THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENOSUICIDE

by

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The Sociology of Genosuicide

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This thesis is concerned with the sociological variables contributing to mass self-destruction. It attempts a macro analysis of the social phenomenon of genosuicide and offers a heuristic model of genosuicide as part of the general processes of cultural development and decline.

The hypothesis to be investigated states that cultural petrification refers to the domination of certain elites corresponding to a lack of adaptation to changes in society. Genosuicide is a mass behavioral reaction of human individuals to a state of cultural petrification. Large scale destructive drug use for example may be understood as being symptomatic of the processes of genosuicide.

The data utilized in this thesis are sociological concepts and processes based on historical occurrences. The sociological approach which is employed here reviews the changing composition of the social, cultural and personality systems and subsystems particular to the Ch'ing Dynasty. The development of opium use during this period as well as the consequences and implications of such drug use are examined.

A number of sociological variables, characteristic of this society were found to be correlated with large scale destructive drug use which is in turn indicative of the processes of genosuicide.
For Sandra
What can oppose the decline of the west is not a resurrected culture but the utopia that is silently contained in the image of its decline.*

Theodor W. Adorno

*Adorno, Theodor W.; Prisms (Neville Spearman; London; 1967) P.72
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude for
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INTRODUCTION: GENOCIDE AND GENOSUICIDE

The central focus of this discussion shall be twofold. First to provide a schematic overview as to the more typical structural and social psychological contributory factors necessary to the development and initiation of genocide generally. Secondly to outline a working definition, and conceptualization of the predisposing conditions leading to the occurrence of genosuicide.

The propensity to commit an overtly aggressive act such as genocide is determined by an intricate network of contributory factors. This network is comprised of a synthesis of certain structural-sociological and social psychological facilitating conditions of aggressive and genocidal behavior formulated by Vahakn N. Dadrian and Konrad Lorenz; outlined by (among others) Herbert Blumer. These factors will be defined within a wider framework of analysis based on the understanding of man's continuing need for...'an assurance of eternal survival for his self'. This is an assurance that is realized in certain symbolic actions and systems of meaning. Such an underlying approach is consistent with the existential psychoanalytic or psychohistorical perspective defined and articulated by Otto Rank, Robert J. Lifton and Norman O. Brown. These theorists together, have been critically synthesized in the more recent works of Ernest Becker.
The question of genocide is problematic. Its occurrence is not confined to any one historical epoch. Nor is it restricted to any one type of socio-cultural system. Rather, it permeates the whole history of the development of human civilization. Also we must not neglect to recognize the various forms of genocide as well as the variety of methods employed in its initiation. The descriptive definition of genocide provided by the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide testifies to the variability of the forms of this social phenomenon. Lastly in our review of genocide we must consider the wide range of justifications given by the group(s) responsible for the implementation of genocidal acts throughout history. It is within the context of its extreme historical variability; characterizing the development of some societies while on the other hand, remaining relatively absent in other socio-cultural systems, that we must agree with Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills who emphasize that...

Neither man's values and purposes, nor his ways and means of achieving them are common to all man, nor stable in the sequence of generations.

In short, societies differ in histories, levels of social organization and cultural development. Such a cultural-relativistic viewpoint may aid us in the explanation of the differences between the types of forms of genocide that have occurred historically.


2Girth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright; Character and Social Institutions (Harcourt, Brace and World Inc.; New York; 1964) P.9.
What such an analytic perspective does not accomplish is the provision of a system of reasons why genocide occurs at all. Nor does it explain why we view its development in dissimilar historical and cultural situations.

The reality of genocide consists of the dual interaction between factors of human emotion and objective social conditions. A reality aptly defined by Margaret Mead in a recent lecture on The Social Significance of Theories of Human Aggression. Mead emphasized that one of the major determinants of human aggression is the social organization itself and how it plays upon human emotion.  

The consequences of such interplay often result in

...the use of deliberate, systematic measures toward the extermination of a racial, political or cultural group.  

This constitutes the conventional form and method of genocide which transcends all socio-cultural differences that exist between divergent societies in different historical periods. Specific differences may be inevitably linked to the general differences between each particular historical and cultural situation in which it occurs. Genocide being in this sense cultural-specific.

What we must agree upon is not the similarity of the socio-structural and cultural level of organization of the societies that have generated genocidal incidents, rather, we must focus our attention on the similarity of the consequences that often arise out of dissimilar social situations and systems of socio-

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3 Referring here to the lecture given by Margaret Mead at U.B.C. in Jan. 1975.

cultural organization. Consequences which may center around one of the possibly more basic and essential motivating elements of human behavior and social action - the human emotions of anxiety, frustration and fear. It is exactly such consequences which, as the social psychologists tell us, men will do anything to avoid, even kill one another. If anxiety stands out as the common link between the various historical incidents of genocide, then there must exist equally common mechanisms which channel human anxiety into the destructive genocidal forms repeatedly manifested throughout history. As Erich Fromm quite correctly points out...

It goes without saying, how important it is not only to realize the dynamic role of destructiveness in the social process but also to understand what the specific conditions for its intensity are.5

In agreeing with Fromm, in this context, it shall be suggested here that aggressive destructiveness is an escape from the feeling of anxiety and fear, since its primary goal is the removal of all 'objects' with which the individual or group must unfavorably compare himself or themselves with. More importantly in this context, we must recognize and come to terms with those contributory conditions which legitimize such unfavorable comparisons. It may be asserted that aggression is a function of fear and/or frustration resulting from a threat to an individual's or group's image of self-esteem and self-identity. However it does not logically follow that aggression will be necessarily initiated. Nor for that matter, does it follow that such aggression will inevitably result in genocide.

From the point of view of daily observation, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that aggressive behavior of the usually recognized varieties is always traceable to and produced by some form of frustration. But it is by no means so immediately evident that, whenever frustration occurs, aggression of some kind and in some degree will inevitably result. 6

To initiate aggressive behavior, a group or nation must be in a situation which allows or permits its expression. Extending from this, there must exist various structural and social psychological facilitating factors which promote the use of genocide over other expressive forms of aggression. It is essential to arrive at some form of general understanding as to what are the specific conditions which allow for the implementation of genocide. Also it is necessary to maintain the background understanding that such conditions exist, within divergent socio-cultural situations. Conditions that ultimately transcend such cultural-specific differences.

From this baseline, this analysis will attempt to point out the use of opium in China during the latter half of the nineteenth century as being a particularized form of genocide; to be defined more specifically as genosuicide.

The concept of genosuicide shall be defined and utilized within the context of this discussion. It constitutes at least an original contribution to the sociological understanding of the nature of human responses to socio-cultural discontinuity. More specifically, this concept shall contribute to the understanding of human adaptive responses to social situations

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6 Dollard, John; Frustration and Aggression (Yale University Press; New Haven Conn.; 1939) P. 1.
characterized by conditions of cultural stagnation, regression and petrification generally.

In reviewing the relevant literature it is important to note that the conceptualization, definition and theoretical implementation of this concept would appear to have been wholly neglected. Self-destruction, most notably examined by Durkheim in his work *Suicide*, has yet to be treated as a mass behavioral phenomenon; occurring as a socially collective response to specific cultural conditions. The occurrence of such a mass behavioral phenomenon presents itself as a possibility worthy of theoretical consideration and sociological investigation.

In that we may more explicitly note the operations and implications of the processes of genosuicide it is necessary to provide at this point, a working definition of this concept. Genosuicide shall be understood as a pathological adaptive behavioral response to a cultural condition of petrification. Moreover, it is a regressive mass behavioral phenomenon. Its occurrence is restricted to the population of a given society which is unable to alter their general socio-cultural environment in the hope of negating a condition of general social anxiety. Anxiety, as experienced by the social collectivity is seen as the ultimate product or consequence of cultural petrification. As a result such social groups turn towards means of inner-modification in their attempts to alleviate such collectively experienced social anxiety and frustration.

Drug use is understood here as constituting one particular means of facilitating inner-modification. Such experiential transcendental means are ultimately detrimental to the pro-
gressive development of the individual as a social entity. Other activities and behavioral responses to cultural petrification, inclusive of the development of inner-worldly philosophies, schools of psychotherapy and certain trends in education and the processes of socialization generally, could be seen as symptomatic of genosuicide and as consequences of a condition of cultural petrification.

The concept of genosuicide is completely amenable to further modification and clarification in the future. This introduction to the concept of genosuicide is a heuristic one; hopefully providing the basis for further research and theoretical elaboration.

Implicit within such an approach is the understanding of the necessity to include not only as acts of genocide, those forms of aggression exemplified by the attempt of one group to exterminate another. Moreover, one must include also those instances in history where groups (which being similarly characterized by an underlying motivational base of anxiety) were restrained from employing methods of scapegoating against certain minority groups in the quest of self-transcendence and perceived immortality. Which instead, were necessitated by conditions of social organization and social and cultural inhibitions to institute a quest for symbolic meaning as defined by the inner-modification of the self through the destructive or self-limiting use of certain drugs. Most importantly, such processes of inner-modification, self-limitation and finally self-destruction are seen as aspects of a more general social phenomenon - genosuicide.

Processes of inner-modification in the achievement of
personal self-esteem are to be seen as being more consistent with the social and cultural contexts of these groups than the use of scapegoating. Scapegoating is a means of aggression particular to the more overt forms of genocide.

...without a transcendental belief each man is a mean little island. The need for self-transcendence through some form of 'peak experience' (religious or aesthetic) and/or through social integration is inherent in man's condition.\(^7\)

It will be pointed out that the participation in aggressive acts and the experiencing of a drugged euphoric condition, particular to genocide and genosuicide respectively provide for such 'peak experiences'. We shall also attempt to illustrate that such examples of genosuicide occur, or at least from the example of China, would tend to occur at periods of cultural petrification; a condition due primarily, as Pitirim Sorokin elucidates, to the exhaustion of the creative forces of a socio-cultural system.

By cultural petrification Sorokin refers to a culture which remains rigidly fixed in

...mechanically continuing its existence with its creative forces exhausted, but outwardly stationary in respect to the quality and quantity of its components.\(^8\)

A condition of cultural petrification is indicative of a cultural situation where the dynamics of artistic or intellectual innovation and creativity are visibly absent or forcibly prevented from public expression and recognition through the normative and legitimate channels of communication. Cultural petrification itself

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8 Sorokin, Pitirim A; *Society, Culture and Personality* (Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.; New York; 1962) P. 592
is to be understood here as being synonymous with the regressive trends of cultural decline. A petrified culture is unable to generate forces internal to itself to provide for the alleviation of anxiety which is its ultimate product. A petrified culture is unable to provide heroic life-meaning to its constituent population. General social anxiety and/or frustration is the consequence of this fact.

There is a distinct necessity to dealing in detail with the nature and contributory determinants of the processes of cultural petrification. Cultural petrification, that is the arrest of the dynamics of cultural development, as a socio-cultural condition is a selective precondition for the occurrence of genosuicide. Consequently, this analysis will also address itself to the reviewing of the trends particular to cultural decline. Such regressive conditions of culture will be related to the abilities of elites, within the given social situation to provide cultural meanings and symbols as they are related to an on-going, ever-changing social problematic. Thus we shall study the link that exists between the dynamics of cultural development generally as they are in turn dependent upon the planning and manipulation by specific elite interests.
CHAPTER I. GENOSUICIDE, CULTURAL PETRIFICATION AND ELITES

The occurrence of processes of cultural discontinuity, stagnation and/or regression must be understood in relation to the subtle interdependency which the formation and articulation of specific cultural categories have relative to elite interests within any given historical epoch. Culture itself, its genesis, development and decline must be seen as a deliberate manufactured construct or interrelated systems of constructs. Moreover, the techniques of cultural construction themselves are monopolized by a definite stratum of society - the elite interests. Such a stratum retains the responsibility of providing for both social definition and direction for the social collectivity of which it constitutes quantitatively, a minority grouping. However, it is a highly organized minority grouping. The historic re-occurrence of elites, responsible for cultural definition and direction within the context of diverse and often unique societies is a rather blatant testimony to the necessity of studying their specific roles and functions in relation to the dynamics of cultural development as well as cultural decline.

This discussion in part shall constitute a tentative attempt to direct the theoretical orientations of a sociology of culture towards the recognition and appraisal of the role of elites historically. In short, this portion of a more general discussion of genosuicide is an heuristic attempt to integrate many of the fundamental and commonly recognizable premises particular to a sociology of culture with a number of
equally basic and commonly recognizable premises particular to a sociology of elites. This synthesis itself will be a rather generalized one. Hopefully, generalization at this level will allow for a more specific and detailed complex of analyses in the future.

The consideration and inclusion of elites within any explanatory framework dealing with the varied processes of cultural development or cultural disintegration has been neglected both by historians as well as sociologists. T.B. Bottomore adamantly testifies to such neglect within the often speculative areas of cultural analysis and culture-critique.

The present lack of information (on elites) is no doubt due, in part, to the fact that general historians have not usually been interested in this kind of investigation, and that social history which would concern itself with these problems, has still to be developed.  

The necessity of including within one's own theoretical framework, considerations of the role of elite interests in the formation, development and decline of particular cultural complexes or whole socio-cultural systems is based on the realistic appraisal and factual recognition of the monopolization by elites, of the sources and means of cultural production.

Any major civilization in any historical period may be defined by having both a certain consistency and reasonableness in terms of normative structures of values, rules of conduct and systems of general social meanings and purposes. These definitive social qualities of major civilizations have usually

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been produced and maintained by an elite or a number of interrelated elites. More importantly, the cultural definitions provided by an elite(s) also serve as sources of legitimization for the existence of the elite(s) itself. In this respect Marx has noted, with some original insight, the tendency of ruling elites to be the chief formulating agents of cultural meanings and formations. Thus, as elites will most often

...rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident that they do this in their whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of ideas of their ages; thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch.

Marx, unfortunately does not discuss in detail the intimate and often subtle links that exist between the dynamics of power maintenance directed by elites and their ability to define the legitimacy of their own social position. The definition of such legitimacy is dependent upon the monopolization of the means of cultural production. More simply...

To some extent, however, an elite system writes its own rules by influencing the cultural values, or ends, against which it may be judged.

Thus the level of consensus and integration within the social collectivity is based, at least in part on an elite's ability to define the legitimacy of their own position within a wider system of cultural meanings, values and norms.

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10 For a more specific and detailed elaboration of this point see: Bell, Clive; Civilization (Harcourt, Brace & Co.; New York; 1928)


The extent of general consensus within any social collectivity may be viewed as functionally dependent upon the capacity of a creative and innovative elite to address themselves to the evolving and changing problematic of social existence. They must relevantly redefine the complex system of cultural norms and meanings in light of objective tensions and processes of structural change. Thus a creative ruling elite constantly provides for and defines new orientations for cultural progress and development in the face of often unique and unprecedented, internally and externally motivated socio-structural changes. Such a social service, provided by 'creative' ruling elites necessitates more than simple innovative talent on their part. The ability to maintain such a service for the general social collectivity as a whole requires the ability to perceive the objective requirements of an evolving social problematic. In short, an elite must be able to estimate meaningfully the extent of cultural redefinition required at any given time.

The dynamics of cultural development and progression are fundamentally based on the talents, abilities and services of ruling elites. Elites are able to acquire power through such abilities. Conversely, however, as Mosca illustrates...

Ruling classes decline inevitably when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power, when they can no longer render the social services which they once rendered, or when their talents and their services they render lose importance in the social environment in which they live. 13

There exists a distinct relation between cultural morphology and elite morphology. In this sense we may relate cultural discontinuity, stagnation, petrification and the ultimate decline and extinction of certain socio-cultural systems to the consequent stagnation and loss of creativity and innovative abilities of the ruling elite(s) particular to the socio-cultural system in question.

The tentative consideration of such a possible interrelationship existing between the ability of specific elites to perceive objective cultural requirements as they are dictated by a changing social problematic and the maintenance and preservation of a dynamic and stable cultural continuity is an important step forward. It is a step towards recognizing the contributory and contingent variables effecting and determining cultural development or on the other hand, contributing to cultural regression. Also it is towards the clarification and elaboration of the possibilities of the existence of such an interrelationship that this particular portion of this discussion shall direct itself. In such a manner we may more realistically come to grips with the constellation of causes contributing to cultural decline in the Ch'ing Dynasty of nineteenth century China.
1. The Social Psychological Consequences of Cultural Petrification.

The Ch'ing Dynasty was characterized by a condition of cultural petrification. China, during this period was unable to generate forces internal or external to itself in the elimination of a condition of normlessness, alienation, anomie and anxiety generally. This common incapacity necessitates our classifying its social and cultural dynamics as 'petrified'. The state of petrification defined more specifically here, refers to the inability of this culture to provide, through artistic, intellectual or ideological innovation a sense of heroic life meaning and values for its constituent members. In such a social state an individual's sense of social cohesion— the mainspring of his sense of self-identity, is broken or fatally weakened. It is a condition of spiritual sterility as subjectively experienced by the individual.

He lives on the thin line of sensation with no future and no past.  

It is clear that the alienated, focus consciously on the present. Their subjective interpretation of existence emphasizes the irrelevance of the past and accentuates a sense of pessimism about the future. They reject long range systems of ideals in favour of the personal and situational needs of the moment. Time is experienced as decline or stagnation. Such a social environment and such a corresponding state of mind is what Kenneth Keniston has referred to as 'the cult of the present'. It is such states of mind, upon which the most profoundly

14MacIver, R.M.; The Ramparts We Guard (The MacMillan Co.; New York; 1950) P. 84.
delicate artistic creations and conversely, the most barbarous atrocities are founded.

Indeed, it is partly the ability to capture such fluctuating and anxious states of mind which enables the rise of another elite and the creation of revolutions; to make men risk death for something larger than themselves or to even commit genocide.15 Within such activities the anxious man may transcend his fears. More specifically, such activities may provide the individual or groups of individuals with at least a *symbolic* sense of actively denying or doing away with the causes of those fears. The mechanisms of 'transference heroics' provides as Ernest Becker describes, the individual or larger social group with a definite point of reference for the practice of 'goodness' and denial of insecurity - all within a certain secure level of safety and control.16 However, in a state of cultural petrification there are no ideologies, no in-groups and out-groups, no means to express anxiety but the normative and traditionally defined channels which have long ceased to be self-fulfilling. Anxieties remain free-floating, diffuse and unfocused; perceiving neither a cause nor a method of change.

In the last few decades of the Ch'ing Dynasty and within our own present post-industrial period we view the loss of the possibility of the intensive social creation of life-meaning.

15 Keniston, Kenneth; *The Uncommitted* (Harcourt, Brace and World Inc.; New York; 1965) P. 78.

The fundamental problem of every living organism is simply the continuation of action in the face of stimuli. When frustration of action in the face of insurmountable stimuli continues, and the organism can not adjust or set the situation right, it bogs down into the surrender of death. 17

The rigidity or flexibility of the organizational features of the elite groups particular to any social system is that which determines the level, capacity and general possibilities for social reconstruction or reorganization. From culture, men derive a feeling of legitimate self-meaning and importance; a sense of heroic denial of creaturelessness and the anxiety of death.

In more direct sociological terms, culture constitutes systems of belief and expressive symbols. Culture defines what is true and what is pleasurable; it provides canons for the discovery, creation and education of new truths, new forms of beauty and possibilities for self-transcendence. Culture is manifest as objects (symbolic meanings) toward which general social action is oriented: as an integral feature of individual personality and as institutionalized normative patterns of behavior. 18

All great cultures and those which were, or are, in the process of moving in the direction of greatness, have an elite which may be called, to coin a term of Jules Henry, cultural maximizers. Their function is to maintain or push ahead the


18 See Parsons, Talcott; The Social System (The Free Press; New York; 1951) especially Chapters 8 & 9.
culture's level of creative integration.

The functions of a cultural maximizer include organization (maintaining the level of integration of the culture as it is) and contributing certain qualitative features necessary to the continuance of the cultural life. 19

Within any socio-cultural context, such elite cultural maximizers never attempt to alter the culture radically. Such abrupt alterations would noticeably threaten the stability and legitimacy of the prescribed stratification of individuals within that society and consequently threaten the security of the elite's position within the same society. Those who have the capacity to maximize culture in this fashion are usually among the ruling elite in all highly developed civilizations. In the Ch'ing Dynasty such a cultural maximizing elite consisted of a ruling group referred to as the literati, the scholar gentry or the Mandarins. They were the chief constituent members of the Chinese bureaucracy.

The culture of a given society shall be taken to be the sum total of persisting values, ideas and other symbolic systems that shape the pattern of behavior of individuals in the society together with the products of that behavior. Culture has in most instances continuity; it is accumulated and transmitted. Also it is expressed in, and may dictate and enforce patterns of social behavior which the members of that society learn. It includes tangible social goals and easily evident and perceptible modes and styles of living, as well as specific institutions and codes of conduct often complexly interwoven.

2. Culture and Elites - An Overview

We must as well consider here the problem of cultural change.

It might be proposed that since cultural change is a response to changing internal conditions or pressures, it represents an advance when the society in question succeeds in adjusting itself to these internal conditions and retains stability.20

Sorokin, in outlining the principles of immanent change of systems and supersystems has noted that the cause of the changes in a social system is inherent in the system itself. On the other hand, he illustrates that there are certain socio-cultural factors which may be influential...

(a) in the acceleration or retardation of the immanent change of a system;
(b) in facilitating or hindering the realization of its potentialities;
(c) in the suppression, distortion or overdevelopment of some of its characteristics;
(d) in a modification of its secondary traits, or in its mutilation or destruction.21

It is the relation of change to cultural continuity or in some cases cultural discontinuity to which we must relate, in turn, our understanding of elites and their role in cultural formation and development. In this regard we must consider the dynamics, or lack of them, of such cultural development in any specific social situation in relation to such factors as the size of elites, the number of different elites, their relations with each other, and with the rest of the population,


21 Sorokin, Petirim; Society, Culture and Personality (Cooper Square Publishers, Inc., New York; 1962) P. 697.
their method of selection and the social distance between elite and mass and the cultural ideals which they produce and how they relate to newly defined situations. These, as Bottomore has emphasized, are the most important factors which have to be taken into account in explaining changes in a culture; that is changes or alterations in major cultural characteristics and continuity generally. 22

Amitai Etzioni has defined social units according to where the majority of their consequences lie. Macroscopic units are those which primary actions effect changes in social properties; that is basic structural and cultural characteristics of a society. Elites in this sense may be understood as a macroscopic unit.

From a pragmatic viewpoint, a disciplined study of the substantive problems of society...cannot be advanced without a systematic analysis of macroscopic factors. 23

To follow Raymond Aron's idea or principle here, 24 the characteristic features of any society's social structure and cultural makeup is dependent upon the relationship between groups exercising power, their degree of unity and division, their system of recruitment and ease of access. At this point one might assert that the degree of cultural advance or progression is dependent upon the ability of the elite to recognize the demands of a changing social environment and addresses itself to it in a creative

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22 Bottomore, T.B.; Elites & Society; Op Cit; P. 18

23 Etzioni, Amitai; 'Toward a Macrosociology' in James S. Coleman & Amitai Etzioni (eds); Macrosociology (Allyn & Bacon Inc.; Boston; 1969) P. 107.

manner. An elite that removes or distances itself from the social reality for which it is responsible in providing direction, removes itself simultaneously from a position of being able to comprehend the changing objective requirements of a changing social situation.

The concept of social distance refers to the extent or level of reciprocal communication that exists between the mass and the elite. A situation where the elite is relatively distant from the mass is synonymous with a social condition which lacks a definite communicative feedback mechanism existing between the elite grouping and the rest of the social collectivity. The further a directing elite distances itself from the corresponding social collectivity of which it forms a part, the greater are the possibilities that the policy proposals which it formulates with regards to socio-cultural development would be irrelevant or impractical in dealing with processes of immanent change particular to the general social collectivity.

Using Toynbee's conceptual terminology here, a creative minority or elite is that group in a given society which is able to relevantly prescribe norms and goals of social conduct and organization which are suitable to the objective socio-cultural dictates and requirements as they are defined by the changing social reality. Toynbee coined the principle of challenge and response in referring to the capabilities of the elite to effectively inhibit or facilitate cultural change. For him processes of immanent change constitute challenges to which an elite grouping may or may not respond creatively. A creative elite is able
to respond meaningfully, practically and progressively to external and internal challenges to the social environment.

In the succession of victorious responses to challenges in which the process of growth consists, the Creative Minority to whose enterprise and energy and resoluteness the victory is due is apt to be recruited from different individuals, with different social heritages and different ideas and ideals, at each successive performance of the drama...25

Here Toynbee relates the innovative creative qualities to the degree of elite circulation; to the degree that an elite incorporates elements from all classes.

It is at this point that we must differentiate between leadership and domination. The elements of innovative and responsive leadership and relevant policy proposals, that is proposals for social action, are particular only to a creative elite. Such an elite is responsive to the situations and requirements of all classes in the interests of those classes. On the other hand, domination, maintained and extended by a dominant elite or dominant minority is only responsive to the maintenance and furthering of its own interests, regardless of the consequences which such interests might hold for the other classes.

If one of the features making for the creativity of an elite is dependent upon elite circulation, cultural petrification might well be a consequence of the restriction of elite circulation. In this discussion an elite which restricts access to its membership will be referred to as a dominant elite or dominant minority.

By contrast the Dominant Minority in a disintegrating society tends to degenerate into a close corporation whose ideas and ideals have the legendary rigidity of the unchanging laws of the Medes and Persians... Toynbee here equates the existence of a dominant minority with the processes of social disintegration.

As a number of elite theorists have suggested, such sociological factors as consensus, socialization, power, stratification or force, which all are assumed to play a determinant role in the influencing of social continuity, are only valuable in understanding the processes of social life when their significance and the concrete mechanisms through which they operate have been systematically examined. Included among these mechanisms, and of major importance are strategic elites. Strategic elites are those elite groupings which exert definite influence and power over strategic or essential areas of the social, economic or cultural life in a given social collectivity. The dynamic qualities of cultural development are ensured and determined by the directorship of a creative and culturally strategic elite. Pareto emphasizes, a level of creativity of a strategic elite is ensured by a high degree of accessibility to the elite itself - a high level of elite circulation.

The governing class is restored not only in numbers, but - and that is the more important thing - in quality, by families arising from the lower classes and bringing with them the vigor and the proportions of residues necessary for keeping themselves in power.27

26 Ibid; P. 31

Consequently we will assert that chief among the factors contributing to the transition of a creative elite to a dominant one is a corresponding restriction of elite circulation. As Suzanne Keller notes...

However strategic elites are displaced... they always participate in their own - death - either by their obstinate refusal to change or by their inability to keep in step with the tempo of the times.28

As Mosca observed, ruling classes decline when they cease to find scope for the capacities through which they rose to power and when what they have to offer loses its importance.29 Mosca, in relation to this point also, agreeing here with the majority of elite theorists, saw that a ruling elite is the more prone to fall into errors of misinterpreting the objective requirements of social situations, the more closed it is to 'elements' (both in terms of information as well as individuals) from the other classes.30

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28 Keller, Suzanne; Beyond the Ruling Class (Random House; New York; 1963) P. 237.


30 Ibid; P. 119.
3. Genosuicide and Drug Use

Such a situation of cultural petrification is characterized by conditions of distinct social psychological and structural inhibitions preventing the 'outward' modification of the biophysical environment. This petrified social condition places objective checks on the possibilities for political action by the social collectivity as a whole. Within such a social situation individuals are unable to overtly modify the social-structural and social-organizational arrangements of the society, in the hope of effectively alleviating the possible causes of the general social frustrations as experienced by the collectivity. Also such a petrified social situation can neither generate new ideological orientations or new and dynamic leaders although it establishes a social climate which is conducive to its emergence. Without such ideological or charismatic leadership it is unlikely that certain minority groups will be defined as being responsible for the social contradictions at hand, whose concurrent elimination would provide for the restoration of, at least at a symbolic level, a social bond between members of the in-group.

As we shall discuss at a later point, the formation of in-groups and out-groups is dependent on a particular ideological system or leadership to point out and define group membership patterns and to provide the criteria by which individuals may or may not belong to a particular group. Within a state of general social anxiety an out-group is often given the responsibility for such social discontinuity by the in-group. In such a manner general social anxieties are objectified;
that is they are transformed from unfocused anxieties to genuine fears as related to particular out-groups. The elimination of the out-group becomes then a necessary prerequisite for the elimination of such fears on at least a collective symbolic level. It is possible that a society in a condition of general social anxiety and frustration is neither able to structurally reorganize itself in the hope of ridding itself of such social anxieties, or to define specific out-groups as being symbolically responsible for such frustrations and fears. The last remaining alternative available, in the quest for the restoration of a sense of continuity, predictability and heroic meaningfulness to one's own perceptions of the social world is inner-modification. By denying the importance of certain characterizing features of the social reality in which one participates and through which an individual realizes himself, one may deny the effects and significance of a general state of social frustration which typifies the social situation at the time. Such processes of inner-modification and the inner-limitation of one's world view may, as shall be pointed out, lead to self-destruction in the quest for symbolic meaning and the self-transcendence of anxiety.

The availability of drugs in China, must be seen as a precipitory factor of such inner-modification specifically, genocide generally. We must consider Freud's pessimistic but nevertheless relevant statement that...

...one can try to re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others that are
in conformity with one's own wishes. But whoever, in desperate defiance, sets out upon this path to happiness will as a rule attain nothing.\textsuperscript{31}

The recreation of a symbolic world is dependent upon the means or objects used to create the illusion of meaning, One is dependent on the drug for the illusion it provides. The ultimate criticism of such a method of self-modification is that it is too narrow a fetishization of meaning. One is dependently bound to the object (whether it by physiologically or psychologically) for self-justification, for meaning, for 'spiritual balance' and for a triumphant position over confusion, powerlessness and evil which one always senses but cannot define. One mistakes the artificial reflexes of the drug for life itself.

The drug experience is a reified one. Drug use marks the replacement of the sense of a continuity in history for the immediacy of sensory and imagined experience.

A cult of subjectivity - complete with drugs - dopes the discontented into taking their own death - figuratively and in fact - for life itself.\textsuperscript{32}

Drug use is symptomatic of general attempts to initiate processes of inner-modification. They constitute attempts to transform through certain mediums i.e. drugs, an individual's own conceptual view of the world. This is one of the characterizing features of the late Ch'ing Dynasty where the

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\textsuperscript{32} Jacoby, Russell, 'The Politics of Subjectivity - Slogans of the American New Left' in \textit{Telos}; \#9 (Fall, 1971) P. 120.
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...general focus upon the transcendent psychic experience would seem to be related to impairments in other modes of symbolic immortality. 33

It shall be the purpose of this analysis to define the existential nature of these impairments within the context of the socio-cultural system of the Ch'ing Dynasty in order to come to terms with the nature of this form of genosuicide. Also and more importantly we shall place these specific case studies within a wider framework of analysis in the attempt to understand the general motivational mechanisms both structural and social psychological in origin, of some forms of genocide, particularly genosuicide.

4. Statement of Hypothesis

This analysis is concerned with the examination of three distinct variables: elites, cultural petrification and genosuicide. The hypothesis to be tested here states:

A society characterized by cultural petrification and dominated by a non-creative elite, might resort to genosuicide as a consequence of inner modification when outer modification in the forms of aggression, conquest or genocide is impossible.

Drug use is understood here as being symptomatic of the processes of genosuicide.
5. The Hypothesis As a Socio-Cultural Rhythm

The testing of the hypothesis, as it has been stated here, will be directed towards establishing whether or not the three categories or processes particular to it constitute a socio-cultural rhythm. Pitirim Sorokin is the first to have elaborated upon this principle of socio-cultural rhythms.

A socio-cultural rhythm is a recurrent unit of process consisting of two or more different phases... or some complex series of phases.\(^3^4\)

The phases of the socio-cultural rhythm defined by the hypothesis would include: elites and certain developmental qualities particular to them, cultural petrification and genosuicide. In this sense the hypothesis constitutes a three phase rhythm. Specifically, this socio-cultural rhythm is made up of the dynamic interrelationships that exist between certain developmental qualities of elite structures (as defined by Mannheim), the influence of those qualities on the processes of cultural petrification and in turn the contributory influential role of cultural petrification in the occurrence and initiation of behavioralistic trends of genosuicide.

It is essential that this analysis place such a rhythm within the context of the dynamics of cultural development and decline; noting its periodicity. The establishment of the periodicity of socio-cultural rhythms refers to ascertaining whether or not such a rhythmic dynamic interrelationship as defined here, occurs at a specific stage of cultural development. It is necessary to find out whether the occurrence of this

\(^{3^4}\)Sorokin, Pitirim; Society, Culture and Personality (Cooper Square Publishers, Inc.; New York, 1962) P. 681.
socio-cultural rhythm is in itself, both symptomatic of cultural decline as well as a contributory factor to the initiation of such decline.

Looking wholistically at the internal dynamics, and external context of the operation of socio-cultural rhythms it is essential to realize that...

Rhythms may be embraced as subrhythms in a larger rhythm, this larger rhythm being in its turn a subrhythm is still larger embracing superrhythm. Thus this socio-cultural rhythm of elites, cultural petrification and genosuicide are embraced within the larger rhythm of cultural development and decline which in turn is embraced within the superrhythm of cultural transformation. The superrhythm of cultural transformation is understood as constituting the non-linear succession of sensate, idealistic and ideational supersystems, defined and elaborated upon by Sorokin.

The conceptualization of such socio-cultural rhythms as described here holds a definite value for sociological theory in general. An observed recurrence of a specific rhythm such as that designated by our hypothesis provides a more solid basis for prediction of changes to be expected in certain social group structures, institutions or more complex socio-cultural systems. Also a recognition of such socio-cultural rhythms and most importantly such superrhythms as they have been defined by Sorokin, are significant in comprehending the relationships between the

35 Sorokin; Ibid; P. 681
vast array of subsystems in specific macro socio-cultural structures. They aid also in estimating the direction and implications of the direction of their concerted changes. As Sorokin emphasizes...

It gives us a key to a whole network of multilinear, causal-meaningful relationships, static and dynamic, between a multitude of systems or 'variables' in a given culture. This network of relationships is so complicated that it can hardly be grasped by any other means.36

The initiation and elaboration of such a method of analysis within the context of sociological theory construction would transcend the mechanistic boundaries of comprehension established by the more typical prevailing methods of studying the causal-functional relationships between socio-cultural phenomenon. Such a grasp of a whole network of the causal-meaningful relationships between a host of variables (systems and subsystems) cannot be obtained at all without an understanding of systems, supersystems, their rhythms and superrhythms.37

This thesis as a whole constitutes a first step towards the recognition of this fact.

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36 Ibid; P. 688.

37 Ibid; P. 690.
6. Methodological Note I - Analytical Orientation

A detailed note should be made here pertaining to the methodological orientation of the analytical framework to be utilized in this discussion; defining the basic premises concerning human behavior underlying that framework. The methodological approach to the phenomena of genocide and genocidesuicide is comprised of four distinct but nevertheless interrelated conceptions of human nature social organization, the role of sociology, social psychology and the existential dilemma of men.

Gunnar Myrdal points out, in relation to the problem of biases and valuations in the maintenance of objectivity in social research, that it is necessary...

...to determine approach and define concepts in terms of a set of value premises that have been explicitly stated. Though this method may not assure an ideal condition of objectivity it at least lets one know explicitly, the colour of the horse that kicked you. It is in the maintenance of this rationality that the following brief methodological exposition is made.

In analyzing any social system or phenomenon of human behavior particular to a given social system, it is of primary importance to realize the central dynamic of that social system.

This integration of a set of common value patterns with the internalized need-disposition structure of the constituent personalities is the core phenomena of the dynamics of a social system.

38 Myrdal, Gunnar; Objectivity In Social Research (Pantheon Books; New York; 1967) P. 5.

39 Parsons, Talcott; The Social System (The Free Press; New York; 1951) P. 92.
The level of integration of values and needs is that which determines the social psychological stability or instability of any social system and is central to the understanding of the social psychological causal roots of anxiety, frustration and fear. The social psychological factors of stability or instability must be seen in relation to the level of integration that exists with regards to the cohesiveness of group identification within the social collectivity as a whole. A lack or imbalance of group identification which normally facilitates within the collectivity, a definite sense of group immortality, will provide for the concurrent symptoms of anxiety and general social frustration. The cohesiveness of group identification is based on the level of integration of the value patterns and need disposition structure. Furthermore, it is when such a level of integration is insufficient that we view the attempts of social groups to find alternatives to the cultural patterns of meaning that have to this point provided a legitimate channel to the quest for symbolic immortality. Culture itself, constitutes the common and accepted value patterns allowing men to transcend the anxiety of their creature limitations.

Also it is important to recognize in our analysis of genocide and genocidesuicide, a limited number of restrictions that an orthodox Marxist approach would impose on such an analysis. Typically then, an orthodox Marxist orientation arrives at an evaluation of a social situation or phenomenon through the analytical dictates of historical and dialectical materialism. Human needs exist so much as they are defined by the relationships of a given group of individuals to the means of production -
the productive processes particular to any given historical epoch. One can see that it is obvious that genocide or genosuicide is not entirely dependent on the relationships of any set of individuals to any one particular mode of production throughout history. Genocide's essential nature and the contributory factors that determine its evolvement reach further than merely a simple materialist basis.

Reich has emphasized, though in a slightly different context, that it is social psychology complemented by the structural insights of sociology

...and not social economy that is in a position to investigate the structure of man's character in a given epoch, to investigate how he thinks and acts, how the contradictions of his existence work themselves out, how he tries to cope with his existence.40

This is not to deny the valuable insights that are to be derived from a historical and materialist perspective. Simply it is to testify to its relative shortcomings in this instance in its inability to come to terms with the psychic dimension of human experience.

That it fails to investigate the conditions under, which the 'ecstatic' and 'instinctual' come into being in certain cultural epochs...41

In emphasizing the subjectiveness of genocide and genosuicide in this manner we enter, with little restraint, into the realm of social psychology.

40 Reich, Wilhelm; The Mass Psychology of Fascism (Farrar, Straus and Giroux; New York; 1971) P. 16.

41 Ibid; P. 85
With the utilization of some of the more basic presuppositions and perceptions of social psychology it is possible to reach a closer theoretical approximation of the social and psychological conditions of men that contribute to the occurrence of genocide and genosuicide. Social psychology, at least according to George Herbert Mead centers its focus neither on an independent individual nor on the organized social group, or for that matter on society as such. Rather, it views each of these entities as constituent elements of a dynamic, interacting whole.

George Herbert Mead explains that it is psychology which deals with the experiences of the individual in relation to the conditions under which the experience goes on. However, it is social psychology which perceives such conditions as social ones.42

For social psychology, the whole (society) is prior to the part is explained in terms of the whole, not the whole in terms of the part or parts. The social act is not explained by building it up out of stimulus response; it must be taken as a dynamic whole - as something going on - no part of which can be explained or understood by itself - a complex organic process implied by each individual stimulus and response involved in it.43

This then shall constitute the analytical framework maintained in this discussion for the reasons previously defined. By such means will the seemingly purposelessness and irrationality of genocide and genosuicide be comprehended as an aspect of men's struggle for the perpetuation or restrengthening of a symbolic


universe of meaning. Genocide and genosuicide constitute both pathological responses to the absence of life-meaning as well as being attempts to reconstruct it.

...which is in itself neither 'rational' nor 'irrational' but comprehensible within a formal and ...scientific framework.44

44 Lifton, Robert Jay; Revolutionary Immortality (Random House; New York; 1967) P. xiii
Methodological Note II - The Data

The collection of data relevant for testing the hypothesis is based on historical records particular to the socio-cultural developments as they occurred in the Ch'ing Dynasty. The collection, correlation and interpretation of this data is conducted within the context of a number of specific theoretical interpretive frameworks. The hypothesis as it has been stated here includes three distinct qualitative variables: elites, cultural petrification and genosuicide. The purpose of this analysis in short, is to measure these three variables and to ascertain whether or not they are correlated with each other meaningfully, causally or both.

These above mentioned qualitative variables are identified in each historical instance by abstracting them from the data, using the theoretical interpretive frameworks. The control of interfering variables was dealt with by:

1) noting the instances when such interfering variables might occur.
2) pointing out and evaluating the implications which such interfering variables might hold for the concurrent development of, and the degree of dependency between, the three major substantive variables with which this analysis is primarily concerned.

In a research design of this type, there exists always the possibility of misjudging the importance or lack of it, of the nature of certain interfering variables and their concurrent effect on the major variables being examined. The consequences of such a mistake would noticeably effect the verifiability of the conclusions reached in the analysis. The estimations of the interrelationships and degree of interdependency that might
exist between the variables with which this analysis is concerned would be largely invalidated as a result. With this possible consequence in mind, the appraisal of specific interfering variables was accomplished by way of comparing their treatment in various historical accounts. In this fashion the possibility of systematically avoiding the overestimation or underestimation of the weight, role and function of interfering variables was attempted.

The documents that were reviewed here, especially in regards to the examination of events as they occurred in the Ch'ing Dynasty were made up of substantially documented historiographies as well as primary accounts. The possibilities and implications of political or general ideological bias was considered in the analysis of both historiographical accounts as well as records of first hand observation. The subject of the opium trade, both for British and Chinese historians as well as for the actual participants in the trade is a provocative subject. The Chinese historical accounts had the inherent tendency of placing the weight of responsibility and guilt for the opium trade on the British interests involved. The British accounts for the large part, saw the trade as a rationally profitable activity, addressed to an inherent propensity for opium use on the part of the Chinese. The actions of the British during this period were viewed at the time, as both guiltless and free of the taint of exploitative entreprenurialism.

The selection, reviewing and analysis of historical documents was carried out by way of noting the degree and extent of empirical documentation of the material dealt with in these accounts. The
degree of documentation may be understood at least as a partial measure of empirical verifiability.

The degree of representativeness of a given historical document may be measured by observing and noting in a comparative fashion, the commonality or lack of it which the assertions particular to the document, have with other documents from similar sources. Their exists a functional utility in the comparative use of historiographies in establishing the representativeness of a given historical document, especially when such a document constitutes a first hand account of an event. Also historiographies aid in the measurement of the importance of the views and interpretations as they are expressed in the account. They enable one to more realistically weigh the importance and validity of the first hand observations and interpretations as they relate to a larger sequence of historical events. The comparative use of historiographies in judging the representativeness of the theoretical generalizations reached in the conclusions of this thesis with regards to the three variables and/or processes previously mentioned have been substantiated through the comparative synthesis of historical record. The level of generalization of the theoretical constructions and the variables particular to them is in close proportionate relationship with the level of specificity of the historical information and data available. The more specific the historical material, the more specific will be the theoretical inferences and implications drawn from that material. The level of exactitude of any theoretical construction must be in direct conjunction with the level of detail and specificity of the factual information
pertaining to the social situation or phenomenon of which such theoretical constructions attempt to interpret and put within a sociological context.
8. Genocide and Genosuicide As Related to Social Psychological and Sociological Premises

These last methodological considerations lead one into the necessity of providing a brief exposition relating to some underlying existential psychoanalytical and psycho-historical premises which shall form the basis of this analysis of genocide and genosuicide.

We must understand or at least hope to, that men historically, as they are differentiated from animals, build a symbolic world around themselves in order to comprehend their own position and role within the world. It is felt that such a premise must constitute a cornerstone of any analysis that deals with social organization or with individuals within social organizations. The construction of cultural symbols is dependent upon the human imagination. The human imagination is that essential innate feature which differentiates man from all other life forms. The meanings, values and norms form a unified cultural system. Defined and articulated within the context of cultural development, they provide the individual with a sense of coherency and meaning in relation to his own understanding of his position within the social environment. By providing a sense of meaning to the individual, culture provides him with a sense of personal power over the social environment. Such a sense of power enables the person to calculate, estimate and even predict his own personal life chances. Within the symbolic universe of culture men may transcend their own animal limitations of fear, powerlessness and the inevitability of death and instead define them-
selves as having a prestigious life-form; as being heroic entities.

In order to render reality meaningful, in order to stimulate his own productive energies, man must bring his own meanings to the world, impart his own sense of conviction. This is the tragic burden, as well as the unresolved creative opportunity of Homo poeta.45

The symbolic cultural sphere of human existence is the means by which such a sense of conviction is achieved.

One of the functions of culture is to maintain and lay out a progressive and predictable universe in which the individual is firmly oriented. The dynamic of historical change revolves around the process of the reformulation and re-evaluation of such symbolic spheres in the face of constantly changing socio-cultural conditions. A society is characterized as being in a state of dynamic equilibrium when it is flexible enough to alter its symbolic sphere in responding to the constant encroachment of internal and external influences and alterations. The social-collective quest for symbolic meaning is most likely to take dangerous forms during periods of social upheaval and crisis. At such times the symbolic consistency and realizability within culture is lacking and even its continuity is inhibited. At such times members of one group may feel compelled to strengthen or redefine their sense of identity, continuity and power by the extermination of another group. The act of extermination is dependent in turn on the ability, usually of an elite political or religious grouping, with a formulated legitimizing ideology to transform loosely connected, socially experienced anxieties into overt fears. Anxiety itself is objectless. The experiencing

45 Becker, Ernest; The Structure of Evil (George Brazillier; New York; 1968) P. 172.
of anxiety does not necessarily mean that one understands its causes nor that one can relate it to a definite source. One experiences anxiety while being unable to understand the nature or the cause of the experience. Existentially, anxiety has been understood as the separation of man from God or from some other absolute source of life-meaning. Anxiety, as elaborated upon by Paul Tillich may be divided into three separate categories: anxiety about death, anxiety about the meaning of life, and anxiety about right and wrong. For Tillich the state of anxiety is synonymous with doubt and the threat of nonbeing. Anxiety is the subjective apprehension of such doubt and the threat of nonbeing. At the same time however, one is not aware of the source of such threats. Anxiety is also synonymous with a state of helplessness. If one does not know the reason why one is anxious, very little can be done about it.

Conversely, fear has an object. One is fearful of something. Anxiety is reaction to a vague, diffuse and often intuitively sensed threat to one's personal value-security pattern. However an anxiety is not located spatially nor related to the activities of another individual or group. As a result, the cause of the anxiety cannot be resolved or modified so as to deny the anxious state.

When anxiety is transformed into its specific objectivated form, fear, social action is rendered possible. The nature of

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the fear is provided with a specific cause; a cause which can be modified, channelled or eliminated. In this respect we must understand that anxiety and aggression are interrelated. One effect generates the other. Anxiety gives rise to the possibilities for aggressive action. The transformation of anxiety into fear is complemented by the transformation of undirected aggressiveness into object-directed aggressiveness.

In a social situation characterized by socio-cultural conditions where elite leadership is able to transform diffuse anxieties into object-directed fears, a group led by such an elite may direct such fears to another group (out-group). By eliminating the group which has been defined as responsible for such fears, one eliminates the fear. The results of eliminating the fear by disposing of the group to which such fears were ascribed is that the in-group's sense of identity, continuity and power is restored. The threats to the in-group's 'being' have been permanently removed.

We may be able to affirm life, our own life by perpetuating death. The suffering or death of another may possibly contribute to the affirmation of the worth and quality of one's own existence. The Appollonian spirit, as Nietzsche has commented, presupposes the Dionysiac spirit. Unfortunately Nietzsche may be quite correct when he asserts that...

Man's highest good must be bought with a crime and paid for by the flood of grief and suffering which the offended divinities visit upon the human race in its noble ambition. An austere notion this... 48

48 Nietzsche, Friedrich; The Birth of Tragedy (Doubleday Anchor Books; New York; 1956) pp. 63-64
This idea that goodness and virtue are achieved through suffering is a phenomenological notion; a notion, which in this discussion one can only assert its possibility rather than verify objectively, its actuality. The death of another may contribute significantly to reaffirming the realization of one's own life existence. By actually killing another, we may reaffirm the understanding that we are able to go beyond the simple fear of death. More importantly we are able to impose what we have feared on others. In such a manner one may experience a sense of control over life and death and by implication one's own life.

Such a phenomenological notion may be imbedded in the role and function of ritual and sacrifice. Sacrifice may be understood as the reaffirmation of the life of the social collectivity as a whole, through the killing of one of its own members. Sacrifice is in essence a symbolic form of achieving, maintaining or reaffirming group identity.

The words form or symbolic form may be used in connection with any cultural invention of the intellect that synthesizes a situation of ambivalence.49

Sacrifice, throughout the history of religion has been offered in the following situations among others:

1) in religious rites that have as their object, the enhancement of the general welfare of the culture.
2) to avert or to lessen the effects of a calamity.

49 Sagan, Eli; Human Aggression Cannibalism & Cultural Form; (Harper Torchbooks; New York; 1974) P. 51.
3) transferrence of monarchical power.
4) promotion of the fertility of crops.
5) celebrate the construction of an important object, i.e. house, temple.
6) the casting out of sin
7) to ensure success in warfare. 50

In the majority of these categories as listed above, we must note the intimate connection that exists between the affirmation of community life through human sacrifice. As Bertalanffy has commented, men have exterminated one another in the name of...symbolic contraptions - nation, religion, democracy, communism, whatever you want - created by man's so called reason and lending a changing foil for that inter-group aggression, which without the symbolic superstructure would have remained a comparatively harmless affair. 51

We affirm life, our own life by perpetuating death. It is in defense or strengthening of their cultural-symbotic structures that societies historically, have promoted atrocity after atrocity.

At this crucial point in our discussion we may begin to understand the function of genocide as well as (and of equal importance) genocidae. Genocidae on the other hand must be seen as the affirmation of life by the limitation of one's own perception or experience of the world; by imposing death on one's own self. It constitutes the mistaking of such regres-

50 For a specific elaboration of each of the areas in detail, especially those situations where human sacrifice and cannibalism are both an integral part of the sacrificial rite see: Eli Sagan; Ibid; pp. 53-63.

sion for complete life-meaning. What fosters genosuicide? The inability of a group of individuals, who in a state of anxiety, fear or dread of the unknown (for whatever reason), are unable to generate a symbolic superstructure within which they can find the resolution to such anxiety. They are unable for specific socio-structural and psychological reasons to define in-groups and out-groups upon who they may vent their anxiety and ultimately relieve it. Genosuicide it seems is a consequence of cultural petrification. The common traits particular to human behavior caught within the constraints of a state of cultural petrification is characterized by a grasping at symbols which inhibit self-development. These symbols emphasize the subjectiveness of the individual. They do not begin to aid in relating the individual to the larger social collectivity of which he is a member. Such symbolic spheres admittedly provide for a sense of identity, continuity and personal power. However they promise no future while at the same time denying the past. These symbolic spheres provide for the subjective denial of the existing social reality. They allow for the subjective internalization of an alternative, individually constructed social reality; that is to say, a new subjective perception of one's social situation. Ultimately such symbolic spheres are detrimental to the development of the individual as a social entity; being destructive to the social-self of the individual. The occurrence and utilization of such symbolic spheres on a mass scale may be understood as symptomatic of the process of genosuicide. Drug use on a large scale is indicative of such processes.
This then constitutes a rather schematic overview as to the underlying premises of a psycho-historical and existential psychoanalytical approach which takes into account the two ontological motives of the human condition.

...the need to surrender oneself in full to the rest of nature, to become a part of it by laying down one's whole existence to some higher meaning; and the need to expand oneself as an individual heroic personality.52

Beneath these needs exists the possibility of at least three important motivational factors: the terror of death, the anxiety of powerlessness and meaningless insignificance and the desire to overcome and transcend such existential fears; to 'chase the dragon' as the Chinese opium smokers say, rather than let the dragon chase you.

52 Becker, Ernest; The Denial of Death (The Free Press; New York; 1973) P. 203.
In order that we may be able to define the nature of genosuicide as a subvariant of genocide, it is necessary to note the more typical or obvious social psychological and structural prerequisite and facilitating factors contributing to the occurrence of genocide. It is not meant to be understood here that this analysis has investigated all possible mechanisms leading to the initiation of genocide. The analysis of the various facilitating factors to its occurrence in no manner attempts to deny the existence of others.

To say that the use of opium in China during the nineteenth century is a significant illustration of genosuicide is to presuppose that we understand the specific motivational and operational techniques of genocide itself; enabling us to differentiate between genocide and genosuicide. The following portion of this discussion will constitute an attempt (though in a tentative and general fashion) to systematically define this presupposition.

In the defining of the constellation of contributory factors leading to the initiation of genocide we must begin with the fundamental prerequisite underlying many facets of human behavior—anxiety and fear. More importantly not only must we review the nature and behavioral consequences of anxiety in and of itself. Also we must be aware of those mechanisms which succeed in transforming general social anxiety into fear. It is essential to understand how fear and the objective
responsibility for fear is transferred to particular minority groupings.

Anxiety may exist at very many different levels and in varying forms. The causal basis of anxiety lies in the essential existential dilemma of the human condition — the individual or collective feeling of helplessness, powerlessness, of the anxiety of death and insignificance and the consequent need to transcend and overcome such fears. We have already considered the possibility that one of the primary human needs is the conviction of one's own sense of identity, continuity and power and that culture is the normalized channel by which such conviction is achieved and maintained. Historically however, situations of consistent strain on the cultural values of a particular system have arisen. Genocide within at least the context of this analysis will be understood as a means to achieve the symbolic reaffirmation of the complex of cultural values and norms particular to the in-group. This process of reaffirmation is facilitated by scapegoating and the often genocidal extermination of an out-group which has been accused of being responsible for the lack of social cohesion and the related anxieties and fears stemming from such a social situation.

We will assume that if the value hierarchy is threatened or is insufficiently bound together, the individual's self-worth or self-esteem is in danger of dissolution. Such a condition is a contributory force or predisposing factor leading to anxiety and loss of self-identity. Identity itself constitutes a situation where the individual experiences himself as agent-controller of his own powers. The development of aggression and/
or genocide is not necessarily assured in such instances where a group's sense of self-worth is threatened. Further, the propensity to commit an overtly aggressive act such as genocide, is determined by an intricate network of precipitory factors. This network is comprised of a synthesis of certain structural-sociological and social psychological pre-conditions of aggressive and genocidal behavior formulated by Vahakn N. Dadrian and Konrad Lorenz; including as well as certain dynamics of collective behavior outlined by (among others) Herbert Blumer.

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As Lorenz mentions in his description of what he refers to as militant enthusiasm, apart from the predisposing factor of collective anxiety, there must exist a hated enemy from whom the threat to the above 'values' emanates. This enemy, too, can be of a concrete or of an abstract nature.

Simply, an individual or group must have at its disposal an object, i.e., a minority grouping which allows for the general social anxiety to be reduced to fear and resentment. One must keep in mind, in this regard, that the existence of a hated enemy is based on the capacity to perceive or define a group as such - as an out-group.

The problem then is essentially this: How does a group, motivated by collective anxiety, come to define another group as an outside threat? What we will discuss here are the more obvious elements that might lead to such a cognitive association. Thus we refer here to the mechanisms that promote such differentiating identification.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibid; P. 272.
2. The Transition From Anxiety to Fear as Related to Elites

The first sociological factor contributing to the initiation of in-group anxiety is what Lorenz refers to as 'an inspiring leader figure'. Such a figure not only points to and defines the group responsible for such anxiety but also provides at the same time a blueprint or program of action. In short the leader focuses diffuse free-floating anxiety on a specific cause. It is here that one must recognize also, the role of language as a conceptual stimulant to aggressive or genocidal behaviour. Language itself, as it is utilized by various groupings is able to reorganize feelings and in consequence, direct general social action. Essentially it is the medium through which anxieties are objectified into overt fears.

The main dangers of language, however, is not in its separative, but in its magic, hypnotic, emotion-arousing powers. Words can serve to crystallize thought, to give articulateness and precision to vague images and hazy intuitions. They can also serve to rationalize irrational fears and desires to give the semblance of logic to the wildest superstitions...

Language itself provides the catalytic elements to, the often explosive and destructive reactions of group psychology and collective behavior patterns. Language - that which has been responsible for the expression of the creative element in man; raising him above all other forms of life has also been guilty of lowering him in the abyss of destruction and extermination; the tool of the poets and the Hitlers of history.

56 See for a more specific examination of this point; Klapp, Orrin E.; Symbolic Leaders (Aldine Publishing Co.; Chicago; 1964)
It is necessary to consider, though tentatively, the relationship of particular elite groupings to the initiation of genocidal actions. Historically, the elite stratum in most societies have been the language monopolizers. That is to say, general policy formulation, cultural definition and the guidance of social action has always been the responsibility of an elite, or an interrelated group of elites. Genocidal action must be viewed as being similarly dependent on the control of language by an elite. The suggestion that there exists a definite relationship between the prescription of social action by elites and the consequent occurrence of genocidal acts is a tentative one. Such a hypothesis is a complex and provocative subject for future analysis and clarification. The possibility of such a relationship will be considered within the context of this discussion.
3. Historically Defined Scapegoat Minorities

There is at least a second factor which must be taken into account in the explanation of the generation of in-groups and out-groups and the implementation of genocidal behavior. This contributory factor is exemplified in its operation as seen in the genocidal relationships between the Turks and Armenians during the early part of this century and in Yugoslavia between the Croats and Serbs. These are situations where one encounters a historically defined scapegoat minority. Dadrian quite clearly points out, that once a scapegoat minority has been persecuted in the history of the development of a society

...the injured person or group is disliked even more for having been the object of the aggressor's hostility, for having caused his sanguinary behavior. Later sight of the frustrator would remind him of his inner conflict and stimulate him to renewed resentment, or to an increased propensity to interpret the instigator's behavior at some later time, as frustration.58

In a sense, the feelings of guilt of previously committed atrocities may contribute to the initiation of further, more extensive atrocities in the future until there is no one or nothing left to remind the in-group of their own barbaric capabilities. The latter of the two points made here by Dadrian is of more importance in this respect.

58 Dadrian, Vahakn N.; Factors of Anger and Aggression; Op Cit; P. 415.
4. Other Conditions Contributing to the Occurrence of Genocide

Also, there must be made mention of other contributory conditions beside those which Dadrian has outlined that would contribute to the identification of a group as being responsible for the frustrations of a particular in-group. Of these factors we must include such obvious stimulants to aggressive behavior as where there exists a successful minority group which exhibits such success or which has been traditionally defined successful while at the same time the majority find themselves in an impoverished state. Not only in such situations do the majority or in-group perceive themselves as impoverished relative to this successful minority. Also they feel themselves to be in an imbalanced and unjust competitive situation with this successful minority. A condition conducive to the experiencing of resentment which may in turn catalyze aggressive and even genocidal actions. This is a tension-ridden and hatred-filled situation of which we have seen the consequences in both Germany and Indonesia.

Aggression between social groups, especially between a successful minority and a less-successful majority is more likely to be provoked by relative than by absolute deprivation on the part of the majority. The critical question for social scientists to answer is not only why some people who are subjected to gross maltreatment resort to aggressive behavior, but rather why a


60 For more specific elaboration of the concept resentment and its implications to social action see: Max Scheler; Resentment (Free Press of Glencoe; New York; 1961)
sizable majority of them acquiesce to dismal living conditions in the midst of affluent styles of life? Informal observation would indicate that discontent produces aggression not in those who have lost hope, but in those whose efforts at social and economic betterment have been reinforced; consequently they have some reason to expect that coercive action will force additional social change.  

Enduring severe privations is more likely to create resignation and dispair than aggression or revolutionary action. Discontent created by raised aspirations, by deceleration in the rate of anticipated improvement and by reduction of rewards and privileges from accustomed levels as experienced relatively by the majority, coupled with an obviously successful minority out-group may lead to aggressive or even genocidal actions against that out-group.

Additionally we must not neglect the easily identifiable differences of skin, language or cultural traits and habits; important objective distinguishing features allowing for the collective identification of an out-group by another. Such features of visibility and easy identification must be understood as facilitating factors for aggressive and genocidal actions that might occur between social groups. A group is in all probability more likely to be persecuted to the extent that it is uniquely observable or apparent. That is, to the extent that it stands apart from other groups by having many differentiating features, such as physical appearance or values and customs.

61 For a more detailed discussion of theories of relative deprivation see: Bandura, Albert; Aggression - A Social Learning Process (Prentice-Hall, Inc.; New Jersey; 1973) pp. 170-172
The last point to be made in this regard is the passivity of a group which might alternatively lead to its being recognized by an anxious in-group as a possible outlet for aggression. Such an out-group would promise little possibility of effective or forceful retaliation. The availability and vulnerability of one group as compared with another is what we may refer to as the 'leverage of power' that exists between specific groups. The passivity and defenselessness of the European Jew surely contributed to its choice as the scapegoat in the process of the development of Fascism. Moreover, we must not neglect to consider the religious history of anti-semitism as also providing fertile ground for the choice of the Jew as a scapegoat.

This then constitutes a tentative and rather narrow schematic overview as to some of the more obvious means by which the identification of out-groups and scapegoat minorities is conducted. They are means, as we say, of identification, communication and tactful logic; a logic that is, of barbarism.
5. The Occurrence of Genocide As Related to Socio-Structural and Social Psychological Inhibitions

Necessary also, for the promotion of aggressive and genocidal acts is the relative lack of inhibitions within the particular society which might deter the implementation of such acts. More simply there must exist a relative absence of socio-structural and cultural as well as social psychological inhibitions or restraints which might have the tendency to direct anger into channels other than overt aggression.

Every case of genocide is a product of history and bears the stamp of the society which has given birth to it.62 Acts of aggression would quite likely be uninhibited in their occurrence if the society in question had not adequately formulated general social sanctions and normatively accepted social constraints, or more importantly was unable to substantially enforce them. If aggression as a means of resolving inconsistencies within the social environment has an historical precedent then it will not be unlikely that this precedent will be relied upon in future situations of anxiety and fear. Such 'habitual aggression' might in this fashion acquire a value in itself as a source of pleasure and satisfaction. Providing an adequate uninhibited opportunity for the expression of aggression could also in this manner direct such a group's habitual hostile actions.

A society which provides for a rigidly patterned cultural system of values and a complementary system of institutional forces and constraints, which de-emphasize the use of

62 Sartre, Jean-Paul; On Genocide (Beacon Press; Boston; 1968) P. 57.
aggression as a means of solving social inconsistencies or provide for institutionalized, regulated non-violent outlets for aggression would of course tend to limit the possibility on the part of the frustrated group to revert to such means of absolving themselves of anxiety. It is necessary to consider the fact that the degree of adherence which the social collectivity as a whole holds and displays to the prescribed cultural norms is dependent upon the leadership of the elite grouping. This leadership includes the ability of the elite, to define whole cultural and social systems with corresponding systems of meanings and values as well as systems of institutions and social roles. Keeping this one qualification in mind it is only logical to assume that

...the greater the degree of inhibition specific to a more direct act of aggression, the more probable will be the occurrence of less direct acts of aggression. 63

We might in this sense propose that the extent of the genocidal act - both quantitatively in terms of the number of victims involved and qualitatively, in terms of the nature of the means used to commit the act(s) is at least partially dependent upon how the elite influences the cultural inhibitions which in turn influence the policies and goals of the aggressor-group generally. In accounting for the differences between the various forms of genocide we must consider these cultural-specific factors.

Also in the consideration of cultural-specific conditions lending to the occurrence of aggressive behavior we must consider

63 Dollard, John; Frustration and Aggression (Yale University Press; New Haven, Conn.; 1939) P. 40.
the function of institutions and the lack of them within the context of collective behavior. Normally, cultural activities are embodied in the structure of institutions. Social institutions embody or represent organized social activities and social attitudes. They define the social or socially responsible patterns of individual conduct usually in a broad and general sense. Individuals within society can develop and mature as social beings and personalities only in so far as they are able to reflect, 'prehend' or interpret their identity through the organized social activities and attitudes which social institutions constitute.

George Herbert Mead has pointed out that in order that the individual may develop and maintain a sense of self, it is necessary that the individual interpret his identity through the organized set of attitudes of others which he himself assumes and points out to himself.

The 'I' is the response of the organism to the attitudes of the others; the 'me' is the organized set of attitudes of others which one himself assumes. The attitudes of the others constitute the organized 'me', and then one reacts toward that as an 'I'.

The 'I' and the 'me' taken together constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The 'me' represents a definite organization of the community embodied and represented in social institutions.

We may understand that the development of the individual with a consistent personality structure is dependent upon the existence of social institutions. If the 'me' which the 'I' is

64 Mead, George Herbert, Mind, Self and Society (University of Chicago Press; Chicago, 1962) P. 175.
dependent on, is in turn dependent upon institutions which represent socially responsible patterns of individual behavior. Then the lack of institutions within a society would result in a 'me' without a source of reference; a condition detrimental to the self and to a socially integrated personality structure.

When people have impulses, desires or dispositions which cannot be satisfied or at least reflected in the existing cultural forms and institutional arrangements they are in a state of unrest. The lack of social institutions because of its negative effects on the personality structure in terms of maintaining a balance between the 'I' and the 'me' would provide for such a state of social unrest.

Their experience is one of an urge to act but of being balked in doing so; consequently the experience is one of discomfort, frustration, insecurity and usually of alienation or loneliness.  ^65

Such inner tension as experienced in a state of social unrest will express itself through random, sporadic and unco-ordinated activity. If this restlessness has a reciprocally stimulating and reinforcing effect elementary forms of collective behavior are likely to arise.

Collective behavior must be sharply differentiated from institutional behavior.

Institutional behavior characterizes groups which are envisaged and guided by the culture of the larger society. Accordingly, institutional behavior refers to activities which support the norms of the larger society. Collective behavior on the other hand, develops norms which are not envisaged in the larger society and may even modify or oppose those broader norms.  ^66

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^65 Blumer, Herbert; Op Cit; P. 66

^66 Turner, Ralph & Killian, Lewis; Collective Behavior; Op Cit; P. 5.
Genocide or at least the attempts to initiate it may often possibly be seen as a consequence of the dynamics of collective behavior. As a result of the operations of collective behavior, forms of social action may occur which may be quite contradictory to the normally prescribed forms of institutional behaviour.
6. Genocide And The Dynamics Of Collective Behavior

The last major consideration of some structural and social psychological variables which may facilitate or promote the enactment of aggressive behavior and/or genocide centers around the mechanics and consequences of collective behavior. It is essential to understand in detail the interrelationship between certain characterizing features of collective behavior as it is influenced by elites, and the occurrence of genocide. Any discussion of the prescription of social action by elites must include the consideration of the forms and mechanisms of elementary collective behavior which are often directed by elites. The elementary forms of collective behavior which we shall be concerned with here include the active crowd, the mass and the social movement. Also it shall be necessary to consider the mechanisms of collective behavior particular to each of these three forms.

Genocide is usually conducted under the auspices of a social movement. The active crowd and the mass may often constitute collective preconditions for the emergence of a social movement.

If the crowd develops a more enduring sense of group-identity and pursues a plan of action requiring more substantial activity than can be maintained through crowd conditions, a social movement is emerging.67

Likewise, when a mass becomes organized around a specific set of goals, its consequent behavior is not indicative of mass behavior. Rather it is illustrative of the emergence of a social

67 Turner, Ralph & Killian, Lewis; Collective Behavior (Prentice-Hall, Inc.; New Jersey, 1957) P. 301.
movement. A social movement is a collectivity acting within a set framework of action to initiate or resist change in the society or collectivity of which it is a part.

Social movements are likely to arise in periods of social unrest and anxiety. Such unrest or anxiety, occurs when people's desires, impulses or fears cannot be satisfied or alleviated by the existing institutional arrangements. This unrest, to give rise to collective behavior must be reciprocally stimulating, reinforcing and shared collectively. When individuals are aware of the similarity of their plight with others, social unrest is most likely to occur. Any significant socio-cultural change that results in major disturbances in the feelings, thought and normatively patterned behavior of people will give rise to social unrest. As Blumer has observed, there are three essential behavioral characteristics of social unrest:

1) the random character of behavior
2) exciting feeling, usually in the form of vague apprehensions, fears and insecurities.
3) irrationality and increased suggestibility.68

Social unrest will be defined here as a sociological variable. Social unrest constitutes a groping for solutions by individuals who are in a state of anxiety. People in a condition of social unrest are amenable to suggestions and quick to react to such suggestions. Anxiety on the other hand, will be defined here as a social psychological variable. Anxiety may be a consequence of a marked incongruity between institutions and personality structures - social unrest is a sociological condition of anxiety.

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68 Blumer, Herbert; 'Outline of Collective Behavior' in Evans, Robert (ed); Readings In Collective Behavior (Rand McNally & Co.; Chicago; 1969) P. 66.
The success of a social movement is based on the elite grouping particular to the movement:

1) to translate diffuse anxiety into fear.
2) to organize and integrate social unrest into a program of action as rationalized by an ideology with definite goals to be attained.

Genocide in itself has not usually been the goal of a social movement. It is on the contrary, the means whereby the social movement removes an obstacle, a scapegoat minority, in advancing towards the realization of a chosen set of goals. Genocide in this sense emerges as a possible course of action in the concurrent development of a social movement.

Blumer as well as Turner and Killian have observed that a social movement must 'weld' a group together with a definite sense of membership. This is what is meant by comradeship; a common sense of belonging to a group with a common cause. Also the movement must provide a sense of determination to continue in the face of difficulties, hardships or indecision. Genocide is itself a consequence of the determination of a social movement to overcome and do away with all obstacles in its path. If genocide may be seen as a possible consequence of the determination of a social movement to achieve its goals then it becomes immediately necessary to explain the dynamic development and mechanisms that contribute to the influencing of the determination of a social movement.

The emergence of most social movements is dependent on such facilitating factors as morale, spirit de corps, the charismatic leader, agitation and ideologies as well as the elementary mechanisms of collective behavior. These facilitating factors, for
the most part are in turn dependent upon the elite groups of the social movement. These elite groups provide for the rational construction, emotional translation and technical manipulation of these facilitating factors.

The emergence of a social movement and the possibility that genocide would be committed during the course of its development is dependent upon the extent the members of this movement become ardent advocates of the elite's persuasions. These persuasions would have to be directed towards convincing the members of the movement of the necessity and value in taking such extreme measures.

The planned efforts to ready people to listen to persuasive attempts and to stir them into becoming ardent advocates of such actions as genocide shall be referred to as agitation. Agitation is concerned with motivating and exciting numbers of people. Agitation does not usually propose a set plan of action. Also agitation creates, redirects or reinforces discontent. Agitation is the means whereby the mass is prepared emotionally to become a public. Such a public will be able to react at some low intellectual level to issues which are propagandized as having important consequences for them.

As Killian and Turner illustrate, the agitator

...by concealing his purpose and working through indirection, may call people's attention to sources of discontent they had but faintly sensed. He must maintain the safe appearance of a member of the in-group, a person whose loyalty to the system is not seriously questioned. 69

69 Turner, Ralph and Killian, Lewis; Op Cit; pp. 286-7
Once discontent is brought to the surface the agitator then attempts to push people to initiate social action based on their discontent. Genocide may occur as a result of this process.

Charismatic leaders also play an important part in providing the conditions necessary for the initiation of such extreme measures as genocide. The charismatic leader is set apart from the capabilities of ordinary men and treated as if he was possessed with exceptional qualities and powers. Such qualities are not available to the common person. As a result, the individual understood as possessing such exceptional qualities is treated as a leader. The charismatic leader is given unquestioning support by his adherents. The decision making process in the charismatic movement is concentrated in the hands of the leader. This frees the followers within the movement of personal responsibility; enabling them to commit actions, inclusive of genocide which under normal conditions they would not.

The emergence and concurrent development of a social movement is also dependent at the same time, upon such mechanisms of collective behavior as morale and espirit de corps. Blumer has differentiated between moral and espirit de corps. As Blumer sees it, morale provides the rational for the determination of the social movement. A social movement will often confront conflict situations. The outcome of such conflicts are always uncertain and unpredictable. As a result of its uncertain future, a social movement needs such a sense of determination provided by morale.

Elite groups usually provide this sense of confidence and determination in a social movement. An instilled sense of confidence and predictability about the outcome of a social action, initiated collectively by a movement will be referred to here as morale. Morale is a collectively shared conviction concerning the worth of the social movement's goals. It is also expressive of the movement's confidence as a whole in the eventual success of the course of action undertaken.

As Herbert Blumer has pointed out, morale may be classified into three major categories:

1) Practical morale
2) Romantic Morale
3) Sacred morale

Practical morale develops around a goal of expediency. Romantic morale develops about a goal usually depicted in heroic or glorious terms; promising prestige, wealth or power. Usually this goal is legitimized through myth, where practical consequences are neglected in the idealization of a romantic future. Sacred morale centers around a goal that is pursued from duty, divine or otherwise. The attainment of this goal is seen as inevitable.

The initiation of genocide may be carried out under the auspices of any one of these three goal-oriented forms of morale. Morale itself does not develop independently. Morale requires a prescribed rationality, whether that rationality be one of expediency, myth or duty. This rationality must be defined and

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71 Blumer, Herbert; 'Morale' in Ogburn, William F. (ed); American Society In Wartime (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1944) pp. 207-231.
articulated by the elite grouping and held as being legitimate by the rest of the movement's membership.

Espirit de corps on the other hand is the sense or feeling people have in the movement of being identified with one another in a common undertaking. The development of espirit de corps is dependent on the mechanisms of crowd behavior, structured through the techniques of, as Blumer outlines, the development of an in-group, out-group relation and the participation in formal ceremonial behavior. Both morale and espirit de corps are complimentary to one another. Both factors are required in providing for the determination that such social action like genocide will be implemented and carried through.

Espirit de corps is dependent in part on the mechanisms of crowd behaviour. Consequently it is necessary to define such mechanisms. The typical forms of interaction between people in a state of social unrest have been commonly referred to as the elementary mechanisms of collective behavior. Such elementary mechanisms include milling, collective excitement and social contagion. Milling is a condition where a number of people experiencing a condition of unrest and anxiety, begin to narrowly focus their attention on one another. As a result people are inclined to act together, under the influence of a common feeling or a common mood. The desire to exterminate another group may possibly, in some instances constitute such a common mood in a social movement. Milling could in this sense facilitate the occurrence of genocide.
The mechanism of collective excitement is able to speed up the process of milling. In a state of collective excitement the individual will tend to act less responsibly than usual.

In collective excitement individuals may embark on lines of conduct which previously they would not likely have thought of, much less have dared to undertake. Likewise, under its stress and with opportunities for the release of tension, individuals may incur significant reorganization in their sentiments, habits and traits of personality.72

In a condition of collective excitement where a social movement as a whole, held a distinctive hostile attitude towards a minority group, the possibility that aggressive action would occur would be greatly increased.

The possibilities that a social movement would commit aggressive or genocidal actions would seem even more pronounced if the social movement was influenced in its behavior by social contagion. Social contagion is the rapid and nonrational dissemination of a common mood. If the members of a social movement have a common disposition to act in a certain way; for example, to act aggressively towards a minority group

...the display of such behavior under collective excitement easily releases the corresponding impulses on their part. Under such conditions the given kind of behavior will 'spread like wildfire'...73

The emergence and development of a social movement is facilitated by the systemic interaction of such sociological factors as the agitator, the charismatic leader, morale, espirit

72 Blumer, Herbert; 'Outline of Collective Behaviour;' Op Cit; P. 70.

73 Blumer, Herbert; Ibid; P. 70
de corps and the more general mechanisms of collective behavior. These factors address themselves to the emotional receptiveness of the members of a social movement. As a result of the systemic interplay of these sociological variables, the feelings of the members of the movement begin to display a distinct level of integration and organization.

A social movement is not simply characterized by the organization and focusing of the feelings of the members of the movement. It is also characterized as having a program of social action with a definite set of goals in mind and a prescribed system of means to realize such goals. A movement has a particular program of change that it advocates and a conception of society through which it justifies that program. The conception of society through which a movement justifies its program of action has been referred to as the ideology of the movement.74

An ideology consists of an interpretation of the historical processes that have led to existing social conditions as they are experienced by the members of the social movement. The ideology of the movement also predicts the future and defines certain utopian goals toward which the movement must strive to realize. The ideology prescribes also certain courses of action to be followed in the practical securing of such goals. Thus, in this sense an ideology provides a social movement with goals as well as means to achieve those goals.

74 Turner, Ralph and Killian, Lewis; Op. Cit; P. 331
In order that the ideal utopian goals be realized some obstacle or set of obstacles must be removed or passed over. If such obstacles were not defined there would be no point for a social movement developing as the ideal goals would be immediately available. To be able to realize an ultimate good an evil must be defined and eliminated.

A movement needs enemies who threaten its success so as to marshal the determination of its members to overcome its obstacles.\textsuperscript{75}

Often a scapegoat minority is defined as being such an obstacle to the realization of the goals of a social movement. Genocide in this context may be understood as a means by which such an obstacle is permanently and completely removed. It is the means whereby the evil is eliminated; promising the inevitable realization of the idealized future as defined by the ideology of the movement.

An ideology is the rational construction of an elite grouping of a social movement. It's emotional translation is dependent upon such sociological factors as morale, espirit de corps, agitation and a charismatic leader as well as the mechanisms of collective behavior.

The adherence of the membership of the social movement to the rational ideological construction of the movement's elite is at least partly dependent on the ability and opportunity the elite has to communicate this rational ideological construction. The ability and opportunity to provide for its communication must be related to the access to the means of communication and the

\textsuperscript{75} Turner, Ralph and Killiam, Lewis; \textit{Ibid}; P. 337
technological skill which the elite has. The complete monopolization of the means of communication available to a social movement by an elite will significantly contribute to the acceptance of the elite's ideology by the movement as a whole. The monopolization of the means of communication by an elite, with a definite ideology may promote the transformation of a mass to a social movement. The occurrence of genocide must be related to such factors which take into consideration that:

1) genocide constitutes an aspect of the program of action of the movement which is rationalized and legitimized by the ideology of the movement
2) the communication of the ideology is monopolized by the elite of the social movement
3) all other expressions of opinions about the course of action which the movement could follow are either forbidden or eliminated.

The existence of such factors as these concerned with the typifying characteristics of the mass further accentuate the possibility that genocide will occur.

A mass, according to Blumer\textsuperscript{76} is characterized by the lack of opinion or policy formation provided by its individual membership. In a mass situation, fewer people express opinions than receive them. As a consequence of the arrangements of the communications systems it is difficult or almost impossible for the individual to effectively reply or answer back on questions of public policy. Most importantly in this respect, as C. Wright Mills has elaborated...

\footnote{Blumer, Herbert; \textit{Op Cit}; P. 77}
The realization of opinion in action is controlled by authorities who organize and control the channels of such action. The mass has no autonomy from institutions; on the contrary, agents of authorized institutions penetrate this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the formation of public discussion. It is within the mass situation that specific elite groups are more easily and readily able to translate collectively experienced anxieties into collectively apprehended fears. Fears which may be often related to specific scapegoat minority groupings.

Blumer explains that an individual in the mass...

instead of acting in response to the suggestions and excited stimulation of those with whom he is in rapport, he acts in response to the object that has gained his attention and on the basis of the impulses that are aroused by it...

Thus, if we may agree here with Blumer, an individual in a mass situation is more likely to respond to the dictates of authoritative symbols provided by an elite stratum than to the suggestive influences of the social collectivity with which he has little exchange.

We have outlined the basic mechanisms by which the most elementary forms of collective behavior operate in relation to the emergence and development of a social movement. In this fashion we have noted the relation between social movements and genocide. Also it is necessary to provide at least a preliminary differentiation of collective groups and their relation to

77 Mills, C. Wright; The Power Elite (Oxford University Press; New York; 1959) P. 304.
78 Blumer, Herbert; Op Cit; P. 78
the emergence of social movements. We shall be mostly concerned here with the nature of the acting crowd and the mass.

The acting crowd is a social grouping which acts on the basis of aroused impulse; acting concertedly in pursuit of a group objective. The formation of a crowd often results as a consequence of the milling process. Crowd behavior is not necessarily particular to a compact group. A nation may come to act like a crowd. The objective of the crowd is the committing of some action on an external object, person or group of persons. The individual within a crowd situation loses ordinary critical understanding and self-control as he enters into rapport with other members of the crowd. Together, all the members of the crowd are dominated by collective excitement. The crowd is easily manipulated by an elite which removes itself from the pressures and influences of the collective excitement.

Social theorists and observers of collective behavior have shown that the characteristics of the compact crowd; features of anxiety, permissiveness and individual suggestibility may also be found in the dispersed crowd as well; that is in a situation where people are dispersed over a wide area. If a crowd develops a more definite and durable sense of self-identity and pursues a plan of action requiring long-term organization which could not normally be realized by crowd conditions, then a social movement often emerges.

There exists another category of collective grouping which may facilitate the occurrence of a social movement. This grouping is what is referred to as the mass. It is an elementary and
spontaneous collective grouping. The membership of the mass consists of a large variety of individuals with differing social origins. It is composed of anonymous individuals, loosely organized and having a low level of communicative exchange.

In its simplest form the mass is a number of separate individuals each responding independently to the same stimuli in the same way.

The mass constitutes a diffuse collectivity; that is a collectivity which members are dispersed. A definite process of uniformization takes place in the mass. The responses of a mass are uniform and stereotyped. This means that members of a mass are constantly prepared to interact because they have a common set of stereotyped interests, a common universe of discourse, common preoccupations and have common symbols and meanings, values and norms at their disposal for communicating with one another.

A mass does not normally interact and is without any sense of group feeling. Usually it has a common focus of attention and a common response. It is a product of the intensive division of labour and systems of mass communications which are definitive characteristics of modern post-industrial society.

Summarily, the mass is a widely dispersed, heterogeneous anonymous aggregate. Its large membership live in widely differing circumstances and are unaware of one another though they are aware that they are part of a mass. Without a common set of customs or traditions, the mass is relatively unorganized. For this reason it is open to suggestions. The factor of suggestibility furnishes the possibility for elite groups to develop

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79 Blumer, Herbert; Op. Cit; P. 77
ideological systems and lead the members of the mass towards goals and initiate means to realize such goals, which normally would not be considered by the people comprising the mass.

When a mass becomes organized around a specific set of goals its consequent behavior is not indicative of mass behavior. A social movement may consequently emerge.

Because the mass is unorganized, the decision-making process is left to those who are organized and can exercise corporate power. Those groups who have influence over the systems of communication may greatly influence the determination of the opinions and attitudes held by the mass. If such groups holding monopolistic control over the means of communication and disseminate a hostile attitude towards a particular minority grouping, it is quite possible that the whole mass will elicit such an attitude. When such negative attitudes and opinions of a minority grouping are then concurrently organized; transforming the mass into a social movement, the possibility for genocidal action is increased.

At times, mass behavior comes to approximate that of a crowd, especially under conditions of excitement. At such times it is likely to be influenced by excited appeals as these appear in the press or over the radio - appeals that play upon primitive impulses... traditional hatreds. 80

An elite who maintained prejudiced and aggressive attitudes towards a certain out-group and was able to gain control over the means of mass-communications might gain a relative degree of adherence within the mass, to their aggressive or even genocidal suggestions.

80 Blumer, Herbert; Op cit; P. 79
Collective groupings, inclusive of the crowd and the mass as well as the collective behavioral mechanisms particular to them, may be organized under the auspices of a social movement. The emergence of a social movement is further facilitated by such collective mechanisms as moral, esprit de corps, agitation and the charismatic leader. The social movement itself is rationalized by the ideology of the elite of the social movement. Genocide may constitute a consequence or means in the process of the realization of the goals of the ideology of the social movement.
Further to the understanding of genocide is the role and function of the scapegoat. Genocide allows for the denial of objectified fear and confused self-identity both on the part of the in-group as a whole as well as for its individual members. The role of the scapegoat is central to this idea.

Suffice it to say, simply, that the scapegoat gives maximal conviction to man, and draws men together, by carrying off in his flesh and blood the symbolic meaning of the social fiction. This is how man fights the fictional nature of these meanings: by grounding them in the hard, living organic things in the physical world. It is this that gives the most convincing merger and closure to his ambivalent strivings.

Scapegoating is a means of action whereby the solidarity of the in-group is redressed in a fashion. It provides for at least the conviction to the in-group that the disruptive force (whatever it actually was is beside the point) has been thwarted in its development. Scapegoating also aids frequently in instilling in the individual, a sense of collective solidarity with other members of his group, community, nation or race who together share a common hatred of a common enemy. The members of the in-group see one another as a consequence of their collective aggressive actions as individual, heroic contributors to a more general heroic action - genocide.

Becker, Ernest; Beyond Alienation - A Philosophy of Education For the Crises of Democracy. (George Braziller; New York; 1969) P. 190.

See also in this context:
1) Klapp, Orin E.; Collective Search for Identity (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.; 1969) Part II
Historically, the idea has persisted that guilt, misfortune and general bad luck may be shifted from one individual to another, from one social group to another. Gordon Allport sums up this idea quite simply when he observes that...

Nowadays we are likely to label this mental process projection. In other people we see the fear, anger, lust that reside primarily in ourselves. It is not we ourselves who are responsible for our misfortunes, but other people. 82

The accusations and feelings of revulsion expressed against the scapegoat minority may symbolize the dissatisfactions with personal inadequacies as experienced by the in-group. When a minority attracts strong feelings of hostility rather than merely mild disparagement we call them scapegoats. Different types of scapegoats 'take away' different types of guilt. Some scapegoat minorities are blamed for a wider variety of evils than others. Such 'all-duty' scapegoats usually constitute religious, ethnic and racial groups. These groups have a definite permanence and stability and are easily given a set status and are stereotyped by a prejudicial in-group.

Definite and permanent categories are needed to provide for definite and permanent hate. 83

The frustrations experienced in the in-group often generates aggression. This aggression often becomes displaced on relatively defenseless scapegoats. The displaced aggression is rationalized through permanent categories defined by projected stereotyping.

82 Allport, Gordon W.; The Nature of Prejudice (Addison-Wesley Publishing Co; Palo Alto, California; (1954) P. 244
83 Ibid; P. 246
The blocking of goal directed behavior in groups, frequently creates hostile impulses in the members of such groups.

In other words, a 'free-floating', undirected hostility may result from frustration when the actual frustrating agent cannot be attacked; and the social context often favors displacement of this hostility onto minority - group members.\footnote{Simpson, George Eaton and Yenger, J. Milton; Racial and Cultural Minorities (Harper and Row Publishers; New York; 1965) P. 53.}

Such hatred must be rationalized. In order to rationalize discrimination toward a scapegoat minority the prejudiced in-group looks for justifications. To get rid of any sense of doubt and to rationalize his belief, the prejudicial individual categorizes the individual members of the minority group by stereotypes. In short, scapegoating constitutes the displacement of the frustrations experienced collectively by the in-group. Displacement is facilitated by the use of stereotypes. One must review not only the frustration that relates to such a process of displacement but also the 'stimulus qualities' of the scapegoat.\footnote{See Cowen, Emary; 'The Effects of Mild Frustration on the Expression of Prejudiced Attitudes, 'in Journal of American Social Psychology (Jan, 1959) pp. 33 - 38.}

Genocide may be the ultimate consequence of extreme forms of scapegoating. Displacement of anxiety on a scapegoat minority could allow the personal guilt for such anxiety as experienced by the in-group, to be transferred to the scapegoat. The in-group in this sense has defined the cause for its anxiety. By exterminating the group which is responsible for such anxiety, the in-group would remove permanently, or so they would believe,
the source of such anxiety. Genocide might be understood as the last and final stage of the processes of scapegoating.

Through genocide the life of the in-group is purified. It is redefined now with a sense of solid membership and belongingness through the removal or outright extermination of another group. Genocide contributes to the affirmation of the feeling of heroic power where one is not a victim of uncontrollable forces but instead a manipulator and instigator of the forces of death and annihilation. Genocide is the final statement to the idea that one may indeed symbolically deny the victimization inherent in death and in fact be an active participant in its allocation to groups other than one's own. The act of genocide proves the heroic superiority not only of one's own group but of one's own self as well. We triumph over the objective inevitability and subjective anxiety of death by instead of falling victim to it, prescribe and distribute it. If participants in the destruction or extermination have sensed a common feeling of heroics this should not seem incomprehensible nor antithetical to what we know of the human character.

As participants in destructive processes of action, men often feel a relief of guilt. They are purified and redeemed from evil and fear. More importantly it is they themselves who are responsible for the direction and control of such redemption.

By eliminating a group which has been defined as being active contributory agents to social imbalances and inconsistencies, the community as a whole is symbolically redeemed from the possibilities of social disharmony in the future. By killing
the other, who had been deemed responsible for the perpetuation of specific, collectively experienced social frustrations, a group frees itself symbolically from such frustrations in the future. In this manner, the aggressor in-group purifies itself of all negative aspects of existence. Death affirms life.

Here also a dynamic conception shows up a more immediate fact one easily overlooks from the metapsychological point of view. The death fear of the ego is lessened by the killing, the sacrifice, of the other; through the death of the other, one buys one's self free from the penalty of dying, of being killed. 86

This is the existential proposition to which we must relate the functional role of genocide in the transcendence of human fear, anxiety and helplessness. Genocide is only one result, a negative one, of the striving for immortality endemic to the human condition. It is a method of symbolically perpetuating and expanding the self.

The concept of immortality striving has been defined and elaborated upon by such theorists as Robert Jay Lifton and Ernest Becker. Their approach is consistent with Otto Rank's emphasis upon man's continuing need 'for an assurance of eternal survival for the self.' Together these theorists understand the need of immortality as being an aspect of man's symbolic life.

The sense of immortality, then is the individual's connection with man's general past and future. 87

Men, as these theorists assert, in the face of inevitable biological death need to maintain an inner sense of continuity with


87 Lifton, Robert Jay; Revolutionary Immortality (Random House; New York; 1968) P. xiii
what has gone on before and what will go on after their own
individual existences. Ultimately the need for a sense of
immortality is based on the fear of death. As Becker points out,
of all things that motivate man and human groups
...one of the principle ones is...terror of death. 88

The sense of immortality, as Lifton sees it, is much more than
the denial of death. It is that which binds each individual to
a group and events removed from him in place and time. The
sense of immortality constitutes the individual's sense of
involvement in the historical process; providing him both with
a sense of continuity between his past experiences, his present
situation, and the possibilities of the future.

Without this unending sense of attachment to aims and
principles beyond the self, the capacity to feel at
home in the world cannot be sustained. 89

Cultural projects constitute a dynamic and ongoing complex of
meanings, values and norms. When individuals are led to believe
in a cultural project they often may come to feel a sense of
attachment to the human collectivity of which such cultural pro-
jects form an important and complementary part. They feel a
sense of immortality which enables active social life to go on
and develop further.

According to Lifton and Olson the sense of immortality may
be expressed in five different modes or categories. These
categories include the biological, creative, theological, natural

88 Becker, Ernest; The Denial of Death (The Free Press; New York;
1973) P. 11.

89 Lifton, Robert Jay and Olson, Eric; Living and Dying (Praeger
Publishers; New York; 1974) P. 76
and experiential. Our concern here in relation to our discussion of genocide is with the biological mode of immortality.

The mode of biological immortality is never purely biological as such. It is experienced both emotionally and symbolically. It transcends and goes beyond one's own biological family, to include the particular social group of which one is a number. Thus it is important to note here, that a sense of biological immortality is only ensured when the continuity of the group of which one is a member is neither threatened nor hampered in any way.

Membership within a group constitutes, according to Lifton, a buttress against the terror of death and personal insignificance. Biological immortality as achieved through group membership may also provide the individual with a sense of self-worth and self-esteem. The group in short comes to represent the self-worth and heroic character of its individual membership. Any threat to the continuity, identity or authenticity of the meanings, values and norms held by the group may consequently constitute a threat to the individual's own sense of immortality and self-esteem. A threat to the group of which one is a member is also a threat to the existence and identity of the individual. The weakening of the group's image of self-esteem and legitimacy allows the individually held fears of death free reign.

Within the existential psychoanalytical perspective defined here by Lifton and Becker; genocide would constitute a particular means of immortality striving. It would be a means whereby

90 For a detailed discussion of these various modes of immortality see; Lifton, Robert Jay and Olson, Eric; Ibid; pp 76 - 90
the continuity, identity and authenticity of the in-group is assured. Genocide committed against a minority grouping perceived as a threat could possibly be seen as a means of preserving the in-group's sense of self-worth and self-esteem. The denial and removal of all threats to the group is necessary for the assurance of a sense of immortality for its constituent membership. Genocide would serve to reaffirm the identity of the in-group; denying the personally held anxieties of death and identity-loss and also promising an unthreatened sense of immortality.
Turning away now from a consideration of the precipitory and predisposing factors for the occurrence of genocide, we must review the advent of an interrelated phenomenon - genosuicide. The use of opium in China during the latter half of the nineteenth century shall be used here as a case study. As has been elucidated, one may understand genocide, as a means of addressing symbolically the existential dilemma of men as related to anxiety and fear and the counterposing necessity to strive for immortality in the symbolic denial of death and the affirmation of identity. Also, the actual initiation of the act of genocide is dependent upon a combination of sociological and social psychological facilitating factors.

Much light can be shed on the understanding of genosuicide by looking at those points in history where acute collective anxiety existed and yet where the necessary facilitating factors leading to aggressive and/or genocidal actions did not exist or at least were inhibited for various specific reasons. These historical situations are characterized by a social condition of anxiety but no means are available that permit the formation of out-groups and in-groups and related inter-group hostility, aggression and violence. The phenomenon of genosuicide might very well be related to sociological instances where the development of aggression between social groups is impossible. These are instances where all other alternatives of immortality striving and the symbolic redressing of socio-symbolic disequilibrium
are blocked. Further, this preventive blocking of alternatives may be due largely to the cultural stagnancy and structural rigidity of the social system itself. Such a social condition is in turn a consequence of the character and structure of the elite stratum as related to the society in question.
1. Sorokin's Systems and Dynamics of Systems

In order that we may, more comprehensively conceptualize the operations and processes of genosuicide it is necessary that we view such processes within a conceptual framework. For our purposes here we shall utilize the conceptual framework of Pitirim Sorokin which takes into consideration the multi-leveled componential structure of socio-cultural interaction. In this respect Sorokin's analytical framework has four distinct aspects. The first consists of the subjects of interaction and their properties. This includes the recognition of the qualities (homogeneous or heterogeneous) of the interacting individuals and the various characteristics of their interaction. The second aspect consists of the three components of interaction: meanings, values and norms. The third aspect deals with the vehicles or conductors of interaction, inclusive of both physical, natural and symbolic vehicles and conductors. The fourth aspect is comprised of the interaction between society, culture and personality as being the 'indivisible aspects of the socio-cultural manifold.' For the purposes of this analysis it is at least necessary to provide a brief account of the developments of the generic socio-cultural phenomena, as inclusive of meanings, values and norms and the nature of their interaction with the personality and societal structure.

As Sorokin explains, meanings, values and norms superimposed upon the biophysical properties of interacting persons form an essential component of socio-cultural phenomena. Meanings may be classified as comprising the contextual meanings of events, etc. Meaningful values are that which define the worth of
something, such as the economic value of land. Norms are standards like the norms of laws. These three classes of meaning are inherent aspects of meaningful socio-cultural phenomena. As Sorokin notes, any meaning in an unrestricted sense is a value, while any value presupposes a norm of conduct in respect to its realization or rejection.

Hence the terms 'meaning, value or norms' will be used interchangeably to denote a general class of meaningful phenomena superimposed upon the biophysical properties of persons and objects, actions and events. 91

This analysis here, shall utilize such terms and concepts in a similar context.

Culture, as defined by Sorokin comprises the totality of the meanings, values and norms possessed by the interacting persons and the totality of the vehicles which objectify, socialize and convey these meanings. Any study of socio-cultural phenomenon or interaction must recognize the indivisible trinity of the componential structure of socio-cultural interaction. This trinity is comprised of:

1) Personality as the subject of interaction....
2) Society as the totality of interacting personalities, with their sociocultural relationships and process...
3) Culture as the totality of the meanings, values and norms.... 92

None of these phenomenon should be investigated without considering the other members of this trinity and the concurrent processes of interaction between them. This thesis is structured on the essential recognition of this fact.

91 Sorokin, Pitirim; Society, Culture and Personality (Cooper Square Publishers; New York; 1962) P. 47.
92 Ibid; P. 63
The interaction between society, culture and personality and between meanings, values and norms must be seen within a larger context. The larger context is comprised of the interaction between various supersystems, systems and subsystems. A knowledge of socio-cultural rhythms such as which the hypothesis of this thesis constitutes, aids the sociologist in unraveling the relationships between such systems and subsystems of a given culture. Moreover, a knowledge of sociocultural rhythms enables one to meaningfully comprehend the multilinear static causal-meaningful relationships of coexistence of many of the systems of a total culture.

An understanding of socio-cultural rhythms permits us...

...to make a number of deductions concerning the general character of many systems and subsystems of such a culture and their mutual relationships.93

Socio-cultural rhythms allow the sociologist to analyze the static componential of the system in a given culture. Secondly a knowledge of socio-cultural rhythms gives the sociologist an idea about the multilinear dynamic causal-meaningful relationships of the systems of a culture. An analysis of sociocultural rhythms provides the sociologist with an understanding of the constituent elements of the systems in a culture as well as the direction of the change of all the systems and of their inter-relationships in the process of change.

93 Ibid; pp. 688-89
2. Cultural Petrification and Elites - Some Concepts

A social level of existence where one may observe the inability of a society to generate new methods of alleviating internal or external strain has been referred to by Pitirim Sorokin as cultural petrification. Sorokin explains, in reference to the decline and extinction of major cultural systems and subsystems that...

Both their extinction and their temporary decline have been due primarily to the deterioration caused by the gamut of its variations, having..., so to speak exhausted all its real values, a social system necessarily ceases to be creative. Hence it becomes a liability rather than an asset, and is eventually eliminated. It may be quickly supplemented by a new creative system, or it may linger for a while in a petrified 'state', to the detriment of the society and the total culture to which it belongs.94

Within such a petrified state as Sorokin defines here, there exists only the imitation, and repetition of previously defined systems of thought and methods of creative activity particular, for example, to art. Originality and innovative thinking are deterred from their actualization. The structural constraints are formulated and imposed by the social system itself and the elite groupings particular to it. These elites constrain and channel cultural creativity and originality along traditionally recognized avenues of conceptualization and expression.

In this manner the traditional social arrangements and distribution of power among specific groups is rigidly maintained.

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94 Sorokin, P.; Ibid; P 711
Such socio-economic systems because of their inflexible sterility, perpetuated in most instances by an elite grouping are unable to generate or give rise to new modes of thought and action as viable alternatives to this self-contained stagnacy. Within such social systems...

An originally creative style of art comes to be imitated and reimitated, with increasingly finical and purile variations until it degenerates into an empty, meaningless triviality.  

Existence in such petrified states is reified. There exists no possibility for self-reflection or innovation in the development of alternatives to such processes of reification. 

The potentiality for development and progress of any socio-cultural system historically, may be related to the ability of its elite groupings particular to the society in question to articulate realizable goals towards which the social collectivity as a whole can direct its energies. The ability of elites to articulate and prescribe relevant systems of meanings, values and norms which will be adhered to by the public is in turn dependent upon the elite's ability to perceive the social reality and the ever-changing demands defined by the evolving social situation. Such an ability, on the part of an elite, is related to certain structural features of the composition of the elite groupings themselves. Chief among these characterizing features are such factors as the circulation of the elite; the social distance between the elite and the rest of society's population, the horizontal integration of the elite grouping inclusive of the competition between elites and the nature of the cultural ideals manufactured by the elite.

Ibid; P. 711
For the sake of analytical consistency, we shall rely upon Mannheim's evaluatory schema of elite composition, selection, inner structure, social distance and cultural ideals. Mannheim's schema is consistent, detailed and unambiguous in its intentions and approach. To this schema shall be added a number of other important factors both contingent and contributory. They are related nevertheless to Mannheim's main analytical categories. Essentially, Mannheim's schema provides an outline of the most important considerations that must be kept in mind in conducting a systematic examination of elite groupings. His evaluatory schema of elites includes the following major analytical categorizations:

A) The mode of selection by which elites are recruited from the mass
B) The inner structure of various elite groups, their mutual relationships and their relation to society at large
C) The social distance between elite and mass, understood primarily as the function of elite consciousness
D) The cultural ideals produced by various elite groups

3. Principle of Immanent Change and the Principle of Limits

We have posited here already, the possibility that there exists a determinate relationship between cultural petrification and certain characterizing qualities of elite structures. This dynamic interrelationship must be placed within a larger theoretical contextual whole. This larger theoretical framework will consist of an understanding of the inherent systemic causes of cultural change as elucidated in Sorokin's Principle of Immanent Change of Systems and Supersystems and the Principle of Limits. These principles are outlined in Sorokin's substantive work, Society, Culture and Personality.

The condition of cultural petrification is itself a pre-condition for socio-cultural change or alteration. Cultural petrification is further understood to be a consequence of an elite structure with particular qualities. Both the developmental process of culture and the features of the elite structure, exemplify the understanding, as illustrated by Sorokin's Principle of Immanent Change that

...the cause of the changes in a social system is inherent in the system itself. \(^7\)

Cultural petrification constitutes a transitional phase from one socio-cultural supersystem to another. Cultural petrification in this sense is indicative of social change and is

\(^7\) Sorokin, P.; Op Cit; P. 696
immanent to the socio-cultural system in question.

Cultural petrification combines two essential characterizing traits:

1) an exhaustion of all the socio-cultural variations possible to the culture. When these variations are completed the creative possibilities are exhausted.

2) stubborn perpetuation of this socio-cultural condition by an elite grouping unable to revitalize it and which noticeably contributed to that condition in the first place.

Though not central to the immediate purposes of this analysis it is necessary that we at least recognize the interrelationship that exists between the characterizing qualities of elites, the condition of cultural petrification and Sorokin's Principle of Limits.

Sorokin's Principle of Limits establishes the understanding that there exists only a limited number of possibilities for the basic variation of systems.

Since every empirical sociocultural system is finite and since there are limits beyond which any further change renders it unrecognizable and unidentifiable, therefore it is capable of only a limited number of basic variations or types of change. Having exhausted these types in a new setting, with different secondary characteristics.98

What Sorokin is saying here is that the exhaustion of a socio-cultural system may be inevitable. Any socio-cultural system is characterized by a definite constellation of meanings, values and norms. These develop through three basic stages of variation: emergence, growth and the realization of their potentialities and finally decline. Where they finally reach a state of 'clear-cut crystallization' the meanings, values and norms tend

98 Ibid; P. 701
...to become static, hieratic and repeated endlessly in their hieratic form. Such hieratic petrification of the system means complete cessation of its creative growth. Becoming petrified it ceases to be the center of the creative forces, less and less successfully

However, this developmental process of variation and the final realization of a socio-cultural complex of ideas must be correlated with certain contributory factors.

This thesis will attempt to point out that the Principle of Limits which states in part, that the complex of ideas particular to any socio-cultural system, inherently limited in its possibilities of variation, is a determinant consequence of the elite structure of the society in question.

The number of variations which a specific complex of ideas, meanings and values may take is based on the imaginative qualities of those groups of individuals responsible for the genesis, development and application of those ideas and values. Often this group has comprised the elite grouping within many societies. The number of variations of a set complex of ideas within a socio-cultural system might well be a function of, among other things, the imagination of the elite group particular to it.

The imaginative capabilities of the elite may be in turn, a function of certain characterizing structural and ideological features of the elite grouping. These features would include the mode of selection of the elite, its inner structure, its social distance from the mass, and the cultural ideals which it produces. If all these characterizing qualities are restricted then so possibly will be the elite's imaginative capabilities.

99 Ibid; P. 655.
As a result the number of possible variations of the original complex of meanings, values and norms particular to the socio-cultural situation in question will be finite.

Mannheim has recognised this possible interrelationship between elite structures and the imaginative capabilities of elites. He observes that the more an elite comes to represent and determine the activities and life chances of a collectivity the more its thinking becomes unified and rigidly binding thereby ensuring stability within the collectivity as a whole.

The more (the elite) makes itself the exponent of a thoroughly organized collectivity...the more its thinking tends towards 'scholasticism'. It must give a dogmatically binding force to modes of thought which formerly were valid only for a sect...The necessity of having to present a unified front to outsiders, compels this transition.

Mannheim also notes that with increased concentration of power within a social collectivity the denial of imagination and intellectual innovation usually becomes much more pronounced. As power tends to become concentrated in the hands of an elite so too then does the possibility increase to maintain ideological uniformity.

...the concentration of power within the social structure will be so pronounced that uniformity of thought and experience can be imposed upon the members of at least one's own caste with greater success than heretofore.

In this fashion it will be shown here that the Principle of Limits is not an autonomous developmental process. Quite on the contrary it may well be contingent upon particular

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101 *Ibid*; P. 10
structural and ideological qualities of the elite groups.

It should be emphasized nevertheless that Sorokin's Principle of Limits provides a valuable critical dimension to the observation, comprehension and abstraction of repeated uniformities in the process of socio-cultural change and of established socio-cultural rhythms, regardless of the approximate or variable nature of such uniformities.
4. Genosuicide and the Ch'ing Dynasty

During most of the nineteenth century, China - The Middle Kingdom, could well be described as a petrified system, as defined by Sorokin. A condition of petrification is evident in the nature, content and form of the arts, in social and political organization and in the philosophy of the period. It was a socio-cultural system which could not provide for, or generate forces that would allow for change within the social system; being unable to adapt to internal and external strains. What China and the elite stratum during this period did provide was mechanically repeated dogmas, highly organized and complex administrative machinery, material opulence and patterns of intrigue and decadence within the circles of the Chinese ruling elite.

Related directly to these trends of decay was the conduct of Chinese society. It was a society displaying distinctive symptoms of acute tensions tending toward anomie. These anomic strains resulted from certain inconsistencies existing between traditionally defined cultural norms and the inability of the typical social arrangements (both institutionalized and uninstitutionalized) to allow for the realization of such norms.

In essence, the Chinese population was barred from the normative channels of meaningful cultural participation. They were unable to find self-meaning or achieve a sense of symbolic self-esteem. The mass of Chinese people were unable to find a route of escape from existential anxiety through the traditional patterns of behavior and social organization as defined by Chinese culture generally, the Chinese official-gentry specifically. Essentially then, owing to the rigid, stultifying histor-
ically defined social and cultural arrangements and modes of adaptation and the characterizing features of its elite grouping, the Chinese elite itself was unable to prescribe or define effectual innovations to this state of normlessness and anxiety. The inevitable consequence of such a situation - genosuicide. This process is exemplified by the use of opium which was provided and made readily available by an external exploiting agent - The British East-India Company.
5. Genosuicide and the Processes of Civilization

The use of the term genosuicide as presented here must be more explicitly defined as to its relation to the processes of the growth and decay of civilizations. Possibly Koestler's biological analogue, which he utilizes to explain the biological evolutionary consequences of over-specialization in the animal kingdom can be utilized in explaining the genosuicidal consequences of over-specialization and cultural petrification as these processes occur within socio-cultural systems.

The essence of this process which I have described is an evolutionary retreat from specialized adult forms of bodily structure and behavior, to an earlier or more primitive, but also more plastic and less committed state—followed by a sudden advance in a new direction. It is as if the stream of life had momentarily reversed its course, flowing uphill for awhile, then opened up a new stream bed. 102

Koestler describes such a process as 'drawing back to leap.' As Koestler understands it, over-specialization in nature reaches such a point where it inhibits any further development of the biological organism in question. A creature that is over-specialized in bodily structure and function is restricted in its ability to adapt to a changing natural environment. The processes of cultural petrification may be analogous to such a biological condition. Cultural petrification is symptomatic of a condition of over-specialization where the ability of the elite to generate any further innovative cultural inventions in contending with a changing socio-cultural reality is exhausted.

102 Koestler, Arthur; The Ghost In the Machine (The MacMillan Co.; New York; 1968) P. 167
A retreat from such an overspecialized and petrified cultural condition might possibly allow further development and the generation of original ideas in a new direction albeit a destructive one. The processes or modes of behavior particular to genosuicide may be viewed as being at least partially indicative of such a retreat. Thus genosuicide must necessarily be seen within a wider framework of the historical evolution of civilizations and as a category of social behavior within the context of those objective processes.

Genosuicide must be viewed as a subsequent retreat from the traditionally defined patterns of values and systems of action of a socio-cultural system. It is symptomatic of popular attempts to contend with a social reality of cultural stagnancy and structural inflexibility. Secondly, such a process of cultural regression via genosuicide, though providing a means of achieving self-actualization and self-meaning for anomie individuals by creating a new, although a dysfunctional and death seeking symbolic universe of meaning is ultimately self-defeating. By self-defeating we refer here to the fact that it neither generates nor provides specific means for the further growth and development of the individual. The symbolic universe of meaning which this form of regression establishes, and of which genosuicide is symptomatic, allows for only the immediate subjective denial of anxiety. It does not permit further development past the level of the symbolic gratification of identity-loss. Such regressive behavior does not constitute in itself a social force; that is to say, it does not alter or modify the source of the
anxiety. Such behavior only denies the symptoms of anxiety. This point shall be more specifically elaborated upon when we consider the consequences of drug use and the potentialities that its use affords to the further development of the human self.

It is important to conceive of the operations of genosuicide as an intermittent stage within the developments of socio-cultural change. Change that is, which is inclusive of the transition of a culture to an alternative form. These specific forms of culture will be illustrated in the utilization of Sorokin's typology of socio-cultural systems of which basic categories are the sensate, ideational and idealistic forms. Sorokin's typology of cultural ideological supersystems constitutes a superrhythm. He asserts that all highly integrated ideological cultures may be classified as being either sensate, ideational or idealistic or as being mixed variations of these basic categories. As Sorokin understands, all cultural supersystems are built upon the major premise concerning the ultimate nature of true reality and value. It is upon this premise that these three cultural ideological supersystems differ.

One of the vastest ideological supersystems called ideational is built upon the premise that the true reality and true value is the super-sensory, super-rational God. This would include 'Tao', World Soul, Brahman, etc. The sensory reality is viewed within such an ideological cultural supersystem as being a mere illusion; neither real nor important. The scientific, philosophical, artistic and ethical systems of the
ideational ideological supersystem reflect and articulate this major premise. Brahmanistic and Buddhistic India or Christian medieval Europe would be examples of ideational supersystems.

Other ideological cultural supersystems view that the true reality and true value is sensory. These cultures are defined as sensate. They establish

...that beyond the reality and value perceived by our sense organs there is no reality and no value. 103

Modern post-industrial society may be characterized, according to Sorokhin as a sensate ideological cultural supersystem. The philosophical scientific, legal, ethical and artistic systems elaborate or explore the empirical world of the senses. The sensate supersystem, like other supersystems, integrates the many subsystems of meanings, values and norms that are current in our culture, into a consistent whole.

Lastly, other highly integrated cultures assume that the true reality and value is partly sensory, partly rational, partly supersensory and superrational. Confucian China, as we shall see from our analysis here, constitutes an idealistic supersystem.

This superrhythm of the idealistic, sensate and ideational is not definitively invariable and certain in its stages of succession, as Sorokhin repeatedly emphasizes.

103 Sorokhin, Pitirim A; Op Cit; P. 320
Therefore we cannot be certain that after the decline of the present supersystem an idealistic or eclectic phase will not come, nor even that the whole of western culture will be destroyed. 104

The hypothesis of this thesis as it has been stated here, may be viewed as referring to a subrhythm operating within this larger superrhythm as defined by Sorokin. The point of this analysis will be to estimate whether and to what extent this subrhythm plays an effective role in the transformation of such supersystems.

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104Ibid; P. 688.
In looking at anxiety or more generally at socio-symbolic disequilibrium there exists at least two means of alleviating it or providing for a reinstitution of a state of socio-symbolic equilibrium.

...there are thus two different ways in which a group adjusts its relations to its environment. One is the path of inner modification of the group: (a) voluntary and (b) imposed; the other is the path of transformation of the external, mainly biophysical environment. 105

The choice of either the route of inner modification or the overt transformation of the social environment is at least related to the specific condition of a socio-cultural system. The nature of the socio-cultural complex of values, norms and prescribed patterns of behavior determine which particular means are to be used.

Erich Fromm's statement in reference to individual personal reactions to identity anxiety, fear or the disruption of one's value hierarchy is pertinent here. It relates to the nature of the conditions determining what mode of adaptation an individual, or for that matter a whole social group might choose in responding to a condition of general anxiety.

...The objects of irrational destructiveness and the particular reasons for their being are only of a secondary importance; the destructive impulses are a passion within a person, and they always succeed in finding some object. If for any reason other persons cannot become the object of

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105 Ibid; P. 445.
an individual's destructiveness, his own self easily becomes the object. 106

It is from this observation of Fromm's that we see the close correlation between sadism and masochism. The differences between them are rooted, not in a differing motivational base, but in the range of possible responses to that motivational base of anxiety and fear.

The case where injury to the object is positively cathected is a further complication of aggressiveness, it may be called sadism. 107

Within any theory of aggression it is necessary to note the conditions which would facilitate or inhibit the actual realization of aggressive behavior. The opportunity for the initiation of aggressive behavior, which may lead in turn to genocide is dependent upon a number of distinct and definite socio-structural and social psychological conditions which combine in a cultural-specific fashion. The question is, what happens when the overt modification of the biophysical environment, a process of which the actions of aggression and genocide are part and parcel, are not positively cathected; that quite on the contrary, they are negatively sanctioned?

Genosuicide is the consequence of a situation where aggressiveness generally and the formation of in-groups and out-groups are negatively cathected. Also genosuicide is related to the situation where all other possibilities to achieve a sense of


social cohesion, cultural stability and anxiety-loss are negated. This results in the internalization of destructiveness; that is destructiveness turned inwards towards the self. The hypothesis to be presented here is that such a condition of negative cathecting and the lack of all other alternatives in the quest for the denial of anxiety is synonymous with a situation of cultural petrification; a testimony to a socio-cultural systems's stagnancy and lack of a dynamic equilibrium. Anxiety may also be a consequence of the complete flexibility of a socio-cultural system. The tempo of change within any major socio-cultural system refers to the quantity of change rather than the quality of change that occurs within it. A condition of cultural petrification is characterized by the complete lack of absence of qualitative socio-cultural change. In some cultural situations however, there might exist a high tempo of quantitative change; such as change having no noticeable effect on the prevailing condition of cultural petrification. For example, in a sensate ideological cultural supersystem, existing within a condition of cultural petrification there may occur a high turnover and variation of the techniques and methods of presentation of the major art forms. These techniques and styles will have no effect on the essential character and content of these art forms. Such content is constantly repeated, imitated, while only its outside structure and the means by which it is communicated, is altered. A high rate of tempo within a petrificied cultural situation would undoubtedly, in most instances, have the effect of
preventing the individual even further, from identifying meaningfully with his cultural environment. In this case not only would the meanings, values and norms be dysfunctional with the existing social reality but their tempo of quantitative change would make it even more difficult for the individual to identify with them. Further and central to our purposes here, the causes of anxiety themselves are rooted in the cultural stultification and structural inconsistencies of a rigidified socio-cultural system which is in turn a function of particularized elite interests. The specific unavailability of other forms of the expression and negation of anxiety, fear and identity-loss are necessary conditions for genosuicide. It is exactly this feature of unavailability which stands as the essential and basic criteria for the judging of the cultural petrification of any socio-cultural system.
Anxiety and frustration may produce much more than the behavioural consequences of genocide and genosuicide. In fact, anxiety and frustration may be viewed as the great dynamo of social life responsible not only for human destructiveness but for human creativity as well. Destructiveness itself, often constitutes a quest for immortality and the denial of anxiety. Creativity is also representative of the quest for immortality and the denial of anxiety.

One may feel a sense of immortality in this mode through teaching, art-making, repairing, construction, writing, healing, inventing, or through lasting influences of any kind on other human beings - influences that one feels enter into a general human flow beyond the self. 108

Creative immortality is the opposite of biological immortality. Biological immortality is based on the individual's ability to submerge his sense of self into the herd. It is the herd which provides the individual with a sense of self-esteem and an heroic identification of the self.

Creative immortality on the other hand is based on the separation of the individual from the herd. The person in this case attempts to fashion, consciously and critically his own framework of heroic self-reference in the denial of existential anxiety.

108 Lifton, Robert Jay and Olson, Eric; Living and Dying (Praeger Publishers; New York; 1974) P. 77.
The key to the creative type is that he is separated out of the common pool of shared meanings. There is something in his life experiences that makes him take in the world as a problem; as a result he has to make personal sense out of it. This holds true for all creative people... it is especially obvious with the artist. 109

Creativity presupposes the rejection of the 'collective solution' in the individual's attempts to establish a sense of immortality in the face of anxiety.

The herd, in reference to biological immortality, justifies the existence of the individual. The artist who has rejected the herd must provide his own justification. He must provide his own sense of 'me'.

His creative work is at the same time the expression of heroism and the justification of it. 110

While destructiveness, even genocide may often be an attempt to justify or ensure the immortality of the herd, so too does artistic creativity often accomplish the same end. Social life as a whole may be understood as comprised of the constant tension that exists between the processes of destructiveness and creativity. The denial of anxiety and the quest for immortality constitutes the common link between these two processes; providing a continual impetus to the evolvement and development of social life.

109 Becker, Ernest; The Denial of Death (The Free Press; New York; 1973) P. 171

110 Ibid; P. 172
CHAPTER IV. GENOSUICIDE AS RELATED TO OPIUM USE IN THE CH'ING DYNASTY

In order to comprehend the occurrence of genosuicide in China as related to opium use there in the nineteenth century, we must deal in an historical fashion with its use prior to as well as during the British opium trade. Also we must analyze the Chinese social, institutional, organizational and elite arrangements and relationships as they relate to the maintenance of the predominant cultural values and norms. In short, we must determine the level of consistency between the socio-cultural structural arrangements and the cultural meanings, values and norms. Additionally it is important to review the degree to which the isolated and self-sufficient characteristics of traditional Chinese civilization contributed to its inevitable petrification. In such a fashion not only will it be possible to determine the causal roots of anxiety as it is related to a general state of cultural petrification in the Ch'ing Dynasty. Also it will be possible to gauge the intensity of such anxiety and to comprehend the means utilized to alleviate it. Anxiety is used here in a rather general sense, to be defined more explicitly once the relation between the institutional and organizational arrangements and the corresponding cultural values and goals in China have been revealed in detail. In assessing anxiety, one must systematically analyze the constraints or inhibitions to the development or expression of overt means of aggression in the denial of anxiety. In this manner it is possible to determine the actual conditions and reasons...
that led to the initiation of general acts of genosuicide through opium use. Lastly it is essential to consider the British role in China in precipitating the act of genosuicide through the monopoly supply of opium.
1. Sociology and Historical Analysis

Historical analysis which will constitute much of the foregoing analysis is a necessary and fundamental complement to sociological inquiry and theory construction. Sociological theory itself is founded upon perceived interrelationships within complexes of historical data. Nevertheless it is important that the sociological investigation impose an interpretive framework on such historical sequences of events; noting the implications such events hold for the continuity of social organization and conduct at the given time. Also it is important to note the consequences which such historical sequences hold for the future.

The task of the historian and the sociologist are not antithetical but mutually interrelated. The relevance and accuracy of the sociological inquiry and the resulting theoretical constructions are dependent upon the objective accuracy and representativeness of the historical data. It is the maintenance of such accuracy and representativeness for which both the historian and the sociologist must assume responsibility.
2. The Traditional Use of Opium in China

The history of opium in China is a relatively long one. The opium producing poppy was first brought to Western China by the Turks and Arabs in the late seventh or eighth century. The drug up until the fifteenth century, was taken as a medicine. It was used as a practical aid in the cure of dysentery where it was given usually in its raw form and swallowed. The Spanish in 1620 introduced the habit of smoking opium mixed with tobacco, to the Phillipines and from there it soon quickly spread to China. The use of opium between 1620 and the late eighteenth century was minimal; being in most cases restricted in its use to young men of wealthy families. 111

Max Weber in describing the traditional cultural habits of the Chinese, noted their general abstinence from any type of intoxicating habit, inclusive of alcohol and drugs.

As regards the use of toxics the Chinese belong to the relatively sober peoples...Frenzy and orgiastic obsession were divested of charismatic value attaching to sacredness and were only considered symptomatic of demonic rule...In the bureaucracy, traditionally, nothing was allowed that might bring the psyche out of its equilibrium. 112

Opium is both a medicinal as well as a therapeutic agent. Its principle alkoloid (morphine) relieves pain, represses emotional distress and relaxes the mind. Persistent opium consumption is accompanied by certain physiological effects inclusive of a slowing down of the heart and respiration, an irregularity of

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111 For more specific description of this period see Li, Tung-I; A History of Modern China (Oriental Publications; Dartmouth; 1970) pp. 37-40.

basic body functions and a decrease in body weight not to mention its habit forming nature.

The smokers paid heavily for their hours of dreams and ecstasies. Continued use of opium sapped the will and enfeebled the body, and the hardened smoker suffered pitifully when deprived of his supply. The great danger lay in the difficulty of smoking moderately. Most smokers found that they needed a continuous increase in their supplies, and there were few examples of people who had freed themselves from the vice...113

The detrimental effects of prolonged opium use on the person became quickly known in China. As a result, in 1729 the domestic sale and consumption of opium was prohibited by Imperial Edict.

113 Holt, Edgar; The Opium Wars in China (Dufour Editions; Pennsylvania; 1964) P. 67.
3. Britain and the Opium Trade

Although small amounts of opium were harvested in many parts of Asia, India was the chief producer of the drug where it was used for international trading. But as of the 1770's no one single government had the desire, the necessary marketing organization, or the political and naval resources to develop new and profitable markets or to internationalize the Asian drug trade on a large or worthwhile scale.

It was Britain's move to colonize India that dramatically changed the dormant situation of the opium trade. Warren Hastings, in 1772 was appointed governor of the territory of Bengal in India. His most urgent and demanding task was to find and establish a dependable and profitable source of tax revenue. Warren, acting the part of a colonial administrator, proceeded to sell the concession that granted the buyer the exclusive rights to oversee opium production, buy the harvest and deliver the product to the British opium factory at the port of Calcutta. There it was auctioned off to wholesale merchants for export. The British administrator of Bengal brought the trade in opium within that area under the monopoly of the East Indian Company in 1780. The Company in this fashion became the largest merchant of opium in the world.

During this early period of opium production, competition for British-supervised opium in the Bengal, Benares and Patna varieties, came mainly from Malwa opium which was grown in central and north-western Indian states not directly under British rule. But during the early nineteenth century, the colonial
government gained control over most of the routes and ports used for shipping Malwa opium. This gave them the power to tax and thus regulate Malwa exports. By this time, the British East India Company had the complete monopoly of the production and sale of the drug. 114

China's Policy of Isolation

The development of the opium trade in China itself must be understood by way of considering China's policy of isolation and her relative economic self-sufficiency. It is within this framework that we must realize the nature of Chinese society at the time as constituting a largely closed and self-maintaining type of social system. It was exactly the closed nature of the socio-cultural system particular to the Ch'ing Dynasty, its rigid and inflexible determination to exclude foreign influence and eliminate internal disorder, which was a definitive contributing element in providing for the cultural petrification of this social system.

Arnold Toynbee has emphasized the role and function of the 'external factor' or external influence in the maintenance of a society as a viable and progressive system of human organization.

In prose we may put it that the function of the 'external factor' is to supply 'the inner creative factor' with a perpetual stimulus of the kind best calculated to evoke the most potentially creative variations. 115

It is exactly such external factors which the Chinese ruling elite towards the end of the Ch'ing Dynasty, were so determined to exclude. The relations between the Chinese and British during the whole of the nineteenth century must be viewed, at least partially in this context.

Early Western contacts with China had been considered by the Chinese court as new episodes in a long history of conflict with whom they referred to as 'the barbarians'. During the early half of the eighteenth century, Christian missionaries were admitted to, and given free conduct in the whole of the interior of China. As a result, Western scientific learning such as mathematics, astronomy and geography began to win a measure of acceptance. In time the missionaries threw this advantage away by arguing among themselves as to the relation between Christianity and the indigenous Confucian cult centered upon ancestor worship. Finally, when the dispute was decided upon by the Pope himself, the Chinese Emperor considered it an incursion and violence upon his undisputed universal authority over all of his subjects and in 1724 forbid the teaching of Christianity in his kingdom. 116

China was left again after 1724 with the system of Confucian thought which was to become both ineffectual, stagnant, systematically impoverished and inconsistent with the real world of the Ch'ing Dynasty; that is inconsistent to the practical possibilities of realizing its basic norms of conduct and virtue. In 1757 also, foreign trade was strictly limited as to where it could be carried on within the Empire. The Ch'ing government felt that the number of ports where trade was carried on was too extensive. They were afraid that these places would become infected by foreign and barbarian customs. Systems of trade regulations were established, drastically limiting the number of}

ports of trade as well as the conditions of such trading. The lack of foreign secretary and also a foreign office was indicative of China's determination to preserve her isolation. The absence of any accepted procedure for making contact with the Emperor or his advisors was an exasperating and humiliating feature of the Chinese administration as it was experienced and perceived by foreigners.

The mummified and isolated nature of the Chinese Empire was a consequence of the Chinese conviction that the Confucian way of life and thought stood at the very apex of the development of human civilization. The industrial revolution and the vast advances in Western science had passed China by. All the Chinese knew or thought they knew was that China was itself the Celestial Empire, the Heavenly Kingdom, which was portrayed on Chinese maps as the central country of the world. Knowing little of the West or what to expect of it, China's ruling elite applied to it the ancient theory of tributary relations as it would to any other foreign interest group. This is an ancient concept where the Middle Kingdom was conceived of as the center of civilization and that the Chinese Emperor (the Son of Heaven) actually represented all mankind. The Chinese expected that all nations of the world should in turn recognize this fact and pay homage.

The Chinese theory of state...was that of universal empire. The foreign rulers who wished contact or trade with the empire should first enroll as tributaries, accept investiture, send envoys to perform the kowtow. As European

117 Li, Tung - I; A History of Modern China; Op Cit; P. 23.
contact increased the Ch'ing court persisted in the effort to fit western nations into this traditional and outmoded tributary framework. 118

It was also irritating, from the point of view of Western Commercial interests to view how they were humiliated by being classified as barbarians and to have to conduct trade in such an irregular manner. All foreigners were limited to a single port and to transacting business with one single government appointed agency—the Co'hong. The Chinese, prior to 1801, believed themselves immune to foreign influence and that the control of the situation lay in their own hands.

Thus what we view simply in this historical situation is a self-sufficient China trying to maintain that self-sufficient isolation despite all odds. Where the possibilities of 'external factors' emerged to add new life to the system, they were quickly and firmly rejected. A rejection which ultimately left China dependent upon her own innovative potentialities, which as we shall see were rigidly dominated by its elite stratum—the literati.

Marx was quite correct when he prophetically wrote...

'Isolation having come to an...end by the medium of England...dissolution must follow as surely as that of any mummy carefully preserved in a hermetically sealed coffin, whenever it is brought into contact with the open air. 119

The worlds and world views of Britain and China were obviously mutually opposed. If the circumstances had not altered, this

118 Teng, Ssu-yii and Fairbank, J.K.; China's Response To The West (Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1965) P. 18.

119 Comments by Karl Marx on Chinese affairs in letters he wrote from London to New York Daily Tribune in the 1880's as cited from Holt, Edgar; The Opium Wars In China (Dufour Editions; Penn.; 1964) P. 11.
abnormal relationship perhaps might have been sustained. Britain, however, because it was undergoing extensive industrial changes, was no longer able to put up with her past relationship with China. Out of internal economic necessity, Britain was compelled to conduct a course of commercial expansion. The friction that arose between Britain and China at various levels of commerce and diplomacy were merely illustrations of a more fundamental underlying problem—expansion versus containment. The opium trade was an indispensable vehicle for facilitating British expansion.
5. Disorder, Disruption and Crisis in the Ch'ing Dynasty

It is important not only to consider the development of cultural petrification as related to the isolation of the Chinese Empire but to note also the manifestations of petrification in the internal rigid, inflexible and stagnant modes of social organization and cultural practices of Chinese society. To consider, at a realistic level both the complicity of Chinese officials in the opium trade itself and the rapid spread of opium use in China after its introduction by the British, one must take into consideration the overall decay and decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty. In such a fashion it will be possible to trace the causal roots of the anomic condition experienced by the Chinese population at large, as a consequence of such decline.

The Ch'ien-lung period (1735-1796) was a pivotal period in the transition from prosperity to decline in China. Such decline was greatly encouraged by Emperor Ch'ien-lung who was extravagant in his tastes and habits and noticeably negligent in his official duties. A direct consequence of this emperor's reign was that the vast number of officials within the complex Chinese bureaucracy became as equally corrupt and negligent as well as intriguers for position and power. Such habits became deeply ingrained in the officials' way of life. Ch'ien-lung as it is said 'stood in the shadow of his forefathers' spending untold amounts on courtly extravagances. Military expenses, as a result of several Imperial ventures against roving bands of bandits and the putting down of an increasing number of rebellions in the interior, permanently depleted the treasury.
There were also other problems, much more devastating in effect than overspending.

...partly because of the introduction of such new crops from the West as maize, sweet potatoes and peanuts - China's population surged from perhaps 100 million in 1600 to about 300 million in 1800. 120

As a direct result of the rising level of population, the standard of living had generally declined. The numbers of unemployed and idle all over China increased at a phenomenal rate daily, as the population outran China's resources.

The old regime of the Manchus that had been at its height of power in the eighteenth century could not effectively respond to such new strains on the social system and would inevitably dissolve in their inability to maintain power and control. The Ch'ing Dynasty of the Manchus faced intensive challenges from within and from without. Outside of the negative effects of population growth, new ideas and techniques began undermining the traditional conduct and direction of the Confucian social order. Government corruption and mismanagement, inaction and inability to cope with internal strain and dissent resulted in the emergence of popular widespread discontent, rebellion and general anxiety. Banditry and coastal pirate activities developed into major problems and threats to social stability. Hundreds of bandit organizations and secret societies were established. Rebellion in the interior emerged again and again, each time more violent than the other.

In 1781 the Moslem revolt occurred in Kansu Province. Thereafter there were frequent revolts in the North West. By 1795 there had been uprisings in areas of three separate provinces: Szachuan, Hunan and Kwachow. Also there was the White Lotus Sect uprising (1796-1804). Gathering strength in local outbreaks of the 1830's, growing discontent erupted in the infamous Tai-ping Rebellion which wracked South and Central China for fifteen years costing perhaps 10 million lives.

Simultaneously, North China was ravaged by roving bandits called the Nein rebels. Again the Moslem Chinese rose in a separate rebellion. The Ch'ing government with support of such leaders as Tseng-Kuo fan, who rallied to defend the crumbling Confucian social order, managed at great expense in lives and materials to put down such rebellions.

To the existing deterioration and impoverishment of the country had been added the demoralizing exploitation by foreigners. China was gradually deprived of her military means of defense. The intense development and concentration of capital in the area of the trading ports proceeded at the expense of the economic development of the hinterland. Foreign intervention, exemplified in the Opium War of 1839-42 and Anglo-French military 'expeditions' in 1856-58 and 1859-60 and the sway of foreign customs and commerce in the coastal cities began to effectively undermine the structure of the Chinese social system. Such internal dissention and strife did not prevent the empress dowager, Tz'u-hsi on one occasion to spend twenty million ounces of silver intended to be used to build a navy, in financing the building
of a palace garden. 121

Essentially then, the Chinese empire, The Heavenly Dynasty, was beginning to fragment. Bandits and rebels openly defied the law and the complacent obedience to traditional Confucian customs. Pirates were a constant threat to shipping. The government administration was rife with corruption and intrigue for power and profit. The great bureaucracy which had sustained China for so long had lost its grip when these various crises arose to disrupt China's traditionally self-maintaining order.

121 Sources that may be referred to in providing a more detailed understanding of these developments of which it is beyond the scope of this discussion to provide;

i) Li Chien-nung; The Political History of China (Van Nostrand; Princeton; 1956)


iii) Latourette, Kenneth Scott; The Chinese, Their History And Culture (MacMillan; New York; 1964)

iv) Teng Ssu-yii & John K. Fairbank; China's Response to the West - 2 vols. (Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1954)

v) Fairbank, John King; The United States and China (Harvard University Press; Cambridge; 1958)

vi) Bland, J.O.P. and E. Backhouse; China under the Empress Dowager (Tippincott; Philadelphia; 1910)
6. The Cultural Petrification of the Ch'ing Dynasty

Not only were there elements of disorder, disruption and crisis within the Ch'ing Dynasty at this time, but we must not neglect to omit in our general observations the growing cultural rigidity and stagnancy as portrayed by the character of the governmental, intellectual and artistic pursuits. The stagnation to which the Ch'ing Dynasty had been reduced can perhaps be traced to a number of contributory factors. As a minority group, ruling over a large and extensively populated area, the Manchus found in the Neo-Confucianism of the Sung School a useful instrument of government. Confucianism had provided for the right of the 'superior man' to rule and the duty of the inferior to obey in order that the underlying basic common cultural goal of virtue-jen, would be realized by all. As a result Confucianism, to which all of China adhered and had done so for almost 2000 years, was used by the Manchu rulers to prevent sedition and threats to their power and to stability of the nation generally. As it has been noted...

The Neo-Confucian concept of China's cultural superiority and centrality tended to encourage ethnocentrism and disdain toward outside peoples and foreign ideas. Complementary to such disdain for originality and outside ideas was the civil service examination which already corrupted by the M'ing, became more rigid and formalized under the Ch'ing. To discourage independent thinking the government carried out a literary inquisition where a large quantity of books were pro-

hhibited while many critical scholars were suspended at the same time.

The Manchu's sought to stultify the minds of the scholars by allowing them to engage in only the compilation and copying of classical literary and philosophical works.

The best that the intellectual life of the K'ang Hsi and Ch'ien Lung periods had to show for itself was the Han Learning, and that was directing its energy not toward the giving birth of new ideas, but discovering what the forefathers had thought and done during the great creative centuries before the Han and the Ch'ien. 123

It was the Chinese state that killed all artistic, scientific and technological invention in China during the Ch'ing Dynasty. An atmosphere of routine and stagnant traditionalism and immobility in which innovation or creative initiative not demanded or sanctioned in advance by the Manchu court, was regarded with hostile suspicion and prevented from being recognized. Such a cultural atmosphere is hardly conducive to the extension of original knowledge or more importantly to the realization of jen.

In the defining of the relation and responsibility of the Chinese elite structure to the initial genesis and maintenance of the conditions of cultural stagnation which characterized the Ch'ing period, we must begin with a short account of how particular groups of people founded the Ch'ing Dynasty. In addition one must come to understand the relation that the founding group, the Manchus, had with the Chinese population; being almost in a sense foreign conquerors. There exists the distinct possibility within the context of the conclusions of our analysis that the social order and stability prescribed by a dominant Mandarin elite with distinct Manchu affiliations may be seen as being synonymous with a state of cultural petrification.

The early 1600's was the beginning of a new age for China. Western European explorers, traders and missionaries had begun to arrive by sea in large numbers bringing with them new socio-cultural orientations. At the same time, the Russians were moving towards Manchuria. These groups were to exert major influences on the course of history in China. Apart from such external threats to the traditional complacency of Chinese socio-cultural existence was the simultaneous occurrence of a major internal transition.

The Ming Dynasty, which came into power in 1368, had long since passed its zenith and entered a state of rapid decline, beset with problems usually associated with the end of a 'dynastic cycle' - eunuch
domination of the court, moral degradation, political corruption, intellectual irresponsibility, high taxes and famine. 124

Within this same period (1628-1647) two highly organized and aggressive rebel bands under Chang Hsien-chung and Li Tzu-ch'eng overran the greater part of the country; causing widespread social misery and unrest. These Manchu bands had arisen to challenge the dynastic decline of the Ming. The Manchus finally were able to establish a new dynasty in 1644. Thus the Manchu's reign over China proper, grew out of an 'episodic' military conquest at a time when the Ming Dynasty was disintegrating.

War between the Chinese and Manchus who were aided by Mongol allies and Chinese deserters lasted from 1600 to 1659 when the last Ming claimant to the throne fled from Yunan to Burma. The first Manchu emperor, Chun-chih's (1644-1661) was mainly concerned with the military subjugation of the empire during the course of which the scholars of the country either submitted to his demands or fled. Relative social stability developed under the rule of K'ang-hsi (1662-1722) and Yung-chen (1723-1735). It is only during this short-lived period that there occurred some form of socio-cultural development.

K'ang 'hsi...was keenly interested in Chinese culture and gave privileged treatment to the scholars of the gentry who came forward. A rapid recovery quite clearly took place. 125


125 Eberhard, Wolfram; A History of China (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1960) P. 272.
These disturbances of the last few years that had passed had rid the Manchu's of their worst enemies - the formidable rival Ming intellectual cliques. Also the gentry had become more cautious in their behavior to the peasants and bribery in government for a time was largely stamped out. Finally the empire had been greatly expanded and brought under forceful control by the Manchus. Together, all of these factors aided in the stabilization of the regime of the Manchus.

It was at this time that Ch'ien-lung came to the throne, a young man of 24 who was destined to rule officially for sixty years. The Manchus had gained power over China not as a result of their military superiority but rather owing to China's weak and crumbling internal situation. The question that must be answered at this point of our analysis, is how was it that the dynasty could have endured for so long under the Manchus even though they were militarily restricted in numbers? It is here that we must take into consideration the role of elites; that is to say the Chinese literati who were responsible for the socio-cultural containment and ultimate socio-cultural petrification of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

The early Ch'ing intellectual world was split into two sections. The Manchu government officially sponsored the Sung School of Neo-Confucianism as it was taught in the 11th and 12th centuries by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. Chinese officials who served in the government and scholars who wished to do so, attached themselves to this 'Sung learning' as a kind of state philosophy. The Ch'ing rulers used Neo-Confucianism as an
instrument to win over control of the intellectuals, the traditional ruling class of China, and through them they gained power and control over the whole of the Chinese population. K'anhsı's Sacred Edict of Sixteen Maxims, a required reading for all subjects, was full of the Confucian ideals of obedience, duty, morality and propriety.

The task of the government, it was reasoned, would be facilitated if everyone followed these maxims and if the scholars and officials would set an example for the rest of the empire. 126

Thus Neo-Confucianism, at least its orthodox interpretation was a necessary and valued complement to maintaining social order. As a result the Manchu rulers forbid any attempts to reinterpret the Confucian moral code.

Ch'ien-lung intended from the outset of his rule to follow the lead of his father in permitting only an orthodox interpretation of the Confucian texts. This orthodox interpretation soon degenerated because of its self-contained unreflexive nature. It tended merely towards abstract discourse and metaphysical argumentation. The practical aspects of Confucianism were neglected. Students drifted in an abstract and sublime realm of the philosophy of Mind (hsin) and Nature (hsing). To pass the civil service examination and win official appointment they had to memorize over a long period of years the Encyclopaedia on Human Nature and Rational Principle. In this way only the officially prescribed interpretation would be then permitted to be utilized in influencing public policy formulation by the civil service. Philosophical orthodoxy in this sense must be

126 Hsu, Immanuel; Op Cit; P. 105
seen in relation to the conservatism of cultural development, which the government officials, trained in such orthodox interpretations of the Confucius tenents were, without doubt an active contributory force.

In order to preserve the orthodoxy of the Confucian tenents upon which the social stability of the Ch'ing Dynasty rested, the Manchu ruler Ch'ien-lung had often to resort to coercive acts of censorship. It was Ch'ien-lung himself who carried out a great literary inquisition of any literature guilty of a moral-liberalistic interpretation of the governing rules of conduct, loyalty and obedience particular to the Sung School of Neo-Confucianism. The edicts issued against such social critics as Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, marks the beginning of a phase of cultural regression that was to gain momentum as the years passed. It points the way to an almost house to house search throughout the empire for the books in question, accompanied by a demand for their delivery to the capital for burning. As for the kind of literature involved nothing was spared: short stories, romances, plays, poetry, letters, essays, encyclopedias, direct commentaries on the classics as well as historical accounts of the Manchu conquest.

Ch'ien-lung, in brief was a despot. For all the numifence of his gifts to literature, he stands accused before the bar of public opinion for his open interference with the independence of the scholars of his day, for his deliberate falsification of history, for his malice towards a score of authors...and for his repeated burning of hundreds of books, woodblocks of many of them included. 127

It may also be assumed that for a generation, in acute form, and

127 Goodrich, Luther Carrington; The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien Lung (Paragon Books; New York; 1966) P. 6.
a century or more in lesser degrees, many of the more innovative of the authors and poets of this period in China held themselves in check, so as not to incur the displeasure of the ruling house or run the risk of an accusation of disloyalty. This obviously constitutes a serious loss of ideas & talent. Most importantly it was a loss that was distinctly enforced and in some instances coercively initiated by a ruling elite stratum of Chinese society.

It was also Ch'ien-lung who had set the precedent for corruption within the official circles of government administration and the military. Ho-shen, the chief advisor to Ch'ien-lung appointed it is felt as a result of Ch'ien-lung's senility and degeneration of judgement was himself chiefly responsible for setting this precedent for the development of open corruption, intrigue and extortion within the Chinese bureaucracy. 128 The influence of Ho-shen spread quickly. There was corruption at different levels within and without the capital, among civil as well as military personnel. The Bannermen, the Imperial bodyguard developed licentious habits and became totally useless as a military force. The Chinese Green Standard army became rampantly irregular in the practice of its official duties and lost much of its earlier fighting spirit. Military defense of the frontiers was neglected. The habits of luxury within the circles of the ruling elite, the Mandarins, contributed to moral

degeneration and to a general decline of the dynasty. Ch'ien-lung's six trips to the south cost at least 20 million taels. His Ten Complete Accomplishments were made at great cost to the Chinese state (approximately 120 million taels). These massive expenditures and the general trend toward luxury which he had inculcated in the empire set the machinery in motion for great financial difficulties in the future.

With the death of Ch'ien-lung the grip of the Manchus began to loosen. Between him and his successor Chia Ch'ing was an enormous gap in character and capacity and the decline continued...Court intrigue, concubine meddling and eunuch politics entered, the unfailing signal of decay. Corruption increased. Official discipline relaxed...Exploitation and oppression by officialdom became more callous...

Thus as Ch'ien-lung's reign drew towards its final conclusion, China was experiencing the beginning of a dynastic decline characterized by official corruption, a degraded military and fiscal imbalances. Westerners began to intensify their bid to open China to trade and diplomacy.

Summary

We have to this point in our analysis examined the general 'cultural climate' of the earlier periods of the Ch'ing Dynasty. Within this examination we have noted how cultural stagnancy or more aptly, the prevention of cultural innovation by the Manchus in terms of their refusal to allow the revision and reinterpre-

129 Hsu, Immanuel; Op Cit; P. 52
tation of the Confucian tenents was a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of power by the Manchus and as a source of legitimization for their position as a dominant elite. Such orthodoxy was often maintained by utilizing such extremes of coercive action as book burnings. Also and equally as important, we have reviewed the development of corruption and general instability within the circles of government and the military. Simply, we have examined in a rather generalized fashion some major prerequisites for the dynastic decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Keeping these general characterizing qualities of the cultural climate of the Ch'ing period in mind we must now examine, using Mannheim's evaluatory schema, the specific characterizing features of the Chinese literati in relation to such categories as circulation, inner structure, social distance, and the nature of the cultural ideals which such an elite has produced. We shall be in a more realistic and viable position to deal with the possibility that elites in the Ch'ing Dynasty constituted a major contributory force in maintaining and perpetuating a condition of cultural petrification.
1. The Mode of Selection by Which the Mandarin Elite Has Recruited From the Mass

In China during the Ch'ing period the highest worldly rewards of the society were all integrated into one ideal career pattern - office of the Imperial bureaucracy. Office holding was both a source of prestige as well as a very important and major source of income. Those who gained office could be sure of acquiring considerable wealth and many officials made great fortunes. The high officials within the Chinese civil service are referred to as Mandarins.

They were the guardians, the promoters, and representatives of an ethical system based on the tenents of Confucianism which provided the rules of society of man's relation to man. 131

The Mandarin gentry or literati were the holders of academic degrees obtained in the government examinations. The possession of these degrees set the gentry apart from the common people, gave them a privileged position in society and the right to serve as government officials. In theory, their education in the Confucian classics were supposed to give the gentry the knowledge, practical skills and social character necessary to exercise authority over other men. The degree was the legal certification of this assumed qualification.

The degree was nothing more than an objective manifestation of an accepted ideal; the ideal of education as the instrument of intellectual and moral superiority which specific individuals

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131 Chang Chung-Li; The Chinese Gentry (University of Washington Press; Seattle; 1955) P. xiii
with talent could acquire. Such an instrument would qualify its holder for moral leadership. This was a Confucian version of Plato's philosopher-king.

It was the degree alone that established the status of a member of the gentry. The degree therefore drew a clear line between gentry and commoner - a much clearer line in fact, than can be usually drawn in any attempt to delineate social classes. 132

The gentry of imperial China were a distinct social group. They had definite and popularly recognized political, economic and social privileges and powers and led a special style of life. The gentry stood apart from the large mass of commoners. Primarily, they dominated the economic and social conduct of all Chinese communities. The position shen-shih or gentry was gained through the acquisition of a title, degree or official rank which automatically made the holder a member of the shen-shih group. The letters, grades and degrees were meant to indicate the holder's educational standing.

The upper gentry had a distinct advantage over the lower gentry groups. Members of the upper gentry were either acting officials or were qualified for the holding of office in the future. Members of the lower gentry had yet to purchase office or pass higher examinations. The gentry of nineteenth century China had a definite set of privileges which placed them distinctly apart from the rest of Chinese society.

The Chinese gentry derived its position not from landed estates, but from its educational monopoly...

132 Chang, Chung-li; The Income of the Chinese Gentry (University of Washington Press; Seattle; 1962) P. xiii.
The gentry held a monopoly of government offices. As Max Weber has noted for more than two thousand years this group of gentry or literati had been the ruling group in China. It is also important to realize that...

The gentry did not only exercise the controlling function in the economy. They also played their part in that part of it which was left to individual enterprise. In an agrarian economy...land was still the common form of investment. Many—though not all—of the gentry were landowners. Other possibilities of individual economic activity existed in the fields of trade, credit and banking.

The center of the Chinese power structure was the absolute monarch. From the monarch power was entrusted to the hierarchy of officials. It should be clear now why the gentry being a class of people living on privileges were anxious to enter into officialdom. If they were not in alliance with the power hierarchy their position as landowners would have been threatened.

On the other hand the bureaucratic Chinese state depended on the gentry for social control and management and to provide for its administrative staff. While on the other hand the state placed an institutional check on the gentry through its control over admission to this dominant group. This was accomplished by making admissions to the official-gentry positions dependent on a state-controlled examination system with fixed quotas.

133 Ibid; P. XIV
135 Op Cit; P. XV
136 For a detailed discussion of this point see: Fei, Hsiao-Lung; 'Peasantry & Gentry: An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and its Changes' in American Journal of Sociology; Volume LII (July 1946 - May 1947) pp. 1-17.
This institutional check was paralleled by an ideological control which forced the members of the gentry into a constant preoccupation with the tenets of the authoritarian aspects of Confucian beliefs. The gentry's relationship to the state was thus of a dual nature, sustaining it and controlled by it. 137

In this context the social origins of the Mandarin official-gentry should be emphatically noted.

A major and significant aspect of this elite career model in China was that legally, recruitment to it was open to virtually all males in the society on the achievement basis. Even though all males, whether they be peasants or from a gentry family, were allowed to compete on an equal basis however not all males had the same access to the objective requirements of social mobility - money, leisure, family, social influence and tutors. As a result, the sons of peasants competed at a decided disadvantage with officials' sons. The Chinese youths acquired their education in any way accessible to them. Some who could not afford a teacher, would study under their own direction after laboring in the fields during the day. Others would be taught in the more expensive secondary schools by a talented and well-informed graduated teacher. The very rich utilized the services of a tutor.

It should not be surprising from this fact that elite circulation; that is the absorption of a high level of individuals from the lower strata of Chinese society was relatively restricted. This is exactly the conclusion that Robert Marsh

137 Chang, Chung-Li; The Chinese Gentry; Op Cit; P. xvii
draws after an intensive and exhaustive analysis of Mandarin elite circulation in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

Because a large number of the Manchus in our sample were sons of other descendents of the imperial family, nobility, tribal chieftains, and high hereditary officials, they rose higher in the bureaucracy and held higher rank posts longer than both Chinese from official-elite families and Chinese from commoner families in our sample. Of those officials who received degrees in the examination system, the proportion from Chinese official family backgrounds was far greater than the proportion of official families in the total population. 138

The examination system as a whole then, had definite limitations as a mobility channel for the Chinese commoner. If we consider this fact critically and relate it to the potentialities of cultural development within the Ch'ing Dynasty, the implications appear quite negative in relation to the realization of those cultural potentialities.

The fact is, that what we view here constitutes a process of intensive restriction to vertical mobility as related to the opportunities of the common mass of Chinese to raise themselves to a higher situation.

By vertical mobility is meant the relation involved in a transition from one social stratum to another. 139

The Chinese Mandarin government was a government of restricted circulation. We must recall what has been observed in our own considerations of the implications which such restrictions to elite circulation holds for cultural development.


139 Sorokin, Pitirim A.; Social & Cultural Mobility (The Free Press of Glencoe; New York; 1959) P. 133.
But if instead the governing class opens its doors only to individuals who consent to be like it, and are indeed driven by their ardour as neophytes to exaggerate in that direction the already harmful predominance of certain residues is carried further still and the road to ruin is thrown open...it acquires nothing to replenish its own inner strength. 140

It has already been maintained that the literati functioned as guardians of the traditional Confucian moral teachings. This was one of the main aspects of their role in Chinese society - the expression and definition of the Chinese cultural tradition. The official-gentry elite was actively engaged in teaching illustrating and representing in their own life conduct, the moral principles of jen. Generally then, we have a situation where not only were the Chinese ruling elite from the time of Ch'ien-lung confined to an orthodox interpretation of the Confucian tenets. Also new and original ideas necessary for cultural innovation available from the insights of lower class members of Chinese society, were structurally restricted by a social system enforcing a distinctively restricted access to elite positions. Elite positions in Chinese society were available only to those individuals with an upper class background and the corresponding opportunities for the appropriate training for the examination. In this fashion the Chinese literati distanced itself from a relevant and realistic objective understanding of Chinese social reality. By excluding lower class elements from its ranks the official-gentry forfeited some of its resources for change and adaptation.

Any stratum of society that systematically prevents admissions from other strataums of the social collectivity of which it forms a part, ultimately isolates itself from any real comprehensive understanding of the social collectivity as a whole. Their world view as a result becomes a partial one. Thus, the Chinese elite who were responsible for cultural guidance and cultural definition and formulation and which at the same time was self-perpetuating, relatively closed, isolated and ideologically-rigid could never hope to articulate and initiate cultural directives that would be necessarily relevant to satisfying the requirements of an ever-changing social reality. Such irrelevant social directives could not provide impetus to further cultural development. The final consequence, at least in the case of the Ch'ing Dynasty of such a lack of elite circulation and restricted access is cultural degeneration and petrification.

Coinciding with this lack of elite circulation, which in itself constituted a distinct contributory factor to cultural stagnancy, was the nature of the administrative self-discipline characterizing the whole of the Chinese bureaucracy. Of all the controls upon the bureaucracy, perhaps the most effective was the one that might be termed the 'bureaucratic ethic'.

This ethic involved the integrity, sense of public obligation, moral standards and value systems of the members of the civil service. It existed as a personally internalized discipline and as such the government could ...use its powers to maintain and guide the force that produced much of this ethic - the educational system that trained the bureaucracy. 141

141 Herson, Laurence J.C.; 'China's Imperial Bureaucracy: Its Direction & Control' in Public Administration Review; V.XVII, #1 (Winter, 1957) P. 44.
For example, during the course of his education the future official learned the patterns of obedience and deference to superiors—a lesson resulting from long years of extensive memorization, physical punishment and unquestioning obedience as a student.142

The civil service examination was orientated almost exclusively to questions dealing with the classics, particularly the *Four Books*. This meant that men who knew nothing else of value might gain admission to the official class through their detailed knowledge of such classics. While men who had talents in more practical fields would have no opportunity to demonstrate them. During this educational process the official acquired a body of knowledge so standardized that he could find himself in almost complete ideological accord both with his fellow officials and with the ideal value system of his entire society. The keeping of the educational system administratively orientated and based on a rigid orthodox content served as a means to maintain a rigid and stagnant ideological stability within the elite groups themselves. Also it made certain that the educated individuals, who for whatever reasons remained out of government service, still maintained an ideological consensus with those in power. This served not only to tie the goals and policies of government together in a tight and rigid manner but also to keep the educated who were not in power from becoming ideological malcontents.

142 For an elaborate description of this training period see A.H. Smith; *Village Life in China* (Fleming H. Revell & Co.; London; 1899) pp. 70-135.
The sole purpose of the state supported schools which were maintained in the capital and the provincial seats of administration was to prepare those who passed the district examinations for higher degrees leading to eventual employment in the bureaucracy, while an overwhelming majority went uneducated.

Except for the select number who gained admission to official schools and the Imperial Academy instruction could be obtained only from private tutors whom few could afford. Thus the state's interest in scholarship did not have the effect of developing any general system of education. 143

The possibilities for general cultural development in light of the fact that education for most was unavailable would appear effectively limited. The impetus for cultural development was restricted to a specific stratum that was locked in a web of intellectual orthodoxy and administrative conservatism.

We observe in this situation then, the notable denial of the dynamics of cultural regeneration and development. Such dynamics must necessarily include the freedom of scholarly inquiry and exploration, the lack of a set orthodox framework of cultural formulation and prescription, freedom from educational standardization and the availability of educational opportunities to a variety of social groupings. The Mandarin elite, because of lack of circulation and accessibility could not contribute meaningfully to the formulation and prescriptive initiation of those necessary dynamics particular to a state of cultural progression. Their contributions as a cultural elite provided not for such regenerative processes but quite on the contrary for the processes of cultural regression, ineffectuality and

143 Fairbank, John K. Chinese Thought & Institutions (The University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1957) P. 177.
meaninglessness. By examining the mode of selection of elite groupings, as we have done here, it is possible to begin at least, to gauge the objective effect that such a mode of elite selection, particular to the Ch'ing Dynasty had on the concurrent processes of cultural development and decay.
The Inner Structure of the Mandarin Elite Group and Their Relation to Society at Large

The Mandarin official-gentry served a number of social and cultural functions. This stratum constituted a highly cohesive and integrated elite structure. It shall be assumed, with some logical justification, that the more diffuse an elite structure; that is the more autonomy that is granted to each specific elite grouping the more probability would there be for meaningful development and progression in the interest area over which the specific elite presides; whether it include the economy, the political arena, or culture generally. However, when all areas are dominated by a single elite or by a number of elites with highly integrated interests the possibility that each of these areas would develop freely and unrestrained would be severely hampered.

A cultural elite restrained in their possibilities of innovation by economic or political considerations will undoubtably not be as original and explorative as a cultural elite unhindered by such considerations.

In history, the literati and the gentry may be considered as one intellectual class with different degrees of learning. They had no conflict in ideology and interest. 144

The Chinese elite, whether holders of office in the capital, provincial administrators, or minor landowners were a cohesive, integrated and ideologically uniform social grouping.

144 Lee, Schu Ching; 'Intelligentsia of China' in American Journal of Sociology Volume LII (July 1946 - May 1947) P. 494.
We have noted in the previous section the close coalition between the land owning gentry and the holders of official positions. Also it must be recognized, as Robert Marsh emphasizes, that

...the elite was recruited disproportionately from 20% of the population in the elite stratum, rather than from the 98% of the population in the below-elite, or commoner stratum. 145

These figures alone represent a distinctive testimony to the existence of a highly integrated community of interests within the ruling elite stratum of the Ch'ing Dynasty.

The official-gentry group held both a monopoly of education and government offices and were also notably influential in the economic life of Chinese society. A large majority of these gentry-officials were landowners themselves and were concerned over the protection of their invested interests. As a direct result of their concern, one observes a close link between political policy formation and the preservation of their interests as landowners.

Within the cultural sphere the gentry likewise held a monopoly. The qualifications for leadership, both in the state and in society at large, were tested in the examination system established by the state, but depended on an education which the gentry themselves provided.

Teaching was therefore the most fundamental of the activities that involved the gentry. The beliefs and ideas on which the social order rested and which were the unifying force of the gentry stratum were restated and carried on by the gentry teachers. 146

145 Marsh, Robert M.; The Mandarins; Op Cit; P. 190

146 Chang, Chung-Li; The Income of the Chinese Gentry; Op Cit; P. XV
As the gentry were responsible for maintaining political and economic stability, thereby ensuring the security of their elite positions so were they equally responsible for maintaining cultural stability or rather cultural stagnancy for exactly the same ends. The ultimate consequence of such a unified cohesive control network, managed by an elite over cultural development, in the production of the legitimacy of their own position, was complete cultural discontinuity and regression.

Their own activities as a cultural elite to the cultural character of the Ch'ing Dynasty only quickened the pace of the processes of regression. No other class of cultural producers or innovators i.e., writers, painters, and musicians were allowed to exist in an official context. They were forbidden to openly communicate their works. Only the official-gentry retained such a privilege.

By the end of the Ming Dynasty, one rule had been formally established in the world of painting: officials themselves were painters and they liked their painting best. Painters by profession were discouraged. 147

Instead of having a class or group of individuals devoted entirely to an artistic speciality who would establish aesthetic standards to follow, the officials themselves established such standards. Cultural productions (artistic works) were provided for by a league of naive amateurs, usually preoccupied with their official duties. An aesthetic imagination and a bureaucratic one do not easily mix. The cultural-developmental consequences of attempting to enforce such a mixture is reflected

147 Levenson, Joseph R.; Confucian China & Its Modern Fate—The Problem of Intellectual Continuity; (University of California Press; Berkeley; 1958) P. 20.
in a remark made by a Chinese official at the time.

Wang Yu, tsu Jih-ch'u, hao Lung-chuang, Lao-jen painted landscapes and grasped in them the very marrow of the Vice President of the Board of Revenue's art. 148

This may be referred to as the bureaucratization of culture.

Unmistakably one may conclude from these varied observations of the Chinese elite's role in cultural development that they themselves as an elite grouping had all the characteristics and defining features of a dominant elite rather than being an openly receptive and progressively imaginative one. Cultural development as a whole was almost entirely restricted to their aesthetically amateurish whimsy and rigidly orthodox philosophical views of how the Chinese socio-cultural order should operate and function. As T.S. Eliot has observed

...culture attracts the men of politics not that politicians are always men of culture, but that culture is recognized both as an instrument of policy and is something socially desirable which is the business of the state to promote. 149

There exists a definite interdependent and functional relationship between the self-maintenance of power by a dominant elite and cultural stagnancy or regression. Rigid cultural stagnancy being the result of social and political domination.

148 Ibid; P. 54

3. The Social Distance Between Elite and Masses

The functions which the elite in a given society carry out on behalf of the collectivity (irrespective of the elite's motivation for carrying out such functions) should at least include the following:

1) to order relationships between sub-groups
2) to embody the ideal norms
3) to symbolize solidarity

Such functions are of course dependent upon an intricate communication system that must necessarily exist between the elite and the masses over which the elite exerts influence. The differences between a creative and dynamic socio-cultural climate and a stagnant or regressive one is dependent upon the level of the intensity of reciprocal processes of understanding particular to the communication system(s) itself that exists between the elite and the rest of the population.

Understandably then, the further away an elite positions itself from the general population the less it shall be representative of and be able to respond to, the interests, needs and goals of the majority. Elite isolation also denies the possibility for the 'cross-fertilization of ideas' between the population as a whole and the elite. Such a process of 'cross-fertilization of ideas' is necessary to maintain a constant dynamic impetus of originality, creativity and meaningful relevancy within the governing elite itself. Briefly then, the greater the social distance between the elite and the popu-

For a detailed and elaborate discussion of these points see Suzanne Keller; Beyond The Ruling Class (Random House; New York; 1970) P. 30.
lation, the greater the level of socio-cultural discontinuity.

The more isolated an elite is from the actual social reality and processes of social interaction over which it presides, the less able will it be as a directing corporate body to anticipate social strains and processes of change and be able to formulate relevant socio-economic policies in attempts to respond to the imbalancing effects of such strains of social change.

In any case, whether or not the factor of intellectual or moral isolation is reinforced by this factor of, so to say, personal isolation, certain it is that when the ruling class has degenerated in the manner described, it loses its ability to provide against those of the society that has the misfortune to be guided by it. 151

Previously in our analysis we have reviewed the closed nature of the elite structure of the Ch'ing Dynasty; an elite constituting a cross representation of only 2% of the total population. This is one particular factor which ostensibly contributed to the maintenance of social distance between the Chinese masses and the elite themselves.

The lifelines of any administrative organization are the channels of communication that exist between the general population and the elite. To the mass of the Chinese population during the Ch'ing Dynasty, 4/5 of whom lived by simple farming, the Mandarin was a remote figure

...who was rarely seen beyond the high walls and closed gates of his town house, where he lived with his wives,

The actual life of the peasant stood in distant and distinctive contrast to the revered and pampered life style of the Mandarin. The average Chinese peasant was in constant fear of starvation.

Confucius explains the word cheh as wisdom or knowledge of right behavior. Those who work for the people, as the Confucian saying goes, and those who respect the spirits are the people to know in this sense is not only to be intelligent but also to be virtuous. Knowledge of this sort corresponds to the ideal values of jen and courage. The wise man, within the context of Confucian philosophy is not merely an intellectual but is also someone who is aware of how society at large should be directed. To the peasant population of China a successfully examined candidate was a privileged holder of 'magical qualities' of wisdom.

...just as much as an examined and ordained priest of an ecclesiastic institution of grace, or a magician tried and proved by his guilt. 153

Because of the revering of the mandarin elite by the Chinese masses, the masses themselves refused to contribute to initiating a critical dialogue between themselves and the government officials. Such reverence contributed, to the perpetuation of


the elite's dominance and the legitimization of their position in the Chinese society. Thus it was the Chinese masses themselves who, because of the elites ability to elicit this reverence from them, aided in the perpetuation of the social distance that existed between themselves and the literati.

Finally, as already previously outlined, it was the very nature and content of the education received by the Chinese literati which also contributed significantly to furthering the social distances between themselves and the rest of the Chinese population. The education of the elite, as discussed earlier, had degenerated into a mere exercise in the memorization of the classics. It was an education which prepared the elite insufficiently for the practical demands of government. As Confucius himself is quoted as saying in the Analects...

"A man may be able to recite the three hundred Odes, but if when given a post in the administration he proves to be without practical ability, or when not anywhere on a mission he is unable to answer to himself a question, although his knowledge is extensive, of what use is it?"

Their education was partly of a ritualistic and ceremonial character and partly of a traditionalist ethical character. Their intellectual concerns were channelled into the fields of philosophy, literature and fine arts. Their ability in dealing with practical affairs was therefore largely uncultivated and underdeveloped. The education of the literati may be understood and viewed as a significant contributory factor in the preservation and even extension of the social distance between

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the Chinese ruling elite and the great bulk of the population; a social distance which in turn was a significant contributory factor to the further development of cultural petrification, cultural regression and degeneration. The responsibility for such negative tendencies within the cultural development of the Ch'ing Dynasty must be placed ostensibly as we may conclude from this brief analysis of social distance, upon the shoulders of the Mandarins themselves.
4. The Cultural Ideals Produced by the Mandarin Elite Group

At least one function of any elite is to continuously create a set of moral rules defining the long-term goals toward which the social collectivity as a whole should strive. Simply elites may be seen as formulaters and guardians of collective aims and ambitions; responsible for the articulation and realization of the social goals particular to the whole of the social complex. If their contributions are relevant and dynamic then socio-cultural continuity is assured. However, the Chinese Mandarin elite provided cultural ideals not based on a relevantly interpretative response to a concern with perpetuating a progressive socio-cultural continuity in respect to changing objective social conditions. Quite on the contrary, they formulated cultural definitions irrespective of, and irrelevant to, general social requirements as they were defined by an ongoing process of social strain, both internal and external.

Not only is a ruling elite responsible for the definition of the moral order of a society. Equally as important, it is also responsible for acting as symbolic representatives of that moral order; that they provide symbolic reassurance to the population of the legitimacy and worth of the moral order itself. As Murray Edelman has commented...

The appeal of the public official exists fundamentally because of what he symbolizes to his followers... 155

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155 Edelman, Murray; The Symbolic Uses of Politics (University of Illinois Press; Urbana; 1970) P. 90.
Already we have examined the rather decadent behavior of the official-gentry stratum from the time of Ch'ien-lung. Being themselves representatives of the cultural ideals of Chinese society they thus set the precedent for the widespread occurrence of decadence, economic intrigue and corruption.

The last twenty years of Ch'ien-lung's reign was rampant with decadent and corrupt activities on the part of the Manchus. Ho-shen, one of Ch'ien-lung's bodyguards was an ideal example of the extent to which corruption had developed within official circles. He had amassed an incredible fortune of 800 million taels (about $1.5 billion), reputedly more than half the actual total state income for twenty years, through the taking of bribes. Such figures as Ho-shen were representative of the extent which corruption had reached in this period among the Manchu elite.

Most officials led a way of life far beyond their salaries; maintaining luxurious residences with private staffs of servants, guards and sedan-carriers. It was not uncommon for the tax collected to be many times the official quota. The burden of payment fell on the peasant who, under the pressure of the Manchu tax collector often had to pay 50% to 80% more than the stated tax in cash and as high as 250% more in grain. 157

156 Hsu, Immanuel C; The Rise of Modern China (Oxford University Press; New York; 1970) P. 166.

157 Ibid; P. 167
The Bannermen, instead of studying the military arts, led a debauched life of gambling, theater-going, watching the cockfights, and profiting from usuary. The number of Manchu, Mongol and Chinese bannerman and their families was about 1.5 million. They came to constitute an immense burden to the Dynasty. 158

Corruption in the army was also widespread. The Manchu general Fu-k'ang-an (the bastard son of Emperor Ch'ien-lung) deliberately prolonged his campaigns against the Chin-ch'uan rebels to increase his chances for embezzlement. Military funds for the suppression of the White Lotus Rebellion (1796-1804) went mostly into the private coffers of the officials in charge. 159 It is quite evident that the Manchus set a definite precedent for corruption and intrigue throughout the whole of the bureaucratic and military structure of Imperial China. Confucius himself was aware of the intimate symbolic relationship that exists between a ruling elite and the mass of people who are ruled.

If a ruler is himself upright, his people will do their duty without order; but if he himself be not upright, although he may order, they will not obey. 160

158 Ibid; P. 168
159 For more detailed examples of corruption and decadence within the Ch'ing Dynasty see Craig, Michael; 'The Taiping Revolution' in Immanuel C.Y. Hsu (ed); Readings In Modern Chinese History (Oxford University Press; New York; 1971) pp. 169-182
160 Confucius; The Analects; Op Cit; P. 132.
Also the Chinese literati established other equally influential socio-cultural precedents; the ideals of philosophical orthodoxy, of political and social obedience, of intellectual conservatism and artistic and literary amateurism. Certainly such precedents can not be viewed as valuable or worthwhile stimulants or catalysts to cultural innovation, creativity or general development.

Summary

The ruling elite of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a small, self-contained relatively closed and self-perpetuating social organization. By setting strict limitations on its own circulation as an elite grouping it thwarted the possibilities for the cross-fertilization of ideas with individuals rising out of the lower social strata of Chinese society. This itself was a distinct factor contributing to the intellectual stagnation and stultification of this particular elite, which was in turn responsible for the cultural development of Chinese society.

The synchronization of cultural, economic and political activities by a single, ideologically uniform elite constitutes a second contributory factor to cultural regression. The lack of an autonomous cultural elite, free from the threat of censorship and more coercive measures i.e., book burning, considerably negated the possibility for free-flowing cultural exploration and innovation.
The social distance of the Chinese literati from the Chinese population contributed significantly to the elite, underestimating and misconceptualizing the objective needs of the Chinese socio-cultural system, as these needs were defined by the ongoing processes of social strain and change.

The cultural ideals produced by the Mandarin elite were likewise a significant contributory influence in maintaining and extending an intensive level of cultural banality and mediocrity. Most importantly, the literati acting as symbolic representatives of the cultural ideals (inclusive of jen) were completely inconsistent. These representatives of the cultural ideals set determinant precedents for the furthering of general cultural inconsistency and discontinuity.
The confusion, disorder and instability of the Ch'ing Dynasty stood in direct contradiction to the historically maintained ideals of the Confucian social order. In realizing this contradiction between the past condition of the Chinese Empire and its condition in the Ch'ing period one may begin to understand the nature of the anxiety that was to pervade all levels of Chinese social organization.

Confucianism, has been the major underlying, molding force both philosophically, religiously and educationally for at least 2000 years in China. It was Confucianism which characterized every aspect and condition of Chinese culture. Also it provided the basis for a code of moral conduct to which all Chinese had traditionally conformed. Confucianism emphasized neither the individual over the society or the society over the individual, but viewed each aspect as an interconnected whole. The 'cultivation' of the individual's 'moral worth' according to the Confucian tenants included five inward steps of self-perfection and three outward steps of social responsibility; extending to the development of individual knowledge, the family and the state. This 'eight-legged' framework was used as a blueprint for social development and individual development.

Social well-being or socio-symbolic equilibrium according to the Confucian perspective, depended on the proper development of the individual social member. However the individual could
only achieve such proper development of the self through the sacred institutions and practices of the acquiring of classical knowledge, the family and the state. According to Confucian logic the Emperor, in order to promote the virtue of all virtues - _jen_, must provide for a just form of government in all the states under his control. In order that such states may be governed well, the families of these states must be regulated or controlled. For a family to be well regulated this required on the part of each of the family's members that they always attempt to seek new knowledge and in so doing 'cultivate their persons'. Cultivation of the person implied that one learn everything that is available to him but also that such new thoughts and ideas remain 'sincere'. This constitutes the totality of the Confucian way of life.
1. Jen and The Chinese Family Structure

Obviously it could not be expected of every member of Chinese society to achieve the status of the 'superior man'. However, it was universally expected that the leading figures in the government including the Emperor himself, must be exemplary individuals. The concept of jen, as has been mentioned already, was the cornerstone of Chinese society and Confucianism. All virtues like love, reciprocity, loyalty, courage and trustworthiness may be regarded as jen. It is the super-virtues of all virtues. Government ideally was the representative embodiment of jen. Supposedly jen is inborn in all men and is the common mission of life generally, government specifically, in the cultivation and nurturing of this 'seed-essence' of humanity.

The family in China stands as the centre and basis of all social organization. It is the fundamental and traditional link between the individual and the state. The individual may achieve a sense of self-esteem and meaning by becoming a participant in the social process. The family is the point at which the individual must begin nurturing the seed of jen. 161

In this respect it is of importance to consider the effects of over-population on the continued existence of the family as an identifiable unit. There is a distinct relationship that exists between the traditional Chinese family and the land by

161 Sources referred to in this general analysis of Confucianism.
   1) Nivison, D.S. and Wright, A.F. (eds); Confucianism in Action (Stanford University Press, Stanford, California; 1959)
   ii) Wright, A.F.; The Confucian Persuasion (Stanford University Press; Stanford, California; 1960)
which they maintain their existence. Because of the phenomenal rise in population between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the average per capita landholding dwindled from two acres to half an acre. As the Chinese scholar Chao Tsun has said...

"Property, it is true is that on which both the subsistence and the virtue of the family depend'.

The Chinese family, because of the increase in its size could now no longer depend solely on the same plot of land for the realization of jen in this sense. Banditry and thievery were the only recourse."
2. The Causal Determinants of Anxiety As Related to Opium Use

The determinants of anxiety within China during this period, must be seen in relation to the disjuncture that existed between the traditionally, culturally-prescribed norms of conduct as related to Confucianism and the inadequate social organizational and institutionalized means to realize them. Such a disjuncture was brought about by a condition of cultural petrification. This state of cultural petrification itself contributed to the occurrence of genosuicide through the use of opium. Cultural petrification allowed for no other alternatives to the expression of such anomic anxiety or its negation, through the development of some alternate cultural-symbolic universe. This constitutes a manifest example of a state of society that exists in a transition stage between an old and corrupt traditional social framework and a newly emerging one.

However because a petrified culture is predominantly made up of the old traditional customs and habits of which the civilization in question has found to be both valuable and worthwhile in the past, it is not surprising then that the elite particular to the traditional social order tries to maintain in a stubborn, inflexible fashion such traditional cultural traits despite the emergence of new, more dynamic and creative ones. It is a situation where all other alternatives to the suspension of anxiety are prevented. The only other alternative left open is that of self-modification and self-limitation - experiential transcen-
dence through the use of specific means. In the case of China - opium. The tendency of a whole culture to revert to inner-modification through the utilization of such means as drugs constitutes a socially regressive mode of adaptation. The processes of inner-modification are representative of the abandonment of the existing social structure by the members of the socio-cultural system in question. The occurrence of these processes are also indicative of the abandonment of the means to modify the social structure. The tendency to abandon the existing social structure as well as the means to change it is facilitated by the unavailability of means to noticeably change the social situation.

Any sociological inquiry that is concerned with the development and operation of the processes of inner-modification must examine the cause of general social anxiety which would generate the desire for social change or modification. Secondly to consider what interest groups are responsible for the denial of the means to outwardly reshape the existing social situation. In making such considerations a more comprehensive understanding of the genesis and development of the processes of inner-modification might be achieved. A sociological understanding of opium use by the population of China in the nineteenth century must encompass the specific predisposing factors leading to such opium use. Recalling the brief analytical overview of the cultural and social conditions of the Ch'ing Dynasty, the following characterizing features may be summarized:
1) general intellectual stagnancy exemplified in the inflexible, rigid and unimaginative pursuits of the Chinese scholars. Also the uncreative and non-innovative repetition of familiar themes in the art and literature of the period.

2) pressures inhibiting the normal and traditional functioning of the family as the basic unit of economic intercourse.

3) a vast network of corruption and instability in the government and bureaucracy.

The ability of Chinese society to realize the Confucian ideal and directing norm of morality and behavior—jen, was severely strained and retarded. If it may be understood, utilizing here this definitive Confucian concept of jen, that the common pursuit of the individual, the family and the government was the cultivation and nurturing of jen, then conversely the particular conditions of the Ch'ing Dynasty testify to the impossibility of its realization. Simply, there existed a notable and observable disjunction between the cultural ideals of jen and the normative means to realize such ideals within the Chinese socio-cultural system at that time. Moreover, the very nature of the general activities of the large numbers of the Chinese people and the government bureaucracy as a whole, point not to attempts to redefine society in the hope of realizing jen. Rather such activities illustrate the abandonment both of jen and the necessary activities fundamental to its realization.
3. The Inability of The Chinese Family & State To Realize Jen

The family, during the latter half of the Ch'ing Dynasty was drastically inhibited from its normal and traditional operations and goals. The family provided for the realization of jen through two distinct social and economic channels:

1) ancestor worship
2) cultivation of the land

During this historical period, both of these activities were contested and sharply strained. As to ancestor worship, it was with the permeation into all parts of China of the Roman Catholic missionaries that this traditional activity which had existed in China for hundreds of years came to be undermined or at least disputed. More important than this however, was the growing inability of the family unit or clan, to survive as a self-contained entity through the cultivation of its own tract of land; owing to the pressures of population. Simply, the possibility of realizing jen either through ancestor worship or through the cultivation of the land became markedly inconsistent and difficult.

The emergence of large numbers of bandit organizations and secret societies which were responsible for the large part, for the numerous rebellions during this period, testify both to the partial abandonment of the family as the traditional means of realizing jen, as well as to the abandonment of the concept of jen itself. These many organizations were chiefly concerned with the profits of looting and the booty of war rather than with the cultivation and nurturing of virtue. This is not to say however, that the family structure was absolutely broken apart
in the Ch'ing Dynasty. Those organizations which arose however, re-channelled the conventional functions of the family into practices antithetical to the traditional norms of moral and economic conduct.

Lastly, in the consideration of the cultural and social conduct of China it is essential to include in such an overview an appraisal of the last cornerstone of the Confucian ideal of jen - the state. According to the Confucian ideal, the state, the Emperor and the bureaucracy were ideally supposed to be the representative embodiment of jen. What one sees in fact during the period of the Ch'ing Dynasty is quite the opposite of this ideal relation. The phenomenal growth of corruption, at least in the higher echelons of government, is symptomatic both of the inability of the state generally to realize the Confucian tenents and the unwillingness of the state bureaucracy to even concern themselves with these virtuous ideals; being totally occupied with the accumulation of 'squeeze' from the British. This is not to say that the higher levels of the Imperial court were not concerned with these tenents of which the sincerity and frequency of the issuing of the anti-opium edicts, against the importation and domestic consumption of the drug is a convincing example. However, there are contradictions to such official sincerity when we recall the extravagant indulgences of the empress dowager.

The general condition of the Ch'ing Dynasty, from this brief and generalized overview, may be said to be characterized by the tendency towards the abandonment of the Confucian concept
of jen - the directing and molding force of traditional Chinese society. Also, it was a period where the three social-economic cornerstones of the means of jen's realization: the development and extension of individual knowledge, the family and the state were limited, retarded or misdirected in their development.
4. Anomie, Retreatism & Opium Use

It is out of this disjuncture between the governing norms of Confucian philosophy and the institutional framework traditionally integrated with the realization of these norms that a condition of anomie came into existence. Durkheim, who originally coined the term meant it to refer to a condition of normlessness, a moral vacuum, a state sometimes referred to as deregulation. He used the term to refer to a property of the social and cultural structure which occurred typically as a consequence of economic crisis and which could result in the anomic form of suicide. Robert Merton (among others) has constructively extended the use of this term to mean

...a breakdown in the cultural structure occurring particularly when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of members of the group to act in accord with them.

The Ch'ing Dynasty may be said to have exhibited the breakdown between, on the one side, the cultural values of Confucian ideals of jen and on the other, the social capacities of a large percentage of the members of Chinese society at the time to act in accord with such ideals.

Our analysis of the socio-cultural values of the Ch'ing Dynasty briefly outlined the nature and extent of this disjuncture. Both Durkheim, Merton and others have elaborated


a typology of adaptive responses to the condition of anomie. Durkheim's chief contribution in this respect has been what is referred to as the anomic suicide. Merton however, has been slightly more elaborate in the construction of typologies of adaptive responses. The most significant response which we shall use for the purposes here, is defined by Merton as retreatism. Retreatism consists of the substantial abandoning both of the once-esteemed cultural goals and of institutionalized practices directed towards the realization of these goals. It will be understood here, in attempts to maintain theoretical and conceptual consistency, that the processes of inner-modification, inclusive of drug use may be subsumed in their operation under the more general behavioral characteristics of retreatism as it has been defined by Merton. Like retreatism, the processes of inner-modification involve the abandonment of the normative cultural goals and the institutional means to realize them.

Not all behavior in the Ch'ing Dynasty, in response to a condition of anomie was retreatist or indicative of the processes of inner-modification. Quite on the contrary, much of it was characterized either by rebellion or ritual. As Richard Cloward has logically deduced...

If the individual turns to innovating devices, the question of whether or not he becomes a retreatist may then depend upon the relative accessibility of illegitimate means. 165

164 Ibid; P. 187
What Cloward means here is that if you have a retreatist syndrome or the development of inner-modification within a given group, the extent of their retreatism or inner-modification is dependent upon the absence of illegitimate means. On the other hand, one must also have the means available to initiate the retreat. With respect to this, it is significant to note that revolt (illegitimate means) was relatively infrequent in areas of high level of opium availability.

There is a distinct relationship between opium use and the unavailability of social movements to channel conditions of general social anxiety. Genosuicide itself as an adaptive behavioral process to a state of social unrest constitutes an alternative mode of response to anxiety when the possibility for the generation of social movements has been denied or prevented in some fashion. With reference to the dynamics of collective behavior, opium use in China during the Ch'ing Dynasty did not constitute a social movement; lacking a definite ideology, a program of action and leadership. The use of opium during this period, was symptomatic instead of mass behavior where a large number of people were reacting in a similar fashion to a common stimulus in widely divergent and heterogeneous situations. Opium use may in turn have been facilitated, in its widespread use over a relatively short period of time, by the collective behavioral mechanisms of social contagion and collective excitement.

The quick acceptance and utilization of opium by the Chinese may be more simply defined when we consider interaction between certain predisposing and precipitory factors. In the first instance
the contradictions and inconsistencies of the Chinese socio-cultural framework led to a general condition of anomie. This in turn contributed towards the development of a predisposition to adopt retreatist patterns of behavior. In the second instance, the British, attempting to break into the profitable possibilities of the China trade, offered a substance which by its very nature addressed itself to the social and cultural condition of the Chinese.

The consequences of such interaction are of course detrimental when we consider the effects opium had on the cultural, economic and political stability and well-being of China as well as the negative physical effects of its use. Here we view a situation involving not simply one nation intent on destroying the particular social and cultural foundations of another, but where the victim's themselves actively participated in the destruction of their own social and cultural existence. Essentially then, the British provided means in order to achieve specific economic ends - the profits from the opium trade. While the Chinese themselves, in response to their own anomic social and cultural conditions provided the impetus or will towards self-regulated self-modification; promoting as a result physical and cultural deterioration and inevitably, the processes of geno-suicide.
5. Inner Modification and the Availability of Means

The development of behavioral patterns of inner-modification are dependent upon the unavailability of other means for the expression and/or negation of anxiety. The very lack of alternatives is a brief but positive testimony to the cultural petrification of the Ch'ing Dynasty which, in its stagnant rigidity would not allow for the development of other possible alternatives to the deterrence of the anxious-normlessness produced by its own internal decay. A petrified cultural symbolic universe fails to provide self-meaning for the individuals who are constituent members of such a socio-cultural situation. The fact that a condition of anomie did develop in the Ch'ing Dynasty illustrates that neither the normative culture channels of intellectual development, participation in the traditional family pursuits of ancestor worship or cultivation of the land, nor participation in government could afford such self-meaning to the Chinese people as a whole. This typifying lack of cultural-symbolic identification was rigidly maintained and perpetuated by the ruling Manchu elite - the literati.

All artistic creativity was denied a legitimate existence also. The ferocity and brutallity of the methods used to suppress the occurrence of banditry and rebellions contributes to the understanding of the impossibility that confronted the Chinese to pursue other routes or have other alternatives at hand in the frenzied quest for self-meaning and self-prestige within other symbolic universes. Thus, referring back to the
analysis of the structural and social psychological determinants that contribute to the formation of overt acts of aggression and genocide, it is possible to conclude from this situation that the necessary lack of cultural and structural inhibitions that would allow for the expression of aggression in response to anxiety was decidedly thwarted by the stagnant inflexibility of this socio-cultural system. Also, such a condition of cultural petrification would effectively deter the possibility of formulating alternative 'ideologies' (in a general sense) which would provide for the then, anxious and the anomic Chinese, a symbolic system of meaning and articulation of the causes for their alienated and frustrated life goals. Such ideological articulation could possibly lead to the enacting of aggression against other groups. When such ideologies did emerge, as in the case of the White Lotus and Tai'ping rebellions, they were forcibly crushed in the hope of preserving the obedient complacency and order of the traditional Manchu-dominated, Confucian way of life. Their stubborn and barbarous persistence to retain the old order again exemplifies the negative processes of cultural petrification. Genosuicide is at least one of the ultimate consequences of the logic of such process. It constitutes one of many alternatives. Attempts were made to suppress genosuicide as all alternatives were suppressed.
Genocide provides the necessary alleviation of anxiety through scapegoating; allowing for the heroic transcendence of such anxiousness. So too does genocid, at least as it is related to drug use, allow for this process of heroic transcendence of individual limitations or inadequacies, whatever the objective causes of such limitations might be. It is within the oblivious ecstatic realm of the opium euphoria that one comes again to feel control over one's own life chances, over the world and social existence. Opium provides a symbolic universe where the submergence of the self is seductively simple. However as Abraham Kardiner has said, '...there is no fantasy equivalent of social well being.' Charles Baudelaire, in a rather prosaic fashion has explained the logic of the drug addict and his world‐view. It is a logic with no tomorrow, only the here and now; concerned only with the present moment of happiness, meaning and self‐fulfillment.

Here then, is happiness! It is large enough to fill a small spoon. Happiness, with all its intoxications, follies and puerilities. You can swallow it without fear – one does not die of it. Your physical organs will be in no way affected. Later on, perhaps a too frequent consultation of the oracle will diminish your strength of will, perhaps you will be less of a man than you are today. But the retribution is too distant and the disaster in store for you so difficult to define. Here in such a state there is no death, there is no fear or anxious questions of self‐identity. There is only the ecstasy and pleasures of the moment with no past or no future. Such a

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state is defined by Robert Lifton as 'experiential transcendence'. The immediate fear of death and the lesser existential anxieties of daily existence that plague the human psyche are sublimated in a tactile and sensual euphoria where one may sense, though only for a short while, a condition of self-esteem and a patterned cohesiveness to the conduct of the outside world. One becomes temporarily immortal in a world in which one's own self stands at the centre; providing a sense of heroic vitalism to a once fragmented ego.

Physically, the consequences of the continued use of opium are frightening — a payment for the disruption of the continuity of time and experience; a consequence of life of unlimited illusion. It is ironic that opium use, of which its ultimate function is to deny the inevitability of death should provide for a death that is more grotesque and frightening than that which was originally feared.

The poor victim becomes enervated and weak, a gripping pain rend his entrails, his stomach loses all relish for food, even the power of digestion fails, pain racks his limbs, and when the weary wretch retires to rest the demon of his own creating pursues him still and frightful dreams disturb his broken slumbers. 167

The judgement of opium use as a form of self-willed suicide must not simply rest on the comprehension of the negative physiological effects of the drug, but must also include certain social psychological criteria of evaluation. Such criteria find their basis not in a liberal moralism. Rather such criteria are found

within an analytical framework which judges the positive or negative attributes of any action in terms of the effects it has on the promotion or retardation of other consequent acts.

It is a judgement based on the understanding whether a specific action will lead to the realization of the self as a social being which is self-reflective and dynamic in its growth and not a reified self-contained entity. George Herbert Mead states this idea quite simply.

If we look at the individual from the point of view of his impulses, we can see that those desires which reinforce themselves, or continue on in their expression...will be good; whereas those which do not reinforce themselves lead to undesired results, and those which weaken other motives, are in themselves evil. 168

While man's immersion in some symbolic universes inclusive of religion, provides incentive - works as a catalyst, for the perpetuation of creative acts; of acts of self-expansion, other symbolic universes, such as the universe of the drug euphoria, provide no catalytical momentum for self-expansion or for the furthering of the processes of self-expansion.

Throughout history, the emergence of new and innovative forms of art and other manifest forms of human creativity are a consequence of particular groups of individuals immersed in a symbolic universe of a kind that did not inhibit or weaken other motives such as curiosity and creativity. The complete immersion of the self in the symbolic sphere of drug use generally refutes the reality principle for the principle of pleasure and does not seek out beyond those pleasures. The ecstasy of

168 Mead, George Herbert, Mind, Self and Society (University of Chicago Press; Chicago; 1962) P. 385.
experience in a world of a chemically induced sensuality and orgiastic excitement, which the use of opium and other drugs produces, generates inevitably a desire for only more pleasure. In consequence one neglects all other spheres of human experience. It is true that drugs, at least for the user can eliminate time and death or at the least anxieties of their anticipation. The drug experience does not go beyond such an elimination but remains fixed in the experience of elimination itself. From the self-contained and static characteristics of the drug experience we must deduce its destructive or negative elements - its immobility. By pointing out such characterizing traits as these, the defining of drug use itself as suicidal; suicidal that is to the expansion and realization of the potentialities of the self, does not seem at an objective level to be unreasonable. On a mass scale such drug use constitutes a trend synonymous with the processes of genosuicide.
The British Opium Trade – Exchange and Power

The nature and intensity of the act of genocides itself is dependent upon the means available to provide for its initiation. The defining of the British opium trade in China in the nineteenth century as a particular case of a genocidal occurrence is a relatively involved affair. Our understanding of genocides in this case is necessarily dependent upon the consideration of a complex and interrelating system of contributory factors. In order that such factors may be coherently systematized, they shall be placed within an analytical framework, bounded by two distinct, definitive categories – exchange and power.

The genocidal consequences of opium use in China is to be related at a primary or general level of analysis to a particular relation of exchange, or rather unequal exchange which in turn is a direct function of the maintenance of power on the part of the British in this case. The opium trade in China, between the years of about 1790 and 1906 constitutes a particular exchange relationship defined by an imbalance of reciprocal dependency. The relations between the Chinese and English during this period, are relations primarily understood in regards to the chief articles of exchange – opium and money. The relation of the English to the Chinese is one of power. By power, we mean here, first in the sense outlined by R.M. Tawney

...the capacity of an individual or groups of individuals, to modify the conduct of other individuals or groups in the manner in which he (they) desire and to prevent his own conduct
being modified in the manner in which he does not. 169

As the historical data has tended to point out; the general
use of opium by the Chinese may be understood as constituting
a modification of behavior, precipitated by the British impor-
tation of opium through the monopoly channels of the British
East India Company.

The ability of the British to alter the conduct of a vast
number of Chinese was entirely dependent in turn, on the
Chinese' dependency or need for the drug. As Peter M. Blau
has stated in *Exchange & Power in Social Life*...

In short power resides implicitly in the other's
dependency. When this is recognized, the analysis
will of necessity revolve around the concept of
dependence. 170

Both Peter M. Blau and Alvin Gouldner 171 have defined depen-
dency; that is a relationship characterized not by mutual de-
pendency, but rather by a definite imbalance of dependence, as
those relationships where one party or group monopolizes the
access to the satisfaction of the needs generated in the other
group. A lack of needs for particular services, constitutes a
condition of independence. The fewer the wants and needs of a
group, the less dependent that group is on others to meet the
satisfaction of those needs. Needs however, do not remain
constant. By providing a group or even a whole society with
particular goods or services that increases their level of

169 Tawney, R.H.; *Equality* (Barnes and Noble Inc.; New York; 1965) P. 159.


171 Gouldner, Alvin; 'Norm of Reciprocity' in *American Sociological Review*; Volume 25, #2 (April, 1960) P. 164.
satisfaction or gratification, their level of expectation tends to be raised. While they were previously satisfied without these benefits, they now strongly desire to continue to obtain them. If there exists a situation in which the satisfaction of these newly generated needs is monopolized by one group, then what one confronts in such an instance is both a relation of power and dependence; the relationship of exchange between the two groups being disproportionate or unequal in this sense.

In elaborating upon the genocidal implications of the opium trade, we must deal specifically with the concept of power and its relation to the concept of dependence, previously defined. This concept of power is inherent in the definition and the understanding of the motivating forces of the colonial era, of which the relations of Britain to China is no exception. A preliminary definition of power as related to the relations between the Chinese and British in this period must begin with the utilization of the notion of the monopolization of needed rewards.\textsuperscript{172} Simply, a requirement of power is to assure the continued dependence of others on the services one is able to supply by barring access to alternative suppliers of these services. In recalling the role of the East India Company and its capacity of monopolizing both the production and marketing of opium, the implications of power as related to this first definitive criteria are easily justified.

\textsuperscript{172} Blau, Peter M.; \textit{Exchange and Power In Social Life}; Op Cit; P. 121.
It must be emphasized here that in referring to a definition of power between China and Britain, it is justifiably assumed, that the determinant reason for the maintenance of power by the British was obviously related to the preservation and extension of the high rate of profits realized chiefly from opium trade itself. For example, it is estimated that Britain sold about $230,000,000 worth of opium in China between the years of 1831-1839. The value or worth of opium for Britain did not just stop here. The annual value of the duties collected in India by England was £50,000,000 and what was derived from opium amounted to as much as £8,000,000. This was income Britain could not afford to lose if she was to maintain her dominance in India. It is well known, that the British Empire itself was founded on the revenue derived from the opium trade.

A definition of power and exchange as related to the British and Chinese necessitates the inclusion of a second criteria taken from Peter M. Blau's analytical schema.

The ability to prevent others from resorting to coercive force to affect their demands is a second prerequisite of maintaining power. Discouraging coalitions among subordinates that would enable them to extract demands is a strategy that serves this end...

The specific occurrence and reasons for, the Opium Wars testifies blatantly to Britain's efforts to prevent the Chinese from instituting or maintaining the official anti-opium edicts. The consequences of the Opium Wars, (The Treaty of NanKing) illustrates the cohesive constraints imposed by the supremacy of

173 Ibid; P. 121.
Britain's military power, on the possibilities of the governing interests of China to initiate and enforce their own contesting demands for the elimination of the importation and consumption of opium. The consequences of the Opium War as articulated in the conditions of the Treaty of NanKing (where opium was defined as a legal commodity of exchange and where British trade was to be uninhibited in its development in China) defines a relationship of power between the British and Chinese generally; a relationship stipulating the conditions of continued dependency.

There was a dramatic increase in the number of opium smokers during this period.

Naturally accompanying this growing importation of opium...was a rise in the consumption of the drug by the Chinese. One estimate of the number of consumers in 1835 exceeded 2,000,000. By 1906 it is estimated, the number of smokers was nearly 13,460,000 out of a population of 4000,000,000 i.e., 3.4% of the total population and 27% of the adult males. 174

Such active participation by the Chinese in their own self-limitation and self-modification may be an explicit indication of the degree of frustration and anxiety which these people experienced at the time.

Summary

We have outlined here the constellation of contributing factors leading to the occurrence of genosuicide in the Ch'ing Dynasty. Most notably these contributary factors have included a state of cultural petrification; a condition which was facili-
tated by the particular structural characteristics of the Mandarin elite grouping which dominated this period. A general condition of anomie was a consequence of such a condition of cultural petrification. As a result of the unavailability of means in attempts to modify the social situation in order to alleviate a condition of social unrest and anxiety, processes of inner-modification were initiated through opium use. The unavailability of alternative means to change the social condition of the Ch'ing Dynasty may be related to the Mandarin elite's determination to remain in power and maintain the traditional way of life and social organization. Inner-modification was further facilitated by the easy availability of opium provided by British trading interests. The negative physiological as well as socially regressive implications of opium use were noted. Genosuicide as a mass behavioral adaptive response to a condition of general social anxiety may be understood in relation to the systemic interaction of these various contributory factors as they have been outlined here.
CHAPTER VII: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Such an instance of genosuicide as reviewed here is necessarily dependent upon the conditions afforded by a state of cultural petrification. Cultural petrification was a condition immanent to the Ch'ing Dynasty as related to the Manchu reign of power and influence. The consequences of such a specific cultural reality may be linked to the development of identity-anxiety within the Chinese population; a result of the suppression by elite interests of alternative means of achieving identity fulfillment.

In our analysis of the Ch'ing Dynasty it was found that there existed a formally dependent relationship between particular characteristics and definitive qualities of the Mandarin elite and the level and nature of socio-cultural development of the Ch'ing Dynasty. The literati of this period, a monolithic elite grouping, were ostensibly responsible for the provision of general cultural definitions for all of Chinese society at the time (1644-1911). Their rigid and stultifying attempts to maintain an orthodox and traditional system of interpretations of the Confucian tenents led to the negation of intellectual, scholarly and artistic innovation. The examination system which was the basis of entrance into the Mandarin elite stratum led to the petrification of elite ideology and to a stagnant, isolated and unrealistic view of Chinese society.

The isolation and social distance of this ruling elite contributed to policy inconsistencies with respect to their
relevance and practicality in alleviating increasingly unstable socio-cultural conditions. Also, the type and nature of the cultural ideals which this elite was responsible for formulating, contributed further to a stagnant and regressive socio-cultural milieu. Consequently, it may be concluded from these observations that the nature of the cultural discontinuity which characterized much of the period of the Ch'ing Dynasty was to some degree, the responsibility of the elite grouping particular to this period.

The ultimate consequence of cultural petrification as it occurred in the Ch'ing Dynasty was the inability of the constituent population to be able to identify meaningfully with their socio-cultural situation. Cultural petrification denies social identity. We must understand with Robert Lifton that social identity, as defined here constitutes

...man's need, in the face of inevitable biological death, to maintain an inner sense of continuity with what has gone on before and what will go on after his own individual existence. 175

Also that such a sense of immortality is that 'cement' which holds groups together. 'It is the individual's inner perception of his involvement in what we call the historical process'. 176

As it has been repeated throughout this analysis, such immortality striving, when specific social and psychological factors exist may result in genocide. The process of scapegoating particular to the initiation of genocide constitutes a symbolic

175 Lifton, Robert Jay; Revolutionary Immortality (Random House; New York; 1967) P. 7.

176 Ibid; P. 7
expression of the denial of death and the affirmation of the in-group's immortality. Simply, one's own life meaning is affirmed in the death of another.

Genosuicide itself, is also a manifest form of a certain type of immortality striving which we have labelled 'experiential transcendence' which amounts to the individual experiencing a sense of immortality though a feeling or emotional state is so intense that it transcends all anxieties and ultimately, time and death. Experiential transcendence may be linked to the use of opium in the Ch'ing Dynasty. The reasons that such forms of experiential transcendence are themselves considered genosuicidal is that inevitably such drug abuse will be detrimental to the further development of the self and will inhibit the individual from realizing himself as a social entity. We have seen also, genosuicide is directly connected to a state of cultural petrification; a socio-cultural reality which may be understood as being an expression of the decline of a civilization generally. To use a phrase from Toynbee, cultural petrification itself is merely an expression of 'death in life' - drug use contributes significantly to the quality and intensity of such a death.

Sorokin has explained, in relation to his attempts to elaborate upon the principles of immanent change and the principle of limits that...

Having fulfilled its mission, each supersystem becomes increasingly sterile & progressively hinders the emergence of a new and vital supersystem representing an aspect of reality largely neglected during the domination of its predecessor. [177]

The Ch'ing Dynasty for example may be understood as an exhausted socio-cultural system unable to generate any further creative or innovative developments which might remove it from its 'fossilized' condition. Finally the fossilization of a social system must result in its final banishment from the stage of history. Cultural petrification itself is a transitory stage; existing between the decline of one civilization and the emergence of a new and more dynamically progressive one. Thus in this fashion we might explain the emergence of Mao's Revolutionary People's Republic from the decayed and decrepit structure of the Ch'in Dynasty itself.

Genosuicide results from a situation where such cultural stagnancy and structural rigidity exists at an intense level. The degree of unwillingness of a socio-cultural system to give up its traditional social framework is relative to the historically defined greatness, strength and creativity of the supersystem in question. Genosuicide, at least the form of it defined here, may even be viewed as catalyst to the speeding up of this process of transition from one socio-cultural form to another. Genosuicide as exemplified in China in the use of opium, accentuated the decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty; allowing for the consequent development of Mao's social project.

The occurrence of genosuicide in the Ch'ing Dynasty, as it has been examined in this thesis is distinctly related to the dynamics of the elite structure particular to this period. The Mandarin elite were dependent upon preserving an orthodox, conservative and rigid philosophical Neo-Confucian value-system in order to maintain the legitimacy of their position as a ruling
elite. Cultural petrification as it developed in the Ch'ing Dynasty may be said to be a consequent feature of the Mandarin elite, attempting to dominate a large nation by means of ideological orthodoxy and cultural conservatism. The act of rigidly preserving a system of values by an elite to legitimize its own existence, regardless of the socio-cultural consequences of the preservation of such values, is synonymous with a condition of socio-cultural domination. Such domination is itself a fundamentally necessary prerequisite for cultural petrification.

The Mandarin elite constituted a monolithic elite structure. The development of cultural petrification as it occurred in the Ch'ing Dynasty is intimately linked to the essential monolithic characteristics of this elite stratum. Genosuicide through the use of opium by the Chinese population was a mass behavioral reaction to the cultural consequences of such an elite structure.

As a monolithic elite, the Mandarins dominated all aspects of social, economic and political life in the Ch'ing Dynasty. Such monolithic control was carried out with the understanding by the Mandarins themselves, that this would ensure the preservation of the traditional Confucian way of life; a way of life that ensured the obedience of the Chinese population to the Mandarins' positions of authority. The Mandarins considered themselves and were in turn considered by the whole of China to be representatives of the Confucian ideals, specifically the Confucian ideal of jen. In order to rid themselves of any threats to their position, the Mandarins forcibly prevented
other rival intellectual groups, proposing dissenting interpretations of the Confucian tenents from developing and gaining public recognition. Consequently, during the Ch'ing Dynasty, the power and influence maintained by the Mandarin elite remained unchecked and uncontested by any other rival elite groups. The social policies which the Mandarins proposed, as well as the methods by which they conducted the general socio-cultural affairs of China were made and initiated without fear of possible reprisals or criticisms. Almost anything might have been suggested and initiated by the Mandarins regardless of its consequences or long-range implications for the social welfare of Chinese society at the time. The emergence of a condition of cultural petrification in the Ch'ing Dynasty must be understood now both in relation to the internal characteristics of the Manchu elite as well as in reference to the noticeable lack of rival elites.

The Mandarins removed all checks and limits to their power by the elimination of rival elites. At the same time this particular elite limited its recruitment to a specific group of people with similar socio-economic backgrounds and interests. The Mandarins dominated all aspects of the social, political, economic and cultural life of China. It failed to establish an intimate system of communication with the rest of the population in the estimation of the objective socio-cultural requirements created by a changing social situation. Lastly the Mandarins repressed all cultural innovation and intellectual exploration.
The **systemic and developmental interaction** of all the characterizing features of the Mandarin elite stratum as outlined in this thesis, resulted in the occurrence of cultural petrification in the Ch'ing Dynasty. It is important to realize that each of these characterizing features particular to the Mandarins did not all occur at the same time. Each feature had its own history and rational of development as did the various stages of interaction between them. It is only with the intensification of the interaction between these characterizing traits of the Mandarin elite that we view the emergence and development of cultural petrification.

It is curious that an elite group such as the Mandarins, intent on both preserving the traditional Confucian way of life as well as being supposedly, the ideal representatives of such a way of life, fell into a state of corruption in a relatively short period of time. The emergence of such corruption may be linked to the absence of an internal policing or control body within the Mandarin elite structure itself. The hierarchy of positions and ranks within the elite structure was arranged in such a way to act as a check in the assurance that responsibilities allotted to each Mandarin official were fulfilled. A system of checks based on the hierarchy of rank and position does not ensure the complete denial of corruptibility. What it did ensure, at least in the case of the Chinese bureaucracy was the fulfillment of the various duties allocated to each official in the traditional and stipulated manner expected of him. Whatever else the Mandarin official accomplished was not
recognized nor of concern to his superiors. The rigid ideological orthodoxy of the Mandarin ensured that the official tasks would be fulfilled in the traditional manner. The system of checks inherent within the hierarchical rank structure of the Chinese bureaucracy went no further than to guarantee the fulfillment of official duties.

It is entirely possible that official duty could be maintained and carried out in a bureaucratic structure like that of the Mandarin elite while beneath the structure unrecognized, corruption and intrigue was rampant. The development of corruption in a bureaucracy like that of the Chinese elite is entirely possible where no constraints exist to the initiation of such corruption other than the fulfillment of official duty which is supervised by the immediate superior of each official. The lack of an internal policing force within the Chinese bureaucracy outside the internal hierarchy of rank and position, constituted a structural prerequisite for the emergence of corruption. Such a structural prerequisite for corruption within the bureaucracy does not explain the cause of its emergence.

The emergence of corruption within the Mandarin elite grouping could be said to have been facilitated by the development of decadent practices and habits in the higher echelons of the elite structure itself; promoted most notably by Emperor Ch'ien-lung and his chief advisors. Ch'ien-lung was only able to develop decadent habits after he had completely eliminated his social critics; their existence prior to their elimination had always constituted a constraint to the extent to which Ch'ien-lung was able to pursue the various pleasures afforded
to his position of power. Ch'ien-lung saw that such decadent behavior on his part was not out of context with his position as the Emperor and Son of Heaven. His behavior as well as that of his immediate advisors could not but help to influence the tastes and habits of the rest of the Mandarin elite. Such influence was almost unavoidable when we recall the fact that the Mandarin elite considered the Emperor to be the representative of the Confucian ideals. The only way in which the Mandarins could even begin to imitate the life style of the Emperor was to resort to corrupt practices of extortion, embezzlement, over-taxing the population and whatever other activities they would find profitable.

The social climate of the Ch'ing Dynasty also facilitated the emergence of extensive corruption in the Mandarin elite. The emergence of bandit organizations, piracy, and secret societies were a consequence of the Chinese population at large being unable to realize the traditional way of life through the cultivation of the land. Such a general social climate of corruptibility as this was influential in further facilitating the extension of corruption in the bureaucracy; in profiting from the illegal practices of the population at large. These opportunities were not ignored by the Mandarin elite especially in the low echelons of the elite group who maintained a day to day contact with the people.

It is essential to realize that such a general social climate of corruptibility was a distinct consequence of the inability of the elite to deal effectively with various social strains as they occurred during this period. This inability to
contend with the changing social circumstances of the Ch'ing Dynasty was a result of the certain characterizing structural and ideological features of the elite. The maintenance of such features by the elite was a consequence of the Mandarins attempting to preserve themselves as a monolithic elite grouping. Social corruption on a large scale in the Ch'ing Dynasty was related to the monolithic elite structure of the Mandarins while in turn such general social-corruption facilitated the further emergence of corruption in the elite. The corruption and degeneration of the Mandarin elite was the ultimate product of its attempts to maintain itself as an autonomous, monolithic and supposedly uncorruptible elite grouping. The lack of internal checks within the Chinese bureaucratic elite structure further facilitated the conducting of corrupt activities by the Mandarins.

From this it might be said that the degeneration of an elite, at least in the case of the Ch'ing Dynasty is immanent to the elite itself as related to its structural characteristics, the cultural consequences of such characteristics and the adaptive response of human individuals to those cultural consequences.

The qualities of the Mandarin elite structure provided for many social inconsistencies in the Ch'ing Dynasty inclusive of the Chinese population's inability to realize jen. The occurrence of genosuicide as a mass behavioral response to this cultural situation was dependent upon the availability of the means to initiate it; that is to say dependent on the availability of the drug, opium. It was the Mandarin elite who allowed
for the admission of opium into China. The British opium trade provided the means by which the Chinese could alleviate their anomic situation through inner-modification. It also provided the means by which the Mandarin elite could realize its own corruptiveness. The ability to commit genosuicide is dependent upon the availability of the means to provide for its initiation. It was because of the corruptibility of the Mandarin elite as well as the promotion of opium by British trading interests that the means did become available to the Chinese. The elite not only provides for the cultural predisposing conditions necessary for the occurrence of genosuicide. The elite also has a great deal to do with the provision of the precipitory factors necessary for the actual initiation of genosuicide.

During the course of the development of the Ch'ing Dynasty means other than opium had been made available to the Chinese inclusive of Christianity that could well have alleviated their condition of anxiety as experienced in a socio-cultural condition of unrest. Christianity however was finally rejected and forbidden in China by the Mandarins. It is essential that we consider the reasons that would have led to such a rejection. Christianity it might be said constituted a threat to the Mandarins' exclusive power over Chinese society. However, the opium trade represented such a threat as well. Opium and the trade surrounding it promised to satisfy the growing corruptibility of the Mandarins. Christianity on the other hand could offer nothing but the denial of the Chinese ideological consensus over the Confucian tenents.
Hundreds of thousands of Chinese converted to Christianity especially in the latter half of the seventeenth century. This was a time when major social inconsistencies in China were just beginning to be experienced.

The Jesuits came, as did a great many other foreigners from Macao, and Catholicism in China enjoyed a boom: in 1640 the total number of converts was between 60,000 and 70,000 and by 1651 it had risen to 150,000. 178

Christianity provided a means to alleviate general social anxiety in a time of great unrest. Its popularity was indicative of the deterioration and inapplicability of Confucianism and the need of the Chinese to regain a sense of identity and a more meaningful system of values and norms by which they could conduct their lives. If Christianity was popular and obviously satisfied certain needs on the part of the population, why was it not allowed to flourish?

Christianity, while serving to alleviate the fears of a society caught in the turbulences of dramatic social unrest, provided nothing of benefit to the elite of that society. The Christian missionaries made no attempt to appease the growing corruptibility of the Mandarin elite, while at the same time constituting a threat and an incursion upon the stable docility of the traditional Confucian way of life. Consequently, in 1721 the Manchu Emperor, Yung-cheng made the statement that...

China has her religions and the Western world has its religions. Western religions need not propagate in China just as Chinese religions may not prevail in the Western world. 179

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178 Hiis, Immanuel; The Rise of Modern China (Oxford University Press; London; 1970) P. 133

179 Li-Shou-k'ung in Ibid; P. 139
The Mandarins continued to maintain opposition to the influx of Christian influence in China and by 1773 the moving spirit of Catholicism in China was gone.

It was not the Chinese population that rejected Christianity as a means of 'self-strengthening' (tzu-ch'iang). The Mandarin elite rejected Christianity. The Mandarins continued to reject Christian influences even while some of them actively participated in the opium trade.

The Mandarins' fear of Christianity threatening their monolithic domination over China grew to such a point that they actively initiated the ruthless murders of many nuns and priests. One rather glaring incident stands out in this respect, which occurred during the early stages of the opium trade when the Catholic missionaries were again trying to exert their influence in China. The Mandarins to counteract the possible appeal of the missionaries to the Chinese population spread rumors that at Tientsin, the French Sisters of Charity who ran an orphanage there, cut out the children's eyes and hearts to make various medicines. In this fashion the Mandarins were able to stir up mob uprisings against the few missionaries entering Canton.

On June 21, the Consul was attacked by the mob and had a spear thrust into his side. He appealed for help to the Mandarin...the Mandarin shook his head and said, 'It's no business of mine.' Later, close to panic, the Consul opened fire with his revolver on the mob and tried to shoot the Mandarin who jumped behind his servant so that the servant was killed instead. Before the day was out, with the Consul and his Chancellor had been killed and sixteen nuns had been hacked to pieces in their mission and then thrown into the flames. 180

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180 Hibbert, Christopher; The Dragon Wakes (Harper and Row Publishers; New York; 1970) P. 309.
At the same time such aggressive acts were being conducted under the guidance of the Mandarins this same elite group was accepting squeeze from the British for allowing opium to be smuggled into China.

Genosuicide as it occurred in the Ch'ing Dynasty was initiated under the directing influence of the Mandarins. The Mandarin elite were responsible not only for the provision of the cultural predisposing conditions for the occurrence of genosuicide, but also provided the means to initiate it. The choice of opium as a genosuicidal means was dependent on the corruptibility of the Chinese elite as well as the predisposing conditions which facilitated its demand by the Chinese population; conditions which were ultimately created by the elite themselves. The choice of the means of genosuicide is dependent upon the benefits such means shall have to the elite grouping. If the opium was not profitable to the Mandarins it would not have been allowed entrance into China, as for example Christianity was forbidden. Opium was chosen because of its profitability to the Mandarins regardless of the consequences of its widespread use. For the monolithic Mandarin elite, the only consequences with which they concerned themselves was their own enhancement. Opium promised such enhancement.

Additionally we must deal with the influence of the Chinese elite on the quick increase and spread of opium use in China during this period. We must take into consideration the inter-relationship between the Manchu elite structure and particular dynamics of collective behavior. As it has been defined here,
opium use in this period constituted a mass behavioral response to a condition of cultural petrification. Opium use as a means of inner-modification was facilitated by the lack of alternatives to initiate the outer-modification of the Chinese social situation. The Mandarin elite had determined such a lack of alternatives through their determination to maintain the traditional state of affairs.

Alternatives which were denied to the Chinese population as means to alleviate a condition of social unrest and anxiety including the possibility to develop social movements. Social movements typically allow for the channelling of anxieties and provide for the possibility of collectively resolving them. Genosuicide generally, opium use specifically, must be understood in relation to the inability of Chinese society to generate or be permitted to generate social movements. The Mandarin elite was responsible for the continued struggle against the development of social movements in the Ch'ing Dynasty. The fierce extended struggles against such movements as the 'Nien Rebels' is ample proof of this fact.

Within the context of collective behavior, genosuicide might be understood as a mass behavioral response to generate a lasting rival leadership which could initiate a social movement; providing morale, ideology and a general program of action. Any aspiring leader or leadership group was quickly denied recognition and disposed of by the Mandarins. The development of alternative ideologies was a near impossibility during this period. Without social movements within which the Chinese might partici-
pate, their anxieties remained free-floating, unrelated to any specific cause. Genosuicide is an example of mass behavior; a heterogeneous, widely distributed and diffuse collection of people reacting to a common stimulus of social unrest in a common fashion - the using of opium.

A society experiencing a condition of social unrest becomes easily suggestible to any and all means to alleviate such a condition. The more intensive a condition of social unrest develops, the more desperate the members of the society in question become in searching for means of alleviating it. The more intense such desperation becomes in turn, the more the individuals involved will act upon suggestions, for example the use of opium, which in normal conditions they would not even consider. Social contagion, a collective behavioral consequence of social unrest allows for the quick dispersal and common utilization of suggestions acted upon out of desperation.

An elite is responsible for the emergence and guidance of a social movement. Conversely, an elite is also responsible for the suppression of social movements in the attempt to preserve its own interests and what it considers to be the interests of the society as a whole. Genocide may constitute the means whereby a social movement attempts to realize its goals as they have been defined by an elite. Ultimately the occurrence of genocide is suggested, planned and directed by the elite of a social movement. Genocide constitutes a means by which the anxiety of the in-group may be resolved. Genosuicide results on the other hand, when an elite prevents the emergence of a social
movement. Genosuicide is a means by which anxiety, as experienced by a large number of people is alleviated.

The factors contributory to the processes of genosuicide are mutually interdependent. Their mutual interdependence must be reviewed and comprehended within an analytical framework that recognizes their dynamic systemic interaction. Together, these contributory factors and their dynamic interaction with one another may be defined as a socio-cultural rhythm. The existence and operation of such a socio-cultural rhythm may be said, as indicated by the evidence provided here, to be noticeably contributory to the degeneration of a socio-cultural super-system. It was found that this socio-cultural rhythm, consisting of the factors of a dominant elite, cultural petrification and genosuicide had an influential part in facilitating the decline of the socio-cultural system of Confucian China.

This thesis has shown that the use of opium by the Chinese in the nineteenth century was not simply the consequence of the imposition of opium on the Chinese by the British. The often commonly held view that the use of opium by the Chinese during the Ch'ing Dynasty was a result of the Chinese being forcibly coerced into such drug use is, in the least, a partial distortion of the historical facts as well as an underestimation of the socio-cultural dynamics and rhythms as they were operating within Chinese society at the time. The Chinese, especially the Mandarin elite contributed effectively to their own victimization. The Opium Wars were necessitated in order to eliminate the inconveniences created by a minority of Mandarins who opposed the opium trade. The predisposition on the part of the Chinese population
to use opium was not created by the British trading interests but rather by the cultural consequences of a monolithic elite group. The precipitory factor to genosuicide was the easy availability of opium due largely to the British promotion of the drug and the active cooperation of the Mandarins in the opium trade. The Mandarin elite was shown to have forcibly prevented all means of outer-modification in the denial of anxiety and social unrest; a consequence of cultural petrification as it is determined by a dominant elite structure. Opium use was understood to be a means of inner-modification indicative of the processes of genosuicide.

The hypothesis which was tested in this thesis through the examination of opium use in the Ch'ing Dynasty states:

A society characterized by cultural petrification and dominated by a non-creative elite, might resort to genosuicide as a consequence of inner-modification when outer-modification in the forms of aggression, conquest or genocidicide is impossible.

It was found that the Ch'ing Dynasty was characterized by a condition of cultural petrification. Also it was shown to be dominated by a non-creative elite grouping, the Mandarins. The Mandarins had forcibly prevented outer-modification of Chinese society in their attempts to maintain the traditional Confucian way of life and socio-cultural arrangements. Individuals within Chinese society resorted to inner-modification through the use of opium. Opium use was understood to be symptomatic of genosuicide. The means to initiate genosuicide were promoted by the British as well as the elite particular to this period.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this thesis, it
was found that the hypothesis as stated here is valid. The hypothesis ought to be accepted with respect to the occurrence of genosuicide in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

This thesis has deliberately limited the occurrence of genosuicide to the Ch'ing Dynasty. This does not mean to say that this mass behavioral phenomenon is limited exclusively to this period. Nor does it mean to say that the contributory factors to the occurrence of genosuicide, inclusive of particular elite characteristics or the condition of cultural petrification have occurred solely in this particular historical epoch.

The examination of genosuicide in the Ch'ing Dynasty provides a basic framework of analysis for examining the possibilities of the emergence of the contributing conditions necessary for the occurrence of genosuicide in other historical epochs and divergent social situations. By comparing other socio-cultural supersystems to the Ch'ing Dynasty, the sociologist may possibly be able to estimate whether or not the processes of genosuicide were, or are in operation in the socio-cultural supersystem under examination. Equally as important, by being aware of the contributary conditions to the occurrence of genosuicide, the sociologist may be able to estimate the possibilities of the emergence of genosuicide in the future in contemporary socio-cultural supersystems. A knowledge of the dynamics particular to genosuicide would be useful in the prevention or even in the rechannelling of the conditions contributory to the emergence in societies at present.
It is important also that the sociologist consider in a critical fashion to what extent there is a link between current drug use in North American post-industrial society and the use of opium in the Ch'ing Dynasty. The sociologist must begin to estimate to what extent the contributory conditions to Chinese opium use in the nineteenth century are similar to, or differ from, the contributory conditions to drug use today in North America. It is in the consideration of the negative implications which opium use held for the Ch'ing Dynasty that the examination of drug use in North America and the weighing of its possible relation to the processes of genosuicide appears both as a necessary and urgent task for the sociologist.
EPILOGUE: A HEURISTIC CONSIDERATION OF SOME FACILITATING FACTORS LEADING TO DRUG USE IN MODERN NORTH AMERICAN POST - INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY.
The conclusions that have been made in this thesis leaves us with an open-ended question as it is related to the use of drugs and the subsequent implications of genosuicide within the modern North American post-industrial context. If we may understand the fact which Ernest Becker has stated that

...the real problem of the human condition is terror of death and the need for heroic transcendence... 181

then we must admit to the necessity of analyzing the extent to which North American society is able to provide for such effectual means of heroic transcendence. Drug use cannot and must not be separated from the inability of a society to provide such symbolic means. Recalling however the use of opium in China, we have observed the consequences of drug use as a euphoric prelude to a fundamental reorganization of traditional Chinese society. One is unable to contain the thought that possibly there is a connection here with our own circumstances; indicative of the course of events to follow in the future.

We stand now in the midst of a sort of severe mental epidemic; of a sort of black death of degeneration and hysteria, and it is natural that we should ask seriously on all sides: 'What is to come next?' 182

It is to this question which the sociologist of culture must now respond or at least attempt to elicit a response.

It is necessary to consider the sociological factors within the modern North American post-industrial context that would facilitate the use of drugs. The more general and tentative theoretical considerations to be outlined here, hopefully shall


182 Nordau, Max; Degeneration (Howard Fertig; New York; 1968) P. 537.
provide a basic framework for future empirical verification. It attempts merely to suggest some specific sociological interrelationships in relation to drug use, as it occurs in North America. As consequence of the possible far reaching implications of these interrelationships, it is felt that they might require more serious consideration by sociologists in the development of a comprehensive explanation of contemporary drug use and abuse; demanding further systematic and detailed empirical investigation.

The foregoing analysis shall utilize various cultural critiques of modern North America post-industrial society. These critiques are not provided here as evidence or as a means of empirical verification. Simply, they are presented and synthesized in a wholistic manner in the attempts to suggest a possible theoretical and conceptual framework with which we may begin to consider and evaluate the occurrence of drug use in North America. The development widespread use of drugs in China during the Ch'ing Dynasty and the consequences and implications of such drug use as they have been noted in this thesis, necessitates that we at least begin in a completely heuristic fashion to put the use of drugs in North America within a critical and comprehensive sociological perspective.

The cultural critiques relied upon in this analysis take for the large part, a notable ideological position in their evaluation of modern North American post-industrial society. The validity of such an ideological position is open to criticism as of course it should be. This position as expressed in these various critiques views that modern post-industrial
society must be studied within a political and economic context. It recognizes that post-industrial society is dependent upon the processes of mass production and mass consumption for its maintenance and perpetuation as a socio-economic system. In this regard, this particular ideological perspective, as it will be expressed here, takes into consideration the technical means as well as specific elite interest groups which might aid in the maintenance and legitimization of these processes of production and consumption. It also takes into consideration the possible interrelationships that might exist between the character of North American popular culture and the objective processes of post-industrial society. Its evaluations of 'popular culture' are essentially negative. This perspective has been most notably elaborated upon and defined by various members of the Frankfurt school. As a result of the apparent growing popularity of this perspective within the discipline of contemporary sociology, it is essential that it be both recognized as well as, where ever possible, criticized.

The systematic and logical collection of empirical data in any sociological inquiry is dependent upon theoretical frameworks which provide both direction as well as justification for the collection and correlation of such data. The foregoing analysis constitutes an attempt to provide such a necessary theoretical framework in respect to the explanation of contemporary drug use in North America. The empirical verification of sociological interrelationships presupposes the suggestion that they exist as possibilities requiring such verification. This discussion is comprised of suggestions of such possibilities.
The use of drugs historically, as a cultural phenomenon, has not been restricted simply to China. At present we are living within a cultural situation of which most notable feature is the increasing use of drugs. The modern North American post-industrial society has been described as the 'addicted society'. The causes of such compulsiveness could possibly be seen as being rooted in the social conduct and norms of the society at large; a society of the compulsive consumption of fetishized commodities. The society of the 'spectacle'.

The spectacle is the moment when the commodity has attained the total occupation of social life. The spectacle related to the commodity is not invisible, but one no longer sees anything but it; the world one sees is its world. Modern economic production extends its dictatorship extensively and intensively. 183

Our own society may be such, that social space becomes commodity space; becomes the totality of commodity production and consumption. It is within such a social context of absolute commodity production that we might view the process of reification where objective conditions and subjective motivations can no longer be differentiated or understood separately. Reification itself is expressed by the loss of meaningful activity in the increasing rationalization and mechanization of the productive process. All thought and motivation is assimilated to the dictates and constraints of the work-day.

183 Debord, Guy; Society of the Spectacle (Black & Red Publications; 'unauthorized; Detroit; 1970) P. 42.
Culture As Commodity

The movement towards the banalization of the human self might be understood as being synonymous with the rhythmic movement of the machine.

Reified man advertises the proof of his intimacy with the commodity as in the convulsions or miracles of the old religious fetishism, the fetishism of the commodity sometimes reaches moments of fervent exaltation. The only use which is still expressed here is the fundamental use of submission. 184

Such exaltation is expressed in every facet of post-industrial existence. The commodity is that which we produce and forms the essential portion of our daily activity. It is also that to which we turn for personal gratification, self-esteem and identity. Constantly expanding stockpiles of goods and services are legitimized by a complementary super-structure of values and norms which emphasize personal gratification through acquisition. A massive substructure of compulsive production is complemented by a mass culture of compulsive consumption.

The reality of post-industrial society is an immediate one; the immediacy of the gratification of needs which themselves have their own developmental dynamic. This dynamic might be rooted in the maintenance of the production system itself.

At its best, mass culture threatens not merely to cretinize our taste but to brutalize our senses while paving the way to totalitarianism. 185

The processes possibly inherent in the all-encompassing devel-

184 Ibid; P. 67.

185 Rosenberg, Bernard, 'Mass Culture in America' in Rosenberg, Bernard and White, David Manning (eds); Mass Culture (The Free Press; New York; 1951) P. 5.
opment of mass culture (more so in the west) are those of vulgarization. Popular culture might have the tendency to translate and transform any language, any ideology and system of ethics or any art form into the banal. Within such banality we ourselves would define our own life essences and meaning. The mass media itself and other subsidiary branches of popular entertainment and literature, all of which have a definite dependency upon commercial sponsorship, may promote and reaffirm a largely unthinking allegiance to the dictates of mass productivity - the propaganda of irrationalism.
2. Symptoms of Cultural Decline

The evaluation of the socio-cultural reality of modern North American post-industrial society is for some, necessarily a negative one.

We...arrive at an evaluation of such phenomena, but it is an evaluation based on the conditions of the social process that appear as symptoms of 'decline' in a civilization. 186

Such a decline has been understood in terms of the transformation of the imagination of the Enlightenment. It constitutes the transformation of an imagination of critical self-reflection, to the imagination of the passive commodity form. This is what is meant by the industrialization of culture. Simply, cultural meaning and activity, it would appear at least to certain theorists, have been assimilated to the imperatives of machine production, market organization and bureaucratic power.

The very notion of a mass culture presupposes a material capacity on the part of those in command of the cultural market, to treat large publics as composed of cultural consumers-themselves incapable of organizing in their own interests. 187

To maintain the norms of individuality as defined by a collectivity reified post-industrial society, to be a part of it, '...is to live without purpose, to worship platitudes and empty truths ...'; 188 truths that is, as defined by commodity production

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186 Reich, Wilhelm; The Mass Psychology of Fascism (Farrar, Straus and Giroux; New York; 1971) P. 85.
188 Rubinsonoff, Lionel; The Pornography of Power (Quadrangle Books; Chicago; 1967) P. 183.
and marketing. Even sexuality may not have been excluded from such processes where the objective loss of meaningful and intimate human relationships is tranquilized by 'their endless and meaningless pursuit'. A mutilated ego knows only the methods of mutilation and distortion. Such fractured egos could well be the anomic consequence of living under the shadow of the apocalyptic spectacle of the commodity form.
3. The Refusal and The Collective Search For Identity

It is only in the last few decades that we have viewed some cautious, confused, and erratic attempts aimed at the rejection of this one-dimensional reality. This rebellion culminating in the developments of a 'counter-culture' in the early 1960's was not solely formed and directed by the 'wretched' - by those who were denied active participation in the self-contained and self-perpetuating categories of commodity fetishism. Noticeable participants in such a counter-culture were also those who had a full and easy access to the channels of success and material gratification as related to their middle-class origins. The new radicalism of the 1960's did not have a distinctive and uniform political, economic, class, or racial motivational base. On the contrary, it was characterized by a hopeless intermingling of all such disparate causes.

It had a sociology, no doubt; but there was no generally understood ideology that could state its premises or stake out its objectives and program - legitimate or otherwise.189

The question remains then why a whole generation, composed not only of the deprived and the inhabitants of the slums but also educated middle-class youths, responded to a society - supposedly able to reproduce itself and maintain its legitimacy ad infinitum, by a collective rejection of this reified totality of thought and experience?

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Orrin Klapp has proposed that the variety, incongruity and diffuseness of the rebellion of the 60's was symptomatic of a general quest for identity on the part of the youth of America. As he sees it, the cultural-symbolic sphere traditionally defining the function and purpose of advanced industrial society was insufficient to contain various groups of individuals who could find neither self-worth or a heroic sense of meaning within such a manipulated symbolic universe. Possibly one might view that equally parallel in weight and importance to the economic and political inconsistencies of an advanced stage of North American post-industrial society, to which the new radicalism was a direct response, were also identity problems or contradictions of identity. Problems that is, of self-meaning and self-esteem.

The vagueness and erratic nature of the means of action and articulation undertaken by these various groups at the time is illustrative of a confusion of goals and lack of knowledge on the part of the participants of how to grasp them. This however does not even begin to explain the use of drugs in North America today. What it may possibly illustrate in any case is a state of cultural stagnancy as related to the characterizing condition of North American post-industrial society, being in turn a tentative reflection of cultural petrification. The counter-culture might be understood in this sense as a particularized reaction to such petrification. However, in order to empirically verify that North American society today is characterized by a condition of cultural petrification, one would have to account for the more
progressive trends within this cultural situation, inclusive of technological developments as well as the increasing extension of social welfare benefits. Such progressive developments are facts which any future 'culture critique' of North American post-industrial society must seriously contend with, in the explanation of the possibilities of the emergence of cultural petrification.
4. General Cultural Predisposing Factors Contributing to Drug Use

The contradictory conditions and events that might have led to such a state of identity crisis shall be briefly outlined here as they relate or might be seen as possible predisposing factors leading to drug use within a North American context. A major contributory factor to such a condition has been referred to by some as 'psychic numbing through stimulus flooding'. A notable feature of our own popular culture is the continual blanketing of diffuse and contradictory information by various forms of media of communication.

Our experience, from childhood onward, with the constantly flickering images and sounds of television, radio, films, newspapers, paperbacks, neon signs, advertisements and sound tracks numbs us to the sights and sounds of our civilization. 190

A generalized, continuous and almost uninterrupted exposure to a massive influx of different ideological, religious, cultural and philosophical orientations might numb us in their tempo or quantity, to be able to differentiate the unique spiritual and intellectual values of each one. It becomes difficult to personally identify with a particular philosophic, religious or ideological world view in such a society.

As a result of the close connection between an intensive network of communication and the processes of mass production, our own socio-cultural situation could very well be able to constantly provide and manufacture new ideas as they are related

to our needs. Such needs may be only in turn satisfied by the commodity form. Similarly, the easy availability of moments of high passion, tragedy, joy, exaltation, sadness as expressed in the films, on television and in the more popular and sensationalist forms of literature might often result in the psychic numbing of our own emotions. The consequence of these processes might be a whole population which is....

Continuously looking for some new way to overcome their emotional starvation, these are the prototypes of the... restless American consumer, always receptive to new fads and fashions, to new products and models - and to new tranquillizers and pain-killers. 191

The easy availability of the ecstatic, sublime and the sensational within the confines of a post-industrial mass culture could add noticeably to the confusion between happiness and despair, the authentic and the superficial and even between art and entertainment.

The ultimate reason for such existential confusion, confusion of life-meaning could possibly be attributed to, or at least linked with a mass production and marketing system. A system which itself, it appears, can only differentiate between what will sell profitably and quickly and what will not. This might in fact be a more fundamental criteria in the defining of life-meaning itself for our own socio-cultural system. A paradox has been noted in the description here of popular culture as repressive or stagnant, as it immediately impresses one with the fact that it is uninhibited and progressive. Such a paradox is denied credibility when one considers that possibly the commercialized

191 Baran, Paul & Sweezy, Paul; Monopoly Capital (Modern Reader Paperback; New York; 1966) P. 359.
rampant and clinical sensuality upon which the advertising spectacle is based and a loud repetition of noise as found in popular musical forms are attempts to rechannel the dissatisfaction of unused capacities and repressed individualities.

In response to the barrage of sound, image and conceptual stimulation that we confront every waking hour of our lives, we construct 'thresholds' or systems of defense with which we protect ourselves from over-stimulation and over-excitement. In this manner we are able to maintain some sense of self-control as well as meaning. However, it would seem that this protective shield could be insufficient to ward-off estrangement; a possible product and definitive category of popular culture.

All mass media in the end alienate people from personal experience and, though appearing to offset it, intensify their moral isolation from each other. From reality and from themselves. 192

Kenneth Keniston describes, the continual flooding of stimulation to which modern populations are subjected is not only related to the psychological constraints and institutional pressures that aid in the perpetuation of such estrangement. Also one might relate such estrangement and numbing to the nature and possibilities of experience provided by, and particular to, certain dynamics of reproduction inherent within the more intense levels of material production and consumption of monopoly capitalism.

Drugs, as related to these processes of psychic numbing, might be understood as a synthetic attempt to provide for its

192 Haag, Ernest van den; 'Of Happiness and Of Despair We Have No Measure' in Casty, Alan (ed); Mass Media and Mass Man (Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc.; New York; 1968) P. 5.
elimination. Drug use is a response that is neither out of the cultural context of this socio-economic system and is not itself exempt from the directive dictates of production and marketing.

Another dominant feature of this society which must be included in this analysis is that of affluence. The easy accessibility of relative affluence for the modern North American middle class provides this class with an opportunity to re-evaluate the purpose of hard work, abstinence and self-control; making it in the same moment possible to conceive of, and establish new cultures of leisure and systems of values. Mass production provides for new and continuous possibilities for the satisfaction of life meaning.

As work, success and achievement decline in relative importance, new values are beginning to replace them, and new patterns of consumption are beginning already to reflect these new values. As getting ahead in the world no longer reaffirms to define the meaning of life, today advantaged students turn increasingly to explore other meanings of life.193

Automatic affluence then, means that many of those who experience abundance as routine, attempt to create goals that transcend the boredom, and self-alienation of affluence. The individual is faced with a mass culture of compulsive consumption, a function of the irrationalism of advanced industrial production.

As a result of a growing area of leisure time allocated to the work-year, the syndrome of 'not knowing what to do' merely accentuates the inner-sterility of one's own personal life and life chances. Affluence itself has created the conditions

193 Keniston, Kenneth; 'Heads & Seekers: Drugs on Campus'; Op Cit; P. 133
necessary for its contemplation - free leisure time. The constant pre-occupation of the middle class individual of this society with 'time-filling' activities (everything from monopoly to golf) is itself indicative of a quest for the... release from the tension which binds his own life - energy, his Eros, and makes psychic pain the common denominator of his experience with other human beings.\textsuperscript{194}

An individual might not achieve satisfaction to this sense of inner-sterility and psychic impoverishment through the normally prescribed channels legitimized by this social system. Feeling oneself in such a dilemma it is quite possible that one will turn to other alternatives which are not difficult to obtain.

A significant condition of post-industrial society which possibly could also facilitate drug use is the state of social and political disenchantment. The traditional American liberal ideas of democratic America became quite inconsistent and unapplicable in the late 50's and early 60's, with the actual social, economic and political conditions of the country itself. This was a period of foreign intervention, racial strife and anti-war protests. A decade which began with liberal optimism in ascendance, ended with liberalism in disarray. Long neglected terms of 'racism', 'monopoly capitalism' and 'imperialism' began to re-enter the language of political debate and concern. Political and racial assassination, the adoption of extensive

\textsuperscript{194}Calvert, Greg and Neiman, Carol; \textit{A Disrupted History: The New Left and The New Capitalism} (Random House; New York; 1971) P. 112.
policies of military intervention to implement foreign policy, the contests of strength within the civil rights movement—these were the events which aided in the destruction of the liberal illusion. Daniel Bell had pronounced the 'end of ideology' when ideological debate was to characterize and fashion a distinct social movement—the New Left.

We cannot however, trace the phenomenal growth of student drug use directly to such perceptions of basic inconsistencies in North American society nor to the War in Vietnam. The overriding and widespread disenchantment that such provocative events provided might be tentatively considered as a necessary predisposing condition contributing to drug use.

5. Repressive Tolerance and Cultural Petrification

The search for alternatives to a socio-economic system that is able to produce Disneyland and the atomic bomb with the same fervor and enthusiasm has tended it appears, to follow at least two specific and interrelated courses of action and non-action. The first and most politically significant of these courses has been exemplified in the sporadic development of a quasi-militant movement among the student populations; organizing conspicuously within a framework that has been referred to as the New Left.

The New Left grew out of the new conditions of post World War II America - the affluent society, the lonely crowd, the silent generation of the 1950's...it had prophetic forerunners in the Beat Generation...196

The development of the New Left was paralleled by the emergence of a number of dissatisfied minority groups who were equally as 'militant in their organization and intentions. The militancy of the New Left and certain racial minorities, was short-lived. Such militancy erupted noticeably in Detroit in 1967 in which 1300 buildings were razed and 2700 businesses were looted. Such events as these expressed

...the alienated spirit of a mass of have-nots sharing a subculture of poverty; that there was an emotional satisfaction in...destruction for its own sake...197

This ravaging militancy was as equally brutally suppressed. The techniques of crowd and riot control grew to the proportion of a science. Students were shot on campuses. The Black Panther

196 Calvert, Greg and Neiman, Carol; The New Left and the New Capitalism; Op Cit; P. 11.

Party emerged from the ghettos and was quickly forced back. Unorganized or organized violence was not a competitive force with an organized state machine; a machine of organized technical violence, arrest and imprisonment.

The Democratic Convention of 1968 was an example of the confrontation of militant interests with a state power that refused to consider alternatives to the cultural, political, economic and social order. Thousands of McCarthy supporters were beaten and gassed by police and riot squads in the streets.

Moreover, the maintenance of extensive internal police forces constitutes a continuing institutional preparation for violence; there is clearly no evidence that in terms of efficiency or readiness to intervene, the role of such forces has diminished in industrial societies. 198

The existence and quantity of such organized preparations for violence is a distinguishing feature of modern post-industrial society as it is of most social systems. Such preparation is indicative of the sincerity and determination of this social system to maintain itself despite internal or external opposition.

Our society has been defined by some as a social system which perpetuates the irrationalities of poverty and estrangement, loss of personal integrity and self-esteem on the one hand and which on the other, rigidly enforces and allows no alteration of the established routes conventionally used to attain its chosen goals, regardless of what it leaves behind or in its wake. As Marcuse illustrates for example, the liberal tolerance which is conspicuously displayed within this society is a facade for its...

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underlying basis of 'repressive tolerance'.

The question that must be asked and examined in an empirical fashion in the future, is whether such a social system, as described here is a petrified one. It would seem true that from a general level of observation there would tend to exist certain coercive constraints inhibiting social change. A condition of cultural petrification presupposes that the socio-cultural system in question was relatively free of such coercive ideological and structural constraints prior to its entering upon a state of petrification. The truth of this can only be ascertained by extended detailed historical and comparative sociological analysis; comparing the characterizing socio-cultural conditions of the past to those conditions as they define themselves presently.
Any sociological consideration of the possibilities of the emergence of cultural petrification within modern North American post-industrial society would have to note the relationships between the characteristics of its elite structure to the nature and content of popular culture as it exists in North America today. Further, it would be necessary to estimate the interrelationship between popular culture and the systems of production and consumption and by what means this interrelationship is maintained and in whose interest it serves.

In this regard it is of fundamental necessity and importance for any sociological analysis to note the extent of the interconnected dynamics of cultural manipulation and the enthusiastic participation of the mass of people in those systems of manipulation. The understanding of this intimate and most often, extremely subtle interrelationship could well be a necessary prerequisite for providing a relevant culture critique which takes into consideration the intricate techniques of social psychological coercion. However, such an orientation can form only one portion of a relevant and comprehensive critique of popular culture. We must not underestimate the importance of the role of particular elite groupings which might be responsible for the articulation and initiation of the cultural definitions which extensively dominate our social milieu. There exists the possibility that popular culture itself is a necessary and
functional complement to the processes of production and consumption particular to this socio-economic system; that is to say popular culture might operate as a means to ensure the stability and further advancement of advanced industrial society. Also we must consider those groupings of elites, who direct these modes of production and consumption and who, as a group could ultimately benefit from their continuation and expansion.

It is necessary to critically recognize the possibility of the intertwining of industrial interests with cultural monopolies and the elite formations that dominate both spheres.

In our age of objective social tendency is incarnate in the hidden subjective purposes of company directors, the foremost among whom are in the most powerful sectors of industry—steel, petroleum, electricity and chemicals. Culture monopolies are weak and dependent in comparison. They cannot afford to neglect their appeasement to real holders of power if their sphere of activity in mass society...is not to undergo a series of purges. The dependence of the most powerful broadcasting company on the electrical industry, or of the motion picture industry in the banks, is characteristic of the whole sphere, whose individual branches, are themselves economically interwoven. 199

Most importantly it is essential to critically consider the possible interdependencies between popular culture, the economic systems of production and consumption and the elite groups (corporate, scientific and military) that might dominate, control and direct these social and economic processes. This elite grouping or stratum who, in the interests of maintaining the stability of this socio-economic system and ensuring which the security

and legitimacy of their own positions rest, could well under-
stand that the maintenance and perpetuation of the systems of
production and consumption is a necessity. Popular culture in
this sense could satisfy such a necessary requirement. The
activities, forms and categories of contemporary popular cul-
ture have been understood as contributing not the the development
of a self-aware and critical public but to its opposite - a poli-
tically and culturally passive mass. For this reason we must
empirically estimate whether popular culture in North America
is indeed synonymous with cultural petrification. This must be
the task of future sociological inquiry.

Dominant elites have been historically responsible for the
maintenance of stagnant cultural formations and the negation of
progressive cultural continuity. By utilizing Mannheim's
evaluatory schema of elites we shall be better able to at least
begin to determine relationships that might exist between the
ruling elite of modern North American society and the nature of
the cultural developments (or lack of them) which characterize the
present period. By applying Mannheim's schema here, we may
tentatively and in a heuristic fashion evaluate the level of
dominance of this elite stratum and relate its specific effects
on cultural formation and development; that is its specific
effects on cultural continuity or discontinuity.

It must be emphasized here that such a generalized analy-
sis of the contemporary North American elite structure as will
be provided here, does not constitute complete and emperically
verifiable evidence. Rather it is meant to constitute a theor-
etical framework which future empirical analyses might begin with and use as a guide in the collection of relevant data. Many of the generalizations made here concerning contemporary North American elite structures and characteristics are based on short-term empirical investigations. These generalizations must be considered and examined further by sociologists in the future in the establishment of a comprehensive understanding of elites in North America.
1. The Mode of Selection By Which North American Elites are Recruited From the Masses

If one reviews critically, the western democracies of the present day the question arises as to the extent of the circulation of the members of the elites. These elite groupings have been viewed by some sociologists as being recruited from a set and fixed reservoir of individuals - an upper class. Essentially...

...the levelling of conditions has gone on so slowly that the rulers are still very sharply distinguished, economically and socially from the ruled.

Arguments have been made that there exists in North America, distinctive and influential elites that are ultimately tied to corporate interests. Moreover, it has been suggested that such elites, fortified by the liberal myth of the free enterprise system are relatively free to render authoritative decisions on questions effecting the nation's well-being. Also it has been asserted that this elite is a relatively small, closed and self-perpetuating grouping in possession of most of the decision-making apparatus in business and in government. Such suggested possibilities as these must be more seriously considered and analyzed.

Although America is a nation of more than 200 million people, no more than a few thousand play a direct role in governing the society and no more than several hundred occupy the critical command posts in the nation's economy. The liberal notion of businessmen and general corporate interests being remote from political affairs in American society might greatly underestimate their objective historical role in determining the policy and social directions of American society.

In the United States, businessmen were in fact the largest single occupational group in cabinets from 1889 to 1949: of the total number of cabinet members... more than 60% were businessmen of one sort or another. To be able to begin to understand the possibility of the predominance of business interests in the various and more significantly important institutions of the state system one must review the economic and social hierarchies outside that system.

Children born of upper-class and upper-middle class parents might have a vastly better chance of access than lower-class children to the necessary life opportunities, i.e., education and training, which are required for the achievement of elite positions in the democratic state system. Greatly unequal opportunities in education also are reflected in the class origins of those individuals in the lower state service. Unfortunately today when one hears so much being made of democracy, equality, social mobility, classlessness and equality of opportunity, it could very well be true that the vast majority of men and women have been officially 'represented and governed, administered, judged and commanded' by groupings of persons drawn from privileged and economically and socially superior segments of society.

It is for this reason that when we trace the patterning of elite circulation we might assign little significance to the role of elections - by these conditions the electorate is limited in its choices.


There exists the distinct possibility that heads of giant corporations are in turn political elites. There is also reason to believe that leaders of these immense corporate complexes significantly influence societal values directly and in the short run. The ruling elite hierarchy in North America, may not be based solely on personal or family relations among the members of the ruling class. On the contrary, it might also be fortified by a massive network of institutional relations. Of paramount importance in this connection are the corporate giants; with divisions, branches and subsidiaries reaching out to all corners of the country. The question that one must necessarily ask here is:

In a political system where nearly every adult may vote but where knowledge, wealth, social access to officials and other resources are unequally distributed who actually governs? 203

The end result of such a situation (if this situation may be empirically substantiated) would be a society dominated no longer by independent owners but by cliques of industrial and political leaders. Social, economic, political and cultural development would be determined then, not by the mass of average men but by cliques of leaders at the various levels of command in the economy and the state.

There is grounds to believe that there might also exist an intimate connection between family background and the possibilities of access to elite positions in the modern North American post-industrial society. For example, in the political elite in the United States...

Six out of ten of the 500-odd men who have come to the top of the government during the course of United States history have come from quite prosperous family circumstances; ... 20% are from the distinctly upper class of landed wealth, big merchants, industrialists, financiers of nation wide prominence, or professional families of great wealth and national standing; 20% are from the prosperous upper-middle class of farmers, and professionals who although not of national stature nevertheless were quite a successful or prominent in their respective localities.

These families, which are among the upper 5% or 6% of the American population, can well afford to give their children distinct advantages contributing towards the selection and pursuit of their careers. Such figures as these, cited above, provide the grounds to consider the fact that there might exist a highly intensive process of bounded and self-contained selection of individuals for elite positions in American society. In this respect the fluidity of the circulation of elites would be greatly retarded. So too, would the possibility for alternative ideological or administrative policy development be significantly prevented.

All general public policy would in this regard be then oriented, because of the social and economic backgrounds and interests of the policy-makers themselves (especially over the long run) in the direction which is fundamentally in line with major business and corporate interests - even when these interests are in conflict with other social goals. If there is government intervention in the corporate economy so too might there be corporate intervention in the government process.

\[\text{104} \text{Mills, C. Wright; The Power Elite (Oxford University Press; New York; 1959) pp. 400-401.}\]
...one wonders if it is actually possible for leaders to possess a realistic view of our society when, day after day, at home, in the office and the club their most intimate social relations are limited to contact with a homogeneous caste of men exactly like themselves. 205

Such elite exclusiveness and restricted selectivity, if it is true in actual fact would only lead then to the elite's resentment, unconscious fears and suspicions of change or of new ideas. Another major factor to be considered as possibly contributing to the denial of fluid elite circulation is the opportunity for education and the significance that prestigious educational institutions hold for elite circulation.

It has been considered by some sociologists that one of the major channels of access to the governing elite in North America, apart from family origins itself, is through education. In this respect we must note the inequality of appropriate educational opportunity available to the mass of people in the contemporary North American context. Rather than facilitating social mobility, the educational system has been understood as an instrument of social and economic class distinction. Indeed, as Patricia Sexton has shown in her study of education and income...

...in the schools of modern America we still find that children from... 'urban slums' cannot compete with the children of the elite. This is true not necessarily because of any deficiency of talent or ability but because society being dominated by elites has given their children a head start and, following the lead as always, the schools have compounded the advantage of providing them with superior educational services of every conceivable variety. 206

205 Baltzell, Digby; The Protestant Establishment (Vintage Books; New York; 1966) P. 323.

206 Sexton, Patricia, Cayo; Education & Income (Viking Press; New York; 1961) P. IX.
Such sociologists as Sexton note that not only do upper class members of this society have more of an opportunity to gain advancement to governing elite positions because of family connections. Equally as important as this, they also have the opportunity to receive an education from institutions with a more prestigious character than lower class individuals. Access to elite positions might then be dependent upon often times, the socially prestigious nature of the educational institution that one has attended. The ivy league schools as Mills notes, also have been essential in the training of American presidents. It is not only presidents who are trained at these elite universities. Mills' study of 573 higher politicians; that is men who between the years of 1879 and 1953 served as President, Vice-president, Speaker of the House, Cabinet Member or Supreme Court Justice, revealed that 22% of them had attended either Harvard, Yale or Princeton.

If one includes such famous schools as Dartmouth and Amherst, then one-third of all the higher politicians, and 44% of those who ever spent any time in college went to topnotch Eastern Schools. 207

A similar pattern of educational background and opportunity may hold true for the elite business community. In a study of 476 top executives who went to college, 86% had received their undergraduate training at Yale, Harvard, and Princeton alone. 208

207 Mills, C. Wright; The Power Elite; Op Cit; P. 402.

208 Baltzell, Digby; The Protestant Establishment; Op Cit; P. 119.
A study of all directors in Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors and Executives revealed that 4135 of the directors were from Harvard. Harvard was followed in numerical representation by Yale, Princeton and the University of Pennsylvania. 209

It is evident from this that the accessibility to elite groupings in North America generally could possibly be dependent on education from institutions which have a distinctive status orientation and character. It might be said that all of the formal, personal and institutional ties that bind the ruling class together could have at least a twofold function:

1) they are transmission belts and channels of communication

2) they are molders of ideals, values and behavior norms, i.e., ruling class ideology.

These two factors, then, of family background or social ties generally and education, as related to the prestigious nature of the educational institutions might have the tendency to noticeably inhibit rapid elite circulation. These inhibiting conditions could serve to reinforce and perpetuate a uniform world view on the part of the elite groups. As a direct result such a uniform weltanschauung might noticeably contribute to general ideological uniformity and rigidity. Any explanation of socio-cultural stagnation or petrification must take such contributory factors as these outlined here, into account. The points that have been made here in regards to the recruitment of elites in North America demand serious sociological consideration as well as detailed empirical investigation.

2. The Inner Structure of Various Elite Groups

According to G. William Domhoff less than 1% of the population of the United States comprises the American upper class elite. This elite stratum is said to own a distinctively disproportionate amount of the country's wealth, receives a disproportionate amount of the country's yearly income and contribute a disproportionate number of its members to active positions of military, political and economic leadership. Most of the non-upper class leaders are selected and trained by members of the upper-class. These leaders must necessarily maintain policies and goals that are shared by members of the upper class elite group.

Domhoff has illustrated in a somewhat detailed and empirically verifiable manner, that members of a definite self-perpetuating upper class elite in America, with a low level of curculion... dominate major corporations, foundations, universities, and the Executive branch of the Federal Government... It would seem, according at least to Domhoff, that an American business aristocracy linked with large corporate interests controls the American economic system as a whole.

Within the American political arena the situation has been summarized as follows. The Republican Party for example, is controlled by the largest manufacturers and bankers of the American upper class; men who are primarily of white Anglo-Saxon and Protestant background and whose families became prominent between the Civil War and the Depression. It receives its support from local upper classes of small businessmen and

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the upper echelon of white collar workers. The Democratic Party is controlled by very new and very old elements within the upper class including Southern aristocrats and the ethnic rich. 211

The possible lack of objective differentiation between political parties in terms of the areas of financial support and the active participation of the business elite in politics could testify to a homogeneity of corporate interests in the political sphere in North America. The ultimate consequence of such homogeneity would be of course the formation of national policy with respect to only the corporate benefits that would result from such policies. The possibility for socio-cultural development apart from the continued maintenance of corporate profits would then be in turn severely restricted.

In that we have generally considered the possibilities of an interdependency between the business and corporate community and the political forum in North America, we must make also careful note of the interrelationship that might exist between elite groupings and the systems of ideological dissemination. It is the mass media, the educational institutions and to a lesser degree, the religious institutions which are the main centers of power and influence within the ideological system as a whole. The mass media itself - the newspapers, magazines, television, radio and the film constitute the daily, most easily available and widely participated in, forms of information and opinion dissemination. These various forms of mass media set the limits

211 Ibid; pp. 86-87.
in which public discussion and dialogue can take place. They
determine the informational framework within which decisions are
made.

Mass communications is itself a social process. Communications pattern the environment for the individual. Mass media reflects that environment. Communication relates one individual
to other individuals. Mass media continuously and repetitious-
ly serves to reaffirm social norms by exposing deviations from
those norms to the public view. One of the possible functions of
the media which must be extensively investigated is related to

...the process of selling commodities and producing
audiences (out of people) to be used by... industry
to enhance its profitability and political security. 212

One might consider the mass media itself as being an industry.
The structure and control of the media industry could very well
parallel the structure and control of other corporate enterprises.
The media industry itself might not be, in this regards exempt
from the directives and influences of a specific elite grouping
that could already dominate the economic and political sectors
of North American society.

Probably the most influential means of exerting pressure
and directing control on the media is through corporate advertise-
ing. It is the corporate interests themselves which can guarantee
or threaten the rate of profitability of any media enterprise.
The forming of any media business enterprise is itself, almost
entirely dependent upon major corporate backing and investment.

212 Smythe, Dallas W. 'The Role of Mass Media and Popular Culture
In Defining Development' presented to the International Scien-
tific Conference on Mass Communication and Social Consciousness
The importance of advertising as a financial bulwark should not be underestimated. The possibility that media organization and advertising might be in direct interrelationship with one another must be further investigated. If such an interdependency was found to be true, the consequences would be that the threat of the discontinuance of advertising to a major media operation could have an influential effect on the content of the material, information and editorial policy presented by that media organization. John Porter has observed that...

The ownership group in their selection of personnel to run their newspapers and periodicals have to concern themselves not only with technical competence but also with ideological acceptability which means sharing the attitudes and values of the owner. 213

In short, there appears the possibility that there might exist definite constraints set upon the media itself which would impose a degree of ideological uniformity in terms of the information being presented. These constraints would take the form of the dependency of media organizations on advertising provided by corporate interests which in turn could be organized and dominated by an interlocked complex of political and economic elites. The possibility of such an interrelationship as outlined here must be further explored and elaborated upon.

The actual ownership patterns of media organizations must also be considered and investigated. Members of a distinctive upper class elite grouping who, apart from exerting a determinant influence on the economy and political policy formation, might also be responsible for the control of the mass media through

213 Porter, John; The Vertical Mosaic (University of Toronto Press; Toronto; 1971) P. 486.
ownership. There seems to be a visible tendency for mass media ownership to become monopolized and concentrated in its control by certain large investment corporate bodies. Such concentration of control with respects to newspapers for example, is to be found in all major cities in North America. The stock controlling interests in the major newspaper complexes lies in the hands of families or individuals with two or three generations of wealth behind them. The Hearst empire is a case in point.

The Hearst empire includes 12 newspapers, 14 magazines, three television stations, a news service, a photo service, a feature syndicate and Avon paperbacks. 214

Such factors as a relatively confined business diversity within the upper class elite, the non-upper-class backgrounds of most reporters and scholars and the myriad of locally controlled colleges, newspapers and magazines might facilitate an upper-class domination of major opinion-making institutions from being translated into a publicly-obvious, monolithic control of opinion. In this sense, members of an upper class elite could very well play an important role in determining the framework within which public discussion on important issues are reached.

In the examination here of the political, economic and ideological organisations of North American society we have emphasized the necessity of investigating further the possibility of their monopolization and domination by a specific, closely interlocked ruling elite which might be both self-contained, self-perpetuating and noticeably restrictive in accessibility. Also the possibility of there existing a close and intimate inter-

214 Domhoff, G. William; Who Rules America?; Op Cit; P. 81.
connection between the economic sphere, dominated by corporate interests which might be in turn be dominated by elite groupings and the cultural (media) sphere which could also be dominated by similar corporate interests must be further considered by sociologists.

An intimate interrelationship and dominating influence exerted by elite-controlled corporate bodies over cultural communication and definition, vis-a-vis the media might then have the tendency to channel all communication, all cultural definitions towards the exemplification, development and legitimation of one end - the commodity form. Simply, cultural development itself would become synonymous with the degree of creativity and innovation utilized in the redefinition of techniques for the presentation and outward enhancement of the commodity form generally. Cultural innovation outside these pre-defined channels of commodity production and consumption would be denied the appropriate access to the systems of communication necessary to effect cultural change or cultural development.

The process of commodity fetishization might act as a determinant contributory factor to the development of a state of cultural petrification which could also be linked to the nature of advanced industrial society itself and its possible dependency on the subsequent systems of mass production and consumption. The benefits of such objective productive and consumptive processes could be seen as incentives for a specific elite interest group. This elite might also be responsible for the definition of
goals and values which they might largely prescribe for the whole of North American post-industrial society. Such goals could include the maintenance and perpetuation of the systems of production and consumption particular to our own social situation as well as the furthering of the necessary cultural values and norms required to ensure the active public participation in those objective processes.

The development of a one-dimensional North American social situation could ensure the confinement and restriction of socio-cultural development to the objective dictates of the systems of commodity production and marketing. Cultural petrification in this sense would be the consequence of a rigid orientation of an elite stratum particular to this society, to the continual legitimation of the social utility of the commodity form. The possibilities of such a rigid orientation of the elite stratum developing in contemporary North American post-industrial must be critically considered and investigated further by the sociologist as the implications would be both far reaching as they would be socially negative. The Ch'ing Dynasty was ample proof of this fact.
3. The Social Distance Between the Elite and the Mass In North America

The question of the social distance that exists between elite and mass is problematic when dealt with in the context of modern North American post-industrial society. Traditionally as Mannheim has outlined...

Every sophisticated system of dress and manners, speech, deportment and conventions can serve to keep up distance between the ruling groups and the subjected ones. The hidden task of this system is to create distance and thus to preserve the power of the ruling minority. 215

The techniques of distantiation between elite and mass, particular to modern North American post-industrial society are complex and might be related to the possibility of the distortion of communication between the masses and the governing elite stratum. Such techniques of distortion could provide for the negation of public dialogue and criticism; thus preserving the unhampered possibility for socio-cultural development to follow in the direction desired by the elite groups themselves.

The recognition of the possibility of the distortion of communications has been extended analytically into the political, administrative and scientific spheres by a later member of the Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas. Habermas states the necessity of explaining what lies behind the apparent ideological consensus that is presented as fact and which by its very nature supports the dominant tradition of the time - a tradition of monopoly corporate elite interests.

215 Mannheim, Karl; Systematic Sociology (Grove Press; New York; 1957) P. 52.
The immunizing power of ideologies, which stifle the demands for justification raised by discursive examination, goes back to blockages in communication. As Habermas explains, such blockages require explanation within a framework of a theory of systematically distorted communications. These blocks have their origin within the structures and networks of communications themselves which effectively limit the options to establish a two-way flow of information exchange between the source of information and the audience.

The consequences of such blockages of communication within the political realm might be linked, in a causal fashion, with the 'depoliticization of the masses' and the decline of the public as a political force to be contended with. These factors of the decline and depoliticization of an active and critical public are the functional prerequisites for a complex though subtle system of domination which must by its very nature, exclude practical technical questions from an intervening body of public critics. As Habermas understands, the bureaucratization of power and decision making is complemented by a passive public which has been confined to the affirmative consumption of spectacles. The spectacles themselves as Adorno has suggested are ideological complements to the continued functioning of this socio-economic order; that the spectacles may preserve and extend mass political passivity.

Habermas argues that politics, within the confines of the technocratic administration of industrial society has undergone, or is susceptible to scientization; depriving the democratic

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Habermas, Jurgen; Theory & Practice (Beacon Press; Boston; 1971) P. 12.
decision-making process 'of its object'. Its object is the rationalization of technical progress with public needs. These public needs are

...based on a historically determined preunderstanding, governed by social norms, of what is practically necessary in a concrete situation. 217

The public comprehension and definition of needs can only be formulated through the exchange of critical dialogue; through the 'discourse of citizens' within the community as a whole. Simply, needs can be formulated and defined through informed public discussion and debate. Democracy in essence, is conceived of as institutionalized forms of general and public communication; dealing with the fundamental question of how men should cope with the objective conditions within which they find themselves. The rationalization of the power structure, particular to a democratic state is dependent upon the power of self-reflective thought, developed and communicated by way of public dialogue.

The redeeming power of reflection cannot be supplanted by the extension of technically exploitable knowledge. 218

The domination of science according to Habermas, within the state and government functions is one of the important characterizing features of post-industrial societies today.

Habermas, points out that the communication that takes place today within the realm of government administration and policy formation, flows between experts at major research consulting organizations and political authorities. The information that is communicated relates to 'objectively delineated problem areas'.

218 Ibid; P. 95.
The successful transference of technical and strategic recommendations into political policy and practice is in general, not dependent upon public mediation. The inaction of such policy recommendations finds its sources of legitimization in the ideology of technical expertise. It is the scientific-technical experts who delegate to themselves the right to articulate the needs of the public in strict accordance with technical knowledge and insights.

The isolation of scientific information from the public consciousness as Habermas believes, deprives the public of active participation in, or knowledgeable insights into, the problematic of government administration and decision-making. Specific reasons for the isolation of scientific and technical information may be attributed to such factors as the secrecy necessary for armament development as related to the objective situation of competing social systems; more specifically the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Under the aegis of a general arms race, state monopolization of the technologically productive sciences is around the corner. 219

The relative inaccessibility of scientific and technical information Habermas further attributes to the more obvious lack of contact between the scientist and the public. Such lack of contact between the scientist and the public, is believed to be a direct consequence of the individualization of scholarship; that is a large part of scientific research is seen as being increasingly confined to institutionalized research bodies. The results of this research is in turn believed

219 Ibid; P. 78
to be legally restricted to the interests and purposes of these organizations. The self-contained dialogue, now going on between scientists and politicians about the formulation of a long-term research policy, no longer takes into consideration or includes the objective necessity of public discussion in the determining of such formulations. The extensive specialization of large-scale research programs and the bureaucratization of power, reinforce and complement one another by way of a self-contained and self-restricted medium of communication. The public in this respect as Habermas asserts, is effectively depoliticized. Finally, he sees that the public is excluded as a political force to be reckoned with.

We must juxtapose the objective realities of these communication blocks, as outlined here by Habermas, with the nature of the communication processes as perceived by American sociology generally. The American sociologists have asserted that...

The mass media necessarily play a central role in representative democracy. It is through the media that the people get the information that they need to decide what they want their officials to do. And it is through the media that the people find out if their officials are doing it.220

Such statements as this, imply that the general public still holds ostensible political power. This type of perception of the role of the media in American political life is completely removed from any consideration of the political economy of the existing network of communications. Nor does it realize the possible necessity of formidable communication blocks in the preservation of the facade of liberal democracy as it exists in

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America today. More importantly, such liberalist conceptions as this as expressed by American sociologists might be intimately linked with the maintenance of distorted communications. A testimony to the pre-established harmony that could well exist between scholarship and national purpose, a purpose which might be synonymous with the movement towards the depoliticization of the public.

By maintaining social distance through the techniques of communicative distortion related to the policy-making activities of government, the ruling elite of the North American post-industrial society would be able to dominate and direct the form of public criticism. The dominant political-economic elite is at the same time the dominant intellectual elite. Education, newspapers and the other means of cultural communication, as we have seen generally from our analysis here, might very well all come under the control of a highly cohesive elite. Through these various media, the elite might also communicate the values, norms and social goals which implicitly legitimize their own positions. With this, the elite is aided, C. Wright Mills suggests, by the 'mass' character of the mass media.

A single message is transmitted to millions of individuals in the mass, each of whom receives the message in isolation from the others. There is no scope for any response from the person in the mass. He can't discuss or reply to the opinionated information presented to him. The flow of information from elite to mass is a one-way flow. The members of North American mass society are essentially receivers not transmitters. As
C. Wright Mills has outlined the situation...

From almost any angle of vision that we may assume, when we look upon the public, we realize that we have moved a considerable distance along the road to a mass society. At the end of the road is totalitarianism... We are not yet at that end... But surely we can see that many aspects of the public of our times are more the features of a mass society than a community of publics. 221

The relative absence of knowledgeable and informed dialogue between elite interest groups and a well informed public within the spheres of economics, politics and culture is a necessary prerequisite for a mass society generally. A mass society might in itself, be a major contributory factor to a condition of cultural petrification. The concern of the sociologist today must be with the estimation of the extent that such informed dialogue does or does not occur between the mass and the elite within the context of contemporary North American post-industrial society.

221 Mills, C. Wright; The Power Elite; Op Cit; P. 304
4. The Popular Cultural Ideals Produced By The Various North American Elite Groups

One must also consider the possibility that the final product of the culture industry is the definition of the human self within the context of the commodity form. Amusement itself might already have become a cultural ideal realizable through commodity consumption. Also, one must consider that the specific means of communication, if they are in fact dominated by elite-controlled corporate interests, could define and articulate social needs, goals and ideals and at the same time present commodities directed towards their satisfaction.

...the circle of manipulation and retroactive need in which the unity of the system grows ever stronger 222

The logic of cultural consumption as understood by such cultural critics as Theodore Adorno is synonymous with the logic of leisure. Adorno sees that the differentiation between cultural products is a pseudo-differentiation. Popular culture and

...its alienation from human affairs terminates in its absolute docility before a humanity which has been enchanted and transformed into the clientele by the suppliers...the manipulators suppress everything in culture which enables it to go beyond the total immanence in the existing society...223

It is both Horkheimer and more especially, Adorno, who introduce and trace tentative definitions of the techniques leading to the enchantment and transformation of the public into a passive mass. A mass that can only respond as consumers to the display of

222 Horkheimer, Max & Adorno, T.W.; Dialectic of Enlightenment (Herder & Herder; New York; 1972) P. 121.

many fetishized commodities. They believe that culture itself takes the shape of a commodity to be consumed.

Horkheimer suggests that the final achievement of the culture industry of advanced capitalist society is the negation of the inner life; of the ability to conceive of a world different from that in which one finds himself at present.

The gradual dissolution of the family, the transformation of personal life into leisure and of leisure into routines supervised to the last detail, into the pleasures of the ball park and the movie, the best seller and the radio, has brought about the disappearance of the inner life. He asserts that necessary objective dynamics of the system of production are produced in the activities of leisure; a reproductive process which is channelled and directed through the means of communication particular to popular leisure activity and which categorizes such leisure time. Popular culture within the situational context of advanced industrial society according to Adorno, takes the shape of a veil; preserving the political compacency of the public by bombarding them with the products of banality—the commodity form.

It is Leo Lowenthal who has developed a provocative analysis of ideological veils, manipulation and popular culture in a number of related articles. Entertainment itself, as illustrated by Lowenthal is understood not as a pleasant and innocent diversion from the work sphere but rather as a subtle form of

224 Horkheimer, Max; 'Art & Mass Culture' in Critical Theory (Herder & Herder; New York; 1972) P. 277.

225 For a short biographical review of Lowenthal and his contributions to a critique of mass culture see: Martin Jay; The Dialectical Imagination (Little Brown & Co.; Toronto; 1973) pp. 212-214.
psychic terror. The use of language by the biographer as Lowenthal notes, most particularly the use of the superlative within the confines of the popular magazine stories levels the presentation of human excellence to the presentation of merchandise.

Lowenthal has commented that individual uniqueness and achievement have become the basis for the selling of both individuals and commodities.

The most vivacious girl corresponds to the best toothpaste, the highest endurance in sportsmanship corresponds to the most efficient vitamins...There is a pre-established harmony between the objects of mass production in the advertising columns and the objects of biography in the editorial comment. The language of promotion has replaced the language of evaluation. Only the price tag is missing. 226

One can only look at such perfection, at such ideals and be anxious about one's own comparable insignificance. It is such anxiety which promotes the active participation of individuals in this social system to strive towards success. Such goal-striving is a necessary motivational complement to the production and consumption processes.

There is a correlation as Lowenthal sees it, between advertisement and terror. Advertisement promotes the terror of the insignificance of one's own life and life chances but which in the same moment provides for the resolution of such terror - the commodity. Simply Lowenthal has recognized in a very general manner, the dynamics of psychic coercion. Such coercion must be in turn related to the processes of forgetting - reification, which are dependent also on the fetishization of commodities. Simply, he

226 Lowenthal, Leo; Literature, Popular Culture & Society (Pacific Books; Palo Alto, California; 1968) P. 131.
has begun here to explain the techniques of barbarism; to take the distortion of human communications as fact and to begin to deal realistically with the negative implications of such fact.

Such cultural ideals as outlined here by Lowenthal which, if they hold true to empirical sociological analysis might then be in turn ultimately oriented to the perpetuation of the existing systems of production and consumption. In their long-range consequences such ideals would strengthen and solidify the position of the corporate-political elite who depend for their own existence on the survival of such objective processes. The rigid one-dimensionality of such ideals is obvious. If such ideals did exist, they would contribute towards a cultural condition which would reflect and deny the cross-fertilization of ideas between the critical public and an elite. Moreover, such ideals would be a blatant testimony to the lack of cultural autonomy; where culture itself would be objectively prevented from developing freely apart from the dictates of the market. It would be a condition which would directly negate cultural exploration and innovation; processes, which in and of themselves are fundamentally necessary in the negation of cultural stagnation and petrification.

We have outlined in our analysis here the necessity of investigating the mode of selection of the North American elite stratum particular to modern post-industrial society in order to estimate the extent to which it is restricted. Any sociological considerations of restriction to elite selectivity must take into account in this respect, family background and educational opportunity. As C. Wright Mills has shown previously, there is
a tendency for these separate elite groupings, inclusive of the
corporate, military and political elite to be highly interconnec-
ted and interdependent. Also that these various divergent elites
share a common ideological value and goal system; together having
a single world view based on the common understanding of the
necessity of rigidly perpetuating the existing systems of produc-
tion and consumption upon which the security of their elite
positions rests.

If such assumptions as these made by C. Wright Mills and
others are emperically verifiable, then consequently the develop-
ment of popular culture could then in turn be understood as not
being a product of imaginative innovation but rather a necessary
functional complement to the objective requirements of a mass
marketing system owned, directed and managed by a self-contained
ruling-elite stratum. The possibilities of restricted elite
circulation, the structural and ideological homogeneity of elite
groupings, the reputed one-dimensional restricted process of
communication between the elite and the masses and the depen-
dence of cultural innovation on market demands must be further
analyzed and researched by sociologists. These factors must be
considered within a specific analytical context; a context which
measures the extent to which these factors are contributory to
the realization of a state of cultural petrification within
modern North American post-industrial society.
Both North America's refusal and inability to generate alternative means of achieving self-identity, self-expression and dignity for its population might be related to a condition of petrification. The political climate of the past four years it would seem from general observation has created a negative view of the possibility of meaningful involvement with the established institutions of this society. At the same time it may have convinced many students that society is in desperate need of reform. If militant reform is blocked, and passive reform is locked in a stalemate within bureaucratic structures then in this sense it is quite understandable that a drug movement has developed within our own social situation.

Student drug use is indeed a commentary upon American society, but it is above all indirect criticism of our society's inability to offer the young...honorable and effective ways of using their intelligence and idealism to reform our Society. 227

Any worthwhile analytical explanation of the intensive use of drugs by the young today must consider such a phenomenon in relation to the availability of other viable alternatives to satisfy the individual's desire for self-identity and self-authenticity which could be in the process of being effectively denied by a rigid and self legitimizing social situation.

A collective search for identity might be one of the chief motivational conditions of this disillusioned generation. A generation which might have very well been forcibly prevented

227 Keniston, Kenneth; 'Heads and Seekers: Drugs on Campus'; Op Cit; P. 136.
from alleviating its anxieties and doing away with their more obvious objective causes in an outward fashion; that is, allowed to alter the bio-physical environment. As a result they could well have been compelled by the objective dictates as defined by specific elite groups of this society to turn inward and modify their own selves. Drug use could constitute a logical step in this direction. A step as we shall see that ultimately leads to self-defeat and self-limitation and ultimately self-destruction on a mass scale - genosuicide. Drug use in this sense might be explained by a lack of alternatives in the achievement of a sense of identity. However, this constitutes only one hypothesis of many which necessitates empirical verification.

We might also, in the explanation of drug use consider Durkheim's thesis of individuation. Durkheim, in his major work *Suicide*, has maintained that as long as a society is highly integrated, the individual's goals in such a society will remain subordinate to the community's goals. When however, the individual becomes detached from social life or when the groups to which the individual belongs, for whatever reason weaken or when the goals of the individual become preponderant over those of the community, the more the individual in such circumstances must come to rely upon himself.

...and recognize no other rules of conduct than what are founded on his private interests. 228

Durkheim has referred to such a state as egoism.

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228 Durkheim, Emile; *Suicide* (The Free Press of Glencoe; New York; 1963) P. 209.
As Durkheim further outlines, when an individual experiences such a state of excessive individualism and when he is subsequently unable to do for himself what institutions did for him previously, he might as a consequence withdraw from social life in one manner or another.

When society is strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its control, considers them at its service and thus forbids them to dispose wilfully of themselves. An egoistic individual has no such constraints to prevent him from disposing of himself. The egoistic suicide is often the consequence as Durkheim has pointed out. So too might drug use be considered as another means of initiating self-destruction or withdrawal.

In the light of Durkheim's thesis as outlined here it would be necessary for sociologists to consider the extent to which symptoms of egoism or individuation are evident in North American post-industrial society. The sociological measurement of individuation would have to consider such factors as the role psychoanalysis has had on influencing the North American individual's sense of personal responsibility for his actions. Secondly, to consider the extent to which individuation might be an inherent characteristic of mass society. According to such theorists as Blumer, mass society is comprised of a heterogeneous aggregate of atomized individuals. Thirdly, to see how individuation is reflected in the current development of inner-worldly religious cults which stress subjective awareness and experience.

229 Ibid; P. 209
The 'hippie movement' might be seen as being symptomatic of an egoist movement. These few considerations as well as others, might be made by sociologists in the explanation and elaboration of the facilitating factors leading to the occurrence of drug use and abuse in North America.
1. Self-Blame and the Negation of Objective Social Change

An important factor we might also include in our explanation of drug use today is the notion that prevades the American legal and spiritual morality that the individual is responsible for his own frustrations.

Americans advertise themselves as 'masters of their own fate'. Concretely this means that Americans tend to blame themselves for their frustrations and that they incline to self-aggression when they fail. 230

The dominating Protestant religion as Max Weber has shown, has significantly aided in the historical development of the North American industrial society, to nurture a general feeling that it is the duty of the individual to 'seek virtue and avoid evil' and to hold himself ultimately responsible for any deviations that he might make from the path of righteousness. 231 Possibly the most fundamental problem encountered by any group that attempts to establish a mass political base is that most people in our own society might be predisposed to blame their own selves for what goes wrong in their lives. In light of this predisposition, the alienated and isolated individual existing within a post-industrial social framework, instead of trying in some fashion to transform the external situation to meet his unsatisfied anxieties and needs, might turn to other means to meet their satisfaction.

Psychoanalysis may be a case in point. Both Ernest Becker and Erich Fromm point out that psychoanalysis attempts to reintegrate the awkward and deviant individual into the social and

230 Dollard, John; Frustration and Aggression (Yale University Press; New Haven Conn.; 1939) P. 156.
231 Weber, Max; The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Charles Scribner's Sons; New York; 1958)
economic processes of post-industrial production. If in advanced industrial society, human lives are conceived of as privatized; human problems would then be seen solely as private problems. Such a process of privatization must be at least considered as another possible contributory factor to the use of drugs. Drugs themselves, more importantly the psychological consequences of their use, address themselves specifically towards the propensity of self-modification as opposed to the external modification of one's own socio-cultural situation.
2. Self-Modification, Self-Aggression and Drug Use

Since self-punishment is an almost unavoidable consequence of self-modification, such aggression turned inward against the self must overcome a certain amount of inhibition. Therefore such a method of modification tends usually not to occur unless other forms of expression are even more strongly inhibited. In a situation where the level of inhibition to various acts of aggression is held at a relatively constant degree of intensity, the possibility of the occurrence of self-aggression might be greater both when:

1. The individual believes himself to be responsible for his frustration rather than an external agent.

2. When direct aggression is inhibited by one's own self, rather than by an external force. 2.32

The logic of drug use with respect to these factors of self-blame and the structural and social psychological inhibitions to aggression becomes much more evident in this context.

Sorokin has made the argument that a sensate culture, of which modern North American society is an illustration, when prohibited for whatever reason, to modify the biophysical environment in its attempts to maintain a level of equilibrium of function and identity, will out of necessity revert to the methods and strategies of self-modification.

Another form of group-adaptation through imposed self-adjustment occurs ordinarily in groups dominated by

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2.32 Op Cit; p. 53
sensate-culture, which in spite of their desire to change their environment, are frustrated by overwhelmingly adverse forces of the environment. 233

The point he makes here, might in fact hold some definite relevance to our own socio-cultural situation with respect to the poverty of alternative possibilities to institute change. By change we mean here the provision of a more cohesive symbolic universe; allowing for the achievement of heroic self-meaning and self-esteem by the social collectivity as a whole.

The relative proliferation in America and Europe of counter-culture communities and cults could be interpreted as being expressive of a general refusal of routine and industrial work and leisure habits as defined by the dictates of the manufacturing and marketing processes themselves. Possibly because the 'critique of routine' as articulated by the members of this counter-culture could not find institutional expression, some of these members turned to drugs as there remained no way out, apart from such inner ecstasy and withdrawal from the normative social sphere.

...loss of meaning in a higher system is increased entropy, whether expressed as disorder in personal identity or social identity. Symptoms of such entropy include the closing of the ranks against the stranger, nostalgia...and turning to cults which provide a greater sense of harmony. 234

The drug movement itself, as expressed in the growing number of alienated youth might be indicative of such entropy - both at

233 Sorokin, P. Society Culture & Personality (Cooper Square Publishers; New York; 1962) P. 446.

234 Klapp, Orrin; Models of Social Order (National Press Books; Palo Alto, California; 1973) P. 296.
a personal and social level. One might understand their experience as...

One of deprivation, not in any material sense, but a deprivation of participation. The disaffection springs from a sense of powerlessness in the face of inflexible political structures. This is the condition that generates a sense of disillusionment...235

Sociologists in this regard must systematically investigate the degree of social and political inflexibility displayed by the every-day operations of our own social system in order that they may begin to estimate the possible occurrence of cultural petrification. Such a socio-cultural condition may be a necessary and sufficient prerequisite for the development and progress of advanced industrial society as related to the demands of mass production and mass consumerism. These categories of the economic process must be analyzed to determine to what extent they require in turn, a cultural level of mediocrity, dynamic enough to generate cultural habits and tastes which ensure active and widespread participation in the consumption of an infinite array of goods and services.

Within a wider framework of meaning, the search of the current generation for psychedelic experience seems to hold a curious resemblance to a much larger, though apparently legitimate social development, in which the 'parent-culture' noticeably participates. It is entirely possible that our own society has become significantly drug dependent. The habitual dependence upon certain chemical forms to control, inhibit or facilitate the more basic functions of the human organism may be today a more typical means for large segments of the population to achieve health.

The parent culture uses prescription drugs in a semimystical belief that taking a drug will provide a solution to almost any ordinary everyday problem. Drugs are used to lose weight, get to sleep, pep one up, and ease depression. 236

During 1967, for example, Americans consumed some 800,000 barbiturates as well as approximately ten billion amphetamine tablets to counteract the affects of such barbiturate use. Also it is estimated that one out of four, of the American population uses some form of a tranquilizer regularly.

At a recent congress of the World Psychiatric Association held in London during November, 1967, it was revealed that in Great Britain... a staggering total of over forty-three million prescriptions for psychotropic drugs was issued within a recent three-year period. 237

The shortcut to contentment through the use of mind drugs could well be on the way towards becoming a definite part of the life of the isolated American housewife who alternates

236 Johnson, Bruce D.; Marihuana Users & Drug Subcultures (John Wiley & Sons; New York; 1973) P. 11
between the swallowing of amphetamines for dieting and the taking of tranquilizers to calm her nerves.

Generally then, drugs, whether it be within the population of a youth sub-culture or in the parent-culture could seem to be quickly becoming the standard method both legal and illegal, by which identity-anxiety, emotional disorder and the general existential fears are alleviated, at least for the immediate moment. The intensity and extent of drug use within our own social milieu might be conceived of as being illustrative of the abandonment of concern and effort to alter the environmental factors as they are related to specific production and market determinants, that may in fact be generating the suffering, anxiety, uneasiness and loss of self-meaning as experienced by this society as a whole.

The experience of general anxiety and the insufficiency of traditional cultural patterns of meanings and values to contain social unrest may be measured quantitatively. According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census for instance, the number of criminal offenses between the years 1960 and 1970 have increased by 139%. This constitutes an average annual increase of 9%.238 Such a measurement as this constitutes a blatant indication of growing popular dissention and the failure of the cultural system of values and norms to be relevant enough to maintain social order. Also we must recognize the number of individuals being admitted currently to mental institutions which presently constitutes an

increase of 19% over the number admitted in 1955. 239

The late 1960's and early 1970's were, and remain periods
typified by enormous and well-documented increases in the use
of marihuana and hallucinogens such as lysergic acid diethylam-
ide (LSD). Use, that was conspicuously related to the youths
belonging to a materially successful American middle class.

Gallup surveys have shown a major increase in drug use with the
college student population in the United States over a three
year period. In the spring of 1967 only 5% of the student pop-
ulation had used marihuana. By the spring of 1969 the figure
had risen to 27%. By December of 1970, 42% and finally by
December 1972, 59%. Also we must take note of increases in the
use of hallucinogens. In the spring of 1967, 1%; in the spring
of 1969, 18% 240 Surveys of the U.S. population as a whole have
shown that while only 4% of the population had experimented with
either LSD or 'pot' by October 1969. The figure had risen to
11% by March 1972. 241 Such figures as these provide rather un-
settling evidence of one of the most significant processes of
social change to occur in North America in the 1960's.

The most important question that must be answered at this
stage of our analysis is: what does the use of drugs provide for

239 Ibid; P. 82

240 For a summary of the first 3 Gallup surveys see 'The Latest
Findings on Marijuana' U.S. News & World Report; Feb 1, 1971
and 'Gallup Finds a Continual Rise in the U.S. of Marijuana
and LSD on Campuses' in New York Times (Feb. 10, 1972)

241 See Gallup Poll 'One Young Adult in Eight Has Tried Pot' Prince-
ton, New Jersey; American Institute of Public Opinion, Oct. 25,
1969. 'Poll Finds Surge in Marihuana Use' in New York Times
(March 29, 1972)
the anxious, the alienated, and those without a sense of identity? More importantly, what are the consequences of such a provision? What does the use of marihuana, hashish or even LSD satisfy that the normative channels of behavior as related to the typical forms of economic, social and political life, as defined in this society, do not?
4. Drug Use and The Alleviation of Anxiety

It has been argued that what surrounds the young is either dying or else deals with death. As one sociologist has put it...

We murder the Vietnamese and savage the blacks; we turn the world into a profitable pigsty. Our institutions are like sows with dry teats. They make it impossible for persons to go inward with ease, they sever their connections with anything or anyone outside themselves...242

It is the task of the sociologist to ascertain whether or not such a description characterizes the essential existential reality of modern neo-capitalist society; a reality which while providing for the continued maintenance of this socio-economic situation may perpetuate also at the same time, a cultural and spiritual sterility. The sociologist must also explore whether the methods of, and relationships to, the processes of production are responsible for this; responsible that is for the isolation and fragmentation of the individual ego. The commodity-oriented structure of production and marketing might be responsible first through its manufacturing of estrangement and alienation on the assembly line for this feeling of identity-anxiety; a feeling which could very well permeate all corners and levels of the modern post-industrial society. But this production structure could also be entirely dependent upon such anxiety and frustration to which it addresses its own products and commodities as material solutions. It would be similar in this respect to Hitler's provision of National Socialism as a cure for the fears of Germany; fears and anxieties which he had himself

articulated and defined. The underlying developmental dynamic of modern North American post-industrial society may be one which rigidly maintains a high level of cultural stagnancy and banality in order to market banal goods and services, in the hope of satisfying a condition of self-estrangement which in itself is its ultimate product and cause.

Drugs, whether it be marihuana, hashish, LSD, cocaine or what have you, might deny such estrangement and feelings of personal insignificance and for a moment negate a form of psychic death which may be inherent within the normal functioning of this socio-cultural system.

Marijuana can sweeten and soften the world, relax defensive rigidity and fear; it can trigger a release an ease and diligent, often a kind of featherly belonging. The amphetamines sharpen and tune the self to a temporary sense of bright potency, a tense coursing of life. Psychedelics seem to reveal the truth; perception and feeling change rapidly, fluidly; there is an exhilarating sense of expanding reality; a new self.

The unbearable would then be made bearable - at least for the immediate, short-lived moment. Meaning would become sensitized. Danger, insecurity, fear and identity would be sublimated in a slower, absorbing, occasionally 'microscopically minute' engagement and apprehension of reality which only the taking of these drugs allows. One would become immortal in a fashion which would not deny the right of other individuals or groups to exist. As scapegoating provides this sense of immortality in a bloody symbolic fashion when the socio-structural and social psychological conditions permit, so possibly could drug taking

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243 Ibid; P. 15.
provide for such a sense of heroic immortality. To say, however that such drug use is genosuicidal one must go beyond a simple definition of its function as related to its provision of immediate heroic transcendence.

Theodore Roszak has summed up the negative and possibly genosuicidal consequences of sustained drug use.

At the level of disaffected adolescence, the prospect held by psychedelic experience— that of consciousness expansion— is bound to prove abortive. The psychedelics, dropped into amorphous and alienated personalities have precisely the reverse effect; they diminish consciousness by way of fixation. 244

In the use of drugs, the totality of one's life experience comes to center despotically and uncritically on one act—one basic mode of experience. It is an experience of the self in a limbo of pleasure and tactile sensation. It is a category of reification as equally as self-alienating and self-limiting as the processes of reification possibly operant within capitalist society. The sensual and the ecstatic emotion-arousing experiences accompanying drug use might lead in many cases to an obsession with such experiences; that such experiences themselves provide for, or accentuate, a limited vision of the world. The fascination with the need for such mind expanding events could be reinforced by the popular publicizing of the equipment and apparatus which are deemed necessary to secure and provide for an 'enjoyable trip'. Such paraphenalia as certain types of clothing, light shows, rock music, posters, strobe lights, bells, buttons, beads and elaborate equipment for smoking

244 Roszak, Theodore; The Making of a Counter Culture; Op. Cit.; P. 160.
and taking drugs may have it seems, become characterizing features of a youth oriented commodity sphere; reinforcing the legitimacy of the drugged reality.

Marcuse has asserted that...

The reign of such a one-dimensional reality does not mean that materialism rules and that the spiritual metaphysical occupations are petering out... But such modes of protest and transcendence are no longer contradictory... and no longer negative. They are rather the ceremonial part of practical behaviorism, its harmless negation and are quickly digested...

The drug experience itself, or at least some of its more typical accessories might be viewed as having been directly brought into the definitive boundaries of the production project of this society; that in fact the drug movement might have provided a much needed impetus to the innovation of new and equally useless products.

245 Marcuse, Herbert; One Dimensional Man (Beacon Press; Boston; 1964) P. 14.
5. Drug Use & Genosuicide In North America

What must be emphatically stated here is that regardless of the physiological effects of drug use, of which there is today considerable debate over, it is necessary for the sociologist to determine whether or not drug use, within the North American context constitutes an example of genosuicide. Such critical considerations by sociologists must relate the specific limitations which drug use imposes on self-development as well as the restrictions it generates to the development of other means of social action which might lead to self-development and growth.

Drug use generally, might be understood as experience reified to a point where one stands caught within such immediacy. This fact may be due to the ability of drugs to provide a synthetic sense of meaning and coherence to the world which no other form of organic-social experience can apparently live up to. As related to the survival of any biological system as Bertalanffy defines, it is necessary

...that a certain degree of isomorphism exists between the experienced world and the 'real' world, so that the experience can guide the organism in such a way as to preserve its existence.246

Drug use might constitute an implicit denial of such an isomorphic relation and ultimately a denial of the survival of the human being as a social entity. In this respect the popular use of drugs today could be genosuicidal. The use of drugs could constitute a process of symbolic rebirth where one never is

246 Bertalanffy, Ludwig von; General Systems Theory; (Brazillier; New York; 1968) P. 241.
actually reborn but rather remains fixiated within that process of rebirth. A heroism that is never recognized. It is important to investigate whether such drug use is a fetishism of pleasure which denies the development or perception of any other reality or mode of behavior other than that which is orientated towards the extension of such pleasure. Such fetishism exists in greater or lesser degrees of intensity; the implications or consequences being relative to the level of intensity of the use of drugs generally. Such considerations as outlined here must be kept in mind by the sociologist in the exploration of the possibilities of the occurrence of the processes of genosuicide within the context of modern North American post-industrial society.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH

This heuristic analysis has attempted to provide some generalized considerations in the sociological explanation of drug use in North American post-industrial society. Essentially it has emphasized the necessity for sociologists today to begin, in a systematic empirical fashion to investigate the interrelationships that might exist between cultural development, specific elite characteristics and the contemporary use of drugs. In light of what was found and elaborated upon the thesis, The Sociology of Genosuicide, an analytical concentration on the possible interrelationships that might exist between elites, cultural petrification and drug use was seen to be both important and useful.

Essentially what this analysis has provided is an analytical framework hopefully to be utilized in future sociological research and inquiry. It is a framework based on the understanding of the operational techniques and consequent implications of the processes of genosuicide. This analysis has not meant it to be understood that genosuicide as related to drug use is occurring today in North America. What this analysis has provided is a research design within which such similar considerations may be made.

It is of importance that not only must future sociological inquiry consider the interrelationships of the sociological factors as they have been outlined here. Also it might be fruitful to compare, though cautiously, these interrelationships as they become more specifically defined through empirical
investigation with the subrhythm of cultural petrification, elites and genosuicide as it was evident in the Ch'ing Dynasty.

The choice of a comparative framework of analysis is based not upon the illusion or pretense that it is possible to estimate or predict absolutely the potentialities of our own social situation as it might be related to the final historical outcome of the Ch'ing Dynasty. There is a major and fundamental difference between speculative prediction based on the superficial observation of commonalities that might exist between two or more social systems and tentative prediction that is grounded in a detailed framework of analytical comprehension. Such an analytical framework would recognize not only the similarity in the socio-cultural trends that might exist, for example between the Ch'ing Dynasty and the socio-cultural system as it presents itself today in North America. Most importantly it would recognize and note the dissimilarity and uniqueness of such trends.

Agreeing with Robert Marsh on this point, cross-societal comparative analysis is fundamental to any generally comprehensive sociological or anthropological theory. 247 As Radcliffe-Brown testifies...

It is only by the use of the comparative method that we can arrive at general explanations. The alternative is to confine ourselves to particularistic explanations similar to those of the historian. The two kinds of explanation are both legitimate and do not conflict; but both are needed for the understanding of societies and their institutions. 248

247 Marsh, Robert; Comparative Sociology (Harcourt, Brace & World Inc.; New York; 1967) pp. 5 - 20.
A comparative approach to reviewing the nature of specific social processes, i.e., those particular to cultural development as well as decline, is, in its formal intentions interpretive. The sociologist would be concerned more than with the particularistic and relative aspects of the findings. Rather, he would be interested in the possibilities of their universal application. It is also a systematic means to ascertain the credibility of one's assertions with respect to the social processes under review. As Marsh explains...

A further point is that we want to obtain an extensive range of variation in the settings in which certain processes operate or structures are located. These settings are, on the one level, societies. To determine whether our assertions about the processes or structures hold true independently of the varied social settings in which they occur, we of course need data from different societies. We need in short comparative analysis. 249

Simply then, a cross-societal comparative approach would enable us to estimate more objectively, realistically and critically the cultural-specific or cultural-universal nature of the socio-cultural processes under review.

The choice of comparing the Ch'ing Dynasty and our own social situation in North America today is based on a number of logical and consistent qualifications. In the case of the Ch'ing Dynasty, we may trace with a relative degree of objectivity the continuum of cultural development and decay between the inception of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1644 and its termination in 1911. The boundaries of our analysis, however, are determinately fixed - a limited spectrum of inquiry. This spectrum is essentially limited to the period of the opium trade in China

249 Marsh, Robert; Comparative Sociology; Op. Cit; P. 9.
beginning about 1790 and terminating around 1901. In this manner one might review the factors and constellation of factors, both contingent and contributory, which ultimately determined the cultural decline of the Ch'ing Dynasty. The topic of analysis, the Ch'ing Dynasty, is a distinctly definable and limited one. The final outcome is known while on the other hand, with reference to the contemporary North American social situation, the boundaries of analysis are not as definite. As a result it becomes a rather difficult, as well as a rather spurious endeavour to ascertain whether or not certain signs of cultural decline and decay are wholly definitive and objectively symptomatic of such decline or whether they are merely transient and only temporary developments.

The social reality of North America remains an evolving one. The course which such evolvement in view of the possible interference to the processes of its evolution which have no set calculus of prediction. By comparing such processes as they occur within North America with not necessarily exactly similar occurrences in another social situation which did finally degenerate and disintegrate one would be able to more realistically and objectively come to terms with the importance and effectual weight of the social processes in question relative to the North American social situation, inclusive of the processes of genosuicide.

It is one thing to assert that we are living in a period of cultural decline or cultural barbarism. Such assertions are reserved for social philosophers. It is entirely another matter
to assert with some objective justification that the symptoms of decline that we ourselves are observing and experiencing every waking hour of our lives have occurred in another socio-cultural situation. In a society that ultimately did collapse more appropriately, that had to finally transform its whole socio-cultural character in order to survive and develop progressively as a social collectivity. Such a comparison is a task for the sociologist. It is through such an approach that the sociologist may even begin to speculate as to the future potentialities or lack of them of this society. Probability estimates, suggested and utilized by the sociologist require reference to historical record. It might become necessary, from the understanding of genosuicide as it relates to the trends of the decline of a civilization to begin reinterpreting the nature and significance of individual pathologies as they might appear in the population at large. As has already been pointed out such pathological symptoms as the increase of crime, drug use and mental illness appear to be increasing daily. By understanding that such pathologies as drug use might be symptomatic of genosuicide as related to the processes of cultural petrification, the sociologist will be in a more realistic and comprehensive position to evaluate the social significance of such drug use and abuse. In this fashion the sociologist as well as the criminologist could turn their attention away from simply suggesting preventive means of social control in the hope of alleviating such pathologies. Instead they could begin to understand the necessity of suggesting means to provide for general cultural redifinition which will ultimately contribute to the
elimination of the sources of such pathological symptoms. The concept of genosuicide is a necessary prerequisite for such an alteration of perspective and theoretical concern on the part of the sociologist as well as the criminologist.
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