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HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE AND THE FICTIONAL IMAGINATION

IN THE ERA OF FASCISM:

A STUDY OF THOMAS MANN'S DR. FAUSTUS

by

Jody Dee Berland

B.A. Simon Fraser University 1972

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

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Title of Thesis/Project/Extended Essay

"Historical Experience and the Fictional Imagination in the Era of Fascism: A Study of Thomas Mann's Dr. Faustus."

Author:

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May 8, 1978
Abstract

This thesis is the result of an interdisciplinary study of German culture from the last quarter of the 19th century through the Weimar Republic (1918-1933) and the subsequent Nazi regime. I chose to study Mann's fiction as a focus for investigating some important cultural and social tensions in that period, and how they entered into and were expressed through literature. Mann's literature, unique in certain respects, confronts most explicitly the emotional and creative tensions which resulted from German political and social developments during that period.

The thesis demonstrates that Mann's fiction was a conscious attempt to combine the narrative structure and attentiveness to social conflicts of the European novel with the lyrical, mythical traditions of German writing. His desire to play the role of "representative" writer for the German middle class, combined with the development of a progressive social consciousness in response to political events during this period, form a paradox that finds its most explicit expression in Dr. Faustus. This tension can be identified structurally in the balance between symbolism and naturalism, which leads to a synthetic mode of writing Mann called "constructivism". It is also apparent in the ambivalent attitude expressed through the novel towards the reactionary politics of the German middle class intelligentsia, a politics of nihilism and authoritarianism crudely masked by the aestheticist-ideology of German romanticism, of which Mann had earlier been a staunch advocate. The thesis attempts to show how Mann's experience of the historical and social catastrophe of German Nazism appeared in his fiction, essays, and letters, and altered his orientation towards society and subsequently towards literature. The ambivalence suffered by Mann concerning his own creative identity, which was frequently in conflict with his own intellectual and political
perspectives, allowed him to articulate most transparently character-
istic difficulties of fictional writing faced by the modern novelist
who has lost a sense of integration with himself or with society.

The first chapter traces Mann's development, both as essayist and as
novelist, from the Expressionist and conservative tendencies of his early
stories to the more committed social orientation of his last novel. In-
fluences of the social and cultural milieu of Weimar Germany are con-
sidered. The second chapter explains how Zeitblom, narrator of the novel,
exemplifies in his intellectual perspectives the mentality of the German
petit-bourgeois. The chapter includes a historical analysis of the ex-
periences of that social class in Germany. The third chapter studies
the form and structure of Leverkühn's music, explaining how Mann came to
associate the 12-tone system with authoritarianism and alienation. The
fourth chapter investigates the relationship of symbolism to realism in
the novel itself; the fifth chapter summarizes changes in Mann's fictional
orientation in connection with changes in his perspectives on art and
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Introduction

Thomas Mann is widely considered to be both the greatest and the most "representative" German writer of this century.¹ To be the "representative" German writer was a public role very much sought by him, first within Germany and later internationally, after his permanent exile from Germany which began in 1933. His integration of German tradition with the European trends of realism and naturalism showed a responsiveness to current developments that was matched by the response of his audience:

...no other "serious writer was quite as widely read in his own lifetime or as successful in bridging the gap between the minority publics available to other "serious" writers. Only very few of these minority groups, rejected Mann before 1933; only very few critics failed to agree that he was the most important, the most distinguished German writer of imaginative prose during the first half of this century.²

That Mann's fiction began and remained fixed upon his preoccupation with the moral and aesthetic problems of the isolated artist, fundamentally alienated from his own society, does not contradict this self-assigned and widely accorded role of representativeness. As one critic has commented,

The representative or exemplary status assumed by and sometimes granted to modern German writers may seem to contradict what has been implied about their tendency towards a cult of inwardness; but where the cult of inwardness is general to the point of being built into the (German) educational system, the contradiction is less acute than it seems.³

Certainly the philosophical background in German thought was characterized by such introspection. Schiller's ideas, which later influenced Mann,⁴ exemplified this ideological passivity, which called for freedom of thought but ignored the question of political rights. In fact,

...the whole intellectual movement of the German eighteenth century had as its almost exclusive aim the education of the individual, and to that it subordinated all political demands.⁵

Mann considered himself to be a sympathetic descendent of the
tradition of German romantic idealism; certainly his original beliefs and his emotional affinities were with the "cult of inwardness". At the same time he believed the inheritance of that tradition to be the national and international catastrophes caused by the Nazis after 1933. This is but one of the many perplexing paradoxes that arise when Mann's "representativeness" comes to be examined. Any discussion of Mann's work, spanning as it does over half a century of dramatic social and cultural changes, must begin with a recognition of the hosts of such contradictions. This is entirely consistent with his work itself. The desire to explore the positive and negative aspects of his own tradition, and to discover how they could be contained within one system of thought (exemplified by himself) was to occupy him for all of his later years.

This essay will treat Mann's last major novel, Dr. Faustus: The Life of the German Composer Adrian Leverkühn As Told by a Friend (1947) as a conscious and explicit attempt by the author to account for the entire scope of Mann's early work in the context of its relationship to the development of German contemporary history. While the intention of this study is to analyze aspects of Dr. Faustus as a literary work, the very nature of the novel demands an evaluation of its relationship to Mann's earlier writing, both fiction and criticism, and more particularly the nature of its response to an entire epoch of historical and political development to which Mann felt himself uniquely responsible.

Part of Mann's desire for accountability is enacted through the astounding complexity of the novel, which purposefully demands a reading which can make sense of its many levels of meaning only by considering its intellectual, emotional, political, and cultural genesis. Such a task, in its entirety, would require a thorough analysis of Mann's literary work, as well as his political and critical essays, in the context of a political
and cultural history of Germany. Only this exhaustiveness could completely explain the trauma and catastrophe at every level of human experience which gave impetus to the final work. Of course such thoroughness is impossible here. Yet rather than concentrating on a single aspect of the novel I have chosen to consider a range of them, to elaborate on several of them, and above all to bring into focus the profoundly dialectical relationships between them. A proper study, like the novel itself, should reveal connections between the rational intellectual processes within the structure of the novel and the emotional impetus of its creation, as well as the identification established within the novel between the political and the aesthetic, the historical and the uniquely individual.

Such a methodology is not without dangers. In choosing to follow a particular image or dynamic from one traditional "discipline" to another, it is difficult to do justice to each. Unavoidably I will disturb some expectations of thoroughness, or substantiation, or selection, in the treatment of an individual problem. In a sense this is precisely the challenge that Dr. Faustus presents. The very complexity and novelty of its structure demands a critical methodology that is at present insufficiently developed. A later chapter will discuss the degree to which, in the thematic and formal structure of the novel, everything is internally connected. History, autobiography, fiction, myth: it is impossible to completely establish the borders between them, though certainly enough detective-work has been directed to just that purpose. But Mann was deliberate in his obscuring of these boundaries. He neither expected nor desired an easy reading of this novel. After what he had seen in his lifetime, he undoubtedly felt that the perimeters between the old conceptions of individual, social, ideological, historical or political realms would
have to be intransigently converged before they could once again be valid-
ly separated.

This necessarily directs the critic to be wary of the narrow scope of inter-
pretations available through the usual methods of literary criticism. Mann
would have agreed that "the sundering of a scientific from a poetic
truth is the primal mark of an administrative mind." At the same time,
some critical methodology is necessary which can do justice to the pre-
carious relationship established by Mann between the creative and critical
fields. Mann insistently rejected what he saw as a fatal separation
between science and poetry. The encyclopedic quality of his longer
novels, and the poetic licence taken in his critical essays, attest to
his rejection of the anti-rational thrust of poetic practice within German
aesthetics. Thus Mann's attempt to inject rational validity into an ide-
ology—or perhaps more accurately, an emotional experience—that was anta-
gonistic to such a purpose, underlines all his work. The form of this
attempt at reconciliation, which in the end was born of an internal
struggle that would not release him, moved from irony—the resigned am-
bivalence of non-resolution—to tragedy, when the consequences of this
non-resolution, in Mann's eyes at any rate, had ravaged all of Europe.
Of course romantic ideology, in itself, was certainly not responsible for
World War II or other horrors, as Mann sometimes seems to have thought.
Here, at least, a more objective analysis can place Mann's treatment of
history within his own ideological framework. Yet such a historical cat-
estrophe, and the human imagination which struggles to comprehend and
compensate for these events, are indeed different aspects of a social
totality which must be understood in all its aspects. The novel itself is
an attempt to recreate such a social totality, and it is this attempt that
the following analysis will attempt to explore.

I. The Development of the Writer

A. Themes in Mann's Early Fiction

A familiarity with some of Mann's earlier work helps to illuminate the extent to which Dr. Faustus is autobiographical—although the novel itself, with its many hints and coincidences, makes no secret of the fact, and the additional explicitness of Story of a Novel: The Genesis of Dr. Faustus (1949) is provided in case anyone missed the point. This introductory review of early tendencies and developments is not intended as a thorough retrospective of Mann's work before Dr. Faustus, but will examine only selected developments that occurred both through creative activity and through the influence of political events. This is doubly important (and this is what determines the selection), since such a review concerns also the time period described in Dr. Faustus: that is, the early part of the century, which ended officially with Hitler's takeover in 1933. The mingling of history and fiction has been carried over into the act of writing itself, since the fictional time in which Zeitblom writes Leverkuhn's biography corresponds precisely to the actual time that Mann wrote the novel; beginning on the same day in May, 1943. More substantial correspondences are to be found in that the aesthetic and political questions raised in an analysis of the novel itself, particularly concerning the development of Leverkuhn's work in composition and his personality as portrayed by Zeitblom, are precisely those involved in a discussion of Mann's early attitudes and creative work. Because of this at least a brief review of these early developments in Mann's work and in his ideas is necessary, to show how Mann might have been Leverkuhn, and in the end was
Mann's earliest literary works were short stories; they appeared in a collection entitled _Little Herr Friedemann_ in 1898, though some, including the title story, had been written earlier. The collection included "Little Herr Friedemann", "Der Tod", "The Dilettante", "Tobias Minder-nickel" and "Little Lizzy". These stories share with the Expressionist movement a fascination with disease and the pathological, but the tone and style are entirely distinct from Expressionist extremism. The narration of the stories remains quite old-fashioned, so that an unusual ironic tone is introduced, fore-shadowing a device that was later more conscious: the "calculated and artistically mastered incongruity between the meaning of the story told and the manner of telling it." These stories evidence a kinship with certain Expressionist characteristics, the "darkness, introspection, a concern with the mysterious and uncanny, massive metaphysical speculation, a certain gratuitous cruelty and a brilliant linear hardness." The central characters are invariably social outcasts who, because of their alienation from social norms through disease, disfigurement, or eccentricity, have developed an over-refined awareness of aesthetic form. The characterization of these personalities rarely elicits sympathy. Artistic leanings are always suspect, coupled with disease or neurosis, a dubious replacement for social warmth and acceptance. Herr Friedemann's cultivation of aesthetic refinement, which springs directly from the isolation of the disfigured, collapses too easily under the weight of sudden erotic obsession. The entire structure of his life crumbles when his real "inward" self is touched. That these are not connected is assumed, anticipating a similar dichotomy within Thomas Buddenbrooks. Warmth is lacking in the implicit authorial attitude towards the
characters as well. The attitude of the author, one of cool and unsympathetic irony, is similarly recreated in *Buddenbrooks* (1901) in the abhorrence the fastidious Thomas Buddenbrooks feels for his creative, eccentric, socially unproductive brother Christian. The influence of Nietzsche, whom Mann encountered early, is apparent here. Art is viewed as a dubious substitute for vitality, and the perspective of the sensitive artist is examined without mercy. Although the subject is treated ironically another coherent perspective does not offer itself as an alternative. In this way the hidden kinship of the author to his characters reveals itself: any control over his own resources that might be available to the character, in other words the primacy of the will over social forces or instinctive drives, exists purely as the external, and arbitrary, control of form. Because of this the will itself appears to be arbitrary and, at the same time, fundamentally antisocial. The author, who seems to be completely in control, shows himself to be superior to the interesting specimen being examined. His ironic tone communicates both a preoccupation with disease and a distance from the diseased characters that render them grotesque. The implied superiority of the author exists not on the basis of spiritual values, ethical principles, or a strong autonomous personality, but is confined to the aesthetic sphere. The authorial voice stands in a relationship of the primacy of skill fastidiously probing rather unpleasant aspects of repression and the unconscious in the morbid and isolated character. These characters seem to be destined to suffer hypersensitivity, perpetual disquiet, and failure.

Such a pattern does not recommend a quality of sympathy on the part of the writer. The young Mann was an aristocrat in his emotional as well as in his intellectual nature. His instinctive inclinations were towards the pleasures of the aesthetic; for him this meant subtleties of form, a
faultless and classic structure, the mastery of technique over the most
delicate aspects of his own feelings. Unendingly self-conscious, Mann
should not be seen to be self-indulgent. Just as he sought absolute dis-
cipline in the realm of aesthetic form, he rejected facile optimism or
complacent ethics. This was consistent with the conservative preference
for ambivalence or "profundity" to the simplification and sentimentality
which in his view characterized most of the contemporary movements. The
artistic mastery which is communicated in the early short stories, to which
the characters are somewhat ruthlessly subjected, is ironic about values,
and about emotional experience in general, but is profoundly serious about
form. "While life suffers, language indulges in almost self-sufficient
revels." The implicit defense of the prerogative of the artist to stand
aside from moral judgement or social involvement is itself the subject of
later work, Dr. Faustus in particular.

Of course the reader is made aware that such fastidious and elegant
artistry must spring from some depth of emotional suffering: that is what
the stories are about. The earnestness of confession, the clearly auto-
biographical narration of the artist's traumas, with all its coy hints and
suggestions, may be the most humanly winning quality in Mann's stories.
This confessional tone becomes more explicit in Mann's first novel,
Buddenbrooks, because of its conspicuous autobiographical detail, and of
course in the novella Tonio Kroger (1902).

And then, with knowledge, its torment and its arrogance, came sol-
itude; because he could not endure the blithe and innocent with
their darkened understanding, while they in turn were troubled by
the sign on his brow. But his love of the word kept growing
sweeter and sweeter, and his love of form; for he used to say (and
had already said it in writing) that knowledge of the soul would
unfailingy make us melancholy if the pleasures of expression did
not keep us alert and of good cheer. At the same time this melancholy earnestness is ridiculed in the content
itself, in the ironic tone towards such preoccupation with one's own faults and visions. For the most part the author stands apart, mercilessly exposing, observing with a smile. The very form itself becomes a kind of parody; like Leverkühn's early work, the authenticity of expression makes parody of the form the only solution. Because of this Zeitblom will continuously forgive Leverkühn's arrogant parody, because it is proof of his hero's genius: the "proud expedient of a great gift threatened with sterility by a combination of scepticism, intellectual reserve, and a sense of the deadly extension of the kingdom of the banal" (152).

It is implied by the tone of Mann's early stories that the emotional drive to create is really rather neurotic, a sign of weakness and self-indulgence. By diminishing the validity of the creative imagination, through irony or descriptive distance, the author seems to exempt himself from the anticipated charge of weakness or over-sensitivity. In this sense the author becomes complicit in the patriarchal dismissal of creative activity which separated the authoritarian state from the artistic community, forcing the artistic community into a stance of autonomous inwardness. The cool distancing of the author from the subject artist's fated nonconformity implicitly accepts the official exclusion of modern artists from favour that characterized Wilhelmine Germany. This attitude among artists themselves was the target of Robert Musil's radical accusation against intellectual conformity in 1914, a year that was profoundly significant in the development of German political attitudes. His claim was that such official exclusion of artistic activity had created an urge to conformity on the part of the intellectual community:

...though nothing less than war could have made sudden conformity feasible. And even war could only make it feasible because of the traitor within the intellectuals' gates, the ubiquitous belief that art and intellect were decadent, the products of over-refine-
ment and deficient vitality. 15

Such a dismissal of the value of artistic activity made both possible and necessary the "cult of inwardness" which Mann treated, in these early works, as the sign on the brow, the unavoidable mark of fate of the destined artist who longs unrequitedly for the living strength of the commonplace. Mann's own patriotic propaganda during the war was no exception to the pattern Musil attacked, and exposed the conservative implications of avowed aestheticism. We will come to this in a discussion of Mann's political writings during the first world war.

The "subject" of Dr. Faustus is not new, neither to Mann nor to the genre of German romanticism. Mann's particular use of the Faust myth to explore the pain of too much knowledge, or over-refined awareness, was inevitable because of Mann's loyalty to the traditions of German literature. It was Mann's way of objectifying his own alienation into an archetypal phenomenon. The crisis of the artist who has become separated from his own social milieu, and who suffers the traumas of isolation simultaneously with the intoxication of independence from normal "human" considerations, is to some degree the subject of every one of Mann's creative works.

The mystification of the life of the artist was certainly not an uncommon tendency. The grandiose sentimentality with which the poet was viewed was a prominent feature of contemporary German culture. 16 Gay points to the influence of the George circle, the cult of Rilke, in general the religiosity with which the poet was "raised into the heavens as a seer and a saint." 17 The call to art was worshipped in large portion as a call away from life: an inexplicable destiny of mystic vision and cultivated isolation. The setting-apart of the poet as a unique and magical figure was not just a manifestation of the more general seeking
of supermen to admire, but contained a strong religious element: a passion for mysticism, a rejection of society and the present, an infatuation with destiny, anti-rationalism, and death.

Mann's portrayal of the artist in *Tonio Kroger* participates in the acceptance of creative talent as an inescapable destiny, manifested as an over-refined awareness and sensitivity. The notion of destiny is beginning to appear formally in Mann's technique, with the reappearance of certain motifs symbolizing the "sign on the brow" which sets apart the estranged artist. At the same time an ironic balance peculiar to the author is created by the artist's humble longing for the commonplace.

Tonio Kroger's dilemma, that "he who lives does not work, that one must die to life in order to be utterly a creator"\(^{18}\) rests on an irreconcilable dualism, essentially that between spirit and life, between artist and society, to which Mann returns again and again. His formation of every story around a roughly equivalent dualism (as M. Hamburger has suggested, his philosophical system was not rigorous and his categories of dichotomization are not entirely consistent\(^{19}\) evidence a concentration on that problem which seems almost involuntary, so invariably and repetitiously does this polarization occur. Reading a number of Mann's stories at once, consecutively, one receives an impression of painful absorption bordering precariously on the tedious. Yet Mann was far too conscious and deliberate a writer for this exhaustiveness to be attributable to an unconscious neurosis. Rather it expresses the degree to which Mann put into practice his later articulated notion of literary creation, during his own historical era, as a "heroic activity" in search of truth.\(^{20}\)

Yet the very notion of "truth" as an object of literary activity was problematic. Mann was a writer schooled in the notion that only
individual experience could be called truth, who at the same time fought to condemn such narcissism within himself. Because of this conflict he was faced with an unusually difficult struggle to release artistically (truthfully) a vision of which he himself might approve. Some of this battle is later recorded in the account of Leverkuhn's contest with his own internal censor. The early literary struggle against "Dionysian" elements, described in *Death in Venice*, was an internal struggle between the safe objectivity of classical form and the subjectivity of a personality once immersed in romantic idealism. During the writing of this story, the author's desire to maintain absolute aesthetic control over intense emotional experience became integrated into the subject matter, and in fact changed the original intention of the story. Eventually this internal struggle, which Mann always revealed in his stories with aloof candour, took on political significance, and the familiar dualism became a public battle. But in the early stories, the conflict that is crystallized in *Death in Venice*, in particular, was very much a process towards self-consciousness, in which the conscious will, initially the will to achieve impeccable, classical form in defiance of the emotional qualities of the subject matter, consistently emerged victorious. The emotional impulses, it is implied, are weak and suspect. An individual might be fully conscious of his own impulses and drives without having to give way to them. This was the inner voice of the patriarchy, exemplified by Mann's dignified and industrious father:

How often have I caught myself up, realizing with a smile that it is actually the personality of my dead father which, as my secret example, determines my actions and omissions...He was not a simple man, not strong, but rather nervous and sensitive. He was a self-restrained, successful man, who early achieved respect and honor in this world, the world in which he built his beautiful house.

The unsympathetic connotations of such self-restraint are elaborated
in *Buddenbrooks*. Giving way to emotions and instincts is weak and dangerous. But the trial of too much knowledge, the presence of the ever-watching eye, was not so much better, and in fact really an inseparable aspect of the same problem. To the Romantics, and of course within the Expressionist movement, instinct was infinitely preferable to the intellect. To Mann's peers on the right, that was a given. As long as Mann could avoid the outward implications of this perpetual dualism, through the non-committal framework of irony and the blithe ignoring of real politics, the conflict was to remain roughly the same.

B. Encounters With Politics: Early Events and Influences

Mann was not quick to adapt his perspectives to the changing political atmosphere; again, his "nature" sided with the conservatives and he did his best to ignore the facts of German war guilt or the political necessities of the Republic immediately after the war. As Reed has pointed out, Mann's reconstruction of the Lichnowsky memorandum, which provided conclusive evidence of Germany's provocation and responsibility for the war, managed to accommodate the information to suit his own argument of "genuine German unpoliticality, as 'beautiful' and 'appropriate to the suprapolitical, mighty ethical moment'". His allegiance to Germany's assumed cultural superiority was used by him to reject any specific facts that might suggest self-criticism. When he could no longer ignore the alarming political potential of his own cultural ideals, his notion of "heroism" took on a different guise. His perpetual battle against his own emotional inclinations then acquired an explicitly political context. Mann came to attribute his inward compulsion to speak about himself (albeit still shrouded in dualistic irony) to a historical imperative, and thus
took on the role of "representative" writer with a characteristic spirit: thorough, scrupulously self-centred, at once pompous and ironic.

Mann's political conversion led him to call for literary "heroic activity" in support of the Social Democratic Republic, in 1922. As it turned out, the historical conditions called for a great deal more heroism than he could have anticipated when he initially challenged the dragons of nationalism, romantic conservatism and aestheticist self-cultivation—all of which he had once represented—in his call for support of the unstable Weimar government.

Mann's desire to confront the political manifestations of right-wing ideology necessarily took the form of direct political speeches. He was not satisfied with the indirect treatment of these themes in his fiction, and was at that stage unable to integrate his political concerns into his art.

I am very much aware that social problems are my weak point and I also know that this puts me to some extent at odds with my art form itself, the novel, which is propitious to the examination of social problems. But the lure—I put it frivolously—of individuality and metaphysics simply happens to be ever so much stronger for me.

At the same time his awareness of his own artistic limitations in the social realm, finding their reflection in the strengthening of the intransient conservative movement around him, fed his guilty conscience so that he was forced to speak out more boldly than he might have done otherwise.

Taking on the duties of a public spokesman for the liberal cause was the beginning of a life-long dedication to political speech-making and essay-writing. By stating his convictions as clearly as possible in these forms, he allowed his creative imagination to take its desired forms relatively unhampered by political guilt. His attempt to find means to integrate
his own clearly disparate affinities can be seen in both his fiction and in his political writing. Just as he was beginning work on Dr. Faustus, Mann wrote in a letter:

Incidentally, in late years (Goethe's) monumental ego renounced individualistic imperialism to a large extent, at least didactically, and professed a kind of democratic communitarianism. I say "didactically" and secretly strike my own chest; for my conscience often asks me whether I too do not merely teach it, without having really laid aside the "inward", "German" concept of culture. But can I do more than profess my views, even against my own nature?

Mann's "conversion" to social democracy is presented in contemporary political lectures as a peculiar synthesis between the most idealized German romanticism and a deliberate and self-conscious republicanism. There is little reference to actual political events or imperatives. The terrain of struggle is purely an ideological one, as though political events had not themselves influenced Mann's thinking and could not be expected to influence that of his audience. Support for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and its coalition government was first expressed publicly in 1922 in a speech entitled "The German Republic". One sees here the incongruity of an attempted synthesis in his attempt to defend and continue the ideas of an earlier work, his first political essay Meditations of a Non-Political Man (1918). This earlier essay had arisen in opposition to the ideals of rational republicanism and progressivism which had gained popularity during the last years of the first World War, and which had been politically reinforced by the establishment of the Social Democratic government in 1918, after the abdication of the Kaiser. To Mann throughout the war, the values of republicanism represented the inferior culture of the West: his own political battle had been to defend Germany and its claim to a unique cultural mission in opposition to such values.

Meditations is a rationalization for Mann's patriotic defense of Germany during the war. The arguments are all based on cultural nationalism;
since the more explicitly economic and political issues of the war did not concern him, he was not forced to recant in the face of changed circumstances or new evidence against early myths of German defense against Russian attacks. The book was six hundred pages long, took three years to write, and was the expression of a profound philosophical crisis within the author. Its fervent emotional tone reveals the degree of involvement of the author in the purpose and subject matter of the essay. Its purpose was to defend the unique cultural identity of Germany; to romanticize the conservative nostalgia for the past, and to reinforce the rejection of political considerations on the grounds of a superior, more profound cultural identity. It is an intensely propagandistic and naive justification, in Mann's own terms, of the Emperor's complacent comment on the almost unanimous nationalist fervour of 1914, that he "no longer knew any parties, only Germans".

In fact in 1914 party differences seemed in danger of being enveloped by a surge of patriotism. Even the SPD had supported German entry into the war, in spite of their radical internationalist rhetoric of only months before. Mann's initial enthusiasm for the German cause was not an unusual one, in that context and in that particular year. The SPD had long been uneasily split between a maintenance of radically orthodox Marxist theory, in their Party congresses, and an increasingly reformist strategy in the context of parliamentary activity. Their desire for political integration was apparently stronger than their adherence to Marxist principles of class struggle. The SPD had certain material incentives for their complicity in the war effort: the justifications in the party press for their negotiations with the government showed their desire for increased popular support, greater political integration into the government, a modification of the Prussian franchise system, and greater power
The apparent emergency of a defensive war situation enabled the party to concretize and benefit from their reformist tactics; the popular belief that the German position was a defensive one encouraged the relaxation of their political principles and their unexpected patriotic enthusiasm in 1914.

The support of the SPD, in spite of their previous commitment to anti-imperialism, anti-militarism, and proletariat internationalism, is significant because of the eventual formation of the Republican government in 1918 by the majority of the party, after some had left in dissatisfaction, after 1916, over the party's failure to oppose the war. But 1914 was significant in a more general sense, revealing the extent to which diverse sections of German society which had traditionally been composed of "outsiders" leaped at the opportunity for integration into the national spirit of conformity and patriotism.

We German Social Democrats have learned to consider ourselves in this war as part, and truly not the worst part, of the German nation. We do not want to be robbed again by anyone, from the right or the left, of this feeling of belonging to the German people...We have given up this inner resistance, which for decades dominated us, consciously or unconsciously, against the German idea of the state because we could no longer honestly maintain it.

In fact there were few exceptions to the widespread fervour with which artists, intellectuals and various political tendencies forgot their non-conformism and supported the German side in the war. The enthusiasm with which Germans embraced each other may have been brief, but it touched almost everyone. This contributed to a systematic idealization of the "will of the people", which justified the opportunism of the SPD, for example, and which served to obscure the actual imperialist and expansionist incentives of the state.

Mann returns to this movement through the words of Zeitblom, the
narrator of Dr. Faustus. Zeitblom, like so many others, recalls being overwhelmed by the enthusiasm, the awareness of "destiny", the prospect of a "break-through" (301) of Germany to world power.

I would by no means deny that I fully shared in the popular exaltation which I just sought to characterize, though its more extravagant ebullitions were foreign to my nature. My conscience, speaking generally, was not perfectly clear. Such a "mobilization" for war, however stern and grim a face it was, must always have something about it like an unlicensed holiday; however unreservedly one's duty, it seems a little like playing truant, like running away, like yielding to unbridled instinct. (299)

The evasive verbosity of Zeitblom's recollection is not uncharacteristic of Zeitblom's tone in moments of ambivalence; but the tone may have had another cause. If Mann himself felt similar reservations at the time, he kept them closely guarded secret. His defense of Germany's war aims was considerably more intransient than Zeitblom's, who recollects with the surprisingly articulate perception that occasionally enters his narration that

of course the sword-waving of that fundamentally unsoldierly play-actor, made for anything but war, who sat on the imperial throne was painful to the man of culture; moreover his attitude to the things of the mind was that of a retarded mentality. But his influence on them had exhausted itself in empty gestures of regulation. Culture had been free, she had stood at a respectable height; and though she had long been used to a complete absence of relations with the governing power, her younger representatives might see in a great national war, such as now broke out, a means of achieving a form of life in which state and culture might become one. In this we displayed the preoccupation with self which is peculiar to us: our naive egoism finds it unimportant, yes, takes it entirely for granted, that for the sake of our development (and we are always developing) the rest of the world, further on than ourselves and not at all possessed by the dynamic of catastrophe, must shed its blood. (300)

This was precisely the position that Mann had argued in Meditations, and in his earlier essay "Frederick the Great of Prussia". The Frederick essay is an "aggressive defence of German Kultur and German conduct" following the German invasion of Belgium in 1914. This conservative polemic,
which likens the position of Wilhelm to that of Frederick the Great, incited Mann's more progressive brother Heinrich to respond, under the guise of an essay on Zola, with an attack against Mann's reactionary idealism. Heinrich's accusations, clearly directed specifically towards his brother, were quite accurate: that "German thinking went to the very limits of pure reason and into the nothingness beyond, yet left the social realm to be ruled by crude power...." As Heinrich's essay graphically pointed out, "The real world had only a walking-on part in their dramas."  

Some of the aggressive conservatism and "naive egoism" of Mann's Meditations is due to Mann's defensive response to Heinrich's attack. If Mann then had reservations such as Zeitblom expresses, he was not about to admit to them. No doubt he, like his later spokesman, indulged in the "great pleasure to the superior individual, just once - and where should one find this once, if not here and now? - to lose himself altogether in the general" (301). Of course Mann did not merely lose himself, did not merely participate with beating heart and quiet professorial misgivings, but lent considerable effort and intellectual rationalization to the cause of national chauvinism. The Meditations, which rejects wholeheartedly the "Zivilisationsliterat" values of rationalism, materialism, and optimism (those values espoused by Heinrich's essay on Zola) found a sympathetic audience among the conservative intelligentsia. The vulgarized dualism between the higher realm of Kultur and the inferior realm of "human affairs, sordid with practical matters and compromises" was exemplary of the reactionary idealism of the established mandarin class of academics and intellectuals.

The power and influence of this circle is evidenced by Mann's portrayal of Zeitblom's confused outrage and vulnerability to their ideas. The dominant themes and attitudes of this cultural milieu are to be reproduced
with relentless detail in the intellectual discussions throughout Dr. Faustus. These take place initially among the theology students at Halle, where Leverkühn is a student, and later among the Kridviss discussion circle in Munich. Zeitblom finds himself unprepared for the crisis of bourgeois humanism with which he finds himself confronted. This does not prevent him from regularly attending the discussion evenings. His role as narrator is to present and describe this milieu, against which his moral and somewhat equivocating humanism can find no defenses. Lukacs has aptly described the importance of these fictional conversations in recreating "the most important trends in German pre-fascist thinking and...the ideology which prepared fascism itself": 39

All the themes of later reaction are sounded here: the arrogant rejection of economic solutions to social problems as "shallow", touching only the surface of human existence; the equally arrogant repudiation of all questions and answers based on reason and the understanding; the a priori acceptance of the "irrational" as something higher, more fundamental, beyond reason and understanding; about all, the fetish of the Volk with all its (then still unconscious) aggressively chauvinistic implications, which still took the "purely intellectual" form of the natural superiority of the Germanic to both East and West, the "purely intellectual" belief in Germany's mission as world saviour. 40

No more articulate presentation of this attitude could have been hoped for than that formulated in Meditations. Later the conservative intellectuals who welcomed the essay, adamant in their contempt for the shallow sphere of materialist politics, would welcome the Nazi regime as an end to the petty bickering of parliamentary politics. The conservative aesthetes then welcomed fascism as the introduction of their cultural values into political action.

The failure to distinguish between art and politics in any but aesthetic terms led in Germany to much more than a facile aristocratic scorn for democracy; it led men of culture who were enamoured of "profundity" to welcome the apparent introduction of cultural values into politics. They had feared for the life of culture within the all-too-rationally ordered Republic. The state
which succeeded it was allegedly ordered so as to promote cultural health and community, a spontaneity free from "intellect", a characteristic national expression; it led to unheard-of brutality and regression. The "profound" cultural ideas coursing in Germany since the turn of the century made evil politics. As Mann later said of Nietzsche's irrationalism, the worst form of popularization of an idea is its realization. Of course this depends in part on the initial idea itself: Mann's perpetual desire to attribute political events to ideological causal forces may find root in this disillusionment. By the time Mann's original philosophy had found political realization, he had come to realize, unlike his 1916 supporters, that "every intellectual attitude is latently political." The tension of this forced realization, which to his credit came to him before the Nazi regime actually took control of the state, crystallized his native habitual dualism between instinctive sympathies and thought processes into an outward political commitment to democracy. To some extent the process of writing Meditations was a kind of exorcism; it enabled him to turn his major creative work of the same period, The Magic Mountain, into a "refined or naive guerilla war against death" in which Settembrini's voice, that of the liberal humanist, can be heard in Hans Castorp's resolve that death shall hold no dominion over his thoughts.

Other contemporary influences were to appear in The Magic Mountain, indicating perhaps the early, experimental appearance of historical events and figures in fictional form. Mann's self-criticism in the political sphere dates from a significant political event in Weimar's history: the murder of Walter Rathenau, in June 1922. Rathenau was an industrialist who had administered the Kaiser's war economy through the War Raw Material Department during World War I and had continued to work under the SPD government after the war. According to H. Pachter, Rathenau actually believed in neither the monarchist nor the social democratic form of government, but as a mystic and early technocrat "confided to his diary
Pachter conjectures that Naghta, the fascist-nihilist of The Magic Mountain, represents traits of Rathenau as well as traits of the more accepted source, George Lukacs. Pachter offers no supporting evidence for this conjecture; at any rate, under the SPD administration Rathenau was first Minister of Reconstruction and later Foreign Minister in Wirth's coalition government, which was formed in 1921. Rathenau's signing of the Treaty of Rapallo, and his support for the attempted fulfillment of the Allied reparations conditions, was intended to demonstrate its impossibility; there seemed to be no other way to lighten the terms. The right-wing movement was not accustomed to thinking in terms of compromises and expediency, however, but in terms of uncompromising morality and patriotism. This treachery to the nationalist cause, added to the fact that Rathenau was a Jew, led to his assassination soon thereafter. He was murdered by a group called Organisation Consul, led by a participant in the Kapp Putsch of 1920. Such assassinations, it should be added, were becoming an almost commonplace event: between 1919 and 1922 there were 376 political murders in Germany, 356 attributed to right-wing extremists. "The consequences are notorious, but they deserve emphasis:...Right-wing extremists...found the courts sympathetic: of the 354 murders committed by them, only one was rigorously punished, and not even that by the death penalty." The conduct of the judiciary during the Republic has become infamous among historians; like the rest of the civil service, their roots in the upper classes and their loyalty to the old Empire did not prevent Republican reliance on their services, but it did contribute to continuous administrative sabotage. The inordinate willingness of the Social Democrats to accommodate themselves to the right did not find a corresponding sentiment
The murder of Rathenau, one among a series of political assassinations which took place within a short period, contributed to panic and agitation among the supporters of the republic. Its effect on Mann, too, was particularly forceful. Mann's reaction to the Kapp Putsch had been ambivalent. Still a firm supporter of the conservative cause, his concern was the possible damage to conservatism by the rash overestimation of support among the people. The idea of a conservative coup, in itself, does not seem to have disturbed him. At this time, his cultural nationalism and anti-Western sentiments remained unshaken, even after the German defeat in the war, the proof of German war guilt, the humiliation and disintegration of the old government, the founding of the new Social Democratic Republic. But the assassination of Rathenau, less than two years after the formation of the new government, struck Mann with an entirely different force, and perhaps catalyzed a new outlook on the situation.

Rathenau's death was a great shock for me too. What benighted minds these barbarians have! Or are they misguided idealists? I am gradually coming to see the dangers of history, the way it obscures the uniqueness of a situation by false analogies and leads a certain kind of youth astray into mad acts. The distortion of the German countenance causes me acute suffering. I am thinking of turning a birthday article on Gerhart Hauptmann into a kind of manifesto in which I appeal to the conscience of the young people whose ear I have. I am not going back on the Betrachtungen, and I am the last to demand that young people should be enthusiastic about things like democracy and socialism which their inner development has left far behind. But I have already on a previous occasion called mechanical reaction sentimental coarseness, and the new humanity may perhaps after all flourish no worse on the basis of democracy than on that of the old Germany. It is all a matter of shying and rebelling at words. As if "the Republic" were not still the German Reich, which is in fact today placed in all our hands to a much greater extent than it was when historical forces which had generated into banal theatricality throned over it - and that precisely is democracy.

This planned speech on Hauptmann was to take the form of "The German Republic", the speech which first placed Mann publicly on the side of the
Weimar democratic republic. Heinrich's accusation, that "the world had only a walk-on part", could describe this paper too. The stubborn conservative nationalism and chauvinism of the war-time essay has been replaced by a pedagogical tone of progressivism, oddly reinforced in argument by a similar allegiance to the cultural ideals of 19th century cultural romanticism. This combination, in fact, is not unlike Zeitblom's perspective on culture and the right in Dr. Faustus, and suffers from many of the same contradictions. In "The German Republic" the combination of progressivism and romanticism leads to a kind of tangled organicism which bears little resemblance to the material considerations of the typical German social democrat. The peculiar "literary bouquet made up of Novalis and Walt Whitman...with all but the offer of the inheritance of the Romantic Movement" is indicative of more earnest good will than ideological coherence, marking the degree to which social conscience and aesthetic passion have been brought together in uneasy alliance.

C. Social Structure, Authority and Idealism: German Romanticism and the Volkish Movement

Mann's attempt to establish himself as a spokesman for the values of the Enlightenment suffered from the disadvantage that no such perspectives had developed in German thought. Thus his version of liberal humanism was necessarily built upon shaky metaphysical foundations. The sophistication of the German bourgeoisie in philosophy and art was not matched by a corresponding level in progressive political thought. The late development of the German bourgeoisie as an economic and political class is a familiar feature of German history. Mann's political commitment to republicanism and to liberal democracy was relatively late, not only in his lifetime but more significantly in relation to the contemporary intellectual and social
trends of the German middle class. It was said of him that he conducted "one of the most brilliant rearguard actions of Enlightenment against barbaric credulities."\(^{58}\)

Until the 1860's Germany had lagged behind other industrialized countries of western Europe in industrial and economic growth. The lateness and rapidity of industrial development was due in part to the strong landed aristocracy and feudal-militaristic nobility whose power discouraged the growth of economic diversification, democratic institutions, or liberal political thought. The period preceding Wilhelm's ascendancy to the throne, in 1888, was a period of rapid and unprecedented growth. After its beginning in the 1860's, except for one period of depression after 1873, this development was rapid, increasingly centralized, and to many Germans settled into the static and traditional milieu of Prussian conservatism, profoundly threatening.

While the growth of social forms of production, and the development of an industrial class of owners, brought about some social changes, a large portion of the middle class was not immediately affected by these changes. The paternalism and authoritarianism of the German social structure extended into every aspect of German social relationships, and was not easily broken. The state administration was noted for its extensive and rigid efficiency, and maintained its exclusive bureaucratic hegemony even under the later Republic.\(^{59}\) The army was a powerful organ of aristocratic rule dominated by feudal-militaristic characteristics. It was responsible to the monarchy rather than to the civil service and thus the ties between nobility, monarchy and the military were inseparable.\(^{60}\) The belief shared by administrative and military officials in a kind of secular "divine right" of leadership helped to maintain a rigidly
hierarchical structure which permeated the social lives of its members and created, among the nobility, a highly class-conscious aristocratic lifestyle. The values of aristocratic militarism had an effect on the mushrooming industrial ruling class, which integrated itself with the Prussian social models rather than developing a more liberal or democratic structure such as was fought for by the British or French bourgeoisie in the 19th century.

The development of a powerful workers' movement beginning in the 1860's gained a strong organizational footing with the founding of the SPD in 1875. In essence the party was a reformist social democratic movement with a radically orthodox party program and a remarkably unmilitant party bureaucracy. In other words, the militance of the party program was not materially evident in their practice: "Marxism was only a means to separate ideologically their own movement from the middle class." The emphasis on parliamentary control of the state, achievable through elections, necessarily ignored the great economic forces that could oppose the programme of any political movement, even one holding a majority in the government. The actual strategy of the party, in spite of its theoretical radicalism, was one of co-operation with the administration with the existing state. Therefore it was not difficult for a politically naive liberal, like Mann became, to support the reformist SPD government with no familiarity or allegiance to Marxist theory. This was true of many of the party's members as well. The failure to educate people within the Social Democratic Party did nothing to redress the political inexperience of the masses of the German people, who were "totally lacking in practical experience of managing their own affairs in a responsible manner."

In 1918 the party was organizationally strong enough to gain large sectors of the working class vote, and to take control of the newly
declared republic, without having gained a strategy for socialism in Germany, an active militant body of workers ready to assume control of production, or an autonomous intellectual basis in radical theory with which to confront the new situation. There was little radical theory developed within the SPD, particularly after 1914; intellectuals, for the most part, did not like the SPD, which was dominated by a trade unionist outlook, and they were not welcome within its ranks. For these reasons, there was no development of Marxist theory of the intellectually sophisticated calibre that might have attracted liberals such as Mann was in the early 20's; and he could dress his social democratic sympathies with rhetoric and ideology that would have found little understanding within the ranks of the party itself.

The intelligentsia had gained its own peculiar status during the last part of the century. Because of the relative poverty of the middle class, the academic establishment was predominantly sponsored by the monarchy, sometimes more indirectly through state institutions. Their social status derived from extensive education and from an elitist cultivation of the notion of spiritual nobility. Gay has noted the extent to which poets and writers were worshipped and set apart. The glorification of intellectualism was nurtured both when the academic establishment was formally sponsored by the monarchy and later when many intellectuals became disaffiliated from the state. Paradoxically, the ideology of the established intellectuals was idealist and in fact anti-intellectual. This group, which Ringer has termed the "mandarins" because of the patronage of the monarchy, developed a system of complex intellectual justifications to defend the authoritarian power of the state. It is relevant to recall Heinrich's charge against his brother, in this context, that "German
thinking went to the very limits of pure reason and into the nothingness beyond, yet left the social realm to be ruled by crude power."

Intellectual rationalization of the social reality which had produced their world view was not always conscious of its function in relation to that social context. Because the material relationships of the 19th century German to the social and political world were so strenuously formalized, and so removed from immediate political dynamics, they tended to look outside of these relationships for a higher "meaning" to their existence, and to glorify idealism and anti-materialism. From this evolved the particular ideology of romantic cultural nationalism, described by Lukacs as "pre-fascist thinking", which later gave rise to the Volkish movement. Built upon a distinctly anti-rational, anti-intellectual system of thought, the national cultural ideals involved a nostalgia for pre-industrial social unity, a romanticized vision of the Volk and its relationship with nature, and a pervasive idealism that arrogantly rejected the possibility of historical or material solutions, but sought wish-fulfillment in the metaphysical sphere, and in the past.

As an ideology it stood opposed to historical progress, industrial modernization, and rational thought, preferring mystic vision or primitive energy. From this perspective, human "temperament" is naturally controlled by vital instincts, mysteriously manifested as the will, which can only be harmed by the imposition of logical thought. For this unfortunate suppression, the positivism and materialism of modern civilization is responsible. The peasant is the archetypal hero of this nostalgia, a romantic relationship with nature, a simple sense of justice, and a fascination with primitive animal force separated the image of the Volk from the weak, arid image of the industrialist, the social democrat, or the Jew. Politically
this attitude manifested a hatred for industrialization, democracy, and any intellectual conflict, with a nostalgic preference for the spiritual superiority of a primitive and undivided religious Volk led by a charismatic leader. Political activity was seen to be sordid and petty, based on mean economic interests. A disdainful attitude towards the democratic transformation of social institutions was consistent with this ideological foundation. Individual experience (of an incommunicable, undescrivable type) was more valuable, more poetic and profound, the less it was subject to the banal influence of modern society.

D. Middle Years: The Romantic Republican

By now Mann's own emotional affinity with this tradition should be clear. An essay several years after "The German Republic", called "Freud's Position in the History of Modern Thought" offers some insights into the extraordinary contradictions in Mann's position. The essay was presented originally at a lecture to the members of the Democratic Students' Club in Munich, in 1929. By this time Mann's advocacy of support for the republic would have been well known. It was an "encouraging evening" for Mann, which is indicative of the support for comparatively liberal ideas that he might expect from such an audience. But it is to be suspected that the essay was intended for a wider audience. It is to right-wing circles such as Zeitblom describes in Dr. Faustus, like the "Kridwiss Circle", that Mann might have attempted to direct such a message. It is in the context of that milieu that the purpose of the essay requires explanation.

The argument contained in "Freud's Position" is, briefly, that the widespread fascination with the instinctive, primitive, pre-rational qualities that had characterized German romanticism in the 19th century
was in fact a potentially "progressive" one because it exposed the shallowness of rationalist materialism. Mann follows the reanimation of the primitive in religion in the culture in some depth, attempting to argue that its function was a "humanizing" one, just as Schopenhauer's metaphysics were a necessary corrective to Christian dogma. Nietzsche's ideas on the interweaving of reaction and progress are quoted as instructive on "the involved, double-faced and questionable nature of intellectual processes." Mann postulates that Freud belongs to the tradition of romanticism, because of his return to the study of the instinctive and subconscious (what Schopenhauer called the "will"), at the same time this preoccupation with dark instincts is a necessary stage in the search for "a free and genuine unity of existence, secured by conscious possession, (and) the culture of men developed to complete self-consciousness." Mann's argument asserts that the preoccupation with the instinctive and the primitive in fact accords with progressive tradition; Freud is both reactionary, in his emphasis on "the night side of nature and the soul as the actually life-conditioning and life-giving element" and revolutionary, in leading backwards to these forces in order to move forward. In other words, Freud was a romantic revolutionary in reviving the intellectual history of earlier anti-intellectualism in order to "condition the will" to face the future. For Mann, it is in no contradiction with romanticism therefore to put these cultural ideals to the service of revolution.

Such a purpose, in the realm of moral intentions, is of course admirable. The accuracy of this portrayal of Freud's science is a question that moves outside the boundary of this review. But the complexity and subtlety of thought required by this pleasant re-definition of romanticism, and its potential relationship to revolution, in itself reveals an
inevitable tension. The speech clearly documents an inward battle. It is noteworthy that reference to external sources - either to Freud's work itself, or to relevant political considerations - is never direct. It is Mann's own ideas that are really the subject of the argument. Mann's attempt in the essay is to couple German romanticism with the French revolution, to argue that romanticism was in its nature progressive. Thus he approves Freud's attempt, as he describes it, to rescue the familiar cult of the unconscious and primitive instincts from the possessive grasp of reactionary ideology, placing it in the forward march of scientific research. Mann is unable to release himself from his attachment to the resounding words of the past: his words linger sympathetically over the "clinging to ideas of preservation and restoration, the pious and deliberate, melancholy and defiant fixation with the past, the sympathy with death" that impelled the reactionary cults "back into the night, the sacred primitive, the fore-known, the life-bearing, backwards into the romantical, prehistorical motherwomb." In the attempt to legitimate these feudally inspired sentiments in the face of the realization that "the political is latent in every intellectual position", Mann is compelled to accede rather generously to the anti-intellectualism of the romantic movement a critique of the sophistry of the Enlightenment. In this way, Mann imposes a critical legitimation on his own emotional affinities that places the "rational" position that he is proposing under suspicion. By then creating an argument acceding to both sides, his own position emerges unscathed.

Again the argument is not in the realm of politics, as one would ordinarily define that sphere, but in a world of rather cosmically conceived cultural ideals. Mann's intention was to maintain his affinity with those ideals, to explore them creatively and at the same time to draw
them into the service of "progress" in the name of intellectual enlightenment. In this attempt, he sought to justify his own impulses by recruiting them, by standing above them and naming them as progress— with a different voice. This required some complex intellectual juggling.

I have laid it upon myself, not un instructed in the intellectual complicatedness of all life, to use with great caution the terms "reaction" and "progress". 79

The tone of patriarchal complacency with which the resolution is proposed is suspect; again one suspects that moral resolve and emotional affinity are not entirely at peace. The defiant complexity assumes and demands an audience eager to think through paradox and contradiction, willing to arrive at a position of progressive optimism which yet "conserves" a romantic intensity which had been in itself fundamentally antagonistic to such a stance.

External circumstances alone might have been a strong enough force to discourage most from trying to effect such a reconciliation between German romanticism, particularly given its contemporary visage in the 1920's, and the actual institutions of the social democratic government. Mann's only hope for influencing his audience, which included the reactionary intelligentsia, was to create a "representative" position for himself that would rise above such ideological disputes. In this early period, the late 20's, he was still attempting to integrate his own romantic love affair with "the night side of nature and the soul as the actually life-conditioning and life-giving element" with the political direction that he had taken. Because of this, his own notion of "heroism" was substantially different from the "unprecedented intensity of feeling, unheard-of purity of conviction" 80 that was aspired to by both the left and the right of the Expressionists and other movements. Singleness of mind did not correspond to Mann's notion of heroism; he preferred rather the individual-
istic notion of an authenticity recognizing contradictions in every experience. For this reason if for no other, he could never have participated in either the Expressionist or the more explicitly right-wing Volkish movement.

Gay has described the "hunger for wholeness" which characterized the artistic community during the Weimar period. But this hunger was popularly interpreted as a search for the mysteries of the soul, leaving problems of the mind untouched. Politics were not part of the "humane sphere" in the popular view, although Mann had just decided that they were; the process of dismissal was made easier by political developments themselves, which did not appear on the surface to be particularly rational. Members of the artistic community were, on the whole, nonpolitical. Cultural movements sought ways of creating unity, generally based on notions of metaphysical dignity, the soul of the people, and often race. While many tendencies within the artistic community sought means for breaking down the enormous gulf between the artist and the people, what they were seeking (and reflecting) was not a politically democratic society within which to create but a surge of energy, a rebirth, a regeneration of a society made decadent by defeat and the petty squabbles of the social democrats who had abandoned even their revolutionary rhetoric. Spiritual unity: the vision was not of political democracy but of a "breakthrough from convention to nature." On the whole this search for "wholeness" was anti-political, metaphysical and reactionary. Therefore it was easy not to recognize (or merely to recognize, as do members of the Kridwiss Circle with murmurs of delight) how this search sprung from a reactionary concept of life, one which strove to analyze social disorders from a spiritual or sometimes psychological perspective rather than a rational political one. It was easier to blame the anti-intellectual, compromising, pluralist
and non-spiritual - that is, unprincipled - nature of the social democrats
than to analyze the political contradictions of the situation and to seek
political solution. Given this critique of reactionary spiritualism, which
Mann would have shared, it is relevant to consider the savagery with which
Mann attacks movements such as these; the responsibility implied by the
critique of the Kridwiss Circle as a reactionary cultural movement indi-
cates that Mann, too, maintained a wilful romanticism in analyzing even
later political developments in terms of cultural content. But for them,
political progress or self-determination was not even an issue. For Mann,
it was.

In such an atmosphere Mann was forced to re-evaluate his early attrac-
tion to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and his dichotomization between artist
and bourgeois. The rejection of this mode of thought was difficult for
him, since he was schooled in the tradition of Nietzsche and Wagner, and
his rejection of this tradition involved continual confession on his part.
The continual examination of the alienated artist kept his own emotional
experience of romantic inwardness at the centre of the conflict. His early
artist characters, like Hanno Buddenbrooks, cannot "act" because they are
submissive, pessimistic, self-centred and oversensitive; this was in fact
reflective of the general position of disillusioned intellectuals as Mann
observed them. But of course there was more than a detached, "objective"
critique involved in Mann's continual articulation of the decadent phase
of romantic culture. Mann's own experience of this "power-protected in-
wardness" enabled him to use this dichotomy between spirit and life to
explore for himself the process in which both the alienated artist and the
middle-class conformist became implicated in the charge against fascism.
Like the bewildered social democrats who trusted the ensconced judicial
administration more than their own democratic leanings, the arguments of
the right are formally dismissed, but never lose the deeply rooted power
that they hold. The dispute is still over cultural ideals.

E. Dr. Faustus: Autobiography as Redemption

The evolution of Mann's fiction reveals a continuing struggle between
the safe objectivity of classical form and the subjective truth of a person-
ality once immersed in extreme romantic idealism. Eventually this internal
struggle, which Mann always revealed in his stories with aloof candour,
took in political significance, and the familiar dualism became a politi-
cal battle. Unwilling to reject either of the inner voices, Mann initially
bonded them together. In fiction, this resulted in irony. In criticism,
the result was a somewhat dubious integration of opposing ideas. In Dr.
Faustus, they are each fully articulated.

Inevitably there was some degree of mistrust for either of the polar
figures: the progressive, rational, optimistic liberal who had shunned or
censored the profundity of poetic experience, and the instinctive, irration-
al romantic who sought explosive mystic experience at any cost. In Dr.
Faustus the mistrust finds vindication in their fascist variations; both
the artist and the bourgeois are implicated by the author's notion of
political guilt. This is reflected in the process through which the
political and moral consequences of Leverkuhn's art become clear to Zeit-
bloom. This process is the "subject" of the novel; the author's perspective
stands distinct from both characters in recognizing the political culpa-
bility of their total dedication to art. Zeitblom states at once at the
beginning of the novel that his primary opposition to the Nazis stems from
his fear that they will interfere with the performance of Leverkuhn's work.
The aspects of political oppression and human suffering are considered only politely, at a distance, from Zeitblom's perspective and from Leverkuhn's not at all.

Leverkuhn's delight in the joys of aesthetic constructivism, his antisocial and amoral disregard for the social dynamics surrounding his esoteric explorations and self-cultivation, his superstition about numbers and about theology, his outrageous snobbery and elitism towards others, his love for music, his inward dualism causing parody and fear of artistic sterility: Mann's own personality is revealed in countless ways and it is hard not to be overwhelmed by the cool deliberation with which Mann scrutinizes and dissects his own faults through the projection of the "representative" German artist. This identification creates a tone of painful ambivalence ("so I die as a good and as a bad Christian") which, as in earlier essays, is never thoroughly transcended. The conclusion of the novel is therefore metaphysical: its optimism suggests a hint of salvation because it has been shown wrong not to believe that such salvation is possible.

Mann differs from Leverkuhn in his realization that the cultural and political crisis would not leave the solitary artist untouched. Dr. Faustus demonstrates this in two ways: in the political culpabilities of its characters, particularly Leverkuhn and Zeitblom; and also in the attempts to deal artistically with the challenge raised by this realization to the traditional art form, the 19th century bourgeois novel. This is dealt with fictionally within the novel (as well as being embodied in its structure) in the metaphor between Leverkuhn's music and Mann's own writing. This relationship will be examined in a discussion of Leverkuhn's work, particularly the "Lamentation of Dr. Faustus", which is an obvious reference to the creation of the novel Dr. Faustus itself.
In *Story of a Novel*, Mann wrote that the metaphor of Hell, and the dialogue with the devil, would have been inconceivable without the psychological experience of Gestapo cells. What the exact nature of his experience was - Zeitblom only occasionally reads the newspaper and lives, as did Mann, removed from events - could be questioned. What is obvious is the process of disillusionment and guilt that is recorded, the realization that the privilege of the artist and the gestapo cellars were somewhere connected. The attempt to trace that connection produced a confused but authentic and monumental attempt on Mann's part to expose, to compensate for, and to convince others against his early detachment.
Notes (Chapter I)

1. Harry Pross, "On Thomas Mann's Political Career", Journal of Contemporary History 2, 2 (April 1967) p. 65; Michael Hamburger, From Prophecy to Exorcism, 1965, p. 75, T.J. Reed (see below) 1

2. Hamburger, op. cit., pp. 75-76

3. ibid., p. 3

4. See "On Schiller", Last Essays, 1955

5. Hajo Holborn, quoted by Peter Gay, Weimar Culture, 1968, p. 75

6. In particular, Gunilla Bergsten, Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus: The Sources and Structure of the Novel, 1969


8. Thomas Mann, The Story of a Novel; The Genesis of Dr. Faustus, 1961, p. 26; Dr. Faustus, p. 3. Henceforth all references to the novel itself will appear in the body of the essay.


12. T.J. Reed, Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition, 1974, p. 13


15. Reed, op. cit., p. 185

16. Gay, op. cit., passim

17. ibid.; p. 55

18. Mann, "Tonio Kroger", p. 100

19. Hamburger, op. cit., p. 85


21. Reed, op. cit., p. 151

22. ibid., p. 154
23. Burgin and Mayer, op. cit., p. 1

24. Reed, op. cit., p. 211

25. see 20


27. Letter to Agnes E. Meyer, May 1942, ibid., p. 303


29. Reed, op. cit., p. 211


32. ibid, passim

33. ibid.

34. ibid., p. 290

35. Quoted by Guenther Roth, The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany, 1963, p. 289

36. Gay, op. cit., p. 76

37. Reed, op. cit., p. 194

38. Gay, op. cit., p. 75


40. ibid.

41. Reed, op. cit., p. 313

42. Mann, "Freud's Position in the History of Modern Thought", Past Masters, 1933, p. 181; this version of the quote in Reed, op. cit., p. 306

43. From a contemporary review by Bertolt Brecht, quoted in Burgin and Mayer, op. cit.

44. Reed, op. cit., p. 289


47. ibid.
48. Carr, op. cit., p. 312
49. ibid., p. 310
50. ibid., also Hay, op. cit., p. 21
51. Gay, ibid.
52. Arthur Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, 1965
53. ibid., pp. 164-165
54. Reed, op. cit., p. 284
55. Letter to Ernst Bertram, July 8, 1922; quoted by Reed, op. cit., p. 290. This was one of a series of letters to Bertram, a close friend of Mann's at the time and a conservative, documenting Mann's political changes and considerations. None of these letters, from the early 20's, are printed in the English edition of Mann's letters.
56. Heller, op. cit., p. 117
57. For a brief synopsis of this development, see the background provided in Fritz Ringer, The German Inflation of 1923, 1969.
58. Reed, op. cit., p. 411
59. Rosenberg, op. cit.
60. Talcot Parsons, "Democracy and Social Structure in Pre-Nazi Germany", Essays in Sociological Theory, 1964
61. Rosenberg, op. cit., p.12
62. Ibid., p. 15
63. Fritz Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933, 1969
64. Gay, op. cit., passim
65. Ringer, The Decline of the German Mandarins
67. Mosse, op. cit., p. 26
68. Mann, "Freud's Position in the History of Modern Thought", Past Masters, 1933
69. Burgin and Mayer, op. cit., p. 83
70. ibid.

71. Mann, "Freud's Position", p. 171

72. ibid., p. 170

73. ibid., p. 178

74. ibid., p. 172

75. ibid., p. 179

76. ibid., p. 185

77. ibid., p. 173

78. ibid., p. 181

79. ibid., p. 177

80. Gay, op. cit., p. 115

81. Gay, pp. 73 passim.

82. ibid., p. 77

83. ibid., p. 112

84. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 108
II. Zeitblom's World

Mann's intention in writing Dr. Faustus was to write "nothing less than a novel of my era". Events of the war and his own exile led him to focus on depicting social context more than he had in previous fiction. His concern with social setting differentiates Dr. Faustus from much other post-war literature. In fact the portrayal of social totality in a time of great historical complexity provides problems for the novelist that many of Mann's contemporaries were unable to confront. Mann had left Germany in 1933 and throughout the war resided in the United States. His distance from the immediacy of war-time Germany may have presented him with some limitations, but it enabled him to attempt a larger historical account of those events, a coming to terms with the historical factors that had caused them within a hermetic relationship of totality, rather than limiting his portrayal to documentation, confession or anguish.

A. Zeitblom as Narrator

Mann's traditional artist-bourgeois opposition, which has formed the basic tension of all his work, is adapted to these changed historical conditions most explicitly in Dr. Faustus. This process of adaptation vindicates Mann's ambivalence toward either polar figure by endowing both characters with characteristics of fascist mentality. Zeitblom, the narrator of Dr. Faustus, assumes the ironic role of commenting on the social and cultural milieu of the petit bourgeois within Germany "while still subject to its historically generated psychology."

Zeitblom reveals his role as commentator on historical crisis in a number of ways. Most obvious is his continuous calling to the attention of the reader his own intellectual inadequacy. His timidity in the face
of his task threatens to confound him from the first; the first sentence of the book spreads itself "over a whole page without reaching its goal... The untranslatable sentence does in fact collapse in the middle, and the embarrassed author makes a fresh start with 'I beg to begin again.'"\(^4\)
Zeitblom's fumbling attempts to excuse the inadequate portrayal in his biography are humble and pedantic at once, though their sometimes humorous cast can serve to lighten the ponderous, gloomy subject matter of the novel. In fact it is precisely where the events or description in the novel are the most frightening and significant that Zeitblom can bring a smile to the reader through his absurd pontification.

It will perhaps be granted that a man labouring to digest such novelties as these might lose twelve pounds' weight. Certainly I should not have lost them if I had not taken seriously my experiences at the Kridwiss sessions, but had stood firm in the conviction that these gentlemen were talking nonsense...But I must repeat that I should have been so endlessly grateful, and perhaps should have lost only six pounds instead of twelve, if they themselves had been more alarmed over their findings or had opposed to them a little ethical criticism... (371)

Zeitblom's apologetic interjections appear often in sections of the novel where historical events, events of the war, overwhelm him, allowing Mann to remind us at appropriate moments that the biography of Leverkuhn is of utmost political and historical significance. We are to see beyond Zeitblom's conscientious ingenuousness when he calls attention to the earthshattering events, the shaking walls, the dilemma of the patriotic German; he may not be prepared to draw close the threads of connection to the subject close to his heart, but we must. Zeitblom's apologetic interlocutions should warn us to be wary of his abilities as a biographer and social commentator - and also as a music critic. Mann is not an author who is inclined to comic relief for its own sake, and he does not need such an exaggeratedly philistine narrator to point out to us the social context
of the events he describes. Zeitblom displays the moral equivocation of hero-worship and the philistine intellectualization of the German middle class; the most ethical and conscientiously humanist character of the novel, he is yet an impotent opponent of Nazism, no less than is Leverkuhn. But this is not due to bad faith on Zeitblom’s part; his weakness in confronting the surge of fascist ideology is not attributable to an amoral or equivocating personality (after all, he resigns from his teaching post). His modest but conscientious humanism contrasts sharply with the self-indulgent aestheticism of the social milieu he describes, though of course not sharply enough, and it is this aspect of his narration, the moral, that has tended to occupy the attention of Mann’s critics. Since his voice is the one which brings to the reader the story of Leverkuhn’s corruption, his perspective is not difficult to interpret as a weak but positively moral one. This establishes his identity with Mann as a representative of an ethical humanist value system. But his failures, too, serve the confessional aspects of the novel that Mann refers to.

Zeitblom’s narration is expressive of certain ideological limitations, or limitations in perception, which are historically drawn from a partly autobiographical portrayal of the humanist intellectual in Germany in the 1920’s. The system of thought which Zeitblom exposes contributes to the theme and structure of the novel. Zeitblom’s moral equivocation is inseparable from what has been termed his “philistine intellectualization”, which characterizes Zeitblom’s thinking both in petty problems of narrative style and with regard to major social and political issues which it is his responsibility to present. While his awareness of these issues is indispensable to the presentation of the story, his inability, or unwillingness, to connect the various social and ideological aspects of fascism in
Germany before World War II determines his presentation of these. "In making this philistine the mediator of the social reality leading up to Nazism, Mann created a schoolmaster within that reality whose understanding of Nazism in many ways reflects his social circumstances. Zeitblom shows us the mentality of the threatened Mittelstand in the pre-Nazi period."

Zeitblom's pedantry takes form most obviously with his absorption with petty detail, selected and transcribed with apparent randomness; we know better, but it is Mann's shrewdness which connects the details, not Zeitblom's. Think for example of Zeitblom's apparent ingenuousness in describing the "almond-shaped eyes" of Esmerelda, and then of Fitelburg (399). Zeitblom's references to Hitler are invariably cautious and euphemistic. While it is to his credit that he interjects these references, he confuses events of immense historical significance with minor personal considerations; these habits of thinking are made explicit in moments when Zeitblom wishes to call attention to the historical trauma, which he does at the same moment that he trivializes it in drawing attention to his own moral superiority or his own delicate condition.

I say all this to remind the reader of the historical conditions under which I am setting down Leverkühn's biography, and to point out how the excited state bound up with my subject constantly assimilates itself to that produced by the shattering events of the time. I do not speak of distraction; for - at least so it seems to me - events have not actually the power of distracting me from my task. Even so, and despite my personal security, I say that the times are not precisely favourable to the steady pursuance of work such as this. And, moreover, just during the Munich disorders and executions, I got an influenza with fevers and chills, which for ten days confined me to my bed and necessarily affected the physical and mental powers of a man now 60 years old. (173)

The pompous gravity of the speaker, ironically portrayed in the verbosity of his phrases, seems to indiscriminately bestow import to every concern. One has to look beyond his explanations to judge independently the situation being described, since the tone insists on viewing with equal seriousness...
any number of disparate traumas. These are placed, like the mention of the
"Munich disorders" as a landmark for influenza, within a hierarchy of sig-
nificance relating more to proximity to the speaker than to any objective
criteria. One is unfortunately reminded of the slightly petulant but
tolerant observation of Zeitblom's, when Leverkuhn responds ironically "to
the raptures of my humanistic soul" in admiration of an Italian sunset:
"Artists pay little heed to their surroundings so long as these bear no
direct relation to their own field of work; they see in them no more than
an indifferent frame, either more or less favourable to production" (214).
Zeitblom treats the events of the war, particularly before 1945 when dis-
coveries about genocide became public, as events equal in importance to
his own concerns: "For my hand trembles in any case, on account of my
subject; it cannot much matter to me that it trembles a little more due to
terror from without" (173). Of utmost importance and interest to Zeitblom
is Leverkuhn's biography: his life, and his work.

Zeitblom's dislike for fascism is consistent with this preoccupation.
He abhors it because it is primitive and crude. His objection to the
dictatorship is based chiefly on its threat to scholarly and artistic pur-
suits, and specifically involves his personal loyalty both to traditional
cultural monuments and to Leverkuhn's own work.

I will not lose myself further in these speculations, to my mind
as idle as they are agitating (Zeitblom speaks here of the inter-
weaving of time units as he writes.) I will only add that the word
"historic" fits with a far more sinister emphasis the time in which,
than about which, I write...Leipzig, which played so significant a
part in Leverkuhn's development and tragedy, has lately been struck
with might and main; its famous publishing quarter is, I hear, a
heap of rubble, with immeasurable destruction of educational and
literary property: a very heavy loss not only for us Germans but
altogether for the world which makes culture its concern, but
which, in blindness or in even-handedness, I will not venture to
say which, appears to pocket up the loss. (252)

The serious incongruities of this position are not apparent to Zeitblom:
the historically "sinister" qualities of Leverkuhn's music; Leverkuhn's "terrifying ingenuity" (486) or its historically inspired significance; the impossibility of cherishing both the foundations of traditional bourgeois culture and Leverkuhn's work at once. It is no wonder that Zeitblom finds "agitating" the prospect of speculating on Leverkuhn's time as historic in itself.

"Even Zeitblom, who retires when the Nazis come to power, has not escaped their infiltration of the mind." His passivity is as much intellectual myopia as it is moral in origin. He simply is incapable of observing what is going on around him within an intelligible framework of social totality, one which connects the political with the psychological, or the general with the particular; one which attaches morals to genius or history to inspiration. It is this division of his imagination into tightly separated spheres which prevents Zeitblom from responding adequately to the stimuli so painful to his sensibilities. Zeitblom can safely worship demonic art, and yet righteously reject the demonic in the world. The hypocritical naivety which underlines such mental division is thus exposed and mocked by Mann with all the force that irony can muster.

Zeitblom's susceptibility to fascist intellectual tendencies is an essential aspect of the novel, not only within itself, as a political critique of bourgeois humanism or of cultural snobbery, not only in its structural importance as narration within the novel, but specifically in Mann's implicit criticism of Zeitblom's relationship to Leverkuhn's work, the "subject" of the novel and certainly the issue most problematic to the author himself. There are thus dangers in associating Mann too closely with Zeitblom's vision, of treating Zeitblom as an unconscious or simple-minded spokesman for Mann's own perspective on Leverkuhn's work. This misconception
has generated fundamental errors about the "meaning" of the novel both in its aesthetic and its political intentions.

Zeitblom is a stubborn adherent to cultural tradition, notwithstanding the evidence or experience of its state of crisis. Perhaps he has more to lose in the recognition of a crisis in bourgeois culture; his identification of himself as one with particular artistic judgement, and as a member of an artistic "circle", is precious to him and central to his valuation of himself. But his cultural status is earned, not innate. It is more a matter of his ideological values and social status than of creative urges.

He is not quick to move in his cultural sympathies beyond old suppositions, old institutions. The landmarks of familiar culture, for Zeitblom, map his world for him; the social world is culture and this determines his place in it. In this particular sense his adulation of Leverkuhn's work is an anomaly, a departure from his own moral and aesthetic sense, and thus more of a submission of his own sense of self to the cult of genius. Zeitblom's fundamental (and frequently sentimental) attachment to the legacy of romantic traditions is otherwise inextinguishable. This is voiced explicitly throughout the narration (it is not accidental that he is a teacher of classics!), and exemplified repeatedly. Late in the novel, for example, his eloquently loyalist defence of King Ludwig's madness, intended as a defence of the romantic experience of "frantic extravagance" in opposition to both psychoanalysis and political common sense, meets with unexpected resistance from Schwerdtfeger (unexpected because Schwerdtfeger is, after all, an artist) and amused tolerance from the other artists present (422).

In understanding the situation of art, the collapse of traditional forms of expression in every genre, Leverkuhn is of course much more astute,
more honest and therefore more authentic. Zeitblom's sentimentality invariably prejudices his judgement.

It does one good, among such impressive performances, to contribute something oneself to the artistic entertainment, and I was gratified when Excellence von Riedesel, seconded at once by our long-legged elegant hostess, urged me in his south-German pronunciation, and voice made more strident by his officer's training, to repeat the andante and minuet of Milandre (1770) which I had once before played on my 7 strings. How weak is man! I was grateful to him, I utterly forgot my dislike of his smooth and empty aristocrat's face, which out of sheer imperturbable insolence positively shone, with the twisted blond moustaches, the smooth-shaven cheeks, and the gleaming monocle in the eye under the bleached brows. To Adrian, as well I knew, this titled gentleman was a figure beyond judgement or sentence, beyond hatred or scorn, yes, beyond laughter; he was not worth a shoulder-shrug - and just so, actually, I felt myself. But at such a moment, when he challenged me to contribute something "graceful", that the company might recover from the attack of the revolutionary arriviste, I could not help acceding to his request.

Zeitblom's sentimental attachments form the basis of his relationship to cultural icons in general, to Leverkuhn's music as well, often he apologizes for his lack of straightforward or calculated organization in the novel because the subject is "too close" to him. In listening to Leverkuhn's later works Zeitblom confesses that

A man of culture, such as I am, when he/esses to talk about a work with which he is in such painfully close touch may be pardoned for comparing it with existing and familiar cultural monuments... (Its birth) actually went beyond my mental capacities, so that I trembled and was carried away. (358)

Leverkuhn's music may have been a radical negation of Wagner's; but Mann's familiar infatuation with Wagner's extravagance is echoed in Zeitblom's submission to the power of Leverkuhn's musical energy. In Buddenbrooks Mann chronicles his own early passion for Wagner's operas through the musical education of young Hanno. The glorification of primitive energy, the unresolved yearning and the intense power of Wagner's music become for Hanno a substitute for life. A later discussion of music in Dr. Faustus will investigate further this aspect of music as a mediation.
of abstract power. The identification of the author with Zeitblom's emotional submission of his "mental capacities" to the hypnotic effects of Leverkuhn's music returns us to the problematic relationship between Zeitblom, as narrator, and Mann himself.

It is common to assume the hidden presence of the author in the person of a fictional narrator. There are enough sly references to Mann, through Zeitblom's susceptibility to music, for example, and through his parodistic exaggeration of Mann's style of writing, as well as the moral outrage against political events which one assumes is shared by the author, to make the relationship between Zeitblom and Mann a problematic one. Certainly it is never assumed that Zeitblom is Mann; his aesthetic clumsiness and naivete, if nothing else, preclude total identification. But a more rigorous understanding of the precise relationship between author and narrator is essential. This can be better understood after reviewing earlier attempts by Mann to study characteristics similar to these we have described in Zeitblom.

There is an earlier instance in which Mann's strategy is to confuse narrative with authorial voice. The story "Mario and the Magician" describes the inability of a group of people to resist the manipulation of a hypnotic magician. We can recognize a similarly disarming self-consciousness in the voice of the narrator, who has neither the will nor the clear-sightedness to condemn the manipulation whole-heartedly.

I have got ahead of my story and lost sight of the sequence of events. To this day my mind is full of the Cavaliere's feats of endurance, only I do not recall them in their order - which does not matter...So much I do know: that the longer and more circumstantial tests, which got the most applause, impressed me less than some of the small ones which passed quickly over...I can still see the face of that stately, mustachioed colonel smiling and clenching his teeth as he struggled to regain his lost freedom of action. A staggering performance! He seemed to be exerting his will, and
in vain; the trouble, however, was probably simply that he could not will. There was involved here that recoil of the will upon itself which paralyzes choice - as our tyrant had previously explained to the Roman gentleman. 8

The narrator's fussy but quickly dismissed preoccupation with order, his subtle distinction of himself from the more plebian audience, his fascination with the technique of the hypnotist, all foreshadow Zeitblom's mannerisms. Note his half-tolerant amusement at the situation, the domestication of the villain ("our tyrant") and the ironic treatment of the victim, which create a paradoxical complicity in the narrator's desire to render the event as descriptively - artfully - as it was brought about.

That was a monstrous moment, grotesque and thrilling, the moment of Mario's bliss. In that evil span of time, crowded with a sense of the illusiveness of all joy, one sound became audible, and that not quite at once, but on the instant of the melancholy and ribald meeting between Mario's lips and the repulsive flesh which thrust itself forward for his caress. 9

The value that is communicated here is admiration for skill; both the Magician's, and implicitly, his own. The attitude is supercilious, ironic and naive. The reader can easily be fooled by the narrator's complacent indignation at the "commotion" at the end, the fatal "liberation" - but somehow the tone tells us to think again. Even his sympathetic commentary on the difficulties of those accustomed to obedience seems to place the narrator in a special category, a position of aristocratic disdain for oppressor and common folk alike. In fact it is not this educated and literate visitor who resists the hypnotist's indescribable humiliation; as with Zeitblom, his security allows enjoyment. Defiance comes from Mario, son of a petty clerk and a washerwoman, waiter at a resort cafe. Our story-teller is too fascinated with the "uncanniness" of the atmosphere even to leave; too curious about the "fascination which he gave out independently of the programme and even between tricks and which paralyzed our resolve." 10 In spite of the visitor's obvious gift for story-telling,
he is unable to provide either himself or the reader with a reason for remaining cooperatively in the magician's audience. He mentions vaguely "inertia"; the inadequacy of the explanation he calls to the reader's attention with minimal concern.

The naivete of the storyteller's attitude about the use of power is as enlightening here in its connection to the later novel as the more conspicuous characterization of the gentleman from Rome, who tries to resist hypnosis by honourably doing nothing. In Georg Lukacs' view, this gentleman is powerless because "he acts from pure negativity...but mere not wanting is too flimsy; it turns unnoticeably into acceptance and then surrender." Lukacs associates the negativity of "not wanting" with Zeitblom's ineffectualness, springing as he maintains from a lack of positive ideals or independent perspective on the situation, because Zeitblom is not a socialist. Lukacs' reticence about including the narrator, and by implication the author, in his accusations of susceptibility, is interesting. Lukacs too easily associates the narrator, both in this story and in Dr. Faustus, as disguised spokesman for Mann's criticism of the reactionary villain, perhaps not forceful enough but certainly ethically commendable.

The analysis of passive susceptibility is a good beginning for an understanding of Zeitblom's role, but it does not go far enough. Like other characters who exemplified Mann's artist-bourgeois dualism visible throughout the development of his work, the narrator of Dr. Faustus has acquired historical grounding, ideological specificity in a political context, and a place in an autobiographical structure of self-criticism that goes beyond irony. We see Zeitblom's weakness of will to oppose reactionary politics and his admiration for the superman figure of artistic genius (always, for Mann, closely alligned with criminality - as in his essay on
Hitler, "A Brother" evidences often enough in Dr. Faustus. This is an indication of his ideological confusion, which, in his rendition of aesthetic theory and Leverkuhn's work provides a particular framework.

The failure to place Zeitblom in a specifically delineated social context has led to hopelessly inadequate interpretations of his role in the novel. His weakness and collaborationism in succumbing to the more subtle manifestations of Nazi ideology and aesthetics, which permeate his social world, have been variously viewed as an aesthetic expression of Mann's irony, an instrument of apologetic autobiography, and typically recognized as an important structural aspect of the novel in allowing naturalist description of social events to parallel the development of Leverkuhn's biography. Undoubtedly these are all elements of Mann's motivation for the use of an unreliable narrator to mediate the story of Leverkuhn's creative development. But Mann's intention that Dr. Faustus should be "nothing less than the novel of my era" requires serious consideration. Zeitblom is an autobiographical figure allowing self-criticism; he is a structural device allowing tricks of conventional narration to slip past the critical eye of a demanding writer; he is also a historically specific personality whose ideological perceptions of his world are, for Mann, a historical phenomenon that demands exposure before the world itself can be historically understood.

B. Zeitblom as Social Representative: Ideology and the Petit Bourgeoisie

The central role of the petit bourgeoisie, the rural and urban middle class, as the social base of Nazism has been generally recognized. Their panic in the face of economic and social upheaval made them particularly susceptible to fascist ideology. The author's recognition of this involvement was central to the realization and structure of Dr. Faustus. Since
Zeitblom is intended to be "typical" of a social type, it seems desirable to portray what Zeitblom is representative of. It is through Zeitblom's dual quality of autobiographical figure and historical representative that Mann places himself in history.

The German middle class was faced with unusually rapid capitalist industrialization in the latter part of the 19th century. The development of industrialization in Europe occurred simultaneously with the emergence of a monopolized form of capitalist (private) ownership of industry, which produced a structural transformation of the entire society. Because of the particular unevenness of development in Germany, the middle class was unable to create either an accurate understanding of these changes, or a corresponding means of political control.

Monopolization of economic ownership generates a polarization of social classes, and in this process threatens to eliminate the middle class. Because of the sudden and intense antagonism that appeared between the industrial classes, the political conflict between employers and workers became a dominant force. This occurred before the middle classes had been able to transform feudal relations into a bourgeois democratic society. The economic threat to the middle classes was exacerbated by their political inexperience and their failure to understand the relationship between private enterprise and monopolization. Monopolization is an inherent feature of the development of capitalist relations of production, although it does not always consolidate itself as quickly in juxtaposition to pre-capitalist conditions as it did in Germany.

Through monopolization, because of the centralization of capital, all forms of labour are integrated into the wage labour system. "Capital grows in one place to a huge mass in a single hand, because it has in another
place been lost by many."¹⁵ Industrialization, through competition, leads to the monopolization of power through ownership by a few corporations, whose spreading influence creates "the dependence of all social life, and indeed of all the interrelatedness of humankind, upon the marketplace."¹⁶ The petit bourgeois ideal of self-sufficiency and private ownership, which had been necessary to the evolution of capitalist ownership in its early stages, becomes obsolete. The loss of self-sufficiency and the increase of dependence on wage labour (as opposed to self-employment) as a means of livelihood, is accelerated by economic crisis, such as the depression in Germany in the early 20's.¹⁷

The support of the petit bourgeoisie for fascism grew from their economically anachronistic rejection of the loss of power and economic security that they suffered through these changes. This change of status has been termed "proletarianization".¹⁸ Because of corporate amassment, occupations which appear to be middle-class, such as technical, or semi-professional, low-level managerial or scientific work, in fact become a form of wage labour, rather than self-employment or employment with public institutions or small private firms. The desire to resist proletarianization in favour of an older form of social status leads to an ideological cohesion among a class which is otherwise highly individualized and disparate. The ideological cohesion of the petit bourgeoisie, which eventu- ally took political form, sprang from a "negative unity"¹⁹ based on their fears of their own economic irrelevance, loss of social status, and other rapid social and cultural changes. Small property owners were thus led to support the propaganda of fascist political objectives: "a state which guaranteed the social status of the Mittelstand and which protected it from all danger."²⁰ Their desire was to reduce the powerful position of
large industry and finance capital, and at the same time to defeat the growing workers' movement. With this aim they sought to guarantee the protection of private property and private ownership of production. To do this, they thought, they would need a strong state, one which would represent their interests with whatever means were necessary. Unaccustomed to liberal democratic forms of representation, since the Imperial government had held at least nominal power until 1917, they felt that such a state, in the drive to decrease the powers of both workers and capital, should not be impeded by parliamentary or constitutional limitations.

The subjective aspirations of the petit bourgeoisie had long been superceded by the development of productive forces. Their ideology was tied to the productive and social relationships which characterized early capitalism. Thus though their perceptions of their own social relationships had been formed by those social relationships, a lag had developed between their conceptions of social forces, and the evolution of the forces themselves. Their ideological reflexes, as "echoes of the life-process" were incapable of scientific evaluation of contemporary political developments. As Marx pointed out, the specific property relations of social organization bring forth specific forms of consciousness. In the development of capitalism these forms of consciousness become ideological because they remain imprisoned in social appearance rather than dynamic essence, or inner laws, of social reality. This mystification of the basis of social relations in fact contributes to the domination of the rulers of society, who also rule the ideology of its members. The role of the state becomes obscured through such mystification; the structural emergence of polarized classes has led inevitably to the dissolution of bourgeois "universal interests" so that the state no longer represents the whole of
society. A schism ensues between the class function of the state, that is, the obligation of the state to support the maintenance of class relations in production, and its political function to respond to representative institutions. 24

In Germany, economic crisis contributed to the dissolution of a liberal or representative state which had never found strong support among the German people. After 1918, the social democratic government maintained its power only through a compromising alliance with the power base and administration of the preceding feudal-authoritarian state. The power of the conservative judicial system, military, rich industrialists and landowners both maintained and undermined the liberal democratic regime. Throughout the duration of the Weimar republic, the public "political" arena of socially representative institutions was further separated from the class function of the state. 25 Because of this separation, the real determining powers in economic and social policies were disguised by the apparent responsibility of the state for determining policies over which they had no control. The execution of real power in the society was controlled by forces which were separated from the political institutions in which socialists who wanted to change that order were seated. 26 The inability of the SPD government to replace the imperial administration and judicial system, or to effect significant economic changes, has been well documented. 27

Parliament, as the popular institution of representative government, was increasingly overshadowed in the administration of political decision-making by the reactionary legal and military institutions and the industrial ruling class. The separation of the public "political" arena from the class function of the state was developed to an unprecedented degree by
fascist government. During the period of fascist power, the state was controlled by the independent power of National Socialism, in alliance of course with the economic ruling class. The economic elite collaborated with a political power that was in many ways independent, but ensured its own power by a mass base. While the interests of the two powers frequently coincided, they were not the same forces. Support from the economic elite for the Nazi Party was based on the assurance of a strong state, the ability to overcome economic crisis through military expenditures and rearmament, an expansionist foreign policy, and the complete political subjugation of the German people, particularly the labour movement.

The irony of this alliance was that the development of large industrial cartels and mergers was facilitated by this alliance; the free market, which the petit bourgeoisie sought to protect, met with no support from the party who had promised its maintenance. Because of this dichotomy, it is necessary to distinguish between the social base and the social function of fascism: "The social basis and social function of a party need not necessarily correspond to each other at all, and for the most part they do not correspond...."

By dealing with the character of the fascist supporters we can raise significant questions about their political and social objectives, their consciousness and the ideology of the fascist party. At the same time it should be emphasized that the situation of these small property owners is not the decisive and ultimate cause of events, but a single factor in the total social development. Moreover, the social situation of the followers is itself a product of the centralization of capital. Furthermore, consciousness is not exclusively a product of their social situation but is conditioned by the dominant ideology which is expressed in the form of social norms and conceptions...which to a high degree correspond to the interests and world view of the dominant class. Within these limits, therefore, studies of the social basis of fascist movements can contribute considerably to a theory of fascism. 28

Of course objectively it could not have been in the interest of the petit bourgeoisie to support fascism. This support came not from an
objective appraisal of where their interests could best be represented, but from the false consciousness of an increasingly irrational right-wing ideology.

The middle class of Germany were primarily accustomed to thinking of society in terms of social status rather than economic roles. It is significant that members of this class termed themselves members of the Mittelstand, a term more concerned with status than with class; thus the term "middle class" would be considered highly unacceptable. The popular ideology of the petit bourgeoisie viewed society as an organism, never analyzing structurally the enforced antagonisms and class distinctions within a class society.

One way to describe the whole transformation (between the established values of a pre-industrial culture and the new urban and technological civilization) is to draw upon the distinction between "class" and "status". The modern concept of class refers primarily to a man's wealth or to his objective place in industrial economy. Status, by contrast, suggests a place of social honor and a certain style of life which is based upon convention, and upon the "subjective" estimates of one's contemporaries. The great German sociologist Max Weber argued that during periods of economic stability, class and status ranks would tend to coincide; for rich families would eventually become "good families" as well. During periods of rapid socio-economic change, however, class patterns would at least temporarily conflict with the established hierarchy of status. This is exactly what happened in Germany during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.

The petit-bourgeois assumptions of cultural superiority, to the unionized labour movement in particular, were of the utmost importance, and contributed significantly to their alliance against the labour movement and their contempt for its organized political party, the SPD. We have seen this assumption of cultural superiority exemplified by Zeitblom; his insistent adherence to familiar cultural mythologies is motivated by this reliance on cultural status as a basis for social definition. As an ideology of a larger social class, the notion of exceptionalism and self-
sufficiency was, in addition to everything else, paradoxical in light of growing dependence on finance capital.

The professional sectors of the middle class were engaged in occupations that were relatively untouched by industrialization, and by the "revolution" which in 1918 replaced the Imperial government with a social democratic republic. Yet there were major social developments in the Weimar period, with which they were ideologically and politically unprepared to cope: The Republic, in spite of its supposed transformation of the political form of government, left many social and economic institutions to develop autonomously. The constitution was based on a concept of equal representation and the balancing competition between pluralist interest groups. Economic developments in fact facilitated the rapidly developing power of large monopolies and ensuing social and class conflict. The incompatibility between the available political responses, and the dissatisfaction of large sections of the German people, led to attempts to evolve new forms of political response.

C. "Prussian" Socialism and the Intellectuals

For the most part German intellectuals found themselves unable to accept either the ineffectual democratic liberalism of the capitalist-based Republic, or the narrow version of socialism espoused by organized labour and the left, influenced as it was by crude materialism and revisionism. As a result, trends emerged whose purpose it was to supply a new interpretation to problems of industrial capitalism. The social conservatism and anti-capitalism of the intelligentsia gave rise to new concepts of "German" or "Prussian" socialism, which were intended to revive pre-industrial socio-economic values, in effect attempt-
The notion of German exceptionalism, which Zeitblom, like Mann, propagated during the period of the first World War, was used against existing models of socialism (in Russia) and capitalism alike. This was the milieu that produced Spengler's *Decline of the West* (1918), which promised a new German outlook on the decline of Western civilization. Spengler was a profound pessimist, influenced by Nietzsche, who announced the decadence and coming catastrophe of European civilization with fashionable fatalism: his unnamed presence "lurks behind the Kriegeis attitudes" in Dr. *Faustus*. Spengler's "biological" treatment of social history heralded the demise of the 19th century ideologies which placed economics at the base of political conflict. His thesis was that liberalism and Marxism were dying out because they left the soul of the people out of their calculations. Spengler's new definition of socialism, as "the will, the organization, and the discipline which kept the community in trim for the great battle of blood and money; the battle between politics and capitalism" was further developed in his elaboration of Prussian Socialism: in Germany the conflict was not between the manual worker and his employer, who were both workers, but between the forces of creative production and the crude power of money. Prussian Socialism would be an international manifestation of the "faustian will-to-power": nationally, the absolute domination of commercial life by the state, and internationally, the collective will of Germans for world domination.

Spengler's mystical notions of an organic people's state were eagerly received by a public who welcomed the "contemporary" repudiations of Marxism and liberalism in favour of cultural nationalism and social conservatism. These ideas were welcomed by the patriots of World War I
on the same basis that Western culture had been scorned during the war for its individualism and shallow materialism. Spengler's notion of a state which would mediate in economic affairs, controlling commercial transactions in the interest of the people, contributed to the enthusiasm for a "strong state which would guarantee the social status of the Mittelstand and which would protect it from all danger." The goal of reducing the powerful positions of large industry and the workers' organizations, in order to guarantee private ownership and the maintenance of cultural privilege, could ostensibly only be carried out with a strong "people's" state.

This notion that a strong state power, independent of specific economic tensions within the society, could assume a major role in social reform, merits further comment, since it is impossible to understand the peculiar dialectic between social democracy and the ideology and practice of the fascist movement without reference to perceptions of the role of the state. The myth of the political neutrality, or autonomy, of the state contributed to the naive optimism of the SPD regarding the possibilities of reform in Weimar Germany. To some degree a current of idealism regarding the potentiality of state reform had been present in the SPD from its origins. Their aim during the Weimar period was the gradual transformation of society through control of the state apparatus, achieved through parliamentary majority. As a current study of this theory demonstrates, the "revisionist" assumption, which had gained currency within the SPD long before its assumption of state power in 1918, rests on the hope that social reform and a democratic constitution can guarantee a democratic society regardless of its economic structure. The government is seen as a body balancing between various pluralistic interests, able to determine social policy and the distribution of wealth regardless of the ownership
of the productive forces. A parliamentary majority can increase the power of the state to intervene in economic relations, to redistribute the social wealth according to political whim. In this perspective, capitalism is seen as a technical and rational institution where only its organizational top remains capitalist. Thus, the introduction of socialism merely requires changing top personnel, rolling back the capitalist oligarchy's influence on economic policy through a strong social-democratic government, and gradually dismantling the top by replacing it with planning experts.

Mann's own sympathy for this view, which will be discussed in a later chapter, was strong enough to contribute to the creation of the figures of benevolent leadership in the Joseph trilogy, and was shaken finally, in his old age, by disillusionment with the Roosevelt administration in the United States. His optimism regarding the avenues for reform open to a reformist state long outlasted its real viability. The considerable influence of this perspective in Weimar Germany provides an exemplary case study of its errors. The ignoring of the power of economic relations meant a submission to them. Rather than a clear strategy for social transformation, the SPD muddled through unsuccessful attempts at social change which in fact contributed to the consolidation of economic monopolies. The power of these industrial giants, and the corresponding bonding together of the workers' movement, left little room for private entrepreneurship. But Mann, like Zeitblom at a later time, was still prone to viewing the worsening political situation as a question of ideological confusion.

The right-wing appeal, like that of Spengler, to the subjective fears of the middle class contributed to the growing irrationality of a position demanding restoration of the past, without serious consideration of the economic imperatives of the present, that is, of the evolution of productive or economic relations in a capitalist society. This was inevitable in a philosophy that had no use for economic analysis. For the petit
hostility toward present conditions, created an irresolvable schism between subjective notions of social justice and the objective development of industrialized society. Mass propaganda played on this irrationality, fear, and hostility, substituting the promise of unity within and support from a strong state, which could unite the people around a strong leader, for a more judicious analysis of contemporary problems. Mass newspapers were bought and produced by entrepreneurs, so that they might editorially represent political blocs founded upon common economic interests. In this way industrialists and landowners used their increasing economic power to influence popular opinion, scolding the masses for allowing "materialism" and "interest politics" to replace idealistic traditional values. 43

The political propaganda proposing a strong state and an organic "people's" government emphasized implicitly the irrationality of historical development. In a situation in which the subjugation of the people to the laws of the market system is real, but hidden, it is inevitable that people perceive history as fate, with people themselves manipulated as historical objects. 44 This perception necessarily played into the passivity of the authoritarian personality, which sought the abdication of their own responsibility for thought or decision in favour of a strong leader capable of uniting a dispersed and fragmented population and giving them feelings of power through his own power. Thus they seek the pleasure of self-abnegation, or the loss of the individualized ego (what Schopenhauer had described as involved in the production of a work of art: submission of the will to the pleasure in beauty 45), which could be enacted in various forms; the individual could submit his own autonomy to the mass leader, and yet never perceive the process as a political one. The pleasure in
this submission must derive from viewing the mass leader as the personification of the unity and soul of the people, finally regained; the strength of the people as an organic mass finds its expression in the strength of the totalitarian leader.

The cult of individual heroism as the primary determinant of historical progress was and remains a cornerstone of bourgeois romantic ideology: the proliferation of romanticized and semi-fictional biographies of historical figures in the popular reading market of the Weimar middle class attests to the popularity of this sentiment. The forgetfulness which sees only the policies and decisions of a heroic leader, and denies the participation and moving force of the masses of people, represents another form of self-abnegation, dismissing from historical consciousness what is not transcendentally heroic. Zeitblom's contempt for Hitler's crudeness is balanced by his submissive awe and suspension of judgement in the presence of artistic genius, his aversion to political gymnastics replaced by a no less sentimental and self-effacing worship for the "great man" figure represented by Leverkuhn's aloof, prodigally and demonically inspired drive to create. All of Zeitblom's critical activity, emotional energy and perhaps even his sexuality, in a sublimated form, are channeled into his intense preoccupation with Leverkuhn's life. As I will discuss in a later chapter, this individual submission to the personification of artistic genius is an indispensable feature of Zeitblom's role and personality in the novel. As school teacher, "humanist" and aesthetic snob, Zeitblom sees the personal characteristics of Leverkuhn - and of others - as heroically important. Zeitblom's inability to understand politically the social basis of his hero-worship and cultural snobbery is brilliantly representative of the habits of thought of the petit-bourgeois intelligentsia during
Weimar Germany's republican era.

The emphasis on social status and the exclusive role of the intelligentsia was part of a systematic attempt to perpetuate anachronistic economic models: intellectuals rationalized their own position in society by emphasizing cultural values and idealist notions of an "organic" peoples' state. When the ideas of conservative intellectuals appeared in vulgarized form in Nazi newspapers, such as the call of Die Tat for a "Third Front" to carry out a "revolution of intellectuals" to have been loud objections. Zeitblom's unhappiness at the blithe satisfaction of the Kridwiss Circle in the face of an anticipated wave of primitivism and barbarism exemplifies the complacency of this intellectual de-politicization.

It was an old-new world of revolutionary reaction, in which the values bound up with the idea of the individual - shall we say truth, freedom, law, reason? - were entirely rejected and shorn of power, or else had taken on a meaning quite different from that given them for centuries. Wrenched away from the washed-out theoretic, based on the relative and pumped full of fresh blood, they were referred to the far higher court of violence, authority, the dictatorship of belief - ... Freedom was given to thought that it might justify force;

Although I felt sick at my stomach, I would not play the spoil-sport; I showed no repugnance, but rather joined as well as I could in the general mirth; particularly since this did not necessarily mean agreement but only, at least provisionally, a smiling, gratified intellectual recognition of what was or was to be. (368-369)
Notes (Chapter II)

1. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 38


3. ibid., p. 80

4. Heller, The Ironic German, p. 254

5. Baker, op. cit., p. 81

6. ibid., p. 83

7. Mann, "Mario and the Magician", Stories of Three Decades 1936

8. ibid., p. 558

9. ibid., p. 566

10. ibid.

11. Geory Lukacs, Essays on Thomas Mann, p. 91


13. Hermann Lebovics, Social Conservatism and the Middle Classes 1914-1933, 1968, p. 5; also Fritz Ringer, The German Inflation of 1923

14. Ringer, The German Inflation, p. 3


16. Braverman, op. cit., p. 276


18. Braverman, op. cit.


20. Kuehnl, op. cit., p. 32

21. ibid., p. 32


23. ibid., also Kuehnl, p. 33

24. Anson G. Rabinbach, "Toward a Marxist Theory of Fascism and National Socialism", New German Critique 3, 1974. For a far more thorough and
rigorous analysis of fascism, that state, and the middle class, see Martin Kitchen, *Fascism*, 1976, which was published since this chapter was in first draft. Further on the relationship of class function to political institutions of the state, see Claus Offe, Volker Ronge: "Theses on the Theory of the State", *New German Critique* 6, 1975

25. Rabinbach, op. cit., p. 128

26. Ibid., p. 131


28. Kuehnle, op. cit., p. 31

29. Lebovics, op. cit., p. 5


32. Lebovics, op. cit., p. viii

33. Reed, *Thomas Mann: The Uses of Tradition*, p. 378

34. Lebovics, op. cit., p. 159

35. Ibid., p. 160

36. Ibid., p. 162

37. Kuehnle, op. cit., p. 32

38. Mueller and Neussus, op. cit.


40. Mueller and Neussus, op. cit.

41. Ibid., p. 26

42. Rosenberg, op. cit., 151 passim; Kuehnle op. cit.

43. Ringer, *The German Inflation*, p. 6

44. Kuehnle, op. cit., p. 43
45. R.J. Hollingdale, **Thomas Mann: A Critical Study**, 1971, p. 52


48. Lebovics, op. cit., viii
III. Leverkuhn's Music

A. Order and Allegory

It is not the "subject" but the making which is the object of contemplation. This is central to Modernism: it sets form over life, pattern and myth over the contingencies of history; the power of the fictive presides. And yet that artistic absoluteness ('I should like to think of art as absolute', he commented) is persistently compromised in Mann's work.

The anachronism of Zeitblom's world view, imbedded as it is in the naively complacent ideology of petit-bourgeois idealism, allows Mann to narrate through Zeitblom the story of the novel with the use of traditional naturalist description. The historical events surrounding the events of the novel are always tangibly formulated, with the peculiar mixture of objective description and pedantic obscurantism which Zeitblom invents to explain what is going on around him. The time sequences involved in these events, and in the experiences of character development in relation to the historical occurrences, are complex but clearly "objectively" consistent. Zeitblom's social perspective is one which can record the events of history, grand historical events affecting the world or small personal upheavals, without the need to question his own subjectivity. His own emotions or identity he attempts to ignore or obscure at all costs - unless it relates to Leverkuhn. Therefore his attention is riveted on the questions of Leverkuhn's art, the times in which he writes, and the social world surrounding Leverkuhn. He does not become involved in searching inside his own identity, or questioning his own perceptions; he rarely modifies the descriptive flow of the biography to turn his own perceptions upon himself. After all, the irony of the narration does not, for the most part, flow from Zeitblom's pen. This literalism and self-effacement molds the narrative structure, allowing the reader's attention to remain centred on the description of Leverkuhn's art without losing allegiance
to the objective dimensions of time and social context not available through a more "creative", inner-directed imagination such as Leverkuhn's (from what we can surmise at such an emotional distance). The art of implicit distancing inherent in irony is unavailable to Zeitblom, whose humility and self-effacement is apparent at every interval in which he dares to interject his own comments. This embarrassment, which is really unjustified in terms of his masterful accounts of the art he observes, becomes almost unbearable when he encounters Leverkuhn's music. In general his primary source of unhappiness concerning his own inabilities seems to be the lack of calculated organization in the construction of the novel: his ambivalent admiration for Leverkuhn's system is related to his own fear of ineptitude in that sphere. In confronting Leverkuhn's music, his fear is not merely lack of system on his own part but the possible inability to translate into words at all that subject "with which he is in such painfully close touch... (Its birth) actually went beyond my mental capacities, so that I trembled and was carried away." (358)

Zeitblom's trembling humanity of course offers sharp contrast to Leverkuhn's cool intellectuality. Zeitblom is constantly nonplussed by Leverkuhn's cool and ironic temperament.

But Adrian's attitude to the curious phenomenon differed from mine in what was after all so distinctive a way that it soon occupied me more than the subject itself. I mean that even while he mocked he set store by preserving the right to appreciate: set store by the right, not to say the privilege of keeping a distance, which includes in itself the possibility of good-natured acceptance, of conditioned agreement, half-admiration, along with the mockery and laughter. Quite generally this claim to ironic remoteness, to an objectivity which surely is paying less honour to the thing than to the freedom of the person has always seemed to me a sign of uncommon arrogance. In so young a person as Adrian was then, the presumption of this attitude, it must be admitted, is disquieting; it was calculated to cause one concern for the health of his soul. Of course it is also very impressive to a companion with a simpler mental constitution, and since I loved him, I loved his arrogance.
as well - perhaps I loved him for its sake. Yes, that is how it was: this arrogance was the chief motive of the fearful love which all my life I cherished for him in my heart. (67)

It is precisely this arrogance in Leverkuhn that makes a mockery of romanticism, and seeks an elemental "break-through" which will purify expression and release him from his own reflections. This search is the cause for Leverkuhn's "tragedy", which Lukacs represents as the tragedy of bourgeois culture:

on the one hand how the purely subjective, that which is estranged from and despises all community, is rooted in the modern bourgeois individualism of the imperialist epoch; and on the other, how this dissolves, just as inevitably every bond, old and new, both within society and within a work itself. For this reason, Leverkuhn's parodistic attitude is a mark of his intellectual honesty...Longing for synthesis, for control, for order and organization, though such a longing has no foundation in popular life, in the social world, but is the product of the same subjectivity which creates the disintegration. The longing for order, therefore, is itself indirectly a disintegrating tendency; hence it destroys itself.

In the literary creation of Leverkuhn's compositions, the development of an individual work follows upon intellectual conceptualization. In Leverkuhn's work, the actual musical composition, once he has developed his own method, flows from a rationally conceived system of organization which has been constructed before the actual process of creation. The innovative method of conscious construction of specific works replaces inspiration with craftsmanship, bringing forth constructivism as a new form. Leverkuhn's musical structures follow a desire to merge speech with music through this technique, as Mann's style seeks a merging of music into speech. The problematic nature of this formal innovation of Leverkuhn's own imaginative world, and how Mann treats this musical "system" contextually and formally within the novel, is an indication of the extent to which Mann was conscious of the problems of form raised by a re-evaluation of culture and politics in his own art.
I am going to introduce the discussion of Leverkuhn's creative work with a critique of a particular methodology which has attempted to understand the significance of Leverkuhn's music within the novel as a whole. I have chosen Gunilla Bergsten's analysis as a focal point for this critique because hers is the most articulate example of the view (shared by Zeitblom) that Leverkuhn's musical images - and by analogy, Mann's use of these images - must be "interpreted symbolically."³

Bergsten maintains that Leverkuhn, like Mann himself, attributes the threat of artistic sterility to the exhaustion of artistic conventions: spontaneous invention is "impeded by reflection and by the paralyzing feeling that everything the conventional novel can express has already been said."⁴ Mann's own creative interpretation of this situation will be left for a later discussion. The concern here is with the interpretation that the historical pastiche surrounding and reflecting Leverkuhn's work shows that the story of his music is intended as an allegory for political events of the times. Within this interpretation lies the assumption that the crisis in culture is an autonomous one, appearing to the artist as "dissatisfaction with traditional forms, in the curbing of 'invention' by means of critical reflection, and, finally, in a tendency towards experimentation with structure."⁵ In other words a crisis has attacked the "technical horizon" (239) of artistic forms, and so the artist must suffer imaginatively in the search for new ones. Bergsten's reduction of this aspect of the novel, the story of Leverkuhn's music, to problems of form resembles Zeitblom's being "lost" in culture and in the tradition of the Enlightenment, to the point that he sees political threats to culture (and here, to artistic conventions) rather than to people.

Mann's experimentation with method is described as the development
of motifs, based on a musical structure, which parallel the Faustian myth with German historical evolution, and with the aesthetic problems of the novel faced by the author himself. Bergsten's synopsis of Mann's method defines the parallel relationship between Faust, German history and aesthetic development (which she briskly terms "adventures of the novel").6 as allegory. It is strange that in Leverkuhn's case this aesthetic experimentation with constructivist form is proposed to be symbolic of Germany's "dark destiny",7 while Mann's intensified use of precisely the same creative methods is necessary for the realization of his theme: "To balance the subjectivity of ruthless self-revelation, and perhaps also to help him withstand the impact of his own insight, Mann needed a solidly objective form. This he found in the montage technique."8 While the distinction is not clearly explained, it appears that Mann's use of such techniques is necessary to maintain a complex structure of metaphor; Leverkuhn's use of similar techniques, on the other hand, is the result of unhealthy narcissism, cold intellectualism, and Faustian arrogance. The artist here personifies the association of artist, criminal and madman, corresponding with Mann's association of these in Mann's essay on Hitler.9 Mann's psychological concern in portraying obviously historical figures facilitates his "metaphorical way of portraying historical drama;"10 attributing to them "a symbolic meaning above and beyond their recognized achievements."11 If Mann's depiction of Leverkuhn's work is in fact metaphorical of demonic collapse, the self-conscious identification with precisely the same techniques is presumably then enlightened self-criticism: that is, he would not deploy these methods if he had the choice and is sorry that he has, and, symbolically, warns us against them through Zeitblom's humanist objections. Again, the good-natured identification
of Zeitblom as a confessional voice for Mann's guilty conscience puts it all in easy perspective.

Bergsten employs the terms "allegory", "metaphor" and "symbol" not only to explain the connection between Leverkühn's work and Mann's fictional mode of description of it, but as an attempt to account for the obvious relationship between Leverkühn's life and the general collapse of German cultural and political structures. Accordingly, she arrives at the ludicrous conclusion that "Mann so greatly expands the symbolic significance of the individual that he arrives at the romantic identification of the individual with the race. And psychology is only a metaphor" - so that the need for an ethical and metaphysical perspective within the novel creates yet another metaphor, that of Germany's pact with the devil.

The problem with this model of "metaphor", common as it is, is that it implies that the identification between the individual psychology and historical development is an artistic one - an aesthetic unity conjured up in the imagination of the writer and existing in the autonomous world of the imaginative structure. This is precisely the error in interpretation made by Zeitblom, to the extent, that is, that he draws the connection at all.

And still! Little as it was possible to connect his worsening health in any temperamental way with the national misfortune, yet my tendency to see the one in the light of the other and find symbolic parallels in them, this inclination, which after all might be due simply to the fact that they were happening at the same time, was not diminished by his remoteness from outward things, however I might conceal the thought and refrain from bringing it up directly. (342)

This failure to connect Leverkühn's creative impulses or work directly and internally to the historical conditions which affect them is one aspect of the "secret that the two protagonists are identical with each other" that Mann refers to in Story of a Novel. Zeitblom, infatuated
as he is with Leverkühn's genius, grows to an awareness that such a connection exists. But an integrated or specifically social evaluation of Leverkühn's work does not flow from this awareness.

Mann does rely on a form of allegory in his integration of myth and pastiche, and this is the common interpretation of his fictional identification of Leverkühn, Nietzsche, Faust, and German history. But as a key to thematic interpretation the model of allegory is a limited one, since it treats as separate what it is supposed to connect, obscuring the theoretical distinctions to be made between the basis of allegory in thought, and the connections Mann reveals between social history and the individual subjective experience. The allegorical assumption is restrictive in a formal analysis as well, since it obscures the meaningful developments in form taking place through the novel.

The ascendence of metaphor and symbol to its position as dominant form of description and expression has in fact characterized the evolution of modernist poetry and fiction. The aesthetic assumptions which generate such emphasis in the literary genres have inevitably invaded methods of criticism as well. In the creative process the reliance on metaphor is born of the need to restore unity between artistic form and its material where such unity is not generated spontaneously as a link between the poetic and contemporary artistic conventions. To the degree that this loss of unity affects the method and scope of artistic inspiration, Mann is in agreement with the devil, or rather with Adorno:

Certain things are no longer possible. The pretence of feeling as a compositional work of art, the self-satisfied pretence of music itself, has become impossible and no longer to be preserved - I mean the perennial notion that prescribed and formalized elements shall be introduced as though they were the inviolable necessity of the single case. (241)
The unity between "prescribed and formalized elements" of artistic convention, and the shape of emotional experience seeking its own autonomous expression through the "inviolable necessity of the single case" suffers not just in music but in the evolution of form itself, through the expanding of the technical horizon to accommodate the individual search for freedom from such conventions. In the realist novel of the 19th century the "formalized elements" were based on a unity, embedded in the plot, character, and descriptive detail, between the individual and the typical. The writer's perspective allows the creation of "lasting human types" portrayed within a depiction of concrete social development. The possibility of conceiving individual experience, even the most private and intense subjective experience, in the same moment and within the same social totality (even when the individual was in an antagonistic position to that social totality) - this possibility was essential to the structure of the traditional realist or bourgeois novel. The thematic structure of the novel, based on a dialectical relation of community and opposition, upheld even as a problematic matter the viability of individual values and activity. The potentiality of this relation of totality had passed and with it, of course, the artistic conventions which were the expressions, the mediated form, of that vision.

The modern world has caused the loss of such totality. The contemporary status of metaphor, as an over-determined form, is born of the attempt to restore unity between form and its material, empirical genesis. Symbol becomes a means of transcending the apparent randomness of everyday life. "Because a principle of unity is felt to have been lost, the present seems to lose its organic connection with the past and the future. Time becomes a series of fragmented instants, and a sense of continuity gives
way to discontinuity." The creation of metaphor signifies an imaginative striving for order, as "reality, of more dimensions than the individual artist can cope with, decomposes and shatters the novel." Though it is not, I would argue, mere complexity which shatters the form of the novel, but the severing of connectedness between "facts" - social events, objects, historical experience - and the comprehensive shape of the imagination, which raises the rubric of complexity to explain the seeming incoherence of the material world. The lending of metaphorical structure to the aesthetic organization of material is then a metaphysical acceptance, and attempted transcendence, of such alienation. Creativity in such a context is forced into self-consciousness. "Language ceases to be what we see through, and becomes what we see." This leads to the "aggressive aestheticism" of the artist in the search for structural unity: the order of the abstractly logical imagination, which in the end reflects only itself. Artistic order then becomes subjective, in the end a negation of the objective world, an assumption that it is inherently, and perhaps inevitably, inexplicable.

Mann's fictional treatment of Leverkuhn's work reflects his own rejection of the extreme aestheticism paralleling Leverkuhn's attitudes to his own early work. Therefore it is important to resist a mode of analysis which does not recognize Mann's very particular approach to allegory in the novel. Walter Benjamin's study on allegory proposes the interpretation that allegory is "the dominant mode of expression of a world in which things have been for whatever reason utterly sundered from meanings, from spirit, from genuine human existence." In Benjamin's terminology, "allegories are in the realm of thoughts what ruins are in the realm of things..."
In other words, the object itself is henceforth incapable of projecting any meaning on its own; it can only take on that meaning which the allegorist wishes to lend it. He instills it with his own meaning, himself descends to inhabit it; and this must be understood not psychologically but in an ontological sense. In his hands the thing in question becomes something else, speaks of something else, becomes for him the key to some realm of hidden knowledge, as whose emblem he honours it.25

In criticism, the reduction of meaning to metaphor provides an explanation of connections between disparate elements - between music and German history, for example - which tends to separate rather than to connect the meanings of each. If a figure is said to "represent" a certain meaning, then in its essence, and in the relation of its own features, it is separate from that meaning. Each thing described remains inherently autonomous from the other, since what unites them is not internal relatedness, but imaginative, arbitrary assignment of resemblant meaning to frozen things, a dance of the author's imagination for which the viewer must rely on inside knowledge, good fortune, or concentrated study to comprehend.

Benjamin's formulation of the allegorized thing confronts a world in which both objects and people, in their comprehension of themselves within a larger milieu, have been conceptually deprived of human significance. The meanings of objects become abstracted from our experience of them - as our encounters with people do - because they are not defined in direct relationship to spontaneous human values or needs but are controlled and mediated through money and the imperatives of the economic system. Objects in the world become thus abstracted from human relations and at the same time acquire power over them. The power of the economic system assures that abstract values of that system prevail, masked by an ethos of idealism and social individualism. Capitalist economic relationships assume an unprecedented organizational hegemony over every aspect of human society, maintaining a totalitarian power and at the same time lending a
false surface appearance of independent identity to things - including works of art - and to social relationships. The real essence of these things is that their intrinsic value is extracted through alienated work, and resides instead in their monetary (commodity) value, which is abstract. In other words, value is not indissolubly linked to the concrete object, since value can change arbitrarily at the dictates of an autonomous system, so that the concept of its "meaning" or worth becomes entirely relative and equivocal. Use value is replaced by exchange value. Money, as Hauser points out, reduces value to quantity without quality, and disguises the individual who possesses it: it thus makes values "comparable, exchangeable, transferable from one person to another - in other words, makes them abstract." As the "very symbol of quintessence of relativism" money speaks for the laws of the market which govern the whole of life. The individual values debated within the bourgeois novel dissolve as religion and sentiment are drowned in the "icy water of egotistical calculation."27 This is why Lukacs calls the devil, as representative of equivocal calculation, a "historical critic of the entire bourgeois culture of imperialism."28

As Leverkühn's devil himself maintains, the sundering of subject and object consequent upon the negation of authentic meaning finds its expression in problems of artistic form. The active powers of totalitarian organization assume an independent and active identity in the "equivocation" of the aesthetic system. Artistic creation, under the power of such intolerable determinism, is "not free not to reflect what it reacts against."29 This modern tragedy forms the basis of the novel's identification of Leverkühn's work with the disintegration of Weimar Germany and the triumph of fascism. Mann understands, and has felt, through his own
experience of the creative need for unity and order, this temptation to structure, this will to organizational coherence which so easily can annihilate truth. At the same time he resists the structuring because it questions the fundamental belief in the value of individual action (the traditional tale of an individual's life, implying meaning and value to the activities of the individual, requires no such structure). Mann's own identification with Adrian's system is therefore highly problematic. Mann himself described the novel's emergence from "a strange and licentious spiritual relaxation", \(^30\) which in Leverkuhn's characterization leads to the necessity for a systematization of form, an objectification of alienation which seals his isolation from social life.

Adrian's derivation from Nietzsche is not simply an anecdotal one; like Nietzsche, Leverkuhn's life is justifiable only as an aesthetic phenomenon. "Art and appearance were all, since life was based upon deception, perspective and illusion." \(^31\) The reflecting and making of truth which forms the basis of artistic works becomes limited to the creation of structure. Leverkuhn's own method of work, which on the surface resembles Mann's preparation and composition of the novel, shows that the integration of subjective, personal expression, motivated by illusions of autonomy, into a structural model of totality, becomes possible only as a product of calculated systematization on the part of the artist. The search for meaning, or for a conceptual system for understanding the world, becomes inextricable from mysticism: the denial of real human experience, which is intuitively believed to be false, in favour of modes of expression which are thoroughly abstracted from human experience. "To the modern, psychological mind there can be no easy demarcation from appearance and reality: both may be equally unreal." \(^32\) What follows from this lament is
the inability or refusal to recognize permanent values. The organization of artistic form becomes synonymous then with ultimate cynicism about human life.

B. The Search for Freedom

In art, at least, the subjective and objective intertwine to the point of being indistinguishable, one proceeds from the other and takes the character of the other, the subject precipitates as objective and by genius is again awaked to spontaneity, 'dynamized', as we say; it speaks all at once the language of the subjective. The musical conventions today destroyed were not always so objective, so objectively imposed. They were crystallizations of living experiences and as such long performed an office of vital importance: the task of organization. Organization is everything. Without it there is nothing, least of all art. And it was aesthetic subjectivity that took on the task, it undertook to organize the work out of itself, in freedom. (Leverkuhn, 190)

It has been suggested that the continuum of musical references in Dr. Faustus reflects a musical history of the Western world. Moving from the singing of the cowgirl Hanne through the classical musical education of Leverkuhn and Zeitblom to the final works of Leverkuhn's maturity, it is possible to gain quite a thorough understanding of the evolution of musical forms. And this is intended. Like other motifs throughout the novel, the "meaning" of this vast array of encyclopedically dispensed knowledge is inseparable from the "meaning" of the novel as a whole.

That Mann would offer specifically musical forms as a paradigm for his total examination of German culture is inevitable. This discussion cannot attempt either an exhaustive presentation of Mann's lifetime views on music as the most typical and highest form of German art, nor should it be held responsible for a detailed analysis of what has happened in music since Beethoven in the innovation of new forms. Rather attention will be focussed on those aspects of musical development that are relevant to the
political parallels already provided in the novel. Given the reservations about the allegorical approach that I have expressed, hopefully the relationship between the musical developments that Mann communicates so impressively, and their place in the historical and political intention of the novel, can find their connectedness formulated in a different way.

Romantic music sought to create new sounds and effects more intensively than previous epochs. This was typical of the search for radically new forms that spread through all art forms. The function of new techniques was to contain the surplus of emotional depth which no longer found expression in classical formulae. The classical form epitomized the perfect integration of the harmonic (vertical) and melodic (horizontal) elements of music. The sonata, most representative of the classical form, is based on a structural opposition between the tonic and dominant keys. The principle of contrast motivates thematic development in which the clearly defined melodic element, or individuated musical idea, undergoes a transformation through the working out of this contrast in an interplay of opposites. Because the contrast within the sonata form takes place through this harmonic or tonal opposition, tonality forms an objective and specific harmonic base. In other words, the harmonic aspect is limited in its movement to those keys which facilitate the dialectical movement between tonic and dominant key. Within and through this objective formal basis, the individual composer's melodic idea is developed and expanded.

Themes or subjects are introduced in what is established as the basic key or tonality. They are developed rhythmically and harmonically, with a sense of movement, away from the opening, piling up of tension and conflict, resolution and returning to the opening tonality, but with the themes now seen in a transformed light.

Through the romantic period, the tonal horizon constantly broadened to elaborate the harmonic possibilities of expression. The urge to create
more emotional, more personal music demanded new technical means. "In an art form intent on intimacy and subtlety of expression each smallest cell and element in the individual work of art needs to be determined. Like romantic lyric poetry, romantic harmony is an art of nuances, of minute ramifications and transitions." 37

The emotional overrunning of the traditional forms was expressed through chromaticism, a broadening of the harmonic possibilities so that the composer could move from one key to any other with a wider variety of tonal combinations. Chromaticism increased the nuances of harmonic shading, causing the development of melody, or theme, to be reduced to a recurring pattern. Rather than thematic development occurring through changes in the melodic idea, the focus began to shift to subtle harmonic variations, with the relationship between tonal patterns becoming increasingly arbitrary and whimsical. "Not only did romantics enjoy that mixture of the literary and the musical which is the essence of the leitmotif, but also the reiterating of themes furthered their tendency toward homogeneity of structure, as opposed to classical musical architecture built upon principles of contrast." 38 Wagner's introduction of leitmotif was the crystallization of this transformation, the replacement of repetition for development, tone colour and expression for movement and idea.

The changes that had taken place in the increasingly chromatic movement from classical to romantic music reach their ultimate form in expressionism (early Schoenberg) and, although in different form, in atonality. The concentrated musical moment of expressionism reveals the isolation of the note from a context of thematic development, from the immediate past or future of the hermetic musical time sequence. In this way the bonds between notes, in a horizontal sense, disintegrate. The subtleties of
harmonic chromaticism are summoned to express the depths of individual emotion; the individual cry of isolated subjectivity gains precedence over the development of theme through dialectical contrast. (One critic singled out the formless shriek as the chief characteristic of Expressionism. 39)

This atonality, and the system generated by its formlessness, were both a continuation of romanticism and its negation. Jameson has described the hypersensitivity of romantic composers of the nineteenth century for whom the contrapuntal work is reduced to a bare minimum, the working through of themes to perfunctory and monitory repetition, and in whose work the centre of gravity of musical invention moves to sheer instrumental expressiveness and orchestral coloration. 40

Ernst Krenek, the composer whose book on modern music was studied and used by Mann in his work on the musical sections of Dr. Faustus, 41 comments in that book that romanticism instigated the "decay of humanity, of universality in music. Technically, it gave momentum to thematic individuality, shifting the balance of the composition as a whole from its constructive base and stressing inspiration as the compelling original force." 42

The emphasis on fine expressive distinctions through harmonic subtlety rapidly undermined the previously unchallenged objectivity of the harmonic base and created an increasing relativism in compositional possibilities. The loss of structural balance in this case was no exception to the widespread expressionist tendency to question the relationship between objective and subjective reality, resulting in a deliberate confounding of the tenets of rational thought. The Germans, in particular, were men of "spirit". No longer working within the previously collective and predictable formal framework, artists sought increasingly to break through artistic conventions, to struggle against their satiation with these forms through the elaboration of increasingly exceptionalist personal qualities.
Musically the emancipation of dissonance inevitably followed upon this
defiance of conventions.

A state of affairs in which all choices are open because no laws
exist or are acknowledged militates against artistic creativity. Artistic forms are dictated solely by the feelings: a line between
coherence and incoherence cannot be drawn. In the first years of
the twentieth century, existing conventions were thrown overboard
in a revolt of the collective unconscious... As happens in every
sphere, almost limitless freedom led to a state of uncertainty.  

The paradox arose when the endless possibilities of such creative
"freedom" turned out in fact not to be endless, but vacuous: this is where
parody and word-play, or musical quoting, became necessary. Parody becomes
the only path open to Leverkühn, for whom such "freedom" from all conven-
tions and obligations "begins to lie like a mildew upon talent and to
betray traces of sterility" (189). The rejection of existing artistic
conventions may have indicated a revolt, but the revolt against convention
(musical formula or theory) as such holds no guarantee of expressive free-
dom. Leverkühn's absolutism in search for artistic freedom is inseparable
from his cold isolation. Art as the subject of itself: through such
internalized self-consciousness the form becomes the content, rather than
the means for expressing the content. Increasing obscurity in the mater-
ial reinforces the isolation of the artist, so that this isolation is no
longer imposed by the society but by the artist himself.

Leverkühn's recourse to an ironic treatment of old forms, in the face
of "limitless freedom", is not then such a paradox. Rather it exposes
the bankruptcy of the idealist conception of "freedom", in which the in-
dividual search for the self replaces the collective world view of organ-
ized religion. "The private individual, free to pick and choose, was a
fraud from the beginning; not only were the allotments already picked and
chosen, but the contents of the choice followed the dictates of the social
not the individual world."44 As Fromm has pointed out, "the right to express our thoughts, however, means something only if we are able to have thoughts of our own; freedom from external authority is a lasting gain only if the inner psychic conditions are such that we are able to establish our own individuality."45 This contradiction is present in Leverkuhn's rebellion. An evaluation of the changes in musical forms attempted in his work illustrates to what extent Mann believes that the rejection of the objective, or social, bases of expression contributes to an eventual paralysis of the very possibility of genuine expression through the formal mediation of artistic creation.

Leverkuhn shares the Expressionist urge to deny objective reality by submerging his own consciousness of it in the irrational energies of the individual unconscious. The extreme self-consciousness of artists working with forms over-saturated with emotional expressions of the self has ironically threatened the very possibility of such expression, since it assumes, and demands, a spontaneous or intuitive mode of creativity. Mann's interest in Freud is instructive in his views on this, since he found himself in sympathy with Freud's description and moral treatment of the id and the ego. The early distrust of "Dionysian" forces which gave impetus to his creative struggle in producing Death in Venice and other of his early stories found itself corroborated in Freud's psychology. A second essay on Freud (1939) refers to the vulnerability of the id to exploitation: it is "not organized, produces no collective will, merely the striving to achieve satisfaction for the impulsive needs operating under the pleasure principle."46 Leverkuhn's pact with the Devil resembles this abdication in favour of unconscious forces, necessarily a pact with amorality, a "prelude to a trial of the artistic potential of the id after the powers
of mind, reason and metaphysic have been rejected. "47 If there is any-
thing he cannot abide, if there's one thing in the whole world he cannot
stomach, it is destructive criticism. What he wants and gives is triumph
over it, is shining, sparkling, vainglorious unreflectiveness!" (237) This
Narcissism is what entices Leverkuhn to seek solution in the pact. The
arrogance of searching for guiding principles solely within the most in-
dividual emotional self necessitates the consequent dismissal of moral
responsibility: at this level it is possible to treat Leverkuhn's creative
urge as a manifestation of Freudian neurosis. More generally, the self-
seeking assignation with the artistic impulse towards thoughtless, exclu-
sive self-expression, towards the objectification of its own uniqueness
in form, the novel suggests, must be seen as the ultimate cultural heri-
tage of bourgeois culture. The exhaustion of the resources of this cul-
tivation produces the crisis of that culture, as Leverkuhn's words at the
beginning of this section suggest.

Eventually the disconnected self must seek to escape from its own
poverty; the loss of integration leaves its mark in the creative process.
The search for connection takes form in the search for purpose, in an
idealistic pursuit of sensuality (personified, within the novel, by Inez),
or in the submission to a greater power. The individual seeks for iden-
tification with a larger power to compensate for his own feelings of
powerlessness. 48 Here the power of romantic music asserts itself; as early
as Buddenbrooks Mann was exploring the power acquired by music as it is
appropriated by the self. High moments in Hanno Buddenbrook's life are
when he is allowed to sit with his master in the church, "in the midst of
a mighty tempest of rolling sound, which at once set them free from the
earth and dominated them by its own power." 49 Music as mediator between
the realities of concrete or social existence and the subjectivity of the inner state has become an abstract power in itself. Leverkühn expresses his discomfort and intimidation in the face of such power:

A manifestation of the highest energy — not at all abstract, but without an object, energy in a void, in pure ether — where else in the universe does such a thing appear? We Germans have taken over from philosophy the expression "in itself", we use it every day without much idea of the metaphysical. But here you have it, such music is energy itself, yet not as idea, rather in its actuality. I call your attention to the fact that that is almost the definition of God. Imitatio Dei — I am surprised that it is not forbidden. Perhaps it is. (78)

The attractiveness of music for Leverkühn (and for Schopenhauer, whose aesthetic ideas he is expressing here directly) is precisely its power over him, its very abstract energy, its independence from social life. This is why for Leverkühn the involvement with music must always mean total isolation, and a separation of that activity from all others. Schopenhauer's interest in music was based on his postulation of the Will as abstract energy. Music best represents reality, for Schopenhauer, because "it is an art without ideas, or rather an art in which ideas are identical with form and do not lead outside the functional, self-sufficient universe of the work to the illusory cosmos of empirical experience. It is an art untranslatable into any terms of external experience." Schopenhauer's conclusion from this dangerously articulate mystic vision of mystic inarticulateness was that the creation of form and meaning in music must take place precisely in defiance of the meaningfulness of human experience in conceptual terms. Meaning in music comes not from references to an external universe but from its internal relationships; the chord receives its meaning precisely and exclusively from its relationship to the whole. This autonomy itself, however, has a content: in Schopenhauer's terms music "conveys emotions before the practical needs of life (that is,
of the Will) have channeled and narrowed them into definite feelings and conceptualized thoughts, and so it reveals the naked Will, as it exists before assuming the disguises of individuation. Music reveals a universal longing without purpose and object, an emotional absolute, reality in its true and original state. The postulation of inchoate emotion as "reality in its true and original state" removes the rational, conceptual, or social qualities of the human imagination from the experience of musical response, and in fact from any definition of meaningful reality.

From Schopenhauer's affection for music we can draw conclusions about the German adoption of music as their most typically national medium of expression. One can argue, particularly with their romantic music, that music represents a "binding social force" precisely because of its spiritual qualities. The "meaning" of musical experience does not fall easily into ideological or social categories, and indeed these can be ignored altogether. Because of its sensuality and its spirituality it has the power to "unify whole masses of people... (and) further serve as a bridge to a transcendent spiritual world beyond the here-and-now."

Music is thus culturally "typical" because it acts as a general abstraction of power, by claiming power for itself and by distancing itself from both the social dynamics of the real world — as Leverkuhn comments, from the Church as well — and from the subjectivity of the artist himself. Its technical obscurity as a system is related to this autonomy. Leverkuhn speaks of music "always as a strange power, a phenomenon amazing but not touching him personally, talking about it with critical detachment and a certain condescension." (74)

Adorno comments on the condition in which the artist faces his own material as foreign or alienated matter; objects which he produces which
yet are not so much whole expressions as technical experiments in production. "The artist has become the mere executor of his own intentions, which appear before him as strangers — inexorable demands of the compositions upon which he is working." Mann's familiarity with this notion is indicated by his description of Leverkuhn's condition after the pact, during times when he is composing. "Obviously and admittedly this man lived at the time in a state of tension so high as to be anything but agreeable. It was more like a constant tyranny: the flashing up and stating of a problem, the task of composition (over which he had heretofore always lingered), was one with its lightening like solution." (359) Adorno's analysis reappears in Dr. Faustus, significantly in the words of the devil. The appearance to Leverkuhn of an imagined devil, spokesman for his own anxieties, is a grim commentary on the situation faced by the artist in which the problems of expression face him as alienated objects, the expressional devices available to him creating works which are the objectification of his own alienation. A comparison of a relevant passage from Adorno's study of Schoenberg with the appearance of the devil in Adrian's study shows the extent to which Adorno's ideas influenced Mann. Perhaps what he called the "tragically cerebral relentlessness of (Adorno's) criticism" haunted and troubled him, since in the novel it appears so intransigently, in its undisguised rendition, in the words of the devil.

Dr. Faustus
"They are powerless too," he went on, "But I believe we, thou and I, lever prefer the decent impotence of those who scorn to cloak the general sickness under colour of a dignified mummery...Does not production threaten to come to an end? And whatever of serious stuff gets on to paper
betrays effort and distaste. Extraneous, social grounds? Lack of demand? And as in the pre-liberal period the possibility of production depends largely on the chance of a Maecenas? Right, but as explanation doesn't go far enough. Composing itself has got too hard, devilishly hard. Where work does not go any longer with sincerity, how is one to work? But so it stands, my friend, the masterpiece, the self-sufficient form, belongs to traditional art, emancipated art rejects it. The thing begins with this: that the right of command over all the tone-combinations ever applied by no means belongs to you. Impossible the diminished seventh, impossible certain chromatic passing notes. Every composer of the better sort carries within himself a canon of the forbidden, the self-forbidding, which by degrees includes all the possibilities of tonality, in other words all traditional music... Everything depends on the technical horizon. The diminished seventh is right and full of expression at the beginning of Op. 111. It corresponds to Beethoven's whole technical niveau, doesn't it? -the tension between consonance and the harshest dissonance known to him. The principle of tonality and its dynamics lend to the chord its specific weight. It has lost it - by a historical process which nobody reverses...In every bar in which one dares to think, the situation as regards technique presents itself to him as a problem. Technique in all its aspects demands of him every moment that he do justice to it, and give the only right answer which it at any moment permits. It comes down to this, that his compositions are nothing more than solutions of... Therefore, the altercation of the composer with his material is the same as an altercation with society, precisely to the extent that it finds expression in his work, and does not simply face his product as consumer or opponent - ... All the tonal combinations employed in the past by no means stand indiscriminately at the disposal of the composer today. Even the more insensitive ear detects the shabbiness and exhaustion of the diminished seventh chord and certain chromatic modulatory tones in the salon music of the nineteenth century. For the technically trained ear, such vague discomfort is transformed into a prohibitive canon. If all is not deception, this canon today excludes even the medium of tonality - that is to say, the means of all traditional music. It is not simply that these sounds are antiquated and untimely, but that they are false... The isolated appearance of chords does not in itself decide their correctness or incorrectness. These are to be judged only from the perspective of the level of technique adhered to at a given time. The diminished seventh chord, which rings false in salon pieces, is correct and full of every possible expression at the beginning of Beethoven's Sonata (opus 111)...it is the total niveau of Beethoven's technique which gives the chord its specific weight. The components of this technique include the tension between the most extreme dissonance possible for him and consonance, the harmonic perspective which includes all melodic events, and the dynamic conception of tonality as a whole. But the historic process, through which this weight has been lost, is irreversible...But at this point the picture of the composer is also transformed. He loses that freedom on a grand scale which idealistic aesthetics is accustomed to grant to the artist. He is no longer a
that kind; nothing but the solving of technical puzzles. Art becomes critique. That is something quite honourable, who denies it? Much rebellion in strict obedience is needed, much independence, much courage. But the danger of being uncreative - what do you think? Is it perhaps still only a danger, or is it already a fixed and settled fact... Don't blame it on social conditions. I am aware you tend to do so, and are in the habit of saying that these conditions produce nothing fixed and stable enough to guarantee the harmony of the self-sufficient work. True, but unimportant. The prohibitive difficulties lie deep in the work itself. The historical movement of the musical material has turned against the self-contained work. It shrinks in time, it scorches extension in time, which is the dimensions of a musical work, and lets it stand empty. Not out of impotence, not out of incapacity to give form. Rather from a ruthless demand for compression, which taboos the superfluous, negates the phrase, shatters the ornament, stands opposed to any extension of time, which is the life-form of the work. Work, time, and pretence, they are one, and together they fall victim to critique. It no longer tolerates pretence and play, the fiction, the self-glorification of form, which censors the passions and human suffering, divides out the parts, translates into pictures. Only the non-fictional is still permissible, the unplayed, the undisguised and untransfigured expression of suffering in its actual moment. (238-240)

Like the dialogue with the devil in another great novel, Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamozov, Leverkuhn's encounter with the devil crystallizes the contradictions that are developed throughout the novel. In these
dialogues the man in search of meaning is confronted with the responsibility of free choice, which is represented as a tortuous one; the rejection of that freedom brings the compensation of a sense of power. This is what Leverkuhn's devil offers. He epitomizes an adulation of system and authority, the submission of the individual ego to a larger power. The self-sufficient work is no longer possible; "the prohibitive difficulties lie deep in the work itself." The search for a solution to this historical exhaustion must apply itself to composition as to a historical puzzle. The solution demands the resolution of this technical puzzle; the renunciation of the self finds fulfillment in its correct execution. Thus the negation of the time dimension in the music: as human passions "fall victim to critique", the flow of human expression is reduced to a single admissible phrase.

Schoenberg himself had advocated brevity, the self-contained moment in the musical work. Leverkuhn as well follows the Expressionist urge to the single cry, the destruction of melody and continuity in time replaced by the direct instinctive momentary expression. The doubts cast upon the possibility of language in the end question the intrinsic meaning of everything.

With this separation of meaning from form, tonality becomes entirely dependent on its own internal context; as Leverkuhn says, relationship is everything. (47). In total ambiguity Leverkuhn's music "turns the equivocal into a system." Leverkuhn's absorption in musical problems takes the form of speculation in "the problem of unity, interchangeability, identity of horizontal and vertical writing...and the transformation of the horizontal interval into the chord, which occupied him as nothing else did: that is, of the horizontal into the vertical, the successive into the
simultaneous." The confounding of the elements of music in this speculation is reminiscent of the Expressionist merging of myth with history, obscuring in both cases the boundaries between reality and art and in the end sabotaging the meaning of each.

The influence on modernism of the aesthetic philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer is apparent here, articulated in the notion of the self-sufficiency of the arts in relationship to a dubious reality. The forms of modernist art have changed in accordance with a movement towards musical structure. (Kandinsky and Valery, for example, explicitly called on other arts to emulate music. 58) Schoenberg himself insisted that "music has no more to do with society than a game of chess." 59 Adorno's departure from his admired master involved his disagreement with this conclusion. His fascination with music grew from his concern with the secularization of the Enlightenment; his admiration for Beethoven, which was certainly not unique but particularly influenced Mann 60 formed the basis of his dialectical theory of mediation in the sociology of music, which is in essence what is being presented here. As Jay summarizes Adorno's perspective,

So it is that Western music at the very outset marks itself off from the culture as a whole, reconstitutes itself as a self-contained and autonomous sphere at a distance from the everyday, social life of the period and developing, as it were, parallel to it. Not only does music thereby acquire an internal history of its own, but it also begins to duplicate on a smaller scale all the structures and levels of the social and economic macrocosm itself, and displays its own internal dialectic. 61

It is the structure of music, not its overt message or content, that duplicates the organization of society. From this we conclude that it is precisely the abstractness, the freedom from articulated meaning or value, and the ensuing arbitrary power of the form itself, that fascinated the Germans in the way that Mann has described. At the same time this explains
in what manner Schoenberg’s music best represented, for Mann, the structure of German society, with its abstractness of organization from human society, its internal logic as a system impervious to the whims of desire, and its "totalitarian" overdetermination of all musical elements. Mann could thus identify, at least for his own purposes, both the artistic manifestations of this barbarous retreat from humanism (he was, not surprisingly, not fond of modern music), and the political consequences of such absolutist aesthetic self-cultivation. As a political analysis of the causes of fascism, this identification is, of course, simplistic. As a moral renunciation, and as a form of cultural critique, the parallels are devastatingly effective.

In Leverkuhn’s speculation, the dialectic inherent in the movement through contrast of the separate elements of music is destroyed by the artist’s need for their identity, through the collapsing of the subjective (harmonic) and objective (polyphonic) elements into one dissonant chord. The destruction of one form of balance, which had been based on a particular kind of autonomous integration, eventually creates the need for another. Abstraction and speculation are crystallized into a totalitarian system. "Even a silly order is better than none at all." (68)

C. Triumph of the System

"What we call the purification of the complicated into the simple is at bottom the same as the winning back of the vital and the power of feeling. If it were possible - whoever succeeded in - how would you say it?" he turned to me and then answered himself: "the break-through from intellectual coldness into a touch-and-go world of new feeling, him one should call the saviour of art." (321)

Leverkuhn’s longing for a "break-through" is at the heart of his development of the 12-tone system. The term itself originates with Zeitblom’s vaguely mystical defense of the outbreak of patriotic sentiment and
aggression in 1914, at the beginning of World War I. The concept is fami-
liar to students in the Winfried Circle, too, in their rapturous disserta-
tions on nature and youth, which look forward to renewal and revolution in
purified faith (117).

Leverkuhn's flirtation with theology, during which he encounters the
Winfried students, is an avoidance of the temptation to dedicate himself
to the study of music. Because of his unextinguishable sense of parody,
he feels himself unsuited to the calling of an artist. For some time he
deliberately resists the call of his own impulses to devote his life to
music. He also resists the urging of his music teacher, Kretzschmar,
with this explanation:

I am embarrassed at the insipidness which is the supporting struc-
ture, the conditioning solid substance of even the work of genius,
at the elements thereof which are training and common property, at
use and won in achieving the beautiful; I blush at all that, weary
thereof, get head-ache therefrom, and that right early... Dear friend,
why do I have to laugh? Can a man employ the traditional or sanc-
ify the trick with greater genius? Can one with shrewder sense
achieve the beautiful? ... - I have always had to laugh, most damna-
bly, at the most mysterious and impressive phenomena. I fled from
this exaggerated sense of the comic into theology, in the hope that
it would give relief to the tickling - only to find there too a
perfect legion of ludicrous absurdities. Why does almost everything
seem to me like its own parody? Why must I think that almost all,
no, all the methods and conventions of art today are good for parody
only? (132-134)

Leverkuhn's uncontrollable mockery at the conventions of musical ex-
pression may be more extreme, but bear conspicuous resemblance to the
irony throughout Mann's work. In case we miss the connection, Mann pro-
vides comments in Story of a Novel on the parody of public activity: With-
out his desiring this to be so, the world of humanity "takes on a charac-
ter of fantasy, dream, buffoonery" - so that the effect of parody in his
work is not merely literary guile but true lived experience. 62 This is
sufficient to warn us against viewing Leverkuhn's parodistic detachment
from conventional forms - and the systematization that provides the solution - as a purely artistic concern. Of course evidence of such a warning is also abundant in the novel. The situation in which the work of art turns its attention upon itself is responsible for such parody, and is responsible also for the error of critical preoccupation with questions of form. The wordplay and affection for quotations as a response to personal embarrassment characterize Leverkuhn in both senses of the word. Leverkuhn's desire to escape from boredom lacks the "robust naivete" necessary to the artist which he claims to lack in his letter to Kretzschmar. (132) His intransigent cleverness masters all conventions too quickly to allow subjective involvement to penetrate the material; for his critical imagination, the harmonic possibilities of tonality no longer hold any meaning. That this is true on the level of emotional response, as well as in terms of tricks of technique, he proves with his zestful - and yet painful in its persuasiveness- review of the conventions of the "beautiful", in the same letter.

Leverkuhn seeks the confines of a radically new strict style to free himself from the paralyzing prohibitions of his consciousness. Zeitblom's pontification on the German national character is meant to reflect on this aspect of Leverkuhn's work, though Zeitblom himself does not intend this. "In a nation like ours," I set forth, "the psychological is always the primary and actually motivating; the political action is of the second order of importance: reflex, expression, instrument. What the break-through to world power, to which fate summons us, means at bottom, is the break-through to the world - out of an isolation of which we are painfully conscious, and which no vigorous reticulations into world economy has been able to break down since the founding of the Reich. The bitter thing is that the practical manifestation is an outbreak of war, though its true interpretation is longing, a thirst for unification." (306)

Zeitblom's confused belief in the primacy of psychological motivation as the "true interpretation" of politics is accompanied by a zealous readiness
to take on any wrong in the service of national unification. This meets with accord from Leverkuhn. "Who denies that a real break-through is worth what the tame world calls a crime?" he agrees, reinforcing the placement of political action or criteria to second place. (307) For Leverkuhn, the proposition opens up one problem only: how does one break through? He points to the volume of Kleist essays which provides material for one of his works, "the last chapter of the history of the world. But it is talking only about the aesthetic, charm, free grace, which actually is reserved to the automaton and the god: that is, to the unconscious or an endless consciousness, whereas every reflection lying between nothing and infinity kills grace." (308) The act of reflection is the "mildew", the source of the "dialectic reversal" of freedom: in response to its own subjectivity, Leverkuhn maintains, "some time or other she despairs of the possibility of being creative out of herself and seeks shelter in the objective." (190) Leverkuhn's search for a figure, and eventually an entire system, which will determine completely every note of the composition, evolves from his protest against the emptiness of this subjectivity.

The use of "strict style" begins with the Brentano song cycle, with his use of a basic figure of five notes, B(II) E A F E-flat, HetAEra Esmerelda. Like Schoenberg's early experimentation with the technique, the brevity of the motif prefigures a more complete systematization of the 12-tone series. Leverkuhn comments on the inadequacy of the 5 notes: the motif would like to determine everything in the song, but it is too short a word and in itself is not flexible enough. (191) His desire is to create combinations of 12 letters, or 12 semitones, a series from which "all the movements of a work must strictly derive. Every note of the whole composition, both melody and harmony, would have to show its relation to this
fixed fundamental series. Not one might recur until the other notes have sounded. Not one might appear which did not fulfill its function in the whole structure. There would no longer be a free note." (191)

It has been argued\(^63\) that a difference exists between Leverkuhn's development of the 12-tone system, and Schoenberg's development. In Schoenberg's case, the 12-tone system evolved as a formal rationalization of something he had been working with years; musical problems generated from emotional needs which required new language. The difficulties encountered by Schoenberg in handling the extreme chromaticism of his Expressionist phase led him to search for a formal solution which would allow him to give shape to what was potentially incoherent. Since Schoenberg's techniques were a "resistance to uncontrollable unconscious forces"\(^64\), the method was in part thrown up by the music itself rather than deliberately preconceived. Carnegy has traced the progress from Schoenberg's early songs, through his initial use of the 12-tone method (we are reminded that Schoenberg would not call it a "system"\(^65\)), to the establishment of 12 note rows. Schoenberg's variant forms of the row, however, were not intended to "warrant any combination of notes which can be explained in terms of the system" as Leverkuhn proposes. (193) Rather, the note's particular place in the row was to provide it with a specific relation to both dimensions of melody and harmony, and a precise relationship to all other notes in the series, with a large number of possible variations. In other words, for Schoenberg, "the demands of the row were not to be considered as taking precedence over all the other demands, whether technical or expressive, of a well-made composition."\(^66\)

Schoenberg's struggle to find, and then to formalize, a new expressive language to accompany the movement from the extreme limits of tonality
into atonality is distinguished by Carnegy from Leverkuhn's cold speculation. Schoenberg's rationalization of the new method was not predetermined and not immediately clear:

I can only refer you to my compositions published since about 1921. I do not know, as yet, the theoretical basis for these; on the purely compositional side, I must depend entirely on feeling, sense of form, and musical instinct.67

Schoenberg's allegiance to the imperatives of emotion bear no immediate resemblance to Leverkuhn's seeking of a determinate form. Even before Leverkuhn's system has been fully articulated, he looks forward to the strict control of the new method.

The decisive factor is that every note, without exception, has significance and function according to its place in the basic series or its derivatives. That would guarantee what I call the indifference to harmony and melody. (192)

Leverkuhn's apparent antipathy to the expressive aspects of music differs from Schoenberg and younger disciples of the 12-tone system. They had trust in the music itself - that is, in its possibilities as a creative and emotive medium, and by implication in their own creative and emotive potentiality. They hoped for a reconciliation between tonality and method, while Leverkuhn's trust is directed solely toward the row and whatever it might produce. For Leverkuhn the strictness of the system serves to release his emotions almost without his having to experience them: without his complicity, as it were, and certainly without his trust, in the emotional or human aspects of the music. These he has signed away.

Mann's presumably exaggerated depiction of the intended determinism of the system was intended to reveal the artistic - and the political - consequences of such arbitrary discipline. It is his depiction of these connections that has aroused such defences by advocates of Schoenberg's system. In fact Mann's fictional exaggeration of the actual process of
developing the 12-tone row held a truth that was resisted, but not dis-
proved, by Schoenberg's defenders. Mann would have been familiar with
Krenek's defence of the organic "unifying principle" of the 12-tone ser-
ies, based on the supposition that the balance of tonality has been volun-
tarily - but necessarily - replaced with a new form of balance, reflective
of old contrapuntal techniques, that will find its own creative freedom. Kren
ek argues vigorously against the accusation of over-determinism on the
grounds that the system itself has limitless possibilities, is dependent
"exclusively on the composer's artistic intention, controlled here, as in
any other method of composing, by his imagination, and by nothing else.
Inspiration is no more limited by the 12-tone technique than by any other
system of musical rules." Krenek, himself a composer, argues in this
1939 work that the technique will become more flexible, more free. The
notion that what is "freed" by such a system is artistic inspiration ig-
nores the expressive content inherent in the form of the music itself.

In brief, it can be taken for granted that atonality, after the
strict training to which it is being subjected in the twelve-tone
method to which it is being subjected in the twelve-tone
technique, will graduate to a condition where it will no longer
need this tight apparatus. A real danger to the twelve-tone tech-
ique would arise if it were allowed to degenerate into a new kind
of fetish. In that case it would have a kinship with every sort
of rabid totalitarianism. The way to escape lies in using the
method as a means, not an end. Twelve-tone technique, like any
other technical process, is sensible in so far as it increases the
mastery of the human mind over natural resources; or, to phrase it
differently, in so far as it enlarges the region of spiritual free-
dom. Without technique, man would still roam the primeval forest
like an animal. But if progress should make him a slave to tech-
nique, his fate would be hardly more enviable.

Mann had plenty of his own reasons for distrusting such an optimistic
account of the ability of technical progress in the sphere of art to "en-
large the region of spiritual freedom". Perhaps familiarity with Adorno's
work helped to motivate such intuitive distrust. Mann's ambivalence to-
ward artistic preoccupation with formal solutions could not have been
calmed by the uncertain line between totalitarianism and inspired freedom
Krenek proposes. In any case, in 1955 it was Krenek who introduced the
concept of "totally predetermined music". 71 By this he meant "a method
of composition such that each element of musical sound - frequency, dura-
tion, intensity, timbre, and if possible even the tonal area or ambitus -
is determined according to preselected series." 72 Krenek in fact took on
in extreme form the task which Leverkuhn has exemplified, perfecting those
aspects of the method which he had initially argued against purely by
taking the method itself to its logical conclusions. Mann's intuitive
prophecy in this case was more true than fiction; rather than allegory,
it was a comprehension and articulation of the inherent potentiality of the
compositional method itself.

The composer who prepares his material mathematically beforehand
deprees himself of the possibility of generally reviewing and
thus fully controlling his material...total pre-determination, in
other words, leads directly to a new irrationalism: the mathematical
theorist's pipe-dream of ultra-precision is fulfilled only in ir-
rationality. 73

This is so because the multiplications of possibilities in variation of
the 12-tone row become so mathematically overwhelming that in the end the
only method of choice is arbitrary. But the smallness of human choice in
the face of mathematical hugeness is fascinating to Leverkuhn; he plays
with such human insignificance in his cosmic adventures with the imaginary
Ackercocke. Magic and rationality are to him one and the same. That they
should be distinguished in the area of human will is of less interest than
their comprehensibility through systematic analysis.

Leverkuhn's ideal of a break-through, like the pipe-dream of the math-
ematician, presents itself as an elusive ideal, something to strive for.
In "The Lamentation of Dr. Faustus" it is realized. The paradox of the
system attains the sought-for integration: total organization allows for
greater freedom of emotional expression than his earlier works. Like the
novel itself, with its assimilation of objective historical reality, the
music's "rational organization through and through" (as Zeitblom is made
to quote Adorno) becomes the vehicle of extreme subjective expressiveness.

These words: "For I die as a good and as a bad Christian" form the
general theme of all the variations. If you count the syllables, there are twelve, and all twelve notes of the chromatic scale are
set to it, with all the thinkable intervals therein. It already
occurs and makes itself felt long before it is reintroduced with
the text, in its place as a choral group - there is no true solo
in the Faustus - rising up until the middle, then descending, in
the spirit and inflexion of the Monteverdi Lamento. It is the
basis of all the music - or rather, it lies almost as key behind
everything and responsible for the identity of the most varied
forms - that identity which exists between the crystalline angelic
choir and the hellish yelling in the Apocalypse and which has not
become all-embracing; a formal treatment strict to the last degree,
which no longer knows anything unthematic, in which the order of
the basic material becomes total, and within which the idea of a
fugue rather declines into an absurdity, just because there is no
longer any free note. But it serves now a higher purpose; for -
oh, marvel, oh, deep diabolic jest! - just by virtue of the ab-
soluteness of the form the music is, as language, freed. (487-488)

The "Lamentation" draws together the musical moments and literary
motifs of earlier works, the methods and styles having reached their high-
est degree of organization. In this way previous tendencies in the mater-
ial itself are exposed: most conspicuously, the system of motifs controlling
all the "characters" of expressiveness, and providing a series of varia-
tions "to some extent static, in which every transformation is itself
already the echo of the previous one." (488) To Zeitblom it is a distress-
ful paradox that the greatest conscious control over all the elements of
expression has allowed such overwhelming freedom of expression and lament.
That there should be a correspondence between such technical rigidity and
calculation, and the passionate lament that bursts forth, is to him as
incomprehensible as the correspondence in the work between saviour and
tempter, hellish laughter and angelic chorus, lamentation and hilarity. A dialectical approach which accepts contradictions within things is not only incomprehensible to him but is dangerously equivocal, just as we have seen that the ability to conceive the connections between things is beyond his grasp. Zeitblom is used to the either/or perspective of the confident positivist. Of course his inability to conceptualize this unity except in terms of "paradox" does not interfere with his glorification of the work, "which in my zeal and love I am bound to call matchless." (485) His love for the work derives from its release of emotional energy, its liberation from the "bloodless intellectualism" which has previously characterized his 12-tone method. In this respect Zeitblom's enthusiasm for the "break-through" represents the same "organic" mysticism as his commitment to the "break-through" of German imperialism before the war.

Does it not mean the "break-through", of which we so often talked when we were considering the destiny of art, its state and hour? We spoke of it as a problem, a paradoxical possibility: the recovery, I would not say the reconstitution - and yet for the sake of exactness I will say it - of expressivism, of the highest and profoundest claim of feeling to a stage of intellectuality and formal strictness, which must be arrived at in order that we may experience a reversal of this calculated coldness and its conversion into a voice expressive of the soul and a warmth and sincerity of creature confidence. Is that not the "break-through"? (485)

The defiant negativity of Leverkuhn's purpose here reveals itself. The attempt to overcome emotional sterility has been made possible only through a dehumanized method of composition which removes expression from the sphere of critical human thought. Leverkuhn's drive for free expression has been conceived by him as a rejection of artistic conventions, commercial exploitation (as Fitelburg observes), all the possible avenues of influence which he rejects in the social world. But through the extremism of his rejection he loses human society as the source of emotional experience - as he in fact comes to realize - and at the same time has not
been able to escape society's pervasive powers. His cult of subjectivity (which after all is the real motivation for the "objective" work) seeks to reinforce an emotional bankruptcy, and so clearly marks subjectivity's decline. Thus Zeitblom is wrong to seek an emotional break-through for his hero: "To prescribe more subjectivity as aid to the damaged subject is to prescribe the illness for the cure."74

There is no doubt that the total discipline and over-determination of elements, the totalitarian aspects of Leverkuhn's work, have released expressive energy. The point that must be established is that emotional or expressive energy has itself a "content" which is not exempt from the probing sphere of conceptual analysis, or from the social sphere of human life. Zeitblom's separate formal categorization of the work as "total", like the more general critique of Schoenberg's system, takes the form and forgets the content, thus "deliberately underscoring the relationship between that work and the totalitarian world in which it comes into being...

For it is no less true that this drive toward a total organization of the work which we find operative in the twelve-tone system is symptomatic of an objective tendency in the socio-economic structure of the modern world itself. Indeed, it is hardly surprising that this music, which finds its reason for being in a reaction against the debasement of hearing in general, should as in a mirror image develop all the strengths and weaknesses of its adversary, in a kind of point by point correlation...modern music finds itself at once deeply implicated in a social struggle without so much as straying from the internal logic of pure musical technique, and reproduces the structure of the alienated society in miniature in the intrinsic language of the musical realm.75

Of course the formal totalitarianism of such music must repeat its conquest in the area of the subjective, in spite of the illusions of individual autonomy or the idealism of an expected "break-through": this is as true in the political realm as in the private world of art and indeed the distinctions between the two, by the very nature of totalitarianism,
become increasingly obscured by the conquest of spontaneity, expression, and autonomy, even as autonomy is propagated as the true value of art.

This is the nature of the "tragedy" of modernism as Mann has conceived it: the "possession of man by historical determinism, the intolerable power of history itself over life and over artistic creation, which is not free not to reflect what it reacts against."
Notes (Chapter III)


2. Georg Lukacs, Essays on Thomas Mann, 1964, p. 69

3. Gunilla Bergsten, Thomas Mann's Doctor Faustus, p. 85

4. ibid., p. 100

5. ibid., p. 107

6. ibid., p. 112

7. ibid., p. 126

8. ibid., p. 113

9. ibid., pp. 120-122

10. ibid., p. 128

11. ibid., p. 129

12. ibid., p. 131

13. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 90

14. See for example the diagram of multiple causes in Reed, Thomas Mann, p. 370

15. Bradbury and Fletcher, op. cit., p. 401

16. Lukacs, Realism in Our Time: Literature and the Class Struggle, 1971, p. 43

17. ibid., p. 57

18. Lucien Goldmann, Cultural Creation in Modern Society, 1976, p. 79

19. "(It is at this point, of course, that the novel, as a meaningful identification between the individual and social dimensions, begins to come apart at the seams as a form...)") Fredric Jameson, Marxism and Form, 1971, p. 28


22. Bradbury, op. cit., p. 401
23. Kahler, op. cit., p. 202
24. Jameson, op. cit., p. 71
25. ibid., pp. 71-72
26. in Beryl Lang and Forest Williams, Marxism and Art, 1972, p. 402
28. Lukacs, Essays on Thomas Mann, p. 76
29. Jameson, op. cit., p. 37
30. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 32
31. Patrick Carnegy, Faust as Musician: A Study of Thomas Mann's Dr. Faustus, 1973, p. 56
32. ibid.
33. Bergsten, op. cit., p. 139
36. ibid., pp. 59-60
37. Stuckenschmidt, op. cit., p. 7
40. Jameson, op. cit., p. 40
41. Bergsten, op. cit., p. 76 and p. 184
42. Ernst Krenek, Music Here and Now, 1967, p. 135
43. Stuckenschmidt, op. cit., p. 90
45. Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom, 1965, p. 266
46. quoted by Carnegy, op. cit., p. 88. Essays of Three Decades, p. 309
47. Carnegy, op. cit., p. 87
48. Fromm, op. cit., passim

49. Mann, Buddenbrooks, 1971, p. 390

50. Sokel, op. cit., p. 24

51. ibid., p. 25


53. ibid.

54. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 63

55. Theodor Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, 1974, pp. 34-37

56. R.J. Thomas, Thomas Mann: The Mediation of Art, p. 144

57. Carnegy, op. cit., p. 59

58. Sokel, op. cit., p. 26

59. Blomster, op. cit., p. 91

60. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 46

61. quoted by Blomster, op. cit., p. 93

62. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 56

63. Carnegy, op. cit., p. 49

64. ibid.

65. ibid., p. 50

66. ibid., p. 47

67. ibid., p. 50

68. Krenek, op. cit., p. 169

69. ibid., p. 189

70. ibid., pp. 190-191

71. Stuckenschmidt, op. cit., p. 210

72. ibid.

73. ibid.

74. Jacoby, op. cit., p. 104
75. Jameson, op. cit., p. 35.

76. Ibid., p. 37.
IV. Symbol and Deed: Realism and Constructivism in the Novel

Since the artist is constantly occupied with formal matters, since he constantly forms, one must define what one means by formalism carefully and practically, otherwise one conveys nothing to the artist. If one wants to call everything that makes works of art unrealistic formalism, then - if there is to be any mutual understanding - one must not construct the concept of formalism in purely aesthetic terms. Formalism on the one side - contentism on the other. That is surely too primitive and metaphysical.

Brecht, "Against Georg Lukacs"

A. Method and Motive

Many of the seemingly ingenuous phrases Zeitblom uses to describe the "Lamentation of Dr. Faustus" are really about the novel, Dr. Faustus, itself. Mann's tongue-in-cheek irony must have provided him with some of his greatest moments in planting those wondering and affronted phrases in Zeitblom's garrulous narrative; one can see them reproduced, in a different key as it were, in Story of a Novel, or within the novel itself. There the recurring references to the movement of words and music towards each other are more explicit signs of Mann's desire to make the novel into what it was about: musical form.

...since the music, insofar as the novel treats of it (for, to be sure, the novel also practices it - but that is a subject in itself) - the music was only foreground and representation...

Both the "Lamentation" and the novel that contains it are built upon strict constructivist principles "in which there is no longer anything unthematic, anything that could not prove itself to be a variation of an ever constant element." (486) They are both based on a reinterpretation of the Faust legend, that most German of tales, which as a basic motif or theme unites all the elements of the work. The words "For I die as a good and as a bad Christian" form the twelve-tone basis for the variations of the "Lamentation" (as Zeitblom points out, the work is built on "concentric
rings" of variation, rather than development (487) and these words thematically account for the profound ambivalence of the work. Of course in connection with the novel, we are to read "For I die as a good and as a bad German" and the interconnectedness of the good and bad elements of representative German-ness, the "substantial identity of the most blest with the most accurst" (486) accounts for the tragic tone of the novel. Both works are laments, allowing a "liberation of expression" through a complicated dialectic process in which calculated coldness, work-play, and parody are converted into "a voice expressive of the soul and a warmth and sincerity of creature confidence." (485) Mann's association of expression with lament is not purely a fictional one: a letter written by him during the work on the "Lamentation" shows in words similar to those attributed to Zeitblom his own corroboration of Zeitblom's association of these.

At the moment I am imagining and composing for my musician the Symphonic Cantata, with which he bids farewell to the life of the mind - The Lamentation of Doctor Faustus (after the chapbook), an ode to sorrow, since Adrian's destiny obviously does not include the Ninth Symphony's "Joy", whose heralding must therefore be canceled. It is a most expressive work, for man's first and truest expression is lament, and as soon as music freed itself for expression, at the beginning of its modern history, it became lamento and "Lasciatea te morir." 3

As with Leverkuhn, it is only in this final work that the dark tone of lament replaces irony as the dominant expression of the artist. Significantly they are both final works, appearing late in the life of the artist. Zeitblom says of the "Lamentation" that it is

...stylistically purer, darker in tone as a whole and without parody, not more conservative in its facing towards the past, but mellower, more melodious, more counterpoint than polyphony - by which I mean the lesser parts for all their independence pay more heed to the main part, which often dies away in long melodic curves, and the kernel of which, out of which everything develops, is just that twelve-note idea: "For I die as a good and as a bad Christian." (489)
Like Leverkuhn, emotional trauma has impelled the author to come to some accounting with his own past, through the medium of a tragic work. Mann himself felt no doubt that his "facing towards the past" in the novel was indistinguishable both from the intense autobiographical nature of the story, which "agitated and moved" him more intensely than any of his other works, and from the desire to create and maintain an objective structure through which the story could be told. A letter to his publisher touches on these aspects of the novel.

Your reticence in the judgement of this strange work is only too justified. I myself share this reserve completely and don't let my head be turned by the enthusiastic hymns of praise which are reaching me from Europe, and now also from German. It is a work whose rank and value will remain undetermined for some time...But already today the reading public recognizes that I have written this work in particular with my innermost feelings, I can almost say with my heart's blood, and I am glad to note that you too seem to understand this...

The short review from the London Times Literary Supplement is the first English-language echo to reach me...I was especially surprised that at the end the author speaks of a "loosely woven net of ironically glittering prose." I should say that I was never less ironical than in this very serious, confession-like tome, and as concerns the "loosely woven net," this is in truth an extremely tight-knit composition in which, musically speaking, "no note is free," and in which all elements are interrelated.5

As late works both Fausts carry out the previous methods and themes of the artist to extremes. In Mann's work, the problems of the artist detached from society, and the anti-political force of music, have appeared before; but only here in this last work is the message clearly that this detachment is destructive, and that this aspect of music is deplorable.6 Paradoxically, it is in this novel that the musical forms, techniques and methods of composition that are attributed to Leverkuhn are most extensively practiced by the novel in comparison with any of Mann's previous work. The use of leitmotif, which in his earlier novels had passed through the work like a unifying thread, has now taken hold of the entire content of
the work, so that every episode, description and image finds its relation to one of the dominant themes. In this sense Mann, like Leverkuhn, intends to replace romantic development, dependent on the delineation of the individual subjectivity (the melodic "idea") and so crucial to both the fiction and the music of the bourgeois epoch, with a more unified and objective structure of counterpoint and construction. His inability to construct an individual voice is reflected in the lack of a single empathetic character in the novel; in this way the novel is distinguished from the 19th century novel, whose hero or heroine may have questioned everything but the viability of their own individuality. Here he draws a relationship between the Faust chapbook and his novel, parallel to the formal relationship between Palestrina, the composer who developed to its highest level the art of pre-classical counterpoint, and Leverkuhn. To Mann this set of parallels signalled the historical boundaries of the cultural epoch. The conspicuous placement of his own novel in relation to an earlier art object (the chapbook) reveals the extent to which the individual voice was problematic to Mann, so that he continued to stand outside his own creative urges in an attempt to objectify and legitimate his own status as a writer.

That Mann felt it necessary to look backwards to an earlier cultural epoch to expose and transcend the bourgeois era is typical of his preoccupation with both ancient Germany and his own past. Leverkuhn's work represents his placement of his own work in a transitional phase of the present, both summing up in extreme forms the characteristic views and modes of expression of what Mann defined as bourgeois humanism, and negating those forms at the same time.

Sufficient material exists to show that Mann's identification with Leverkuhn was profound, heartfelt, and, of course, intentional. His diary
of the period of writing Dr. Faustus calls attention to his own obsession
with writing and the human costs of such preoccupation. Mann's illness
during the writing of the book caused him some apparent moments of remorse:

Surrounded in a critical situation by so much love, sympathy, sol-
licity, one asks oneself what one has done to deserve it and
pretty well asks in vain. Has any man who ever bore the incubus of
creation upon his back, always concerned, obsessed, preoccupied with
the work of days and years - has any such man ever been an enjoyable
companion? Dubito... And I doubt it particularly for myself. How
is it, then? Can the consciousness of one's arrears in this res-
pect, the knowledge that one's work is claiming what one should be
able to give freely to one's intimates - can the coloring of exis-
tence by this sense of guilt make up for the great lack and recon-
cile others to it, even win their affection? Here is a speculation
implous enough to be ascribed to Adrian Leverkuhn.

The comparison seems spontaneous, even accidental. But of course the
association is more substantive and profound than that. There are many
similarities between the two: the method of preparing the material for
composition before undertaking the actual work, for example, precedes Dr.
Faustus as well as the musical processes it describes. Both artists assi-
milate material and integrate it into their material in quotation marks.
As Adorno has pointed out, quotation is the stylized mark of a self-con-
scious art at the end of an era:

The relationship between the historical aspect of writing music
about music and the collapse of what was once commonly known as
"melody" is unmistakable. Mann explains that his growing inclination is to "look upon all life as a
cultural product taking the form of mythic cliches"; this view causes him
to "prefer quotation to independent invention. Faustus shows many a trace
of this leaning."

Mann quotes from Shakespeare, Adorno, Nietzsche, Nazi propaganda;
incidents in the lives of artistic predecessors; not only literary sources,
but episodes and personalities from Mann's own life appear thinly disguised
as fiction. In fact this curious manner of freelance borrowing from
familiar personalities provided Mann with most of the characters in the novel.

That Professor Zeitblom begins his narrative on the same day that I myself put the first lines on paper is characteristic of the entire book, of the curious brand of reality that clings to it, which seen from one aspect is total artifice. It is part of the playful effort to achieve something precise to the point of being infuriating—realization of something fictional: the biography and the character of Leverkuhn. This work, moreover, took a curiously ruthless form, and I was constantly amazed by the way its fantastic mechanisms drew upon factual, historical, personal, and even literary data. As in the "panoramas" shown in my childhood, palpable reality was forever indistinguishably merging into painted perspectives and illusions. This montage technique was continually startling, even to me, and gave me cause to worry. Yet it rightly belongs to the conception, to the "idea" of the book; it has to do with the strange and licentious spiritual relaxation from which it emerged, with its figurative and then again literal directness, its character as arcanum and confession, so that, as long as I was working on the book, the concept of its public existence did not enter my mind.

Both The Story of a Novel and letters from the period show that Mann was constantly receiving, studying, and integrating new material into the novel as it was being written. Yet one might ask what it was about the "montage technique" that gave this writer, whose confessions must always be viewed with the utmost suspicion, "cause to worry." Presumably one never writes in a creative process quite as one expects to; Yet the technique itself should be accepted as part of a conscious purpose; what we know of the preparation of the novel, as well as Mann's own account of his intentions, shows that the montage technique itself was in fact central to the theme and structure (here, if anywhere, the two are inseparable) of the novel. A 1945 letter from Mann to Adorno, soliciting Adorno's assistance in the technicalities of musical characterization of Leverkuhn's "Apocalypse", presents his conception of the montage technique in a more positive light.

It is curious: my relationship to music is fairly accepted; I have
always been adept at literary music-making, have felt myself to be half-and-half a musician, and have translated the technique of musical interweaving to the novel...But in order to write a musician-novel which occasionally even seems to aspire to become, along with other things, a novel of music, more is needed than mere "initiation." Scholarship is wanted, and that I simply lack. Which is one reason I was determined from the start, since the book in any case is based on the principle of montage, to shrink from no borrowing, no appropriation of other men's property. I trust the borrowings will serve as an independent function within the pattern of the whole, will acquire a symbolic life of their own - while at the same time continuing to exist intact in their original places in works of criticism.11

Mann saw his use of montage as necessary as a method for incorporating and connecting outside material that he had "borrowed"; this material would provide an objective basis and would serve as a means for mediating the connection between theme and structure in the novel. That to some extent the novel should become what it was about, Mann had always intended; he had understood this initially in terms of structure, and design, while the relations of these to their own particular (literary/musical) cultural tradition became increasingly apparent.

Quotations of this kind have something musical about them, disregarding the innate mechanical quality. They are, moreover, reality transformed into fiction, fiction that absorbs the real, and thus a strangely protean and attractive mingling of the spheres.12

Mann's fondness for the use of leitmotif is familiar to readers of even his earliest works; as early as Buddenbrooks (1901) the images that reappeared throughout the novel, providing an unchanging image or aura to each character, were recognized for their musical quality and their literary transcription from Wagner's operatic characterization. Mann's incorporation of non-fictional material is not new to Dr. Faustus either; The Magic Mountain (1924) is famous for its encyclopedic inclusion of medical science, and its characters never tire of long conversations revealing storehouses of accumulated cultural knowledge. The adaptation of a traditional myth...
to tell a story with contemporary relevance produced *Joseph and His Brothers* from a familiar Biblical story. (1933-43) But these experiments take on a new character in *Dr. Faustus*; the interlacing of fiction, history, literary quotation and autobiography within the structural confines of a dominating central theme explicitly takes on its most extreme form, just as in the "Lamentation" the determining motif achieves its greatest power.

The constant utilization of material which was undeniably historical indicates the extent to which Mann felt compelled to bring his art closer to life. Mann was aware that his earlier idealism had involved a failure to relate these and at the same time to understand their separateness. More accurately, he had seen the world of art, and of "culture," to be the whole of life. His increasing tendency to draw in forms and ideas from outside of his immediate "creative" experience was his response to this dilemma. The quest to give his material an objective context thus took form in the structure of montage, the way in which the novel was so conscientiously and deliberately constructed in an "objective", anti-romantic form. As long as Mann had allowed the social context for his imaginative resources to be a general one, always indirectly related to himself, then the forms of allegory and myth, combined with his usual observant naturalism, could retain their epic quality. But Mann's intense anxiety to respond clearly to his own time, and his own history, necessitated the reliance on tangible pieces of things: images, newspaper clippings, childhood memories, which find their place in the novel as broken pieces of a puzzle laboriously connected.

It is this response to outward circumstances that distinguishes Mann's constructivism from the formal similarities in Leverkuhn's music. Leverkuhn, too, brings together the artistic with the "human"; but he does this in an entirely different manner, and from a clearly different motivation.
Leverkuhn's developing experimentation with merging chorus and orchestra - the human voice with sounds of nature - renders them finally indistinguishable. The chaotic sounds celebrate the failure of the human spirit to rise above the wilderness of primitive nature. Zeitblom fears for this mingling of the elements of music in the same way that in the "Apocalypse" he shudders at the anti-human sound of the glissando, a "mockery of art itself." The human voice is deprived of its specific, civilized quality; returning to a pre-tonal era, its function is reduced to pure sound. Zeitblom's humanistic affection for the sound of the single voice is not shared by Leverkuhn, who detests the "animal warmth" of the naked voice and prefers a chorus which increasingly shares the function of wordless instrumental sound traditionally relegated to the orchestra. Zeitblom explains that

Chorus and orchestra are here not clearly separated from each other as symbols of the human and the material world; they merge into each other, the chorus is "instrumentalized," the orchestra as it were "vocalized," to that degree and to that end that the boundary between man and thing seems shifted; an advantage, surely, to artistic unity, yet - at least for my feeling - there is about it something oppressive, dangerous, malignant. (375)

In the "Lamentation of Dr. Faustus", too, the orchestral chorus replaces the solo voice. "There is no true solo in the Faustus" (487), since Leverkuhn has rejected the romantic individualism of solo expression, replacing it with a choral group which collectively establishes the demonic identity between opposites that so disturbs Zeitblom, appearing now as angelic chorus, now, with the same musical sequences, as hellish cacophony. Similarly, within the novel, the character of Leverkuhn is never a realized "solo" fictional character - Mann's reluctance to provide his audience with a physical description is relevant here - but a shadowy host of historical figures combined with personal fantasies, all appearing at once and continuing simultaneously like a vertical chord. All the intricate motifs
that define Leverkuhn's presence are there from the first, and Leverkuhn himself always seems to know everything, to be aware beforehand of anything his contemporaries might say, to have read it all before.

In response to the "Lamentation", Zeitblom is struck finally by the ambivalent relationships within the work. That a tightly organized work can release such emotion presents a bewildering challenge to his suppositions about expression. But he shudders and is repelled by the ambivalent identity between good and evil parts in Leverkuhn's work. The "conscious control over all the characters of expressiveness" hold the angelic choir and the hellish yelling in one all-embracing system. What is good is also evil, and it is their equivocal identity with each other that in fact compels the emotional effects of the work, rather than a direct response to one or the other. Thus a technically sophisticated and deliberately constructed work gives birth to emotions which appear to be new, in fact primitive, without connection to what Zeitblom thinks of as civilized values: ethics, or reason.

Zeitblom's reproach of Leverkuhn's methods, of course, must be viewed with caution. The narrator's compulsive need to draw attention to his own inadequacy just in describing such complexity does not disguise the sophisticated organization of the novel itself. The construction of the novel from a wide variety of sources, both conspicuous and private, the merging of historical, scientific and literary material with fiction; always the conscious artifice of absorbing real personalities and episodes into a set of thematic motifs; these show us the degree to which Dr. Faustus was composed through just such a process of calculated invention. Zeitblom's naivety in this regard is outweighed by the self-conscious parallels between the novel and the "Lamentation", which is described in such a way
as to draw the attention of the alert reader to the tactics of structure and design of the novel itself. In fact Leverkuhn's work is used precisely for this reflective purpose: self-analysis personified, in order to draw attention to the problems of creation in an artistic crisis. "I can only talk about myself", Mann once stated (to the delight of his critics, particularly Brecht, whose response was "exquisitely malicious"\textsuperscript{14}); his response to such an artistic crisis is precisely this tangled process of internal speculation, for the purpose of autobiographical revelation.

Presumably Mann did not intend readers to interpret this self-conscious intellectualism in the composition of \textit{Dr. Faustus} in the same spirit that Zeitblom mediates the portrayal of Leverkuhn's work. The novel, after all, is intended as an indictment. As such we are to assume a clear moral stance on the part of the author. A comparison of the aesthetic principles of the two artists, as has been outlined, necessitates a number of questions. A full evaluation of this comparison will be postponed for the conclusive analysis of the novel. Here we will not propose what allows Mann's novel to be distinguished by the reader from the source of accusations against similar principles of construction described by its narrator, and communicated by the novel's own internal correspondences.

B. Character, Plot, and Social Crisis

The language of events of \textit{Dr. Faustus} is peculiar and in some ways eclectic. The formal conventions of traditional realism, formulated most tendentiously by Lukacs, coexist in interaction with the symbolism and constructivism of a newer era. An answer to some of these outstanding questions might be found in whether or how the innovative techniques we have described, the super-realism of historical montage and the symbolism
of mythical leitmotif, make possible a creative relationship of totality (realism) within the work that the familiar conventions of realism could not achieve. We have seen this to be the case in the portrayal of Leverkuhn's music, since Zeitblom himself, the old-fashioned narrator, has not the tools at his disposal to account for the deeper structure of meaning in the music.

The sole consideration of Zeitblom and Leverkuhn as characters in the novel necessarily directs the critics to a kind of symbolist deciphering - the approach unavailable to the culturally limited and myopic Zeitblom. Both Leverkuhn and Zeitblom are more figurative than realist in their participation in the novel. What could be described as a dramatic plot in a conventional sense surrounds the experiences of relatively minor characters. Mann observed that with Chapter 39, in which Marie Godeau is introduced into the story, the novel "grows more and more novelistic, that is to say, dramatic." The social and personal events involving these characters are experienced only distantly by Leverkuhn (his illusions of guilt notwithstanding) or by Zeitblom, who in particular is present as a commentator, rather than as a participant. Zeitblom's aloofness from affairs of the heart is both part of his personality - his deliberate and strangely unemotional marriage is witness to this - and part of his role as observer in the novel. Of course, these are not separate things.

Both sisters had confidence in me; that is, they seemed to consider me capable of just evaluations of others, a capacity, of course, which, if it is to inspire full confidence, must stand outside any situation and view it with unclouded eye. The role of confidant is always at once gratifying and painful, for one always plays it with the premise that one does not come into consideration oneself. But how much better it is, I have often told myself, to inspire the world with confidence than to arouse its passion! How much better to seem to it "good" than "beautiful!" (291-292)

Inez Rodde confides in Zeitblom because he is a "good soul" who
arouses no emotions. Leverkuhn, similarly aloof, arouses emotions among his friends, but they are for the most part rather impersonal, almost religious emotions of awe and solicitous respect. Schildknapp is one exception to this response, because Schildknapp shares the same remorseless irony towards the world. Schwerdtfeger is another, precisely because he cannot comprehend such a stance. Schwerdtfeger's "robust naivete", that quality which Leverkuhn lacks, allows him to be a good, if not a brilliant artist. His ardent ingenuousness and his ignorance about suffering draw him too to Leverkuhn. His real charm and his fatal innocence draw him erotically to Leverkuhn. Perhaps Leverkuhn cannot bear such closeness, however ironic his own stance, to a naive artist who has become successful partly through Leverkuhn's own parodistic work. In any case, Schwerdtfeger's innocence dooms him. Mann, too, has a semi-erotic fascination with the character of Leverkuhn, but this does not contribute to the psychological delineation of Leverkuhn's personality but rather renders him more mysterious. Like Leverkuhn himself, Mann avoids the sound of the naked human voice.

Quite literally I shared good Serenus' feelings for him, was painfully in love with him from his days as an arrogant schoolboy, was infatuated with his "coldness", his remoteness from life, his lack of "soul" - that mediator and conciliator between spirit and instinct - with his "inhumanity" and his "despairing heart", with his conviction that he was damned. At the same time, oddly enough, I scarcely gave him any appearance, any physical body. My family was always wanting me to describe him...How easily that could have been done! And yet how mysteriously forbidden it was, how impossible in a way I had never felt before!...To depict Adrian's outer appearance was instantly to threaten him with spiritual downfall, to undermine his symbolic dignity, to diminish and render banal his representativeness. That was the way it was. Zeitblom, of course, cannot articulate his infatuation with the same frankness. His own distance from the realm of passionate emotion causes him to translate his own fascination and love for Leverkuhn into that same self-
denying mystical awe that Leverkuhn elicits from others.

Here it is useful to separate the world of Leverkuhn and Zeitblom from the rest of the characters, though all are immersed in the same atmosphere of crisis and decline. Their presentation is predominantly figurative, intellectually abstract in terms of the kind of activity they represent within the world of the novel. Their personalities are remote from us because they are remote personalities. We know, for example, that Zeitblom is a schoolteacher. But we know nothing of the lived experience of being a liberal schoolteacher among Nazi youth. This activity, like his life with his family, is not described to us directly. This is more odd, in that it is he who is doing the describing. We are made aware, even if it were not stated by him explicitly, that his proximity to Leverkuhn is more important to him than the activities of his own life. In terms of his place in the novel, he is to be signified as a schoolteacher, as he is by Leverkuhn, in conversation, and as he has been within this analysis. This dehumanization of character permeates the portrayal of the central characters. In this sense their creation corresponds to aspects of the symbolist novel, evidencing an "art of figures rather than an art of adventures." Since their experiences as characters are predominantly mental, and their relationships to social events as we see them mostly imaginative, their portrayal passes into symbolism, giving the impression peculiar to symbolist fiction that their world is "not reported or reflected, but created, with the complicity of the characters, who seem to have read the novel in which they exist." 

That Leverkuhn does not change or develop as a personality through the novel, except insofar as his musical abilities develop and acquire technical sophistication and stylistic extremeness, may remind us of the
"Lamentation" itself, whose motifs are built on concentric rings of variation, rather than on development. His conflict is all within himself.

"I am looking," he wrote to me, "I keep asking round about and hankering for news of a place buried from and untroubled by the world, where I could hold speech alone, with my life, my destiny..."

(209)

Leverkühn's desire to retreat in order to hold communion with himself results in precisely that: the dialogue with the Devil, Leverkühn's most important encounter in the novel, and perhaps the only occasion in which he speaks openly, is of course a dialogue with himself. This is why the Devil can offer him nothing new, only the extremes of what already exists. Overtly Leverkühn does not change after this "fateful" dialogue. In fact the continuity of the outward circumstances of his life is remarkable.

Mann's own identity with Leverkühn is found in their mutual dualistic introversion; Leverkühn seeks escape from his own intellectual coldness by seeking wholeness in unattended emotional release. This longing is presented by the Devil in their conversation.

We make naught new - that is other people's matter. We only release, only set free. We let the lameness and self-consciousness, the chaste scruples and doubts go to the Devil...That is it, you do not think of the passage of time, you do not think historically, when you complain that such and such a one could have it "wholly", joys and pains endlessly, without the hour-glass being set for him, the reckoning finally made. (236)

Leverkühn responds not to the passage of time, nor to the effects of historical events in the outside world in which he lives as a man, but only to the inner debate that rages in his over-refined intellectual consciousness. His ironic detachment from social reality renders his outer being cold and aloof. Hence the devil is indeed an aspect of his personality appearing before him; for as Mann cites from an old essay,

"The true devil must be the utmost extreme of cold. He...must be supreme complacency, extreme indifference, self-satisfied negation.
It cannot be denied that such fixation upon empty self-assurance, excluding as it does everything outside this possession of self, is perfect nullity, from which all life is banished, save for the most piercing egoism. 19

From Mann's viewpoint one is tempted, especially if one is German, to love Leverkuhn for his god-like egoism, his all-embracing irony, and his apparent inner turmoil, to which he is fated as an artist, and which emanates from him not as a personality but through the forms that he creates. Leverkuhn's coldness as a person is related to the ironic ambivalence of his forms, which attempt to be as autonomous as he is from the emotional imperatives of social crisis. Human activity is all viewed as raw material for his art; like Nietzsche, he finds it interesting only as potential art (beauty). Of course, his development as an artist is what concerns Zeitblom most as well. As far as personal connection, there is not much in Leverkuhn's nature that invites trust. His excess of abstract and self-contained consciousness provides a model for his creator's, which has experienced that "penchant for forms, which by turning in upon themselves, show the process of the novel's making and dramatize the means by which the narration is achieved." 20

At this point the possibility of an endless circle presents itself, a route not entirely unfamiliar in the pursuit of symbols. Mann's familiar dual personality has created an ironic self-consciousness about his role as an artist, which has led him to create a symbol for that dualism towards which he is thoroughly ambivalent. Yet Mann's solution is not Leverkuhn's. Were Zeitblom and Leverkuhn the only characters, or were all the characters in the novel to resemble Leverkuhn in his static abstractness as a personality, then we would find that the introverted intellectualization of their characterization would provide an example of a modernist or
symbolist novel that Leverkuhn himself might have written. Here it must
be noted that it is characteristic of Mann's evasiveness as a writer (iron-
ic in one so preoccupied with autobiographical critique) that the char-
acters most expressive of his own personal experiences and tensions are
the most psychologically remote. The correspondences between Zeitblom and
Leverkuhn and the author are conspicuous but ambivalent. Remote as his
characters are, Mann is further removed from access to perception or empathy
on the part of the reader. This veiled exposure of his own past conveys
his predominance of concern with ideas and their consequences. Leverkuhn's
most intimate encounters, like Zeitblom's, are shrouded in mystery - the
relationships with Esmerelda and with Rudolf are referred to (delicately)
but take place outside the actual narrative. Only towards the end, with
the boy Echo, are Leverkuhn's emotions directed outwards visibly and
strongly towards another person. But with such shadowy, constrained
personalities, the process of characterization and of depicting social
interaction makes the writing of a novel, in the traditional sense, prob-
lematic.

These figures, so like their creator in many ways, pose problems for
the novelist. In fact Mann was aware of some of these difficulties.

"As his subject matter reveals the decomposition of the middle
class," Levin writes, "Joyce's technique passes beyond the limits
of English realistic fiction... (This) paralleled my own question
whether in the field of the novel nowadays the only thing that
counted was what was no longer a novel. There are sentences in
Levin's book which touched me with a strange intensity. "The best
writing of our contemporaries is not an act of creation, but an act
of evocation, peculiarly saturated with reminiscences." And this
other one: "He has enormously increased the difficulties of being
a novelist." 21

That the novel does not exist in the realm of symbolized ideas is an in-
dication of the degree to which Mann was forced, through historical events
and through the creative process of writing the novel, to humanize his
human symbols, just as he was compelled to give creative shape to the "real" personalities he integrates into the novel. Freud's notion that neurotics are not a class unto themselves, but are more advanced cases of the personality problems that permeate their contemporaries, was never more convincingly demonstrated than by these characters. Where Mann's rather ponderous philosophical imagination is directed to the acute observation of the personalities of his own contemporaries, symbolism becomes profoundly real.

From Buddenbrooks onwards, Mann relied on distinctive individual characterization to provide his weighty and sometimes obscure philosophical material with fictional (dramatic) life and movement. In Dr. Faustus, the dramatic plot involves the social relationships of relatively minor characters: the Rodde sisters Inez and Clarissa, Rudi Schwerdtfeger, Marie Godeau. The hollowness of their lives, and their search for forms in their activities and relationships which will provide a sense of personal realization, communicate the desperation of a group of individuals in the midst of social crisis.

These chapters, with their blend of tragedy and grotesquerie, attempt to paint the final stage of a society, when it lies open to ridicule, totally at the mercy of intellectuals' picayune conspiracies. The chapters were also to conjure up accelerando the feeling of the end in every sense.

Many of the dramatic characters of the novel are modelled after Mann's recollections of his own acquaintances during the period described: Munich, in the 1920's. These included not just casual acquaintances but friends with whom Mann had close emotional ties. The particular personal idiosyncrasies of the characters are often drawn from remembrance and observation of the appearances of such people; yet neither their strength as literary characters, nor their place in the tightly woven fabric of the novel, is
diminished by static portraiture. The right-wing ideologues of the Kridwiss Circle, for example, express in their discussions the conservative ethics and aesthetics of the proto-fascist movement of the time. Their individual characters, as personalities, express and are defined by the aristocratic nihilism of the conservative intelligentsia. Their maliciousness and sophisticated decadence are recognizable, typical expressions of the group of intellectuals Mann himself was on familiar terms with at the time, in their contempt for the Republic and for democratic aspirations, their worship of the cult of barbarism and the primitivism of the idealized past. Here Mann's activity as a political writer and spokesman was of value to him. His personal experience with the spiritual and intellectual factors of the political crisis enabled him to analyze concretely "what the historian finds so hard to reconstruct: the climate of thought and feeling in which popular movements arose."24

That these ideas spring directly from the shape of personalities is perhaps described more clearly in other characters. The affinities between Zeitblom, Leverkuhn and the characters of their own fictional contemporaries show the degree to which "symbolic" neurosis is part of a larger social and intellectual force. These other characters, however, are drawn from life. The movement from symbolist concretization to "naturalist" observation, perhaps to the distress of the author, is not a long one. Perhaps the best example of this mediation between the abstractness of ideas and the concreteness of personality is the portrayal of Inez Rodde. Inez is in fact a "truthful and ruthless portrait" of Mann's sister Julia, as Clarissa Rodde is modelled on Mann's other sister Carla.25 The closeness of the author to these characters in this case does not interfere with the dramatic portrayal of the potentiality of such a personality in a
social context. Inez is dramatically pivotal because of her role in the centre of the Munich circle, and more specifically in her love affair with Schwerdtfeger. Zeitblom is not fond of Inez, but his observation of her is devastating. The reader is presented with a compelling fictional character, one who contains within her personality all the neurosis which accompanies, and no doubt contributes to, a particular view of life.

Even Zeitblom recognized the "ideological" tension existing between Helmut Institorus, the little professor of Renaissance aesthetics, and his bride-to-be, Inez Rodde. This tension is rarely expressed in the direct articulation of opposing ideas, however, but in the different approaches and sentiments of two personalities with radically different world views.

I could not, even using all my imagination, ascribe to the man, unimpressive as he was, absorbed in himself, refined indeed, with an excellent education, but physically anything but commanding (he even had a tripping gait), any appeal for the other sex; whereas I felt that Inez, with all her maiden reserve and austerity, needed such an appeal. Added to this was the contrast between the philosophical views, the theoretic posture towards life, assumed by the two - which might be considered diametrical and exemplary. It was, to put it briefly, the antithesis between aesthetics and ethics, which in fact largely dominated the cultural aesthetics of the time and was to some extent embodied in these two young people: the conflict between a doctrinaire glorification of "life" in its splendid unthinkingness, and the pessimistic reverence for suffering, with its depth and wisdom. One may say that at its creative source this contrast had formed a personal unity and only through time fell out and strove against itself. Dr. Institorus was in the very marrow of his bones a man of the Renaissance - one feels like commenting "Good God!" - and Inez Rodde quite explicitly a child of pessimistic moralism. For a world that "reeked of blood and beauty" she had no use at all, and as for "life" she was seeking shelter from it in a strictly orthodox, modish, economically well-upholstered marriage, which should protect her from all possible blows of fate. It was ironic that the man - the manikin - who seemed desirous to offer her this shelter raved about beautiful ruthlessness and Italian poisoners. (288–289)

Inez' intellectual affection for the cult of suffering does not incline her to seek it in her real life. It is consistent with the imaginary
structure of the novel that suffering should be associated, for Inez, with the disorganized bohemian life of the decaying aristocracy. Her marriage to Institorus is purely one of form; the deliberate bourgeois perfection of their formal living arrangements testifies to its emotional vacuousness. Zeitblom remarks on this incongruity with unusual astuteness, sharpened by distaste:

I saw that Inez, who set such store by patrician dignity and conservative propriety, who indeed had only married to gratify those tastes, chose to go about with Natalie rather than with the staid spouses of her husband's colleagues, the typical German professors' wives. She even visited and received Natalie alone. And thus was revealed to me anew the split in her nature; the fact that despite her nostalgia for it, the bourgeois life had no real viability for her. (327)

Inez, too, might have remarked that "even a silly order is better than none at all." Her attempts at maintaining a secure and proper marriage, in spite of her own strained discontent and the unpropitious pressures of worsening economic conditions, are heroic. Zeitblom describes with disturbed zest the dedication of her wifely duties.

It was a conscious love of respectability that she devoted to him, and so much is true, that she upheld with consummate distinction, refined yet more by her expression of delicate and fastidious roguishness, her husband's station in life. Her meticulous conduct of his household and his social activities might even be called pedantic; and she achieved it under economic conditions which year by year made it harder and harder to sustain the standards of bourgeois correctness. (327)

The reader is acquainted, in unusual detail, in fact with a pedantic thoroughness on the part of the narrator that matches her own obsessed adherence to the details of traditional patterns, with the conservative correctness of her life: the immaculate furnishings, the safe and dignified books and paintings, the compulsive perfection of her children's upbringing. Zeitblom's frequent espousal of his own humanism and social concern here reveals itself in the sharpness of his observation, though one might wish
for a greater allowance for human sympathy at the same time. At any rate, detached as his relationship to her may be, his conclusions about Inez' life are sharply accurate.

Must I say now, or repeat, that with all this correctness things were by no means correct, that they rested on self-will, not to say on a lie, and were not only more and more challenged from without, but for the sharper eye, the eye sharpened by sympathy, were crumbling within, they gave no happiness, neither were they truly believed in or willed. All this good fortune and good taste always seemed to me a conscious denial and whitewashing of the problem. It was in strange contradiction to Inez's cult of suffering, and in my opinion the woman was too shrewd not to see that the ideal little bourgeois brood which she had wilfully made of her children was the expression and over-all correction of the fact that she did not love them, but saw in them the fruits of a connexion she had entered into with a bad conscience as a woman and in which she lived with physical repulsion. (329-330)

Inez's "shrewdness" is brought to our attention in other ways: the articulate expressiveness with which she justifies her adultery and her ardour for Schwerdtfeger to Zeitblom shows the degree to which her experiences are examined constantly in her brooding mind. The intoxicated outpouring of her confession to the trustworthy Zeitblom betrays to him an excess of imaginative contemplation upon her own situation, showing the degree to which she is "psychologically trained, keeping watch with a poet's eye upon her own experience." (295) A carefully designed life, one which would on the surface imply a state of total unthinkingness about the choices with which she has been presented, in fact has been motivated by precisely the opposite condition.

The weight of a painfully conscious reflectiveness creates as much of a burden for Inez as for the more intellectually rigorous Leverkuhn. Both suffer from the demands of an indomitable ego. Each then seeks a means of organization which will allow them to free their emotions from the paralyzing prohibitions of self-consciousness, wherein, as Leverkuhn laments, "every reflection lying between nothing and infinity kills grace." Inez
seeks shelter from the emotional chaos of her family's bohemian contemporaries. The total security and organization of her bourgeois settlement, perpetually reinforced by the icons of wealth, provide an objective framework for her life; but precisely because it is so deliberate and conventionalized, she draws no emotional satisfaction from it.

The irony, as Zeitblom depicts it, lies in her then seeking emotional union with the unthinking Rudolf Schwerdtfeger, the perpetual adolescent with the charm of unchanging innocence. Because Inez is a moralist, she ascribes value to goals achieved through striving, which to her indicates ethical merit, rather than to achievement which is "natural" or aesthetically stimulated. Rudolf, on the other hand, is "utterly unaware that there was such a thing as immoralism". (290) His naive spirit is not acquainted with the quandaries of ethical dilemma. Of course Inez is not blind to the spiritual limitations of her lover, but the knowledge of her own moral superiority contributes to the depth of her emotional suffering. Her maniacal possessiveness suffers from Rudolf's frivolity, but this is in part his attraction, and it is the hopelessness he arouses in her that also arouses her passion.

And stranger still: her inadequate suitor's predilection for soullessness and the beauty of instinct, so repugnant to her own views - had she not fallen victim to it herself, in her love for Rudolf? She was, in a way, betraying Institoris with his own convictions; for did not Rudolf represent to her wise and disillusioned gaze something like sweet unthinking life itself? (297)

Inez's passion causes her to fall prey to love of beauty and instinct, within herself, and then she must justify it; she is too articulate not to feel compelled to argue its merits. Of course for her the pursuit of instinctive experience is a real one, not a fantastical program like the beliefs of her uninspiring husband. Counter to his romantic fondness for brutality and ruthlessness (if they are beautiful), she believes that, in
art, great things come from suffering. Yet her passion, when it is
touched, is not directed towards someone who epitomizes ethical and con-
scientious suffering - Zeitblom, for example - but towards someone whose
"natural" gifts are such that neither moral scruples nor intellectual
torment have ever interfered with the direct and naive enjoyment of all
the experiences of life. Desiring unthinkingness, and a relief from her
own brooding self-contemplation, she worships Rudolf's unconscious life.

Because she is a woman, whose femininity is tantalized and disappoint-
ed by her husband, her desires light upon Rudolf's beauty. But precisely
so she finds the suffering increased of her own refined, over-civilized
psyche, tormented by doubt. It comes about that the fullest expression of
her emotions is found in the combination of sensuality, emotional suffer-
ing and lament. Paradoxically this release is made possible on the basis
of a secure and absolutely organized living arrangement. Of course it is
not a coincidence that her verbal re-enactment of sensual bliss, so dis-
turbing to Zeitblom, resembles Leverkuhn's defense of the conscious pursuit
of sensuality in Bullinger's drawing room. (414) The insistence on the
virtues of primitive sensuality in both cases jars against a disturbing
sophistication in the argument. With Inez, too, the difficulties of her
situation are surmountable only through a "break-through". Her conscious
adoration of sensual gratification is a seeking for purification, for the
ability to experience singly and directly her own physical life. Her need
for organic, pure "feeling" involves a necessary departure from her con-
scious ideas, indeed from mental processes altogether. Physical union
with a man who neither challenges nor probes her mental anxieties offers
the chance to submit herself wholly to a physical force that can sweep her
into unconsciousness and pure feeling. The strength of her will in search
of this feeling overshadows all obstacles — including, finally, her lover’s inevitable rejection of her, whence the sentimental unconsciousness of morphine addiction threatens to take its final hold upon her. In the end, her seeking for a force to which she can submit herself wholly and without conscious reflection leaves her in the power of the inarticulate will: as Leverkuhn says elsewhere, "the purification of the complicated into the simple is at bottom the same as the winning back of the vital and the power of feeling."

Here, too, Zeitblom is a secret accomplice. He resents her malicious abuse of his "honourable" friendship, and dislikes her maniacal single-mindedness towards the affair with Schwerdtfeger. (But Zeitblom dislikes seduction. He expresses the same scrupulous objections to Schwerdtfeger’s seduction of Leverkuhn.) When her will has lost its object, he condemns the "sentimental disingenuousness" (387) of her escape into a morphine addicts’ clique of women. But his reaction when she murders Rudolf after Rudolf has become engaged to marry Marie Godeau, the aspired bride of Leverkuhn, is of a radically different nature.

But one admission I will make: Inez, as we know, committed a few years later a capital crime, which aroused general horror and put an end to her bourgeois existence. I shuddered at the awful deed; at the same time, in memory of my old friendship, I felt almost, nay, I felt definitely proud that in all her sunken state she found the strength, the furious energy to commit it. (387)

Of course Zeitblom’s admiration for Inez’s "break-through" involves the same abdication of principles that accompanies his enthusiasm for the first World War. Then too a sublimated organism expresses its admiration for violence in terms quite incompatible with the liberal humanism Zeitblom claims to profess. Zeitblom’s metaphorization of this act of violence — Inez’s murder of Rudolf — obscures the physical, and implicitly the social reality of such a deed. Even at this late stage, Zeitblom insists on
"aestheticizing" everything: ignoring the human and ethical aspects, he is pleased with the "furious energy" of her act. This is not far from the sophisticated admiration of the narrator in "Mario", who approves, in spite of himself, of the hypnotic energy of the evil magician. By his treatment of this murder, Zeitblom makes the horror bearable.

The tragedy of Inez and her terrible deed can be said to "represent" in this sense the actions of Germany during the imperialist phase, in the author's mind. As Zeitblom comments about the nationalist frenzy surrounding World War I, in which he took part:

In this we displayed the preoccupation with self which is peculiar to us: our naive egocism finds it unimportant, yes, takes it entirely for granted, that for the sake of our development (and we are always developing) the rest of the world, further on than ourselves and not at all possessed by the dynamic of catastrophe, must shed its blood.

That this characteristic, generalizable to the German nation, should reveal itself in Inez's actions may have been fundamentally undisturbing to Zeitblom. But his righteous horror, which is in fact accompanied by a casual dismissal of her person, is Zeitblom's, not Mann's. That Inez began as a conceptual representation of Mann's sister, like Clarissa, whose fate is no less tragic, may account in part for the anxiety mentioned earlier which accompanied Mann's process of integration of reminiscences into the thematic structure of the novel as a whole. And this tension, which found traces of the German disease in all the beloveds that appeared, like an X-ray vision examination which uncovers disease in every patient, focusses the unfolding of his account mercilessly on the lives of real, specific people. For this reason it is less accurate to describe Inez's relationship to the German people as "symbolic": she does not symbolically represent Germany but is it, in microcosm, a single component which contributes to and participates in the totality of disaster of the German people.
2. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 41. Cf. Letters, p. 362, also quoted below, n. 11
3. Bergsten, op. cit., p. 190
4. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 221
5. Mann, Letters, p. 398
6. Michael Hamburger, op. cit., p. 133
7. Mann, Story of a Novel, p. 180. Notice that in this discussion of the process of writing the novel, regarding its formal as well as its thematic intention, it is natural to refer constantly to Story of a Novel. Mann's anxiety to make sure that readers had not missed anything in reading the novel, his fear that perhaps fiction could no longer communicate explicitly enough the doubts and demands of his own creative intentions, is revealed in these supplementary comments.
8. Adorno, op. cit., p. 182 n
9. Story of a Novel, p. 155
10. ibid., pp. 31-32
11. Mann, Letters, p. 362
12. Story of a Novel, p. 33
13. ibid., p. 152
15. Story of a Novel, p. 206
16. ibid., p. 89
17. Fletcher and Bradbury, op. cit., p. 397
18. ibid.
19. Story of a Novel, pp. 138-139
20. Fletcher and Bradbury, op. cit., p. 395
21. Story of a Novel, p. 91
22. ibid., p. 131

24. Reed, op. cit., p. 307

25. Bergsten, op. cit., p. 19
V. Conclusion: History and Fictional Orientation

Art will never be moral in the political sense, never virtuous; art will never insure progress. Art's basic character is unreliable, treacherous; one cannot eradicate its delight in scandalous rationality, its penchant for beauty born of barbarity; even if one denounces this leaning as hysterical, inimical to the spirit, immoral to the point of imperiling the world, it remains an immutable fact.

Mann, Betrachtungen (1918)

"The whole temper of art, believe me, will change, and withal into the blither and more modest; it is inevitable, and it is a good thing. Much melancholy ambition will fall away from her, and a new innocence, yes, harmlessness will be hers. The future will see in her, she herself will once more see in herself, the servant of a community which will comprise far more than 'education' and will not have culture but will perhaps be a culture. We can only with difficulty imagine such a thing; and yet it will be, and be the natural thing: an art without anguish, psychologically healthy, not solemn, unsadly confiding, an art per se with humanity...."

Dr. Faustus (1948), p. 322

The autobiographical intention of Dr. Faustus forms the emotional core of the novel. Mann's identification of aspects of himself with both Zeitblom and Leverkuhn leaves no doubt that it is his own crisis as an artist that is the subject of the novel. At the same time Mann's familiar identification with earlier cultural figures takes on a larger function in relation to historical concerns. This placement of himself at the centre of a profoundly historical work allows - and demands - the peculiar combination of documentary realism, myth and allegory, and autobiography which renders the novel so complex.

The creation of the central figure, Adrian Leverkuhn, sprang from a composite portrait primarily of Mann and Nietzsche. Nietzsche's influence on Mann's work has not been a subject of discussion in this study. However it is relevant to follow Nietzsche's example in literary criticism, in proceeding from "'the deed to the doer, from the ideal to the man who needs it, from every way of thinking to the commanding need behind it.'"2

In this way the analysis of the author as "producer" can take its appro-
appropriate form as biography, social analysis, and literary criticism simultaneously.

The original idea of using the "Faust" figure for a story of an intoxicated artist dates from 1905. This period was a difficult one for Mann; he wrote in a letter that his own standards "were becoming so desperately exacting" that they would probably one day prevent his writing altogether." His fears of literary sterility coincided with his courtship and marriage plans. This conflict between creativity and love is reproduced in Leverkuhn's experiences. Mann's own experience of this fear undoubtedly affected his ambivalent attitude towards "inspiration" and "genius".

Even at this early time Mann's distrust of his own artistic impulses impelled such "exacting standards." His early association of aesthetic inclination with the "delight in scandalous irrationality, its penchant for beauty born of barbarity", was a deeply emotional issue for him, and explained his pleasure in the playfulness of his own creativity. Yet it conflicted with his own conservative temperament and later with his social commitments as well. Dr. Faustus, like the early Death in Venice, explores this antithesis between the Dionysian impulses of the instinctive and unconscious, and the rational and conceptual consciousness. At one time Mann, refusing to accept their incompatibility, sought the synthesis of these aspects of experience in a spiritual admiration for beauty, which could contain in its forms a higher meaning (the Platonic ideal with which Von Aschenbach deluded himself); the artist in this vision was thereby imbued with a sacred role of spiritual leadership auspiciously combined with the pleasure of creative expression. But by the time he came to write Dr. Faustus, this aesthetic ideal was no longer viable. The notion
of the spiritual leadership offered by the artist had been destroyed by
Mann’s experience of the historical reality in Germany, and the novel
records the tragic defeat of this central belief of the author. The in-
tuitions of the artist were not to be trusted, and it was no longer in the
artist’s power to provide a potentially useful way of seeing the world.
This was because of the culture’s evolution of the ideology and techniques
of the German artist, which perpetrated a myth of self-sufficiency and
self-cultivation. Mann’s indictment of the artist’s leadership in the
culture here becomes inseparable from his indictment of the fascist move-
ment. For Mann to confront this situation, as for Leverkuhn, "harmonic
subjectivity" as a basis for creative work is no longer possible.

(Leverkuhn:) "and ye could at the same time not exclude the theoret-
ic possibility of spontaneous harmony between a man’s own needs
and the moment, the possibility of 'rightness', of a natural har-
mony, out of which one might create without a though or any compul-
sion."

He (laughing): "A very theoretic possibility, in fact: My dear fellow, the situation is too critical to be dealt with without
 criticize." (240)

The Devil speaks for Leverkuhn’s unconscious urges; the urge to be
released from every social bond, every conceptual doubt, and the confines
of his own parodistic mind. In rewarding Leverkuhn with a successful
musical "system", the Devil reinforces Leverkuhn’s desire to succumb to
instinct rather than to reason and the imperatives of social conditions.
Music is to Leverkuhn a lure, an almost sexual seduction away from the
power of his own mind. The Devil offers "triumph over (criticism),...
shining, sparkling, vainglorious unreflectiveness!" (237). Leverkuhn
listens "with as much pleasure as the maid to the whisperer in church...
(237). Acceding to the Devil’s offer, he releases his own repressed im-
pulses for unconscious creation. His amoral pursuit of art as an object,
combined with his cold egotism, create a relationship with art which
justifies Mann's conviction that the artist is a relative of the criminal and the madman. Free to retreat from his conscious understanding, Leverkuhn creates - or is the medium through which is created - a musical system which is clearly expressive of the abstractness of music (most typically "German" of all the arts) and of his cold detachment from human relationships. The 12-tone system is both a continuation of romanticism and its negation: in seeking to authenticate the primacy of the subjective self, it inevitably expresses the dissolution of that self in the anti-human guise of autonomous art forms. In the progression from romantic, through expressionist, to atonal music, what emerges is atomistic or random sound in desperate need of a new formal order to legitimate its existence as art. The calculated constructivism and systematization of form through which this crisis is resolved reflect the domination of the subjective in an authoritarian society. The adulation of system and authority, the submission of the individual ego to a larger power in search of mental freedom, and the rejection of human solidarity are epitomized by Leverkuhn's contract with the Devil, who is of course only a psychological projection of a deluded imagination in search of mindless, unthinking, unfettered purity. As this Devil proposes:

"A genuine inspiration, immediate, absolute, unquestioned, ravishing, where there is no choice, no tinkering, no possible improvement; where all is as a sacred mandate, a visitation received by the possessed one with faltering and stumbling step, with shudders of awe from head to foot, with tears of joy blinding his eyes; no, that is not possible with God, who leaves the understanding too much to do. It comes but from the devil, the true master and giver of such rapture."

The language and intensity of Leverkuhn's encounter with the Devil convey an intimacy and mutual involvement with culture - ancient culture, embedded in their language and cherished as an absent lover - shared only by the two of them as a secret language. Of course, this is a chilling
thought since the dialogue, as familiar an archetypal myth as it is, represents in the world of the novel Leverkühn's assignation with himself. The "harmonic subjectivity" and "polyphonic objectivity", those two elements of musical form now fractured within the human soul, have met to discuss their integration at any price. The cost for this victory is the renunciation of society, of both human love and a broader social responsibility. The compensation is inspiration, made possible only by an absolute faith in the relevance of the order revealed through art.

Mann does not have this faith. The role of "spiritual leader" that he once claimed for the artist is impossible given the absolutist individualism of this commitment to art as expression. Mann's own victory over the crisis of culture is of a different nature. His achievements are "heroic" because they are completed through persistent plodding. Aware of what he calls "the decline of the entire Western culture", he views his own method as a process of craftsmanship which can encompass his self-conscious reflection, allowing a "transition from unconscious creation to creative consciousness." Not trusting in his own intuitive powers of invention to autonomously arrive at a picture of "truth", he prefers a more arduous process of constructivist assimilation.

Among the papers gathered by Mann in preparation for Dr. Faustus is an article entitled "Twilight of the Novel", written by Charles Glicksberg. Glicksberg seems to have shared Mann's notion of a crisis in the novel; his proposed solution must have appealed to Mann.

Every age calls forth its own appropriate aesthetic and ideological response. Ours takes the form of absorption in the problems of war and peace, fascism and democracy, sociology and economics and politics, and our demand is not for imaginative fantasy but for creative insight based on authentic observation. Not Surrealism but the documentary is the distinctive art form of our time.
earlier work. The inclusion of reminiscences and of montage had provided a "social" setting in previous novels; in Dr. Faustus this technique of montage becomes explicit and central to the structure of the novel. In Story of a Novel Mann quotes approvingly from Harry Levin's critical work on Joyce, in which Levin's words parallel his own question "whether in the field of the novel nowadays the only thing that counted was what was no longer a novel... The best writing of our contemporaries is not an act of creation, but an act of evocation, peculiarly saturated with reminiscences".9

The development of new literary techniques, resembling modernist innovations of constructivism and montage, by a writer with such an avowedly conservative imagination thus need not appear so paradoxical. Mann's guilty conscience as an artist drove him to seek ways to include in his fictional world a portrayal of the historical world. He has concluded that he cannot seek objectivity in his own perceptions, in the way his perceptions and ability as a writer mediate social reality, because he does not have faith in the viability of art. Now he is no longer voicing this criticism solely with the voice of an artist: art has become a dubious enterprise at best, and lacks political respectability and even, perhaps, the ability to tell the truth. So he brings in newspaper clippings, reminiscences, real personalities as models for his characters, so that there can be no argument, no doubt that these events are true, that they happened, that this is the real world being presented to us. Thus he can say that this is "no longer a novel... but rather a work that took the form of the most disciplined art and at the same time stepped out of art and became reality."10

Mann's compulsion to ensure historical veracity within a novel which is yet an intensely private autobiography demands that his orientation
toward history be examined. The novel combines allegory, in which the fate of Germany is personified through a psychologized re-presentation of an archetypal myth of fateful hubris, with non-fictional historical documentary. The epic quality of the myth structure, combined with the connections with historical reality fused through montage, indicate Mann's rejection - transcendence may be a better term - of certain aspects of the novel form, particularly certain assumptions about the individual consciousness which are communicated by the traditional "realist" narrative. The plot structure of the traditional European novel assumes an integration, albeit a problematic one, between individual consciousness, its enactment in purposeful activity, and its contributing role in a larger social process through which the individual is clearly affected. But the logic of human activity had been profoundly shaken by the events in Germany preceding the war and the novel. The disruption of Mann's personal philosophy caused by these events necessitated a substantial change in his political attitudes, and this change demanded a different means of literary expression. The changes in structure enacted through the novel, in other words, are imminent in the changed political and philosophical orientation of the writer.

Like Zeitblom, Mann's opposition to fascism as a political movement originated with both moral opposition to its violent racism and oppression, and with a conservative, aesthetic distaste for the "malignant petty-bourgeois rabble." 11

True to his conservative principles he at first regarded the terror campaign as a concession by the leadership to the rank and file... Although he was aware of the gathering storm, it was nearly another decade before he realized that the collapse of bourgeois democracy in Germany was being engineered from above and not merely by the mob. 12

This indictment of the German bourgeoisie was later to be directed, much to Mann's own distress, against the rulers of the entire western democratic
Accustomed to analyzing fascism as an ideological phenomenon, a primitive regression in reaction against the rationalistic humanism of the nineteenth century, Mann was forced to politicize his response to it by the realization of its political-economic foundations.  

As such it is an attempt of all the old social and economic reactionaries to suppress the peoples and their aspirations for happiness, to prevent all social progress by attaching to it the frightening name of Bolshevism. In the eyes of conservative Western capitalists, fascism was frankly a bulwark against Bolshevism and against everything that they wished to assail under this name - especially after the German purges of June, 1934, in which everything that was socialistic in National Socialism was destroyed and the old power combination of Junkers, army and industry was saved.  

This awareness was magnified by his later disappointment with the United States, whose democratic nature he had mythicized through Roosevelt, and where the decline in democratic freedom, and virulent anti-communism, caused him grave concern. One American critic accuses him of distortion, insult, and "hysterical exaggeration" for questioning the sincerity and thoroughness with which the U.S. had waged the war against fascism. Certainly this question, on Mann's part, was a fundamental one; it involved a disruption of how Mann was to view the "curse" of German destiny.

In 1938 Mann expressed his new realization in this way:

The world's patience with Fascism, however painful for us, and the world's endeavors to come to an arrangement with it, have their good, or at any rate cogent, reasons. But as I have said, analysis of these reasons would lead me too far. To put it concisely, National Socialism and Fascism are expedients against the threat of social revolution everywhere in the world; they are methods for suppressing, whitewashing, postponing, checking that revolution by taking some of it over in a false and deceptive spirit. In other words, they are brutal quack medicines for which the respectable world everywhere, despite its distaste for the attendant humbug, has a secret weakness. This explains why we find it so hard to mobilize the world against Fascism and why our warnings are taken as agitation for our own selfish ends.

While Mann was quick to criticize the complicity of other governments
in the rise of fascism, and anxious to attribute blame to the military and economic elite within Germany itself, Mann's views in fact were not consistent. It need not be said that the attribution of guilt is not so simply formulated in the novel itself. What the novel records is not so much the need to destroy "that fatal power combination, the world-threatening association of Junkers, the army generals, and heavy industry" that Mann called for elsewhere, as it reveals the collapse of a world view, a framework of values that were made untenable by the events of the period, the "Holocaust" or "Final Solution". These values were centred around faith in the dignity of the individual - the bourgeois individual - and the power to make conscious decisions which would affect other events, other social occurrences in the world. That this belief in individual responsibility, identity, and freedom was destroyed not by the "rabble" but by the power of the bourgeoisie itself - with the complicity of the western, democratic nations, on the basis of a shared desire to preserve an economic system - achieved its catastrophic magnitude through the incomprehensible events of the period. Mann's observation of these social events was nourished from two sources: his political understanding of the power alliances that allowed the Nazis to rule, and his own emotional, social, and ideological experience within the culture. On the one hand, he could ascribe fault to a political force based on class interests; on the other, the fault was everywhere in the experience of the culture, and it was artistically impossible not to sense the integration of reactionary thought and nihilistic ethics into the very fabric of the society. Mann's inability to formulate a consistent response to those events is rooted in that disruption of his framework of values and perceptions.

Mann was insulted by this history, because his attempts to understand
its causes exposed a senselessness in relation to his own consciousness. Possibly his increasing desire to return to old myths and to explore cyclical or archetypal patterns in historical events was motivated by a reluctance to confront his own confusion about how to interpret the political developments during his lifetime. According to his original frame of reference, history was made by a group of superior and intelligent individuals; to the extent that they have been successful, social progress reflects their personalities just as an artistic work reflects the temperament of its creator. This can be seen in his essays on thinkers and writers who were important to his appraisal of German culture. In other words, he was accustomed to judging events by the conscious intellectual terms of its most conspicuous or articulate makers, rather than by a more structural political outlook which could analyze events and personalities as individual manifestations of more fundamental forces of social change. Yet the fascists precipitated a history of ugliness and senselessness which was incomprehensible to him in those terms. Hitler was not a "great individual" and those who supported his policies were sick and destructive, not creative or progressive. Mann's need to make sense of those events led him to a radical critique of the economic elite, though the political assumptions and consequences of this critique were based on a world view in which he only partially believed. This ideological critique of his own culture was also painfully difficult, since it involved a radical investigation of his own thought, and the boundaries he himself had established between the real and the unreal, the normal and the abnormal, the valuable and the dispensable. In this sense his plight was the plight of millions of individuals whose sensibilities had been assaulted by experiences ordinarily comprehensible only as distortions of the most surrealist novels.
or the most overwhelming nightmares. Confronted by these experiences, the response is a feeling of helplessness before the total permeation of evil, which in Mann's world unaccountably and uncontrollably was revealed everywhere he turned. Evil as a totalitarian force: the powerful force of over-determination which takes hold of Leverkuhn's music, in which "there is not a free note", provides one of the most compelling emotional experiences communicated by the novel. Like his music, Leverkuhn is "not free not to reflect what it reacts against."

This concern with the enveloping power of an evil force returns us to the importance of Leverkuhn's dialogue with the Devil. Mann commented in another context that the violent acts of fascism were "all expedients of this lust for human degradation which it would be too much honour to call devilish, for it is simply diseased." The Devil lost his mythical status: he is not an isolated or objective phenomenon but a fundamental constituent of reality which hovers over all of Leverkuhn's life. In Leverkuhn's mind he may be an independent entity, but in Mann's mind he is a psychological projection of a force which is suffused throughout the culture. Vague borders between reality and unreality are part of the paradoxical experience of the "holocaust", because nothing in past notions of reality or logic or intention could fully explain those events. A political analysis could begin to sketch the outlines of the causes - but even the most thorough understanding of social forces could not account for the extent of the social devastation witnessed in Germany at the time. Only an imagination bent towards the Satanic could begin to explain - and so the evil force acquires a concrete entity in such a mythical guise. Mann's flirtation with the Devil, or with a religious or mythical model for the powers within the novel, helps to identify the extent of the evil -
but the degree to which the Devil is, after all, only a psychological projection within the novel forces us to reject that model as anything but a compelling metaphor grasped by a diseased imagination.

Mann's recreation of the permeation of evil and disease accounts for the fictional "totality" of the novel, communicated by its integrated structure. The sense of integration, in other words, is not so much an expression of the artist's control, or claimed potential for control, as it is a measure of his sensitivity to the power of the organizing elements of society. The novel seeks to propose a new method for integrating an awareness of this social context with an exposure of the intensity of intransigently protected individual experience; this unifying force in the novel attempts to make coherent Mann's own historical experience. The paradoxical combination of epic patterns and myth with modern constructivist techniques is the structural manifestation of a moment in ideological transition: individualism as a social practice is confronted and rejected, but individualism as a world view in search of ethical restoration still remains. Mann's reflections in the novel on human catastrophe, like the work of Adorno, indicates an awareness of the entanglement of fascist domination "in the ideological contradictions of bourgeois individualism, whose irrevocable decay it has understood; at the same time, it cannot disengage from it."20 While the terror of fascism does produce an understanding of capitalism as a system, this terror "also violates the subjectivity of the theoretician and reinforces the class barriers against his cognitive ability."21

Mann's particular awareness of this contradiction is the realization that the artist can no longer fulfill the role of spiritual leader of the German people, having resigned that role in pursuit of escape and
expression. Thus the power of history itself became stronger than the weak wills of the myth-makers, who may have danced or chuckled or philosophized as it occurred, but could not be called its initiators. Mann's emotional experience of "over-determination", as it is presented in the novel, addresses his entire social class. If history was not precipitated by the "natural leaders" of German society, the intelligentsia, then whose responsibility was it? Mann suggests in the novel that events may have slipped out of the hands of proper leaders (in his eyes, the middle class intelligentsia), but it was his responsibility to speak to these potential leaders and urge them to confront the situation and thus to accept their social responsibility. Only a consciousness of the deep and absolute corruption of German traditions could lead to the eradication of that corruption. Perhaps the novel overstates that corruption of every fibre of German society - there were many who thought so. But Mann's insistence on presenting history as an ethical problem, more perhaps than a social or economic or philosophic issue, was his solution to the unbridgeable gap between the ironic irrationality of his own spirit and the rational social imperatives of human society. This synthesis is proposed as an urgent moral and human problem at the deepest level of emotional experience, because it is here that Mann still believes the hopes for historical progress are to be found.

In returning to the situation of the artist in his fiction once again, Mann demonstrates that the problems of aesthetic work are not effectively solved within the aesthetic world. The novel, in attempting a description of an entire culture, evokes for the reader the results of being part of that culture without implying the possibility of liberation solely through aesthetic response. The artist cannot assume the proper relationship
between himself, his work, and the social context from which it is generated and to which it returns. That distrust is intensified by the frustration with the forms which he is capable of producing, which cannot adequately give expression to the most urgent issues. The Devil accurately describes the feelings of impotence of the most truthful artists, who realize that the extent of this crisis makes mockery of the mental world which they inhabit. This crisis calls into question not only the language of present artistic forms but further the fundamental suppositions of the creative drive, which for the contemporary artist has meant a constant drive to elaborate his awareness of himself. The Devil insists that this is an artistic problem, "nothing but the solving of technical puzzles. Art becomes critique." (239) Like Adorno, his "weapon of critique needs a critique of weapons."22

In addressing his contemporary artists and intellectuals, Mann exposes the false ideal of formalism. Traditionally art has played the role of passing beyond the appearance of human beings in particular circumstances and realizing an image of human potentiality. To the extent that the development of that potentiality has been warped or impeded by an objective social organization, the production of a work of art becomes an act of social criticism, as well as a means to gain insight into social reality. Mann understands the distortion of human potentiality, and to some extent the political and social cause of that distortion. What the novel communicates is that the achievement art must strive for is the portrayal of the world as a whole, rather than merely the category into which the artist is placed by that world.
Notes (Chapter V)

1. Quoted by Bergsten, op. cit., p. 121.
4. Ibid., p. 362.
5. Quoted by Bergsten, op. cit., p. 106.
6. Ibid., p. 108.
7. from Direction, March 1943. Quoted by Bergsten, 110.
8. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 87.
12. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
13. As he explains in "What is German?", Atlantic Monthly, 173 #5, 1944, p. 82.
14. Ibid.
15. Henry Hatfield, "Thomas Mann and America", Salmagundi 10-11, p. 178.
17. "What is German", p. 82.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid., p. 165.
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