts were also expressed in other districts about the veracity of damage reports. "The damage done by elephant is generally grossly [sic] exaggerated by shamba owners..." wrote one officer on the Tana River.** He believed that the complaints were motivated by hopes of being allowed to hunt elephants and sell the ivory to the government. Nevertheless, this officer sanctioned an elephant-control scheme on the lower Tana, whereby Galla hunters under the supervision of a European were allowed to shoot elephant and sell the ivory to the government. The scheme was ended after 300 elephants had been shot, as the district officer considered that the line between control and extermination had been crossed. The Galla were hunting elephant far from the shambas and the "situation seemed more like a profitable rake off from ivory than/ Shamba protection.****

Similar arrangements were allowed later in the decade, and a few Arabs were permitted to hunt as well.
Other officers on the river in the 1920s and 1930s believed the reports of damage by elephant and other game. Reactions to the problem varied considerably. Some officers thought that all game on the river should be treated as vermin—that is, exterminated. For example, one officer reported that:

Game continue to do great damage to native cultivations... In spite of everything the district officer can do in the way of keeping down the numbers of hippo living in the lakes in the vicinity of native cultivations agriculture is now hardly worth while and the only hope for the river one can see is for hippo and buffalo to be declared vermin and, if necessary, a reward paid from Game Department revenue for each head produced.

Reference was made to "the Game Department's elephant", and the department was castigated on the one hand for insufficient efforts to stop illegal hunting and the ivory trade, and on the other for leaving the shambas at the mercy of game.

The Game Department staff were well aware that both poaching and crop destruction on the Tana were beyond their control, and regretted it. They were naturally reluctant to sanction hunting privileges or donate rifles to "the worst poaching tribes in Kenya", but they did, as in other areas, send African game scouts to poison vermin. Intensive campaigns were risky: if the poisoning were not carried out with proper safeguards, stock and humans, especially children, could become victims. But the gravity of the damage done by pig and baboon forced the issue.

The Game Department's sympathies with African cultivators were tempered not only by false reports of damage, but by annoyance at the absence of efforts by Africans to protect their crops with fences. Why should the Game Department kill off the
game, when with a little effort the game could be kept out of the crops? In particular, the department was most reluctant to shoot hippopotamuses when the most rudimentary barrier would deter their passage into the fields. And the unwillingness to fence crops made the department suspicious that requests for permission to hunt game were motivated by a desire for meat rather than prevention of crop damage.

Keith Caldwell of the Game Department, returning in 1923 from a safari from Meru down the Tana River to Kipini, Lamu, and then Mombasa, wrote as follows:

Throughout the safari I made most careful enquiries regarding damage done by game and I am glad to report that I only came across two cases in the whole trip which could possibly be said to come into this category. One was at Diarti where a Korokoro said Buffalo had been into his shamba 3 weeks previously. I investigated the matter and found that some Buffalo had been in but that they had done little damage. The shamba was a small one in the middle of thick swampy bush and had no fence, boma or protection of any sort or kind. I asked the owner why he did not protect his crop and he explained that to do so would mean work.

Near Ngau I found some natives cutting up a Hippo. They said they had killed it as it had damaged their crops. I asked where and was shown about a shamba containing about 50 half grown mealties of which 20 had not flourished. There were some old holes in the ground which they said had been made by a hippo which had devoured the above mentioned mealties.

I imagine that a desire for meat was at the bottom of it all but the river shambas were very open to attack and I cannot entirely blame the Pokomo for their action.

Some district officers tried hard to persuade the Africans to fence; others pointed out that many Africans, although they did not fence their crops, slept on their shambas at night to guard them, and often stayed up at night chasing pigs and other unwelcome visitors.
The department rarely refused some form of help when complaints were persistent, but tried to confirm reports of damage before taking action. The staff continued to hope for a measure of coexistence between game and agriculture, but the principle that game should not hinder development exerted an ever-increasing pressure on the department as the government put more effort into developing the African areas.

Apart from the banks of the Tana River, the region most concerned with elephant (and hippopotamus) damage was the Nyanza Province bordering Lake Victoria. The problem was particularly severe in areas where the local administration had encouraged the expansion of cultivation into areas traditionally inhabited by elephant herds.

The situation as it now exists has arisen entirely through the efforts of the D.C., Kisii, to get large areas of Africa cultivated by natives. These areas had previously been occupied by elephants almost entirely. I admit without reservation that the claim of the native is a priority one, at the same time it must be remembered that the laudable effort of the D.C., Kisii, to transfer elephant grazing grounds into native gardens is the cause of existing conditions.*

It was in Nyanza Province that the most ambitious schemes to rid various districts of elephant were tried. Mr. Horace Dawson, an experienced elephant hunter and Game and Vermin Control Officer in 1931 and 1932, undertook to clear some eight hundred elephants from the Lambwe Valley, where serious damage was being done to potato and cassava shambas. Over fifty elephants were shot, nearly all of them leaders of herds, and the initial clearance was completed in two months. About half the elephants then broke back as an attempt was being made to drive them further away into the Mara area of the Masai Reserve
in south-east Kenya. The next seven or eight months were spent in driving the herds from adjacent areas and taking measures to prevent their return. A ten-mile trench was dug by local Africans, a road was built, and bush cleared. Further large drives were organized in 1933 and 1934, and European hunters were authorized to shoot great numbers of elephant in order to frighten them away. All these efforts achieved partial and temporary successes, but continuous vigilance was essential if the elephant were not to drift back from the Masai Reserve into which they were driven. The Game Department had no one to station permanently in Nyanza, and finding trustworthy hunters who were willing to undertake the arduous labour was often difficult. Consequently elephant continued to trouble Nyanza farmers periodically. Again, as in other areas, the Game Department treated damage reports with caution and tried to verify them. Hearsay information from Africans known to relish elephant meat was regarded as suspect.

Nyanza farmers also had to contend with small game and vermin, the numbers of which increased in response to extensive campaigns directed against carnivores, jackals and feral dogs in particular, which could carry rabies. Here, as elsewhere, Africans were entitled to kill game found damaging their crops, and it was possible for local officers to obtain special and limited permission for Africans to hunt in the vicinity of their shantas where damage was severe, but this did not satisfy all District Commissioners, some of whom wished to extend a wider freedom to Africans to hunt in the vicinity of their fields. The Game Department, knowing how little supervision would inevitably
attend such activity, was loath to allow any loose arrangements.\textsuperscript{83}

In other African areas, game damage was reported only sporadically. The Masai complained of stock raids by lion and of the competition of zebra and hartebeest for pasture and water in times of drought.\textsuperscript{84} Elephant herds raided crops in Meru and occasionally troubled other areas.

In summary, although most European and African farmers and stockraisers might occasionally be troubled by game, the serious and recurrent problems were limited to specific areas and animals. Elephants caused the greatest difficulties; crop damage and elephant control are mentioned in every Annual Report of the Game Department through most of the 1920's and 1930's.\textsuperscript{85} Year after year, conflict between elephants and human enterprise recurred in the same areas: the coast, particularly Lamu and the region close to the southern border, Laikipia, Meru, and Kisii.

Difficulties with zebra and plains game, lion, buffalo, and rhinoceros are recorded in slightly more than half the reports. Other game animals appear seldom. Zebra and plains game were in most frequent conflict in the 1920's with settlers on the Usam Gishu Plateau and near the Athi River, north of the Southern Game Reserve. Drought aggravated this latter problem in particular, as the game was driven out of the reserve by the need to search for grass and water. In the 1930's no reports mentioned trouble on the Usam Gishu; damage seemed to be more generally scattered in the settled areas. Little was heard from Africans about plains game. Lion attacks on stock were reported most often from the Masai Reserve and Laikipia, occasionally
from the Tana. Buffalo were usually mentioned as troublesome on
the Mau Escarpment, in the adjoining section of the Rift Valley,
and near Mt. Kenya. Finally, the rhinoceros, with the exception
of individual incidents, was the subject of repeated complaints
in only one area: Nyeri. On the whole, damage to crops and stock
by game seems to have been of minor significance to the
agriculture industry compared with other destructive factors:
crop diseases, eroding and exhausted soils, insects, "vermin,"
erratic rains, and epidemic stock diseases. The Agriculture
Commission of 1929, charged with investigating the agriculture
and stock industry as a whole and recommending policies for its
improvement, presented no recommendations concerning game.**
Nevertheless, the damage that occurred was highly visible and
hurt individual farmers who naturally resented it. District
officers labouring to improve the economic condition of the
African were sometimes resentful too. The income from game was
not a tangible asset to the individual farmer or even to the
district administrator; it went to the central coffers of the
government in Nairobi.

The Game Department's heart was in preservation, not
extermination, and the staff tried to destroy as few animals as
possible. But they recognized perforce that the needs of an
agricultural community would dictate the decline of game
populations in large areas of Kenya, and tried to maintain a
precarious balance of interests, protecting both the crops and
the game. The policy often failed in both directions owing to
the inability of the department's small staff to visit all the
areas where they were needed.
The department had no funds or staff for research, hence investigation of another serious game question in Kenya, the role of game in the spread of various stock diseases, was left to the Veterinary Department. Diseased game animals in proximity to domestic stock had occasionally to be shot; otherwise, the Game Department merely tried to keep track of reported disease in game populations, and to keep abreast of research done by others.

At the time of the Protectorate's establishment, East Africa was plagued with a number of serious diseases, including rinderpest, east coast fever, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, and trypanosomiasis. All these attacked cattle and profoundly affected the lives of Africans such as the Masai and Kamba. The settlers also became vulnerable as the cattle industry developed. In the early days of settlement, before much was understood of the nature of these diseases, epidemics were commonly attributed to the movements of game over the country. The belief that the game 'could be held accountable for many stock deaths was one important source of resentment against policies of game preservation. As research progressed, however, this belief underwent considerable modification.

The Veterinary Department's first concern was to assist the settlers in the successful establishment of a cattle industry, and attention was concentrated upon the eradication of disease in the settled areas. Efforts regarding African cattle were initially limited to attempting to confine outbreaks in the Native Reserves, in order to prevent losses in the settler herds. In the 1920's, and still more in the 1930's, attention
was devoted to reducing disease among the African herds, but the work of the department was handicapped first by African suspicion of inoculation programmes, and later, when inoculation became acceptable, by the reluctance to pay for it. Many Africans lacked cash, and were unwilling to pay in cattle. Consequently, large-scale immunization programmes awaited the development of cheap vaccines.

Meanwhile, the Veterinary Department promoted fencing, attempted to separate settler and African cattle, and studied the mechanisms by which disease was passed from one animal to another. The settled areas were never completely fenced; some settlers could not afford it, others were discouraged by the destruction of fences by game. It also proved impossible to keep African cattle out of the settled areas, for two not unconnected reasons. The Native Reserves became overstocked, leading Africans to seek better pasture, and, most important, settlers wanted African labour, and many Africans would not live and work on settler farms unless they could bring their stock with them. Consequently, the settled areas were everywhere infested with squatter cattle. Disease control under such circumstances was very difficult.

Contagious bovine pleuro-pneumonia reached South Africa from Europe in 1854. By the 1880's, it had travelled northward beyond the equator. This disease, which attacked the lungs, was spread by the movement of infected cattle; game was not implicated. Though mortality was high in epizootic areas, not all infected animals died and those which did not became carriers and infected other cattle. A vaccine conferring
temporary immunity had already been developed when the first veterinarian arrived in British East Africa, and by 1922 it had "almost conquered pleuro-pneumonia in the settled areas." In 1925, the Agriculture Department reported that the disease had "ceased to be of economic importance to stock-holders." It was not so easily disposed of in African areas. Free vaccine was given out late in the 1920's, but pleuro-pneumonia continued prevalent in the Nyanga, Masai, Rift Valley, and Northern Frontier Provinces. During the 1930's, vaccination and quarantine were accepted even by the conservative Masai, but unless infected animals were slaughtered, they continued to harbour the disease to the danger of all susceptible cattle. Many Africans were unwilling to slaughter the carriers.

East coast fever, trypanosomiasis, and rinderpest proved more difficult to eradicate even in the settled areas, and game played a part in their transmission, though in the case of rinderpest, a less serious one than was at first imagined.

East coast fever, a tick-borne disease indigenous to the East African tropics, was first recognized in the East Africa Protectorate in 1905. It was enzootic in southern Kenya, especially near the coast, and around Lake Victoria, and while less prevalent in other regions, was a problem in Kikuyu and the settled areas. It was considered in 1927 to be the "most dangerous disease in the Colony." The Veterinary Department maintained that high-quality dairy stock could not be built up where east coast fever was enzootic. Consequently, profitable dairying was closed to some Africans. The department felt that this was a severe set-back, as it was thought that Africans
could be persuaded to abandon their traditional ways - and overstocking - if a profitable dairy industry were the alternative.95

East coast fever was combatted by dipping, fencing, and the removal of game from cattle pastures, in other words, by the eradication of ticks. This programme was handicapped in the settled areas by the presence and movement of undipped squatter cattle, by unoccupied, tick-infested lands interspersed among working farms, and by game which broke fences and brought ticks. It was realized by 1929 that game was not altogether a handicap in dealing with east coast fever. Most game animals were not susceptible to the disease, and experiments showed that a tick infected with the east coast fever parasite cleansed itself by feeding on an insusceptible animal.96 Thus the presence of game could render large numbers of ticks harmless to cattle. Only the buffalo was later demonstrated to be slightly susceptible.97 Nevertheless, the opinion of the Veterinary Department was that ticks could be carried considerable distances by game without feeding, and thus brought into contact with cattle. The control of the disease rested with the eradication of ticks, a hard task when large numbers of game animals acted as hosts.98 The immediate spread of infection, however, was largely attributed to the movement of infected cattle.99

Trypanosomiasis, carried by the tsetse fly, presented a similar picture in that game was not susceptible and could flourish in fly belts where cattle perished. The problem, however, was not so much that game carried fly into the cattle pastures, although this happened occasionally, but that fly
belts closed, potential grazing lands to domestic stock, and certain game animals, which acted as the natural hosts of various trypanosomes and provided the tsetse flies with food, were an integral part of the tsetse problem.

Fly was discovered to be a problem as soon as work commenced on the Uganda Railway, of which the first 250 miles were infested. Immense numbers of transport animals died, particularly bullocks. Horses were more resistant, but even these died eventually. No antidote was known. The Galla were reported to build fires along the paths when transporting cattle from the coast, and in the Sudan oil of mimosa was smeared over the cattle. Sheep fat was reputed to protect animals for two or three days.

It was believed by many people in the early days that fly only existed in conjunction with large herds of game, and buffalo were singled out as the worst offenders. Later it was demonstrated that fly could exist independent of buffalo, and where game animals were not numerous. Fly was not much of a problem in the settled areas, but infested Nyanza, the Kerio and Guaso Nyiro Rivers, Lake Baringo, Ukambani, and parts of the coast. Fly lived in open woodlands and bush areas. Cattle-keeping Africans avoided the fly belts as best they could, but sometimes had to pass through them to reach water or were forced to risk pasturing animals in fly country rather than see them starve. Epidemics on the scale of pleuro-pneumonia or rinderpest infections did not occur outside the fly belts, but the large amounts of land rendered useless to stock by fly stimulated a great deal of research.
The difficulty of understanding and dealing with trypanosomiasis was complicated by the fact that numerous species of the genus Glossina existed, each with its own habitat, and each carrying varying trypanosomes which affected different groups of domestic stock. Kenya harboured seven species of fly, of which the two most important were G. longipennis and G. pallidipes. These were widely distributed along the coast and over large parts of central Kenya. The coast was also infested by G. austeni, and Nyanza harboured three species of fly.105

The Game and Veterinary staffs agreed that where cattle existed in proximity to fly belts, game wandering from one area to the other sometimes carried a few flies to the cattle. Moreover, the Veterinary Department stated that other biting flies (Stomoxys) could transmit the disease if they bit an infected animal and then a clean one before the infected blood of the former dried. Trypanosomiasis could also be spread by cattle movement and even mechanical transport; fly could be carried by vehicles. The resulting small outbreaks could be easily contained by separation of infected and clean animals and by slaughtering diseased beasts. Biting flies were discouraged by dipping.106

Of the possible solutions to the problem of trypanosomiasis, the solution most frequently considered during the colonial era was the elimination of the tsetse fly, and, as a corollary, it was asked whether game should be exterminated over large areas in order to banish the fly. This question was not readily answered, and not until nearly the end of the
The colonial period did research begin to furnish some of the necessary information. The absence of scientific data did not deter the implementation of a programme of large-scale game slaughter in Rhodesia; that this did not occur in Kenya was doubtless due, in large part, to the insignificance of the tsetse problem in the settled areas. In the 1920's and 1930's, efforts were directed towards quashing small outbreaks, watching the fly belts for extensions or reductions, and conducting experiments with bush-clearing and trapping flies.

Rinderpest was the worst of all the cattle plagues. Deadly, and highly infectious, it was also the disease in which game was most heavily implicated. Rinderpest was a disease of Asia and Europe, where it had spread over the centuries through human migrations and wars. It was estimated that towards the end of the eighteenth century rinderpest had killed some 200 million cattle in Europe. It was successfully eradicated by slaughter and quarantine, although it was not unknown as late as 1920.

Rinderpest was thought to have been brought to Africa in the nineteenth century. Tradition indicated an outbreak in the Sudan at the beginning of the century, but it was believed that the disease might have been introduced later, by Austrian cattle brought to Egypt in 1841, or by Russian cattle brought in 1884-1885. In the 1890's, a dreadful epidemic ravaged the entire continent, spreading southward and westward from Egypt and Somalia, and finally reaching South Africa where it destroyed 97 per cent of the cattle.

In East Africa, the epidemic probably contributed to the decline of Masai power and remained a very destructive force.
until the 1940's, when it was brought under control among African cattle. It was particularly difficult to control outbreaks of rinderpest because the virus could live for about a week outside an animal host, and could therefore be transported from place to place on cattle hides and cattle meat, or even by humans who had eaten infected meat. This ability to remain virulent outside the host determined another unfortunate consequence for the Kenya cattle industry: beef from Kenya could not be exported to Britain for fear of spreading the disease.112

Rinderpest also attacked many wild ruminants, most notably buffalo and antelope. Hence, in contrast to most cattle diseases, outbreaks of rinderpest were often heralded by news of game dying on the plains. This smouldering source of infection influenced the choice of treatment in British East Africa in the early years. Quarantine was hopeless in a region where infected game wandered freely. It was employed in attempts to keep African and settler stock separated, and to prevent the movement of infected stock from one reserve to another, but inoculation conferring permanent immunity was needed to control the disease. The double inoculation system developed in South Africa, in which virulent blood and anti-rinderpest serum were simultaneously injected, was used. There were drawbacks to this method: the use of virulent blood risked opening new centres of infection, and other diseases such as heartwater were spread during mass inoculations.113 Immunization was therefore open to criticism. But it was considered the only possible system of control since large herds of game were to be set up throughout the Colony, and quarantine regulations could not be applied to
In a country like Kenya, where rinderpest is enzootic in most parts, and travelling game are susceptible to the disease, any method adopted which does not confer a permanent immunity to the disease ... is generally considered worthless.  

It was found to be true, nevertheless, that most outbreaks of rinderpest were caused by the illicit movement of African cattle. This could not be controlled, and infected beasts were constantly moved in and out of the settled areas and to different parts of various reserves. Consequently, scattered outbreaks occurred every year in the settled areas, and were treated by local inoculation. In the reserves the disease took a heavier toll, and inoculation, which involved a slight incidence of mortality, was not readily accepted. In the mid-twenties, the Department of Agriculture reported that Africans were gaining confidence in the double inoculation method. But the Masai were not interested. They knew a great deal about cattle, as the Veterinary Department admitted, but rinderpest mortality remained high in their herds. Not until the 1930's did the Masai and many other Africans wholeheartedly accept immunization. By 1934, the department had difficulty meeting the African demand. In the decade from 1929 to 1939, a new, inexpensive vaccine was developed, the KAG (Kabete Attenuated Goat) virus, and the mass vaccination of hundreds of thousands of cattle was made possible. Free vaccinations were given out as of 1942, and within two years, epizootic rinderpest was confined to northern Kenya.

During the same period, it became largely accepted that rinderpest was fundamentally a cattle plague, and that cattle
were therefore the only true reservoir of the disease. Game became infected through contact with cattle, and could pass the disease on, but many experts believed that should rinderpest be eradicated in cattle, it would die out of its own accord in game. "...game do not act as a true reservoir of rinderpest infection for prolonged periods when they are removed from contact with active disease in cattle....if rinderpest could be eradicated from domestic cattle the infection would cease to exist." It would not be simple to reach this happy state of affairs, however. While game and cattle mingled, and some portion of the cattle were not immunized, rinderpest would continue to smoulder unseen, and game, especially buffalo, would remain a source of anxiety to the stock-owner.

Rinderpest, trypanosomiasis, and east coast fever were all brought under increasing control in the 1920's and 1930's, but none was eradicated. The role of game in the transmission of these diseases became better understood, but no easy answer emerged. Game animals were not the primary source of infection in any of these diseases, but in each case the presence of game populations, acting as secondary reservoirs of infection (rinderpest), as carriers for ticks (east coast fever), or hosts for tsetse fly (trypanosomiasis), made the elimination of disease in cattle difficult or impossible.

In light of this knowledge, the view that game and stock must be separated acquired increasing support in both settler and official circles. Farmers with vulnerable crops also wanted the game kept at a distance. The questions were, how was this to be accomplished, and where was the game to go. The host of
problems pursuant to the coexistence of game and development could be clearly discerned in the 1920's in general form, although detailed knowledge increased as the years passed. Those who wished to preserve this coexistence were sailing uncharted waters. In the developed world, wildlife had consistently been destroyed to make way for mankind. The view that this was the natural and sensible course to be followed in East Africa did not lack adherents in Kenya. The question of attitudes became ever more acute as men multiplied and their demands on the land increased.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

1. Delamere to F.O., July 17, 1900, FOCP 7675/25. Delamere took care to mention that the land was too hot to be suitable for European settlement.

Charles Allsopp, the third Baron Hindlip, was born in 1877; he served in the Boer War, where he perhaps acquired his strong views on the rights of white settlers. He held lands in England and the East Africa Protectorate and supported settler interests in the House of Lords. Surrenson, *European Settlement*, p. 233; Bennett, *Kenya*, pp. 20, 23.


6. Norman Leys, *Kenya*, p. 156. The census gave a total of 9651 Europeans, of whom 5241 were listed as having occupations. Of these, 1078 were government officers, leaving 4163 as the unofficial population. The occupations of 1893 of these were connected to land. There were also about 300 missionaries and 1634 Europeans in industry and the professions.


9. Wrigley, "Patterns," p. 242. The only non-agricultural product of significance was sodium carbonate. Tea became important in the mid-1930's.

10. The three urban constituencies were Nairobi North, Nairobi South, and Mombasa. The eight rural constituencies were: Coast, Rift Valley, Plateau North, Plateau South, Kenya, Ukamba, Kikuyu. The member for Plateau South was A.C. Hoey, a well-known hunter as well as a landowner. *Official Gazette*, XIII (April 14, 1920). Settlers were also appointed to the Executive Council and dominated some key committees. In 1922 there was a heavy unofficial
majority on the Economic and Finance Committee; the Select Committee on the Estimates had a large unofficial majority in 1931. Bennett, Kenya, pp. 49-50. Bennett's political history conveys the rural, agricultural character of settler politics.

11. Report of His Majesty's Commissioner on the East Africa Protectorate 1903, Cd. 1626 (1903), pp. 28-29. Most of the settlers who arrived prior to 1903 settled in Kikuyu country. Delamere, who returned to East Africa to settle in January 1903, was the first to apply for land in the Rift Valley. A South African family settled on the Uasin Gishu Plateau in 1904, but was forced to retreat by the hostility of the Handi; Boers settled the plateau in 1908. Laikipia was unavailable for white settlement until after the Masai were moved in 1913. Sorrenson, European Settlement, pp. 65, 70, 207, 214, 230.


13. The Game Ordinance, 1904, Acts, C.O. 630/1. Schedule I included a number of birds, and giraffe, mountain zebra, white-tailed gnu, eland, buffalo, and female and young elephant. Schedule II embraced rhinoceros and hippopotamus, and was rather more irksome to settlers, as it included zebra and the various species of antelopes and gazelles. The zebra was particularly troublesome to farmers, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

14. Bland were permitted to be captured only, as it was hoped that they might be usefully domesticated.

15. Annual Report of Game Warden 1910-11, p. 3, C.O. 544/4. These regulations formed the framework of game policy throughout the period under discussion. Further ordinances were promulgated in 1921 (No. 58) and 1928 (No. 25), but the changes made were relatively minor.

16. On the tribulations of the pioneer farmers in Kenya, see Huxley, White Man's Country, I, 135-147; Come and Lipscomb, Kenya Agriculture, Chapter iii.

17. Machakos District Annual Report 1908-09, DC/NKS 1/1/1, NA. Machakos, or Ulu, was in Ukamba Province. It was settled early, and was destined from the first to be troubled by foraging game, as the herds moved north from the adjoining reserve during dry periods.

Ostrich feathers were much in demand in Europe before World War I, for modish ladies' hats and feather boas.

18. Machakos District Annual Report 1940-11, p. 23, DC/NKS 1/1/2, NA.

19. Ukamba Province Quarterly Report September 1910, PC/CP 4/2/1, NA. It was hard to build a fence high enough to
keep the hartebeest and other large antelope out. The heavily-built eland has been known to jump an eight-foot enclosure with ease, and the impala, the best jumper, effortlessly sails over ten-foot fences. C.T. Astley Haborly, *Animals of East Africa* (Cape Town: Howard Timmins, 1960), pp. 22, 61.

20. Machakos District Quarterly Report, September 1910, p. 22, DC/HKS 1/1/7, MA.

21. Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1909-1910, p. 8, C.O. 544/4. It was not known then that the industry would collapse in a few years owing to changes in fashion.


23. Ukamba Province Annual Report 1914-1915, PC/CP 4/2/1; Machakos Political Record Book IV, 1914-1920, DC/HKS 4/6, MA.


25. A survey of damage by vermin was conducted in 1956, but the results were far from complete.

26. The varied browsing and grazing habits of game animals can help keep grasslands from turning into bush. Elspeth Hurley mentions a farmer on the Usim Gishu Plateau who kept a herd of giraffe for this very purpose. She also remarked upon the favourable contrast between his pastures and his neighbours. Elspeth Hurley, *A New Earth* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1960), p. 21. The effects of game on grazing lands are still very poorly understood although some research has been done during the 1960's and 1970's.


28. Customs Department Annual Report 1916-1917, pp. 31, 36, C.O. 544/8. Ivory exports were at their lowest during the War. After the War, they fluctuated considerably in both quantity and value. But during the ten-year period 1924-1933, exports (Kenya produce) averaged about 300 cwt., worth about £20,000. Total exports averaged well over £2 million; thus ivory represented about one per cent of all exports. See Customs Department Annual Reports 1924-1933, C.O. 544/17, 18, 19, 22, 24, 27, 31, 33, 37, 39.

29. See Chapter viii.

30. This survey is based on Game Department Annual Reports and on district and provincial reports and files. The
conclusions are tentative, as a complete picture of game damage cannot be attempted without access to Game Department files. District and Game Department records probably underestimate the problem, as much of it was handled without recourse to government assistance, and it was in the interest of the Game Department to play down the issue.


33. Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1910-1911, p. 204, C.O. 544/4. A disadvantage of enclosing ostriches in bosas was that Africans found it easy to steal the feathers.


36. Game Department Annual Reports, 1924, 1925, 1926, C.O. 544/17, 18, 20; Usain Gishu Political Record Book 1908-1933, DC/UG 2/1, NA.


38. Examples of the former: greater kudu, bongo, sable antelope, roan antelope. In the latter category, the wildebeest, though very numerous, retreated rapidly from the presence of man.


40. Game Department Annual Report 1926, p. 14, C.O. 544/20. Ag. Game Warden to Ag. Senior Commissioner Coast, October 11, 1926, FC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197; Oldfield to Enley, January 20, 1928, Tana River Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TBD 2/1, NA.

41. Percival, *Notebook*, p. 182. Andrew Fowle, game control officer, wrote of the elephant at Lalu that they were "inclined to keep clear of crops on moonlight nights and the incursions take place on the darkest nights." Game Department Annual Report 1929, C.O. 544/28.

42. G. Colville to Game Warden, August 28, 1932; Ag. Game
Uardem to Colvile, September 6, 1932; Ag. P.C. Rift Valley Province to D.C. Rusuruti, September 9, 1932; D.C. Rusuruti to P.C. Rift Valley Province, September 15, 1932; PC/RVP 6A/22/3, NA. On the Dorobo move, see PC/RVP 6A 1/1 pieces 1-4, NA.

The Dorobo were moved because they were not wanted in the settled areas or in some of the forest reserves. As there were some Dorobo already living with the Samburu in the Game Reserve, it seemed logical to the authorities to send more there. There was nothing in the laws covering the game reserves to prevent Africans from living in them. Indeed, the Southern Reserve was largely occupied by Masai. See also H. Agriculture Dep. 4/937, NA, and The Report of the Kenya Land Commission, Cud. 4556 (1934).

Subsistence hunting by the Dorobo was permitted even in the reserve, as it was thought to be more feasible to control than to stop the killing of game by the hunting peoples. But killing elephants was prohibited, because the Dorobo, Boni, and Liangolo were not trusted to hunt for meat only. Correspondence in PC/Coast 26/292, NA.

43. Game Department Annual Report for 1932, 1933, and 1934, C.O. 544/48, p. 37. Over these three years, about 550 elephants were killed under control schemes throughout the colony, the number increasing year by year. More than 20,000 pounds of ivory accrued, the tusks averaging about 18 1/2 pounds each.

44. Legislative Council meetings March 13, 1913, March 27, 1913, Legislative Council minutes 1912-1920, C.O. 544/6. Protection for the lion was established over the opposition of two settler representatives.

45. Executive Council meeting October 20, 1932, Executive Council minutes 1931-32, C.O. 544/36; Game Harden to P.C. Coast, May 27, 1938, PC/Coast 2/715, NA.

46. Game Department Annual Report for 1932, 1933, and 1934, p. 42, C.O. 544/44. See also A.C. Hoey, "Early Days in Kenya," East African Standard, 1/9/39, Uasin Gishu Political Record Book 1908-1933, DC/UG 2/1, NA. The Game Department Annual Report 1927, pp. 13-14, notes the very large numbers of oribi and reedbuck on the Uasin Gishu Plateau, mainly due, the Game Harden believed, "to the decrease incidental to settlement of leopard, cheetah, hyena, jackal and other voracious meat eaters."

47. The regulations allowed the landholder to kill any animal doing damage on his property and to use methods prohibited elsewhere. No licence was necessary, but any trophies acquired in this manner were the property of the government. Game Ordinances, No. 9 of 1906, No. 19 of 1909.
48. See for example the report of the D.C., Kisii in 1935: "A herd of elephants can do an enormous amount of damage and natives can be ruined in a night. It is essential, if a full collection of tax is to be made, and an intensive agricultural programme carried out that elephants be driven out and kept out of this District.

Ag. P.C. Nyanza to Game Warden, January 14, 1935, PC/MZA Dep. 3/3, NA.

49. Access to Game Department files would be of considerable help in this regard. Reliance on Game Department Annual Reports which summarize and condense, and on district reports in which the officer of one year may regard the game problem as important, while the officer of the next year perhaps sees the same problem as insignificant, may result in a distorted picture.

50. Bush pigs (potamochoerus porcus kenya) are fairly small wild pigs, of wide distribution and nocturnal habits. They are very destructive to crops, "trampling and rooting as much as they devour." Haberly, Animals of East Africa, p. 112.

51. D.C. Malindi to P.C. Mombasa, July 29, 1915, PC/Coast Dep. 1 47/1121; P.C. Mombasa to D.C. Vol., January 22, 1917, PC/Coast Dep. 1 50/1220; D.C. Lamu to Director of Agriculture, Nairobi, January 4, 1922, PC/Coast Dep. 1 55/1485; P.C. Coast to Game Warden, February 12, 1930, PC/Coast Dep. 2/715; D.C. Central Kavirondo to Agricultural Officer Bukura, November 10, 1932, M.C. Copen, Africa Inland Mission to D.C. Central Kavirondo, November 28, 1932, Agricultural Officer Nyanza to Agricultural Officer Bukura, December 5, 1932, PC/MA Dep. 3/3; Tana River District Annual Reports, 1923, 1924, 1925 Tana River Political Record Book DC/EBQ 3/2; D.C. Kisii to Game Warden, April 27, 1936, PC/MA Dep. 3/3; Carslake to Chief Native Commissioner and P.C. Rift Valley Province, December 9, 1937, PC/RVP 6A/22/3; NA, etc. See also Game Department Annual Reports.

52. Game Warden to D.C. Baringo, October 24, 1935, PC/RVP 6A/22/3, NA.

53. D.C. Lamu to Game Warden, September 30, 1929, P.C. Coast to Game Warden, February 7, 1933, PC/Coast Dep. 2/715, NA.

54. P.C. Coast to Game Warden, February 12, 1930, PC/Coast Dep. 2/715, NA.


56. Captain H.H.L. Watt to P.C. Rift Valley Province, November 19, 1935, PC/RVP 6A/22/3; D.C. Lamu to P.C. Coast, January 25, 1933, PC/Coast Dep. 2/715, NA.
57. D.C. Kwale to P.C. Rift Valley Province, March 24, 1938, PC/Coast Dep. 2/715.

58. Ibid. Baboons were also very difficult to get rid of. Being very intelligent animals, they were not easily poisoned. They were wary of food left out for them, and the poison had to be well disguised. Even then, a few bad experiences would teach the baboon troops to leave the bait untouched. They were also clever about traps, and the formidable and aggressive males could not easily be chased away.

59. Wildebeest were a problem in the view of the Masai, as a cattle disease, snotziekte, was connected with their presence. (See below, note 87.) Buffalo became a problem in some forested areas when harassment drove them off the open plains.

60. He was allowed to keep the skins. Good black-maned lionskins were worth £20 at the time, and even lioness skins brought £3. Hunter, Hunter, pp. 71-73.

61. See Hunter, Hunter, Chapter 1, for an experienced man's account of the hard labour of control work.

62. A.D.C. Lamu to D.C. Lamu, September 19, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197, NA. See also Annual Report of the Game Department 1922, C.O. 544/15, p. 6: "Fires, shouting, and tom-toms are treated with scorn."

63. Game Warden's Report on Meru, January 14, 1929, Game Department file G. 1369 (306). Also Game Warden to Owen, December 4, 1935, PC/NZA Dep. 3/3; Game Warden to D.C. Port Hall, February 8, 1935, DC/PH 23/2, NA.


65. D.C. Malindi to P.C. Mombasa, April 8, 1909, PC/Coast 49/1197; P.C. Mombasa to Chief Secretary and Game Warden, July 30, 1917, Ag. Chief Secretary to P.C. Mombasa, August 11, 1917, PC/Coast Dep. 1 50/1247; A.D.C. Lamu to D.C. Lamu, September 19, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197; D.C. Kipisi to P.C. Mombasa, March 4, 1922, PC/Coast Dep. 1 29/403; Ag. D.C. Lamu to Sr. Coast Commissioner, August 25, 1927, PC/Coast Dep. 1 47/1160, NA. Annual Report of the Game Department 1922, C.O. 544/15, p. 6.

66. Percival, Notebook, p. 179.


68. Ag. Game Warden to P.C. Rift Valley Province, October 10, 1935, P.C. Rift Valley Province to D.C. Laikipia-Samburu, October 16, 1935, D.C. Laikipia-Samburu to P.C. Rift Valley Province, November 5, 1935, Ag. Game Warden to
P.C. Rift Valley Province, November 13, 1935 PC/IVP 6A/22/3, NA.

69. D.C. Malindi to P.C. Mombasa, April 4, 1909, PC/Coast Dep. 62/51; Ag. D.C. Vanga to Ag. P.C. Mombasa, February 7, 1920, A.D.C. Lamu to D.C. Lamu, September 19, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197; Game Warden to Sr. Commissioner Coast, November 10, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 29/403; Tour Diary, K Malindi 1915-1924, PC/Coast Dep. 1 47/1121; A.D.C. Kimini to P.C. Mombasa, March 4, 1922, PC/Coast Dep. 1 29/403; D.C. Lamu to Sr. Commissioner Coast, June 21, 1926, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197, NA.

70. Ag. D.C. Lamu to Sr. Commissioner Coast and Game Warden, August 25, 1927, PC/Coast Dep. 1 97/1161, NA.

71. Tana River District Annual Report 1935, extract, Tana River Political Record Book, DC/TRD 3/2. R.H. Windley to C.P. Atkins, November 1936, Tana River Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

72. Tana River District Annual Report 1935, extract, Tana River Political Record Book, DC/TRD 3/2, NA.

73. Oldfield to Mahony, m.d. (1927), Mullins to Windley, August 13, 1935, Atkins to Bromhead, April 1, 1938, Harrison-Lowder to Keir, October 1939, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

74. Tana River District Annual Report 1927, extract, Tana River Political Record Book, DC/TRD 3/2, NA.

75. Oldfield to Ealey, January 20, 1928, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

76. In the 1930’s and 1940’s local Africans were trained as poisoners by the Game Department (with inconsistent results.) See for example Game Department Annual Report 1930, p. 14, C.O. 584/32.


78. Ag. Game Warden to Ag. Colonial Secretary, April 9, 1923, PC/Coast Dep. 1 26/292, NA. Caldwell joined the Game Department in 1923 and remained until ill health forced his retirement in 1929.

79. See for example Oldfield to Ealey, January 20, 1928; Mullins to Windley, August 13, 1935, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

80. Ag. Game Warden to Colonial Secretary, June 25, 1935, PC/NZA Dep. 3/3, NA. Having encouraged the Kisii to make the effort required to grow more than the minimum
necessary for subsistence, the D.C. was reluctant to see them discouraged by game damage.

81. P.C. Nyanza to Game Warden, February 2, 1933, P.C. Nyanza to Game Warden, February 9, 1934, and further correspondence, PC/HZA Dep. 3/3, NA. Game Department AH 1932, 1933, 1934, C.O. 544/44, pp. 32-37. Dawson stated that there had been few elephant in the Lambug Valley, which had once been extensively cultivated, until about 1926, when big herds were driven from the Masai Reserve and the sara by shooting parties.

82. Game Warden to Owen, December 4, 1935, PC/HZA Dep. 3/3, NA.

83. Game Warden to D.C. Central Kavirondo, June 14, 1940, PC/HZA Dep. 3/3, NA.

84. Masai Province Annual Report 1926, p. 38, C.O. 544/21; 1922, 1925, 1928, PC/SP 1/2/2, NA. Research into the specific grazing habits of the various plains game and compatibility with stock-raising is still in its infancy.

85. Annual Reports, Game Department 1922-1937. Note: 1923 not included as I have been unable to find a copy to consult.

86. Report of the Agricultural Commission October 1929, PC/HZA Dep. 3/4, NA. They did discuss de-stocking, fencing, mixed farming, stock diseases including rinderpest, etc. Game was not mentioned at all in the summary of recommendations.

87. Other diseases such as snotsziekte, black quarter, anthrax, wire worm, and swine fever were also present, but were comparatively unimportant. Malignant catarrh, or snotsziekte (a vivid South African term) was particularly interesting as an example in which a game animal acted as a reservoir of a virus without contracting the disease. Wildebeest carried snotsziekte, and cattle became infected when grazing where wildebeest cows had calved. The Masai knew this, but were not at first believed. "The idea was ridiculed at first by the Vety Dept but now it has been credited". Masai Province Annual Report 1926-27, PC/SP 1/2/1, NA. Snotsziekte also occurred independent of wildebeest contact. Department of Agriculture Annual Reports 1929, pp. 161, 169, 1932, p. 201, C.O. 544/28, 544/38.


89. The first veterinarian in British East Africa, R.J. Sturdy, was appointed to the staff of the Uganda Railway at the beginning of 1898. Commissioner Hardinge had proposed a veterinary staff for the East Africa Protectorate in 1896; the Foreign Office then suggested that he make such provision in the estimates for 1898-99. In an economizing mood, Hardinge elected not to do so, and was then remorseful when rinderpest broke out. Over 50,000 head of cattle died in Ulu District. A veterinary surgeon, Charles Buckel, was appointed late in 1898 on a supplementary grant. Sturdy was appointed jointly to the East Africa Protectorate and the Uganda Protectorate when the railway was completed. He headed the East Africa Protectorate department until 1922. F.O. to Treasury, August 11, 1896, FOCP 6861/127; Salisbury to Hardinge, August 25, 1897, FOCP 7018/87; Hardinge to F.O., July 8, 1898, FOCP 7090/83; February 22, 1899, FOCP 7401/12; March 6, 1899, FOCP 7401/14; Treasury to F.O., March 25, 1901, FOCP 7690/179.

90. One veterinarian was murdered after experimenting with rinderpest inoculations. Hardinge to F.O., March 6, 1899, FOCP 7401/14.


95. Veterinary Department Annual Report 1938, p. 17, C.O. 544/55. The administrators of the Coast Province considered the area hopeless for a cattle industry. Calf mortality could reach sixty per cent.


97. Annual Report of the Veterinary Department 1942, p. 3, C.O. 544/60. The eland was also suspected. A standard text of 1964 does not include the eland as a carrier; the buffalo is named, but is termed "quite resistant"; Merchant and Barmer, Outline of Infectious Diseases, pp. 432-4. The Masai recognized the constructive role of
game; they welcomed the presence of antelope which they said kept the grazing clear of east coast fever. Masai Province Annual Report, 1928-29, PC/SP 1/1/2, NA.


99. Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1932, p. 190, C.O. 544/38. The same was true of other tick-borne diseases.

100. In July, 1898, it was reported that of 550 bullocks imported from India only 104 remained; 95 mules were alive. By August, only 76 bullocks and 59 mules remained, and some of these were sick. Meeting of the Uganda Railway Committee, October 6, 1898, Annex D., PC/CP 7212/68. See also PC/CP 7212/14, 27, 37, 44, 78, 7422/39. Camels, donkeys, and horses were vulnerable to the trypanosomes carried by some types of tsetse fly.


103. See for example Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1931, C.O. 544/34.

104. C.F.H. Swynnerton. Game Warden and Director of tsetse fly research in Tanganyika, began a programme of study in the 1920's. He devoted most of his attention to selective bush-clearing schemes. In Southern Rhodesia a vast quantity of game (over 600,000 head), was exterminated in order to rid the country of G. vogtianus, one species of fly. On the other hand, the complete destruction of game in areas infected with G. palpalis could be very dangerous, as shown in West Africa. This fly species merely transferred its attention to man and his stock. Tsetse fly research, general file, N. Agr. 1/549, NA. For a general picture of tsetse research in Africa, see Ford, Trypanosomiasis. He sees much to praise in the work that was done by colonial regimes, but more to criticize.

105. Tsetse Research, General, 1949 N Agr 1/556, NA; Ford, Trypanosomiasis, pp. 36-41 (maps of fly distribution).

106. Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1927, pp. 72-73, C.O. 544/23. Trypanosomes would not multiply in the bodies of other biting flies, (Stomoxys) as in tsetse, but could be transmitted over distances of a few hundred yards in undried blood. Game Department Annual Report 1926, p. 13, C.O. 544/20. "... when one of these insects is interrupted in a meal from an infected host and immediately transfers its attention to another in the same herd ... infective trypanosomes are transferred." Ford, Trypanosomiasis, p. 3.
Ford, *Trypanosomiasis*, pp. 13, 20, notes that until 1950 very little attention was given to the relationships of tsetse to game animals, and that even in 1960 practically nothing was known about the game populations of East Africa.

In his masterly study of the tsetse problem in Africa, Ford points out that the Rhodesia experiment was successful only on the basis of permanent vigilance and continual slaughter of game entering the area cleared of fly, plus the maintenance of fences and buffer zones; this was not a practical solution for the large expanses of Africa infested with fly. *Trypanosomiasis*, chapters xviii-xx, pp. 490-1.

For example, the experiments in the Lambwe Valley. See E.A. Lewis Veterinary Entomologist to Game Warden, December 2, 1935, PC/WZA Dep. 3/3, NA.

A summary of the state of tsetse research in 1949 pointed out the difficulties of attempting bush clearance or fly extermination over the vast areas infested and that curative drugs would achieve no permanent solution as long as cattle and game remained in contact.

It was hoped that studying the resistance of game to trypanosomiasis, resistance which was high but not absolute, might yield some clues toward the development of the immunization of stock. H.H.O. Lester, "The Control of Trypanosomiasis in East Africa," *East African Tse Tse and Trypanosomiasis Research and Reclamation Organization*, July 4, 1949, H. Agr 1/549 Tse Tse Research, general file, NA.

Rinderpest Conference 1948, ABC (MAUR) 3 Vet 3/55, NA.


Veterinary Department Annual Report 1937, p. 5, C.O. 544/33. Rinderpest was described as "the last of the major limiting factors to the successful development of the stock industry." Veterinary Department Annual Report 1938, p. 4, C.O. 544/55. One reason the department was so anxious to develop the stock industry and export was that they hoped to de-stock the over-grazed Kamba Reserve and
turn surplus cattle into beef exports through the operation of a meat-processing plant.


116. In 1922, 18,894 cattle were inoculated in one reserve, with three per cent mortality. Department of Agriculture Annual Report 1927, p. 59, C.O. 544/23.


119. Rinderpest Conference 1948, ARC (MAWB) 3 Vet 3/55, WA.

120. Veterinary Department Annual Report 1937, pp. 6, 20, C.O. 544/53; see also ARC (MAWB) -3 vet 3/38, WA, rinderpest conference 1948. Not all specialists were satisfied that rinderpest would die out in game if eliminated in cattle, and one crucial riddle remained unsolved: if indeed rinderpest would die out in game, how long would it take? Months? Years?
CHAPTER VIII. A Place for Wildlife

During the first years of the East Africa Protectorate's existence, a number of factors combined to produce a situation unusually favourable to the preservation of wildlife. Firstly, the administration found itself in charge of a territory with a rather small human population and abundant wildlife. Secondly, the timing of the Protectorate's establishment was important. The variety of game, plus the pleasant climate and open country, attracted sportsmen at a time when fascination with African hunting trips was at a peak. Thus the numbers of hunters who came were sufficient to generate interest in preserving game as an economic asset. These visitors returned to Britain and heightened public awareness of the Protectorate's wildlife during a period when it had already been realized that wild animals, if not preserved, would swiftly disappear. The Foreign Office was interested enough to prod the Protectorate administration into taking prompt measures for game protection. Soon afterwards, in 1900, the international game conference in London drew increased attention to the issue, and the articulation of the ideal of preservation stimulated the proclamation of new regulations and two large game reserves. These important steps were taken before the economic development of the Protectorate came into conflict with game preservation. As a result of all these circumstances, the principle of preservation acquired a firm foothold.

Though the situation was on balance favourable, there nevertheless existed serious difficulties which became more
apparent with the passage of time. The indigenous population had not participated in the decision to preserve game. Africans could be expected to ignore the regulations unless forced to observe them, and the existing commercial network for the export of ivory was ready-made for smuggling. Preservation policy was also handicapped by ignorance of the habits and needs of the various species the government wished to protect, and by insufficient funds which restricted research and crippled law enforcement. Moreover, a certain confusion of idealistic and economic aims resulted in muddled policy regarding valuable game animals and their products.

Finally, the concept of wildlife preservation embodied in the early regulations was peculiarly limited. The limitation is apparent in the term "game." The original intent of the regulations was to preserve those species which Europeans enjoyed shooting. Other animals were left unprotected, and some, designated vermin, were subject to deliberate extermination. Under the IBBA Company regulations, "game" included only the elephant, the rhinoceros, and the larger antelopes. The Protectorate regulations first broadened the definition to include hippopotamus, zebra, buffalo, giraffe, and all the antelopes, and in 1900 further expanded the term. Notable omissions remained, however, among them being lion, leopard, hyena, and crocodile. Lion and leopard, though carnivorous and always treated as vermin near European settled areas, were attractive to hunters and later acquired some protection. But the hyena and the crocodile, doubly stigmatized by being carnivorous and, in European eyes, repulsive, remained
A concept of preservation which included only those animals which were attractive to Europeans was bound to create its own problems, such as those stemming from the destruction of predators. It was not until the early 1930's, that the complexity and delicacy of the ties binding all living creatures together began to be widely appreciated. Methodical study of wildlife in its natural habitat was not undertaken on any significant scale until the 1960's.

These various impediments to a successful preservation policy acquired greater significance as time passed, because economic development made the wildlife more vulnerable through the destruction of both animals and their habitat. Development, with the accompanying multiplication of human beings, was the fundamental threat. By the late 1920's, it became apparent that if the wildlife were not to be engulfed by the on-rushing tide, a new preservation policy would have to be drawn up. Simple limits on hunting would not suffice, nor would game reserves which were poorly protected and had no permanent status. These methods, which formed the basis of existing policy, had been selected under the conditions obtaining at the turn of the century, and had the merit of being inexpensive. To protect the wildlife in a rapidly-developing country, however, it would be necessary to take a new approach: one which would put the interests of wild animals first, on a permanent basis, in some portions of Kenya. The accomplishment of this end would require both government action and public support. In the 1920's and 1930's, a period when the conflicts between preservation and
development became uncomfortable, and when the need for new measures to preserve game was becoming acute, attitudes to preservation were of great importance. The views of government officials, white settlers, and Africans all affected the wildlife's chances of survival.

The position of the government was that game could and should contribute to Kenya's finances. Parsimony characterized most dealings with the Game Department, but the department's aims were regarded with sympathy: preservation was a good idea, but spending money on it was not, unless greater revenues would result.

The attitudes of European settlers and Africans were also significant. The settler community enjoyed considerable influence on government policy, and the Game Department leaned heavily upon settler cooperation and goodwill. Africans had relatively little influence, but their views in part determined their behaviour, which in the long run held the key to success or failure.

The settlers held a wide range of views, but their chief concern in the early years of settlement was to establish their right to eliminate unwanted game in the settled areas. Game was abundant, and, when the settlers first came, restrictions on hunting applied to all parts of the Protectorate. Support was found among the settlers for game reserves: Lord Delamere and Lord Hindlip were prominent advocates. But there was much opposition to licence fees and restrictions on hunting in and around the settled areas. As early as 1903, the Game Ranger, Percival, reported that it would be impossible to prevent
unlicensed shooting unless the licence fees were reduced. "The feeling at present is much against the Game Laws and no assistance is given to those wishing to see the laws obeyed." Restrictions were eased in the game ordinances of 1908 and 1909, but not all settlers were satisfied. In 1911, a settler representative complained that settlers had to pay for licences to kill the game "which they considered detrimental to the progress of the country."

Even under the difficult conditions of the pioneering years of settlement, however, there were settlers who took a strong line in defence of game. One settler, residing in the Hua Hills, close to the Southern Game Reserve, wrote that he preferred this region because of the abundant game. He added:

Everyone who has taken up land here knew the conditions as to the game, and could have selected other land more favourable to farming without game. ... Everyone who has suffered damage from game in this neighbourhood has had a "set-off" against it in a continual and plentiful meat supply.

This settler had lost forty ostriches in one night, but still opposed the extermination of lions in the nearby reserve. In his opinion, most residents of the Protectorate were proud of the game.

Lord Hindlip also believed that settlers generally supported preservation.

I am sure that all settlers with large holdings, and the best of the small men, will be the last to wish to exterminate the game; and to regard the settlers, as a class, as being antagonistic to the preservation of game is to do them a great injustice, and is not advisable in the interests of the wild animals themselves.

Hindlip emphasized, however, that to maintain settler support for preservation, the settlers must be fairly treated, that is,
given cheap licences and allowed to kill game that was a nuisance to them. Then they would preserve game for the sake of sport and assist the Game Department. In the absence of reasonable regulations, they would simply shoot as they pleased, without licences. 7

While Hindlip favoured the relaxation of restrictions on settler hunting activities, he also supported preservation and game reserves. He regarded the game regulations as "miserably inadequate," the funds available to the game ranger as "wretchedly small." Instead of one ranger with £100 to spend, Hindlip recommended three rangers and a budget of £1500, apart from salaries. As matters stood, the game reserves were not worthy of the name, because they were completely unprotected. Hindlip favoured a smaller, better-protected Northern Reserve, and a Southern Reserve extending one mile past the railway and well-patrolled to prevent Boers living in German East Africa from poaching. 8

By 1910, the settlers had obtained many concessions. In addition, the Game Ordinance, 1909, gave settlers in good game districts a new incentive to support preservation. The new, cheap traveller's licence, which entitled the licence-holder to shoot on private land with the consent of the owner, was attractive to visitors who did not want to pay £50 for a sportsman's licence. Landholders were able to lease shooting rights on their properties to such visitors, or to charge a fee for permission to shoot a particular animal. Thus some of the money brought to the Protectorate by visitors went directly into the pockets of settlers. The Game Department welcomed these
arrangements as "a great inducement" to landholders to protect game."

After the war years, during which issues concerning game were generally ignored, the question of game preservation received a good deal of attention. The appointment of honorary game wardens gave a number of settlers who favoured preservation a chance to give the Game Department active support, and free-spending visitors were once again attracted to Kenya by the game. However, some settlers in the developing Colony harboured harsh views on preservation as detrimental to the country's economic interests. Their antagonism focused on two points: damage to settler agriculture and restrictions on the expansion of settlers into new areas. First, there was the problem of game damage: of destroyed crops and infected stock. Settlers could do much as they pleased to rid their own lands of game, but that did not entirely solve the problem. They pointed out that much of their private land may adjacent to crown land; thus the government was in effect preserving game right next to the settlers' fields and herds. Such game continually strayed onto settler property. For this reason, settler objections were aimed at the policy that game should be protected everywhere but on private land. In 1921, during the second reading of the proposed new game ordinance, a member of the Legislative Council, speaking, he emphasized, as a representative of the farming community and not as a sportsman, criticized the "idea of keeping up a good deal of the land of the country as a Game Reserve." He mentioned rinderpest, in particular the communication of this disease from buffalo to cattle, and
maintained that maize grazed down by waterbuck and other game was a common sight. He himself had had forty to fifty coffee trees damaged by rhinoceros. The government could not expect a man to wait until an animal was actually trampling down his crops before shooting. Lord Delamere rose in support of this statement, asserting that if the government sold land to settlers, then it was the government's responsibility to see that its own land nearby was not a nuisance to the purchaser. He thought it would not be possible to keep cattle in Kenya until the government "took the matter of the game in hand."  

A few years later, during a discussion of the Game Department estimates, another settler representative brought up the issue of game damage, suggesting that it cost the country more than the revenue accumulated by the Game Department. Hinderpest was again mentioned, and it was stated that if the government wished to preserve game in the neighbourhood of settlement, then it should also actively protect the settlers, not merely permit the settlers to protect themselves. The government, in the person of the Director of Agriculture, replied that settlers were not discouraged from killing game on their farms, that they were even given assistance by the government, and that experience showed that game receded before the advance of settlement until it became no serious matter. This time, the government received support from Delamere, who said that no great damage had been caused by the preservation of game, and that where there was a problem, on the Usambara Plateau with zebra, for example, the government was giving assistance. He added that the large safari parties spent as much
as £5000 in the country, and that was a significant contribution to Kenya's finances. Delamere probably changed his stance because Ritchie, the Game Warden since January 1924, placed a new emphasis on the department's responsibility for game control. Ritchie was well aware that the freedom to hunt on their own lands was of limited use to the settlers as long as many farms lay adjacent to unoccupied lands, and he placed increasing emphasis on game control during the twenties and thirties. The effectiveness of this policy was handicapped by the Game Department's lack of staff, but the honorary game wardens assisted, and at the end of the 1920s, the department did acquire two full-time game control officers.

The second source of settler hostility to game preservation was the fear that game policy might hinder the development of Kenya as a white man's country. Thus attacks were made on the other cornerstone of preservation: the game reserves. Settler opinion was not opposed to the idea of reserves, but the white community did not want any land that might be used to expand white settlement tied up for other purposes. The increase of their numbers was enormously important to the settlers, and to further this end they wanted first call on as much arable, habitable land as possible as well as government policies designed to provide the maximum encouragement to white immigration.

In the very first year of the Legislative Council's existence, 1907, Lord Delamere questioned the Commissioner of Lands as to what game, native, and forest reserves had been established, and which ones were permanent. He asked that the
government give an undertaking that no reserves should be permanent unless they were previously submitted to the Legislative Council, where settler representatives could object to them.15

In 1924, a suggestion was made that land adjoining the railway where it ran through game and native reserves would be made better use of if given to settlers. Supporting this idea, Delamere voiced a general theme that would later be brought into use by both sides—in arguments over preservation. He stated that all the land in the world must be put to its best use. In Kenya, the country should "not be left to game and small patches of cultivation."16 The catch was, of course, that ideas of best use varied, but Delamere's view, and that of most settlers, was that the best use was that which was most economically productive.17

A motion read two years later by another elected representative summed up the view of many settlers as to what the Colony's land policy should be. The first principle was that as many Europeans as possible should be brought into the White Highlands. Towards that end, any "unutilized areas of land" in game reserves, forest reserves, and elsewhere that were suitable for European settlement should be made immediately available for that purpose.18 The motion was not, in fact, particularly relevant to the existing game reserves because, as the member for Kikuyu constituency pointed out, the Southern Reserve was in the Masai Reserve, and was thus inalienable according to the Agreement of 1911, and the Northern Reserve was largely unsuited to white settlement, being low-lying and hot. Nevertheless, the motion exemplified a settler attitude which put the expansion of
European settlement before any other interest. Fixed boundaries which excluded settlers were opposed on principle.

Some advocates of controlled preservation held the opinion that the adoption of a close season would preserve sufficient game in the absence of reserves. They argued that reserves provoked hostility from those who wanted as much land as possible to be open to settlement. This was indeed the case. Even Cranworth himself, who supported reserves, wrote following World War I, during which the Southern Game Reserve became better known and the game much reduced owing to the search for food and sport by the military, that there was good agricultural land, "too good for Game Reserves," near Kilimanjaro. The elimination of reserves, however, would have increased the vulnerability of game populations. Game suspected or known to carry stock diseases would have been destroyed everywhere, having no refuge. No protection would have existed against development - a greater enemy than even the rifle.

Settlers who questioned preservation policies were not always convinced by the government defence of game on the grounds of the revenue it brought to the Colony. One settler representative challenged the government to show that the revenue was greater than the financial losses to settlers caused by game damage. He argued that compensation should be paid for damage done. This idea was periodically suggested to the Game Department by individual settlers and by some district and provincial officers, but the department steadfastly refused to undertake such a responsibility, on the not unreasonable grounds that thousands of complaints would pour in from settlers and
Africans, and the department, lacking either the staff to investigate or the money to pay, would be utterly unable to respond.

In a typical case, the Game Warden was informed that thirty-two elephants had entered the shamba of one Henry Watkins, trampling down some fifty acres of sorghum before they were driven off. Watkins had shot four, and wanted to keep the ivory as compensation for the damage. The B.C., Nakuru, and the P.C., Rift Valley, both supported Watkins. The Acting Game Warden replied that no compensation could be paid by the government for damage by game.

Acknowledgement of any liability by Government for damage done by game is dangerous. Claims would be sent in by Europeans, Indians and Natives at the rate of thousands a week and it would be impossible to investigate them.

In further letters, the Game Warden expressed his sympathy with Watkins, but pointed out that he, the Warden, had no discretionary powers regarding compensation, and that in principle there was no difference between elephants trampling Watkins' sorghum and a native losing a row of potatoes.

Both the opposition to, and the support for, game policy were frequently focused on the Game Department. The opposition criticized the allocation of department funds and its choice of priorities, suggesting, for example, that more attention should be paid to the prevention of ivory smuggling and less to trivial infringements of the law by settlers. Those settlers who favoured preservation often acted on their beliefs by helping the Game Department.

The Game Department could never mollify its severest
critics. If the department defended itself by pointing out that it produced revenue, it was accused of not spending enough on game control. If expenses rose in proportion to revenue, the department was chastised for not devoting more attention to revenue-producing activities such as chasing ivory poachers, and risked loss of favour with the government. In any case, the argument over revenue was a foolish one. Figures were available for neither the financial gains brought by hunting and tourism, nor the financial losses caused by game damage. The budget of the Game Department was inconsequential compared to these large unknowns. Ritchie frequently pointed out that the department should not feel obliged to defend itself on grounds of direct revenue.

In the Legislative Council, the views of those settler representatives most hostile to game were expressed over the decades in rather similar flights of hyperbole. In 1911, a member of the Legislative Council declared that he "had not great sympathy with this movement to retain the country as a vast zoological garden." In 1921, another member opposed the Game Ordinance as being designed to keep most of the country a game reserve. Three years later, the member for Kenya constituency, opposing a grant of £150 to the Coryndon Museum, remarked that he liked the game dead but not stuffed. He went on to proclaim his objection to "the principle of running this country as a Game Reserve generally." He thought it was time that some people were disillusioned and made to understand that the country was not a place for hunting holidays only. In 1926, a new member for the same constituency asserted that "it
should be accepted as an axiom that game, when it conflicts with
the interests of mankind, should be totally abolished ...." He
maintained that game was only kept for sentimental reasons. The
Council had agreed to tax luxuries; he concluded that sentiment
was a luxury and he "should like to see it taxed out of
existence." He later pressed the Game Department for
assurances that agricultural interests would take precedence
over game preservation.

Some of the most vociferous complaints came from Kenya
Province which abutted on the Northern Game Reserve. Settlers in
parts of Nyeri District were frequently plagued by rhinoceros
and buffalo, and the Game Department's attempts at control met
with little success. Most settlers who raged against the Game
Department and game policy were exclusively concerned with the
deleterious effects of game on their own economic pursuits. If
the game could be tucked away in some corner of Kenya where it
would not bother them, they would be satisfied. Even those who
spoke most vehemently against preservation conceded, for
example, that the destruction of game would not be necessary if
the game were moved further north. Unfortunately, this
solution was not as simple as it seemed to those whose concern
was confined to the settled areas. If African interests were to
be considered, it would not be easy to frame a successful
policy. However, it was on this point - that game should be
preserved where it would not be a nuisance - that most settlers
could agree. It was the starting point for any discussion of
future game policy.

Attacks on preservation policy died down in the late
1920's, probably as a result of Ritchie's emphasis on game control, which apparently fostered much goodwill. By 1927, Ritchie was able to write that the old resentment of "the department's game" was dead. The department was enjoying the cooperation of the public, and it was generally recognized that the game belonged to the community and was an asset. Accompanying this softening of hostile settler attitudes was a tangible increase in the support the department received. The numbers of honorary game wardens rose very rapidly, and the department's budget was enlarged. The improved relations with the settler community were very welcome to a department which depended so much on cooperation to achieve its ends.

A portion of the settler community had, from the earliest days of settlement, given strong support to game preservation, even in areas where game damage was a problem. Lord Delanore suggested the establishment of the Northern Game Reserve; Hindlip advocated a Game Department when there was only a ranger, and other settlers supported preservation even when their own farms suffered. Few would tolerate heavy damage to crops or livestock, but many found the game attractive and were willing to endure some losses in return for its graceful presence.

Percival thought it was the large landowners who were most likely to preserve game on their own holdings. Writing about the Rift Valley in 1903, he said that the very worst thing for the game would be a number of small settlers.

Where large tracts of land are taken up for sheep or cattle there always is a chance for game, as most large landowners like to see game about the place. In the case of small settlers game has absolutely no
This view made sense. Large landowners were usually better able to afford marginal damage, and were also likely to be in a financial position which would allow them to invest in fencing. Moreover, many large holdings were ranches and consisted of vast tracts of unimproved grazing. These holdings were less vulnerable to game damage than were those of crop-growers. Another factor was that the destruction of game over large areas of sparsely populated land was more difficult than its elimination in densely settled areas. So game was likely to survive where there were large holdings unless great trouble was taken to eliminate it.

Lord Cranworth had large holdings, and, like Hindlip, he supported game preservation and publicly expressed his belief that the settlers would not exterminate the game. He was certain they would preserve game for sport and food. Herds of hartebeest and zebra, "which are responsible for nine-tenths of the damage and for ninety-nine-hundredths of the outcry against the preservation of game," would not be preserved, nor would the rhinoceros and large carnivora, "distinctly undesirable residents on a farm," but eland, Thomson's gazelle, reedbuck, and other species would be kept on many farms. Cranworth acknowledged that there were settlers who "would exterminate at once, without distinction, all the larger fauna with the view, at some distant and visionary date, of filling their place with the settlers' flocks and herds"; nevertheless, he believed that the bulk of the settler population took a more balanced view. This view was that where game was deleterious to the prosperity
of the bulk of the people, it must be banished, but that elsewhere game should be preserved. There was a responsibility "to see to it that none of the splendid and beautiful forms of animal life contained in the Empire should be ruthlessly or needlessly exterminated." 37

The trouble with Cranworth's position was its assumption that the maintenance of desirable game demanded nothing more than shooting the animals that were not wanted. Preservation was a more complex problem, and the failure to realize this was frequent. For example, one preferred solution to the difficulty inherent in large, poorly-patrolled game reserves was simply to make the reserves smaller so a tiny staff could police them.

The D.C., Samburn, who found himself more or less in charge of the Northern Game Reserve, with only the help of a few African game scouts, thought that the reserve was far too large to be controlled effectively by these slender resources. Somali and Indian smugglers operated with impunity. He thought the reserve should be reduced and controlled by a resident gardener, and that the "size of the area should be determined according to the funds available for its control." The rest of the country should be open to hunting so that safari parties would bring in revenue. 38 This solution took little notice of the needs of the game. Many species could not survive in small reserves, and to reduce the size of the present reserves would only have made it very difficult to reclaim the land for game should funds ever be available to protect it.

Lord Dalanere was a most interesting example among the large landowners. He had first come to the region as a hunter,
and he had suggested the establishment of the Northern Game Reserve. He maintained an active interest in game preservation. Yet he spoke out many times against forms of preservation that interfered with settler interests, and even took note of the hardships imposed on Africans. He was among those who pressed the government to alter the system of game licences in the settlers' favour. At the same time, he consistently supported the game reserves, writing to Clement Hill at the Foreign Office as early as 1900 that a large reserve, self-contained with regard to food and water, was the only way to save the game. Close control in the settler areas and strict protection in the reserves was Delamerre's prescription for the Protectorate.

That a significant number of settlers would be willing to preserve game where it was harmless was exemplified by the stock farmers around Lake Naivasha, who preserved the hippopotamus population in the lake. But the reservation "where it was harmless" was always there. Carnivores, for example, were rarely tolerated. Even carnivores had some friends, however. In 1913, when two settlers vehemently opposed the proposed measures for the preservation of lion more than twenty miles from European lands, another settler spoke up in Council to support the measures, and would have taken them further, and on other occasions when game policy was attacked, settler representatives defended it. The member for Kikuyu who had pointed out that the Northern and Southern Reserves were not appropriate targets for settlement also stated that he would oppose, "at the expense of being classed as a sentimentalist, any suggestion to demude or decrease these Game Reserves...."
The strength of the support for preservation in the settler community was most solidly demonstrated by the phenomenon of the honorary game wardens. The swift increase in their numbers and their willingness to do hard work for no pay showed the depth of their concern. The acceptance of these honorary wardens by the community, despite the fact that they enforced the game regulations as well as helping with game control, indicated that the settler community in general were prepared to cooperate with the aims of the Game Department.

It was relatively easy to support the preservation of game at a distance from settler holdings. As for game on settler farms, the attitude of many settlers, struggling with crop failures and the overdraft at the bank, was probably accurately summed up by Elspeth Huxley in The Bottled Lizard, her description of settler life in the 1920's:

"Tilly was torn two ways. She did not want to see the buck killed off, but they ate the young maize, the vegetables she grew beside the river, the roses she planted round the house. They leapt the highest fences, and smelt out the most hidden shoot. So she could not forbid Kikuyu to trap and hunt them, but nor did she encourage their destruction by offering a bounty on tails or heads."  

Like the settlers, government officials were not agreed upon all aspects of game policy. The Game Department, of course, staunchly defended preservation wherever possible, but tried hard to avoid the appearance of an unreasonable partisanship, knowing that the latter would make more enemies than friends for the game. Colonial government officials in Nairobi tended to support preservation measures, the arguments being usually financial. It was claimed in the 1930's, for example, that the
game brought an average of £150,000 a year to Kenya.

Some members of the administration, such as Sir Robert Coryndon, the Governor from 1922 to 1925, believed in the principle articulated by Cranworth, that preservation was a moral responsibility. Also, the strong interest of the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office made itself felt in Nairobi. Delamere once irritably remarked in a Legislative Council meeting that the amount of interest taken by the Colonial Office in the question of game had always been a mystery to him.

... The matter of the game was an obsession and it reminded one of the old days when North Africa was kept as a reserve for the Emperors of Rome to get their animals from.

Provincial and District Commissioners scattered over the country did not feel the pressure from London so directly. Some did have the hot winds of settler rhetoric blowing about them. Moreover, as greater attention came to be paid to African agriculture, government officers took increasing notice of game in the Native Reserves.

The attitude of the local officer depended largely upon two variables: on how much of a nuisance the game made of itself in his district or province and on his opinion as to whether hunting was a constructive activity or one destructive to the local economy. His attitude was probably also coloured by his own enjoyment of sporting or naturalist pursuits, that is, on whether he himself admired the game. This factor was less likely to show itself in official correspondence, however.

In the Tana River District, where game was abundant, one District Commissioner, Sutcliffe, devoted a rare degree of
attention to discouraging poaching, because he believed that crops and stock-raising, which needed to be expanded if the district were to achieve any progress towards prosperity, were being neglected in favour of hunting. Hunting would not increase the wealth of the district, and Sutcliffe went so far as to hope for a programme to prevent the Boni from hunting and teach them agriculture. 77

Sutcliffe's successor, Oldfield, on the other hand, while interested in discouraging ivory poaching in order to stimulate other economic activities, was not inclined to suppress hunting generally. He saw the game as a menace to agriculture and resented its preservation in an area where Africans were being encouraged to farm.

If it is really necessary to keep large herds of hippo and other spoilers of the land, for the sake of deriving revenue from Game Licences, I can see no reason why they should be kept at the expense of the natives, who get no help from the Game Department in protecting their crops or compensation when their cultivations are destroyed. One's entire sympathies are with a former D.O. who recommended that elephant and other destructive game on the Tana River should be declared vermin. 78

Comparable sentiments were expressed in other agricultural areas. In Lamu, where Africans were using ancient rifles to scare off elephant, a district officer wanted to issue more modern, effective rifles and to grant the Africans half the proceeds of the ivory as compensation for damage. 79 The D.C., Kisii, said that elephant could not be preserved in his district if his programme of agricultural expansion were to be carried out. He believed that the destruction of crops discouraged Africans from planting more than bare necessity required. He
urged that Africans be given greater freedom to hunt and destroy game in the vicinity of their shambas. Another District Commissioner, in Central Kavirondo, thought that the Game Department should pay more attention to protecting African crops.

The Game Department have collected £7000 through the Administration, in this district during the past twenty years. It is doubtful if they have spent any money for the protection of native crops from the depredation of game. Officers in the pastoral areas also became critical of preservation when they attempted to establish controlled grazing programmes. The D.C., Baringo, with the support of the P.C., Rift Valley, stated in 1935 that "the time had come" to control zebra herds in the Turkana area because he was endeavouring to improve the grazing for the cattle. He was soon echoed by the D.C., Laikipia-Samburu, who, with the support of the same Provincial Commissioner, wanted the zebra on the Leroghi Plateau reduced to assist his grazing control scheme. The District Commissioner was reluctant to use the Samburu to hunt the zebra, for fear they would get out of hand, and suggested allowing some Boers to shoot. The area was in the Northern Game Reserve, and this latter proposal made the Game Warden's "hair stand on end."

In the Masai Reserve, one officer thought that the game was not destructive, provided that occasional help was given by the Game Department, and that "so many people are nowadays attracted to the country by the possibilities of game photography that it would appear desirable, in view of the little damage done by the
game, to retain this wonderful game park.*** But other officers thought that the Masai should receive compensation for damage done by game and that any plans for rotational grazing were doomed while "vast herds of game roam at will."** Such comments on game and grazing were not founded upon research. Little was known of the effects of game on pasture; the Agriculture and Veterinary Departments did not study the question, although this did not stop them from observing occasionally that the game competed for grazing in the native reserves and should be reduced in numbers.**

A common thread in most of the statements on game policy made by local officers was that the game must take second place to economic development. Even those who heartily supported preservation did not want it near African agriculture. This was particularly true in the 1930's, when local officers devoted more of their energies to agricultural development in the African areas. "There is no more ardent preserver of game than myself but game and cultivation cannot live side by side and the welfare of the native must, in my opinion, come first."**

Attitudes towards poaching varied. Poaching for meat on a small scale, and going rather further afield than was allowed for shamba protection, were often tolerated, and indeed were impossible to control. Some officers set more store by fencing than others; some organized poisoning drives against vermin in areas where damage was serious.** Commercial poaching for ivory and rhinoceros horn, or leopard skins, was most often frowned upon as unnecessary, as taking time from other more productive activities, and as leading to financial losses to the
The hunting tribes, however, were a special case, and some officers sympathized with their illegal activities even when they poached elephant. These tribes, mainly the Dorobo, Bomi, and Liangulo, were dependent upon game for their subsistence. Hence, according to the game regulations, they were allowed to hunt in their own areas. In the case of the Dorobo, these areas included the game reserves, where they were permitted to kill some of the commoner species, such as zebra, wildebeest, and hartebeest. But this permission effectively excluded the elephant, the preferred prey of all these groups. From 1909, the sanction of the Governor had to be obtained by District Commissioners who wished to give Africans permission to hunt; the Governor consulted the Game Department, and permission to hunt elephant was not extended. Acting District Commissioner Sharpe, in Digo District on the coast, took particular trouble to investigate the hunting economy of the Liangulo in his area. He found them to be profoundly dependent upon elephant for the large quantities of meat supplied and for the ivory which could be sold during hard times. He was certain that it would be better to allow the Liangulo to hunt limited numbers of elephant than to forbid them to hunt any. They could not be stopped from hunting illegally, and were not destructive like Europeans or commercial African ivory hunters, he said.

It is absurd to say these people exterminate game - they have lived amongst it from time immemorial and the game has remained... There are more elephants in the impenetrable bush occupied by the Waboni and kindred tribes than anywhere else in East Africa which is due to the fact that the country is utterly impossible to any but these people who though they
This position was not entirely invalid, but it neglected to take into account that the changing world around the hunting tribes would alter the effects of their activities.

Sharpe attempted to persuade the Liangulo to take up cultivation, but when their crops failed he was all the more inclined to give them privileges in the hunting sphere. His Provincial Commissioner supported him, also believing that concessions would induce the Liangulo to cooperate in a programme of controlled hunting. The Game Department nevertheless stuck to its prohibition, maintaining that control was not possible, and limited permission would simply lead to more abuses. Discussion also took place regarding the Bomi further north. The Game Department was not without sympathy for the hunting tribes, but the close relations of these tribes with others who took a commercial interest in ivory prevented the department from taking a conciliatory position.

On one occasion, the Colonial Secretary solicited the opinions of local officers regarding broader hunting privileges for all Africans. In 1912, the Game Warden proposed that Africans be permitted to obtain residents' licences on the same terms as Europeans. Certain tribes were "addicted to killing game," and it was hoped that if they could obtain licences there would be less excuse for poaching. The Colonial Secretary issued a circular requesting that District and Provincial Commissioners express their views. A few months later, in August, it was announced that the collective wisdom of the local officers had decided the Governor against granting Africans any further
facilities for the killing of game.**

Africans were not asked for their views on game, and their general opinions are unrecorded. The record does show continued, widespread poaching and a flow of specific complaints from Africans about damage to crops and stock. The Masai, for example, who were probably more aware of preservation policy than many Africans, since they lived in the Southern Game Reserve, complained that lion were preserved to feed upon their flocks. They also petitioned to have the wildebeest exterminated, because of the *spotzicht* problem, but were not willing to spend their own money to finance a campaign against them.** Complaints were heard in all agriculture areas from the coast to Lake Victoria,** with the exception of a few places, such as parts of Kikuyu, which were so densely populated that little or no game existed. Much of the damage was done by animals classed as vermin, but it is uncertain whether the distinction made by the administration between game and vermin was clear, or of any significance to Africans. When allowed to conduct organized drives against pig, for example, they killed buck as well.**

In addition to complaints about game, Africans expressed their opinion of preservation in another way: by evading the game regulations intended to secure that preservation. Where there was a commercial incentive, as in the case of ivory, poaching took place on a large scale, and Africans, sometimes with the help of Indians, organized their own illegal marketing systems. Rhinoceros and leopard were heavily poached when the value of their horns and skins rose. But game animals were
poached for meat as well, and not only by the tribes whose entire existence centred upon hunting. Tribes with crops and stock who had hunted and trapped game before the advent of regulations continued to do so afterwards. These included the Kamba, Kisii, Turkana, Teita and Taveta.

The Assistant Game Warden stationed at Taveta in 1912 reported intensive poaching in the District. With hardly an exception, every Taveta had his game pits and traps, and buffalo, oryx, giraffe, waterbuck, eland, and other game were killed. He passed on the explanation given by the Taveta:

'Ve don't like work. We are tired of digging many shambas. It is much easier to catch game than to dig. Game is very good to eat so we kill it. We know we shouldn't do so but we kill it all the same.'

The Assistant Game Warden also found Kamba hunting in the area, as they had been wont to do in earlier years.**

The Kisii, too, hunted to supplement their harvests. They left their own area to do it, and complaints were received both from nearby white farmers and from the officer in charge of the Masai Reserve. The white farmers did not want the game indiscriminately slaughtered in their neighbourhood and thought that if their own hunting was hedged about with restrictions, so should that of Africans be also. The local officer in Southern Kavirondo sympathized with the Kisii and maintained that accounts were exaggerated, but the P.C., Nyanza said the complaints were certainly genuine.** The Game Department recorded in 1930 that "organized hunting by large bands of Kisii in the Trans Mara corner of the Masai Reserve assumed serious proportions." Administrative officers were anxious to help, but lack of staff hindered efforts to check the forays.***
A good deal of poaching also occurred in the Northern Game Reserve, owing to the activities of Dorobo, Turkana, and various groups from Abyssinia descending on Marsabit.\footnote{1}

Poaching in general increased during years of inadequate rainfall, as the Game Department well knew. Poor rains meant poor crops, and Africans would look for other sources of food and cash. At the same time, the game population concentrated around permanent water and thus became more vulnerable to hunters. Moreover, if grazing was scarce, game was drawn to the shambas to seek food, and competed with livestock for grazing and water. The increased poaching noticeable in these years was not necessarily the result of game being killed in order to be eaten. Often animals were killed in order to exchange their tusks, horns, and skins for food, stock, and cash for hut-tax. Elephant and rhinoceros suffered particularly. As the Game Department recorded, 1929, and 1933 to 1935 were dry years. Those years were also terrible years for poaching. But poaching was also widespread in years of good rain, as reported, for example, of Kitui, Machakos, and the coastal areas in 1936.\footnote{2}

Apart from the evidence of poaching activities as an indicator of African attitudes to game preservation, it is worth recording that European opinion unanimously held that Africans had no interest in preserving game, and were in fact hostile to the idea. As Elspeth Huxley wrote, "wild beasts ate crops or else menaced people, and the sooner they were eliminated the better."\footnote{3} If the Game Department had asked Africans for their opinions, it would not have been surprising if they had found little support for preservation policies. Africans were poor,
and their point of view was local. Game was killed to make a living. Game revenues did not go into their pockets, except in the shape of wages from Europeans on safari, and this source dried up as the automobile replaced travel on foot. Perhaps, if asked whether they would choose to have all the game disappear, many Africans would have answered "no," since game had its uses. Even if this were true, however, it would not follow that government preservation policies held much attraction for Africans. It is unlikely that Africans, who had little opportunity to analyze conditions on a colony-wide basis, thought that game was in danger of disappearing. Of more importance was that government policy restricted the freedom of Africans to kill game while offering them no compensating rewards.

The reasons underlying African resistance to preservation policy - if accurately described - did not greatly differ from the thoughts of those Europeans who attacked the policy, who wanted compensation for game damage and greater freedom to kill game. The wide support that preservation policy gained in the settler community, the belief described by Ritchie in 1927 that game was an asset, was made possible by the latitude the settlers were given to reduce the hazards and annoyances caused by game in the European areas. The aesthetic appreciation of wildlife and the wider perspective Europeans were able to bring to bear on the issue of preservation were important, but such support for game policy would have vanished if the government had attempted to preserve game in the White Highlands to the extent that it did in African areas.
Though settlers were willing to preserve game outside the White Highlands, the vague idea that game could survive in the rest of Kenya became increasingly untenable after World War I. As the development of Kenya proceeded and its human population increased, game was pushed out of more and more areas. In addition, as more acres were tilled and grassland reconditioned, tolerance decreased in many of the regions where game remained. When the settlers first arrived, and their voices were raised against the presence of game on their lands, the solution seemed easy: clear the White Highlands of game, there was plenty of room for it elsewhere. Kenya was large and much of it was thinly populated. The only problem was keeping the game out when the Highlands themselves were but sparsely occupied. Since the conflict between the preservers and the enemies of game could be resolved by preserving the game where it would give no trouble, and since nearly everyone agreed that "human interest" came first, the idea grew up among both settlers and officials that game could and should be confined to areas where it would not interfere with human economic activities.

This idea first developed in the early days of European settlement, when African interests were often ignored. For example, the two game reserves had been gazetted in 1900 in areas unsuited to European use, but the Africans living there were not consulted. The Game Department tended to treat all areas outside the White Highlands as game preserves. If the Africans did not count, certainly the expanse of country left to game was wide indeed. But this was a false assumption. Pastoral and agricultural Africans were no more tolerant of game damage
than the Europeans, and when their needs began to be recognized by the administration, and money and effort were expended on African development, the game was to be driven from the African areas too. Moreover, as development proceeded, the occupied regions expanded and the empty spaces filled with people. In a scheme of things where game was only allowed to occupy those areas unwanted by people for other purposes, the game would eventually be left no space at all, and would cease to exist.

The economic development of Africans in Kenya was slow, and it was possible for the colonial government and the settlers to close their eyes for a long time to the end towards which the path was leading. Not all, however, were unaware of the pitfalls ahead. Lord Cranworth, for example, wrote as early as 1912 that the native reserves were unlikely to remain a reservoir of game.

There used to be a pleasing theory that game would always be thick in the Masai Reserves because this tribe are not hunters of game. It is perfectly true that the Masai do not hunt game for food; they have but one thought and that is cattle and sheep, but as surely as the game interfere with the grazing for their enormous herds of cattle and sheep, so surely will the game be banished. To this fact anyone who has trekked across Likipia of late years can bear eloquent testimony.

In the 1920's, what had previously seemed to be a cheap and simple solution was revealed as inadequate. Development brought more roads, cars, aeroplanes and the growth of human and domestic stock populations. Administrative interest in African areas increased, and the old notion of preserving game throughout the non-European regions had to be relinquished. The Game Department then began control work in the African areas. The view that troublesome game should be eliminated in African
as well as European areas drastically reduced the space in which preservation was an acceptable goal. The reserves still existed, but elsewhere, the game was pushed slowly into the remote parts of the country, into areas which were too waterless or fly infested for current human use. Against this trend, the reserves were not a sufficient defence. Apart from the fact that they were not well guarded, they were not entrenched behind barriers of legislation which could offer resistance to human opportunism. Their boundaries could be altered, their very existence ended by a stroke of the pen. Reserves were created and could be destroyed simply by a Governor's proclamation, with the sanction of the Secretary of State. Both the Northern and Southern Reserves had been reduced from their original dimensions. It was this vulnerability that led those who were most concerned with preservation to seek the security of national parks for game.

The establishment of national parks was a large step beyond that of game reserves. The permanency of parks, and the stringent protection of both fauna and flora within them, demanded a degree of commitment that was not required by the easily-abolished reserves. National parks were not invented in East Africa, although the parks that are there now probably enjoy greater world renown than any others. The first national park was Yellowstone National Park, established in the United States in 1872. The concept of parks had been developing in Britain and other parts of Europe for centuries, springing largely from a tradition of hunting privileges reserved for the aristocracy, but it was the United States which first defined
and established what are now understood to be national parks. Areas of outstanding natural beauty were set aside to be preserved intact for the enjoyment of all the people. Exploitation of mineral and other resources was excluded, and people were not permitted to live in the parks.

In the twentieth century the idea of national parks spread from the United States to other parts of the world, including Africa. The first park to be declared, in 1926, was the Kruger National Park in South Africa, hitherto the Sabi Game Reserve. The second was the Parc National Albert, in the Belgian Congo, proclaimed in 1929. In East Africa, national parks were not established until the 1940's, the first being Nairobi National Park, gazetted on December 24, 1946. Other parks in Kenya followed, among them Tsavo (1948), Mount Kenya (1949), and Aberdare (1950).

It is not intended to recount here the history of the establishment of these parks, the struggle for which took place from the 1930's through the 1950's and involved both settlers and officials. Suffice it to say that those who cared most deeply about game preservation achieved less than they hoped for, but a great deal more than has been accomplished in most parts of the world. What is of interest here is the acceptance, by the colonial government and those settlers interested in preservation, of the idea of national parks as the solution to the conflict over game in Kenya. Effective acceptance may be said to have come about by 1933. At that point, Kenya's course was set, although it still required a good deal of effort to make the government take action, and there was much controversy
over the size and location of the parks.

The year 1933 was none too soon. Dangerously depleted game populations were not yet the real problem, although some species, such as the white rhinoceros, were near extinction. Poaching and development had taken their toll of nearly all species, but the position was not yet that of saving the last few elephant herds. It was the growth of the human population, their claims on land, and the government's increasing concern for African rights that made time press. National parks were intended to be permanent and to be places where the interests of wildlife were paramount. Thus it was difficult to secure agreement on the establishment of parks in areas where human interests, such as farming, already existed, or even in areas that promised to repay economic endeavour of some kind, although as yet unclaimed. The longer the fight for parks was postponed, the fewer areas would be left to which no one had laid claim.

Moreover, for the parks to be successful, they had to be of reasonable size and not chosen purely on the basis of their uselessness for other purposes. Grazing, water supplies, and space for the game to move about naturally without constantly straying out of the park were basic considerations. A park was not a zoo; the animals were expected to fend for themselves and this required large tracts of natural habitat. A secure legal hold on such tracts could not be sought too soon. As Mervyn Cowie, first director of National Parks in Kenya, wrote in Fly, Fulture, many people were in favour of preserving animals in theory but had little idea of the requirements. They often argued that game had survived for thousands of years, and that
the current laws and reserves were protection enough. And many opposed any measures that would interfere with personal plans. "There was little land left that was not part of someone's plans." 2

But the general consensus among settlers and officials that game should be preserved in areas where it would not bother people provided the idea of national parks with suitable soil to root in. Game Wardens Percival and Ritchie had both favoured national parks for some time," and the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire in 1928 had appealed to the Governor, Sir Edward Grigg, to establish national parks. 46 In 1930 and 1933 two events crystallized the concept of national parks and gave it wide publicity. One was the Game Conference of 1930, presided over by Sir Edward Grigg, and the other was the International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa, held in 1933.

The Game Conference of 1930 was the result of initiatives in both London and Kenya. 41 In London, the Society for the Preservation of the Fauna of the Empire (later known as the Fauna Society) 42 approached Lord Passfield, Secretary of State for the Colonies, on March 5, 1930, with proposals for a conference of East African game wardens, and for a representative of the Fauna Society to be sent to survey the problems of preservation in the various territories. Passfield did not give his approval to the conference, but agreed that a representative should be sent. 43 The Fauna Society hoped to send the Warden of Kruger National Park, Colonel Stevenson-Hamilton, but he could not spare the time from his duties and Major
R.E.G. Hingston was chosen. His mission was to survey national parks for the various territories including Kenya. His proposals were to obtain the approval of the local authorities and were then to be presented to the Colonial Office. The initiative in Kenya came from Grigg, who decided to take advantage of the opportunity provided by Hingston's visit to hold a conference to discuss general policy with regard to the preservation of game in Kenya. Grigg wrote to Passfield in these terms on July 4, 1930, and the Game Conference met in Nairobi on July 31. The aim of the conference was not to question the object of preserving game, but to consider the best means for achieving this end. The participants included the Governor, the Game Warden, the Chief Native Commissioner, the Chief Veterinary Officer, the P.C., Masai, and some settler representatives, including Delamere and several honorary game wardens.

The conference appointed a sub-committee chaired by the Game Warden and empowered to study "the desirability of establishing a definite National Park as a permanent game sanctuary in the Colony, and if so where." A second meeting of the conference was held on September 19, 1930, and the sub-committee's recommendations regarding national parks were approved, with minor amendments. Three areas were selected as likely sites for permanent sanctuaries: the Northern Game Reserve, a region lying between the Giriama and Kamba Native Reserves, north of the Sabaki River, and a small, forested area in the Aberdares Range which would provide conditions suitable for the bongo, colobus monkey, and other forest creatures.

At this conference, the idea of national parks achieved
acceptance as the most important tool of preservation and was supported by a number of people with power and influence. The conference stimulated thought about parks in other quarters as well. Even the Department of Agriculture, not notably enthusiastic about preservation in the past, looked forward to the establishment of a definite system of permanent segregation of game and agriculture, noting that the easily-altered boundaries of the reserves made them unsatisfactory. The specific recommendations made at the conference underwent various changes as Ritchie and others studied them. Ritchie, in particular, pushed hard for the establishment of a park near Nairobi which would attract tourists and afford easy access to the enjoyment of game for the main centre of population in Kenya. In 1933, the Kenya Land Commission under Sir William Morris Carter supported Ritchie's recommendation as well as approving the proposal for a park in the Northern Frontier Province including Marsabit, provided that African rights were adequately safeguarded.

In that same year, 1933, the International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa was held in London. Two years earlier, the International Congress for the Protection of Nature, meeting in Paris, had passed a resolution urging that a convention for the protection of African fauna and flora be drawn up. The British government, whose official delegate had put forward the resolution, subsequently prepared a draft convention and invited the Powers interested in Africa to an international conference. This conference was immensely important to the future of game in Africa. The issues dealt with
were quite similar to those discussed at the conference held in 1900, but the delegates gave stronger support to the proposals for preservation. This was probably due to the insignificance, relative to 1900, of income from the exploitation of game products in colonial finances. A Convention was signed on November 8, 1933, by all the European powers with territory in Africa and by Egypt and the Union of South Africa, and, unlike the Convention of 1900, it succeeded in obtaining ratification. Consequently, Kenya, among other territories, was bound by the provisions of the Convention.

This landmark conference accomplished two significant steps: a definition of the term "national park" was internationally accepted, and signatories of the Convention were required to "explore forthwith" the possibility of establishing national parks in their territories. Where such parks were possible, work was to begin within two years of the Convention's coming into force.

The definition of "national park" agreed to by the Conference read:

The expression "national park" shall denote an area (a) placed under public control, the boundaries of which shall not be altered or any portion be capable of alienation except by the competent legislative authority; (b) set aside for the propagation, protection and preservation of wild animal life and wild vegetation, and for the preservation of objects of aesthetic, geological, prehistoric, historical, archeological, or other scientific interest for the benefit, advantage, and enjoyment of the general public; (c) in which the hunting, killing or capturing of fauna and the destruction or collection of flora is prohibited except by or under the direction or control of the park authorities.

In accordance with the above provisions facilities shall, so far as possible, be given to the
general public for observing the fauna and flora in national parks. 91

A number of other important provisions included the definition of national reserves, lacking the permanency of parks, regulation of the trophy trade, preservation of endangered species, and the prohibition of hunting from automobiles and aircraft or the use of fire, poison, explosives, nets, pits, and traps. 92

The Convention established a legal framework and a timetable for national parks in Africa, and obliged the signatories to cooperate on such matters as the trophy trade. A remarkable degree of unanimity was displayed at the conference, and the future looked brighter for game preservation than it had seemed before. But the implementation of the articles of the Convention was not to proceed so quickly and smoothly, as Kenya found in connection with the smuggling trade across the border with Italian Somaliland. 93

The conference excited a good deal of attention and encouraged those supporting preservation, both in London and Kenya. The Times reported a strong public opinion in Kenya favouring action on preservation. 94 Mervyn Cowie, who grew up on a farm in Kenya and was to play an important role in forcing action on the parks issue, was first excited by the international conference, and then convinced of the immediacy of the need for parks by his discovery, after an absence from Kenya, of the rapid spread of cultivation and the disappearance of the game from many of its old haunts. 95

According to Cowie, there was a great deal of opposition to
be overcome. Africans were generally hostile because the parks would take up land, although some who lived in areas that would be unaffected were indifferent. The European farming community included many who opposed setting aside land for fear that their claims would be curtailed. This attitude resembled earlier expressions of hostility to reserves. The Colonial Office was wary of abridging African rights and the Treasury was wary of the expense. On the other hand, Hingston reported meeting "almost unanimous opinion," official and unofficial, that the fauna must be preserved, that "its disappearance would be a crime against posterity." He went on to observe that opinion was just as strong that game must not be allowed to injure man or his cultivations and possessions. He concluded, "This dual demand can be effected only by placing man and animals in two permanently separate compartments; in other words only by establishing National Parks."  

By 1933, national parks had become the central aim towards which the energies of the supporters of preservation in Kenya were directed. This was the culmination of the gradual process whereby game policy had been modified to accommodate changing conditions in Kenya. Initially, the policy had been to preserve game everywhere in the Protectorate. The process of modification had begun when the European settlers arrived and the principle that game should not hinder development was articulated. It had continued with the expansion of settler hunting rights and the increased emphasis on game control. The extension of game control to African areas marked a fundamental reversal of the original policy, at least in theory. Instead of preserving game
throughout the Colony, or, as soon became the case, everywhere but in the settled areas, the administration intended to control game wherever it interfered with development—African as well as European. In practice, the small staff of the Game Department did not permit very effective control. This was significant in light of the continued denial of increased hunting privileges to Africans. Nevertheless, the extension of game control, coupled with the pressures of development, forced the issue of national parks. Under the new policy, permanent sanctuaries were needed if the game was to survive. It was hoped that control of game outside the parks and revenue obtained through visitors inside the parks would overcome many of the problems of the co-existence of game and man.

The selection of national parks as the method of preservation, and the degree of success achieved were to have spectacular results in Kenya. After World War II, when air travel made Africa accessible to many more tourists, the income deriving therefrom became immensely important to Kenya. In 1958-59, tourism became the second largest source of foreign exchange in Kenya, after coffee, and it became the largest source in 1968. After fifty years, during which the security afforded by its economic significance was eroded, game came into its own once more, becoming Kenya's greatest attraction, as it had been at the turn of the century.

This achievement was considerable. But the fundamental weakness of colonial preservation policy—the absence of African support—remained. When national parks became the chosen target of the preservationists, Africans were not
involved. When enough support was acquired to realize the parks scheme, Africans were not part of the consensus. Owing to the neglect during the previous thirty years of efforts to make wildlife preservation attractive to Africans, this omission was unavoidable. Preservation measures could not wait for a change in African opinion that might be induced by alterations of policy to accommodate African interests. In consequence, the establishment of national parks by Europeans in an African country was resisted. It did not seem to Africans that the parks offered any advantages to them. Africans who had hunted for meat and skins before the Europeans came, and who had learned to hunt commercially to satisfy the trophy trade, did not change their ideas or alter their habits. Pastoralists and agriculturalists who wanted to rid their lands of game and expand their holdings put pressure on the parks and prevented some suitable areas from becoming parks.

It is curious that so little effort was made to experiment with methods of preservation that might have transformed the game into an asset in some African areas. Much land in Kenya is ill suited for anything other than the support of game populations. In regions where neither domestic stock nor crops could flourish, attempts might have been made to augment African income through game ranching. But game ranching was hardly thought of until the 1960's. The Game Department had no funds for such projects, and the Agricultural and Veterinary Departments were too taken up with other large problems to give attention to uncertain experiments with game. Simpler ways might have been found to ensure that Africans received some tangible
benefits from the presence of game in their areas. Schemes whereby some game revenues could find their way directly into local African pockets would have been useful. Hunting and photography fees, or entrance fees into certain areas might have been paid to Local Native Councils, for example. None of these possibilities was free from difficulties. The point is, however, that virtually no effort was made by the European administration until nearly the end of the colonial period to concoct schemes which might present the attractions of direct financial gains to Africans living in areas where game preservation was desirable.

The neglect of African interests in the first half of the colonial era assisted the survival of game populations in large parts of the Protectorate where they would have diminished under a regime of rigorous game control and unrestricted African hunting. The initial success of this strategy was striking. The spectacular quality of Kenya's game which had attracted so much attention early in the Protectorate's history was maintained, stimulating determined European efforts to save the game when development became a threat. But the opportunity to gather African support was lost. The wildlife in Kenya still reaps the bitter fruits of this failure. Without the African public's informed cooperation, the achievements of the colonial period in the field of preservation will not endure.
1. The trend away from hunting and towards photography, among those people interested in wildlife, has altered the sense of the term "game." It is now loosely used to mean all protected wildlife and does not necessarily or usually imply any interest in hunting.

2. The negative view of these animals has changed quite recently, thanks to a greater understanding of the web of relationships among all species, and to detailed studies of some of the unpopular animals, such as hyenas (Hans Kruuk, *The Spotted Hyena*, 1972) and crocodiles (Alistair Graham, *Evelids of Morning*, 1973). Crocodiles were protected beginning in 1958, after an upsurge in commercial hunting. Game department Annual Report 1958/59.


4. Memorandum by Percival, enclosed in Eliot to F.O., December 11, 1903, F.O. 2/819/42. The fee for a settler's licence was £10 at the time.

5. Meeting of the Legislative Council, September 18, 1911, Legislative Council Minutes 1911, C.O. 544/2.


8. Ibid., p. 285.


11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.

15. Meeting of the Legislative Council, September 11, 1907, Legislative Council Minutes 1907-1909, C.O. 544/2. The Commissioner replied that the reserves were Executive Council business, but that the Legislative Council was free to bring up any topic.

16. Meeting of the Legislative Council, September 16, 1924, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, NA. This has been an argument popular with settlers and others possessing a relatively sophisticated technology, who are competing for land with less sophisticated people. The ability to extract greater wealth from the land is seen as conferring a right to that land.

17. After World War II, the tourist boom enabled preservationists to argue that game conservation offered better economic returns than any other form of land use in some parts of Kenya.

18. Meeting of the Legislative Council, November 6, 1926, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, NA.


20. Meeting of the Legislative Council, November 2, 1926, Kenya Legislative Council Debates, NA.

21. Asst. D.C. Lamu to D.C. Lamu, September 19, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197; Masai Province Annual Reports 1935, 1936, PC/SP 1/2/2; Archdeacon of Kavirondo H.E. Owen to D.C., Southern Kavirondo/Kisii, September 22, 1933; D.C., Southern Kavirondo/Kisii to P.C., Nyanza, November 4, 1933, PC/NZA Dep. 3/3, NA. See also following note.

22. D.C., Nakuru to P.C., Rift Valley, October 23, 1935, P.C., Rift Valley to Game Warden, October 25, 1935, PC/RVP 6A/22/3, NA. The hides, horns, tusks, etc., of game shot in defence of crops or livestock were the property of the government unless the settler had a licence for private land and the animal was listed on that licence. Elephants were not on the list. Therefore letting Watkins keep the tusks would have amounted to payment of compensation. This provision annoyed settlers who suffered real damage and could have used the money obtained through the sale of trophies, but it prevented farmers from shooting for profit animals innocent of causing damage through trespass.

23. Ag. Game Warden to P.C., Rift Valley, November 12, 1935, PC/RVP 6A/22/3, NA.

while an independent agent acting for the Game Department assessed it at Shs. 250. The Warden received a very abusive letter from Watkins, but the two men later met, and having roundly cursed each other, parted on good terms.


27. Meeting of the Legislative Council, September 18, 1911, Legislative Council Minutes 1911, C.O. 544/2.


33. Game Department Annual Report 1927, p. 39, C.O. 544/23. Ritchie did not specify, but it is safe to assume that he was referring to the European public.

34. Report by Percival enclosed in Eliot to P.O., October 26, 1903, P.O. 2/819/33.


38. D.C. Samburu to P.C. Rift Valley, September 28, 1934, PC/RVF 6A/22/3, NA.

39. Delamere to Hill, August 12, 1900, P.O. 403/303/38.

40. Cranworth, *Colony*, p. 280. Hippopotamus destroyed crops but were harmless to stock.

41. Meeting of the Legislative Council, March 27, 1913, Legislative Council Minutes, C.O. 544/6.

42. Meeting of the Legislative Council, November 6, 1926.

Sir Robert Thorne Coryndon, (1870-1925) the Governor of Kenya from 1922 until he died in 1925, was born in the Cape Colony and had once been a professional big game hunter. Thus he had a special interest in game. He had also been private secretary to Cecil Rhodes, and he had served in the administrations of Swaziland, Basutoland, and Uganda.

Meeting of the Legislative Council, October 19, 1921, Legislative Council Minutes 1921-1929, C.O. 544/29. For evidence of the strong interest in preservation exhibited by the P.O. and the C.O., see the series of Command Papers entitled *Correspondence Relating to the Preservation of Wild Animals in Africa*, Cd 3189 (1906), Cd 4472 (1909), Cd 5136 (1910), Cd 5775 (1911), Cd 6671 (1913).

Tana River District Annual Report, 1925, extract in Tana River Political Record Book, DC/TRD 3/2; Sutcliffe to Oldfield, undated, Tana River District Handing Over Reports, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

Oldfield to Huxley, January 20, 1928, Tana River District Handing Over Reports 1922-45, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

Asst. D.C. Lamu to D.C. Lamu, September 19, 1921, PC/Coast Dep. 1 49/1197, NA.

Ag. P.C. Nyanza to Game Warden, January 10, 1935, August 26, 1935, PC/HZA Dep. 3/3, NA.

D.C. Central Kavirondo to P.C. Nyanza, November 4, 1933, PC/HZA Dep. 3/3, NA. He recommended the appointment of native game control officers.

The Boers were notorious for unrelenting game destruction, and the Game Department had no expectation that they would confine themselves to shooting zebra in the Reserve.

54. Masai Province Annual Report 1928-29, PC/SP 1/2/2, NA.

55. Masai Province Annual Reports 1935, 1936, PC/SP 1/2/2, NA.


57. D.C. Central Kavirondo to P.C. Nyanza, April 12, 1939, PC/NZA Dep. 3/4, NA.

58. Oldfield to Reiley, January 20, 1928, DC/TRD 2/1; Louder to Keir, October 1939, DC/TRD 2/1; Masai Province Annual Report 1932, PC/SP 1/2/2; D.C. Kisii to Game Warden, April 27, 1936, PC/NZA 3/3, NA.

59. Tana River District Political Record Book, DC/TRD 3/2, extracts of Annual Reports 1920-21, 1922, 1925; Sutcliffe to Oldfield, DC/TRD 2/1, NA.

60. Masai Province Annual Report 1924, PC/SP 1/1/2, NA.

61. Ag. D.C. Digo to Senior Commissioner Mombasa, October 1, 1925, PC/Coast Dep. 1 26/292, NA.

62. Ag. D.C. Digo to Game Warden, August 13, 1924, PC/Coast Dep. 1 47/1168; Senior Coast Commissioner to Ag. Chief Native Commissioner, October 7, 1925, PC/Coast Dep. 1 26/292.

63. Senior Commissioner Coast to Ag. D.C. Digo, October 15, 1925; Ag. Chief Native Commissioner to Senior Commissioner Coast, October 26, 1925, November 9, 1925, PC/Coast 26/292, NA.

64. Secretariat Circulars 45, May 31, 1912, and 59, August 8, 1912, and correspondence, PC/Coast Dep. 1 3/186, NA.

Responses to the first circular have been obtained from the Coast Province only. Five out of six District Commissioners opposed the extension of licences to Africans. The sixth merely observed that the hunting tribes would hunt without licences even if the latter were available. The Acting Provincial Commissioner also disapproved of the proposal. Two District Commissioners were willing to give limited licences to "chiefs," hoping that this would spark some interest in game preservation, but the consensus was that if licences were issued, they would be abused and the administration would be unable to
do anything about it.

65. Masai Province Annual Reports, 1914, 1922, 1925, PC/SP 1/2/2, NA. The Masai would doubtless have considered the extermination of wildebeest a good use for their taxes. It is still questionable how troublesome wildebeest were, however, if the Masai could have paid to get rid of them and did not.

66. Game Department Annual Reports, C.O. 544, and see Chapter vii, note 51.

67. P.C. Nyansa to D.C. Central Kavirondo, April 6, 1939, D.C. Central Kavirondo to P.C. Nyansa, April 12, 1939, PC/NZA Dep. 3/4, NA.

68. Assistant Game Warden Woodhouse to Game Warden, October 8, 1912, PC/Coast Dep. 1 4/335, NA.

69. Correspondence file "Game 1931-50," PC/NZA Dep. 3/4, NA.

70. Game Department Annual Report 1930, p. 9, C.O. 544/32. See also the Masai Province Annual Report 1930, PC/SP 1/2/2, NA.


73. Buxley, The Bottled Lizard, p. 265. It should be noted that poaching, in particular for profit, was not unknown among the European population. It angered the Game Department, but according to their reports, it was not a serious problem.

74. Cranworth, Colony, p. 238.

75. See Chapter iv, note 58. The Northern Reserve, originally bounded on the north by the third parallel and on the east by the thirty-ninth meridian - roughly 100 miles north and east of Marsabit respectively - lost perhaps two-thirds of its area. In 1909, Marsabit was its north-east corner.

76. The Serengeti Plains in Tanganyika received the title "national park" in 1941, but did not truly become one until 1951, when the region's legal status was altered to conform to the definition accepted by the Convention of the International Conference for the Protection of the Fauna and Flora of Africa held in 1933. (To be discussed below.)

77. Information regarding the establishment of Kenya's parks may be found in Mervyn Cowlie's Fly, Vulture and in his unpublished "History of the Royal National Parks of


81. I am indebted to Mervyn Cowie, first Director of the National Parks in Kenya (from 1946), who gave me both a personal interview and access to his own unpublished "History of the Royal National Parks of Kenya," on which I have drawn for this discussion of the Conferences of 1930 and 1933.

82. Those out of sympathy with the Society's aims often referred to it as "the Penitent Butchers."

83. Passfield considered that it would be preferable to consult individually with the governments concerned, and suggested that the Fauna Society send a representative to do so. He also believed the question was not urgent. "Joint Deputation to H.M. Secretary of State for the Colonies," *JSPPE*, Vol. XI N.S. (1930), pp. 11-16.

84. Major Richard William Hingston, born in 1887, was a surgeon and naturalist. He was employed by the Indian Medical Service from 1910 to 1927, served in East Africa during the first World War, and was medical officer and naturalist to a number of expeditions, including the Everest expedition of 1924, the Indian Marine Survey of 1925-1927, and the Oxford University Expedition to Greenland in 1928. In 1929, he led the Oxford University Expedition to British Guiana. He wrote several books and numerous articles in the field of natural history.

Lt. Col. James Stevenson-Hamilton, born in 1867, was educated at Rugby and Sandhurst. He travelled from the Cape to Cairo in 1898, and explored the Congo-Zambezi watershed in 1898-1899. After serving in the Boer War, he became Warden of the Transvaal Game Reserves from 1902 to 1926, and Warden of Kruger National Park from 1926 to 1946. He wrote several books, including *South African Eden*, (1937) and *Wild Life in South Africa* (1947).


87. The sub-committee had also recommended proposing to the Masai that the latter fully accept the preservation of game in the Southern Reserve in return for assistance in the form of water and fencing schemes. But the P.C., Masai, stated in September that it was not yet the proper time to approach the Masai regarding permanent game conservation in their reserve. Ritchie's subsequent efforts to obtain approval for a park near Nairobi were animated by a fear that the Southern Reserve would soon disappear.


92. So far as possible, it was recognized that it would not be easy to stop Africans from using many of these methods.

93. Even at the Conference Italy gave a warning rattle. The British representatives wanted to declare all found trophies the property of the government concerned, in order to end a situation in which people from country A could buy ivory in country B, smuggle it back across the border and sell it in country A as "found" ivory. The Italian representative stated that Italy would not change the system in their colonies whereby half the value of the trophy went to the "finder" because the finders would then cease to bring trophies in, smuggling them instead. The present system was very efficient. *The Times*, November 3, 1933. This sort of efficiency boded no good for the game. The article in question was weakened, much to the disappointment of the Kenya Game Department.


95. Interview with Hervyn Cowie, November 27, 1974, Nairobi.

In the 1940s, when the government was considering exactly where to establish parks, Africans did have influence on the selection of areas. Hopes of establishing a park at Amboseli, in the Masai Reserve, were disappointed; some areas were excluded from Tsavo Park owing to questionable African claims. Second Interim Report of the Game Policy Committee 1939; interview with Hervyn Cowie, November 27, 1974, Nairobi.

Grazing schemes began to receive attention in the 1960s. See for example E.W. Russell, ed., The Natural Resources of East Africa (Nairobi: D.A. Hawkins Ltd., in association with the East African Literature Bureau, 1962); E.B. Worthington, The Wild Resources of East and Central Africa (London: HMSO 1961, Colonial No. 352.) A pilot game-cropping scheme was set up by the Kenya Game Department in 1960, but it was difficult to make a profit. Cropping game in its wild state is expensive, owing to the need for refrigerated trucks to collect the carcasses. Additional handicaps were that Kenya could not export game meat owing to the presence of rinderpest in the Colony, and that many Africans would not eat game meat or could not afford it. Game Department Annual Report 1960, pp. 7-9. A scheme to domesticate the oryx is currently being tried in East Africa. "Nova," P.B.S. Telecast, August 8, 1978: "The Tsetse Trap."

The first tentative scheme was established in 1951, when hunters visiting the Marck area of the Masai Reserve were charged additional fees, the extra money going to the local African District Council. Game Department Annual Report 1951, p. 7. A system of Controlled Area fees, established in 1958, whereby game hunters and photographers paid fees to Local Native Councils, obtained swift and positive responses in some African areas where game was abundant and could be expected to produce income. Game Department Annual Reports 1958/59, pp. 1, 4; 1960, pp. 2-4.

According to D.M. Sindiyo of the Game Department, a small pilot programme of public education was tried out in 1964 - a year after independence. The Samburu District was selected, and efforts were made to discover what the Samburu thought of game preservation, and to explain to them the economic value of wildlife. In 1967, the programme was described as successful. The Samburu agreed to an extension of the Samburu Game Reserve, and some of the money generated by the game through fees and the sale of trophies was used to benefit the people living in the reserve. D.M. Sindiyo, "Game Department Field Experience in Public Education" Proceedings of the Symposium on Wildlife Management and Land Use (Nairobi, July 5-8, 1967) The East African Agricultural and Forestry Journal XXXIII
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