WILLIAM WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR
A Critical Account and an Assessment of its Relevance
to Eighteenth and Twentieth Century Linguistics

by

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This thesis offers an account of William Ward's *Essay on Grammar*. The Introduction discusses the relation of the history of linguistics to general linguistics and suggests that the study of former theories provides a useful evaluation measure for current work. The first two chapters outline the main formative influences of linguistics from the Greek period of 1765. The link between the study of language and other intellectual pursuits is suggested as the force behind innovations in the European tradition; in England linguistics was divorced from other interests and the problem of adapting the grammatical categories of Latin to the English language was the main spur to linguistic investigation.

Chapter III describes Ward's attitudes to language and education, and suggests that he is distinctive among the English grammarians because his grammatical theory grew from the wider intellectual tradition of his age. Chapter IV is an account of Ward's sources and the use he made of them. John Locke's theory of ideas is the basis for a psychological theory of language. David Hartley and some continental grammarians also figure as major influences on Ward. Chapter V discusses Ward's metalanguage in preparation for an account of his grammatical theory. The juxtaposition
of psychological terminology and grammatical terminology gives new values to the grammatical terms. Ward's word-class theory, the subject of Chapter VI, is unusual because it concentrates on the similarities of the major classes rather than their differences. The Lockean idea is seen as existing prior to grammatical categories; operations performed by the mind on the idea give it grammatical features. A feature analysis of the major parts of speech is developed as a means of explicating and formalizing Ward's theory.

Ward's approach to syntax is discussed in Chapter VII. His account is motivated by the desire for a psychological explanation of the relation between words in constructions and the Lockean ideas that are said to lie behind them. The realism inherent in Ward's adaptation of Locke's ideas makes it difficult to account for transitive sentences, and leads him to formulate a singular analysis of them. His account of prepositions is unusual on account of his enlightened discussion of their meaning and his proposal that they are signals of underlying transitive verbs. Ward's efforts to relate language to ideas in the mind lead him to make significant remarks on the syntax of the relative clause and on extraposition. For the former he proposes a solution analogous to a rule cycle: extraposition is recognized to be the result of an optional rule of the grammar.
The final chapter discusses Ward's grammatical theory in terms of its relevance to contemporary theories of syntax. A parallel is drawn between Ward's notion of grammatically undifferentiated ideas and Emmon Bach's proposal that nouns, verbs, and adjectives are all members of one major category. The later rules of Ward's grammar give the noun substantive a priority over the other categories, which are all describable in terms of their relationship to the noun; this suggests a comparison with categorical analyses of syntax which have two major categories: sentence and noun. The fact that Ward's grammar has so much in common with current interests is attributed to the use he made of Locke's philosophy. The philosophical standpoint from which he was working gave new impetus and depth to his linguistic analysis. When Ward's conclusions are false, which is not infrequent, they serve to remind the linguist that his theory will never be able to transcend the inevitably limited intellectual background of the age in which he was living.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction  p. 2

Chapter I  p. 12
The European Linguistic Tradition behind Ward's Essay on Grammar

Chapter II  p. 44
Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England
  2.0. Introduction.  2.1. Cartesian Ideas in England.  2.2. John Locke 1632-1705.  2.2.1. Locke and Language.  2.2.2. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.  2.2.3. The Grammarians' Neglect of Locke.  2.3. David Hartley 1705-1757.  2.3.1. Hartley and Locke.  2.3.2. Hartley's Theory.  2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition.  2.4. Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the Eighteenth Century.  2.5. Survey of the Grammatical Works in England prior to 1765.  2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with Case.  2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case in Latin.  2.5.1. William Bullokar.  2.5.2. Alexander Hume.  2.5.3. John Wallis.  2.5.4. Charles Gildon and John Brightland.  2.5.5. James Harris.  2.5.6. Further Directions.
Chapter III
William Ward

3.0. Introduction. 3.1. Editions of the Essay on Grammar. 3.1.1. Contents of the Essay. 3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar. 3.3. Ward's Attitudes to Education. 3.4. Ward's Attitudes to Language. 3.5. Ward's claim to Uniqueness.

Chapter IV
The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar

4.3.2.1. Harris' View of Case. 4.3.2.2. The Parts of Speech 4.3.2.3. Sentence Types 4.3.2.4. Coalescence 4.3.2.5. Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward. 4.3.3. Robert Lowth (1762). 4.4. Summary of Sources.

Chapter V
The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar

5.0. Introduction. 5.1. Technical Terminology. 5.1.1. The 'Idea' or 'Conception.' 5.1.1.1. The Term 'Idea' in Previous Theories. 5.1.1.2. The 'Idea' or 'Conception' in Ward's Theory. 5.1.2. The Term 'Speculative.' 5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind.' 5.1.4. 'Coalescence.' 5.1.5. 'Principles of Existence.' 5.1.6. 'Demonstrative Circumstances.' 5.2. Terminology of Word Classes. 5.2.1. 'Parts of Speech.' 5.2.2. Definitions of Particular 'Parts' Examined. 5.3. The Study of Metalanguage.

Chapter VI


Chapter VII
Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax

7.0. Grammatical Relations. 7.1. Case. 7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis. 7.1.2. The Function of Case. 7.1.3. Nominative and Accusative Cases. 7.1.4. Substantives in Oblique Cases the Equivalent of Adjectives. 7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity. 7.1.6. Two Basic Sentence Types. 7.1.7. Verbs

viii
Followed by Prepositions or more than One Noun. 7.1.8. Prepositions. 7.2. Adjectives and Verbs. 7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb. 7.3. Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses. 7.3.1. The Notion of Degree. 7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses. 7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution. 7.3.4. Rule Cycles in Relative Clauses. 7.4. Extraposition. 7.5. A Note on Performatives.

Chapter VIII
The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries

Bibliography
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James N. Pankhurst
Si les principes de la Langue que l'on enseigne étoient vraiment raisonnés, les jeunes gens, que la Grammaire rebute, y prendroient goût; ... on enrichéroit leur mémoire, et on orneroit leur esprit; on n'éteindroit pas, dans les glaces d'une triste et sombre routine, ces beaux feux d'une noble imagination, qu'on ne doit qu'exciter et entretenir dans le cours des humanités.

Abbé Fromant

Réflexions sur les Fondemens de L'Art de Parler. 1756, p. xiv.
Introduction

0.1. William Ward's *Essay on Grammar*
0.2. Goals of the History of Linguistics
0.3. Two Criteria for Evaluating Linguistic Theories
0.4. The Contemporary and Historical Significance of Ward's *Essay*
0.5. Division of Thesis
INTRODUCTION

0.1. William Ward's Essay on Grammar

The following chapters offer as a contribution to the history of linguistics an account of an interesting but little known English grammarian, William Ward. He published *An Essay On Grammar* in 1765; its complexity, scope of investigation, and speculative approach place it outside the more familiar English grammatical tradition.

In eighteenth century England the only study at all comparable to Ward's is James Harris' *Hermes: or, A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar* (1751), and although Ward's *Essay* is in many ways a development from *Hermes*, it is markedly different in approach. The *Essay on Grammar* owes a considerable debt to the *Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée* of Port Royal, published in 1660, yet there is little direct borrowing; Ward follows a different line of development from it than do the eighteenth century French speculative grammarians. The *Essay* has

1. The word 'speculative' is defined by the O.E.D. as "characterized by speculation or theory in contrast to practical or positive knowledge." This meaning would seem to be close to Ward's; it is, however, different from the older sense of the word, as it was used in the Middle Ages, in the sense of 'mirroring' reality.

many intellectually stimulating suggestions, but it appears to mark the end of development in the short speculative tradition in English grammars. There are several other English works which purport to be universal or speculative, but they are usually so only in name. Ward and Harris are the only two outstanding speculative grammarians of the English tradition in grammar.

0.2. Goals of the History of Linguistics

The present-day linguist may very well question the value of attempting to characterize the grammatical theories of earlier periods, particularly the work of a man who marks the end of a line of development; it is, in any case, commonly held that the scientific study of language began with Sir William Jones' lecture on Sanskrit in 1786. However, it has recently become evident that the past two thousand years have been rich and varied as far as linguistic speculation is concerned. What has not been made so evident is why the study of the past in linguistics is not merely

1. No one appears to have developed Ward's ideas, although there is evidence that Charles Coote owes something to Ward. Ian Michael in "English Grammatical Categories," (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1963), p. 428, notes that Coote uses the same examples as Ward in his discussion of the transitive verb. Coote's interest in communication and his interest in Locke are discussed in Chapter VIII.

2. There is a discussion of these in paragraph 8.1.1.

3. Harris' Hermes has frequently been discussed in histories of linguistics. It will only be discussed here in its relation to Ward's Essay.
an antiquarian interest.\(^1\) Obviously, although the past may well have much to teach us, the linguist does not in practice go to history in search of new ideas or new approaches. The importance of the history of linguistics is that it helps place the present in perspective. Present-day linguistic science is inevitably a product of the past in that it was the past which provided the intellectual and cultural environment out of which the present grew. This suggest that an understanding of the history of linguistics provides us with a means of measuring the extent to which our own theoretical assumptions are culture bound and a means of observing the latent dependency of these assumptions on the requirements of current applications of linguistic theory.\(^2\)

If the history of linguistics is to serve these ends it is important that the past should be seen as it was rather than through tinted lenses of the present. It is tempting to survey the past and select those aspects of it for study which seem to support the findings of modern theory, but

1. In R. H. Robins, A Short History of Linguistics, (London, 1968), there is an excellent introductory chapter (to which this introduction owes much) offering a theoretical justification of the study of the history of linguistics.

2. The argument does exist, and is supported in part by M. A. K. Halliday, that practical requirements would dictate the structure of the theory. In many ways it is a persuasive argument, but it renders even more necessary a clear understanding of the nature of the dependency between theory and application of theory. See M. A. K. Halliday, "Syntax and the Consumer," Georgetown University Monograph Series on Language and Literature, XVII (1964), 11-24.
such a procedure will not be a means of illuminating the present. Historical studies will be interested in the relevance of the past to the present, but the historian must seek to unfold the past according to what it was, even though he is a very different participant in the context of situation. After he has illuminated the past his task would seem to consist in relating it to the present, pointing out such advances or parallels as may seem relevant, always remembering that the present is but the antecedent of the future and cannot necessarily be used as a yardstick for measuring the worth of the past. However, the past, because it is not part of the present to which we are culturally and intellectually bound, may be able to serve as a yardstick or criterion for evaluating the present.

0.3. Two Criteria for Evaluating Linguistic Theories

The progress which is being made today in theoretical linguistics can be measured according to two criteria: one is the extent to which a theory is able to account in general terms for the phenomenon of language. This supposedly an empirical criterion; however, as yet, no acceptable evaluation procedure has been agreed upon by linguists for measuring a theory's value, (simplicity is rejected by some, and agreed by others, but even those who agree to it have been unable to define it satisfactorily);\(^1\) moreover, there

1. P. H. Mathews, "Some Remarks on the Householder–Halle
is no general agreement as to whether the starting point of a theory should be a series of syntactic rules to which semantic and phonological representations are eventually attached or whether it should be a number of unordered terms, with attached lexicon-independent semantic features, which are ordered according to the rules of the grammar and their inherent semantic features. While these questions remain unanswered, there are definite problems in attempting to use a theory's accountability value as a critical tool measuring its worth. The alternative criterion to empirical evaluation is the historical and comparative evaluation. This depends on the hypothesis, for which there is an increasing amount of evidence, that most supposedly new developments in linguistic theory will have various historical antecedents. By modern standards these antecedents will generally appear to be crude attempts at formulating coherent theories; that these antecedents appear crude will partly be due to our inability to understand the writer's terminology and general frame of reference. However, past

Controversy," Journal of Linguistics, IV, 2 (1968), 279, discusses the problem of how we are to measure simplicity:

It is not obvious that there is ANY evaluation procedure which will meet this particular condition [That descriptively adequate grammars will always be shorter]. Halle evidently hoped that such a procedure could be devised; but there is nothing, at least in the published literature which suggests that this hope is likely to be fulfilled.
theories will offer assistance in several ways: they will illumine for us the philosophical motivations for the kind of approach that we ourselves are embarking on;\(^1\) critical evaluation of an earlier theory will sharpen the critical faculty for approaching the contemporary theory, making us aware of the more obvious pitfalls; finally, the later development of the old theory, or its falling into oblivion, will suggest possible trends for the future of the contemporary theory. Modern linguistics, then, has two methods available for evaluating its progress; one is the accountability approach, which it shares with modern science; the other is the critical evaluation approach based on the history of linguistics, which is akin to the evaluation procedures of literary criticism and philosophy: contemporary work is evaluated implicitly or explicitly in terms of what has gone before it. The fact that linguistics uses and needs both the accountability and the comparative criterion in evaluating its progress suggests that the elucidation and evaluation of previous theories of language


> With the benefit of hindsight I think we can now see clearly that the disparagement and neglect of a rich tradition proved in the long run to be quite harmful to the study of language.

Chomsky's work in the history of linguistics, even if somewhat sketchy, is a good example of how history can clarify the presuppositions, goals, and philosophical assumptions of a contemporary theory.
is a contribution to present-day linguistics and that the study of the history of linguistics is part of the study of general linguistics.

0.4. The Contemporary and Historical Significance of Ward's Essay

The speculative theories of the Middle Ages and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which are so often dismissed as obscure, are particularly deserving of attention. Their obscurity arises out of our own failure to understand the language and the goals of the writers of past ages. Many theories were successful or unsuccessful attempts to make insightful statements about language; however, we find that even if the expositions were unsuccessful the explanatory goals were often remarkably similar to our own goals. William Ward's Essay on Grammar puts forward an explanatory hypothesis which describes not merely what the relationships are between words, but explains how the relationships achieve the speaker's communicative intention. He sees what is essentially a two-term system operating in our process of thinking, and relates the traditional and somewhat arbitrary categories of grammar to this system. Ward's language is often obscure, his categories often doubtful, and his analysis frequently in psychological terms rather than grammatical terms, but there is ample evidence that recent developments in linguistic theory appear to
have features in common with Ward's system. The historical significance of William Ward is not to be seen in terms of the influence he had on his contemporaries as an authority on usage or as an innovator in the tradition; indeed, in this sense he is not a major historical figure. His importance lies in the fact that he took over some ideas that had developed from the Port Royal theory of language in eighteenth century France, and adapted them to the theory of knowledge of John Locke, and attempted to show how one human mind uses words to communicate with another human mind. It was not enough for William Ward that there should be a certain number of grammatical categories (parts of speech) in language to which ideas or meanings happen to be attached; for him the starting point had to be the idea itself as it existed in the mind. He sought to explain grammar not just as a system of classification (as the tradition was content to do), but as an account of the total process of communication.

0.5. Division of the Thesis

Chapter I outlines the European grammatical tradition which was the matrix out of which English linguistics grew. Chapter II discusses the philosophical and grammatical tradition in England of which Ward was part, and suggests the special problems of the English grammarians. Chapter III

1. This is discussed in paragraphs 8.2. and 8.2.1.
introduces Ward the grammarian and educator. Chapter IV discusses in detail the most obvious and important sources of the *Essay on Grammar*. Chapter V is an explication of Ward's metalanguage. Chapter VI gives an account of Ward's view of the formation of grammatical categories. Chapter VII outlines Ward's approach to syntax and seeks to show how the *Essay* offers new psychological dimensions for the study of language; it examines Ward's discussion of the operations performed by the mind in encoding and decoding speech. The final chapter evaluates Ward's significance in terms of the eighteenth century and present-day linguistics.
Chapter I

The European Linguistic Tradition Behind Ward's Essay on Grammar

1.0 Introduction

1.1. A Unified Tradition: The Greeks
1.1.1. The Limits of Linguistics in Greece
1.1.2. Reasons for Greek Interest in Language
1.1.3. Aristotle
1.1.4. The Stoics
1.1.5. Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians
1.1.6. Appolonius Dyscolus

1.2. The Romans
1.2.1. Varro
1.2.2. Donatus and Priscian

1.3. The Middle Ages
1.3.1. Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby
1.3.2. The Modistae

1.4. The Renaissance
1.4.1. Sanctius, Ramus and Lily
1.4.2. Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar

1.5. The Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries
1.5.1. The Cartesian Movement
1.5.2. Port Royal
CHAPTER I

THE EUROPEAN LINGUISTIC TRADITION BEHIND WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR

1.0. Introduction

The history of linguistics is much more than an account of the Western grammatical tradition which grew out of Plato's first speculations about the function of language. China had a tradition of linguistic studies even before the European world had made contact with the country; both the Jews and the Arabs are known to have had a linguistic tradition; then there were apparently isolated developments of great originality, such as the First Grammatical Treatise by an unknown Icelandic grammarian. However, there are two dominant streams of thought which are the antecedents of current work in linguistics: one is the European tradition which grew from Greece, and the other is the Indian tradition. Indian linguistics was probably inspired by the desire to preserve religious texts of the Vedic period (c. 1200-1000 B.C.) and flourished several centuries before the main Greek studies of grammar. The Indians were especially sophisticated in the area of phono-

2. Ibid., p. 72.
3. Ibid., p. 136.
logical theory; the discovery of their work at the end of the eighteenth century provided a great impetus for linguists in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to concentrate their studies on phonology rather than syntax. The latter was largely abandoned, and those studies of syntax that were produced in the first half of the twentieth century tended to be arid and unproductive in theoretical terms. However, prior to the discovery of Indian linguistics, syntax had been of much greater theoretical significance and William Ward was writing his Essay on Grammar at a time when the rich Greek-inspired tradition was still flourishing. The following account of the European tradition attempts to show that it was a productive tradition, and suggests that the science of linguistics has made its greatest strides forward when the field of enquiry has been in touch with other disciplines and has thus been wider than what is often conceived to be the field of linguistic enquiry.

1. The work of Noam Chomsky is important historically because it has served to unite the phonological tradition in linguistics with the European grammatical tradition. Chomsky readily admits the correlations between his work and the concerns of the earlier grammarians.

2. This account has largely relied for factual information and, often, quotation of primary sources on the following books and article: R. H. Robins, op. cit., Francis P. Dinneen, An Introduction to General Linguistics (New York, 1967), and G. L. Bursill-Hall, "Mediaeval Grammatical Theories," Canadian Journal of Linguistics, IX (1963), 40-45.
1.1. A Unified Tradition: The Greeks

The 'Parts of Speech' approach to language study, which Ward and the other grammarians of the eighteenth century inevitably followed, owed its origins to classical Greece. We see Plato and Aristotle attempting to talk about language and making basic divisions of the sentence (or rather the proposition, which was taken to be the basic sentence form), calling the first part the onoma and the second part the rhema. It is not easy to decide from the texts whether these were names of linguistic divisions of the proposition, comparable to subject and predicate, or topic and comment, or whether they were names of word categories as such. The terms were interpreted or re-classified by later speculators as what we understand to be noun and verb; various other parts of speech were then distinguished. Dionysius Thrax recognized eight, and his system was followed closely for the succeeding two thousand years. There is probably no other science which has clung so closely, or so doggedly, to the framework set up by the Greeks.

1.1.1. The Limits of Linguistics in Greece

Discussion of the science of linguistics in the past is inclined to beg an important question, which is that of the delineation of the area of its enquiry. It would be a possible but fruitless procedure to limit the area to what is today considered as part of linguistic science (and there
is no general agreement on this question even today). A more satisfactory working procedure would be to recognize all discussion of problems connected with language as relevant to the history of linguistics in those times when there was no division between philosophical and grammatical studies on the other: thus although Aristotle's preoccupation with language may have been a logician's preoccupation, his logical categories were the foundation of the Stoics' and Alexandrians' grammatical classification. The latter procedure has been followed here, but this is not to suggest that a comprehensive history of linguistics is being presented. Rather the aim is to present a highly selective account of the study of language in as broad a historical perspective as possible. ¹

1.1.2. Reasons for Greek Interest in Language

Interest in language in the past was fostered by the practical needs of the community or by its intellectual interests in areas other than language. In Greece linguistic speculation was motivated by a wide-ranging number of contemporary problems. One of these was the physis-nomos controversy—the controversy which when discussed in relation to language centered on the question of whether it was

¹ One of the areas that has not been touched upon at all is phonetics.
purely conventional. Aristotle held that language was conventional, while the Stoics believed that it had once been natural even if it had now become largely conventional. There were good arguments for both sides, and in itself, it was not perhaps a very important issue. Its importance, suggests Robins, is that it stimulated people to examine language as an entity in itself:

Historically the importance of the controversy is due to its place in the early development of linguistic theory and to the stimulus it provided to more detailed examination of the Greek language. In maintaining and criticizing each side of the argument people were led to examine more closely the structures and the meaning of the words and the formal patterns that words exhibited. In such examinations lies the beginnings of precise linguistic analysis. 1

It is important to recognize that this physis-nomos debate did not arise from an interest in language, but developed from the much more general philosophical concerns of the day, and was instrumental in creating an interest in language:

A principal topic of discussion among the pre-Socratic Philosophers and among the later Sophists, and one that appears in several dialogues of Plato, was to what extent accepted standards, institutions, and judgments of what is right and wrong, just and unjust, and so on, were grounded in the nature of things and to what extent they were essentially the products of a tacit convention or even of explicit legislation. 2


2. Ibid., p. 19.
1.1.3. Aristotle

The extent of Aristotle's influence in linguistics is debatable. The Stoics, although disagreeing with him in the above controversy, did use his division of the sentence or proposition; but they used his terms only as a starting point, and made their division of language into parts of speech. However, his comments on language have served as more than just a starting point for Stoic grammarians. Others throughout the next two thousand years repeated in various ways what Aristotle had said; this suggests that he was touching on matters of enduring concern to linguists. His remarks occur in De Interpretatione, a discussion on logic. He introduces his discussion of ónoma and rhêma in connection with the proposition:

Let us first define ónoma and rhêma, and then explain what is meant by denial, affirmation, proposition, and sentence . . . . . . . . . An ónoma is a sound having meaning, established through convention alone but with no reference whatever to time . . . . A rhêma has a time reference as well . . . . It indicates always that something is said or asserted of something else . . . . Rhêmata by themselves, then, are ónomata, and they stand for or signify something for the speaker stops in his process of thinking and the mind of the hearer acquiesces. However, they do not as yet express positive or negative judgments.

Aristotle was interested in speech as a way of

1. The translation is by Dinneen; see op. cit., p. 80.
expressing judgment. It is interesting to note the essential similarity that he sees between ὀνόμα and ῥῆμα. The only difference is that one has time reference and the other does not. There is no other such explicit emphasis on the similarity of noun and verb until William Ward makes his outstanding and revolutionary statement that they are more alike than different. ¹

In his discussion of language Aristotle introduced a word that has had a long and controversial history in the metalanguage of linguistics: ἐπιτοσις, 'case.' Aristotle used it to mean falling away. For him all tenses of the verb except the present tense were cases of the verb, or fallings away, and all of our cases except the nominative were cases or falling away from the true ὀνόμα or noun. He is not using the term in a linguistic sense, but as a descriptive term with, it seems, slightly pejorative overtones; he uses it as a means of circumscribing and excluding as irrelevant all linguistic forms which do not make up part of his logical proposition. Propositions about which truth value had to be determined were necessarily in the present tense (there could be no doubt about the past and no certainty about the future), and they were of the form: "every man is healthy" or "no man is healthy." In Greek, all nouns, substantive and adjective, in these phrases would be in what we call the nominative case, consequently, only

¹. Cf. Para. 6.1.
the nominative was relevant to Aristotelian logic. The words used for connecting propositions, or distributing them (in a logical sense) were known as *syndesmoi*, which is often translated as 'particles.' The point which is being emphasized here is that Aristotle's terminology was not really grammatical terminology as such, but was developed in order to talk about the linguistic units which made up one type of logical proposition. The significance of Aristotle's comments on language arises directly from the fact that at a certain stage in its history linguistics was not distinguished from the science of logic. The lack of differentiation between what we now recognize as separate sciences was, however, productive; Aristotle's methodology for establishing categories was different from the methodology of traditional grammar. His alternative criteria provide us with fresh insights on the process of classification. In as much as he was not using grammatical criteria it could be said that he is not actually part of the western grammatical tradition, but was instrumental in creating it.

1.1.4. The Stoics

The Stoic philosophers divided Aristotle's units according to formal linguistic criteria. The *syndesmoi* were divided into those which had invariant forms (prepositions and conjunctions) and those which were subject to inflection (having certain formal similarities to *ónoma*),
naturally, the article and the pronoun; as such articles and pronouns were not distinguished at this stage. They were jointly called the arthra. Aristotle's ἁπτωσις was restricted to nominal categories, and extended to include the nominative case. A separate terminology for verbal categories was evolved; temporal divisions of the verb were analysed and the Stoics recognized aspectual as well as temporal classification of tenses. The principal interest of the Stoics was philosophical, but their well known zeal for categorization of reality led them to create categories in language on a formal linguistic basis.

1.1.5. Dionysius Thrax and the Alexandrians

Ultimately it was not the Stoics, but the Alexandrian scholars who were responsible for the final division and naming of the parts of speech as we know them. The Τεχνη Grammatika of Dionysius Thrax (c.100 B.C.) is the most definitive of the Alexandrian grammatical works. Thrax's classification of the parts of speech is a masterpiece of formal precision and is quoted here on account of its historical importance.¹

¹ Robins attests its importance: "...the description given by Thrax was regarded as definitive. It was translated into Armenian and Syrian early in the Christian era, and was the subject of a considerable amount of comment and exegesis from Byzantine critics, or scholiasts. It remained a standard work for thirteen centuries and a modern writer has declared that almost every textbook of English grammar bears evidence of a debt to Thrax." (p. 31).
onoma (noun): a part of speech inflected for case, signifying a person or a thing,

rHEMA (verb): a part of speech without case inflection but inflected for tense, person, and number, signifying an activity or process performed or undergone,

metoche (participle): a part of speech sharing the features of the verb and noun,

arthron (article): a part of speech inflected for case and preposed or postposed to nouns,

antonymia (pronoun): a part of speech substitutable for a noun and marked for person,

prothesis (preposition): a part of speech placed before other words in composition and syntax,

epirHEMA (adverb): a part of speech without inflection, in modification of or in addition to a verb,

Syndesmos (conjunction): a part of speech binding together the discourse and filling gaps in its interpretation.

The Alexandrians were literary scholars, and interest in language was inspired by a desire to perform textual analysis and to preserve the literary language; thus classification of linguistic material was regarded as a worthwhile activity in itself.

1.1.6. Appolonius Dyscolus

The grammatical work of Appolonius Dyscolus, a grammarian who introduced developments and innovations to Thrax's scheme, has survived. He was described by Priscian as the greatest authority on grammar. His historical importance lies

1. The translation is by Robins; see op. cit., p. 34.
firstly in his attempt to reunite philosophy and linguistics:

He made use of the same set of eight word classes as those given in the Téchne, but he redefined some of them more particularly to make greater use of philosophical terminology and to establish a common class meaning for each word class. He defined the pronoun not merely as a noun substitute as Thrax had done, but additionally as standing for substance (dusia) without qualities, a statement repeated by Priscian and of considerable importance later in mediaeval linguistic thought.¹

and secondly in his interest in syntax, an area which Thrax had not dealt with. His interest in syntax centered on the relation of the noun and the verb; he recognized different classes of verbs (active, passive, and neuter), and described their relationship to the nominal cases. He describes the action as "passing over to something else" in active or transitive verbs. The result of many of his innovations is still with us today.

1.2. The Romans

1.2.1. Varro

The linguistic theories propounded during the period of the Roman Empire all owe a great deal to their Greek antecedents; this is even true of Varro, who was the most original of all Latin grammarians. Only fragments of his work remain; it is evident from these that he was dependent

on Greek thought: he analyses in detail the analogy–anomaly debate on the nature of language. Here he offers a compromise solution with his notion of 'spontaneous derivation' and 'natural derivation.'

'Spontaneous derivation' (derivatio voluntarius) refers to the spontaneous creation of a lexical item with or without regard to the rules of the language, and would appear to correspond to the anamalist position; 'natural derivation' (derivatio naturalis) is the derivation of forms according to the rules of the language. Varro asserted that any expression referring to an object or an idea must be subject to this process. It is the process of analogy that the Greeks had discussed, but Varro's observations are interesting because he suggests that not only is it a property of Latin, but a property of language in general, and one that makes language learning possible. Varro's account of word formation was also interesting on account of his separation of derivational and


2. "Derivation has been introduced not only into Latin speech, but into the speech of all men, because it is useful and necessary; for if this system had not developed, we could not learn such a great number of words as we should have—for the possible forms into which they are inflected is numerically unlimited—nor from those which we should have learned would it be clear that the relationship existed between them so far as their meanings were concerned." (De Lingua Latina, viii, 15, 62. tr. Roland G. Kent, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass., 1938, quoted in Langendoen, op. cit.)
inflexional endings. His division of the parts of speech, which appears to owe little to the Greeks, and which re-appears in later grammars, was based on four inflexionally contrasting classes: nouns, having case inflexion, verbs, having tense inflexion, participles, having both, and adverbs having neither. Varro wrote his grammar in the first century B.C.

1.2.2. **Donatus and Priscian**

Donatus (fourth century) and Priscian (c. A.D. 500) are the two best known Latin grammarians. They both owe much to the Greek tradition, especially the formulations of Thrax and Appolonius Dyscolus. Although the evidence of borrowing from Thrax is strong in both grammarians, Priscian claims that Appolonius is the source of much of his work. Priscian's grammar, the most complete of the Byzantine period, and still the most complete Latin grammar shows evidence of Appolonius' influence. Appolonius is quoted when Priscian describes pronouns as having substance without quality; the sentence is defined semantically: "Oratio est ordinatio dictiounum congrua, sententiam perfectam demonstrans."\(^1\) Priscian's definitions of the noun and verb indicate most clearly the change in emphasis from

1. Priscian, 2.4.15.
formal to semantic criteria:¹

nomen (noun, including words now classed as adjectives): the property of the noun is to indicate a substance and a quality, it assigns a common or a particular quality to everybody or thing.

verbum (verb): the property of a verb is to indicate an action or being acted upon; it has tense and mood forms, but is not case inflected.²

Priscian was codifying the grammar of classical Latin, a dialect which had little in common with the vulgar Latin tongue spoken in the sixth century. His purpose in analysing grammar was the elucidation of the classical authors and the preservation of classical Latin as a literary language among his own contemporaries.³ The literary approach of the Alexandrians had favoured formal analysis as the process most suitable for its purposes, and Priscian's adoption of semantic definitions is not obviously explained by his immediate objectives. It was probably due to the influence of Appolonius, who Priscian esteemed so greatly. In any event, Priscian's semantic definitions, which were accompanied in most instances by formal criteria, were to

1. But formal or logical definitions are not abandoned. It would seem likely that the non-semantic definitions are still prior to the semantic.

2. The translations by Robins, op. cit., p. 57.

3. The debt that classical scholarship owes to Priscian as the preserver of literary Latin through the Dark Ages can only be guessed.
change the entire direction of the study of language in the following centuries.

1.3. The Middle Ages

From the point of view of the present study this period is the most interesting and important prior to the eighteenth century itself. We are still not able to estimate the value and extent of the grammatical work which was accomplished during the Middle Ages. This rather broad term should be delimited more accurately: the most interesting period for this study coincides with the golden age of scholastic philosophy and extends from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries. The development of interest in grammar is due to the integration and organization of scholarly activities of the university curriculum into the trivium and the quadrivium. Before a student could go on to acquire knowledge of mathematics, astronomy, music, and geometry—the quadrivium—he had to become familiar with the basic tools of the scholar: grammar, logic, and rhetoric, which were known as the trivium. Thus grammar was to be studied by every student. The general direction of grammatical studies in the Byzantine period had been towards the elucidation of literary classics, but the linking of grammar with logic and rhetoric gave these studies a new impetus. Although a considerable number of literary grammars are known to have been produced in the Middle Ages, they were becoming less literary in that they
paid less attention to the literary works they were intended for. Bursill-Hall notes the shift in emphasis: "In the twelfth century, grammar was taught primarily as the guide to the art of good speaking and writing, but with the shift away from the study of literature to the study of logic, grammar in the thirteenth century became the handmaid no longer of literature but of logic, a speculative science; grammar and logic go arm-in-arm, logic distinguishing from true and false in speculation and grammar ensuring their correct expression."¹ Peter Abelard, who has some claim to being called a grammarian, was a significant figure in this change of emphasis in that the rise of dialectic in the twelfth century, in which he played an important part, coincides with the change in grammatical interest.

1.3.1. Helias, Bacon, and Kilwardby

Most grammatical treatises since the sixth century had been commentaries on Priscian, and it is one such commentary, by Peter Helias² which signals the change of interest in grammatical studies. Peter Helias sought philosophical explanations for Priscian's rules of grammar. Both Robins and Bursill-Hall suggest that Peter Helias is a systematizer of past achievements. He gains his place in history as the man who reintroduced Aristotle to

2. Peter Helias, Summa Super Priscian, c. 1150.
grammarians and reunited language studies with logical studies. There is no doubt that he would have given the same response as the speculative grammarians who followed him to the frequently asked question of the next century: "Quis grammaticam inventit, an scilicet grammaticus an philosophus?"¹ Roger Bacon (?1214-1294) and Robert Kilwardby (d. 1279) follow Helias, and it is with these men that we first observe the question of general or universal grammar discussed. Bacon thinks that the accidental differences in languages are not worth serious study, and considers the subject matter of grammar to be general principles: "Grammatica una et eadem est secundum substantiam in omnibus linguis, licet accidentaliter varietur."² Robert Kilwardby is similarly explicit in discussing the property of grammar which gives it the right to be called a science: "Since science remains the same, in any part of the world, and its subject remains the same, the subject matter of grammar ought to be the same in all parts of the world."³ The possibility of a general grammar stemmed from the fact that all languages were believed to mirror the world,


(hence the term 'speculative') and so would possess certain correspondences. These considerations would lead to a new grammatical movement in the thirteenth century.

1.3.2. The Modistae

The second half of the thirteenth century was to see the rise of a new grammatical theory, proposed by a group of grammarians who came to be known as Modistae. The name comes from the subject of their investigation: the word classes' mode of signifying (modi significandi) of the world's mode of being (modus essendi). Their theory undoubtedly grew out of the work of Peter Helias; while Peter was concerned with the connection of logic and language they were concerned with studying language according to the way in which it was capable of signifying reality. Their treatises were known as Summae Modorum Significandi. The basis of grammatical division was moved from the realm of language to the real world. Words had different powers of signifying reality, and the various word classes signified different aspects of it; the division of the parts of speech was according to the way words signified reality. It is generally considered to be a semantic classification but Bursill-Hall takes issue with the concept of signifying as only a semantic notion and suggests that "the new method ... sought to state the functional nature of the categories which Priscian had described, but by means of
criteria stated in the form of correlates of reality to which they correspond.¹ The problem for the Modistae lies with the indeclinable parts of speech, which can only be described in functional, or formal terms. Any account of the modes of signifying which discussed the indeclinables as well as the principal parts of speech tends to be unsatisfactory if it is seen as a semantic classification. Bursill-Hall summarizes the usual explanations of the modi significandi of the various word classes:

Of the declinable partes operationis, the Nomen and Pronomen signify substance, that is, the stability and permanence of things; the Verbum and Participium express becoming, and this mode of signifying which embraces movement and becoming is the general feature that they share. The Nomen and Pronomen thus represent an essentially static element and the Verbum and Participium an essentially dynamic element. The indeclinable partes orationis are grouped together by virtue of a general mode signifying the disposition of the "ens" or the act and then are differentiated by their special modes. The division of the declinable partes orationis into two sections, together with the indeclinable partes, suggests a classification, even though based on different criteria, which is not unlike the classification of word classes found among modern linguists, viz. Hockett and Jespersen.²

This account derives its coherence and usefulness from the fact that it is in reality a psychological account of the distinguishing features of the functions of the various partes. The indeclinables are grouped together signifying

the "disposition of the 'ens' or the act." This signification of disposition, signifying "per modum disponentis"¹ as Siger de Courtrai calls it, does not seem to have any ontological status, but rather a psychological status in that it is, as it were, an instruction to the mind to consider one of the principal parts of speech in a certain way.² Whether they realised it or not, the Modistae were having recourse to formal definition in these cases. The mode of signifying of the nomen, perhaps the most clearly semantic of the modes in that it signifies through the modes of stability and permanence,³ has a certain dependence on psychological criteria, because the permanence and stability of many nouns, particularly abstract nouns, is the result of a construct of the mind rather than of any criterion in the real world. The modistic analysis of syntactic description, which is based on the four types of causation of Aristotle: material, formal, efficient, and final, is further


2. Ian Michael denies that there is any psychological motivation in the Modistae's analysis of language: "Grammar is fundamentally concerned with the expression and communication of ideas, but this central position given to communication derives not from psychological thinking about language, but from logical." (Op. cit., p. 25). Michael is talking about the Modistae here, but the facts do not seem to bear out his statement.

3. Thomas of Erfurt describes the nomen as "a part of speech signifying by means of the mode of an existent or of something with distinctive characteristics . . . . The mode of an existent is the mode of stability and permanence." The translation is by Robins, op. cit., p. 79.
testimony of their essential concern with the psychological aspects of language:

Each construction is subject to analysis in terms of the four principles of construing, so that the material represents the members of the potential construction, the formal represents the construction itself, the efficient represents congruence, the mutual appropriateness (congruitas) of the construction, and the final represents the completed construction which has satisfied all the requirements for the expression of a compound concept of the mind.

The four principles of causation are used as a means of syntactic analysis, but the discussion of the final cause can only be interpreted as an ultimate interest in how concepts of the human mind are communicated, rather than a purely grammatical interest. This is not a criticism; the point at issue is whether going beyond narrowly grammatical concerns yields a grammatical theory which is richer than it would otherwise have been. The richness of the syntactic theory of the Modistae is only now being discovered. Their discussions of transitivity, of dependents and terminants, of congruity (collocational suitability?) and other matters offer evidence of concerns of fundamental importance to linguistics. It seems evident that these concerns were brought to the notice of the mediaeval grammarians as a direct result of their training.

in and interest in scholastic philosophy and the renewed mediaeval interest in Aristotelian philosophy. Scholastic philosophy is often accused of dealing in fine logical or psychological distinctions which have no validity in the real world; these accusations are often unfair, and arise out of a lack of understanding of the goals of the scholastics; in their approach to language the awareness of fine distinctions led the writers of this period to attempt not merely a classification of linguistic data, but to attempt to understand how linguistic forms convey an awareness of reality from one human mind to another. They stand out in sharp contrast to the Nominalist grammarians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

1.4. The Renaissance

This survey of grammatical interest in Europe is following the usual divisions of history because these divisions seem to be well founded, even if not as clear cut as was once believed; more importantly, they do correspond to changes in linguistic interest, changes brought about by changing philosophical interests and new political movements. On the political scene the most obvious Renaissance factor is the rise of nationalism and the recognition of the status of the vernacular tongues as languages. Dante is justly famous for his De Vulgari Eloquentia, written in the early fourteenth century, which
recognizes the need for an accepted Italian dialect other than Latin as a means of political unity. As the vernaculars came to be recognized as languages, the study of Latin as an ideal of perfect language gave way to studies which once again had the task of imparting rules to people who wished to learn Latin or Greek. The Renaissance stressed the values of classical Rome and Greece, and hence the value of the literature of these periods. Thus grammarians once again adapted themselves to the needs of literary study; they did not ignore the syntactical work of the Mediaeval speculators; they only ignored its implications:

The teaching of Latin and Greek grammar gradually took on the form in which it is known today in the standard school textbooks. Essentially this process involved the incorporation of mediaeval syntactic notions into the morphological systematization of the late Latin grammarians.

1.4.1. Sanctius, Ramus, and Lily

One of the most famous of the Renaissance grammars is Sanctius' Minerva Seu de Causis Linguae Latinae which was widely read and respected throughout Europe for the two centuries following its publication. There is no critical edition of Minerva and it is difficult to assess its content from a cursory reading. There would appear to

1. Robins, p. 110.

2. Franciscus Sanctius, often known as Francisco Sanchez, first published his grammar in 1604.
be reason to believe that Sanctius' work was not as barren as Robins suggests most of the Renaissance grammars were. He may have been instrumental in developing the Port Royal view of language. This will be considered briefly in a later chapter. It was not Sanctius, but two other Renaissance grammarians who overshadowed the English grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pierre Ramée was one; he was a Frenchman, born about 1515, and is famous for the educational reforms he introduced into Europe. He wrote grammars of French, Latin, and Greek, and set down his theory of grammar in his Scholae Grammaticae.¹ He attempted to analyse each language according to its own formal system and showed scant respect for the a priori approach of the Middle Ages. One result of his system was an intense formalism. Emma Vorlat describes the Scholae Grammaticae as "an attack on the philosophical foundations of the Aristotelian grammatical theory."² She claims that Alexander Hume, Paul Greaves, Alexander Gill, Charles Butler and Ben Jonson follow Ramée's formal system in England.³ His influence is fairly limited; the main reason for this is that sixteenth century England already had its accepted Latin Grammar, published by William Lily and John Colet in

1. Robins, p. 102.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
1510. It has easy, straightforward definitions, and restricts itself to the essential rules of grammar. Its success was so great that in 1540 Henry VIII decreed that it was the only 'authorized grammar.' It was written for the purpose of instructing English children in the Latin language, and was completely devoid of any philosophical intentions (unlike Sanctius' and Ramée's grammars). It had a major influence on the grammars published in England in the following hundred years, and is the chief single reason why English grammarians showed absolutely no interest in offering reasons for the classifications they had made. Lily's authoritative, lapidary definitions had every appearance of being God-given, and there was very little reason for challenging them.

1.4.2. Continuing Interest in Speculative Grammar

Speculation about the nature of language was not extinguished so easily in France during the Renaissance period. Grammars by Sanctius, Julius Caesar Scaliger and Thomas Campanella (the latter two being Italian grammarians of the sixteenth century) kept alive at least some interest in the reasons behind language; this is attested by the recurring titles, like De Causis Linguae Latinae. This interest was to have a remarkable resurgence with the publication of the Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée at

1. Ibid., p. 14.
Port Royal in 1660. But by this time there would no longer be a unified European tradition in grammatical studies.

1.5. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

The Renaissance marked the breaking up of the unified Europe of the Middle Ages, and the rise of nationalism. The intellectual development of the following centuries cannot be treated as a unified movement. There were separate movements in Germany, France, and England, movements which undoubtedly were still closely related and influenced each other, but which have their own separate identity. The remainder of this chapter will consider France and the significance of Descartes and Port Royal. The development of grammar and philosophy in England will be the subject of the next chapter.

1.5.1. The Cartesian Movement

The Renaissance saw the diversification of intellectual endeavour according to the emerging national boundaries; but the impact of Rene Descartes' writings and thoughts on the Western world was such that we must consider him and the Cartesian school as a significant factor in the intellectual history of seventeenth century Europe. His philosophy laid emphasis on the dichotomy between matter and the spirit, since all certain knowledge came from ideas, which derived from the spirit. Cartesian dualism fostered an interest in language because language was the vehicle through which the
spirit of man expressed itself.\textsuperscript{1} Ernst Cassirer suggests
the implications of Cartesianism for the philosophy of
language and quotes Descartes' remark to Mersenne:

Descartes gave us no independent philosophical
study of language--but in a letter to Mersenne
. . . he shows a very characteristic approach
--which was to be highly significant in the
ensuing period . . . . Since the one identical
fundamental form of knowledge, the form of
human reason, recurs in all branches of know-
ledge, really deserving the name, all speech
must be based upon the one, universal, ration-
al form of language, which, though cloaked by
the abundance and diversity of verbal forms,
cannot be hidden entirely.

As the system of numbers is exact with rel-
atively few signs . . . "it must be possible
to designate the sum and structure of all
intellectual contents by a limited number of
linguistic signs, provided only that they are
combined in accordance with definite, univ-
ersal rules."\textsuperscript{2}

Robins notes that Mersenne "probably influenced by Descartes,
suggested the creation of the best of all possible languages
by which all men's thoughts could be put into the same words
with brevity and clarity."\textsuperscript{3}

1. Cartesian philosophy laid much greater emphasis on the
separation of the spirit from matter, on the idea and its
importance than did the scholastics, whose philosophical
starting point was one of "realism."

2. Ernst Cassirer, \textit{The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms}, trans.
Ralph Manheim, (Yale, 1953), I, 128. Descartes' Letter to
Mersenne is dated Nov. 20th 1629, and appears in \textit{Descartes'}
Correspondence, ed., Adam-Tannery, 1, 80ff.

1.5.2. Port Royal

The Cartesian influence on linguistic studies is most evident some thirty years later when the Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée by Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot was published. Known as the Port Royal Grammar in England and referred to as such hereafter, it was an attempt to look behind the apparent anomalies of usage and to find a rational explanation for the grammar of the French language. The possibility of rational explanation of syntax was suggested by Descartes; Arnauld attempted to find the reasons behind the facts of French and several other languages, but he did not, as has often been suggested, attempt to set up universal and immutable principles about language in general. His synthesis was rational rather than general. Although one of the tenets of Cartesianism is that one should begin scientific enquiry with an analysis of the innate conceptions which are known to be true, this method is not followed in the Port Royal Grammar; Arnauld's approach is synthetic rather than analytic. He makes no attempt to set up a discovery procedure, for example, and the resulting grammar has much in common with the Modistic grammars produced by the scholastic philosophy which Cartesianism had rejected. The influence of Cartesian thought on language had another important parallel with the Middle Ages, and this was the relationship, suggested in Descartes' letter to Mersenne, between language and a system of logic. The
Port Royal Grammar takes as its starting point that the mind of man has the powers of perception, judgment, and reasoning, that the first two are to be explained by grammar, but it is the study of logic which throws light on the process of reasoning. Two years after the publication of the Grammar, Arnauld published La Logique, ou l'Art de Penser. In this work he sees the connection between grammar and logic to be close; it is reminiscent of the work of Peter Helias in the twelfth century. Arnauld thinks that the mistake of recent logicians is that they have concentrated exclusively on the process of reasoning, for which the syllogism was the necessary tool, and neglected the way in which the premises are formed, the joining of words in a nexus of affirmation:

Most philosophers seem to busy themselves with giving rules for good and bad reasoning. These rules often help us to discover the defects of certain intricate arguments and to arrange our thoughts in a more convincing manner; so we cannot say the rules are useless. Still this utility must not be thought to extend very far. Most of man's errors derive not from his being misled by wrong inferences but rather from his making inferences from premises based on false judgments.

Arnauld is stating here that logicians should concern themselves with the processes involved in sentence formation, and he appears to be suggesting that a study of

grammar, or sentence construction, should precede a study of logic, which for him means the process of deducing truth or falsehood from complete syllogisms. On account of this many of the observations made in the Grammar are repeated in the Logic because of their relevance to the formation of premises. The achievement of Arnauld, which was to be a major influence on French thought for the next two hundred years, and the outstanding reputation of the Port Royal Grammar can be attributed to the fact that the study of language was deriving inspiration from an allied discipline, in this case, logic.
Chapter II

Philosophy and Linguistics in Post-Renaissance England

2.0. Introduction

2.1. Cartesian Ideas in England

2.2. John Locke, 1632-1705
   2.2.1. Locke and Language
   2.2.2. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
   2.2.3. The Grammarian's Neglect of Locke

2.3. David Hartley, 1705-1757
   2.3.1. Hartley and Locke
   2.3.2. Hartley's Theory
   2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition

2.4. Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the Eighteenth Century

2.5. Survey of the Grammatical Work in England Prior to 1765
   2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with Case
   2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case in Latin
   2.5.1. William Bullokar
   2.5.2. Alexander Hume
   2.5.3. John Wallis
   2.5.4. Charles Gildon and John Brightland
   2.5.5. James Harris
   2.5.6. Further Directions
CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY AND LINGUISTICS IN POST RENAISSANCE ENGLAND

2.0. Introduction

Lily's Latin grammar was significant for the future of English linguistics in that it divorced grammatical studies from the wider field of intellectual pursuits. A reunion occurs in the latter part of the eighteenth century, but until then the separation was total. Consequently this chapter will consider first the philosophical and intellectual perspectives of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and then the development of the grammatical tradition.

2.1. Cartesian Ideas in England

It is neither possible nor necessary to estimate the total impact of Cartesianism on the intellectual life of England. In the field of philosophy it was obviously considerable; its influence on grammatical works will be dealt with in the latter part of the chapter. The aspect to be considered here falls midway between philosophy and linguistics: it is concerned with projects for a universal language. It seems likely that Descartes and Mersenne were instrumental in the development of these projects in seventeenth century England. These two Frenchmen had

1. Para. 2.5.4.
discussed the possibility and desirability of a language which would be universal and unambiguous, but it was Englishmen who undertook the extensive task of creating such a language. At the time Arnauld was undertaking a rational explication of the grammar of French, George Dalgarno, Bishop John Wilkins, and other Englishmen were attempting to create a general or universal language. Although Mersenne's work was known to Wilkins,\(^1\) suggestions of a similar nature had already been made in England. Francis Bacon had deplored the inefficient nature of language, and had mentioned it was one of the idols of the market place which hinder the advancement of learning.\(^2\) However, Wilkins was chiefly influenced by Cartesian ideas in writing his \textit{Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language}. The \textit{Essay} is part of the intellectual tradition rather than the grammatical tradition of England in that it does not treat of natural language; it is an attempt at a classification of reality. Scientists in England were interested in classifying data and thus the working out of such a language would have many practical applications. The \textit{Essay} had this much in common with the grammatical work of the period: its creation was dictated by practical needs. The projects for universal language never really reached fruition: they

\(^1\) Robins, p. 114.

\(^2\) Francis Bacon, \textit{The Two Booke} ... of the Proficiency and of Learning, Divine and Humane, (1605).
remain as monuments to the great ingenuity of their authors.
It is interesting to note the different directions that
Cartesian ideas took in England and France: in France they
served as an impetus, but not a model, for the creation of
rational grammars, while in England they moved people to
create rational languages.

2.2. John Locke, 1632-1704

The history of thought or intellectual trends is dif-
f erent from the history of philosophy because philosophical
writings are read and discussed by specialists, and only
slowly do the ideas contained in them influence the thought
and attitudes of the greater part of the literate and edu-
cated population. Thus although David Hume had published
all his philosophical works over a decade before William
Ward wrote his Essay, Hume is not here considered part of
the intellectual movement of the period because he is read
for the most part only by philosophers. Samuel Jonson
dismissed Hume as a man who had a morbid love of change
which involved a preference of new error to old truth.¹
The dominant philosophical influence on the thought of the
age was undoubtedly John Locke.

¹. Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the
2.2.1. **Locke and Language**

Locke has been sadly neglected by historians of the study of language. In his book, *The Study of Language in England, 1760-1869*, Hans Aarsleff has written more extensively on Locke than anyone else in this field, and he is very conscious of his inability to treat Locke's work with the attention it deserves: "A full account [of the philosophy of language in the mid-eighteenth century] would need to pay much more attention to Locke."¹ Aarsleff confines himself to discussing Locke's influence on Condillac and Destutt de Tracy and does not discuss the implications of his philosophy on English linguistics; in fact, the only reference to Locke that will be found in discussions of English linguistics will be either about James Harris' antagonism towards Locke or Locke's influence on educational thinking, and hence on the construction of grammar books. The next chapter will discuss Locke's influence on English linguistics, which appears to amount to his influence on Ward. His influence on the teaching of grammar has been assumed rather than proved, but there is no doubt that he was one of the first people in England to state clearly that "the child should first be instructed in its own tongue so that it speaks, reads, and writes that tongue

correctly;"\(^1\) the proposal that English should be studied as thoroughly as Latin and Greek would have seemed revolutionary at the time he was writing, (1693), and for long after; perhaps even until the middle of the present century the study of the English language has not been accepted in its own right.\(^2\)

2.2.2. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Locke's most famous philosophical work is An Essay Concerning Human Understanding; it was first published in 1690. His purpose in it was "to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human Knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of Belief, Opinion, and Assent."\(^3\) Unlike the mediaeval philosophers who allowed a theory of knowledge to grow out of their system of philosophy, Locke developed the suggestion implicit in Descartes' work, that philosophy should begin with epistemology.\(^4\) He rejected Descartes' assumption that ideas were innate and the mind worked on them. Instead he called the mind a tabula rasa, and investigated how it acquired ideas, and how far these

2. Charles Gildon and John Brightland, A Grammar of the Tongue, (1711), is an interesting exception. In this work there is no hint of its being a preparation for learning Latin.
ideas are representations of things in the world. At the outset he had not considered the necessity of treating words, but inasmuch as these are the means by which knowledge is communicated from one person to another, their importance soon became obvious, and he devoted a whole book of the Essay to their consideration. This book is of fundamental importance for an understanding of Ward's Grammar, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

2.2.3. The Grammarians Neglect of Locke

Locke was a man of sincere and original opinions; there is no doubt that many of his non-philosophical ideas, such as those on education, were ahead of his time. This is a fortiori true of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Reaction to it came largely because of the fear that it was attacking the foundations of revealed religion. Locke comments on some initial reaction to a preliminary draft: "I have been told that a short epitome of this treatise, which was printed in 1688, was by some condemned without reading, because innate ideas were denied in it; they too hastily concluding, that if innate ideas were not supposed, there would be little left either of the notion or proof of spirits." Yolton discusses the nature of the reaction to the Essay and shows the extent of the criticism, but notes that only

a small proportion of it came from philosophers. In spite of the fact that the Essay was at first hastily received (partly on religious grounds), it is difficult to understand why grammarians so completely ignored one of the most significant books of the century, and one that was concerned in no small way with language. Until 1765 only one grammarian used Locke's work, and then "only in two or three places." This is James Greenwood; for the most part he creates a Latin-based grammar, but he does look to Locke on brief occasions. The failure of grammarians to take note of Locke can be attributed to two causes: one (as mentioned), that they viewed their task as grammarians as narrowly pedagogical and were content to merely make slight emendations to the basic plan of Lily's grammar; the other (related to their pedagogical intentions), that they were bound to the Christian tradition, to which Locke's ideas were not acceptable.

2.3. David Hartley, 1705-1757

Hartley was not a philosopher of the same calibre as Locke, but he was a man who was in much closer contact with the people of his age. His Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations appeared some fifty years

after Locke's *Essay* and was much more immediate in its effect on the reading public.

2.3.1. **Hartley and Locke**

It is argued here that Hartley was largely responsible for making Locke's ideas acceptable to the ordinary man in the eighteenth century, thus allowing even conservative grammarians to use Locke. Hartley makes few specific references to Locke's *Essay*, but appears to be interested in those areas which Locke felt were beyond the province of the philosopher, and that Locke had stated that he was not going to treat: "I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensations by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and those ideas do, in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or no."  

2.3.2. **Hartley's Theory**

Hartley was advocating a physiological psychology in place of one based on the concept of soul, a psychology that would complement Locke's philosophy in explaining how ideas are formed in the mind. However, the work as a whole deals with many more issues than the physiological explica-

1. Locke, op. cit., The Preface to the reader.
tion of the formation of ideas. The Encyclopaedia Britannica summarizes Hartley's work, saying he

... aimed to overcome "the greatest difficulty of supposing that the Soul, an immaterial Substance, exerts and receives a physical influence upon and from the Body." The preface states that he had been "informed that the Rev. Mr. Gay had asserted the possibility of deriving our intellectual pleasures and pains from Association." From Isaac Newton's Opticks (1704) he derived the idea that sensory stimuli might operate by producing "vibrations" propagated through the nerves, like "the trembling of particles in sounding bodies;" in the brain the occurrence of vibrations in a certain order sets up a readiness for similar vibrations to recur in the same order. Part II explains how more complex processes—imagining, remembering, reasoning—may thus be analysed into clusters or sequences of elementary sense impressions formed by individual experience, so that all psychological acts can be explained by a single law of association.

2.3.3. Hartley's Place in the Intellectual Tradition

In Chapter I of the first volume of Observations of Man, Hartley explains how he deals with questions raised by Newton and Locke; he stands in a direct line of intellectual development from them. His contribution to the intellectual climate of his time has not been thoroughly investigated by scholars and his influence on the thinking of the ordinary educated man may well have been much greater than is suggested by the short references to him.

in histories of philosophy and histories of ideas. Accounts of Hartley's thought have given no attention to his original and extremely interesting remarks on language.

2.4. Summary of the Dominant Intellectual Trends of the Eighteenth Century

This has been a selective rather than a comprehensive account of those major trends of the age which are known to have had an effect on Ward's intellectual development. The Cartesian revolution was of such importance that it could not be omitted; people who were antagonistic to some of its basic assumptions, such as Locke, could not but be influenced and stimulated by its interest in rational explanation. Locke's importance derives from the amount of debate that centered around his proposal that there was no such thing as an innate idea and his alternative suggestions. His incomplete but substantial theoretical assumptions about the nature of language were to filter down to and affect the grammatical tradition, but not for some time, and the Thoughts on Education had a wider influence on the reasons and motivation for teaching grammar. Hartley did much to soften the earlier conflict between science and


2. The direct influence of Hartley's ideas on William Ward will be discussed in the next chapter. His psychology also seems to have been a major influence on Joseph Priestley, as has, to some extent, already been recognized.
religion, and to make way for a rational explanation of the world and events in it which the theologians had believed to be beyond the scope of such an explanation.

2.5. Survey of Grammatical Work in England Prior to 1765

This survey\(^1\) views the tradition of grammatical work in England largely in terms of the category of case. The reasons for this are several: firstly, the development of the English grammatical tradition is very much a continuing attempt by grammarians to accommodate this category (inherited from Latin grammar), to the English language; secondly, the attempts to accommodate the category of case in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had the positive result of introducing new approaches to linguistic analysis; and finally, Ward's own attempt to deal with case is the main spur to his innovatory ideas, and forces him to extend the subject area of grammar to horizons beyond the ken of his contemporaries in England.

2.5.0.1. Ways of Dealing with Case

Most early English grammarians recognized that case is an unimportant category in the description of English.

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1. This is a brief survey. Fuller accounts may be found in the following sources, which have been used in the preparation of this summary: Ian Michael, "English Grammatical Categories to 1800 and the Tradition Behind Them," (Unpublished Dissertation, University of Bristol, 1963); Ivan Poldauf, On the History of Some Problems on English Grammar Before 1800, (Prague, 1945); Emilia Vorlat, Progress in English Grammar 1585-1735, 4 vols., (Louvain, 1963).
Understandably they were diffident about abandoning a category so central to the grammatical systems of Latin and Greek, and their continuing attempts to make it a valid concept were instrumental in forming opinions about the nature and structure of language. One particularly interesting fact that emerges is that grammarians resisted any approach that would carry the application of the category in English to its logical conclusion. The significance of their refusal will be seen as the discussion develops; its most lasting effect seems to be that they never succeeded in making a complete break with the Latin system. Let it suffice here to say that there are presumably two logical conclusions about case in English: one that there are no cases in English—this was in fact put forward by John Wallis in 1653, but was completely ignored by everyone except Cooper in spite of the high esteem in which Wallis' grammar was held. The other conclusion, which would follow for those who pursued the 'sign theory' to its logical conclusion would be that there are as many cases in English as there are 'signs' or prepositions. No one proposed such an idea; its possibility was considered, but rejected as too unusual to deserve serious consideration. James Beattie's attitude is typical: "I should not wonder, if a grammarian, much given to novelty and paradox, were to

affirm that there are in English as many cases almost as there are prepositions."¹

2.5.0.2. The Notional Concept of Case in Latin

There had been problems in the analysis of case in the classical languages. Different declensions had different numbers of case endings: the mensa declension had four, dominus had five, and verbum only three. However, because of distributional criteria, it was possible to assign different cases to the same forms of some words, as the diagram shows:

Although no Latin word has six different forms in one number there were seen to be six cases in the language: domino sometimes had the same distribution as mensa, but sometimes it shared the privileges with mensae. Hence it

represented two cases. Names based on notional values were applied
to the cases in order to distinguish \textit{domino}_1
and \textit{domino}_2. Thus case in nouns came to be not just a
formal variation, but necessarily a notional concept.

Word terminations represent the formal aspect of case.
The interrelation of nouns with themselves and with other
parts of speech was seen as representing the interrelation
of objects, and the denotation of this was seen as the
semantic aspect of case. Notional names were given to
cases on the basis of their most frequent semantic function
in Latin grammars, and it was the notional aspect of case
which was taken up by the English grammarians. The obvious
manner of approaching case in English was to take a Latin
grammar (usually Lily's) and translate it into English,
making such alterations as would seem necessary. Thus
from 1586 to 1654 Bullokar, Greave, Hume, Gill, Butler,
and Wharton all claim that English has five or six cases.

2.5.1. William Bullokar

The first English grammar was written by William
Bullokar, and was published in 1586. Although Bullokar
largely translates from Lily's Latin grammar, he shows
sophistication in the adaptations he makes, and the way
he handles case. He says: "A noun substantive may be
declined or at least used in five cases: to wit the Nom-
inative, the Accusative, the Gainative, the Vocative, and
the Genitive Propietary."¹ "At least used" is an addition to Lily's definition, and suggests that English does not have as many distinct forms as there are cases. The Genitive is defined formally: "it getteth es, s, or z added to the nominative" and syntactically: "having after it another word proper or pertaining to it called the propriety."² Bullokar notes that the genitive may be resolved by setting the propriety before the propietary and inserting 'of.' If this is done, then he says that the noun is no longer in the genitive, but in the accusative because the accusative follows "verb, participles, prepositions, or gerundial, and answereth to the question 'whom'?"³ Although the ablative generally followed prepositions in Latin, Bullokar claims that it is the accusative in English. He does not give any reason for this, but from his treatment of the other cases, reasons may be established. His definition of the nominative is syntactic and functional: it precedes the verb and answers the question "who, what?" The Gainative case is defined in strictly syntactic terms: it is the first noun when two nouns follow a verb. Me is in this case in the two sentences he gives as examples:

3. Ibid., p. 47.
"He told me the matter," "He showed me his mind." 

Like the genitive it can be resolved, by a preposition, to the accusative case; 'He told the matter to me.' Bullokar sees case in a consistent fashion—insofar as the category can be treated consistently in English: case belongs to one word, the noun, as in Latin; a noun must be in some case, although it shows no formal variation. The case is determined by the syntactic position. The position is the case, because that position has meaning. A noun acquires a distinctive case if its position performs a function which would otherwise require a special preposition. While it is to Bullokar's credit to have proposed the phenomenon of resolution (it is an explicit recognition of the functional 'slots' that nouns can occupy in English, and a recognition of word order as a signalling device) it was tantamount to a complete rejection of the concept of case, because all its characteristic features had been rejected. It is usually a formal distinction in the termination of the word, or, much more loosely, an attribution of the semantic meaning signalled by a particular formal termination to a word which does not actually have the variation.

2.5.2. **Alexander Hume**

In Hume's Latin grammar case is the "specialis terminatio nominis." Hume defined case as the change in form

1. Ibid., p. 5.
in a word, the bending to the oblique position from the rect or straight form. It is also the "affectio nominis ad societatem personarum variati"—the changing of the nominal form to indicate the relation between persons, or beings, or subjects of the discourse: "Rectus unde transitio procedit, obliquus est in quem fit transitio."  

His English grammar has the same approach: "Case is an affection of the noun for distinction of person;" however, Hume notes, and deserves much credit for doing so, that English differs from Latin in having 'notes' or 'particles' rather than termination cases: "This difference we declyne not as doth the Latines and Greeks be terminations, but with noates after the manner of the Hebrew, whilk they call particles."  

It is perfectly true that English often expresses the same meaning as Latin cases by means of a sign before the noun, and in stating this Hume is stating a fact that was already implicit in Bullokar's theory: meaning is expressed by a particular case (formal ending or position) or the combination of preposition and noun. However, as it stands, the sign theory does not seem to be an advance in the treatment of case. Hume sees English cases as parallel to the Latin cases, and very often one case will have two or more signs (e.g. 'to' and 'for') for

the dative) while two different cases may have the same note: "the accusative hath noe other noat than the nominative." The note of both these cases is the, and Hume does not even suggest distinguishing them by position. Frequently, as in Hume's own example, the note is entirely missing: "Men in authority should be lanterns of light."

2.5.3. John Wallis

John Wallis' *Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae* (1653) is considered significant in the history of English grammar because in it Wallis recognizes openly and clearly that English has a different structure from Latin, and so will require a different mode of analysis: "Et propterea nova prorsus methoda indedendum esse mihi visum est, quam non tam usitata Latinae Linguæ quam peculiaris linguæ nostræ suade."¹ But in spite of this he appears to accept many of the categories of Latin without question: "... nollem expectatis ut singula artis vocabula quae Grammaticae Anglicanae cum aliarum linguarum Grammaticis sunt communia, singillatim explicarem."² This was perhaps an intelligent way of avoiding a very difficult task. If he accepts the names of the Latin parts of speech, the correspondence ends there. He recognizes only six of them in English: noun, verb, preposition, adverb, conjunction, and inter-

¹ p. vii.

² p. 68.
jection. Pronouns are not a distinct part of speech, but part of the noun: "sunt quidem nomina, sed aliquantum irregularia."¹ The noun, of course, comprised substantive and adjective, and words like **my**, and **this** which could not stand in a substantival position are adjectives. **The** is an adjective, and so is **man's**. Wallis conceives of an adjective as something that wants and cleaves to a substantive. **Man's** and **his** are manifestly lacking in signification without the addition of a following substantive, and so, in Wallis' grammar they became adjectives, and are not substantives in the genitive case. The noun therefore has no case, because there is no variation of form if the genitive is discounted. The cases discovered by other grammarians (apart from Bullokar) were only translations of the meaning of Latin cases, and it is difficult to contest the reasonableness of Wallis' statement: "Diversitatem cassum . . . Anglicana Linguae . . . neutiquam agnoscit: sed praepositionum auxilio rem omnem illam praestant quam Graeci et Latini partim praepositionibus partim casuum diversitatem perficiunt."² He recognizes that the function of the nominative and accusative is performed by word order in English, but he does not equate **case** with the function of **case**. This treatment of case might well have been the

1. p. 86.
2. p. 33.
final word, had Wallis' handling of the genitive form been more acceptable. But the grammarians who followed him and many commentators have been unable to accept that two words belonging to the same inflectional paradigm should belong to different word classes. Of course, in saying that they belong to the same inflectional paradigm one is actually stating that they do belong to the same word class, but perhaps the so-called genitive suffix should be considered as a derivational ending. Wallis recognized two cases in pronouns, the rect and the oblique; but he calls them 'states,' not from antipathy to the word 'case,' but because the change in form is more than inflectional change, (cf. I/me, we/us).

2.5.4. Charles Gildon and John Brightland

Gildon and Brightland are influenced by Wallis in their treatment of case in A Grammar of the English Tongue (1711). They call the cases 'states' and do not mention case names in English; the influence of the Port Royal Grammar is evident in the form of copious footnotes, which are little more than a direct translation of that work. Brightland and Gildon reformulate exactly Arnauld's logical description of the nominative and his notional description of the accusative. Arnauld had described the nominative as the subject of which an affirmation is made in the proposition: "Its principal use is to be set in discourse before the
verb in order to be the subject of the proposition, as "Dominus regit me." But when the proposition is broken down in a logical analysis it has a subject, a copula, and attribute: "Dominus est regens;" grammatical objects do not fit easily into the logical pattern. Thus the accusative has to be defined notionally:

The verbs that express actions, which pass from the agent, as to beat, to break, to heal, to love, to hate, have subjects to receive those things, or objects, which they regard. For if a person beats he beats something ... so that those verbs require after them a noun ... which is called the accusative.²

Arnauld and Lancelot adapted Latin case names to French using logical and notional definitions. Failure to distinguish between the two criteria being used prevented them from making the transition from the logical system of subject--copula--attribute to the grammatical system of subject--verb--object. Gildon and Brightland are inadequate in the same way.

2.5.5. James Harris

James Harris' Hermes (1751) was not intended to be a grammar of English, and Harris makes no claim to treat case in English. His book is given the secondary title

1. The English translation of 1753 is used throughout, this being the only one easily available.

2. Ibid., p. 116.
of *A Philosophical Enquiry Concerning Language and Universal Grammar*. While he accepts uncritically the case system of Latin, his two chapters on prepositions and cases contain ideas that mark a development in the approach to case in English, and the relation of cases and prepositions. He first attempts to define the nature of the preposition for language in general: "A preposition is a part of speech devoid itself of signification, but so formed as to unite two words that are significant, and that refuse to coalesce or unite themselves." He explains how far language can coalesce words into phrases, and phrases into sentences without prepositions, and shows how prepositions eventually become necessary if the process is to continue. The discussion of coalescence appears to reflect the trend towards a psychological explanation of language, which becomes much more evident in William Ward.

Harris claims that the genitive, dative, and ablative cases in Latin and Greek perform the function of prepositions:

> These relations the Greeks and Latins thought of so great importance as to distinguish them when they occurred, by peculiar terminations of their own, which exprest their force, without the help of a preposition. Now 'tis here we behold the rise of the ancient genitive and dative.

2. Ibid., Book II, Chapter 3.
His stand on cases in the modern languages is clear:

"Whatever we may be told of cases in modern languages, there are in fact no such things; but their force and power is expressed by two methods, either by situation or by prepositions." He later qualifies this statement in relation to English, and points out how the characteristics of English throw light on the nature of case:

There are no cases in the modern languages, except a few among the primitive pronouns . . . and the English genitive, formed by the addition of s . . . . From this defect however, we may be enabled to discover in some instances what a case is, the Periphrasis, which supplies its place being the case (as it were) unfolded.¹

It seems as if Harris has a double view of case. On the one hand it is only a formal variation, but on the other hand it is some kind of universal category which exists in language independent of formal considerations. In later discussion Harris refers to the nominative, accusative, and genitive (of + noun type) as if they were categories of English. His position appears to be that case as a formal variation is not one of the essentials of language, but the relations which inflected cases indicate are universals, and we may use the term case with this new definition as a convenient form of referring to these

¹. Ibid., p. 275.
relations. (Cf. a similar position taken by Fillmore). ¹

Harris' proposals concerning the nature of case have little importance in relation to the genitive and dative, being but a more sophisticated version of Hume's sign theory.

However, his proposals concerning the nominative and accusative are of some interest:

When a sentence is regular and orderly, Nature's substance, the Logician's subject, and the Grammarians substantive are all denoted by that case we call the nominative.

He then goes on to say "The nominative is the case, without which there can be no regular and perfect sentence." That is to say that every verb must have associated with it at least one noun, and the noun which occupies this obligatory position is said to be in the nominative case. ²

Harris then defines the accusative as the case which gives an active verb a subject to work on (an object in grammatical terminology), thus rendering the sentence complete.

"Achilles vulneravit Hectorem" is more complete than


2. Ibid., p. 280.

3. Note similar recent proposals that when a verb has two nouns, one in subject, one in object position, one is considered obligatory, the other optional, e.g.:
   - The man kicked the ball: The man kicked.
   - The man closed the store: The store closed.

But in these recent proposals the obligatory noun is sometimes a subject, and sometimes an object.
"Achilles vulneravit," but this latter, Harris claims, can be understood, and is the basic sentence form. Thus Achilles is the obligatory noun, and therefore in the nominative (though this hardly fits the facts of Latin).

Harris was thinking of case as something which specifies the obligatory and optional terms which may enter into relationship with verbs. At the time it must have seemed a curious approach, but it looks ahead to the approaches to language structure which see semantics having a role in the base component of grammar. In Harris' view the obligatory term will always be in the nominative, and the fact that it is obligatory will be marked by this; the verb will specify whether the noun in the nominative is an "active efficient cause" or a "passive subject."
The secondary or optional term will be in the accusative case, which, in effect, marks the fact that it is secondary. Thus far, case is a universal phenomenon for Harris. In Latin this universal category will be realized by case inflections, and in English by word order. The theory does not improve with analysis, but it does seem important because it proposes optional and obligatory categories, determined by case, and links case with semantic and structural features in a meaningful way, and not simply because it is translating Latin cases into English.
2.5.6. Further Directions

In the period discussed (1586-1751) there were many minor alterations, especially to the more traditional definitions, and many rather grotesque imitations of Latin, with long declensions of nouns in English. This summary has touched on the more colourful variations; it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that the case problem was forcing English grammarians to be creative in spite of themselves. The proposed solution of equating case with prepositions was little help in dealing with the nominative and accusative cases; the muddling of criteria in the Port Royal explanation of these made the most reasonable method (syntactic position) of dealing with these two cases less acceptable. Attention was directed to the peculiar problems of the transitive construction, which Harris dealt with in an unsatisfactory but interesting way. Description of cases was fast becoming explanation of cases. Further progress in purely descriptive grammar was unlikely and difficult with the state of linguistic science at that time. Ward would be dealing with the problem of case some fourteen years after Harris; the general direction of his predecessors' work suggests that any further development would have to be in terms of some kind of explanatory hypothesis.
Chapter III

William Ward

3.0. Introduction
3.1. Editions of the *Essay on Grammar*
3.1.1. Contents of the *Essay*
3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar
3.3. Ward's Attitudes to Education
3.4. Ward's Attitudes to Language
3.5. Ward's Claim to Uniqueness
CHAPTER III
WILLIAM WARD

3.0. Introduction

William Ward (1708-1772) was a man of varied interests, of which the study of grammar was but one; he was an educator, an ordained minister, a translator of Terence, and a promoter of the first written school plays since medieval times; he is also believed to have written an opera, The Billet-Master, which was performed posthumously at Edinburgh in 1787.\(^1\) Other English grammarians had had equally varied interests: William Bullokar was a soldier and a farmer, John Wallis a mathematician, James Harris an antiquarian, and Joseph Priestley a scientist. But the difference between Ward and all the rest, except Harris, is that while the others laid aside their interests in the world around them when they took up the grammarian's pen, Ward did not; his grammar attests the breadth of his interest in other intellectual pursuits. It is usually impossible to relate English grammars to the times they were written in, except perhaps through their citation of authors; Ian Michael suggests that this is because "in the eighteenth century, especially, there

\(^{1}\) The British Museum catalogue enters this play under his name.
is a gap (because there was then a gap) between the grammars and the intellectual movements of the time."1 Ward, however, stands out as being deeply involved in the philosophical and psychological issues of his age, and, as an educator, was obviously seeking to make the study of language relevant to his pupils, and to present it in a much broader context than was generally considered necessary. Little is known about Ward's life except what is related in "The History of Beverley Grammar School."2 Born in 1708, he was educated in Cambridge, and became headmaster of Thornton Grammar School at the age of twenty eight. In 1751 he was appointed headmaster of the Grammar School at Beverley, Yorkshire, and it was while he was there that he wrote the Essay on Grammar.

3.1. Editions of the Essay on Grammar

The Essay was published in 1765; two years later a shorter version of it was published as A Grammar of the English Language in Two Treatises. The original Essay was reprinted three times in 1778, 1779, and 1788.3 The

1. Ian Michael, English Grammatical Categories, p. 575.
3. The three reprints of the Essay on Grammar are posthumous. In 1766 the second part of the Essay was published alone as A Practical Grammar of the English Language. A list of all editions appears in the bibliography at the end of the thesis. For a list of all known printings of
first edition of 1764 has as its full title: An Essay on Grammar As It May Be Applied to the English Language in Two Treatises. The One Speculative, Being an Attempt to Investigate Proper Principles. The Other Practical, Containing Definitions and Rules Deduced from the Principles, and Illustrated by a Variety of Examples from the Most Approved Writers.

3.1.1. Contents of the Essay

The title is misleading in that the general principles of the first part turn out to be not so much general principles as principles derived very much from the structure of English; the result is that many definitions are offered in the first part, and are not confined to the second part as the title suggests; much of the second part inevitably appears as almost verbatim repetition of the Speculative Grammar. The Practical Grammar contains little new material, even in the application of general principles; for this reason little will be said about it in the account of Ward's grammatical theory. Yet Ivan

these editions, and information on the whereabouts of copies, consult: R. C. Alston, A Bibliography of the English Language, (Leeds, 1965), I, pp. 50-51. The edition of 1765 was used throughout this thesis; it has been republished in facsimile reprint by The Scholar Press, Menston, Yorkshire. Research by Alston, Michael, and Poldauf indicates that this edition is definitive and that later editions do not differ from it in any material way, apart from being less comprehensive.
Poldauf has claimed that the most remarkable aspect of Ward's Essay is the successful integration of speculative and practical grammars; such an opinion overlooks other more significant features of Ward's work, but it probably suggested itself to Poldauf because of the heavy dependence of the practical grammar on the speculative. This is in contrast to the usual procedure of those who professed to treat of universal or speculative grammar, which was to append a short essay on universal features of language to a completely traditional grammar. The 554 pages of the Essay are divided almost equally between the speculative and practical grammars. The former comprises sections dealing first with the noun and verb together (on account of their similarities), then with the noun substantive in particular and the meaning and function of its cases; this account of the substantive completes Book I of the speculative grammar. Book II is short, and treats the noun adjective; Book III is entitled "Of the Pronoun" and as well as discussing the personal pronouns it has a long section on the syntactical implications of the relative pronoun. Book IV discusses the verb; Ward's account of the verb as a major part of speech is important, but his account of tense is lengthy.  

1. It was not unusual for the relative pronoun to be discussed in early grammars, but there are few discussions of its syntactic significance or of dependent clauses in general.
and uninteresting. Book V devotes a section each to the adverb, the conjunction, the preposition, and the interjection. The account of the preposition is one of the most important aspects of Ward's theory of grammar. Book VI discusses "the power of use or custom in language," it offers a definition of taste, and suggests why general rules are not followed in every instance in the practical arts. The second section of Book VI would seem to belong to the practical grammar; it is entitled "Of words in connected construction" and discusses practical rules of syntax and prosody. The Practical Grammar follows almost exactly the same plan as the Speculative Grammar, and offers numerous examples in English at all stages. It repeats all definitions in poetic form so that they may be more easily memorized.

3.2. Ward's Motives for Writing a Grammar

For various reasons the writing of grammar books was a common occupation in the eighteenth century. R. C. Alston lists over four hundred different printings of grammar books devoted to the analysis of English in the period 1750 to 1800.¹ Attitudes to education both in Britain and in North America created a demand for such

1. In A Bibliography of the English Language, I.
books, as Priscilla Tyler and S. A. Leonard have shown.  
From the available evidence it seems that schools were not looking for complex and long treatises: even Robert Lowth's Short Introduction to English Grammar was considered too difficult for beginners, and John Ash's Grammatical Institutes was commonly used as an introduction to it.  
It was not, then, the popular demand for pedagogical grammars that led William Ward to turn grammar writer. It seems to have been curiosity that first led him to speculate about language and this led him to the writing of a grammar which he was able to make use of in his own teaching. Curiosity existed in others as well as Ward because there was dissatisfaction among scholars and educators with the traditional enumeration of the parts of speech according to Lily's adaptation of the Priscian schema. This dissatisfaction resulted in the numerous grammar books of the period. In the Preface to the Essay William Ward attempts to answer those who, coming upon yet another grammar, will complain 


2. Changes in the name of Grammatical Institutes are evidence of its use in this way. An edition was produced in 1766 called The Easiest Introduction to Dr. Lowth's English Grammar.
"that grammar has been treated of already by so many
writers in so many languages, that whatsoever
be said upon the subject must be little more than a
repetition of what has been said by former grammarians."¹
Ward answers these people by saying that he is going to
show "the true nature of the conceptions annexed to
single nouns and verbs" and the "several modes of pro-
ceeding by which these conceptions are again united into
conceptions more and more complex at pleasure."² Ward
feels that he has important contributions to make to
our knowledge of language, or rather, to our knowledge
of how language works. He is obviously fascinated by
how grammatical constructions bring about the coalescence
of the separate conceptions in the mind to form "one
single conception."³ He also feels that although others

2. Ibid., p. iv.
3. Ward says that he is attending to the problem which
Locke called attention to long ago. In fact Locke was
little concerned about how words join together; he was
concerned only with individual words, and the nature of
the idea that lay behind the single word. What Ward
mistook for an interest in connected discourse was an
interest in the nature of the ideas which lay behind
particles, those words which, according to Locke, con-
nected other words. Locke the philosopher showed no
interest in grammar, but felt that the grammarian
should be interested in the words which puzzled the
philosopher; he remarked: "These words that are not
truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such
constant and indispensable use in language. This part
of grammar has been perhaps as much neglected as some
had accommodated the Latin case system to English, they had neglected to explain the "effect" or the function of the cases or the signs of cases. Thus Ward's principal reason for writing his grammar was to give some explanatory account of the linguistic system. He is not content with observing correspondences between the classical languages and English (e.g. the correspondence of cases to certain prepositions and word order), but wants to explain why these different grammatical forms are able to perform the same function. His professional concerns as a teacher were never far removed from his work. He states at the conclusion of his Preface:

My design was to make a grammatical knowledge of the English language a step towards gaining the like knowledge in other languages, especially in the Greek and Latin: therefore I have followed the usual heads which are found in the grammars of these languages. To depart from these heads may perhaps seem more concise; but in reality little advantage is gained by it; at least no others over-diligently cultivated." (Essay Concerning Human Understanding, III.7.1.) Whether or not Locke was interested in connected discourse, there is no doubt that he should have been for words do not exist just as separate entities but are always parts of sentences. Ward's apparent misunderstanding of Locke's intentions led him into an interesting study of how words join together. Ward's concern with "the grammatic forms... introduced into language for the sake of direction and precision" (i.e. prepositions and cases) was closer to Locke's real concern.

1. William Bullokar had called prepositions "signs of cases" in his Bref Grammar of 1586.
advantage which is equivalent to the inconvenience of a new plan and new terms, to those who have been accustomed to the old.¹

Yet if the Essay was to be used as a pedagogical aid, one wonders why it should be so lengthy (554 quarto pages) and so obviously beyond the needs of schoolboys. Perhaps it is because Ward believed as an educator that the master should be more than a few pages ahead of his pupil and have a genuine and deep understanding of his subject matter so that he can help his students not just to learn but to understand. He advises language teachers in terms that are reminiscent of the Abbe Fromant:²

But those who profess to teach any language, would do well to carry their researches still further concerning the nature of human speech; because such researches, if prudently made, will enable them in many instances to give those whom they teach, general views of the reasons of construction, which is the only sure way of fixing in their minds.³


². Fromant's views on the teaching of grammar suggests a worthy ideal for all language teachers. They are quoted on page 4. It seems that Ward was trying to achieve the ideal proposed by Fromant for speakers of English.

³. Ibid., p. 12.
3.3. Ward's Attitudes to Education

Ward wrote his Essay on Grammar because he was interested in educating people. His views on education would seem to be sound and enlightened. For example, he is quite clear that one goes from the known to the unknown in learning; this means that one should first understand the grammar of one's own language before seeking to understand that of a foreign tongue. This is an idea that was accepted only slowly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Only sixty years before Ward, Richard Johnson (who may well have influenced Ward in this respect) was complaining bitterly about the practice of teaching Latin grammar in Latin:

Against these rules [Lily's] I have several exceptions. At first, that they are given in Latin; which, considering the time that children are to learn them in, that is, before they understand anything of the Latin tongue, . . . is not only improper but ridiculous. 'Tis ignotum per ignotum, than which nothing can be more absurd. If it be said, that this Latin is explained to them in English; then I say again, 'tis the English they learn them by, and they would sooner do it by the English without Latin. And this exception is good against the whole Latin grammar: and I here make it once for all."

Not only does Ward wholeheartedly espouse this fundamental educational principle of working from known to unknown,

but he applies it when he insists on using the terminology of Latin grammar in his grammar of English so that his students will be more prepared to come to terms with Latin. Even more important is the fact that he realizes that the transfer from the grammar of English to the grammar of Latin will not be automatic, as the two languages differ in many ways. He attempts to compensate for this by providing the student with general principles. These general principles help the student to understand how there can be a similarity of function in spite of the diversity of form in the structure of the two languages. The understanding of these principles is not considered as too strong milk for his young students; it is looked upon as an intellectually stimulating activity which, though abstruse, will lead to enlightenment. Ward's greatest quality as an educator would seem to be his desire to create understanding in his students. This is the force behind his grammar; it is the reason why he is not content with the usual enumeration of rules; it is the spirit which Ward inherited from Abbé Fromant and suggests that Ward is a figure to be esteemed in the history of education as well as the history of linguistics.

3.4. Ward's Attitudes to Language

Since the publication of Sterling A. Leonard's
Doctrine of Correctness in English Usage 1700-1800, the eighteenth century has been labelled as the century of authoritarian attitudes in language. Leonard is by no means wholly responsible for this gross generalization, but it is true that attitudes to correctness developed then were of such force that they still have tremendous influence at some levels of our society today. It is important to emphasize that not only did the grammarians of the eighteenth century not have any divinely bestowed legislative authority, but many of them, most notably Joseph Priestley, developed enlightened and intelligent attitudes to usage. William Ward preserves an attitude of almost scientific neutrality in that he offers no criticisms of any particular usages; he certainly never has any prescriptive advice for his readers. The following quotation from the Essay argues that the analysis of usage is not enough; the task of the grammarian is to investigate the principles behind the usage; Ward is not condemning usage as a guide, he is saying only that to understand the principles behind language we need to think, and not to take for granted the folk myths about the nature of language:

For if that is true which is laid down, as a certain principle, by some writers on grammar,

viz. that whatsoever is authorized by use and custom, is therefore right in language; it is then evident, that the only province of a grammarian is, to examine what is of the most established use in the language of which he treats; and to give himself no trouble as to speculative reflexions on the general nature of language.¹

At no point in the Essay does his speculative reasoning lead him to make proposals about a theory of usage. He does make clear that we have "an accustomed plan of construction" which enables us to use language, and that, using this plan, we are able to say things which have not been said before, bending or moulding the language to our needs:

But when an author sits down to write, he must adapt his style to his subject, and this subject may be of a kind that has never been treated of in the language in which he writes. Here then he is at liberty to exert his genius upon the language itself in which he composes. And, provided he does not quite lose sight of the accustomed plan of construction, he may model his expressions into various forms that never have been used before; and every original genius has constantly done this in poetry, oratory, history, and in every work of imagination . . . . So that the received forms of construction in the language in which they write, supply them not with fixed patterns, from which they must never depart; but with rough materials, which they mould and fashion so as to fit them to their conceptions of excellence in the language in which they write.²


Not only is this passage exceptional in the eighteenth century in its attitude to variation from the accepted norm, but it also seems as if Ward is here making the same kind of suggestion which is often made today when discussing poetry and generative grammar: poets have to follow the general plan of the language in order to be understood, but can obtain special effects, insights, and creativity by breaking low level rules of syntax. Ward does not offer any examples of how creative writers mould language, so it is difficult to decide exactly what he means; but the important point is that Ward not only refuses to see himself as a legislator, but makes a positive attempt to include deviations from the norm in his general theory. This position is a long way from that of his contemporary James Buchanan who took it upon himself to render the first six books of *Paradise Lost* into grammatical English!

Although Ward does not set himself up as an arbiter right and wrong in language, he does profess to see language as an organic and growing system which is capable

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2. Ward's comment on Milton's language is amusing: "Mr. Addison says that the English language sunk under Milton. So would the Greek language have sunk under Homer, if he had made an epic poem on Milton's subject." (p. 291).
of amelioration or deterioration:

Many attempts in every language are usually made, before the plan of construction is brought to such a degree of perfection as the language is capable of reaching. And posterity easily perceives, that the language used in one age by the writers of a nation, is better than that which is used by those of another age. As for instance, all agree that the language of Virgil is better than that of Ennius.

In spite of the ease with which we are able to decide on the superiority of Virgil over Ennius, the way we do it, our judgment by taste, is so intimately human that Ward is able to offer no analysis of how it is done. Ward does not go so far as to offer any judgments about style in English; we can only infer from the fact that he uses Dryden, Pope, and Addison as sources of many of his examples of English that he considers the language of the hundred years immediately preceding publication of his grammar to have reached an acceptable standard of development. On the other hand, it may be that the practical purposes of his grammar suggest to him that the obvious period to go to is the most recent regardless of the value of the style of the period.

3.5. Ward's Claim to Uniqueness

Ward's claim to uniqueness derives from his interest

in the intellectual movements that were influencing man of letters and scientists, but not grammarians in the eighteenth century. He had obviously read and thought about John Locke's philosophical work; there is considerable evidence, which will be discussed in the following chapter, that David Hartley's psychological theories had a great impact on Ward's thinking. Even his attitudes to language mark him as a man of his age, aware of the intellectual currents around him. His reading of the French grammarians point to a breadth of scholarship which appears to be unequalled by his fellow-grammarians. Harris' *Hermes* and Ward's *Essay* mark a turning point in language studies in England. After them we see two distinct developments: on the one hand the continuation of prescriptive school grammars; on the other the scholarly study of language. The uniqueness of William Ward's work and the viewpoint from which it will be studied here, is that it is the only comprehensive synchronic study of the English language in the eighteenth century that relates the study of language to the wider intellectual movements of the age.
Chapter IV

The Sources of Ward's Essay on Grammar

4.1. Introduction
4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledgement of his Sources

4.1. The Direct Influence of John Locke, David Hartley, and Claude Buffier
4.1.1. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690)
4.1.1.1. Locke's Division of Ideas
4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas
4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic Relativity Theory
4.1.1.4. Ideas of Relation and Ward's Transitivity Theory
4.1.1.5. Particles
4.1.1.6. The Relation of Ideas and Words
4.1.1.7. Summary of Locke's Influence

4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749)
4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational Grammar
4.1.2.2. Hartley's View on Language Structure
4.1.2.3. Hartley's Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra
4.1.2.4. A Seminal Semantic Theory
4.1.2.5. A Summary of Hartley's Influence

4.1.3. Claude Buffier: Grammaire Françoise sur un Plan Nouveau
4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal
4.1.3.2. Ward's Advance on Buffier
4.1.3.3. Ellipsis
4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier's Influence

4.2. The Indirect Influence of Some Continental Grammarians
4.2.1. Franciscus Sanctius: Minerva (1587)
4.2.1.1. Ward's Use of Sanctius
4.2.2. Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée (1660)
4.2.2.1. Language and Thought
4.2.2.2. Arnauld's and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure
4.2.3. Abbe' Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de l'Art de Parler

4.3. The Indirect Influence of Some English Grammarians
4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706)
4.3.2. James Harris: Hermes (1751)
4.3.2.1. His View of Case
4.3.2.2. The Parts of Speech
4.3.2.3. Sentence Types
4.3.2.4. Coalescence
4.3.2.5. Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward
4.3.3. Robert Lowth

4.4. Summary of Sources
CHAPTER IV
THE SOURCES OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR

4.0. Introduction

Chapter II outlined the grammatical tradition and allied philosophical developments of the years prior to Ward's Essay. This chapter is also concerned with the years prior to 1765, but only insofar as certain works of grammar or philosophy appear to have directly influenced William Ward. It is intended as an investigation of his sources, and will prepare the way for an account of his own theory; in the course of the chapter a number of interesting points in the Essay will be mentioned, as they grew out of Ward's study of his sources. They are mentioned here as they do not form part of the main argument of later chapters.

4.0.1. Ward's Acknowledgements of his Sources

Anxious to show his suitability for the task before him, Ward indicates the extent of his reading in his preface:

I have received some assistance in this work from a very learned and ingenious treatise, called Hermes; as likewise from the Grammaire Raisonnée of Messieurs de Port-Royal, with the Abbé Fromant's very useful and ingenious reflexions upon it; also from Father Buffier's Grammar; I have had some advantage from Sanctius' Minerva; some from the excellent Introduction mentioned above [Robert
I have also received some help from Dr Ward's four Essays on the English Language, especially from the list of verbs published at the end of these Essays; I likewise made use of Mr White's treatise of the English verb; but above all Mr Johnson's dictionary has been of use to me. I could not have written several parts of the Practical Grammar, had not this most excellent performance supplied me with examples, and other help.

Ward also mentions William Holder ("... whoever considers attentively what Dr Wallace and Dr Holder have said on the articulations by which the sounds of language are formed...") and Thomas Ruddiman. Although Ward never mentions David Hartley there is sufficient evidence in the text to suggest that he not only knew of Hartley's work, but was strongly influenced by it. Ward refers to John Locke in his preface, and his entire plan of grammar evidently owes much to his reading of Locke. In the following pages the direct influence of Locke, Hartley, and Claude Buffier will be discussed, and then the indirect influence of three continental grammarians (Franciscus Sanctius, Antoine Arnauld, and Abbé Promant) and three English grammarians (Richard Johnson, James Harris, and Robert Lowth) will be considered.

3. John Wallis, William Holder, Thomas Ruddiman, Samuel Johnson, John Ward, and James White are not significant in terms of influence. However, a short account of their
relation to Ward is given here:

John Wallis: Grammatica Linguae Anglicanae (1658). Ward mentions the aid he received from a Dr. Wallis; the history of English grammar suggests that Wallis was read and ignored by all his successors; this certainly seems true as far as Ward is concerned. There is no trace of any of Wallis' original grammatical ideas in Ward's Essay; he has read him because at one point Ward says his disagreement with Wallis on case is only really an argument about terminology. The main reference to Wallis in the text is a discussion on articulation. Ward was using Wallis' account of articulation in his introductory chapter on orthography and phonology; Ward does not consider that orthography and pronunciation form part of universal grammar, apart from the self-evident fact that all words are composed of sounds, and these sounds unite together to form syllables; all else is beyond his province as a speculative grammarian: "But this proceeding must be conducted by different rules in every different language, and therefore has little relation to universal grammar." (Ward: p. 6). Ward's remarks in these areas are not worthy of serious consideration, and so Wallis' influence will not be discussed. William Holder will not be discussed for the same reason.

Thomas Ruddiman: Grammaticae Latinae Institutiones (1725). Ward makes an isolated reference to Ruddiman's Latin grammar on page 24. The grammar is completely uninteresting apart from the fact that Ruddiman makes his primary division of the parts of speech according to whether they are declinables or non-declinables. He also acknowledges that there is a 'natural' syntax and an arbitrary syntax, the former being language universal. He had no obvious influence on Ward's thinking, but explicit recognition of possible universals is unusual enough in England that he deserves mention for this alone.

Samuel Johnson: Dictionary of the English Language (1755). It is rather surprising to find that Ward describes Johnson's dictionary as "my greatest help;" Ward explains that he used it to help him with his examples in the Practical Grammar; thus it is not directly relevant to the development of his theory. We do not easily understand the value attached to it because we are not aware of the tremendous gratitude that people interested in language
4.1. The Direct Influence of John Locke, David Hartley, and Claude Buffier

Locke, Hartley, and Buffier all appear to have had a direct influence on the formation of Ward's theory, in that he not only read their works, but took over in almost their original form some of their thoughts concerning language.

4.1.1. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690)

Locke's Essay is largely concerned with what he calls 'ideas,' and how they are formed in the mind as a result of sense impressions; he totally rejects the Cartesian idealism which regards ideas as innate. He is concerned as are most philosophers who take realism as a starting point of their philosophy, with the possibility of acquiring in the eighteenth century must have felt towards Dr. Johnson for the cast and unparalleled work of reference that he gave them.

John Ward: Four Essays Upon the English Language (1758) and James White: The English Verb (1758). John Ward's four essays and James White's treatise on the verb helped Ward with the practical grammar rather than the speculative grammar. In the practical grammar Ward's analysis of tenses and mood is traditional and bad. It seems likely that such systematization as he has he took directly from Ward and White. We find the usual conjugation of the verb with six persons, but just one change in form on page 292. Ward's treatment of tense is the worst aspect of the Essay on Grammar.
ing general or universal ideas from the transitory and particular sense impressions which are for him the source of all ideas. He proposes that general ideas are formed by taking note of only certain features in the multiplicity of sense impressions which an object presents us with; these features have no reference to the existential uniqueness of the object: "Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place and any other ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence."\(^1\) Book III of Locke's Essay is entitled Of Words, and is explicitly concerned with the expression and communication of ideas; it is from this book that Ward obtains some of his most stimulating ideas on language.

4.1.1.1. Locke's Division of Ideas

Locke divides the ideas that we have in our minds into four major categories: simple ideas, complex ideas of substance, complex ideas of relation, and complex ideas of mixed modes. Adjectives denoting single physical properties would signify simple ideas; gold, when it simply means a colour, is the example that Locke uses. But gold would signify a complex idea of substance when it refers to the metal, and in this case would be composed

\(^1\) Locke, op. cit., III.iii.6.
of a collection of simple ideas representing its colour, malleability, weight, value, etc.; we have complex ideas of substance of all natural objects qua objects. Man signifies a complex idea of substance, but if a man is considered as a father, then this is a complex idea of relation; ideas of relation are ideas of cause, effect, identity, and conventional or natural relationships; Aaron says: "For instance if of Caius I say he is a man, this is describing him positively, but if I say he is a husband, this latter is a purely relative term, and I signify more than Caius here, I signify another person."¹

Locke describes complex ideas of mixed modes thus:

Modes I call such complex ideas which, however compounded, contain not in them the supposition of subsisting by themselves, but are considered as dependences on, or affections of substances; such as are the ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, etc.²

Ward's choice of examples appears to reflect an attempt to deal with the universalist language which caused difficulty in the empiricist's position. Locke had to account for the abstract terms in language and did so by choosing to discuss fairly concrete abstract

1. Aaron, op. cit., p. 181.
2. II.xii.4.
terms, such as triangle and murder. He subsumed all qualities that were universal rather than particular under the catch-all category of mixed modes. Ideas of substance are ideas of things that subsist by themselves, while mixed modes are 'affections' of something else.

In Locke's discussion of ideas he seems to have been concerned with describing the ideas of things and qualities. He does not consider explicitly the ideas attached to verbs. However, we are not concerned so much with Locke's intentions as with Ward's understanding of those intentions. There is sufficient ambiguity in Locke's discussions for Ward to perceive grammatical correlates in Locke's distinctions. Simple ideas correspond to adjectives, ideas of substance to substantives, but mixed modes could be interpreted either as abstract nouns or second order nominals (nouns derived from verbs or adjectives), or as verbs. In this passage Locke appears to be referring to

1. I am grateful to Jonathan Bennett for suggestions about Locke's mixed modes.

2. Locke describes them thus:

   The ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief. (II.xii.6.)
abstract nouns:

The names and essences of mixed modes have nothing but what is common to them with other ideas; but . . . they have something peculiar.

The first particularity is that abstract ideas or the essences . . . of mixed modes are made by the understanding wherein they differ from those of simple ideas. In the next place, these essences of the species of mixed modes are not only made by the mind, but made very arbitrarily.

Locke also refers to mixed modes as actions, and here they would seem to refer to verbs:

Besides, the greatest part of mixed modes, being actions which perish in their birth, are not capable of lasting duration, as substances which are the actors, and wherein the simple ideas that make up the complex ideas designed by the name have a lasting union.

4.1.1.2. Ward's Use of Locke's Ideas

Locke's discussion of mixed modes is unclear, probably because Locke himself was unclear, but in any case Ward makes little attempt to follow this discussion of ideas as it stands. There are, however, a number of important correspondences and borrowings. He accepts completely Locke's distinction between words, ideas, and things. Ward discusses the correspondence of grammatical categories, not to things in the world, as did the

1. III.v.1-2.
2. III.vi.42.
Modistae, but to distinctive types of ideas or conceptions in the mind: "The whole plan of the application of language takes its immediate original from the nature of the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the objects whence the conceptions are formed."¹ A detailed analysis of Ward's use of the term 'idea' is given in the following chapter. Ward makes a distinction (corresponding to Locke's distinction between ideas of substance, and ideas of mixed modes) between words whose annexed conception denotes a principle of existence with a foundation in the world and those whose conceptions denote a principle of existence which is given by the understanding; this distinguishes abstract and concrete nouns. He talks of verbs as having an "inconstant principle of existence" because they denote transitory states. This inconstant principle is again based on Ward's understanding of Locke's analysis of mixed modes "which perish in their birth."

4.1.1.3. Mixed Modes as a Source of Ward's Linguistic Relativity Theory

Locke's discussion of mixed modes appears to have stimulated Ward to some comments on language differences

¹ p.31.
and the problem of translation. Locke says that mixed modes are arbitrary creations of man:

But in its complex ideas of mixed modes, the mind takes a liberty not to follow the existence of things exactly .... In the making therefore of the species of mixed modes men have had regard only to such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another. These they have combined into distinct complex ideas and given names to, whilst others that in nature have a near union are left loose and unregarded.¹

Following from this Ward sees a uniformity in all languages in the naming of natural objects and animals (Locke's complex ideas of substance), but not in the naming of artifacts and institutions of society (which are represented by ideas of mixed modes); here the selection of ideas is made according to what society sees as important: "such combinations as they had occasion to mention one to another."² This will present problems in translation from the language of one culture to that of another: "It comes to pass that there is little agreement amongst the conceptions annexed to names of species, which take their characteristics from institutions peculiar to each nation. And this is one principal reason why

1. III. v. 3-7.
2. p. 36.
these languages cannot be translated one into another."

4.1.1.4. **Ideas of Relation and Ward's Transitivity Theory**

Probably the most far-reaching, though not the most obvious use that Ward made of Locke's division of ideas, is his use of the ideas of relation. Ward felt it was a grammarian's task to divide nouns into species according to the kinds of species discoverable in nature; this was an amusing pastime for earlier grammarians, but was of little real use in the grammatical categorization of language. One species that Ward finds among nouns is the "correlative species" which comprises all nouns that Locke would have said signify ideas of relation. A parent is "an object generating," and an offspring "an object generated"; mention of one introduces in the mind a notion of the other, or as Aaron says of Caius: "If I say he is a husband, the latter is a purely relative term, and I signify more than Caius here, I signify another person." The idea of relation is not important in Ward's discussion of nouns, but he extends the discussion of relation to suggest that one grammatical structure will call forth in the mind its related transform:

1. p. 37.
Hence it is clear, that the conception of either species of any correlative pair, supposes the conception of the other species of the same pair. And it will appear, when we speak of the corresponding active and passive states of any one and the same transitive verb, that either of them supposes the other; so that if the verb which expresses either of the states be mentioned, there is no need to mention that which expresses the other; but any certain mark, or sign, appropriated for the purpose, is sufficient to direct the hearer to supply in his own mind the verbal state, either passive or active, which is the correlative to that which is actively mentioned.\(^1\)

This speculation on the extension of Locke's idea of relation is seminal in forming Ward's analysis of the transitive sentence type. On account of some inconsistencies in the Essay on Grammar there seems little doubt that Ward developed his theory while he was actually writing the grammar; there is likewise little doubt that Locke's discussion of relation was the inspiration of his theory of the transitive construction. The theory will be fully discussed in Chapter VII.

4.1.1.5. **Particles**

Ideas are signified by words, and conversely most, but not all words signify ideas. Those that do not signify ideas are discussed by Locke in his chapter Of Particles:

Besides words which are the names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connexion that the mind gives to ideas or propositions, one with another .... The mind needs other signs to show or intimate some particular action of its own at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as is and is not are the general marks of the mind, affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others connect not only the parts of propositions but whole sentences one to another, with their several relations and dependencies, to make a coherent discourse.

Man must observe the dependence of his thoughts and reasonings one upon another; and to express well such methodical and rational thoughts, he must have words to show what connexion, restriction, distinction, opposition, emphasis etc. he gives to each part of his discourse .... These words not truly by themselves the names of any ideas are of such constant and indispensable use in language. ¹

Particles are concerned with the connexion of ideas, and it is the problem of connecting ideas which motivates Ward to write his grammar; he says his primary intention is to account "for the several modes of proceeding by which those conceptions are again united into conceptions more and more complex at pleasure. This is by much the most difficult part of grammar, and, as Mr. Locke complained long ago, has not been sufficiently attended

¹. III.vii.1-2.
Locke says that particles are used to connect subject and attribute; these particles are the copula in its positive and negative form: *is* and *is not*. Locke's discussion of the copula appears to be not so different from the Port Royal proposal that the verb is essentially an affirmation. Such a view is totally rejected by Ward, and he never discusses the copula as an affirmation word. His proposal for the joining of noun and verb is nevertheless remarkably similar to Locke's; Locke says that the function of the copula is to assert that the idea represented by the subject and the idea represented by the attribute are present together in the same larger unit; Ward says that when a noun and verb are in construction the conceptions denoted by each unite to form one larger conception and become "an object of the species"

1. Ward, p. iv. The passage from Locke to which Ward is referring is:

   But though prepositions and conjunctions etc. are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions, yet he who would show the right use of particles, and what significance and force they have, must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts, and observe nicely the several postures of his mind in discoursing.

   They are all marks of some action or intimation of the mind; and thence to understand them rightly, the several views, postures, stands, turns, limitations and several other thoughts of the mind . . . are to be diligently studied. (III.vii.3.)

2. p. 168.
whereof the state is the characteristic."¹ Affirmation for Locke or the construction of the noun with the "verb definitive" for Ward is a recognition of identity rather than a statement of affirmation. "A is b" becomes "ab," whereas the traditional logician and even the Port Royal logician sees "a is b" as a statement that "one of the properties of a is b-ness." While the dividing line between these two positions may seem fine, it reflects important differences in the conception of language. The Port Royal view of the affirmation as the signal of judgment in a proposition sees language as a tool for analysing and dissecting the universe, whereas Locke and Ward see language as a process of addition in the mind. Our mind is full of isolated ideas, and the function of language is to signify the joining of these disparate ideas together, so as to build from them a picture of the universe which will enable us to communicate to another person the conceptions we have. It is the stress on the communicative side of language which is the significant aspect of Ward's theory, and Locke is directly responsible for this emphasis.

4.1.1.6. The Relation of Ideas and Words

In spite of the credit given to Locke for his founding of the empirical school of philosophy, many of his

¹. p.165.
ideas have been severely criticized by philosophers, particularly his views on language. His proposal that ideas exist independently of words has been rejected inasmuch as no one has been able to give an empirical account of the thought process before it is expressed in any symbolic medium. Wittgenstein points out the vacuity of Locke's argument in _The Blue Book_: "It is misleading then to talk of thinking as a 'mental activity.' We may say that thinking is essentially the activity of operating with signs." Locke's separation of the idea or content from the sign or the vehicle of expression is not acceptable to his critics. However, this separation of word and thought is of considerable importance when adapted to Ward's theory of language. Ward suggests that the idea can have several characteristics, and the particular characteristics it has will determine the form of the word which is later attached to it. Thus the idea WHITE may have "a mark of constant existence which is not attended to;" this will mean that it has the form of an adjective: _white_; on the other hand, the principle of existence may be attended to, in which case the idea or conception will have the noun _whiteness_ attached to it. Something similar occurs when certain ideas or characteristics are withdrawn from the complex conception; here the complex idea is represented not by different grammatical...
tical categories, but by different words altogether: Locke suggests that "man and horse can be subsumed under animal, by taking away particular parts of these separate complex ideas"¹ and Ward makes use of the distinction between idea and word to elaborate a theory of pronominalization, which clearly owes much to Locke's suggestion that distinguishing characteristics can be withdrawn. Locke's account of the idea/word distinction, as taken over by Ward, is not an unrealistic or useless linguistic assumption when considered as a level of abstraction rather than of physical separation; the idea corresponds closely to what linguists today call a bundle of semantic features. The occurrence of a lexeme signifies that certain semantic features are present; thus the word man would appear to consist of several semantic features including the following: i) human, ii) adult, and iii) male; these contrast its meaning with that of bull, child, and woman respectively. Linguists who accept that the meaning of words can be atomized in this way into semantic features will have no trouble in accepting Ward's interpretation of Locke's idea/word distinction in spite of the absurdity of some aspects of Locke's original formulation.²

1. III.iii.9.

2. A full discussion of the philosophical debate over Locke's dichotomy between idea and word is out of place here. D. J. O'Connor outlines the arguments against Locke's position in Chapter 6 of his book John Locke.
4.1.1.7. Summary of Locke's Influence

Locke's philosophy enabled Ward to break away from the traditional concept of the idea as an objective copy of reality. He was then able to discuss translation difficulties, and to offer at least a weak version of the linguistic relativity hypothesis. The novelty of this approach to the idea is discussed in the following chapter. Locke provided a means for Ward to differentiate the parts of speech not on a semantic or logical basis, but on a psychological basis, according to the kind of idea or conception to which they were attached. Perhaps the greatest contribution of Locke's philosophy is the fact that it enabled Ward to recognize that the word was not the ultimate unit in linguistic analysis, and could be broken down into its semantic components.

4.1.2. David Hartley: Observations on Man (1749)

Hartley's main contribution to psychological theory is his extension of Locke's account of the doctrine of association to account for the interaction of the spiritual and material in man; he puts forward a theory of physical vibrations which are in perfect correspondence with a parallel set of intellectual vibrations. Among other

1. An account of the development of the idea in linguistic theory is given in the following chapter.
things this offers an account of language and its connection with thought: "Words and phrases must excite Ideas in us by Association, and they excite ideas in us by no other means." 1 The ideas that most words excite are simple ideas, but they coalesce to form complex ideas, and these complex ones coalesce to form more complex ones: "And . . . it may appear . . . that simple Ideas of sensation must run into clusters and combinations, by Association; and that each of these will, at last, coalesce into one complex idea." 2 Locke had spoken of the simple ideas coalescing to form complex ones, but Hartley's statement of coalescence of complex ideas into more complex ones is much closer to Ward's own view. For Ward, every noun, adjective, or verb indicated some kind of conception, which he usually called a complex conception; when two words were united in construction Ward described the conceptions as coalescing to form one single more complex conception. Only occasionally did Locke discuss coalescence above the level of the word; with Hartley this is a constant theme.

4.1.2.1. Hartley and Rational Grammar

Hartley considers that his theory of association of

ideas will have important ramifications in the field of rational grammar: "It follows from the Proposition [that words and phrases excite ideas in us by association] that the Arts of Logic and rational Grammar depend entirely on the Doctrine of Association. For Logic, considered as the Art of Thinking or Reasoning, treats only of such Ideas as are annexed to Words;"¹ he is suggesting that his analysis of words joining together to form more complex conceptions be used as the starting point of a grammatical analysis, and Ward willingly takes up his challenge: "I have accounted for the several modes of proceeding by which these conceptions are again united into conceptions more and more complex at pleasure."²

4.1.2.2. Hartley's Views on Language Structure

Hartley himself makes a number of interesting general remarks about language structure in the context of a discussion about how a child learns his language; he sees the child as conditioned to learn the meaning of words by constant repetition, and coupling of the sound with what it represents: "The Association of the Picture of the Nurse will by degrees overpower all the accidental Associations of this Picture with other Words, and be so

1. Ibid., p. 270.
firmly cemented at last, that the Picture will excite
the idea of the word."¹ Hartley emphasizes one important
point about language learning which appears to contradict
his analysis of speech as a process of coalescence: it is
that we learn a language by learning the sentences of the
language rather than the individual words: "Both Children
and Adults learn the Ideas belonging to whole Sentences
many times in a summary Way, and not by adding together
the Ideas of the several Words in the Sentence."² Locke
has been much criticized by philosophers of language for
proposing that word meaning is prior to sentence meaning,
and sentence meaning is always to be derived from an addi-
tion of word meanings. We get the impression from Locke
that by adding words together we create conceptions more
and more complex until we get final complex conception,
which is the sentence. Locke's position is clearly un-
tenable as a model of language learning because word
meanings are normally only learnt in sentential contexts.
Hartley is not contradicting himself and Ward is not com-
promised by tacitly accepting Locke's approach; it is
perfectly true that sentence meaning is a composite of
the meaning of the words and the structural meaning.³

3. See for example, J. J. Katz and J. Fodor, "The Structure
The point is that Locke's account is not a valid analysis of the way languages are learnt, but it is perhaps a valid account of how a language, once learnt, is used. Hartley is perceptive in noticing and correcting Locke's shortcoming; Ward never actually considers the nature of language learning. Hartley shows even more perception when he discusses how, having learnt a language, children possess a set of rules, with which they can form new sentences: "The rules of Etymology and Syntax determine the application and purport of words in many cases; agreeably to which we see, that Children, while yet unacquainted with the Propriety of Words and Phrases, which Custom establishes, often make new Words and Construction, which . . . are yet analogous to the Tenor of the language, in which they speak."¹ It is remarkable that a view so similar to the modern views of language learning should be proposed: Hartley is suggesting that in learning a language we internalize a system of rules. This view is reflected in Ward's own approach to language and grammar teaching, which is to reveal what is in a sense already known, rather than to impart rules.²

4.1.2.3. Hartley's Word Classes and the Analogy with Algebra

The discussion of language learning leads Hartley to


2. This is discussed in Chapter I.

¹ Hartley, op. cit., p. 282.

² This is discussed in Chapter I.
see four different classes of words. He distinguishes:

1: Such as have Ideas only.
2: Such as have both Ideas and Definitions.
3: Such as have Definitions only.
4: Such as have neither Ideas nor Definitions.

These may be equated with different classes of ideas in Locke's analysis of ideas: the first class are Locke's simple ideas, which, being simple, cannot be defined. The second class are his complex ideas of substance, which may be defined by enumerating simple ideas of which they are composed; the third class are abstract ideas, or mixed modes, which do not have exact counterparts in reality, and therefore, according to Hartley, but not Locke, are made up of ideas. The fourth class is equivalent to Locke's particles, and Hartley's comments on this class are interesting:

Lastly, Words of the Fourth Class answer to the algebraic Signs for addition, Subtraction, &c. to Indexes, Coefficients, &c. These are not algebraic quantities themselves; but they alter the Import of the Letters that are; just as Particles vary the Sense of the principal Words of a Sentence, and yet signify nothing of themselves.¹

Hartley refers to the principal word classes as algebraic quantities, and to particles as the signs of algebraic operations. When Ward discusses the fact that different prepositions can be arranged with substantives to produce

¹. Hartley, op. cit., p. 280.
the same meaning, he follows Hartley in the analogy with algebra:

This is no more than comes to pass in estimating all kinds of quantity, so as to express the result of the process in algebraic species: . . . And to carry on the resemblance farther, a fictitious quantity is always introduced merely to assist the mind in registering the steps of the process; and this quantity is frequently place into a fictitious state, till the result of the operation arises, in which whatsoever was fictitious is ascertained. This proceeding in algebra is made use of merely to aid the limited powers of the mind of man, and the like kind of proceeding in language is made use of on the very same account.  

Here the preposition is compared to an algebraic symbol of unknown value, and its value is determined from the context; the use of context in determining the signification of words such as by or to is self-evident. In his preface Ward talks about 'case' and structural markers acting as signs which require the mind to perform certain operations:

It has long been observed, that algebraic species, when used in connected series, form a kind of language applicable to quantity only; and the reason why these artificial marks do so, is evidently because the letters express conceptions similar to those which are denoted by noun substantives, and the signs by which the letters are connected, denote discursive acts similar to those which are denoted by the signs of cases, whilst the mark of

1. Ward, op. cit., p. 244.
equality denotes affirmation . . . . It is clear that the [algebraic] signs do not perform these operations, but are only marks invented to register the several kinds of discursive operations by which the mind proceeds in its investigation; and the signs of cases are exactly of the same nature with these signs, only less definite and precise. Now surely no man will say that there are no general principles on which the application of algebraic species proceeds, and if this cannot be said, neither can it be truly said, that there are no general principles on which the application of language proceeds. And if the former are clearly discovered, why may not the latter. 

Hartley and Ward are the first people to make a comparison of this kind between algebra and language. Ian Michael notes Ward's reference to algebra and two other isolated comparisons of the same kind: John Sedger, in The Structure of the English Language (1798) compares auxiliaries with the signs of algebra, and the 1797 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (B. p. 56) tells us "The office of the verb . . . seems to be merely this: 'To join together the subject and predicate of a proposition'; its powers are analogous to those of the sign + in Algebra."

Michael describes such references as "extremely rare" and suggests that they are antecedents of George Boole's linking of language and algebra; he does not observe


that it was David Hartley who made the first extended comparison of language and algebra about a hundred years before Boole.

4.1.2.4. A Seminal Semantic Theory

Hartley's speculations on the relation of language and thought have some interesting implications for semantic theory that Ward appears to have taken over. Hartley discusses how we acquire the meaning of words and suggests that words have a central core of meaning and additional meanings which they take on when in association with other words. The words they collocate with determine to some extent their semantic features: "Thus the word white—being associated with the visible appearances of Milk, Linen, Paper, gets a stable power of exciting the Idea of what is common to all, and a variable one in respect of the particularities, circumstances and adjuncts."1 Ward goes even further than Hartley in stating that these words will have certain selection restrictions; he properly does not attempt to state the rules for these. He then clearly reiterates Hartley's point that the substantive determines the precise semantic content of the adjective:

It is manifest that the judgement must be exerted before any adjective can be joined consistently with the word on which it depends; for every

adjective cannot coalesce with every substantive; nor can any rules be given to shew what substantives or verbs a particular adjective may depend upon. The conception denoted by one and the same adjective is modified in the mind, so as to suit the nature of every different object, or state, upon the name of which such adjective is made to depend. The quality denoted by "good" is as different as the nature of the objects to which the same adjective is applied.  

A comparison of the two passages does not offer conclusive evidence that Ward has taken this idea from Hartley; however, the obviously close reading which Ward gave to Hartley means that Hartley's discussion of the meaning of the word white cannot have escaped him, and probably did inspire his own reflections on semantics.

4.1.2.5. Summary of Hartley's Influence

Ward is indebted to Hartley for stating many of the suggestions offered by Locke in a form much more suitable for the grammarian to accommodate. Hartley's account of the coalescence of conceptions at sentence level expanded considerably Locke's seminal ideas on this subject; Hartley's account of how a child learns language produced completely new insights; his views on an internalized grammar were useful to Ward in establishing what the function of grammatical teaching should be. His considerations

of semantics were also extremely novel (although the Modistae had recognized the need for collocational suitability or 'congruitas'). Hartley's most significant influence is his attempt to compare algebra and language. This had far-reaching possibilities which Ward made use of throughout his account of grammatical construction, and particularly in his account of the meaning of prepositions. Hartley's interest in language forms but a small part of his Observations of Man. His whole plan is offered as a possible explanation of the tension between the spiritual and the material in man. Ward accepts his views on language, and with more dogmatism than Hartley shows; Ward never considers the possibility that his explanations may have very little empirical validity. Hartley was very conscious of his limitations; however, he felt that even if his theory was incorrect, it was a mode of understanding some of the phenomena that were little understood in his day; an incorrect understanding was much more than no understanding at all. Hartley gave Ward the impetus to explore language in its psychological dimensions, dimensions that had been virtually ignored for the last four centuries.

4.1.3. Claude Buffier: Grammaire Françoise sur un Plan Nouveau (1741)

Ward says that he found great help in Buffier's
grammar; it seems that he was the only English grammarian to make use of French grammars other than the Port Royal grammar. French was taught in schools, and it would seem that grammars such as Buffier's, though little suited for teaching Englishmen French, found their way into England for the purposes of instruction in the language rather than on account of interest in their theoretical viewpoint. In an age that was trying to break free from the vice-like grip of the Latin grammatical tradition it is understandable that grammars other than English grammars should be ignored by grammarians. However, French had far more in common with English than Latin had, and Ward was able to discover many stimulating ideas in Buffier's grammar.

Like Arnauld, to whom he was obviously greatly indebted, Buffier recognized an intimate connection between language and thought, that would influence all the sciences including theology:

\[ \ldots \text{puisque l'art d'arranger les mots, a connexion essentielle avec la mani\`ere d'arranger les pens\`ees.} \]
\[ \text{C'est par-l\`a qu'il sert de base aux plus hautes sciences, et surtout \`a la Logique: et qu'il fournit des r\`egles, o\`u la Th\`eologie m\^eme est quelquefois oblig\`ee d'avoir recours.} \]

The reference to theology reflects the theological debates that Arnauld entered into, and reminds us of his attempt to defend the doctrine of transubstantiation with his grammatical definition of the pronoun.

4.1.3.1. Grammar, Particular and Universal

Buffier follows Sanctius in his discontent with the usual methods of defining the parts of speech, claiming that they are long, ambiguous, and often circular! He says that it is necessary to pay more attention to their natural relations with each other and their mutual dependence:

Une défaut qui semble les regarder toutes: savoir qu'on ne fait point assez sentir leur rapport mutuel, leur arrangement, leur dépendance; ce qu'elles ont d'essentiel selon l'ordre naturel, et ce que l'usage ou la prévention y ont ajouté d'arbitraire.  

It is not possible to make a language fit a preconceived and fossilized grammar:

Tout au contraire c'est essentiellement à la Grammaire de s'ajuster aux langues pour lesquelles elle est faite, & dont elle n'est pour ainsi dire que le témoin ou l'analyse. Les langues n'ont pas été faites pour la Grammaire, mais la Grammaire pour les langues: elle doit servir à les enseigner à ceux qui ne les savent pas: mais en les supposant déjà établies telles qu'elles sont; puisqu'il seroit ridicule de prétendre montrer ce qui n'existeroit pas déjà.

Buffier has been quoted at length here on account of his sound views on grammar as a description of a particular language, rather than as a universal system which is superimposed on language. He does, however, recognize that there will be certain things in common to all languages:

Il se trouve essentiellement dans toutes, ce que la Philosophie y considère, en les regardant comme les expressions naturelles de nos pensées; car comme la nature a mis un ordre nécessaire entre nos pensées, elle a mis par une conséquence infaillible, un ordre nécessaire dans les langues.2

The necessary order resides in the recognition of three units in language: there are those which signify i) "le sujet dont on parle," ii) "ce qu'on affirme," and iii) "les circonstances de l'un & de l'autre,". This is very different from the Port Royal division of the parts of speech: the link between the noun and the verb is one of affirmation, but the verb is not the affirmation itself, as in the Port Royal grammar, but is what is affirmed.

of the subject. The noun and the verb are the two principal parts of speech, and they may both be modified by adjuncts. Thus the basic structure of the sentence could be represented by the following:

( Noun ( Adjunct ) ) ( Verb ( Adjunct ) )

Buffier does not discuss the fact that adverbs will modify the verb while adjectives will modify the noun; in his discussion of natural syntax he sees them belonging to a common class of adjuncts. Ward breaks with the powerful Port Royal tradition and follows Buffier's plan almost identically. Ward states that "the noun and verb are the principal parts of speech" and he considers that the adverb derives its importance from the fact that it modifies nouns, adjective or verbs, and completes or closes the construction: "notice is given that the conception is intended to modify some quality denoted by an adjective, or some state denoted by a verb which is placed in construction with the adverb; whilst the conception itself

1. Le nom & le verbe sont les plus essentielles parties du language . . . L'une & l'autre . . . sont susceptibles de diverses circonstances ou modifications: 'Le zèle sans prudence agit témérairement.' --Ibid., p. 44.

2. "Cette dernière sort de mots, qui ne servent qu'à modérer le nom et le verbe n'a point de nom général dans les grammairies ordinaires. On nous permettra de les appeler ici modificatifs."--Ibid., p. 45.

denoted by the adverb, is not usually intended to be modified."

Buffier suggests that nouns occur in one of two positions in sentences: they are either "nominatifs du verbe," when appearing in subject position, or "si le nom est seulement employé, pour exprimer l'objet qui particularise la signification du verbe, alors le nom est appelé régime du verbe;" Buffier gives the following sentence as an example: "Le pasteur conçoit ses brebis" and states that "les brebis est le régime du verbe, parce que c'est l'objet qui particularise la signification du verbe conçoit, marquant en particulier ce que le Pasteur conçoit." He continues, stressing the modifying function of the object of the transitive verb:

Quand les noms sont employés comme régimes et non pas comme nominatifs, ils sont dits être en des cas obliques. Ces cas obliques des noms se distinguent par les divers articles dont nous avons parlé. Ils pourraient encore très-bien s'appeler cas modificatifs: car ce qui particularise la signification d'un mot la modifie aussi.

Ward's view of syntax is that the noun in the nominative is the principal unit of the sentence, and that the verb attached to it modifies its conception in a certain way, and the noun following the verb modifies or limits the

1. Ibid., p. 213.
verbs conception very much as any other modifier would. Common to the two descriptions is the fact that the nouns other than those in the nominative are demoted from their status as nouns to that of mere modifiers. It should be noted that this is only one of two distinct explanations of transitivity that Ward puts forward.

Ward discusses the verb be exactly as if it were any other verb, whereas it had been given special status by Sanctius and Port Royal, and had been known as the verb substantive. Buffier made the break with this tradition before Ward and may have suggested the idea to him; he discusses the sentence "Vous êtes savant" as if it had exactly the same structure as a transitive sentence type "vous sera le nominatif, & savant sera le régime: parceque savant particularise ce que vous êtes."

4.1.3.2. Ward's Advance on Buffier

Ward only mentions Buffier once, and this is in a discussion of the relative pronoun, where Ward's conclusions about it are the same as Buffier's, but he feels that his explanations are better:

We have shown, that the relative pronoun extends its signification, so as to partake of these connexions of its antecedent; and therefore it is seldom considered singly and in itself, as the name of any object. Hence Father Buffier had called the relative an incomplete pronoun, and the personal and demonstrative pronouns compleat ones; because, he says he, these
frequently stand alone for the names of objects, which the relative pronouns do not. Buffier gives no reason why this happens in language, which reason is manifestly that given above.

It seems that Ward had great respect for Buffier's grammar, but felt that he himself was able to go somewhat further in explaining the universal phenomena of language. We see him claiming his superiority of explanation here, and there is no doubt that he felt that his second and later explanation of the transitive construction was superior to the one suggested to him by Buffier.

4.1.3.3. **Ellipsis**

Sanctius and Port Royal had discussed the function of ellipsis in language, but it is Buffier who most clearly indicates how certain formal devices in language serve to signify the same thing as a much longer locution. Thus he sees the imperative and the interrogative moods as short ways of saying what is in the mind: "Les interrogatifs sont encore des termes du supplément: ainsi dîtes-vous cela ou quand viendrez vous signifient je vous demande si vous dîtes cela, ou je vous demande quand vous viendrez" and "Les impératifs des verbes qui sont pour marquer la volonté que nous avons qu'un autre fasse certaine chose; ainsi venez me trouver signifie je vous ordonne, ou je vous conseille, ou je vous prie, ou je

He is spelling out in a paraphrase the meaning of the structural devices which mark the imperative and interrogative. Ward follows him in resolving imperatives and interrogatives to affirmative sentences; his description of interrogatives is part of a general discussion of interrogative pronouns:

To dispatch the subject of question in language all in one place, it is only necessary to observe, that when a question is not asked by the means of an interrogative pronoun, or an interrogative adverb . . . a supposition is made by the speaker concerning that which the question is about, and the speaker signifies his desire to be informed, whether that supposition is right or not; which signification is made by placing the nominative case after the verb. Thus, "Is Mr N-here?" is equivalent to the expression "I would know whether the supposition expressed in the words, Mr N- is here, be true or not?"2

The paraphrase of the imperative mood is more straightforward:

We have already shewn, that a question always depends upon the words, "I would know, or I would be told," or upon some sentence of the same import. And it is equally manifest, that a command always depends upon the words, "I direct—I ordain—I command" or on some sentence of the like import; for if the expression, "do this" be completed it will amount to the following sentence, "I direct that you do this."3

3. Ibid., p. 189.
Paraphrase as a mode of resolving structural features in language was not unknown in the preceding centuries, but the closeness of Ward's analysis and Buffier's, the almost parallel performative verbs used in the imperative paraphrase (ordonner, conseiller, prier, and direct, ordain, and command) suggest that Buffier's grammar is the immediate source of Ward's resolution of imperatives and interrogatives.

4.1.3.4. Summary of Buffier's Influence

Buffier is one of Ward's most important sources; his analysis of transitivity, and oblique cases, his division of the parts of speech, and his analysis of imperatives and interrogatives are all taken over by Ward. It would seem that Sanctius was one of the major sources of Buffier's own work; but much research remains to be done on the sources of many of the seventeenth and eighteenth century grammarians. Vivian Salmon has pointed out that most of the supposedly new or 'Cartesian' ideas in fact have antecedents in Priscian, the Modistae, and some little known Renaissance grammarians.¹

4.2. The Indirect Influence of Some Continental Grammarians

One of the aspects of Ward which distinguish him

from other English grammarians is the extensive use he made of the continental grammatical tradition. His borrowings from Buffier has been examined. If there is not any evidence of direct borrowing or absolute dependence on Sanctius, Arnauld, and Fromant, there is undoubtedly ample evidence of indirect influence.

4.2.1. Franciscus Sanctius: Minerva (1587)

Ward’s reference to Sanctius was perhaps more dutiful than genuine. Sanctius was the one Renaissance grammarian besides the native Lily that every English grammarian knew of. There is evidence in the form of numerous editions of Minerva to show that he was much read and widely esteemed. Both Chomsky and Michael attest that he is the most interesting of the Renaissance grammarians. He is discontented with the traditional grammatical categories, mocks their weakness, and suggests that more logical criteria be used in delineating them.¹ He believed that reasons should be given for language; by this it seems that he meant a set of rules; language would be explained by its conformity to these rules. One of the notions that he introduced to achieve this goal of explanation was that of ellipsis, whereby certain constructions could be rendered more reasonable by the addition of certain words, which though not uttered, were supposed to be in

¹ See Michael, op. cit., p. 550.
the mind of the speaker. Again pursuing his goal of logical explanation he makes a distinction between verbs substantive and verbs adjective, esse being the only verb substantive. The Port Royal grammar followed this distinction.

4.2.1.1. Ward's Use of Sanctius

Ward's use of Sanctius is no more obvious than his disregard. He explicitly rejects Sanctius' statement that the vocative case is not in the second person.  

On the other hand, he maintains emphatically with Sanctius, and against almost everyone else, that the infinitive is a true verb. It was generally regarded as a kind of noun substantive. Sanctius makes the observation, which is partly true, that the ablative is the case associated with prepositions in Latin. Bullokar, who also read Sanctius, had decided in 1586 with some sense that rather than the ablative the accusative would be the case which performed this function in English. Ward naively follows

1. Sanctius had claimed: "Vocativus non est secundae personae, ut ajunt Grammatici, sed res aliqua, cum qua sermonem communicamus." --Minerva, (apud Jansonio-Waesbergios, 1733), p. 155. Ward says "This case is in effect only a nominative case of the second person." (p. 90)

2. Sanctius' definition of the infinitive was: "Infinitivum verbum est, quod personas, modos, et tempora non finit, (sive quod personis numeris et temporibus non definitur)." --Op. cit., p. 104. He says that time and person are present but not defined so that it does not contradict his general definition of the verb: "verbum est vox particeps numeri personalis cum tempore." (p. 78)
Sanctius' position in English and gives a long, very unsatisfactory elaboration of prepositions which go with the ablative case. Ward also uses ellipsis as a means of explaining a great deal in his system, but it is not obvious that he borrowed the concept direct from Sanctius, as most of the French grammarians that Ward knew had also followed Sanctius in proposing ellipsis as a means to grammatical analysis.

It would be a mistake to attribute too much importance to Ward's having read Sanctius, as Sanctius had been a source of many ideas to many people; it is impossible to isolate influence unless there is evidence of direct quotation. But Ward's tenacious claim that the infinitive was a verb and not a substantive, although to some extent a meaningless quibble\(^1\) reflected a burning issue of the day. The fact that he had this esteemed authority to support him would have been invaluable and his reliance on Sanctius at this point is without question.

4.2.2. **Antoine Arnauld and Claude Lancelot: Grammaire Générale et Raisonnée (1660)**

Ward knew this grammar well, but its influence seems

1. It is a meaningless quibble for those who can see the study of language as something more than a study of only one level of language, and for whom the task of definition is not of paramount importance. Obviously in the eighteenth century the problem of adequate definition could not be easily dismissed.
to have been limited to proposing topics for Ward to consider and provide better explanations for. It had been read widely in England ever since its publication in the original French. An English translation was published in 1753. Gildon and Brightland are the only English grammarians to have made extensive use of it, and it seems that they did not understand it very well. Misunderstanding of its method was probably as widespread as knowledge of its aims in England; it was remarkably different from the English grammars of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

4.2.2.1. Language and Thought

Arnauld, like Ward, stresses the relation of language to thinking, and the fact that words are signs by which we express our thoughts. His definition of grammar states this point: "Grammar is the art of speaking. Speaking is to explain our thoughts by signs which men have invented for that purpose." Any investigation of language, he says, will have to pay attention to what happens in our minds: "We cannot therefore perfectly understand the different sorts of significations, annexed

1. Arnauld and Lancelot were co-authors; for the sake of convenience only Arnauld will be mentioned, as he is the senior member of the partnership.

to words, without first considering what passes in our minds, since words were invented only to communicate our thoughts." \(^1\) The powers of the mind are said to be powers of perception, judgment, and reasoning. Judgment is considered to be the essence of language; consequently Arnauld's theory of language stresses the process of affirmation; it divides parts of speech into those which signify objects of thought, and those which signify the manner of thought, that is, those that are signals of the process of affirmation or judgment, and the other operations of the mind. The verb *esse* was the one word that truly expressed affirmation and hence expressed a manner of thought, but all verbs, on account of their similarity to this verb were considered as expressing manners of thought. The theory was not always coherent; the division of words into those representing objects, and those representing manners of thought was an interesting one, but its application was slipshod. However, the grammar was breaking new ground, and it is not surprising that there should have been inconsistencies; the inconsistency of the definitions of case was mentioned in Chapter II. Both Arnauld and Ward are inconsistent in their efforts to accomodate the category to their native languages. The difference

between the two is that the Port Royal grammar makes no attempt to show how case functions, while Ward does. Both claims to be rational grammarians, yet Ward has much more far-reaching explanatory goals; perhaps this is because Port Royal shared Sanctius' views of explanation in language.\(^1\) We find the same absence of interest in explanations in the Port Royal discussion of the relative pronoun; the analysis has been widely acclaimed in that it recognizes both the conjunctive and the subordinating aspects of this pronoun, but the explanation of how or why the pronoun subordinates the following clause is not considered as it is in Ward's discussion.

4.2.2.2. Arnauld's and Ward's Views of Underlying Structure

The linking of the adjective and noun in the sentence: "The invisible God created the visible world" is seen as the signal that there are underlying propositions present, namely 'God is invisible' and 'the world is visible'; this recognition of underlying structure has recently been considered as the greatest insight of the Port Royal grammar. However, its failure to see more than one proposition in "The valour of Achilles has been the cause of the taking of Troy" is difficult to understand; Arnauld saw the genitive relationship as a simple one involving no underlying proposition. Ward on the other hand felt that

1. Cf. Para. 4.2.1.
between the two nouns in this relation there was an understood transitive verb; he was slow to recognize anything corresponding to the Port Royal resolution of the Adjective-Noun construction. It was mentioned in the discussion on Hartley that Ward recognized that prepositions had a range of meanings from which we had to select the appropriate one for the discourse; this was not an imperfection with language in Ward's eyes, but the gentlemen of Port Royal see it as not in accord with a rational account of language: "No one language has followed on the subject of prepositions what reason seems to require, which is that one relation should be marked only by one preposition, and that the same preposition should not mark more than one relation."\(^1\) The Port Royal account of the adverb as an abbreviation of preposition and noun (cum sapienta = sapienter) was also questioned. Ward's rejection of the verb *esse* as an affirmation word distinct from other verbs is also surprising. His alternative views the psychological aspect of affirmation. It is difficult to talk of influence when Ward continually seems to be paying no heed to Port Royal, and often saying the exact opposite. The point is that the Port Royal grammar was read by Ward, as he admits, thought about, and then much of it was rejected. Its influence may have been

negative, but such a work could not be considered unimportant. Ward's rejection is evidence of a positive step to build a new and independent theory.¹

4.2.3. Abbé Fromant: Reflexions sur les Fondemens de l'Art de Parler (1756)

Abbé Fromant wrote his reflections on the art of speaking only some nine years before Ward's own grammar was published.² Fromant is a compiler and seeks to bring together what has been said on universal grammar since the publication of the Port Royal grammar. He is emphatic about the universality of grammatical phenomena: "Comme il n'y a qu'une Grammaire dans le monde pour toutes les

1. No mention is made in Ward's Grammar of L'Art de Penser, or the Art of Thinking as it was known in English (see chapter 1), and there is no reason to assume that Ward was familiar with it; however on p. 117 Arnauld says: "Note that any sentence containing an active verb along with its object expresses a complex proposition and in one sense two propositions." This sounds remarkably like Ward's statement that every transitive verb implies that there are two sentences, however, Arnauld clarifies his statement by saying that the sentence "Brutus killed a tyrant" can be analysed as "Brutus killed someone who was a tyrant." Ward's own analysis of the transitive construction is concerned with the relationship of active and passive sentences rather than Arnauld's (extremely interesting) analysis of noun phrases.

2. It has not been possible to consult the original edition which Ward probably knew; the one consulted was published in 1769, some four years after Ward had written his grammar, and, more important, after the publication of M. Beauzée's grammar. Fromant's reflections are concerned with what was being written about language in the eighteenth century; thus the 1769 edition has numerous comments on and criticisms of Beauzée's grammar. He claims that there is little difference between this later edition and the previous one; such as there are would presumably be the additions about Beauzée.
langues, parce qu'il n'y a qu'une Logique pour tous les hommes, il ne faut pas être surpris de trouver dans une langue, ... les mêmes principes et les mêmes règles que dans les autres langues."¹ He has few original opinions of his own, though he has considerable ability in criticizing the opinions of others. His claim to greatness undoubtedly rests on the importance he gave to reasonable explanation, as opposed to enumeration of facts. The quotation at the beginning of the thesis is an eloquent testimony to an educational ideal that Fromant passed on to Ward. Fromant felt that those students who have to put up with dull rules in colleges would love "les règles lumineuses et fécondes de la Grammaire raisonnée." He adopts Buffier's system of nouns, verbs, and modifiers, and emphasizes the difference between this and the Port Royal approach. Noun substantives and adjective were the same part of speech for him because they share in an identity; attributes in the predicate position do not share in identity with the substantive because they are in a relation of affirmation on account of the nexus formed by the substantive verb. Although an admirer of Buffier, Fromant lays much greater emphasis than did Buffier on the verb as an affirmation word. Ward's treatment of

the verb follows Buffier, not Fromant. Fromant is important to Ward because of his plea for grammatical studies which would not only be useful for the acquisition of languages, but would also be intellectually stimulating. Ward's Essay on Grammar can be seen as an attempt to answer Fromant's plea for the students of grammar in England.

4.3. The Indirect Influence of Some English Grammarians

No mention has been made as yet of any English grammarian that had any influence on Ward. Obviously, influence cannot be traced when it is extremely general. Ward inherited the tradition, such as it was, of English grammar. There were, however, three grammarians that may be singled out as having influenced him in a more specific way than the others. Their influence is not direct. Ward thought about what they said, and then went his own way in the tradition. These three grammarians are Richard Johnson, James Harris, and Robert Lowth.

4.3.1. Richard Johnson: Grammatical Commentaries (1706)

Richard Johnson's commentaries are on Lily's Latin grammar, and he is completely concerned with a discussion

1. Fromant's position had difficulties as he himself realized. It correctly suggested that the adjective and noun in 'beau livre' were in a relationship of identity, and the words in 'liber Petri' were not, because "ces deux mots présentent à l'esprit deux objets différents, dont l'une n'est pas l'autre"—(p. 157). However, forms in Latin of the type 'Evandreus ensis' could not be claimed to be in an identity relation.
of Latin; Michael suggests, that he was widely read in the eighteenth century. Johnson's emphasis on sound educational methodology has been noted in Chapter III as a possible stimulus to Ward's own common-sense approach; perhaps with educational objectives in sight, Johnson rejected the regular concept of substantive and adjective as members of the same major parts of speech; he has been credited with introducing them as separate parts of speech, but Mark Lewis had already recognized their distinctness in 1670. Ward did not follow Johnson in his innovation, but his grammar does reflect Johnson's definition of the adjective. Johnson's definition is:

It is a word added to a substantive, to declare some additional accident of the Substantive considered by itself as of Quality, Property, Relation . . . . I have added considered by itself because the Relations of substantives, as considered in sentences are declared by Prepositions and not by Adjectives.¹

Johnson distinguishes the adjective by its having a relation solely with the noun; it is never involved in the sentence structure as such other than as an adjunct of the noun. This is quite different from the Port Royal account where every adjective is part of a proposition. It is a reasonable account, particularly when one considers the structure of Latin, and would seem to be the

motivation for Ward's strong assertion in his preliminary discussions of the adjective that it unites with and operates with the substantive; for all other constructions Ward requires some verb to be recognized in the deep structure as a linking force. Johnson's views on the distinction between substantive and adjective do not prevent him from recognizing class change between nouns and adjectives, depending on position and use of the words: "And though Substantives be put in apposition with other Substantives and agree with them, yet this is no real objection; such Substantives become Adjectives, by that very use, as an adjective, or any other part of speech becomes a Substantive when it is used like a Substantive, that is, considered as a thing."¹ Johnson's definition of parts is based on their form, and he allows class change through functional change. This is a much more structural account of language² than we find in Ward, however, the fact that Johnson sees this change of class as a possibility in language allows Ward to give his psychological account of class change with good authority. Ward's use of Johnson is reflected in his adherence to the general plan of Latin grammar and the viewing of noun and adjective as closely


². The distinction so clearly drawn between form class and functional class membership is similar to that proposed by James Sledd in A Short Introduction to English Grammar, (Chicago, 1959).
related. Johnson's grammar does not make any startling innovations, and one doubts whether it greatly affected Ward's general plan. Johnson formed part of the grammatical establishment, and Ward would have failed in his preparation for his task if he had not made himself familiar with Johnson's work. Ultimately Johnson's greatest significance stems from his enlightened and sensible comments on methods of teaching grammar.

4.3.2. James Harris: *Hermes* (1751)

Harris was the most interesting and certainly the most readable grammarian of eighteenth century England. He wished to excite his readers to a contemplation of language and universal grammar, and has a number of stimulating ideas which later grammarians unfortunately failed to develop. As a classical scholar he goes to Aristotle and Plato rather than to John Locke for the philosophical background to his theory. The result is that he is able to talk with confidence about universals in language; he offers lexical universals and grammatical universals. His lexical universals are interesting but were unacceptable to Ward as they assume a Platonic ideal relation between words and things; his grammatical universals were far more reasonable and Ward's attempt to recognize universals developed from Harris' position.
4.3.2.1. **His View of Case**

We saw in Chapter II that Harris viewed case not just as an inflectional ending or the translation of such into English, but as a category of functional relation, and as such language universal; this view of case as a relation can be compared with Ward's; Ward sees case as an operation of the mind; it has the function of subordinating the idea signified by the noun so that it can coalesce with the idea signified by the verb or noun it is in construction with. Harris sees case as a statement of relation rather than a signal of an operation; these positions are not so far apart and Hockett suggests that statements of relation or operation are alternate ways of looking at the same thing: "Whether we speak of an 'operation' or of a 'relation' depends on notation and attitude, rather than on the abstract mathematical nature of what we are dealing with."¹ Both grammarians have in common the view of case as a language universal phenomenon expressing functional relationships; while this does not seem an extraordinary or unusual view today, it is in marked contrast to the usual eighteenth century view of it as a transfer to English of the meaning of a Latin inflection which had been determined by rules without reason.

4.3.2.2. The Parts of Speech

Harris' views of the parts of speech is his most original contribution to grammatical theory. He divides all words into 'principals' and 'accessories' according to whether they signify ideas or relations within the linguistic system. The 'principals' are divided into 'substantives' and 'attributes'; both verb and adjective belong to the common class called 'attribute.' The substantive is separated from other principals because it posits an existing object: "Whatever a thing may be whether black, white,... it must first of necessity exist, before it can possibly be anything else." ¹ Harris' view is in accord with modern linguists who believe that the one universal surface category in language may be the noun. Attributes take several forms: "The Sun is bright, the Sun rises, and the Sun is rising" have three different forms, but are said to form a common class inasmuch as they all modify the substantive. Harris distinguishes a third class of principals which he calls 'attributes of the second order' and which are commonly called adverbs. Jespersen develops much the same analysis of the parts of speech in The Philosophy of Grammar and it is the basis of most theories of categorial grammar. It would appear to be fundamentally the same as Ward's system, but Ward ¹ Harris, Op. cit., p. 88.
did not explicate it with the clarity of Harris; it is put forward in a slightly different form as Ward sees the basic sentence as a noun modified by (or coalescing with) a verb, and finally closed by an adverb. Ward's explanation has some advantage over Harris' in that he is able to accommodate the transitive verb sentence pattern to his explanation, whereas Harris appears to be content to consider only those kinds of sentences which Aristotle had considered (see Chapter I). Harris is more realistic than Ward when he includes adjectives with verbs as a common part of speech; Ward, under Richard Johnson's influence, discusses the adjective as part of the noun phrase rather than as a sentence element. It is not suggested here that Harris was the definitive influence on Ward in his account of the principal parts of speech; Buffier's analysis of the sentence was closer to Ward's than Harris'; had Ward been following Harris directly he could have scarcely avoided considering the adjective from a wider perspective than he in fact did.

4.3.2.3. Sentence Types

A central concept in Harris' discussion about language is that of energy. He sees words and parts of
speech generally endowed with the energy of things;\(^1\) sentences publish an energy of the soul.\(^2\) Although he sees four sentence types: statements, interrogatives, commands, and volitions, he claims that they represent only two energies of the soul: those of perception and volition. Thus although he does not spell out the explanation of how four 'moods' or sentence types can be subsumed to two major categories in the same detail as Ward and Buffier, he is wrestling with the same problem: the semantic resolution of structurally distinct types.

4.3.2.4. Coalescence

The term 'coalescence' is familiar to us from Hartley's Observations; Harris sees coalescence as an important concept in language, although it is not always clear whether his discussion is about language or about things:

Some things coalesce and unite of themselves; others refuse to do so without help and as it were compulsion. Thus in words of War the mortar and the stone coalesce of themselves;

1. "All things that exist, exist as energies or affections of some other thing, or without being the energies or affections of some other thing. If of something else they are attributes. Thus 'to think' is an attribute of 'man,' 'to be white' of a swan. If not of this manner they are substances."—Ibid., p. 9.

2. "Speech or Discourse is a publishing of some Energie or Motion of his soul. So it indeed is in everyone that speaks, excepting along the Dissembler or Hypocrite."—Ibid., p. 15.
but the wainscot and the wall not without nails and pins. For example all quantities and qualities coalesce immediately with their substances. Thus 'tis we say 'a fierce lion,' 'a vast mountain'; and from this natural concord of subject and accident arises the grammatical concord of Substantive and Adjective.1

Harris concludes from this that things which are united in nature unite easily in language, but those which do not, need the addition of prepositions: "Those parts of speech unite of themselves in Grammar, whose original archetypes unite of themselves in Nature."2 Coalescence occurs between noun and adjective, noun and verb, and even verb and verb, though here the help of the accessory to is required; Harris gives as examples of the coalescence of verb and verb: "I desire to live" and "I eat to live," remarking that the coalescence is more intimate in the first case than in the second. Ward's discussion of coalescence in the Essay on Grammar is derived from Hartley rather than Harris; Harris views coalescence not as the coalescing of ideas but rather the coalescence of things in nature as reflected in language. While two very different ideas when joined in construction are said to be completely in coalescence in Hartley's theory, Harris will only admit a degree of coalescence, because the

things represented by the words cannot easily coalesce in the world. Ward and Hartley use the term 'coalescence' to denote the complete union of ideas in the mind which a grammatical construction represents, while Harris uses the term only as a means of distinguishing those constructions of principals which do not require accessories from those that do.

4.3.2.5. Summary of the Relation of Harris and Ward

There are many points of common reference between Ward and Harris: there is the reduction of the sentence types, the analysis of the principal parts of speech, there is the idea of coalescence, and the proposal that words represent ideas. However, there were fundamental differences on all these points. Harris' statement that there are two kinds of sentences, those indicating perceptions and those indicating volitions seems to be a foretaste of the modern distinction between performative verbs and others; Ward was intent on reducing sentence types too, but he did not make the division with the clarity that Harris does. Harris' analysis of the principal parts of speech has much in common with Ward's, but they both use a very different terminology. Harris' idea of coalescence is not nearly so well worked out as Ward's, and suffers from confusing the realm of language
with the realm of things.' Rather than suggest that Ward borrowed the idea from Harris, we should question whether Harris went to the same source for it as Ward, i.e. Hartley; if he did, he distorted rather than developed Hartley's views. Both Ward and Harris discuss the ideas that are signified by words, and seem to posit the existence of an idea in the mind for every word. Here they are manifestly different: Harris claims that his ideas must have been implanted in the mind by God, while Ward goes to Locke's philosophy for an explanation of his ideas. Thus their ideas have no common ground. Harris uses his as evidence of lexical universals, and Ward uses his as evidence of linguistic relativity and as a basis for a theory of pronominalization. Ward's intentions to avoid "all disputes with former writers of grammar" must have been strained to the utmost when he considered those of Harris' ideas which were so close to his own and yet so different.

4.3.3. Robert Lowth: An Introduction to English Grammar (1762)

William Ward had a high opinion of Lowth's grammar, particularly of the way it discussed the so-called errors of many eminent writers. He argues for the importance of practical grammar of English on account of the mistakes
made by the great, which Lowth had pointed out. Yet such an attitude is totally foreign to Ward (see Chapter III); it is certainly disappointing that such a perceptive writer should be so impressed with Lowth's syllabus of errors. Lowth's grammar had been published three years before Ward's Essay, and had obviously gained immediate popularity. Lowth acknowledged the importance of universal grammar, but said that it should be approached through the grammar of particular languages; his own grammar deals with English, and makes no further mention of universal grammar. It is a significant advance on earlier works published in England as it has a long section on syntax, enumerating twelve distinct construction types. Ward's attitude to Lowth is difficult to determine. He appears to admire him, but rejects almost everything that Lowth says: Lowth observes only two cases in English; Ward recognizes six. There are two points of interest which do not appear to have influenced Ward, but which do suggest that Lowth and Ward were not quite so apart as a casual glance at their grammars might suggest: firstly, Lowth recognizes three modes in English: the explicative, the interrogative mode, and the imperative. He goes on to say that the interrogative mode does not exist as such (presumably because there is no formal distinction of the verb for it, but only a change in word order), but
the interrogative construction should be recognized as a mode. His belief in this suggests that he is in accord with Harris and Ward in seeing modes from a semantic point of view as well as a structural point of view; secondly, he recognizes that many verb + particle constructions could be seen as paraphrases of another verb. While to cast means the same as to throw, to cast up is totally distinct, and means to compute. He is attempting to resolve the same kind of problem as Ward, who claimed that to arrive at should be paraphrased as to reach as a means of avoiding the explanation of this difficult post-verb preposition. Such views reflect a common attempt in both men to recognize lexicon-independent semantic units or "ideas," to which lexical formatives are afterwards attached.¹

4.4. Summary of Sources

William Ward claims that he received help from many sources, and we have examined most of them, not in enough detail to do justice to the intrinsic merits of the sources, but sufficiently to suggest which of his sources were most obviously responsible for his very singular views on

1. Cf. John Anderson, "On the Status of Lexical Formatives," Foundations of Language, IV, 3. (1968) 308-318. Several times in this chapter points have been mentioned because they are recurring in modern discussions; their reappearance does not imply that they are valid or correct; it merely suggests that these ideas are of enduring interest
linguistic theory. Many of the ideas that Locke had brought forward were used by Ward, but Locke's ideas came to Ward just as much through the writings of Hartley as through those of Locke himself. Hartley was the most powerful and important influence of all on Ward, inasmuch as he was chiefly responsible for suggesting to Ward that some words are signals of operations that are performed by the mind on ideas, and that the construction of words together was a symbol or sign of the coalescence of ideas. Père Buffier suggested to Ward many of his most interesting grammatical ideas; he suggested an explanation of transitivity, the resolution into ordinary discourse of the various moods of the verb; he suggested a system of the parts of speech to him and preceded him in the complete break from the Port Royal tradition. Richard Johnson and Abbé Fromant are important because of their sound views on pedagogy and the function of language studies. James Harris, though not an obvious influence, cannot be ignored because even though he and Ward agreed on so few points, Ward's course ran so close to his own and they were both attempting to improve the study of language in eighteenth century England.

to the students of language, and hence are of some interest to the historian of linguistics.
Chapter V

The Metalanguage of Ward's Essay on Grammar

5.0. Introduction

5.1. Technical Terminology
5.1.1. The 'Idea' or 'Conception'
5.1.1.1. The Term 'Idea' in Previous Theories
5.1.1.2. The 'Idea' or 'Conception' in Ward's Theory
5.1.2. The Term 'Speculative'
5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind'
5.1.4. 'Coalescence'
5.1.5. 'Principles of Existence'
5.1.6. 'Demonstrative Circumstances'

5.2. Terminology of the Word Classes
5.2.1. 'Parts of Speech'
5.2.2. Definitions of Particular 'Parts' Examined

5.3. The Study of Metalanguage
CHAPTER V
THE METALANGUAGE OF WARD'S ESSAY ON GRAMMAR

5.0. Introduction

A grammarian's metalanguage is the language he uses to talk about language; he has to discuss a linguistic system by means of itself or a related system, and in order to do this he introduces new terms or re-defines old terms to accommodate the language to its introspective examination of itself. Ward's metalanguage needs examining with some care, for, as he says, "the old terms of grammar are indeed retained; but the investigation of every part of the subject is altogether new."

Linguists are sometimes criticized for talking about everyday subjects in technical jargon; Ward goes to the other extreme and hides novel ideas behind familiar terms. This Chapter will consider Ward's metalanguage in two parts: firstly, the general technical vocabulary he uses will be discussed, and then the terminology of the word-classes. Both these areas cover to some extent the terminology of syntax. Syntax is very much Ward's concern, but his psychological interest in the formation of language leads him to talk about it in psychological terms rather than specifically grammatical terms.

1. These two terms are used interchangeably by Ward, although he usually opts for 'conception.'
5.1. Technical Terminology

5.1.1. The 'Idea' or 'Conception'

The 'idea' or 'conception' that Ward is always discussing is a case in point. His use of the term is the most significant aspect of his metalanguage; in order to make clear the novelty of his approach, the relationship of 'idea,' 'word,' and 'thing' will be traced through history as a prelude to analysing Ward's own view of the relationship of the three, and his meaning of the term 'idea.' Inasmuch as 'ideas' are the building blocks of Ward's linguistic theory, an understanding of them is of paramount importance. Their elucidation renders understandable the differentiation in the levels of his analysis; it ascertains his views on the relation of substantives, adjectives, and verbs; it accounts for his theory of linguistic relativity, his comments on collocation, and his view of pronominalization. Above all it will enable us to determine whether the idea is a linguistic unit of some kind, or just, a mentalistic copy of the word, whether or not it has a formal relation to linguistic units on other levels which is statable in non-redundant terms.

5.1.1.1. The Term 'Idea' in Previous Theories

The relationship between the word, the idea, and the object that the word represents has been of constant
interest to students of language. For Plato the meaning of a word is its idea. In the Theaetetus he has Socrates formulate his definition of language: "The expression of one's thoughts by means of onomata and rhēmata which, as it were, mirror reflect one's ideas in the stream which passes through the mouth." The main point here is that words are capable of reflecting or mirroring ideas, and ideas for Plato are the distinctive reality, existing independently of words and things. F. R. Dinneen says that Plato discussed language because of "the possibility of learning something about things through a study of their names and the correct combinations of expressions dealing with them." ¹

Aristotle brought Plato's ideas down to earth conceiving of them not as existing independently of the reality that we see, but as abstracted from the world around by the active power of the mind. He believed that all people see the world in the same way and words represented the 'essences' of things; his system of logic provided him with the means of ensuring that language would adequately reflect reality; thus his epistemological foundations were secure. Ernst Cassirer describes how not only words, but even grammatical structures were seen as corresponding to reality in Aristotelian and Medieval

The structure of the sentence and its division into words and classes of words seem, in large part, to have served Aristotle as a model for his system of categories. . . the last four categories . . . seem to become fully transparent only when we consider them in reference to certain fundamental distinctions which the Greek language makes in its designation of verbs and verbal actions. Here logical and grammatical speculation seemed to be in thoroughgoing correspondence, to condition one another—and medieval philosophy, basing itself on Aristotle, clung to this correspondence between the two.1

But there were important differences between the Greek and mediaeval grammars. The Greeks analysed only Greek; the mediaeval grammarians were aware of other languages and sought to discover universal grammatical features, and later, the actual rules followed by the mind in expressing itself.2 Their search for universal categories implied a belief in universal properties of the mind; one of these powers for the Modistae was the power of understanding things. Bursill-Hall sees the direct relation of word and thing in Modistic grammar as prior to any grammatical function: "The word, which must express a reality, is a sign (signum); these words


must be taken as correlatives of things in the world of
reality before they can be considered grammatical express-
ions."¹ The belief that the word can correctly express
reality is the same as Aristotle's, but here the idea
has absolutely no place in the system: the mind can under-
stand an object, but it does this by participating in the
object itself (the object has the 'modus intelligendi
passivi') rather than creating a copy or idea of the
object.

The age of Descartes has been called the Age of
Reason because many beliefs which previously had been
uncritically accepted were subjected to rigorous intel-
lectual analysis. This rigorous analysis stemmed from
a faith in the power of the mind, and because of this
very faith, no one questioned the power of the mind to
formulate objective ideas of things. Ideas or thoughts
were recognized as intermediaries between words and things;
the purpose of language is to communicate our thoughts
about things: "Words therefore may be defined, distinct,
and articulate sounds, made use of by men as signs, to
express their thoughts."² The Port Royal Art of Thinking
emphasizes the precise status and psychological reality

1. Ibid., p. 49.
of the idea as intermediary: "We are capable of expressing something with a word when we have an idea of the thing signified by the word."¹

Thus in the past an idea was sometimes recognized as intermediary between words and things, and sometimes it was not; when it was, it had no function in linguistic theory. The word expressed our idea of a thing, but since our idea of a thing was always a direct reflection of the thing (Plato's position), or objectively shared in the qualities of the thing (Arnauld's position), it was not a useful concept for grammatical analysis.

English linguistics was dominated by practical motives in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The English grammarians did not question or even consider the relationship between words and things. Gildon and Brightland offer a description of 'names' (nouns)² which is the most extended comment we find on the relation of words and things in the first half of the eighteenth century:

Names, (as the Word imports), express the things themselves, and convey some certain Idea, or Image of the Mind that wants not any other Word

1. Ibid., p. 22.

2. Analysis of the relationship between words and things is here considered in terms of the noun substantive. If a grammarian has no comment on this part of speech it is unlikely that he will have any on the others.
Wilkins with his *Philosophical Language* had realized that natural languages do not offer a one to one description of the world. He had demanded that "... the theory upon which such a design [as a universal language] were to be founded should be exactly suited to the nature of things." De Mott, noting the development within Wilkins' thoughts remarks:

One notes a progress from the conviction that a satisfactory pattern for a new language can be taken from an old language to the belief that such a pattern must derive from a correct description of the order of reality.

While Wilkins is not in the main line of development of English linguistics, his interest in universal language had drawn attention to the fact that the words we use do not necessarily represent things as they are. It is not until Harris' *Hermes* in 1751 that the problem of the relation of words and things really entered the field of discussion. Harris argues that words are not images or


imitations of individual objects, as this would make communication impossible:

They can be Symbols of nothing else, except general Ideas, because nothing else except those remains. --And what do we mean by general Ideas? --we mean such as are common to many individuals; not only to Individuals which exist now, but which existed in, past ages, and will exist in ages future.

Ultimately the permanence and authenticity of these ideas is derived from God, because it does not make sense that intellectual ideas should originate from sensible objects. Presumably the sense impressions made on the mind illumine the divine ideas which are innate in the mind. Because these ideas in the mind came from God they are seen as the basis of the lexical universals discussed in the last chapter.

5.1.1.2. The 'Idea' or 'Conception' in Ward's Theory

William Ward broke new ground in An Essay on Grammar by borrowing or rather accepting Locke's psychological theory of the formation of ideas and his distinction between nominal and real essences. Locke had argued that words must refer to general ideas of some kind; however his general ideas were very different from those of James Harris. He recognized that things could have two essences:

1. James Harris, op. cit., p. 341.
a nominal essence imposed, as it were by the name, and a real essence, which is generally unknowable. In other words a sign, because it represents a thing does not represent the heart of it, or a kind of Platonic or even Aristotelian essence, but it is just a name which is associated with those ideas that the speaker associates with the things; there is no reason why the speaker's idea of a horse should correspond to the real essence, or even be the same as the listener's idea of a horse.¹ The consequences of this position are more significant than they may appear: we do not attach (arbitrary) names to fixed, pre-established ideas in the mind, but we construct or unite the complex ideas themselves on an arbitrary basis. We have ideas of some things but not of others because we have never yoked together the right collection of simple ideas. Moreover although two people may use the same word to designate the same object, there is no guarantee that the word will refer to the same complex idea in their minds.

These are the foundations on which a theory of

¹. To understand the origin we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists: and that is not in the making of any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: first it chooses a certain number. Secondly, it gives them connexion and makes them into one idea. Thirdly it ties them together by a name. (John Locke, op. cit., III.iii.9).
linguistic relativity could easily be built.¹ When Ward explains how the conceptions of noun substantives are created in the mind he is almost paraphrasing Locke: the mind is not passive in acquiring its conceptions but exerts a selective attention. The fixing of attention upon an object accompanied by hearing its name mentioned in childhood creates a bond of association whereby the occurrence of one will call forth the other.²

The fact that most ideas are constructs of the mind of man, that once constructed they can be stored and recalled at will enables Ward to treat them as malleable entities capable of modification, and as classifiable into a variety of states, which would have the function of selecting the appropriate lexical or grammatical word form. In adopting a Lockean approach to the idea Ward

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.3.

2. "The power of the mind is not merely passive in acquiring the conceptions above mentioned, as it is in receiving the perceptions which are conveyed to it by the senses. But the attention is confined to some particulars of what may be before the mind at once, so that the rest are disregarded, till the particulars which are intended to be taken into signification of one substantive, or verbal name, are fixed in the intellect. We acquire in our earliest infancy the custom of exerting the power of confining or checking the attention. For this is constantly done, when particular things . . . are pointed out, or presented to us, in such a manner that we fix our attention on them, whilst their names are mentioned to us. When any set of particulars has been so attended by the mind, as that it forms a conception from them, separately considered and denoted by a substantive or a verbal name; the event is, that whenever the conception recurs to the mind, the name recurs with it by mere recollection." (Ward: p. 23).
was attempting to create some linguistic unit below the surface on which (psychological) operations could be performed to produce the peculiar picture of reality that language provides. The components of Ward's ideas are often unclear. The idea which represents a noun is said to have "constant marks or characters, which are conceived to be evidences of a constant principle of existence peculiar to each object, whether such principle is to be taken notice of or not."¹ In other words, the features which mark the noun as a noun are in some way related to the fact that there is an object which caused the idea. But this is not always the case: ideas annexed to abstract nouns are considered as if they themselves were the external objects.²

Ward had difficulty severing completely the idea as an entity from the objects to which he owes its origins. The confusion in many instances appears to be due to lack of revision; the following quotation appears to be a statement of intention and should serve as a guide in a search for a coherent theory in Ward's presentation:


2. "Very many objects denoted by substantives have really no separate principle of existence in themselves; as for instance, all the 'virtues--vices--arts--sciences, and all relations--qualities--attributes,' and in general all objects, the conceptions whereof are usually called abstract ideas. But the mind considers these objects as if each of them had a constant principle of existence in itself." (Ward: p. 14).
The whole plan of the application of language takes its immediate 'original from the nature of the conceptions which the mind of man forms and affixes to substantives and verbs; and not from the nature of the objects whence the conceptions are formed.1

Grammarians had recognized from the very beginning that the word, or 'vox,' or material part of language was of an arbitrary nature. De Saussure's 'signe' or the traditional 'idea' had been considered to be fixed, to be some sort of a copy of the entities of the external world. The result was an increasing faith in the power of semantics to define word categories, and several naive approaches to the problem of universal grammar. The significance of Ward's application of Locke's philosophy to grammatical studies is that at last the 'signe' as well as the 'signifiant' is seen as an arbitrary construct of the mind of man. Its powers to function in discourse depend not on some grammatical category that it is given from above, but on what operations the mind chooses to perform on this grammatically undifferentiated bundle of features, or as Ward calls them, conceptions. The consequences are that Ward will have to seek for universals or general principles not as pre-existing entities, but either as entities created by the mind using ideas as basic data, or in terms of the kind of processes which the

mind performs; the interest in universals is transferred from particular categories (e.g. case) to the universal processes of the mind that are signified by such a category; the entirely new linguistic unit which has brought about this revolution is Ward's 'idea' or 'conception.'

5.1.2. The Term 'Speculative'

Ward made use of ideas or conceptions in order to offer his readers a 'speculative' grammar. The meaning of the term has changed little since the eighteenth century, but Ward's meaning of the term differs considerably from the mediaeval meaning. The Modistae were speculative grammarians because they believed that language was a speculum or mirror of reality, and because they believed their task was to explicate exactly how language was able to mirror reality. Ward however felt that language was anything but a picture of reality; it was perhaps a picture of how we see reality, but that is a very different thing. While his Practical Grammar would give instructions on how words are to be placed in construction, the Speculative Grammar would account for the "general principles . . . by which the application of language is conducted."¹ It considers the "general nature of the very parts of speech" and is interested in language in

general. But Ward does not make the claim that the categories he is investigating are in any sense universal. They are categories of English, and a speculative grammar for Ward does not attempt to show why particular categories are universal, but instead shows the general principles that are involved in setting up these categories in this language and in setting up these or other categories in other languages. Speculative grammar will investigate the principles involved in language generation, and these appear to consist in the kind of operations performed on the fundamental and non-grammatical ideas or conceptions which are at the base of Ward's theory.

5.1.3. 'Operations of the Mind'

Language is a signalling system for Ward, but it does not directly signal meaning, but rather signals 'operations of the mind.' Ward sees words as signs of Lockean ideas; almost every word has an idea associated with it. When words are placed in construction, the grammatical construction itself is a signal that the ideas behind the words are to be linked in certain ways. One of the most usual ways that they are linked is by means of fusing the 'principles of existence' of separate ideas so that instead of there being two unlinked ideas,
they are indistinguishable from each other and exist in coalescence. This transfer of the 'principle of existence' is a typical 'operation of the mind' signalled by certain constructions.

5.1.4. 'Coalescence'

'Coalescence' is a term that Ward has borrowed from Hartley,¹ and which he uses with the same signification. Hartley discusses the union of ideas to form more complex ideas, and even the union of letters to form words. The union is one of 'coalescence:' what were previously separately existing entities are no longer distinguishable from the other parts to which they have united. In Ward's theory the union of the noun and the verb is one of coalescence: "Thus, 'a man speaking--thinking--approving,' denotes the man to be considered as of the species 'speaker--thinker--approver.'"²

5.1.5. 'Principles of Existence'

While one of the fundamentals of Locke's theory of ideas was that every idea in the mind must have been caused by some sense impression, Locke himself had difficulty in the application of this, which led to a class

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.2.
of ideas known as mixed modes. The problem was even more acute for Ward who wished to characterize the nature of verbal conceptions as well as other abstract conceptions. For Ward the 'principle of existence' of an idea was that which gave it its raison d'être, which sustained it in existence. Where he could, he claimed that the principle was in objects in the external world, and that ideas had 'marks' which indicated the nature of the principle of existence. However, with abstract nouns which did not have correlates in the world of objects, this became meaningless, so Ward claimed that such words, or their ideas, were derived from the world of objects, but the principle of existence had been transferred from the real world and were actually attached to the ideas themselves. In a sense, the ideas became things. In verbs, the principle of existence was still considered to be in the action in the world, and because actions are transitory, the principle was said to be 'inconstant' (principles of existence in nouns were always 'constant'). Moreover, the principle of existence of verbs was said to be 'communicable,' that is, it could be transferred to particular nouns, which signified objects or people capable of performing the action denoted by the idea. Thus when a

3. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.1.
noun and verb were in construction the inconstant principle of existence of the verb, which had to receive its existence from some actual performing of the action denoted by the verb, received it from the object or person denoted by the noun, who was the performer.

5.1.6. 'Demonstrative Circumstances'

'Demonstrative Circumstances' are Ward's way of describing the non-linguistic context in which an utterance occurs. They would seem to be the equivalent of the Firthian term 'context of a situation.'^1 Like Firth, Ward maintains that the total meaning of an utterance is only knowable if the demonstrative circumstances are taken into account. Ward's conception of the relevance of the non-linguistic setting is narrower than Firth's in that he only sees it as important in connexion with a limited number of grammatical features; pronouns and one word sentences are the areas where demonstrative circumstances become important. He remarks that the first and second person pronouns are not marked for sex, and do not need any form of antecedent because the 'antecedent' is the speech act itself in which the first and second person

1. J. R. Firth used and developed the term 'context of situation' to refer to the extra-linguistic components of the speech event itself and its situation.
actually participate. ¹ Ward remarks that the nature of verbs is such that they require a noun to precede them in order for there to be a sentence realising the speaker's communicative intention. When there are single word sentences, the fact that they are sentences derives not from the nature of the verbs "but from the demonstrative circumstances which may attend the act of pronouncing any one of them singly." 'Demonstrative circumstances' include not only the actual situation in which a sentence is uttered, but the act of pointing, and paralinguistic features, such as the tone of voice: "The act of pointing . . . and the tone of voice . . . amount to declarations, by the established customs observed in the use of language."²

5.2. Terminology of the Word-Classes

Nowhere is Ward's claim that he is using the old terminology with new meanings more completely demonstrated than in his discussion of the parts of speech. Although his delineation of the class of verbs for example is probably little different from most others,³ his divergence lies in the reasons for calling them verbs. His

2. Ward, p. 263.
3. The only area of difference being the infinitives, which were often considered to be nouns.
definitions of the parts will be examined briefly in this chapter (fuller discussion of the more interesting classes follows in the next chapter), but first his rather confused overall view of the parts will be examined.

5.2.1. 'Parts of Speech'

Although Ward refers to the word-classes as 'parts of speech,' and enumerates seven of them in the Speculative Grammar, his conformity to the tradition is apparent rather than real, and his discussion of the various classes indicates that the term 'part of speech' had little meaning in his grammatical analysis. The plan of the Speculative Grammar treats the parts in the following order: Noun (including Substantive and Adjective; the article is treated with the noun, and deemed to be just an appendage of the noun rather than a part in its own right), Pronoun, Verb, Adverb, Conjunction, Preposition, and Interjection. However, in the Practical Grammar, Ward says that the participle is a part of speech, and, in English, the article as well.¹

 Ward's manner of definition or description suggests a very different plan: he has five major categories, distinguished by the nature of the ideas annexed to exponents

¹. Ward, p. 320.
of the categories. These categories are: Concrete Noun Substantive, Abstract Noun Substantive, Noun Adjective, Verb Infinitive, and Verb Coalescent (including Verb Definitive). Pronouns are not a separate category, but are a subclass of Nouns, and are also divided into Substantives and Adjectives. Some Pronouns have a special syntactic function (e.g. relatives and interrogatives), but this special syntactic function is not a reason for making them members of a separate class, any more than the special syntactic function of the definitive verb is a reason for setting this up as a class separate from the verb coalescent. Adverbs, however, although in many ways equivalent to nouns in the ablative case, form a separate class precisely because they have a distinctive syntactic function which differentiates them from nouns. Prepositions, conjunctions, and interjections are all traditionally defined. The disparity between Ward's superficial description of the 'parts of speech' and his working model suggests that the term 'parts of speech' had no theoretical significance or real meaning for him.

5.2.2. Definitions of Particular 'Parts' Examined

The term 'noun' refers primarily not to a particular

1. These categories are discussed in detail in Chapter VI.
2. Cf. Para. 6.4.2.
syntactic class of word, but to those words which are attached to a particular class of idea, or conception. The distinguishing feature of the conceptions annexed to nouns is that they have "constant marks or characters." Pronouns are able to belong to the same general class because they have annexed conceptions, which though less distinctly laid out than those of nouns, have the same constant marks attached to them. Adjectives and substantives are closely related, but the relation is conceived as existing only between abstract substantives and adjectives. There appears to be no real difference between the conceptions of substantives and adjectives. Both, as nouns, have a constant principle of existence, but the mind is only aware of it in substantives. In adjectives the principle of existence is not noted; instead the principle of existence of the adjoining substantive is noted.

Verbs have inconstant marks of existence, denoting states. The verb is divided into the infinitive, the coalescent, and the definitive. The infinitive is like the other verbs because it has an inconstant principle,

4. Ward often calls the infinitive the 'verb objective.'
but it is like a noun substantive in that it can have other verbs depending on it when it is in subject position. The verb coalescent is so called because it most naturally coalesces with a noun; the verb definitive has the same properties as the verb coalescent, but it also marks a completed construction. Coalescence is a quality of ideas, definiteness is a grammatical quality.

5.3. The Study of Metalanguage

The purpose of this chapter is twofold: in the first place, it attempts to relate some of the more important terms that Ward uses to the intellectual context of their time; secondly, it provides in short space an introduction to the more unusual terminology that will be met in the detailed explication of Ward's grammatical theory.

Ward's technical language highlights a juxtaposition of terms taken from psychology and the conventional grammatical terminology. Grammatical terms in collocation with the psychological terms (coalescence, principle of existence, conception) have taken on a signification so entirely new that an understanding of their new meanings requires a full analysis of Ward's theory of word-classes. Bursill-Hall has suggested that collocational analysis be used as one way of stating the meaning of the technical
terminology or metalanguage of grammar. But it would seem that the theory of collocational meaning is suggestive rather than definitive in its analysis of terms. It shows that familiar words in new collocations take on new meanings, but it does little to show why Ward assigns new values to old terms, nor does it reveal the significance of the new values. The full explanation of the new values and Ward's aims in assigning these new values will be the subject of the next two chapters.

Chapter VI

Word-Class Theory

6.0. Introduction

6.1. Common Features of Substantives, Adjectives, and Verbs
   6.1.1. Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives
   6.1.2. Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives
   6.1.3. The Verb

6.2. Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes
   6.2.1. The Feature [con] or Constant Mark
   6.2.2. The Feature [ss] or Self-Supporting
   6.2.3. The Feature [noted]

6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes
   6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of Existence

6.4. The Minor Word-Classes
   6.4.1. Pronouns
   6.4.2. The Adverb
6.0. Introduction

William Ward's theory of the parts of speech is based on the idea or conception. He sees different word-classes based on distinctions in the ideas that are annexed to words. This chapter seeks to explicate Ward's analysis of the parts of speech in terms of the idea.

6.1. Common Features of Substantives, Adjectives, and Verbs

Grammatical theories can usually be divided into those that stress the similarity of verb and adjective and those that stress the similarity of substantive and adjective. In the past the latter approach was almost universal as a result of the impetus given it by the close ontological relation of substance and accidents in the philosophy of the time; Plato and Aristotle, however, had favoured the identification of adjective and verb as a result of the close dependence of their linguistic analysis on the logical proposition. William Ward's position differs from all others in that he recognized

1. "If grammatic definitions are made as accurate as the subject admits of, they must be founded on properties of the conceptions of the mind which are somewhat remote from common observations." (Ward, p.x.)

174
an underlying similarity in all three parts. It may well be, he thinks, that the grammarian's most difficult task is to indicate how parts differ from one another: for this "much abstract consideration becomes necessary." One obvious difference appears to emerge which will distinguish nouns and verbs: it is that nouns are said to denote objects and verbs to denote states. But we must weigh against this Ward's warning that his plan of language takes its form from the conceptions that the mind of man forms and affixes to nouns and verbs, and not from the nature of the objects. The fact that Ward says some ideas refer to states and some to objects is therefore irrelevant and extra-linguistic: parts of speech differ only as the ideas annexed to them differ.

6.1.1. **Noun Substantives and Noun Adjectives**

Ward's explanations are often cumbersome, and his style repetitious. In the following pages a feature analysis of his major parts of speech is proposed which

1. It will be necessary to consider the general nature of several [sc. subst., adj., and verb] of the parts of speech together on many occasions, for the sake of discovering the properties that they have in common with each other—as likewise the properties in which they disagree." (Ward, p. 3.)

2. "Much abstract consideration becomes necessary to distinguish the several particulars of the signification of the same part of speech one from another; and especially in the noun and verb. Every part of speech in some particulars of its signification approaches to the nature of some other part of speech." (Ward, p. x.)
attempts to abbreviate and state succinctly what Ward takes many pages to lay before his reader. The conceptions or ideas annexed to nouns "are distinguished in the mind by constant marks or characters, which are conceived to be evidences of a constant principle of existence peculiar to each object, whether such a principle is to be taken notice of or not." Although the constant marks or characters are evidence of a constant principle of existence in the extra-linguistic world of objects the constant marks are characteristics of the ideas. When an idea or bundle of semantic features is associated with the grammatical category 'noun' it has the characteristic or distinguishing feature of a 'constant mark'; we will call this an "Idea with a Mark of Existence which is constant" and give it the abbreviated notation: IME [+con].

Noun substantives and noun adjectives are distinguished according to whether or not the mind takes notice of this constant mark attached to the idea.2


2. "In the conceptions annexed to substantives, notice is taken of the peculiar separate principle of existence of the object which each substantive denotes . . . . In the conceptions annexed to adjectives, no separate principle of existence is to be taken notice of." (Ward, p.12) The second sentence here could be interpreted as a suggestion that not only should a separate principle not be taken notice of in adjectives, but that it may not exist at all. But this would contradict Ward's claim that all nouns have a constant mark indicating principles of existence.
Ideas associated with adjectives do have a constant mark as evidence of a constant principle, but the mind does not attend to the mark. In noun substantives the constant mark is taken notice of. The mind’s attention to this feature of the idea will be marked with [+noted] in our abbreviated notation, and its lack of attention will be marked with [-noted]. Thus the noun substantive will become: IME [+con] and the noun adjective: IME [-noted]. Ward envisages the ideas not simply as the perception in the mind of the essences of objects denoted by sense impressions (the position of the Port Royal grammar), or as constructs made from these sense impressions through association by the active process of the mind (Locke’s position), but as objects existing in the mind which the mind can know completely or only partially. If an idea has a constant mark attached to it, as do all nouns, there seems no reason in principle why the mind should not pay attention to this mark. But according to Ward the mind frequently does not take notice of this mark, for this is the reason why the word annexed to such an idea takes on the grammatical form and function of an adjective.

6.1.2. **Class Change in Substantives and Adjectives**

It would seem to follow from this that all adjectives are capable of becoming substantives, and all substantives
are capable of becoming adjectives, as it is merely a matter of the kind of attention given the idea by the mind. Thus Ward says that woody is an adjective, because its conception is not "separately ascertained in the intellect," that is, its constant mark is not attended to. If it were attended to and ascertained, it would receive a separate principle of existence and would become the abstract conception denoted by woodiness.¹ In fact it seems that all substantives are not freely interchangeable with adjectives because here Ward has selected woodiness rather than wood, and later he becomes even more explicit: "The conceptions denoted by 'manly-brutish-earthy' are not the same with those denoted by the substantives 'man-brute-earth,' but with those denoted by 'manliness-brutishness-earthiness.'"² This is because all adjectives "express abstract conceptions; even such

1. Ward puts it thus:

If it were considered under such ascertained, it would become the conception of an abstract object, to which the mind gives a separate principle of existence; and such conception might be denoted by a substantive which corresponds with the adjective. As for instance the conceptions denoted by the adjectives 'woody--fertile--extensive--desolate,' if considered as separately ascertained in the intellect, become the abstract conceptions which are denoted by the substantives 'woodiness--fertility--extent--desolation.' (Ward, p. 15)

2. Ward, p. 15.
adjectives as are derived from substantives which are
the names of real beings."¹ Adjectives, then, as signals
of abstract conceptions are related only to abstract
substantives. Some adjectives do not have a related
abstract substantive, but this is only "because such
have not been found necessary in language." Ward's dis-
tinction between substantives which represent abstract
conceptions and those which do not depends on whether
the conception has a constant mark indicating a constant
principle of existence in some object or whether "the
mind considers these [conceptions] as if each of them
has a peculiar principle of existence in itself."² Ward
is saying that the constant mark is not always evidence
of a constant principle in things, but is sometimes evi-
dence of a principle of existence in the ideas themselves.
He seems to be saying that the constant mark of an abstract
noun has the additional characteristic of being self-
supporting, of being a mark of the idea's own constant
principle. As only the conceptions attached to abstract
nouns enjoy the privilege of changing class from substan-
tive to adjective and vice versa it seems that the fea-
ture [±noted] is relevant to these only. The conceptions

1. Ibid., p. 15.
which are self-supporting, will be marked [+ss] and those whose marks are evidence of a principle of existence outside the idea will be marked [-ss]. The following analysis of Ward's plan of the ideas annexed to nouns is proposed:

Concrete substantives: IME [+con] [-ss] (There is a constant mark of a principle of existence outside the idea).

Abstract substantives: IME [+con] [+ss] [+noted] (The principle of existence is now within the idea, and thus it is self-supporting. The mind is taking notice of the principle).

Adjectives: IME [+con] [+ss] [-noted] (A constant principle belongs to the idea, but is not noticed. All adjectives are considered abstract).

In spite of the fact that Ward sees the 'abstract' adjectives related to abstract nouns (inasmuch as they have the same bundle of semantic features behind them), he calls such adjectives 'derived' adjectives and claims that they are derived from concrete nouns. He does not state what this process of derivation consists of, and

1. Ward, p. 15.
he probably had no clear idea; for the purposes of our analysis we can say that it consists in the marking of [-ss] with a positive value; this makes a concrete noun, or idea of substance, into an abstract idea without any grammatical or phonological realization; a linguistic distinction will arise according to whether or not the mind is attending to the mark of existence which is now a property of the idea itself. Thus derivation of abstract nouns and adjectives consists in the change of the 'self-supporting' feature from negative to positive value, and the addition of the feature 'noted.' For Ward, ideas annexed to concrete noun substantives, being the equivalent of Locke's complex ideas of substance, are inevitably linked to the grammatical category of substantive, but when the mind makes these ideas independent of the world of objects, so that they become self-supporting, they are not intrinsically substantival or adjectival, but belong to a more general category, 'noun.' They only become further differentiated when the mind actually focusses on the idea. If the mind focusses on it completely then the noun takes on the rank of substantive; if it only focusses in a more general way and does not take into account the specific nature of the mark of existence, then the noun only has the status of adjective. The category to which the word belongs depends
on the degree of attention given to the idea by the mind; but this only seems to be the case with abstract nouns and adjectives; all other categories would seem to enjoy the full attention of the mind.

6.1.3. **The Verb**

Ward's definition of the verb stresses that it has a mark which indicates that the principle of existence of the verbal state is not constant. The main problem with this definition is to establish what Ward means by the inconstant nature of the principle of existence, and to determine how and when it is present, and when it is absent. Unfortunately Ward gives few examples to demonstrate his definitions; it seems that he recognizes an inconstant principle to be present when a verb is in construction with a noun; the principle of existence is inconstant because it is the mark of existence of one of Locke's ideas of mixed modes, which perish in their birth; thus verbs in construction have a mark of the inconstant

1. Ward's definition of the verb is:

Verbs are expressions of states of being, as distinguished in the mind by marks or characters, which may be conceived as evidences of a principle of existence in the states. But not of a principle of such a nature as to be constantly in each state, or peculiar to each period into which the state may be distinguished. (Ward, p. 12).
principle of existence of the fleeting actions denoted by 'mixed modes.' Because this principle of existence is communicable to the noun and will be the means of uniting the idea of the verb with the 'incommunicable principle of existence' of the noun, Ward says that the inconstant principle is not inherent in the idea, but is only marked by it. Thus finite verbs do not have a self-supporting principle of existence. However, the infinitive, when used as subject of a sentence, having another verb dependent on it, is not required to communicate any principle of existence to a noun; here, Ward says, "the state under such consideration will be represented to the mind by a conception that is separately ascertained in the intellect [i.e. has its own principle of existence], as the conception denoted by a substantive is; and such conception must become the object of number." Ward appears to be giving an explanation of the independence of the 'conception' attached to an infinitive verb which is similar to that proposed for an abstract noun: the conception is marked for a principle of existence not in some extra-linguistic entity but in the idea itself. Ward is adamant that infinitive differ from nouns, even though there are so many similarities; the greatest 1. Ward, p. 16.
similarity for him is that infinitives, like substantives are subject to number; his examples include "to think and to speak" and "to speak once - twice - thrice many times." Apart from the formal distinction of the linguistic forms themselves (which Ward recognizes as a reason for looking for distinguishing features, but not the basis of the difference), the only distinction between nouns and infinitives is that the idea attached to an infinitive verb has an inconstant principle of existence, inconstant because the state it denotes is inconstant. He also notes that while even abstract nouns can receive "the mark of the vocative" in poetry, infinitives never can; this, however, is a structural feature, and does not explain why they are different.

The ideas attached to infinitive verbs will be represented in our notation as "Ideas with Marks on Existence that are not constant, but that are self-supporting," which becomes \( \text{IME} \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{con} \\ +ss \end{array} \right] \). All other verbs differ from infinitives in having conceptions which are not separately laid up in the mind, and therefore are not self-supporting; they have a derived principle of existence; it is derived from the world of objects as was the

1. Ibid., p. 17.
case with the concrete noun substantives. Verbs other than infinitives are annexed to "Ideas with Marks of existence which are not constant and self-supporting," or in our notation: $\text{IME } [-\text{con}]$. There are also differences between participles and finite verbs; Ward calls the two categories 'verbs coalescent' and 'verbs definitive'; but these differences are not differences in the ideas annexed to them, but differences in them as signals of operations, and as such will be discussed later.

6.2. Feature Analysis of Major Word-Classes

Thus far we have discussed five different kinds of principal parts of speech; these are: concrete substantives, abstract substantives, adjectives, infinitives, and other verbs. The ideas attached to these differ according to the nature of the mark of existence. It may be constant or inconstant, it may be self-supporting or derived from things; whether the mind focusses on it or not may also be significant. The feature representation for the marks of existence of the various parts is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concrete substantives</th>
<th>IME $[-\text{ss}]$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abstract substantives</td>
<td>IME $[+\text{con} +\text{ss} +\text{noted}]$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of this feature representation is to suggest the similarity in Ward's view of all three parts of speech. The three become five distinguishable parts in Ward's analysis, and the change in class is achieved in all instances by the change of one feature from a positive to a negative value or vice versa, or by the addition of one new feature. All five distinctive classes or parts have in common the fact that they are made up from an idea with a mark of existence. Differences are only in the nature of the mark of existence, and it is these differences that are distinguished by features in this analysis.

6.2.1. The Feature \([\text{Con}]\) or Constant Mark

The validity of the analysis rests upon the recognition of these features, and so these will be examined in some detail; let it first be clear that the purpose of this analysis is not to test the validity of Ward's theory, but is simply a means of explicating his writing.
In Ward's discussion of the constant or inconstant principles of existence ([+ con]) he appears to be allowing the real world to impinge on his linguistic system: the finite verb has an inconstant principle of existence which is not its own, but that of objects in action; the reason the principle of existence is constant in the noun, and inconstant in the verb, is that it is only in existence for the verb during the period of time indicated by the tense of the verb, or perhaps, for the duration of the activity signified by the verb; it can be completely withheld by the negative particle. It is possible to follow Ward's reasoning, if not to agree with it, when he discusses the inconstant principle in relation to the tenses and to the notions attached to verbs in general: we are reminded of Locke's mixed modes. However, his discussion of the negative, and his proposal that a verb with a negative particle gives evidence of an idea

1. Ward discusses the verb's principle of existence and the effect of the negative particle as follows:

It is clear that a verbal state, as expressed by any of the tenses or any of the moods, is apprehended to have a principle of existence which may be conceived as withheld from it at the pleasure of the mind. If this principle is conceived to be always withheld from any part or period of a verbal state, such part or period can have no existence. Hence the negative particle "not" when united with a verb, expresses a state which is without actual existence . . . because the principle by which it should exist is never communicated to it. (Ward, p. 19).
with absolutely no mark of existence is perplexing. If the idea has no mark of existence, one wonders how it exists at all; Locke and Hartley believed that the mind had a store of ideas that had accumulated from birth and were summoned forth either by the recurrence of the appropriate physical stimulus or by a word linked to them by association; consequently for them, ideas do all exist in the mind, but are only activated or charged with what Ward calls existence when stimulated by the associated words or things. We must assume that where Ward considers verbs that have been negated he is suggesting the ideas excited by those words remain in the unactivated state which the countless other unmentioned ideas in the mind are in. The only difference between uniting the particle *not* with a verb, thus negating it, and not mentioning the verb at all is that in the former case one is explicitly publishing the fact that the state denoted by the verb is not existing, and therefore cannot be in coalescence with the substantive. Ward's explanation is consistent with the rest of his theory of ideas, although it produces certain difficulties in the formulation of the parts of speech which he sets out, and which has been explicated here. However, even today linguists are not at all certain about how the negative enters into the verb phrase. The rather curious implications on the proposed feature analysis of the parts of speech suggests an inconsistency
in Ward's own theory, but should not be considered of sufficient importance to destroy the otherwise coherent scheme that Ward has established.

The feature [con] is fairly clear in its implications: ideas associated with words have to be activated, that is, they have to become associated with a principle of existence; some words (nouns) have this principle all the time, while others (all verbs) only have it for the period covered by their time reference. This appears to suggest that the main difference between nouns and verbs is that of time reference; however, Ward does not say that this is the case, and his distinction may well be more subtle. (Cf. end of Para. 6.3.).

6.2.2. The Feature [ss] or Self-Supporting

The feature [ss], when marked for its positive value, indicates that the mark of existence, whether constant or inconstant, denotes a principle of existence within the very ideas (as in woodiness or woody), while its negative value denotes that the principle of existence is derived from things in the case of noun (as in wood) or actions of things in verbs (as in sees, holds). This rather tenuous distinction between marks of existence and principles of existence, the validity of the concept of the principle of existence, and the supposed transfer-
ability of it constitute the most unsatisfactory part of Ward's analysis; it is clearly based on Locke's notion that all ideas exist in the mind only because they have some kind of correlates in the outside world. Ward undoubtedly considers things in the world as the 'principle of existence' of ideas; when ideas are removed from the immediate realm of the physical world (that of the concrete noun substantive) to the realm of the abstract ideas they are given a self-supporting principle of existence; Ward realized the difficulties of the realism in his theory, and excuses himself for this hypothesization of principles of existence; "The mind considers these objects [abstract ideas] as if each of them had a peculiar constant principle of existence in itself [i.e. [+ss]]; and this the mind does merely for its own convenience." ¹

6.2.3. **The Feature [Noted]**

The feature [+noted] indicates whether or not the mind is paying attention to the mark of existence. Ward's proposition that the mind either notices or does not notice the principle of existence is, as it stands, difficult to understand; however, it has much in common with the Port Royal suggestion that substantives signify things

clearly and adjectives signify them confusedly; it also reminds us of Jespersen's suggestion in The Philosophy of Grammar that adjectives can become substantives through a process of specialization, focussing, or definition. Although Ward does not use the terms 'clear' or 'confused' of Port Royal, and although he does not appear to see the wider implications of his statement that Jespersen does, it does not seem unreasonable to suppose that he had in mind a similar explanation.

6.3. Rules Linking Ideas to Word-Classes

It is now possible to see why Ward's ideas are said to be grammatically undifferentiated, and to demonstrate how related the various parts are one to another. Ward, as a follower of Locke, believed all our ideas to be founded in sense knowledge; as a consequence of this the basis of all linguistic ideas would have to be objects in the world; concrete substantives, then, are in a sense the primary linguistic category. Ideas all start as members of this category: IME [\(+\text{con} \) \(-\text{ss}\)] . The first process which the mind can perform on these ideas is to make them abstract, or self-sufficient, by removing their

dependence on the world of objects; this is done by making the feature \([ss]\) positive. As a result of this the idea does not belong to any surface grammatical category (there is no category with only the features \([+con][+ss]\)); if, however, the mind is considering the idea as representing an object in the world (and linguistically manifested as a primary or concrete noun) this feature change will not take place. The mind has the option of leaving the original idea in the concrete noun substantive form or preparing it to belong to other categories; this option can be expressed by the following feature change rule:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) \quad [+con][-ss] & \longrightarrow [+con][+ss]
\end{align*}
\]

Assuming that the optional change is made, the idea now has no grammatical significance and is just a collection of simple ideas or semantic features which, as they are, can have no grammatical function. However, any change or addition to them will make them members of a grammatical category. The following rule allows them to remain as they are, in which case an additional feature will be added (\([+\text{noted}]\)) which will distinguish abstract nouns and adjectives; alternatively the value of one or both features may change, giving an infinitive or some other
verbal form:

(2) \[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{[+con]} \\
\text{[+ss]}
\end{array} \rightarrow \begin{cases}
\text{[-noted]} \\
\text{[-con]} \\
\text{[+ss]}
\end{cases}
\]

The change in feature from [+con] to [-con] implies that the mind is focussing on a typical activity of the object rather than on its existence. It would be useful to demonstrate these rules with an 'idea' or semantic concept in English; Ward himself only outlines his theory; he never worries about showing us how it will work. There are few semantic concepts that occur in all five grammatic forms that have been discussed. The concept of a circle, although not considered by Ward, is one that is susceptible to the various changes which he envisaged: circle could be a noun or a verb, there is an adjective circular, and an abstract noun circularity. But these forms do represent a considerable semantic spread: to circle is to 'put a circle around,' and circularity is considered a property of arguments rather than circles; however, if we can lay aside the semantic spread of these words, and consider the verb circle as referring to what aircraft do when waiting to land, and circularity a property of circles, and circles to be physical objects (which is highly unlikely!) we can see Ward's point: the mind
perceives a circle through the sense impressions, and
the idea that this enkindles is an IME \([+\text{con}]\), that is, one that has the grammatical properties of a concrete noun substantive; however, there are occasions when one does not wish to refer to a circle, but may wish to refer to the activity of circling, the abstract property of being circular, or just the quality. If this is the case, the mind takes the idea either from the store of ideas, or from the immediate sense impressions and first performs the process of turning it into an abstract idea by applying rule one. This abstract idea can receive the feature \([-\text{noted}]\) by rule two and may thus be lexicalized without the mind noting its principle of existence; it will thus become the adjective \textit{circular}. If rule two changes the existing features to their negative value we will have the finite verb \textit{circles} (but not necessarily marked for third person or in this tense); Ward is claiming that the mind can alter the grammatical characteristics of a bundle of semantic features to make them belong to different categories of classes. When he discusses the three terms \textit{man, manly}, and \textit{manliness}, he says that both \textit{manly} and \textit{manliness} are derived from \textit{man}; this would be achieved by applying rules and two; he also said that they both share the same idea: that is, in our analysis, both have the features \([+\text{con}]\). There are no verbs with the base form 'man' except as in "to man the
guns," which is semantically distinct, but Ward does suggest that to be a man and to be a judge are verbs; so if the negative value of [con] were chosen the verbal form of the idea would be the result. The rules of syntax ensure that the correct feature matrix combinations result in a sentence which follows the normal conventions of the language.

Ward says that the process of abstraction from a concrete substantive may result in the formation of a verbal conception;¹ the process involves forming abstract conceptions from the objects, and allowing these to exist by a principle that may be communicated or withheld, i.e. an inconstant principle. Interchangeability between verb and adjective is also easily accomplished by ignoring the inconstant principle in verbs, with the result that no principle is noted; the idea would appear to have

¹. He says:

No such object as is expressed by the 'mind, body, a man, a tree, a beast, a mineral' can be denoted by any verb. But states, the conceptions whereof are formed by abstraction from the objects above mentioned, may be denoted by verbs, if these states are conceived to exist by a principle which may be communicated to them, or withheld from them, at the pleasure of such objects as have a real principle of existence in themselves, or of any object to which the mind assigns such principle for its own convenience. (Ward, p. 20).
the features of an adjective. The easy change between
verb and adjective helps Ward to see why the verb coa-
lescent (the participle, that is) can easily occupy the
same position as the adjective (cf. a running horse and
a black horse). He says that verbal conceptions may unite
with substantival conceptions in the same way as adjecti-
val conceptions do. But Ward still emphasizes the in-
constant principle of existence of the verbal conception,
even though the so-called present participle hardly has
any limiting time reference. It seems that while Ward
appears to be referring to actual time reference when
discussing the inconstant principle, he is actually
trying to make the active/stative or action/non-action
distinction which is discussed in many modern treatments
of verbs and adjectives. The point that Ward was empha-
sizing was that verbs are not indicative of a permanent

1. "The same conceptions which are denoted by verbs, may
be denoted by adjectives, if the occasional principle by
which the verbal states are conceived to exist is not at-
tended to." (Ward, p. 20).

2. "Conceptions denoted by verbs may unite with those
denoted by substantives, much in the same manner that
adjective conceptions unite with substantive conceptions;
except that the verbal conception will carry along with
it the notion of the inconstancy of the principle by which
it exists. But the adjective conception will carry no
such notion along with it." (Ward, p. 20).

state as are adjectives; he was gropingly reaching for this distinction through the limiting factor of tense. It is not of course true that all verbs indicate action and all adjectives non-action or permanence, but undoubtedly the great majority do, and Ward felt that this was the main distinguishing feature of verbs and adjectives; it is this feature that lends support to his proposal that infinitives are true verbs. While his insight into the relation of substantive and adjective resembles the analysis offered by Jespersen early in this century, his analysis of the verb and adjective appears to be founded on the same insights as those developed in current transformational theory.

6.3.1. Coalescence and the Principle of Existence

Construction in language is said to occur through a process of 'coalescence'; this is one of the cornerstones of Ward's theory. Coalescence has to be under-

1. He is aware that there are exceptions to the general rule of action/non-action division between verbs and adjectives, such as "equalleth," and treats them as exceptions.


stood in terms of Ward's notion of number. He says that if we had one word to express every different conception in the mind there would be no need for connected discourse as such; for him, a sentence is a unit because it builds up one complex conception, just as a picture subsumes many details into a unity. The difficult thing for him to explain is how it is that words that are each attached to a separate idea with its own principle of existence can all refer to only one single complex conception when they are in construction. He uses the principle of coalescence to resolve the difficulty: an idea becomes a 'coalescent circumstance' by virtue of being in a particular syntactic position, and as such, it "unites with an object without increasing the number of the Object."

Thus when a verb unites with a noun substantive it is able to do so because its inconstant principle of existence coalesces with the principle of existence of the noun, and instead of there being two distinct principles there is only the one larger one. Adjectives in English can achieve coalescence more immediately than verbs¹ because the characteristic of the verb is attended to by the

¹. Ward maintains this position in the first part of his Speculative Grammar, but appears to revise it later. See Para. 7.2.
Thus the adjective is immediately taken to be in coalescence with the nearest principle of existence, that of the noun substantive. Ward does not discuss how the adjective gives this express notice; he entirely ignores structural considerations throughout the Essay; we can only assume that he considered they gave express notice because they are adjectives; we know that they are adjectives because of their syntactic position, and the form of the word which, we, as native speakers, know is that of an adjective.

6.4. Minor Word-Classes

The discussion of word-classes has so far been limited to those areas which concern the way the mind forms concepts; the reason for this is that the uniqueness of the terms discussed lies in their psychological implications, in the process of the formation of concepts. Ward's grammatical analysis consists of two chief topics: one is a discussion of the formation of concepts, and the other is the expression of the relation between these concepts. His discussion of the formation of concepts relies heavily

1. Ward says:

Noun adjectives are the names of abstract conceptions, similar to those which are denoted by substantives; only these adjective names give express notice, that no principle of separate existence is to be attended to, in whatsoever is denoted by any of them. (Ward, p. 13).
on Locke and Hartley. His unique and original contribution here is that he is able to give an account in psychological terms of the characteristics of ideas which lie behind the different grammatical categories. The analysis of his account given here has attempted to stress the essential simplicity of his formulation, a simplicity which is difficult to see when reading his grammar on account of the endless repetition which he indulges in, as well as his failure to give examples and define his terms unambiguously. So far we have discussed only ideas which lie behind nouns and verbs, the parts which Ward calls the most important parts of speech. Discussion of the term 'coalescence' suggested that these concepts, once formed, undergo processes which relate to each other. The processes of relation which Ward discusses are essentially his account of syntax; here, as in his account of the parts of speech, he pays little attention to the structural markers of syntax; whether they are cases, articles, pronouns, or prepositions, they are all seen as "signals of the operation of the mind": as such these minor parts of speech will be discussed mainly in the following chapter; however, pronouns and adverbs are discussed here because of their relation to the noun.
6.4.1. Pronouns

Pronouns are "the names of objects of certain species, distinguished by characteristics of so extensive a nature, as to comprehend all objects whatsoever as individuals thereof;"¹ sometimes they refer back to objects previously mentioned; often they are general names made to refer to particular objects by means of additional 'demonstrative circumstances' such as pointing: "Pronouns are names of objects belonging to species so very extensive that when some demonstrative circumstance does not attend the use of them it must be supplied, in order to ascertain more particularly the nature and properties of the object denoted by any one of them."² Ward's description of the pronoun is distinctive, especially when compared to the more usual definition of them as noun substitutes, such as Lowth's; Lowth says: "a pronoun is a word standing instead of a Noun, as its Substitute or representative."³ The superiority of Ward's definition of the pronoun is probably more due to his indebtedness to Harris than to original thinking, except for one important part of his description: the quality of the pronoun that he focusses

3. Lowth, op. cit., p. 31.
on is its ability to refer to individuality without referring to specific characteristics; pronouns have "characteristics of so extensive a nature, as to comprehend all objects . . . as individuals." This approach is somewhat similar to the much older one which claims that pronouns indicate 'substance without quality,' but Ward developed his approach through contact with Locke's philosophy. The mind has the ability to focus on particular ideas, perhaps on those of a horse; but it can just focus on some so that this horse is seen not as a horse but as an animal; it may then choose to ignore the features which indicate that it is living; then it will be referred to as a thing, or just as it; the idea is sufficiently removed from particulars to be able to refer to a wide variety of objects at the choice of the mind, but its property of number is such that the mind can only choose to focus on one such object at a time. Substance without qualities was unknowable and anathema to the Lockean spirit, but the association of the pronouns with ideas so general that the possible area of reference is unlimited achieves the same perspicuity as the mediaeval interpretation of the attitude. It is interesting to observe how two very distinct philosophical systems are able to offer equally useful explanations of linguistic systems.
Ward makes the usual division of pronouns: personal pronouns, possessives, and relative pronouns; his analysis of the relative will be discussed in the chapter on syntax, as he discusses it with reference to the relations between conceptions. His treatment of the personal and possessive pronouns is largely conventional apart from an interesting distinction between the first and second person pronouns and the third person pronouns. The first person has the characteristic of "a speaker mentioning himself in what he says, as distinguished by the act of speaking," and the second person pronoun has the characteristic of being "an object . . . mentioned as distinguished by words addressed to the object." All other pronouns are of "third personal species." The point is that I and you, although words with extremely general signification are immediately given singular significations without any kind of antecedent, the "demonstrative circumstances" being attached to the act of speaking itself. Although Harris notes and Lowth repeats that


2. "For when the words are actually spoken, the person or persons to whom they are addressed usually see the speaker; and by that means know more of that speaker, than the pronoun "I" expresses. And the speaker, by seeing those whom he speaks to, and frequently by being acquainted personally with them, knows more of them than the pronoun "ye" or "you" expresses. (Ward, p. 126).

3. Harris, op. cit., p. 70; and Lowth, op. cit., p. 32.
the first and second person do not have a sex distinction because the people are present together, making such a distinction superfluous, they do not go any further in studying the implications of this presence. Ward goes further in attempting to state the implications of the peculiarities of these two persons. He notes that the writers of Latin grammar had considered these two pronouns not to require antecedents; he attempts to show how the place of antecedents is taken by the peculiar circumstances of the addresser-addressee relationship. He also criticizes former grammarians for suggesting that pronouns form a common class on account of the antecedent requirements. He says: "This is a very considerable oversight; for the connexion of a personal pronoun with its antecedent is very different from that of a relative pronoun, as will fully appear in the account of each in this book." Ward's inherent conservatism in relation to class names does not allow him to set them up as completely distinct classes, but his statement of their distinctive natures will serve as a justification for the separate discussion of personal and relative pronouns in this thesis. Relatives are discussed in Paras. 7.3 ff.

6.4.2. The Adverb

The adverb is discussed with a certain ambiguity by Ward; he does not completely endorse the Port Royal analysis which sees the adverb as an abbreviation of the preposition + noun construction because for Ward the adverb has a particular function to perform which cannot be performed by any substantive; however, he does say that "the sense of the adverb may be expressed by some of the forms of a substantive in the ablative case, in almost any sentence. Thus 'very good' is in effect 'good in verity.'"¹ But there is a fundamental distinction between the adverb and the noun in the ablative case or with a preposition. The adverb is more than just an abbreviated form of 'preposition + noun' because it has the syntactic function of closing the construction or sentence modification.² This it does by giving notice of a mental operation. However, the conceptions denoted

1. Ward, p. 213.

2. If the conception, usually expressed by an adverb, is at any time expressed by the case of a substantive of an equivalent signification; that conception may, if the speaker pleases, be farther modified by some connective word made to depend on the substantive; as appears in the expressions, 'good in perfect reality—to act with infinite wisdom' . . . . These modifications by other dependent words, can very seldom be applied when an adverb is made use of; and therefore this circumstance . . . with the grammatical form of the adverb are the only particulars which distinguish most of the adverbs from the oblique case of the noun substantive. (Ward, p. 213).
by the adverb are similar to those of a noun with a preposition. Ward agrees with the Port Royal analysis in seeing the adverb as signifying a particular species of conception, also signified by 'preposition + noun,' but he disagrees as to its syntactic function.
Chapter VII

Relations Between Concepts: An Approach to Syntax

7.0. Grammatical Relations

7.1. Case
  7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis
  7.1.2. The Function of Case
  7.1.3. Nominative and Accusative Cases
  7.1.4. Substantives in Oblique Cases the Equivalent of Adjectives
  7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity
  7.1.6. Two Basic Sentence Types
  7.1.7. Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than One Noun

7.1.8. Prepositions

7.2. Adjectives and Verbs
  7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb

7.3. Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses
  7.3.1. The Notion of Degree
  7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses
  7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution

7.4. Extraposition

7.5. A Note on Performatives
CHAPTER VII

RELATIONS BETWEEN CONCEPTS: AN APPROACH TO SYNTAX

7.0. Grammatical Relations

Part of the function of the adverb, the relative pronoun, the verb definitive, and the entire function of the cases, prepositions, and conjunctions, is to give notice of operations of the mind. Ward's continual reference to 'operations of the mind' suggests that this term transcends and embraces the particular functional units in some way. It invokes considerations of Locke and Hartley. Ward's view of language structure is essentially a dynamic one; he does not view a sentence as a set or relations without movement, but a set of relations which has developed because a series of operations have modified and arranged the primitive conceptions or ideas of the mind. These operations of the mind are triggered off by various structural markers, prepositions, cases, etc., and serve to arrange the ideas in an order of dependence. Before these operations start functioning the grammatical categories attached to the ideas have already been selected, presumably by the communicative needs of the speaker. The operations of the mind are a means of arranging these grammatically undifferentiated ideas. Thus there are two stages in sentence con-
struction; they are:

1) attachment of semantic concepts to grammatical categories,

2) arrangement of grammatical categories in meaningful dependency relation.

The first stage was discussed in the last chapter. There were no observable signals for this part of the process; Ward recognized that there are related forms in language (cf.: man, manly, and manliness) and used Locke's theory of ideas to construct a theoretical interpretation of these forms. There are however, observable signals of the ordering operations that are performed by the mind. Operations of the mind are signalled by structural markers which place one idea in a dependency relation to another (as was briefly discussed in relation to adjectives and verbs). Operations can be said to order grammatical units; however, this ordering does not appear to be a sequential ordering; the way that particular surface forms in language follow each other is considered only a matter of custom, and not a part of universal grammar. Ward gives the Hebrew genitive as an example of language particular surface distinctions; he says that the same relation is indicated as in Latin, but the attachment of case markers to the nouns is the opposite from what it is in Latin. Undoubtedly the fact that noun adjective
comes next to the noun substantive and the verb follows
the subject in English, is considered extremely appropri-
ate by Ward, but ideas themselves cannot be sequentially
ordered; they can only be placed in dependency relations.
This, and not the ordering of the phonological manifesta-
tion of language is the function of the 'operations of
the mind.' If Ward had followed his plan through coherently,
he would have had to discuss the set of language
particular rules which take into account the order of
dependency in ideas and relate it to the sequential
ordering of words. It does not seem that Ward's overall
view of language was sufficiently sophisticated to achieve
this, or perhaps it was that he felt that such was too
trivial an activity for his concern, it being so obvious
that adjectives come before substantives, and preposi-
tions between nouns.

There is perhaps the more fundamental reason why
Ward was not concerned with stating the rules which join
the dependency relations of ideas to the sequential
ordering of the phonological manifestation of them: in
spite of the fact that Ward's starting point was a philo-
sophical or psychological account of the formation of
ideas in the mind, once he had accounted for these basic
ideas, the criteria he used for manipulating them, the
only criteria he had available in fact, were the criteria derived from the structure of Latin and English. Only occasionally does he allow considerations of the structure of Latin to impinge on his Essay, so his analysis of English is the continual justification for his discussion of what happens to the ideas in the mind which have been derived from the world through sense impression. This reliance on English is almost inevitable: Ward's limited knowledge of other languages could not provide him with a wider knowledge or analysis of language; his predecessors had all been guilty of exactly the same mistake, believing analysis of language to be an analysis of their own language. While the perspective that this provided him with is inevitably limited, it is important to point out that his reliance on his own language does not make his investigations any the less interesting, but it does render any attempt to relate the underlying ideas to surface structure completely redundant. Ward's attempt to understand the process of speaking, and to suggest some universal properties associated with it, is not expected to withstand objective criticism as a current theory would be; conscious of the limitations imposed on Ward by the state of knowledge of his age, the present-day reader of Ward's grammar is searching for innovations in terms of the
eighteenth century attitudes to language. Insofar as Ward's analysis is limited by his lack of knowledge of other languages and by a lack of methodological presuppositions, we excuse him; insofar as he was able to transcend these limitations and suggest avenues of investigation which have proved valuable in throwing light on the nature of language, we admire him. These observations on Ward's aims are made here in order to account for the continual use of psychological accounts to explain supposedly grammatical terminology, and to account for Ward's lack of interest in what are normally considered to be grammatical definitions. It might once have been objected that accounts of this nature were not the concern of linguistics; times have changed from this point of view; interest in categories and phenomena that are not directly observable has returned, and is justified just so long as there are definite empirical reasons for positing the existence of such categories and phenomena. The empirical reasons we find in Ward lie in the structure of the English Language; insofar as the structure of English is not characteristic of language in general it is easy to pinpoint numerous false observations that Ward makes; but a surprisingly large number of observations do in fact transcend the limitations of the English language, and it is this ability of
Ward's to transcend particulars that gives him his claim to recognition.

7.1. Case

It was suggested in Chapter II\(^1\) that the category of case was a stimulus to linguistic investigation, and that Ward's own method of dealing with case would play a significant role in the development of his syntactic theory. The explanations of case that had been proposed in previous years were encouraging future grammarians to be less concerned with data and more concerned with theory.\(^2\) Psychological or explanatory interest in case led to a return to the kind of speculation on syntax that the mediaeval grammarians had indulged in.\(^3\) Accounts of the history of linguistics do not usually

1. Para. 2.5.6.

2. James Harris is definitely theory-orientated. Cf. Para. 2.5.5.

3. Ian Michael describes the mediaeval approach to syntax as an interest in explaining phenomena:

   The speculative grammarians' most significant extension of the grammatical tradition was their enlargement of the concept of syntax: they were less interested in whether a verb or a preposition governed a particular case than in what was meant by saying that it 'governed' a case at all. By virtue of what power did it govern? This new approach to syntax, for all its patterned artificiality, was, at its best, a linguistic enquiry. But it is perhaps only by hindsight that it can be seen as such. (Michael, p. 523).
credit Renaissance grammarians or English grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with such enquiries. However, a cursory glance at Ward's Essay on Grammar (or Hermes) would suggest that it is different from the usual run of English grammars, even though only a few pages are devoted to the topic "Of Words in Connected Construction" or what today would be called syntax. What would be equated with the mediaeval notion of syntax is discussed throughout the Speculative Grammar.

7.1.1. Three Levels of Analysis

In the Essay there is no classification of construction types of the kind we find in Lowth's Grammar, and there is little explicit concern with régime and concord, which formed such a major part of continental discussions on syntax at this period. Ward's discussion centres on the relations of ideas rather than the relations of words, and it is case, or its manifestation in English, which he sees as the principal signal of these relations; case, prepositions, and word order are all signals of dependencies among ideas. Ward is unique among the English grammarians in recognizing three separate levels of grammatical analysis; he

1. Ian Michael's account is typical. See p. 523.
recognizes the phenomenon of language as manifested in words as the surface level of language, below this there is the level of grammatically differentiated ideas, and below this again, the level of semantic units which belong to no grammatical category:

The surface level, level one, is the only concern of most grammarians, but Ward neither dealt with this level prescriptively, as did many writers of the eighteenth century, nor did he seek to describe it systematically as Wallis and a few others had attempted to do. He
recognized the surface level only as a means of signaling important processes in the underlying levels. Ward's interest in the deep structure rather than the surface structure suggests that he was interested in the explanatory rather than the descriptive aspects of language; in many ways he was, and he paid little heed to the quality of the description of surface categories, as is evidenced by his acceptance of a conventional schema of the parts of speech. However, his neglect of this area was occasioned by attention to what he believed to be the more fundamental concern: the meaning of the syntactic categories of level two. He used level one as a means of reaching level two; after analysing level two he could have returned to the surface level and offered a new analysis of this on the basis of his findings; however, he did not take this final step, and consequently his work has remained relatively unnoticed by those who trace the history of English grammar.

7.1.2. The Function of Case

Case was one of the traditional categories that Ward used in order to reach level two. For him the lack of formal manifestation of cases in English was no reason for ignoring case or abolishing it, as Wallis had done. The cases, he argues, have a function, and
so they must exist in English in some way.\(^1\) The main function of cases and "the connective parts of speech" is to place substantives in such a position that they are able to modify either other substantives or verbal states.\(^2\) Modification of substantives by other substantives is fairly common in language, whether it is by means of the genitive relation or the modifier-head construction as in *pin cushion*; Ward says that case is necessary in order that the conceptions signified by both words unite to form one complex conception instead of remaining two separate ones. The result of mentioning two different substantives is usually to increase the number of objects being considered by the

1. "Although the English nouns have little of that variation which in Latin and Greek grammars is called case, it is by no means unnecessary for the understanding of the principles on which language is founded to explain what the cases of nouns are in those languages, and to shew by what means the English . . . supplies the want of cases in its nouns." (Ward, p. 48).

2. "The intent of language requires, that the conception annexed to any noun substantive, or to any verb, should be modified in innumerable ways; and this can only be done by applying one conception, as to modify, or give additional ascertainment to another. All the connective parts of speech are used for this purpose; and the Greeks and Romans have varied their nouns by alterations of the last syllables, in order to make these forms of the substantives themselves connective parts of speech." (Ward, p. 48).
mind. This can be avoided by giving signals that certain substantives are not to be considered as signs of independent ideas, but as "circumstantiating" or depending on other nouns. The signals used are those of an oblique case or a preposition. The result is that there is only one complex conception in the mind because when substantives "are applied merely to express circumstances attending states or objects, or other circumstances, . . . no increase of number ensues upon the application of the dependent circumstance."  

7.1.3. Nominative and Accusative Cases

Ward offers a discussion of the transitive verb which he hopes will help elucidate "this most abstruse part of grammar." In the transitive sentence type the substantive in subject position raises the conception

1. "For when the conceptions of objects and states are . . . united, none of them will represent mere circumstances coalescing with some other object, but each of them will represent an object, or state, as the conception thereof is separately laid up in the memory." (Ward, p. 53).

2. "If a substantive be used in dependence upon another substantive or upon an adjective; the sign of an oblique case or some preposition, must be made use of to shew the nature of the dependence." (Ward, p. 54).

3. Ward, p. 54.

4. Ward follows the usual custom of English grammarians of identifying these cases on the basis of position. His interpretation is latinate. Cf. 7.1.6.
of a "capital object" in the mind of the hearer; when this is followed by a verb definitive (any finite verb) the conception raised by the finite verb does not exist independently of the conception of the substantive, but coalesces with it to give a complex conception of the object represented by the substantive engaging in the activity or state expressed by the verb. The reason that the ideas coalesce is that the verb's principle of existence lies outside of itself, in some object which suggests to the mind the "idea of mixed modes" denoted by the verb and one such object in which the verb's principle of existence could inhere is that signified by the substantive. Thus walk denotes a typical activity of a human being or an animal, and when the construction "The horse walks" is uttered, the principle of existence of the idea of walk is said to be in the idea signified by horse rather than in some unmentioned ideas. Thus coalescence of two separate conceptions has been achieved and these have become just one single conception. Coalescence of adjectives to nouns is even easier because the principle of existence in adjectives is unnoticed so there is no necessity of transferring it to the substantive. It seems then that the substantive-verb construction and the adjective-substantive construction are in no way dependent on the function of cases or any
other structural markers. However, when an object follows the verb, as it always does in the sentence type we are discussing "Notice is given that the conception, denoted by the [second] substantive is to be made use of merely to circumstantiate the state denoted by the verb, in which the substantive depends."¹ For this circumstantiation to take place "the sign of an oblique case, or some preposition must be made use of to shew the nature of the dependence,"² because "the property of an oblique case is, 'a direction to supply in the mind somewhat not directly mentioned, in order to turn the conception of an object into that of a dependent circumstance.'"³ The accusative case gives explicit notice, we are told, that the conception denoted by the noun in that case is to be considered as a dependent circumstance of the conception denoted by a verb, which in its turn is already united to the noun substantive in the nominative case. Thus the accusative is giving notice that the idea denoted by the word James in the phrase "John holding James" is not to be considered as separately ascertained, but is to be seen as a dependent circumstance of the conception denoted by John holding.

2. Ward, p. 61.
3. Ibid., p. 58.
The principle of existence, which is the reason for the conception normally being separately ascertained is presumably cancelled out or ignored as a result of the choice of the accusative case for this noun. This cancellation would appear to have the effect of making the grammatical composition of this word exactly the same as that of an adjective.

7.1.4. Substantives in the Oblique Cases the Equivalent of Adjectives

As the function of all the oblique cases is similar to the accusative in turning the conception of the object into a dependent circumstance,\(^1\) no noun in any case except the nominative should be considered a substantive as its principle of existence will not be taken notice of by the mind.\(^2\) Such nouns will of course have the same form as a substantive and for this reason Ward is prepared to continue calling them substantives rather than upset the tradition. However, even if we can equate a substantive in the accusative with an adjective as far as the idea is concerned, we cannot say that they are equivalent in all ways: the dependence on the substantive


2. Ward does not here consider sentences with Be + Pred. Nominal, but elsewhere (p. 44) says that to be a man and to be a judge are real verbs. The predicate nominal would presumably become part of the verb in sentences of the type 'James is a baby.' Cf. related discussion in Para. 6.3.
is not the same as that of the adjective, at least, not if we are to continue using Ward's original account of the adjective, as we have up till now. It is at this point that Ward's explanation becomes somewhat confused: he is certain that a case does not denote a fixed relation but rather "a mode of attention of the mind itself," yet this distinction between the different modes of attention is never made explicit. The basic grammatical distinction in language that he sees is binary rather than multiple. It distinguishes between words that exist independently and the others that exist dependently. There do not appear to be distinct modes of dependent existence in spite of the four oblique cases, the noun adjective, and the finite verb.

7.1.5. A New Theory of Transitivity

So far Ward's system appears to be very similar to Buffier's:¹ the verb is dependent on the substantive in the nominative case, and the substantive in the accusative case is dependent on them both; yet the dependency of the accusative is obviously not the same as the adjectival dependency of the 'adjective + substantive' construction, and would appear to be of a different order from the dependency of the verb on the subject noun

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.3.1.
substantive; the mode of circumstantiation is by no means obvious or satisfactory to Ward at this point. The weak point of James Harris' theory of transitivity was that he too saw the initial subject noun and its verb as the basic unit to which the object was somehow added on as an optional element. Such an explanation does not correspond to our intuitions about language, although it is a manner of explaining the three terms of the transitive construction. Essentially it sees the object noun phrase as an optional addition just as an adverbial phrase. Ward realized clearly the unsatisfactory nature of this approach, and investigated the implications of the relation between active and passive sentences as a possible avenue of explanation. He says that the traditional notion of the two voices of the verb expressing action and suffering is "proper enough for conveying to learners a general conception of the nature of each" but that the semantic implications of the two voices is frequently not one of action and passion; they are actually signals of mutual equivalence.\(^1\)

1. Cf. Para. 2.5.5.

2. "The true nature of these states is, that those of each pair . . . are conceived to derive their existence from one and the same principle; so that if this principle of existence is communicated to, or with-held from, either state of a pair, it is communicated to, or with-held from, the other state of the same principle." (Ward, p. 59).
He suggests that the following two sentences are paraphrases of each other:

John holding James
James is held by John.¹

This pair, and all similarly related pairs, express the same account of reality, he says, and if a picture were painted of both it would be the same in both cases; the picture, however, would not be able to take notice of "the modes of operation by which the parts . . . are put together in the mind itself." This is a way of saying that speech allows us to focus on particular aspects of an event. Both sentences, he says, are made up of two components: John holds and James is held; the choice of the active or passive sentence indicates the point of view or focus of the speaker rather than any real difference in the situation. The 'subject-verb-object' construction is a shorthand way of making two distinct

¹. The verbal forms that Ward uses in his examples when he discusses these paraphrase relations raise certain points: firstly, he continually uses the present participle rather than an active finite verb in his examples; this appears strange, and incomplete, but later discussion of the verb reveals that he regards the participial form of the verb as more basic (Cf. 7.2.); secondly, when he was discussing the passive, he might well have suggested that is held consists of more than one grammatical unit, particularly in view of the fact that he views as a full verb when it occurs alone in a sentence. The fact that he sees the passive construction of 'be + participle' as no more complex than the active form is
statements.\textsuperscript{1} This new way of analysing transitive sentences is not to be found in any of Ward's sources; it was suggested in Chapter IV that it grew from a consideration of Locke's ideas of relation, which Ward used when discussing the "correlative species" of the noun substantive.\textsuperscript{2}

The function of the accusative in this new analysis is to give notice that the passive form of the verb is to be associated with the substantive in the accusative case.\textsuperscript{3} Thus the expression "John holding James" tells us first of all that John is holding, and then, the last word, James, gives notice that the passive form of the verb hold is to be considered in construction with James, doubtless a result of his adherence to a Latin-based interpretation of verb forms. To be consistent with himself, he should have selected the form being held.

1. "Now if an object is represented in one of these verbal states, and another object in the same relation to the first object, as it would be if the corresponding state were mentioned and this other object represented in that state; there is no occasion actually to mention such corresponding state, but to give notice by some sign that it is to be supplied in the mind, and it will be supplied of course; because the one of these corresponding states always supposes the other." (Ward, p. 60).

2. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.4.

3. "The sign of the accusative case is not the mark of any one certain relation, but of a certain kind of operation of the mind itself, which can be performed upon the sort of conception that is denoted by the active form of a transitive verb." (Ward, p. 60).
giving: "James is held." The implication is that whenever we have any transitive sentence, although only one sentence appears in the surface structure, the substantive which is considered to be in the accusative case gives notice to another sentence, and is not really part of the original sentence at all. The conception attached to the passive form of the verb is the same as that attached to the active form, so although there are two sentences in the mind, in the sense that there are two substantives, both with verbs depending on them, they are both linked by the common verbal conception; they both share its mark of existence. The substantives then have no relation to each other except that indicated by the verb in its two forms.

7.1.6. Two Basic Sentence Types

Ward's grammatical terminology relies heavily on Latin terminology; "James is held by John" is given a latinate analysis: by John is in the ablative case because this would be the case of John in the Latin translation. In both sentences the first word is considered to be in the nominative, as in Latin, because this has the function of raising a conception in the mind: "For the noun in this case is considered as barely raising a conception
of some object, and that 'by mere recollection.' Ward sees the active and passive sentence forms and the accusative and ablative cases as the fundamental grammatical constituents of the language.

He says that if verbal states could intervene between every pair of objects "there would manifestly be no occasion in language, for the sign of any case except that of the accusative, and that of the corresponding ablative." The point is that verbal states do not always intervene between two nouns, and therefore these cases are not enough. Where there is no verbal state between two nouns, one of them usually occurs in a distinctive case, which has the function of indicating the nature of

1. Ward, p. 73.

2. "Now it is manifest that the objects, between which every particular kind of relation can exist, are each of them in a certain state of being in consequence of such relation; so that to consider two objects as the terms between which a certain relation exists, is, in effect, to consider one of the objects as in a state of being, with which the state of being, in which the other object is, has the same kind of correspondence as that which occasions the relation. And this is manifestly the reason why so many kinds of relations may be expressed in language, by representing one object as in the active or passive state, which is denoted by some transitive verb, and another object as in the correspondent passive state." (Ward, p. 63).
the relation.  

The sign of, which for Ward is the sign of the genitive, has the function of showing that the word following it depends on the word preceding it. The kind of relation between the words man and learning in "a man of learning" is so obvious, according to Ward, that there is no need for a transitive verb to express it; the 'of' construction and the saxon genitive may be considered elliptical forms of a 'subjective + verb + object' expression: "A man of learning" is equivalent to "a man having learning."  

Ward's recognition of have as a deep structure verb indicating the state of some object is difficult to relate to his theory of verbs being the expression of mixed modes, and would generally be considered

1. "But on some occasions, it is utterly unnecessary to mention the particular states of being, in which objects are . . . because the nature of the objects themselves sufficiently shews how they are related; and therefore any mark, or notice, to direct to the name, which is to be considered a mere circumstance and not a capital object, is direction enough to enable the mind to unite the conceptions denoted by two substantives into the conception of a capital object further ascertained by the circumstance which is denoted by the dependent substantive." (Ward, p. 63).

2. "The kind of relation that is given notice of by the sign 'of' placed in English between two substantives, may be more exactly expressed, by substituting some transitive verb instead of the sign; as 'a man of learning - a horse of strength' are expressions equivalent to 'a man having learning - a horse having strength;' and these expressions may be reversed, if the corresponding passive state, 'had' be substituted instead
unsatisfactory by modern standards; certainly the passivization of such a verb is unacceptable. Ward was probably aware of the awkwardness of the passive form here, but, being unable to deal with verbs such as have and be in any more sophisticated way, he was forced to bend the language slightly in order for it to fit his facts. It is not difficult to see the ingenuity behind his proposal, and on the basis of this, ignore the occasional strange construction he presents. Ward also notes the relation of 'a horse which has strength' to the other forms, but delays discussion of this till he discusses relative pronouns.

7.1.7. Verbs Followed by Prepositions or More Than One Noun

Although Ward states that all nouns have a transitive verb linking them, if not on the surface, then at least signalled by the case of one of the substantives, he still has a problem in accounting for cases or signs of cases other than the accusative or ablative which nouns depending not on other nouns but on transitive verbs exhibit; there also seems to be no reason for pre-

of 'having' ... 'the learning had by a man'.' (Ward, p. 64).

positions between verbs and nouns. These difficulties lead Ward to state the nature of the relation prepositions and cases signify. He discusses for at length, suggesting that the "mode of contemplation is made the characteristic of the species 'final cause';" in doing this he is guilty of the worst kind of notional simplification of distinct semantic relations. He recognizes that there are difficulties in analysing the meanings of prepositions: "This way of reducing connections to sorts, by the several modes of attention which the mind exerts in apprehending and applying each sort is manifestly the utmost effort of the abstractive powers of the mind." He suggests that although the meaning that we associate with the different occurrences of the same preposition may not be the same, the recognition of a common class is justified because the common basis resides not in the meaning but in the common processes of the mind: "For every connexion, or relation, is denoted by the same sign, when the same kind of proceeding of the mind itself is used in applying

1. "If more than one object are required to circumstan-
tiate a transitive state different signs must be used, to show the different manners in which the conceptions of these objects are applied to signify mere circumstances of such state." (Ward, p. 67).

2. Ward, p. 68.
such connexion, or relation."

In spite of the convincing appeal to the proceeding of the mind, the recognition of unity here is pure casuistry; Ward is clearly unhappy that the facts of English do not correspond with the analysis he would like to put forward. He can account for prepositions or case relations between nouns, but he has no satisfactory solution for the 'verb-preposition-substantive' construction. Prepositions are not susceptible to simple semantic analysis, but their indistinct meaning can be resolved in the case of the 'noun-preposition-noun' construction by replacing the preposition or case with a transitive verb. Not only does this remove the indistinctness but it also resolves the construction to the more basic noun-verb construction which Ward sees as the fundamental one in language. But no such solution is possible with prepositions following verbs. He sees the necessity of prepositions when more than two nouns enter into constructions with the verb, but cannot explain them satisfactorily. Where there are only two nouns in construction with a verb, and the one following the verb is preceded by a preposition as in "We came to such a place," or "John being with James," Ward attempts to overcome his immediate

1. Ibid., p. 69.
difficulty by suggesting that paraphrases without prepositions are in some sense more basic, and the function of the cases or prepositions is to suggest the paraphrase alternatives.  

7.1.8. Prepositions

The point that Ward's own theory is forcing him to recognize is that the preposition or the mark of case is a very flexible unit. The meaning of a preposition is derived from a consideration of the meaning of the words it joins: "The precise nature of the connexion... is left to be determined by the judgement, from the nature of the conceptions which are united to it."  

1. 'We reached such a place' is of the same import in English with 'we came to such a place'. . . ., 'John accompanying James' is equivalent to 'John being with James' and so of innumerable other instances, in which a transitive verb may be substituted instead of a preposition or sign of a case. This shews clearly, that the same relation between objects may be expressed in language by different modes of estimation, if the premises are changed, by the help whereof the relations are to be estimated." (Ward, p. 70). Cf. Lowth's position discussed in Para. 4.3.3.  

2. "It is obvious to perceive, that they are all expressions of relation, but the difficulty is to determine how such various kinds of relations among objects themselves, can be expressed by one and the same preposition without confusion; and why one and the same relation may be expressed... by the help of different... prepositions." (Ward, p. 243).  

3. Ward, p. 244.
He recognizes that

The distance of London from York
The distance from London to York
The distance between London and York

all indicate the same meaning, and the difference between them comes from the "different modes of estimation, which modes the prepositions give notice of." The same kind of process is seen in numerical calculation where the same answer is achieved through different modes of calculation. \(^1\) Ward equated prepositions with variables: they are like "a fictitious quantity . . . introduced merely to assist the mind in registering the steps of the process." He is not saying that the preposition or case is without meaning, but that its meaning is not clearly determined; it is acquired in a particular construction: "It comes to pass that signs of cases and prepositions bear in themselves a less determinate signification than nouns and verbs do." Premises or accompanying information are necessary to make their

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\(^1\) "This is no more than comes to pass in estimating all kinds of quantity, so as to express the result of the process in algebraic species: for we are usually at liberty to proceed several different ways; and yet, if the reasoning is just, we shall always come at last to an expression, which, though different in form, is in effect the same with that which is the result of any other way of proceeding, in which the reasoning is also just." (Ward, p. 244).
signification clear: "Some premises must be given ... before the conception of a relation denoted by a particular sign will arise."¹ Harris had attempted to explain English prepositions by saying that in their literal meaning they express a spatial relation, and that this meaning is extended metaphorically to apply to abstract objects. Ward's account is distinct and original because he does not recognize metaphorical extension to the basic meaning, but sees the prepositions as having an almost infinite variety of possible significations and only vague connections with directional meaning. The reference of a preposition is indeterminate, like that of an algebraic symbol; its meaning can only be discovered from the meaning of the words it is relating.²

Ward is attempting to express what was never considered in the eighteenth century, that prepositions do not have determinate meaning; his originality lies not

1. Ward, p. 244.

2. "The mind perceives that abstract objects have connexions with each other, which require nearly the same modes of estimation which the relations of local situation do; and therefore, in Language whatsoever connexion is conceived to require the same mode of attention in order to estimate it, is denoted by one and the same sign, and the precise nature of the connexion, as it is in itself, is left to be determined by the judgement, from the nature of the conceptions which are united by the sign." (Ward, p. 244).
in drawing attention to the variety of meaning, but in attempting to explain how the person hearing such a preposition is in fact able to associate with it a definite meaning. He suggests that the preposition is a signal of an operation of the mind which places a definite transitive verb, suggested by the nouns and the preposition, in relation with those nouns. Circumstances do not always make such an explanation possible, and then his account is less satisfactory; thus he cannot deal with prepositions in sentences where more than two nouns are attached to the verb phrase.

7.2. Adjectives and Verbs

Ward's analysis of the transitive sentence type allowed him to develop his considerations in several interesting ways. One particularly valuable approach, which broke new ground as far as the English grammatical tradition was concerned, was the analysis of relative pronouns and relative clauses. This analysis of the relative, which will be discussed shortly, led him to see deficiencies in the theory he had already developed: he had reduced the principal constructions in the English language to two: the adjective-substantive construction and the substantive-verb construction; but he had to distinguish, if he wished to preserve this analysis, between adjective-substantive constructions and particle-
substantive constructions. He also had to offer some kind of explanation for the difference between verbs coalescent and verbs definitive. In his analysis of the relative he maintains the distinction between participle and adjective, although, as he commented, most grammarians see them as the same. It is difficult to see Ward's distinctions, and realizing this, he offers other distinctions. He says that when participles are united with substantives they have a union which is so intimate that it is expressible in the form of derived nouns: 'a seeing man' is the equivalent of 'a seer', 'a moving man' the equivalent of 'a mover.' This, says Ward, only happens with participles: "But nothing of this kind ensues when an adjective, or the oblique case of a substantive is made dependent on another substantive." Actually a similar process happens with adjectives: the substantive form a black is derived from a black man, but it is true that the -er suffix is only added to verb stems. Such an explanation as Ward offers here to distinguish participles from adjectives is still convincing, although at base it is a repetition of Ward's

1. "The participle is as properly a verb, as any other verbal form is; for it expresses a state which depends on an inconstant principle of existence. Whereas an adjective gives express notice, that no principle of existence is to be attended to, in that which is denoted by it." (Ward, p. 115).

belief that the verb represents activity of limited
duration rather than the permanent condition expressed
by adjectives, for he says that the objects denoted by
\textit{see} and \textit{mover} are not to be considered to be in these
states continuously but only occasionally. His struggle
to mark off the participle from the adjective results
eventually in redefinition of the adjective. Ward had
originally seen the mode of union of the adjective with
the substantive as a simple one achieved without any
intervention because no principle of existence was to
be noted in the adjective, and it could therefore unite
with the substantive.\textsuperscript{1} In his discussion of the verb
coalescent, he has to amend his original account of the
adjective in order to suggest another difference between
adjectives and participles. He now sees the coalescence
of participles as more natural than that of adjectives.\textsuperscript{2}

1. The original description of the adjective was:

An adjective unites with a substantive, so as to
form a kind of name of the object represented by
the expression. For the principle by which the
object exists is taken notice of in the concep-
tion which the substantive denotes, and the con-
ception denoted by the adjective takes no notice
of the principle of existence, but unites with the
conception which does take notice of such principle.
(Ward, pp. 15-16).

2. "The mode of coalescence by which a participle unites
with the object . . . is more simple than that by which
an adjective unites with the object . . . In the union
of a participle coalescent, there is no intervening state
to be understood: but in the union of an adjective, some
The two salient points of his new definition are: firstly, that an intervening state is now required to unite adjective and substantive, and secondly, a substantive is said to be contained in an adjective; previously they were alternate grammatical lexicalizations of the same underlying idea. Ward gives the example 'a deceitful man' and says this is equivalent to 'a man of deceit.' Prepositions often indicate underlying verbs, and this construction in turn implies 'a man practising deceit.' This development of the definition of the adjective is tantamount to a rejection of the schema proposed in Ward's original discussion of nouns; Ward is here saying that there are no independently existing adjectives, but all are derivations from abstract substantives, and that these adjectival substantives are linked to the head noun by a transitive verb, here practising, but more usually having. This is a move to remove the 'adjective-substantive' construction, and reduce all language to the form of either 'substantive + verb active' or substantive + verb passive.'

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state must be understood to form the coalescence. For the substantive contained in the signification of an adjective, can seldom or never be considered as the characteristic of a species, as a participial state may be; and therefore the mind is under a necessity of having recourse to some mode of estimation similar to some of those which are denoted by prepositions, to form the connexions between an adjective and the substantive on which it depends.” (Ward, p. 162).
Such a change is brought about by Ward's recognition that his distinction between participles and adjectives is unconvincing. Obviously some proposal similar to current approaches suggesting a common category of verbals to which both adjectives and verbs belong would have been a solution to Ward, but no such solution was available; he wanted to keep the traditional categories separate, but in maintaining the verb/adjective separation he was forcing himself to move the adjective closer to the substantive.

Such vacillations in fundamentals of the theory in the course of the Essay make it impossible and meaningless to attempt to extract a coherent analysis from Ward's grammar; but it would be a mistake to gloss over his inconsistencies and to impose on his writings a system that appears satisfactory to the modern linguist, but is totally foreign to Ward's own speculations. The interesting aspect of Ward's grammatical speculations, which in this respect form a microcosm of the whole of English linguistics in the eighteenth century, is that there is a continuing search going on as he writes the grammar for a set of categories, and for definitions of categories, which will fit the facts of the English language. Ward hoped that his own search might be more successful.
than most others because he was taking a different starting point, one that should not lead him astray: the Lockean idea, which Hartley had shown was a useful tool in linguistic analysis. Ward attempted to link Locke's ideas to grammatical categories, and the link-up he achieved was convincing; the grammatical categories themselves, however, had not been examined in the first place for their validity. Participles and infinitives were reckoned to be verbs because Sanctius had seen them as such,¹ and because of their formal similarity in English; Ward felt that all the verbal forms had the common characteristic that they were comparable to certain aspects of Locke's mixed modes: they perished in their birth.² But he did not have the means to make clear in what ways verbs differed from adjectives; he appeared to be conscious of the active/stative distinction between verbs and adjectives, but was only able to express it in terms of the time reference of the verb. Unfortunately the present participle has no explicit time reference, and his initial reason for distinguishing verbs and adjectives was no longer very good. He gave up his subtle distinction of constant/

1. Cf. Para. 4.2.1.1.

2. Abstract nouns were comparable to other aspects of the mixed modes. Cf. Para. 4.1.1.1.
inconstant (action/state) because he could find no structural marker of the semantic distinction in participles; and these for him were the basic form of the verb. However, with the new distinction of participles as immediately coalescing words, and adjectives as words requiring the intervention of a preposition or transitive verb, he was able to use the two categories to define two distinct types of relative clause: all relative clauses are reducible either to adjectives or participles.

Where the antecedent indicated by the relative is linked with the action denoted by the verb in the relative clause (e.g. 'the man who I saw') the clause is equivalent to a participle; where the antecedent is not immediately linked to the relative clause verb (e.g. 'the man whose brother I saw') the relative clause is the equivalent of an adjective. How much better Ward's analysis might have been if he had said


2. "When the object represented by a relative pronoun, is neither that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends ... such relative clause is equivalent to an adjective. But if the object represented by the relative is either that on which the verb of its clause immediately depends, or that depending upon the verb by the means of a sign of case or other preposition; such relative clause is equivalent to a participle." (Ward, p. 146).
that a participle was the equivalent of a relative clause rather than the reverse. However, he did not; in a sense he obviously felt that the participle was a very basic unit. The reasons for this probably were that its union with a substantive so easily summoned up a picture in the mind: 'a running man' seems to be a single idea in a way that 'the man runs' or 'the man who runs' could never be. This would also account for Ward's preference for 'John holding James' rather than the sentence 'John holds James.' The former is not a sentence from a grammatical point of view, but although it is not complete, it definitely summons up as clear a conception in the mind as the more normal sentence form. Ward is not decided about the status of the verb definitive. He says that it summons up the same kind of conception as the verb coalescent; this is the reason they were discussed together in the last chapter.

7.2.1. Syntactic Function of the Definitive Verb

Ward defines the verb definitive by its characteristic function which is to show "that the expression of the objective conception on which it depends is stopped, as to any further composition; and that the object denoted by the whole expression, becomes an
object of the species whereof the participial state contained in the verb is the characteristic."¹ This description is interesting for two reasons: firstly, it shows that the participial form is definitely considered in some sense more basic: it is "contained in the significance of the verb definitive;" secondly, it pays no heed to the common notion that affirmation is the distinguishing characteristic of this form of the verb. The participle is the basic verb, and when it is in construction with the substantive, the ideas signified by both words are already in coalescence--there is thus an identity between the ideas rather than an affirmation²--so that the function of the more complex definitive form cannot be to affirm the proper ties of the verb to the substantive. It must have some function distinct from that of the participle, and Ward claims that it is to "stop" or limit the conception indicated by the substantive. Ward is saying that the verb definitive signifies that we have a complete noun phrase, which will not be susceptible to further modification. His example of this is interesting: all the while only participle forms are used

2. Cf. Locke's position discussed in Para. 4.1.1.5.
in post-head modification, the complex conception denoted by the noun phrase can expand: "a lady sitting in the garden, viewing the flowers, presenting various colours." The use of the definitive form of the verb implies that the construction is now closed. This is a definition of the finite verb as a signalling device: it signals that the sentence formation is now reaching a stage of completion, just as an intonation contour might do; he sees the verb definitive as having characteristics similar to an intonation contour: it directs attention towards the subject. The difference between verbs coalescent and verbs definitive is relatively unimportant. Ward mentions but does not dwell on the fact that definitive verbs have tense forms; the point is that the difference between verbs coalescent and definitive does not lie in the realm of ideas and their relationship.

7.3. Relative Pronouns and Relative Clauses

Only when Ward considers relative clauses do the implications of syntax really come to the fore. He entitles Section III of his chapter on pronouns "Of the Relative Pronoun" but shows insight and originality by enlarging his discussion to centre on the whole relative clause rather than just the form of the pronouns. He

saying that the simple pronouns of the class are who, which, and that; he fails to make any distinction between the relative that and the that which introduces whole sentences in noun phrases. He also includes all whom-adverbs as having the "power" of a relative pronoun in their signification. His definition of the relative pronoun stresses that the relative clause must be part of some larger unit, and that the pronoun itself must have an antecedent. His own discussions of the relative do not in fact always require the second condition, as is evident when he discusses the various degrees at which a sentence can operate.

7.3.1. The Notion of Degree

Ward's concept of a sentence operating at various degrees is very similar to the modern concept of rank-shift: units of language usually operate at their own level, thus words function in phrases, phrases within clauses, and clauses within sentences. However, they

1. "The relative pronoun is the name of an object as a personal pronoun is: but when an object is named by a relative pronoun, notice is given, 'that the pronoun both expresses the object, and likewise shews that the clause in which such object is concerned, is not to be considered either as expressing complete truth or falsehood, or a complete conception of the intellect; but as an expression of the same object which the relative represents.'" (Ward, p. 134).

are frequently shifted to a different level: when a clause modifies a noun, it is operating within the phrase rather than within the sentence, and it is said to be rankshifted to the level of a word. Ward discusses the unit 'clause,' which, though he does not define it, would seem to consist of some kind of noun followed by either a verb coalescent or a verb definitive. The relative clause 'which runs' contains as its noun the relative pronoun, and in Ward's example has as an antecedent horse, water or time. However, if the antecedent "be placed in the clause 'which runs' instead of the relative 'which' the three sentences 'a horse runs - water runs - time runs' will be formed."

Ward concludes from this that "any relative clause will become a complete sentence." He also sees the reverse to be true: that any full sentence may be turned into a relative clause.

7.3.2. Content Clauses and Relative Clauses

The notion of degree is most completely discussed when Ward introduces the sentence "a peace is concluded." As it is, it is a complete sentence. By prefixing 'that' to this sentence and inserting it in another sentence, it becomes the equivalent of a noun substantive: "That

1. Ward, p. 137.
a peace is concluded is now past doubt." Ward comments: "Thus a sentence of complete truth or falsehood is reduced one degree lower, viz. to a level with the expression of a mere object of the intellect, as denoted by a noun substantive."¹ The clause is now one degree lower than a sentence, because it occupies the position of the major or principal sentence constituent, the noun substantive. The process can continue: "But it is of the utmost convenience in language to reduce a complete sentence lower still, viz. to a level with the expression of a conception denoted by a noun adjective, or dependent participle."² Ward does not give an example of this lower degree with his basic sentence "a peace is concluded" but it would have to be of the following type: "The belief that a peace is concluded is now past doubt." This analysis of the three levels at which a sentence can operate is very perspicacious, but it is at odds with Ward's account of the relative in various ways: firstly, sentences in the second degree have no antecedent whatsoever, and instead of proposing some 'understood' antecedent, Ward affirms that the clause is in the noun substantive position of the sentence. He does

¹. Ward, p. 135.
². Ibid., p. 136.
not appear to notice the inconsistency of this with his earlier definition of the relative, nor does he notice that the *that* is not the 'name of an object.' Secondly, Ward's failure to notice the distinction between the two grammatically distinct forms of *that* and thus his failure to recognize that he is not talking about the relative clause at all, makes us feel that his discussion of the three degrees is much more idiosyncratic than it in fact is. However, the phenomenon with which he was dealing was an interesting one, and later grammarians' discussions of it indicate the real difficulty which Ward was attempting to account for. Jespersen recognizes two kinds of clauses introduced by *that*, a content clause and a relative clause; content clauses are of the type "that a peace is concluded" and they have the characteristic that the *that* cannot be replaced by a wh-word; relative clauses however have *that* as an optional reduced form of who or which. Ward's proposal that the clause can be reduced to the degree of adjective or participle, by the placing of a substantive before it as antecedent has been demonstrated by the sentence: "the belief that a peace is

1. Many true relatives do not have antecedents, notably the indefinite relatives; but they do all name objects in some sense. Cf. "You can have what you like."

concluded is now past doubt." Jespersen rejects the notion that the "that a peace has been concluded" of this sentence is a relative clause, because the obviously related sentence "that a peace has been concluded is now past doubt" has no relative clause in it. The content clause in post-substantive position differs from the relative clause in that only a limited number of nouns can come before this clause as antecedents, and these appear to be pro-forms of the following content clause. Jespersen notes this and calls them "props" rather than antecedents: "Sometimes the words the fact or the circumstance are used to prop up the clause."¹

Jacobs and Rosenbaum distinguish between these content clauses and relative clauses in a rather different manner by positing different deep structure analyses of the noun phrases:²

```
  NP   NP
     /   \
   Art N   S
    the  boy whom I saw

  NP
     /   \
   Art N   S
    the  fact that Ricky came late
```


But such an analysis is rather unsatisfactory because the rules for the noun phrase expansion

\[
\text{NP} \rightarrow \left\{ \begin{array}{c}
\text{NP} \quad \text{S} \\
(\text{ART}) \quad \text{N} \quad (\text{S})
\end{array} \right. 
\]

would have to be complemented by a highly specific set of restrictions on the lexical selection of the N if, and only if, the optional S were selected. (The nouns required would be idea, fact, belief, etc.). It seems to be an \textit{a priori} requirement of any grammar that the obligatory elements should determine the nature of the optional elements and not the reverse. Jacobs and Rosenbaum fail to specify the dependence of the N on the S in their rule formulation. Their analysis also fails to relate 'that Ricky came late' with 'Ricky's coming late,' 'for Ricky to come late,' etc. Their oversimplification is almost as gross as Ward's.

Jacobs and Rosenbaum see Ward's second degree sentences as really constituting third degree sentences; the fact that the clause can appear in substantival position is attributed to optional deletion of the substantive; Jespersen on the other hand sees the noun substantive only as an additional prop, and supports his statement by historical evidence: "I think that he
is dead" evolved from "I think that" he is dead"; the that was originally a demonstrative pronoun.

The facts surrounding this problem are complex and Ward was attempting to impose a pattern on them. Jespersen's and Jacobs and Rosenbaum's analyses are not discussed or offered as a measure to evaluate Ward's attempt (although he would not come off badly in such an evaluation), but to demonstrate the contemporary debate which still surrounds an issue which Ward had provided a meaningful analysis for in the terms of his own theory. In the Practical Grammar he again discusses the 'that + S' clause or 'content clause' in relation to extraposition; his remarks on extraposition will be considered shortly.

7.3.3. The Relative Clause and its Resolution

Ward's analysis of "that a peace is concluded is now past doubt" ignored the requirement of his own definition of the relative, that it have an antecedent. His inclusion of some pronouns in the class, notably whatsoever, whichever, and whosoever completely precludes the possibility of any antecedent in many cases; he does not appear to notice this, but he is aware of some forms (apart from the content clauses discussed earlier) which

have no antecedent, such as "I know who has been here" and "who reasons wisely is not therefore wise"; here he says that there is a personal pronoun understood within the relative.¹ Ward's solution is open to dispute as being remarkably ad hoc (it says in effect that a characteristic of the relative is that it refers to an antecedent except where it doesn't); however, if his analysis was incomplete, or inaccurate, it was no different from many later analyses in this respect, and it was very different from the majority of contemporary works. Ward recognized the unusual quality of his description, and attributes his notion that the relative pronoun is an incomplete pronoun to Buffier; but he stresses the superiority of his own explanation of incompleteness.² The fact which he has to explain is how there should only be one idea in the mind when it has been summoned up twice, once by the antecedent and once by the relative; the problem is one that is created by the theory of the correspondence of words and ideas, but it is resolvable by the general theory of the plasticity of the principle of existence; the nature of the operation

1. "Therefore the relative, in such application of it, may be considered as equivalent to a relative and personal pronoun both in one, and the relative clause may be considered as containing complete sense in itself." (Ward, p. 147).

2. Cf. Para. 4.1.3.2.
performed on the principle of existence of the relative clause after the "clause is formed" makes it "vanish out of existence" rendering the clause equivalent either to adjectives or verbs coalescent, neither of which increases the number of objects existing in the mind."

The structure of the adjectival relative clause (e.g. 'a man who is good') gives Ward some evidence and basis for his suggestion that adjectives are signs giving notice that a noun substantive equivalent in meaning to the adjective is linked to the principal substantive by means of a preposition or a transitive verb. In the relative clause the adjective is not linked immediately to the substantive, but is joined by means of the verb be.

1. "A relative pronoun represents the object denoted by it, only till its clause is formed, and the object is ascertained with which the conception expressed by the clause is to coalesce: but when the mind forms the coalescence, the object with which that coalescence is made is not conceived to be denoted twice over, i.e. once by the antecedent and once by the relative; but by the antecedent only. So that such object as is denoted by the relative vanishes out of the conception which is expressed by a relative clause in actual union with its antecedent.

Hence it evidently follows, that the relative represents an object as supported by a principle of existence, which the mind can destroy, or transfer at its pleasure . . . but the conception may be contemplated in itself . . . If the principle by which the relative object exists is conceived to be destroyed, the relative clause becomes of the nature of a noun adjective, if this principle be conceived as only transferred, the clause becomes of the nature of a dependent participle.
It would seem that there are two stages in the process of arriving from the surface structure to the structure of the ideas in the mind: first of all the relative clause is reduced to an adjective, and this adjective is then converted in the mind to a noun substantive, and linked to the principal substantive by means of a transitive verb, probably have: "A man who is good" becomes "a good man," which becomes "a man having goodness." Ward does not often connect statements made in one part of his Essay with those made elsewhere, and it is a matter of conjecture whether he ever carried out all these steps even in his own mind. They are suggested by the text, but examples are rarely given. The precise existential status of the intermediate stages are no clearer than is the existential status of various stages in the derivations proposed in generative grammars, but with less reason: modern accounts of sentence derivation are quite simply rules linking one level with another level, and they have no claim to real existence; but Ward's account is everywhere closely related to what is happening to ideas in the mind. Thus the relative clause

Thus, 'a man who is good - a horse which is swift,' are expressions nearly equivalent to 'a good man - a swift horse' and 'a man who speaks - a horse which runs' are nearly equivalent to 'a man speaking - a horse running.' (Ward, pp. 142-3).
cannot be related to the 'substantive + have + substantive' form by means of the 'adjective + substantive' stage unless all three levels exist in some real way. It might be easiest to account for his proposals by admitting that the 'substantive + have + substantive' form corresponds closely to the ideas in the mind (the actual ideas being two: 'substantive + verb active' and 'substantive + verb passive') and that the only function of all the other forms is to recall in the mind this basic form. They are just alternate realizations of it; Ward never considers how these alternate realizations first found their way into the language.

7.3.4. Rule Cycles in Relative Clauses

Ward's explanation of the way the relative clause fits into the sentence suggests that he sees the process of communication to be in some sense the application of rules on a cyclic basis: he says that the pronoun represents the object denoted by itself "only till the clause is formed and the object is ascertained with which the conception expressed by the clause is to coalesce."¹ Then, when coalescence is achieved between the clause and its antecedent, the relative no longer represents the objects as existing separately from the antecedent.

¹. Ward, p. 142.
We are reminded of how Katz and Postal suggest in *An Integrated Theory of Linguistic Description* that transformational rules apply first of all to the innermost sentence (signified by the bracketing), and when all the rules have applied to this sentence, the brackets are removed, and the sentence becomes a unit of the next sentence up, and the process of rule application begins anew. Ward sees the relative clause at a certain stage (which he presumes to be the actual moment it is uttered) as an entire sentence with its own principal or capital object (the relative), its own coalescing verb, and the related passive form united to the object of the verb within the relative clause. Noun substantives, or their substitutes (the relative pronouns), have independent marks of existence; but when the construction is completed all the independent conceptions are fused into one complex conception, and then, the principle of existence of this complex conception is "destroyed or transferred" with the result that the whole sentence unit becomes an adjectival or verbal part of a larger unit, and the process of sentence formation begins again. Ward's analysis of the relative lacks some of the perspicuity of the discussions in the *Art of Thinking* of Port Royal.

but the lack of perspicuity is more on account of style than poverty of ideas. Ward does not, however, make the distinction between limiting and non-limiting relatives that Arnauld does.¹ Ward's analysis takes into account a large number of facts about the relative pronoun, and seeks to relate them to the philosophical standpoint from which he is giving an account of language.

7.4. Extraposition

Little attention has been given to the second half of Ward's Essay, the Practical Grammar; this is because it very often merely restates the points made in the Speculative Grammar or discusses usages in English, and offers ad hoc accounts of them. However, Ward does turn his attention again in the Practical Grammar to the sentential complements or content clauses that he had discussed in the Speculative Grammar as if they were relative clauses. This time he does not confuse them with relatives; in a Section entitled "Of whole sentences used as substantives"² Ward recognizes that as a demonstrative, which is historically correct, rather than as a

1. The Art of Thinking, op. cit., p. 124 and p. 118. The terms used for these clauses are 'restrictive' and 'explicative.'

relative. Ward not only correctly describes the that clause in "it came to pass at the end of forty days, that Noah opened the Window of the Ark," but appears to recognize that the sentence has been extraposed from its subject position. He discusses the phenomenon of extraposition under the heading "Of the construction of verbs impersonal." He says that all verbs have subjects, but sometimes it is not convenient to mention the subject before the definitive verb. The fact that Ward notes the phenomenon at all is interesting; discussion of syntax had been minimal in previous grammars of English,

1. "The sentential or causal demonstrative that, when prefixed to a sentence is to be considered all of it together as one substantive in some cases. Thus in,

It came to pass at the end of forty days, that Noah opened the Window of the Ark. (Old Testament)

'That Noah opened the Window of the Ark' denotes that which came to pass, and therefore is a kind of nominative case." (Ward, p. 488).

2. "I have already shewed that every verb definitive has relation to some subject . . . Nevertheless, it is not convenient, in all instances to express this subject at large before the definitive verb is mentioned . . .

It is highly laudable to pay respect to men descended from worthy ancestors. (Spectator, No. 612)

i.e. 'to pay respect to, &c. is highly laudible.' It is likewise used to represent what is denoted by a full sentence depending on that in the following part of the sentence." (Ward, p. 492).
which had concentrated on defining categories and discussing category membership. Ward not only attempted to deal with the significance of the basic constructions in language, but was sufficiently observant to notice the curious phenomenon of extraposition. The reason that Ward gives for the existence of such a feature, that "it is not convenient ... to express this subject ... before the definitive verb," has nothing whatsoever to do with the arrangement of ideas in the mind, or their relation; it is only for the convenience of the speaker, and is for the convenience of arranging the surface structure. This is presumably the reason why it only merits a place for discussion in the Practical Grammar. The 'there is' construction is similarly relegated to the Practical Grammar, as it is a surface structure variation which does not affect deeper levels.¹ All words of a structural character "give notice" or information about the linguistic system. Those discussed immediately above (viz. the it replacing extraposed subjects and the un-stressed there) give notice of changes in the superficial word order, and could be called signals of optional transformations that have taken place. Others, giving

1. "There is only used to give notice that the nominative case stand behind the verb, and therefore, is no more than a notice concerning the structure of the words themselves." (Ward, p. 492.)
notice of the arrangement of ideas and the kind of dependency relationship, could be called signals of obligatory transformations. It is of course a mistake to attempt to see Ward's grammar through the filtering lenses of current transformational theory; the purpose of the study of texts of the past is to elucidate what they are saying in their own time rather than measure it against current theories. As stated in the Introduction, the purpose of elucidation is partly that current theories may be measured against theories of the past, rather than vice versa. However, inasmuch as many of the achievements of transformational theory are the formalization of previous insights about language, the terminology often proves useful in referring, in short-hand form, to phenomena that have long been recognized by grammarians.

7.5. **A Note on Performatives**

It would be a mistake to believe that Ward's analysis of grammatical devices is thorough and coherent; an attempt has been made in this chapter to present some points which Ward develops in a reasonably coherent fashion. But there are many other phenomena that Ward accounts for by stating that they give notice that some supposedly related form is to be understood. Thus he
gives the unwary reader the feeling that all things are being reduced to the utmost simplicity whereas in actual fact Ward makes no real effort to come to terms with many of the facts. One particular instance of this occurs in his discussion of imperatives and interrogatives. His resolution of these forms, and his dependence on Buffier for the suggestion have already been discussed in Chapter III.\(^1\) It may be remarkably easy to say that the structural markers of the interrogative signal a particular locution, and the structural markers of the imperative signal another; however, what Ward is really doing is attempting to give a semantic analysis of a syntactic feature; similar proposals are being made today.\(^2\) Of particular interest is the fact that present-day proposals and Ward's proposal both suggest that these sentences consist of two sentences in the deep structure: a performative and a proposition. Ward is actually discussing questions with interrogative pronouns, such as "Who is that man?"; he says: "Every question that is asked by the help of one of these pronouns consists in effect of two complete sentences, in each of which one and the same object is concerned. The one of these

1. Cf. Para. 4.1.3.3.
sentences shows what the question is about; and the other signifies the desire or intention of the speaker to receive information concerning that which the question is about."¹ The first of Ward's sentences is the 'proposition,' and the second is the 'performative' in Boyd and Thorne's terminology. In their article "The Deep Grammar of Modal Verbs," they only discuss imperatives. They suggest that the imperative sentence "You will go," and its paraphrases ("Go," "I order you to go") have identical deep structures made up of two, not one, sentential elements, the first carrying the illocutionary potential of the sentence, the second what might be termed its 'propositional content.'² That is, something roughly like:

```
S
  I
    IMP
      YOU
S
  YOU
    GO
```

Ward's discussion is of interest because similar discussions are currently being hailed as new analyses (Boyd and Thorne claim that they are proposing a new analysis of modals;) but Ward does not attempt to integrate the fact that there are two sentences here with

with his theories about ideas in the mind. There would perhaps be some difficulty in having ideas signified by a performative sentence. In any event, this discussion of modals is not part of Ward's analysis of language in Lockean terms; it is an idea that he had obtained from Buffier and which is mentioned here for its own value rather than as part of his overall scheme to relate the grammatical categories of language to Locke's theory of ideas.
Chapter VIII

The Essay on Grammar in the Eighteenth and the Twentieth Centuries

8.0. Introduction

8.1. Eighteenth Century Views on Ward
8.1.1. Eighteenth Century Interest in Universal Grammar

8.2. Ward and the Twentieth Century
8.2.1. Categorical Grammars

8.3. Conclusion: Ward and Locke
CHAPTER VIII
THE ESSAY ON GRAMMAR IN THE EIGHTEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES

8.0. Introduction

William Ward's theory of language had little influence among his contemporaries; this does not mean that it is historically unimportant. In terms of trends and influences it may not be significant, but in terms of its relation to present-day linguistics it has much to offer for consideration. Linguistic theories of the past are interesting to the antiquarian because they belong to the past; but to linguistic scientists they are interesting either because they are the sources of the present or because they have interesting parallels with current concerns. Ward's theory is interesting to the historian (and not just to the antiquarian) because of the extensive use he made of Locke's philosophy in his grammatical theory. It cannot be claimed that his theory is the source of any present-day approaches to linguistics, because his influence on the history of linguistics is negligible. However, his interests do have important parallels with linguistic trends of the current decade, and these will be the concern of this
chapter. As little attention has so far been given to contemporary reaction to Ward's work, this will first be considered.

8.1. **Eighteenth Century Views on Ward**

It is only in retrospect that Ward can be considered to have enlarged the eighteenth century concept of grammar. His contemporaries appear to have been blind to the task that Ward had set himself, and his reviewers in both the *Monthly Review*¹ and the *Critical Review*² had few words of praise for his endeavour. The latter journal is almost wholly condemnatory of Ward's attempt, but this is because the only reason that the reviewer sees for the study of grammar is that it might enable one to learn better the practical art of writing; in fact he negates his own point by also observing that the connection between learning grammar and writing well is illusory.³ He quotes extensively from what are


3. "Upon enquiry it will perhaps be found, that our purest and best speakers, as well as writers, lived in times when no grammar of the English tongue existed; or if there was one, that they never consulted it." (p. 199).
considered to be important passages of the Speculative Grammar in order to show their lack of relevance to practical rules.

The Monthly Review is much more sympathetic to Ward's endeavours, but points that Harris' Hermes and Lowth's Short Introduction are superior to the Speculative Grammar and Practical Grammar respectively. There is no doubt that Harris' work is much more readable than Ward's, but the reviewer does not seem to be aware that Ward is trying to do very different things from Harris. The latter's universals in language were surface grammatical categories and lexical universals; Ward's were concerned with the nature of ideas and the rules that unite ideas to each other. The Monthly Review takes issue with Ward's definitions and says that they are enigmatical because they are "just." This comment reveals an interesting facet of the attitudes in the eighteenth century towards grammatical definition. Ward's definition are said to be bad because they are inclusive.¹ Simplicity and clearness rank above correctness for the reviewer, and it would not seem unlikely that this was a general attitude. Twentieth century grammarians berate and criticize

1. "This will ever be the case, also, when a writer, in defining a term, is solicitous to include every circumstance that relates to the object or attribute specified." (p. 290).
eighteenth century grammarians for the inaccuracy and incompleteness of their definitions without realizing that they did not perhaps intend to create complete definitions, but were rather giving useful or mnemonic descriptions. On these grounds Ward's attempt at fuller definition results in criticism; however, the reviewer is disturbed not only by the difficulty of the definitions themselves but by the extremely incomprehensible general style of Ward's writing. While admitting the "true philosophic principles" that Ward has worked from, the reviewer suggests that "most people will rather choose to remain ignorant all their lives, than engage in so laborious a task as that of pursuing the same path" as Ward.

It is significant of the reviewer's field of interest that after making his justified comments on Ward's tortuous style, and his interesting comments on the function of definition, the reviewer goes on to discuss Ward's very short section on phonology and his section on metre\(^1\) rather than comment on the much more significant

\(^1\) The reviewer objects to Ward's use of the classical metre, indicating that there did not exist a general acceptance of classical metrics in the eighteenth century:

Mr Ward is also one of those classical theorists, who would reduce the numbers and measures of English
aspects of the Speculative Grammar that this thesis has attempted to discuss. It seems that what modern linguists see as important were not necessarily important in the eighteenth century; indeed even Harris' Hermes often seems to have been praised rather than used. The mood of eighteenth century England was not ready for speculations on universal grammar of so sophisticated a form. The fact that Horne Tooke was to capture the minds of the reading public so shortly afterwards is itself evidence of an absence of any deep enquiring interest in language at this period in England.

8.1.1. Eighteenth Century Interest in Universal Grammar

There was a lack of interest in Ward's Essay on Grammar because he was attempting to give an account of language that was more far-reaching than the average educator felt was necessary. Interest in language that went beyond the superficial forms of language was generally known as "universal grammar"; Harris was considered

verse, to the standards of the ancients; but the learned have so long in vain attempted to shackle modern poetry with the fetters of Iambics, Trochees, Dactyls and Anapests, that the point is now given . . . by almost every reader of taste.

1. Robert Lowth, for example, praises Hermes and dismisses Universal Grammar in the same sentence. (Lowth, op. cit., p. xi).
by the Monthly Review writer to be the best recent exponent of universal grammar; however, there were several other people who claimed to treat of universal grammar or who have some claim to be compared with Ward in the investigation of abstract principles. As early as 1695 A. Lane had attempted to deal with "such precepts as are common to all languages"¹ in his Rational and Speedy Method of Attaining to the Latin Tongue. Lane's grammar is chiefly interesting because it is an early attempt to apply the Varronic classification of the parts of speech to the English language;² although Lane's attempt at formulating universal principles was muddled and indirect,³ his conception of their existence was unambiguous; he speaks of "the unalterable rules of right reason, which are the same in all languages how different soever they be."⁴ In 1726 J. T. Philipps prefixed a universal grammar to an edition of James Shirley's Latin Grammar, and called the whole book a Universal and Rational Grammar: together with Rules for Learning Latin, in English

1. A. Lane, A Rational and Speedy Method of Attaining to the Latin Tongue, 1690, title page.

2. Varro had maintained that there were four, not eight, parts of speech. Cf. Para. 1.2.1.


4. Lane, op. cit.
Verse; however, this, in common with several other attempts at investigating general principles was indistinguishable from a basic grammar. The most interesting universal grammar to appear before Hermes was Benjamin Martin's essay which formed a preface to his dictionary. The dictionary was known as the Institutes of Language: containing a Physical-Grammatical Essay on the Propriety and Rational of the English Tongue; Michael describes it as "the most thoughtfull consideration of Universal grammar since Wilkins, though on quite different lines and poorly organized." It was an investigation of linguistic change rather than a logical analysis of language. James Harris' Hermes was the first extended treatment of universal grammar or general principles of language in English; as has already been mentioned, it is a far more readable work than Ward's. Ward's Essay is not able to match the breadth of learning that Harris' work possesses; the Essay is interesting and a valuable record of eighteenth century linguistics because it extended the field of analysis of general principles or universal grammar beyond the area treated by Harris;


2. Ibid., p. 187. Wilkins and other creators of universal languages have not been considered here because they were not strictly writing grammars and they were far removed in time from Ward's Essay.
Ward was concerned with the deep structure of language as well as the surface categories that Harris treats. Ward's interest in levels of language below the surface parallels the continental interest in these areas, but little of it was borrowed from the French grammarians. It was Ward's interest in Locke's philosophy that had enabled him to extend his analysis in new ways and propose an altogether new basis for the parts of speech.

After 1751 there are numerous works which deal with the theory of language, and which tend to supersede the interest in universal grammar, as this is generally understood. Most of them have a scope of investigation beyond the narrowly grammatical, and pertain to the philosophy of language rather than the study of linguistics; three works in the latter half of the century should be mentioned: these are Joseph Priestley's lectures On the Theory of Language or Universal Grammar, delivered and published at Warrington in 1762, James Beattie's Theory of Language (1783), and Charles Coote's Elements of the Grammar of the English Language (1788). Priestley's lectures are of interest because they deal with the parts
of speech in psychological terms.\(^1\) Ivan Poldauf\(^2\) suggests that Priestley's theory is influenced by Hartley's psychology, and that his grammatical categories are founded on Locke's distinction between names and particles. It appears that although Priestley was using the same sources as Ward, his theory and his conclusions are very different. There is no evidence to suggest that Ward was aware of Priestley's lectures.

James Beattie's *Theory of Language* discusses in its first part "the origin and general nature of speech," and in the second, universal grammar, which is defined

1. He says that their aim is:

   . . . to point out the several powers and modes of expression that sounds and characters are capable of, to trace their connexion with, or relation to the ideas they represent; and to show the actual variety of the external expressions of the same mental conceptions which different languages exhibit. (Joseph Priestley, *On the Theory of Language* or *Universal Grammar*, Warrington, 1762, p. 7).

2. Ivan Poldauf and Ian Michael are the sources of information of all comments on Priestley; it was hoped that he could have been considered in much greater detail; however, it was not possible to locate a copy of the Lectures. Poldauf says of Priestley:

   In his general attitude towards language, Priestley follows the lines of his materialist philosophy and David Hartley's psychology of associations. His chief concern is the origin and development of language in their relation to the social and cultural atmosphere of the single stages of the growth of language, which itself is determined so that it is useless to try to change it by supposed authority. (Poldauf, op. cit., p. 138).
as "those things, that all languages have in common."

Beattie's treatment of universal grammar is like that of most of his predecessors: it is a grammar of English with reference to Latin, Greek, and Hebrew. His book is interesting, but not from the point of view of general principles.

Charles Coote quotes Locke to support his opinion that knowledge of universal grammar is important for investigating the philosophy of the human mind; his treatment of universal grammar, however, is but the introduction to his grammar of English; it follows Harris' schema of the parts of speech, while showing the same interest as Ward in speech as a process of communication.

This short survey suggests that although in some sense Ward's Essay is a natural development from the English grammatical tradition, it was undoubtedly unique in the eighteenth century in the scope of its investigation of general principles.

8.2. Ward and the Twentieth Century

In the course of the preceding chapters reference

1. Cf. Para. 2.5.6.
has been made on several occasions to present-day views on language and linguistics that have parallels in Ward's Essay. These parallels are interesting because they suggest a continuing effort to come to terms with certain problems and serve as a reminder that much of the work of present-day linguistic science consists in the reformulation of linguistic facts in contemporary terms rather than in their actual discovery. Examples of this include the notion of extraposition, the psychological relation of substantive and adjective,¹ and the equation of adjective and verb in the deep structure.²

It was suggested in the Introduction that Ward's theory of grammar has much in common with modern theories which see the base component of language structure as semantically differentiated units.³ The most common present-day view of grammatical theory is still that of Chomsky in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), which sees the set of phrase structure rules as the starting point in sentence generation; they produce a syntactic

1. An adjective becomes a substantive through the process of focussing. Cf. Para. 6.2.3. where Ward's analysis is compared to Jespersen's.

2. This was not part of Ward's final theory, but was part of his initial suppositions, and was recognized in Buffier's grammar, from which he borrowed a good deal.

3. Especially those of George Lakoff, John Ross, and Emmon Bach.
string which is then paired with a semantic interpretation, as illustrated below.

Even from a superficial point of view such a model seems undesirable because the role of semantics appears marginal rather than central.\textsuperscript{1} It is intuitively obvious that semantics should have a central role in sentence generation. James McCawley shows that the syntactic selection rules, part of the phrase structure rules, are completely unnecessary and argues that semantic selection restriction must operate in the base component in order to produce a deep structure which is adequate for the functioning of the transformational rules.\textsuperscript{2}

1. This is perhaps the result of the development of Chomsky's theory from a series of structural theories of language, which were not intended to deal with meaning.

Such a view is held by Ward who declares that the starting point of linguistic theory is not grammatical categories (e.g. nouns and verbs), but ideas or conceptions (i.e. bundles of semantic features) which become grammatically differentiated for the purpose of entering into syntactic construction. Such a view makes semantics a central part of the theory of language in a way that it can never be in Chomsky's theory (cf. diagram above). Ward goes further than McCawley, however, and sees semantics as relevant not only to the very first stage of sentence generation, in terms of rules, but as functioning before the semantic features are attached to specific grammatical categories.

This can be compared to Emmon Bach's proposal that nouns, verbs, and adjectives are variations of one more general category. Bach's view is suggested by a

1. Cf. Chapter VI.
3. "If this third hypothesis [that the actual rules of the base are the same for every language] is correct, then it cannot be the case that Nootka, Japanese, and English, for example, differ in having one, two, and three major lexical categories, respectively. George Lakoff and Paul Postal have argued that the classes of adjectives and verbs in English are in actuality merely two sub-classes of one lexical category, thus making English look more like Japanese. Traditional
comparison of Nootka and English and is supported by
the facts that 1) in general, transformational rules
work on the element NP rather than on the category Noun,
2) Chomsky's claim that the difference between nouns on
the one hand and verbs and adjectives is reflected in
their behaviour with respect to selection rules is false,
3) phonological rules of English require the identifica-
tion of a class consisting precisely of nouns, adjectives,
and verbs, and 4) active and stative are categories of
the noun as well as of verbs and adjectives (cf. "Don't
be a fool" and "Don't be a mammal")\(^1\) Bach's proposal is
part of his argument that individual verbs, nouns, and
adjectives are all derived from relative clauses; it
has not been justified in detail, or even demonstrated
in detail, but offers extremely interesting areas of in-
estigation. The categories of the base component include
'term' (which Bach says is more or less an NP and 'con-
tentive.'\(^2\) The contentives consist of grammatically

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2. Ibid., p. 91.
undifferentiated bundles of semantic features which are attached to the terms or indices in a relative clause matrix. Rules of ordering and transformation determine the surface categories of noun, verb and adjective.

Bach's conclusions, although tentative, are based on the facts of English and Nootka. If his position turns out to be tenable, it will have far-reaching implications; Bach suggests that these will include the realization that "the actual rules of the base are the same for every language," which will constitute "a direct denial of the Humboldt-Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in its strongest form." The implications for the history of linguistics are even greater: the apparently fundamental categories of linguistic description from the beginnings of the Western grammatical tradition until later than 1965 have in fact only been surface categories, suggested by the forms of Greek and other Indo-European tongues. Although this has in part been recognized by the identification in some cases of substantives and adjectives, and in others of adjectives and verbs, the aspects common to all three categories has completely escaped the notice of all grammarians except William Ward, who proclaimed

that all three categories are more alike than different.¹

The history of linguistics, then, is almost totally
the history of a science which has been unable to see
beyond certain supposedly fundamental units, because these
units had been reified and hallowed by the tradition.
William Ward's recognition of underlying unities in the
first book of his Essay is a significant breakthrough in
the traditional thinking about language. The idea or
conception is the source of unity of the three categories
at a specific stage of the communicative act of speech;²
however, when substantives, adjectives and verbs are

1. Aristotle, though hardly a grammarian, had noted that
the only difference between onoma and rhema was that the
latter had time reference as well (see Para. 1.1.3.).
George Dalgarne, in his Ars Signorum (1661) had recognized
only one part of speech: "Ego vero . . . unicum tamen
Orationis partem, Primarium, et proprie sic dictam agnos-
c(o; Nomen scil. Caeteras vero vulgo sic habitas esse
inter Flexiones, et Casus hujus numerandas." (p. 63).
The verb was considered to be a name, just as the noun.
Apart from the impracticability of such a scheme, it is
not the same kind of proposal as Ward's and Bach's.
Thomas Gunter Browne in Hermes Unmasked; or the art of
Speech Founded on the Association of Words and Ideas
(1793) attempted "to shew that there is in reality but
one sort of word, and that there is no distinction ori-
ginally between the noun and verb." (p. 3). This seems
a more interesting proposal, particularly as Michael sug-
gests that "his argument is derived from an incomplete
However, it has not been possible to consult Browne's
work at first hand. It is not likely that his proposal
is as carefully worked out as is Ward's.
Ward says, at the beginning of his discussion of
grammar: "I shall therefore proceed to give a general
view of both of these parts of speech together, in order
to account for some general properties in which the verb
appears to agree with the noun." (p. 11).

2. Represented by level 3 in the diagram in Para. 7.1.1.
differentiated by the focussing process of the mind,¹ their distinguishing features and the priority given to the substantive suggest comparisons with other proposals concerning the parts of speech.²

8.2.1. Categorial Grammars

Ward's grammar emphasizes the fundamental importance of the noun substantive as a sentence constituent on which all others depend. Categorial grammars have a similar view of the noun. These grammars, largely developed by logicians,³ have two fundamental categories: 'sentence' and 'noun'; all other categories are derived from these, and their notation indicates their combinatorial possibilities with other elements. Thus the sentence "John runs" is denoted by 'n. S'. The meaning of 'S' is that when this is combined with a noun (hence the 'n' in the denominator position) they will together form a

1. Expressed in rules 1 and 2 in Para. 6.3.


3. Kasinierz Ajukiewicz, a Polish logician produced a seminal article on the subject of categorial grammars in 1935: "Die Syntaktische Konnexität," Studia Philosophica (Warszawa), Vol. I (1935), 1-28. J. Lambek, Y. Bar-Hillel, and J. Lyons have also pursued the subject. The notation used in this discussion is that of Lyons, but there is little difference between this and others.
sentence (indicated by the 'S' in the numerator position). The sentence could be expanded with an adjective and adverb:

$$\frac{\text{Poor John ran away}}{n \cdot n \cdot s \cdot s \cdot n \cdot n \cdot n \cdot n \cdot n \cdot n \cdot n} = S$$

By cancellation these elements can ultimately be reduced to the single S. However, the order of cancellation must be restricted in order to complete the process without residue. The correct order of cancellation will reflect the order of dependency of the elements. The proposed advantages of the categorial analysis of sentence types rather than the rewrite rule analysis is that the categorial analysis has to make clear the dependency of one category on another. The significance of the comparison of Ward's system to categorial grammars is that the notion of dependency is inherent in Ward's system: all other words or categories are ultimately dependent on the noun substantive in the later stages of his grammar, although he had earlier asserted the essential similarity of substantives, adjectives, and verbs.

John Lyons draws attention to a supposed inadequacy of categorial grammars: "A categorial grammar will identify
'adjectives' and 'intransitive verbs' as members of the same major category (e.g. beautiful and dances in such sentences as 'Mary is beautiful' and 'Mary dances'), but will fail to relate 'transitive verbs' and 'intransitive verbs.' Thus dances and is beautiful may be signified by 'S', while a verb such as kick will have the representation 'S'. Ward's analysis circumvents this difficulty because he sees the presence of a transitive verb as a signal of two distinct sentences. Thus "John kicks the ball" is composed of "John kicks" and "The ball is kicked." The representation given to "John walks" would be exactly the same. Categorial analysis fits Ward's scheme suitably because it formalizes his views of dependency and adequately reflects his view of the relation between transitive and intransitive sentences.

Let us consider an analysis in Ward's terms of the sentence "Poor John, who is holding James, kicked the horse." A categorial analysis of "who is holding James"


2. This sentence, although not Ward's has been chosen because it exhibits those features which have had a central part in the discussion of Ward's syntax.
gives in the first place two simple sentences: "who holds"
and "James is held"; however, after the sentence has
been uttered, the relative pronoun, according to Ward,
gives notice that no independently existing conception
is denoted by it, that it expresses an object only through
its link with its antecedent, and that the clause attached
to the pronoun is not a sentence but a modification of
the capatal object. When this notice is given the status
of the relative changes from that of an 'n' to a unit which
combines with a substantive to indicate the conception
of that substantive, that is n. The verb holds joins
with this relative to form a modification of it, and so
will be denoted by n. "Poor John who holds" becomes:

There does not, however, seem any reason

for demoting the second part of the relative clause from
its sentence status, because this is, in fact, a sentence,

1. "Not . . . expressing complete truth or falsehood . . .
but as an expression of the same object which the relative
represents." (Ward, p. 134).
completely independent of the relative pronoun: "James is held." Kicked, the definitive verb, combines with the conception denoted by John to form a sentence, and is given the notation $S$. Finally, there is a third independent sentence: "The horse is kicked." The analysis of the three sentences is as follows:

Poor John who is holding -- kicked.  
James is held.  

The horse was kicked.  

After the first series of cancellations, these become:

then:
The analysis links every element of the sentence directly to the constituent noun or substantive, and ensures that the final cancellation is between the noun substantive, or the phrase representing it, and the verb definitive. It gives a classification to verbs in subordinate clauses which is distinct from that of those in the principal clause, but this is because they are different: the relative pronoun has given notice of this fact.

The disputable part of Ward's analysis still remains, that it makes of the original sentence three distinct sentences. This has no equivalent in modern theory; it was suggested to Ward by the fact that there are three distinct ideas in the mind; the idea of John, the idea of James, and the idea of the horse. However, the strange-ness of this analysis may be more apparent than real: there is little difference between the statement that there are two terms in the mind related to a verb by distinct case relations and the statement that there are two nouns which each have separate but identical verb forms attached to them.
Much of the unreality of Ward's theory for the modern reader comes from the fact that he was forever reifying his categories whereas modern grammarians have a highly abstract interpretation of the units of linguistics: units in the deep structure obviously exist in some sense, but the problem of how they exist has not been the subject of discussion. It was stated above that the difference between Ward's unusual approach to the transitive sentence type and contemporary approaches may be more apparent than real. This implies that the categorial analysis of his grammatical theory is of some importance: it suggests that the selection of the main categories of a categorial grammar is a direct reflection of the notional importance attached to the categories of the theorists. This importance is made clear by Ward, but does not seem to be noticed by some proponents of the theory. Bar-Hillel claims that the notation represents only a way of presenting an analysis already made; however, it would appear that a choice of major categories must be linked with certain theoretical presuppositions. Ward's Essay makes clear the implications of the choice of these categories, as does to a certain extent, John Lyons' discussion "Towards a 'notional' definition of the parts of speech." The work on categorial grammars 1. Bar-Hillel, op. cit., p. 47.
2. See Note 31.
is not sufficiently developed to have produced much discussion on the implications of the choice of the noun as the major category, but several linguists feel that this may be a universal category of language. Ward's arrival at this same conclusion by means of a consideration of Locke's philosophy indicates that the findings of linguists working from different philosophical standpoints will not necessarily be different, but only that the mode of explanation will be different.

8.3. Conclusion: Ward and Locke

Ward's central achievement can be considered to be his adaptation of Locke's theory of ideas to a grammatical theory of language. Ward was not a professional philosopher, and there is no evidence in the *Essay on Grammar* of any critical evaluation of Locke's ideas, and few specific references to the work; Hartley's dilution of Locke's philosophy was obviously acceptable to Ward, and Ward himself had no qualms about diluting the theory further for his own purposes. However, in spite of the dilution and disregard for the philosophical issues raised in the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Ward's reading of Locke had two consequences of fundamental importance. The first and greatest was undoubtedly that he was to seek for explanations of the surface structure of language
at a distinct and deeper level; the second was that the nature of this level was predetermined by the philosophical system that he was using. The first consequence gives Ward's Essay a claim to originality in the English grammatical tradition: he was proposing underlying sentences which existed in the mind, and which were signalled by the surface structure. The real sentences were those that existed in the mind. Thus the language of thought was not just a mirror of the real language in Ward's terms, but was distinct in several ways: there were two sentences in the mind for every transitive sentence in the surface structure; imperatives, and interrogatives were signals of two sentences in the mind; prepositions were signals of underlying sentences. No such complexities had been envisaged by Locke, but they arose from Ward's attempt to adapt Locke's account of ideas to units of language at the sentence level, rather than just at the word level. The Port Royal grammar had proposed underlying sentences for adjective-substantive structures, but had not generally dealt with the problems of any construction other than the Substantive + Be + \{Adjective construction; Participle

thus Locke's schema of underlying levels was much more complex than that envisaged by Arnauld. In English linguistics the relations between language and thought had been discussed to some extent, and the realization
that language and thought did not correspond perfectly had been the impetus for speculation on universal language. The lack of correspondence, however, had never motivated anyone to attempt to state the rules that link the level of thought to a natural language.

Ward was the first to see the function of grammar as that of accounting for the link between the process of thinking and the surface phonological form of language. That he attempted to describe this link may be largely explained by the fact that Locke had provided him with an analysis of the thought process, or the formation of ideas, which he could use as the starting point of his analysis.

This leads us to the second point about Ward's grammar, and that is that the nature of his notions of the deep level was predetermined by the philosophical system he was using. Ward set out to explain the relation of language to thought, to explain the general principles on which language was constructed so that there would be reasoned foundation to grammar. His model of the thought processes was essentially that of Locke; he had the

English language, and Locke's account of the mind; his task was to account for one in terms of the other. He was restricted by his decision to keep the traditional terms of grammar, but his greatest restriction lay in adopting Locke's scheme as his starting point. However sure Locke and Ward may have been that Locke's system was a correct account of reality, we can see (admittedly with hindsight), that there are good reasons for rejecting Locke's account. We are also aware that any present-day theory of the mind that we are familiar with, and find attractive, as Ward did Locke's, is only a theory, and cannot be taken as a starting point to develop a system of grammatical rules. We therefore start with the data of language, and seek to find rules that will relate apparently diverse data; the more general a rule is, the more likely that it is a genuine insight into the workings of language. Rules today are said to require 'empirical validity'; this is a way of saying that their justification must stem from the fact that they account for diverse forms in language. When we have formulated such a rule, it is often the case that we have done so by positing a deeper level of language from which the surface level is derived. The deeper level is an abstraction which is tentatively accepted because it accounts for language data. But Ward did not work from
the data of language to formulate abstract deep levels. His deep level was already in existence, provided by Locke, and he only had to produce rules which would link particular surface forms to the deep level. Hence he was able to posit many arbitrary solutions to problems by saying that there would have to be rules which connect a certain base form to a certain surface form. He did not have to formulate the rules in every case because his knowledge of the base form was not derived from the surface form, nor contingent on a knowledge of the rules relating the two levels. Thus Ward's deep structure differs from current models of deep structure in that it is one of pre-existing axioms of the theory rather than a construct of the theory. It also differs in that in current theory all levels of language are abstract levels. Ward made his deep level a level really existing in the mind of the speaker. Locke's ideas were very real things, and Hartley's theory of association made it possible to relate them to the linguistic forms. Ward was proposing not only grammatical rules but an incompletely formulated but nevertheless real neurological model of speech.

Modern theorists seek to explain language, or give an account which satisfies the particular enquiries of twentieth century man. They are conscious of the limitations of their theories—or should be—and realize
that proposals are tentative and likely to be superseded by more adequate models. No such doubts entered Ward's mind. He was confident of the validity and reality of his units. In his certainty and in his concretization of what we see as abstractions, he was no different from his contemporaries: although the categories of grammar were under constant examination and reappraisal in the eighteenth century,¹ the category names remained as evidence of some supposedly real entities: the parts of speech. They were seen as existing independently of language, hence the ready transfer of them from one language to another; case and tense distinctions were equally reified. Ward is as guilty of the reification of categories as any other grammarian, and extends it to levels other than the surface level.

It is Ward's extension of the area of language study, and hence also of reification, that makes him such an important figure in the eighteenth century; it is the reification itself of the deep structure which makes his analysis so unacceptable to modern linguists. His Essay serves as a warning to modern linguists of the dangers of concentrating on rules which connect a pre-established

¹. Michael's dissertation attempts to show the amount of reappraisal and examination beneath the apparent uniformity of the English tradition.
base component with the surface structure, rather than recognizing that ultimately the only acceptable input for the generation of rules is the language itself. When rules are derived which account for language data and fit the constructs produced by other similarly formed rules, then progress is being made towards producing a general theory. Once the underlying abstractions (or real entities in Ward's case) have become axiomatic, linguistics ceases to be a scientific investigation of language, and becomes, as it has in the Essay on Grammar a sophisticated but unproductive form of game playing.

Ward stands near the close of the Priscian tradition in grammar (no new theories of grammar in the tradition were to emerge in the following years, although countless compilations were published), and almost on the threshold of modern linguistics (he was writing just twenty years before Sir William Jones was to give his lecture on Sanskrit). He is significant in terms of the older tradition in that he considerably enlarges the area of interest: the relation of language and thought was not one to one, and he indicated that it was the grammarians' task to state the nature of the relationship between the two levels. He is mainly significant for modern theoreticians in that he draws attention to the dangers of
reifying hypotheses, treating them as axiomatic, and consequently limiting the scope of investigation. His use of Locke was undoubtedly tremendously productive in terms of the contemporary approaches to grammar, but it again serves as a warning that although modern philosophical insights can have a liberating influence on linguistics, they serve as no panacea and inevitably turn out to have severe limitations of their own insofar as the development of linguistic science is concerned.
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296

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