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PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION AND URBANIZATION IN TUNISIA
A Contribution to the Social History of the Growth of Modern Tunis

by

RICHARD LESLIE ROBERTS
M.A. University of Wisconsin, 1970

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
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History

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June 1973

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Title of Thesis/Dissertation:
A Critique of the Social History of the Growth of Modern Tunisia

Author:
Richard Leslie Roberts

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ABSTRACT

The most noticeable feature of the social and demographic changes in the non-Western world since the turn of this century is the explosive patterns of urbanization. Although a great deal of literature has been published dealing with urbanization, most urban studies deal with functional, geographic, and metropolitan administrative factors. The material on urbanization in the Third World usually fails to explore the historical causation and developmental factors involved in the meteoric growth of urban populations, especially the populations of the capital cities. The material available on urbanization in North Africa is limited principally to studies concerning the proliferation of shantytowns (courbivilles) surrounding the large urban conglomerations.

The framework for this thesis is designed to explore the historical patterns of internal rural migration to Tunis and to trace the implications that this rural exodus has on the process of urbanization in Tunis. The approach utilized in the first part of this thesis explores the changes in the fallah's relationship to the land, starting from the imposition of the Protectorate by France in 1881. The significant changes in land tenure from the penetration of the French colonists after this date are analyzed in terms of the progressive expansion of a money-value economy. The feature of
capitalist expansion involved changes in agricultural production to produce surplus for an external market. The principal factors of this expansion are the penetration of mechanization and the reciprocal impoverishment and proletarianization of the rural populations. The progressive impoverishment of the agricultural population after 1956 stems from the failure of the collectivization program to offer structural alternatives to the concentration of wealth in the hands of the rural bourgeoisie.

The second part of the thesis explores the structural changes in Tunis as a result of the rural exodus. The structural changes within greater Tunis correspond to the influx of vast numbers of migrants, especially since the post Second World War and after independence in 1956. The rate of urbanization is diagnosed as a direct result of the changes in agricultural production coupled with the results of the demographic explosion of the 1930's. This high rate of urban population increase has not shown signs of decreasing since independence. Increases in migration after 1956 are analyzed as a function of the failure of the governmental ideology to effectively restructure agricultural production.

The third part explores the patterns of rural adaptation to urban life in Tunis. The theoretical framework materialized by much of the influential western scholarship correlates modernization of non-Western societies with the process of urbanization. This premise is questioned in regard to the case of urbanization in Tunis. The maintenance of rural
Contact groups in Tunis is analyzed in terms of migrant residence and occupation. Results from previous studies in Tunis are supported by a survey conducted for this thesis among a small sample of rural migrants in Tunis.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This study was made possible through a generous grant from Simon Fraser University, which enabled me to conduct this research in Tunisia. However, without the advice, criticism and support of my supervisor, Dr. W. L. Cleveland, this thesis would not be possible. I am also thankful to my Tunisian friends, especially Bechir Dahmani, who assisted me with my questionnaire. I also appreciate the advice and encouragement of my friends here at S.F.U.

Lastly, I want to thank my wife, Amy, for the illustrations and for her constant support and encouragement.

R. R.
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PART I
THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION

High density urban areas, or primate cities, have been growing at a rapid rate in the non-Western world since the post Second World War period. The growth rate of these cities is usually much higher than the rate of natural population increase. In Tunisia, which is a prime example of this tendency, the population of Tunis is increasing at a rate almost twice as high as the natural increase of population. The problem of assessing this phenomenon of the meteoric urbanization forms the theoretical boundaries for this study. Although the phenomenon discussed here is based on a case study of urbanization in Tunis, the means of approaching this problem are by no means limited to this regional area. The problem of ascertaining the historical causation of urbanization demands a certain orientation. This orientation is furthermore determined by the nature of the problem itself. Urbanization which exceeds the rate of natural population increase, is brought about through the shifts in the internal distribution of population. The basic direction of this movement of population is a movement away from the rural areas towards the urban centers; in our case toward the capital city.
Internal migration of population usually follows fundamental changes in environment, production, or population. There are, nonetheless, certain definite push factors to internal migration. These factors are discernible through historical inquiry into the nature and changes in land tenure. Although population shifts towards the primate city in Tunisia have taken place in the past, these previous increases in urban population had not had the same impact as those taking place after the Second World War. Never has the internal migration taken on the dimensions of a rural exodus, as it has since this post war period.

The examination of the causation of the rural exodus in Tunisia forms the basis for the first part of this thesis. The situation of land tenure at the time of the rural exodus has definite historical antecedents. This discussion of the gestation of these antecedents is the bulk of the following analysis on land tenure. Our discussion of the changes in land tenure will serve as the explanation for the internal migration phenomenon; without having contact with the causation of the conditions which resulted in the rural exodus, any discussion of the rapid rate of urbanization would be extremely shallow. The rapid urbanization of the primate cities in the non-Western world is only intelligible within the context of the changes in agricultural production and in the cultivator's relationship to the soil.

Whereas the analysis of land tenure serves as the
background and springboard for our discussion of urbanization, the problem of urbanization is itself a multi-faceted one. However, our chief aim here is to deal with the urban response to the influx of migrants. This is consistent with the basic orientation of this thesis, which is an analysis of the internal migration patterns within Tunisia. The urban response to increased population through rapid migration is manifested on many levels: the structural change of the city to accommodate the rapidly increasing population; the economic response of the city to the inflated labor force; and the social and political adjustments of the city to changes in the composition of the urban population. These topics form the basis for the discussion in the second part of this thesis.

The theoretical framework for this study on the urban response to migration falls within the current debate on modernization and development. The actual progression of this part of the thesis is consistent with the theoretical arguments concerning modernization of traditional societies. Following an initial demographic sketch of Tunisia, we will analyze the structure and composition of the traditional Muslim city and Tunis in particular. For us to perceive more accurately the extent of the changes in the urban form, this section extensively analyzes the form and context of the traditional city and discusses the traditional points of urban-rural contact within the city. The impact of the rural
exodus on the structure of Tunis will be analyzed in terms of the points of migrant residence location. The changes in the urban form after the Second World War reflected the concentration of migrants in certain peripheral areas, shantytowns, and in the central medina. This section will be followed by an examination of the degree to which contact group continuity is maintained by rural migrants in Tunis.

This assessment of contact group continuity lies exactly at the focal point of the debate concerning the modernization of traditional societies, and follows the discussion of the problems concerning the urban response to the influx of migrants. This problem of assessing contact group continuity revolves around the migrants' responses to the urban environment. By analyzing the actual means of migrant adjustment to urban life, we are directly assessing the validity of the modernization and transition arguments concerning the process of development in underdeveloped countries. The purpose of ascertaining whether migrants maintain rural contact group continuity within the city will be to redefine the metamorphosis theories of the traditional man in contact with the modern city.

The debate on modernizing societies has been dominated by a few prominent and prolific writers, among whom are Robert Redfield, Bert Hoselitz, and Oscar Lewis. The debate originated long before the concept of "developing nations," and lies in the growth of the city in the Western
world as the seat for the concentration of the arts, literature, and scientific knowledge. However old the debate is, the current form of the modern/traditional dichotomy stems in part from the urban dominance of the European city over its rural hinterland. The more recent antecedents to this debate stem from the work of Robert Redfield in the "Folk Society". Redfield's orientation to the anthropology of the "Folk Society" can be traced to the Chicago University's urban ecology school, where he gained some of the necessary theoretical impetus to regard the "Folk Society" in relationship to the larger context of the urban society. The genesis of Redfield's conceptualization of the "Folk Society" followed his extensive anthropological work during the 1930's in Mexico. On the basis of this research Redfield postulated the dichotomy between the "Folk Society" and the modern urban society. The principal concern of the folk/urban dichotomy was cultural change. The cultural role of the city was in the process of "carrying forward into systematic and reflective dimensions an old culture, and the creating

of original modes of thought that have authority beyond or in conflict with the old culture and civilization. According to Redfield, the "Folk Society" was the composite of those aspects of the society which served to impede modernization.

Redfield's folk/urban dichotomy gained influence through the growing awareness of the non-Western world during and after the Second World War. The surge of nationalism in colonial areas of the Third World offered a perfect stage for the development of modernization theories. These theories tried to account for the general lack of economic and political development in underdeveloped countries. Among the chief protagonists of this explanation of retarded economic development in the non-Western world was Bert Hoselitz. Hoselitz utilized the modern/traditional dichotomy (a rephrasing of Redfield's folk/urban dichotomy) as the basis for analyzing the present state of underdevelopment. According to Hoselitz, the cause of underdevelopment was principally the concentration of the mass of people in the traditional sector, which was characterized by certain rigid views of behavior, roles, and the world. "It is generally acknowledged that one of the chief barriers to rapid economic development is the traditionalism in the social values on the part of the bulk of the

population. According to Hoselitz, postulated that only through the modernization of the traditional sector could economic development take root and eliminate underdevelopment.

Furthermore, the core of the modern sector, (hereby reiterating Redfield’s dichotomy) was centered in the urban areas. Urbanization, or the growth of the modern sector, was described as the means of altering the traditional perception of society and thereby facilitating economic development by removing one of the main retarding forces, i.e. traditionalism. "(Cities) exhibit a spirit different from that of the countryside. One may look to the cities as the crucial places in underdeveloped countries in which the adaptation to new ways, new technologies, and new consumption and production patterns and new social institutions is achieved." Urbanization, then, is concomitant with economic development. 

It is through the cities that the traditionalism of underdeveloped countries is broken.

The process by which an underdeveloped country will

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4 Ibid., p. 163.

5 Hoselitz is cautious in explaining this interaction. Without urbanization there can be no development; however, urbanization does not automatically determine successful development. Urbanization is the major precondition for development. It will be through urbanization that the impeding factors of traditional society will be destroyed.
become economically developed, is defined as a definite pattern or set of stages. The ethnocentrism, which is evident in this and other stage theories of development, focuses on the patterns of urban and reciprocal economic development in the Western world as the process by which underdeveloped countries must follow to achieve their own economic development. The problems which we discovered in the study of the medieval (European) urban development are repeated in part in presently underdeveloped countries. The patterns of development in the non-Western world will naturally follow the same stages through which economic development of the Western world was achieved. At the base of the argument for the stage theories of development is the belief that all development must follow certain preconditions. Chief among them is the development of a powerful and expanding urban society.

The most significant rebuttal to this concept of urbanization as the means of undermining the traditionalism of underdeveloped countries is the work of Oscar Lewis on the concept of "urbanization without breakdown." Lewis

7 Hoselitz, "The Role of Cities", p. 172.
discovered through his research on rural migrants in Mexico City, that "traditionalism" did not disintegrate in response to urban environment. Rather the city of the third world was characterized by enclaves of tightly knit rural groups, which still maintained solidarity after several generations. The importance of Lewis' contribution to the debate on the process of modernization was essentially the evidence that modernization did not ipso facto lead to the breakdown of traditional patterns of behavior, but rather that urbanization necessitated an adaptation to different spatial and economic activities. The adaptation is not necessarily synonymous with the destruction of the "traditional" life style.

The economic basis of the stage theories of development has been rather extensively criticized by various scholars including A. G. Frank, Irving Horowitz, and Paul Sweezy. These theories, primarily utilizing evidence from Latin American development, define underdevelopment as the dynamic interaction between the "developed" country and the underdeveloped country. Frank argues that underdevelopment stems from a country's relationship to the world market and

its relationship to patterns of exchange. \textsuperscript{10} This means that underdevelopment is a structural facet of economic imperialism, rather than innate behavioral impediments of a traditional society.

The following analysis of the internal migration patterns within Tunisia, and the urbanization of Tunis as a result of the rural exodus, falls within the context of this debate on underdevelopment and modernization. Through the discussion of the material presented here, we will be able to assess the situation which led to the rural exodus. It is only by understanding the causes of the rural exodus that we can understand the rapid urbanization of Tunis.

CHAPTER I

LAND TENURE IN PRE-PROTECTORATE TUNISIA

In societies such as Tunisia, which were predominantly characterized by agricultural activity, relationship to the land served as the basis for existence. Land was the source of livelihood, the foundation of familial unity, and the framework for social relations. The different types of relationships to the land determined the various modes of social interaction. Land in Tunisia was an all pervasive element; land served to define the parameters of the social world. In Tunisia, land was also the basis of social control. Access to land was equivalent to survival; denial of access to land usually implied starvation.

According to land use and geographical characteristics, Tunisia can be divided into four broad natural zones. The most fertile region of Tunisia, and one especially suited for the cultivation of cereals was the Northern Tell. This zone followed the Dorsal Mountains from the heights of Mogord Khroumirie Mountains of the northwest through the fertile plains of the Medjerda and the high plateau plains of le Kef.

and Teboursouk. It also encompassed the low plains surrounding Tunis and the Dorsal fringes of Cape Bon. South of the Dorsal Mountains the second natural zone consisting of the large steppe in the center of Tunisia, which is characterized mostly by poor soil, intermittent and unreliable precipitation, and by large herds and sparse cultivation. The third broad natural zone is the Oriental Tell encompassing the hilly coastal fringe areas of the Sahel region from Hammamet to the south of Sfax. This area is especially suited to olive tree culture. The semi-arid and arid plateau leading from the steppe north of Gafsa through the clayey depressions of the Chotts into the northern reaches of the Great Erg and the Sahara, formed the fourth natural zone. This zone was sparsely settled except for concentrations of population in the oases, and supported the meager herds of the southern nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes. Most of the following material on changes in land tenure and agricultural production is based on the changes in the cereal region of the Dorsal Tell. It was within this zone that colonialism made its greatest impact on the agricultural production.
In the following chapters I will trace and discuss the more important changes in land tenure in Tunisia since the French Protectorate of 1881. By doing so, I intend to determine the changes in the cultivators' relationship to the land in order to account for the rural exodus and rapid urbanization, both of which have characterized Tunisian social development for the past three decades. The structure of this study corresponds to the historical development of the changes in the mode of land tenure and in agricultural production. In the first chapter I will present a brief overview of the deployment of land and agricultural production prior to the Protectorate. The second chapter will explore the process of European penetration into Tunisia and the patterns of early European colonization. Intrinsic to this discussion of European penetration, is the tracing of the impact of the European system of land registration. Developing concomitantly with this system of land registration was the creation of dependent agricultural production. This forms the bulk of the third chapter, which concentrates on the establishment of an export-oriented surplus production. The final chapter of this part deals with post-independence land policies. In it we will critically examine the failure of the agrarian reform program.

Through the composite view of the agrarian situation in Tunisia since the Protectorate, we will be in a position to assess properly the rapid urbanization of Tunis. The
dynamic condition of urbanization in Tunisia can only be properly understood in the perspective of the changes in land tenure and agricultural production. Therefore, the purpose of this part of the thesis is to detail the condition of rural Tunisia in order to analyze the cause of the rural exodus.

**Muslim Concepts of Land Tenure**

The Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth centuries brought to the Maghreb a feudal concept of property. Under the principles of Muslim law, all land was the exclusive property of God, held in trust on earth by the caliph. This land was considered "dead land", or land that was resting in a state of non-use (variously defined as maqoot or

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2 In this context I am using a very liberal conception of the term "feudal". Although the term "feudal" refers to the political and social conditions of Medieval Europe, there are enough similarities with the Maghrebian experience to justify its use here. The use of the terms in this context is valid, in that it serves to immediately orient the reader to the familiar set of political and social norms usually referred to as "feudalism". I caution the reader, however, that the term "feudal" is used in a very broad sense.

3 The concepts of land tenure and property in Muslim law are extremely technical. For this introductory orientation to the agricultural land use patterns prior to the European penetration I will offer only the briefest sketch. The technical complexities of land ownership are more fully discussed in A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia: A Study of Land Tenure and Land Revenue Administration (London: Oxford University Press: 1953); A. W. Poliak "Classification of Lands in the Islamic Law and its Technical Terms", *The American Journal of Semitic Languages* LXXVII, January-October 1940, p. 50-62; and Edvard Sultan, *Essai sur la Politique Foncière en Tunisie* (Paris: Librairie Dalloz, 1930).
The concept of "dead land" signified all land that was unproductive, though not necessarily through the lack of water, poor quality of the soil, or any other natural cause, but rather to all land that was not cultivated. According to Poliak, all "dead land" was under the proprietorship of the state, represented by the caliph. However, the act of reviving the land, or making the land productive, created "living land" (variously defined as maamour or 'amir). Generating "living land" or productive land from "dead land" was a social function, resulting in temporary ownership of that productive land. As soon as the "living land" became unproductive, it returned to the trust of the caliph. The concept of private property in terms of land ownership was only alluded to in the Koran and Hadith, and signified the responsibility surrounding the social function of maintaining the land in a state of productivity. Land which was perpetually maintained in the productive state became melk land, very similar to the concept of private property in the occidental sense. The difference was that melk land which became unproductive would revert back to the caliph's trust.

4The French sources, which serve as the basis for this orientation, use the term terres mortes to signify this type of land classification. The transliterations used in the following text are also based upon French sources and reflect the French transliteration system. At the time of the conquest, not all land in the Maghreb was "dead land". Land already in cultivation was considered "living land".

5Poliak, "Classification", p. 53.

6According to the French sources, terres vivifiée.

7See especially Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 17-30.
The caliph still maintained ultimate jurisdiction over all land, and regulated feudal relationships through its distribution.

Since malk property was held temporarily while productive, only constant production would guarantee ownership. In Tunisia, ownership, or more accurately control over the means to continue production, was transferable and legalized through the complex form of a religious-legal title. The title was composed of a long roll of paper, sometimes as long as several yards, where the ownership of the property was traced from the first proprietor through all successive transactions to the present proprietor.8

Mulk property existed in all areas of concentration of population where soil, climate, and water conditions were favorable to sedentary life. Although mulk property was situated primarily in proximity to villages and oases, it existed also in all zones of sedentarization. The largest distribution of mulk property was in the regions of the Sahel, Cape Bon, the plains surrounding Tunis, and in the Tell. Even though reviving the land through working it generated ownership, large areas of cereal cultivation in the Tell and olive culture in the Sahel did not belong to

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8 Sultan, Politique Foncière, p. 107. I have not been able to ascertain exactly when titles were introduced in Tunisia. However, the importance of titles became evident after the penetration of the French.
that the caliph did not have control over these lands, and therefore could not control feudal fealty through their distribution.

An outgrowth of melk property was the habous. Habous was ostensibly a gift of land to a religious foundation. The proceeds from the habous were designed to support the pious or charitable works of the chosen group or institution. Since the habous was used to support works of a religious nature, these lands were beyond the vicissitudes of the political situation. This is significant in that the caliph did not have control over these lands, and therefore could not control feudal fealty through their distribution.

There were two types of habous: public and private. The public habous was formed by a gift of land directly to the religious foundation. The private habous differed from the public habous in that the gift of land was held in trust by the religious foundation for certain descendants designated by the donor. The proceeds from the private habous went to support these descendants. Only after the line of

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designated descendants was extinguished did the habous become public, whereby the proceeds would be used for the religious foundation. The designated descendants of the private habous had only indirect and limited control over the property, since the cadi was the titular head of all habous.

The process through which the melk property became habous involved a complex legal contract between the donor and the cadi or his representative. The actual mechanism of this contract does not concern us here, but at the moment of the transaction the property became crystalized in the form of the habous. The descendants of the donor ceased to have direct control over the property, which they could not sell, exchange, or give away. 10

The habous, however, did not usually lie fallow. The habous was maintained in production through the contract of the enzelist: at the formation of the habous the donor could designate an enzelist, subject to the approval of the cadi. The contract of enzelist was the vehicle through which a fellahe could work the land. The enzelist would pay a fixed share of the harvest for the usufruct of the land. Since the habous were usually large domains, exceeding five hundred

hectsres (one hectare = 2.4711 acres), many fellahin would be engaged on one habous. Because of the nature of the relationship of the enzelist to the soil, the enzelist would work only to obtain a minimum to live.\textsuperscript{11}

The significance of the private habous was that it lacked the productive value of the land in a form not conducive to increased productivity. Since the enzelist rented the land in perpetuity, he could not be evicted unless he failed to meet the payments. This situation did not encourage the enzelist to invest energy to produce an abundance. In some cases habous land would remain fallow.\textsuperscript{12} The payments from the private habous to the descendants of the donators created a group of wealthy urban bourgeoisie similar to the absentee landlord, but with no direct control over the means of production. Being a religious donation, the habous was protected from political confiscation as well as being tax exempt. This tended to guarantee an income to the descendants of the donator, supporting this group of urban bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{13} At the time of the protectorate, one-third of all

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{Bulletin de Direction Générale de l'Agriculture}, vol. 1924, p. 530, Hereinafter referred to as BDGA.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture}, p. 78.

\textsuperscript{13}I have not found any direct evidence supporting the notion that the proceeds from the habous were used to support a group of urban bourgeoisie. However, the administrative structure of the habous testifies to the absence of the descendants on the habous itself. This structure would be conducive to supporting a group of descendants living in the urban center. See especially BDGA Vol. 1903, p. 457-9.
productive land was crystallized in habous, of which the private habous far outnumbered the public habous.  

The last category of land use was principally limited to the regions of low soil productivity in the center and south of Tunisia. This area was characterized by nomadic and semi-nomadic Bedouin tribes who subsisted on semi-sedentarized cultivation and on raising herds. Because of the nature of their nomadic and semi-nomadic livelihood within regions of low soil productivity, huge areas of land were utilized by the tribes for their nomadic movements. These lands were considered collective lands over which the tribes as collective entities had the right of jouissance or usufruct. The collective lands were also subject to the political vicissitudes of the times. For example, the huge domain of Enfida (which was to become one of the first huge European estates) was initially given to the Ouled-Said tribes by Ahmed Bey out of gratification for the protection rendered as a buffer against marauding Bedouin tribes. Again in the late 1850's, this domain was confiscated from the Ouled-Said and returned to the private domain of the bey.  

All property in Tunisia, except for the habous.  

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14 Sultan, Politique Foncière, p. 80.  
remained under the ultimate jurisdiction of the bey.

Through the distribution of land the bey was able to control political and social ties. In general terms the bey's jurisdiction was over two large masses of land: the public domain, and his own private domain. The public domain consisted of all the land held in trust by the bey for the people of Tunisia. Collective lands and melk property were created from this land mass. The public domain also included all water supplies, rivers, and other natural zones. The bey's private domain consisted of those areas which were worked or held for the express benefit of the bey, and used to support the administration of the state. Mining and all underground wealth were considered part of the bey's private domain. 16

Population and Land Tenure Prior to the Protectorate

Prior to the significant penetration of the Europeans and the imposition of the Protectorate, Tunisia was in a state of demographic equilibrium. This equilibrium was based on a subsistence agricultural economy; the population level was regulated by periodic epidemics and famine. In 1867 the Consul of Austro-Hungary estimated the Tunisian

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16 Henri de Montety, Une Loi Agraire en Tunisie (Cahors: Courseul, 1927) p. 27.
population to be between 1,600,000 and 1,800,000. A series of severe epidemics and the famine of 1868-69 reduced the population by nearly two-thirds. At the establishment of the Protectorate, the French estimated the population to be 900,000. This population was supported on 650,000 hectares, 400,000 of which were in cereals yielding at best two quintaux (200 kilogram) per hectare; 7,000,000 olive trees on 170,000 hectares; and 1,100 hectares in viticulture. Crains and olive oil constituted the staple ingredients of the Tunisian diet.

The base of the agricultural subsistence production was the mechia, a plot of land from 8-15 hectares depending upon soil and climatic conditions. The mechia was worked by one fellah within the familial group, which served as the foundation for familial cohesion and livelihood.

17 Quoted in Jean Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture Européennes en Tunisie depuis 1881 (Paris: Mouton et Co., 1962) p. 44. The accuracy of the early population figures for Tunisia are very doubtful. The population for this time has been variously assessed from 1,000,000 to 1,800,000.

18 Ibid., pp. 42-44.

19 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture p. 63. The total surface area of Tunisia was 12,000,000 hectares.

20 de Montety, Une Loi Agraire, p. 75.
hereditary usufruct (*moustauten*). *Moustauten* differed from *melk* property in that it did not have the same exchange value. The *moustauten* refers to the relationship to property without the acknowledgment of ownership that comes with the possession of a legal title. This became significant after the Protectorate with the expansion of a European money-market economy, which I will discuss below.

Much of the fertile regions of the Dorsal Tell and the Oriental Tell (the Sahel) were contained in large *hanchira*, controlled by absentee landlords. These large estates were

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21 The possession of a legal title to the land was a fairly expensive procedure. In order to establish a clear title, the proprietor would have to call for a council consisting of the local notables and the cadi's representative. The proprietor, barely subsisting on agricultural production, usually could not afford to supply the necessary food and presents for this council. The implications of this on the group of proprietors without proper title will become evident in the discussion of the land registration acts.

22 This does not mean that prior to the penetration of Europeans there was no money functioning in a money-exchange economy. There definitely was money. However, the extent to which the market based on the exchange of money had developed prior to the French Protectorate was certainly concentrated in the larger cities and market areas. By the use of the term "money-market economy", I am referring more exactly to the growth and expansion of the market based solely on the exchange of money, and existing in a definite relationship to the world market.
worked under systems of sharecropping depending upon the type of agriculture. The Direction Générale de l'Agriculture established after the Protectorate, estimated that 80% of the agricultural population worked their land under some sort of sharecropping. The areas of the cereal culture, especially in the regions of the high and low plains of the Dorsal Tell, were worked under the sharecropping system of the khammessat. The khammès was a tenant farmer who usually worked one mechias. The obligations of the khammessat stipulated that the proprietor give an advance of grain or money, and supply the oxen, seed, charrue (the traditional plow), and the land in return for four-fifths of the harvest. The khammès retained one-fifth of the harvest, barely sufficient to survive until the harvest, when again the proprietor would advance grains or money until the next harvest. This system of sharecropping was a fundamental capital-work relationship which tended to support the large estates and perpetuate the dependence of the fellah on the landlord. In addition to the khammès, the cereal harvest was worked by the hataias, the

23 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture, p. 3.

24 Ibid., p. 81. The obligations of the khammessat were codified by Khereddine in the decree of 13 April 1874. The proprietor would supply all that was necessary for the khammès to survive until the harvest.
traditional seasonal migrant worker. In order to complement their fragile nomadic subsistence equilibrium, tribesmen would work on the large henchirs during harvest time and return to their tribes immediately afterwards. The hataias served as a cheap source of manpower.

Sharecropping was equally important in the arbo-cultural regions of the Sahel, in the Oriental Tell, and in the oases region of the south. Under the system of m'gharsi the proprietor designated the species of tree to be planted on his land, whether olives, almonds, palms, etc., and gave an advance of grains and oil or money. The m'gharsa was obliged to furnish the seedlings, tools, animals, and the labor. The contract of the m'gharsa lasted for seven to twelve years and was renewable. The length of this contract reflected the time necessary for the seedlings to yield fruit, from which the m'gharsa would receive one-third to one-fifth of

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25 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 154. Also called Agir.

26 These patterns of the traditional migration during harvest time in search of work served as the basis for the French analysis of the dramatic population movements which followed the Second World War. I will argue that this was not the basis for the rural exodus. See below, Chapter VI.

27 Secrétariat d'Etat à l'Agriculture, République de Tunisie, Région 05+ Sahel de Sousse (Tunis, 1962) mimeographed, pp. 63-64.
the yield. The sharecropping system of the m'gharsa differed from the khammessat in that the m'gharsa had control over tools and animals, while the khammès was totally dependent upon the landlord to supply the means of production. Another form of sharecropping was the contract of the mouçakate. This was a short term specialization of the olive culture sharecropping system, and dealt with mature trees already yielding fruit. The mouçakate would receive one-fifth of the harvest in exchange for the labor involved.28

The relationship of 80% of the agricultural population to the landlord through these series of sharecropping systems created a social organization which concentrated the wealth in the hands of the large landlords. The large landlords were usually absentee landlords, who composed part of the urban bourgeoisie. The degree of dependency and the intricacies of the social relationships between the landlord and the sharecropper varied as a function of the type of agriculture and the kind of contract. The most dependent of the sharecroppers were those in the cereal culture. Not only was the length of the contract short, and in need of annual renewal, but in the event of a poor harvest, the portion the sharecropper received was still one-fifth. Therefore, the mass of the agricultural population survived under varying degrees of

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28 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 63.
dependence upon the large landlords.

**Europeans in Pre-Protectorate Tunisia**

Tunisia's prominent geographical position on the Mediterranean had always facilitated foreign conquests. Throughout history Tunisia has been a center of conquest and trade. Situated among the ruins of the Phoenician, Roman, and Arab conquests were large numbers of Jewish communities. Especially after the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a small but expanding number of Christian merchants began to reside in the area we call Tunisia. This group consisted principally of Italian merchants, and was concentrated primarily in Tunis. The position of the foreign communities vis-à-vis the dominant Muslim community was always rather tenuous. Although the Muslim world prided itself on its heterogeneous ethnic make-up, the security of the foreign communities could not always be guaranteed. 29 After the Ottoman Empire gained control of Tunisia in 1546, a certain degree of uniformity in dealing with the foreign communities was imposed. Under Turkish control, all non-Muslims (zimmis) were officially permitted to live in Tunisia. The zimmis, however, were obliged to pay a special tax (kharadj) in addition to the standard tax (djasia). Due to the changes in the European

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29 See especially Ira Lapidus, "Muslim Urban Society in Mamluk Syria" in Hourani and Stern *The Islamic City*, p. 199.
production system and the greater degree of order imposed by the Turks, the size of the European communities residing in Tunisia increased.

The early part of the nineteenth century witnessed the imperial expansion of Europe into the non-Western world. This expansion was characterized by the progressive penetration of luxury items. Coinciding with this European expansion, an attraction to European "modernity" was demonstrated by the rulers of the Mediterranean world, such as Mohammed Ali in Egypt and Mohammed Bey in Tunisia. Among the figures who represented this attraction to "modernization" was General Khereddine, mamuk and Minister to the bey of Tunis. In many ways Khereddine exemplifies the growing tendencies in the Arab world of the later half of the nineteenth century to be attracted to the European modernized society. 30

By the middle of the nineteenth century, the first major beylical act reflecting this attraction to modernization was promulgated. In 1857 the Pacte Fundamental was issued. The Pacte was based on the Déclaration des Droits des Hommes and proclaimed equality to all residents of

Tunisia who respected the laws and customs of the land. The Pacte also proclaimed the right of all residents to acquire property. 31

The loosening of property regulations, including foreigners, by the Pacte facilitated Western penetration into Tunisia. Furthermore, through Khereddine's influential ministerial position under Mohammed Sedok Bey, the beylical government was reorganized, the army modernized, the administration of the public habous was reorganized and regulated in the djemaia, and the regulations of the khammassat contract were codified. The modernizing tendencies introduced through the Pacte and under Khereddine were an invitation to European penetration. As a result in 1859 the French Telegraph Company of Algeria received a concession to connect Algiers to Tunis by telegraph. In 1861 the French engineer Colin reconstructed the old Roman aqueduct designed to supply Tunis with fresh water. The 1860's saw the creation of a railway line from Tunis to la Goulette, and the connection by rail of Algiers to Tunis. 32 The beylical government, having grown accustomed to imported luxuries and burdened with the costs


of modernization issued credit notes. In 1869 Tunisia was declared bankrupt, and financial control over the budget was placed in the hands of a council composed of French, Italian, and British comptrollers. This typical form of nineteenth century imperial penetration through the control of credit notes, eventually resulted in the imposition of the Protectorate in 1881. However, expansionist tendencies within metropolitan France as well as within Algeria were already being manifested by the 1870's, as the French began to view Tunisia as the natural extension of French territory in Algeria. By 1878 at the Berlin Congress of imperial powers, Britain allowed France a "free hand" in Tunisia in exchange for a similar gesture from France for British interest in Cyprus. In the following chapter we will examine the process of the French penetration into Tunisia, and trace the development of French colonization.
CHAPTER II

COLONIZATION AND LAND TENURE IN THE EARLY PROTECTORATE PERIOD

Early colonization in Algeria had been characterized by the concession of huge tracts of land to large banking and capitalist organizations in exchange for guarantees of colonization. These guarantees consisted of private initiative by the capitalist groups to bring to Algeria colonists to work the land. By the 1870's much of the most fertile land in the Algerian Tell had been already parceled out to the large capitalist organizations, and these groups now viewed Tunisia as the natural extension of French territory in Algeria. However, changes in the political structure of metropolitan France during 1873-74 resulted in the creation of the Third Republic. Part of the surge in republicanism in France at this time manifested itself in the movement away from the active support of la grande colonisation, which had characterized imperial policy in Algeria. The republicanism of the Third Republic, however, did not signify the total decline of the influence of the large capitalist associations in France. The events leading up to the Treaty of le Bardo and the formation of the Protectorate of 1881 in Tunisia testify to the continued influence that the large capitalist interests exerted on French policy.
As we have discussed in the previous section, the financial position of the beylical government by the 1870's was undermined by the outlay of capital for the construction of utilities, the purchase of luxury goods, and the expense of modernizing the army. General Kheredine, who was instrumental in generating the ideological climate which was amenable to the penetration of European goods and construction, had been receiving an annual pension for his services as Minister to the Bey. By 1874-5 Sadok Bey's treasury was almost completely empty of reserves, so he offered Kheredine a tract of land as compensation. The vast domain of Enfida became Kheredine's private estate.

Kheredine's influential and prestigious position as Minister to the Bey was eventually undermined through the constant pressure exerted by the European comptrollers on the treasury. By 1879 Kheredine sensed that he was losing his prestige, and that Enfida was threatened by confiscation. In 1879 Kheredine sold the domain of Enfida to the Société Franco-Africaine de l'Enfida, which was an affiliate of the Société Marseillaise de Crédit. The

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1 Loth, La Grande Colonisation, p. 54. The very program of modernization that Kheredine had helped generate in Tunisia led, to his demise as minister, when the European powers began to exert their power over the budget.

2 The total cost of Enfida, which consisted of 96,000 hectares, was 4,000,000 Old Francs.
Société Marseillaise de Crédit also had large land holdings in Algeria. In fact, the vice-president of the Société Franco-Africaine de l'Enfida, M. Beauvergerd, was also president of the Compagnie Genevoise de Setif. The Compagnie Genevoise de Setif was one of the largest land controlling groups in Algeria. The second large estate to be brought under the control of the Société Marseillaise de Crédit was the domain of Sidi Tabet in 1880. The domain of Sidi Tabet, totaling approximately 5,000 hectares in the fertile Medjazeel-Bab region, had been amassed over a decade by a Frenchman M. de Saucy, during the time that he was in the favor of the bey.

Anxiety over the control of such large tracts of land by the Société Marseillaise de Crédit resulted in certain intrigues on the part of the bey's new minister, Mustapha ben-Ismail, which threatened the Sidi Tabet and Enfida with confiscation. Under the pretext of chastizing the tribes of Khroumirie for the alleged piracy of the French boat Auvergne (for which there is evidence that the piracy was led and


4 Claude Bizet, Monographie du Centre Tunisie (Sousse: Librerie Française, 1906) p. 53. Bizet was the director of the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture in Tunis.
instigated by Italians, the French army stationed in Algeria marched on Tunis and imposed the Protectorate. The intervention of the French Army and the creation of the Protectorate in Tunisia were in no small way the result of the influence of the large French banks interested in land speculation. A contemporary historian of French colonization would state that the possession of Tunisia by France dates from the signing of the contract between Khereddine and the Société Marseillaise de Crédit.

Although the initial significant European penetration into Tunisia occurred during the later half of the nineteenth century, and concerned itself primarily with the industrial-utility sector, agricultural colonization was not late in manifesting itself. Ever since the promulgation of the Pacte Fondamental, foreigners had had the right to acquire land; the nucleus of Europeans settling in Tunisia had been Italians. The major reason for this was that, in the early part of the nineteenth century a disease of the grape vine, Phylloxeria, had begun to destroy the vineyards of France and Italy. Between 1858-63 Phylloxeria had almost completely

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5Emerit, "La Pénétration Industrielle", p. 215.

6J. C. Lanessan, La Tunisie (1917) quoted in Passeron, Les Grandes Sociétés, p. 218. It is significant to note that due to the Republicanism of the Third Republic, the Société Marseillaise de Crédit was obliged to rationalize its investment in Tunisia as "Franco-Tunisian collaboration". Passeron, Les Grandes Sociétés, p. 221.
destroyed the productive capacities of the Italian vineyards. The spread of *Phylloxera* and the resulting loss of livelihood for French and Italian viticulturists, coupled with the relative cheapness of land (*terre à bon marché*) in North Africa, caused a wave of migration to the chalky-calciated soils of the low plains surrounding Tunis. By 1881, immediately preceding the Protectorate, the European population consisted of 707 Frenchmen, and 11,206 Italians.

It is significant to note that the early European colonization of Tunisia was characterized by a small number of very large landholding *colon* and capitalist-group proprietors, with a nucleus of an Italian population limited to the region of viticulture. Speculation was the prime force behind the large capitalist investment in Tunisian agricultural land. In addition to the Société Marseillaise de Crédit, which led the capitalist group investment in Tunisia, there were two other large capitalist groups. By the turn of the century, following the relative pacification of the interior by the French army, the second significant penetration of Metropolitan French capital into Tunisian property ownership occurred. The Société de l'OMNIUM Immobilier Tunisienne was the agricultural branch of a *groupe d'affaires*.

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which constituted the association of several large financial
corporations in Metropolitan France. 9 Also following the pacifi-
cation of the interior, the Société des Fermes Françaises was
established. This association differed from the other two
capitalist-investment groups in that it was an internally
based group of wealthy colonists with sufficient investment
capital. 10

The first problem facing the Société Franco-Africaine
de l'Enfida was a manpower shortage. The events of 1881 had
reduced the population of the Ouled Zeid tribes of the Enfida
region from 9,000 to 6,000, of which 1,000-1,200 were laborers
or herdsmen. 11 In order to increase the labor force the
Société Franco-Africaine de l'Enfida increased the khammès' share of the harvest to two-fifths in place of the usual one-
fifth. 12 Due to the labor shortage at the time of the Pro-
tectorate, many black Muslims from the Fazzouli region of
Northern Sudan migrated to work in the huge estates of the
French. 13

10 Ibid., p. 247.
11 Ibid., p. 219-20.
12 Ibid., p. 220.
13 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 155.
In the majority of the cases, the large colon proprietors, who took over agricultural production from the previous Tunisian landlord, maintained production without transforming the conditions of production at the base. Many colon proprietors found that the retention of the khammessed sharecropping system was profitable as well as safe. In retaining the khammessed system the colon did not have to invest capital in modernizing the means of production, and was therefore covered from the financial outlay of salaries, especially when the harvest was poor. During the 1880's the Société Franco-Africaine de l'Enfida began to bring in European colonists, mostly Pantellarians (from an island off Tunis) and Sicilians, who bought their land from the Société.  

The Société de l'OMNIUM Immobilier Tunisienne began in 1905 with an initial investment of 150,000 Francs. By 1924 l'OMNIUM had an investment capital of five million francs, and controlled more than 25,000 hectares. In 1923 2,500 of the 3,000 tenant sharecroppers working for l'OMNIUM were Italians. The Société des Fermes Françaises was begun  

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14 Passeron, Les Grandes Sociétés, p. 222. The earliest colonists bought land at 150 francs per hectare, payable in ten years at 6% interest. After a series of good harvests, the price of land in 1889 was set at 300-350 francs per hectare.

15 Ibid., p. 239. L'OMNIUM controlled eight subsidiary companies in Tunisia.
by M. Saurin, a French colon professor in 1899. From an initial investment capital of 238,000 francs, the Société des Fermes Françaises controlled 34,000 hectares in Tunisia and over 7,000 hectares in Algeria. 16

The early European penetration into agricultural land was characterized by a small number of very large colon and capitalist-group proprietors with large investment for speculation. The early European population consisted of a nucleus of Italian proprietors limited to the area of viticulture, and a fairly large Italian tenant-sharecropping population. At this time French colon constituted only 5% of the total foreign population. It is significant to note that with the establishment of the official colonization programs during the late 1890's, a large quantity of the land used to promote immigration came from the properties of the large capitalist-groups.

Changes in Land Tenure After the Protectorate

In terms of the changes in the structure of land tenure and the cultivator's relationship to the soil, three laws form the framework for the patterns of European colonization and for the imposition of occidental concepts of property and relations to production. These laws are the Immatriculation Foncière of 1885, the Habous Échange laws of 1898, and

16 Ibid., p. 247.
the Délimitation des Terres Collectives Laws of 1901. In the following section we will examine the significant factors of these laws in regard to the changes in land tenure and changes in production. Through these laws the European community was able to concentrate a great deal of the productive capacity of agriculture in its hands, which eventually led to the creation of an export-oriented production. The analysis of these three laws is valuable in terms of their impact upon the future development of the dependent economy in Tunisia.

The foundation of occidental land tenure is the concept of inalienable but still exchangeable private property. The exchangeable nature of property determines its value in a market where greater circulation of property increases its value. At the time of the imposition of the Protectorate, land tenure in Tunisia was an admixture of various types of property: some were exchangeable in the occidental sense, some were only temporarily held in usufruct, while others were totally inalienable. The purpose of these three laws was to impose a certain degree of uniformity on property in the occidental sense, so that the circulation of land could be facilitated.

Private exchangeable property in Tunisia, melk property, was legitimized through its confirmation in a title. However, the real limits of the property were often only vaguely defined. The colon, who would purchase a melk property, would discover
that the boundaries of the property were one-third to one-half smaller than specified in the original title. In many cases the titles themselves were lost or non-existent. The process by which the proprietor would establish an original or a duplicate title was long and costly.\textsuperscript{17}

On 1 July, 1885, the Regency government passed the first of the three land tenure laws.\textsuperscript{18} The \textit{Immatriculation Foncière} was designed to create a formal pattern for the registration, and thereby for the circulation of property. The Resident-General, M. Paul Cambon, described the decree as promoting the development of Tunisia through its primary resource, its agricultural fertility. According to Cambon, the law would protect the new owners of property from their ignorance of the language, the laws, and the customs of the country.\textsuperscript{19} Therefore, the purpose of the law was to facilitate the security of property transactions.

The means by which property transactions were to be

\textsuperscript{17}George Souléagnon, \textit{La Loi Tunisienne du 1 Juillet 1885: Sur la Propriété Immobilière} (Paris: Libraires du \textit{Renseign}, 1933) p. 40. The proprietor would have to call for a council consisting of the village sheikh or notable and the local representative of the cadis. In his plea for a duplicate or an original title, the proprietor would have to supply the necessary food for the duration of the council.

\textsuperscript{18}Journal \textit{Officiel Tunisien}, 12 July, 1885. This journal is hereafter referred to as \textit{JOT}.

\textsuperscript{19}Quoted in \textit{Régence de Tunisie, Direction Générale de l' Agriculture, La Colonisation en Tunisie} (Bougie: Victor Berthod, 1931) p. 43.
controlled was through the creation of a Tribunal Mixte.
The purpose of the tribunal was to assess the limits of the
boundaries and to register the ownership of the property. The
tribunal consisted of six members: a president, three French
magistrates, and two Tunisian magistrates. The two Tunisian
magistrates had only a consultative vote. At the conclu-
sion of each registration a numbered title was only in
French, which accurately described the boundaries of the
property. If the original owner was without title, he had
eight days to prove that he was the legitimate owner. If
he failed to do so the tribunal would set the limits of the
property on its own jurisdiction. The fees for the tri-
bunal, similar to the "court costs" in English law, were
to be paid by the party who called for the tribunal.

The system of property registration created by the
Immatriculation Foncière usurped the bey's traditional author-
ity over property and transferred it to French jurisdiction.
The system was obviously intended to aid the needs of French
colonization. The issuance of the property title in French

22 JOT, 12 July 1885, article 43.
and the need to pay the costs of the registration process were indeed prohibitive measures to many fellahin who owned some small fallahin property. Not only was the *Immatriculation Foncière* significant because it represented the penetration of a colonial market economy, but the registration of property would also serve as the basis for the access to credit. The implications of the access to credit will be discussed in Chapter III.

The second significant legal change in the land tenure system concerned the *Habous Exchange* laws of 1898. In a series of four laws promulgated in 1898, the jurisdiction of the *habous* passed over to French supervision, and the means to promote the circulation of *habous* lands were thereby established. Since one-third of the productive surface was crystallized in the inalienable form of the *habous*, French colonization interests were necessarily eager to reshape the *habous* system, so that these lands could be effectively utilized for agricultural exploitation.

The initial set of three laws was promulgated on 31 January, 1898. The significance of these laws is that they established the exchangeable character of *habous* land. The law stated that an individual desiring ownership over a specified *habous* could receive that property in exchange for another property of equal value, or in exchange for an equivalent amount of money. The individual desiring this

23 BGDA vol. 1898; p. 10-13; article 1 "Décret Sur le Règlement de l'Exchange des Biens Habous".
transaction must enter a written demand to the President of
the Djemaïa, who would assess whether the transaction would
be favorable for the descendants of the habous. The Djemaïa
would set the exchange price in money or set the limits of
the property to be exchanged. The habous given in exchange
cess to be considered habous, and become melk property.
If the exchange involved another property, this property
would then be considered habous, and placed under the jurisdic-
tion of the Djemaïa.

The other aspects of this set of laws involved a re-
definition of the enzelist's contract. The Djemaïa would
now have the sole control over the authorization of the
renting of the habous, whether public or private. The choice
of the enzelist would be on the basis of public bidding; the
period of the contract was not to exceed ten years. The
new structure facilitated the penetration of Europeans into
the habous land. Since this system was conducive to agri-
cultural exploitation without the necessity for the large

24 Ibid., articles 4, 5, 17.
25 Ibid., article 29.
26 BDGA vol. 1898; p. 18 and 22; Decree 31 Jan. 1898
"Sur la location à longue terme des Biens Habous" and Décret
31 Jan. 1898 "Sur l'Adjudication des Enzels des Biens Habous".
investment in land, it encouraged the utilization of the enzeliat system, provided an inexpensive means of initially gaining access to land, and allowed for the eventual possibility of demanding ownership. Furthermore, this system was conducive to quick profits from agricultural exploitation without the need to plan for the depletion of the soil or for improvements.

The last part of the Habous Echange laws was issued on 31 December 1898. This law was designed to create a source of land for the purpose of facilitating colonization. It created a system of land transfer between the Djamia and the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, by authorizing a transfer of not less than 2,000 hectares per year of public habous in exchange for money. The Direction Générale de l'Agriculture was to utilize this source of land for purposes of official colonization and enticements for immigration.27

The significance of this law lay in the process by which the traditional jurisdiction over the public habous was usurped by the French colonial regime. Public habous,

27 BDGA vol. 1899, p. 3; Decree 13 Nov. 1898 "Autorisant l'Echange d'Immeuble ruraux entre la Djamia et la Direction Générale de l'Agriculture en vue de faciliter la colonisation et le peuplement de la Tunisie". The value of the properties would be fixed by two specialists, one from each of the two organizations.
initially intended to serve the Muslims of Tunisia through the pious works of a religious foundation, were now to be used to facilitate official colonization and immigration by Frenchmen. It is significant to note the degree to which the money-market economy had even penetrated into Tunisian religious life. I will discuss the significance of the official colonization programs in the next section.

French interest in the tribal lands of central and southern Tunisia was almost non-existent during the early Protectorate period, as these areas were characterized by low soil productivity and very meager and uncertain precipitation. However, interest in these areas increased sharply in the late 1890's with the discovery of large quantities of phosphates by Phillippe Thomas. By 1901 a series of laws were promulgated delimiting the areas of tribal jouissance. These laws initially reasserted the nature of the tribal possession; the lands which the tribes used were still the.

28 In order to further insure control over the habous land, the Conseil Supérieur de Habous was created on 17 July, 1908 and empowered to supervise the Dijamaa. This council was composed of eight members: four from the French Regency government, two Tunisian magistrates, and two religious professors. The creation of the council represented the progression of French control over the property jurisdiction of the Dijamaa, and was furthermore a step towards the consolidation of French governmental control over property in Tunisia. BDGA vol. 1908, p. 290.

29 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 185.
property of the bey. The series of laws, which began on 4 January 1901, created committees to define more accurately the limits of tribal usufruct. The committees were composed of notables from the tribe, the local representatives of the cadi, and were under the chairmanship of the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture. As a result of the delimitation of the tribal lands, the areas in which the tribes moved were more confined. This allowed for the creation of isolated plots of private property scattered among the broad areas of tribal jouissance. The process of delimitation of the tribal lands was eventually absorbed into a program of nomadic sedentarization. The sedentarization program was designed to standardize the property laws and to facilitate the creation of plots of melk property. Melk property was the surest means of property circulation and exchange in a money-market economy.

The Program of Official Colonization and Its Impact on Land Tenure

The official colonization program was designed to promote immigration of French nationals to Tunisia. The policy of stimulating and enticing immigration to Tunisia

For legal purposes the French considered the bey as the representative of Tunisia.

A series of similar laws followed over a ten year period.
reflected the French intellectual concept of la mission civilisatrice. The political basis underlying this concept was the need to establish a stable rural French population sufficiently numerous to constitute a base for the expansion of French influence.32 The major result of the program of official colonization was the consolidation of the money-market economy in terms of an export-oriented production, which resulted in the creation of two distinct modes of agricultural production. The process leading to this situation will form the basis for the following discussion.

Prior to the possession of a source of land for official colonization purposes, colonization in Tunisia was characterized by private initiative, as in the case of Enfida. With the exception of the Italians, who were predominantly tenant farmers and small proprietors, the colonos of the early Protectorate period were fairly wealthy or associated with the large capitalist groups. The absence of a large base of middle-sized French colon proprietors, was to a large extent a function of the high cost of the voyage, and the need to have a ready source of capital to purchase land. By 1896 (the earliest comprehensive population data which is available) the total colon population was

32 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, La Colonisation, p. 53-4.
26,700, most of with 10,150 were military. The remaining 16,550 civilian residents were concentrated in Tunis; only 22% were rural residents. This represented an increase of 35% of the 1881 European population, but as yet the rural residents still comprised a minimal portion of the total European population. The need to increase the stable rural population served as the basis for the official colonization program.

Although the Habous Echange laws of 1898 created a definite source of land for official colonization purposes, attempts by the Regency to stimulate immigration and colonization programs was the terre sialine in 1891. The terre

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33 BDGA vol. 1898; p. 79. The civilian population of Tunisia was divided into the following Contrôles Civiles:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contrôle de Tunis</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ville de Tunis</td>
<td>7,912</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contrôle de Tunis</td>
<td>2,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Sousse</td>
<td>14,446</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Souk el Arba</td>
<td>1,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Bizerta</td>
<td>934</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Sfax</td>
<td>798</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Gabes</td>
<td>459</td>
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<tr>
<td>* le Kef</td>
<td>410</td>
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<td>* Grombalie</td>
<td>406</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Beja</td>
<td>376</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Kaimuan</td>
<td>239</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Gafsa</td>
<td>224</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Thala</td>
<td>87</td>
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<tr>
<td>* Maktar</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>* Sud Militair</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16,534</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 Ibid., p. 182.

35 Bizet, Monographie de Centre Tunisie, p. 61. The terre sialine had belonged to the private domain of the family by that name until 1871, when it was confiscated by the bey.
sialine was ceded to the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture by the bey as partial repayment for debts incurred to France and to French subjects. The terre sialine was situated in the heart of the olive culture region of the Sahel. It is significant that the ceding of the terre sialine coincided with the discovery by the French in the late 1880's of the "wealth" of the olive culture in Sfax region. Olive oil was a very exportable, high profit product.

The first of the series of official colonization legislation was passed on 8 February 1892, following the possession of the terre sialine. Coincident with this was the creation of the influential Comité du Peuplement Français. The Comité was organized by the large property owning colons, and by the large capitalist investment associations. These large proprietors had originally purchased vast estates exceeding the potentialities of direct cultivation, and were interested in increased immigration and colonization because of the high rate of returns from land speculation, which would naturally follow increased demand for land. The Comité manipulated the so called danger italien, the fear that the Italians would gain control over Tunisia by the predominance of Italians residing there. Although the number of

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36 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 171.

37 Ibid., p. 170.

38 Ibid., p. 175.
Italians residing in Tunisia prior to 1931 was constantly greater than the number of French residents, the position of the Italians was inferior to that of the French. In terms of property ownership as of 31 December 1895, 750 French colon owned 436,500 hectares, compared to 367 Italian proprietors, who owned 38,750 hectares. The French agricultural colon population was scattered throughout Tunisia, while the Italian population was principally limited to small family owned plots in the region of viticulture on the plains surrounding Tunis. The Italians were also employed as tenant farmers, agricultural workers, and foremen by the large French colon and Tunisian proprietors.

La danger italien, however, did prove effective in catalyzing the official colonization programs in Tunisia. The law of 1892 offered colonization land at five francs per hectare. Until the Habous Echange law secured a source of land, some of the land used for official colonization purposes was bought by the Direction Générale de


40 BDGA vol. 1898, p. 25.

41 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture, p. 33.

42 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, La Colonisation, p. 44.
l'Agriculture from the large colon proprietors. As in the case for the Société Marseillaise de Crédit, official colonization resulted in increased profits from the returns on land speculation.

The laws of 1892 and 1898 established the initial policies of official colonization, but yet no definite program for stimulating immigration existed other than the price of land à bon marché. It was not until the Ordinance of 23 July 1902 that credit was made available for land bought directly from the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture. Prior to this Ordinance, the entire price for the plot of land had to be paid in advance, thereby restricting the program of colonization to French colonos with available capital. The Ordinance of 1902 established the policy of paying on credit for colonization lots. The program of official colonization was further developed by the law of 26 January, 1904, which made provision for the creation of an Office Central du Placement Français en Tunis. This office was empowered to actively encourage immigration by offering partial payment for the voyage to Tunisia for the prospective agricultural or artisan colonos without sufficient funds.

43 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture, p. 32.
44 BDGA vol. 1902, p. 309.
45 BDGA vol. 1905, p. 204.
The basis of the legislation of 24 January 1914, which presented a fully detailed plan for immigration and colonization, was a program designed to intensify French immigration to Tunisia. The program, however, was aborted by the First World War. A new program based on that of 1914 was realized by legislation in 1919. This new program was designed to settle a minimum of 100 French agricultural families each year.\(^46\)

The incentives of this program induced advances of up to 50,000 francs in credit and a tax remission for five years. The reason for the apparently large size of the loan and tax reduction was that exploitation techniques in Tunisia were based upon the traditional charrue, and the family-sized plot. Modern European techniques of direct agricultural exploitation were non-existent on land not previously owned by a colon who had involved himself in direct production. Moreover, modern European direct exploitation involved an initial large investment in the purchase of European technical apparatus, such as plows, reapers, remorques, etc., as well as building adequate housing for livestock and for the colon’s family. I will discuss the growth of credit and credit organization in the following chapter. What I wish to emphasize here is that it was only through the initial indebtedness that the

prospective colon could establish direct-Europeanized production.

The results of the program of official colonization were not impressive in terms of population increases. The program guaranteed cultivatable lots of a minimum of 100-150 hectares to each eligible immigrant. During the initial 22 years of the program, 812 lots were awarded; the average size of the lots was 155 hectares. The colonization program which started in 1919, however, proved more effective in stimulating colonization and immigration. Between 1919 and 1923, 574 lots representing 116,000 hectares were awarded, averaging over 200 hectares each. For the period 1924-1929 approximately 775 lots were awarded.\(^\text{47}\) For the total period of official colonization, 1,470 lots were awarded, totaling 260,000 hectares. The population for the total period was about 7,000 people; this was an average of 700 people per year.\(^\text{48}\)

The increasing success of the official colonization

\(^\text{47}\) Between 1919 and 1923 more than 1,440 lots were awarded each year; the average size of the lots was over 200 hectares. For the period 1924 to 1929 the average size of the lots decreased to 188 hectares, but the number of lots awarded increased to 824, representing 155,000 hectares.

\(^\text{48}\) Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, La Colonisation, p. 67-68. Between 1897-1919 an average of 44 families represented 220 persons settled each year. Between 1919 and 1923 the average yearly number of families settled increased to 140, representing about 720 people. The period 1924 to 1929 resulted in the average yearly settlement of 155 families, representing 775 people.
program during the post war period 1919-1929, can be attributed to the increased stability and productivity of Tunisian agriculture. Certain factors in metropolitan France also contributed to increased immigration. In certain areas of Metropolitan France agricultural productivity had declined during the war years, and with the return of the soldiers, the costs of agricultural property had risen sharply. Therefore some of the increase in immigration to Tunisia was a result of the inflation of property values in Metropolitan France and a result of the war damage itself. Legislation in Tunisia facilitated credit and land acquisition for refugees from war devastated areas. 49

The official colonization legislation of 1919 had included provision for the colonization of Tunisian families. This was the beginning of the sedentarization programs, and the logical outgrowth of the delimitation laws of the terres collectives. If the nomadic tribes could be made to settle permanently on plots of land worked individually, the internal cohesion and organization of the tribes could be loosened. Individual fellahin tied to plots of land would be easier to control than the collective group of the nomadic tribe. Through the sedentarization program, the mission civilisatrice could be extended to the nomadic groups by way of hygiene,

49 BDGA vol. 1919; p. 212.
medicine, education, and civil control. In 1920 the first group of 260 families was settled on 7,000 hectares of domain land in the region of Bou Arda and El Aroussa. The average land allotment for the Tunisian families in 1920 was 23 hectares. In 1922, 220 Tunisian families were allotted 6,316 hectares, on the average of 28 hectares per family. In 1923, 170 Tunisian families received an allotment of less than 15 hectares each, totaling 2,500 hectares together. During the first three years of the sedentarization program from 1920-23, 650 Tunisian families were settled on 15,816 hectares, principally located in the area south of the Dorsal Mountains. This area was characterized by infrequent rainfall and low soil productivity. The average land allotment for the Tunisian family during this period was between 15-29 hectares, while for the same approximate period, 1919-1923, the colon family received an average of over 200 hectares.

The result of the official colonization program was the creation of a double standard for Tunisian and French colonists. In terms of the size of land allotment, the colonists received ten times more land than the Tunisians. The quality of the land differed tremendously. The colon received land located in the most fertile regions of Tunisia, the high and low plains of the Dorsal Tell, and in the fertile arbocultural

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50 BOCA vol. 1924; p. 530-531.
region of the Oriental Tell. The Tunisian received land in the central and southern areas, plagued by periodic zemna (drought). The law of 24 October 1924, which established the first comprehensive colonization program for Tunisians, also reaffirmed the right of the state to reclaim all land that was not productively exploited. The fellahin, who left their land during a zemna in search of a livelihood by journalier (day) work in the more fertile regions, were in danger of forfeiting their land through their absence. The result of the official colonization programs was that the productive lands were concentrated in the hands of the colon community, which began producing for an external market. Prices for agricultural products were also dominated by the colonos, whose production far exceeded the quantity from Tunisian production.

The situation in 1931, after fifty years of French control, led to the establishment of a dual system of production—the modern-Europeanized production characterized by production for an external market, and Tunisian production characterized by both the traditional charrue on the meehia worked by the familial group, and by the traditional sharecropping khammessat system. This is not to say that Tunisia

51 Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, La Colonisation, p. 46. Official credit for Tunisian cultivators did not begin until 1936, at a time when much of the damage was irreparable.
in 1931 was a dualistic society, but that the economy was dominated by the expansion of a money-market economy under which both the traditional production and the modern production existed. There was the constant pressure of the modern economy to extend its realm of production, and each year the extent of European exploitation increased. The further penetration of European exploitation based on modern technological knowledge and investment capital supplied by Metropolitan France, resulted in the progressive proletarianization of the rural population. Concomitant with proletarianization was the impoverishment of the rural agricultural population. The expansion of the money-market economy resulted in the destruction of the traditional subsistence equilibrium.

The concept of the traditional/modern dichotomy is true in the sense of the existence of two modes of production, but this dichotomy is false when it is used to express the relationship to the means of production. Control over the money-market economy was in the hands of those with modern technological means of production, and dominated by the French colon community. The colonas' access to credit and their surplus production based upon the use of advanced agricultural techniques established their control over prices, which in turn resulted in the impoverishment of the Tunisian rural population. In the following chapter I will explore the impact of the growth of mechanization on the intensification
of rural proletarianization and impoverishment. As I will discuss in the second part of this thesis, this process of rural impoverishment was to have a direct bearing on the rapid urbanization of Tunis.
CHAPTER III
MECHANIZATION AND THE DEPENDENT AGRICULTURAL SYSTEM

The following analysis of the changes in production leading up to the period 1931-36 is significant for our understanding of the creation of the agricultural structure in Tunisia, which was the result of the colonial experience. The principal aspect of this analysis of the changes in agricultural production reflects our need to understand the establishment of the dependent agricultural system, under which the mass of the rural population existed. This system was characterized by an export-oriented surplus production. The nature of the export-oriented production will be examined in terms of the penetration of mechanization and the changes in the fellahin's relationship to the soil. By understanding the nature and structure of the export-oriented production, we can better associate this as a major factor in the causation of rural migration.

In 1931 the Centennial of French annexation of Algeria was held in Algiers. A delegation from Tunisia attended, marking its own Cinquantenaire. The buoyancy which characterized this celebration was not solely because France had successfully implanted French society in North Africa, but reflected the general euphoria of the times.
Production had steadily and rapidly increased since the Great War. Even though the mechanisms of the world market had collapsed within the last year, its full impact had not yet been felt among the colon community producing for export. Essential to the progressive expansion of European production during this period was the development and extension of agricultural credit. The transformation of the mode of production to allow for the production of a surplus required a large initial investment in modern mechanized apparatus, seed and better seed hybridization, storage, and transport facilities. Aside from the initial private colonization in the early Protectorate period most of the colon had little investment capital. It was only with the development of the official colonization programs that the colon population began to increase. In 1896 the colon population consisted of 16,534 of which 3,000 were rural residents. By 1931 the colon population was 196,000, of which approximately 39,000 were rural residents.

The Establishment of a Dependent Agricultural System: The Role of Credit and Mechanization

The initial penetration of mechanization immediately

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1 BDOA vol. 1897: p. 79 and 182.
preceded the First World War. The expansion of mechanization, however, was interrupted during the war years. In the case of the progressively expanding technological mode of production during the period following the First World War, substantial credit infusions were necessary for cultivators investing for the first time in some sort of mechanization. The viability of mechanized production of agriculture had already been proven in North America, and was especially suited for the cereal cultivation on the large henchirs of the Dorsal Tell. Much of the mechanized equipment imported into Tunisia during this time, consisted of tractors from the war stocks, reapers (moissonneuses) and harvester-tractors from North America.3

The devastation of metropolitan French agriculture during the war years had resulted in a growing reliance on cereal importations from Algeria and Tunisia. The boom years of the early 1920's resulted in the expansion of mechanized agriculture through the demand for surplus production of grains. Customs regulations with France and Great Britain had originally been modified in the late 1890's, but were again changed to meet the needs of increased demand for grain importations during the war years. Agricultural production

in Metropolitan France was slow in regaining its capacities, and by 1923 the impact of the reliance on imported Tunisian grains had been firmly established. Investment in mechanization was prohibitive for most of the colons involved in direct cultivation, and therefore the number of imported tractors was almost negligible until the 1920's. During the ten year period from 1920 to 1930 more than 3.600 tractors and 1.000 reapers were imported. In 1924 alone more than 1,100 tractors and 330 reapers were imported. The production for the external market sharpened competition among the cultivators in Tunisia and resulted in the growing penetration of mechanization. Production on mechanized farms was approximately 400% per hectare greater than on farms utilizing traditional or animal production methods. The production of surplus through the extensive use of mechanization increased during the 1920's and well into the 1930's. Production on colon farms during the five year

4 In 1923 approximately 750,000 quintaux of wheat was exported to France. This was 88% of the total wheat export for that year. For the same year 25% of the total barley export went to France, while 49% was exported to Great Britain. These figures were taken from Direction Générale de l'Agri-
culture, Notice Commerciale de Tunisie: L'Alfa Tunisien (1924).


6 Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 265.
period from 1921-25 averaged 752,000 quintaux per year, while during the five-year period 1931-35 production of colon farms averaged 2,100,000 quintaux per year. The surface area utilized for cultivation doubled during these periods, while the production tripled. By this time the colon cultivators involved in direct cultivation had become almost totally engaged in production for export by utilizing mechanization. Cultivation through increased mechanization and more scientific agricultural techniques had increased productivity during this period by 50%. By 1931-35 the production on colon farms accounted for more than 65% of the production of wheat, but occupied only 20% of the surface area utilized in wheat cultivation.

Access to mechanization had proven essential to the production of surplus and for successful competition in the market. However, access to mechanization was limited to those with either access to credit, or to those with other sources of substantial amounts of investment capital, such as the large landlords and the urban bourgeoisie. Official

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7 Ibid., p. 256.
8 The increases were from 8.7 quintaux per hectare in 1921-25 to 12.5 quintaux per hectare in 1931-35.
9 Cultivation on Tunisian properties had increased in surface area by 35%, but did not increase reciprocally in productivity. The increases were from 480,000 hectares at 2.9 quintaux per hectare in 1921-25 to 642,000 hectares at 2.7 quintaux per hectare in 1931-35.
credit was a function of official legislation, and therefore principally limited to the colon community, and to those with acceptable collateral. Collateral in the agricultural sector was a function of exchangeable land; in the Tunisian régime foncière exchangeable land was a function of having the land registered with an official title through the process of the Immatriculation Foncière.

The success of the Immatriculation Foncière was principally a result of the need to establish a clear title and thereby acceptable collateral. During the first twenty year period of the official registration system from 1885 to 1906, less than 800 titles were granted. This was an average of 40 titles per year. 10 During the fifty year period from 1885 to 1936, 22,500 requests were placed and 18,120 titles granted. This represented an average of 450 requests per year and 362 titles per year. Between 1927-32 the average number of requests was 660. 11 It was during this period that the need to establish credit and thereby to obtain access to mechanization was necessary for the active participation in the market, which was dominated by surplus production from mechanized cultivation. Thus to a great extent

10 Taken from BDCA vols. 1904, 1905, 1906; and from Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 151.

economic viability in agriculture depended upon access to credit.

The 18,120 titles granted from 1885 to 1936 represented 1,474,950 hectares; this was an average of approximately 80 hectares per registered lot. In the same period the 4,380 requests denied registration represented slightly less than 10,000 hectares. The average lot size of this category was 20 hectares.12 This is significant in that it represents a group of small proprietors who were denied access to official credit, and therefore their survival in the market dominated by surplus production was threatened. These figures, however, also represented those proprietors who were in a position to apply for registration. Because of their socio-economic position, the large majority of proprietors on microparcels did not even apply, due to the prohibitive costs of the registration process. However, the average size of those lots denied registration is significant because it reflected the concentration of wealth and economic viability in the hands of the large and middle-sized proprietors.

The double standard imposed by the Immatriculation foncière limited economic survival to those cultivators with substantial property holdings. Of the 22,500 requests for registration, 50% were from the colon community, while the

12 Scemma, _La Tunisie Agricole_, p. 55.
number of colon proprietors was only a small percentage of the total cultivator population in Tunisia. Thus, the small proprietors were effectively excluded from viably functioning in the market because of the difficulties of obtaining access to official credit.13 Economic viability was limited to the colon agricultural community, the group of large Tunisian proprietors, and to those who had access to substantial amounts of capital without collateral.

Upon their arrival in Tunisia, the immigrant colon population after 1919, found themselves in a situation which demanded their participation in a market economy dominated by mechanization and an export-oriented production. The expansion of the surplus production during the 1920's created the need for a set of agricultural services which dealt with the refining, storage, and transport of agricultural produce destined for export. Between 1920-30, 29 cooperatives were established to aid the movement of surplus produce.14

13Direction Générale de l'Agriculture, L'Agriculture, p. 355. Prior to this credit legislation, the Regency had established a set of credit institution in 1888. The decree of 15 September 1888 created the Caisse de Crédit Mutuel and the Coopératives et Assurances Mutuelles Agricoles. Under pressure from the Chambre d'Agriculture the Caisse de Crédit Mutuel was restructured by decree in 1905 by creating the Crédit Agricole Mutuel with regional offices throughout the colon community.

14Of the 29 agricultural service cooperatives, 11 were exclusively involved in cereal production. Capital investment in the cereal culture service cooperatives accounted for 60% of the total governmental capital involved in the cooperatives. Nine cooperatives were involved in viticulture, with governmental capital involved accounting for 14% of the total governmental capital.
Governmental infusions of capital accounted for more than 75% of the total investment in the agricultural service cooperatives.

The infusions of credit, which coincided with the need to participate in the market economy, allowed for the investment in mechanization, but also resulted in the large-scale indebtedness of the immigrant colon population. As had been discussed earlier, the official colonization legislation made domain land available to the colon without the need for substantial investment capital. The credit legislation of the 1920's permitted the immigrant colon on domain land access to mechanization. The over extension of the colon cultivator into mechanization was justified by the rapidly increasing prices paid for exported produce combined with the progressively expanding productivity due to mechanization. The average price paid per quintal of wheat during 1910-14 was 25 francs, while during the period 1915-1919 the average price had increased to 40 francs per quintal. By 1929 the average price paid for one quintal of exported wheat was 230-240 francs. The amount of wheat produced increased more than seven fold during the period 1919-1929.

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16 Increased from 290,000 quintaux in 1919 to 2,104,000 quintaux in 1929.
while the price paid increased eight fold.\textsuperscript{17}

The price of land in the cereal region of the Dorsal Tell increased correspondingly with the rise in the general productivity due to mechanization and due to the increased revenue from export. From the basic price of 100-150 francs per hectare of land during the early Protectorate period, the price of land rose sharply in 1914 to between 400-800 francs per hectare. The demand for productive land increased after 1919, which was a function of both immigration and the increased potentialities of extended cultivation through mechanization. The price of productive land spiralled from between 1,000-1,500 francs in 1919 to between 2,500-3,000 francs in 1929.\textsuperscript{18} The need to extend the productive capacities

\textsuperscript{17}As an illustration of the increases in prosperity during this period I will compare the revenue from the production of wheat in 1914 and 1929. The illustrations are simplified by not taking into account soil depletion, or climatic conditions. The mathematics involved are two equations:

1. \text{area} \times \text{productivity} = \text{yield,}
2. \text{yield} \times \text{price} = \text{revenue.}

- In 1914: \(100 \times 8.7 = 87\) quintaux
  \(87 \times 25\) francs = 2,175 francs
- In 1929: \(100 \times 12.6 = 126\) quintaux
  \(126 \times 235\) francs = 29,610 francs.

\textsuperscript{18}\text{Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 261.}
of the farm, resulted in the further indebtedness of the colon cultivated. The increase in the land prices resulted in the tremendous increases in profits for the large speculative land holdings by individual and capitalist group investment. Increased revenue from speculation was especially lucrative for the Société Marseillaise de Crédit, the Société l'OMNIM, and for the Société des Ferms Françaises, whose profits resulted from the resale of the huge tracts of land purchased during the early Protectorate period.

The position of the Tunisian cultivator in relation to the changes in agricultural production was a function of the amount of investment capital at his control. Access to credit was principally designed to serve the colon population. However, in 1936 legislation created a series of official credit institutions primarily designed for the Tunisian agricultural community. Productivity on Tunisian farms was

19 It was not uncommon to find the colon cultivator extending the limits of his farm through renting the adjacent land. In the cereal region of the north, the colon with access to mechanization would rent the neighboring land from the Tunisian proprietor, who did not have access to mechanization. It was not uncommon to find a colon proprietor of 140 hectares, 40 of which were rented, or a proprietor of 220 hectares, 100 of which were rented. Taken from Poncet, La Colonisation et l' Agriculture, p. 355.

20 See the material in Chapter II.

21 André Boutboul, Le Statut de la Propriété Foncière Non-Immatriculée, (Lyon: Boë Frères, 1937), p. 65-68. The impoverishment of the Tunisian agricultural population had become extreme during the late 1920's and 1930's, especially in relationship to the penetration of the money-market economy. The decree of 23 January 1935 established a collateral nature for non-registered property. The purpose of this law was twofold: (1) to attempt to alleviate the conditions of the Tunisian population through access to credit; and (2) to combat usury of the traditional credit system. The means to re-evaluate non-registered property was to be through a nation wide cadastral survey.
on the average 2.9 quintaux per hectare in the period 1921-25, and decreased to 2.7 quintaux per hectare during the period 1931-35. During this period the amount of land exploited by Tunisian cultivators increased by 35%, but at the expense of productivity. This was principally the result of the need to increase productivity to compete in the market, while not having access to either mechanization or scientific farming techniques. Credit, however, was available to the Tunisian cultivator through the traditional patterns of lending. Rates for credit to the Tunisian proprietors during this period were 300%. The decision to utilize this form of credit meant extreme indebtedness; the choice not to use this credit prohibited investment in mechanization and determined the cultivator's financial viability. As a result, the Tunisian proprietors were increasingly impoverished, and were forced either to rent or sell their land, and to seek work as journaliers on the colon or large Tunisian henchirs.

The collapse of the world market after 1929 was not immediately felt among the agricultural community in Tunisia, producing for an external market. Demand for wheat, grains, wine, and olive oil was still strong enough to insure the prices on exported agricultural produce. The impact of the market crisis, however, came in 1934, with the collapse of both export prices and the quantity of exported goods. The

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22 Scamma, *La Tunisie Agricole*, p. 313.
price of wheat fell from 230-240 francs to 100 francs per quintal. The price of wine fell from 180-200 francs to 30 francs per hectolitre, and the price of oil fell from 1,400 francs to 300 francs per hectolitre.23 The over-extension of the agricultural colon population in terms of credit and production coupled with the deflation of prices resulted in the agricultural crisis of 1934-36 and the collapse of many colon cultivators.

The reliance upon the export-oriented surplus production resulted in a dependence upon fluctuations in the world market, and upon changes in demand within metropolitan France. Awareness of this dependence had come too late to protect the colon agricultural community from the changes in demand from this external market. The agricultural reconstruction programs initiated by the Regency government and the Direction Générale de l'Agriculture after 1934 were designed to protect against too great a reliance upon cereal production. The programs involved subsidies for hybridization studies, scientific education of farming techniques, diversification programs and long-term low-cost loans.24 Agricultural production was again interrupted by the invasion of the Second World War. It was not until the 1950's that agricultural stability was regained in Tunisia.

23Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 260.
24Ibid., p. 313.
Changes in the Cultivator's Relationship to the Soil

The progressive expansion of mechanized production coupled with the increasing reliance upon the production of surplus for an external market, involved fundamental changes in the nature of the cultivator's relationship to the soil, and to the ownership of the means of production. The traditional form of cultivation involved the limitation of the individual's productive capacities to the *mechta*, worked by the *charrue* and limited to whatever animals the cultivator had access to. Prior to the penetration of direct Europeanized production, most of the cultivators worked their land as tenants (*khamēs*) on the large *hencīrs* of the Tunisian landlords. Although the initial colonization had maintained the *khammessa* system, the expansion of the *colon* agricultural community through the official colonization programs and by mechanization began to change the *colon*'s relationship to the land. Access to official colonization land stipulated that the *colon* cultivate the land directly. Direct Europeanized production concentrating on high value export-oriented production resulted in the progressive erosion of the *khammessat* system. Direct cultivation utilizing European implements and knowledge permitted the cultivation of a larger surface area. The expansion of the amount of land under direct cultivation by the *colon* proprietors began to erode the tenant sharecroppers' role as the basis of agricultural production. With the penetration of mechanization especially during the 1920's,
more and more area was placed under direct cultivation. The new production involving large scale direct utilization of the land by mechanization created the need for skilled workers to maintain and utilize the machinery, and a large base of unskilled workers for labor intensive operations.

The changes in agricultural production and thereby the changes in the relationship of the workers to the soil and to production are represented in the following examples of the penetration of the Europeanized mode of production. On the 2,600 hectare domain of Chasset-Tefala in the Medjez el-Bab region 100 hectares were cultivated in 1881, and supported 30 cultivators. By 1925, under French ownership, 2,000 of the 2,600 hectares were cultivated and supported 250 workers plus 100 seasonal workers. The domain of Montarnard also situated in the fertile cereal culture region contained 4,500 hectares, 180 of which were cultivated in 1905. Under French ownership by 1931, 4,000 hectares were cultivated and supported 600 workers. These examples reflect the degree to which production changed during French proprietorship. The amount of cultivated surface increased demanding increased labor. The significance of this, however, lies in the nature of the change in the workers' relationship.

25BDGA vol. 1924; p. 514. The terms used in the text are fellah and cultivateur for the agricultural workers on the Tunisian farm, while the term ouvrier was used to distinguish the agricultural workers under French proprietorship.
to production. Under Tunisian proprietorship, the fellahin would work on the mechia as a tenants. Although the khammès was dependent upon the landlord, his fundamental relationship was with the plot of land that he worked. His livelihood and that of his family depended upon his ability to cultivate his mechia. Under the expansive pressure from direct Europeanized cultivation, the khammèssat system eroded and was replaced by wage labor. Wage labor represented a very different kind of relationship to production. Wages were paid on the basis of exchange for labor, and did not correspond to profits. Increased profits did not mean increased wages. Wage labor, which replaced the tenant sharecropper, was more easily adapted to changes in harvest conditions. A small number of skilled workers were required to direct and maintain the machinery, which replaced the need for the constant employment of a large base of unskilled workers. The expansion of wage labor reflected the degree to which the money-market economy had penetrated and signified the proletarianization of the Tunisian agricultural population.

26 Under French proprietorship the journalier workers would receive a wage between 1 franc 20 and 1 franc 80 (BDCA vol. 1903 p. 201; and Poncelet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 233). The journalier would receive a food supplement for the period of his work in addition to the wage. The food supplement consisted of flour and oil. (Poncelet, p. 233). The permanent agricultural worker would receive between 300-350 francs per year without a food supplement. For the same time period the European agricultural worker received between 3-4 francs per day. This wage difference was based upon the estimation that the Tunisian worker required less money to live than his European counterpart. (Poncelet, p. 155).
Large numbers of unskilled workers were hired during labor intensive operations, such as harvesting or seeding. This group was composed of the agir, who were permanently settled though only marginally employed workers in the cereal culture region, and was supplemented by large numbers of hafejas or seasonal migrant laborers. The patterns of migration during this period were from areas of scarce agricultural production (the center and the south) to areas of high agricultural production (the Dorsal Tell and the Oriental Tell) preceding periods of high labor demand. Following the periods of high labor demand, the hafejas would return to their tribe or regional area. Migration patterns such as these do not conform to the later patterns of rural exodus. Although population was concentrated principally in the areas of high soil productivity, the patterns of migration during the post Second World War period reflect other changes in the economic-demographic make-up of Tunisian society. I will discuss this in Part II Chapter VI.

Moreover, the expansion of mechanization resulted in the increased profits from large scale surplus production for export, but also resulted in the destruction of the traditional subsistence production equilibrium. The progressive penetration of mechanization eventually led to the limitation

27 Haout, "De Quelques Aspects" p. 82.
of labor intensive operations. Prior to the penetration of mechanization an average of one agricultural worker was needed for each 20 hectares under cultivation.\(^2\) As a result of the expansion of mechanization during the 1920's and early 1930's 50-75% of the actively employed labor force could be replaced.\(^2\)

The significance of the replacement of labor through mechanized agricultural production became marked in conjunction with the disappearance in the demographic equilibrium. Until the 1930's the population was in a fairly stable state (deaths equalled births). The rate of population increase from 1881 to 1926 was 0.45%.\(^3\) The increases in the demographic growth rate during the period starting in the late 1920's had its origins in the hygienic, sanitary, and medicinal services brought in by the French. The impact of the increase in population, together with the limitation of labor intensive operations, resulted in the impoverishment of the rural population. Labor intensive operations had been decreasing steadily

\(^2\)BDCA vol. 1911; p. 633.

\(^3\)Haout, "De Quelques Aspects"; p. 85.

since the expansion of mechanization; rural employment was marginal at best. The 1949-50 FAO study recorded that latent unemployment affected 50% of the active agricultural population.31 This survey further revealed the breakdown of agricultural ownership and the agricultural population within the Europeanized sector: less than 10,000 cultivators exploited 1,305,000 hectares, while 15.3% of these cultivators controlled 67.8% of the land. 49.9% of the agricultural population exploited 7.8% of the land.32 Even more significant was that of the active agricultural population of 1,843,200, which was supported on 50,000 farms (the total number of exploitations), more than 75% of this population was wage labor, working on land that was not their own.

These figures represent a substantial part of the total Tunisian population, and reflect the degree of the proletarianization of the agricultural population. The proletarianization in Tunisia was a result of three interrelated variables: (1) the concentration of land and the means of production in the hands of the large and middle-sized proprietors; (2) the reliance upon the production of staple crops for export, through the production of surplus

31 Active here signifies the male population over 15 years. Women and children are not considered part of the active population. Taken from Food and Agricultural Organization study 1949-50, quoted in Poncet, La Colonisation et l'Agriculture, p. 329-336.

32 Ibid., pp. 332-334.
by mechanization; and (3) the rapid population increases. The full impact of these trends toward increased production combined with increased population growth resulted in large scale urban migration patterns in the two decades following the Second World War. The agricultural activity of the 1950's was characterized by attempts to regain the inertia of production, which was disrupted by the Second World War. It was during this period that the problems discussed above become magnified. As I will discuss in the following chapter, the failure of labor intensive projects and the failure of the agrarian reform program within the general economic dependency of Tunisia led to the rapid urbanization of Tunis. The failure to industrialize sufficiently to compensate for the rural exodus and the reciprocal swelling of the urban areas, resulted in the underdevelopment of Tunis.
CHAPTER IV
THE FAILURE OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM

The surge of nationalism in the non-Western world after the Second World War resulted in the need to legitimize the new political regimes through a series of land reform movements. An agrarian reform program followed independence in Egypt, Senegal, Mali, Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia, etc. The patterns of the agricultural reform programs in many ways reflected the political orientation of the government elite. The legacy of the two modes of production, which the colonial experience left to the newly independent Tunisia, proved to be one of the first vehicles for legitimizing the new administration, political viability.

The following analysis of the structure, development, and ultimate failure of the agrarian reform program in Tunisia will demonstrate the process by which the cooperative movement was undermined even as it was enthusiastically received. This study will show that the failure of the agrarian reform in Tunisia was largely a function of the ideological orientation of the administrative elite in charge of formulating the plan for agrarian reform and development. As I will also demonstrate, the actual structure and ultimate failure of the agrarian reform program was a definite factor in increasing the rural exodus and therefore an important
factor in the rapid urbanization of Tunis.

Program of Agrarian Reform after Independence

The politics of land tenure was one of the first socially oriented problems which faced the newly independent state of Tunisia. The process of establishing a plan for agrarian reform and economic development involved four significant governmental actions during the period 1956-69. The development of these laws and actions reflected the ostentation of the Destourian Party's ideology, through which the framework of the agrarian reform program was developed. These laws included the abolition of habous land; the creation of the Three Year Plan for Development and the concomitant reorganization of agricultural production in the Unités Coopératives de Production; the law of 1964 ending all foreign ownership of property; and the September 1969 decision to dissolve the UCP program; and the accompanying trial for treason of Ahmed Ben Salah, the Minister of Economy and Planning.

The first step by the government toward changing the nature of the land tenure system was the law of 1957, which abolished all habous land. Although the French had succeeded in dealing with the problem of land crystallized in the form of the habous by establishing a pattern of exchange for these lands, they did not solve the problem of land still locked in the form of the habous. The French had hesitated to abolish the habous system, since the habous had a very strong
religious orientation. By abolishing all habous lands, which had continued to be a hindrance to effective agricultural development, the Destourian Party asserted its judicial powers. This law also established the Office des Terres Dominales, which was to serve as the nucleus for an agrarian reorganizational plan. Although at this time no concrete plan for agrarian reform had yet been evolved, the OTD was empowered to purchase land from the French colon community still residing in Tunisia. These ex-colon farms were maintained in production and directed by cadres from the Secrétariat d'Etat à l’Agriculture. During this interim period, until the agrarian reform program was implemented in 1962, the directors of these farms were usually graduates from the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Agriculture.

Immediately preceding independence in 1956, the colon cultivators had been rather uncertain about their future security under an independent Tunisian state. Although

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1See my discussion of the habous in Chapter I pp. 18-22, and Chapter II, pp. 43-46.

2Immediately prior to independence the French controlled approximately 893,500 hectares in Tunisia. See Habib Attia, "L’Evolution des Structures Agraires en Tunisie depuis 1962" Revue Tunisienne de Sciences Sociales No. 7 (Nov. 1966) p. 46. This revue is hereinafter referred to as RTSS.


4This was the new title for the old Ecole Coloniale de l'Agriculture.
independence had been granted on the condition that no reprisals be taken against Europeans residing in Tunisia, many colon cultivators had begun to sell their land to the large Tunisian landlords. Most of these Tunisian proprietors had already had substantial agricultural landholdings and possessed adequate mechanization for surplus production. The real threat to the colon agricultural community came in 1957 through the Sakiet Sidi Yousef incident, which involved governmental action against a colon cultivator in favor of a Tunisian plaintiff.\(^5\) The Sakiet Sidi Yousef incident foreshadowed the nationalization law of 1964, and resulted in the increasing pressure on the colon cultivators to sell their lands. The OTP accumulated 63% of the ex-colon land, which was sold prior to the 1964 nationalization of foreign owned land. However, 37% of the ex-colon land was purchased by private Tunisian proprietors.\(^6\) This group of Tunisian proprietors already had access to the modern-technological mode of production, so that the purchase of ex-colon farms resulted in the concentration of land and mechanization in the hands of the large Tunisian landlords.

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\(^6\) Ibid., p. 54.
In 1961 the Plan Triennal (1962-64) was issued. The Plan Triennal was the initial phase of the larger Ten Year Plan, but was more complete and principally oriented towards agrarian reform. The Plan was very ambitious and designed to create the situation for "la décolonisation, la promotion de l'homme, la réforme des structures, et l'auto-development". The structure and ideological fabric of the agrarian reform program will be discussed below.

Although the ideological orientation of the Destourian Party and administrative elite was already evident in the formation of the agrarian reform program and economic development plan of the Plan Triennal, the events of 1964 demonstrated the commitment of the Destourian ideology towards some kind of definite political stance. The incident at the French Bizerte military installation in 1961 pushed the Tunisian government into an offensive position vis-à-vis the French nationals still residing in Tunisia. Although the QTD was purchasing colon farms, the foreign community was still a very important symbolic manifestation of lingering colonialism. As a result, on 12 May 1964 Bourguiba took the position of nationalizing all foreign property. The

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nationalization of colon property was a definite step towards the consolidation of the Destourian ideology in regard to economic development and internal improvements.

The transformation of the Neo-Destourian Party into the Socialist Destourian Party, which followed the nationalization law of 1964, occurred during the Congress de Bizerte (October 1964). The constitution of the Socialist Destourian Party avowed a definite orientation to the establishment of a collective society through the struggle against underdevelopment. The significant aspect of the orientation of Destourian socialism was that the ideology of the opposition of the classes and class struggle was markedly absent. The impact of this ideological orientation to society will become evident in the discussion of the ultimate failure of the agrarian reform program.

Mechanization and Agrarian Reform: The Ideology of the UCP

The ideological basis of the Plan Triennal and the agrarian reform program reflected both the liberalism of the Destourian Party's orientation to society, and the social origins of the cadres responsible for formulating the program.


10 Ibid., p. 657. "Le socialisme Destourien qui refuse le luttes et les heines de classes, vous invite a consoldier votre union en vue de vaincre le sous-developpement et de construire une societe nouvelle et democratique." The emphasis is mine.
The Plan Triennial acknowledged the existence of a dualistic agricultural structure, which was "the cause of a serious gulf between the sectors". Realizing the existence of this gulf between the agricultural sectors, the agrarian reform program was designed to restructure the traditional sector into a viable modern productive sector. The traditional sector was defined only in relationship to the modern sector, that is, the sector that did not have access to a mechanized mode of production. The concept of the dual structure of agriculture was formulated within the broad ideological framework of the Destourian Party, and did not signify an opposition between the two sectors. The dualistic nature of agriculture, rather, represented the division of society along the lines of technological advances. The agrarian reform program would eliminate this dualism, as soon as technology was made available to the traditional sector.

The technological orientation to the problem of the dualism in agricultural production not only reflected the ideological position and training of the cadres formulating the agrarian reform program, but also reflected the extent to which mechanization determined economic viability in agricultural production. As I have discussed in the

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11 Plan Triennial, p. 14. In the text, "gulf" was translated from désarticulation.
preceeding chapter, during the period since the late 1920's, mechanization was the means of effectively competing in the market dominated by export-oriented surplus production. 12

The following chart traces the distribution of mechanization among the cultivators according to the size of the farm and the location:

Distribution of Mechanization 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size of Farms</th>
<th>Land utilizing mechanization</th>
<th>Total Tunisia</th>
<th>Cultivators who own / use but do not own</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-20 hectares</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-100 hectares</td>
<td>64.5%</td>
<td>42.6%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 100 hectares</td>
<td>97.0%</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>65.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


12 The following chart on the distribution of land in Tunisia is an indication of the concentration of wealth in the hands of the larger landlords. As the discussion will show, these large landlords also controlled the distribution of mechanization.

Land Distribution 1962

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Farm size</th>
<th>Percentage of Cultivators</th>
<th>Percentage of surface</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under ten hectares</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>16.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 to 50 hectares</td>
<td>32.6%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 50 hectares</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0% 100.0%

(source: Attia, "L'Evolution des Structures Agraires", p. 36.)
The significance of the results on the above chart lies in the correlation between the access to mechanization and the size of the farm. The larger the farm the greater the likelihood that the cultivator would have mechanization at his disposal.

The disparity on the above chart between the results for those who own and those who use without owning mechanization stems from the growing significance of rented mechanization. Although the importation of tractors and other forms of mechanization had increased steadily since the 1930's, mechanized production was principally limited to the larger Europeanized farms. By the 1950's a new kind of sharecropper system had evolved to replace the archaic khammessat, which had been progressively eroded through the penetration of mechanization. This new system of sharecropping, called dhara, involved the renting of mechanized apparatus and hiring the farm machinery. The dhara system eventually led to the growth of a group of entrepreneurs of machines.

The growth of this group of landless owners of machines stemmed from the increasing reliance on the need to produce for the money-market economy, which coincided with the penetration of mechanization and the development of an export-oriented surplus production. Survival in this market economy depended upon access to mechanization. This need for mechanization led to the creation of a group of skilled workers, whose position demanded operating and maintaining
the mechanized apparatus and therefore set them apart from the mass of unskilled agricultural workers. Although this group of skilled operators originated from the same social milieu as the unskilled rural proletariat, their position vis-à-vis the proprietors and foremen of the large Europeanized farms, and their relationship to mechanization led to a differentiation among the skilled and unskilled rural proletariat. However, the growing reliance upon mechanization was offset by the prohibitive costs of investing in machinery. The pressure to utilize mechanization resulted in growth of the dhara system of sharecropping.13

The impact of the reliance upon mechanization was significant when we analyze which groups of proprietors did and which did not have access to mechanization, either by renting or by purchase. The following chart clearly describes the degree of reliance upon mechanization.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Access to Mechanization:</th>
<th>Cultivators: Northern Tunisia 1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultivators</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not use mechanization</td>
<td>49,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access by renting</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access by owning &amp; renting</td>
<td>4,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Access by owning</td>
<td>5,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(source: Makhlouf, "La Modernization de l'Agriculture" p. 24-5.)

13 The growth of this group of entrepreneurs reflected the social differentiation among the rural proletariat. A further study of this group would be helpful to aid our understanding of the rural social structure in the contemporary period. For instance, the dhara system involved a certain definite wage, continued...
Mechanization was utilized on 75% of the surface area in the fertile northern regions, which encompassed only 33% of the cultivators. The remaining cultivators were functionally excluded from effectively participating in the market economy, which resulted in this impoverishment. The degree of impoverishment varied according to the size of the family and the amount of land. However, most of the cultivators without access to mechanization were on microparces of under 20 hectares.14

The impoverished rural population did not include only the small cultivators, but was also composed of the rural proletariat. Among this latter group, latent unemployment was 50%.15 On the basis of income distribution, 75% of the rural population earned less than 30 Dinars per year (equivalent to

In 1962, the dhara received either a share of one quintal of wheat for each ton harvested or 1.5-3 Dinars for the labor on each hectare harvested or seeded. Ezzedine Makhlof, "La Modernisation de l'Agriculture en Tunisie", RTSS No. 15 (1968) p. 25.

14 See the chart of page 81 of this section and footnote #12 of this section.

15 See the series of regional studies Secrétariat d'Etat à L'Agriculture, #01-11, Etude du Plan de Développement Agricole. (Tunis, n.d.) Mimeo.
approximately $65.00). The impoverishment of the rural population was magnified by the results of the demographic explosion, which began to be felt during the decade of the 1950's. Population pressure increased the poverty, which resulted in the rural exodus of this period.

Immediately following independence, the Tunisian government created the Chantiers de Chômage, which was designed to offer the impoverished rural population employment through labor intensive projects. The purpose of these temporary work gangs was to organize the underemployed population for rural development programs. Usually the Chantiers would work on the lands of DTD. The Chantiers de Chômage appeared under a variety of euphemistic names including Chantiers de Travail, Chantiers d' Assistance, and Chantiers de Lutte Contre la Sous-Développement. Although the Chantiers

16 Republique de Tunisie, Perspective Decennales de Developpement (Tunis, 1961) mimeo. p. 34, and 74-75. The following chart is taken from this source.

Income Distribution: 1959

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Rural Population</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-20</td>
<td>1,166,014</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-30</td>
<td>604,705</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-40</td>
<td>304,705</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-50</td>
<td>176,506</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-60</td>
<td>100,860</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-70</td>
<td>68,619</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70-80</td>
<td>41,171</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80-90</td>
<td>77,418</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>more than 90</td>
<td>109,791</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2,600,000</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17 See Part II, Chapters V and VII for a detailed analysis of the rural exodus.
were only a temporary measure to alleviate to some degree the poverty among the rural population, the extra sum of income from the work on the Chantiers resulted in a slightly improved standard of living. In 1960, 37% of the cultivators in the governorate of Jendouba, located in the fertile high plains, were inscribed in the Chantiers. 18 It was planned that the Chantiers would be superseded by the agrarian reform program and the creation of the UCPs. The UCP was designed to satisfy all the needs of the coopérateurs. 19 As we shall discuss in the following sections, the agrarian reform program was formulated within this basic framework of rural impoverishment and within the context of a market dominated by surplus production through mechanization.

The Program of the UCP

The program of the Unités Coopératives de Production was formulated by the Secrétariat d'Etat du Plan et aux Finances in conjunction with the Secrétariat d'Etat à l'Agriculture. The purpose of this plan was to modernize the traditional sector through the UCP system by allowing

18 Lilia Ben Salem, "L'encadrement des Unités de Production Agricole", RTSS No. 26 (September 1971) p. 121. Jendouba is representative of the conditions in the cereal regions of the Dorsal Tell.

the small landholding fellahin the possibility of regrouping in common their land, their labor, their technological material, and their capital. The collectivization of the small proprietors' resources was designed to allow for the purchase of a tractor which was both the vehicle and symbol of mechanization. The initial guidelines for the program limited participation in the UCP to those fellahin with property of under 5 hectares. However, since even the combined assets of all those small landholders could not justify the purchase of a tractor, the UCP was broadened to contain all the fellahin with property under 40 hectares. As we shall discuss, the ultimate failure of the UCP was inherent in the structural limitations of the program, and in the role that the UCP was to play within the larger agricultural sector.

In September 1962 the first UCPs were introduced on an experimental basis in the high plains of Le Kef in the cereal culture region. Most of the UCPs established during the next seven years to September 1969 were in Le Kef, Baja, and Teboursouk regions of the cereal culture. The basis for the choice of the high and low plains as the location for the

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20 plan Triennal, p. 37.


22 Ezzedine Makhlouf, "Nouveau Dualisme de l'Agri-culture Tunisienne" RTSS No. 10 (March 1967) p. 27.
development of the agrarian reform program was threefold: (1) the state had access through the OTD to ex-colon farms already in production, (2) the distinction between the traditional and modern sectors was much more evident in the cereal regions, and therefore the success of the program would be more evident; and (3) the process of "modernization" would presumably be facilitated, since the gulf between the two sectors was defined only through their relationship to mechanization. The actual program of agrarian reform involved two types of UCPs depending on the involvement of the OTD farm. The most prevalent form of the UCP was the coopérative mixte. This involved an initial nucleus of an OTD farm, extending from 100-500 hectares, around which the small proprietors would regroup their land. The success of the coopérative mixte would be guaranteed by the presence of trained government technicians and technocrats. The director of the UCP was to be a member of the Service de l'Agriculture. 23 The second type of UCP consisted exclusively of privately owned property with no state involvement. The private UCP was intended to be a control group.

The Unités Coopératives de Service Agricoles were to

23 Perspectives Décennales de Développement 1962-72: Project, p. 94. In some cases the director of the UCP would be the Tunisian foreman of the ex-colon farm, if he had retained that position while the farm was under the supervision of the OTD. In this case he was also affiliated with the Destourian Party.
be an integral part of the agrarian reform program, and were designed to serve the secondary production needs of the UCP. Parts of the UCSA's role as the center of agricultural services was to supply the UCP with manure, seed, plants, and antiparasitic chemicals at a price lower than the market costs. 24 The UCSA were also to be involved in the commercialization of the product from the UCPs. The agrarian reform program began to emerge as a plan to reform the conditions of production among the small proprietors without transforming the agricultural market, which had been and continued to be dominated by the large landlords producing surplus for export. The limited scope of the agrarian reform program ultimately resulted in its failure. The development of the UCP program to 1969 reflected the ideological flaws in the program.

With the end of the Plan Triennal in December 1964, the state had 561,000 hectares of ex-colon land retrieved through the program of decolonization. Sixty-four percent of this land was located in the fertile regions of the north.

24 Hafedh Sethom, "Modernisation de l'Agriculture et Coopératives de Service dans les Zones de Cultures Maraichère du Cap-Bon", RTSS No. 15, (December 1968) p. 55. It is important to note that the agrarian reform program was to exist within the open agricultural market, competing against the large landlords and entrepreneurs.
The following chart traces the progress of decolonization.

Decolonization to January 1965

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zone</th>
<th>No. of Properties</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>No. of Properties</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Properties</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>108,000</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>1244</td>
<td>360,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>103,000</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>201,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>206,000</td>
<td>2239</td>
<td>355,000</td>
<td>2786</td>
<td>561,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(sources: Attica, "L'Evolution des Structures Agraires" p. 46.)

Under the direction of the OTD the ex-colon farms were continued in production, and the products sold in the agricultural market. The growth of the UCPs during this period is significant in regard to the amount of domain land held by the state and the amount of state involvement in the UCPs.²⁵

²⁵The following chart on the growth of the UCPs is based on Daniel Rodinson, "Chronic Economique Tunisie", AAN VIII (1968) p. 416.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UCP</th>
<th>1962-66</th>
<th>Number of UCP</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Average Members/UCP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td></td>
<td>127</td>
<td>11,622</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
<td>177</td>
<td>14,530</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td></td>
<td>259</td>
<td>23,932</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td></td>
<td>378</td>
<td>35,283</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td></td>
<td>445</td>
<td>40,810</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 June 1968</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>58,273</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The growth of the UCPs shows a steady increase. The UCPs were increasing even as the problems were developing.
In 1963-4 the amount of domain land involved in the UCPs of the northern region accounted for only 8% of the available state land there. Even in 1968, when the number of UCPs was 500, the state land in the UCPs was never more than 50% of the total land in the UCPs. The limited direct involvement of the state lands in the UCPs stemmed from the ideological construction of the agrarian reform program and will be discussed below.

Although more than 50% of the UCPs were in the governorate of le Kef and Tebourouk, by 1965 the UCPs of this northern zone covered only 10% of the productive area here. By 1968 the UCPs covered only 19% of the productive area in this zone. Due to the limitation of the available land from the coopérateurs, and the need for more land for effective mechanized production, the UCP was forced to rent land from the neighboring proprietor. In 1965 more than 20% of the total land in the northern UCPs was rented. In some instances the UCP rented more land than the combined total of both the coopérateurs and the state's land; the UCP at Ebba-Ksour rented 69% of its land. Even though the


27 Makkhloof, "Les Coopératives Agricoles en Tunisie", p. 89.

28 Makkhloof, "Nouveau Dualisme de l'Agriculture Tunisienne" p. 41.
portion of rented land in the UCPs decreased during 1966-68, the impact of rented land within the UCP system was still significant.

The process of renting land demanded a contract determining the payment for the use of the land. Since the land to be rented belonged to those outside the UCP, it therefore belonged to the large or middle-sized proprietors. The rented land, worked by the UCP, resulted in increased income for the large and middle-sized proprietors at the expense of the profits for the UCP. Although the portion of rented land decreased after 1966, it still accounted for 30,000 hectares in 1968. One of the contradictions of the UCP program was that at the same time the UCPs had to rent land from the large and middle-sized proprietors, the state still had over 70,000 hectares not involved in the UCPs. The following graph traces the role of rented land and state land in the UCP system.
The Failure of the UCP Program

The UCP program was designed to encompass those cultivators still involved in the traditional sector. The plan proposed that by combining the resources of the small proprietors, modernization of this sector would be facilitated through the collective purchase and productive power of those regrouped in the UCP. As noted above, membership in the UCP was originally limited to those proprietors with less than 5 hectares, but was changed to include proprietors up to 40 hectares.29 The rationale for this change was based upon an FAO report in 1959, which stated that it was hard to justify the use of a tractor on the limited amount of land involved, even when a large number of very small proprietors were collectivized.

The FAO report suggested the most favorable group to justify modernization would be the proprietors between 10-15 hectares.30 By 1968 the make-up of the coopérateurs is described in the following chart:

Previous land Ownership of Coopérateurs in the UCP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>% of coopérateurs</th>
<th>% of area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 1 hectare</td>
<td>29.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-5 hectares</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 hectares</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-20 hectares</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>24.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 20 hectares</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

100.0%

(source: Makhlof, "Les Coopératives Agricoles en Tunisie", p. 91.)

Coopérateurs who owned less than 5 hectares formed about 80% of the population in the UCPs, while less than 10% owned more than 10 hectares. Most of the population in the UCPs had previously been unable to survive by agricultural production alone, and had been obliged to seek additional work. Thirty percent of the total coopérateurs had been inscribed in the Chantiers de Chômage, and 55% had been employed as journaliers. Eighty-four of the journaliers were employed on colon farms, or on the farms of the OTO. Only 6% of the coopérateurs were skilled. \(^{31}\)

The UCPs were designed to guarantee an income of 45 Dinars per year to the coopérateurs, as well as to guarantee 250 days of work per year. To have offered less work and a smaller income would not have changed the conditions of life, and would have resembled the Chantiers de Chômage too exactly. \(^{32}\)

According to the Plan Triennal, modernization of agriculture would follow the specialization of the workers in the UCP. The absolute value for labor could be guaranteed through the decrease in the numbers of the active population involved in agriculture. The Plan called for a reduction of number agricultural workers from 70% of the total population in 1957.

\(^{31}\)Makhlouf, "Les Coopératives Agricoles en Tunisie", p. 94.

to 33% in 1971. The Plan also called for a reciprocal increase in industrial production and employment to compensate for the reduction in the numbers of agricultural workers.

However, the reality of the situation was quite different from the design. In a survey conducted in 1968 in several Baja UCPs, the average days per month worked was 13, or 156 days per year. Only 15.6% of the coopérateurs worked more than 17 days per months. These were principally skilled workers. In fact the UCP did not create more employment, but it did decrease the opportunity to find supplementary work, especially when the Chantiers were eliminated. In response to a question posed in another survey during the summer of 1968, as to whether the yearly income of the coopérateurs had increased since joining the UCP, the response was an emphatic no; many replied that their incomes had, in fact, decreased. Makhlof's study further revealed a disenchantment with the UCP system. The coopérateurs surveyed responded positively to the question inquiring whether they wanted to return to individual cultivation. The only condition demanded

33Plan Triennal, p. 31. The Plan called for a continuation of the rural exodus. As we shall see in Part II Chapter VI, during this period of the agrarian reform, migration to Tunis increased drastically. In many ways the present condition of rapid urbanization and urban poverty can be attributed to the agrarian reform program.

34This did not materialize, and as a result the occupational characteristics among the rural migrants in Tunis demonstrate the lack of industrial employment. For a detailed analysis see Part II Chapter IX.


36Makhlof, "Les Cooperatives Agricoles en Tunisie" p. 95.
by the *coopérateurs* was that the state should reopen the
*Chantiers de Chômage.* 37 Coincident with the disenchantment
with the *UCPs* the large proprietors doubled the amount of
the harvest collected by the sharecroppers. 38 This tended
to enhance the position of the large proprietors vis-à-vis
the state, and effectively co-opted the disillusionment with
the *UCP* system into non-radical action. By offering increased
portions from sharecropping, the large proprietors safely
retrenched their own position.

The orientation of the *UCP* system was towards ameliorat-
ing the conditions of the small proprietors unable to compete
in a market dominated by mechanization and large farms. The
agrarian reform program was an attempt to regroup these small
proprietors in such a way as to enable them to compete more
successfully, and thereby to increase their standard of living.
Those not involved in the *UCP* system were the large and mid-
dle-sized proprietors, and the peasants without land. Follow-
ing the formation of the *UCP* system there were two categories
of peasants, those inside the *UCP* and those outside it. As a
result of the creation of the *UCPs*, the *Chantiers de Chômage*
were disbanded, and much of the *OTD* land was incorporated in
the *UCPs*. The employment possibilities of the landless


peasants, therefore, radically decreased. This group formed the bulk of the rural exodus during this period.

The failure of the agrarian reform program was directly attributable to the ideological contradictions of the cadres responsible for formulating the program. The conceptualization of the UCP program was formed within the Secrétariat du Plan et aux Finances, and the Secrétariat d'État à l'Agriculture. The ideological framework for the UCP was comfortably within the realm of the Destourian Party's dominant ideological orientation. The socio-economic origin of the cadres, which composed the ruling elite of these governmental departments involved in formulating and establishing the Plan Triennal, were studied by Zghal.39 This study was conducted on the previous five graduating classes of the École Nationale Supérieure de l'Agriculture. The results from the study give us some indication of the socio-economic milieu from which these ruling cadres came, and also offer some orientation to the ideological framework within which these cadres functioned.

There was a definite regional concentration of graduates of the École Nationale Supérieure de l'Agriculture. The results showed the following regional origins of the graduates:

39Abdelkader Zghal, "Cadres Agricoles et ouvriers qualifiés dans le nouveau système Agricole" RTSS No. 7 (1966).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% of graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunis region</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel de Sousse region</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahel de Sfax region</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central and Southern region</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern region</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The significance of this regional concentration lay in the nature of the type of agriculture milieu from which the graduates come. Forty-three percent were from the Sahel region; this area was characterized by smaller middle-sized plots, usually involved in the arboculture of olive cultivation. The number of graduates from the Sahel and Tunis regions accounted for 63% of the total, whereas only 19% of the graduates originated in the cereal culture regions of the north. Since the problems associated with cereal production were quite different than those of olive cultivation, the majority of the graduates, who formed the ruling cadres, had little or no experience with the complexities of cereal production in Tunisia.

Zghal's study also involved the graduates' self-characterization of their socio-economic origin. The results indicated a predominance of bourgeois origins. This tended to support the regional concentration of the graduates from areas of large and middle-sized property holdings. The following results trace the self-characterization of the graduates’

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40 Ibid., p. 147.
Slightly better off than middle
From the middle or small rural bourgeoisie
From poor origins

These results indicate that the graduates characterized themselves as 30% being from the middle and small rural bourgeoisie. This group was composed of sons of the large and middle-sized rural proprietors, functionaries, and merchants. The most significant aspect of Zghal's study, was that only 10% of the graduates perceived an opposition between the rich and the poor. The fact that 90% of the graduates did not perceive an opposition between the rich and the poor is consistent with the liberal ideology of the Socialist Destourian party.

It was this perception of non-opposition between the rich and the poor, which created one of the fundamental contradictions of the agrarian reform program; in fact, the private sector and the collective sector were in direct competition.

The ideology of the agrarian reform program was conceived within the framework of the elite status of the graduates of the *Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Agriculture*. Since the graduates were principally from bourgeois background, and trained as technocrats, the object of the agrarian reform was

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the modernization of the traditional sector without a fundamental alteration of the existing modern sector. The fact the two sectors of agriculture (the private and the cooperative) would compete against each other, and that this did not pose alarming contradictions to the cadres responsible formulating the program, indicated the liberal nature of the reform program itself. It was also significant, that the policies of agrarian reform were determined at the level of the administrative elite, and not a decision on the part of the cultivators themselves.

The directors of each UCP were principally members of the cadres from the Secrétariat d'État à l'Agriculture. The socio-economic origin of the directors (who were usually graduates of the Ecole Nationale Supérieure de l'Agriculture) was much different than the coopérateurs. In most cases the directors were not from the same regional area as the UCP, and therefore they were not familiar with the specific problems of cultivation and intra-group problems of that region. As a result serious administrative problems arose.

There are four fundamental contradictions in the agrarian reform program, which began in 1962 on an experimental basis, became law in 1963, and was suddenly dissolved.

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in September 1969. The first contradiction involved the amount of capital resources of the coopérateurs. The purpose of the reform program was to modernize the traditional sector; however, even the combined capital assets of the coopérateurs were meager. This prohibited the purchase of sufficient mechanical means of production. The second contradiction lay in the lack of total involvement of state lands in the UCP. At the time when the UCP was forced to rent land from the large and middle-sized proprietors, the state had more than enough QTD land to cover the amount of land rented. The renting of land caused an unnecessary drain on the profits of the UCP, especially during the poor harvests of 1966-67. The limitation of the size of the UCP also resulted in the limitation of labor intensive activities involving many coopérateurs. As a result the coopérateurs were only marginally employed on their own UCP. The third contradiction was the continued existence of both the private and cooperative sectors competing in the same market, which ultimately resulted in the failure of the UCP. The private sector was composed of the large and middle-sized proprietors who still maintained control over the principal areas of cereal cultivation. Control over mechanization was also largely contained in the hands of these large and middle-sized proprietors. The agrarian reform did not threaten the large and middle-sized proprietors, and therefore did not change the dualistic nature of agricultural production. The
dualistic nature could only be eliminated if the concentration of land and mechanization was removed from the control of the large and middle-sized proprietors. The fourth contradiction was inherent in the ideology of the administrative elite, which did not account for the origins of the dualistic nature of agriculture. The UCP program reflected the elite position and social origins of the cadres responsible for formulating the program. The cadres technocratic orientation to modernization via technology resulted in the division of skilled and non-skilled in the UCP itself.

In September 1969, following the extensive increase of the agrarian reform program during 1967-68, the UCPs were suddenly halted, and plans were made for decollectivization to begin in January 1970. At the same time as the failure of the agrarian reform program became evident, the large proprietors increased the portion of the sharecroppers contract to two-fifths. This tended to coopt the potential radicalization of the coopérateurs, who were searching for the reason for the failure and misery of the UCP system. In order to prevent this disaffection from centering on the government, the Minister of the Plan, Ahmed Ben Salah, was held individually responsible for the failure of the program and tried for treason.44 After the dissolution of the UCPs

44 See the material on the Ben Salah affair in "Documents IV: Tunisie" AAN VIII (1969) and "Documents IV: Tunisie" AAN IX (1970).
the land was returned to the coûpérauteurs. However, the ex-coûpérauteurs were to a large extent without sufficient resources to survive the year. In order to satisfy their hunger, the ex-coûpérauteurs rented their land to the large and middle-sized proprietors in exchange for advances of wheat and oil. Zamiti argues that the failure of the agrarian reform program was the cause of the rural exodus towards the large urban areas during this period, and the agent provocateur for the shantytowns. In the following section, I will examine the changes in the urban structures of Tunis in response to the internal migration patterns.

45 Since many coûpérauteurs had migrated to the urban centers to escape the misery, not all wanted to return to the land. The land from the people not returning reverted back to the state.

46 Zamiti, "Les Obstacles Materiels et Ideologiques" p. 52.
PART II
INTRODUCTION

Through the preceding analysis of the changes in land tenure and agricultural production, I have discussed one of two significant factors which resulted in the rural exodus. It is only by understanding the impact of the changes in agricultural production that we can fully appreciate the significance of the patterns of internal migration. However, the changes in agricultural production were magnified by the rapid increase in population, which was the second of the two significant factors of the rural exodus.

As I have discussed in Chapter III, the demographic explosion occurred in the period between the two world wars. The term "explosion" refers to the extremely rapid rate of population increase within a short period of time. Until the inter-war period the population of Tunisia was in a fairly stable state, regulated by successive droughts, famines, and epidemics. As a result of the expansion of the money-market economy and advances in sanitation, hygiene, and pest control through programs by the French, the fragile agricultural subsistence and population equilibrium was destroyed. The result of this was a rapidly increasing population.
The effects of this became noticeable immediately after the Second World War, as the Tunisian population began to increase at a rate of over 2.0% per year. The relative impact of population growth by itself is negligible until it is put into a framework of economic development and employment opportunities. As I have argued in the preceding chapters, the Tunisian economy was dominated by an export-oriented surplus production utilizing labor intensive mechanization. As a result, latent unemployment in agriculture was extremely high. Industrial employment, however, did not compensate for agricultural unemployment as production in the industrial sector accounted for only 16% of the total GDP in 1956.1 Tunisia was dependent upon an external market for the sale of agricultural surplus, and was dependent upon the importation of manufactured and industrial goods. Therefore the employment opportunities in the urban and industrial sector were extremely limited. The patterns of internal migration and rapid urbanization must be viewed within this context of dependency and underdevelopment.2

The so called "take-off" of population increase

1 Institut National de Statistique, Recensement Général: 1966 (III Immigration) p. 9.

occurred between the 1926 and the 1936 census. More specifically, the "take-off" began in the late 1920's, increased slowly until the early 1930's, and increased rapidly from 1936 onwards. The following chart shows the population increases from 1881-1966:

**Population in Tunisia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Annual Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>1,518,914</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,938,000</td>
<td>13,470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>2,093,439</td>
<td>15,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>2,159,708</td>
<td>13,254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>2,410,692</td>
<td>50,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,608,313</td>
<td>52,166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>3,230,363</td>
<td>62,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>3,940,256</td>
<td>71,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>4,533,351</td>
<td>59,009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As I have discussed, the limitation of agricultural employment opportunities coupled with an increasing population within the framework of a dependent economy were the two significant factors in the gestation of the rural exodus. The direction of the internal migration patterns was essentially towards the medium and large cities, principally Tunis. The following chart traces the growth of the population in Tunis:
The extent of the urbanization of Tunis as traced in the above chart can only be understood in the larger context of the overall population movement; especially in comparison with the growth of the other urban agglomerations in Tunisia. The increase in the overall urban population concentration since 1936 has been fairly constant at an average rate of 5% per year. The following chart places the urbanization of Tunis in perspective with selected other urban centers in Tunisia (Source: Stambouli: "Urbanisme et Développement en Tunisie" p. 85.)

The rate of population increase is impressive, because it is approximately 2.5% greater than the overall national population increase of 2.5%. The additional 2.5% here is a continued...
Even though the rate of urbanization in these selected cities is generally constant, population increase in the smaller middle-sized cities is very impressive. However, the large urban populations are concentrated in the coastal regions. This testifies to the importance of their commercial import-export activities. The traditionally important inland cities, such as Kairouan, are not as important as such cities as Tunis, Sfax, or Bizerte (with its industrial counterpart at Menzel Bourguiba). According to Sekalni's studies on the overall population movement, there is a definite tendency to concentrate population in the more densely populated cheikhats. The number of cheikhats has decreased since 1936, while the population of the larger cheikhats has increased.4

In terms of the impact of population concentration, the urbanization of Tunis is the most impressive. The rate of population increase there has been over 5.5%. This is in part accounted for by the housing and occupational vacancies after the exodus of the French community in 1956. Between

result of migration entering Tunis. These figures were given to me by the Directeur, Section des Etudes, Municipalité de Tunis, May 1972.

4Mahmoud Sekalni, "Villes et Campagne en Tunisie" Population No. 3 (1960), p. 487. The cheikhat is an administrative district.
1936 and 1966 the Tunisian population of Tunis increased approximately 500,000. This rapid influx of population into Tunis has had fundamental implications for the social and economic composition of the city's population.

In the following chapters I will analyze the urban response to the rapid influx of migrant in Tunis. The implication of this rapid population increase through migration will be discussed in terms of the structural changes of the city to accommodate its swelling population. The major consideration of this study is to discover the means by which migrants adapt to their new environment. In doing so I will analyze the location of migrant residences in Tunis, their socio-professional activities, and assess the decree of the migrants' rural contact group continuity. Through this discussion I will be directly assessing the validity of the metamorphosis theories of modernizing societies.
CHAPTER V

THE MUSLIM CITY OF TUNIS: CONCEPTS AND FORM

Among both Muslim and Western scholars, Muslim society has been characterized as an urban one,1 The Muslim city was viewed as being basically isolated, among a mass of semi-barbarous rural population. Until the middle of the 1960's most of the research on Muslim society concerned itself with the study of the culture and elite groups of the city. This tendency, added to the already prevalent notion of urban dominance, and helped create pro forma the dichotomy between urban and rural areas. The history of the Muslim world then, was taken to be that which took place

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1The basic ideas and conception for this short overview of the traditional Muslim city, which is designed to acquaint the reader with some background material, are taken from the following sources:


g. Arthur Pellecрин, various articles in the Bulletin Economique et Social de Tunis, (1952-53). continued...
within the limits of the city. It was true, however, that the Muslim city was the center of Muslim society in terms of religious, scholarly, and administrative activities. For instance the concept of the "correct life" as defined by the Koran and the religious traditions, stipulated the need to pray five times each day. The most important of these prayers was the Friday afternoon service. For this service, especially, it was necessary to participate in a mosque. However, it was required that a minimum of forty males attend this service. It was natural, then, for a concentration of population to be gathered to legitimate the jami (Friday mosque). Because of its integral roles as part of the "correct life" the jami developed as a permanent feature of Muslim towns.

The mosque itself was the center of religious as well as intellectual life of the city. Because of its role as the center for scholarly activity, the specific function of the teaching became specialized in the madrasa or religious school, which was usually situated close to the mosque. In


See especially Von Grunebaum, Islam, Chapter VI.
many ways the mosque in general, and the madrasses in particular, served both the intellectual and political needs of the ulama, the community of religious scholars. An integral part of the ulama's functions was to interpret the laws of societal conduct, inheritance, and punishment. Since these laws were contained in the body of judicial literature and tradition, the judicial order of Muslim society was maintained by the ulama. Moreover, the central location of the mosque in the construction of the traditional Muslim city testified to its importance.

The physical security of the traditional city was guaranteed through the presence of the kasbah, in which the garrison was housed. The presence of the kasbah necessarily implied an administrative structure of comparable authority. The palace of the prince, or the principal government building, was usually located close to the mosque. Although the garrison functioned as the means through which the political order was maintained, traditional Muslim cities usually were contained within a walled embankment. The political-military orientation of the city also determined its location.

Closely following the mosque in importance to the

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3 The case of Tunis is a very good example. Until the twelfth century Kairouan was the seat of political and administrative power in Tunisia. At that time Tunis broke away from central control of the Kairouan, and set up a separate administrative entity.
Muslim city, were the **souks**, or market areas. As the city developed, the **souks** diversified from providing alimentary necessities to extensive commercial activities. The Muslim city grew as a center for the division of labor, as well as a center for trade and commerce. The actual location of the traditional city reflected the nature of its commercial activities as well as its political role. Most traditional cities were inland, dominating caravan trade routes. The inland cities also served as the center of authority over a wide expanse of interior plains.

Therefore, the actual form of the city revolved around three specific architectural components: religious, economic, and military-political. Scholars of the traditional city utilized these three components as the basis for classification of urban areas as cities. The presence of these three functions, represented in their architectural forms, established the basic order of daily life in the traditional Muslim city.

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4 It is also interesting to note that the traditionally important inland Muslim cities such as Damascus, Kairouan, Marrakesch, Tlemcen, etc. are now small rather unimportant cities. Coastal cities such as Tunis, Algiers, Beirut, Casablanca are now the significant cities. This development was a function of the changes in commercial transactions and European imperialist penetration utilizing ocean transportation as the primary means of export-import transactions. Cairo, however, is one of many exceptions.
However, the 1960's witnessed the growth of a revisionist approach to the Muslim city. This analysis, concentrating on the Muslim city of the Middle ages, attempted to break down the concept of the urban-rural dichotomy as the basis for Muslim social relations during this period. The basis of Hourani's argument was that the city supplied the necessary religious, intellectual, and administrative functions, while the rural hinterland supplied the necessary raw materials, foodstuffs, and labor for the perpetuation of the commercial and administrative functions of the city. Although Hourani's attempt to break down the notion of the Muslim city's dominance seems rather undeveloped, it does serve to open the argument in favor of urban dominance, but in the rather more complex interrelationship of metropolitan dependency and progressive rural underdevelopment. Although this latter concept was designed for contemporary urban-rural relationships, the conceptual basis is also valid for the traditional Muslim city. In addition to the standard

5 See especially Hourani and Stern, The Islamic City, and Lapidus, Middle Eastern Cities.

6 Hourani and Stern, The Islamic City, p. 16.

7 See A. G. Frank "The Development of Underdevelopment." Frank offers a conceptualization of the role of metropolitan underdevelopment. For examples of this process in the Islamic world see especially Paul English, City and Village in Iran (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1966); and A. Fahkfahek, "Evolution des Relations de Sfax et de sa Région," RTSS No. 15 (1963) pp. 263-274.
notion of the rural hinterland supplying essential foodstuffs and raw materials, the rural areas would directly support the apparatus of the religious as well as the military and administrative functions of the city. The rural areas would bear the burden of the taxes for the religious and military administrations. These taxes would further concentrate the power and wealth within the urban center. In return for the taxes, the rural hinterland would be offered protection, but rarely did the city respond in terms of aid to rural development, such as irrigation, road construction, etc. This process was one of progressive rural underdevelopment by the city; the wealth from the land would be concentrated within the city. The history of Tunis to the formation of the Protectorate in 1881 can be shown to correspond to this pattern of metropolitan underdevelopment of the rural hinterland.

In the following sections of this chapter I will limit the discussion to a brief overview of the form and growth of Tunis. Through this discussion I will show that

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8 In this sense, taxes should be more correctly defined as the privilege of using the land over which the bey (in the Tunisian experience) had jurisdiction. This approach to the study of the dynamic form of urban-rural relations would definitely be a valid source for understanding the role of the city in Muslim society.
the growth of the central medina reflected social and occupa-
tional group differentiation. The actual construction of
Tunis demonstrated a definite social stratification based on
distinct occupational zones.

The Growth of the Muslim City of Tunis

The development of Tunis as a Muslim city began with
the Arab invasions of the late seventh century. Prior to
this, Tunis had been overshadowed by the ancient city of Carthage,
which was located approximately ten miles north of Tunis.
After the Arab invasions, however, Tunis began to flourish
as a center for trade and religious scholarship. Throughout
the periods of unrest during the ninth century, Tunis
was in opposition to the consolidation of central authority
over this area of the Maghreb in Kairouan. Kairouan had
become the capital during the Umayyad, Abbasid, Aghlabid, Fatimid,
and successive reigns. However, Tunis' commercial and
scholarly reputation flourished during the tenth century,
following an extended period of peace. This was again
interrupted during the middle of the eleventh century and
was not regained for any significant period until the Hafsid
takeover in the early twelfth century. 9

9For a more detailed account of this period see R.
Brunschvig, "Tunis", Encyclopaedia of Islam IV (London,
Due to Tunis' location off the north-eastern tip of the Maghreb, within one hundred miles of Sicily, trade with Italy began to develop under the Hafsids. Coinciding with its growing commercial prosperity, construction of the medina flourished. Although following no definite plan, the actual lay-out of Tunis developed along the lines of the typical Muslim city. This was concentric radial construction developing outward from the central mosque, el-Zitouna.10 The location of the various trades within the concentric radial construction correspond to prestige values placed on each specific trade and occupation. At the core of the medina were the mosque and the various madrassas. Surrounding the central mosque were the more prestigious occupations: Souk Attarine, the market of oils and perfumes; souk el-Kutubiyan, the market of the bookbinders and the booksellers; and the souks el-Leffa and later el-Trouk, the markets for fine clothes and materials. The more prestigious trades, such as those mentioned above, involved the least contact with the rural hinterland. In terms of the manufacturing process, oils, perfumes, fine cloth, and books were quite distant from their original source as raw materials. Trades demanding more direct contact with the rural hinterland such as

Traditional Points of Urban-Rural Contact

During the period of relative stability under the Hafsids until the middle of the sixteenth century, Tunis developed as a center for trade and commerce. By this time Tunis had established itself as the dominant city in the eastern Maghreb. Tunis was the center not only of extensive overland trade routes, but also of oceanic trade. As a result of the increased trade specialized souks developed both inside and outside the medina. Souks dealing with luxury items were located within the city walls, while wool, leather, butcher, and other agricultural produce souks were located outside the central medina. Wool and leather souks were centered in Bab Djedid, the gate to Cape Bon to the east. Butcher and metal souks were located near Bab Souika, the gate of the water carriers, to the north. Both of the

11It has been suggested that part of the reason for the position of those trades near the outer wall of the city, was because they either made noise, such as the metal workers, or smelled badly, such as the tanneries. This could very well be part of the reason for their location in these areas. However, I would argue that the location of these trades, far from the prestigious urban core, was perhaps more than just the nuisance of the smells and the noise. Rather, the need to handle raw materials directly was an affront to the "privileged" groups in Muslim society. Although I am not in a position to support this argument, I would suggest that if we were to look through the literature written by Muslims, we would find definite negative allusions to trades such as tanneries and metal workers, principally because they require direct contact with raw materials.
old "suburbs", Bab Souika and Bab Djazira (founded around the thirteenth century) became the zones of primary contact with the rural hinterland. These zones also became the habitation for the surplus population of the central medina. The population of these old "suburbs" was characterized principally by their occupations, which dealt with closer contact to raw materials, and by migrant and seasonal workers.  

In addition to these zones of primary contact with the rural hinterland, there were several specific points of urban-rural and urban-foreign contact within the medina itself. These were foundouks and oukalas, which were traditional lodging places for travellers. While both the foundouks and the oukalas catered to specific clientele, they both served as the basic points of contact between the external source of materials, trade, labor, and the commercial interests within the city. Foundouks were essentially designed for merchants and visitors whose stay in Tunis was short. This category of lodging place was usually situated close to the city walls, either inside or outside, so that provision could be made to stable the pack animals within the foundouk itself.  

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12 See Chapters VII, VIII, and IX for a discussion of rural migrants in Tunis.

foundouks because they catered to those whose stay in Tunis was longer. The location of the oukala, more adequately described as rooming houses, was a function of the occupational and social group, which composed the clientele of the oukala. There were two general types of oukala, characterized by their occupants: the oukala of the souks and the oukala for the workers. The oukala of the souks was primarily oriented to the wealthy merchants with extensive transactions in the city. Because of their occupations, these merchants were usually housed in the same souk as their trade. The oukala of the souks was designed to offer a storage and display area for the merchants' goods until the transactions were completed.

The second category of oukala was for the rural migrants and the seasonal workers. Testifying to the low prestige position of this group, their oukala were usually situated outside the central core area. Although the seasonal workers, who would return to their flocks and families in time for the fall migration, were not permanent members of the city, they provided a fairly steady supply of labor for the commercial and handicraft manufacturing enterprises in

14C. Cladet, P. Revault, and H. Z. Eckert, Medina Oukalisation (Tunis: AUASM, 1970) mimeographed. The process of oukalisation is very significant in the transformation of the central medina. I will discuss this in Chapter VIII.
the city. These oukales were essentially for single men. The significance of these various types of temporary accommodations lay in their differentiation according to occupational and social group. This differentiation manifested itself in the location of the residence, which was manifested on the basis of its proximity to the prestigious urban core. Occupational and residential prestige was marked by the distance of their location to the urban core. As a result, there was a definitely discernible social stratification in Tunis based on a residential and occupational location. The two old "suburban" areas were characterized as zones of rural migrant and seasonal worker residence, and as the occupational location of manual trades using raw materials. The significance of the progressive encroachment of the oukales for workers into the urban core beginning during the period between the two world wars, reflected the change in the prestige position of that area as well as representing fundamental changes in the composition of the medina's population. I will discuss this in a chapter dealing with the transformation of the medina of Tunis.

15 This kind of migration, which consisted of seasonal workers, characterized the early patterns of migration to Tunis. However, these workers were not permanent additions to the labor force, but worked in Tunis to compliment their nomadic subsistence equilibrium. These patterns do not account for the rapid urbanization, which followed the Second World War.
The Growth of the European City of Tunis

The separate European city of Tunis, which developed rapidly during the middle of the nineteenth century, had a life and structure of its own. Even though Europeans (Christians) had been residing in Tunis since trade with Italy had resided under the Hafsids, no sizable community of Europeans lived in Tunis until the French annexation of Algeria in 1830. Due to changes brought about by the Pacte Fondamental after this date the number of Europeans, especially those who were not merchants, increased. Although there is mention of some Europeans living in medina, the accelerated growth of the separate European city began at this time.

Because of prohibitions against Europeans living and building within the medina, the European city was relegated to a position outside Bab el-Bahr, the main gate to the medina from the harbor. The European city developed its own religious, cultural, economic and administrative centers. Between the time of the construction of the French Résidence-Général and the completion of the cathedral in 1897, the European city and the French Protectorate had firmly established themselves in Tunis. It is interesting to note that, the physical layout of the European city in a grid like fashion was in contrast with the seeming randomness of the Muslim city.

16 For a more detailed account see Brunschvig, "Tunis", pp. 841-844.
with its winding streets and numerous cul de sacs. The creation of a European city with its own religious, cultural, and economic symbols can be regarded as the start of the cultural struggle between the European city and the Muslim city of Tunis for domination over the same location. However, the creation of the European city also signaled the establishment of a French administrative and economic system, which eventually supplanted the Muslim one.

The new organization of production in Europe during the middle of the nineteenth century led to the progressive invasion of the finished product into Tunisia. This gradually led to a reliance on the European product, at the expense of traditionally produced artisan goods. For instance, prior to the penetration of the finished product, Tunis was the producer of the famous red cap, the chechias, for the entire Arab Mediterranean world. Following the invasion of European goods the production and distribution of the chechias declined sharply. However, artisan production in Tunis did not collapse altogether. Instead, Tunis' chief economic role ceased to be artisan production, but became the center of import and export. By the early part of the twentieth century

17 Jellal el Jafi, Assainissement, Restauration, et Réanimation, p. 7 uses the term mort à distance to encapsulate the notion of the penetration of the finished product.
90% of all imports into Tunisia and 45% of all exports went through the port of Tunis. Tunis had become the center for the redistribution of European finished products.

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the European city of Tunis began to spread out. European habitations on the northern suburban areas was facilitated by the introduction of a commuter train from Tunis to la Goulette in 1872. Following this period the string of small towns from la Goulette to Camarth developed as a prime location for the construction of garden villas for the European bourgeoisie.

The construction of the European city of Tunis has been analyzed by Stambouli as being a "segregationist urbanism". Although Stambouli misses the point here, because the bey prohibited the Europeans from living within the medina, the actual urban construction and life of the European city isolated itself from the Tunisian culture in which it found itself. The French, who dominated the cultural atmosphere of the European city, brought with them their music.


20 Stambouli, "Urbanisme et Développement", p. 81. Stambouli is one of the foremost contemporary scholars on the urbanization of Tunis.
theater, and arts. These were housed in the Theatre Municipal, located within a few block radius of the center of the other attributes of French cultural presence, the Résidence-Générale, the Cathedral, and the bourse. In this context of cultural self-containment, Stambouli's "segregationist urbanism" is valid.

Stambouli has further argued that there were three periods of urban development in Tunis: the Muslim traditional, the French colonial, and the nationalist period. As far as offering a basic orientation to urban development in Tunis, this is quite valid. However, this orientation is based on a static-action model, and does not take into consideration the dynamic interaction between the two cultures. This interaction eventually resulted in the creation of a Europeanized Tunisian bourgeoisie, which had tremendous implications for the urbanization of Tunis.

Increased immigration of French colonists after 1919 was, in part enhanced through the construction of cheap housing developments (habitations à bon marché) in Tunis. Part of the program to increase colonization after this date was to offer each French functionary, and worker the basic necessities

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21 Ibid., p. 78.
of a good life, i.e., a house and a garden.\textsuperscript{22} During the period from 1919 to 1930 seventeen \textit{cité-jardins} were constructed in the urban and suburban areas of Tunis. The first \textit{cité-jardin}, Beau-site, was constructed in 1919. Mutuelville followed Beau-site on the eastern edge of Belvédère Park. The neighborhoods of Mutuelville and Beau-site were to become the most exclusive in Tunis. In the following ten years, housing developments were constructed in various areas around Tunis.\textsuperscript{23} Of the 1,000 odd dwellings constructed under the program of the \textit{cité-jardins}, only 61 were allotted to Tunisians. In 1921 El Omrane on the southern fringes of Belvédère Park was constructed for the exclusive use of Tunisians. The housing development of El Taoufik near the western edge of the medina was also constructed exclusively for Tunisians. By 1930 El Taoufik consisted of only five dwellings.

The creation of these \textit{cité-jardins} for the exclusive use of Tunisians signified the beginning of a very fundamental change in the structure of the Muslim city. The traditional city had had a classically stratified social structure. The components of this social structure were the ruling class, the men of learning (\textit{ulama}), the merchants, the artisans, and


\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Cité-jardins} were constructed in Franceville near Mutuelville; in Montfleury, St. Germaine, Étienne Flandin, Bellevue, Hammam Lif, and Groupe Militaire to the South; in Lucien Saint, La Goulette, and Gremieuxville to the West. Le Foyer was an experimental apartment complex near Ave. Routan. \textit{Les Habitation à Bon Marché}, p. 17.
workers. Social stratification was based on occupation, residence, and ethnic group. The point however, was that the medina was a composite of these stratified groups. The penetration of the French through the Protectorate and through cultural means caused a disruption in the traditional patterns of habitation, commerce, and even education.

The penetration of the colonial system eventually resulted in the creation of a Europeanized Tunisian bourgeoisie. The construction of suburban cité-jardins for Tunisians signaled the beginnings of the active disintegration of the traditional Muslim city. After 1921, the Europeanized Tunisian bourgeoisie began to move out of the medina and into the suburban areas. The exodus of the Tunisian bourgeoisie rapidly accelerated during the inter-war period.24 The final coup de grâce to the traditional city came in 1956, when the apartments and villas of the Europeans were vacated and promptly filled by the medina residents.

The Europeanization of the Tunisian bourgeoisie reflected the patterns of cultural marginality as described by Gordon for the Maghrebian experience in general, and for Algerian society in particular. The concept of marginality

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used by Gordon refers to the inability to successfully straddle cultural barriers. The agony of marginality especially affected the Tunisian bourgeoisie, who were in direct competition with the French bourgeoisie. The process of education and commerce, which brought the two groups together, eventually resulted in the breakdown of traditional patterns.

Coincident with this formation of the Europeanized bourgeoisie was the destruction of the central medina as a traditional composite of Muslim society. The actual process of the formation of the Europeanized bourgeoisie needs to be studied in more detail. However, certain patterns emerge in terms of changes in residence, and therefore changes in the socio-economic composition of the residents in the central medina. These changes were a direct result of the colonial experience and the creation of a dependent society, both economically and culturally. The actual degree of cultural dependence and marginality depended upon the socio-economic position of the group, the degree of the group's contact with the colonial system of education, and the amount of direct contact with the colonos themselves. Although the colonial system penetrated all areas of Tunisian society, the bourgeoisie

was affected to the greatest extent.

The process of the migration of the Europeanized bourgeoisie from the central medina to the cité-jardins must be viewed in conjunction with the process of the rural exodus during this period, a process which contributed to the immense changes in the composition of the central medina of Tunis.
CHAPTER VI
PATTERNS OF INTERNAL MIGRATION TO TUNIS

Internal migration has constantly been a factor in the urban development of Tunis. Migrants have acted as a steady source of labor for the flourishing commercial and artisan activities. However, in response to the changes in land tenure and agricultural production after the First World War, and in response to population pressure, the basic characteristics of the patterns of internal migration were altered. After 1936 migrants tended to reside permanently in the city, rather than return seasonally to their flocks and families. This change had its origins in both the increased demographic pressure on the agricultural population and the progressively limited agricultural employment opportunities, due to the greater reliance on labor intensive mechanization.

The rate of population growth in Tunis has increased considerably since 1936. By 1966 migration alone accounted for fully half of the annual population growth. This swelling of the urban population in Tunis by non-skilled agricultural workers has had extensive economic and social implication. The presence of an increased mass of unskilled workers has accentuated the lack of industrialization and the dependent nature of the Tunisian economy.
It is within this framework of a dependent economy that I will examine the patterns of migration. In the following chapter I will examine the demographic characteristics of the migrant population, their residence patterns, and the process of adaptation to urban life. The balance of the material on the process of urban adaptation is taken from a questionnaire administered to a small sample of migrants during November-December 1972; the results from the questionnaire will be discussed in Chapter IX. The following analysis of the patterns of migration will be reconstructed into a set of theoretical hypotheses which will be contrasted with the basic conceptions of the role of internal migration and urbanization in modernizing traditional societies.

As I have discussed in the introductory demographic overview, pages 111-116, the significant changes in population occurred between the 1926 and the 1936 census. The impact of the demographic explosion became noticeable after the Second World War, as this substantial increase in population reached active age.\(^1\) The population of Tunis increased initially between 1936-46 as a result of displacement during the war and through mechanized agriculture. However, the increases after 1946 are more significant in terms of numbers.

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\(^1\) The concept of "active age" refers to the period of participation in the labor force. This has been arbitrarily set starting from age fifteen by the Institut Nationale de Statistique, Tunis. Although this was for census purposes, it corresponds to the average age when entrance into the labor force is expected. The "active age" for agricultural population is lower, while for industrial activities it is substantially higher.
Although migration accelerated between the 1946-56 censuses, it was not until the 1966 census that the full balance of migration could be analyzed. The following chart traces the development of the population of Tunis by administrative commune from 1931-66.

### Population Increase in Greater Tunis 1931-66

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunis</td>
<td>202,405</td>
<td>219,578</td>
<td>364,543</td>
<td>410,000</td>
<td>468,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bardo</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>7,085</td>
<td>15,997</td>
<td>40,714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Goulette</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>10,862</td>
<td>14,449</td>
<td>26,323</td>
<td>31,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hammam-Lif</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>19,187</td>
<td>22,060</td>
<td>25,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ariana</td>
<td>5,144</td>
<td>5,530</td>
<td>9,608</td>
<td>16,341</td>
<td>22,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manouba</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,388</td>
<td>14,780</td>
<td>18,732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rades</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>11,117</td>
<td>13,184</td>
<td>16,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marsa</td>
<td>5,094</td>
<td>5,669</td>
<td>6,122</td>
<td>14,725</td>
<td>16,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megrine</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5,383</td>
<td>8,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carthage</td>
<td>2,089</td>
<td>2,019</td>
<td>4,873</td>
<td>8,232</td>
<td>8,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Bou Said</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,692</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>3,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ez-Zahra</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>919</td>
<td>2,196</td>
<td>3,926</td>
<td>6,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Arous</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7,248</td>
<td>11,640</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Recensement Général: 1966: Section 2.)

However, the results of this are only significant when put into the context of the general exodus of the French.

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2 There are two factors involved here: (1) The 1966 census contained the first substantial data on migration; and (2) the exodus of the French after 1956 left a large temporary vacuum in the urban population of Tunis.

3 The administrative communes of Manouba, Megrine, and Ben Arous were officially incorporated respectively in 1942, 1946, and 1945 which accounts for the recorded population only following their incorporation.
after 1956 (225,000 French in 1956 to approximately 25,000 in 1966). Over 60% of the French population in Tunisia had resided in Tunis. The graphic result of this can be seen in the following chart:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tunisians</th>
<th>Europeans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>131,000</td>
<td>99,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>138,000</td>
<td>112,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>287,000</td>
<td>142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>379,000</td>
<td>160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>607,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Picouet "Aperçu des Migrations", p. 132.)

In regard to the Tunisian population of Tunis, the most significant increases followed the independence of 1956. In the 1966 census, migrants accounted for 31.4% of the total population in Greater Tunis.4

Through the study of the origin of the migrants in Tunis, we will be able to assess the general patterns of inter-governorate migration in Tunisia. 36.3% of the migrants were born in the high plains of Le Kef, Béja, and Jendouba. This is significant because the increase in the rate of population growth was fairly uniform throughout Tunisia (the exception being Tunis itself with a slightly lower natural growth rate). The predominance of migrants from the high plains testifies to the immediate effects of mechanization, and after 1962, to the effects of the failure

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4Recensement Général de la Population: 3 Mai 1966 (III Migration) p. 16.
of the collectivization program.

Throughout Tunisia migration can be shown as conforming to certain definite patterns. The 1966 census defined migrants as those residing for longer than six months outside the administrative delegation where they were born. In addition to migrants, the term personnes de passage was used to refer to those who were just visiting in delegations other than their birth place. The census yielded 640,500 migrants, and 53,000 personnes de passage out of a total population of 4,533,300. Migrants were further broken down into three categories:

- Migrants who reside in governorates different than their birth place: 424,400 (66.3%)
- Migrants who reside within the same governorate as their birth place: 168,646 (26.3%)
- Migrants from other countries: 47,501 (7.4%)

The patterns of migration have been analyzed in greater depth by Groupe Huit and Picouet, as conforming to those outlined

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5 Ibid., p. 5.

by Seklani in 1960. These patterns were essentially the movement from agricultural areas of low density population to zone of high population concentration; that is, to the central city in each governorate. This also accounts for the inter-governorate migration consisting of 26.3% of the total migrant population. In addition to this inter-governorate migration there is the inter-governorate migration which accounts for 66.3% of the migrant population. The vectors of this inter-governorate migration are towards the larger cities in Tunisia, especially Tunis and Sfax. The smaller cities serve as stopping-over areas, en route to the larger cities.\(^7\)

The census material limited its population studies to the classification of governorates. On the basis of the material presented in the census, the Tunis governorate can be considered 87% urban.\(^8\) Of the total population in the governorate of Tunis (789,800), 31.4% were migrants (245,900).\(^9\)

What this means is that every third person in the governorate

\(^7\)See especially the material on the "Mateur Study": Zechir Maaloul (unpublished article: 1972); Hachmi Keroul "Mateur...lieu d’émigration" RTSS No. 23 (Dec. 1970), pp. 121-143.

\(^8\)Recensement Général 1966 (II: Population par Division administrative). The 1966 census considered the governorate of Tunis to be 86.8% urban.

\(^9\)Recensement Général 1966 (III: Migration) p. 16.
of Tunis was a migrant. The breakdown of migrants in the Tunis governorate is as follows:

| Migrants who reside in governorates different than their birth place | 247,300 | 86.6% |
| Migrants who reside in the same governorate as their birth place | 16,200 | 5.7% |
| Migrants from other countries | 22,200 | 7.7% |

Total: 285,700

These results show that 86.6% of the migrant population in the governorate of Tunis corresponded to the patterns of migration as outlined by Groupe Huit, Picouet, and Seklani. Only 5.7% of this migrant population was born within the various rural delegations of the Tunis governorate. This population of intra-governorate migrants was 15.5% of the total population of this governorate. The large number of migrants from within the rural delegations of this governorate can be accounted for through the progressive encroachment of the urban areas upon its immediate rural hinterland. Moreover, the metropolitan dominance of Tunis as measured through the variable of migration is fairly high. Greater Tunis attracted 44.6% of the total number of migrants throughout Tunisia. Of the migrants who changed their residence from one governorate to another, Greater Tunis attracted 58.3% of the total number of migrants from this population. The map on the next page traces the patterns of internal migration in a schematic form:
Patterns of Internal Migration

(Source: Picouet, "Aperçu des migrations intérieures" p. 131.)
The analysis of the origin of the migrant population residing within the Tunis governorate is significant in that it points out certain zones of increased rural exodus. Migration from the high plains of le Kef, Beja, and Jendouba, accounts for 36.3% of the total migrants in Greater Tunis. The concentration of migrants from this one regional area corresponds to the area where the greatest direct penetration of the colonial economic system occurred. It was in this zone that the changes in agricultural production were the most significant. The following chart is a breakdown of migrants into origin by governorate for the governorate of Tunis.
### Origin by Governorate of Migrants in Greater Tunis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Plains</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beja</td>
<td>38,751</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Kef</td>
<td>33,352</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jendouba</td>
<td>17,543</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>89,646</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sahel</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sousse</td>
<td>29,773</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sfax</td>
<td>16,923</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>46,696</td>
<td>18.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low Plains</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bizerte</td>
<td>23,903</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabeul</td>
<td>18,810</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>31,713</td>
<td>16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Center</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasserine</td>
<td>9,337</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kairouan</td>
<td>11,121</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gafsa</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28,058</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>South</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabes</td>
<td>16,298</td>
<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medenine</td>
<td>23,877</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>40,175</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunis Governorate</strong></td>
<td>247,292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other Countries</strong></td>
<td>16,201</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>263,732</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Recensement Général: III Migration, p. 25.)
As I shall discuss in Chapters VII and VIII, there is a definite correlation between the origin of the migrants and their residential locations in Tunis.

**Historical Antecedents and the Migration Curve**

The number of migrants and their date of installation in Tunis reflect the two variables that we are using in terms of the historical causation of migration: the effects of the demographic explosion, and the changes in agricultural production. The material available in the census has certain limitations, in that the precise date of migration prior to 1962 is not given. We can only estimate the date of arrival on the basis of the available data and the total population growth for greater Tunis from 1936 to 1966. The initial substantial increase in the population of Tunis occurred between the 1936 and 1946 censuses, and accelerated thereafter. In terms of migration, we can assume that the surge of migrant population in Tunis occurred in the late 1930's and the early 1940's. This would coincide with the increases in mechanization and the disruption of agriculture during the war years. The period on the chart 1952-57 is the critical period during which the exodus of the French community occurred. During the period 1957-62 there was an initial surge of migrants entering Tunis following the post-independence or early nationalist period. This can be partially accounted for by the attraction of the availability of numerous flats and villas, as well as the employment vacancies, which followed the exodus of the French.
The opportunities for employment in the formation of a new government were also a great attraction. Following this escalation of migration to Tunis during the early nationalist period, migration tapered off during the 1962-64 formation of the agricultural cooperatives. The initial enthusiasm with the agrarian reform program soon diminished as the inherent contradictions within the program became evident after 1964. The progressive impoverishment of the landless fellahin and the coopératoo (cooperators) as a result of the agrarian reform program manifested itself in increased migration after 1964-65. However, not all the migration originated in the high plains where the cooperatives were formed. Many of the migrants came from the Sahel de Sousse, and from the South, where employment opportunities were extremely limited.

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10 See especially Habib Attia, "Croissance et Migration de Population Sahéliennes", RTSS No. 23 (1970). The Sahel de Sousse had always had a heritage of education. It was not surprising that many of the administrative cadres were from Sousse.

11 One of the limitations of the available source material on migration is the lack of explicit data on the governorates of origin and that date of migrant arrival. This would be necessary to better substantiate the cause of migration and the precise date of installation.
Migration Curve

No. of Migrants


Estimate Yearly Average  Estimate

Progressive Failure of Collectivization

Period of Collectivization

Early Nationalist Period

Exodus of the French Community

(Source: Recensement Général 1966 (III Migration).)

150
One of the other very striking characteristics of migration in Tunisia is the patterns of male predominance. The proportion of male migrants exceeds female migrants by more than 15%.\textsuperscript{12} This sexual imbalance of the migrant population is in part a function of the exclusion of women from the labor force. It is also a function of the position of women in regard to familial authority, especially in terms of decision-making power: women are effectively excluded from making independent decisions.

The other significant characteristic of the migrant population is the mean age of the migrants. Sixty-seven percent of all migrants are between 20 and 24 years old.\textsuperscript{13} Both the sexual imbalance and the age characteristics of migrant population reflect the overall economic situation in Tunisia. The degree of economic dependency manifested itself in regional unemployment, and resulted in the migration of those unable to find work in the region of their birth. I will deal with the "push-pull" factors of migration in Chapter IX.

\textbf{The Urban Response to Migrants: The Growth of the Shantytowns}

Increases in the urban population after 1946 resulted in certain structural changes in Greater Tunis. The most

\textsuperscript{12}Recensement Général 1966 (III: Migration) p. 19.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., p. 13.
obvious change on the urban landscape was the proliferation of the courbivilles or shantytowns on the urban fringe areas of Tunis. The earliest mention of the rapid swell of the shantytowns in Tunis in scholarly literature was in 1950. Interest in migration as the cause of this urban population explosion followed the publication of this article. After 1956 the Commissariat à la Reconstruction et au Logement was empowered to halt the creation of new shantytowns and prevent the growth of the existing ones. In 1955 the population of the shantytowns accounted for 20% of the total population of Greater Tunis. The growth of the shantytowns around Tunis correspond to the patterns of the population increase in Tunis as discussed above. The following chart shows the growth of the shantytowns from 1926 to 1970.


15See especially Paul Sebag, "Le Bidonville de Borgel" Les Cahiers de Tunis VI No. 21-22 (1958). The first urban renewal project was the destruction of the shantytown of Borgel in 1958. Special Brigades were created from unemployed workers under the direction of the Sûreté Urbaine (Police Department). Those displaced from Borgel were given tents to use until better accommodations were found.


17These figures for 1970 are based upon the estimate by H. Eckert, Projet Tunis-Carthage: Les Populations de Grand Tunis (Tunis: UNESCO and AVASM, 1970) mimeo.
### Shantytown Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1970 (Estimate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Djebel Lahmar</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>30,121</td>
<td>38,220</td>
<td>5,340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ras Tabia</td>
<td>6,069</td>
<td>30,121</td>
<td>38,220</td>
<td>5,340</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melassine</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,240</td>
<td>32,380</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saida Manouiba</td>
<td>4,163</td>
<td>17,063</td>
<td>32,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borj de Reis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15,848</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zitouan Djerbi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,650</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djebel Djiloud</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8,240</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidi Fathellah</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>648</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>2,740</td>
<td>1,822</td>
<td>39,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Khadra</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khazhadar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>13,040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borgel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>13,040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeroport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13,040</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ech-Chouk</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bir el Bey</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>50,500</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>169,740</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, the proliferation of the shantytowns has not been halted. By 1970 the population of the shantytowns accounted for more than 25% of the total population of Greater Tunis.

The actual locations of the shantytowns are significant because they are a function of the colonial system of land registration. The majority of the shantytowns were located on non-registered land.¹⁸ Because non-registered land usually belonged to the proprietors without sufficient resources to register the land, they did not have full legal rights over the land to enact eviction. As a result most of the residents of the shantytowns are squatters.¹⁹

The origins of the heads of family in these shantytowns shows a definite pattern to the migrants' choice of residence. The choice of residence location in Tunis is an indication of the degree of rural continuity in internal migration. By rural continuity I am referring to the maintenance of familial, village, and regional group contact among the migrant population residing in Tunis. In the following chapters we will assess rural contact group

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¹⁹ Ibid., p. 80-81; see also Sebag, "Borgel", p. 268.
continuity on the basis of residence location and occupation. Chapters VII and VIII will assess the concentration of migrants from regional areas in selected shantytowns and in the central medina. In Chapter IX we will examine the actual process of rural adaptation to life in Tunis.
CHAPTER VII
SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF MIGRANTS IN TUNIS:
RESIDENCE LOCATION AND OCCUPATION

As I have outlined in the Theoretical Introduction, the stage theories of development argue that the process of urbanization is the starting point for the modernization of a traditional society.¹ The basic assumption of these theorists was that urbanization was the first stage in breaking down traditional patterns of beliefs, which were regarded as the primary factor hindering modernization. This stage has been described as anomie, and refers to the condition of normlessness following the breakdown of accepted patterns of behavior and ideation.

On the basis of the tendencies to reinterpret development theories, which I have also outlined in the Theoretical Introduction, I proposed an analysis of the process of urbanization to assess the degree of anomie. Anomie is defined for my purposes as the breakdown of traditional patterns of behavior and contact. The framework for assessing anomie in the process of migrant adaptation to

¹ See pages 4-10.
urban life was based upon Abu-Lughod's early thesis concerning the ruralization of Cairo. This thesis argues that the rural migrant searches for a certain milieu in the city which closely approximates his rural social environment. The questionnaire which I have utilized and will discuss in Chapter IX, is based on the desire to assess the degree of rural contact group continuity maintained among rural migrant groups in Tunis. The following study on the patterns of migrant residence location is concerned with one aspect of anomie: assessing whether migrants maintain their rural contact groups in the city.

Through an analysis of various micro-studies conducted on the shantytowns surrounding Tunis, certain general tendencies are observable in the migrants' choice of residence location and in the migrants' occupations. Both of these variables are a function of the general dependent

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4 Occupations in Tunisia generally fall within a definite hierarchical scale of prestige values. In the French literature on Tunisia, the term occupation is more clearly defined by "socio-professional activity". By using this term we can assess the prestige values of any specific occupation. Although these are usually associated with income, they are not always so.
nature of the Tunisian economy. As has been discussed in the preceding chapters, the lack of employment in the agricultural areas of Tunisia resulted in the migration to the urban centers (especially Tunis), which are characterized by the lack of industrial activity. Therefore, residence in a shantytown reflects the general lack of employment opportunities in Tunis, and the lack of financial resources to live elsewhere. As a result the shantytowns are characterized by a predominance of marginally employed and unemployed workers.

Industrial activities in Tunisia accounted for only 9.7% of the labor force, while the official unemployment figure was 12.4%. The unemployment figure for the governorate of Tunis was 17.8%. This substantially higher rate of unemployment in the Tunis governorate can be accounted for by the high rate of urbanization which accentuates the general lack of industrialization.

The socio-professional situation of the residents in

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5This figure is an underestimation, not taking into consideration those marginally employed, or women. If women were added to this figure, the unemployment would be more in the order of 47.7%. Recensement Général 1966 (III Migration) p. 9. However, in Muslim societies, women are generally not considered part of the labor force.

6 Ibid., p. 9. Both these unemployment figures are important when put into the general changes in economic activity. In 1956 67.7% of the active population was employed in agriculture. By 1966 only 53.6% were employed in agriculture. At the same time industrial employment rose from 7.4% in 1956 to 9.4% in 1966. In no way did the increase in industrial employment compensate for the reduction in agricultural employment. These changes resulted in the proliferation of underemployment.
the shantytowns is primarily characterized by marginal employment. Unemployment in the shantytowns is approximately 37%. Because of the dependent nature of the Tunisian economy, the socio-professional stratification of the shantytowns is characterized by:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lumpen-proletariat</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Forty-two percent of the population of Tunis earning under 10 Dinars per month live in the shantytowns; 60% of the unskilled vendors (sous-métiers ambulantes) live in the shantytowns. Therefore, the standard of living and the conditions of life in the shantytown reflects this predominance of marginally employed and unemployed laborers.

The migrants' choice of residence location in Tunis corresponds to their socio-professional situation. However, it also corresponds to the general tendencies to maintain

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8 F. Stambouli, "Système Sociale de Urbanisation: Aspects de la Dynamique Global de d'Urbanisation de la Ville de Tunis", RTSS No. 27 (1971) p. 51-52. For a further categorization of these occupations see H. Eckart, _La Medina de Tunis: Faubourg ou Courtiville_ (Tunis: AUASM, 1970) mimeographed p. 10. See also footnote 3, this chapter.
rural contact group continuity in the city. The origin of the heads of the families residing in selected shantytowns is indicative of rural continuity. By rural continuity I am referring to the maintenance of familial, village, and regional group contact among the migrant population. The choice of residence location is to a great extent a function of the overall economic dependency in Tunisia; the decision to reside in a shantytown is essentially made due to inability to afford accommodation elsewhere. On the basis of data available on the shantytowns of Borgel, Sidi Fathella, and Seidi Manouiba, there is evidence that the migrants' choice of residence corresponds to the presence of other migrants from the same governorate. The shantytowns surrounding Tunis absorb 60% of the migrants. Seidi Manouiba and Sidi Fathellah alone accounted for 42% of the shantytown population in 1970.

9 Abu-Lughod uses the term "ruralization" to signify this aspect of my rural contact group continuity. See "Migrant Adjustment to Urban Life" p. 27. See also Hassan El Saaty and George Hirabaayashi, Industrialization in Alexandria (Cairo, Social Science Research Center, 1959); and Paul Suzuki, "Encounters with Istanbul" Journal of Comparative Sociology V (1964) and "Village Solidarity among Turkish People Undergoing Urbanization", Science (1960).

The shantytown of Borgel was located near Avenue Mohammed V on the site of a proposed suburban project. The study of the population of Borgel was conducted by Sebaq in 1956-57. The total population residing in Borgel at that time numbered 2,060 residents contained in 429 familial units. Although the largest single group of residents were those born in Tunis, who comprised 36% of the population, the largest group of migrants was from the governorate of Kasserine. This group comprised 27% of the Borgel population. Of the migrant population in Borgel, 45% were from the governorates of the central steppe (Kasserine and Kairouan). The remainder of the migrant population was from various areas throughout Tunisia; there was also a very small percentage of migrants from the other Maghrebian countries. (See Appendix A, page 208).

Saïdi Manouiba, one of the largest shantytowns of Tunis, is located on the western fringe of the city. Its population was studied by Sebaq, and consisted of 10% of the total population of 16,000. His findings concerning the

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11 Refer back to the chart on page 153, Chapter VI.


13 The large concentration of Tunis born residents reflects the general economic dependency of Tunisia. Marginal and underemployment affects the whole population of semi-skilled or unskilled laborers.
origins of the heads of family in Saidi Manouiba is indicative of the patterns or residence outlined in the Borgel study. This pattern is the concentration of migrants from certain regional areas in certain shantytowns. While the largest group of residents in Saidi Manouiba originated in the governorate of le Kef (14.4%), the next largest group of residents were Tunis born (13.3%). It is interesting to note that a large Moroccan born population lived in this shantytown. This group alone comprised 11.7% of the sample. Migrants from the high plains of le Kef, Beja, and Jendouba composed 34.6% of the total residential population in Saidi Manouiba.\(^{14}\) (See Appendix B, p. 209) Although the figures of residence location tend to support the hypothesis on rural contact group continuity, the actual process of migrant lodging will be discussed in Chapter IX.

However, the study conducted at the shantytown of Sidi Fathellah is significantly more useful for our purposes, because the shantytown is broken down into ten interrelated but separate units.\(^{15}\) Sidi Fathellah is located on the edge of the industrial zone to the south of the city. Here too the results from the micro-study on the population there demonstrated the tendency to concentrate groups from

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\(^{15}\) Paul Sebaq, "Le Faubourg de Sidi Fathellah" *Les Cahiers de Tunis* VIII (1960).
certain regional areas. Although 31.7% of the sample were Tunis born, 16.7% of the sample originated in the governorate of le Kef. The migrants from the three governorates of the high plains accounted for 32.6% of the total migrant population. Beside these general results, this study had the added advantage of analyzing the population according to the ten units of Sidi Fethallah. For instance, the unit of Mallâha was characterized by a concentration of migrants from the governorate of Kasserine, mostly from the area of Maiseur. This migrant group accounted for 82% of the residents in this unit. Buladom, another unit of the shantytown, had a concentration of migrants from le Kef, mostly from the Aïl-\[A\]var region. In Buladom, these migrants accounted for 70% of the residents there. The other units have equally interesting regional concentrations.\(^{16}\) (See Appendix C, p. 210).

On the basis of the evidence presented here, we can discern a definite tendency for migrants from the same regional area to concentrate in particular shantytowns. Although the results do not measure the degree of rural contact group continuity, there is evidence that the migrants' choice of residence location tends to support this concept. In the following chapter I will discuss the impact of the migrants on the composition of the central medina.

\(^{16}\)Ibid., p. 97.
CHAPTER VIII

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CENTRAL MEDINA

The transformation of the social structure of the central medina during the course of the colonial period closely reflected social change in Tunisia. By 1956 the central medina had been reduced to a degraded residential area, characterized by a high density of migrants, and low income groups. Its social structure in 1966 closely resembled that of the numerous shantytowns on the urban periphery of Tunis.

The active forces which led to the transformation of the central medina have been discussed in the preceding sections. The process that transformed the social structure was the dynamic interaction of the opposition between the colonial system and the traditional society. This resulted in the Europeanization of the Tunisian bourgeoisie and the exodus of the rural population. The process of the social transformation of the central medina was the dialectic between the center (traditional) and the Europeanized suburban areas (modern) within the context of the colonial system. Moreover, transformation of the means of production both in manufacturing techniques (the importation of the finished product) and in agriculture resulted in the
displacement of both the urban and rural population. The displacement of the rural population was caused through the progressive utilization of mechanization which resulted in the creation of a marginally employed urban labor force. However, the displacement of the urban population was also a function of the destruction of the administrative and economic activities of the central medina. These two tendencies converged upon the central medina and progressively undermined the stability of the traditional social structure. This process manifested itself in the encroachment of migrant groups into zones of the central medina which had been once exclusively bourgeois. This progressive influx of migrant groups, and the exodus of the bourgeoisie, eventually led to the degradation of the urban core as a prestige residential area.¹

The socio-professional characteristics of the population of the post independence central medina resemble the social and occupational breakdown of the shantytowns. The largest concentration of population in the central medina is characterized by marginal employment and proletarian

¹See especially Jellal El Kafi, La Courbification de la Medina de Tunis: Terme de la Degradation de la Trame Urbaine Traditionelle (Tunis: AUASM, 1969) mimeographed, p. 7; and Stambouli, "Systeme Sociale et Urbanization", p. 31-68.
activities, while only a residual number of residents were "privileged". The socio-professional breakdown is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lumpen-proletariat</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class &quot;privileged&quot;</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The concentration of lumpen-proletariat and proletariat in the residential zones of the central medina shows a definite transformation of the social structure. In the traditional stratification of the medina the proletariat were consigned residential locations outside the parameters of the urban core. Through the colonial period the prestige location of residence within the medina was exchanged for residence within the European cité-jardins. This process corresponded with the destruction of the medina as the cultural, social, and administrative heart of the Muslim city.

Furthermore, the changes in the ethnic population after 1956 added to the transformation of the social structure of the central medina. An increase of 18,200 in the

2 These figures are based upon a study by Paul Sebaô and G. Soria Les Populations de la Medina Centrale (Tunis: AUASM, 1969) mimeographed. On the basis of income distribution the figures are slightly changed:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lumpen proletariat</td>
<td>73.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat middle</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;privileged&quot;</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These latter figures are based on material in Eckert La Medina de Tunis p. 17. I believe occupational characteristics are more valid than income distribution alone, since income alone does not always reflect the relationship to control over the means of production.
Tunisian population of the medina between 1956 to 1966 represented the influx of a large group of migrants, whose presence characterizes the present social stratification of the medina. The following chart traces the changes in ethnic population of the central medina:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1956</th>
<th>1966</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Muslims</td>
<td>27,730</td>
<td>45,930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Jews</td>
<td>10,550</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Tunisian Muslims</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French</td>
<td>8,230</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>9,800</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>58,990</td>
<td>48,620</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Sebæo and Soria, AUASM, 1969).

An analysis of the origin of the heads of family also resembles the breakdown for the shantytowns of Tunis, by showing a definite regional concentration. 60% of the population of the central medina are migrants. 42.7% of the migrant population are from the governorates of the South. There is a strong concentration from the areas of Matmata, Tataouine, and Tamazret in the governorate of Medenine. 3

The influx of large numbers of migrants into the previously exclusive residential zones has had a number of

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structural and spatial implications. The architecture of the traditional house was designed to offer the urban family certain spatial arrangement which served to unify the family while isolating it from the outside world. Traditional urban architecture revolved around the central courtyard, with rooms serving as the outer walls of the courtyard (see Schematic Drawing).

Schematic Drawing: One storey traditional urban house.
The inner courtyard was the inviolate domain of the women and children. The outer door would lead indirectly to an inner doorway so that there would be no accidental disruption of the seclusion of the urban family. Indeed, it has been argued that the actual form of the traditional Muslim city was based on the need to provide this kind of familial seclusion. 4

The structure and spatial implications of the presence of the large population of proletarian migrants was the process of oukalisation 5 of the traditional urban house. The term, oukalisation, refers to the segmentation of the traditional urban house to accommodate several families in the same building. Ouvalisation is a direct result of the migration process and the socio-economic limitations of the dependent economy; several families must share the same space, which had been traditionally a one family house. Since the rooms are not necessarily inhabited by members of the same extended family, familial cohesion and authority weaken, and therefore the original purpose of urban residential architecture is negated. 6 The extent of oukalisation


5Ouvalisation is the process of urban spatial adaptation based upon the structure of the oukala, or hostel discussed above. In the present usage of oukalisation refers to the process of accommodating several separate families within a traditionally one family house.

is directly related to the increase in migrant population. In 1946, 1,575 rooms were okalised. In 1956 the number of rooms okalised reached 3,020. However, by 1968 approximately 9,250 rooms, or 67% of the houses in medina were okalised. The progressive influx of migrants into the central medina, and the reciprocal process of okalisation reflect the erosion of the traditional social and spatial structure of the urban core. The resultant degradation of the central medina as a traditionally prestigious residential area also corresponds to the breakdown of the traditional symbols of authority. However, the degradation of the medina does not stop at the residential quarters. The souks themselves reflect the change in the socio-economic make-up of the mass of medina residents. The quality of the material in the souks has declined to accommodate the consumptive levels of the residents. The erosion of the prestige position of the central medina is directly a function of the colonial penetration and the dependent economy. In the following analysis of my questionnaire, we will examine some of the indications of this change, in regard to the patterns of migrant adaptation to urban life.

7H. Eckert, Projet de Réaménacement du Quartier de la Hafsia: Enquête de la Solvabilité (Tunis: AUASM, 1970) mimeo. p. 15. The figures cited yield a total of 9,250 rooms, however on page 21 Eckert states that only 5,700 rooms were okalised. Two separate figures are given by Eckert: (1) Medina Okalisation p. 4, 64% is cited; (2) Projet de Réaménacement p. 21, 66% is cited.

8The medina has all but lost its quality handicraft and artisan workmanship. The souks of the central tourist area, Rue Diaaa Zitouna, Souk el Attarina, Souk el Leffat, etc. are now characterized by the manufacturing and selling of tourist trinkets. The more indigenous souks, Souk el Graha, Souk el Elat, rue des Teinturiers sell primarily cheap manufactured goods to the local residents.
CHAPTER IX

MIGRANT ADAPTATION TO URBAN LIFE

The value of a questionnaire-survey for socio-historical analysis is fairly obvious, since material for the study of non-literate groups is not always available. The lack of source material demands certain concessions to historical technique, including generating valid source material for the study of non-literate groups. The ultimate value of this type of source material for socio-historical analysis is that the problem to be examined is placed in greater perspective. Only through reliance upon valid source material can we progress in the analysis of the process, and implications of the formation of this group of basically non-literate rural migrants. The role of survey material for the historical analysis is determined through the need to assess the validity of historically determined patterns. For the purposes of this study, this survey material serves as one part of the analysis of the patterns of migration in Tunisia.

The sample for this study on the process of migrant adaptation to urban life consisted of the selection of migrants in three specific zones of Tunis. The criterion for the selection of migrants was essentially birth place; the selection of specific residential zones for the interviews was to discern and assess any correlation between the location of migrant residence in Tunis, and the selected variables: origin,
occupation, income, mode of residential occupancy, and societal perceptions. The size of this sample, however, ultimately determines the validity of the generalizations abstracted from the results. The size of the sample for this study limits our ability to establish and support evidence for definite patterns of migrant adaptation to Tunis. However, this does not deny its usefulness as a means of supporting the suggested hypotheses and establishing some general tendencies to be examined in a more sophisticated study of the same problem.

The analysis of the data from this survey will be broken down into four main sections: general characteristics of migrants and causes of migration; the process of migration and adaptation; the migrant's socio-professional and residential situation; and the migrant's perception of society. The framework for migration and urbanization has already been discussed in the previous sections of this thesis. The following sections will examine the actual process of migration and migration adaptation to urban life.

The sample for this study was selected in three residential zones in Tunis: the central medina, Bab Souika, and Talassaïne. Although the basic framework for the social structure of the central medina has been discussed above, the central medina was chosen on the basis of already available source material, which certain aspects of this survey will
develop in greater detail. The basis for the selection of Bab Souika for the survey was due to the study on population done thereby Sebag, which suggested that the population of Bab Souika was more stable than that of the central medina. Melassine was chosen because it was an accessible shantytown, located next to the university on the shores of Sekkat Sedjoumi, the marsh area west of the medina. The rationale for the selection of these areas was to assess the correlation between these specific residential zones and the selected variables. However, no correlation was evident between interview location and these variables, since the sample's residential location did not necessarily correspond with the interview location. The interviews were held in cafés within the residential zones chosen. Although the sample was selected from within the cafés, its clientele was composed of residents, as well as visitors to the quarter, and men whose employment brought them there.

Cafés play a very important role in the leisure-time activities in Arab society. The café is where men gather to

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1Paul Sebag and Gilbert Soria, Les Population du Faubourg Nord: Bab Souika (Tunis, AUASM, 1971) mimeographed. Based upon the origin of the residents, and the date of arrival of the migrants, the population of Bab Souika is fairly stable. More than 52% of the heads of family were born in Tunis. Of the migrant heads of family, only 30% arrived after independence. This shows the basic characteristics of a more stable population than in either the central medina or the shantytowns.
exchange gossip, friendship, and transact business. Different cafés cater to different social groups. The café is also the exclusive realm of men, except in the most evolved segments of Arab society. Moreover, cafés offered a very accessible sample population for this study. Certain studies have suggested that cafés serve as a contact point for members of the same regional area. However, in our sample there was no evident correlation between homogeneous regional groups and cafés.

**General Characteristics**

The date of the migrant’s permanent installation in Tunis, and the migrant’s place of origin are significant in terms of examining the historical causation of migration. The following chart serves as the basic orientation to our sample:

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Date of Arrival and Place of Birth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beja</th>
<th>Djerba</th>
<th>Kairouan</th>
<th>Kasserine</th>
<th>Nabeul</th>
<th>Sfax</th>
<th>Sousse</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1951</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-56</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-61</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-64</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-67</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-72</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The chart shows a definite regional concentration of migrants from the high plains. The date of arrival of this group is also significant, in that the pattern of their arrival corresponds with the patterns of migration and causation described in Chapter II (see Chart, page 150). 40.6% of the migrants from this region arrived after 1964; after this date, the contradictions in the agrarian reform program became evident. This surge of migrants after 1964 corresponded exactly to the patterns suggested through my analysis of the census data. The initial increase in migrants from the high plains during the early nationalist period corresponded to the
general patterns of migration for this period.

The arrival of migrants from the Steppe region of Kaibourou and Kasserine are concentrated in the period prior to independence. The earliest arrival from this area was during the early inter-war period, at the time when population pressure began to be felt. Most of the migrants from the Steppe region arrived after the Second World War. However, the general characteristics of the migration pattern for the total sample population do not correspond exactly with the patterns outlined in the census data, as does the migrant sample from the high plains. The ultimate limitation of this survey is its small size; a large sample certainly would have better substantiated the validity of our analysis.

The causes of migration must be related to the general characteristics of the migration pattern. The results from our survey show a definite pressure to find work. Work related grounds accounted for 72% of the sample's causes of migration. Non-work related causes (such as family and studies) accounted for the remainder of the causes of migration. The largest concentration of non-work related causes was prior to 1963 as the date of migrant arrival. After 1963 only an insignificant proportion of the sample population migrated for reasons other than economic (see Appendix C, p. 210). The need to find work serves as the fundamental "push" factor in migration. Moreover, this is indicative of the lack of employment potentialities in the
rural hinterland. Another valid correlation can be made between the migrant's age at the time of arrival and the cause of migration. 80% of the sample was under twenty-one years of age at the time of arrival. Of this population under twenty-one, 65% migrated for work related reasons. Non-work related causes were most significant among the population under eleven years, tapering off as the age of the migrant increased. At the age of entrance into the labor force, from fifteen to twenty, work related causes accounted for 86% of that age group. Work related causes accounted for the full population older than twenty-one (See Appendix D, p. 211). The predominance of work-related causes of migration accentuates the basic economic condition of Tunisia. Marginal employment in the place of origin, through increased mechanization and population pressure, served as the "push" factor in migration. Non-work related causes accounted for the attraction ("pull" factor) of migration. These statistics show that the strongest force in migration is the push factor from the lack of employment. The predominance of migrants under twenty-one is also accounted for by the fact that the pressure of limited employment potentialities principally affected those entering the labor force for the first time (see Appendix E, p. 212.)

The occupational characteristics of the migrant population reflected the general economic dependency of Tunisia. The situation of urbanization without industrialization of
which Tunis is a clear example, colors the occupational characteristics in certain definite ways. The lack of demand for a large labor force results in the proliferation of marginal and underemployment. The socio-professional breakdown of our sample of migrants is based upon the occupational components as listed by Eckert.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lumpen-Proletariat</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proletariat</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Privileged&quot;</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the basis of income breakdown our sample takes on slightly different characteristics. The following income categories are also listed by Eckert:  

3Eckert, _La Medina de Tunis_, p. 10.

4Ibid., p. 17. The use of income distribution as the determinant for socio-economic group is more widely used in western academic analysis. However, I tend to think that the occupational categories are more valid, as they take into consideration the relationship to the means of production. The significant determining factors in the consciousness of the individual is his awareness of his relationship to production. In the case of a recently developing proletariat, as in Tunisia, awareness of class is not as prominent as awareness of income. In an underdeveloped country, where employment is limited to the nature of economic dependency, any salaried position, be it administration, factory work, or garbage collecting places that individual in a different socio-economic position as the marginally employed vendor or day laborer. Although these various occupations may have the same relationship to production, the fact of having a salaried position which guarantees income, is a determining factor in social position.
On the basis of both occupational and income categories, the largest group of migrants belongs to the lumpen-proletariat and proletariat. A study detailing the origins of the urban proletariat would show a definite relationship to agricultural land. The exodus of the landless peasants who became the urban unemployed is the principal characteristic of migration in Tunisia.

Process of Migration and Adaptation

The actual process of migration and migrant adaptation to urban life has not been studied in detail for the Arab

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5Here is a case in point: one of our sample worked as a seasonal factory worker, and earned between $200-240 per month. This is an extremely high wage, when the average monthly income was under $90 per month. Although he earned a wage comparable to a middle ranking governmental official, his contact group was limited to the poorer elements where he lived in Malassine, the shantytown. Social position in Tunisia is determined only in part by income: there is a definite rigid social structure determined by the nature of the occupation, rather than income. The other member of this income group worked as a merchant, a greater prestige occupation. The latter migrant was legitimately part of the "privileged" sector of society. His paternal uncle was also a large-scale merchant.

6El Kefi, Assainissement, Restauration, et Réanima-

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7"Le fellah sans terre devenu citadin sans emploi".
world. The general theoretical constructs of the rural to urban migration as proposed by Redfield and Hoselitz among others, further propagated through the various studies supporting the stage theory of development, correlate the process of modernization with urbanization. The process of modernization is assumed to be similar to the breakdown of traditional behavior patterns which follow the acculturation of ethnic minorities in America. Moreover the process of acculturation is defined through various progressive stages of anomie and disorganization, eventually resulting in new behavior patterns, characterized by secular, heterogeneous life styles. In contrast with the modernization aspects of the stage theory of development in terms of disorganization and anomie is the theoretical hypotheses of ruralization or continuity of contact groups within the urban area after migration, testifying to the continued cohesiveness among migrant groups.


The assessment of theoretical arguments of anomie or ruralization served as the basis for this section of the survey. The survey was designed to assess the degree and mode of migrant contact with familial, tribal, village and regional groups in order to substantiate the theoretical hypotheses stated above. The purpose for these questions assessing migrant contact group continuity was to discern modes of contact. The degree of prior contact with Tunis is not significant in terms of the choice to migrate. Only 25% of the sample had had prior contact with Tunis. Of this group, 86% had visited relatives there. 14% of the group with prior contact had previously come to Tunis in search of work, which they had not found. The significance of these figures is that most of the migrants did not have contact with the city prior to their decision to migrate.10

There are certain definite patterns to the process of migration and adaptation in terms of the migrant's contact group. 80% of our sample's contact group consisted of the extended family, while only 4% listed acquaintances as their contact group. The reliance upon familial contact group shows the relative importance of the extended family in the migration and adaptation process. The patterns of this process are listed in the following chart.

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10 It would be interesting to have a control group of village residents to assess their contact with the city and their choices to remain in the countryside rather than permanently reside in the city.
Contact Group and Aid in Finding Lodging and Work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lodging</th>
<th>Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brother</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal Uncle</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal Uncle</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncle unspecified</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paternal and maternal cousins</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquaintances</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arab society is principally patrilineal and patriarchal, so that it is not surprising to see that the patrilineal contact group accounted for 48% of our sample's contact group. What is surprising is the degree of reliance upon the matrilineal relatives which presumably are not very important in traditional Arab society. The process of matrilineal group contact should be analyzed in greater depth to account for this change. A tentative answer to the reliance upon matrilineal relatives is the modification of the patrilineal dominance to the need to have relatives as the migrant's contact group. Since relatives account for the largest contact group of our sample, perhaps we can understand this modification by utilizing matrilineal relatives as a function of the need to have familial aid in the migration process. Of the matrilineal contact group, maternal uncles constituted the most important group.
The nuclear family accounted for 36% of the migrants' contact group, while an additional 44% of the contact group was accounted for through the extended paternal and maternal families. The two most important contact groups were brothers and maternal uncles. Maternal and paternal uncles accounted for 36% of the contact group. The relative reliance upon uncles as contact groups in the city was by far the strongest.11

The single most important function of the contact group was to supply the migrant with temporary lodging. All the migrants' familial contact groups supplied lodging for the migrant upon his arrival. Non-familial contact groups did not accommodate the migrants upon their arrival. Providing the migrant with lodging upon his arrival definitely places greater significance on familial contact groups in the adaptation process than either village, tribal, or regional groups. In terms of aid in finding work, the single most important group was maternal uncles. Perhaps this reliance upon maternal uncles is a function of the limitations of our sample, but it is interesting to note that both paternal and maternal uncles accounted for over 55% of the groups which helped the migrants locate work. Of our sample only one migrant found work in the same occupation as the person who helped him locate the job. Acquaintances accounted for a

11 See especially, El Kafi, Assainissement, Restoration et Réanimation, p. 26-29. Here he describes a similar hypothetical model.
higer percentage of the migrants' contact group in locating work, than in locating lodaine. The relative dependence upon familial contact groups to aid in locating jobs for migrants is minimal in comparison to their own initiative for locating work. The reliance upon the migrant's initiative to locate work could be attributed to the income level of the contact group. In response to the question of whether the migrant himself had rendered aid to other migrants, the lower the income, the less prone the migrant was to help other migrants. The following chart traces income and aid rendered to other migrants.

### Income and Aid Rendered to Other Migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>36 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 and over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the sample who had rendered aid to other migrants, aid to given brothers accounted for 50% of this group. The next largest group helped was cousins. This process is significant because it does not exactly reflect the patterns outlined in terms of contact group. A large sample would be needed to suggest general patterns here.

The desire to actively solicit migrants to come to the city is indicative of the relative economic situation of our sample. 72% would not actively encourage and help their
families to migrate to the city. Of the population that would actively encourage their families to migrate, 39% had mixed feelings about this. Their sense of loneliness or their desire to be with their families was the predominant feeling among this group.

Another assessment of rural group continuity is the degree of contact that the migrants maintain with their place of birth. Of our sample, 72% returned to their place of origin. The following chart traces the occasions of their return.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Festivals</th>
<th>Summer</th>
<th>Familial Causes</th>
<th>Unspecified</th>
<th>Do not return</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Return</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Sometimes)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Rarely)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do not Return</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The largest percentage of migrants returned during festival periods, especially during **Aid** at the end of **Ramadam**. This is the most important festival in Muslim culture and unites families for this occasion. However, the degree of contact continuity with the migrant's place of origin reflected only one aspect of migrant group contact in Tunis.

**Socio-Professional Activities**

The migrant's socio-professional activity is an indication of his general welfare. Income alone does not adequately reflect the general condition of the individual's standard of living. This section will probe various aspects of the migrant's socio-economic situation through the mode and type of residential occupancy, migrant's perception of his standard of living, migrant's desired occupation and residential location, and migrant's perception of the modes through which his present socio-economic situation could be ameliorated.

The results of the correlation between income and the mode of occupancy are not as evident as might be expected. Those of the highest income group were tenants, while most of the proprietors were from the two lowest income groups. The correlation between income and type of occupancy is equally unrevealing. 68% of the sample lived in traditional houses, **courbis** and traditional Arab style houses. However, 12% of the sample did not have proper residences; that is, they lived on the streets or in partially completed houses. These people were from the lowest income groups.
The results from this chart are useful in showing a concentration of courbi residents in the lower income groups. The one member in the sample of the lowest income group residing in a villa, lived there under the care of his brother. The average rent for tenants is 5.5 Dinars per month; the range of rent is from 2-18 Dinars per month, the highest rent being paid by the resident of the villa. The average number of rooms rented is 2.5, while the range is 1-10 rooms. The number and rent for the rooms is contingent upon the type of house and its location.

The migrant's perception of his standard of living is indicative of his income level. The majority of those in the lowest income level predictably perceived their standard of living as having been unimproved since their migration,
while one-third responded with mixed feelings. The proletariat basically viewed their position as having been improved; only 25% of this group had mixed feelings. The highest income group defined their standard of living as having been improved. The most interesting results were from the middle income group, whose perceptions were split between improved, unimproved and mixed. The socio-professional position and occupations of this group can be related to their expectations. (See Appendix F, p. 213). It would be instructive to analyze the previous socio-professional position of this group prior to migration in order to correlate their present self-perception in regard to their aspirations.

The causes of the perception of improved standard of living were predominantly characterized by sufficient salary, which generally improved the migrant's situation. Specific responses to the perception of improved standard of living were school attendance, better nutrition, better lodgings, and having many friends. The causes of the migrant's perception of an unimproved standard of living were directly related to insufficient employment and insufficient salary. (see Appendix F, p. 213).

The corollary to the perception of standard of living is the migrant's perception of himself in relationship to the society. Specifically in terms of his ability to analyze his present situation, the migrant's responses are indicative of his general perception of society. In the following chart
the migrant's responses are traced in terms of the vehicle of raising their standard of living. The largest majority of migrants perceive an increase in their standard of living to be a function of their personal environment; that is, through better lodging and personal and familial circumstances. In other words, their perceptions are primarily related to a high degree of individualization. Only 16% of the sample viewed the improvements of their position to be a function of the state. The majority of this group is in the middle income group. This group's consciousness of the state's role in their well-being will be discussed in the following section.

The Vehicle of Ameliorating Present Condition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>Through state</th>
<th>Through work</th>
<th>Lodging</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>God</th>
<th>I.C</th>
<th>O.C</th>
<th>R.</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>32</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-49</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lowest income level suffering from general apathy and malnutrition demonstrated the least consciousness of the state's role in their lives. One-third of this group
responded to the modes of ameliorating their situation through
renatatives. The feebleness of this groups' perception of
society in terms of governmental responsibility is directly
related to the poverty level upon which they exist. The
highest income group is also the least radicalized politically.
The responses to this question were individualist, through
better locomotion, improved personal situation and through
allusions to God's help. Reliance upon God to ameliorate
the migrant's present situation constituted 12% of the sample.
Migrants' perception of desired occupation reflected
their present socio-professional position. The group most
marginally employed demonstrated its consistent apathy by
defining retirement and unconcern (45.4% and 23.2% respectively
of this group) as their desired occupational goals. The
highest income group desired participation in governmental
administration and a return to agriculture as their occupa-
tional goals. The group primarily involved in production,
the proletariat income group demonstrated a marked desire to
have skilled and industrial trades (50%), and to participate
in services (25%). Another 25% of this group did not have
specific occupational goals. The middle income group, those
primarily participating in services, clearly exhibited a lack
of occupational goal orientation (50%); 33% of this income
group desired to continue in services, while only 16.6%
desired to obtain skills. These results indicated a lack of
Societal Perception

Migrant perception of class in terms of the ability to analyze the socio-economic makeup of exclusive residential areas is indicative of income levels, but does not correspond exactly to the results obtained in the preceding discussion of the modes of ameliorating the migrant's present standard of living. The use of an exclusive residential area as a vehicle for analyzing class consciousness is valid in terms of assessing migrant perception of class constituents. By class constituents I am referring to the groups which compose a given class. The concept of class is left undefined; the results supported class consciousness by deducing migrant awareness through his perceptions of the parameters of class. The results, however, are not conclusive. The perception of class is not consistent in all the following results; one income level scores high on one question, but does not score consistently high on related questions. The following chart traces migrant awareness of the constituents of the group which lives in the exclusive residential zones.

The progression of the questions which led to the results on the graph were: (1) Would you like to live in (selected exclusive residential areas)? (2) Do you think that it would be possible for you to live there? (3) What are the obstacles preventing you from living there? (4) If you think that the cost is too high, how do you account for the fact that some people can afford to live there in spite of the high costs?
Migrant Perception of Class Variables: Incomes and Conceptualization of Exclusive Residential Areas.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Long Residence</th>
<th>High Government Officials</th>
<th>Rich Families</th>
<th>Those Who Work</th>
<th>Wealthy</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17 D.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-39</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the above graph the proletariat income group shows the highest degree of class awareness. 89% of this group defined the reasons why some people can afford the high costs of residing in the exclusive residential areas as a function of their high governmental posts or due to their positions of being members of wealthy families. The lowest percentage awareness was in the highest income group. The lowest income group again demonstrated apathy due to malnutrition by 56% responding with negatives ("I do not know"). The group which demonstrated the highest potential radicalization, the middle income group, had no definite class awareness. These results demonstrate a qualitatively different response than in the standard living response. These results are not consistent with another consciousness assessment question.
The assessment of class consciousness is not solely dependent upon perception of the parameters of class constitu-
ents. The following chart traces the results from questions which variously probed the migrant's perception of society.
These results do not support consistent radicalization.

How Migrants Account for the Present
High Unemployment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Lack of Chancing</th>
<th>Lack of Industry</th>
<th>Lack of Co-operatives</th>
<th>Inadequate Housing</th>
<th>Lack of Education</th>
<th>Lack of Independence</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and over</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results are from the question asking the migrants to account for the present unemployment. 62.5% of the group which demonstrated the highest consciousness, showed the least sophistication in accounting for the present unemployment. The lowest income group showed an initially high sophistication, but rather reflected their present marginal employment situation by pinpointing the lack of industrialization as the cause of unemployment. Whereas the group which
showed the highest radicalization in the previous results, demonstrated a low level of sophistication in terms of assessing the causes of the present unemployment. 62.5% of the proletariat income group did not indicate a larger causation awareness of their position in society. Of this group only 25% related unemployment to the lack of governmental planning. According to percentages, the middle income group demonstrated the highest sophistication in this question; 33% related unemployment to lack of governmental planning. However, the variety of different responses indicated no pattern to this group's perception of the causes of unemployment. The highest income group reiterated its lack of sophistication by expressing a lack of causal understanding.

Another question was designed to further probe the migrant's societal perception. In response to the question asking whether there will be sufficient employment in the future, only 60% of the sample indicated positive responses. Of those indicating negative responses, 71% were from the lowest income group. Of the population perceiving a positive future, 53% related this through governmental responsibility. The concentration of these responses were in the proletariat and middle income levels. The other vehicles for generating sufficient employment were through general development and urbanization (20% and 13% respectively).
The last question in this series of societal perceptions was to assess the migrant's attraction to Europe. 68% of the sample was attracted to Europe. The groups which demonstrated the least attraction to Europe were the lowest and middle income group. The causes of the attraction revolved around the ability to find work there. (47% of this group). The "good" life of Europe attracted 35% of the population to Europe. The members of the lowest income group who were attracted to Europe, demonstrated the least awareness of why they were attracted to it. (see Appendix C, p. 214).
CONCLUSION

The social history of internal migration and urbanization is a multifaceted study. In the preceding analysis of this phenomenon in Tunisia I have concentrated on two basic and interrelated problems: the historical causation of the rural exodus, and the reciprocal process of the urbanization of the migrants. As I have argued, the causation of the rural exodus, which has characterized Tunisian social history since the Second World War, had its origins in the colonial experience. There were two significant antecedents to the rural exodus, both of which were a function of the penetration of the colonial system: (1) changes in agricultural production, which resulted in changes in land tenure, and in agricultural employment opportunities; and (2) the demographic explosion, that had its roots in the destruction of the subsistence production equilibrium, coupled with advances in hygiene, sanitation, and preventive medicine. It was these two antecedents that are the most significant in the gestation of the rural exodus.

The actual rate of migration to Tunis has been shown to correspond to certain periods during the last twenty years. As I have argued, the largest increase in migrants followed
a few years after the formation of the agrarian reform program. This program did not solve the problems of the agrarian structure, but only intensified the misery of the mass of agricultural peasants and workers. I have also shown that the push factor is much stronger than the pull factor in inducing migration.

The concomitant problem of assessing the impact of the large scale influx of migrants into Tunisia has been discussed on three levels: the structural change in housing to accommodate the rural migrants, the socio-economic situation of the migrants entering a narrow employment market due to the lack of industrialization and general economic dependency in Tunisia, and finally the process of migrant adaptation to urban life.

Although this study is valid in itself, it has the added dimension of lying directly at the focal point of the debate on modernization of traditional societies. As I have discussed, the debate concerns the actual process of modernization. The stage theories of development usually point to the "traditionalism" of the non-Western world as the major factor hindering economic development. By so doing they have demonstrated a narrow ethnocentrism in defining the process of modernization as following the stages of development of the Western world. They have argued that "traditionalism" breaks down in contact with the modern urban sector of society. Through my research on the actual
process of migrant adaptation to urban life I have discovered that rural contact groups tend to maintain themselves in the urban setting. This tends to support the work by Oscar Lewis on "urbanization without breakdown" in the process of migrant adaptation in Mexico.

In so doing I have demonstrated that there are several definite characteristics to rural contact group continuity in the city. These consist of patterns in the mode of migrant installation in the city, in lodging, and in residence location. Through this evidence I have been able to support the theories that "ruralization" of the urban areas follows the influx of migrants, rather than the metamorphosis of the tradition-bound individual following the rural-urban migration. In the same context I have also argued that economic development should not be regarded as a function of transforming the traditional society into a modern one, but that economic development is more adequately described as a function of the underdeveloped country's relationship to the international market. Although the evidence that I have presented is not conclusive in terms of firmly establishing a theoretical construction dealing with rural contact group continuity and with urbanization in Tunis, the evidence that I have presented justifies a more sophisticated study of the same problem.

Finally, I have discussed the impact of migration in transforming the central medina. The implications of this
change lie in its reflection of the general changes in Tunisian society since the imposition of the Protectorate in 1881. By demonstrating that the medina in Tunis, which was once a composite of traditional Muslim society, has been degraded and is no longer the prestigious core of culture, society, and residence, I have alluded to the similar degradation of Tunisian society at large through the creation of a dependent economic and cultural system. This process has not ended with independence and with the establishment of a Tunisian Republic, but rather these patterns have developed further, especially through the failure of the Destourian Party to transform the nature and conditions of agricultural and industrial production. The future economic and social development of Tunisia demands a more coherent and critical stance on the part of the government in regard to such pressing problems as marginal and unemployment in both urban and rural areas, and malnutrition. Both of these problems stem from the nature of Tunisia’s economic dependency. These problems will only be solved through a concerted program to eliminate Tunisia’s reliance on her present patterns of trade, which deny her the possibility of economic development through her reliance upon the importation of manufactured and industrial goods.
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Claudet C. Revault, P. and Eckert, H., Medina Ouksalisation. Tunis: AUASM, mimeographed, 1970. (AUASM is the Atelier d'Urbanisme, Association du Sauvegarde de Medina, located in Tunis and funded by the Municipalité de Tunis. AUASM is primarily a research oriented body. It has worked in conjunction with the UNESCO projects in Tunisia.)


II. Secondary Sources: Books

A. Land Tenure


P. Urbanization


III. Secondary Sources: Articles

A. Land Tenure


Haouat, H. "De Quelques Aspects Sociaux de la Mechanisation Agricole" Bulletin Economique et Social de la Tunisie (June 1953).


B. Urbanization


Stambouli, F. "Urbanisme et Developpement en Tunisia" RTSS No. 9 (1967).


## APPENDIX A

### Origins of Heads of Family

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shantytown of Borjel</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>City of Tunis</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Tunis</td>
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<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Nabeul</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Bizerte</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Beja</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Governorate of Le Kef</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Kairouan</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>117</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>55</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Sfax</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Gabès</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governorate of Gafsa</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governorate of Tozeur</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governorate of Medenine</td>
<td>20</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Morocco, Libya</td>
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429 100%

(Source: Sebaï, "Borgel", Las Cahiers de Tunis VI (1958).)
APPENDIX B

Origins of Heads of Family

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Shantytown of Saida Manouiba:</th>
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<th>%</th>
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<td>12</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<td>Governorate of Nabeul</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
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<td>Governorate of Beja</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>Governorate of Souk el Arba (Jendouba)</td>
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<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Governorate of La Kef</td>
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<td>6.5</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>7.6</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
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<td>Governorate of Morocco</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governorate of Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

(Source: Sebag, Saidi Manouiba, Centres des Etudes Economique, No. 111, 1958.)
### APPENDIX C

#### Origin of Heads of Family

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Shantytown of Sidi Fathalleh</th>
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<table>
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<tr>
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<table>
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<td></td>
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<th>%</th>
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<td>00.9</td>
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<table>
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<th>%</th>
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<table>
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<th>%</th>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total</th>
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<td></td>
<td>940</td>
<td>100%</td>
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(Source: Sebäç, Les Cahiers de Tunis VII (1960).}
APPENDIX D

Causes of Migration and Age at Date of Installation: Push-Pull Factors. (1)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Work (Push)</th>
<th>Familial (Pull)</th>
<th>Study (Push)</th>
<th>Work and Familial (Pull)</th>
<th>Work and Study (Push and Pull)</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>2-10</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<td>16-20</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>21-25</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-30</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 and over</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

56 16 12 4 100%

80% of the sample was under 21 at the date of their installation in Tunis.
APPENDIX E

Causes of Migration and Date of Installation
Push-Pull Factors (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Work (Push)</th>
<th>Family (Pull)</th>
<th>Study (Pull)</th>
<th>Work and Family (Push and Pull)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1951</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951-1956</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957-1961</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1964</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-1967</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968-1970</td>
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<td>-</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1972</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### APPENDIX F

**Migrant Perception of Standard of Living**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Improved</th>
<th>Mixed</th>
<th>Unimproved</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17 D</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
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<td>31-39</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49</td>
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<td>85 and over</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
<td>44</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

A. Migrant Attraction to Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>I Do Not Know</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>32</td>
</tr>
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<td>31-40)</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-49)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 and over</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>68</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Of Migrant Sample Attracted to Europe (answer "yes")

Migrant's Perception of European Life

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income</th>
<th>Good Life</th>
<th>More Work</th>
<th>I Do Not Know</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17 D.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-40)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-49)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 and over</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>68%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>